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What is the purpose of including the statement "All trademarks are property of their respective owners"? I see this phrase everywhere. Isn't it a pointless statement? Is it not equivalent to "Trademarks are owned by their owners"?
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The purpose of such a statement is to disavow the reading of any impression that the person making the statement is affiliated with the trademark owner, because the gravamen of a trademark infringement suit is that the person using the trademark mislead a consumer into thinking that the person using the trademark was endorsed by or affiliated with the trademark owner.
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Trademark symbols Such symbols and notices were never required. Many company lawyers thought that they helped make a stronger case for infringement actions if someone did infringe. And perhaps also that they would deter people from using the trademarks without approval, perhaps even in ways that were legal but that the company did not like. (Companies routinely claim more trademark protection than the law allows.) Added, legal and source citations [15 U.S. Code § 1111] provides](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/1111): Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1072 of this title, a registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, may give notice that his mark is registered by displaying with the mark the words “Registered in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office” or “Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off.” or the letter R enclosed within a circle, thus ®; and in any suit for infringement under this chapter by such a registrant failing to give such notice of registration, no profits and no damages shall be recovered under the provisions of this chapter unless the defendant had actual notice of the registration. emphasis added This section was last revised in 1988, and dates originally from 1946 The US patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) publication Basic Facts About Trademarks (PDF) says (on page 9): Each time you use your mark, it is best to use a designation with it. If registered, use an ® after the mark. If not yet registered, use TM for goods or SM for services, to indicate that you have adopted this as a trademark or service mark, respectively, regardless of whether you have filed an application with the USPTO. You may only use the registration symbol with the mark on or in connection with the goods/services listed in the federal trademark registration. However, no specific requirements exist as to the precise use of the “®” symbol as to placement, e.g., whether used in a subscript or superscript manner. emphasis added Added Analysis I cannot find any provision of US law requiring use of the ® symbol or any of its equivalents. However failure to use it may reduce the damages available in the case of infringement. I cannot find any provision of US law authorizing or requiring the use of the tm symbol. It appears to be a matter of common law, that is judge-made law, and a reference to court cases would be needed. There have been significant developments in US trademark law in recent years, but mostly in the degree to which First Amendment concerns are being held to limit tr4ademark protections. I found no change in regard to the symbols, their use, meaning or effect. Many countries, unlike the US, do not grant protection to trademarks unless they are registered, so the tm symbol is largely a US usage. What Changed? To the best of my knowledge, there has been no change in US law on this issue in recent years. I see lots of tm and ® symbols on everyday products. I just looked at the power supply for my laptop and it has a tm after the maker's name. I just looked at a candy bar wrapper and it carries an ®. If there WAS a recent court case that changed the practice or influenced a change I haven't heard of it, and I've done some reading in recent major trademark cases. But I am not a lawyer, much less an IP lawyer, so I can't be sure. Another possibility is that the comparatively large symbol adjacent to the large logo on the front of the package was removed, and a smaller logo, with symbol, was placed on the back of the package. That would probably give legal notice to any would-be infringer.
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It may be useful to draw a distinction between the NFT and the Art referenced by this NFT. There is no intellectual property in an NFT itself because an NFT is not a creative work, invention, or trade secret. Ownership of the NFT. As far as I'm aware, no laws recognize the Ethereum blockchain as an arbiter of ownership. However, NFTs and other “crypto” assets seem to be recognized as property. Thus, it can be the case that lawful ownership diverges from the ownership records on the blockchain. In the referenced scenario, someone gained control over an NFT but likely did not receive the property rights in that NFT (i.e. stole it). License to use the Art. The “Bored Ape Yacht Club” terms define ownership of the NFT purely in terms of the Ethereum blockchain, and ignore legal ownership: Ownership of the NFT is mediated entirely by the Smart Contract and the Ethereum Network The blockchain-owner of the NFT is then granted a license to use the Art via these terms. This leads to the following conclusions: There are no intellectual property rights in the NFT. Any intellectual property rights in the Art are held by Yuga Labs LLC, the company behind the “Bored Ape Yacht Club”. Nothing in the terms transfers ownership in the Art. Yuga Labs LLC grants the blockchain-owner of the NFT a license to use the Art. Here, this means that the thief held the license, then after the sale the subsequent buyer. Yuga Labs LLC does not grant the legal owner of the NFT any rights, in case the legal owner and the blockchain-owner are distinct. Of course, nothing would prevent Yuga Labs LLC from also granting a license to the legal owner of the LLC. They can still do so retroactively, as their license grant to the blockchain-owner is probably not exclusive. But I would be surprised if they would do so, since it would shatter the “NFT = Art” and “Blockchain = Ownership” illusion that their business model relies on.
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This sounds like legal nominative use to me. The issue is trademark. Trademark law isn't a monopoly on using the trademark, it is a prohibition on using the trademark in a way that misleads a customer about who is selling something or what is being sold. You cannot sell goods in a manner that implies inaccurately an affiliation or endorsement of a trademark owner, causing confusion in the mind of a reasonable consumer. But, it sounds like your disclosure makes a factually accurate statement without implying or stating that the goods are sold with the affiliation or endorsement of Kodak, only that you used their goods as parts in your product. To be safe, in order to be completely clear and avoid all doubt, you might want to say, in addition, "This produce is not licensed or authorized by Kodak." The First Sale rule expressly protects your right to resell physical good protected by trademark or copyright to someone else, so the sale itself is not illegal, it is just a question of whether you have abridged its trademark. Conceptually, what you are doing isn't that different from stating that the used car you are selling had all replacement parts obtained to maintain and repair it done with dealer approved parts, rather than third-party knock offs, which would likewise be legal. Similarly, you could sell a house with a listing that identifies the brand of every building material used. For example, "this house was constructed using Pella Windows."
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Assuming Chegg own the copyright, then they can restrict the activities that copyright protects The statement you quote is no more or less than the rights granted to them by copyright law. Basically, it's their stuff, they get to decide how you can use it. However, that does not necessarily mean that the uses that you have nominated are prohibited. For that, we would have to look at the specific fair use or fair dealing exemptions to copyright protection where you are. It's likely that both of your usage scenarios would meet fair use and probably fair dealing (which is harder to meet). You may also find that, buried somewhere in those massive terms of use, is something that deals with this directly.
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Yes, they are. A business can decide not to do business with someone for pretty much any reason. The obvious prohibited reason is due to your race. But I don't see how eBay would even know your race. Some State laws might protect you, but I don't think there's any that applies in this case. For example, California might give you a means of appeal if someone stole your identity and they performed those transactions, not you. But I don't know of any Federal or State law that would change the very, very basic principle of law that a property owner gets to decide who can and cannot access their property. eBay owns eBay. One key benefit of ownership is precisely that you can make decisions that other people consider to be unfair, discriminatory (other than the specifically prohibited categories) and draconian. Other people don't have to agree with your decisions for them to be lawful.
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The entire purpose of the Entire Agreement clause is to say that this contract is the agreement, and anything previously negotiated is not part of the agreement. I don't know why they would fail to include that in the contract.
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In your example is the spare part the subject of a design patent? I assume it is not. When you combine the spare part to create a “different product” does the finished product resemble the drawings in the design patent? If, in its intended use, the final thing is close enough to the design patent to fall within its scope then you might by indirectly infringing by inducing people to infringe. The scope of a design patent is very difficult to determine reliably. This has nothing to do with how you got the components of your product, just how the completed thing looks. Copyright does not cover products (unless it is a model of a building or a statue or mold for a statue).
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What are the copyright terms on patents? Are patents (and the attached text, diagrams, images etc) covered by copyright? Or are they, by virtue of being published patents, in the public domain?
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In the U.S. the text and drawings of a patent application/patent may be copyrighted by the author. If such protections are being claimed, the patent application must contain this authorization from 37 CFR 1.71 (d) and (e)- e) The authorization shall read as follows: A portion of the disclosure of this patent document contains material which is subject to (copyright or mask work) protection. The (copyright or mask work) owner has no objection to the facsimile reproduction by anyone of the patent document or the patent disclosure, as it appears in the Patent and Trademark Office patent file or records, but otherwise reserves all (copyright or mask work) rights whatsoever.
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Words cannot be copyrighted. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, or short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive or lends itself to a play on words, it cannot be protected by copyright. The only intellectual property protection that might be afforded to such things is trademark.
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Court filings are, in general, matters of public record. This does not automatically put them into the public domain. This will mean that, absent a special order of the court, anyone will be able to read this filing as pert of the court records. Many courts now make all or parts of their records available on the web. But the copyright holders will possibly retain their rights to authorize the making of further copies, and surely retain the right to authorize the making of derivative works, and their other rights that are part of the copyright bundle, such as the rights of public performance. These rights would not be retained if the work had been placed in the public domain.
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The whole purpose of a patent is that the contents of the patent becomes public knowledge, in exchange for a time limited monopoly. Therefore you are allowed to do anything, since you are not just allowed but expected to examine the patent in order to improve on it, except that you need a license to sell or give away products implementing the patent as long as it is valid. The only thing to be careful about is that by publishing source code, you might be enticing others to infringe on the patent, so I'd recommend not to do that without advice of a lawyer. PS. With software, the interpretation of "making" software in patent law may be a bit surprising. There was a major case between Microsoft and AT&T about that. The software developer isn't "making" the software. The build engineer putting everything together isn't "making" the software. The CD manufacturer making a million copies isn't "making" the software. The person installing it on their computer is the one who makes it.
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No, it means you can't copy it. By default, the copyright to a work is owned by its creator, and nobody else is allowed to copy it, or create derived works, without their permission. That permission can be granted by a license. "License unknown" doesn't really tell us anything, but it certainly isn't clearly granting you permission. So you don't have permission to copy, and thus you cannot. You would have to seek permission from the copyright holder. See also If no licence is distributed with an application/source code, what license applies by default if any? (Some jurisdictions do allow for "fair use" exceptions, which allow you to copy a work without permission. You haven't said what jurisdiction you are in.)
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Patents protect inventions, Copyright protects artistic or literary creation Software does not qualify for patents. In some jurisdictions but by no means most, algorithms and business processes can be patented. Software, both the literary (code) and artistic (UIJ) work, is protected by copyright which prevents copying the expression but not the idea. So software writers can take inspiration from other software but can’t copy it. So, things that look like copyright infringement often aren’t but things that look like patent infringement often are. Patents last for a short time (10-20 years) and take a lot of investment of time and money so their owners are incentivised to commercialise them quickly and on a large scale. Copyright lasts for a long time (life of the creator(s) + 50 years minimum depending on jurisdiction) and come into existence automatically. In general, it is easier to create a literary or artistic work than a novel invention. So, patent owners are more incentivised to protect their IP than copyright owners.
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A book (or any other creative work) published in the 1800s is now in the public domain everywhere in the world (excepting odd cases like Peter Pan where a special rule applies in some jurisdictions.) Anyone may legally quote from such a work at any length with no legal requirement for permission. In fact there is no legal requirement to attribute the quote to the author (although there is an ethical requirement). In fact one may publish a new edition of such a work, unchanged or modified in any way one chooses, with no legal need to obtain permission from anyone or to pay any royalties or fees. If the work were recent enough to still be protected by copyright, a limited quote could be used under fair use, fair dealing or another exception to copyright under the laws of most countries. The exact rules vary by country, and are often highly fact-dependent, so the exact details will matter. If one wanted to quote enough from a recent work that permission is required, the copyright holder, who is often not the publisher, would need to grant permission. That is often the author or the author's heir, but it can be a person or firm to which the author transferred the rights. Sometimes the rights-holder can be hard to identify. Update: it would be possible for a work published in, say, 1890 by an author then young who lived to a fairly old age, dying in, say 1960, to still be protected in some countries, although not in the US. (Anything published before 1925 is now PD in the US.) But Charlotte Bronte died in 1855, and all of her work has long been in the public domain
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You would first have to find out if publishing a book was "for commercial purposes". I can write a book and publish it as a hobby. Next you check if there is any copyright infringement. It doesn't sound like there is. Using your website as a tool to create these diagrams doesn't give you copyright unless the result contains your own copyrighted work. So at best there is a violation of your terms and conditions for your website. You can sue about that, but might have to specify damages. If you allow commercial use say for a fee of $1,000, that would give you grounds to claim damages. Or if someone used your website so excessively that it costs you money, that would be damages.
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HOA By-Laws: Conflict between amending process and an amendment's change process? My question is: if the original by-law amendment process (Article XIII as a point of reference) states that a simple majority of ALL members is required for changes, and that provision has not been amended, then is it legitimate for an amendment (amended Article VII) to prescribe a less-restrictive change process if the change is isolated to the specifics of the amendment itself? To give a little context: my HOA recently voted on highly-contested proposal for a dues increase (~60% increase). The proposal was recently announced as having passed with majority: 65 votes of 129 "homeowners in good standing" The by-laws of our association mention the amendment process (Article XIII) with the following wording: "These By-laws may be amended, at a regular or special meeting of the members, by a vote of a majority of the members. Such votes of the members of the Association shall require the designated affirmative vote of all the members, not just the designated affirmative of a quorum of the membership" Originally, from what I can tell, the By-laws did not include explicit dues rates, so amendments were passed in 1985, 1988, 1991, and 1997 to update that. In 1985, the first dues introduced (added to Article VII) with a provision that "Any increase in this amount must be approved by a majority vote of the Members of the Association." In 1988, however, that provision was changed to include the following wording(emphasis mine): "Any increase in this amount must be approved by a majority vote of the members in good standing of the Association." The amendment in 1991 removed the "in good standing" requirement, but then the amendment in 1997 added it back in. (Our HOA is nothing if not inconsistent) In this specific case, having at least one member who's not in good standing reverses the outcome of the vote (65 affirmative votes is majority of 129 members in good standing; but it's not the majority of 130+ total members).
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Since you did not provide the full text of your bylaws I will proceed by how I would imagine the language was written. I will give an alternative at the end of the answer. Your organization (HOA) created a set of bylaws. The bylaws indicated the method by which they can be amended. Later on the HOA added an amendment to these bylaws authorizing dues and instituting a specific procedure by which the dues could be increased. Now assuming this amendment was properly adopted (i.e. the original requirement was followed to amend the bylaws) it is now on equal footing to any other part of the bylaws. What this means is you now there is a process which can voluntarily be followed for increasing dues. You can either continue using the old process to amend bylaws and increase the dues that way or you can use this new process to increase dues through a majority vote of the members in good standing. Either way is valid to increase the dues. Thus the procedure as you described is a valid way to increase dues. However, if the language in your bylaws was poorly worded I might come to the opposite conclusion, which is possible. Suppose the amendment to the bylaws, which originally created dues, specified the dues as part of the bylaws (like exact dollar amount). Suppose that the language about increasing dues was poorly written and said exactly what you quoted: “Any increase in this amount must be approved by a majority vote of the Members in good standing of the Association”. Then there really needs to be an analysis of what procedure was indeed meant by the original adopters of the language or relevant case law in your state. It is unlikely, but possible, that this language could be interpreted to put another, separate, requirement on amendments to the bylaws that specifically increase the dues. I.e. dues increasing amendments must be both approved by the majority of the members and majority of the members in good standing. However, if at all competently written the bylaws should not require this method of approval unless it was intended to require this method.
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In my experience, varying jurisdictions can and do differ as to the myriad ways these disputes are resolved. Contract law is one area where the judge has a lot of discretion. This is definitely true in state courts, even from judge to judge, and can even be true in the federal level-The 9th Circuit has some wildly different appellate decisions when compared to the 1st Circuit, and so on. I say this not to be argumentative, but to highlight the importance of careful and concise drafting that fully explicates the bargained for exchange, as there can be a vast amount of judicial subjectivity that goes into determining which rules pertain to certain situations. "Conflicting or competing clause" cases are now some of the most commonly litigated contract disputes. This is largely because the last 20 years has seen a huge influx of people "drafting" (more like piecing together) contracts without benefit of qualified counsel. This is particularly true because lay people do not generally create a specific insturment like an attorney would - from scratch, with definitions and terms specific to the transaction. Rather, they go online and find "form" or model contracts that they feel are close enough (which are almost always missing key components), and then they type in their own terms, or even write them in. Because this is so common, most jurisdictions follow the rule that hand written terms supersede pre-printed terms; likewise, type written terms will take precedence over pre-printed terms. Specific terms also carry more weight than general terms. Specific terms will usually be given precedence over general terms, as these are seen as creating a specific exception to the general terms. For example, if Clause A in your scenario said: Written notice must be provided at least five days in advance of (any) change... (leaving out "to price"), then clause B would prevail because it would be more specific than the more general term (A), which in my scene would pertain to any change whatsoever (this is assuming the whole of the agreement did not shed light on the issues more fully). In your hypothetical, these are both specific terms. In that case, the court would first examine the entire contract and all addendum, specs, plans, etc. when interpreting competing or conflicting clauses applying the fundamental principal that a contract should always be interpreted as a whole - not clause-by-clause - and not section-by-section. Contracts will often have numerous parts with portions incorporated specifically by reference, or numerous documents that may be integral to the transaction, If the parties agree to what constitutes the various parts of the contract (even if not incorporated) the entirety of the transactional documents may be considered by the trier of fact (and law). Once examined, if a proposed interpretation makes other portions of the global agreement meaningless, illogical or unenforceable, and another party's interpretation is in keeping with the document as a whole, that is the interpretation that will typically be adopted. Assuming this analysis doesn't work to resolve the issue, then the court would look to see if there is an order-of-precedence clause, which is a clause that lays out what parts of the contract / types of clauses take precedence over others (ex. written requirements take precendee over performance requirements, addendum hold less import than the signed agreement, schematics hold less import than addendum, and so on). Assuming this there is no order of precedence, the court will look first to see if the contract was negotiated back and forth, with terms being modified with each draft. If Yes, then the court will except extrinsic evidence (parole evidence) that goes to the intent of the parties bargained for exchange. If not, the contract term(s) will be construed against the drafter and in favor of the one who signed the others' instrument. So, as you can see, there is no clear answer to what seems to be a simple issue. This just goes to show: Lawyers seem expensive when you decide to hire them - Lawyers are expensive when you have to hire them, because you decided not to in the first place!
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Yes, the President can certainly veto such a law. Per the US Constitution (emphasis added): Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. This can have a very real effect: legislators are under no obligation to vote the same way on a veto override as on the original bill. The reason the President needs to supply written objections in the first place is that it lets legislators reconsider, see if they're swayed, or see if they think this is a matter where a Congressional majority needs to be respected even if they disagree (they can change their mind in either direction). They can also get a sense of public reaction. And because the threshold for this is "present and voting," it's possible that just more legislators show up. Even if legislators won't be swayed, it still matters for pocket vetoes. That's where the President neither signs the bill nor returns it within 10 days; normally this is equivalent to signing, but if Congress adjourns in the meantime, it means the bill does not become a law. Because "Congress adjourns" is a necessary part of a pocket veto, it's impossible to override the veto (you can't do it if you're not in session). And even when this doesn't apply either, it matters for politics. Example of a futile veto: Public Law 100-4. Passed 406-8 in the House, 93-6 in the Senate. Vetoed; veto was overridden 401-26 in the House and 86-14 in the Senate (note that at least 7 Senators who voted for the bill voted not to override the veto). Example of an effective veto: While technically there was a conference report agreed to by both houses, and it doesn't seem to have had a roll-call vote (my guess is it was agreed to by unanimous consent; side note: many, many laws don't have roll-calls to check on, because they're passed by voice vote or unanimous consent), H.R.10929 from the 95th Congress was passed in the House by a vote of 319-67 and in the Senate by 87-2. After President Carter vetoed it, the House voted on whether to override the veto. The motion to override was defeated 191-206: after the veto, they couldn't even get a simple majority to override the veto of the bill which had been passed by an overwhelming supermajority. I mentioned it above, but the two-thirds threshold is "present and voting." As a general rule, any time you see a fraction of something needed for a vote to succeed in a deliberative assembly, then unless it specifies some other denominator, it's talking about the fraction of members present and voting. Relevant CRS report on override procedure.
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The Seventh Amendment's jury trial provision does not apply to the states. The Bill of Rights does not inherently restrain the states at all, merely the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment does restrain the states; notably, it forbids a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Courts have read into "of law" the added requirement that the law be compatible with the fundamental rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty; this means that most stuff that would violate the Bill of Rights if done by the feds violates due process if done by the states. However, not all provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated (i.e. applied to the states); the requirement for a jury in a civil trial is one of the few that hasn't been incorporated, because courts do not consider it a fundamental right (merely one protected in the federal courts). Now, many traffic tickets are actually misdemeanor offenses, and a jury-trial requirement for crimes is incorporated. However, even for federal offenses, the courts have generally found that the Constitution doesn't require jury trial for petty crimes (those with a maximum sentence under 6 months).
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No. It is an often repeated misconception that "Freedom of Speech" means that no one can restrict speech ever. This is not the case. Let us look at the US Consitution's First Admendment, which contains the "Freedom of Speech" clause: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... (Emphasis mine) As one can see, the First Amendment only restricts government actions. (It also stops other branches of government from restricting speech, because those branches are innately weak with very few powers granted to them by the constitution; the majority of executive or judicial branches powers are granted to them by a law passed by Congress, and Congress cannot give a power to another party that they do not possess). A Home Owner Association (HOA) is not a government or government agency; it is a private organization (and it is not the same as the "private management company" that manages the condominium, which is probably in the employ of the HOA; which also means that emailing the manager is not emailing the HOA board). Their power stems from a contract, one that your friend signed when they bought the property (one of the conditions agreed to is that a member who sells or gifts their HOA-member property can only do so to someone who also agrees to the contract). That said, HOAs can be horribly abusive and many states have laws that restrict what kinds of rules and penalties can be applied by an HOA. But that is not a constitutional matter (at either the Federal or State level), nor a question of "Freedom of Speech", but rather a limitation on the kinds of behaviors that can be enforced by contract.
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Are there any underlying reasons behind the nonsensical structure of U.S.C. titles? Is it simply a case of "This is how it's been for awhile, don't fix what isn't broken." or is there more to it than that? First of all, the United States Code is generally not designed to be used by non-lawyers. Second, one of the main ways to research case law interpreting a statute is by doing a boolean search on the code section of that statute. Every time you change a title or section number, you impair the ability of people doing legal research (both judges and lawyers) to find previous case law interpreting the meaning of the statute. Third, you make it much harder to determine when the substance of the provision was originally enacted (e.g. if you want legislative history or to determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions was enacted first) since an annotated statute will often show when the current section was enacted but will not explain what it was derived from. Fourth, the location of a statute within the context of other statutory sections often informs its meaning. Machine gun may have one definition in two or three laws, and a different one in two or three other laws, and there may be yet other laws where machine gun is an undefined term. Moving a statutory section from one part of the code to another could influence the default definition that one uses for an undefined term changing substantive law. Fifth, usually a new codification will also involve some drafting standards, for example, to add gender neutrality or to avoid notoriously ambiguous constructions (like 250 word sentences). But, it isn't at all uncommon for very slight changes like the position of a comma or the formatting of a section with multiple indents, to result in a change of the likely meaning of a somewhat ambiguous statute and it is pretty much impossible to know a priori when a statutory section is ambiguous until you are confronted with a fact pattern that makes the ambiguity in that context clear. This isn't confined to obscure laws of little importance. For example, the question of whether Obamacare applied in states that hadn't set up their own exchanges hinged on these kinds of issues. None of this is to say that you should never recodify the statutes. But, a basically aesthetic motivation that mostly matters to people who make up a tiny portion of the main users of the product (non-lawyers) that poses multiple threats to how statutes will be located using legal research tools, and how it will be interpreted once located, means that reorganizing statutes is not something to be done lightly. In short, there are a lot of serious, substantive costs that can accompany a recodification of a law. As a result, re-codification is most often done only as part of an overall omnibus reform of an area of law on the merits where the interest in being able to track prior interpretive caselaw and determine the original meaning of a statute enacted long ago is at its lowest. Barring the even more ridiculous case of Congress repealing everything and passing the exact same laws again, just under different Titles/Chapters/etc, This is not so ridiculous. Most states have done exactly that one or two times in their history (sometimes more for older states). Also, many newly admitted to the union states also do something similar. For example, the basic template for the statutes in Colorado was the statutes of the state of Illinois. Basically, the first time around, somebody started with an Illinois statute book, eliminated Illinois specific laws and laws that they didn't like, rearranged them and adopted them as the original statutes of the State of Colorado (it may have actually been version 2.0 after a stopgap set of statutes, I don't recall which). Also, most states completely repeal and readopt all of their statutes in codified form on the recommendation of the codifier to a legislative committee, to reflect the acts passed in the previous session, every year. This doesn't involve overhauls really, but in principle is a complete repeal and reenactment. While the federal government has never overhauled the entire U.S. Code in this manner, it has been done at the level of individual titles of the U.S. Code. For example, the most recent major reorganization and overhaul of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) was in 1986. The copyright laws were overhauled in the late 1970s. Both of those accompanied major substantive changes in those areas of law. Another major recodification of many parts of the U.S. Code took place following 9-11 in connection with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which reorganized both the bureaucracy and the associated U.S. Code language associated with dozens of federal agencies. would it be possible for Congress to arbitrarily merge, combine, and delete Titles, and to rearrange the location of laws, definitions, etc? Are there laws/regulations governing this? Yes. Congress can do so any time it wants by passing a bill (it would be the longest bill ever - dozens of volumes long) doing so, and getting the President to sign it. The legislative process would be exactly the same as any other bill.
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One can argue both ways. On one side, yes, zero representation in the Senate for all states is equal suffrage in the Senate. On the other side, no, depriving all states of all representation in the Senate deprives them of their suffrage in the Senate (without needing to consider the question of whether the suffrage is equal). Since this question has never been considered by a court, we can't do much more than speculate how one might rule. There has never been an amendment proposed to modify the composition of the Senate -- at least not one that was seriously considered. The spirit of the law works in favor of the second interpretation. Furthermore, a strict application of abstract logical reasoning was probably not the intention of the framers. A strategy that might seem more likely to succeed would be to introduce amendments reducing the Senate's power in the legislative process, similar to the evolution of the House of Lords in the UK. If the goal were to sideline one state, this might work, but if the goal is to address the complaint that the Senate is undemocratic because people in smaller states have proportionally more influence there, there's no way the amendment would pass 3/4 of the states' legislatures. The number of states with one or two representatives is 13, by itself a sufficient number to block the adoption of an amendment.
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It is true that a shareholder who controls a majority of the votes can be quite powerful indeed. This is a somewhat murky area of the law, but in many cases, a majority shareholder has a fiduciary duty to do what is best for the corporation as a whole (not just the majority shareholder, but all shareholders), an obligation that logically parallels the obligation of the board of directors (which controls a corporation with much the same effect as a majority shareholder). In Delaware, where most large corporations are incorporated, a major shareholder or group of shareholders can have less than 50% of the vote can still be considered de facto majority shareholder if they have influence over the rest of the shareholders. Majority shareholders, either de jure or de facto, are required to act only with "entire fairness" to all the shareholders, and courts may invalidate or otherwise grant relief on transactions made by majority shareholders that are not fair to all shareholders. If a majority shareholder takes actions directly, it has the burden of proof in court to show that any actions taken accord with the "entire fairness" standard. A more in-depth discussion of these issues can be found in this article out of the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation.
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Can all members of a group be civilly liable when some are provably innocent? Scenario: A crime involving property damage is committed. Suppose that it can be proven beyond reasonable doubt that of a group of 3 people, 2 of them were involved and one was not. However, there's no evidence as to which one exactly is innocent and which are guilty. This makes a criminal prosecution unlikely as there's no way to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, could a civil action instigated by the property owner succeed? The standard in civil trials is "on the balance of probabilities" or "more likely than not." This is often expressed as "more than 50% likely", but this question is meant to provide an edge case to this standard of proof. Despite one person being provably innocent, could all 3 people be found civilly liable for 1/3 of the damages, since each individual has a 67% chance of having committed the crime? Assume there is no other evidence tipping the balance of probabilities one way or the other. Answers from any common law jurisdiction are welcome, especially citing case law.
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The standard in civil trials is "on the balance of probabilities" or "more likely than not." This is often expressed as "more than 50% likely", but this question is meant to provide an edge case to this standard of proof. Despite one person being provably innocent, could all 3 people be found civilly liable for 1/3 of the damages, since each individual has a 67% chance of having committed the crime? General Rule: No Generally speaking, the answer is "no". A plaintiff must prove liability by a preponderance of the evidence as to each individual defendant. This flows from the basic structure of tort lawsuits (a civil claim alleging damages suffered from criminal acts is a form of tort lawsuit). The Narrow Market Share Liability Exception There is pretty much only one circumstance where something similar to your example. But, it isn't strictly analogous because it only applies when all of the defendants can be proven to have harmed some of the plaintiffs and the only question outstanding is who harmed whom. Defendants may be innocent of harming some of the plaintiffs, but can't be innocent of harming any of them, to face liability in this scenario. This occurs which is when a class action lawsuit is brought against all (or almost all) of the multiple separate defendants who manufactured the products of the same type, all of which were defective. A manufacturer of a defective product is strictly liable for all harm caused by the defective product, but usually a plaintiff must show precisely which defendant's product caused that particular person's injury. But, in the class action context, where (almost) all of the people who made the defective products are sued by (almost) all of the people who were injured by defective products of that type, courts have allowed the class to recover an amount calculated to represent the aggregate economic value of the damages suffered by all members of the class combined. Then, the aggregate damages award is allocated among the defendants in proportion to their market share of the defective product. Then, the amounts paid to the class by the various defendants are then allocated to members of the class based upon the estimated damages suffered by each subgroup of class members (or in separate case by case damages hearings). This is an exception to the usual requirement to prove causation against each individual defendant in the case of each individual plaintiff, because the risk of injustice by the process overall to any given defendant is small, and requiring proof of causation in this situation creates a burden on plaintiffs that lacks the justification that it would have if the injured parties had sued on a piecemeal basis. But, this only works when the defect in the product was shared by everyone who made that kind of product, and was not simply a "quality control" issue in the manufacturing process. For example, this kind of market share causation could be appropriate against all makers of tobacco products or asbestos or lead based paint. But, it would not be appropriate in a product liability case where some cars with built with substandard parts while others were built with parts that met the specifications for the cars and those that were did not cause any harm.
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Not generally. While double jeopardy considerations does not apply in Canada until the final verdict (i.e. all appeal processes have been exhausted by decision or failure to appeal within the time limit), the right to a jury trial for serious offences, both under the Constitution Act, 1982 (or the Charter, its bill of rights Part) and the Criminal Code (section 471, which not only makes the jury trial a right, but also the compulsory mode of trial unless both prosecutor and the accused consent), exist. Under common law principles, the jury's verdict, in the fact-finding role exclusive to the jury, is almost sacrosanct. Even if in Canada an appeal court can set aside a jury's verdict of acquittal or conviction, they may only do so if there is a reviewable legal error (for appeals from the Crown and the accused), or if the verdict of conviction is plainly unreasonable and cannot be supported by evidence (or otherwise may constitute a miscarriage of justice). In the first case, the reasoning is that the jury's verdict was defective due to e.g. insufficient or wrongful instructions, seeing evidences that should not have been admitted or failure to see evidences that should have been admitted. In the second case, the appeal court acts as a safeguard, much like in the U.S., for the accused to prevent wrongful convictions however it may occur. Even then, the appeal court cannot in essence conduct a new trial from the appeal records and substitute its own factual findings for those made by a jury, unless it finds that no properly instructed jury can reasonably convict the accused based on the evidences presented (R. v. W.H.). Now going back to what the trial judge can do after a jury's verdict. The proper course of action in case where the Crown's case cannot support a conviction is for the accused to seek a directed verdict before presenting any evidence. If the judge grants the motion, the judge (not the jury) enters a verdict of acquittal, which can be appealed for errors of law. Otherwise, the trial judge has no capacity to usurp the fact finding role of the jury. The judge can, however, in exceptional circumstances, declare a mistrial or stay of the proceedings (i.e. the proceeding is concluded without a verdict, due to e.g. abuse of process by the state or other considerations to preserve the integrity of the justice system) following the jury's verdict. All most all cases on this issue followed a verdict of conviction. In one unusual case (R. v. Burke), a verdict of "acquittal" was involved. The verdict is in quotes because in this case, the court recorded a verdict of acquittal apparently contrary to the jury's intention, as the jury foreman had coughed before pronouncing "guilty as charged" and the judge (along with the court reporter, the prosecutor and the defence lawyer) misheard "not guilty as charged". After seeing the accused in the parking lot, some jury members were confused and returned to the court and reported the error. However, not all jury members could be immediately contacted and the jury had only reconvened in the court with the accused a couple days after the original verdict, and after some newspapers had reported on the situation. The trial judge decided to enter the intended verdict of "guilty". The accused appealed and the Supreme Court decided in this particular case that: the trial judge can nonetheless exercise a limited jurisdiction after the jury's discharge; the judge could enter the intended verdict if it did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; in this case, due to the media reports and relatively long delay between the original verdict and the reconvening of the jury, which may have improperly influenced the jury, a mistrial should have been the appropriate remedy instead of entering the intended verdict. On the appropriateness of a mistrial, the Supreme Court said In declaring a mistrial, the trial judge therefore turns his or her mind to the question of whether a mistrial is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This determination will necessarily involve an examination of the surrounding circumstances. Injustice to the accused is of particular concern, given that the state with all its resources acts as the singular antagonist of the individual accused in a criminal case. This factor should be balanced against other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the offence, protection of the public and bringing the guilty to justice. It may be fitting to allow the announced verdict to stand where the period the accused has been at liberty and under the mistaken impression that he or she had been acquitted has been lengthy, and where the charge is not so egregious as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. As has already been stated, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the circumstances of each individual case and select the most appropriate remedy. This case does not directly apply to a case where the jury intended an acquittal, but the considerations may still be applied in extremely limited circumstances. While no one but the jury is privy to their deliberation process and no judge can overturn a jury's acquittal because they think the jury's verdict is unreasonable, it could be imagined that, for example, if a jury reports an acquittal and a member of jury before being discharged makes a claim of jury intimidation or the Crown presents clear evidence of jury manipulation, the trial judge might still have the authority to declare a mistrial. But this has not been clarified in jurisprudence.
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People are routinely and almost universally defended by lawyers in serious criminal cases in both civil law country and common law country legal systems. The availability of counsel for the indigent in cases involving petty crimes varies, but not in a way systemically related to the common law v. civil law distinction. It has more to do with the available supply of lawyers. The lawyer's job isn't very different, despite the fact that the lawyer has an audience of a panel of judges rather than a judge presiding over a decision making jury, although obviously lots of fine details (e.g. concerning the procedures for presenting evidence) are different. In both cases, defense lawyers call the attention to the facts favorable to the defendant's case, offer up evidence that tends to exonerate the defendant if the lawyer can obtain it, argues to the court regarding how the evidence should be interpreted and what inferences should be drawn from it, and argues regarding any ambiguities in how the law should be applied to these particular facts. Furthermore, in most criminal cases, in both civil law countries and in common law countries, guilt or innocence is not the primary issue. The primary issue for criminal defense counsel in most cases is assisting the judges in determining the right sentencing option on the right charges for a defendant who pleads guilty or is found guilty at trial of some crime, based upon the character of the crime and offender that is presented to the court by the lawyer. This part of the process is very similar indeed in the two systems. Typical issues might include an assault case where the issue is whether there was serious bodily injury, justifying a more serious sentence, or mere ordinary bodily injury, justifying only a less serious sentence, in a case where it isn't clear cut at the guilt and innocence phase, or arguing whether probation and a fine, or incarceration is a better fit to a minor offense, in the sentencing phase. It isn't entirely or primarily about "legal loopholes" in any system, although "legal loopholes" tend to be more important in U.S. criminal law than in many legal systems. There are some places in which civil law courts are more open to consider a defendant's arguments than others (and many civil law countries decide serious criminal cases with a panel that is a mix of legally trained judges and lay jurors), but that can vary wildly from country to country and within a country as well.
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If the younger person starts a civil suit against the older person for statutory rape, can the older person countersue for "actual" rape? There is no civil action counterpart to statutory rape. Is there any way that the older person can use the "actual" rape as a defense in either a civil or criminal charge? Statutory rape does not give the person who is defined as a victim of statutory rape to bring a civil action for money damages against the adult with whom that individual had sex. Sometimes there might be a civil action for breach of a fiduciary or confidential relationship, or intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrageous conduct. But that would be the exception, rather than the rule, and the civil action tort would not be a strict liability offense. While statutory rape is sometimes a "strict liability crime" in the sense that actual subjective consent is not a defense, and reasonable mistake of age is not a defense, a prosecution for statutory rape still requires proof of a voluntary act by the defendant charged with the offense. The claim that someone did not voluntarily have sex with the underaged person and instead was forced to engage in sex with the underaged person without their consent would be a valid defense to the crime. This is because it would prevent the prosecutor from proving that the defendant committed the voluntary act element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This kind of defense could also be conceptualized as the affirmative defense of duress which would still apply to this offense. My understanding is that if the older person has been convicted criminally for statutory rape, that would bar that person from prevailing in a civil suit for "actual" rape. Would this be true[?] One could bring a civil action for assault and battery in connection with a rape not implied in law by virtue of age (i.e. what you mean when you say "actual" rape). A criminal conviction for statutory rape (for which all appeals have been exhausted) would probably be a valid defense to such a civil action pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel (i.e. because a binding determination of the same issue with the same or stronger burden of proof was finally resolved on the merits in another case involving the same people). This is only true, however, because the lack of voluntary act defense would have been available in the criminal case for statutory rape. has such a sequence of events actually happened anywhere in the United States? Probably. The United States has had states with statutory rape laws for many, many decades and many hundreds of millions of people, if not billions of people, have lived in that time period. So, almost anything that could happen with respect to a widely enacted law involving activities that are possible for ordinary people to engage in has probably happened. This said, however, I've never heard of a legal case with this fact pattern in the news media or in reported case law (although admittedly, this isn't my area of practice). The more common case which does come up from time to time is a case of brother-sister incest where there is dispute over who should be charged (usually, but not always, the older sibling, and in rare instances, both are charged). Historically, in the overwhelming majority of cases where statutory rape charges could easily be proven, they are not brought by prosecutors. Sometimes this is because that is what the victim wants. Historically, victims have frequently wanted this outcome, either out of hope for an ongoing relationship with the adult, or doesn't want to relive a traumatic event, or out of the well founded believe of the victim that the case would do more to harm her reputation and well being than it would to suitably punish the adult (and keep in mind that statutory rape is often a misdemeanor offense which might be punished fairly lightly at sentencing depending upon the judge). Sometimes this is because the prosecutor sees keeping the perpetrator employed and able to pay child support when a pregnancy results as a preferable options. Sometimes this is because proving that sexual intercourse happened with someone beyond a reasonable doubt in cases that did not result in pregnancy, when the only witnesses are the alleged defendant and the allege child victim whose credibility may be questioned, was very difficult prior to DNA evidence, widespread use of rape kits, and cheap, ubiquitous video and photography use. Furthermore, factually, it is exceedingly uncommon for young minor girls to rape adult men, and until quite recently, the statutory rape laws applied only to female victims. Even now, with gender neutral statutory rape laws being the norm, prosecutors are much less likely prosecute an alleged statutory rape involving a male victim than a female victim. Finally, many prosecutors feel morally justified in invoking their authority to press statutory rape charges only when they believe that there was a non-consensual sexual act committed against the victim which happened even if it was hard to prove and are reluctant to bring such charges if the prosecutor believes under the circumstances that the act was consensual in fact, even if legally the defendant is still legally guilty in those circumstances. Generally speaking, attitudes towards this have grown more harsh towards men who have sex with young minors in recent years, but historically, this was a pretty important factor.
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france Yes, both for civil and criminal law, but in different ways. The general principle of civil law in France (and I believe every civil-legal-system jurisdiction) is that one is liable for any damage they cause through fault. Of course, details differ greatly between what is considered a damage, what are the standards to prove causation or fault, etc. Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 2, 18 janvier 2018, 16-28.392 specifically endorsed a lower court reasoning that distinguished between préjudice moral (moral damage) and préjudice psychologique (psychological damage). The latter is about quantifiable medical damage (even if mental rather than physical), while the former covers grave breaches of wellbeing. In the case at hand, a couple was assassinated when their child was two years old; the child later developed severe psychic disorders as a result of the trauma; it was found that a compensation for the préjudice moral of losing his parents at a young age did not foreclose a later suit for the préjudice psychologique of developing mental troubles (which became visible much later in his life). To be honest, I would be extremely surprised if any jurisdiction recognized no cause of action for any type of psychological damage. There might be issues of burden of proof etc. such that in practice suing for psychological damage is unviable, but a complete bar on any civil action predicated on psychic damage seems unthinkable. Regarding criminal law, many assault-type crimes are scaled by gravity. That gravity is evaluated by days of "complete inability to work" (search incapacité totale de travail through that section of the penal code). While the notion has been standardized by work law cases, it also applies outside a work context when the damage prevents one from doing basic life actions (children, retirees or the unemployed can be subject to a "complete inability to work"). Whether the damage that caused it was physical or mental is irrelevant. Two notes though: physical damage resulting from assault is more easily quantified by that scale than mental damage. If a mob boss breaks your bones, you spend one month in the hospital, and then you get out roughly healed; it’s easy to say that it cost you one month of your life. If the same mob boss kills your wife in a gruesome manner, you might be haunted for life, but still be able to work, feed yourself etc., past one or two days of shock. "Low-level", long-lasting damage is not well-measured that way. quantifying the duration of a "complete inability to work" depends on the victim’s active cooperation with the prosecution (such as going to see a doctor to get a certificate). That is possible because the civil and criminal causes of actions are usually joined in a single trial, during which the victim will try to prove injury. (It is possible for the victim to open a separate civil trial, but that’s usually not a good idea. The same exact remedies are available by joining in the criminal trial; usually the prosecutor has the same goals as you in proving the facts, so why not let them do it and save some lawyer fees?) It would probably not be reasonable in a common-law system with separate trials. It also breaks down in certain cases (e.g.: in a good fraction of spousal abuse cases, the victim refuses to testify against the accused).
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One does not introduce statutes in a trial, criminal of civil. Rather, one introduces facts. The judge will present "the law", and will present it in a digested form in the form of interpreted instructions to the jury about what the law says. Jurors are not required to interpret the meaning of statutes, because jurors are also not expected to know the relevant case law surrounding a statute. A party might make a motion to the judge where the argument depends in part on the wording of a statute. Then there is a standard but jurisdiction-dependent way of referring to s statute, e.g. ORS 164.015, RCW 9A.56.010. For Minnesota there are three interchangeable forms: "Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 123.45, subdivision 6" which is the same as "MINN. STAT. 123.45 (2008)" or "MINN. STAT. ANN. 123.45 (2008)", which is for statutes. You have to look it up on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis – here is the answer that Minnesota gives (all legal citations).
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The answer ultimately is very jurisdiction-specific, but there are generalizations that apply to most jurisdictions. This IJ study summarizes how it is possible. The first problem is that civil forfeiture is usually handled administratively, not judicially, so unless you challenge a forfeiture, the agency that takes your property decides whether it was correct in taking your property. One impediment to a court challenge is that you may have to post a large bond of e.g. 10% of the property value. Paired with the fact that you will lose the bond plus have to pay the government's legal costs (plus your own) if you lose, it is risky to challenge a seizure. Adding in the fact that seizures are not usually huge (the IJ found average values in 10 states of between $451 to $2,048), there is a significant disincentive to challenge a seizure. For which reason, the majority of seizures are unchallenged, and the number of successful challenges is low (the latter fact reinforces the former fact). I should point out that statistics on seizure are hard to get, since law enforcement agencies are usually not required to track or report seizures. If you do challenge, state or federal law will specify a certain level of proof necessary for the seizure to be legal. In North Dakota and Massachusetts, that would be bottom-of-the-barrel "probable cause". The majority of jurisdictions require a preponderance of evidence to sustain a seizure. The owner then has the burden of proving that he is innocent. On the better end of things, New Mexico abolished civil forfeiture, and a criminal conviction is required for some or all seizures in California, Nevada, Montana, North Carolina, Minnesota, Missouri and Vermont. However, for instance, California requires that there be a criminal conviction, not that the property owner be convicted. Appendix B of the study gives a state by state summary of standards and case law. For instance, Alabama requires "reasonable satisfaction", and there is case law establishing that in that state, suspicion that the property was involved in a crime is insufficient.
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See jury-nullification. I'm not a legal historian, so I can't say for sure what the laws on jury acquittals were at that time in that jurisdiction. However, when a jury has final discretion to acquit a defendant of a crime that's it: They can effectively ignore laws if they want to acquit someone. Such acquittals do not set a precedent or have any bearing outside of the trial in which they issue their verdict.
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What's the difference between the Colorado baker case and Alex Jones getting banned? I'm not american, and this has stuck with me for some time. Recently, Alex Jones was banned from a lot of platforms, most recently Twitter. I saw a lot of news about it, and my general understanding is that the companies are simply not providing their service to that individual, something they have complete right to do. But also, there was that Colorado baker case, and there was a whole lot of discussion if he could or not deny service to the couple. My question is how these two cases are different and how US law states if a company can or can't deny a service to someone.
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The key difference is the motivation for denying service. Generally, a business can deny service for almost any reason, or for no reason, and doesn't have to explain its reasons for doing so. However, laws may make it illegal to deny service for certain specific reasons. The federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. So a business may not deny service for those specific reasons. In the Colorado case, there was a similar state law that also forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. If they deny you service because of your political views, or the way you dress, or because they just plain don't like you as a person, that's legal. If they deny you service because of your sex, or race, or on the other bases in the Civil Rights Act, that's illegal. Obviously, since a business doesn't have to say why they're denying service, or could lie about the reason, this could make it hard for a plaintiff to prove that denial was in fact based on (e.g.) race. They might be able to do so by finding out about internal discussions within the business, or by showing a pattern of denial to customers of a particular race. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the baker made it easy by explicitly stating that he was denying service because of the customers' sexual orientation, or at least because of the same-sex nature of the marriage in question. This would appear to violate the Colorado state law. Had he just said no without giving a reason, it would have been harder for the plaintiffs to make their case. (A state commission held that the baker did violate the law, but the US Supreme Court reversed because, they said, the commission had improperly taken the baker's religion into account.) But there is no such law that forbids discrimination on the basis of political views, so Alex Jones can't make a similar case.
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You may be mistaken about the purpose of the Miller test. If some content is obscene according to the Miller test, then it does not receive First Amendment protection, and could be prohibited from distribution by the government. However, it says nothing about the contractual obligations that two parties can agree to. To the extent that the obligations themselves are objectionable this analysis would fall under the doctrines of unconscionability and public policy.
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Yes, they are. A business can decide not to do business with someone for pretty much any reason. The obvious prohibited reason is due to your race. But I don't see how eBay would even know your race. Some State laws might protect you, but I don't think there's any that applies in this case. For example, California might give you a means of appeal if someone stole your identity and they performed those transactions, not you. But I don't know of any Federal or State law that would change the very, very basic principle of law that a property owner gets to decide who can and cannot access their property. eBay owns eBay. One key benefit of ownership is precisely that you can make decisions that other people consider to be unfair, discriminatory (other than the specifically prohibited categories) and draconian. Other people don't have to agree with your decisions for them to be lawful.
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In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.
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While @jqning is absolutely correct in stating that truth is always an "absolute defense" to a claim of defamation, keep in mind that truth can be a subjective thing. What is one person's version of the truth, may not be another's, even with regard to the same exact experience. Also, while "statements of opinion are not defamation" is typically regarded as true, it has very broad exceptions and is not something that can be relied on in isolation. Defamation is generally defined as a false, published statement that is injurious to the plaintiff's reputation. An online posting, even on an obscure website, will likely be seen by a few people, thus satisfying the publication requirement. A plaintiff cannot succeed in his or her online defamation claim if the defendant's defamatory statement is true. So, for example, if a customer posts a review of your restaurant on Trip Advisor claiming that there were roaches crawling around, you may sue them for defamation. You would then have to prove that there was no roach infestation, and thus, the defendant's statement was false. However, what if there was only one? What if he has a witness who saw it? His truth may be different from yours, and it is up to the trier of fact to decide. Also, getting sued, whether or not you prevail, is at minimum a pain and can be a very expensive ordeal. Opinions are exempt? OK: Following that line of reasoning, restaurant owner shows he's had monthly inspections and prophylactic measures to ensure against pests and the exterminator testifies. The defendant, fearing he's in trouble now, claims that his assertion of roach infestation was just his opinion based on his experience. Opinions are privileged under the law of defamation, right? Not always! Importantly, an opinion may be viewed, generally, as a statement of fact (employing the "reasonable person" standard) if it is something that is either provable or disprovable. What this means is that if the reasonable person would construe your statement to be factual, and not mere opinion, it will be deemed as such and if untrue then you're liable for defamation. The courts may interpret, "I think that [restaurant] has a roach infestation problem," as a statement of fact. This has occurred in numerous cases where people think they can say what they want as long as they couch it as an opinion, with words like "I think..." or "In my opinion...". But when someone says something that factual in opinion form, that is not protected. So, if Jane says, "In my opinion Joe Schmoe is a pedophile..." without absolute proof that Joe is, in fact, a pedophile, then this is libelous (defamation if published or spoken to another). This is because the statement in and of itself is one of "verifiable fact couched in opinion" and it is so damaging to Joe's reputation that if it's not true it is libel per se (defamatory if published – meaning shared). A statement of verifiable fact is a statement that conveys a provably false factual assertion, such as someone has committed murder or has cheated on his spouse. While the law varies some, and sometimes substantially, from state to state, here are some often used examples arising from California courts. Libelous (when false): Charging someone with being a communist (in 1959) Calling an attorney a "crook" Describing a woman as a call girl Accusing a minister of unethical conduct Accusing a father of violating the confidence of son Not-libelous: Calling a political foe a "thief" and "liar" in chance encounter (because hyperbole in context) Calling a TV show participant a "local loser," "chicken butt" and "big skank" Calling someone a "bitch" or a "son of a bitch" Changing product code name from "Carl Sagan" to "Butt Head Astronomer" Since libel is considered in context, do not take these examples to be a hard and fast rule about particular phrases. Generally, the non-libelous examples are hyperbole or opinion, while the libelous statements are stating a defamatory fact. Modified photos that can be shown to scandalize persons or businesses are clearly defamation, and are quite popular on social media. So, for example, if you threw the flyers (I assume you didn't but as an example) all over, and then photographed and published your opinion about the business littering neighborhoods, this would be libelous. The less obvious and absurd the modification, the more likely it is that a court will find it defamatory. So, a picture of a woman with a man's naked torso photoshopped on will not be defamatory, a version photoshopped showing what is to be purported to be her naked body, is. In your case, you face two issues that you should ask yourself: Is your opinion really verifiable (or non-verifiable) facts couched in words that try to make it opinion, or is it truly just your opinion. If fact, is it absolutely true? If the answer is yes, it's fact and yes, it's absolutely true, you're OK. Keep in mind though what I mentioned about truths differing: What if the business didn't know they were put there, or, what if they were placed on cars in a public place and blew in the wind? That could be a problem. While you are most likely fine, you may want to just say, X business's fliers are all over the place, littering the neighborhood and (assuming you called and asked them to pick them up, or wrote them) they refuse to pick up the litter. It sounds like the statements you made are fine, because you don't say that the business littered, or that they put them there; you say they are "plastered" all over, but you don't accuse them openly. That isn't to say it wouldn't be found to suggest fact that they would have to show isn't true (or that they didn't get permission from the property owner). My point is only that, in general, be careful. If he felt that you misrepresented what he did by way of distributing fliers, or if he thought you doctored the photo or set it up, he could sue you if he felt it damaged his business's reputation.
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The purpose of that disclaimer is not to prevent reprimands or legal action. It's really as simple as it appears -- it's to inform the readers that the tweets in fact contain the opinion of the person who wrote them and are not intended to be understood as the official position as that person's employer. This is especially important for people who occasionally or frequently convey their employer's official position. It's not supposed to be some kind of magic word that causes something to happen. It's just an attempt to convey accurate information and avoid misunderstandings.
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No punishment followed because those policies are not the law, and, even it was found out earlier, no Inspector General would have the authority to dismiss Mrs. Cliton, it's POTUS's prerogative, as I understand it. That is true for maybe 10 people max in a government department. For the tens or hundreds of thousands of employees who weren't appointed by the President to serve at their pleasure, violating policies can lead to suspension, fines, or dismissal.
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The additional protections for social-media platforms comes from Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, not from the First Amendment. Section 230 basically provides immunity from defamation and other kinds of liability. Generally speaking, it applies only to platforms, i.e., companies providing a service for other people to create and post content. This goes beyond social-media companies to include message boards, blogging platforms, dating websites, etc. Newspapers generally do not enjoy this protection because the information that they post on their websites is information that they have generated themselves.
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GDPR and personal data that gets crawled and ends up on other websites Data controllers must delete the users' personal data if they are asked to do so, according to the GDPR, except in some cases that don't really apply here. But what if that personal data has ended up somewhere else on the internet, maybe on a search engine like Google, or maybe in multiple places that might even be difficult to spot completely, often because some crawling bots have copied the data? I'm not talking about a data breach, where somebody gets unexpected and unauthorized access to data that is supposed to be private. I'm talking about data that is publicly displayed on a website, so anybody (crawling bots included) can access it. It could be a username, an email address, a little picture of you as an avatar, etc. So here are the questions: Who is responsible for the deletion of personal information that ended up on other websites? Should the user try to get the data deleted, or should the original website do it? For example, if a user asks me to delete some data from my website, should I also try to have it removed from Google or could I just tell the user it's none of my business and that they should go ask Google on their own? Should a user expect all this to happen as "the way internet works", or should anything be made clear in the privacy policy? For example saying "The part of your personal data that can be publicly accessed on the internet is likely to end up on other websites that we cannot control and that might not comply with the GDPR at all"?
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See Art. 17(2) GDPR: Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data. So the controller must tell all other controllers (like google) to delete the data. The privacy policy must include the fact that data is made public.
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The GDPR has an exemption for purely personal or household activity. Creating a family tree seems purely personal as long as you don't publish it. You're also allowed to freely share the tree as long as it stays within that purely personal scope. Your proposed restriction of only showing data of blood relatives seems excessively strict. But assuming that this exemption wouldn't apply, there'd probably still be no problem. The GDPR does not require you to always obtain consent. It requires that the purposes for which you process personal data are covered by some legal basis. Consent is one such legal basis, but legitimate interest is another. You can likely argue that you have a legitimate interest to create a tree of your (extended) family. The legitimate interest must be weighed against the rights and freedoms of the affected persons. For example, contact information could be used for stalking. The balance of the legitimate interest check can be changed if you adopt suitable safeguards. Your idea of only sharing data with close relatives would be such a safeguard, but it might not be necessary. When you rely on legitimate interest, the affected person can object to further processing, furthermore they can request to be erased from your records. A request for erasure can be denied if there are overriding grounds to keep the data. E.g maybe only contact information has to be deleted but names, dates, and relations might be kept. You should notify persons when they are included into your records. It is your obligation as the data controller to make these decisions. If someone disagrees they can sue you or lodge a complaint with a supervision authority. Note that dead persons are not natural persons in the sense of the GDPR, and have no privacy. However, national laws may provide such protections.
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I think there are a couple of different ways to look at this. Deduplication is a technical detail that's irrelevant here While the data may be deduplicated on a technical level, the files remain logically distinct. If users 1 and 2 upload identical files, and then one user edits or deletes their file, this will not affect the other user's data. Users cannot tell whether their files are duplicates of someone else. From the user's perspective, it makes no difference whether or not the storage uses deduplication, except perhaps via the cost of the service. Because there is no user-perceptible difference, it would be difficult to interpret some GDPR significance into this scenario. Whose personal data is it anyway? Personal data is any information that relates to an identifiable data subject. The files here are likely to be their uploader's personal data. Thus, the uploaders would also have a right to have their uploaded files erased. In case of deduplicated storage, this would affect their logical copy. The contents of the uploaded files might also be personal data relating to a third party. Then that third party might have a right to get the file contents erased. But this right must be invoked with the data controller for that processing activity, which might be company A, company B, or the uploaders, depending on context. Which leads us to the next aspect: Company A is not responsible for handling erasures From your description, it sounds like company A is a data processor providing services on behalf of company B. In turn, B might be a processor acting on behalf of the uploaders. In any case, it seems that A would not be the data controller for these processing activities. Data subject rights like erasure must be invoked against the controller, as only the controller can understand whether such a request should be granted. The right to erasure is not absolute, and depends a lot on why that data is being processed. In particular: Personal data need not be erased if it is still necessary For example, a person might very well be the data subject of some of these files, and might then ask for erasure. But if the files are being stored because they are going to be needed as evidence in legal proceedings, the data subject can't use this GDPR right to destroy evidence. The data controller would be allowed to refuse a request in such cases. It could now happen that two different users of this deduplicated storage are storing the same file, but for entirely different purposes. Blanket deletion of all copies of a file could be quite problematic. Note that deletion is also a "processing activity" and needs a legal basis under the GDPR. Unexpected data loss could be a data breach. One user's erasure could be another user's reportable data breach incident. Thus, I would strongly expect such requests to be handled on a logical file level, not on the deduplicated storage level. Caveat: public access and cloned files If the (logical) file is made available to the public who can then clone or copy this file, and if the "original" is taken down due to an erasure request (or copyright takedown notice), it might be appropriate to remove logical clones as well. Again, this might not involve deleting the contents on the deduplicated storage level, but it might affect other users' copies. In a GDPR context, the grounds for this would be the Art 17(2) right to be forgotten: Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data. But this depends crucially on who those other controllers are. If A is the sole controller, the logical files could probably be deleted directly. If B or the end users are controllers, it could be more appropriate to forward the erasure request to them.
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The intention of the GDPR is to minimize the amount of personally identifiable information (PII) you store. So the GDPR never tells you that you have to log certain events. The simplest way to make sure you comply with the GDPR is to simply not store any PII at all. But that might of course conflict with legitimate business interests and with other legal obligations you might have. So when you do store PII, then the GDPR regulates under which conditions you are allowed to store PII, for how long and what you are allowed to do with that PII. So when you receive a GDPR request from a customer to see their data, then you can say that you only have that one timestamp of their registration, because you didn't log their subsequent logins (assuming this is the truth). I hope your privacy policy says that you store all that PII on registration and that you have some good arguments why storing that information is a "legitimate interest" of your organization.
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There is no requirement about "data" in the GDPR, so provided this is just "data", no. An empty form with fields for personal data contains no personal data. On the other hand, if the form is filled in by the user with personal data (as defined in GDPR article 4), and you receive a copy of the filled in form and process these personal data (as defined in GDPR article 4) - then the answer is: Yes. However, if you do not process the personal data (i.e. the form is just printed out on paper and filled in with a pen, and nobody except the data subject has access to the piece of paper with the filled in form - then the answer again is "no").
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The GDPR has a fairly broad concept of personal data: any information that relates to an identifiable person. This is far more than directly identifiable information! The concept of identifiability is further explained in Recital 26: To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. So indirectly linkable information can still be personal data. In your example, that ID can be easily re-identified with a particular person if you know who the secretary was between 2012 and 2014. It is quite likely that there are members in the club with this knowledge, or that this information can be gained from public sources like newspaper reports. Thus, you should assume that your member IDs are at most pseudonyms, but not anonymous. They are likely still personal data. However, it doesn't necessarily follow that you would have to erase everything. Art 17 comes with lots of caveats and exceptions. For example, if you are processing this personal data under a legitimate interest, and someone requests erasure, you might have overriding grounds to continue processing anyway. E.g. such a legitimate interest could involve security or auditability purposes. There might also be such a legitimate interest for keeping some history for the club, but there would have to be a decision based on the individual circumstances. Furthermore, you can of course retain data e.g. due to a legal obligation, or when this information is necessary for the establishment of or defence against legal claims. I understand your desire to keep some data around. Instead of asking “do I have to delete this?” it might be more productive to consider “under which legal basis can I keep this?”. I think you might have a legitimate interest, but you'd have to carry out a balancing test between the various interests and rights. A really problematic approach would be to hold on to de-identified data in the belief that it no longer were personal data. Such a belief is usually mistaken. True anonymization that meets the GDPR's definition is really hard, in particular because you would also have to prevent indirect identification, also by other actors than yourself. There are theoretical models that can help with anonymization, e.g. with k-anonymization methods you'd ensure that there are no unique records in the DB. But this can be tricky to apply correctly, so I'd recommend to only treat aggregate statistics as truly anonymous. In 2012, the ICO has published an anonymization code of practice (PDF). It is no longer up to date with the current legal environment (in particular since the GDPR has expanded the concept of identifiability), but it provides a good overview of both the difficulties of preventing re-identification and an overview of potential solutions.
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Yes, there would still be an obligation to comply with erasure requests – if the data subject can be identified, and if the GDPR applies. This is a case for Art 11 GDPR: processing which does not require identification. The pastebin site is not required to collect identifying info just in order to facilitate later deletion. If the site is unable to identify the data subjects, then the data subject rights (like access, rectification, erasure, restriction, or data portability) do not apply. Other rights like the right to be informed and the right to object do remain, though. But if the data subject provides sufficient additional information that makes it possible to identify their records, then the data subject rights apply again. In practice, this is likely going to mean that anyone with access to a paste will be able to request deletion, since the site would have no ability to verify the identity of the data subject beyond the information in the paste. None of this absolves the site from implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of this data. Even though the pastes might not be directly identifying, they are personal data and are far from anonymous. Common practices like numbering pastes with a sequential ID or showing recent pastes on a homepage have to be viewed critically. My go-to recommendation is to assign a cryptographically random UUIDv4 ID to the post, so that it is practically impossible for anyone to find the paste unless they were given a link by the uploader. Your idea to delete pastes after a fairly short retention period is also good. This helps with security, and it is in line with the GDPR's data minimization and storage limitation principles: data may only be kept as long as necessary for its purpose. On the other hand, quick deletion might not be in line with the purpose of these pastes – it all depends on context. You mention that this is an US-based site. If so, there's a question whether GDPR would even apply. GDPR will apply per Art 3(2) if the data controller is offering its services to people who are in Europe. Here, “offering” does not mean mere availability of the website, but that the data controller intends the service to be used by such people, in particular if the service is somehow targeted or marketed to such people.
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Yes, GDPR applies: you are a data controller established/living in the UK or are offering services to people in the UK you fall under the material scope of the GDPR. The Art 2(2)(c) exemption for “purely personal or household activity” does not apply since you're offering the service to the public. You must consider GDPR compliance here. This is especially important as you are showing personal data to the public. Don't do that unless you have a very good reason, appropriate safeguards, and are clear to users how their information will be shown. On a high level, GDPR compliance involves working on the following questions: For what purpose are you processing personal data? Context: purpose limitation principle per GDPR Art 5(1)(b) What is the legal basis for processing? GDPR Art 6(1) lists the available legal bases. Here, consent, necessity for performance of a contract, or a legitimate interest could be a legal basis. They may have further obligations attached. A legitimate interest requires a balancing test that considers the data subject's rights and freedoms. Consent must fulfil the conditions per Art 7 in order to be valid. What is the minimal data necessary to achieve the purpose? Per the Art 5(1)(c) data minimisation principle, it is illegal to process personal data beyond what is necessary and adequate. You must provide data protection by design and by default per Art 25. Special categories of data per Art 9 such as health data are illegal to process outside of narrow exemptions. You must delete data once it is no longer necessary. What appropriate safeguards and security measures should you apply? Per Art 24 and 25, you are responsible for determining and implementing appropriate measures. This depends a lot on your specific context, so there's no checklist you can apply. Per Art 25(1) you must pseudonymize the processed information if that is compatible with the processing purpose. What further compliance measures do you have to consider? There are additional GDPR and non-GDPR compliance measures. From the GDPR side: Use the answers to these questions to write a privacy policy, including the information that you must provide to data subjects per Art 13. Consider whether you have to maintain a Records of Processing document per Art 30, or if you have to make a Data Protection Impact Assessment per Art 35. If you use third party services, figure out whether they are a joint controller or data processor and apply appropriate safeguards. If you have data processors, ensure that you have a contract in place that covers the items from Art 28(3). If you share data with other controllers (not processors) you need a legal basis for doing so. If you transfer data into a non-EU/EEA country (after 2020: non-UK country) you need a legal basis per Art 44 and have to cover additional items in your privacy policy. Ideally, the target country is covered by an EC adequacy decision per Art 45. For US-based companies, this is the case only when they have self-certified under the Privacy Shield framework. Non-GDPR compliance steps could include cookie consent banners, or showing a VAT ID. How can you prepare for data subject requests? Data subjects have various rights per Arts 15–23, subject to the modalities in Art 12. For example, a data subject could request that their information is erased from your website. The exact rights also depend on the legal basis you selected. You should figure out in advance how to deal with such requests.
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Is it possible to forbid linking to a site? I have seen on several sites notes similar to The creation of hypertext links pointing to the ... site is subject to the prior written approval ... Is this notice legally enforceable? (or legally makes sense at all) A hyperlink is an address, so it would be similar, I believe, to disallowing someone to list an address (on a map for instance). Since Internet is (usually) not limited by country boundaries I will not tag it with a specific country, but if there must be one I would mostly be interested by EU.
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Is it possible to forbid linking to a site? No. It would be quite childish and out of touch to aspire to that level of control. Publishing a website/page for permanent, wide open access is inconsistent with prohibiting accessing it from certain venues, such as hypertext links. The prohibition of linking to a site is an attempt to enforce a certain degree of selective privacy. As such, it would not be enforced by U.S. courts, and it would be laughable if other jurisdictions proceeded differently. In United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008), the court wrote that e-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit because they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information. That rationale is equally --or perhaps even more-- applicable to a publisher, since in this case browsers and/or the publisher himself post(s) his URL (the equivalent of a "from" address of emails) "for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information". A hyperlink is an address, so it would be similar, I believe, to disallowing someone to list an address (on a map for instance). That analogy is inadequate because it overlooks essential differences between a web address and a physical (be it home, office, etc.) address. A web address is used for obtaining information which the initial publisher deliberately makes available to the public. By contrast, the act of having one's physical address registered somewhere else serves no such purpose whatsoever. Another important difference between a hyperlink and a physical address is that "consuming" a hyperlink simply cannot annoy or harm the initial publisher (except in the extreme scenario of Denial-of-Service attacks), whereas a common knowledge of a person's address may make that person vulnerable to harassment, trespassing, larceny, and other unlawful acts. A better analogy with hypertext links would be bibliographical references, since both are types of text strings for directing the consumer to a (or "the") source of information. Neither text string causes detriment to the author/source of that information. Can you imagine if bibliographical references were forbidden by statute or by the author of that information? The mere difference that a bibliographical reference needs to be copied/pasted, whereas it suffices to click on a hypertext link, cannot permit treating the permissibility of hypertext links any differently than the permissibility of bibliographical references.
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I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.
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Sure, you can make such a request, but its not likely to help you. Scammers are criminals and don't generally care about GDPR compliance. Scammers are criminals, and won't just publish their real world identity. Serving them with a lawsuit will be difficult, especially if they are from outside the EU. GDPR lets you sue data controllers, but it's not worth it. You can sue for compliance (e.g. to compel fulfillment of your access request), and you can sue for damages stemming from GDPR violations. Compared to the damages you have suffered, a lawsuit is very expensive.
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Maybe, but probably not The geographic location of the organisation is immaterial: under Article 3.2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: ... (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. Posts anyone (not just EU citizens) make to Reddit (or anywhere else) while they are physically located in the EU or UK engage the GDPR. Pushift.io is therefore captured by the GDPR and any denial of that is just plain wrong. Given the denial, it is likely right out of the gate that they are non-complient. For example, they are unlikely to provided the required information under Article 14. More importantly, it seems that they have not determined the lawful basis for processing the data under Article 6 - they can possibly rely on the public interest basis (preserving deleted publication is arguably a public interest) or a legitimate interest but that requires a balancing of their interest against the data subject's. That said, the right to be forgotten is not absolute, the reasons that might be applicable here are: The data is being used to exercise the right of freedom of expression and information. The data is being used to perform a task that is being carried out in the public interest or when exercising an organization’s official authority. The data represents important information that serves the public interest, scientific research, historical research, or statistical purposes and where erasure of the data would likely to impair or halt progress towards the achievement that was the goal of the processing.
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In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source.
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There is language, but not a mechanism, covering this. Section 3(a)(3) of version 4 licenses says If requested by the Licensor, You must remove any of the information required by Section 3(a)(1)(A) to the extent reasonably practicable. If you become aware of a person using your material and attributing you, and you want the attribution removed, you would accordingly notify them (somehow), and they are required to remove the offending material. The removable informations includes: i. identification of the creator(s) of the Licensed Material and any others designated to receive attribution, in any reasonable manner requested by the Licensor (including by pseudonym if designated); ii. a copyright notice; iii. a notice that refers to this Public License; iv. a notice that refers to the disclaimer of warranties; v. a URI or hyperlink to the Licensed Material to the extent reasonably practicable;
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The conditions for lawfulness of processing are spelled out in Article 6 of the GDPR. As for it being legal for website operators to log the IP-addresses of visitors, this is covered by the following paragraph (also pointed out by phoog in a comment). The paragraph says it is legal to process personal data if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (my emphasis) You are not the only web site that logs IP addresses for the purpose of security. Every web site I've ever worked on - from those controlled by large corporations to tiny NGOs - do this. This security practice will not be impacted by the GDPR (if it were, I am sure we would have heard about it by now). there is the EU cookie law too If your website are going to be accessible to European citizens and not only accessible by your friends and familiy, you have to comply with the EU cookie directive of 2002 (a exemption for "personal websites" does not exist).
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A disclaimer claiming to disclaim authors of content on the website can/cannot protect those authors depending upon: Visibility of the Disclaimer on the website On whether it can be proved that the disclaimer was included intentionally to be brought into the user's notice. Location of the dispute. In United States many courts have ruled in favor of the disclaimers if the were strategically placed not to be missed by the user. In European Union on the other hand there is a directive which strikes down legal obligations which have been imposed and this would make disclaimers unenforceable. For more information, please refer This Link
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Can we use Marines' sign for personal signature? So I'm asking here as a normal person, not as Marine Corps. So as a marine fan, is it possible (legal) to add Marines' Eagle, Globe, and Anchor (EGA) sign before your name in the end of documents or posts? Something like: [ega_sign] Andy, 2018/9/13 Since according to 17 U.S.C § 105 which prohibits the US Federal government from holding copyrights. Which should mean that it isn't illegal to use USMC's sign (is it?). Eagle, Globe, and Anchor (EGA)
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No, it is not illegal to use the symbol of the federal government for your own personal use as it is a public domain symbol. However, the USMC will frown upon it. Marines have a sort of warrior culture ethos to them, when compared to the other branches of the U.S. military and a strong culture among those who served. Among Marine culture "there is no such thing as a former Marine"... that is, once you enter the service, you are a marine even if you retire (a former Marine is usually someone who was dishonorably discharged OR committed an action that would have gotten him/her discharged had they not retired). They do not take kindly to Stolen Valor (pretending or seeming to pretend you served when you did not). While this is legal to do per SCOTUS rule, it's not considered advisable. Most of the US military have dim views of Stolen Valor and will react very negatively. And seeing as how the Marines like to boast in song that they Guard Heaven for God upon Death, these are not enemies you would like to make. Tread extremely cautiously while doing this.
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It is not "perfectly legal" to transcribe music for personal use. It is pretty likely that you can get away with it. The first thing to understand is that the act of transcribing is the creation of a derivative work (see the definitions part of Title 17). The core protection is section 106, which states that the owner of copyright has the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. So it is not permitted to prepare derivative works, e.g. transcriptions, without permission from the copyright owner. There is a big however: section 107 provides a possible loophole, "fair use". If you were to be sued for violation of copyright in making an unauthorized derivative work, your attorney might well advise you to set forth a fair use defense. This question and answer summarizes the basics of the fair use defense. Probably the most important factor would be the 4th factor, the effect on market -- in the circumstance that you describe, the effect is likely to be low. If you do this as a paid service for others and not just for personal amusement, then a fair use defense becomes a stretch.
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In the United States, I would strongly expect that an accurate depiction of historical fact (even if uncomfortably graphic) would be protected under the First Ammendment. Otherwise, the government could functionally censor the worst parts of history (as being too awful to discuss or depict), which is exactly the kind of thing the First Amendment is designed to prevent. There are three important categories of speech that are not protected: (1) "fighting words" directed at a person intended to provoke a fight, (2) words that infict emotional distress such that it qualifies as a tort, and (3) speech that court finds to qualify as "obscenity". Of these three, your game probably will not qualify for the first, since it generally requires speech directed at a specific person or people. I also suspect (less confidently) that an emotional-distress tort would not succeed since your game is not directed at any particular living people. Even if the game caused emotional distress to someone, your public release of the game probably could not qualify as a tort against that specific player who happens to experience emotional distress. The Miller test is used to determine if a work is obscenity. Wikipeida summarizes its three parts, all of which must be satisfied to constitute obscenity: Whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards", would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions specifically defined by applicable state law, Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The first two are explicitly sexual in nature. I don't know if there is any similar prohibition against hyper-violence, but even if there were, as long as your game does not run afoul of the "lacks serious artistic value" condition, you will be on the safe side of the line. Note that none of this stops anyone from initiating legal action against you (which may cause headaches for you); it only stops those legal actions from succeededing.
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Yes. This is legal and it is done routinely. It is called executing a document in counterparts. To be clear, however, as the language of the question is ambiguous on this point, each signature would have to be contemporaneously notarized by the person notarizing that particular signature. In each case that a notarization took place outside the country where the Power of Attorney is to be utilized, normally, it would be necessary to also obtain an apostille for that notarization. An apostille is an official declaration of a designated official in the country of notarization that the notary of the signature in question was, in fact, a notary in good standing at the time that the notarization was done.
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In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source.
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Trademarks apply only to a limited field. If you follow the link, it reports that it applies to class 42, graphic art design. So you are free to use (and register "mama" for your food delivery service, for example.
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Yes and no. While there are no general laws that ban the display of offensive symbols, they are prohibited in certain circumstances. Significantly, this is in the workplace. It is illegal to discriminate on the following bases in the workplace: Race Sex Pregnancy Religion National origin Disability (physical or mental, including HIV status) Age (for workers over 40) Military service or affiliation Bankruptcy or bad debts Genetic information Citizenship status (for citizens, permanent residents, temporary residents, refugees, and asylees) For instance, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 US 742 (1998), the majority found: a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination based upon race could assert a claim for a racially hostile work environment, in addition to the classic claim of so-called "disparate treatment." Since you haven't been specific about the nature of the offensive symbol, some examples might be: displaying a swastika displaying sexually offensive material displaying racially offensive material These are likely only to apply if the employer ought to have known, or did in fact know, that an employee (or in some cases, the customers) of a business would be offended, or it would amount to discrimination. Of course, a single display of only the symbol is not likely, on its own, to create a hostile work environment - it would need to be considered with the rest of the facts - but it can certainly be a contributing factor. It's a bit difficult to list all the situations where similar laws might apply, but this is one of the most prominent (and, to be honest, one of the ones that I'm personally interested in).
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The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed.
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Breach of fiduciary duty for poor management of endowment? If the board of trustees of a private university keeps investing the endowment through an expensive firm run by their friends, despite substandard performance, could a case be made for breach of fiduciary duty? The economists employed by the university have long urged the board to invest in index funds instead. I know I would need to consult a lawyer specializing in this area, but I'd like to know first if I would be laughed at or if this is a reasonable question.
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could a case be made for breach of fiduciary duty? Yes, I think, although not every person or stakeholder would have standing to sue the board of trustees of the private university. The prima facie elements of breach of fiduciary duty are "(i) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (ii) a knowing breach of that duty; and (iii) damages resulting therefrom", Johnson v. Nextel Communications, 660 F.3d 131, 138 (2011) (I am not aware of any material differences in other jurisdictions). Absent any explicit disclaimers of fiduciary duty, (1) the element of existence of that duty is applicable because the trustees' relation with the university is not one of arms length; (2) in their deliberate --rather than negligent-- decision to do business with their friends, the trustees are knowingly and intentionally disregarding the advice from economists of the university, despite the evidenced financial detriment of that deliberate decision; and (3) the element of damages would be proved from the expenses as billed by the firm, coupled with any losses the friends' subpar performance may be causing to the university.
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Yes. You go into the court of relevant jurisdiction, and file a lawsuit to "quiet the question". Usually there is a counterparty who has something to say on the subject; sometimes not. If there is an apparent counterparty, they must be served notice of all aspects of the case. Let's say I manage a pipeline property management company; we are wholly owned by a pipeline company and we buy the land and lease it to said pipeline company. I need a parcel of land to complete a pipeline connection, and as part of my offer I gently remind the landowner, Beth, that we do have the legal right to take the property by eminent domain, with the hopes this will inspire them to a sensible price. Beth says "Bunk! Your LLC doesn't run any pipelines! You don't have eminent domain rights! 500% market price, or go away." Well. So, for the sake of moving the negotiation along, I go to court and ask the judge to quiet the question of whether we have eminent domain rights. Mind you, I don't go any further than that; I don't want to actually take it by eminent domain if I can talk Beth out of a consensual sale. The judge will, of course, suspect this applies to an imminent case, and will ask... so I might as well disclose the Beth situation. As such, I will have to serve Beth and keep Beth fully in the loop, so that Beth has full right to make the other side of the argument. Since it could affect others as well, the judge will probably also require publication in whichever newspaper handles legal notices. (Many newspapers are propped up financially by being official legal-notice organs for their county. They have six pages of editorial content, and 18 pages of legal notices and other ads.) Most likely, the judge will cowardly refuse to rule on whether a pipeline's land holding company has eminent domain, and simply rule that the pipeline company itself does, and could simply buy the land itself then transfer it to my company as a trivial, taxless transaction. So the judge would grant eminent domain conditional on that transaction being done. Beth then offers 133% of market which we haggle to 120% of market + legal fees. Good enough! Or, Beth refuses, in which case we file an eminent domain action in the same court and before the same judge; being already aware of the facts of the situation, there is nothing left to litigate, and the gavel drops quickly and predictably. This is how "quieting a question" works. It is somewhat less confrontational with the counterparty, since you are going to court, sort-of together, to resolve a hypothetical question; once we know whether we are on solid legal footing, we then are able to continue negotiating. Courts love this, because they really want people to negotiate and make consensual settlements. And if a party insists on filing a suit to on the quieted matter, they can pay their filing fees and lawyer fees to get a lecture: "we already resolved this." (Or alternately, to present new facts which mean the past ruling is no longer on-point; e.g., Beth discovers we don't want the land for a pipeline at all, but for an access road.) You can also do this with the IRS. This is called a Private Letter Ruling, and it will set you back a $750 filing fee (and legal costs, of course). You'll still get audited, but then you wave the Ruling in front of them and done. Doing this preemptively in a criminal matter would be adventuresome. Your biggest problem would be the press: it would be impossible to do this discreetly, as the case would be fascinating; and it would put every cop and prosecutor on notice that you have a mind to do the potentially illegal thing.
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Until the estate is settled and the interest in the house is definitively resolved, the estate has to pay property taxes. There is no requirement for the house to be insured, unless there is a mortgage and insurance is mandated by the lender. The duties of the personal representative generally include taking reasonable steps to protect the assets of the estate, which would include reasonable insurance coverage -- which the estate would pay for. Necessary maintenance would also be included in the things that are to covered by the estate, for example the cost of repairing a broken water pipe (which can cause serious loss, if not repaired). Freshening up the paint in preparation for selling the house, assuming that the house is to be sold and the assets divided, would also be covered by the estate. Utilities, on the other hand, are not within the realm of things that need to be done to protect the interests of the beneficiaries: that is a benefit to whoever lives there, making it their responsibility. The question is foot-dragging is a separate issue, one that should be resolved with the aid of your lawyer. I do not understand why he would maintain that the estate is responsible for paying the utilities.
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The attorney's responsibility is framed in terms of the interest of the client, which is not always money. If the trust has some social agenda, that rather than the dollar amount would be the attorney's responsibility. I would want my property to not be subdivided into smaller lots, and I would communicate that interest to my attorney, but that's just me. Since we don't know all of the facts (about you and the trust), all we can say is that "interest" and "duty" are not always about dollar amounts.
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I belive you have misread the linked article: "A Narrow Lane: Navigating Claims for Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing"/ It says thst all conrtreacts involve a duty of good faith: It is a settled principle of New York law that “all contracts imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the course of performance.” 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 98 N.Y.2d 144, 153 (2002) (collecting cases). Courts have described this covenant as a duty “encompassing any promises which a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be justified in understanding were included and which are not inconsistent with the contract.” It goes on to say that it is tempting for a plaintiff to include a bad faith claim in any contract dispute: After all, most plaintiffs probably believe that the defendant did not act in good faith and/or that the result was unfair. But it says that courts are reluctant to honor such claims in ordinary contract disputes: ... courts are loath to make rulings that might vary the terms to which the parties agreed. A party’s conduct either breaches the terms of the agreement or it does not; if it does not, that is generally the end of the line for a breach of contract claim. A party seeking to impose an additional duty on the ground that it is “implied” bears a heavy burden. In short, claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing fail far more often than they succeed. This article explores some of the nuances that make such claims particularly thorny. ... “[t]he law encourages ‘efficient breaches’”; that is, breaches committed based on the breaching party’s calculated determination that it “will still profit after compensating the other party for that party’s expectancy interest.” 28A N.Y. Prac. Contract Law § 23.2. Absent a specific provision in the contract that requires good faith, a “bad faith breach” is no different from any other. ... although a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires that the parties have a valid contract ..., such a claim will fail if it is based on the same alleged conduct that forms the basis for a cause of action for breach of the contract’s express terms. See Kim v. Francis, 184 A.D.3d 413, 414 (1st Dept. 2020). So the article explicitly says that a claim for breach of contract does not automatically imply a breach of good faith. To the contrary, something more is required.
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In a civil rights action in which someone prevails (which is by no means certain in this case, but not impossible either), there is at a minimum an award of nominal damages (i.e. $1) and the reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs incurred in the lawsuit. A jury could also award a prevailing party non-economic damages, and/or exemplary damages (a.k.a punitive damages) in connection with a violation of civil rights. There might also be injunctive or declaratory relief stating that this was a violation of civil rights and requiring the government to adopt practices to prevent harm going forward. It is hard to see how there would be any economic damages at issue in this case, but it isn't impossible to imagine some circumstances in which they could be proven, perhaps.
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I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.
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Attorney-Client privilege is a one-way duty: The Attorney has to maintain protected information in confidence. It's a professional duty supported in law. There is no corresponding duty for the Client to maintain anything in confidence. The client can waive the privilege at will. Some sample limitations to waivers are governed by Federal Rule Evidence 502. (Granted, in this scenario the concerned board member may be bound by some confidentiality agreement or fiduciary obligation as a consequence of service on the board, or membership in the association, but that's a different matter.) The ABA points out , in its article "How to Lose Attorney-Client Privilege" that: Either voluntary or inadvertent disclosure to outside or non-covered recipients, professional advisors outside the privilege, and experts and consultants, can result in waiver as a matter of law. In this "Ten Things" article the author points out: Business advice, however, is never privileged and – for in-house counsel in particular – the line between the two can appear blurry. ... If a document that is otherwise privileged is shared with third parties, then the privilege is lost. ... A common misperception among the business is that all confidential information is privileged or if they label the communication as privileged they can keep the documents out of the hands of third parties. As we’ve seen, this is not correct and the fact that there is a non-disclosure agreement or other type of confidentiality agreement in place will not make a document privileged nor will it preserve the privilege if it is disclosed to a third party.
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At what point do immigrants acquire the right to due process I am asking this because president Trump is calling for sending immigrants who approach the border from Mexico to be sent back without due process. I strongly suspect that it is illegal but a lot of googling and watching cable TV has not pinned down a possible loophole. While it is completely uncontroversial that any person on US soil has the right to due process, I have not seen anything that gives these rights to people who approach the border but are prevented from crossing it. Specifically, what allows them to be granted admission, activating their right to due process. The fourteenth amendment does explicitly protect “...life, liberty, or property, without due process...within its jurisdiction...”. questions: - does interaction with a US border guard, even if one isn’t yet in the country, count as “within its(USA) jurisdiction”? - does refusal of admittance violate any of life, liberty or property? - is the proposal of the president legal? I had expected that this question would be answered here alreadynbut I was unable to find anything.
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An individual obtains due process rights upon entering into the United States. For a recent write-up on this question, see this piece at Reason. The people Trump is talking about generally aren't being denied admission at an established, legal border crossing; they're coming across wherever they can get through, and only being discovered by federal agents thereafter. Because they're already in the United States, they have due process rights. As for cross-border interactions with ICE or CBP, the extent of due process protections is still an open question. SCOTUS took it up last year, but it kicked the case back to a lower court rather than deciding it.
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The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
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The US has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in the US. Canada has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in Canada. As added complications, if you are a Mexican citizen then Mexico has jurisdiction and if your victim is Chinese then China has jurisdiction. If you get arrested on an Interpol warrant in Spain then Spain has jurisdiction. And so on ... Your implicit assumption is that jurisdiction is exclusive, it isn't. Any country (or sub-national jurisdiction) that claims jurisdiction has jurisdiction, at least to the extent of testing that claim. Whether any given polity has jurisdiction depends on the particular law involved, some laws are only applicable within that countries borders others are extra-territorial, some are applicable to citizens but not non-citizens or vice-versa, etc.
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"Police" that one would generally encounter in the US are local or state agencies, and the ordinary crimes you mentioned are matters of state law, so they would be reported to local or state police. (There are federal law enforcement agencies, but they only deal with specialized areas of federal law, and you wouldn't ordinarily encounter them in daily life.) On the other hand, immigration is a matter of federal law. The responsibilities of local or state police are governed by state law, and the federal government cannot compel state officers to enforce federal law. A specific state's law could potentially require state and local police to ask about people's immigration status and/or ask the federal government to check on the status of someone they suspect might be illegal. I believe a few red states have enacted, or are considering, such laws, though they usually deal with people stopped by police rather than people filing a report. Some of these laws have been challenged in court, and I am not sure which exact parts of which laws are still being implemented for each of those states. Most states do not have such laws.
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In the United States, the government has, multiple times, destroyed homes while trying to catch a fugitive. And the homeowner sometimes makes a claim in federal court that this is an unconstitutional taking without compensation in violation of the 5th Amendment. In Lech v. Jackson, the 10th Circuit decided that the police and city were not liable for destroying a house while trying to arrest a criminal who had fled there. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case. But in Baker v. City of McKinney, Texas, less than 3 months ago, a district court declined to dismiss a case in which police destroyed a home to catch a fleeing criminal. Allegedly, in this case the police were given a key to the door, a garage door opener, and the code to the back gate by the homeowner - and instead of using those, they used explosives on the garage door and used a BearCat to knock down the fence and the front door. I'm not sure to what extent those facts, perhaps showing that the scale of the destruction was unnecessary, matter. To the best of my knowledge the case is still ongoing.
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Miranda rights do not attach until the suspect is subject to custodial interrogation. "Custody" means that the suspect reasonably believes that he is not free to leave the conversation. "Interrogation" means that the officer is engaging in direct questioning or other conduct that would reasonably be expected to elicit a response. A suspect is free to waive his Miranda rights and begin speaking without a lawyer, but a waiver must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary. "Voluntary" means that the waiver is obtained without coercion (torture, threats or promises) by the government. None of the five scenarios indicate that Clyde ever believes he is in custody, so he has no Miranda rights in any of them, making his confession admissible in all of them. But to play it out further, let's assume that Officer Olivia arrives and immediately slaps handcuffs on Clyde: No interrogation, no Miranda rights. The confession is admissible. No interrogation, no Miranda rights. The confession is admissible. Miranda rights attached at the beginning of questioning. Clyde waived by confessing. Reading the Miranda rights established that the waiver was knowing. We don't have any facts suggesting the waiver was not intelligent. The waiver was not obtained by government coercion, so it was voluntary. The waiver was effective, so the confession is admissible. Same as 3. No interrogation, no Miranda rights. The confession is admissible. The key thing to keep in mind here is that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was to avoid misconduct by the government, and it has generally been implemented only to that end. The key case here is Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), which involved a guy who approached a police officer and asked to talk about a murder he had committed. The officer Mirandized him, and he told them all about the murder and where he buried the body. It turned out that he was a chronic schizophrenic and was going through a psychotic break at the time of the confession, which he had only offered because "God's voice" told him to. As with your truth serum scenario, the question became whether the Miranda waiver satisfied the voluntariness requirement. The Colorado Supreme Court held that "capacity for rational judgment and free choice may be overborne as much by certain forms of severe mental illness as by external pressure." But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the defendant's due-process rights nor his right against self-incrimination are offended by non-governmental influences, even when they undercut the defendant's free will. Since then, other courts have relied on Connelly to hold that voluntariness was not defeated by: a suspect's flu, hangover, hunger, or exhaustion, U.S. v. Elwood, 51 F.3d 283 (9th Cir. 1995); a suspect's heroin use, Elliott v. Williams, 248 F.3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001); a suspect's heroin withdrawal, U.S. v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1992); a suspect's orders from his father, N. Mariana Islands v. Doe, 844 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1988); or a suspect's unusual susceptibility to suggestion or intimidation, U.S. v. Guerro, 983 F.2d 1001, 1004 (10th Cir. 1993). tl;dr: Because the truth serum was not administered by the government, the confession is admissible in all five scenarios.
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Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here).
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In the case of United States vs Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (a 6-2 decision), the Supreme Court wrote: [T]he real object of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in qualifying the words, "All persons born in the United States" by the addition "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the National Government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases -- children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign State -- both of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England and by our own law from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country. ... [T]he Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States. ... To hold that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution excludes from citizenship the children, born in the United States, of citizens or subjects of other countries would be to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German, or other European parentage who have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United States. In short the phrase “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” excludes three and only three groups of people: Children born to foreign diplomats here on diplomatic business, who have diplomatic immunity to US Law; Children of members of an invading army that has occupied and controlled some part of US territory, born on that occupied area, who are obviously not subject to US Law (which has rarely happened in the US, although Guam was occupied during WWII, and parts of Alaska, and small parts of Maine during the War of 1812); and Members of Native American tribes, subject to the jurisdiction of their tribal governments, who do not pay US taxes. (This was true when the 14th amendment was passed, but it no longer is. See section below on the act that changed it in 1924.) Any other person born in the proper US or in incorporated US territory is a citizen, no matter who his or her parents are or were. (The case is less clear for unincorporated US territory.) See also the Wikipedia article on the case This view was confirmed in 1995 in an opinion from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel written by then-Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, taking the position that this rule could not be changed by legislation, only by Constitutional Amendment, writing: My office grapples with many difficult and close issues of constitutional law. The lawfulness of this bill is not among them. This legislation is unquestionably unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment declares that “[a]ll persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. The unmistakable purpose of this provision was to constitutionalize the existing Anglo-American common law rule of jus soli or citizenship by place of birth and especially to extend it to persons of African descent and their descendants. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) the Supreme Court of the United States struck down both a state statute denying funding for education to children in the United States illegally and a municipal school district's attempt to charge an annual $1,000 tuition fee for each student. The case upheld the same principle that the constitutional phrase "within the jurisdiction" applies to the children of people who had entered the US illegally. According to the Wikipedia article on the case: Texas officials had argued that illegal aliens were not "within the jurisdiction" of the state and thus could not claim protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court majority rejected this claim, finding instead that "no plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment 'jurisdiction' can be drawn between resident immigrants whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident immigrants whose entry was unlawful." The dissenting opinion also rejected this claim, agreeing with the Court that "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to immigrants who, after their illegal entry into this country, are indeed physically 'within the jurisdiction' of a state." Thus the question of whether such aliens were "within the jurisdiction" of the US was very much at issue in Plyler v. Doe EDIT: Since the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 was passed, all Native Americans born within the US have been citizens by birth, and the third class of exceptions noted in the earlier cases non longer exists. Prior to this act Native Americans were in many ways treated as foreigners by the US. They were not citizens by birth, and their tribes had some but not all of the attributes of independent nations. The text of the law is: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all non citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided That the granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property. (End edit on Indian Citizenship Act of 1924) Edit: On reading through the decision of the case of Wong Kim Ark I find one more small exclusion: persons born on board a foreign naval ship, even though present in US waters in time of peace, are not citizens of the US because of their birth location. This is apparently not a usual case, but is premised on the ground that a military vessel remains the territory of the nation it belongs to. Such persons might of course be citizens by inheritance if one or both parents are US citizens, and the statutory conditions are complied with. (The term "public ship" in the 1800s was used to mean a national ship, that is a military ship.) (End edit on naval ships) I just learned that some parts of the State of Maine were occupied by the British during the war of 1812. I do not know if anyone was born during that occupation whose citizenship might have been affected.
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Are there only two, or are there three, forms of conventional involuntary servitude in the antebellum U.S.A.? In 1865 the 13th Amendment provided that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime, shall exist in the United States. I have heard it said that slavery and indentured servitude are the two forms of servitude that were abolished. However, a commonplace practice was that parents signed up their 12- or 13- or 14-year-old son as an apprentice to a tradesman, and such an apprentice was forbidden to resign. If he left his master, the master would advertise in newspapers that whoever found him should arrest him and return him to his master, and the master would sue anyone who employed his "runaway apprentice" (google that term!) and the court would award damages. Was that kind of apprenticeship also abolished by the 13th Amendment?
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This depends on how far along you're waiting for court rulings to set in, and if you count laws of Congress passed under the 13th amendment's enforcement clause. There were quite a lot of things that got ruled as violations of the 13th and 14th amendments (mostly the 14th), but many were not ruled or legislated that way for decades. Some were even ruled to have an essentially opposite effect of what the current (overturning) precedents do. "Separate but equal" was challenged on 13th amendment grounds, but was upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), and wasn't overturned, on 14th amendment grounds, until 58 years later in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Your particular situation sounds like peonage, which was outlawed by Congress in 1867 via the enforcement clause. This law specifically banned "the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise." However, peonage cases continued to make their way into the courts for more than 40 years thereafter, such as Clyatt v. United States (1905)— which ruled that peonage was involuntary servitude— and Bailey v. Alabama (1911). These cases affirmed that the 13th amendment abolished not just chattel slavery but essentially all forms of involuntary or indentured servitude (except as punishment for a crime). Though exactly what qualifies as "involuntary servitude" is still something courts decide on a case-by-case basis; the draft doesn't, nor does mandatory community service to graduate high school.
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It isn't a double negative, although it is a bit of an usual phrasing. The context that you are overlooking is that the United States Constitution does not say who is or is not allowed to vote because that authority is not vested in the federal government. There is no affirmative right to vote in the United States Constitution, there is merely a right not to be denied the right to vote for certain particular reasons. Responsibility for determining who is allowed to vote is vested in state governments. The right to vote for the House of Representatives is derivative of that decision pursuant to Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution which states: The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. The 19th Amendment prohibits state's from denying the right to vote on account of sex, but does not prohibit states from denying the right to vote on account of other grounds not specified in the 19th Amendment, such as property ownership, education, criminal record, possession of identification, etc. When the 19th Amendment was ratified, in 1920, some states (e.g. Colorado) already allowed women to vote, while others did not. Similarly, when the 15th Amendment was ratified some states prevented people from voting based upon race and others did not. And, so on. In practice, the modern trend is for states to enact laws allowing all U.S. citizens age eighteen or over to vote, subject primarily to limitations that vary quite a bit based upon criminal record or incarceration status. But, historically, when the power to set the franchise was vested in the states, race, gender, property ownership, age (in excess of eighteen), poll tax payments, and "civics" tests, have all been used at sometime or another to limit the right to vote. There is, however, some incentive for states not to be restrictive, because certain kinds of restrictions reduce the population of the state under the U.S. Constitution for purposes of allocated members of Congress and electoral votes. This is set forth in Section 2 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution (ratified in 1868) which states: Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. (Incidentally, there are no longer any people who qualify as "Indians not taxed" in the U.S. due to federal legislation that was adopted after 1868.) This set a presumptive baseline that males twenty-one years of age not disqualified by a criminal record are allowed to vote, but with a penalty for not doing so imposed at the state level in apportionment rather than in the form of a prohibition against doing so, before express prohibitions against certain kinds of restrictions of the franchise were adopted in the 15th, 19th, 24th and 26th Amendments. It is also useful to compare the examples of the 15th Amendment (ratified 1870), the 24th Amendment (ratified 1964) and the 26th Amendment (ratified 1971), which are parallel to the 19th Amendment and wouldn't make sense against a backdrop that the population, by default, is allowed to vote. Article XV (Amendment 15 - Rights of Citizens to Vote) The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. and Amendment XXIV (Amendment 24 - Abolition of the Poll Tax Qualification in Federal Elections) The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. and Amendment XXVI (Amendment 26 - Reduction of Voting Age Qualification) 1: The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age. affects 15 2: The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
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This was at least a feature of Athenian law. In the Aristarchus of Isaeus (early 4th century BC), it is recorded that "the law expressly forbids any child—or woman—to contract for the disposal of more than a bushel of barley". This is a sufficiently ancient and transmissible principle of law that there well may have been Egyptian and Sumerian analogs. You might get the details that you seek by focusing on medieval English common law.
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There appears to be no specific number of hours. This article touches on the matter, presenting a slew of cases where e.g. the prisoner was on a hunger strike (self-imposed starvation is not cruel and unusual punishment). Gardener v. Beale upheld a 2-meal plan with 18 hours between dinner and brunch to be allowed. This was, however a temporary exception rather than a long term policy which was to provide 3 meals not spaced further apart than 12 hours. There does not seem to be any period deemed to be legally too long, however a prison system may have (probably does) have a policy, which cannot simply be ignored.
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He has this phrased like it's the ability to decide which laws you follow, and that it's an ability being withheld from the general public (although I seriously doubt that at least the former is the case). This is yet another false claim made by "freemen" or those who claim "common law defences". Notice of Understanding has no legal meaning unless the context demands that it evidences a meeting of the minds for the purposes of contract formation. It is a well-settled principle of common law that in order to be bound by a contract, there must be an agreement. Put simply, I cannot bind someone simply by sending them a Notice unless it is a right conferred on me by some earlier statute or legislation, or legally binding agreement. I tried searching for a solid definition, but all I could find was people/organization's Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights. The reason you've found nothing official about the terms Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights is that there is nothing official or legal about those terms. They are ordinary terms with ordinary meaning being bastardised by deluded people who believe they can fine the government and refuse to be bound by the law of the land. Of course, none of this holds up. What is the purpose of declaring your Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights? It might make you feel better, even though it has no legal, practical or other effect.
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Early in the history of the US, various states passed laws adopting the then extant common law and at least some of the statutory law of Great Britain (much of which was in origin the Law of England) as law in those states. Such laws would still be valid, unless later acts had amended or replaced particular provisions. Tracing which provisions had since been altered would be a massive task. Basic common law, particularly definitions of crimes such as fraud, theft, murder, and of torts such as conversion, slander, libel, and the like will probably be largely unchanged, with some modifications. Blackstone's Commentaries remained a significant legal text used in training lawyers and in legal practice in the US through much of the nineteenth century.
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Since this apparently amends the law giving colleges and universities the power to adopt and enforced various regulations, what it really means is that if such an institution adopts a rule in violation of this law, it may not legally enforce that law. It might also give an affected student a right to sue if such a rule is adopted and enforced. As a comment by ohwilleke mentions, such a law might well authorize a court to issue an injunction forbidding the institution from enforcing the kind of rule prohibited by the law. Note that it is not at all uncommon to have "or else" provisions in different sections of the law. For example Section 123 of the (hypothetical) New France state code might prohibit having a faked driver's license, section 124 prohibit obtaining a license through false or misleading statements on nthe application, and section 458 say "anyone who violates sections 123, 124, 125, or 126 shall be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned for up to 1 year, or both, as a court may think just". Thus it is not always easy to find what penalties, if any, apply to a code section.
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The Fifth Amendment, and all the other amendments in the "Bill of Rights" (numbers 1-10) were universally understood when passed to be restrictions on the Federal Government only. The courts treated them that way through the end of the US Civil War. This was made definite in the US Supreme Court case Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) Since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment the courts have decided that most of the provisions of the bill of rights also apply to actions by the states. A few do not apply, such as the requirement that indictments be by a grand jury, and the Third Amendment ban on quartering soldiers in private dwellings. This was done through a somewhat roundabout mechanism -- the Supreme Court decided that the protections of the Bill of Rights were included in the Due process clause of the 14th. As a result not all the provisions were made applicable at the same time. (Most were held to be incorporated during the period from 1925-1985. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) thru Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)). Modern legal opinions sometimes discuss incorporation as if it was a fact from the passage of the 14th in 1868. But the actual gradual process is clear in the case law. For example, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases was first incorporated in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), but only for death penalty cases, and only if "special circumstances" existed, such as a defendant who was illiterate, far from home and support, or feeble-minded. Later cases gradually found "special circumstances" in more and more fact patterns, and in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) the Court extended the right to all felony cases. It has later been extended to misdemeanor cases if jail time is a possible result. A similar history could be spelled out for the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination, or for the Fourth's against search and seizure, particularly the "exclusionary rule". I, and a number of legal scholars who have better rights to an opinion, think that the 14th's "Privileges and Immunities" clause would have been a more sensible means to this end, but for various reasons that isn't how it was done. Justice Thomas seems to be trying to reverse this -- he has made comments in a number of opinions of late that various things should be protected under the Privileges and Immunities clause of the 14th, rather than the Due Process clause.. Even if the Court adopts this theory, it probably won't change many outcomes. That is how the Fifth, and other Bill of rights Provisions like the Fourth (search and seizure) and the First (free speech and religion) have been applied to restrict the states. None of these provisions directly restrict private individuals. In some cases, courts have said that while individuals may not be forbidden to do things that are forbidden to governments under the Bill of Rights, the courts will not help you do such things, such as by enforcing contracts to do them. No person shall be held to answer for a... crime "held to answer" here means prosecuted in court. Only governments do that. That provision forbids criminal court cases that do not start with a grand Jury indictment. it is one of the few Bill of Rights provisions which the Supreme Court has held do not apply to the states. But in any case it is purely procedural. It doesn't say that crimes may not be prosecuted, nor that they must. It says only "if you want to try someone for a crime, this is a step you must go through." The other provisions of the Fifth all do apply to the states, such as the ban on double jeopardy, and the protection against self-incrimination. does that mean that government can declare it legal for citizens to kill a particular person? No. That would violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause if don3 by the Federal Government, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause and its Equal Protection clause if done by a state. It would probably also violate the provision against Bills of Attainder, and perhaps the provision against cruel and unusual punishment. Once upon a time, several hundred years before the US was founded, the government of England did just that. It was called "outlawry". For certain crimes, the punishment was to be put "outside the law". An "outlaw" (in this older sense) was not protected by the law. Anyone could kill an outlaw, or steal from one, and the legal system would do nothing about it. The US has never used outlawry.
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Parking rules in associations I live in a condo association, i have 2 parking spaces that came assigned with the property, im an owner. if I want a friend, neighbor, anyone to park in any of my parking spaces, lets say because im not at home and I just let a friend to park in there while Im working, can security remove the car from my parking space?
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Very likely. You may own your parking space, but when you bought your condo you also signed a contract agreeing to abide by the rules of the condo association. Condo associations typically have rules that all cars parked on the property must be registered with the association. If you didn't register your friend's car with the association, they have no way of known that it isn't some random person trespassing to score free parking. Some associations may have additional rules limiting parking to residents of the building. Get in touch with your association and find out what the rules are. You should have been given a copy of the association rules when you closed on the purchase of the condo.
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Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions, (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear. (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease.
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Zoning is controlled by the municipality (and possibly state, given where KC is) so you would have to check the rules for the municipality of interest and look at the specific zoning designation (e.g. RP-OE, R-2, MXD). Here for example is a page of code from Overland Park, which tells you that RP-4 land can be used for a private park, but agriculture is not a listed permitted use. You might argue with city hall over whether a giant garden is agriculture, and you might even win the argument (if it is a garden where you don't harvest product). Private / non-commercial is not likely to be the controlling factor over agricultural use.
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It's illegal to (temporarily) break an item The commercial car park owner may not aim the camera at Alice garden. However, even if it does so, breaking the camera or damaging it is still illegal - as one of the various forms of destruction/damaging of property colloquially called vandalism. Do note that the very article and the clasification of laser OP links to points out that *even a low-powered "pet-safe" IIIb/3R laser leaves out burnt-out pixels with a pinkish surrounding. These might not be enough to prevent identification when not aiming the laser into the camera, but they are damage to the sensor. The very article also describes how the camera damage progresses even after exposure, possibly due to the high power lasers. However, even if no such damage occurs, the owner of the camera is (temporarily) deprived of its legal uses while the laser is pointed on it, which is in many jurisdictions enough to count as theft.
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In the US, the laws that govern habitable residences and the related issues - such as land zoning, health regulations, sewer and water services, private and commercial building codes, etc. - are very localized at the city and county levels. So you need to check with the city and county where you want to place such a structure and determine the relevant laws. Commercial buildings are much more heavily regulated than private residences. (And some federal laws and codes could supersede local laws.) Many cities and counties have their zoning and building codes and requirements online, as well as permitting systems to apply for building and utility hookup permits. It's true that some counties in the US have minimal zoning or building codes, so yes, you could move a shed to land you own in that county and build your own road, haul your water, put up solar panels, dig an outhouse, and not deal with any - or very few - regulations. But cities and towns will be much more regulated, since zoning and building codes are used to insure public safety, and services such as water and sewer are supported by taxes and protect public health. In other words, you may not legally be able to live in a shed that does not have city sewer, water and electric service. There may also be building codes for minimum size of bedrooms, egress windows for fire, ventilation, heating systems, so even if a small house is sold as a complete residence in a package, it may not pass local building codes. Breaking zoning, building and health codes can result in the local inspectors visiting and determining if the residence is up to code; they will not typically need a warrant or your permission to enter. They can order you to bring the residence up to code, if possible; or condemn the structure and require you to move out.
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This recently came up in a local PA homeowner association. Legally they own the roads in their development, but they have erected stop signs to make it clear who has the right of way and asked the township police to enforce them. A resident challenged the right of the police to enforce traffic laws on private property, but lost his appeal (albeit at the municipal level). The judge explained that the residents and any visitors had a reasonable expectation that the traffic signs would be obeyed, and that therefore violating them was just as dangerous as violating them on public roads, and that the same law and penalties would therefore be applied.
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Let us assume you want to open a restaurant in Baltimore, in a C4 location. The zoning table Table 10-301 indicates that you can open a restaurant there. While you cannot generally establish a residence there, you can apply for permission for Above Non-Residential Ground Floor or Live-Work residence. Live-Work is essentially "artist's loft", so not applicable. There are a few Industrial zones where a restaurant might be allowed and such a residence might be allowed ("bio-science campus"). You could check the map to get information on a specific location. If you're not in Baltimore, check that location's zoning ordinances and zoning map.
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Regarding concern one: I don't know much of anything about historical landmarks and how they get exempted from certain laws. However, I can tell you that the law generally prefers safety over preserving historical value. It is highly unlikely that a court would ever consider a plant that has existed for any number of years to be of more value than a pedestrian's or driver's safety, and thus requiring that the hedge be trimmed or removed to allow for that safety would be far more important. As well, your argument that cutting or removing the hedges would decrease the value of the property isn't the strongest argument. Currently, you have hedges that violate a local law. That immediately decreases the value of your property because a part of your property is in violation of ordinances that would have to be corrected in order for the sale of the property to go through, because most homeowners do not want to buy a property with a burden attached to it. Thus, a potential buyer would likely stipulate that the hedges be removed before they consider buying, or they might also stipulate a lower price so they can use the difference between buying and list price to remove the hedges themselves after the sale. Sure, if you only include the part of "this property has beautiful hedges" then the property value goes up, but once you tack on "which are also in violation of law" that value you just gained is immediately negated. Now in your specific case you mentioned that it hangs a foot over an eight-foot wide sidewalk. That is an abnormally wide sidewalk (a standard sidewalk in most places is only around three feet wide, with some extending up to five feet). I've only personally seen eight-foot or more wide sidewalks in very heavily trafficked areas, which from your "small town" description doesn't sound like the case there. You might be able to argue that in your particular case, due to the size of the sidewalk, that the hedges do not actually inhibit the safety of pedestrians and thus the ordinance shouldn't apply, but there's no guarantee that would work (it sounds like the city council already decided that they want it enforced there). However, if it is hanging over into the street in any capacity, you are pretty much out of luck. It's unlikely you would ever get an exception for that kind of violation. Regarding concern two: You're widely conflating "daily" and "excessive" to mean the same thing. Daily fines are not automatically excessive fines, and it is not in any way unconstitutional for a fine to be assessed on a daily basis. The laws you cite about excessive fines refer to the cumulative total of the fine. At a certain point of assessing a fine on a daily basis, the amount reaches a point where it is an excessive amount to pay. In a situation like that, it makes far more sense to stop increasing the fine and instead jail the person as they have shown a clear disregard for the law and a willingness not to comply with the law. Continuing to fine them has proven not to deter them any further from breaking the law, and that a massive fine does not justly punish them for the actions they have taken. A different punishment is warranted. This is the premise of the case you cite in your question. Brunk argued that a cumulative fine of over $100,000 for his violations was quite excessive and appealed on that argument. I don't know what the final outcome of his appeal was, because that particular court did not make a decision (rather they vacated the amount and sent it back to a lower court for reconsideration to determine if that amount was fair). It's entirely possible he still ended up with the same fine in the end. Regarding concern three: There is nothing remotely illegal about this. So long as there is a city ordinance that allows the officer to write such a citation, the officer is perfectly within his authority to write such fine and threaten such fine for noncompliance. A law in its natural form is a threat. The government body that created that law is issuing a threat to all of its citizens that if they do this thing, then this fine or amount of jail time will be applied to them. We just don't think of laws as threats in that regard when we talk about them. An officer reiterating that to you does not constitute anything other than them telling you what the law is and what can happen if you disobey it. Now if the officer threatened something against you that is not mandated by law, that would be a more serious concern that potentially could have some legal consequences for them. But there's no evidence that occurred here. Your situation in general: If you're hoping for some constitutional argument that you can throw in the officer's face to get him to back off, you're not going to find one. Generally that part of the constitution is only reviewed after fines have been handed down. You would first need to be fined and have a judge review the case to determine a total amount of how much you will be fined for all the cumulative violations. At that point if you believe it is excessive and in violation of the constitution, you would challenge the decision in court or appeal the decision if the case has already been closed. But even then, the fine would not be dropped. It would just be reduced to a value that some other judge reviewing the appeal thinks is a fair, non-excessive amount for a fine given the specific details of your case. Your case details do matter. For example, if you just argue with the officer the entire time and do nothing to resolve the problem identified, a judge might consider a much higher value vs if you actively worked to resolve the problem but just weren't capable of doing it fast enough. "Excessive" here is a completely subjective term that is different for every single case. No one can tell you whether something is excessive until the final number has been totaled and given out. Consider the two alternatives I just mentioned above. If both of those cases were in trial at the same time, they would both likely end up with different amounts for fines and, on appeal, one might succeed in convincing a judge that the fine was excessive and one might not. Better options: You could talk to the officer and explain to him that you are not capable of doing the work that quickly without hiring additional help, which you cannot afford. But that may only work once. If the issue arises again in the future (say next year), the officer likely won't be as forgiving since you've been warned about the hedges hanging over the sidewalks and streets before. If anything at all, it will show a court that you attempted to work out an arrangement of some sort to fix the problem, and were trying to cooperate. If it ended up in court for some reason, that interaction would be immensely helpful to you. As well, you'll want to consult an attorney for exact interpretations of the city's ordinances to make sure that this is actually against the law and how the law punishes its violation. Many cities have ordinances forbidding trees and other plants from obstructing sidewalks and roadways for safety concerns, but not all. As well, I've found it is much more common for a city to impose a single fine for a violation like that if the warning is ignored. The city would then send out its own crew to rectify the problem and then charge the resident for labor, materials, and removal costs. However, if the city does not have their own Public Works department, that may not be an option for them. If you do find more specifics about how the law is to be enforced, politely tell the officer that. It won't get you out of trouble, and he may still have the legal authority to fine you in some way according to the actual law, but knowing the exact details of your township may give you more peace of mind in knowing the actual limitations of how much you can be fined.
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Is it illegal to run away from a police officer in a way that provokes them, in the US? So I know this is very silly and obviously hypothetical, but I've wondered about it for a while. Let's say you aren't doing anything (else) illegal, you don't have anything illegal on you, and you don't have any warrants for your arrest or anything. And let's say we're talking about this occurring in the USA. Now let's say there's a cop on the street and you're walking by him, and suddenly you yell "Oh shit! The police!" and then bolt down the street in the opposite direction, such that they clearly heard you say that and see you running. Is that illegal? First, assuming that the cop doesn't chase you. Is it just illegal to "provoke" a cop like this? Then let's assume the cop is intrigued and does chase you. Is it illegal to keep running? Would it make a difference whether he yelled for you to stop or not?
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Bobstro gave the practical answer, that it's a stupid idea for many reason. This is for the US in general, states may have laws that say otherwise. It is not illegal to provoke someone or a government official (police), it's done all the time in protest (not riots). It is not illegal to run from a cop who has not detained you in any way, or has not issued an order to you. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that people not suspected of criminal activity can ignore a police officer who approaches them. Wisconsin has even said, that even after a police officer knocked on your window, you can still leave. However, it may give probable cause, especially with the statement of "Oh shit! The police!" It IS illegal to run from a cop who has detained you or issued a lawful order. The order "STOP" is a lawful order, and from that point on, you are committing a crime if you do not stop. For your case, check out the NYTimes article "Supreme Court Roundup; Flight Can Justify Search By Police, High Court Rules".
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united-states This question does not indicate in what jurisdiction the hypothetical events take place. Since they are hypothetical, I am going to assume the United States. Perhaps other answers will be given for other jurisdictions. I would be interested to read such answers. The Officer's Authority In the hypothetical situation described, it would appear that the police officer had no warrant or other court order, and that he did not have any probable cause to believe that any criminal activity was in progress, or that any crime had been committed. Indeed it would appear that the officer did not even have the "reasonable suspicion" required for a so-called Terry stop (named for the case, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) in which such stops were declared legal). In any case the encounter described is not a Terry stop, because such a stop takes place "on the street" or in a public place, not on private property. So far it seems that the police office is acting without lawful authority. When the man orders the officer to leave his property, the demand is lawful, and by not leaving, the officer becomes a trespasser, unless the officer has some justification not mentioned in the question. The Duty to Comply However, once the officer starts to give orders, the other person must generally treat them as lawful. There are exceptions: Officers cannot compel people to commit crimes, nor to submit to rape or murder. But orders given for the ostensible protection of the officer have particular deference. As the US Supreme court said in Terry v. Ohio (cited above): ... we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is, in fact, carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. (emphasis added) Resisting the Officer Following the logic of Terry Courts tend to give deference to police assertions of the need to protect themselves. The modern tread is to require citizens to submit to police orders in such cases, even if the citizen believes the order to be unlawful, and even if the court eventually agrees. In many states, violent resistance to such orders would be a crime even if the order was later ruled unlawful. In every US state, he use of deadly force, by drawing and firing a gun at a police officer who has issued possibly unlawful orders, but has not threatened the life or well being of anyone, and has not used any force at all, would be clearly criminal. Nolo Press's article on "Resisting Unlawful arrest" says: Historically, American citizens were legally entitled to use reasonable force to resist unlawful arrest. Some states continue to follow this rule, while others don’t. A statute rejecting the traditional rule might say something like this: “You can’t use force to resist if you know or should know that you’re being arrested by a police officer, regardless of whether the arrest is legal.” ... It’s critical to note that one can be convicted of resisting arrest even without having committed the crime that was the basis for the arrest. It should be understood that even in those US states which follow the "traditional rule" and permit resistance to an unlawful arrest, only "reasonable force" is permitted. Shooting a gun at an officer is deadly force, and will not be reasonable unless the person has a justified belief that the officer is about to kill or seriously injure the arrestee or another person without justification. Also, if the arrest is somehow lawful, even though the arrestee reasonably believed it to be unlawful, the use of even "reasonable" force is no longer permitted, and the arrestee may be convicted of resisting arrestee and other crimes. This makes resistance a dangerous gamble, even in states that follow the traditional rule. In addition, resistance is all too likely to lead to escalation of the conflict, and end with the arrestee shot dead or seriously injured. Even if the officer's actions are later held unlawful, that will not bring the arrestee back to life. Under Color of Law The question asks if the office's actions are taken "under color of law". They are, in US law. This does not mean that the acts are lawful or proper. Rather it means that they are take by means of legal authority. Such acts therefore constitute "state action" subject to the limitations of the 14th Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. The Wikipedia article on this topic (linked above) says: ... just because something is done with the "color of law" does not mean that the action was lawful. When police act outside their lawful authority and violate the civil rights of a citizen, the FBI is tasked with investigating. The well known "section 1983" (42 USC. § 1983) provides a private right of action in such cases, saying: Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... Here the hypothetical officer's entry onto private property, his refusal to leave when ordered by the owner, his order to put down the pistol and step away from the other guns (implying an arrest or detention), his order to stop recording and turn over the record, and his drawing of his firearm are all acts taken "under color of law", and had the citizen submitted, he could have subsequently filed a Sec 1983 suit against the officer, although he would have had to establish harm done to collect more than nominal damages. The officer is relying on his authority as a police officer to enforce his orders, and indeed to support his presence on private property. This makes his actions clearly done "under color of law".
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It would not work. There is apparently a common misconception in Georgia that this would be the case, based on Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III (b)(1) of the Georgia constitution, which says: No county may exercise any of the powers listed in subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph [including police protection] or provide any service listed therein inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county affected. What many people miss is the clause right before that: "Unless otherwise provided by law." Georgia courts have held that the law does provide otherwise when pursuing someone for a traffic offense: The plaintiff contends that when the collision occurred, the policeman-deputy sheriff had no authority to be pursuing the Mitchell car because he was outside the county in which he had a power of arrest. While ordinarily a peace officer has power of arrest only in the territory of the governmental unit by which he was appointed, there are two exceptions to the rule present in this case. Code Ann. s 92A-509, which deals with arrests for traffic offenses, provides by implication that certain officers (including deputy sheriffs) have arrest powers for these offenses outside their appointed territories. City of Winterville v. Strickland, 127 Ga. App. 716, 718, 194 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1972). What that case decided in 1972, the principle was in place well before the boys began their hijinks. I don't know of any state where the law is different, though the answer would be different if the boys crossed into another state.
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In addition to the general considerations of (1) who is allowed to use non-deadly physical force to maintain order in a shop (which I think that one could do if "deputized" by the property owner or to protect the property of another as well), and (2) the use of non-deadly physical force to make a citizen's arrest (which many of these scenarios would justify as the disorder would be a crime if committed by an adult), (3) I suspect that there is also some point at which a bystander may intervene to prevent harms associated with an unsupervised minor being at large and in need of supervision. Generally speaking, intervention with the minimum reasonable non-deadly physical force to prevent property damage, or an assault, or a threat, is going to be permissible. As to the third reason: for a mentally normal ten-year-old that might be a stretch; for a four-year-old or a clearly impaired older child it might not. One could approach the child, say, "where's your mom or dad", "do you have a babysitter or sibling around?", "what is your name?", or "are you lost?" and detain the child until a satisfactory answer is provided or a suitable authority arrives, to prevent the problem of a child being lost, abducted or hurt by the child's own actions. It would be quite hard for a parent, guardian or babysitter to complain about this kind of conduct when the child was unsupervised and is released as soon as you confirm that this really is a responsible adult or older minor who is responsible for the child. It would be important in doing so to not secret away or isolate the child, to try to determine the location of the child's caretaker, to refrain from doing anything that would harm the child, and to seek assistance from an authority within a reasonable time. Typically, if no caretaker appeared, a cop would come and the cop would oversee the situation until a social worker could come. For example, Colorado has the following statute that would apply once a cop arrived (omitting lengthy provisions that apply to newborn children): § 19-3-401. Taking children into custody (1) A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court: (a) When the child is abandoned, lost, or seriously endangered in such child's surroundings or seriously endangers others and immediate removal appears to be necessary for such child's protection or the protection of others; (b) When there are reasonable grounds to believe that such child has run away or escaped from such child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has not made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home; . . . (1.3) A child shall be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home. (1.5) An emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered as described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the child from the child's home. If such an emergency exists, a child shall be removed from such child's home and placed in protective custody regardless of whether reasonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. (2) The taking of a child into temporary custody under this section shall not be deemed an arrest, nor shall it constitute a police record. A child is considered neglected or dependent under circumstances including the following (provisions related to drug or alcohol abuse by parents omitted): § 19-3-102. Neglected or dependent child (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; I don't have easily at hand legal authority authorizing a third-party who is not a law enforcement officer to take custody of a dependent or neglected child until a law enforcement officer arrives, but I strongly suspect from the context that this is allowed either under common law, or a statute that I have not located, or some legal fiction (e.g., that the citizen is implicitly deputized by the law enforcement officer after the fact), or simply as a matter of custom and ordinary practice not codified in any authoritative legal source.
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No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412
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In Massachusetts where I live, here are the general guidelines: In re G.L. c. 268, § 32B(b). A person can be charged with resisting arrest only when the officer is acting under the color of his official position (meaning he is on duty and acting according to those duties). The Commonwealth must also prove that the defendant knew that the person seeking to make the arrest was a “police officer.” The Commonwealth may do so by proving that the officer was in uniform or, if not in uniform, identified himself (herself) by exhibiting his (her) credentials as a police officer while attempting to make the arrest. Such credentials would include such things as a badge, insignia, identification card, police radio, or other police equipment such as a clearly identified police vehicle. Thus, in Massachusetts according to usual legal interpretation: (1) The officer must be on duty and acting in an official capacity. (2) The officer must be provably known to be a police officer by some means to the person charged. Resisting arrest must be ancillary to some other charge. You cannot just be charged with "resisting arrest" unless you are actually being arrested on some other charge (or interfering with someone else being arrested). So, as far as a search is concerned, even if the resisting arrest charge were thrown out, the real question would be why was the person being arrested in the first place? That would determine the admitability of the evidence.
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In general, yes, police could do this. I am not aware of any US state or locality which requires an officer to execute a stop as soon as a traffic violation is observed. Whether the police would act in such a way is another question, but in some areas maximizing citation revenue is a high priority, so police in such areas might act in such a way. If police think a person's actions are "suspicious" and think that the person might be involved in some crime more serious than a traffic violation, it would be common procedure to follow without making a stop or arrest to get a better idea of what the person was doing. Many police I have encountered seem seriously concerned to stop someone driving in what they consider an unsafe way as quickly as possible, and so stop violators promptly, but I don't say that motivates all police all the time.
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The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal.
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Will software ever enter the public domain? Works enter the public domain after ... years from publication. But most software these days is not sold but "licensed" (per EULA). So the recipient never received said "software", he's just using someone else's work (kind of like me using Google search, its code never enters the public domain). Does that mean that code is considered to have never been "published"?
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Works enter the public domain after ... years from publication. In the United States, this is incorrect for some works and incomplete for the rest. Currently, most works are copyrighted for the life of the author plus 70 years; publication date doesn't affect the copyright term. Works made for hire (such as code written for Google by an employee), anonymous works, and pseudonymous works are copyrighted for 95 years after publication or 120 years after creation, whichever is shorter.
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Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test.
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All the CC licenses permit anyone to use the licensed content, and to make copies of it for others. Some of them permit using it for commercial purposes, others (the ones including the -NC- clause) do not. Some CC licenses permit creating modified versions of the original work (derivative works), others (the ones including the -ND- clause) do not. I do not know of any standard license which allows users to create and distribute derivative works, but not to distribute the original. The license used by Project Gutenberg permits re-use and re-distribution, but if a fee is charged beyond recouping expenses requires the removal of the PG name and logo. One problem is that if derivative works are allowed, this would include works which are only trivial modifications to the original, which would have the effect of allowing distribution of the original. If the main concern is about commercial sales, possibly a CC-NC-SA license would effectively serve the purpose? That allows redistribution, including of derivative works, but forbids commercial reuse or distribution without separate permission, and requires all redistribution to be under the same license. Otherwise a new license for this situation might have to be created. It is often a good idea to have the assistance of a lawyer with IP expertise in creating a new license, or the wording chosen may have unexpected effects or include unintended contradictions. Or one could simply place a basic copyright notice along with text such as "Modified versions may be created only with permission from the author. Request permission at [email protected]". However, if the work proves popular, there might be a large volume of requests.
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It depends on the license the code comes under and whether theres a copyright-assignment requirement for that project. In the case of the Linux kernel, the license is the GPLv2, and there is no copyright assignment requirement - so anyone who can prove ownership of code within the shipped binary (important caveat there - the Linux kernel is configurable, so parts of it can be excluded from the binary) can pursue a claim of copyright infringement if the source code is not distributed according to the license. With the case of things like GCC (until the most recent version), while the project uses the GPL (v3), it also required copyright assignment to the FSF, meaning the original authors do not hold the copyright and thus have no standing to sue (authors rights not-with-standing). They have now dropped this requirement in the latest GCC version, but it stands for older versions. As copyright holder, you have no ability to actually force the binary distributor to comply with the terms of the license - you can merely threaten them with, and pursue, a claim of copyright infringement. In court, you can sue to stop them from infringing further and to pay punitive and actual damages. You may be able to get them to agree to conform with the license terms, but its highly doubtful that a court would agree to force them to conform with the license terms (there has yet to be a copyright-infringement case orientated around open source software that has resulted in a court forcing the infringing company to GPL their own code they were trying to protect by non-compliance). So, to answer your question, theres no actual avenue here which results in you obtaining the source code you have copyright ownership of - the legal actions you can take are ones of stopping infringement and claiming damages. You might be able to come to an out-of-court settlement or a voluntary agreement to provide the code, but court actions will be about stopping the infringement and damages.
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are there any safeguards you could take to preemptively block such behavior, such as a disclaimer inside the book cover that reads something like The safeguard you outline would be overridden as soon as the author enters any contract that requires assignment of copyright. (I would not delve in the differences between licensing and copyright assignment because that hypothetical author is dealing with a contract of adhesion which readily requires assignment; the author has no option to change the ToS to allow for licensing only) Under contract law, one of the essential prerequisites is that the conditions of a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. By deliberately clicking on a ToS page to move forward with the uploading a copyrighted work, the author is signaling his awareness and acceptance of the ToS. The fact that the author chose not to read the ToS is irrelevant and very unlikely to strike whatever entitlements the website owner formulated in the accepted ToS. For the same reason, the author's safeguard disclaimer does not bind the website owner: It cannot be said that the website owner was aware of that disclaimer at the time of the formation of contract between the author and the website owner. That is, the website owner did not knowingly and willfully accepted the author's safeguard. The website owner is not even expected to know about any safeguards which one of its potential user intends to establish. The length of a ToS document is also irrelevant because the website owner has the valid argument that "the user-author could have skimmed through the ToS or do a search (via Control-Find) of keywords such as 'copyright' or 'property', whence any allegation of 'inadvertent' assignment of copyright is untenable". Is there a way to protect your IP from inadvertently being licensed/stolen/assigned via TOS "agreements", without having to waste your life reading huge one-sided online "contracts" that are "subject to change without notice" anyway? Yes. That consists of not uploading one's works in such platforms. In contract law that would be expressed as "declining an exchange of considerations". There are many other alternatives for an author to promote his work without being required to assign copyright.
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"The rights to this work reverted to the author in 1951" means that back in 1951 the publisher's contract to print the book ended, and the author resumed full rights. (This might have been done by the author, or the publisher, depending on their contract.) It does not mean that the copyright lapsed or that the work entered the public domain. "Ms. Margaret Wilson" was presumably the author or the author's agent, or perhaps the publishers representative back in 1951. She may or may not be alive, and the firm of "Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc" may have been the new publisher (unless it was the old one, the question is not clear, and without the title I can't cross check). If DS&P was the new publisher, the rights might now be held by E. P. Dutton, as they seem to have acquired the rights to the bulk of the DS&P catalog. In any case, the copyright would (if it is in force) now be held by the author's heir, or whoever the author might have sold or given it to. Someone will be the legal owner. That it is not being marketed does not release the copyright or license the work for general use. If there was no other heir, it would have become government property. In the US, it would become the property of the state where the owner was a legal resident. If this was a work by a US author first published in the US, copyright needed to be renewed after 28 years, which would have been in 1959 (plus or minus one year, I believe). If the work required copyright renewal, and this was not done, then the work is in the public domain, and can be freely used by anyone. Records of copyright renewals, by year, are available for download from Project Gutenberg, or can be searched at the US Copyright Office. There is no way to be sure how the "scanning institution" determined that "No known copyright restrictions" apply, short of asking that institution. It is possible that they checked for a copyright renewal and did not find one. If you use content from this work, and the copyright is still in force, the copyright holder or an exclusive licensee could sue for copyright infringement. There is no way to tell if this would in fact happen. It may well be that the legal holder does not even know that s/he owns this copyright. Obviously, in that case, a suit is highly unlikely. But that would be entirely at the risk of anyone who used such content. Under US law, such use might or might not be considered "fair use". This would depend on several factors, and there is not enough information in the question to even guess. Fair use is an active defense, that an accused infringer may assert in court. It also does not apply in non-US cases. The odds are probably against any such suit being brought, but the amount at stake if one was brought could be large.
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Interesting that they don't give a source and also don't link to anywhere (such as Wikimedia commons). So I assume that content is google's own. So generally speaking: No, when no license is provided, that means you can't use whatever it is in a project of yours (whether commercially or not), because the "default", when nothing is specified, is that no license is given. So unless you find a license that grants you a permission on google's own content, these sounds can't be used freely.
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The question is a bit sparse on relevant details, but yes, a EULA is binding, even when you agree in the course of employment. It may not be you who is bound, though. In case 1, you install a program at word to do something, the EULA says "don't copy any of these files", you see a cool file and decide "Neat, I'm taking a copy home. I can do this because I installed the program at work and am not bound by the EULA". Wrong. Case 2: you are installing software on behalf of a customer. It's not you that is bound by the EULA, it's the customer. Case 3: you work for the company that develops the software and holds the copyright, either fixing bugs or testing the security of the system by trying to crack it. In that case, you have special permission from the copyright holder that overrides whatever restrictions would normally from from the EULA. I don't know if that covers the kind of case you are concerned with. To reduce the matter to a simple sentence, just because you agree to something in the course of a job does not mean that the agreement is invalid.
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International issues I've been working with a person in the UK and recently fell into some issues. There's breach of contract being thrown around. I'm just wondering which jurisdiction it would fall under: UK or international? There's no professional contract, just emails. There weren't any clear terms and estimates weren't always given upfront. Now, I'm being charged for more money for editing and money already paid. Just like to know what is legal. thank you.
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"There's no ... contract" - wrong! The emails are the contract, see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? If you didn't agree on which laws will apply then that is a matter for the court to determine. In general, they will tend to look at where the bulk of the work was done - since you are being charged I assume the work was done in the UK so probably UK law applies, noting that the UK is actually 3 different jurisdictions (England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). That said, many jurisdictions have non-excludable laws around contracts, particularly consumer contracts that apply irrespective of the substantial law applying to the contract. It is therefore possible that you apply English contract law subject to, for example, Australian Consumer Law. Usually any consumer protection law in the vendor's jurisdiction will also apply. General contract law dictates that where a price was not agreed a reasonable price must be paid. If its reasonable that the editing should have been included in the original price charged then you don't have to pay more but if it isn't then you have to pay a reasonable amount for it. There is generally no requirement for estimates or any other method of determining the price - you just have to do what's reasonable. However, consumer protection law generally imposes more obligations on a business than general contract law. It is likely that your contract is ambiguous - courts will endeavor to fill in any ambiguities to make the contract work. techniques include read in implied terms to give "business efficiency", from custom or business usage (e.g. if particular industries typically deal with particular issues in particular ways), from previous dealings (i.e. what the parties have done in the past), from statutes, whatever works to resolve uncertain, meaningless or ambiguous terms, from the express words used or from the nature of the contract or from the common intention of the parties (i.e. the court might ask you what you meant). "Breach of contract" is a very broad term - it simply means that one of the parties hasn't done what they were required to do and allows the other party to sue for damages.
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Get a lawyer. That employer is skating on very, very thin ice. You can’t have a non-compete agreement in Germany at all without the employer paying reasonable compensation. What is reasonable is decided by courts, but half your last regular salary is not “reasonable”. Especially if this would endanger your status of being allowed to work in Germany. If you were a non-German EU citizen, any non-compete agreement would be immediately invalid because it violates the right of free movement; how nonEU citizens are affected, I don’t know. The rest of the agreement seems quite illegal to me. I would think that any good employment lawyer would love to take your case.
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Yes, it also applies. However, an employment implies they agree to having employment related data stored and processed (e.g., to be paid). When there are performance related bonuses in the contract, this will likely (but IANAL) imply they agree to performance data being collected and stored appropriately. Furthermore I would assume most of such data processing (such as knowing who is responsible for a certain change, who created a file, modified it etc.) falls into "legitimate interests" of the employer, as this information may be necessary for operations. I'd assume (still IANAL) that much of the consequence wrt. GDPR is the right to have your data erased. So a company should be prepared to remove such data when an employee leaves the company, e.g., by clearing the responsible person fields upon request. At least for data where there is no legal requirement to have such data provenance. But: consult your lawyer for a proper legal opinion!
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In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any.
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Private prosecution is allowed in New Zealand, so one possibility would be to conduct the prosecution yourself. You could either do that as a case of destruction of property, or under the Animal Welfare Act. It is not guaranteed that your charging document will be accepted (for example, if your document lacks the required content). An alternative would be to apply political pressure to the Crown Law Office, to persuade them to pursue the matter.
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The law in every country where your service is available prevails. That means that if your servers are in Estonia, your file storage is in Lithuania, your company is in Switzerland, you are in France, you hold Thai citizenship, your users are in the USA and the signal transits through the U.K., Belgium, Germany, Canada and Poland then you are subject to the laws of each and every one of them. In addition, if China has reason to believe that the stored files contain matters relating to their citizens then they can take an interest. And so on and so forth ... A country has jurisdiction wherever it wants to have jurisdiction subject to the limits of and its ability to actually enforce its laws. What you are proposing is certainly illegal in many countries and you need to seek professional legal advice - not rely on strangers on the internet.
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My understanding is such: It doesn't matter where the company is incorporated (e.g. incorporated in the US = "American company"). It matters where the company does business. Companies must comply with the law in ALL countries that they do business in. Facebook does business in the UK, so they must comply with UK regulations, including those by the CMA, just like any other UK company. So, what can Facebook do? Comply Appeal Ignore and face legal penalties (fines, suspension of ability to do business in the UK, seizure of UK assets, etc.) Stop doing business in the UK (e.g. see Google News leaving Spain over their news aggregation law).
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Yes it is kind of possible what country would the legal action need to originate from? Would one file in the US and note the foreign defendant or would one file, as a foreigner, in the home country of the defendant? You can go either way. It is not obtaining the judgment that is the biggest trouble here, but enforcing it. You will need: A UK mailing address. Services like ScanMyPost will suffice. Some money to pay the court fees. Time, tenacity and patience to follow through the procedure and fill all necessary forms. Be lucky in that the defendant actually has something to pay the debt with. There are two stages: Obtain a court judgment in your favour. Unless the defendant pays you, enforce the judgment. Obtaining court judgment in the UK In the UK, the "small claims court" functions are executed by HM Courts & Tribunals Service. The specific service is called "Claim for money" which can be filed online via their old or new system. So, basically, you file the online form, pay the fee by credit card and wait for defendant's response. If they do not respond, you ask the court to make a judgment (in my case it took 10 weeks from filing claim to getting judgment). If the defendant responds and defends themselves, expect much longer wait and uncertain outcome. Enforcement So, you and the defendant have both received court judgment saying that they must pay you. But they are not paying. There is a range of options you can choose from: County Court Warrant of Control (claims from £50 to £5,000). Court bailiff will go to the defendant's address and try to seize goods that can be easily sold. High Court Writ of Control (claims from £600). Attachment of earnings order (you ask the court to order the defendant's employer to deduct his earnings in your favour). Third-party debt order (a.k.a. "Garnishee Order") — if you know the defendant's bank account details. Read about potential pitfalls here. Charging order: you will only get paid if the defendant sells their land. Bankrupt the defendant (big court fees!). Alternatively, you could always hire a UK lawyer but then you would probably not need this answer.
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Can a landlord charge for pet rent without pets? I moved into a new apartment at the beginning of July. Base rent is $875, pet rent $40 (total) and I anticipated having 2 cats living with us eventually (probably soon at the time). So, I told the landlord up front about this and gave them the vaccination papers and everything they needed and they immediately started charging for the pets (even though the pets have yet to be in the apartment). I switched states and there was a 1-2 week gap between when I moved here for a new job and July 1st. So, they "temporarily" started staying with my significant other's parents and are still there and we don't anticipate them moving to the new place for several months at least. Upon trying to not pay for the pet rent in for September, the landlord stated that it didn't matter that they weren't actually there (exact wording below). Apartment is in upstate New York (not NYC) , U.S., and the landlord lives in Florida. Here are relevant pieces from the signed contract: The monthly rent is $875 plus $40 pet rent, totaling 915 per month. ... FAILURE TO PAY RENT If the Tenant fails to pay the rent by the 1st of any month, regardless of fees incurred or owed at any time during the failure to pay rent, the Landlord reserves the option to give the Tenant a 5-day notice to pay the rent with all applicable late fees, to allow the late fees to accrue as described in section 15 above or the Landlord may institute eviction proceedings pursuant to law and/or other remedies provided by law including, but not limited to, suit to collect unpaid rent, damages exceeding the security deposit if the security deposit does not cover the amount of damages and reasonable attorney's fees. ... PETS a) The Tenant may keep a pet on the premises. b) If the landlord agrees in writing to allow any type of pet on the premises, the landlord will require an additional NON-REFUNDABLE $400.00 pet fee. This amount has not been included in section 10 above. c) The pet fee is for a pet(s) weighing less than 15 lbs, with breed restriction. d) Pet 1 Details: ... Pet 2 Details... e) No more than 2 pets will be authorized for the apartment. All pets must be disclosed. Monthly pet rent is shown in section 4. f) By signing this lease agreement, you agree to disclose to the landlord and also not allow any pet to reside on the premises that has bitten anyone. Failure to disclose this information, regardless of bites happening before or after you take possession of the apartment, will result in the pet not being allowed to stay on the premises. Here is the wording from the messages (they messaged/replied to us the night of September 1st, payments were made 1-2 days prior): My email: Hello "landlord name", I just paid the rent for September. You'll notice that I made it $875 this month. This is because we have not yet moved the cats into the apartment and don't think they'll be coming within the next month or so. We will let you know when we bring them and pay cat rent accordingly. Don't worry about the first 2 months' cat rent. Thanks, "name" Their reply (text message. Apparently they didn't see the email): Hi "name". I just wanted to let you know that I received $875 for rent payment, but there is another $40 due. To avoid late fees, please check to make sure this third payment is made. Have a good weekend. Our reply: mention email and repeat (basically copy-paste) what the email said. Their reply: Hello "name", thank you for you message. First, I did not receive an email yesterday about this, so I don't have the information contained in it, I'm not sure what happended to it, but feel free to send it again. Second, I can understand that there may be some confusion about this, but I hope you can understand that the pet rent is very much rent just like the main rental amount. There isn't really any flexibility in paying one month or another based on the pets being in the home or not. Just as you would be responsible for rent, even if you were out of town for a month or two, you are still responsible for the pet rent, even if they have not moved in yet. Again, I would be happy to review the email, if you would send it again, but the full rental amount is due today. Then, we paid the $40 so we didn't potentially get charged a late fee. It feels as though we're getting held hostage a little for this just because we're young (early 20's). We tried to be courteous by even allowing them to keep the previous unnecessary payments, hoping they'd show the same reasonable courtesy, but I suppose not. Can a landlord legally charge for pet rent even when no pets are present in the apartment? Should I take this to court and get a lawyer? The lease was signed with the impression that the $40 would only be necessary if we brought pets. It also sounds like if we never mentioned pets until, say, 6 months in, they would charge us pet rent for the previous 6 months even though the pets were not present.
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Can a landlord legally charge for pet rent even when no pets are present in the apartment? Yes. Absent any indication in the lease that your cats would not move in immediately, the landlord is right. I assume that your lease reflects mutual knowledge of your intent to bring your cats over (via a marked checkbox or in "d) Pet1 Details: ... Pet 2 Details ..."). If so, according to the lease, you officially have pets in the apartment. To avoid being charged unnecessarily, you should have (1) ensured that the contract reflects the intended delay regarding your cats, or (2) asked the landlord to amend the lease once it is imminent that you will bring your pets over. One or multiple administrative reasons justify a landlord to charge pet fees even if there are no pets in the apartment. For instance, the landlord might need to notify his insurer whenever an additional rental unit will host pets, thereby resulting in adjustments to a premium. Likewise, the number of pets might be a factor when a cleaning company bills the landlord. The lease was signed with the impression that the $40 would only be necessary if we brought pets. Hence the relevance of determining whether or not the lease objectively reflects that you notified the landlord of your intention to bring pets and, if so, when it would become effective. If the latter is not specified, it defaults to the start date of the lease. It also sounds like if we never mentioned pets until, say, 6 months in, they would charge us pet rent for the previous 6 months even though the pets were not present. It depends. If the landlord "busted" you, then he could sanction you in accordance with the terms of the lease. Instead, if you subsequently requested an amendment to the lease, then the landlord would only charge you from the date you officially bring the pets. But the effective date needs to be reflected in the lease/amendment. Should I take this to court and get a lawyer? No. First, for the reasons I mentioned above. Second, because lawyers want money, and they will detect right away that there is really not much to recover in a controversy like this one. Third, because complaining about a relatively small amount ($40/month) tells the lawyer that he or she won't get much money from you either (and lawyers want your money). And fourth, because the yearly total of pet fees indicates that the matter would have to be filed in Small Claims Court, where --if I am not wrong-- parties are not allowed to be represented by counsel. Going to court is not "peanuts". Even if your were allowed --and you managed-- to retain a lawyer, you would end up paying so much in attorney fees to someone who might not be forthcoming, let alone diligent. If you no longer plan on bringing pets, just ask the landlord to amend the lease accordingly.
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If you introduced the bedbugs, liability could flow to you by way of the landlord keeping your security deposit (if there is one) and explaining when sending you notice that a portion/all of your deposit was withheld due to you causing the infestation for the purposes of remediation. The inverse is also true, in that if you do not have a deposit, you could be sued in housing/small claims court for the infestation if you were negligent in some way (grabbed the mattress curbside and didn't put a bedbug proof sealed cover on the mattress. Since you said you rent a room, my curiosity is piqued as to whether it came with the bed (mattress). If the bed came with the room, it is almost certainly not your fault. Even when there are statutes/codes/regs delineating a lessor's/lessee's obligations and rights re pest control (from jurisdiction to jurisdiction) they rarely exclude the right to general civil remedies. I used to represent my municipality and remember reading that bed bugs are difficult to treat unless the bed is disposed of and all bedding is washed in hot water with a disinfectant and even that can not ensure their removal because if you brought them in because of access to them on a regular basis (e.g., if you are a maid at a motel), then you may continue to introduce them. If the room had no bedbugs and you brought the bed in and now it does, it may be easier to prove who created the unsafe/unsettling condition, as opposed to ants, roaches, spiders, which can be introduced in myriad ways.
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The government of California has an extensive manual that says what you can and cannot do. To terminate a lease (a rental agreement for a year is a lease), there would have to be just cause for eviction (p. 65), such as failing to pay rent, violating terms of the agreement, cockfighting, and so on, and that does not include being a pain in the neck. Nor would the need to make repairs justify terminating a lease. On p. 79 they clarify that retaliatory eviction for exercising their legal rights is prohibited per California Civil Code 1942.5, and will result in fines. P. 35 ff. covers landlords entering: you may enter to make repairs, but must give 24 hour written notice (6 days if mailed), entering between 8am and 5pm business days, but you can also arrive at alternative times orally. If the local code-enforcers require you to do some modifications on the property, that is a separate matter and does not create a just cause for terminating the lease. For instance, if the electric service is not properly grounded and they require you to fix that, that does not constitute the structure "being destroyed". If the repairs make the building actually and certifiably uninhabitable, you might be on the hook for finding lodging for the tenant for the period of the repairs, so ask your attorney about that. Assuming that the tenant is not somehow responsible for the problem being repaired, then you will almost certainly have to keep the person for the duration of the lease.
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Michigan law say nothing about landlord entry, so whatever it says in the lease is what is allowed. Various sources like this comment on the lack of such statutory regulations. There does not appear to be any relevant case law for Michigan which impose restrictions on a landlord's right to access a rental. Since there is no statutory or case law restriction on landlord's right to access his property, landlord's agent would have the same right to access. That would mean that if the listing agent were authorized by the landlord to enter, then the agent could enter, and it would not be necessary for the landlord to accompany this agent whenever entry was needed. That does not mean that a "listing agent" that happens to work with a landlord has an independent right to enter the landlord's property. The same would go for repairmen. It is actually not clear to me whether there could be blanket permission for any and all with access to the lock box to enter, since pretty much any realtor can enter a house for sale, subject to whatever the stated limitations are, and they don't call the owner for each entry. I suspect that one would not have legal grounds for imposing a particular additional restriction on a landlord's right to access and permit access to the property, since there's no overriding statute, and restrictions on landlord access mainly derive from statutes.
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I assume you are already living there? No, you can't use that clause, specifically because the "previous renter" is the person(s) who occupied the apartment prior to your moving in (the "start date", or the first date that your lease is valid). That clause doesn't allow you to break the lease if one of the current renters vacates the apartment and leaves their stuff. This only means that if the apartment was not ready for you to occupy due to the previous tenant not vacating, that you are allowed to walk away from the lease without any payments (other than a credit verification fee). This pretty much requires you to not "move in" in the first place. If you've already moved in, you don't have a legal leg to stand on since you deemed the property fit to move in (and should have done a walk-through prior to accepting the condition of the apartment). If this is you "getting on" the lease, and the lease specifically says that you are being added and your "start date" is some date in the future that you intend to move in, you may have a leg to stand on since this is more like sub-letting individual rooms with a common area. It isn't clear to me if this is the case for you. Once the other person is off the lease they have basically abandoned their property and you may be able to dispose of it, or have the leasing company dispose of it.
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It would appear, from the facts as stated in the question, that the tenant here has been deprived of some of the tenant's legal rights. Tenants have a right to notice, to a hearing, to appeal the result of the herring, and to obtain property after an eviction. The federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (12 U.S.C. § 5201 *et seq.) gives a tenant a right to 90 days notice before any eviction after a foreclosure, even if there is no lease. If the is a lease, protection will in most cases last until the end of the lease. According to the "Landlord/Tenant Issues" page of the NC court system, a lawful eviction in North Carolina requires that a hearing take place in small claims court before a magistrate. The decision in such a hearing can be appealed to a District court. Parties have 10 days to appeal, and the landlord must not try to remove the tenant before the end of those 10 days. If an appeal is filed the tenant may not be evicted until the appeal is heard. According to the court page after eviction: Depending on the value of your belongings left in the home, you have 5 to 7 days after the home is padlocked to arrange with the landlord a time to remove your belongings. Landlords are only required to allow tenants one visit to the home to collect all of the property. If you leave property worth a total of $500 or less in the home, you have 5 days to retrieve it; if it is worth more than $500, you have 7 days. If you have not yet arranged to move your things in this time period, the landlord can dispose of them. The page "Renters and Foreclosure" from the NC Department of Justice (NCDOJ) says: If your lease is entered into before the notice of foreclosure, the federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act usually requires the mortgage holder and foreclosure buyer to honor your lease. If you do not have a lease, if your lease allows for the landlord to terminate it at will, or if the foreclosure buyer wants to move into the home, you must be given 90 days’ notice to vacate. These protections do not apply if your landlord is a close relative or if your rent is substantially less than fair market rent. ... If you have questions about your rights as a renter during foreclosure contact us for help or call toll free within North Carolina 1-877-5-NO-SCAM. The Nolo page "Protections for Tenants After a Landlord’s Foreclosure" says: The PTFA (12 U.S.C. § 5201 and following) provides protections to bona fide tenants who have a lease as well as those who don’t, like month-to-month renters. ... Renters who don’t have a lease, such as month-to-month renters, or those with a lease that can be terminated at will, get 90 days’ notice before having to move out of the property. Importantly, the PTFA also provides that if state law gives a more generous amount of time for renters to stay in the home, that longer period applies. Foindlaw's page "Tenant Eviction in Foreclosure: What Are Your Rights?" also mentions PFTA and the 90-day notice to tenants it requires The page "Tenant’s Rights in Foreclosure" from HCP l;aw says: One provision under North Carolina law that can protect a tenant before any sale or foreclosure occurs is to record the written lease in the Register of Deeds office. If that is done, any buyer, including a buyer at foreclosure, takes the property but is bound by the lease, just like the prior landlord was. When the lease is not recorded and when a purchaser obtains the property through a foreclosure sale, and the purchaser is not going to occupy the property as his primary residence, in most cases, the tenant can remain through the length of the remaining lease or one year from the date the purchaser acquired the title, whichever is shorter. The NOLO page "Tenant Defenses to Eviction Notices in North Carolina" indicates several defenses that tenants may have to eviction cases. The Nolo page mentions that: North Carolina law states that it is against public policy to evict a tenant by any means other than court proceedings. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25.6.) Any attempt to evict a tenant without a court order constitutes a self-eviction or a “self-help” eviction. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25.9(a).) Some common “self-help” methods include turning off utilities, changing the locks, or simply insisting that the tenant leave the premises. (See the Nolo article Illegal Eviction Procedures in North Carolina for more information.) A tenant subjected to “self-help” methods will have a defense to eviction. However, the eviction will only be stayed until the landlord commences a lawful action. The Nolo page advises that: For an overview of landlord-tenant law and eviction rules and procedures, see the Renting and Evictions section of LawHelpNC.org, the Legal Aid of North Carolina (LANC) Landlord-Tenant brochure, and HUD.gov. To read the law itself, see Chapter 42: Landlord and Tenant of the North Carolina General Statutes. The Nolo article has advice on how to find a lawyer and how to get legal aid. The "Guide to the Eviction Process in North Carolina" also mentions that tenants must be served with an eviction notice, at least 7-days notice for a monthly tenant. This page deals primarily with evictions because of non-payment of rent or other fault of the tenet. It also mentions notice for disposing of property saying: landlords must notify [Tenants] of their belongings before disposing of them. If the tenant doesn’t respond, you can dispose of the personal items after the time-frame on the notice expires. (NCGS § 42-25.9) and (NCGS § 42-36.2) NC statutes section 42-25.9 provides that: § 42-25.9. Remedies. (a) If any lessor, landlord, or agent removes or attempts to remove a tenant from a dwelling unit in any manner contrary to this Article, the tenant shall be entitled to recover possession or to terminate his lease and the lessor, landlord or agent shall be liable to the tenant for damages caused by the tenant's removal or attempted removal. Damages in any action brought by a tenant under this Article shall be limited to actual damages as in an action for trespass or conversion and shall not include punitive damages, treble damages or damages for emotional distress. (b) If any lessor, landlord, or agent seizes possession of or interferes with a tenant's access to a tenant's or household member's personal property in any manner not in accordance with G.S. 44A-2(e2), 42-25.9(d), 42-25.9(g), 42-25.9(h), or G.S. 42-36.2 the tenant or household member shall be entitled to recover possession of his personal property or compensation for the value of the personal property, and, in any action brought by a tenant or household member under this Article, the landlord shall be liable to the tenant or household member for actual damages, but not including punitive damages, treble damages or damages for emotional distress. (c) The remedies created by this section are supplementary to all existing common-law and statutory rights and remedies. (d) If any tenant abandons personal property of seven hundred fifty dollar ($750.00) value or less in the demised premises, or fails to remove such property at the time of execution of a writ of possession in an action for summary ejectment, the landlord may, as an alternative to the procedures provided in G.S. 42-25.9(g), 42-25.9(h), or 42-36.2, deliver the property into the custody of a nonprofit organization regularly providing free or at a nominal price clothing and household furnishings to people in need, upon that organization agreeing to identify and separately store the property for 30 days and to release the property to the tenant at no charge within the 30-day period.
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It depends on whether the lease requires it. If the lease requires you to have renter's insurance, you have to have renter's insurance. If it requires you to have a specific company's renter's insurance, you have to have the specific company's renter's insurance. If you don't do that, you have violated the terms of the lease and can typically be evicted. If you comply with the terms of the lease by having some renter's insurance and they still want you to have a specific brand of insurance, you have not violated the terms of the lease, and you cannot be evicted for such. They cannot "bill you" just because they want to change the terms of the lease -- that requires your agreement, or they can unilaterally change the lease terms at the end of the current period. The same goes for package service (I don't even understand what a monthly package service charge would mean).
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Residents agree that the receipt of mail by any individual not listed as a Resident or Occupant in this Agreement at the Leased Premises shall be proof of occupancy of that individual and a violation of this Agreement. I assume that the lease states that only the listed individuals can reside in the unit. Maybe they think that this says that receipt of mail by an unlisted person is a further violation of the lease, I don't think that is clearly enough stated that the courts would agree that receiving mail is itself a violation of the lease. Instead, it seems to be intended to say something about an existing clause – you can't have other people living there. The courts would look at the requirements of the lease, and ask "did you comply"? The question of whether you did a certain thing is a question of fact that has to be resolved in court. However, the revised lease language does not state that all mail must be addressed to Johnny Johnson – it only addresses receipt by a person not on the lease. You are (apparently) on the lease, so you may receive mail there. Nothing in the lease controls how such mail can be addressed. If you receive mail addressed to Tommy Thompson, your defense is that you received the mail, and you are on the lease, so you will not have violated the new clause.
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What would be required to prosecute a person attempting internet fraud in Nigeria? I've recently been emailing back-and-forth with a spammer from Nigeria. Background: After he spammed RPG.SE, I decided to have a little fun emailing back and forth with him Here's a transcript of our conversation. He is attempting to get me to pay $170, USD, for a "vampire initiation fee". He has provided me with his email address, phone number, and location, down to the city (Edo State, Nigeria). What would be required to prosecute a person who is attempting such fraud in Nigeria? What sort of evidence would need to be given to the police?
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You didn't post the details of what exactly is involved with a "vampire initiation fee": is this simply the purchase of an physical object? Or the purchase of a service, such as the placing of a spell or the providing of the service of alleged protection from vampires? Or is this some form of a real "Advance-fee scam" where money and banking credentials or personal information is involved? (See link below). But in the big picture, one person's scam is another person's persuasive business sales pitch for an unusual item or service. Simply being able to pay for such an item or service doesn't make the sale - or the contract to sell it - illegal everywhere. It may be the case that selling an "vampire initiation fee" does not happen to be illegal in Nigeria. Illegal in the US, possibly yes. illegal there? Maybe not. Contract laws differ; in the US, contracting for something that is illegal voids the contract. In Nigeria, maybe not. Though the "vampire initiation fee" doesn't sound to me like a classic Advance-fee scam (Wikipedia), Google search on 419 scams and the results will tell you that it will be nearly impossible to get a prosecutor in that country to deal with anything like that, even if it is a real scam that promises lots of money for an upfront fee. Prosecutors have much better things to do. And you might have to go to Nigeria to make your case; see other answers that more fully outline the laws and legal aspects. Good luck. And it's better to spend your money on some garlic and a mirror. 7/03/18 Update re: the email transcript linked in question That's not a scam; the person is simply trying to sell you on the initiation fee. There is no crime. There is no promise of more money for a small fee (and bank credentials or personal information) like a typical 419 advance fee scam. You're not producing useful evidence for a prosecutor by engaging in the email and mostly agreeing to pay him. It's not illegal for you to send money by Western Union for the vampire fee. Even if you did send money, you're not being defrauded because you already know the vampire initiation is fake, and as a result you couldn't logically prove to a prosecutor or court that you were scammed. He's not guilty of fraud as no money has changed hands for a (fraudulent) service. Emailing with him might make you feel good by wasting his time, but that's all.
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Given that both parties have committed criminal offenses (the 'bad actor' is attempting fraud and the 'victim' has committed unauthorized access to a computer system), no court would hear a civil case between these parties. As a matter of public policy, criminals do not owe a duty of care to each other so no one can win this case.
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I think you would have difficulty distorting the situation - Pokemon Go is not magic that defies existing laws, and this would be no different to a mall issuing a trespass notice (which is effectively how they would kick you out) for any other reason. I would question the ability of a store to "Arrest" you - that is a job for the police - After they trespass you (ie by giving you notice to leave), if you come back again then they can call the police to arrest you - but its not as clear-cut as someone seeing you playing a game and arresting you. I don't think Pokemon players are a "protected class" of people, so finding a valid cause of action might be tricky. About the best you could do would be to talk with your wallet (ie shop elsewhere with your friends), but for my money that would make me more likely to go to that mall !
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No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412
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I took my car to the mechanic to have a squeaky brake looked at. I was told it would cost $30. The mechanic fixed whatever the problem was. When I was checking out, they could not find a $30 brake-work item in their computer so they billed it as Tire Balancing $30. Or some such thing. Meh, accounting. This is not how the law works. The prosecution needs to prove every element of the crime you are charged with. They need to prove you did not signal. The way this usually works is the cop takes the stand and testifies, and you can cross examine him. Then you can testify if you want to, and can be cross-examined. There might be other evidence against you also, like a dash cam. Assuming there is no other evidence, and that the officer did not prove every element of failing to signal, you do not need to testify. You can tell the judge that the prosecution failed to make the case and ask to have the charge dismissed. Of course, if the judge thinks they did make their case, then you lose. On the other hand, you could take the stand and testify, and subject yourself to cross examination. Just a word of warning, if it's your word against a cop's word, you will lose. Your best bet is to get discovery, get the dash cam, and show that you did signal. Be aware, if you get too saucy, the prosecution can add charges. So they could add the speeding charge, but of course, (see above), they then need to prove it.
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The Star Vancouver has a good article outlining the actual charges. Meng is not charged with "violating an embargo" but with defrauding U.S. financial institutions. It may be easier to report that the "crime" is violating sanctions but it's a little more nuanced. Meng is charged with defrauding U.S. financial institutions in order to avoid sanctions. From the article: The U.S. authorities allege Meng committed fraud by telling an HSBC executive her company was in compliance with U.S. sanctions against Iran limiting communication technology. The meeting took place in 2013, but the location was not revealed. HSBC is based in London with operations in the United States. Joanna Chiu, the Star reporter who followed the bail hearing, tweeted: US banks became concerned about the relationship between Huawei and subsidiary SkyCom. Meng told banks the two were separate when in fact "Huawei is SkyCom. This is the alleged fraud". Supposedly, the claims were in a PowerPoint presentation made to a financial institution in 2013. As a result of those claims, banks in the U.S. cleared financial transactions for Huawei. The nexus between Meng, Huawei, SkyCom and U.S. law is Meng making claims to HSBC that Huawei is not related to SkyCom inducing U.S. based financial institutions to unknowingly engage in transactions that violated sanctions with Iran. Thus, the fraud charge against Meng.
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What legal options do I have here? I don't think I can sue for defamation of character since the email was sent to me only. Your rationale about defamation is accurate with respect to the establishment (henceforth "company"). But you may sue the person(s) who approached the company to falsely accuse you of that crime. Being banned certainly qualifies as special damage (that is, concrete damage), whence you have a viable claim of defamation per quod. If the crime that was falsely imputed to you is a felony or serious crime, then you additionally have a viable claim of defamation per se. I was thinking that I may have some legal recourse since the email clearly threatens to defame my character if I re-enter the establishment You have legal remedies, although not necessarily from this angle. The company can credibly argue that it sought to discourage you from contravening the "safety measure" it adopted in response to the accusations made about you. If it turns out that the company fabricated any false accusations it divulges, though, then you could sue the company for torts related to --and in addition to-- its defamatory falsehoods. So far the information you share here shows no signs of company's involvement in inventing the false accusations. What legal options do I have here? You need to ask the company for source and details of the information. In line with this comment, you should also ensure the company is aware of the mistaken identity. If the company declines to listen to you --and ideally see any proofs you have--, that could evidence some sort of tortious conduct on the company's part. Beware that in Florida a defamed person is required to demand a retraction of the false accusations prior to filing a defamation suit. Absent that request for retraction, it will be very easy for the sued defamer(s) to have your complaint dismissed. If the company refuses to disclose the source of the false information, then you need to seek injunctive relief in court. That means suing the company so as to (1) compel the company to identify the person(s) who accused you, and perhaps (2) strike the ban that the company put in place as a result of the false accusations. Even if you don't prevail in striking the ban, the court proceedings would give you the occasion to set the record straight and prevent the company from defaming you if you legitimately expose (to the public) the arbitrariness of its ban. To be clear, the company can always indulge in defaming you for the sake of justifying its ban, although that would be dumb in light of what you will have proved in court by then. In jurisdictions where a request for retraction is not mandatory, a plaintiff who does not know the identity of his defamer(s) may (1) file suit against "Doe defendants", (2) subpoena the non-party company so as to obtain records related to the false accusations (obviously ensuring that these reveal the authorship thereof), and (3) upon production of subpoena records and requesting the identified defamer for a retraction, amend the complaint to properly identify the defendant. This would be more efficient than filing two suits (one for injunctive relief against the company, and another against the defamers). However, I am uncertain of whether this would work in Florida, given its pre-suit requirement of request for retraction.
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Since sales are in dollar and the OP does not specify a jurisdiction, I will assume Washington state US. You may need a business license, depending on the municipality. There are various permits required for sale of certain wares, such as food, explosives or poisons, but otherwise no special municipal permits are required. A state money transmitter license is required, and there are a number of bond and auditing requirements that also have to be obeyed. The state has a website which implies the pertinent restrictions, but does not actually explain them or how to comply: you would need to hire a lawyer to determine what you have to to to be legal. Those restrictions are not limited to flea markets, they regulate all bitcoin sales in the state, including internet and yard sale.
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Can I legally publish a compilation of copyrighted material without licence? How? I have bought a book A which contains much content, and a second book B which relies on some of that content. I took the time to compile only the content from A that is relevant for use with B into a new work for my own private use (PDF file). Now I would like to make my derived work of A publically available, so that future users of B do not have to spend time again to perform the same work I already did. I assume, that I can not legally do this, but am asking here to be sure. Assume I would be ready to publish my derivative work non-commercially and give up as many rights on it as neccessary to publish it. Is it then possible for me to legally publish my derivative work? Maybe by claiming fair use? Would it make it more legal in any way if I were to add a disclaimer "By clicking download, you verify that you already own A and B.". That is comparable to websites which require you to be 18+, for example. I am interested in U.S., Swiss, and if available international EU-jurisdication.
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No. You may not do this. As your post points out this is a blatant copyright violation. It isn't remotely in the realm of fair use.
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First, copyright means that permission from the author is generally required. The courts find three sorts of such permission: direct author-to-recipient explicit licensing (typical in the case of a book author to publisher relation), indirect licensing arising from platform usage (in using Stackexchange, you probably unknowingly click-agreed to allow me and everybody else to copy and redistribute your creations), and implicit licensing – where permission to use is reasonably inferrable, though not explicitly stated. Since the latter doesn't involve written-out statements of the conditions under which you are licensed to copy text, the courts don't rely heavily on implicit licensing. But implicit licensing is what makes it possible to legally read a web page without first signing an agreement. If we assume in your scenario that the author is fully aware that their responses are automatically distributed to various servers, then even in lieu of a platform license, an implicit license can be found. Second, irrespective of the desideratum of having permission, one is in the US allowed to copy without permission, for certain purposes known as "fair use". This is a complicated area of legal analysis, where one has to weigh factors such as whether the content is artistic vs. factual, whether your use simply re-propagates vs. makes a comment, whether the use is for profit vs. free and educational, and whether the use has a negative effect on the market for the original work.
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It does not matter whether the document is authentic, because it is true, by law. Under copyright law, you must have permission of the copyright holder to copy any protected work (original creative work not created as a work of the US, as an example under US law). This is true whether or not the copyright holder tells you that copying requires permission. A matter for more concern is "false permission", where a person without the right to grant permission utters something that the courts would usually interpret as being "permission", for example releasing a Harry Potter book under CC-0. The legal requirement is that you have actual permission, not that a prohibition was not communicated to you. It is in your interest to know whether the actual person making available a work under some license actually has the right to grant a license. But there is no way to know for certain who holds copyright. You can, however, attempt to determine that a work has been registered with the US copyright office, looking here. Works are still protected when not registered, so failing to find a copyright registration does not guarantee that the work is "open access". It would tell you who the registered copyright holder is. There is no "innocent infringement" defense, but under §504(c)(2), your liability for statutory damages can be reduced to as little as $200, if you can prove that there were no indications that the work is protected.
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Yes. The copyright owner of a work has the exclusive right to "reproduce the copyrighted work" or to make "derivative works" of it. 17 USC 106. Copyright law is older than the photocopier, and it applies to copies made by means of any technology. If your intent is to duplicate the protected work, whether you do it by tracing, photocopying, or even freehand, you are infringing that right. It is possible that you could squeeze into one of the copyright exceptions, such as fair use, but these are much narrower than people tend to assume they are (especially outside of the U.S.), and they boil down to: "Well, yes, I copied your copyrighted work, but..." The bottom line is: is it copyrighted? Did you copy it, in whole or in part? Then, unless you have a very good reason, you've infringed the copyright. Whether you do it by means of tracing paper, jellygraph, or iPhone doesn't matter.
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On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.
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What licence should I display in the footer of my website? None unless you want people to copy and reuse the content. The content (except for mere facts) will be protected by copyright regardless. When you expect people to want to copy and reuse it, it makes sense to tell them in advance under what conditions they can do it (instead of being bothered by their questions). This is what displaying a licence is for. If you were a visual designer then a licence would make sense as visuals are likely to be wanted to be copied and used. But a CV, list of projects and comments from customers are probably not likely to be wanted for reuse and distribution, though it is ultimately for you to decide. If you think someone will want to copy and further distribute your content, you'll need to figure out under what conditions you want to allow it, and then search for a licence that fits. If none found, just create your own.
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This question has been addressed directly, with very similar facts, by the federal courts, and the answer, based on those decisions, is: Maybe. The most famous case in this area is Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). In that case, the defendant had bought a copy of plaintiff's art book, cut out the pages, and affixed them to ceramic tiles, which it sold. The defendant relied on the first sale doctrine, codified in 17 U.S.C. 109. The first sale doctrine says that if you own a copy of a copyrighted work, you can resell it without the copyright holder's permission. The plaintiff argued that, by altering the original artwork, the defendant had created a new derivative work. The first sale doctrine gives you the right to sell the book to someone else, but not the right to create derivative works, whether by writing and publishing an unauthorized sequel or, they argued, cutting and pasting and tiling and kilning the physical pages. The Mirage Editions court agreed with the plaintiff that the tiles were a derivative work outside the scope of the first sale doctrine, and therefore the defendants had infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights. However, other courts faced with similar facts have disagreed, and to date I'm not aware of any Supreme Court decision resolving the issue. The bottom line is: you are allowed to sell what you bought; you aren't allowed to transform it into something new and sell that. Where the line gets drawn is muddy and likely to remain so at least until the Supreme Court addresses the issue.
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There is no special exemption where academic work is unprotected by copyright. You can quote from academic sources to the same extent that you can copy from non-academic sources, without getting permission. In fact, it is legally impossible to tell if a source of "academic" versus "non-academic". Attribution is not particularly relevant for copyright, what matters is permission (when required). It may be that a copyright holder will grant permission for an extensive quote provided you attribute the source, and it may be that academic publishers or authors are more willing to grant permission than other publishers / authors. On the other hand, many academic works are very expensive, so that distributing the text for free may have more "effect on market", and may result in disinclination to grant permission to quote. On the third hand, such quotes are more likely to be squarely directed at the "commentary" motivation behind fair use law. The point here is that there isn't a special law about just academic sources.
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Are "If you breach this disclosure agreement we may sue you" clauses *legally* necessary? This recent question asks the meaning of the following clause in a Mutual Non-Disclose Agreement (MNDA): The Parties agree that the disclosing Party will suffer irreparable injury if its Confidential Information is made public, released to a third party, or otherwise disclosed in breach of this Agreement and that the disclosing Party shall be entitled to obtain injunctive relief against a threatened breach or continuation of any such breach and, in the event of such breach, an award of actual and exemplary damages from any court of competent jurisdiction. Now, my doubt is what would happen to the MNDA if that clause (and any other else to the same effect) were not in the agreement. It seems to me that "if you breach the contract we may sue you" is pretty much a given for any contract1. Does this clause have any actual legal effect? Here I use the "legal" term in a narrow meaning (if the matter goes to court, will it make it a difference the presence of absence of the clause?); I guess that there could be some practical reasons for the clause, like: if the opposing party is not legally savvy, it serves to remind it that breaching the contract can have penalties. if the customer notices the absence (for example comparing the agreement with some other agreement), s/he may think that his/her lawyer "forgot" to include it. it does no harm, so there is no actual reason to make an effort to remove it. (feel free to tell me of other non-legal motives for the clause). If jurisdiction is relevant, let's go with that of the original question (Ohio), although it would be nice to know if I could expect a similar situation elsewhere or if it is dependant on the jurisdiction. 1I know that there may be arbitration clauses forcing the parts to submit to a different conflict resolution mechanism; let's just assume the contract does not not have any.
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This is not a "if you breach the contract we may sue you" clause. This is a clause which says "if we find you trying to breach the contract, we can ask a court to stop you from doing so (even though you may not have actually breached the contract at that point in time)". The provision entitles the aggrieved party to specific relief - in this case, by the way of an injunction. Specific relief means relief of certain determined nature or of a specific kind, rather than a general relief or damages or compensation. Essentially, the clause that provides that if the receiving party of the confidential information threatens to disclose such information, the disclosing party shall be entitled to ask the court to specifically order the receiving party not to disclose the confidential information (as opposed to post-facto asking for damages for the harm caused by reason of such disclosure). In the absence of this provision, a court may rule that the disclosing party has no locus to take pre-emptive legal action, as no damage has been caused yet by the other party.
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You cannot contract outside the law Any "contract" that purports to break the law isn't a contract - it's an unenforceable agreement. For example, across all jurisdictions, a contract that is unconscionable is void. So is a contract that requires one of the parties to break the law - a "contract" for murder for example. In addition, you cannot call an employment relationship a "business" relationship - if the relationship meets the requirements of an employer-employee relationship then that's what it is and woe betide you if you haven't complied with all relevant entitlement, tax, insurance and safety laws. In addition, all of the relationships you listed are contracts.
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Of course Unless you waived your right to go to court in the contract. For example, if the contract contains an arbitration clause, disputes must be arbitrated, you cannot use the courts. It is also possible that an English court may not have jurisdiction. For example, if the contract had a choice of forum clause requiring disputes to be resolved in the courts of the UAE, then an English court would possibly defer to that and refuse to hear the case. Whether you will succeed depends on the terms of the contract and whether the airline had a duty to provide you with accurate information. It is quite likely that the contract contains disclaimers as to the accuracy of information given. These may succeed in defeating your suit.
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First of all, there is no breach - they said they would pay it "over the course of the first year"; in what way is the first week not part of the first year? Second, breaching a contract doesn't always allow the aggrieved party to terminate it: in fact, being able to terminate is only for the most egregious of breaches or ones that are specifically spelled out as giving a right to termination. For example, failure to deliver (or pay) on time or in full would not allow termination, only damages.
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Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on.
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In general, the express terms of the lease signed supersede all prior negotiations of the parties, except to the extent that the particular language in question in the lease is ambiguous. This is called the parol evidence rule (which is the law in all U.S. jurisdictions although it has been expressly rejected in Israel). The parol evidence rule expressly makes a written agreement supersede a verbal agreement, rather than making them equally valid. Also, even if both agreements had been written, generally speaking, the last and final version of the agreement will supersede earlier versions of the agreement. The best defense would be along the lines of fraud-in-factum or fraudulent inducement, i.e. that this term was slipped into the final draft in a manner expressly intended to mislead the signing party about what was being signed. I've won one case where this happened (where there was extensive email correspondence between business lawyers regarding the changes that would be made in each draft and there the version signed did not correspond to the last version signed electronically in a very long document on paper and there were other indicia of fraud), but by far the more common outcome is to bind the party signing the document (especially in a commercial context) and to consider failing to carefully read all terms of the final draft to be negligent on the part of the party signing the contract. Arguably, there might also be a malpractice claim against the lawyer for the tenant for missing this change in a material term before the contract was signed.
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In simple terms: Except as expressly set forth in this Agreement, ... Whatever follows next is only limited by what the agreement clearly says is limited. ... the exercise by Company of any of its remedies under this Agreement ... A remedy is something that helps to fix a situation back to what it "should be" in legal terms. There is an implication that the agreement provides for a number of ways of fixing any problems that occur, related to following or breaching the contract. Whatever follows next is assuming that one of those remedies has been used or chosen for fixing a problem. ... shall be without prejudice to its other remedies under this Agreement or available at law or in equity. Having chosen to use one or some remedies, it still has the choice of using any of the others in the agreement and also those available generally under the law. The election by the Company to terminate this Agreement in accordance with its terms shall not be deemed an election of remedies, ... Ending the agreement doesn't count as choosing one of the remedies. ... and all other remedies provided by this Agreement or available at law or in equity shall survive any termination. It doesn't matter if the agreement is ended, regardless of why, the company still has the choice of any remedies as before.
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Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable.
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Can a vehicle be stopped and driver ticketed for defective equipment in Texas when third stop lamp inoperable In Texas, I believe S 547.323. governs stoplamps in a vehicle. Subsection a states in part "... a motor vehicle ... shall be equipped with at least two stoplamps." Is it not legal (can a driver be ticketed) to allow the third, high mounted stop lamp to become inoperative? Similarly, if the third high mounted stop lamp still works and one of the other stop lamps are not working? Thirdly, what if on some older model Thunderbirds from the 1980s, the brake lamp consists of one large wrap-around red plastic encased solid assembly with about 6 distint and seperate bulbs inside of it, and one of those goes out? Just curious. At various times in my life in Texas I've been stopped for each of those instances and either ticketed or given a warning. I don't think this is duplicate with this question because it involves tail lamps in Oregon.
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Yes because Texas adopted the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 571.108; TX Inspection Procedure Chapter 4, 04.20.28 Passenger cars manufactured 1986 – Newer: 3 stop lamps required Light trucks/SUVs under 80” wide, manufactured 1994 – Newer: 3 stop lamps required per DPS Further Backed by Caselaw https://caselaw.findlaw.com/tx-court-of-appeals/1644657.html
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If we go by Indian case law (as we should), you have to find a way. The relevant case is K.P. Adbul Gafoor v. New India Assurance Ltd, where appellant drove on a motor cycle on a learner's permit without a licensed driver positioned correctly, in violation of Rule 3 of the Rules, and smacked someone. The bulk of the case is about the insurance and liability consequences of violating the rule: the main point here is that the court deemed this to violate the rules.
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License plates in Texas are governed by the Texas TRANSPORTATION CODE, TITLE 7. VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC, SUBTITLE A. CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AND REGISTRATION OF VEHICLES, CHAPTER 504 LICENSE PLATES Texas code section 504.901. TRANSFER AND REMOVAL OF LICENSE PLATES (subsections (b) and (c)) provide that (b) On the sale or transfer of a motor vehicle to a person who does not hold a general distinguishing number issued under Chapter 503, [i.e. not a dealer] the seller may remove each license plate issued for the motor vehicle. The license plates may be transferred to another vehicle titled in the seller's name if the seller obtains: (1) the department's approval of an application to transfer the license plates; and (2) a new registration insignia for the motor vehicle. (c) A license plate removed from a motor vehicle that is not transferred to another motor vehicle must be disposed of in a manner specified by the department. It seems that the seller is not required to remove the plates when selling the vehicle Section 504.010 ISSUANCE AND PLACEMENT OF LICENSE PLATE. provides that: (a) On payment of the prescribed fee, an applicant for motor vehicle registration shall be issued a license plate or set of plates This seems to tie the plates to the registration, which means to the person registering them as well as to a particular vehicle. Section 504.943. OPERATION OF VEHICLE WITHOUT LICENSE PLATE provides that: (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), a person commits an offense if the person operates on a public highway, during a registration period, a motor vehicle that does not display two license plates that: (1) have been assigned by the department for the period; and (2) comply with department rules regarding the placement of license plates. Section. 504.944. OPERATION OF VEHICLE WITH WRONG LICENSE PLATE.provides that: A person commits an offense if the person operates, or as the owner permits another to operate, on a public highway a motor vehicle that has attached to it a number plate or registration insignia issued for a different vehicle. An offense under this section is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed $200. It would seem that under 504.943 or 504.944 (and the related 504.945) the person who bought is committing a misdemeanor every time that the person drives it on public roads or streets. The seller could inform the buyer of this and request the buyer to get new plates, or report the buyer to the police as having improper plates, which would allow them to stop the buyer for having improper plates. Use of certified mail would preserve a record of the notification of the buyer. Note that notification is in no way required before reporting to the police, but might induce the buyer to get new plates on his or her own. Secretly removing the buyer's license plate would probably not be theft, as it seems that the plates actually remain the property of the state, but would at the least involve trespass. It seems unwise at best.
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Damaging someone else's property is not protected free speech in the US. Nor is using someone else's property without permission and against the owner's wishes. Scenario 3 would surely be vandalism or "Malicious Mischief" or some similar offense, even if the paint can be fairly easily removed. The same would be petty surely true of scenario 2, as it would take at least some effort to remove the sticker, and it could be a safety hazard until it is removed (obstructed vision). Scenario 1 would probably not be even a minor crime, unless perhaps the person trespassed to attach the string. But the person has no right to insist that the car's owner not remove the sign. I am assuming that the car is owned by someone else, and the the person placing the sign, sticker or paint acted without permission from the owner or any authorized person.
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Under Florida law (316.0083), an officer can view the infraction and issue a notification of infraction "to the registered owner of the motor vehicle involved in the violation". Thereupon, the owner has the right to remedies under §318.14, which include arguing that the owner did not commit the infraction. The camera evidence may sufficiently prove that an infraction was committed, but not necessarily that the vehicle owner committed the infraction. This is a civil matter, so the official who disposes of the appeal must determine whether it is more likely than not that the owner committed the infraction. That effectively means that in the face of evidence that the owner committed an infraction, some evidence is needed to show that the owner did not commit the infraction. Thus proof that he was not driving (I suppose witnesses to his whereabouts in Timbuktu on the day in question) would suffice, and there is no requirement that the owner prove someone else did the deed.
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Such laws or rules most likely would be on a state-by-state basis. As an example, a rule in Minnesota (and the next part which can be accessed with the arrow in the upper right of the web page) requires that "all electrical equipment, including material, fittings, devices, apparatus, fixtures, appliances, and utilization equipment, used as part of, or in connection with, an electrical installation shall be listed and labeled by a testing laboratory." This rule only forbids use of unlisted cheater plugs, not sale. I have not found a law or rule that forbids selling them. Searching the usual places online, I see it is possible to find 3 prong to 2 prong adapters that are UL listed. I will add that essentially the same skills are needed to figure out whether a cheater plug is more or less safe to use in a certain receptacle as would be needed to replace the two-prong receptacle with a three-prong one, and a properly installed three-prong receptacle is going to be safer.
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2201.4 Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated at all or such times as shall be indicated by official traffic control devices. I'm failing to see the "... except when pulling over for the police" subclause. Equally there is no "... unless you think you should" subclause. If you choose to have a hearing the evidence will show unambiguously that you drove the wrong way in a one way street and you will testify as to your reasons for doing so. For you to avoid the violation you would need to convince the examiner that a) you are telling the truth and b) that your mindset is in any way relevant. Unless the officer clearly directed you to pull into that spot, the decision to do so appears to be yours. I'd pay the fine if it was me.
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So why are Amish people not required to register their "vehicle," and to have a driver's license when driving on public roads? The Texas registration requirement in Texas is at Sec. 502.040. REGISTRATION REQUIRED; GENERAL RULE: a) Not more than 30 days after purchasing a vehicle or becoming a resident of this state, the owner of a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer shall apply for the registration of the vehicle for: (1) each registration year in which the vehicle is used or to be used on a public highway; and (2) if the vehicle is unregistered for a registration year that has begun and that applies to the vehicle and if the vehicle is used or to be used on a public highway, the remaining portion of that registration year. (emphasis added) Now, you might argue that this requires owners of motor vehicles also to register their non-motorized vehicles, but I doubt that this is the prevailing interpretation. Regardless, an Amish person who does not own a motor vehicle is certainly not required by this subsection to register horse-drawn vehicles. Similarly, the requirement to hold a driver's license is at Sec. 521.021. LICENSE REQUIRED: A person, other than a person expressly exempted under this chapter, may not operate a motor vehicle on a highway in this state unless the person holds a driver's license issued under this chapter. (emphasis added) Similarly, this requirement does not apply to the operation of a horse-drawn vehicle. In other words, one statement in your question is incorrect: A driver's license is required for all persons "driving" a vehicle. In fact, a driver's license is generally required to drive a motor vehicle (and even there, exceptions exist).
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What if you lived in a shed? There are many companies such as Tuff Shed/Home Depot that sell portable sheds. These are usually marketed as being for storage/utility purposes, but some of them can be quite sizable with fairly nice finish, windows, porch, etc. It's hard to find a direct link since these are often made to order, but I've seen examples that are subdivided into rooms like a normal 2 bedroom house (including bathroom and kitchen area) and have comparable square footage for about $20k. Since this is much cheaper than a typical house, is there a legal or regulatory reason why you can't just buy empty land, put one of these sheds on it, and live there and use it as your primary home address?
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In the US, the laws that govern habitable residences and the related issues - such as land zoning, health regulations, sewer and water services, private and commercial building codes, etc. - are very localized at the city and county levels. So you need to check with the city and county where you want to place such a structure and determine the relevant laws. Commercial buildings are much more heavily regulated than private residences. (And some federal laws and codes could supersede local laws.) Many cities and counties have their zoning and building codes and requirements online, as well as permitting systems to apply for building and utility hookup permits. It's true that some counties in the US have minimal zoning or building codes, so yes, you could move a shed to land you own in that county and build your own road, haul your water, put up solar panels, dig an outhouse, and not deal with any - or very few - regulations. But cities and towns will be much more regulated, since zoning and building codes are used to insure public safety, and services such as water and sewer are supported by taxes and protect public health. In other words, you may not legally be able to live in a shed that does not have city sewer, water and electric service. There may also be building codes for minimum size of bedrooms, egress windows for fire, ventilation, heating systems, so even if a small house is sold as a complete residence in a package, it may not pass local building codes. Breaking zoning, building and health codes can result in the local inspectors visiting and determining if the residence is up to code; they will not typically need a warrant or your permission to enter. They can order you to bring the residence up to code, if possible; or condemn the structure and require you to move out.
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The information in telephone books is public. so are postal change-of-address records. So are records of the ownership of real estate. So are vital statistics such as birth records. So are voter registration lists -- i myself purchased a voter registration list (in digital form) for a municipality which showed people's names, addresses, and the years when they voted, when I was a political candidate for local office in NJ. It cost about $100. I believe that many states also make driver's license information available for a fee to marketers. Credit records are available for certain limited purposes, also. No doubt there are other public sources I haven't thought of. If such a site relies on public records, or other publicly available data, it is not illegal. Many such sites offer to remove names on an opt-out basis, but there is no legal requirement that sites do so. This kind of information is not considered nto be "private facts" under US tort law. Aside from opting out, if the sites provide that option, I don't think you have any recourse. One could ask the local legislature to pass a law prohibiting such sites, or making them require consent, similar to the GDPR that the EU has. But I don't know of any such law in the US to date.
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Your landlord has an obligation to allow "quiet enjoyment" of the premises. Essentially this means that, unless they are damaging his or her property, the tenants are entited to act as though it were their own property. Many people take drugs at home. Between the tenants and the landlord this is not something the landlord is allowed to get involved in. If you believe there is criminal activity going on, you can but are not obliged to report it to the police.
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Laws regarding billboards and advertising are very local in nature and are typically handled under city/county zoning ordinances. Start with calling your local county zoning office. They will tell you the city/county laws regarding your particular residential zoning overlay, if city or state laws supersede county laws, and recent changes in law that might matter and if the sign might be grandfathered. There can be different types of "residential" zoning and the city/county will tell you this; some allow limited commercial use and signage, and some don't. The housing subdivision you are in may also have covenants; you'll know if there are covenants if you received information when you bought property in that subdivision. 1,2,3,4,8: These depend on local laws. 5: Very generally speaking, land owners typically do not have absolute rights to land usage; that is the rationale behind zoning laws (among others, like health and public safety, building codes, national defense, etc.), because some types of land usage impact adjacent users and the general public. 6, 7: Potential consequences include fines and requirements to take the billboard down, but again, those possibilities are very localized. The size of the billboard could come into play; again, this will be very localized. Some signage may be grandfathered, too. In order for the city/county to look at the situation and possibly take action, you may have to file a written protest with the zoning office; they would help with the process. You may have to present your case at a public city council or county commission meeting, but that basically involves saying such and such is happening and you want the city/county attorney to look into relevant laws. It would help your case if you had a list of names of others in the area who are also unhappy about the billboard. I doubt you will need legal representation to lodge a protest, but if it comes to that, Google for free legal aid in your area. If the city/county attorney won't take action (which is possible, as this involves prosecutorial discretion as to if the city/county wants to press the issue with the landowner), you can look for free legal aid in your area and consider your options.
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Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough).
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No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.
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It may not be legal -- in many places zoning restricts running a business from a residential address. If the academy involves physical students, the landlord could reasonably claim an increase in wear and tear, and liability risks. In any case, with a month-to-month tenancy, the landlord can normally raise the rent with a month's notice for any reason or none.
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You should have seen this coming. This might vary a bit from place to place, however it would generally be accepted that if you are in a rented place, you have to pay rent. Most jurisdictions would have some law which requires pro-rata'd payment for the time you actually stay, there would not be any requiring the landlord let you stay free. An uninvested third party might ask "Why would a landlord provide you with 5 days free rent". Another way to look at it is that one of the elements of a contract is consideration (think payment) - Thus in contracting to stay in his place longer you should expect to provide consideration - and pro-rata'd rent would be typical.
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Why intellectual property and not just trade secrets? Why are intellectual property rights necessary when nothing prevents a company from having trade secrets?
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Trade secrets must be kept secret. There are plenty of intellectual properties that can't be kept secret. The most obvious ones would be a writer, musician or composer - the whole reason for their work is to publish it and make it available to as many people as possible. How could that possibly be a trade secret? Similar with trademarks. The whole point of a trademark is to be widely visible. And there are patents. Here the situation is different. Before patent law, inventors kept their inventions indeed secret. Then people realised that this secrecy is in the way of progress. So patent law was created, which gives an inventor rights beyond those of a trade secret, at the cost of having to publish their invention. Even if you invent today, you have the choice of keeping your invention secret and relying on trade secret law, or patenting it and relying on patent law. Again, some inventions are clearly visible. When the bycicle was invented, it was clearly visible to everyone and couldn't be kept secret.
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The legal issues are too black and white to have any meaningful impact on an ethics discussion. The IP belongs to A and B can't use it. A's not planning to build a product around the patent is irrelevant to the law and I do not see it bring up any ethical issue, but some people who do not understand patent law might. There might be ethics issues if A hired Josh with the specific plan to fire him as soon as the application was filed and intentionally misled him about these plans. Another issue might be Josh's duty to not disclose A's confidential information (the application does not become public right away), and Josh's duty to not draw B into developing an infringing product.
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It depends on what information you are sharing, how you got it, and what rights the business asserts over the information. For example, if it is content created by the business and they claim copyright protection you can only use it without their permission in accordance with Fair use exceptions. If you obtain the information through some limited/conditional access agreement you would be subject to the terms of that agreement. As always: If you want a legal opinion specific to your use case you need to consult a lawyer in your jurisdiction.
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A substantial part of the value of the goods and services provided by tech companies is in intangibles. For example, this analysis suggests that approximately 1/3 of the price of an iPhone is in materials and labour and the rest is in the patents, copyrights and brand value that the names "Apple" and "iPhone" provide. If these intangibles are owned by, say, Aplle (Ireland) then Apple (USA) will have to pay them to use them - whatever amount those two companies agree on will reduce Apple (USA)'s profit and raise Apple (Ireland)'s profit - the tax rates in each of these countries is not the same. Now, tax law says that such transfers have to be at fair market value. So, what is the fair market value of all the IP needed to build an iPhone? Or the value of the names "Apple" and "iPhone"? You don't know, I don't know, Apple doesn't know and the tax authorities don't know. Whatever figure they pick is defensible as "fair market value" because there isn't actually a market - fair or otherwise. Resteraunts can do this too - McDonald's (Australia) pays a licence fee to use the name "McDonalds" but this is the only intangible McDonalds have - there is no patent on how to make a hamburger - so the scope for them to take advantge of this is less than for tech companies.
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If you aren't including those libraries, then yes because it's entirely your own work. If you are publishing those libraries, then no because their licenses will limit how you can do that. GPL's and MIT's main features are restricting how you can distribute software that includes the licensed code, and they don't allow the "do whatever you want" of public domain.
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If you are producing and selling it, that is an absolute bar to patentability by anyone else (this is known as prior art). So if you are using it very publicly before they file, they can't get the patent.
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If an employee takes home information that his or her employer considers confidential, that would be a matter of company policy. The employer could discipline or fire the employee if it learned of the incident, and chose to act. If the information is considered to be a trade secret, or part of one, disclosing it or mishandling it so as to risk disclosure could be a crime under US law. However, only in unusual cases is criminal action taken on such matters, normally it is left to civil lawsuits or internal company action. I do not know if Canada has a similar law.
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Can you prevent the government from using your patent? The opposite is actually true. If you patent something, and it is felt to be potentially of national security interest, then they can take your invention for the nation, produce it, and prevent you producing it or sharing the design indefinitely (though it will be reviewed annually). This has happened to about 5000 patents so far. https://www.wired.com/2013/04/gov-secrecy-orders-on-patents/ Even where it is not of national security interest, and the government (or its contractors!) is not using it directly as covered in user6726' answer, they can still take your patent under the equivalent of eminent domain... well, I'll quote from http://patentplaques-blog.com/eminent-domain-excercised-on-patents/ During World War I, the military took all patents relevant to wireless technology and put them in a mandatory licensing pool. Anyone was then able to use the patents and the patent holders received royalties. The pooling of the patents led to innovations including the mass production of vacuum tubes and a national FM radio network. So, in short, the government can use your invention for its own purposes; it can prevent you from using it; and it can force you to give it to others. They don't do this too often, but if you're working in an area that you think will be of especial interest to them, it's something to be aware of. In general, they will compensate you somewhat for your trouble, but not as much as the open market could have.
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Are there any US laws protecting journalistic sources? I saw the President explicitly tell a newspaper that it should reveal its sources: But for the sake of our national security, the New York Times should publish his name at once. I think their reporters should go and investigate who it is. That would actually be a good scoop. Is this not illegal in the U.S.?
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Where the President explicitly tells a newspaper that they should reveal their sources. Is this not illegal in the US? It is not illegal. Well, it would be a U.S. Attorney, rather than the President himself. You're thinking of shield laws, but no such law exists at the federal level. Moreover, although some people might think that the First Amendment ("freedom of the press") would protect a journalist in such a case, the Supreme Court has held that it doesn't, though the government is required to "convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest". So if a reporter were subpoenaed in federal court to reveal a source, and they couldn't convince a court to quash the subpoena under the Branzburg test, they'd have to either reveal their source or be held in contempt. In practice, many reporters have chosen the latter, and served time in jail rather than reveal the source. For instance, Judith Miller. There've been a number of proposals to create such a federal law, but so far Congress hasn't seen fit to do it. According to the Wikipedia article, every state except Wyoming has some sort of shield protection for journalists, either in statute or case law, though the protections are not necessarily absolute. So a state court or prosecutor would find it much more difficult to enforce such an order.
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tl;dr No, N.Y. Times v. Sullivan established the actual malice standard in the context of defamation. It is not illegal for a public figure to claim the sun revolves around the Earth unless some other law intervenes (maybe something fact-dependant like fraud or lying under oath). Background Here's an example of how N.Y. Times would work in California. Under California law, slander, along with libel, are the defamation torts. See Cal. Civ. Code. § 44. The First Amendment limits California’s slander law by requiring public figures prove actual malice when they want to sue someone for defaming them. Khawar v. Globe Int’l, 19 Cal. 4th 254, 262 (1998). (The Supreme Court got involved in N.Y. Times in the first place because of the First Amendment implications on the States' defamation laws.) In turn, "actual malice" means a statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false." Khawar, 19 Cal. 4th at 275 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)). As to knowledge, California courts consider only actual—not constructive—knowledge. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 398 (2001). In turn, actual knowledge "consists in express information of fact." I.E. Assoc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 39 Cal. 3d 281, 285 (1985). This is a bunch of lawyer-speak, but it basically sets up a pretty high bar for the public figure who is trying to prove defamation. Again, N.Y. Times doesn't have to do with barring public figures from making non-defamatory false statements. You'd have to look to other areas of law about false representations or lying under oath for a claim against the politician. california
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Politico, who published this most recent leak, also has an article about prior SOCTUS leaks. Most of them were very minor or speculative, along the lines of the following two examples given: In 1972, while Roe was under deliberation, an unbylined Washington Post story detailed the justices’ internal wrangling on that subject. The Post story — which appeared days after the justices ordered a second round of arguments in the case — was attributed to anonymous informed sources and did not quote any draft opinions or internal memoranda, but described them in significant detail. In 1979, ABC News Supreme Court correspondent Tim O’Brien went on air with reports predicting the outcome of two decisions that were days away from release. Chief Justice Warren Burger launched an inquiry into whether anyone at the court had breached protocol, and a Government Printing Office employee involved in setting type for the court’s rulings was transferred to a different division. The staffer denied leaking any information. A Business Insider article attributes the original Roe leak to a memo written by Justice William Douglas. The Politico article continues listing a few other examples of a similar vein, where convenient coincidences suggested someone had an inside line on how the court was leaning: a passionate Senate speech here, an article predicting case decisions there, etc. When a leak is strongly suspected, the fingers are usually pointed at one or more of the court's clerks. The aforementioned Business Insider article also mentions that a clerk leaked information to Vanity Fair about Bush v. Gore. Politico does mention the following as a more substantive example: The gravest violations of Supreme Court confidentiality came just over a century ago and led to a law clerk being accused of leaking the outcome of cases to Wall Street traders so he and they could turn a quick profit. The Justice Department fingered Ashton Embry, a longtime clerk to Justice Joseph McKenna, with being the source of leaks in business-related cases handed down in 1919 related to a wartime ban on liquor distilling and so-called patents allowing railroads to use particular lands. The case suffered a number of setbacks, including a lack of any insider trading laws at the time and a disappearing witness, and ultimately Embry was never convicted of anything, or even brought to trial. And it ends with an extremely recent example from a few months ago: During oral arguments on a Trump-era immigration policy this February, Justice Stephen Breyer mentioned that red states’ claim of standing to defend the policy was “pretty similar to what we had just allowed” in a case involving who could defend a Kentucky abortion statute. But the high court had not yet ruled in the Kentucky case. It did so eight days later, ruling 8-1, as Breyer and many less-informed others had predicted. A full leak of a decision does not appear to have occurred before now. Leaks that appear to have been based in substantial part on (draft) opinions do appear to have occurred before, just not as a complete document. But insofar as the Embry incident may have resulted in actual and intentional profiteering off of leaked information it stands as a rather serious and consequential breach.
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If I understand your question, you're asking the difference between something like this: "You shouldn't do business with Bob; he's a child molester. Raped a whole bunch of kids. Everyone knows about it." and this: "You're thinking of doing business with Bob? Huh. That's your call, of course. I won't say anything against Bob. But Bill is in the same business, and I happen to know that Bill has never molested any kids." or this: "There are three people you could do business with. There's me. I've never molested any kids. There's Bill; he's a little expensive, but he's never molested any kids either. Then there's Bob. I don't have anything to say about Bob." I don't know the answer under German law, but under U.S. law, it's surprisingly complicated, and varies by jurisdiction. Here is a thorough but somewhat dated article on the subject. New York has recently established an explicit test for defamation by implication: To survive a motion to dismiss a claim for defamation by implication where the factual statements at issue are substantially true, the plaintiff must make a rigorous showing that the language of the communication as a whole can be reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference. Stepanov v Dow Jones & Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 03940 (App. Div. May 29, 2014). That opinion also discusses the other approaches used in other U.S. states. Under that standard, it seems clear that my example statements would be defamatory; any juror would immediately understand both the factual implication and that it was 100% intentional. In practical terms, I doubt any court in the United States would not consider them defamatory. In general, defamation is harder to prove in the United States than in other jurisdictions, because of the strong protections afforded to speech under the First Amendment--but I don't know enough about German law to speak to that issue.
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Tortious publication of private facts is a doctrine that could get a person in trouble. There is no truth-defense to this tort. However, famous people have a hard time enforcing this one because newsworthiness is a defense and courts often find that facts about famous people are newsworthy (and most movies or books about people who are worth the effort of creation are about famous people). Right to Publicity is another. This basically says that people have a sort of trademark over their personality and it is analyzed much like trademark infringement. Of note is that this is a property right rather than a tort.
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Political speech is at the core of First Amendment protections on free speech, but there are still legal limits that exist on political speech. (I respectfully disagree with the idea posited by user6726's good answer that political speech is immune from legal restraint.) Direct incitement to imminent lawless action that is likely to occur can technically be prohibited and people can be arrested for it, but the segments I've seen of the most pro-violence of Donald Trump's rallies have not quite risen to that standard. He has been couching his incitement-related language carefully; it sounds much tougher than it actually is. "I will pay to defend you if you commit a crime" or even an approving "back in the day, you used to get a punch in the face for X" is not the same as saying "Punch those people in the face on your way out" or "Let's knock those protestors out of here in 3, 2, 1... GO!" While I'm not saying that a pre-crime promise to cover legal fees can never be enough to rise to the level of conspiracy (that's an interesting question), it also isn't really incitement to riot. But If Donald Trump, or anyone else, used their political position to speak at a public event and directly incite a riot, then they could be arrested under an applicable law without violating the First Amendment. There are also other limits on political speech, such as defamation. While a political speaker has incredibly wide leeway, there are still limits that exist, especially if the speaker targets a private citizen rather than another political figure.
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You say: the school expects him to create a public Twitter account, with his real information, in order to promote the program & the results of the program. This is a cut-and-dried case of compelled speech. Your son is being required to say certain things in public in order to pass this course. The Supreme Court has decided that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate". This is subject to the legitimate interests of the school, but it is hard to see how compelled speech on Twitter can be defended as a legitimate interest. You also say this is to "promote the program and the results of the program". It sounds like the students are being required to say certain things about the course. If your son were to create the account and then post only material critical of the school, such as complaints about compelled speech, would that result in a passing grade? It sounds like it might be an issue. Compelled speech at school was considered by the Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), which is the case about students being required to salute the flag. They found that requiring students to salute the flag was unconstitutional. Public education, according to the Court, should “not strangle the free mind at its source [or] teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” Instead, education should enable students to make informed choices about what to believe. From the judgement itself: the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. That is very much the case here. Your son's refusal to make the required public speech is not causing any difficulty for the school authorities. In conclusion, your son has made a decision not to create a Twitter account under his own name and say certain things within that account. This is entirely his constitutional right. You might consider contacting the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), who have a history of engaging in cases like this. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) might also be interested. Edit: Zack Lipton in comments below makes the point that much student work can be considered a kind of compelled speech (e.g. "Write an essay on Hamlet" or "Submit an entry to this poetry competition") and asks how this is different. Its a good question, and I have to say it does suggest that there is a difference of degree rather than kind. However I would argue that posting to an international forum widely used by adults is a different matter to a school assembly, or even a national essay competition. It would also depend a great deal on what has to be posted to get a passing grade.
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It probably is infringement, assuming that this is being done by copying parts of a broadcast of the game. It is up to the holder of the copyright on the original broadcast that is being condensed to decide whether to sue or take other action, such as a takedown notice. Perhaps the holder thinks this is good advertising for its business. They have the right to make that decision. Now if a person went to the game, and used a personal camera to film it, and posted excepts of that recording, the legal issues would be very different. The ticket probably includes a provision prohibiting filming and photography, so this would be a breech of contract. But it would not be copyright infringement. (In practice if this were spotted, the person would be required to stop recording or leave, at least.)
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Which Supreme Court justices have been the most anti-intellectual property? Which Supreme Court justices, present or historical, have ruled the most against intellectual property rights?
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Which Supreme Court justices, present or historical, have ruled the most against intellectual property rights? In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of intellectual property rights, overturned more expansive rulings of the Federal Circuit, and overridden Patent and Trademark Office policies consistently. All but two the 26 U.S. Supreme Court rulings on the subject (pro or anti-IP holder) in the last 13 years (both in 2018) have either been unanimous or had only one dissenter (with no one consistent dissenting justices). The two 2018 cases with more than one dissenting justice, each involving the inter partes review of previously grated patents by the PTO under a new patent statute, implicate separation of powers and civil procedure issues that have historically been more controversial than pure intellectual property issues. Oil States Energy Services v. Greene's Energy Group (2018) (7-2 with Gorsuch and Roberts dissenting) (upholding PTO invalidation of previously granted patents); SAS Institute v. INACU (2018) (5-4 with Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan dissenting)(expanding scope of PTO reconsideration of previously granted patents). Matal v. Tam (2017) (unanimous) (overturning PTO policy on offensive trademarks); Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. (2017) (unanimous) (weakening patent protections vis-a-vis biologically similar drugs to patented ones); Impressions Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. (2017) (7-1 Ginsberg joining the ruling in part and dissenting in part) (weakening rights of patent holders); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC (2017) (8-0) (overruling Federal Circuit by limiting venue in patent infringement cases); SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC (2017) (7-1 with Breyer dissenting) (disallowing laches defense to patent law claims); Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple, Inc. (2016) (unanimous) (limiting damages awards in multi-component products where only some components are infringing); Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. (2014) (unanimous) and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Management Systems (2014) (unanimous) (the Federal Circuit had set too high a standard for the recovery of attorneys' fees for frivolous patent prosecutions); Alice v. CLS Bank, Int'l. (2014) (unanimous) (limiting software patents); Medtronic v. Mirowski (2014) (unanimous) (burden of proof wrongly placed on someone other than the patent holder); Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (2013) (unanimous) (invalidated patents on naturally occurring DNA sequences); Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (2012) (unanimous) (district court's factual findings made clear that drug monitoring device patent merely restated a law of nature and was invalid); Caraco v. Novo (2012) (unanimous) (alleged infringers right to bring counterclaims expanded); Bowman v. Monsanto Co. (2012) (unanimous) (first sale doctrine does not invalidate ban on reproducing crops grown with patented GMO seeds); Kappos v. Hyatt (2012) (unanimous)(expanding ability of applicant denied a patent to challenge the denial with additional evidence); Global-Tech v. SEB (2011) (8-1, Kennedy dissenting) (added knowledge of infringement element in claim for induced patent infringement); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership (2011) (unanimous) (presumption of validity of patent continues to apply during patent re-examination process conducted by PTO); Bilski v. Kappos (2009) (unanimous to reverse, complicated holding as to extent of new law)(limiting software patents); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. (2008) (unanimous) (disavows Federal Circuit doctrines allowing patent holders to limit use of patented device after a first sale); KSR International v. Teleflex (2007) (unanimous) (expanding obviousness defense); MedImmune v. Genentech (2007) (8-1, Thomas dissenting) (allows for contests of patent validity without risking liability by infringing patent prior to legal ruling on question); Microsoft v. AT&T (2007) (7-1, Roberts dissenting) (U.S. patents laws don't have extraterritorial application); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. (2006) (unanimous) (sets higher standard for obtaining injunctions once infringement is established); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (2005) (unanimous) (exemption from patent infringement applies to use of patented drugs for narrow purposes of research associated with FDA drug approval process).* Intellectual property issues have not been a partisan or ideological issue on the U.S. at any time in recent memory, and have not been a signature issue of any one justice relative to the other justices. Dissents in IP cases, where they have occurred have tended to be related to non-IP aspects of the cases.
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The issue is discussed in quite a few cases, including an in depth discussion in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The Official Syllabus of that decision summarizes its analysis: The Copyright and Patent Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, provides as to copyrights: "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science ... by securing [to Authors] for limited Times ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writings." In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years: Under the 1976 Copyright Act (1976 Act), copyright protection generally lasted from a work's creation until 50 years after the author's death; under the CTEA, most copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death, 17 U. S. C. § 302(a). As in the case of prior copyright extensions, principally in 1831, 1909, and 1976, Congress provided for application of the enlarged terms to existing and future copyrights alike. Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain, brought this suit seeking a determination that the CTEA fails constitutional review under both the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Petitioners do not challenge the CTEA's "life-plus-70-years" timespan itself. They maintain that Congress went awry not with respect to newly created works, but in enlarging the term for published works with existing copyrights. The "limited Tim[e]" in effect when a copyright is secured, petitioners urge, becomes the constitutional boundary, a clear line beyond the power of Congress to extend. As to the First Amendment, petitioners contend that the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of speech that fails inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such regulations. The District Court entered judgment on the pleadings for the Attorney General (respondent here), holding that the CTEA does not violate the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" restriction because the CTEA's terms, though longer than the 1976 Act's terms, are still limited, not perpetual, and therefore fit within Congress' discretion. The court also held that there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of others. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. In that court's unanimous view, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 539, foreclosed petitioners' First Amendment challenge to the CTEA. The appeals court reasoned that copyright does not impermissibly restrict free speech, for it grants the author an exclusive right only to the specific form of expression; it does not shield any idea or fact contained in the copyrighted work, and it allows for "fair use" even of the expression itself. A majority of the court also rejected petitioners' Copyright Clause claim. The court ruled that Circuit precedent precluded petitioners' plea for interpretation of the "limited Times" prescription with a view to the Clause's preambular statement of purpose: "To promote the Progress of Science." The court found nothing in the constitutional text or history to suggest that a term of years for a copyright is not a "limited Tim[e]" if it may later be extended for another "limited Tim[e]." Recounting that the First Congress made the 1790 Copyright Act applicable to existing copyrights arising under state copyright laws, the court held that that construction by contemporaries of the Constitution's formation merited almost conclusive weight under Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, 57. As early as McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, the Court of Appeals recognized, this Court made it plain that the Copyright Clause permits Congress to amplify an existing patent's terms. The court added that this Court has been similarly deferential to Congress' judgment regarding copyright. E. g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417. Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress could evade the limitation on its authority by stringing together an unlimited number of "limited Times," the court stated that such legislative misbehavior clearly was not before it. Rather, the court emphasized, the CTEA matched the baseline term for United States copyrights with the European Union term in order to meet contemporary circumstances. Held: In placing existing and future copyrights in parity in the CTEA, Congress acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutionallimitations. Pp. 199-222. The CTEA's extension of existing copyrights does not exceed Congress' power under the Copyright Clause. Pp. 199-218. (a) Guided by text, history, and precedent, this Court cannot agree with petitioners that extending the duration of existing copyrights is categorically beyond Congress' Copyright Clause authority. The case most squarely on point to your question held that a telephone book is not sufficiently original as a constitutional matter to be subject to copyright. It held that originality, for copyright purposes, is constitutionally mandated for all works. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). See also: Under the Copyright and Patent Clause, Congress' copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012). Under this clause, Congress, to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation, may guarantee to authors and investors a reward in form of control over sale or commercial use of copies of their books. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). This clause is both grant of power and limitation; this clause is limited to promotion of advances in useful arts. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). The economic philosophy behind this clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is best way to advance public welfare through talents of authors and inventors in Science and useful Arts. Mazer v. Stein , 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The Copyright Act of Congress, R.S. § 4952, as amended by the Act Mar. 3, 1891, c. 565, 26 Stat. 1106, giving to authors the exclusive right to dramatize any of their works, is valid as applied to pantomine dramatization by means of moving picture films. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). This section does not limit the useful to that which satisfies immediate bodily needs, and painting and engraving not intended for a mechanical end are among the useful arts, the progress of which Congress is empowered by this section to promote. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). No authority exists for obtaining a copyright beyond the extent to which Congress has authorized it; a copyright cannot be sustained as a right existing at common law, but depends wholly on the legislation of Congress. Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888). Legislation concerning trademark protection is not authorized by this clause. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). A list of U.S. Supreme Court cases on the issue of copyright at Wikipedia includes many additional copyright cases that don't implicate the U.S. Constitutional language. It is also worth noting that while the U.S. Supreme Court is the final and most authoritative interpreter of the U.S. Constitution, that any court presented with an issue of constitutional interpretation can, and indeed, is duty bound, to interpret the constitutional in a legally authoritative way, which in the case of appellate courts (state and federal) serves as a legal precedent for other cases that "makes law" on the issue.
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No The case was dismissed on procedural reasons. Like this. Well, perhaps not so pedantic but there are things that have to happen before the Supreme Court can get involved and they haven’t. For example, the Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction in a limited classes of case; if this isn’t one of those (and it isn’t) it has to be heard in a court that does and then get appealed up the chain. When they have, the court will make a decision on the merits.
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Yes Time shifting for personal use was ruled fair use by SCOTUS in 1984.
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This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.
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How should one reconcile these conflicting understandings? A holding of the U.S. Supreme Court that it has not later abandoned is, by definition, the correct interpretation of the U.S. Constitution for all purposes of U.S. law, even if a plain reading of the constitutional language might suggest otherwise.
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The Constitution does not state your opinion of SCOTUS's job, instead it just says that there shall be one supreme court with judicial power, and it says what kind of cases are within the jurisdiction of that court. Thus The Constitution does not mandate whether rulings will adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis, will be based only on a narrowly literal interpretation of The Constitution, or will be based on a general sense of justice. The Constitution also does not say anything about the rules of that Supreme Court, therefore the court is free to set its own rules, and to allow or to not allow amicus briefs. Many points raised in amicus briefs fall on deaf ears, sometimes because they are based on non-shared legal assumptions. You can read a very brief summary of the over 140 amicus briefs in this case here. If you read various SCOTUS opinions over the past 225+ years, you will see that the court does make reference to fact, not just statements of the law and constitution. This brings it well within the scope of "potentially relevant" to determine some fact. The lawyers get to argue how facts relate to legal conclusions, but the basic fodder for any legal decision is some set of facts. The specific briefs you mentioned are: Pro-Life Obstetricians and College of Obstetricians. The latter's argument is self-summarized as Amici’s position is that laws regulating abortion should be evidence-based, supported by a valid medical or scientific justification, and designed to improve—not harm—women’s health Pro-Life Obsetricians' position is self-summarized as support for a law that rationally furthers Mississippi’s interest in protecting women’s health from risks posed by later- term abortions, which are now well established in the literature These statements refer to interpretive doctrines previously established by SCOTUS, but not literally expressed in The Constitution. In US v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 introduced concepts of constitutionality (not literally stated in The Constitution) whereby cases could be reviewed either with "strict scrutiny" for protection of Constitutional rights or else discernment of a "rational interest" in government taking a certain action. Either of these kinds of judicial review require a comparison of law to "the facts". Hence "the facts" can be legally relevant.
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The patent is invalid From 35 U.S.C. 102 A person shall be entitled to a patent unless — (a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent There is no doubt that the Persion "printed publication" in c.1100 BCE predates the invention of the technique by Sharp Co. in 2012 CE. If follows that Sharp Co. is not entitled to patent protection. This is merely a refinement of 35 U.S.C. 101 which says (my emphasis): Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. The process Sharp Co. invented was not "new" - patent rights only accrue to the first inventor, in this case, some unnamed ancient Persian. The prior art exclusion is merely one means of ensuring that the patent holder is the first inventor.
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Have Supreme Court cases with multiple subsequent reaffirming decisions been overturned? Suppose Supreme Court decision A is subsequently reaffirmed in decisions B and C. Have there ever been situations where the court later overturns A, despite B and C?
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Yes, such as this limitation on free speech. Initially, the limitation was "Clear and Present Danger" test (Schenk v. United States, 1919) which held that speech inciting lawless action was not protected speech and thus could be crimilized speech (i.e. Schenk publishing anti-draft fliers during World War I, which advocated draft dodging which at the time was a crime under the Espionage act of 1917). This was later over ruled to the "Bad Tendency" test which allowed for advocacy of criminal actions to be criminilized (Whitney v. United States, 1927. Whitney was accused of helping establish the American Communist Labor Party (ACLP), which held as a party platform the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government in favor of one advocated by the ACLP. This is standard to most Communist Parties at the time around the world. The difference between Schenk and Whitney was that Schenk actively called for a criminal action, where as Schenk was speaking of a future action following other party successes). This was overturned again by Brandenberg v. Ohio (1969) which introduced the "Imminent Lawless Action" test. This explicitly overturned Whitney in addition to other cases not mentioned such as Abrams v. United States (1915), Giltrow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951). It does not overrule Schenk, but it did cast doubt upon the decision made. In the case, KKK leader Brandenburg made a speech advocating for revenge against African Americans and Jews as well as expressing the belief that the United States government actively surpressed White Americans and needed to be opposed. He was charged as advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Imminent Lawless Action added the important componant that the violation must be advocacy of lawless action (revenge against racial minorities) must have a definite future date (like "tonight", "tomorrow", or specific time and date) and a vague future time will not count. And must show intent to break the law (Brandenburg did not specifically intend to break the law... he wanted it changed so it would not be legal before he took action). Additionaly, they found that the mere advocacy of resisting the government did not have any language componant that suggested violent resistance. Brandenburg, as discussed, overturned the reaffirmed B and put Schenk on some shaky ground as parts of Shenk were still relevant (Schenk first introduced that Free Speech was not without restrictions, but some of the case law was not relevent anymore, as Whitney used it as a basis in that decision, as did to a limited extent Dennis, which didn't work well with Whitney for other reasons. It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court does not typically take cases that wholly reaffirm past cases. Typically, their rulings are to clarify situations in a previous case that are not stated by the current extant rulings. For example, if the Supreme Court took a case that called Roe v. Wade into question, the case would more likely test whether Roe allows for a particular practice that isn't all that clear in Roe. It may affirm that Roe is still law, but the new case is not consistent with Roe, which will place a restriction on Roe, but not, figuratively, (pardon the pun) throw the baby out with the bath water.
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There is no opinion from the Ninth Circuit. I just checked PACER, and there is a docketed order dated May 18, 2016: Filed order (STEPHEN REINHARDT, MARY H. MURGUIA and JOHN B. OWENS) We have reviewed appellant’s opening brief, appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and appellant’s opposition thereto. We conclude that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (summary affirmance appropriate where the result is clear from the face of record); see Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (judges are immune from civil liability for damages and for declaratory relief for their judicial acts). AFFIRMED. [9981929] (WL) [Entered: 05/18/2016 02:48 PM] I downloaded Jaffe's Ninth Circuit brief and it's a pretty dull work of a crank. I use the RECAP Mozilla add-on, so the Ninth Circuit docket and brief should show up on RECAP soon. Go to https://www.courtlistener.com/ and in "Advanced Search", search on docket no. 15-56328. Based on past experience it should show up in a day or two. But that's the Ninth Circuit brief, not the SCOTUS one you're looking for; unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court is the one US court that is not searchable via PACER. You're limited to the docket, opinions and orders that the Court publishes on its site. For more legitimate cases, briefs can often be found on either SCOTUSBlog or the ABA's briefs page, but not in this case.
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1. Are this and similar ordinances constitutionally valid? Yes. Some future court might decide the law is invalid at some future time. But that possibility is hypothetical and speculative. Therefore, as of now, the law is valid unless and until it is challenged and overturned. 2. What defenses could a government make if challenged? It depends on what grounds the law is challenged. Your question about possible defenses is highly dependent on the nature of any challenge — which you have not specified in your question. The U.S. Constitution, for example, prohibits laws respecting a number of things such as freedom of the press, speech, religion, peaceful assembly, bearing arms, etc. to list just a few of the most notable ones. But your question does not assert the law in question violates any specific or particular prohibition against it. Although the question mentions "restricting free movement as well as targeting only a specific demographic," it does not specify any part of any constitution that prohibits these things. Therefore, your question is unclear as to what might present a constitutional problem for the law. It is also unclear which constitution you think might contain prohibitive language. Is it a federal constitutional issue that concerns you? Or is it a state constitutional matter? In either case, which issue specifically concerns you? Your question needs to address these specifics in order to analyze it and respond in a meaningful way. Look at it like this... just as it is impossible to prove a negative, so is it impossible for anyone to conclude with absolute certainty that any law is not unconstitutional because no one can predict with certainty every possible future challenge a law might face. There are just too many possibilities to (pre-emptively) exhaust them all with certainty. Also, no one can predict with certainty how any future court might rule on the future challenges (which themselves are unpredictable as previously argued). Therefore, one can only say I think the law is unconstitutional and here are my reasons. Then others can analyze the law and the reasons; then offer an opinion. Further, based on precedent, would they likely be successful? See above answer to question numbered 2. Laws aren't required to be "justified" by the constitution. Constitutional justification for a law is a meaningless phrase. There is no requirement for a law to be "justified" by any constitution other than that the legislature is empowered by the constitution to make laws. That's all the justification any law needs. Beyond that, however, no law can violate the constitution as determined by a Supreme Court (or the last court to rule) if challenged.
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In U.S. practice, double jeopardy protections attach once the jury is seated and this scenario contemplates the change in position arising at trial. A mistrial could be called, or a continuance obtained, if the defendant suddenly claimed an alibi defense, since that amounts of a defendant waiver of double jeopardy protections. But without proof that the witness was tampered with, obtained at the last moment, it can be difficult or impossible to get proof of tampering or to contradict the story with other evidence to undermine the credibility of the witness. The prosecution would probably request a recess in the trial to regroup and try to admit evidence that the testimony changing witness made a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the testimony of that witness, from whomever that witness told the first time (probably a law enforcement officer). But this is still far less convincing to a jury than an affirmative statement from a witnesses about a key fact. If the prosecution could find evidence of defense side tampering and present it to the judge in the hours or small number of days before the trial ends, it might be able to get a mistrial declared. But it is much harder to get a mistrial for witness tampering when the witness shows up and testifies contrary to prosecution expectations than it is when the witness is, for example, killed or kidnapped and doesn't appear to testify at trial at all. But if evidence of neither type could be obtained before the jury was sent to deliberate and evidence was closed, and the jury then acquitted the defendant, it would be very hard for the prosecution to change this result. Perhaps not completely impossible, but very nearly so. The witness could be (and in this circumstance, despite the extreme rarity of perjury prosecutions, probably would be) prosecuted for perjury, but that wouldn't change the acquittal. If a link to the defendant could be found, the defendant could also be prosecuted for witness tampering or obstruction of justice or something similar. But that is hard to prove (and the witness would probably have to be convicted or provided with use immunity for his testimony) to do so. In English criminal law practice, in contrast, the likelihood of having the verdict of acquittal set aside and getting a new trial would be much greater (and the likelihood of getting a recess mid-trial would be greater in far more common bench trials in lower level criminal cases), but it would still be a serious burden for the prosecution that it might not be able to overcome. Lawyers aren't entitled to expect that witnesses will testify exactly the way that they discussed things with the lawyers before trial, and this can be explained away with a variety of excuses that are usually true ("after thinking it over after meeting with you, I realized that I was confused and getting it wrong"), but are sometimes a cover for a change of story that is not sincere. I've had similar things happen a few times in civil litigation and there is only so much you can do about it.
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You can be tried again for the same offence; double jeopardy only applies if you are found "not guilty". It is not uncommon for appeals courts to invalidate a guilty verdict and require a retrial. Similarly a mistrial can result in a new trial at the prosecution's discretion. In addition, some jurisdictions have abolished double jeopardy for crimes like murder (e.g. New South Wales, Australia). New evidence coming to light can be grounds for appeal - in the case of the Fugitive where there have been no appeals this is one avenue open to Kimble. Where appeals have been exhausted; this is more problematic. One of the principles of justice is that there should be finality to the verdict. Kimble has gone from presumed innocent to presumed guilty - enough evidence would need to be gathered to demonstrate a clear and unambiguous miscarriage of justice. This may not be within the purview of the judicial branch of government - he may need a pardon from the executive. In real life (as opposed to Hollywood) Dr. Kimble is still in serious trouble. In some jurisdictions there may be some "innocence" laws that can allow review of convictions outside the appeal process. Notwithstanding, Dr. Kimble is going away for a long time for "escaping lawful custody" anyway.
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Yes, but ... How can you know for sure? Let's say I'm charged with, and acquitted of, murder. Immediately after my acquittal, I confess to the crime describing how I did it and producing tangible and material evidence like the murder weapon, etc. So, did I commit murder? Well, we can't say. All we can say is that if I were tried again with all this new evidence, I'd probably be convicted but we can never know for sure because that trial isn't going to happen. Examples of people who (possibly) evaded justice due to double jeopardy Isaac Turnbaugh, O J Simpson, Fong Foo, Mel Ignatow This Unnamed Queensland man (double jeopardy can be waived under Queensland law when there is new "clear and compelling evidence" - the court found the evidence was neither clear nor compelling), Sharone Sylvester Brown. On the other side of the ledger, Michael Weir was the first person convicted after the UK changed its double jeopardy laws in 2005 allowing the Court of Appeal to grant a retrial if "new, compelling, reliable and substantial evidence" had emerged.
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Yes, there is indeed a conflict, often described as a balancing act. Similarly, the principle of free speech protected by the First Amendment requires that the public tolerate lies in political rhetoric, and hateful public speech and insults, but can be balanced against an individual's interest in reputation in a libel case. See Near vs Minnesota and NY Times vs Sullivan for leading cases on this issue. There is also tension between the right of a newspaper to report on a current criminal case again under the First Amendment, and the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial before an unbiased jury, which might be influenced by newspaper publicity. In these and similar situations, there is no way to fully serve both protected interests, and courts must strike a balance and prefer one right over another, or find some compromise. In the 5th vs 6th situation, courts have mostly favored the 5th. That is, the court will not require a witness to give up the right not to self-incriminate, and usually will not grant a defendant an acquittal because desired testimony is unavailable. It might be that a defendant expected to rely on the testimony of a witness who has since died, or has fled the country and cannot be brought before the court. The sixth does not and cannot assure perfect justice, and the courts do not attempt to make it do so. In the situation described, the defendant may compel the witness to appear and be asked the relevant questions. The jury will hear the answer, and may assume what it would have been without the invocation of the Fifth. The defendant's lawyer can try to find a question that the witness will answer, and can argue that the refusal to answer is consistent with a not-guilty verdict. That is all that the courts provide. When the prosecution calls a witness, knowing or having good reason to know that the witness will invoke the 5th on more or less every relevant question, the US Supreme Court in Namet v. United States 373 U.S. 179 (1963) has held that this may be error requiring overturning the conviction. This was confirmed and expanded in Douglas v. Alabama 380 U.S. 415 (1965). But neither of these are relevant when the defense calls the witness.
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A party can ask a judge to recuse at the outset of a case for bias or other reasons (e.g. a family connection to a party). Generally, a judge rules on that motion personally and it is an interlocutory motion not subject to appeal except by extraordinary writ (or the equivalent) to the state supreme court. It is not generally proper to do so during a trial. Moreover, one jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial (which happens when the jury is sworn) if the trial ends prior to a jury verdict for reasons other than those attributable to the defendant, the defendant cannot be tried again on those charges and is functionally acquitted. There are probably some arguable exceptions to this rule in extraordinary circumstances that are not the fault of either party (e.g. if a meteor hits courthouse and kills the judge and some jurors mid-trial, or if it is revealed that the judge committed the crime for which the defendant is being tried). But the threshold for exceptions to the general rule is very high.
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What to do about Fake Positive Reviews There is a company that I have run into that had a sudden review surge. In each of these 20+ reviews, they, as in individual accounts, review a combination of the same places having reviewed by an advertising company who has reviewed all of these businesses as well. It appears that companies around the area are hiring this advertising company who then creates many reviews, even some local government services appear to be using this advertising companies service. Is there anything illegal about this kind of practice? Who would be the point of contact to mediate this? Is this fraud if they haven't received the services?
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This doesn't sound like fraud (against you, at least), but it does sound like an unfair or deceptive trade practice, which is outlawed by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and perhaps the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, both of which prohibit unfair and deceptive trade practices. I don't know about Pennsylvania, but the FTC has on many occasions taken action against companies for engaging in just this kind of behavior. To find out whether you would be able to take action against the other company, you'd want to find a good competition lawyer in Pennsylvania. For some more basic background on the FTC's rules, check out this primer.
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The most important fact to bear in mind is that there's no way to predict whether a given individual will decide to file a suit against you, though we might say on what basis he might, if he so chooses. There are two basic grounds for a suit, one pertaining to trademarks and the other pertaining to use of names – misappropriation and violating the right of publicity. A word can be a trademark, but the scope of protection is somewhat narrow because the protection is in terms of use within a given business. So calling your computer company "Apple" is out, but calling you roofing service the same is okay (assuming that somebody didn't previously register "Apple Roofing"). The main consideration is the likelihood of confusion. Supposing your business were selling landline telephones and I don't think Apple computer company sells such phones, you might still be in trouble if you called your company "Apple Phone", since they certainly do sell phones. There are thousands of trademarks that include "Puff", including Cocopuffs and various pizza and cheese puffs. Since "Puff" is such a generic word, there is a higher bar to proving infringement (there are thousands of trademarks including "Puff"). "Puff Daddy" is, however, a registered trademark covering perfume, jewelry, clothing and certain online services, so there is a non-negligible chance of confusion. In the case of names (or apparent names), an additional concern is whether this is commercial exploitation without consent of a person's name (which causes harm to the subject). The underpinning of this tort is that such a use falsely implies an endorsement of the product. Again, with a fairly generic word like Puff, there isn't a clear implication that Sean Combs has endorsed a product that is called "Puff Communications", but "Puff Daddy Communications" would almost certainly cross that line. The main issues, then, are the extent to which the name is generic vs. unique, and whether it is likely that a person would interpret the product or service as being the same as another, or would constitute an endorsement.
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Repeating a defamatory statement is itself defamatory This is known as the repetition rule and is illustrated in Brown v Bower & Another [2017] EWHC 2637 (QB). In essence, the "local news site" is responsible for the reputational damage suffered by their publication and you are responsible for the damage caused by your amplification of that publication. So if the local news article was seen by a few dozen people locally, the damages might be relatively modest. If your publication caused it to be seen by millions of people and caused nationwide or worldwide damage to the person's reputation so that they are at risk of losing income or opportunities in the future, the damages can be vast. How you shared it is important. If you endorsed it, which includes forwarding it without commentary, then it is likely defamatory. If you were more circumspect and said something that shows an open mind to the allegations like "This is an interesting story, I can't wait to see how it plays out", then it's likely not defamatory. Of course, if the allegations are true then you have nothing to worry about; truth is a complete defence to defamation. You can prove that they are true, right? I mean with real evidence like a conviction for fraud. Or, at the very least, pending or actual charges from the police. Or, failing that you have good evidence that you yourself have been scammed specifically by this person. Or that you have had people who have been scammed tell you personally exactly how it happened? No? Well, I wouldn't count on a truth defence if I were you.
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Calls to 911 are treated as genuine at all times until the complaint is dealt with. This is because most people only call 911 for legitimate reasons and even some criminals call 911 because they want them to know the situation (Bomb scares are an extreme version of this as they cause a lot of disruption; they cannot be ignored because if the cops were to call bullshit and it was proven not to be bullshit, it's gonna be a lot worse than if they treat it as real and find out it's an alarm clock.). From the point of view of the first responders, whether cops, fire, or EMS, the call is always real and to be treated as such. Entering without warrant is legit if they have a probable cause of a crime or a person in distress, such as a hostage or a person in medical need; the emergency call is almost certainly sufficient. As you correctly said, at this point any evidence of a crime in plain sight is good reason to pursue the criminal acts unrelated to the original call. 911 calls are recorded so they can prove to the courts they got a tip and were following up. However, tying up emergency services with fake crimes is still not a proper use of 911 and there are ways to find people making bogus calls. 911 also traces phone calls in case of prank callers or even generally locating people in distress (if the dispatcher has to tell someone who is hiding from robbers in her house to be quiet, they can still dispatch officers to the general area by pinging the phone's metadata) so a string of burners will be noticed. Burner numbers can be traced to point of sale and most stores that carry them will have cameras (staff that remembers, not so much). If using pay phones, in this day and age, again there is likely cameras because the frequency of the latter and the infrequency of the former. Phone Booths haven't been a thing for far longer, so much so that the Christopher Reeves Superman film had a famous gag about how Phone Booths were phased out, when Clark Kent, needing to switch to his iconic Persona, runs to a bank of payphones (all without booths) and desperately looks for a new place to shed his clothes... in the 1970s. Either way, cops would be looking for nearby cameras to identify you and without many pay phones reliably lying around it won't take long. The more dangerous aspect of this is that drugs and organized crime are pretty much hand in hand. It could be the crack house you just called in is well known to the cops, but they're trying to use it to find out who the supplier is. The vigilante could be ruining their sting by calling in a true threat. If he does this too much, the local gang members will be looking out for him and may try to find him too; and whereas the police have rules, the gangs do not.
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Facebook's local jurisdiction is the US. In the US, making false statements isn't generally illegal or tortious, as they are protected by the First Amendment to the US Constitution. So, Facebook isn't under any legal pressure to remove posts that are posting false information. It sounds like you've already asked them to remove the posts and they refused, so at this point you do not seem to have any procedural recourse with Facebook. It's possible your country or the country the person is posting from lacks free speech protections and would either prosecute or allow suits against someone posting false information, if that's the case you could try to get the local equivalent of a prosecutor to prosecute them. I realize that is unlikely to happen, the reality is that coordinated fake news on the Internet is still something that platforms are figuring out how to deal with fairly.
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Nobody know what constitutes "scamming", because it's not a legal concept. There is no sense in which receiving a gift itself constitutes "scamming". Since scamming is vaguely about dishonesty, there is an imaginable scenario where you could be liable for a false representation, for example if you impersonated someone else in order to receive something of value, you could be prosecuted in California. You should not assume that a police officer saying "That's not our problem" is proof that you committed no crime or civil tort. Your lawyer can give you advice as to whether you have anything to worry about, legally. The other stuff about being called a scammer or having pictures posted might be a violation of Facebook's TOS, and you can always complain to Facebook central authorities. Technically, uploading a picture that someone took is a violation of copyright law, if you didn't give permission to do so. It might run afoul of some state~provincial or national privacy law, depending on where this takes place.
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There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake.
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Point three should include "to the best of my knowledge and belief", or be modified to state that none of those "house or the adjacent shop" have informed the affiant of any such delivery, or delivered any such package to the affiant. It might add that the affiant had questioned such persons and they denied receiving such a delivery. The point here, of course, is to prove that the package was never properly delivered, no doubt in support of a claim on the delivery service. The ordinary assumption is that if a person in the "house or the adjacent shop" had accepted a package, it would normally have been given to the addressee at an early opportunity.
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Can a religious employer prohibit public advocacy? I work for the Roman Catholic church in the USA. I am an administrative assistant with only very rare dealings with the public. When I was hired I was told by a Human Resources representative that if I was seen "holding signs" (direct quote) advocating for any of three political issues my employment "will end." The issues were LGBT marriage, reproductive rights, and euthanasia. The implication was that it did not matter whether I was on or off the job, or whether I was representing my workplace; if I held signs advocating for any of those things even on my own time and with no direct ties to the organization or church, my employment would or could be terminated. Is this legal? I can understand forbidding it when "on the clock" or if I was wearing a shirt that says "I work for the Catholic Church," but controlling my own personal freedom of speech seems very illegal or at least strong grounds for wrongful termination. Any help would be great. Thank you. Related: Can an employer require employees be Christian? From this I know that religious employers are exempt from discrimination laws, but I'm not sure how it applies to my situation.
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The First Amendment forbids the government from abridging your freedom of speech. There is no (federal) law against your private employer doing so. A good summary is https://www.americanbar.org/publications/insights_on_law_andsociety/15/winter-2015/chill-around-the-water-cooler.html
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Elected officials are not "employees subject to the civil service laws" unless a state has made extremely odd decisions, and maybe not even then. The "civil service," as that term is used when talking about government employment, consists of at most those people who work for the government as a career. It generally actually means something even more restricted: civil servants are people protected from arbitrary action or political cronyism. For instance, the Labor Department's Wage and Hour division (interpreting the same type of language) defines it as follows (29 CFR 553.11): The term “civil service laws” refers to a personnel system established by law which is designed to protect employees from arbitrary action, personal favoritism, and political coercion, and which uses a competitive or merit examination process for selection and placement. Continued tenure of employment of employees under civil service, except for cause, is provided. Elected officials, in contrast, do not have an expectation of continued employment other than for cause -- they can be voted out for any reason whatsoever.
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LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision.
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The key difference is the motivation for denying service. Generally, a business can deny service for almost any reason, or for no reason, and doesn't have to explain its reasons for doing so. However, laws may make it illegal to deny service for certain specific reasons. The federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. So a business may not deny service for those specific reasons. In the Colorado case, there was a similar state law that also forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. If they deny you service because of your political views, or the way you dress, or because they just plain don't like you as a person, that's legal. If they deny you service because of your sex, or race, or on the other bases in the Civil Rights Act, that's illegal. Obviously, since a business doesn't have to say why they're denying service, or could lie about the reason, this could make it hard for a plaintiff to prove that denial was in fact based on (e.g.) race. They might be able to do so by finding out about internal discussions within the business, or by showing a pattern of denial to customers of a particular race. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the baker made it easy by explicitly stating that he was denying service because of the customers' sexual orientation, or at least because of the same-sex nature of the marriage in question. This would appear to violate the Colorado state law. Had he just said no without giving a reason, it would have been harder for the plaintiffs to make their case. (A state commission held that the baker did violate the law, but the US Supreme Court reversed because, they said, the commission had improperly taken the baker's religion into account.) But there is no such law that forbids discrimination on the basis of political views, so Alex Jones can't make a similar case.
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Is this illegal? No, subject to some possible narrow exceptions discussed below. Do the social media companies have a duty under the First Amendment to not censor users? No. Indeed, usually, there is greater liability exposure for failing to censor content, for example, by failing to honor a "take down notice" under Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act based upon an alleged copyright violation, or for failure to censor content related to potential sex trafficking. The First Amendment to the United State Constitution (which applies to state and local government via the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution) is a limitation on the power of governmental actors only. This said, some state constitutions, such as California's, provide free speech protections not just from government action, but also in spaces that are privately owned, but are open to the public and constitute de facto public forums. The authority of California to expand its state constitutional protections to these private settings was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). It is conceivable that these doctrines could be expanded to public Internet forums in the case of California based social media companies (e.g., Facebook has its headquarters in Menlo Park, California; so does its sister platform Instagram; LinkedIn is based in Sunnyvale, California; and Google is based in Mountain View, California). There are also laws that limit how employers can regulate employee speech in a labor relations context, although most of them don't have constitutional dimensions. It is conceivable that these doctrines could limit social media platform's authority to limit some kinds of speech by their own employees, or in situations where the social media platform looked like it was acting as a mere agent of some other employer controlled by that employer for all practical purposes. There has also been litigation related to free speech on social media regarding the rights of governmental account holders to exercise the same kinds of account management that is available to other users, implicating the First Amendment right to petition the government. The social media platform operator is not itself the primary target in these cases, but if it simply implements its terms of service neutrally with respect to all account holders, it could be facilitating a constitutional violation by its governmental account holders and could conceivably be held liable for aiding and abetting that violation of the law by a governmental account holder (in the context of a lawsuit for money damages this is a special subtype of something called a civil conspiracy).
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There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law.
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In germany, this is called Friedenspflicht. Both employers and employees (and their unions) are required to refrain from strikes and lockouts in disputes on issues which are covered by a currently valid collective bargaining agreement. The agreement may also stipulate that there will be no labor actions on issues which are not covered, as long as the agreement is in force, but that is not necessary. Example: There is a collective bargaining agreement on wages, which is still running. Strikes for higher wages are prohibited. Strikes to get better staffing for the night shift would be allowed, if the agreement doesn't say how many employees should be on duty even during slack hours.
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Defamation laws do not distinguish between charitable organizations and others: however, in the US there are special considerations for "public figures" (they are not afforded as much protection). The medium does not matter -- texting, blogging, letter-writing, whatever. The defamatory statement need not have been received by a wide audience – it suffices that the message was received by one person other than the person being defamed. A single defamatory act is all it takes: there is no requirement of there being an established and repeated practice of defaming. One way to defend against a charge of defamation is to show that the statement is true. An alternative is to show that the statement is incapable of being proven true or false (e.g. calling someone a "jerk" doesn't assert a factual proposition). A careful scrutiny of the actual statement, performed by an attorney specializing in such matters, is really the only way to know whether words like "may", "possibly" would make a statement an expression of opinion rather than a statement of fact. A person suing for defamation would have to have suffered a loss, but there is a category of false statements, per se defamation, considered to be so injurious that damage need not be proven. That included allegations of criminal activity and allegations of professional incompetence, either of which could be applicable in the context you are describing. The First Amendment provides much protection against such suits, which may not exist in other countries. Because of this, a law was recently passed in the US, 28 USC 111, which says that domestic courts will not enforce a foreign defamation judgment that is inconsistent with the First Amendment. [Addendum] This part is crucial: "The only people I've expressed my concerns to, aside from the organization itself, is my parents and my wife's parents. However, they have shared with a few friends...". If you alleged illegal behavior to your parents, that's a problem. If you only said e.g. "I have concerns", that's not a problem. It would also matter in what way you tried "to disclose to a U.S. based organization details of the foreign organization they are supporting that indicate it might not be on the up and up".
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Does GDPR Prohibit Reading Unsolicited Emails? I originally asked this question on Information Security and it was suggested it was a better fit over here. I'm a member of the management committee of an allotment society in the UK. The committee maintains a list of society members' email addresses to keep in contact with them. Before GDPR started on the 25th of May this year an email was sent to all members on this list asking them to opt in to future communications. Most members replied positively. At a meeting last night, the Secretary of the committee said that she had received emails from members who had not opted in advising of health and safety issues on the site. She said the National Allotment Society's policy was that these emails could not even be read because of GDPR. She added that an email was then sent to the original sender advising of this. I have looked what GDPR says about emails and it seems to concentrate on not sending unsolicited emails and making sure that an organisation has explicit consent to store data. From what I understand we have a lawful reason to process this email but we do not have explicit consent for anything. My question is this: does GDPR prohibit reading unsolicited emails from people who have not explicitly opted in to a mailing list?
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Does GDPR prohibit reading unsolicited emails from people who have not explicitly opted in to a mailing list? tl;dr: No. I have never heard of this, and I don't see how this could follow from the GDPR. You should follow up with the Secretary to find out how she came to her conclusion. Detailed reasoning: The GDPR restricts the processing of personal data, so it does in principle cover reading email, since reading counts as "processing", and an email may contain personal data. However, Article 2 (emphasis mine) says that: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. I would read this to mean that a human reading emails is only covered by GDPR if the emails are part of a "filing system" or intended to be. So reading the emails is ok, it's only problematic if you intend to systematically store them. Even filing them, while covered by GDPR, would presumably be allowed, because to actually act on the email, you would have to keep it, and Article 6 allows processing of personal data to "take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract" and when "processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller". One caveat: If the email contains data that falls under special categories of personal data (Article 9) you may need explicit consent for storage. That covers things like racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs and health information. So if someone discloses a health problem or their religious belief in their mail, you may need to ask them for permission to keep it. In summary: At most, GDPR would require you to promptly delete the email once you no longer need it (which could be immediately if the email is irrelevant to you). If the email contains data you legitimately need (e.g. a complaint you need to follow up on), you are allowed to keep it as required (based on Article 6 (f)). Note that in both cases no explicit consent is required from the email sender, unless the email contains particularly sensitive data, such as political/religious beliefs or health data.
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GDPR does not cease to apply because of the location of data storage. It applies based on the location of the data processor, data controller, and data subject. If you are in the EU, you are a data subject covered by GDPR. It does not matter where the data are stored. Note that you are asked to confirm that you're aware that US laws may be less protective, but you're not asked to acknowledge that anything about the arrangement causes the "laws of your country/region" not to apply. The company also does not seem to be claiming that they don't apply, although it seems that they want you to think so, and it's not clear whether they think so. You are correct that GDPR doesn't allow its protections to be waived. A data subject may always consent to certain processing, and some processing may be performed without consent, but it's not possible to waive the right to withhold consent for processing that does require it.
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Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc.
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Yes, there would still be an obligation to comply with erasure requests – if the data subject can be identified, and if the GDPR applies. This is a case for Art 11 GDPR: processing which does not require identification. The pastebin site is not required to collect identifying info just in order to facilitate later deletion. If the site is unable to identify the data subjects, then the data subject rights (like access, rectification, erasure, restriction, or data portability) do not apply. Other rights like the right to be informed and the right to object do remain, though. But if the data subject provides sufficient additional information that makes it possible to identify their records, then the data subject rights apply again. In practice, this is likely going to mean that anyone with access to a paste will be able to request deletion, since the site would have no ability to verify the identity of the data subject beyond the information in the paste. None of this absolves the site from implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of this data. Even though the pastes might not be directly identifying, they are personal data and are far from anonymous. Common practices like numbering pastes with a sequential ID or showing recent pastes on a homepage have to be viewed critically. My go-to recommendation is to assign a cryptographically random UUIDv4 ID to the post, so that it is practically impossible for anyone to find the paste unless they were given a link by the uploader. Your idea to delete pastes after a fairly short retention period is also good. This helps with security, and it is in line with the GDPR's data minimization and storage limitation principles: data may only be kept as long as necessary for its purpose. On the other hand, quick deletion might not be in line with the purpose of these pastes – it all depends on context. You mention that this is an US-based site. If so, there's a question whether GDPR would even apply. GDPR will apply per Art 3(2) if the data controller is offering its services to people who are in Europe. Here, “offering” does not mean mere availability of the website, but that the data controller intends the service to be used by such people, in particular if the service is somehow targeted or marketed to such people.
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If you are purely a designer (and not contracted for the daily operation of the site), the answer is "no". GDPR Article 4 defines the "roles" responsible for complying with GDPR, and there are two: Controller and Processor. The Controller is the one who calls the shots. In particular: Decides what personal data to process. This is usually the owner of the web site. The Processor is the one that actually does the processing. This is usually some company providing some sort of data processing service (e.g. SaaS, PaaS, etc.). The relationship between the Processor and the Controller must be contractual. The contract is called a DPA (Data Protection Agreement or Data Processing Addendum). As a designer, you don't fit into any of these roles. If your contract with the client is silent on liability for GDPR compliance, then you have no liability. This goes for projects completed both before and after the May 25 deadline. Of course, if there are GDPR clauses in your contract, then you must fulfil them just as have to fulfil any other contractual obligation. But unlike the controller and the processor, there are no automatic legal liability for a designer or programmer.
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The basic requirements for the effectiveness of valid legal consent are defined in Article 7 of the GDPR and specified further in Recital 32. There is no form requirement for the consent, so using a button is not a problem. However, I do not think the MailChimp-button you reproduce as an example is good enough. It asks for a blanket consent to stuff that is buried in MailChimp's “Anti-spam Policy & Terms of Use”. But according to the GDPR, what the data subject consent to can’t be buried in the ToU – it must spelled out in clear, plain language. Requests must be granular, asking for separate consent for separate types of processing. “When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them” (Recital 32). Blanket consent, as used by MailChimp, is not allowed. The other clear requirement from the GDPR is that opt-in is mandatory. Pre-ticked and opt-out buttons are explicitly banned: “Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent” (Recital 32). ‘No’ must become your data default, but if the user chooses to opt-in by clicking a button, this is valid consent. The MailChimp-button complies witrh this. The GDPR also requires you to keep a records of the consents given (so make that part of the user profile), and to withdraw consent at any time – so you make make provisions for that as well in your implementation of consent.
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You could, but how should the companies that want to handle your data know this? If they have no affirmation from you that you allow them to process your data in any way, other than those they are already allowed to because of the exceptions, they have to - under GDPR - assume you don't want them to process your data, and thus have to ask you.
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The Facebook Pixel analytics solution does not seem to support access or erasure for data subjects. While there are some GDPR compliance features, these focus on collecting consent prior to collecting data. The relationship between the pixel user and Facebook is also murky. For certain kinds of data, Facebook acts as the data processor only, and the user has all the responsibility as the data controller. For other kinds of data, Facebook and the Pixel user are joint controllers, and therefore jointly responsible. This lack of features doesn't necessarily mean that Facebook Pixel is in violation of the GDPR, since the GDPR Right to Erasure only applies under certain circumstances. However, it is really difficult to argue that a website or app that integrates Facebook Pixel would be compliant. It is also rather dubious that Facebook could be compliant themselves, since their pixels will also collect data about persons who are not Facebook members. While these problems are most apparent with the Facebook Pixel since it's explicitly intended for tracking, this problem also applies to any other embeds provided by Facebook, such as like buttons. This was the subject of the Fashion ID case, in which the ECJ determined (in 2019) that the site operator is a joint controller with regards to data collection on the website by the Facebook embed. This effectively means that third party embeds can only be loaded after the website visitor has given consent for sharing data with Facebook. The tracking of non-users by Facebook was seen as especially problematic in Belgium, where Facebook had been banned from collecting such data already in 2015 (which was upheld in 2018). Since this was pre-GDPR, FB is currently litigating whether Belgium can continue enforcing their ban. I expect that Belgium will prevail with their ban. While this has no immediate consequences for Pixel users, this would make it more likely that Pixel users could be sued or fined successfully. From an advertiser perspective, Facebook does have valuable data that make the integration of Facebook Pixel an attractive proposition. However, other analytics solutions are much easier to bring into compliance. This is ultimately a business decision: will the better understanding of your ad spend on Facebook outweigh the risk and effort of integrating the Pixel?
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What if a lawyer steals my idea and doesn't do the work? I'm working on a tech startup that involves a specific industry. Because the industry is regulated, I decided to get a lawyer to sign off on my system and tell me whether I would need to change anything. I contacted a law firm who specializes in this industry, and the main lawyer at the firm previously held a senior position in the relevant regulatory authority and still has friends in senior positions etc. I met that main lawyer and I gave him a flowchart of the step-by-step process of the system and how it would work, and although it may or may not be patentable, in my opinion it is a new and original idea and could be very profitable within the specific industry. We talked about the relevant legislation and how the system would work, and he told me how it can be done and what I would need to do to ensure there were no regulatory issues. He said that a key part of making it work would be to have a clear contract with the companies that we connect to the system, to make it clear exactly what my system's responsibilities are, and that they are within the boundaries of what is permissible under the regulations. He said I should pay for that consultation, but that he would talk to his friends who are still working in the regulatory authority and get their opinion, while drafting up the contract I would use when connecting companies to the system. I paid for the consultation and then he emailed me a summary of what we had talked about, as I described above (how the system would operate, relevant legislation, what is permissible under the regulations, that the key would be a contract that makes it clear what my company's responsibilities would be to companies who connect to the system). In the email he also said the work he was willing to do for me as described above (contacting friends in the regulatory agency, getting their opinion, and drafting up the contract that I would use). He said that his friends could have some political motivation and might disagree with his opinion that it can be done legally, but said that in that case we would proceed anyway because he is confident that it can be done lawfully. In the email he asked me to confirm that he should start that work and draft the contract etc and he confirmed how much it would cost. I sent an email back confirming that he should proceed, and I paid for that first consultation. He sent an email 2 weeks later saying that he needed more time to finish everything, but that he could finish soon. Then he didn't contact me for a month, and since then I have not been able to contact him. He doesn't respond to my emails or calls, and when I call his office I am always told that he is "on the phone" and will call me back soon, but never calls me back. I think his position is extremely valuable to me. He has expert knowledge of the regulations, has worked for the regulatory authority in a senior position, and has friends who still work there in senior positions. If there was any question of whether my system was operating lawfully, it is likely that he would be contacted by the regulatory authority for advice, as he is an expert. So I think I can't do it without him because I would not be confident that I had drafted the contract correctly. Also, because of his relationship with the regulatory authority, I would consider my relationship with him as a kind of insurance that I am willing to pay for. Surely I would have no issues from the regulatory authority if their expert has signed off on my idea. Because he seems to be avoiding me, I worry that he may have decided to take my idea and work on it by himself for his own profit, and that he has no plan to finish the work he agreed to do for me. He could easily take the flowchart I gave him and give it to a software company to have a system developed. As I understand it, he offered to do certain work for me which included drafting the contract I would use, getting advice from his friends in the regulatory authority, and signing off on the project as within the boundaries of the legislation for a specific price, and I agreed to that and told him to proceed, so I believe he has some responsibility to me for that. Whether he starts a copycat company might be a separate issue. He could copy my idea even if he did the work that he agreed to do for me. Of course, if he doesn't help me it will be extremely difficult for me to start, and because of his relationships with people in the regulatory authority, it may be impossible. It's also possible that when he contacted his friend, his friend had the idea of copying the idea, in which case my situation would be much worse. It's also possible that he is just extremely slow and busy and is working on it for me now. Regardless, I'd like to know what I can do if he does not complete the work and starts a company that does the same as what I had planned to do. If he never contacts me and I find out next year that someone is doing exactly the same thing, can I sue him for the money I lost for not being able to complete this business? Would it matter whether I could connect him to that copycat company? Can I do anything else now? Does he have some responsibility to do the work that we agreed to, or can he somehow talk his way out of it? Can I get a court order requiring him to do the things he offered to do in the email that I agreed to, for the price we agreed to?
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You identify basically two issues. Non-Responsiveness and Failing To Meet Deadlines One is that he's taking longer than planned to get your work done, and might have abandoned you. The sad but true reality is that lawyers frequently do get busy and sometimes fail to meet the deadlines that they have set for themselves. In this respect, the legal industry is a lot like the construction industry. Lawyers try to meet deadlines on time, and usually they do, but it isn't unusual at all for a lawyer to fall behind schedule in some of his cases. In part, this is because lawyers have little control over their own schedules because things can come up that suddenly require their total attention and get them off track on a regular basis. Sometimes, they have trouble getting back into the flow of work that they were before the interruption came up. Can I do anything else now? In that case, usually your best solution is to nag the lawyer regularly even to the extent that it is a little bit uncomfortable, but to demonstrate no hard feelings when he turns his attention back to your project. But, if he just totally abandons you, you need to find someone else to do the work and fire him. If he never contacts me and I find out next year that someone is doing exactly the same thing, can I sue him for the money I lost for not being able to complete this business? Realistically no. If he blows you off entirely you need to fire him and find someone else to do the work. You are very unlikely to be able to win compensation for him delaying the start of your business. These damages would usually be considered "too speculative" to allow for a recovery in a case like this one. Does he have some responsibility to do the work that we agreed to, or can he somehow talk his way out of it? He does have some responsibility to do the work. If he doesn't he has breached his contract with you and may owe you a refund of your fees. Truly abandoning a client and neglecting his or her case is also a violation of professional ethics. This is a pretty minor offense compared to the offenses involving idea theft if it happens in isolation, which might result in a minor slap on the wrist like a private reprimand that would be held against him if incidents like this surfaced again in the future. But, this routinely leads to an attorney being disbarred (often on an uncontested basis) if an attorney one day just stops working for almost all of his clients and walks away from his practice (often due to a psychological breakdown, despondency after a divorce or an affair, dementia, untreated mental health conditions, a personal tragedy in life such as the death of a spouse or a child, or substance abuse). There is a small but persistent trickle of cases with that fact pattern. It is hard to know from the perspective of an individual client if he just got busy and overlooked a case or two including yours, or if he totally shut down or walked away from most of his practice. Can I get a court order requiring him to do the things he offered to do in the email that I agreed to, for the price we agreed to? No. You can sue for the money damages you suffer from his breach of contract (but probably not speculative lost profits), but you can't get a court order forcing him to do what he promised to do (among other things, it would violate the 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for a court to do that). Idea Theft The second issue is what happens if your lawyer steals your ideas. Regardless, I'd like to know what I can do if he does not complete the work and starts a company that does the same as what I had planned to do. This is very unlikely and a very unwise choice for the lawyer. An Analogy In terms of likelihood and severity of consequences if a lawyer does so, this would be on a par with a lawyer beating up his client severely with a baseball bat. Beating up a client physically is a type of lawyer misconduct that is very infrequent, but isn't entirely non-existent (for what it is worth, most of the rare cases of physical assaults by lawyers on their clients seem to take place in Kentucky or Texas; physical assaults by clients on their lawyers, in contrast, are thousands of times more frequent and happen all over the United States). But, it is punished very severely when it happens (even though there isn't a rule of professional conduct for lawyers that prohibits this kind of misconduct by lawyers with great specificity). Civil Liability He would have legal liability to you for breach of fiduciary duty probably requiring him, among other things, to disgorge all of his profits to you and pay you for any lost profits you could demonstrate (which might be less speculative if his business didn't fail). He could also face civil liability including statutory damages or punitive damages for theft of trade secrets. Suspension or Loss Of A Law License He would probably also face a very high risk of being suspended from the practice of law for a prolonged period, or being disbarred if you complained to attorney regulatory authorities. Attorneys have ethical rules related to confidentiality and related to business ventures or making profits that involve clients or client information that are very strict and are taken seriously by lawyers. If he were caught breaching these obligations the consequences would be harsh for him. Criminal Law Consequences He could even face a criminal prosecution for theft of trade secrets under either state or federal law. I wouldn't be very surprised at all if criminal charges would be brought in a case like the one that you are worried about. The closest analogy (which is much more common) is when an attorney pockets money from the sale of client property instead of turning it over to a client. Those cases routinely result in significant prison sentences for the perpetrator. For example, I have a client whose former attorney was convicted and sentenced to about eight years in federal prison for stealing about $600,000 of proceeds from the sale of client property. These cases are much more common because a lawyer under extreme financial pressure can have a one time impulsive lapse and temporarily solve the problem created by the financial pressure. But, in this case, the lawyer needs to engage in years of sustained, publicly visible activity based upon the misconduct that is unlikely to produce huge sums of money right away and might even require an additional investment on his part, not a single, quick, lapse of judgment after which the wrongdoing is over and the impulsive need is met. This Almost Never Happens A busy lawyer with a successful specialized practice would very rarely risk those kinds of consequences when he already has a successful enterprise practicing law. A "typical" case where that might happen would involve someone whose family members were kidnapped and facing imminent death if he didn't comply by a foreign government trying to steal military secrets or a drug cartel. This isn't something that a lawyer would do out of mere greed. Lawyers with the kind of sophisticated tech industry legal practice that you describe often invest in their clients' businesses in ways that strictly comply with the relevant ethical rules (which the scenario that you are worried about would not). Sometimes lawyers get in trouble when they substantially comply with the rules but don't do so strictly (e.g. providing fully disclosure and consent but not getting it in writing). But, I can only think of a single case in twenty years or so of practicing law where I've ever seen even an accusation of something like what you are worried about happen, and I've never seen a case like that in case law reports, or news coverage in either the popular press, or trade journals. The case where I did see that accusation wasn't entirely implausible, but it wasn't an entirely clear case of misappropriation either, and the client making the accusation, realistically would have been hard pressed to have made the business idea allegedly stolen work himself. Theft of business plans isn't all that uncommon in and of itself, but an attorney for the person whose plans are stolen is very uncommon as a perpetrator. Far more often it is another business person who had some minor or major involvement with the tech venture, or someone to whom the venture was pitched. This is the sort of thing that venture capital guys and start up company executives with little money of their own in the venture usually do, not the tech firm's own lawyers, in most cases. The kind of betrayal that you are worried about would be extremely unusual conduct for a lawyer in this situation. It would be almost as uncommon as a criminal defense lawyer engaging in sustained leaking of incriminating privileged evidence to prosecutors in a death penalty murder case. Either kind of betrayal isn't impossible, but it just almost never happens that way, even though lawyers commit all sorts of other kinds of misconduct now and then, and that sometimes hurts clients badly. Clients are much more often harmed by neglect and incompetence than by such a direct betrayal from their lawyers. Proving Misconduct Would it matter whether I could connect him to that copycat company? Yes, it would matter. You wouldn't necessarily have to show that he was being compensated by the company, but you would have to show that he was, at a minimum, helping another client with information obtained from you, either in his capacity as their lawyer or as someone involved in their business in some other way. If a copycat business appears that you can't demonstrate has any connection to him of any kind, then you have no way to prove that he did anything wrong. Not infrequently, great minds think alike and someone comes up with a very similar idea to yours, independently, at about the same time that you do.
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There are two basic problems with your theory: You say: can't one accept a case on contingency and "as time permits," so that in such an event one would simply drop the contingency case (or, if it looked promising, hand it off to some other lawyer in a slump)? No. you can't. If you take a case, then drop it because a more profitable case comes along, you might well be disbarred, not to mention sued by the client you just threw over. You might even spend a night in jail for contempt--in many cases, you are not allowed to simply drop a case without the court's permission. So if you accept a contingency case, you accept it until (1) the case is over, (2) the client fires you, (3) you, the client, and the judge all agree you can quit, or (4) you can convince the judge you should be allowed to quit regardless of the client's wishes. Until then, you are stuck with the time and expense involved with handling the case. "Expense" is the second problem. You seem to be under the impression that once you've paid for the office and the coffee maker, there's no downside in pursuing a contingency case. But filing and pursuing a lawsuit cost money, not just time. Copying and coding documents costs money. Stenographers for depositions cost money. Just filing a lawsuit often costs a few hundred dollars. Hell, in a major lawsuit, you will probably spend a few hundred dollars just on postage. And a lot of commercial litigation now involves expert witnesses, whose fees start at a few hundred dollars an hour. Normally that all gets billed back to the client, but on a contingency case the lawyer often absorbs most or all of it. So from a lawyer's perspective, even if he or she is not working right now, "any positive payout" isn't enough. It has to be enough of a payout, and enough of a chance of winning, that the expected reward is worth paying, potentially, the cost of a trial, and forgoing other work if things get busy again while you're trying to prep your contingency case for trial. The fact is, for a lot of this sort of case--even if it looks "potentially profitable" to a non-lawyer--is going to be less profitable, in the long run, than spending the same amount of time playing golf with people who might actually pay you by the hour to do something. Also, two quick notes: Your suggestion of raising the contingency up to 100%, or close to it, won't help--it's illegal in many jurisdictions, and unethical in all of them. As a side note, even if a lawyer did take one of these cases, it wouldn't do you any good, since lawyers are prohibited in most cases from splitting their fees with non-lawyers.
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Now I'm having another conversation with a lawyer and I'm not particularly happy (not to say outraged) that to answer a simple question they require £95 + VAT for 30 minutes Skype session. Maybe it is a common practice in law industry - in my industry (web development) we share our knowledge in an open-source manner. The rate you were charged is actually reasonable for such a limited engagement. Few lawyers are willing to even consider providing any advice on such a limited basis. Most would try to limit their clients to cases generating thousands of pounds in an in person visit. Lawyers are in the business of selling knowledge and time, not documents and results. An open-source approach would undermine their business model just as much as it would for the movie industry or the recording industry. While I appreciate professional legal advice (I know it is required) I have a belief that by obtaining some knowledge first I'll be in a position to ask better questions. This belief is not necessarily very well founded in this context. The reality of information about the law is that the raw data has limited usefulness. One of the main things that a legal education provides is an ability to "issue spot" so that you know what points need to be researched and where to look for them. Without the overall context that a legal education provides, knowing what issues you should be looking for is difficult or impossible, and this is particular true in Anglo-American common law systems, where the law is embedded in an opaque network of appellate cases rather than laid out more or less completely in a carefully organized statute. Also, you are almost completely unqualified to distinguish between a simple question and a hard one. Just as it is difficult for a non-expert to know what is difficult or impossible for a computer to do (e.g. turning raw image input in the models of reality is very hard for computers but easy for people, while intense calculations are simple for computers but hard for people), it is often very difficult for a non-lawyer to know what is an easy or hard legal question. For example, the rights of neighboring home owners when trees start to grow across property lines seem like simple questions but are actually extremely complex legally, as is another simple question such as explaining what a book means in IP terms as a book migrates to a new platform. But, some seemingly complex points (e.g. detailed questions of tax law or civil procedure) can have very simple and clear answers. Finally, keep in mind that in a situation like spousal alimony, if you've done as much research as you state, it is very likely that a definitive answer that you are looking for simply does not exist. There a lots of legal questions that do not have clear objective answers. This is because trial judges in family law matters have wide discretion in a lot of the fine points of alimony decisions, much of it exercised at the trial court level that does not generate binding legal precedents and is not widely available to researchers. Therefore, there is really no substitute in evaluating how judges will exercise that discretion for the collective experience of an attorney who has been through the process many, many times before the particular group of judges who are likely to handle your individual case. In sum, while I understand your frustration, a lot of it is rooted in common, but inaccurate assumptions about how the legal system works.
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could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? No, unless by "technology" you mean the employer's materials or resources (see condition 3 of the clause). Your remark that "this is completely and utterly unrelated to [employer's] business model" survives items 1 and 2. Likewise, working on your idea outside hours survives the corresponding part of item 3. Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? No, unless the software you develop is "based on [your] knowledge [etc.] of (COMPANY)".
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You have two downvoted answers here. One of them is actually correct, one is nonsense. Question: Which one? Answer: Doesn't matter. If you provide this service without getting advice from a competent lawyer first, your risk is much too high. Making the wrong decision (either giving up on a good business idea without reason, or providing a banking service without license) will cost you much much more than paying a lawyer for advice.
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Yes. Usually a lawyer can charge until a court formally withdraws him from representing you in a case for representation in that case (even if a new lawyer has entered an appearance and you have fired him). A terminated lawyer, even after withdrawal, can also charge you for legal fees incurred to collect the lawyer's bill from you if the fee agreement allows him to do so. Many lawyers don't charge their clients for billing matters, but the law allows lawyers to charge clients for billing matters if their fee agreement says that they can. The post-termination charges you describe in the question sound like costs of collection of the bill, so they are legal if they are authorized by the fee agreement.
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"Wholly unconnected with your employment" means exactly that. Anything that is not connected to your functions or processes that you use in the course of your employment that your employer would have an interest in either protecting or marketing. Writing a book about software development If you are just a software developer, this would be fine unless you were talking about a process unique to your employer. If you worked in a publishing house that wrote software development books, this would be connected and must be disclosed to your employer. Releasing an open source piece of software not specifically aimed at the industry the company is in Again, this probably fine not to disclose since it would not be something you would develop as part of your employment, or under the umbrella of your company focus market. Release a commercial piece of software not specifically aimed at or competing with the industry the company is in Same as above. Honestly though the best policy is being open. If you come to your company with your idea and tell them that it doesn't have any applications in your industry and would like to develop it in your own time, they would have a much harder leg to stand on in a court case when they finally figured out how to apply it.
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How can you get in trouble? If they see any code you wrote for them show up in your open source project. They own the code you write on company time. Even if your code goes into an open source project owned by the company, you still don't own that code. The only way you can own it is if they directly tell you that you may put it into your open source project. If you make your open source project private so nobody else can see the source code, but they see your side business has the same features you wrote for them. You can try to get around problem #1 by hiding your open source project. But if they see the same features in it that they told you to write for them, they can become suspicious. They might force you to reveal the source to them in court. If you don't want them to see it, they may force you to share it with a third party who is bound by an NDA. The third party can compare your code to theirs and report if you copied any code. Even if your work is not directly related to the company products, your work for them can be a company secret. You reveal that, and you are in trouble. You say your work improves internal procedures, but is not directly related the company products. If a company can reduce its cost, it can lower its prices and still make more money than their competition. That gives them a competitive edge over other businesses. By revealing how your employer does its internal work, you give that competitive edge to their competition. Although you say your open source project does not violate rule #4 - "does not reveal company secrets" - all three explanations mentioned above say it does. What can you do? Quit and start your own company based on your open source project. If you quit, you should do it before you write any code related to your project for your employer. Ask your company to fund your project. Talk to your boss and anybody else there who might be a stakeholder. Tell them what you can do. Make a deal with them that you get to work on your project during work hours. Maybe they could turn it into an additional source of revenue for the company. That changes you from a potential loss into a valuable asset. Their competitors might end up buying products based on your code. Many companies would love for their competition to pay them. Ask your employer to allow you to turn your work into your open source project. Some companies require employees who work on open source projects to give their employers a royalty-free license to use and modify the work as they wish. Ask your employer if they would use a product based on your project. You can start a side business (with your employer's blessing), and turn them into your first customer. They get access to a beta product before their competitors do. Promise them they get it free or at a hefty discount for a year or two before the competition even knows what you have. The first option is win/lose. You win and your employer loses. The other three options are win/win. Good luck!
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Can a medical invoice that was disputed collect interest and be due years later? This is a bit embarrassing. A couple years ago I had been seeing a specialist doctor. I had been a victim of a crime, so the city/police department was paying for my treatment. It had been my understanding that the city/police would fully pay for a set number of visits, but it appeared that was based on the assumption the doctor's office was charging a lower rate (i.e. normally it was $200/hr but for low income or people who were victims of a crime it was $125/hr). Anyway, I had stopped seeing the doctor and I'm better now, but the office sent me an email reading: "Could we please get your police case number, so we can bill them for a outstanding visits?" First, I don't know how I missed payments, as I always paid in person before I left. Second, I noticed they had been inconsistent in the amount they were charging me per session (sometimes $200, sometimes $125). I pointed this out and said I think that they may owe me money back. They never responded. Third, I do not know how it could have gone on for months with only at the end asking me for the police case number. This was such a long time ago, I can't remember all the details clearly. Is there any point in pursuing this? Could it be I have a large bill incurring interest that will come back to haunt me?
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Is It Too Late To Collect The Bill? Probably not. There is a statute of limitations for collecting unpaid medical bills that varies in length in different jurisdictions, and the age of the bill in the question is approximate, so it is hard to know for sure if this one is too old. The relevant statutes of limitations in most U.S. states would be at least three years and in some it could be as much as ten or twelve years. If I recall correctly, in Canada, the relevant statute of limitations would be determined at the provincial level. Given that this was "a couple of years ago" realistically, it is probably not barred by the statute of limitations yet. Are Interest Charges Allowed. Generally yes. Most jurisdictions allow for pre-judgment interest at a statutory rate from the date due in the absence of a contrary agreement and if the provider's paperwork with you provided for another interest rate, that would apply instead. So charging interest is allowed. The existence of a dispute wouldn't change this result, although it would, of course, mean that if some portion of the bill was disallowed in a later lawsuit that interest would be owed only on the portion that the court found was actually owed. The Provider's Remedies A Lawsuit If these bills are not paid, they can sue. Statute of limitations, or errors in billing, or failure to seek reimbursement from the police as arranged with them, would all be legitimate defenses in lawsuit brought by the provider. Given the modest amount allegedly owed and the existence of defenses, this might not be a very attractive one for the provider to choose to bring suit to collect. Credit Reporting On the other hand, in lieu of suing, the provider could simply report it as a bad debt with a credit reporting agency through their collections company. This would look bad on your credit (for up to seven years in the U.S., although you could insist on filing a rebuttal statement as part of your credit report, I don't know how disputes about credit reporting work in Canada). Paying them would almost admit that there was a late payment for credit reporting purposes, but also might prevent the incident from entering the credit reporting system at all.
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Has friend A got any chance of disputing the cost of the seizure as the police didn't issue the notification? I don't think so (see below for why), but you should pay a lawyer if you need legal advice. The met say A FORM 3708 seizure notice will have been given to the driver where practicable, giving full instructions on the reverse. A notice letter will also be sent to the registered keeper, if they were not the driver. In the meantime, this information will assist you. (my emphasis). Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not, so far as I can see, mention any legal requirement for the Police to issue a paper document at the time of seizure. Here's 165A in full 165A Power to seize vehicles driven without licence or insurance Subsection (5) applies if any of the following conditions is satisfied. The first condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 164, a person to produce his licence and its counterpart for examination, b. the person fails to produce them, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a motor vehicle is or was being driven by the person in contravention of section 87(1). The second condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 165, a person to produce evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143, b. the person fails to produce such evidence, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being so driven. The third condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 163, a person driving a motor vehicle to stop the vehicle, b. the person fails to stop the vehicle, or to stop the vehicle long enough, for the constable to make such lawful enquiries as he considers appropriate, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143. Where this subsection applies, the constable may— a. seize the vehicle in accordance with subsections (6) and (7) and remove it; b. enter, for the purpose of exercising a power falling within paragraph (a), any premises (other than a private dwelling house) on which he has reasonable grounds for believing the vehicle to be; c. use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred by paragraph (a) or (b). Before seizing the motor vehicle, the constable must warn the person by whom it appears that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143 that he will seize it— a. in a section 87(1) case, if the person does not produce his licence and its counterpart immediately; b. in a section 143 case, if the person does not provide him immediately with evidence that the vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of that section. But the constable is not required to give such a warning if the circumstances make it impracticable for him to do so. If the constable is unable to seize the vehicle immediately because the person driving the vehicle has failed to stop as requested or has driven off, he may seize it at any time within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time at which the condition in question is first satisfied. The powers conferred on a constable by this section are exercisable only at a time when regulations under section 165B are in force. In this section— a. a reference to a motor vehicle does not include an invalid carriage; b. a reference to evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143 is a reference to a document or other evidence within section 165(2)(a); c. “counterpart” and “licence” have the same meanings as in section 164; d. “private dwelling house” does not include any garage or other structure occupied with the dwelling house, or any land appurtenant to the dwelling house. Also what consequences could Friend A face for knowingly allowing friend B to drive his (Friend A's) car whilst he was drunk and didn't hold a valid license or insurance? A few random thoughts: B is clearly committing several criminal acts and A appears to have possibly aided and abetted them. I imagine A's insurance company might consider this invalidates A's insurance. I'm just some random bloke in the intertubes, not a lawyer.
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Sec. 171.208(c) of the law provides: (c) Notwithstanding Subsection (b), a court may not award relief under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection (b)(2) in a previous action for that particular abortion performed or induced in violation of this subchapter, or for the particular conduct that aided or abetted an abortion performed or induced in violation of this subchapter. The apparent intention, as I see it, is that a defendant is only supposed to have to pay the $10,000 damages once, so that it's not possible for a large number of plaintiffs to sue and collect. Some others have pointed out that there may be a loophole in case there are judgments in several cases before the defendant pays for the first one, and that in such a situation the defendant might be required to pay more than once. It doesn't seem to me, on its face, that such a loophole was intended, but we may have to wait and see how courts handle it. In any case, it would seem that the defendant could minimize this possibility by paying the judgment as quickly as possible.
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Tell your parents Given the circumstances it is a near certainty that the least he will do if you do not pay for the damage is make contact with them. It will be far, far better for you if they learn it from you rather than him. What could he do? He (or his insurance company) can contact your parents - he will almost certainly do this. He (or his insurance company) can sue you for negligence. Children are responsible for their own torts providing they have the capacity to recognize and avoid risk and harm - based on your question I have (and a court would have) no doubt that that you are. If you lose the case, and don't pay, he can have the government seize whatever you own in order to sell it to pay the debt you owe. If this happened in British Columbia or Manitoba he can sue your parents. He could report you to the police - they may or may not choose to prosecute if what you did was criminal: it probably wasn't but the police may investigate to determine this. If he is insured he may be required to notify the police.
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From the link, it appeared that: Payments were made so that exam answers would be corrected before marking Payments were made to have an athletic offer extended for a person who would not otherwise qualify. Fraud and bribery are both applicable crimes. Victims are not necessary for either crime.
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Yes it is kind of possible what country would the legal action need to originate from? Would one file in the US and note the foreign defendant or would one file, as a foreigner, in the home country of the defendant? You can go either way. It is not obtaining the judgment that is the biggest trouble here, but enforcing it. You will need: A UK mailing address. Services like ScanMyPost will suffice. Some money to pay the court fees. Time, tenacity and patience to follow through the procedure and fill all necessary forms. Be lucky in that the defendant actually has something to pay the debt with. There are two stages: Obtain a court judgment in your favour. Unless the defendant pays you, enforce the judgment. Obtaining court judgment in the UK In the UK, the "small claims court" functions are executed by HM Courts & Tribunals Service. The specific service is called "Claim for money" which can be filed online via their old or new system. So, basically, you file the online form, pay the fee by credit card and wait for defendant's response. If they do not respond, you ask the court to make a judgment (in my case it took 10 weeks from filing claim to getting judgment). If the defendant responds and defends themselves, expect much longer wait and uncertain outcome. Enforcement So, you and the defendant have both received court judgment saying that they must pay you. But they are not paying. There is a range of options you can choose from: County Court Warrant of Control (claims from £50 to £5,000). Court bailiff will go to the defendant's address and try to seize goods that can be easily sold. High Court Writ of Control (claims from £600). Attachment of earnings order (you ask the court to order the defendant's employer to deduct his earnings in your favour). Third-party debt order (a.k.a. "Garnishee Order") — if you know the defendant's bank account details. Read about potential pitfalls here. Charging order: you will only get paid if the defendant sells their land. Bankrupt the defendant (big court fees!). Alternatively, you could always hire a UK lawyer but then you would probably not need this answer.
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There is no state that requires you to show ID to obtain medical care. To the extent that this is done it is done at the behest of whoever is paying for the care to determine that you are someone who is authorized to benefit from this payment, and not an imposter, or as a matter of policy of the doctor. (An exception to this general rule applies when one wants to pick up a prescription for a controlled substance or a Sudafed product, where you must indeed show ID to show that your name matches a prescription or to insure that the right name is entered into the Sudafed database.) It might be more convenient for the doctor in terms of collection of bad debt, insurance policy claims (where an insurance card would normally be required, at least), protection against fraud claims from an insurer, and medical record keeping to have a name, so a doctor might make it a policy to require ID, but it is not required by law (except where a government benefit provider like Medicaid or Medicare is involved and has a regulation requiring it). For example, in the Las Vegas shooting, where there wasn't time to process paperwork, hospital triage officials simply assigned an alias to every incoming patient and wrote it in marker on their body to keep the medical records straight, and to allow that alias to track medical costs to be billed when the time came to get the proper intake paperwork filled out and the file sent to the accounting department. There are also other circumstances that do not involve emergency treatment (e.g. STD testing, methadone treatment at free clinics, and clinical trials) where an alias rather than a true name is sometimes used to keep track of patients.
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If I understand your question correctly, you have some clients who have paid you for services that you have not yet provided and, indeed, they have not yet requested. Is this correct? The accounting term for this is a "prepayment". The correct accounting treatment is to increase an asset account (your bank account) and create a liability account (Prepayments or something similar). You need to talk to your accountant about how to treat these for consumption and income taxes. Legally, these people are now creditors of your business - just like all of your suppliers and employees. There is no legal requirement to escrow or otherwise treat this as trust money. Basically, if your business goes bust they will lose their money. This is something that you should have dealt with in your contract with your customers - if you are running an online business then you should get a lawyer to revise your terms of service to cover things like how they can ask for a refund (and how long you have to get it to them) and how long (or if) they forfeit the funds. As it stands the money effectively becomes yours after whatever time under a statute of limitation applies to transactions of this type and size (under whatever law applies to the contract) since after that time they cannot sue to get it back.
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Minnesota Speeding Law I currently am 21 years old and I had a great memorial weekend that ended with me getting the blue lights... I received a speeding ticket for I was going 71 in a 55mph zone.. I currently have been looking into hiring a lawyer to see if I could get this off of my record, but I am still looking into it. My 2 questions are: is it worth the money to have a lawyer and see if they could help me get this ticket off my record? Since I am only 21 years old if I would get caught again it would definitely not help my case... I got quoted for one of the lawyers I talked with and they were asking a very steep price. I then again realize that breaking the law you have to pay a significant price.
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is it worth the money to have a lawyer and see if they could help me get this ticket off my record? No. It is not worth the money and, absent very unusual circumstances, a lawyer is unlikely to be meaningfully more successful than dealing directly with the prosecutor in the case. Your best, cost effective option is to contact the prosecutor's office to see if you could plea bargain it to a lesser charge (which is often possible, for example, by taking a driver's education course). The main collateral disadvantage of a speeding ticket on your record is points on your driving record, which if there are enough of them, result in the temporary suspension of your driver's license, but those points expire after a few years.
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First of all, Sally can't charge Bob, or anyone else. She can file a complaint with the police, or with the District Attorney. It may or may not be investigated, and if it is, charges may or may not be brought, and she has no control over any of that, although she may be able to use persuasion or political pressure to influence the decision. In New York, persuading a child to make pornography is a class C felony. Possessing child pornography is a class E felony. Promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child is a class D felony. Disseminating obscene material to a minor is a class E felony, unless the defendant solicits the child to engage in sexual activity, in which case it's a class D felony. All of these have 5-year statutes of limitation. (N.Y. Pen. Law § § 70.00, 80.00, 235.21, 235.22, 263.05, 263.10, 263.11, 263.16.) I can't find any NY law that makes it a crime to ask for a naked image of a child and be refused, although there may well be one. Note that it is not a crime in NY to posses sexual or nude pictures of a person 16 or older, although it is a crime to create them. There are also federal laws against child pornography, but federal policy is not to bring federal cases where the accused are under 18 and a state case could be brought. In fact, the federal authorities generally do not bring cases except against major producers when a state case can be brought instead. But that is a matter of policy, not law. NY has a pre-trial diversion program for teen-ages involved in "sexting". They can agree to take special classes, and avoid a criminal conviction or any jail time. The court must approve candidates individually for this program, but it is widely used. In the given scenario, the statute of limitations would not have expired (if the law I couldn't find makes this a felony, misdemeanor SoL is 2 years). In theory bob could be charged and tried for his solicitation. If charges were levied, the prosecution would need to prove at trial that Bob had made the request, and that it was serious, not a joke. It would also need to persuade a jury to convict when no sexual image had ever been transmitted. In practice I doubt that a case would be pursued after several years. That would depend entirely on the DA, or the relevant assistant DA who handled the case. Nothing would legally prevent such a case that I know of.
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Now after 4 years I still can't get it off my mind and it's consuming me thinking that I was fooled into believing that the rule of law was the norm in this country (not the jungle law) and the beautiful constitution we have is not there just to look pretty, but something we can rely on. So, at this point, do I need legal help? Or mental help or some kind of miracle pill to help me cope with the situation (?) I know that 6' under we can have peace, but can I live a peaceful (bully free) life here too? We do have rule of law as a powerful norm in this country. But, we also live in a very complex society and the exact content of the law will always be the subject of fierce dispute. The solution is, pretty much, to lower your expectations. The vast majority of the time the law works. Your beliefs about exactly how far you are allowed to disobey an order from a law enforcement officer as a matter of practical reality, were miscalibrated. But, you did get out of jail the next day and the punishment you received was very survivable. In much of the world, this wouldn't be true. The rule of law doesn't mean that everyone perfectly obeys the law. It means that when the law is seriously broken in a manner that has big consequences that there is usually a way to legally mitigate the harm or to obtain a remedy. Pushing the limits of the freedoms the law gives you is rarely wise. But, that is no reason to refuse to live your life. It is one thing to learn from experience. But, sometimes, you can overlearn from experience and need to recognize that your anecdotal experience on a single occasion is not all that there is the law.
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You paid a higher amount so you got to drive the latest model for a year. I can buy a lower amount right now, but I only get to drive last year's model. Or I can pay a higher amount to drive the latest model again. That's life. I have a Wii. I didn't buy it when people queued up for it, but when the shop was selling them off for half the price. That's life. You pay more for the latest and greatest, and then it gets cheaper. The protection you are talking about is this: If the shop advertises a motorbike for £8,000 and when you go into the store the price is suddenly £10,000 then there is some protection in place. The protection means the shop will get a major telling off from trading standards if you complain, and possibly a fine. It doesn't mean you get the motorbike for £8,000. And it most definitely doesn't mean you get money back when they reduce the price a year later.
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Original answer: I am on probation which makes this even more important to resolve. Because you are on probation, you really should consult a lawyer because you might be violating the terms or conditions of probation when you received your ticket. For example, some people's probation require them to tell their probation officer every time they have police contact. See page 2 condition 2 of Colorado's Standard Terms and Conditions of Adult Probation as an example of probation conditions that require you to report all police contact. I received a traffic ticket. It's been a month and the court has still not received the ticket. The normal procedure with traffic tickets in most parts of the country is: The officer writes you the ticket. If it is a violation where you must appear in court, it will include a court date and time. This is so that if you don't show up for court, they will have proof that knew of the Court date and can issue a warrant. This is also why you must sign a traffic ticket in most jurisdictions. If it is not a violation where you are required to appear in court, the ticket it will usually have instructions on how to resolve the ticket by paying a fine, OR request a court date to contest the hearing. The officer files a copy of the ticket with his department and the court (the police department usually files them with the Court to ensure chain of custody). The court clerks receives the ticket and open a court file. The court file almost always has a copy of the ticket. What you should do: If you don't want to get an attorney, show up to court at the date and time on your ticket and bring a copy of the ticket with you. When the court has no record of the ticket, it is safe to assume that the police officer or his department never filed it with the court. But talk to an attorney before deciding to plead guilty. You don't want this to be an issue with your probation and this site is not for legal advice. Are you completely off the hook for running the red light? No. Assuming this ticket for running a red light was a red light under Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.007, there is a 2 year statute of limitations here is a 2 year statute of limitation for class C misdemeanors under Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § art. 12.02. What a 2 year statute of limitations means is that they (the police) have 2 years to start the prosecution from when an offense occurred. In the case of a traffic ticket, they would start the prosecution by filing the ticket/complaint with the court. This means that if your ticket wasn't filed with the Court, the police will have up to 2 years to track you down and re-serve you the traffic ticket. Is this likely? No, not for running a red light. But that is me speculating. Why is a misdemeanor traffic offense treated as a class C misdemeanor under Texas Law? It's a little bit confusing, but here are the cross references. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 542.301 states that A person commits an offense if the person performs an act prohibited or fails to perform an act required by this subtitle" and "Except as otherwise provided, an offense under this subtitle is a misdemeanor. The "subtitle" that a red light ticket falls under is "Subtitle C. Rules of the Road." Next, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.03(b) state that: "An offense designated a misdemeanor in this code without specification as to punishment or category is a Class C misdemeanor." Therefore, running a red light (assuming you were charged with it under Texas' state statutes and not a local statute) has a 2 year statute of limitations. Updated Answer You edited your question after I posted my original answer . . . . however, I left the original post above because it may be helpful to others. To answer your new question, you cannot resolve a ticket that was never received because there is no ticket in the eyes of the Court until it is received. By not showing up, you take the risk that the cop will file the ticket with the court the day before your hearing and you will get a bench warrant for failing to appear. Your best bet is to write a letter to the Judge David Patronella and explain your situation. It is probably wise to leave out the fact you are on probation in a different state. Explain the repeated phone calls and attempts and ask him to have his clerk: notify you if the ticket shows up, or reschedule your court date. While you already know what the answer is your goal is to make a paper trail that you could show a judge if this ticket somehow does get filed and you miss court. So, be sure to keep a copy for your records and consider having it sent some method where you can confirm it was received by the Court. Being able to show this letter to a judge if the ticket ultimately gets filed makes you look responsible and responsive. The reality is that you are probably catching a break and don't need to worry about this--especially since it doesn't violate your probation. You could just sit and do nothing, but based on your comments, I think you are looking for "advice" on what to do; however, there isn't a "right" answer for this type of situation.
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If I were a federal prosecutor (which I'm emphatically not), I might try to charge you under 18 USC § 32 (a) (5): a) Whoever willfully— [...] (5) interferes with or disables, with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, anyone engaged in the authorized operation of such aircraft or any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of any such aircraft; [...] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Since you clearly know, or believe, that this has the potential to interfere with piloting, which would obviously be a serious danger to people on board the aircraft, I'd argue you would be acting with "reckless disregard for the safety of human life." If your conduct results in anybody's death, then life imprisonment and/or the death penalty are also on the table, under 18 USC § 34.
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Publishing government records is pretty classic First Amendment-protected activity. Keeping in mind that one can find a lawyer to sue for anything, I think that person would likely be operating well within the law. One thing in particular that I'd recommend staying aware of is how one might attempt to monetize this endeavor. There have been a lot of sites publishing arrest records, court records, and mugshots, and then charging people to have them removed to keep them from popping up in a Google search for those people's names. That is -- rightly -- regarded as sketchy behavior; while several states have passed laws prohibiting that business model, I don't believe any such law exists in Washington State at this point.
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Bob can certainly "engage" a personal injury lawyer, but it is highly unlikely that they would take the case... Let's take a look at the facts... In Texas, you are required to register every vehicle unless it is damaged beyond repair or destroyed (it's intended to be scrapped). Bob did not do this In Texas, every registered vehicle must be insured, at a minimum, for liability insurance. Bob did not do this But, because of the insurance requirement you can get the information from TxDOT about the other vehicle's registration and insurance. It's more likely than not that the other vehicle is also uninsured, but if it is, Bob should contact Ted's insurance company. Because Bob did not register or insure the car that was parked on the street, Bob assumed liability that the insurance company would typically cover. If Bob had properly insured the vehicle, including uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (which must be declined in writing in Texas), Bob would be whole (minus the deductible). Bob's total liability should be the deductible on the vehicle. Another not-small contributing factor is that this is a self-proclaimed "project vehicle", meaning it has low current value despite a possible high future value. Without insurance, the entire liability would amount to the actual current value of the vehicle, the amount it would take to buy another in exactly the same condition. Now back to the PI lawyer, they make money by suing insurance companies for personal injury (damage to your car is not a "personal injury") because they have the ability to pay. Private individuals, especially those without insurance, typically do not have the ability to pay. The PI can typically recover all the attorneys fees + up to half the judgement. So even if the PI agreed to take the case, and they won some amount (let's say $50,000 which includes attorneys fees and judgement), Ted would probably not be able to pay for this. The PI goes back to the client for the fees and now Bob is in even worse condition, since a majority of the $50,000 judgement would be attorneys fees. Really the best remedy Bob has in this case is to sue Ted in small claims for the value of the vehicle up to the maximum of the court (in Texas, this is a generous $20,000). Small claims courts have a lower burden of proof and Bob can use Alan as a witness.
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Are government fees considered taxes? Are government fees, like the one for getting a passport or a drivers licence, considered taxes from a constitutional perspective? To clarify I am not asking for income tax purposes. I suppose it might depend on the service, like the difference between the gas tax and a toll; or the rights to the service, but most fees seem to "look like a tax, and quack like a tax". The reason I ask is that the Twenty-Fourth Amendment states: The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. but, with the new movement by some states to require voters to have identification to vote, and the fact that no state I know of provides free government issued ID (unless you are an employee) it seems that unless a state provided its residents with free access to state-issued ID, that requiring people to go pay for ID's needed to vote would be contrary to the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.
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with the new movement by some states to require voters to have identification to vote, and the fact that no state I know of provides free government issued ID (unless you are an employee) it seems that unless a state provided its residents with free access to state-issued ID, that requiring people to go pay for ID's needed to vote would be contrary to the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. This specific issue (which is much easier to address than the general question) has been litigated, and in some cases, it has been a successful argument. It is pretty much acknowledged now that requiring a fee for all documents required in order to have ID necessary to vote violates the 24th Amendment. But, the states that enacted these requirements knew that and tried to get around it by making at least one form of voter ID free, which prevents the statutes from being facially invalid. This isn't the end of the question, however: Voter ID laws, enacted in 11 states over the past two years, require voters to show a government-issued photo ID that the state will provide for free. But while the ID is free, the documents residents need to prove their identity in order to get that ID, such as a birth certificate, are not. Now, lots of people already have documents like birth certificates that were purchased by their parents at their birth and are now available to them for free. But, that isn't always the case. This raises the question of whether there is an "as applied" violation of the 24th Amendment in the cases of someone who can't prove their entitlement to compliant voter ID without paying for it, and if so, what the proper remedy is for the violation. These issues are still being actively litigated and haven't been definitively resolved on a national basis in all circumstances.
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There are certain requirements of Statehood according to the Montevideo Convention on Statehood of 1933, which is just a codification of international customary law: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Is it "legal" to buy a piece of land and claim it to be another country than before(either inventing a new one or migrating it to an already existing one)? According to international law, it is. Sure. But just because you say something is the case, doesn't mean it is. Always. Sometimes it is. But for present purposes, let's say that if you found an uninhabited island and said that you were a country, that wouldn't be the case - nor if you bought it from a man living on it. If you found some land that belonged to another country and decided to claim it as that of an existing country, then it would depend on the specific circumstances. That's exactly what happened to the Krim island in the Ukraine(now Russia maybe?), right? I don't think so. As far as I know, the annexation of territory isn't considered sale. In any case, the ownership of this land is still under dispute. So, if it's possible without the influence of these international institutions, trying this in an area with their influence would be easier, right? If trying this means declaring some land you have purchased to be a new sovereign state Nope. You probably still don't meet the requirements for statehood. If trying this means the acquisition of some land by an existing sovereign state Maybe. Probably not. The Montevideo Convention requires that statehood not be gained through force; while member states' interests may be greater where they are more invested, the requirements for acquisition of territory are the same no matter where you are. What would prevent me from creating my own nation? Money, defensibility, recognition, the fact that you probably don't own any land that you "buy" (depending on the jurisdiction and real estate system), the fact that you generally can't unilaterally declare yourself a sovereign state.
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Nobody so far has discussed Electoral law e.g. Representation of the People Act 1983 There are various clauses that may be relevant, one of which is: A voter shall be guilty of bribery if before or during an election he directly or indirectly by himself or by any other person on his behalf receives, agrees, or contracts for any money, gift, loan or valuable consideration, office, place or employment for himself or for any other person for voting or agreeing to vote or for refraining or agreeing to refrain from voting. Subsection 2 similarly makes it an offence to offer employment to induce any voter to vote or refrain from voting but somewhat less concisely. I believe this would make such a contract unenforceable.
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I don't know about that particular case, but you are basically right: In Switzerland, if you want to apply for citizenship, you apply for it in the municipality first. Everybody having the citizenship of the municipality has the swiss citizenship as well. In theory, the canton and the state also have something to say, but that's irrelevant for most applications. This has historic reasons, but going into the details is beyond the scope of this question. Fact is, that every municipality has its own rules, about when and how applications are handled. This has been unified a bit in recent years, but some things still differ. That is for instance, how many years you need to have lived there or who decides your application. There were municipalities (actually most) where the final decision was made using a public vote. This practice was declared illegal by the federal court some years ago, because becoming a citizen is a formal governmental act, and as such a reason needs to be given for turning an application down. This is inherently impossible with a vote. Since that law decision, most municipalities have shifted the responsibility to a committee for citizenship applications. The public can still bring in arguments, but they need to be justified (ie. if somebody knows about the applicant being a wanted criminal somewhere). Consequently, you can now call for a court to check whether the given reasoning is correct and just, if you are turned down.
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Yes, you can register in Connecticut. Connecticut previously limited voting eligibility to "permanent" residents, but it later changed that to limit it to people with at least year's worth of residency, and then six months' of residency. Under current law, though, a voter need only be a "bona fide" resident of "some town" in Connecticut. This means you need only to have legitimately moved into the city with some actual intent to stay, even if not forever. The deadline is tomorrow, so register now.
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At the time of annexation of country X someone would have to decide the status of the countries citizens: If all citizens of X are now citizens of the USA, and whether they are legally citizens from the date of annexation or since they were citizens of X, and if they are considered residents in the USA since the day they became residents of X, and if they are retrospectively "born in the USA" if they were born in X. And other things, like whether non-citizen legal residents of X are now non-citizen legal residents of the USA. That has to be decided for many reasons, and the answer to your question follows naturally from this. Maybe you could check on a history site if anyone knows how this worked with Hawaii.
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No, absent a state law to the contrary (and I am aware of no such law in this case) it is not illegal. Universities, as institutions, are permitted to express opinions on political issues, especially political issues that are pertinent to their operations. Indeed, they often do so. (Political candidates are arguably a different matter and certainly involve a more complex analysis to determine if the Johnson Amendment applies to a public university, but that isn't at issue in this case.) Governmental entities may not take religious positions, but may take political ones. Generally, even public colleges like Rutgers have this autonomy. Indeed, lobbying is frequently necessary for the survival of a public university - it has no choice but to lobby and a free hand regarding the issues upon which it does lobby.
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Defendants in the US would be charged with racketeering, not bribery, since government officials were not bribed. The DoJ indictment against Webb et al. is here: most of the defendants are not citizens of the US, though none are listed as being government officials. DoJ could certainly seek an indictment of ministers, senators or presidents of foreign countries. If said official were in the US on an ordinary passport, they could be arrested. They also might be arrested by e.g. Argentinian policy and extradited to the US, but whether that would be legal depends on the country (some countries don't extradite their own citizens; there would have to be an extradition treaty between that country and the US). It is inconceivable that any nation would hand over a sitting president because of an indictment by the US, and generally unlikely for any government official, but the official could be locally deposed first. But whether a government would do this is basically a political question, not a legal one.
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How can one try to leave a home rental lease Person A cosigns a lease for Person B. The lease is for a house. The lease period is for one year. The landlord agrees to allow the lease to be amended for another person, person C to be on the lease. Person B negotiated this with the landlord without consent of person A. I understand each person to be separately liable for the lease payments each month. If Person A wants out of the lease, is the only option to just try to negotiate a way out of their portion of the lease with the landlord, presumably by payment or other means? It's not likely that landlord would be agreeable to this, since Person B and Person C do not have the financial means to pay. If person A does negotiate a release from the lien, it's likely that Person B and C will be required to move and so they will not agree to the modification. What rights do Person B and C have if Person A does stop paying? I'm assuming they'd have to move.
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There are several questions in the OP. The answers to all of them depend on the lease terms. If Person A wants out of the lease, is the only option to just try to negotiate a way out of their portion of the lease with the landlord, presumably by payment or other means? Yes, usually. Regardless of who is on the lease, Person A is on the lease. In order to terminate or break the lease, Person A will have to negotiate termination. Most residential leases provide for joint and several liability for lease obligations. That means the co-signed lease is like three non-exclusive leases, one each between landlord and Persons A, B, and C. So Person A has to find a way to break the Person A lease. Other than a breach by either party, that likely can only be done by negotiation with landlord. What rights do Person B and C have if Person A does stop paying? Absent some other relationship or understanding between them (that is, other than the lease,) likely none. Persons B and C are each fully responsible to pay all of the rent. In other words, as far as the landlord is concerned it does not matter who pays the rent as long as it gets paid. If it doesn't get paid, the landlord can evict and sue all 3 for non-payment of rent. But the lease likely does not discuss the relationships between A, B, and C - whether they pay pro rata by time in the unit, by space used, per capita, or whatever. Landlord doesn't care, and is not the counterparty to those decisions. That said, if there is a relationship between A, B, & C (for instance, if A & B had a contract describing who would pay what, and B entered into another contract with C,) that will determine their relative obligations. The landlord agrees to allow the lease to be amended for another person, person C to be on the lease. Person B negotiated this with the landlord without consent of person A. This may create liability between B to A, C to A, or B & C to A. It is even conceivable that it creates a liability from landlord to A, if A had a reasonable expectation that the lease would not be amended absent A's consent. And the amendment may not be enforceable against A. So, for instance, A may be able to kick C out of the unit and bar C from reentry. It will not effect A's liability to pay rent.
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she immediately stated that I need to provide 60 days notice She is wrong. See Minnesota statute 504B.135(a). Absent any agreement that supersedes the statute, the landlord cannot unilaterally stretch the notice period to 60 days. Is it legal for a landlord to say my rent is due 5 days earlier than we had verbally agreed? Is it legal for a landlord to do this right after I tell them that I am planning on moving out? No. The lanlord cannot unilaterally alter the implied contract that exists between you two, including the pattern of you paying rent on the 6th of the month. To prove in court that this was indeed the pattern, it suffices to show the receipts your landlord has the statutory obligation to provide to you immediately upon making each one of your payments. See 504B.118. The landlord is just "making sure" you will not recommend her to other prospective tenants.
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You understand the business of landlording before you get started. You don't landlord for the purpose of evicting someone. You landlord for the purpose of exchanging keys for a duration for money, specifically by creating a leasehold estate that you sell to your tenant. Your tenant has the leasehold, you don't have the money, in part because it sounds like you didn't collect any before you handed over the keys or confirm your tenants' ability and history of paying. You now want to nullify the leasehold. In general this is the eviction you ask about. You are now reliant on a court in your jurisdiction to enforce the contract law with respect to the lease language and prevailing local ordinances. I cannot speak specifically to NY courts but they have a reputation as tenant friendly so you need to demonstrate your professional approach and locally required paperwork such as a certificate of occupancy, business license, etc. All lined up to make it easy for a judge to agree with you. You have an uphill battle. Turning off utilities (as mentioned in another post of yours) is not a professional move and will bias many judges against you. No certificate of occupancy may mean your original lease contract created a leasehold contrary to a public policy of NY which could put a judge in a bind if they found your case compelling. If a competent lawyer would cost $15k then it sounds like it might be cheapest to offer the tenant a couple thousand for the keys and a signed release to walk away–spend a couple hundred on the lawyer for this. Do not give them the money until they are out and give you the keys. This is called cash for keys.
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Residents agree that the receipt of mail by any individual not listed as a Resident or Occupant in this Agreement at the Leased Premises shall be proof of occupancy of that individual and a violation of this Agreement. I assume that the lease states that only the listed individuals can reside in the unit. Maybe they think that this says that receipt of mail by an unlisted person is a further violation of the lease, I don't think that is clearly enough stated that the courts would agree that receiving mail is itself a violation of the lease. Instead, it seems to be intended to say something about an existing clause – you can't have other people living there. The courts would look at the requirements of the lease, and ask "did you comply"? The question of whether you did a certain thing is a question of fact that has to be resolved in court. However, the revised lease language does not state that all mail must be addressed to Johnny Johnson – it only addresses receipt by a person not on the lease. You are (apparently) on the lease, so you may receive mail there. Nothing in the lease controls how such mail can be addressed. If you receive mail addressed to Tommy Thompson, your defense is that you received the mail, and you are on the lease, so you will not have violated the new clause.
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If it says "no pets" in the leasehold, then yes, that is enforceable. It doesn't have to be reasonable (in your opinion, or objectively) to be enforceable. Your choices are to either negotiate different leasehold terms, or to find a different leasehold.
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Just think of the subtenant cum owner as two separate people with two separate roles. Tenant = T Subtenant = ST Old owner = OO New Owner = NO The rights of the tenant vis-avis the new owner will be informed by the lease and the local laws. Generally, if the sale happens in the middle of the existing lease, the NO is obligated by the terms, as is the T. NO cannot just kick T out, and T cannot just break the lease. The lease may say what could happen and local laws will apply. Likewise, ST has whatever contract with T that previously existed. Pretend NO and ST are different people. If T owes NO $1000 per month, and ST owes T $400 a month, that continues even though ST and NO are the same person. Depends on what kind of dispute. See above. All contracts continue, subject to whatever the lease with the original owner and the subtenancy agreement say abut modifying or breaking the lease and sublease. Local laws apply. Note, if the subtenancy was "off the books" or was done when not allowed by the original owner, and if it was not in a place that the local law says owners cannot deny subleasing, then tenant might not have any protection. ST, now that he is owner could just move out and stop paying. On the other hand, even if he is the owner, he cannot just say "I am the owner now, so I am moving back in for free" because the original lease gave the tenant use of the whole property. But ST could just drop out because T always owed OO, and now NO, the full rent. Do you mean if rather than sublease, they were both on the original lease? Interesting, but just imagine it as the obligations before the sale = the obligations after the sale. I don't know though. There are some tax implications for an owner occupied rental.
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As a general rule, legal language is interpreted loosely with respect to singular versus plural, or male versus female (in interpreting pronouns). A clause that uses the word "tenant" can thus be construed as referring to multiple tenants, and "tenants" can also refer to a single tenant. Likewise, "he, him" refers to a third person, regardless of gender. If the intent of an agreement is that only a single person shall reside in a place, then the wording of the contract would have to say that, and you can't derive that from using "tenant" rather than "tenant or tenants". I don't think the issue comes down to "treating y'all as one person", it comes down to whether the obligation is joint, a series of several obligations, or a joint and several obligation. You would look for expressions like "We and each of us agree...", vs. "Each of us agree...", or "We agree..." to sort that out: I assume that the language just says "Tenant agrees...", that is, there is nothing at all in the wording of the lease that resolves the matter. Tenant (whoever that is) has an obligation to Landlord to pay rent. It doesn't matter if Tenant is 1 person or 10: you have to pay the rent. If 5 out of 10 of those people mysteriously disappear, the other 5 still have to pay a now-doubled rent per person. Each person is fully responsible for all of the lease obligations, and if you are the only reliable person in a lease with 10 parties, you could get stuck with the entire obligation. If Tenant needs to go away for some reason, Tenant can normally negotiate with another person to assume their obligations, so Tenant would come up with an arrangement with a new person, and the new person would have an obligation to (old) Tenant – this is basically a private arrangement that doesn't involve the Landlord. However: it is pretty standard that landlords get a say in letting in new tenants, and you have a clause in your agreement that says that. There are two ways for the old tenant to "go away". One is to completely terminate the old agreement, and the landlord signs a new lease with the new person: the old tenant is completely free of any subsequent obligations, and if the new tenant fails to pay rent, the landlord has to go after the new tenant. The other way is by assigning his obligation (as described above): the agreement is between the old tenant and the new tenant (with the landlord's consent). The question now is, what is the meaning of the clause "the assignee shall sign a separate written agreement with Landlord and Tenant"? (Earlier, I missed the significance of "Landlord and Tenant"). The core question is whether the new arrangement is a novation, or is it an assignment? A novation requires agreement between all parties, and that is what seems to be implied here. California landlord law then tells you that this "makes the new tenant (rather than the original tenant) solely responsible to the landlord". In contrast, "Like a sublease, an assignment is a contract between the original tenant and the new tenant (not the landlord)". Since this involves the landlord, the conclusion is inescapable that this is not actually an assignment (despite the use of the word "assignee"). All of the parties to the agreement would have to agree to these new terms, if in fact there is an agreement that substitutes D for C in this agreement with the landlord (a notation). If C remains on the hook and this is just a personal arrangement between C and D (with Landlords consent) – which is not what the clause says – then you don't get a vote in the C-D arrangement.
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I am assuming in this answer that the lease or rental agreement provides the landlord with a right of access for required maintenance. The question is not clear on that point. If there is a specific and reasonable ground for refusing a particular representative or agent of the landlord, you might be able to do so. If, for example, that particular worker had previously insulted you in your apartment, or had attempted to steal from you there, you could probably refuse entrance and request the landlord to send a different worker to do the job. But in general the landlord may choose his or her agents, and if it is a reasonable for an agent to be admitted, you must admit whatever agent the landlord sends. You can probably demand reasonable notice, depending on the terms of the lease. You may be able to demand to be present when the agent is to be in the premises, again depending on the lease. But I fo not think that the tenant can arbitrarily choose which agent the landlord will use.
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Can a restaurant add requirements to a “special” that weren’t previously listed? I walked into a bar in Boston and ordered sliders. The sliders were advertised as half off during the specific hours I was there. I ordered the sliders and was then told by the waitress I had to also purchase a drink in order to get half off the sliders. However, nowhere on any of the restaurant signs, menu, advertisements, etc. did it mention I had to purchase a drink to get the half off price. I only found out once the waitress told me. I also asked if the drink requirement was written down anywhere (thinking I had just missed it) and was told “no, it is just common for bars to do this”. Is this legal? It seemed like bait and switch or libel to me.
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This is not "libel," which is a form of defamation (publishing a false and defamatory statement that injures another). "Bait and switch" is a type of violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Law. That Law makes it illegal for a business to engage in any false or deceptive practices, or to perform any false or deceptive acts, in commerce. Read more about it on the Massachusetts' state government site. If the restaurant's conduct was deceptive and it caused you harm (for instance, you would not have gone into the restaurant and ordered at all if you had known you had to order a drink to get the favorable price on sliders,) there may be a violation.
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There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain.
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Has this contract been translated (badly) from another language because the construction of the clause is cumbersome and confusing? Does the contract say that I can have guests over 1 night without charge? Without charge, yes. However "Without Landlord's prior written consent, Tenant has no excuse to accommodate ..." so you need the landlord's permission for overnight guests. If so does it only start charging on nights after the first? No, if a person stays more than 1 night (with the landlords permission) then this triggers the landlord's right to charge. See below for how much they can charge. Is it supposed to be 10% of monthly rent $137 per guest per night? "With temporary commendation, day-based, and additional 10% of rent each person is applied." The term is ambiguous, I can see three ways that this would be interpreted: If you have a guest who stays more than 1 night in a month they can charge 10% for that guest for that month (i.e. 2 to 31 days all for the same price). For 2 people for 2 days this would be $1,400 x 10% x 2 = $280. They can charge 10% of the monthly rent per night that the guest stays. $1,400 x 10% x 2 x 2 = $560 As, 1 except the rent would be pro-rata. $1,400 x 10% x 2 x 2/31 = $18.06 Assuming that the landlord put forward this contract the interpretation adopted in the absence of other evidence would be the one least advantageous to the landlord i.e. 3. However, there is other evidence - the landlord accepts that the rate is pro-rata - he has just failed to account for the 10%, so 3. again. How is overnight defined? Well, is it defined in the contract or by the law where you are? If not, it would take its normal English usage - "for the duration of the night". If they arrive before sunset and leave after sunrise the next day then they have stayed overnight. What if they came over at 9am and slept in the day? It says nothing about requiring your guests to sleep. If they party overnight then they are overnight guests. If they sleep all day but don't stay overnight they are not overnight guests. What about 2 am? If sunrise is after 2am then this is not overnight.
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The relevant guidance is here, at sections 3.4 and 3.6. It is surprisingly(?) confusing, the result of trying to account for exceptions both historical and otherwise motivated. The biscuit/cake distinction is not the one to focus on, because some biscuits are zero-rated (I think this category is basically the fairly plain biscuits like custard creams or bourbons) and some are standard-rated (those with chocolate, but also some others as far as I can tell). The following are supposed to be standard-rated: biscuits wholly or partly covered in chocolate (or some product similar in taste and appearance) any item of sweetened prepared food, other than cakes and non-chocolate biscuits, which is normally eaten with the fingers Later, in the 'zero-rated' column of a table of examples we have both Cakes including sponge cakes, pastries, eclairs, meringues, flapjacks, lebkuchen, marshmallow teacakes and Scottish snowballs and Biscuits coated with icing, caramel or some other product different in taste and appearance from chocolate There is some further clarification here: In most cases, the borderline between cakes and confectionery causes few problems, but there are products whose status as cakes is not self-evident. They will normally be marketed as cakes, through bakeries and supermarkets rather than through confectionery outlets, and will be displayed with cakes and biscuits rather than in the confectionery section. The style of packaging used will also normally follow the pattern for bakery products, with a number of individual portions boxed and cellophane wrapped so the contents are revealed. They are also usually eaten as part of a meal rather than between meals as confectionery. Later in that page they discuss flapjacks vs. cereal bars and admit that flapjacks are classed differently because flapjacks were around when VAT was introduced and cereal bars weren't. Based on this, I think fig rolls are likely classed as confectionery rather than cakes, so get standard-rated for tax. If they wanted to invest in the legal battle that Jaffa Cakes had, they might well win, but 'to the man on the street' they are a sweet product sold for eating between meals in its own packaging, and so they naturally fall into that intended category. EDIT: After all that, I found this wholesaler who states that fig rolls are zero-rated. Perhaps they do get classified as cakes or plain biscuits, then.
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could I claim that my product must be added asap? And is it reasonable to ask for compensation for the missed revenue due to pushing back the launch? Unfortunately, no. Your description reflects that you consciously treated as sufficient the limited knowledge you had at the formation of the contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §154(b). There is no indication that (1) at the formation of the contract the company committed to a more specific timing, or (2) you would have declined the invitation had you known at the formation of the contract that the company would keep postponing the inclusion of your product in the way you describe. You were given the expected date only after you performed your duties pursuant to the contract, which defeats the notion that the company's timing was any relevant to your decision of entering the contract. The only way you could prevail is by proving that the company breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implied in all contracts. See Restatement at §205. Other than that, the lack of contract provisions to protect your interests give the company significant discretion.
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Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.
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Legally, they can kick you out for any reason that isn't illegal discrimination. They can't kick you out for being black. They also can't kick you out for being white. But they can kick you out for not liking your face. Now the question is: Who can kick you out? The store owner obviously can. Anyone who is given the authority by the store owner can. Actually, anyone with the apparent authority can kick you out. However, everyone other than the store owner has been hired to work towards making profits. If throwing you out is bad for business, then whoever did it would have to answer to the store owner. So the ex-friend can't go to court for throwing you out, but they might get into trouble with their boss about it. PS. I interpreted "kicking out" as saying "Please leave our premises. If you don't leave then you will be trespassing and I will call the police", not actually kicking the person with your foot which would be most likely assault.
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No When I go into my grocery store, I can use the lettuce if I pay for it. The grocer does not explicitly state that I can't use the lettuce if I don't pay for it but that doesn't mean I can. Replace "lettuce" with "software" (or any other property you don't own) and you have the same situation.
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Employer did not accept resignation in Germany I'm currently working for a company in Germany and the notice period is two weeks. I sent my resignation via E-mail. They told me after 3 days that they did not accept it because I need to send it via writing in a letter through the post and that it needs to be signed! How should I proceed and should I hire a lawyer?
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This is actually required by german Law. Specifically § 623 BGB says: Die Beendigung von Arbeitsverhältnissen durch Kündigung oder Auflösungsvertrag bedürfen zu ihrer Wirksamkeit der Schriftform; die elektronische Form ist ausgeschlossen. Translation by me: Resignations and ending-contracts to end an employment are only valid in written form; an electronic form is not possible. The definition of the written form is in § 126 BGB. It basically says, that either a signature is needed or a notary has to vouch for it. So if you are actually employed under german law you have to send them a signed letter. How that letter arrives at the employer is not specified. I would imagine most resignation letters to be personally handed in.
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From a German perspective, it would be absolutely normal and expected that you're providing identity & contact information publicly. Per §5 TMG (Impressumspflicht / Anbieterkennzeichnung) this is required for German tele-media offerings, such as websites or email providers, even if non-commercial. Whereas for you as an upstanding and diligent email provider an abuse@... address should be enough, the German context expects a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit… There absolutely are privacy and free speech issues with this compelled self-doxxing. But by running an email service, you're not just acting as a private person. Your privacy interests and the transparency and security interests of other people have to be balanced. Now since you are not in Germany, the TMG does not apply to you. You have no legal obligation to provide this information. However, the ISP also has no legal obligation to to deliver your email. The ISP does have an obligation to apply appropriate organizational and technical safety measures. It seems that one organizational measure they have found appropriate is that they will only deliver emails from providers that provide public contact information, as would be the norm in Germany. I am not entirely sure how the GDPR applies here. The GDPR doesn't really allow or prohibit disclosures of personal data, it just requires that every purpose of processing for personal data has a legal bases per GDPR Art 6. One such legal basis is a legitimate interest, which boils down to a balancing test between your rights and freedoms and other people's interests. I'm also not sure if the contact information should be classified as personal data in this context, because the contact info primarily relates to your role as an email provider. I'm also not sure if the ISP is processing your personal data in the sense of the GDPR when they merely require you to publish it on your own site. They would be processing it as soon as they scrape, store, or otherwise use this info.
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They have to pay you for all hours "worked". If you are an intern, it would come down to whether you are an unpaid intern and therefore agreed to that or if you are a paid employee. I noticed your post said you were an intern and then were asked to stay on, so I don't know if you stayed on as an intern or employee. Employees should be compensated for their time and effort, so if you are an employee you should get some compensation. As for how you claim it, you are going to have to talk to them. If it bothers you that you won't be paid for the training and they won't agree to pay you, your best bet is to find a different job. This article lists how to take them to a tribunal or talk to a union, if you do not want a different job and wish to pursue the matter: https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/work/rights-at-work/pay/problems-getting-paid/#ifnotgettinganywhere
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Obviously you can refuse, nobody can force you to give them a new passport. There may be consequences. The worst: The company's country likely has laws that require the company to make sure you have the right to work there, and to have evidence of it. If you are an EU citizen in an EU country, a valid EU passport would be that evidence. When your passport expires, the company might not have anything that is legally sufficient to allow you working for them. They could have the choice between breaking the law, risking a fine, or firing you. This will depend on the exact laws of the country, and likely somewhere deep in the small print of the laws :-) In the UK, where this isn't relevant anymore, the laws were changed in 2014 to require that you have a valid passport. So in the last seven years you would have had to give them a valid passport. BTW. Having a copy of your valid passport can make it possible for your employer to buy you flight tickets for foreign countries, for example, which could be useful. I was once in a situation away from home where I unexpectedly needed a copy of my passport (privately), called HR, and they emailed me a copy of it, so that was also useful.
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Probably not An employee is someone that the employer "suffers or permits to work" - moderators would appear to be caught by this. There are specific exemptions carved out in the public and not-for-profit sectors where they "a) work toward public service, religious or humanitarian objectives; b) not expect or receive compensation for services; and c) not displace any genuine employees." However, they very specifically say “Under the FLSA, employees may not volunteer services to for-profit private sector employers.” So on the face of it, a moderator is an employee and is entitled to minimum wages and conditions for the hours they work. AOL settled a lawsuit in 2009 with their moderators who were suing for wages for an undisclosed sum and so the case did not set a precedent. This article suggests that "for-profit companies don’t have volunteers; they have lawsuits waiting to happen" and uses examines the situation at Reddit (which could equally apply here). Facebook employs moderators so the precedent exists that this is work that employees do. When the lawsuit happens, we'll find out. It will turn on the particular facts - some types of mods for some companies may be employees while others may not.
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Yes If you look at the law pertaining to the work week and opting out of the maximum, which is also in The Working Time Regulations 1998 (with my emphasis in bold): 4.—(1) Subject to regulation 5, a worker’s working time, including overtime, in any reference period which is applicable in his case shall not exceed an average of 48 hours for each seven days. ... (3) Subject to paragraphs (4) and (5) and any agreement under regulation 23(b), the reference periods which apply in the case of a worker are ... So if we go to 23(b): A collective agreement or a workforce agreement may— (a)modify or exclude the application of regulations 6(1) to (3) and (7), 10(1), 11(1) and (2) and 12(1), and (b)for objective or technical reasons or reasons concerning the organization of work, modify the application of regulation 4(3) and (4) by the substitution, for each reference to 17 weeks, of a different period, being a period not exceeding 52 weeks, in relation to particular workers or groups of workers.
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Yes, the employee can choose not to accept the contract offered at the end of the probationary period and thereby allow the probationary period to end without accepting a long-term position. This is usually called "quitting".
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I found a mention of this issue here, where the case Rhonda Eddy v. Ingenesis was cited. Eddy worked from home in West Virginia, but had signed her contract with a company headquartered in Texas. The link is the decision of The State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, namely, that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to hear Eddy's petition against her employer because she was out of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. The circuit court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent under West Virginia’s personal jurisdiction statutes, and that respondent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia to satisfy federal due process considerations. The circuit court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s WPCA claim because petitioner’s employment contract contained a valid choice of law clause that mandated Texas law would govern any dispute between the parties. Emphasis mine. It all depends on stipulations made in the employment contract. This (in the United Kingdom) states 4. Place of Work Allows the employer to specify the location where the employee will work. However, it also allows for the employer to specify any other location in the future. This gives the employer much greater flexibility. That would seem to indicate that (at least in the U.K.) the place is specified in the contract.
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May I claim fair use for public commentary of a political ad? Preface I am not a legal professional I know that fair use is such an ambiguous area. Hypothetical Scenario I want to publish (online) a marked up copy of a political candidate's campaign advertising (postcard mailer) for the purpose of public commentary of his claims, but I don't want to get sued for copyright infringement (the candidate is a real politician ... if you know what I mean). Questions Is a campaign mailer copyrighted? Have there been any court decisions specifically for the fair use of a copyrighted campaign mailer? Possible Answer If I had to guess, I would say that: yes it is copyrighted. Specifically: the photography and layout. I think it would be legal to quote sections of the text (How else would I be able to make commentary?). I suppose the legal question would be: is the reproduction of the ad necessary for making the public commentary. I could see a court deciding "no, textual citations is sufficient". I could also see a court saying that "yes, the visual representation of the copyrighted ad is necessary to make the commentary". (Again I'm not a lawyer or law student) Research I found this during my Internet research, but none of the examples were for public commentary of mailers.
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This is pretty solid fair use territory. The court will consider how much you copied and whether you needed to, but I don't think they'd think you crossed the line with these facts. Even if they did, that's just one of four factors, and the others generally work in your favor. For a similar case in a New Hampshire governor's race, check out Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F.Supp. 957 (D. N.H., 1978).
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No These are derivative works and making them is copyright breach. Doing this as a hobby or even for the entertainment of friends in private is likely fair use. Distribution or performance in public (monitored or not) is likely not fair use and you would need a licence. Here is a summary of the relevant law in australia.
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It is legsl to include references showing readers where facts you include in your article were derived, or where they can be supported. Indeed academic ethics generally require doing so, although there is (in most cases) no legal requirement to do so. Listing the title, author, and publication information of a source is not an infringement of copyright. That J. Jones published an article on "How to Find the Purple Moth" [imaginary example] in volume 28 of the Journal of Moth Science is a fact.Facts are never protected by copyright. Indeed in US law 17 USC 102(b) provides that: b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. The laws of other countries are similar on this point. Indeed I do not know of any country in which facts are protected by copyright. So, including such references is fully legal, and no permission from the sources being cited is required. This is true whatever form the reference takes. In particular, if an online address for the content is included, this is still true. I do not know whether Medium, or any other specific publishing platform, will pat fees to authors based on clik-thru from such citations. That depends on their particular policies, which might be found in their Terms of Service or other policy document.
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Unfortunately the answer is a vague "it depends." Commercial versus non-commercial is not clearly defined in actual law, and is usually up to the specific license to define what it considers to be commercial use. If you were putting them on your business cards, then it's just being used for advertising and whether it's commercial use is a bit controversial. If the license explicitly prohibits the use of the work in advertising, then the license should explicitly mention that and should not rely on the term "commercial use" to cover or protect it. Creative Commons ran an excellent study on commercial versus noncommercial use back in 2009: Defining “Noncommercial” - A Study of How the Online Population Understands “Noncommercial Use” In the United States, for example, the Copyright Act does not define a copyright owner’s rights in terms of commercial or noncommercial use. Instead, copyright law sometimes attaches legal significance to whether a use is “commercial” or “noncommercial” or whether a user is deemed to be a commercial or noncommercial entity, However, rarely are the terms defined, and the law offers no specific guidance on how to differentiate between commercial and noncommercial uses or users of copyrighted works. If you were putting them on a business card you were making for the client, then that would be more clearly identified as commercial use because you're using it in something you are selling for a profit. What your client will be using them for is not relevant, because you're the one selling them to the client and you need to have the right to be able to do that.
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Yes. This is infringement. This infringement might be excused by a "fair use" defense but it probably isn't. At a very small scale tailor to a very specific educational program, for example, for just members of a thirty person English class that they are currently taking, it might qualify as educational fair use. But I get the impression that the contemplated translation project is far more ambitious than that. The underlying content of the events reported in the news are not protected by copyright, but the language used to report those events and any translations of that language, is protected. The only reliable way to solve it is to get permission to do so from the holder of the copyright of the source of the new reports you are translating.
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I would argue that no, there is no copyright for the restored work. Independent copyright is only possible for any original material added, as previously discussed on this site. In this case, the added work was a technical process rather than a creative process, and technical processes cannot be protected by copyright. Copyright licenses would therefore be ineffective. However, I believe one could still impose a license based on owning the copy as opposed to the copyright (contract might be a better term in this case). However, if a third party managed to obtain a copy through some other avenue, any such contract would not be binding on them and nothing could be enforced against them unlike with copyright laws. Another way a license might be imposed is through patent protections, as technical processes can be protected via patents. However, I'm not as familiar with patent law, and this doesn't appear to be the claim being made.
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I gather that Fischer can claim copyright on its written form of public-domain music because the company adds interpretive markings to its sheet music, and those markings themselves constitute creative content? They can probably also claim copyright on editorial content. For example, a piece may have multiple sources that do not agree with one another, and the editor's choice of how to reconcile these inconsistencies is subject to copyright. Even the layout and typography or engraving are subject to copyright, so if the score is nothing but a faithful transcription of the composer's only manuscript, making a photocopy of the score is infringement. In that case the only contents of the sheet music covered by copyright would be whatever unique musical markings Fischer adds, and not the notes set down by the original composer? The notes themselves are not protected by copyright if the composition has passed into the public domain, but to make a score that does not infringe the copyright in the Carl Fischer edition, you would have to find another source. A copy made by hand might be okay because it would not reproduce the layout and other graphic design elements. Is there any reliable way to determine which elements of a work like classical sheet music are covered by a copyright claim, other than to infringe and have the claimant reveal that at trial? You can consult the sources that the editor used. Anything that isn't in the sources is editorial and therefore protected. If you can't find out what sources were used, find all the sources you can. Anything that's present in a source that is old enough to have passed into the public domain is in the public domain.
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Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark.
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Left Job with all acounts, etc. with personal email I have worked at a startup company for the past year, and I have decided to leave the company after a rough end. The company was basically falling apart, everyone was fighting with each other and the boss and I did not get along. After I left I realize that I am an admin for all of their online stuff. I am the only one with access to their website, access to their google business page, etc. It's all connected to my personal email, and I want to get rid of it. They have not contacted me about any of it, and its been over 1 month. I am just getting tired of seeing all their info every time I look at my personal email etc. Can I just delete everything? Since i am the admin i can't really just leave and let it stay up, I can delete it or keep it up. Could this be breaking the law in any sorts or anything? p.s The boss never gave us business email, so we had to use our personal emails most of the time. I never thought it would end like this either, so I didn't mind using my own email. Thanks.
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What's the worst that can happen? If you do nothing, it's a bit inconvenient. If you delete all that company's stuff, who knows what they could sue you for. I'm not saying they would be right, but being sued can be expensive, no matter whether you are wrong or right. Send a letter by registered mail, with a witness to the contents, that you are the only one with admin rights to these sites, and asking them how they would like to take over these sites, and informing them that you will delete anything on your personal email after a reasonable time if you don't hear from them. And since anything you do is work for you, you should expect some appropriate compensation. Deleting their property, even if it affects you, is risky.
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It depends to a large degree on local employment laws. Depending on how the counteroffer was worded, it might have constituted anything from a binding legal contract for employment for some reasonable minimum term, or a totally non-binding suggestion that was worth less than the air breathed while pronouncing it. Some things to consider would include: What are local employment laws like? Do they require that termination be for cause? If so, what are causes for termination? Does termination require any kind of remediation beforehand? Note that in an at-will, right-to-work state in the US, odds are that the employee can be fired for any time and for any reason, supposing the employer hasn't accidentally entered into a contract by extending the counteroffer. What did the counteroffer say? Did it stipulate that the offer was not for a definite term and that the company reserved the right to terminate the employee for any reason, or no reason at all? Odds are any sufficiently serious business in an at- will, right-to-work state would use standard legal language in any offer or counteroffer to ensure that they are on the right side of this, so odds are the counteroffer was accepted with no obligations at all on the company. Does the termination affect eligibility for unemployment benefits? I would say most likely not, as the termination would probably be recorded as being for no reason legally speaking (if they admitted to terminating the employee for seeking other employment, interested government officials could take a dim view of the company's actions). You'd probably have at least some unemployment compensation coming your way. Some professional - not legal - advice. Never accept a counteroffer. Only get another offer in the first place if you are committed to leaving your current employer no matter what. If your company really insists, you should insist on a minimum definite term of employment written into a legal contract which is signed by an executive and notarized. No company will agree to this (unless the term is shorter than you'd want as a full-time W-2 anyway) but if they do, hey, you have some security (if the company agrees to this, have your own lawyer - whom you pay with your own money - review the document). Even then, I would be very, very careful about staying at a company after getting a counteroffer. Don't do it. Ever. Never accept a counteroffer. One comment asks why I recommend never accepting a counteroffer. There are at least two reasons: The reason you are looking for a new job should be that there is something about your current job that isn't completely satisfactory and that you haven't been able to fix. Either you have grown out of the position, don't like the work, feel you're underpaid, don't get along with somebody, etc. If you were unable or unwilling to fix any of these issues without having another job on the table, having another job on the table shouldn't be what makes you willing and able to fix them. Why work somewhere that you'd constantly need to go job hunting to address workplace issues? Unless the company makes firm agreements about how long they're going to keep you around, you have no guarantee that they'll keep you. Presumably, you didn't have one before, and you don't have one at the new job, but the fact that you are currently employed might support the assumption that your employment would be continued at your current employer and the offer might support the assumption the new employer plans to employ you indefinitely. When you put in your notice, it makes the company more aware of the fact that you could leave at any time; while a perfectly rational actor would realize that this doesn't change the situation at all, companies are run by people and people often act irrationally. Perhaps your manager is vindictive, perhaps your manager is scared that you will still leave after accepting the counteroffer. Maybe your manager knows there are layoffs coming but needs you for the busy season. Hiring replacements can be time-consuming and expensive - and employees who are getting offers of employment elsewhere and putting in notice might be seen as risks. I'm not saying that accepting a counteroffer has always turned out badly. Falling coconuts kill 150 people every year. Still, I am not going to add a coconut rider to my insurance policy and I am not going to accept a counteroffer.
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You seem to have a solid understanding of the ePrivacy implications, but lack a fundamental insight: your organization does not have a right to achieve its mission or a right to disseminate unwanted marketing. But other people do have a right to not be subject to excessive marketing. Of course, reality is more complex, so it's probably not entirely impossible to do marketing. In your point 1, you note that some EU/EEA/UK countries distinguish ePrivacy protections between consumer and business subscribers. You can research the exact rules in the potential customer's country. This may allow you to email corporate/business accounts. I would strongly advise against messaging via Linkedin if there is a chance that the person is using that account for personal purposes like networking or hunting jobs, not just for conducting official company business. ePrivacy has markedly different rules for email marketing vs phone marketing. Whereas there are pretty strict rules for electronic messages and robocalls, manual cold calling can be OK from an ePrivacy perspective. However, many EU/EEA/UK countries have rules that go beyond ePrivacy, and may have a kind of do-not-call registry that you must respect. Of course manual calls take more effort than spamming emails, but recall the above point that you don't have a right to spam other people. Phone calls are probably the most appropriate approach when the company lists individuals' phone numbers on its website. This will at least give you a few seconds of attention with a real human, more than you can expect from an email that is likely to be caught by spam filters. Marketing via physical mail tends to have very lax rules. Note that every company/business that has a website will have to disclose its contact details including an address there, so this information is easy to acquire. However, chances are low that anyone would seriously engage with that marketing. You can consider alternatives to direct marketing, so that interested companies eventually come to you. Things like press releases, writing guest articles in industry publications, speaking at relevant conferences, working on search engine optimization, buying ads. On the GPDR aspects: GDPR and ePrivacy overlap, and it is necessary to comply with both sets of rules (GDPR likely applies here via Art 3(2)(a)). But where they potentially contradict each other, ePrivacy as the more specific law has precedence. For example, ePrivacy overrides the default GDPR legal basis rules when it comes to email marketing to existing customers (opt-out basis, no consent needed) or to using cookies (needs consent unless strictly necessary). Information that relates to corporations is not personal data, but information that relates to individual employees or to sole proprietors would typically be personal data. Since you are unlikely to obtain consent for using this data, you would need an alternative GDPR legal basis such as a "legitimate interest". Relying on a legitimate interest requires that you conduct a balancing test, weighing your interests like marketing against the recipient's interests, rights, and freedoms. Core question in this context is whether the data subject can reasonably expect their personal data to be used like this, taking into account the nature of their relationship with you. Since there is no pre-existing relationship, claims of a legitimate interest are weak to start with. However, it may be possible to argue that when a company makes employee contact details available via its website (not LinkedIn!) then relevant marketing can be reasonably expected. I would rather not rely on such arguments, though.
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No. Absent some collective bargaining agreement to the contrary, you have no recourse because you have not been legally wronged. You have no right to privacy in this regard. You have no right to be free of humiliation based upon truthful statements. If the email is truthful and you were indeed suspended, then the manager is entirely appropriate in sharing that information, and indeed has a need to do so. You would have no recourse in Tennessee, even if your manager gave a national television interview on your suspension and truthfully stated all reasons for the suspension and threw in statements of opinion disparaging you. Humiliation is only actionable if it amounts to "outrageous conduct" beyond mere truthful speech (e.g. throwing your clothes in the toilet or secretly putting some self-disparaging statement on the back of your uniform) and was calculated with a specific intent to cause you extraordinary emotional harm that was not necessary for some legitimate purpose.
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GDPR forces companies and employees to keep personal data confidential and to use it only for its allowed uses. That obligation continues after the work contract ends. If the employee breaches confidentiality, it does not matter if he provides the data as a file in an USB-drive or if he provides it from memory; it is a breach of confidentiality. Access logs will help to determine which employees have had access to your data, in case a leak is suspected. The part of the question about human memory seems to come from a deep misunderstanding of how human memory works1. I can remember tomorrow something that I have totally forgotten now. Even worse, there is no telling of what can make me remember you; your name might not ring a bell but I may remember you by seeing someone walking a dog. And nobody will ever be able to tell if I have complied with any of your requests or if I am just lying. And of course, there is only one proven way to erase memories, and I am pretty sure the GDPR does not allow for the execution of employees (Disclaimer: IANAL and IANYL, check with a lawyer before murdering anyone if you have doubts). 1 The classical example: You can certainly delete a file from a disk. But just try to stop thinking about white bears
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How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.
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You can print a copy of the email, ideally with metadata showing, and testify that you received it and did not modify the email. The lawyer in the case against Mr. A can ask Mr. A if that is his email address, and can ask other people who have received email from him if that is his email address. Mr. A's computer and/or email provider can be subpoenaed. The computer can be forensically examined for evidence that the email was sent or deleted, and the email provider can be asked to provide evidence that the email was sent. Your email provider can be subpoenaed and asked to provide evidence that the email was received. In general, people who deny sending emails in court who are confronted with copies of those emails authenticated by the testimony of the person who allegedly received the email lose their cases and are not believed by the judge or the jury. This doesn't always happen, but it is by far the more common outcome.
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Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data
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Are charities prevented from paying money to other charities? I was recently a participant in a group study, in which there was an option for participants to donate the gratuity offered to a charity. However, I received a message from a researcher today saying that this is not possible: Earlier this year, you participated in our three-part study... we asked you if you would be willing to donate some or all of your £4 bonus to the charity Shelter. However, we were recently advised by our Finance Team that this was not possible. It transpires that the University of Southampton has charitable status and, therefore, is prohibited by anti-money laundering regulations from making payments to other charities. Hence, we cannot transfer the donations to Shelter. (quoted excerpt from researcher's message, bold emphasis mine) I searched and found the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, a 2017 'Money Laundering Regulations' consultation, and a guidance page on the Law Society of Scotland. I cannot find an obvious or direct reference to inter-charity payments, but I am not sure if I am looking in the right places. Are charities really prevented from 'making payments' to other charities? If so, what is the ostensible motivation for such a prohibition? Does it extend to every type of payment? I suspect the law may vary in Scotland, but I would be interested to understand the situation in any part of the United Kingdom.
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It looks to me as if "money laundering" is a misunderstanding; though any organization has a duty to prevent this, charities have no special responsibilties. However, charity law does in general terms prevent a charity from giving money to a cause that does not further the charity's aims. The Charity Commission's guidance says "Charities can only spend their money on projects or activities that support the aims stated in their governing document" (and although it goes on to outline exceptions, you still need to obtain the Commission's agreement to return a gift from a source you find objectionable, for example). The rationale is that people gave money to the University to further the cause of education; the researchers have no right to divert that money to Shelter (or another charity like the Roman Catholic Church) without the giver's consent. My experienced but non-expert view is that these payments would be a breach of the law, though they would probably be treated as a de minimis exception; you can't blame the University's legal team for insisting they should not be made.
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No Such a contract would be an attempt to evade the court order mandating a given level of support, and would not be enforceable. However it is not the case that no contract can deal with Child Custody or Child Support. A couple could surely make a contract to pay more than a court had ordered, that in no way violates the order. A contract could specify a default or initial amount of support, to be paid until and unless a court orders a different amount. Similarly a contract could specify initial custody, pending any court decision to the contrary, but it cannot preclude the court from making an order in accordance with the best interests of the child.
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What does the contract say? I write that so often I should get a stamp made. If the contract is silent, then it is implied that payment in US currency is acceptable, as is any other method of payment the parties agree to. As you have correctly quoted, there is no limit to the number of US coins that are valid for payments, unlike in many other jurisdictions where there is such a limit. Accept the coins, make the tenant wait while you count them one by one and then give them a receipt. Oh, and change your lease when you can to nominate sensible forms of payment like electronic transfer.
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I wouldn't be surprised to see other states and jurisdictions with similar statutes. Fortunately, in the United States, there is a safe harbor against demands for state income taxes: For every dollar of taxable income, you can only be taxed by one state. (This was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne.) Therefore, if you show that the LLC (or its members if it's a pass-through) paid taxes to another state on the income in question (e.g., by sending a copy of the tax return), that's legally the end of the matter.
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Yes, in england-and-wales the Criminal Finances Act 2017 introduced 'Unexplained Wealth Orders', which compel the respondent to provide a statement: (a) setting out the nature and extent of the respondent’s interest in the property in respect of which the order is made, (b) explaining how the respondent obtained the property (including, in particular, how any costs incurred in obtaining it were met), (c) where the property is held by the trustees of a settlement, setting out such details of the settlement as may be specified in the order, and (d) setting out such other information in connection with the property as may be so specified. There a few requirements set out in section 362B, for example, the property must have value of over £50,000; there should be "reasonable grounds" for suspicion that the respondent would have been unable to obtain the property using their lawfully obtained income; the respondent or their connections must have either been involved in serious or organised crime, or be a politically exposed person, and so on. If the respondent refuses to make such a statement, the police may apply for a Civil Recovery Order to confiscate the property, with the property in question "presumed to be recoverable property" (section 362C(2)). Giving false information in such a statement is a criminal offence.
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There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later.
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In the UK, broadly speaking it is not illegal to pay a ransom. However, there may be circumstances such that arranging or paying a ransom constitutes a terrorist financing offence - although a prosecution might be deemed against the public interest. I'm not aware of any such prosecutions. Section 15 (3) of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence for a person to provide money or other property if he knows or has reasonable cause to suspect will or may be used for the purposes of terrorism. Section 17 makes it an offence for a person to enter into or become concerned in an arrangement as a result of which money or other property is made available or is to be made available to another, and the person knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that it will or may be used for the purposes of terrorism. Section 17A makes it an offence for an insurer to make a payment under an insurance contract against kidnapping and ransom if he knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that the money or other property has been, or is to be, handed over in response to a terrorist demand. Section 18 makes it an offence for someone to enter into or become concerned in an in an arrangement which facilitates the retention or control by or on behalf of another person of terrorist property. If a person becomes aware in the course of his trade, profession or business (e.g. the banker assembling the money) that someone may be arranging a ransom to pay a terrorist, section 19 makes it an offence for that person to not disclose to a constable as soon as reasonably practicable his belief or suspicion and the information on which it is based. In terms of maritime piracy kidnappings in the area of Somalia for example, although the Government has tried to link them to terrorism there is no direct evidence of systematic links. But if it became known that such a connection exists, then the knowledge or suspicion element of the terrorist financing offences might be provable. In Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate Member [2011] EWCA Civ 24 (a case partly about whether ransom payments by shipowners to pirates were as a matter of English law against public policy) the Court of Appeal was not aware of illegality in the payment of ransoms under international law. The UK Government supported the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2133 in January 2014, which among other things "Calls upon all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages".
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Yes, if ... ... they are a ‘designated communications provider’ conducting ‘ eligible activities’ under s317C. Your example, Whatsapp is one under item 4. If they refuse to comply they can be subject to financial penalties. If they refuse to pay the fines they can have their assets that are subject to Australian jurisdiction seized - this includes money in accounts held by third parties like MasterCard, Visa and PayPall. The could also seek to have orders and judgement debts given by Australian courts executed by US courts. They would be successful unless the judgement violated US law - the first and fourth amendments spring to mind.
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If someone found out after the wedding that their partner had been sterilized, what rights would they have? A friend of mine was dating, and nearly married an immigrant woman. While she was in the "old country," her parents had her sterilized under circumstances that would be illegal in the U.S. but permissible in the other country. (This happened while the girl was undergoing another operation, so she wasn't even informed.) Only when she went to the doctor for a pre marital check up was this discovered. Since my friend wanted children, they broke up the engagement. But suppose he had found out after the wedding. What rights would he have in the United States? Could he have the marriage annulled as opposed to file for divorce? Could he sue the girl's parents for doing this and not telling her about it?
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The full answer is too broad (it's a 50-state survey question). Here is a starter, though. In Washington, annulment may be sought if (i) The marriage or domestic partnership should not have been contracted because of age of one or both of the parties, lack of required parental or court approval, a prior undissolved marriage of one or both of the parties, a prior domestic partnership of one or both parties that has not been terminated or dissolved, reasons of consanguinity, or because a party lacked capacity to consent to the marriage or domestic partnership, either because of mental incapacity or because of the influence of alcohol or other incapacitating substances, or because a party was induced to enter into the marriage or domestic partnership by force or duress, or by fraud involving the essentials of marriage or domestic partnership, and that the parties have not ratified their marriage or domestic partnership by voluntarily cohabiting after attaining the age of consent, or after attaining capacity to consent, or after cessation of the force or duress or discovery of the fraud, shall declare the marriage or domestic partnership invalid as of the date it was purportedly contracted But then also (ii) The marriage or domestic partnership should not have been contracted because of any reason other than those above, shall upon motion of a party, order any action which may be appropriate to complete or to correct the record and enter a decree declaring such marriage or domestic partnership to be valid for all purposes from the date upon which it was purportedly contracted So an annulment would have to fit into one of these latter unspecified reasons. Although material fraud is considered to be such a reason, the closest case (an attempt to annul based on fraud), the WA Supreme Court avoided deciding whether a particular instance of alleged fraud sufficed to invalidate a marriage, since in addition one party was incompetent and the marriage was not solemnized, as required by state law. In Radochonski v. Radochonski (1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 765), the husband sought a declaration of invalidity of marriage based on fraud in the essentials of the marriage (the allegation was that the wife entered into the marriage to get permanent residency). The petition was denied because "the alleged fraud does not go to the 'essentials' of marriage" and because he "cannot demonstrate reasonable reliance on any statements Barbara made as to her motive in marrying him". The court notes that there is only one case, Harding v. Harding, addressing what the essentials of marriage are: where one of the parties to a marriage ceremony determines before the ceremony that he or she will not engage in sexual intercourse with the other after marriage, not disclosing such intention to the other, and carries out such determination, the offending spouse commits a fraud in the contract of marriage affecting an essential of the marital relation, against which the injured party may be relieved by annulment of the marriage. The court said that fraud in an essential may be found (citing cases in other states) where one spouse has misled another on an attribute that prevents sexual relations between the parties such as impotence, venereal disease, and drug abuse, the latter on the theory that narcotics cause impotence. These attributes have gone to the essentials of marriage because they affected the sexual relations that are at the heart of the marriage but no so in the case of premarital chastity, false representations as to love and affection, misrepresentation of affection, failure to disclose out-of-wedlock children, fraudulent representation of pregnancy, and failure to end a previous relationship. So it is highly unlikely that fraud in the essentials of marriage would be found at least in Washington.
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This is what we mean when we say something falls between the cracks. Sorry for that. First off, in the United States, family law is not federal, it is individual to each state. This means there is no federal agency or official charged with enforcing family law. When it comes to marriage and divorce, the federal government and their border agents are after those seeking to gain benefit through fraud (i.e., attempting to attain status through fraudulent marriage). Likewise, they don't have formal cross-jurisdictional protocols controlling the right of the US government to demand personal, private family law records from other governments. Nor do they have the means to pursue that. What this means, in practical terms, is that no family law judge sitting in the US has authority, interest or means in international marriage and divorce beyond those cases initiated in their court. I hope you read that slowly and carefully. Ask me if you need clarification. I suspect that you have a very specific cause in mind that necessitates you being in possession of a divorce decree. And I get the impression that you and your ex-spouse are in agreement and working together to solve this. You might find it valuable, at this point, to take a step back a little further into history. Let's consider your marriage. You two know you got married. I suspect that your friends, loved ones, and hopefully family know you got married. Then there is that clerk somewhere in Denmark (who records more than 100 marriages every week) who knows you got married. Theoretically. Possibly. Maybe. You've been residing in Russia for some years now, and the Russian government doesn't know you are married. Marriage is illegal there. So, in actuality the Russian government, if asked by some official of some other government, can only state with truth and authority that it is certain that you are NOT married. At the same time, some US federal official decides to investigate the most highly unlikely case ever. Someone is trying to gain entry, not by claiming marriage but by hiding a marriage. (ridiculous!) So, with a budget of zero, and the authority to match, goes from country to country demanding that they open up the (extremely) private records of family courts in search of the evidence he needs. When they ask him to demonstrate cause, he boldly tells them that his sharp mind is cause enough. They agree and give him cups of tea as he searches through the private affairs of their residents. It is never-ending, but he is proud to be working to stop the flood of unwanted divorced persons trying to gain entry to the USA. - - - - You get the picture. Also, consider the option of an international divorce. I would provide a reference here, but a simple Google search will yield many providers. It is expensive and time-consuming, but an available option. I'd rank it last. There are also varied laws by jurisdiction - internationally. I'm not expert enough to know of any jurisdictions that might not require extended residency. I suspect some won't. I am confident, on the other hand, that there are several that you might access with relative short windows of required residency. This Wikipedia article should give you a good start. You are also maybe a little fast in dismissing Denmark as a possible venue. European Union states, at one time, experienced a tangled mess regarding family law across jurisdictions and specifically divorce. In 2003, however, the EU implemented Regulation 2201/2003 providing for conferred jurisdictional competence by way of exception in cases involving applicants for divorce similarly situated to you. And now jurisprudence, in a wonderful show, is beginning to catch up with regulation and public sentiment on the matter. The provisions seem complicated, but they are definitely outside the abilities of a couple of Russians who have managed to get this far. Here's a starting point to get the ball rolling. Aside from those three solutions, you might be stuck. You would be ill-advised to seek some creative solution outside of the law. And I struggle to think of anything that might work. Unfortunately, justice and law are often connected by a mere thread, and sometimes not at all. You are left to forge ahead on behalf of others, who enjoy the fruits of your labour. For that, you have our gratitude. And while I am no expert on the fight for justice, There is this man - an American, who is. He wasn't gay, so much as black. Be he figured out a lot regarding justice. There are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that "an unjust law is no law at all." -Martin Luther King Jr. I salute you.
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This is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1401 which details who qualifies for "birthright citizenship". Including of course the condition mandated by the 14th ammendment, Congress is otherwise free to bestow such citizenship essentially as it pleases by duly enacted legislation. One of the cases that receives birthright citizenship is a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States. So the presumption for young children found in the US is that they are citizens by birth. The law in particular requires positive proof that the individual in question was definitely not born in the United States. Lacking this, or it failing to be found prior to reaching the age of 21 years, they are citizens. For other cases, this will likely end up falling to the courts, who will decide the matter on the preponderance of the evidence. In this case it becomes the burden of the individual claiming citizenship to establish that they are a citizen*. Birth certificates can be filed after birth, and can be submitted as evidence. The laws controlling the validity of birth certificates is locally determined. If there are other birth certificates from other countries, or conflicting witness testimony, then it will fall to the court to decide which case is more likely based on the evidence available. *More accurately the burden generally falls on the entity making the claim about someone's citizenship (their own or someone else's). In a deportation hearing, for example, it falls to the government to establish the individual is not a US citizen. Deporation only applies to aliens, so the defendant must be established as such.
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Article 8 is pretty clear. The fact that it is recommended to extend the draft to women indicates that there is a conflict needing resolution. A relevant case before the European Court of Human Rights ruled on this and found the law to violate articles 14 and 8 of the ECHR. They identify an exoneration from the tax under the Military-Service Exemption Tax Act sect. 4. Reading the judgment could be helpful (maybe you know the case). What I get from it is that there are a bunch of situation-specific details that could be applied (e.g. you have to first complain formally in-country before going to ECHR), and issues of disability level and the distinction between disability and illness. This gives a model for anyone to attempt to resist the tax, but only a change in the law will get rid of it.
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If they do a treatment which you didn't consent to and harm you they risk being sued. As such, they get you to sign a consent form to prove you agreed to the treatment and were informed about what was going on and any material risks. They had implied verbal consent from you which is enough legally, but there's a risk that if it went wrong you could claim you didn't consent, they lied about what treatment you had, and they illegally did it. As an example, they often drip something into your eye which can sometimes cause blurry vision for a while. If you had blurry vision after and crashed your car you could theoretically sue them because you say you didn't consent to that and they have no proof you did.
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The non-citizen is responsible for themselves. If you do not marry within 90 days, the visa expires, and the non-citizen is no longer legally present, thus will have to leave the country.
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Pursuant to well-established law in the US, the person carrying the fetus (conventionally, the mother) has the right to an abortion. Doing so might be a breach of contract. Some jurisdictions flat out ban surrogacy contracts (Arizona, D.C), perhaps even penalizes (Michigan, NY), or declares void (Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska). In California, surrogacy contracts are legal and enforceable. One possible challenging scenario is that the mother refuses a requested abortion, the other is that one or both of the intended parents seek to block the mother from getting an abortion. The former case in the case of Melissa Cook, where there was an attempt made to reduce the number of pregnancies from three – Cook carried the fetuses to term despite a contrary request from the intended parents (no action was filed to attempt to force an abortion). There has apparently been no attempted case to force a mother to carry a fetus to terms because of a contract (i.e. order for specific enforcement). Under present US law, the woman carrying the fetus has the exclusive right to choose to terminate a pregnancy. No statutes or case law suggest that a surrogacy contract will override that right, and some laws explicitly deny the ability to force a mother to have an abortion (Utah Code Ann. §78B-15-808(2) & (3), Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §160.754(g), Fla. Stat. Ann. §63-213(3)(b)). A mother could be sued for breach of contract if she terminates a pregnancy – the intended parents may have suffered a financial loss from that decision, but that depends on the state.
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If one day the child goes around to the father's house, perhaps in a state of upset, and says, "That's it, I'm staying," what is the legal position of the father? An eleven year old child really has no say in the matter. A judge in a custody case may consider what the 11 year old has to say but is unlikely to give it much weight. (In contrast, a judge is likely to give a lot of weight to the views of a child who has a job, who is doing O.K. in school, and is a year or two from becoming a full fledged adult.) This is up to his parents to resolve absent circumstances not present here (e.g. the child has made bona fide allegations of child abuse, or the parents are both incarcerated). And, if the parents can't resolve the dispute, it is up to a court in a case where parenting time is at issue (probably either a legal separation or a divorce in this case). For example, while (as noted below) the police will not generally drag a child kicking and screaming to the other parent without a court order, if the child is at his father's house, the father can absolutely drag the child kicking and screaming to the child's mother's house, no matter how much the child doesn't like it. Moreover, while the father will not be violating any law, if he does not do that, a child custody judge is likely to look dimly upon a parent who intentionally withholds visitation from another parent without good cause, when the court considers what kind of child custody arrangements to put in place. And, the court has extremely great discretion in these matters. The judge is also likely to be pretty unhappy with both of the parents for failing to be capable of communicating or cooperating over child rearing related issues, because they are apparently so focused on not getting along with each other over their issues with each other. In particular, if the mother calls the police claiming "child abduction," what will be the police position? Will they come to the door of the father? Will they drag the child kicking and screaming back to mother's house? It is not generally illegal for a married parent in a situation where there is no child custody order in place to have that parent's child with them over the objection of the other married parent. Absent a court order to the contrary, the police will probably call this a "civil matter" and will be unlikely to take any action until there is court guidance, absent exigent circumstances like evidence of recent not previously adjudicated claims of child abuse or neglect. The way to resolve this would be with a court filing of some sort seeking to resolve the parenting time issue, if necessary, on an emergency basis. Post-Script Whether or not the parents want to end the marriage, this situation is long overdue for court intervention. I've had couples who "pull the trigger" too soon, but this would not be a case of that type. Either the father or the mother needs to find a solicitor (if at all possible to afford that) and get the court system involved. If there is a breakdown in communications over matters related to the child, and the child is not cooperating in the face of an ambiguous parenting situation involving two parents who can't communicate about their child, the situation is out of control. Prompt court action could prevent a more negative outcome in the future by creating stability and structure in the situation.
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How does the mandate to report income from illegal activities in the US jibe with the Fifth Amendment? Al Capone was famously taken down for tax evasion for not reporting income from his illegal activities. If someone were to report the income from illegal activities like a marijuana dispensary or a bribe, my understanding is that they would be then investigated/prosecuted for their disclosed activities. However, The Fifth Amendment states that: No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,... Since reporting income, even if illegal, is a mandate and the Fifth Amendment protects against someone being held as a witness against themselves, the law seems to be inconsistent. How does the mandate to report income from illegal activities in the US jibe with the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination?
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The original 1913 Revenue Act only required the reporting of income from "lawful" sources. In the 1921 Revenue Act the word, "lawful" was removed requiring all income to be reported. [IRS Publication 17] states: Illegal activities. Income from illegal activities, such as money from dealing illegal drugs, must be included in your income on Form 1040, line 21, or on Schedule C or Schedule C-EZ (Form 1040) if from your self-employment activity. In United States v. Sullivan in 1927, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it was constitutional to require that a tax return be filed to report income. If the filer believed information required to be filed would incriminate him then the filer could raise the issue on the form. The filer could not simply refuse to file. Justice Holmes further wrote: It is urged that, if a return were made, the defendant would be entitled to deduct illegal expenses, such as bribery. This by no means follows, but it will be time enough to consider the question when a taxpayer has the temerity to raise it. In Garner v. United States in 1976, the Supreme Court ruled that a filer's income tax return that revealed himself to be a gambler could be used as evidence that the filer violated gambling laws. An article in Forbes describes a taxpayer who filed their returns but refused to answer some questions related to their income, asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege. The IRS attempted to impose a "frivolous return" penalty on the taxpayer for refusing to provide all information. The Tax Court ruled that the taxpayer had a legitimate fear regarding disclosure of information related to failing to file a report of foreign bank and financial accounts. The tax court found the taxpayer had filed the standard return, the return contained sufficient information and that a return doesn't need to be "completely correct" but, rather, "substantially correct." The IRS had claimed that omitting some information because of fear of self-incrimination is frivolous. The Tax Court found that the standard, Notice 2010-33, doesn't require that "all" information must be provided, simply that substantial information must be provided. As a result, the penalty was removed and the taxpayer's assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege was found not to be "frivolous." As the Tax Court ruling explains, the Fifth Amendment privilege applies to tax returns, provided the taxpayer affirmatively claims the privilege on the return and does so before he files it. In summary, it is still necessary to file a return; a blanket Fifth Amendment claim applying to the entire return is considered frivolous. However, the taxpayer must claim the privilege. Any incriminating information included on the return can be used against the taxpayer.
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The law you cite says that the Secretary shall furnish such committee with any return or return information specified in such request That includes specific individual returns. That it was intended to include such returns is made clear by the provisions restricting identifiable individual data to executive session. Whether this ought to be the law might well be debated. Whether the House ought to use this law as a way to get at Trump's returns could also be debated. Those are matters of politics, or perhaps ethics, not law. Whether some other provision of law overrides this provision in this case is pretty clearly going to be argued in court, and we will see what the decision is. I won't try to predict it here.
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Money Laundering The primary crime that you have described is called money laundering. Note that money laundering includes: "structuring financial transactions in order to evade reporting requirements." Unlike some other forms of money laundering, this does not require that the source of the funds be criminal, or that the actual transfer be criminal, so long as it is intended to avoid reporting requirements. Along the same lines is the even less obvious offense of smurfing. So, this does not cease to be money laundering because: "A legally possesses the money and has a perfectly legal (and very private) reason to pay it to B." The transfer would typically have had to be reported on a Form W-2 (wage and salary income), a Form 1099 (most transfers that are usually taxable income), a Form 709 (gift tax return), a Form 1098 (mortgage interest), or 1040 Schedule A (deductible payments), or on a cash transaction form if conducted in that manner. The fact that you are reporting it as income, and that there would have been some disclosure requirement if paid to person B, implies that there is some reporting requirement that is avoided. Tax Crimes There are also multiple tax related crimes that could be implicated, not all of which require that taxes due by the person charged by reduced. See, e.g., Conspiracy to Defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. § 371); Attempts To Interfere With Administration of Internal Revenue Laws (I.R.C. § 7212); Fraudulent Returns, Statements or Other Documents (I.R.C. § 7207); Identity Theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7)), etc. Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, for example, is defined as follows: If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.f "Conspiracy to defraud the government is a very broad concept." Tax Crimes Handbook at 132. Conspiracy to defraud the government is not limited to efforts to obtain money or property, but includes conspiracies where the object of the conspiracy is to obstruct, impair, interfere, impede or defeat the legitimate functioning of the government through fraudulent or dishonest means. Thus, conspiracy to defraud is not confined by reference to common law definitions of fraud. It is a separate crime to interfere with the lawful functions of the government without regard to the monetary consequences. Thus, § 371 involves both efforts to defraud the government of funds as well as interference with the lawful function of the government. The conspiracy to defraud prong of § 371 includes conspiracies to impede, impair, obstruct or defeat the lawful functions of the Treasury Department in the collection of income taxes. United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908, 915 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924 (1958). Arguments have been presented that § 371 was not intended to encompass conspiracies to violate the internal revenue laws or conspiracies to defraud the Service but these arguments have been rejected. Although decided in 1957, Klein is the leading case regarding conspiracies to impede and impair the Service and such conspiracies are commonly referred to as "Klein conspiracies." In Klein the defendants were acquitted of the tax evasion charges but were convicted on the conspiracy count. The wording of the conspiracy count read, in part, as follows: "... to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing and defeating the lawful functions of the Department of the Treasury in the collection of the revenue; to wit, income taxes." In part, it was alleged in Klein that as "part of said conspiracy that the defendants would conceal and continue to conceal the nature of their business activities and the source and nature of their income." The defendants concealed the source and nature of their income by altering and making false entries in their books, filing false income tax returns, and providing false answers to interrogatories. Thus, a money laundering plan may result in a conspiracy to obstruct the Treasury. United States v. Sanzo, 673 F.2d 64, 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). In Sanzo, one defendant argued that there was no direct evidence that the other party to the plan would not report the laundered money or claim deductions. The court felt there was enough circumstantial evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant knew his accomplice would not report large sums of laundered money as income and that he would have to falsify business records to hide the laundering activities. Sanzo, 673 F.2d at 69. Note, it is not necessary to prove that the Service was actually impeded in its efforts to assess and collect the revenue. Tax Crimes Handbook at 132-136 (in the pertinent parts, with most citations omitted). Caveat Regarding Legal Alternatives It is also worth noting that there are legal ways for person A to transfer money to person B without making it apparent, for example, in his check book or on his tax return that the funds were transferred to person B (exactly how is beyond the scope of this answer). Generally speaking, they are distinguishable because the IRS is fully and accurately informed of what is going on in a way that the IRS is not allowed to disclose publicly. But, the crude method used here does not achieve that end.
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Anyone can say anything on Wikipedia – even they tagged that claim as requiring a citation. There's no way to directly prove that there is no such requirement, but these guys maintains that there are no such laws in the US, and EFF says the same thing. This Wiki page agrees, giving details about a specific bill introduced in the House and also in the Senate in the 111th Congress that did not become a law (it did not survive the scrutiny of the judiciary committee in either case). Another failed attempt was in the 112th Congress.
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Qualified immunity is a doctrine that protects government officials (including police) from civil liability in §1983 suits. Anderson v. Creighton describes the legal standard - objective legal reasonableness. There is no condition that would strip an officer of civil immunity and open him up to criminal liability because the criminal charges could attach regardless of the disposition of civil liability. I say "could" because who is going to charge and prosecute the crime? The CATO Institute tracks police misconduct. Not all misconduct is criminal, but reading through their site will give you an idea of why it is difficult to determine when and why cops are charged with crimes. Only a small fraction of the 17,000 law enforcement agencies actually track their own misconduct in a semi-public manner, and even when they do, the data they provide is generic and does not specify what misconduct occurred, who did it, and what the end result was.
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In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"? You are conflating several different ideas here, which is probably the source of your persistent confusion. 1) Actions are legal or not Illegal: Not authorized by law; Illicit ; unlawful; contrary to law The law sets out certain things that you must do (you must stop at a red light) and things you must not do (you must not drive under the influence). Sometimes actions fall into a gray area of the law, or aren't addressed at all, but if something is spelled out, then it's very clear whether the abstract action is legal or not. Running a red light is illegal. Driving under the influence is illegal. There are definitions and specified penalties for both. 2) A person may or may not be guilty of an illegal action Guilty: Having committed a crime or tort Abstract actions can be legal or illegal, but people commit crimes. When someone commits a crime, they are guilty of that crime. This is true whether or not they are ever prosecuted, or even if law enforcement knows who the guilty one is. If someone runs a red light at 2 in the morning on an empty street, it's still illegal and thus they are guilty of running a red - but no one will ever catch them. If someone is shot in the middle of the street, then someone is guilty of shooting them. Again, the shooter may never be found, but whoever they are, they are still guilty. 3) An individual may or may not be guilty of the crime of which they are charged. Charge: the statement of the alleged offense that brings a person to court If law enforcement (whether your local traffic cop or the FBI) believes that you are guilty of a crime, they can charge you with committing it. They may be right. They may be wrong. But the suspicion of having committed it is enough to charge you. To continue the traffic example: If an officer sees you running the red light, they can write you a ticket (effectively charging you) for doing so. They may or may not actually be right (it could have been yellow or malfunctioning, for example), but law enforcement has the power to charge regardless. 4) A defendant may or may be found guilty and convicted. Conviction: In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. This is where the presumption of innocence comes in - the default assumption is that the accused did not commit the crime that they are being charged with, and it's the prosecutor's job to prove otherwise. If the accused is found to not be guilty of the crime, then they (presumably) didn't do it - it doesn't necessarily mean the crime didn't happen, just that this specific person didn't commit it. Alternatively, the defendant can be found not guilty for other reasons - the judge or jury can determine that the crime didn't take place, took place but was justified, or the defendant wasn't in their right mind at the time. On the other hand, if they are found guilty, they're convicted and sentenced to whatever an appropriate punishment is. TL;DR Whether something is legal is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. Someone who commits an illegal act is guilty of doing so, even if they are never charged. Again, this is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. People are charged with violations of specific laws by law enforcement. Defendants can be found guilty by the court system. In other words, only the courts can determine whether a specific individual actually committed illegal behavior, but the behavior is still illegal regardless.
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In the United States, the answer depends on who is unlawfully in power. In the hypothetical you presented, the answer is probably that the law would remain valid, as Congress generally has the sole authority to pass judgment on whether to admit the elected person. A third party would not have the ability to challenge the law based on the qualifications of a lawmaker. But if we were dealing with an administrative official promulgating regulations, those rules would generally be void if that official were unlawfully appointed. That was the case in Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014), where a cola distributor challenged a labor regulation, saying that the members of the NLRB who enacted it were improperly appointed. The Court agreed that the appointments were improper, so the regulations were nullified. A judicial decision coming out under these circumstances would also be nullified if one of the judges weren't really a judge. That happened just last year, in Yovino v. Rizo. In that case, ten judges from the Ninth Circuit heard a case, and the vote split 6-4. But the author of the majority opinion died before the decision was published, which is when it become effective. The Supreme Court held that because there were therefore only five votes for that decision, it was not a majority opinion, and therefore not binding on future Ninth Circuit panels.
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The president is not permitted to blackmail the Supreme Court, but what you've described isn't blackmail. Blackmail is a threat to expose someone's crimes. You're probably thinking of something more like extortion, which is outlawed under 18 U.S. Code § 875: Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. There are three problems with your theory I see right away: With the facts: As you noted, the President's statements were "seemingly unrelated," which is essentially an admission that there's no indication one has anything to do with the other. Under those circumstances, you can't establish that he's making any kind of threat. With the statute: "Extortion" is generally understood to refer not merely to a threat to do something unpleasant. Instead, extortion is inducing another person to turn over property by the wrongful use of force, violence, or fear. There's no property at play here, and it's not unlawful to study changes to the court (nor would it be unlawful to actually make changes to the Court, which the president doesn't even have power to do anyway). With the First Amendment: The President has a First Amendment right to advocate for changes to gun laws, and for changes to the composition of the Supreme Court. That right does not evaporate when it is informed by the court's conduct. So the Biden situation is not really a good fit with the hypothetical you've described, which presents a much stronger factual basis from which to find a threat. Because it also appears you're using wrongfully inducing fear of economic injury to obtain another person's property, and because you have no right to do so, you would be liable for extortion, while the President would not. EDIT: Although the top-line questions has been reframed, I'll just note that the answer remains basically the same. Bearing in mind that the president has no power to force any Supreme Court justice into retirement, one might rephrase the question this way: "If the Court rules that a constitutional amendment has Meaning X, can the president threaten to support a constitutional amendment?" The answer should be obvious: The president is free to support policies to change the constitution, at any time, for any reason.
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Cream cheese is cheese? For legal purposes in the US, is cream cheese considered "cheese"? Who regulates this and what definitions do they give? If someone is contractually obligated to provide cheese and they provide cream cheese, is that acceptable under the law?
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The FDA promulgates regulations regarding what "cream cheese" etc. is, in 21 CFR Part 133 which covers cheese and related products. Cream cheese is described in §133.133, and there are sections on cottage cheese, cheddar, and so on. There is no general definition of "cheese" in this part, nor in related Part 131 covering milk and cream. Although there is no regulation defining the general term "cheese", by its regulatory inclusion with cottage cheese, cheddar and myriad other standard cheeses, one can argue that cream cheese is a kind of cheese (assuming there is no state regulation or contractual term that pins down what counts as "cheese"). By way of contrast, labne, often co-labeled "kefir cheese" (sometimes equated with "Greek yogurt"), is not included in any federal regulation, and at least one brand does not identify itself as a "type of yogurt", leaving the monolingual consumer with only "kefir cheese" to tell you what it is. Supplying labne as an instance of cheese would be in shaky legal ground, not so with cottage and cream cheese. If a person is contracted to supply "cheese" with no further specification, they can rely on ordinary usage of the term, and the evidence of ordinary usage would include cream cheese as a kind of cheese. If someone were to supply labne as an instance of cheese, that would be more problematic.
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It isn't obvious that one must be certified to advertise your product as "Kobe Beef" in the United States. The designation "Kobe Beef", in theory, is supposed to operate a lot like a trademark, but it is a geographic designation that presumably belongs to officials from the geographic area, rather than a true trademark that is owned by a private individual or corporation. It is one thing to state you have "certified Kobe Beef" when you don't and another to say merely that you have "Kobe Beef" in a place where no certification is required by law and the term is not well defined. The United States frequently does not honor foreign law procedures necessary to establish a geographic designation. As another example, the U.S. routinely tolerates the marketing of "champagne" in the sense of a generic term for sparkling wine, even though it is regulated as a geographic designation for sparkling wine made in a particular manner in a particular place within France when used in the European Union. The handful of geographic designations that are treated as enforceable under regimes like the ones for Kobe Beef and Champagne arise under U.S. specific laws. For example, federal law (strictly speaking a federal regulation promulgated pursuant to federal law) mandates that the term Bourbon whiskey refer to a product made at least 50% of distilled spirits made in a certain way in Kentucky. There are deceptive trade practices laws in many states that require designations of origin to be truthful and the Lanham Act also prohibits false advertising. But, to the extent that beef originates from the Kobe vicinity (i.e. Hyōgo Prefecture) in Japan but is not certified Kobe Beef under the Japanese geographic designation laws, this would not violate either of these laws because the geographic designation is accurate. Hyōgo Prefecture where certified Kobe Beef comes from is shown in red on this Wikipedia map. Alternatively, the sellers of Kobe Beef could argue, probably with a good chance of success, that in American English the term "Kobe Beef" refers not to "certified Kobe Beef" or even to beef actually produced in Hyōgo Prefecture, Japan as a geographic designation, but to beef with some important qualities of certified Kobe Beef, without regard to where it is actually made, for example, using the same breed of cow raised so that it has a similar level of fattiness. I would guess that hundreds of places in the U.S. sell "Kobe beef". In the same vein, "Kentucky Fried Chicken" does not mean chicken fried in Kentucky in American English, instead it means chicken fried in the style made famous in Kentucky, a Philadelphia Cheese Steak in American English means a sandwich made in the style of cheese steaks sold in Philadelphia and not a sandwich actually made in Philadelphia, and a Boston Cream Pie in American English means a cream pie made in the style of pies made in Boston and not a pie made with cream that is actually produced in Boston. U.S. law, in general, and American language conventions as well, are quite hostile to the notion that what other countries might consider a geographic designator does anything more than describe a style of making food as opposed to making a true statement regarding place of origin. In American English an unambiguous statement regarding place of origin would normally be made with a statement like "Made with beef imported from Kobe, Japan" as opposed to a mere product description of "Kobe Beef". The inference one makes that "Kobe Beef" is certified Kobe Beef from Kobe, Japan is probably an unreasonable assumption and certainly the question would be a disputed question of fact on falsity that a court could reasonably rule in favor of the restaurant upon. (Similarly, if you say you are headed to "my house" you aren't necessarily implying that I own the house, merely that it is associated with me in some way.) Also, to quantify damages, one would have to determine the difference between the fair market value of fine beef in a fancy restaurant that is not certified Kobe Beef and certified Kobe Beef as you would have to in order to prevail and win damages in a lawsuit like that one, is non-trivial and might determine that, for example, the alternative still charges $300, greatly reducing damages. And, the number of meals involved still probably isn't huge, perhaps in a thousand per year. So, maybe the damages if someone prevailed might be $150,000 for all meals sold in the period covered by the statute of limitations even if one could successfully prove that in a class action lawsuit. It is also possible that no one has decided to take any action to enforce what is a violation of the law, even to the extent that it is indeed a deceptive trade practice. It isn't economical to sue over a single $350 beef purchase, particularly when there are non-frivolous defenses of the type that I have identified. People who purchase this kind of meal aren't easy to identify in order to bring a class action that could lead to a more viable lawsuit, particular as the patrons might be spread all over the world. The New York State attorney general might decide that it has higher priorities than suing a business that is getting people to willingly and happily pay $350 for an entree at a single restaurant that mostly benefits the nine certified Kobe Beef restaurants. And those nine restaurants may likewise have decided that it wasn't worth suing under the Lanham Act because even if they prove false advertising which is causing patrons there to pay $50 more than they should per entree, it isn't at all obvious that this caused any damage to the restaurants in question that couldn't be solved with more advertising of their own.
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"Tamper" implies action taken with intend to improperly change the meaning. "Alter" simply means "change". "Mutilate" simply means "damage" but in this context implies "Make unreadable". "Obliterates" here means 'make unreadable" or "remove". As a practical matter, there is not much if any difference between these words in this context, and no authority will spend any time at all considering whether some action is 'tampering" or "mutilation". The word "or" is used precisely to avoid such arguments. Any of these shades of meaning is equally forbidden. English-language laws and regulations often specify multiple synonyms or near-synonyms , connecting them with "or" so that anything within the more general scope of the concept is included. Charles Rembar, in his book The Law of the Land, asserted that this dated to the period in England shortly after the Norman Conquest, and that lawyers tended to include equivalent terms from Latin, Norman French, and English. He mentions such combinations as "Give, devise, and bequeath" and "Promise, covenant, and agree" as typical and often-used examples of this tendency. When this sort of multiple terminology is used, it is generally only useful to try to understand what is covered by the combined phrase, and of no value to try to determine which term covers which part of the concept. In the cited cases, anyone who tries to change a passport to say something that the government didn't intend, or who tries to damage or destroy a passport, or anything similar, would be guilty of the forbidden act. And similarly, anyone who tries to make an MVID read differently, or to make it unreadable, would be guilty.
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In general, anyone can buy potentially dangerous chemicals. My local service station sells petrol, my local liquor store sells alcohol, my local supermarket sells ammonia, my local pool shop sells chlorine, my local hardware store sells poisons and my local chemist sells drugs. The world is full of dangerous stuff and all of it is for sale. Certain governments may regulate the sale of certain products. Such regulations may cover packaging, storage, quantities, reporting and limits on who can be a buyer or seller. For example, who can be a buyer of Uranium is pretty strictly limited. The decision about what and how to regulate is a political one, not a legal one. In general, governments apply a cost/benefit approach (including political costs/benefits). The fact that one (or a small number) of people use something inappropriately must be balanced with the cost that regulation imposed on government and legitimate users. Also, in most parts of the developed world people are allowed to take risks with their own bodies - climbing mountains, surfing, parachuting and, yes, injecting themselves with foreign substances. It’s unwise but it’s not illegal. I am unable to assist you with who would be responsible for regulating such matters in France but I can suggest that neither the FDA nor the EPA would be relevant in the USA because its neither a food nor a drug (FDA) nor is it being sole in quantities that are likely to adversely affect the environment (EPA).
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You may want to ask Reich what he personally was talking about. There is a distinction within the US between states which prohibit mandatory union membership versus allow mandatory union membership. In about half of the states, a union cannot force an employer to accept a contract which obligates that a person join the union. These are known as right-to-work laws. No state requires all workers to join a union, and no state forbids the formation of unions.
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Well, moral obligations are not laws, nor sometimes even moral obligations. Some laws are based on what some courts and legislatures think are moral obligations. We think cannibals have a moral obligation not to eat people; cannibals think non-cannibals are fools for passing up a good BBQ. As for a leader's moral responsibility for millions of lives, we can take as extreme examples Mao, Hilter, Stalin, Pol Pot, etc., that there are no obligations. The law that could apply in the case of a POTUS who does not "faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States..." (oath of office for POTUS) is that of "High Crimes and Misdemeanors", the grounds for most impeachments. But "faithfully executing the Office of President" has no moral obligation; it has legal implications, that's all. High crimes or misdemeanor are legal definitions, not moral, and depend on previous cases of what a crime or misdemeanor is. Insobriety can be illegal; there are laws on the books concerning public drunkenness. But in the contest of POTUS (one who is hopefully not passed out on the sidewalk in front of the WH), it remains to be seen if insobriety is a high crime or misdemeanor. That would be up to the House Judiciary Committee and US House of Representatives, which by Constitutional powers handles impeachment proceedings. The Twenty-fifth Amendment outlines who succeeds the president due to "Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office," but it does not state who has the power to declare a President incapacitated. It's possible that a POTUS who incapacitates himself with alcohol is guilty of a "high crime or misdemeanor." But how drunk do you have to be to be incapacitated? Drunk enough to think a Game Boy is the nuclear football? Again, that's up to the House. Some past presidents have arguably been functional alcoholics (or functional recovered alcoholics.) But incapacitated? That can be subjective when it comes to the application of the law. And morals have little to do with it, unless those morals have a basis in that same law. Update 12/04/16: Some federal judges have been impeached due to drunkenness: http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html and http://www.crf-usa.org/impeachment/high-crimes-and-misdemeanors.html
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You have accurately summed up the conundrum. There is little else to say. You need to accept that there is confusion, even within the law itself, and rely on context to establish in any given instance which meaning is meant. You will come to find that there are many instances of such confusion in the law. The historic technical distinction in the law (especially in tort law) between assault and battery has been collapsed in the everyday vernacular and this had made its way even into the way that the words are used even by law enforcement officers and legislators, who grew up speaking the vernacular language like everyone else. Where I live, in Colorado, the word "menacing" has been used be legislators to replace the historic sense of the word "assault" and the words "assault" and "battery" have become synonymous. But, in England, they are struck with a situation in which the meaning of the word "assault" has become context specific.
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Because you are on their premises and they get to decide what people can or can't do while on their property. This has nothing to do with if recording is legal or not, it has to do with basic property rights and trespass. Let's assume that recording is perfectly legal: so is eating ice cream. However, if its my shop, I can require that you do not make recordings just as I can require that you do not eat ice cream. If I make this requirement known you have three options: you can comply, you can leave or you can stay and do the thing I have prohibited. The first two are legal, the last one isn't; its trespass which is both a tort for which I can sue you and a crime for which you can be arrested and prosecuted.
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Can terms of service override any written laws? Can ToS override some/any aspects of written laws, or rights granted by written law? I know that ToS cannot compel one to commit murder, theft etc, and that most human rights are off limits. I've seen examples of the right to sue able to be waived via agreeing to a ToS. As I understand it, there are also some consumer rights that can be surrendered (but others that can't). Are there any specific examples of rights that can be surrendered via ToS, especially where a court has upheld that capability? Generally I'm talking about the Common Law systems in the major regions (UK, North America and Oceania). Anything that applies to (majority of) Europe would be fine too.
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For a contract (including ToS) to be valid, one of the things it must have is "legality of objects". That is, if the contract purports to require anything that is unlawful in the jurisdiction then (barring a severance clause) it is not a contract. In common law countries, the starting point is that people are free to contract for and about anything they like - a contract is simply a mechanism for exchanging value between the parties on whatever terms they wish. However, judges and legislatures have decided that there are some things you cannot trade and some terms that are unconscionable or against the public interest and these vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction*. For example, a contract is not legal in any jurisdiction if its terms seek to exclude the intervention of the courts - this is against public policy. So for example, a binding arbitration clause requiring the parties to accept a private arbitrator's decision as final excludes the courts, yes? Well, in Australia, yes, such clauses if used in a contract between parties with different bargaining power (like a Telco and its customers) are invalid because they prevent the weaker party pursuing a class action. However, they are perfectly legal in the United States because the SCOTUS has determined that the customer can persue litigation after arbitration is finished so this doesn't impede the courts. These are essentially the same laws interpreted by the courts so that they have totally opposite effects. So this might lead you to think that you'll put one in - it'll be OK in the US and Australians will represent such a tiny share of your market that you don't care if I can't enforce my ToS there. Except, if your website is visible by Australians, you have just exposed yourself to a government fine of up to AUD 5,000,000 (say USD 3,000,000) per day for breach of Australian Consumer Law. As a general guide (which is very stereotypical), US jurisdictions are the most permissive in the rights they will allow their citizens to give up: the US attitude is that everyone is free to make the best deal they can. European jurisdictions are the least permissive in this regard: most European countries follow a more social welfare state model and the citizen needs protecting from themselves. Commonwealth countries tend to be more in the middle.
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is this absolutely required to be considered a valid document in most jurisdictions, most notably, the European Union? Not at all. There is no legal requirement that contracts, terms of service, and so forth be drafted, devised, or even validated by a lawyer. Law requires that certain types of contract be notarized. That refers to the moment where the parties sign/formalize the contract, which is different from --and independent of-- whether its terms were written by a lawyer. A messaging service like the one you have in mind definitely is not subject to such requirement either.
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None because the principle is Freedom to contract There is a general right of any being (natural like a person or even a company) to contract with anyone. Buying someone's service is a contract. A contract forms when: They offer something You offer something Both sides agree on it. (meeting of the minds) It is totally legal for a company to make wears a mask in our place of business a part of either being admitted onto the property or agreeing to contract with you. Noncompliance means as a result that they don't agree to serve you and don't offer to you. In fact, they explicitly reject to contract with you unless you wear a mask, which is their right unless there is a law that would specifically make that reason illegal. There are laws that reduce the freedom of contract, such as the civil right act (protected classes, such as religion, race, sex and more), the Americans with disabilities act (demanding reasonable accommodation), and labor laws (outlawing labor practices or limiting the amount of work or minimum payment) as well as anti-discrimination laws (establishing further classes). However note, that laws need to be written in such a way that they don't discriminate against the company either! One case where freedom to contract was attacked using an anti-discrimination law was Masterpiece Cakeshop - which was decided on first amendment grounds based on the rights of the owner: the law can't force someone to make a product he would not support the message of. Currently, there might only be some ordinance that bans mask policies in Texas, but it is dubious if that might be even an enforceable order from the Texas governor - Especially since OSHA just made adjustments to standards and mandates on the federal level - which include adjustments to respiratory protection fields.
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Yes. Contracts do not excuse a site from obeying the law, and the law requires sites to obey court orders. "It violates my contract with a third party" is not a valid reason to disobey a court, and disobeying a court order is contempt. On the other hand, contract law (at least in the U.S. and U.K.) says that contracts that violate the law or public policy are invalid, and so you could not win a breach of contract suit if the defendant could not legally comply with the contract. Now, a contract might require the company to attempt all possible legal ways to get the court to revoke its order, or to avoid the order in the first place (for instance, if Google does no business in China, a U.S. court might not excuse them from a contract because they capitulated to the Chinese government). However, when push comes to shove, private contracts are lower priority than court orders.
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It is legal to rewrite a book that is out of copyright, although ethical considerations demand that the original author and source be credited. You need to derive your rewrite from a version that is out of copyright, however, rather than a translation whose incremental innovations due to the transformation arising from the translation is still under copyright. Certainly, the 16th century original would be out of copyright, and in all likelihood, so would many of the later editions, but probably not the one from 1971.
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You cannot safely rely on the US doctrine of Fair Use, except if the rights-holder sues you in US courts. In France, there are limited exceptions to the authors proprietary rights. Under Art. L-122-5, there are some relevant potential exceptions: 3ºa) analyses and short quotations justified by the critical, polemic, educational, scientific or informatory nature of the work in which they are incorporated... 4º. parody, pastiche and caricature, observing the rules of the genre. Your description of the intended use does not fit these criteria. Consulting with a copyright attorney is advised, if you don't want to obtain a license.
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This can be effected without evidence or trial or a right to an appeal in front of an objective party. Not so. If a person is charged with a crime for violating such a code, (or refusing to leave when ordered under such a code) they could defend on the grounds that it is unreasonable, unauthorized, or violates that person's constitutional or statutory rights. Or, if a person has been ordered to leave, the person could comply and then seek an injunction forbidding future enforcement of the regulation. Such methods have been used in the past to challenge the lawfulness of administrative regulations. The Colorado code CRS 24-90-109. Powers and duties of board of trustees says that: (1) The board of trustees shall: (a) Adopt such bylaws, rules, and regulations for its own guidance and policies for the governance of the library as it deems expedient. ... (b) Have custody of all property of the library, including rooms or buildings constructed, leased, or set apart therefor; (c) Employ a director and, upon the director's recommendation, employ such other employees as may be necessary. The duties of the director shall include, but not limited to: (I) Implementing the policies adopted by the board of trustees pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section; ... (III) Performing all other acts necessary for the orderly and efficient management and control of the library. This law seems to authorize libraries to adopt and enforce codes of conduct for persons using the library. This page from the CO State library development agency gives example policies that libraries are encouraged to model their policies on. In the section under "Library Use/Behavior" there are three example policies. All of these list various prohibited acts, which seem relatively reasonable to me. Two of the three include an explicit appeals process for serious violations. You do not indicate what sort of behavior you have encaged in for which the library may wish to ban you. In general, government facilities are allowed to make reasonable regulations for members of the public using those facilities, and it is not a violation of people's Constitutional rights to make and enforce such regulations. However, that depends highly on what the regulations are. A regulation limiting access by race would obviously be struck down. A regulation prohibiting shouting, even though it impacts speech, would be permitted as a content-neutral regulation of "time, place and manner". In short it would depend very much on the specific regulation, and what rights it is alleged to violate.
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You're largely correct, though there's some vocabulary you're using that could go either way in terms of proper understanding. My comments on your understanding, presuming we're dealing with two Berne countries (UCC is largely irrelevant these days): My understanding of copyright is that it grants the author an exclusive right to distribute their work in whatever manner they'd like for some amount of time (determined by the copyright duration in a country). Generally correct though there can be many exceptions here (fair use, technical/temporary copying, first-sale doctrine, etc.). Can a person in Country A legally use the adapted work? I'm assuming no [...], Basically correct, whoever holds rights to the original work could theoretically still assert their rights in Country A on any portion of the derivative work that was part of the original. [...] does that mean that the author of the work created in Country B does not technically have all the rights to the work they created, since they have no control over whether their work can be distributed in Country A? This is splitting hairs, but while the derivative author has the rights given to them by copyright law, they aren't absolute. In particular in this case, regardless of which country, they still don't have any inherent exclusive rights over the original work. With respect to country B, those exclusive rights have expired so they don't bind the derivative author, but they haven't expired in country A. If that is the case, then would these rights be "granted" to the author of the adaptation when the copyright finally expires in Country A? Again splitting hairs, but its more helpful to express that no rights are actively granted by the expiration of copyright in Country A, it's just that no one holds those rights anymore (here there might be a language issue too, generally in copyright law "rights" refers to those exclusive actions that may be taken by the copyright holder, and not always to the "right" i.e. "freedom" for someone to do something).
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Is it legal to publish email that someone sent to me? I'm not asking whether it is ethical - that would be a totally different question. I'm asking whether it is legal? In my book - in my way how I interpret consensual reality - once I press SEND button it is transmitted via email client, via email server, via internet, to a destination email server.... On the way there are so many entities that can intercept the traffic that I effectively consider all my communication public. Event when using GPG / PGP: I don't trust myself (I'm yet to learn reliable way of generating private key) I don't trust my device (see what they did to Snowden's laptop) I don't trust the recipient (they can publish it online) I'm thinking about implementing a buffer system: email is received automated reply: "we consider your email public, 7 days to opt-out" sender has an option to opt-out, ignore, or edit the email (to remove non-public bits of information) after 7 days with no action it defaults to be public Would that system make it any more legal? UPDATE: I'm still thinking about designing email system. Maybe best of two worlds: one public that goes directly to email group one private, that strongly suggest all messages to be encrypted (general philosophy - full transparency, everything in public - without infringing anyone's right and playing by the cultural norms accepted by society) THINK: email password resets are not compatible with public email inbox?
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Generally speaking, if a person sends you an email you can publish it. Like if they call you a bunch of nasty names, or threaten you in some way, that information is yours and you can publish it. However, I'll give you three scenarios where you should not publish an email sent to you (and I'll edit to add more if they come up). Private facts. There is a tort called publication of private facts. A plaintiff must establish four elements to hold someone liable for publication of private facts: Public Disclosure: The disclosure of facts must be public. Another way of saying this is that the defendant must "give publicity" to the fact or facts in question. Private Fact: The fact or facts disclosed must be private, and not generally known. Offensive to a Reasonable Person: Publication of the private facts in question must be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Not Newsworthy: The facts disclosed must not be newsworthy. Stated differently, the facts disclosed must not be a matter of legitimate public concern. From Digital Media Law Project Note one thing - the offensive fact does not need to have been completely private for you to be liable, it must not have been generally known. In other words, someone like you who has a really low "public" bar needs to be careful. Also note that your buffer system might not help if the facts you publish are about someone other than the email sender; you are the one who published them. Stolen Information If someone sends you some intellectual property of a third party it is not yours to publish. Trade secrets, copyrighted works, prototype photos, etc. The sender might be breaking the law by sending the stuff to you but you're the one who published it so you can join as co-defendants. Barrett Brown was indicted for sharing a link to some stolen information. A link! He's in prison on other charges. Copyright held by the original sender (ht to @Dave_D) If the sender is the original author of the email, then the sender holds the copyright to the body of the email. Publishing the email violates the copyright. However, you could account for this in your buffer. Maybe. I am not sure is that is explicit enough.
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No, it's not legal. The General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) apply given that you are in the UK (regardless of where the Data Processor is based). The UK GDPR is slightly modified due to Brexit, but the same principles apply. The only plausible legal basis for this actions would be that you consent to it, and you're entitled to withdraw that consent at any time. Some may claim that Article 6.1(b) applies, i.e. that it's necessary to send marketing email in order to fulfil the contract, but GDPR is clear that bundling such consent into a contract for service simply to permit the data processor additional actions isn't allowed, as I'll demonstrate. UK GDPR requires that consent to use your personal information (in this case, your email address) for the stated purpose be freely given. Consent to use your information for direct marketing is not freely given if it's inseparable from the consent to use it for some other service, as per para 43: Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. And Article 7.4 backs this up with When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. The intent of Article 6.1(b) is that only the processing required for the service you have bought is allowed (e.g. if you supply your address for delivery of stuff you've bought, the data processor can use that address to send you the stuff, but is not allowed to add a contract term that allows them to send you unwanted stuff). Examples of emails that Article 6.1(b) would allow (in my assessment) include things such as notification of upcoming downtime, or a reminder that subscriptions are due, but not unsolicited advertisements for other products. There's a grey area that's open to interpretation, where adverts are piggybacked onto actual service messages.
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There is no US law licensing journalists or people who report the news, or requiring such people to identify themselves by legal name. Nor can there be under the US First Amendment. There is also no law requiring a person to identify himself or herself by legal name online. Some sites, including Wikipedia, have policies against having multiple undisclosed user IDs for the same person, but that is a matter of the site's own rules, not a matter of law. Any US law mandating this would again run afoul of the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. This article on Anonymous Speech reviews and cites a number of US Supreme court cases on the subject of anonymity, mostly in political contexts. This article from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) discusses the same general subject. Both articles mention that The Federalist (analyzing and advocating for the then-unratified US Constitution) was originally published under the pseudonym "Publis". The EFF Article "Court Recognizes First Amendment Right to Anonymity Even After Speakers Lose Lawsuits" discusses the 6th Circuit case of Signature Management Team, LLC v. John Doe in which it was held that an anonymous blogger who lost a copyright infringement suit could nonetheless remain anonymous. This page apparently from a Harvard course, lists and briefly describes several cases on the same subject. In Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) an elected official sued an online poster for defamation, and sought to force the ISP involved to disclose the poster's identity. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against this, setting a standard offering greater protection for such anonymous online speech than previous cases had. This answer is very US-centric. Laws in other countries are different. The OP has not specified a country or jurisdiction.
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If you aren’t the intended recipient of the password-protected file: StGB § 202a makes it illegal to access this file StGB § 202c makes it illegal to obtain (e.g., by brute forcing) the password for this file, if you intend to access the file that way (in the sense of § 202a) (this is the so-called hacker paragraph) If you are the intended recipient, this law doesn’t seem to apply, and it shouldn’t be illegal to brute-force the password.
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Nobody know what constitutes "scamming", because it's not a legal concept. There is no sense in which receiving a gift itself constitutes "scamming". Since scamming is vaguely about dishonesty, there is an imaginable scenario where you could be liable for a false representation, for example if you impersonated someone else in order to receive something of value, you could be prosecuted in California. You should not assume that a police officer saying "That's not our problem" is proof that you committed no crime or civil tort. Your lawyer can give you advice as to whether you have anything to worry about, legally. The other stuff about being called a scammer or having pictures posted might be a violation of Facebook's TOS, and you can always complain to Facebook central authorities. Technically, uploading a picture that someone took is a violation of copyright law, if you didn't give permission to do so. It might run afoul of some state~provincial or national privacy law, depending on where this takes place.
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As stated in the answer to What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?; if either of the participants is in Australia than unless all parties have given consent then the recording is illegal. Notwithstanding its legality, property in the recording vests in the person who made it. There is no law against him keeping it. There is no law against him publishing it unless the material contained is offensive, hate speech or defamatory (see Customer feedback gathering in Australia).
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No Voluntary disclosure, even accidental, by the client ends privilege. The information may still be confidential (inadmissible) if it happened in the appropriate circumstances, for example, as part of a mediation. Edit A recent decision of the High Court of Australia has determined that a litigant can use material that comes into its possession that would have attracted privilege irrespective of how this happens. In that case, the law firm was hacked by an unknown party, the information was given to a journalist and published and the litigant wanted to use it in their case - they were allowed to do so. The court decided that privilege is not a legal right that could found a course of action. Basically, it only prevents the compulsory production of such information - it doesn't protect the information itself.
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IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics.
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Gym Membership Cancellation - Michigan, USA Some Background: My wife utilized a personal training service from a fitness/gym company in Michigan. She signed up for a year contract knowing that she would have to move approximately 9 month into the contract. That contract expired last month, and (to nobodies surprise), we got billed again this month. Digging though my records, I have a signed contract stating that the service is for 1 year, and then goes month-to-month. I have placed 2 phone calls giving the requisite 40 days notice that I wished to cancel, the first time I was informed that I must make an in-person visit to cancel (a 3 hour drive one way for me), the second time I was assured it would not be renewed as month-to-month. Fast forward to this month, I get a bill where I don't expect one. Question: I contested the last charge, which was outside the scope of the original year-long contract. I also had my bank re-issue my credit card so they cannot bill me further. What can this fitness company try to do to keep taking my money, and what can I do to either head them off, or prevent them from charging us for a service we don't use, and have no intention of using, and is also not under contract anymore? Location: Michigan, USA UPDATE: A phone call to corporate seems to have resolved the issue. I still ended up getting a new CC number, and contesting the last charge. Will update again if anything ugly happens.
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what can I do to either head them off, or prevent them from charging us for a service we don't use, and have no intention of using, and is also not under contract anymore? That kind of notifications always should be made in writing, and in a way that allows you to prove that the other party received it (e.g., by email or a printout letter with a copy signed by the other party as receipt). If you are aware that the gym has recorded your phone call, you should ask it (and that means in writing) to preserve that recording in the event that the matter ends up in court. The sole request might reveal to the gym that you are willing to bring court proceedings if the gym insists to act unlawfully. Even if the gym eliminates the records despite your request not to do so, that would weigh against them because it would constitute spoliation of evidence. It would be helpful if in your email or letter you reflect that you even went to the gym, in accordance with the directions the gym gave you. If the gym persists with charging you and/or reports you to a collections agency, your first and easiest recourse is to file a grievance with the Michigan consumer protection agency (I don't know the exact name, as agencies' names may change over the years). For now, as a precaution, you might want to send your phone service provider a request for preservation of records of the call(s) through which you gave your 40-day notice. That is the typical term for asking the phone company to create a back up of your records, since by default phone companies keep records for about a year. Ask that the preservation include the standard information: source number, target number, date/time of the call, and duration. Regardless of whether the gym records phone calls, the fact that visiting the gym now takes you a three-hour drive [each way] suggests that the purpose of your phone call was to give the 40-day notice. Hence the potential relevance of retrieving those header records from your phone service provider.
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A contract need not say anything about the fact that the company could be sold. What matters is that the terms of the contract are not changed. Since there is no opt-out on transfer clause, you have to finish the term of the contract (or pay whatever fee is assessed if there is an early termination clause). So the question is how certain you are that you did not agree to the possibility of adding a "Universal Service Fund" charge. There may be subtle language which allows the company to add charges for specified purposes, and the new owners are availing themselves of that possibility. It may be difficult to determine just how this fee is legal (if it is), because customer service might just say "we are now charging this fee", or "we have to charge this fee", but you could try asking them where in the contract this new fee is allowed. You can hire an attorney to read over the contract to see where this possibility is mentioned; perhaps it is not, and then an exchange of letters between attorneys might be necessary. There is such a thing as the Universal Service Fund, which is a government operation to improve rural telecommunications. Telecomm companies have to pay a percent of their interstate revenues to this fund. If your bill has not increased since the acquisition, that suggests that you simply did not know that you had been paying into the fund, since the original company didn't give you a detailed invoice. If it has increased by this amount, that suggests that the earlier owner hadn't exercised an option to pass the cost on to the customer. It is likely that there is some clause in the contract that addresses charges required by law. That does not mean that you could not prevail in a suit against the company, but it would make the job harder (more expensive) for you. One company sort of explains how they are legally allowed to pass the cost on to the customer. Because it is allowed by federal regulation, it need not be mentioned in the contract.
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I assume the lease does not clarify what the effective date for cancellation of utilities should be: when you "officially abandon" the property, or when the 30-day notice elapses. Who is responsible for the damage? At least under a principle of equity, the landlord is responsible for the damages. That is because, once you have returned the keys and officially abandoned the property, you have no control on how or whether utilities are consumed or (ab-)used thereafter. For instance, if sometime after the 30th of July a person breaks in that rental unit and extracts tremendous quantities of power or gas, that would lead to the inequitable outcome that the utilities company would charge you if your name is still in the utilities company's records. Similarly, it would be unreasonable and inequitable to expect you to essentially insure the landlord (by keeping your name on the utilities) despite his full awareness that you no longer are there.
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Can the address details be found on Companies House? If the seller is non-responsive the buyer must seek help from their bank and/or the authorities. In general a "Faster Payment" cannot be stopped or reversed. Unlike a debit or credit card payment a "Faster Payment" does not have "chargeback" or "section 75 protection". The buyer must contact their bank as soon as possible - there is a process the bank can follow with the recipient's bank but there is no guarantee the money will be returned. Normally the recipient must consent to having the payment reversed. If the buyer thinks they have been the victim of fraud they should contact their bank, which should contact the appropriate authorities. As a practical matter the buyer should be prepared to 'chase' their bank to find out what is happening with their report (because the bank may not be proactive about informing the buyer). Alternatively the buyer can contact Action Fraud. In terms of "buyer's remorse", the buyer must try to establish which legal jurisdiction applies to their contract with the seller. If the buyer and seller are UK-based, the good or service bought after June 2014 via a website, phone, text message or mail order may be covered by the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013. Some things e.g. bets, lottery tickets, bus tickets, plots of land are not within the scope of those regulations (but may be covered by other law). If the sale is covered by those regulations, the seller was obliged to provide certain information including their geographical address and contact details and details of the buyer's right to cancel before the sale was completed. The buyer has a right to cancel 14 days after being informed by the seller of the right to cancel (the "14 day cooling off period") - if the seller does not ever inform the buyer of the right to cancel then this right to cancel lasts for 12 months. The buyer is not obliged to provide a reason. There are certain goods and services where this right to cancel and get a refund varies or does not apply. A refund for a service might be reduced by the value of the service the buyer has used so far. Goods or services where there is no right to a refund include tickets to events, personalised items, health or hygiene products where the buyer broke the seal or digital content the buyer downloaded. If the seller is non-responsive the buyer could contact: the citizen's advice service in their region (they can refer the complaint to Trading Standards) their local Trading Standards office - the buyer should look for the office's contact details on their local authority's website the Ombudsman Services if the seller is overseas, the UK International Consumer Centre may be able to help. The buyer should be prepared to provide a description of the circumstances, the available details about the seller, what the buyer has attempted so far, and what the buyer wants to achieve (e.g. a refund). There is lots of guidance online (e.g. the citizen's advice organisations and Which? magazine) about how to complain and what kinds of evidence to collect. The website resolver.co.uk might also be helpful in terms of guidance and keeping a diary. (The buyer might consider contacting a newspaper, magazine or specific journalist about their experience - some well-known media outlets run articles about individual consumers' problems and sometimes help to get a satisfactory resolution.)
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If the landlord gave you a key, and you can not give it back to him he has every right to charge you for correcting the oversight. I put to you that if you can't provide it back to him, he can't be certain that it has not fallen into the wrong hands, and he would be prudent to change the lock - and indeed, he may not even have another copy of the key in which case he really does not have a lot of alternatives. If you look at the section on "Claims for Damages or Loss" pdf there is a section B - Damage which confirms that Loss includes less tangible impacts including "loss of a service or facility provided under the tenancy agreement" Section C of the same document goes on to assert that "The purpose of compensation is to put the person who suffered the damage or loss in the same position as if the damage or loss had not occurred". There is arguably a question of the amount of loss suffered, and they can't sting you for punitive damages, but they can charge you a reasonable amount to get a new key cut (or possibly to replace the lock) - but that was not your question, and would probably arise if the amount he charges was unreasonable in the circumstance. Depending on if he has already taken action - and if not, how much the bill would be - promptly remedying the breach by finding and returning the key or equivalent action might save you some money.
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First of all, the amount involved is probably a few hundred dollars, maybe a thousand: if you do not pay it is extremely unlikely that your roommate will attempt to recover. Even if they do, they will probably fail - 30 days notice is 30 days notice: unless last month was February, the 8th to the 8th is either 30 or 31 days, you have complied with the terms of the lease. If the lease had said "one named months notice" then your roommate may have a case; as it is, they don't. Is he right? No. Is there ever a case where I'm liable for pro-rated rent beyond the 30 day notice period? Only if it says so in the lease. Do I owe him rent for each day in November that the room is vacant beyond the 8th? No Would a judge make an exception in his favor since I didn't tell him I was looking for a new place to live? Judges don't make exceptions, particularly not in anybody's favour. The role of a judge is to enforce the law - not to make exceptions to it. A judge would give effect to the terms of the contract except where those terms are prohibited or against public policy.
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There are not enough facts to draw a conclusion First, it’s not clear that the document you signed amounts to a contract. For example, what consideration did the school give you in return for the permission you gave them? Providing you with an education doesn’t count - they were legally obliged to do that already. If it is a contract then whether and how it can be revoked would depend on the terms of that contract witch I’m guessing you don’t have a copy of. Notwithstanding, as a minor, you have the right to void the contract until a reasonable time after you turn 18. Even if it is now many years since that happened, it might be reasonable since you only just discovered the website. If it isn’t a contract, then it would be revocable at any time. Practicalities Make a fuss and they may take the photos down even if they are not obliged to. They presumably have plenty of photos of kids who aren’t you and aren’t complaining and if you make it so it’s easier to change the website than to deal with you, thy’ll change the website. I suspect their inertia is because they once paid a web developer to create the site, it has never since been updated, they don’t know how to do it, and they don’t want to have to pay someone to find out. Otherwise, why would they have photos of ex-students rather than current students? If so, an offer by you to cover the costs, might solve your problem.
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With that much potentially at stake, you might want to discuss this with a lawyer. many lawyers will do an initial consultation for free or a low charge. However, you could simply write a letter saying that you do not agree that you owe the money and that you dispute the charge. You may give any reasons why you think you are not liable. It might be a good idea to add that there may be other reasons as well, so you do not foreclose any possible legal arguments that you may learn of later. Send the letter by certified mail, return receipt, and keep a copy with a note of the date that you sent it. It is not a bad idea to get the certified mail form first and include the certified item number as part of the inside address in the letter. Keep the copy, and keep the receipt with it when you get it. It is not a bad idea to send a copy by email, noting that it is a copy of a certified letter. This will put a record of the date and time it was sent in the email service provider's records. Normally it is up to the person who claims another owes money to file suit. If your former landlord takes no action, you need do nothing. However it is a good idea to check your credit reports and see if this was reported as a bad debt. if it is, you can file a statement of dispute with the credit bureaus. If there is any further correspondence on the matter, be sure it is in writing, and that you keep a copy. If you are called on the telephone about it, send a prompt followup letter summarizing the conversation, and particularly any statements made by the other party, and any agreements reached. Keep a copy, and send a copy by email as well as by postal mail. It should probably start something like "In our telephone conversation on {date} about {topic} you stated ..." If you are sued you will need to consider whether to retain a lawyer to represent you.
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Is an adaptation or translation of a public domain hymn also in the public domain? In Christian hymnbooks today it is common to find hymns that were written in the 1700s or 1800s. However, most of the time these hymns have been adapted, to modernize older language, or to adjust the meaning of a phrase for a broader audience. According to current copyright law in the United States, printed works published before 1923 are in the public domain. Are the adapted versions of pre-1923 hymns that appear in current hymnbooks also in the public domain? What about translations? An example is the hymn "How Firm a Foundation." Different texts can be compared here: https://hymnary.org/text/how_firm_a_foundation_ye_saints_of/compare I am interested mainly in the United States copyright / public domain law.
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According to US law according to Cornell, copyright applies to derivative works. A derivative work is an original work based on a previous work (Definitions), so the adaptations would be copyrightable unless they were held to be unoriginal. In general, the courts don't require much creativity to consider a work original. Translations are original works. Therefore, the adaptations are almost certainly under copyright, while the originals remain public domain.
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Copyright Prominent at the bottom of the page is: © RealClearPolitics 2015 This is nice because it tells you who you have to approach for a licence. If it wasn't there the material would still be copyright you just wouldn't know who owned the copyright. Questions So: If I'm looking to build an app or write a book and I wish to use statistics, am I allowed to basically use their numbers as long as I cite where it is coming from? No, unless what you do constitutes fair use and I don't think it does. If I do make a profit from it, do I owe any royalties to the original scientists/surveyers? No, but you would owe whatever licence fee you negotiated with the copyright holder, ostensibly RealClearPolitics. Must I ask them for permission? Yes, unless you are OK with running the risk of being sued. Commentary I see books reference hundreds of studies all the time This is because they are generally protected by Academic Fair Use public polls should be open information to everyone The only public poll that I know of is an election and that information is available. What you are looking at is a private poll commissioned by and paid for by RealClearPolitics and it is their intellectual property; why should that "be open information to everyone"? commercial interests may be legally entangling Always
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There is no special exemption where academic work is unprotected by copyright. You can quote from academic sources to the same extent that you can copy from non-academic sources, without getting permission. In fact, it is legally impossible to tell if a source of "academic" versus "non-academic". Attribution is not particularly relevant for copyright, what matters is permission (when required). It may be that a copyright holder will grant permission for an extensive quote provided you attribute the source, and it may be that academic publishers or authors are more willing to grant permission than other publishers / authors. On the other hand, many academic works are very expensive, so that distributing the text for free may have more "effect on market", and may result in disinclination to grant permission to quote. On the third hand, such quotes are more likely to be squarely directed at the "commentary" motivation behind fair use law. The point here is that there isn't a special law about just academic sources.
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Musical compositions can be, and if recent almost always are, protected by copyright. This is separate from the copyright on a recording of a performance of the work. If you reuse a musical passage, the new work may be a derivative work, that is a work based on an earlier work. Or an extended musical quotation could be considered to be copyright infringement. If this is in the united-states the use of a section from a previous work might be considered to be a fair use (fair-use). This is a specifically US concept in copyright law, although several other countries have a concept of fair dealing which is somewhat similar, although narrower. Whether a use is a fair use is an inherently fact-based determination. There is no clear and simple bright line for what is and is not a fair use. US law (17 USC 197) specifies four factors which are to be weighed by a court in considering the matter: The purpose and character of the use. If your use is commercial that weighs against fair use, but does not at all preclude it. This factor also includes whether the use is transformative or not. A transformative use is one that takes the part used for a very different sort of purpose than the original. Parodies are normally transformative, for example. A quote for purposes of commentary and analysis, or criticism is normally transformative. Transformative uses are more likely to be considered fair uses. The nature of the copyrighted work. Creative works such as fiction and music are more strongly protected than works such as textbooks and news stories. This probably weighs against fair use in the case described. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. If only a short section of a longer work is used, that weighs in favor of fair use. However very short quotes can still fail, to be held to be fair uses. In Harper vs Nation a quote of about 300 words from a 500 page book was held not to be fair use because it was "the heart of the book". The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. A use that significantly harms the market value of the original, or serves as a replacement for it, weigh strongly against fair use. This was a major factor in Harper vs Nation. Each case of claimed fair use is evaluated by looking at all four factors, and the specific facts of the case. From the description in the question, such a use might well be held to be fair use. Musical quotations often are. But there is no way to be sure unless a court evaluates the specific case. A lawyer specifically experienced in not only copyright law, but copyrights on music, might be able to give more specific advice. Or you could, of course, seek permission from the copyright holder, quite likely the original composer or artist. If you get permission, there is no further issue. There might be a charge, but when the use is minor, and has no commercial effect, the charge might be small or even zero provided that the source is acknowledged.
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No Copyright protects expressions of ideas but not ideas. A song with the words if a poem set to music would generally require the permission of the owner of the copyrighted poem. An instrumental score “inspired by a poem” would not remotely be using the same expression, or a derivative of, the poem. Titles are not subject to copyright and there are many books with identical titles. Try “The Gathering Storm” as a book title.
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I gather that Fischer can claim copyright on its written form of public-domain music because the company adds interpretive markings to its sheet music, and those markings themselves constitute creative content? They can probably also claim copyright on editorial content. For example, a piece may have multiple sources that do not agree with one another, and the editor's choice of how to reconcile these inconsistencies is subject to copyright. Even the layout and typography or engraving are subject to copyright, so if the score is nothing but a faithful transcription of the composer's only manuscript, making a photocopy of the score is infringement. In that case the only contents of the sheet music covered by copyright would be whatever unique musical markings Fischer adds, and not the notes set down by the original composer? The notes themselves are not protected by copyright if the composition has passed into the public domain, but to make a score that does not infringe the copyright in the Carl Fischer edition, you would have to find another source. A copy made by hand might be okay because it would not reproduce the layout and other graphic design elements. Is there any reliable way to determine which elements of a work like classical sheet music are covered by a copyright claim, other than to infringe and have the claimant reveal that at trial? You can consult the sources that the editor used. Anything that isn't in the sources is editorial and therefore protected. If you can't find out what sources were used, find all the sources you can. Anything that's present in a source that is old enough to have passed into the public domain is in the public domain.
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Is an article licensed under an Open Access license equivalent to a public domain work? No. Intellectual property practitioners and professors often describe copyright as "a bundle of sticks." This means that intellectual property laws grant the creator of a copyrightable work a large number of rights, and the creator can grant or deny others each of those rights individually. So, for instance, an author can grant a publisher the right to publish his or her book in one country, but not in another, or to copy it verbatim but not to alter it. The purpose of a license, any license, is to specify which of those rights pass to the licensee (the end user) and which stay with the licensor (the creator). This is true of creative commons just as it is for any other license. For example, many open access publishers publish under the Creative Commons CC-BY journal. This is an attribution license; it requires as a term of the license that you give credit to the original creator. This is something you would not have to do with a public domain work. In addition, under CC-BY, you have to include a copy of the license with each copy you distribute, and you cannot add your own copy protection to any copies you distribute. Again, these sort of restrictions do not apply to a public domain work. In short: the purpose of a license--any license--is to define the ways in which you can, or can not, use the licensed materials. Any license that contains any provisions restricting the licensee's use is going to be more restrictive, by definition, than the use of something in the public domain.
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The lyricist and composers already have copyright. Copyright exists for the moment of creation: registration is not necessary to enforce copyright rights and to grant licences. Registration in the US is merely useful if you want to prove that you own the copyright which otherwise would require providing evidence of the date of creation, priority etc. Most countries do not have copyright registers. Similarly, you will have copyright in the derivative work of the soundtrack from the moment of its creation.
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Contractor bailed after getting paid in full I live in South NJ. I have a 25k contract with a building contractor. However, they bailed once they got paid in full from the financial company. Before I knew that they were playing games they kept giving me a whole run around every other day with a different excuse why they can't come. In the winter they said the weather is too cold. now over the summer they started working but then one day they didn't show up. When I called they said it's cause of rain (where they're located but not where my house is) Another day it was being delayed for a couple weeks. Then I was told it's the holidays, and one time they even said a workers family member passed away stalling an other couple weeks. There were a lot of excuses and now they told me that they can't work until there is a straight week without rain. We had plenty times beautiful days and weeks and they just keep ignoring my emails or phone calls asking when they're resuming work since we are having a nice forecast, but they sometimes pickup and give me a false promise for few days or some other excuse. Then I contacted the financial company asking why they paid out in full without consulting with me if the job was completed. They told me there was no need to, and something about that it says in the contract. I don't see anywhere mentioning that. I'm thinking of contacting a lawyer but I don't know what kind I'm looking for. Somebody told me that because they have a clause in the contract "if weather permitted” then that's why they could keep pushing this off this way. I don't know how to go about this. Should I first stop paying the financial company monthly untill this gets resolved? Should I contact the contractor boss directly and tell him I'll make a lawsuit, before I contact a lawyer? Or should I get a lawyer first before I do anything? Are there clauses in the contract that getting a lawyer will just end up costing me instead of getting my money back? Please help this has been dragging out for almost a year. I feel like such a fool being taken advantage of like this.
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I assume that you arranged a contract with some company which paid the contractor the full amount, and not you have to pay that company. If you stop paying the finance company, they will initiate legal proceedings against you to make good on your obligation, and that won't affect what the contractor does. It might not hurt you to write a formal letter (no phone calls) to the contractor stating that you require them to complete the job by some date certain, and hope that you won't have to take the matter to court. If you decide to write the letter yourself, you want to avoid saying anything that could be held against your interest, for example "I don't care how crappy a job you do, I just want this job done!": you need to be sure that what you say in a letter does not put you at a legal disadvantage. The best way to guarantee that is to hire an attorney to write the letter. If you want your money back (plus interest), you will almost certainly need to hire an attorney to write the letter. It is possible that there is an arbitration clause in your contract, requiring you to settle disputes with the firm Dewey, Cheatham & Howe. In that case, your attorney might not be able to do much for you. There cannot be a clause in a contract that penalizes you simply for hiring an attorney.
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Is there a way for us to prevent the sale of the house until they have moved the fence? For example, it seems that filing suit against the current owners doesn't necessarily prevent the sale, and that the suit would be pointless after the sale is complete. You can't prevent the sale, but if you file suit to adjudicate the boundary dispute and file what is called a "lis pendens" giving notice that the suit is filed in the real estate records, the buyer will taken subject to the lawsuit and realistically, won't close in the first place. The prospect of an impending sale is unlikely to be something that would cause the court to take expedited action or issue a temporary restraining order, because you can preserve your rights with a "lis pendens" which doesn't take a court order. The absolute minimum amount of time in which you could get a court order on the merits without a temporary restraining order is perhaps three to four months, which is almost surely too long to prevent a sale of a house. The suit isn't pointless after the sale is complete. You can still enforce the boundary against the new owner. And, often, a new owner, having no ego in the placement of the fence, might settle the case sooner than the old owner would have. But, better practice in terms of neighbor relations would be to file suit first, so that the new buyer, if the buyer goes forwards with the sale, is aware of the defect. The old owner is also more likely to have evidence useful in the lawsuit you bring. Short of filing suit, send a letter to the realtor and the neighboring property owner with a copy of the survey advising them of the problem. If you could somehow figure out who was handling the closing, you could tell them too. This will impose upon them a legal duty to advise the new buyer before closing, and if they fail to do so, they expose themselves to the risk of a fraud lawsuit from the new owner. But, while this is cheaper, it also presents a risk that they won't warn the buyer who will then not have notice and the risk of being sued for fraud may cause the seller and the seller's realtor to resist your suit more aggressively and to be less prone to settle it. If you wanted to be really aggressive, you could give the neighbor notice that the fence is over the line and that you will destroy it if the neighbor doesn't act, and then tear down the fence, which is strictly speaking within your rights if you can do so without a breach of the peace, because it is on your property. I wouldn't recommend this approach, however, as it could lead to violence or police involvement that depending on the policeman who isn't trained in real estate law, might get you arrested which is not good even if the charges are later dismissed.
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From a legal perspective co-signing a loan isn't the same thing loaning the money to the other co-signer. When you co-sign a loan with someone else both you and the other person are equal parties in the loan, both jointly responsible in fully paying off the principle and interest. If loan is defaulted on, the bank can pursue legal remedies to try to recover its money against either or both of you. If you end up having to pay part or all of the loan, then whether or not you can recover any of that money will depend on whatever agreement you made with the other person. Given that you probably wouldn't a have a signed written agreement with the other signer in case like this, it'll probably come down to whether or not you can prove (on the balance of probabilities) that the other party promised to you to pay off the full amount of the loan. It will help if the loan is specifically tied to a car, a house or other property that the other party benefits from but you don't. Note that you'd have to give serious consideration to whether the other party can actually pay the amount owed. There's no point going to court to obtain an unenforceable judgement. I also should say that from a financial perspective it does make some sense to think of it as if you were loaning out the money yourself. While there's a big and significant difference between the two, in that your bank account isn't affected unless the other person defaults, if they do the result is going to be pretty much the same. Indeed in that case it's not much different than just giving the other person the money. When co-signing a loan you really need to trust that other person.
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Landlord-tenant law is an area that is heavily statute-based, jurisdiction-dependent, and far from uniform across the country. A complex, specific, multi-part question like this one is not going to get a simple answer. In general, though, I can clear up some of the confusion with a quick example. Let's say you abandon your lease, but as you do so, you write a letter to the landlord saying: "While I won't be living there any more, my friend's band needs a place to practice. They have agreed to pay half my rent if you let them play there 4 nights a week. They'll be starting on Tuesday at 11 PM: please have a set of keys waiting for them at the front desk." The landlord does not give your friends the keys. They re-key and clean the apartment and rent it two months later. Are you going to stand up in court and argue, with a straight face, that you should only be liable for half the rent for those two months because of the landlord's "failure to mitigate"? Again, jurisdictions differ, but the duty to mitigate is not absolute. If the landlord could rent out a $1,000/month apartment for $5 a month, it doesn't have to do that, and you can't make the Court take $5 a month off their damages if they refuse to do so. Also, you seem to be confused about what subleasing is. A sublessor owes duties to you; you still owe the duty to your landlord to get the rent paid. A sublease is an agreement between you and a third party to pay you rent. It does not affect your relationship with the landlord at all, unless it's a breach of your agreement with the landlord or of local law protecting the landlord from unauthorized subleasing.
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If you want to protect yourself or any property interests you may have in this circumstance you have to talk to a lawyer. You cannot get (or trust) legal advice from the internet. I will, however, make the following personal observations: I only provide a W-9 to people who are paying me money, and who request it as a condition of paying me. I don't know of a legal requirement to supply it after the fact. However, not providing it to someone who did pay you more than $600 in a tax year could certainly make it difficult for them to comply with their tax filing obligations. I do not sign any agreements, assignments, or contracts, without what I consider to be fair consideration. E.g., if on leaving a job (as has happened) I am asked by a former employer to sign something that I am not already obligated to sign due to some prior contract, then I negotiate what is commonly called a "severance package." They pay me and/or extend benefits, and I sign something that limits their liability.
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It is almost certainly legal for the sitter to keep the money. She was ready to provide the service, and it is not her fault she couldn't (and she may have turned down other opportunities because she had this one). I think your fiance's claim would be against the firm providing the security service (they are the ones that frustrated the contract). I foresee the following problems: What are her losses? She was prepared to pay $315 (which she has paid), and the dog has been looked after. Where is the loss? (She may be able to argue that it was worth $315 to her, not to have to owe her mother a favour. I don't know if that will fly.) The contract with the security firm almost certainly waives liability for this sort of thing. She would have to convince the court that the contract terms were unreasonable/unconscionable (or whatever the term is in the local jurisdiction). There are two obvious options here: a) see if there is legal cover on her household insurance (or her pet insurance); b) forget it (it's only $175 all told).
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It is unlikely that you could successfully sue the bank for breach of contract, but of course the first thing you should do is carefully read the agreement and see exactly what they promised. It is understandable that you would like to get your money right now, but that isn't necessarily guaranteed under the agreement. Assuming there is no statement in the agreement as to how long it will take them to deposit the reward once requested, they would have "a reasonable time period". I located on of those agreements, which says that it will be deposited 90 days after completing the requirements. If that is what your agreement says and after 90 days still no money, then you should speak to the branch manager and request timely compliance with the agreement. It would cost more than $600 to sue them, and the court won't punish them extra for missing a deadline (assuming this was not a deliberate and willful refusal on their part).
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I don't have enough to comment but I know where I live it's the landlords responsibility to take care of mold. That being said, if it is mold caused by negligence of the tenant e.g. always leaving the window open in the rain or something, then the landlord can claim compensation. Where I live the landlord keeps some of the damage deposit he must prove to the tenant why he did so within a months time of when he was supposed to return the damage deposit. For example if it cost him $200 to repair damage done by the mold, he must return the rest of the damage deposit and a letter explaining why $200 was kept, and the receipts. Where do you live? The laws really do very greatly from region to region. It has been my observation that it's not that uncommon for landlords to try and sneak something into the lease that isn't really allowed by law.
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Am I at fault? Can I get my security deposit back from Landlord? I signed a weekly rental agreement in Pennsylvania to live in someone's home. I ended up not staying and I text messaged the landlord that I left and no longer wished to stay. The landlord says he will be retaining my security deposit because I didn't give him proper notice. Am I at fault? What should I do?
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Am I at fault? Can I get my security deposit back from Landlord? The landlord is wrong, and he should reimburse you the totality of the security deposit. Clauses #1 and #16 would entitle the landlord to deduct from your security deposit only the portion of the 7-day period that is not already covered in the payment you made for 1st week's rent, which according to clause #1 starts on Sunday July 29. If I understand correctly, you signed the contract (and paid) on July 27, and then gave your 7-day notice on July 28. Since you paid an additional amount for Saturday July 28, then your 1st week's rent payment actually covers the entire 7-day period of your notice. Therefore, the landlord should reimburse you the entire security deposit. The contract nowhere indicates that the count of [post-notice] 7 days starts after the current rent-week elapses. But even if it did contain language in that sense, the dates you mention render that hypothetical clause void. Lastly, clause #16 refers to giving a written notice, which is what you did by sending him the text he obviously read and understood. Therefore, his statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out" clearly is false. What should I do? If the landlord insists to retain the security deposit, your option is to file a complaint in Small Claims court (I don't know whether this has a different name in PA). Depending on PA procedural law, you and the landlord might be cited for mediation prior to being assigned a court date. A process in small claims court is pretty straight-forward, but only you can determine whether the hassle of attending mediation and court hearing is worth. If anything, it (1) certainly gives you some [minimal] exposure to litigation, and (2) teaches the landlord to abide by the very rules he drafted in the contract. 8/30/2018: Edited to address OP's follow-up question of whether section 250.512 of the Landlord and Tenant Act precludes recovery of security deposit (see comments) After analyzing the statute you found, Pennsylvania courts have still held that a tenant's failure to provide a new address does not preclude recovery of the security deposit. See Adamsky v. Picknick, 412 Pa.Super.Ct. 544, 549 (1992): we find the lack of notice argument is tenuous at best since appellant's reason for withholding the deposit was not because he did not have appellees' new address, rather, he withheld it because he maintained there were damages for which he should be compensated. That conclusion is squarely applicable to your situation. The landlord's only pretext for withholding your deposit is his inaccurate statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out", and for that matter he refers to nothing else than the rental agreement. The rental agreement nowhere requires you to provide your new address. One decision that does not constitute legal precedent but still might help persuading Small Claims court in your situation is Back v. Taylor, 19 D. & C. 3d 606, 609 (1980). After citing section 250.512(e) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, the court states: That section sets forth certain guidelines as to when tenants can obtain double recovery. Defendants have only sought recovery of the deposit and therefore, the above cited section does not apply. (emphasis in original) Unless you were pursuing double recovery (see item (c) of the statute), it would be very questionable --to say the least-- why a [Small Claims] court should decide your dispute any differently than in Back. Another non-precedential decision analyzing the same statute is Shoemaker v. Henry, 35 D. & C. 206, 209 (1984). Also in the context of double damages, the court stated: We cannot believe the only purpose [to require a tenant to provide his new address] was a negative one, that is, to cancel a right to double damages for failure to comply. A more rational explanation is that its purpose was to provide a landlord with an address to which the damage list could be sent. (brackets added) The statute apparently was enacted well before the prevalence of electronic communications. If your landlord has any way to send you a "damage list" (as it seems to be the case insofar as he replied to your text), then the rationale in Shoemaker should apply in your situation. If you are not even pursuing double recovery, then it would be unavailing for the landlord to cling to the language in item (e) of that statute. Therefore, you are definitely entitled to your deposit even if you did not provide to the landlord a new address. It is up to you whether you want to go for double damages, in which case the decision in Shoemaker might or might not be persuasive in Small Claims court. Beyond that, the Adamsky opinion constitutes legal precedent which favors your position.
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I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed.
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The fact that you're not a native speaker of English doesn't alter the legal situation. If you literally had no understanding of English but for some reason you signed a piece of paper, then you might argue that there was no agreement in the first place, but obviously you do speak some English. Most people don't actually understand what contracts mean (on both sides). Contracts are still enforced, based on what the contract says. The move-in data is proposed, not firm, and it even indicates what the charges are if your circumstances change and the dates have to change (whereas is their circumstances change, they wouldn't have a basis for charging extra). It also does say that there will be no refund if you change your mind. So the piece of paper says "No refund". The problem seems to be that there's an "agent" whose statements you relied on, who is ultimately responsible for this problem, and s/he implied that you could get a refund. It's not clear what kind of "agent" this is (is he working for you, or for the owners?). You'd have a somewhat different legal basis depending on which it is, but you could sue someone in either event, assuming that you could actually persuade the court that you were given false information which you relied on. The statement "they will refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is false; the statement "they may refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is true. If the latter was the statement that you relied on, then you knew (or should have known) that that isn't a promise, it's just a guess, and if you read the piece of paper you know that it's a promise with no basis. So I would say it comes down to establishing what promise was made to you. Arguing that the agent "made" you sign isn't going to get you anywhere (unless you can prove actual coersion).
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Anti-discrimination laws in the U.S. have exceptions for someone who rents a room in a landlord's own residence, but generally speaking, for other purposes, there is not a distinction in U.S. or Florida law. People who stay at a place with the permission of the owner for a very brief period of time and not pursuant to a lease, such as someone who gains use of a particular seat in a movie theater pursuant to a purchased ticket, is, however, not a tenant with the full rights of a tenant, and is instead a licensee who does not have a property right to use that space, only a contract that can be terminated by the property owner or their agent at will, potentially with breach of contract damages if this is done without justification, but not with liability for violating a tenant's rights. In some cases, someone whose housing, at least part of the time, is for the convenience of the employer, like a medical resident who uses a sleeping room at a hospital, or a member of the crew of a ship who sleeps on the ship incident to their duties, may have reduced rights relative to housing when their employment is terminated for cause, although this is only sometimes clearly enunciated in statutes or case law and the law would not be terribly consistent in this area.
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I don't know Canadian rental law, but as a general rule in civil cases you don't get to play Perry Mason and bring in evidence at the last minute. If you have evidence that the landlord broke the law then disclose it immediately and use it to pressure him into settling. His later lies to you are less important than the fact that he broke the law in the first place. However you can certainly testify about what he said as evidence that he has acted in bad faith.
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In any legal dealing, there is always some risk. The signature constitutes definitive proof that you have a contract, but you still have a contract, because you have mutual acceptance. A far-fetched scenario is that the lessor could allege that they did not agree to the terms of he contract with you (perhaps claiming that you obtained a blank contract form from them and filled in details, but they didn't agree to those details). However, if they allow you to move in, that is sufficient constructive evidence of a contract, so they could not argue "We didn't agree to this". The main risk would be your lack of proof that they ever agreed to lease the place to you (no emails, no texts, no witnesses, no legally-recorded conversations). There may be specific state laws about providing a copy of the rental agreement, such as this California law, where they must provide a copy to the tenant within 15 days of execution by the tenant. This provides a collection of relevant state laws, though you may have to dig a bit because this is a hook into all of the laws about leases and not just about providing copies.
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The Rent Ordinance para (e) explicitly precludes that possibility: Any waiver by a tenant of rights under this Chapter 37 shall be void as contrary to public policy. If he attempts to enforce such a clause or in any way dislodge you from the unit, he is liable for a substantial penalty. The legality of a rebate scheme is not clear, but probably would also be deemed illegal, because there already exists provision for buyout, which has specific restrictions. For the rest of the week, tenant buyouts are subject to these provisions. The problem is that the horse may have left the barn. The landlord has to have provided you with a Pre-Buyout Disclosure Form (which is to be signed and filed) before any negotiation / discussion with the tenant. Since we're talking about obeying the law, it has to occur to the landlord that there is a buyout option, and then he has to give you and file the disclosure form before he opens his mouth. He also has to know what the requirements of a buyout agreement will be in the future. Starting on Monday, the law regarding buyouts changes (it doesn't clearly make an agreement impossible, but it's a reminder that the law can be changed). In terms of legally-enforceable agreements, you could agree to a buyout in the far future, but the agreement might not be enforceable under future law. For example, the disclosure form requires new information to be provided, so if he doesn't do that, the disclosure is invalid (the preamble to the amendment points out that the change in law was directed at legal actions that were considered to violate the spirit of the law). Hence a buyout for two years in the future is legally risky.
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You would report unpermitted lock replacement to the home owner. The building code regulates new construction and renovations, and is not a requirement of any and all residences. This seems to correspond to a "secondary suite", which is supposed to be registered with the city (if it is allowed in your city). Here is a link for Vancouver, for instance. Such suites are supposed to be registered and inspected, the inspection being carried out by Development, Building and Licencing: By-Law Compliance & Administration (a division of the city government). This article discusses some of the legal problems that can arise from an illegal secondary suite, however the penalties would land on the property owner, and he may not have approved of this subletting or the basement suite. A less-nuclear first step would therefore be reporting it to the property owner.
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How do people hire only specific demographics but not face discrimination suits? I like the idea that businesses can specifically hire homeless people who need it, but what I'm not quite sure of is how businesses are able to do that on an arbitrary basis, because as far as I know they are supposed to make the position publicly available and conduct interviews for any applicants.
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You don't specify a jurisdiction, so this answer will be as general as possible, but specify jurisdictions for examples. You are under two misconceptions: 1) The arbitrary selection (hereafter referred to as "discrimination") is illegal in general. 2) A position is required to be publicly announced Discrimination As a general rule, discrimination is legal, acceptable, and in some cases required; however, many places forbid discrimination on specific attributes. For example, US law forbids discrimination on sex, race, religion, and national origin, among other things, barring a specific demonstrable need; all forms of discrimination that are not forbidden by law are allowable. For example, my department has the following legal discriminatory biases: a bias against those who lack university degrees, a bias in favor of a specific local university (which about half my department graduated from), and a bias for our own membership (e.g. promoting from within). Open job postings As a general rule, a company is not required to publicly announce positions. Governments are often required to, sometimes by their own rules, but this is to protect against corruption and cronyism, rather than an absolute. For example, there is not a public posting for, say, US Supreme Court Justices or Cabinet Secretaries. Larger corporations, especially publicly traded ones, often adopt similar rules, to protect the company and shareholders from internal corruption (e.g. a manager hiring a friend to a position that they are not qualified for, or receiving a kickback bribe for their hiring decision), but they are not required to unless a specific law or program they are enrolled into requires them to do so. For example, some Federal Contractors are required to post their positions publicly, as a condition of their contracts. So, in summary, there is no reason why a business cannot arbitrarily hire a homeless person specifically for being homeless, unless a) homelessness becomes a legally protected category, or b) a specific rule or government contract provision requires public posting of open positions.
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In Great Britain Employees have two types of protections: contractual and statutory. It would be in breach of contract ("wrongful dismissal") for an employer to dismiss without notice for job hunting but contractually there is nothing to stop an employer dismissing for any reason if they give the notice required (which may be only a week or two, say). Statutory protection may, however, prevent "unfair dismissal" but this generally only applies if someone has been employed for at least two years. There are some exceptions - e.g. dismissal as an act of religious/racial/sex discrimination etc. is prohibited even if the employee has less than 2 years service but these exceptions do not include job-hunting. So someone who has been employed for less than 2 years could be dismissed with notice for job hunting. There are also contractual and statutory protections in Northern Ireland. The contractual ones are the same as in the rest of the UK but some of the details of the statutory protections are different from GB.
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It sounds like you've read about two party consent and public spaces. But while anyone can sue, it's winning a case that's relevant. "My client respects the applicant's beliefs, but choosing to express beliefs in such a way during a job interview indicated sufficiently questionable judgement that my client was unable to consider the applicant further for the advertised position." "It has also become apparent that the plaintiff was not acting in good faith in making an application for employment." Court finds for the defendant and orders the plaintiff to pay costs.
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No The argument is vacuous in any event because AFAIK all jurisdictions that enforce sex discrimination laws have parental leave (paid or unpaid), not maternity leave so a man is just as likely to need it as a woman. This, of course, raises the issue of discrimination by marital status (on the basis that unmarried people are arguably less likely to have children) or age (on the basis that people outside 'childbearing' age are less likely to have children; fortunately these types of discrimination are also illegal. Notwithstanding, the loopholess you think there are in the laws are simply not there. For example s14 "Discrimination in employment or in superannuation" of australia Sex Discrimination Act 1984 starts with: (1) It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a person on the ground of the person's sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status, marital or relationship status, pregnancy or potential pregnancy, breastfeeding or family responsibilities: Later in s30 "Certain discrimination on ground of sex not unlawful" it says: (2) (a) the duties of the position can be performed only by a person having particular physical attributes (other than attributes of strength or stamina) that are not possessed by persons of a different sex from the relevant sex; If the job requires excessive strength or stamina, then you test your recruits for the level of strength or stamina the job requires.
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Yes this is legal. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there is an exemption under Title VII - Equal Employment Opportunity that allows for discrimination based on a protected trait when there is a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ). The wording is such that it can cover a slew of jobs that have just cause to discriminate against someone in their hiring process including certain roles for actors. However, it does not allow for wholesale discrimination. In order to qualify, an employer must prove three things: A direct relationship between the trait and the ability to perform the job the BFOQ's relation to the "essence" or "central mission of the employer's business" That there is no less restrictive or reasonable alternative As an example, a film about the work of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. would have a BFOQ in hiring a man of African descent to portray Dr. King, given that he is trying to accurately portray a historical person (direct relationship) to further educate the public about that historical person's work (Central Mission) and that a "White MLK" would offend audiences. While many roles in the hypothetical film would also qualify for the BFOQ, this doesn't give the production a blank slate... there is no need to discriminate against a set designer or a camera man, so a studio deciding to hire an all black production crew would face some legal troubles. The restaurant chain Hooters, famous for it's amazing chicken wings they served, has a sometimes noticed habit of hiring very attractive women as their wait staff, almost to the point of exclusively. All joking aside, they do get away with this by making a distinction that they are "casting" not "hiring" waitresses and their brand identity is entirely attractive ladies and not really the wings they serve. This is a BFOQ (and they often come up in discussions about this matter of law). With that in mind however, only Hooter's hiring of wait staff has a BFOQ. The person in the kitchen cooking the wings could be a middle-aged balding man with a noticeable gut and managers at stores can be men or women who aren't as attractive as the standards used for wait staff (or were former wait staff but are not as young looking). Works adapting books and comics may have a little more leeway as certain characters may be portrayed as one race but have had their race switched for various reasons and with different success. No one batted an eye when Lawrence Fishburne portrayed Perry White, Clark Kent's editor in Man of Steel or Samuel L. Jackson as Nick Fury in the various Marvel films (an unusual example as traditionally white Nick Fury was depicted as an African American in Marvel's Ultimate Marvel line). His first appearance in August of 2001 in Ultimate Marvel Team Up, and a second appearance in Ultimate X-Men were of a non-descript African American, before his appearance as a regular in The Ultimates in March 2002, where his look was not only modeled after Jackson, Jackson was specifically "cast" as the visual model for the character, which he leapt at the idea (reportedly his initial pay was quite low given his standing as an actor with the difference made up for by a request of some exclusive artwork and an opportunity to play the character in a then not planned film.). There are even some fictional works where the change in race might be the point of the work itself (for example, in William Shakespeare's play Othello, the titular character is explicitly of North African descent and many consider the work a very early rebuke of concepts of racial superiority (it's very much the subject of debate as to whether Othello being black was an important concept to the play or the Bard just added it for something a little different)). During a 1997 Shakespeare Theater Company's 1997 adaptation, to hammer the "it's about race" side of the argument home, cast very much white Patrick Stewart to play the part of Othello, while the rest of the cast played by African American actors/actresses, a flip of the traditional depiction to highlight that Othello's race separates him from the rest of the characters in the play, regardless of what his actual race was. This play would have a BFOQ to discriminate against white actors seeking to play the villain Iago (IMO, one of the best villains ever written.) because it's important that Iago and Othello not share racial traits for the entire story to work. While acting is usually where this comes up a lot, there are other places where it might be useful to discriminate against a protected class. For example, when hiring a pastor for a church, it would be very important to make sure the Pastor or other spiritual leader was not only of the correct faith, but correct sect within that faith to minister to the flock. A Seventh Day Adventist would be just as successful preaching to Catholic Church as a devout Muslim. For start, all three differ on which day is "the sabbath": Catholics say Sunday (the day of the week Jesus rose from the dead), Seventh Day Adventists say Saturday, the day that those of Jewish faith like Jesus would have observed as the Sabbath, and Muslims say it's Friday (I don't know why off the top of my head). More practically, one might have a BFOQ for not hiring male therapists if one is working at a women's shelter (while gender has no bearing on being an effective therapist, many of the patients at a women's shelter might have problems discussing their situation with a man because most women's shelter's clients were abused by men in their lives, which might cause a delay in healing if the therapist working with them was also a man.).
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In the US, there have been a few cases (EEOC v. The Children's Home, Inc., Michael W. Naylor v. City of Burbank) in the realm of employment discrimination. There may well be more cases which are settled without going to court. There are somewhat more court cases in the UK, see here for a number of relevant categories. In addition, there are significant cases regarding discrimination against gay males, for example Bostock v. Clayton Co, decided by SCOTUS this summer.
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It may be discrimination, but it is not discrimination based upon any reason that the company is prohibited from engaging in. This conduct is legal in pretty much all U.S. jurisdictions.
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The only excuse would be if you didn't know that your actions were a crime (not ignorance of the law, that's not an excuse, but ignorance of facts). For example, if your boss doesn't want you to serve a customer because that customer is gay, and your boss tells you "don't serve that customer, he was here last week and didn't pay the bill", you would be fine. Or if the boss of a demolition company sends a crew out to demolish the house of a personal enemy (surely a crime), the crew would have no idea that their action is a crime, so they should be fine. But if the boss of a bar or club orders a bouncer to beat up a customer, then the bouncer would know that he's committing a crime, and there is no excuse possible.
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Is it safe to use public domain images of Wikipedia for commercial purposes (like printing on a product)? I searched for public domain images on Wikipedia for my t-shirts. Here is an example public domain image. The permission section for the image says: This image consists only of simple geometric shapes or text. It does not meet the threshold of originality needed for copyright protection, and is therefore in the public domain. So is it really safe for me to use that image for commercial purposes? If no, why they call it a public domain image? P.S: large companies can use music band logos for printing business as indicated in this article. (I couldn't figure out if article is missing a point)
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No, it is certainly not legally safe to sell a shirt with such an image printed on it. There are two compatible facts to consider: Wikipedia is correct that the image is not covered by copyright in the United States. The image is likely protected by trademark law, which Wikipedia also notes, directly under the public domain information: This work includes material that may be protected as a trademark in some jurisdictions. If you want to use it, you have to ensure that you have the legal right to do so and that you do not infringe any trademark rights. Copyright Copyright provides a monopoly on the reproduction of creative works, but copyright only applies to sufficiently creative works. In cases such as these, Wikipedia is expressing the opinion that the work in question is too simple or too utilitarian to meet the threshold of originality and/or creativity for copyright. For the U.S. specifically, consider 37 CFR 202.1 which enumerates some categories of work excluded from copyright protection: The following are examples of works not subject to copyright and applications for registration of such works cannot be entertained: (a) Words and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring; mere listing of ingredients or contents; [...] (e) Typeface as typeface. Category (a) excludes the word "Marvel" or "Nirvana" from copyright protection, while category (e) excludes the creative choices that went into the styling of the text. (Note that fonts -- the software that creates/renders a typeface on a page -- are copyrightable in the U.S., but a font's "output" of typefaced text is not similarly protected.) Therefore, in the U.S., that "Marvel" image is likely not copyrightable, since it is just a single word with a particular stylized typeface (the use of which does not make it copyright-eligible either). This may be different from other jurisdictions, some which do recognize the use of the typeface as protectable element under copyright. Trademark Trademark law is a completely distinct area of law that applies to the use of logos, phrases, and other elements to identify a vendor in commerce. The words "Toyota" and "Camry" are not eligible for copyright protection, but the government affords the Toyota Motor Corporation a monopoly on the use of those words to identify the source and model of a car. If you built your own car and tried to attached the name "Toyota Camry" to it without their permission, you would be liable for trademark infringement. Similarly, logos that are too simple to qualify for copyright may still be covered by trademark law, if the company has registered them as trademarks or otherwise uses them distinctively in trade. This is likely the case here. If you put that rectangular Marvel logo on a shirt, you would be misrepresenting your product as being authorized by Marvel Entertainment and be liable for trademark infringement.
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The government's position is that material in the patent documents is generally in the public domain See Public Domain Copyright Trademark & Patent Information Schedule: As part of the terms of granting the patent to the inventor, patents are published into the public domain. And slightly more specific, see Terms of Use for USPTO websites: Patents: Subject to limited exceptions reflected in 37 CFR 1.71(d) & (e) and 1.84(s), the text and drawings of a patent are typically not subject to copyright restrictions. 1.71(d) allows for the patent author to specifically indicate that some of the material is protected by copyright. But that position has not actually been tested in courts However, there is no actual statute explicitly exempting material in the patent documents from copyright nor any case law holding that in the absence of a notice, the material in fact becomes public domain. See Alderucci, "The surprising consequences of exempting patents from copyright protection (2016), at p. 13 and footnote 62.
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The issue you identify isn't really a copyright issue. The same issue would arise if the product contained public domain images in the advertisements that aren't present in the work itself. Essentially, the question comes down to whether there was actionable deceptive advertising. Usually, these claims arise under specialized consumer protection statutes that offer remedies and means of enforcement different from an individualized fraud lawsuit, and usually a deceptive advertising claim is easier to prove than traditional fraud lawsuit. Traditional fraud lawsuits normally require a showing of damages caused by reasonable reliance upon the misrepresentation, which is uneconomic to prove in the case of an individual small consumer purchase. Usually, deceptive advertising of consumer products is established in a lawsuit by a government official in charge of regulating deceptive advertising or a class action lawsuit, and often statutory damages are assigned to each violation rather than requiring detailed proof of economic harm for compensatory damages from some but not other images being present. Often fine print in the advertisement or in a purchase form before buying the product discloses the disconnect. Also, the mere presence of an image in an advertisement doesn't necessary imply that it is included in the product. So prove of deceptive advertising liability in these cases is often difficult even with these relaxed standards. There are many gray area and close cases, and often, businesses settle these lawsuits rather than litigating them. A more specific answer would require knowledge of which jurisdiction's laws apply, which is often a non-trivial question in Internet based advertising lawsuits.
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You are correct that facts in general are not protected by copyright, and most raw data are facts. However, a collection of data may be protected by copyright as to its selection and organization. A use which copies such selection might possibly be copyright infringement. If data constitutes a trade secret it may be protected as such, and "improper" access might be unlawful. This would not apply to publicly available data or collections of data. If, to access a data set, one must sign or agree to a contract, that contract may limit the use of such data. Again, this would not apply to most publicly available data.
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You don't seem to be distinguishing properly between "original artwork" and photographs of it. A 19th-century painting will be out of copyright, so you can set up an easel copy it yourself, or even take a photo if the owners don't mind; your copy can be used however you please. However, other people can't use your photograph without your permission. Similarly, if you want to reuse a photograph used in an art book, the important thing is the copyright on the photograph, not the painting.
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A short phrase such as the band's name, or a song title is not protected by copyright, either in the US or the UK. The shirt as a whole is not protected by copyright, because you created the combination of image and words. The band's name or song title could have been protected by trademark law, but this almost surely doe snot apply, because: A. You are not selling anything, so trademark protection would not apply. B. The phrases are not now being used in trade, because the band is no longer selling music. Thus any trademark protection should have lapsed. The image of the singer may be protected under his "personality rights" but this usually only protects use for commercial purposes, which a shirt for your own personal use isn't. Even if there were an active trademark, the owner is not likely to find out and order you to stop for one short for personal use. In short, the actions described should be legally safe, but selling such a shirt to multiple other people would be a different matter.
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The band's logo can be protected by both copyright and trademark. The band's name is probably only protected as a trademark. Trademark would not apply to your personal use, because to infringe a trademark, you need to "use" the mark, and "use" in trademark law generally means selling an item that has the mark on it. As far as trademark law is concerned, no sale means no infringement. Copyright protects the exclusive right of the owner to copy a "work" (it's much more complex than that, but we don't need to get into the details here). Copyright probably applies because you would "copy" the logo, which under copyright law is something only the copyright owner can do (absent authorization from the copyright owner). You would therefore theoretically be infringing copyright by copying the bands logo on a shirt or something you want to wear yourself. That said, while I agree with the first answer that fair use may apply in theory, there would never ever be such a complex discussion about fair use in this case... because in fact there's absolutely no chance an individual would get fined or sued for having copied a band's logo and name on something he/she wants to wear his/herself. Getting sued by the band The band will not notice. If you're lucky enough to meet the band (or somebody close to the band) in person while you are wearing your garment, they would either not notice or not care. At worst, they'll ask you where you bought it in case they suspect you bought it from someone who illegally sells fake merch. Even then, all of this seems very unlikely. If you are extremely unlikely and the band notices it and sues you (and finds a lawyer to take a case like that to court), my inclination is to think the judge would be extremely mad with the band (and its lawyer) for losing the court's time with such a trivial matter. No judge would allow lawyers to waste the court's time pleading such a complex thing as fair use in a case like that. Getting fined The police would not notice either, because the only time the police cares about copyright is when somebody makes a complaint (nobody would make a complaint about you), except when they seize containers full of copyright infringing stuff (that is destined to be illegally sold for profit) in a port or at a border somewhere. The only possible scenario where I could imagine that there would be legal consequences is if you wear a t-shirt with the bands logo in a YouTube video (or in a picture) where the only thing that you see basically is the bands logo on your t-shirt. Even this scenario is extremely far fetched, but let's say the video becomes popular and the band notices. Well, the likeliest scenario is that they would file a DMCA notice and get YouTube to take down the video, with very little chances that there would be more important consequences to you. Have fun!
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"Public domain" refers to things in principle copyrightable but where protection has lapsed, been repudiated, or is a statutory exception (such as government works). A website is not "in the public domain". The idea that a website is "public property" is (*cough*) mistaken. There are basically two ways in which a web interaction could be illegal. The first regards whether accessing another person's computer is illegally accessing a computer, which is a crime. Authorization essentially comes down to "permission": if the owner permits me to access the computer, I am authorized. Putting stuff out there on a web server is an open-ended grant of permission to look at a web page. That simply means that if I create a web page (with a bunch of links or not), I am granting you permission to interact with my computer to that extent. It does not create permission to hack into a password-protected subdirectory. An ordinary web crawler automates what a clicking human does. Copyright law is also relevant, in that the stuff I put on my webpage is not to be copied without permission. Any webpage access necessarily involves automatic copying from machine to machine: in putting stuff out there for the world to see, I am saying that the world can do that level of automatic copying that arises from normal html-and-click interactions. It does not mean that you can download and do stuff with my copyrighted content (i.e., it is not an abandonment of copyright: I did not put that stuff in the public domain). Putting a web page out there in an unrestricted fashion means that you've given a certain level of permission to "copy" (at least in the automatic server-to-browser viewing sense). I may want to impose conditions on peoples' access to my stuff, so I can impose terms on such material. For instance, I may require users to agree to certain conditions before accessing the CoolStuff subdirectory. Users then have to jump through a minor hoop and agree to those terms. In that case, my permission is conditional, and if you violate the terms of that agreement, I may be able to sue you for copyright infringement. It could then be a violation of my terms of service (TOS) if I say "you may not crawl my website" (in less vague language). A TOS gets its legal power from copyright law, because every webpage interaction involves copying (I assume that technical point is obvious), and copying can only be done with permission. You may technologically overcome my weak click-through technology so that the bot just says "sure whatever" and proceeds to illegally use my web page: I can sue you now for copyright infringement. The robot-specific methods of meta-tags and robots.txt have no legal force. Although there is a way to say "no you may not," which is tailored to automated access, the meaning and enforcement of these devices has not yet reached the law. If my page uses NOFOLLOW and your program doesn't know or care, you (your program) do not (yet) have a duty to understand, detect and respect that tag. Prior registration is also not a legal requirement, and very many pages that are on the master crawl list get there from being linked to by someone else's web page. Again, there is at present no legal requirement of pre-registration (and there is no effective mechanism for verifying that the site owner has registered the site). Archiving and especially re-displaying someone's content is, on the other hand, not legal. It would be plainly copyright infringement if you were to scoop up someone else's webpage and host it. You can analyze their material and somehow associate it with some search terms, and display a link to that page, but you cannot copy and republish their material. You can put very short snippets out there taken from a web page, under the "fair use" doctrine, but you can't wholesale republish a webpage. (It should be noted that the archive.org is an internationally recognized library, and libraries have extra statutory powers to archive).
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Translation of witness testimony You are a juror on a serious criminal case in the United States. One of the witnesses, a tourist, has no knowledge of English. Questions and answers for this witness (both direct and cross) are translated into and out of the witness' native language in the court. You, the juror, happen to be fluent in both English and the witness' native language. To the extent that the translation process is imperfect, you thus have a slightly different understanding of the witness' testimony than your fellow, unilingual jurors. Can you use this added understanding in reaching a decision in the case? In trying to persuade other jurors to share your decision? Or should jury selection eliminate this possibility? (Vague recollection of an early Law and Order episode with this a a plot element...
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You will most likely be instructed to not share or even use your own translation of the testimony. In California, the instruction on translations is: Some testimony may be given in [insert name or description of language other than English]. An interpreter will provide a translation for you at the time that the testimony is given. You must rely on the translation provided by the interpreter, even if you understand the language spoken by the witness. Do not retranslate any testimony for other jurors. If you believe the court interpreter translated testimony incorrectly, let me know immediately by writing a note and giving it to the (clerk/bailiff). In People v. Cabrera 230 Cal.App.3d 300, it was ruled that supplying a competing translation is juror misconduct, see also People v. Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d 907 (it is misconduct for a juror to inject expertise into the deliberations, referring to the fact that a juror "informed the jury ... [that he had a] background in law enforcement, and that the lack of evidence did not mean the defendant has no criminal background, because juvenile records are automatically sealed at 18 years of age." Florida has a similar instruction: The evidence you are to consider is only that provided through the official court [interpreters] [translators]. Although some of you may know (language used), it is important that all jurors consider the same evidence. Therefore, you must accept the English [interpretation] [translation]. You must disregard any different meaning. If, however, during the testimony there is a question as to the accuracy of the English interpretation, you should bring this matter to my attention immediately by raising your hand. You should not ask your question or make any comment about the interpretation in the presence of the other jurors, or otherwise share your question or concern with any of them. I will take steps to see if your question can be answered and any discrepancy resolved. If, however, after such efforts a discrepancy remains, I emphasize that you must rely only upon the official English interpretation as provided by the court interpreter and disregard any other contrary interpretation.
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The defense has an opportunity to question the witness the prosecution had called to provide foundation for the evidence, and in this case the defense's perspective is that the prosecution was trying to introduce evidence that they had improperly digitally manipulated. Part of their questioning was trying to figure out how the witness had manipulated the image prior to offering it as evidence. It's the prosecution's burden to prove that the evidence they are offering is accurate, the defense's purpose in asking the witness questions he could not answer is to try to prove to the judge that the prosecution has not laid proper foundation for the evidence because it has been manipulated from its original form in a way the prosecution cannot explain or justify as remaining fair and accurate to the events captured by the original footage. This case in particular had a lot of video evidence, and most of these issues were handled in motions in limine before the trial started. However, the drone evidence in question was dropped at the prosecutor's office after the trial started, so the prosecution did not really have time to hire and voir dire an expert witness on Amped 5 (keeping in mind that the defense similarly had little time to review and account for the new evidence in the middle of trial). Since the defense in this case were cross-examining the witness, they have some leeway to present an argument with their questioning like they chose to do with the red/blue pixel drawings. As I recall the judge allowed the evidence as-is, so it does not appear that the defense's arguments were persuasive to the judge.
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The parties are generally entitled to present their case as they see fit, as long as they stay within the rules of evidence. If they want a straight yes or no, the court will often require the witness to provide one, which keeps lawyers happy, makes the answers clear for the jury, and limits the parties' grounds for appeal. If a yes or no answer is not as accurate as a more qualified answer, the other lawyer would typically have an opportunity to invite the witness to provide a fuller answer on redirect. If a yes or no answer is inappropriate because of assumption embedded in the question -- as in your "beating his wife and kids" example -- the question should quickly elicit an objection from the defense attorney, who would note that the question lacks foundation or assumes facts not in evidence. Assuming there isn't any evidence of domestic violence, the court should sustain the objection, in which case the witness would not need to answer at all.
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Depositions must always be attended by a court reporter in every jurisdiction I have ever encountered (including Colorado, New York, California, Wyoming and Florida). Alaska may be an exception. Its state constitution creates a right to participate in many kinds of legal and legislative proceedings remotely because the distances involved are often so great. The court reporter administers an oath to the witness, keeps track of exhibits, impartially records what happens (usually stenographically and with an audiotape) and then reduces it to a transcript later, a process assisted by having been there when the testimony was given (and allowing for the court reporter, for example, to request spellings of words during breaks). A videotape can be used in addition to the court reporter and sometimes this is done when it would be helpful for understanding a highly visual topic (e.g. in a patent case where someone is explaining a 3D object) or when a witness is expected to behave badly or is known for problematic voice character or body language. Court proceedings in a courtroom are often audiotaped with a judge present but without a live court reporter present. Appellate court arguments are frequently live streamed over the Internet. There may be some jurisdictions where it is possible to have an oath administered by a notary and simply audiotape or videotape the deposition, but that would be very rare in every jurisdiction of which I am aware.
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The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence.
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The parenthesized part means that if you are being compelled by law to disclose some confidential information, you must promptly notify the company of that fact. They could they respond by trying to get you excluded as a witness, or to limit your testimony, but you don't have to care what they do once they've been notified that you were subpoenaed. It may well be that every time the opposing side asks you a question, "your" side will object, and the judge will decide whether to sustain or overrule the objection. The only way in which you would defer to the company lawyer is by not answering the question before the question is finished (i.e. give the attorney 2 seconds to voice an objection). You would not have to "bring" the employer's lawyer along to a deposition, but that lawyer would probably be present and would similarly raise objections, if he felt like it. Your duty is simply to tell the company that you are being compelled to testify. In case the police or a detective agency are investigating the matter and they come to interview you, you are not compelled by law to answer (or to hand over documents), therefore you are supposed to decline to answer (and you are not obligated to inform the company that someone asked a question). As for an administrative subpoena, the perhaps tricky part will be knowing whether you are being compelled to testify, or invited to testify. The wording of the paperwork should inform you whether this is compulsory.
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The situation you describe is extremely unlikely First, you will have been required to give a statement to the police who would have asked you most or all of the questions that you suggest before anyone gets anywhere near a courtroom and likely before any arrest has been made. That statement will be part of your evidence in chief. As in "Is this your statement?" "Yes". "Is this your video recording?" "Yes". After that, your evidence in chief is pretty much done. A witness of fact (rules for expert witnesses are different) can only testify as to what they personally sensed and what their state of mind was. So questions about what you saw, heard, tasted etc. are all perfectly legitimate as are questions about what you thought or felt. You are required to answer these questions honestly - if that means "I don't know" then say "I don't know". All of the hypothetical questions look fine but as I said, they will all have answers in your police statement. The only one that's off-limits is ""Do you feel that a crime has been committed?" - nobody knows if a crime has been committed; that's why we're having a trial.
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The first thing to keep in mind is that, before appearing on the stand, an expert witness will have given a sworn deposition and delivered a written report of his or her findings. They could expect to be questioned about anything they say under oath that contradicts something else they said under oath. It’s not illegal for an expert to admit they were wrong before, or that there are other facts that support a different conclusion—indeed, a witness on the stand might be obligated to—but it might not do their professional reputation and their credibility with the jury any good, either. In the U.S., the opposing counsel is generally allowed to contact a witness, and take a statement, but may not ask the witness to testify falsely or offer any inducement prohibited by law. (See Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 173/Model Rule (MR) 3.4.) It would certainly be illegal for a witness to take money from both parties in the case without informing them or the court, or to swear that whatever the highest bidder pays them to say is their expert opinion. If this happened under direct examination, the lawyer would probably cut their losses by asking no further questions and getting the witness off the stand. Putting the witness on the stand would give the other side an opportunity to cross-examine them. Grilling your own expert as a hostile witness, even if the judge allowed it, would only make your position seem tendentious. Nothing stops an expert witness from giving testimony that is more helpful to the other side. They are witnesses, not lawyers, and their duty is to tell the truth, not to zealously advocate on behalf of some client.
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Neighbor using my property I have a parcel in Ohio and use to own the house next to it. I lost my home and someone bought it but I still own parcel which I paid 10,000.00 25 years ago. I live out of state but have offered to sell for 4,000.00 to owners of my old house. They won't buy it because they use it. I have put up no trespass signs and they rip them down. I put them back up but they mow my lawn so they can use it. They have a swing set on it and a child's plastic playhouse. They put a fire pit in the middle of my property. What can I file in the courts? I have asked several times to have them remove swing set and quit mowing but they continue.
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You will need to hire an attorney to sue them. They have adversely taken possession of your land, which means that after a period of time they own your land, unless you take legal action. The time period in Ohio is 21 years. An alternative is to grant them revocable permission to use your land, but since they seem disinclined to give up the land, you will ultimately have to take this matter to court.
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It is their property, so keeping it without permission could well be seen as theft. I think you are obliged to make reasonable attempts to notify them you have their property before using it or selling it. Just like if someone left the item at your house after a party. If they want it back, however, it is at their cost, you should not be out of pocket for their failure to deliver within a reasonable time-frame; you may find they've already claimed the cost of the product from the courier and don't want it back. You are well within your rights to offer to buy it from them, and them to accept or reject that offer, this is a separate contract to the original sale.
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I would presume that this is legal (without researching the laws in Cali. or Texas). Their contract is an offer to enter into an agreement. You accept that offer by signing. Their pre-requisite for that offer is that you pay the nonrefundable application fee. In other words, they are refusing to make you an offer until you pay a set fee. Now the degree of negotiability, among other factors, would go into determining whether the contract is fully enforceable. I did a little bit of research. (Please note that this is not legal advice. If this applies to a current situation, seek the advice of an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction.) There does not seem to be any indication that the landlord needs to provide a sample lease to you before s/he decides that you are an eligible applicant. The application fee is not a contract to rent the premises; it is an application to be considered a tenant. Pro-Business Perspective: Why would I (the landlord) waste my time going over an application with someone and show them a model unit if they are not even eligible to rent from me? I have better things to do. Pro-Consumer Perspective: Why waste my time and money if I refuse non-negotiable terms in a lease? The application fee is capped in California and must be used to cover screening costs or refunded if not used. The likelihood of success in a claim regarding this might be indicated by the California Dept. of Consumer Affairs: "If you don't like the landlord's policy on application screening fees, you may want to look for another rental unit. If you decide to pay the application screening fee, any agreement regarding a refund should be in writing." It is important to note that you can always try to negotiate with the landlord. Personally, every lease I have had I have negotiated to get more favorable terms. You, as a tenant, have every right to try to negotiate, and should use that right.
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This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't
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There is no general rule about ownership: one parking lot I know is owned by the city, another is owned by the company that operates the mall, and in a third case it is owned by a third party who doesn't operate the mall. Either way, the owner of the parking lot has the property right to limit how it is used, and their agents (security guards, for example) can request that you refrain from skateboarding. They can evict you; they may not have the legal authority to physically toss you off the property, but they can probably perform a citizen's arrest for trespassing. None of this depends on how many cars are in the parking lot. It is more likely that a governmentally-owned parking lot will have a corresponding law restricting its use (whereas in the case of a private parking lot, restrictions center around general property law and the law of trespass).
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The Constitution said people have the Rights to Properties. No it doesn't. There is no such provision. The closest I am aware of is the so-called "takings clause" in the Fifth Amendment, which reads: Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. There has been a good deal of litigation over just when when a "taking" occurs under this provision. The classic and most obvious case is the use of eminent domain to aquire actual title to the property by a government (Federal, State, or local). This is always a takign, and compensation nis required. The more questionable cases have occurred when some law or regulation leaves the owner with title, but significantly restricts the uses to which the property may be put, particularly when the existing use becomes unlawful. Courts have ruled in different ways in such cases, but I think the current standard is that when a regulation removes all, or almost all, economic value from the property there has been a "regulatory taking" and compensation must be paid. But as far as I know, a tax on the property has never been considered to be a taking inn this sense.
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As you note, it does appear that this tenant has committed one or more crimes. In Pennsylvania crimes are prosecuted by the state, and you can begin the process by filing a private criminal complaint with your local Magisterial District Court, which will forward it to your county's District Attorney for review and prosecution. You've essentially written the complaint here; now you just have to file it. The criminal process would proceed independently of whatever civil processes you might be pursuing.
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Approach the neighbor in your yard and ask him to leave. You are the tenant, you have full rights to do so. Once he refuses to leave he is a trespasser and you can call the police to take care of him, let alone if he makes any threats. Regarding the landlord, just ignore them and take care of the yard and the house as the lease terms bind you. Require them to give 24 hour notice before any appearance as the lease terms bind them.
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Any way to remove Ajit Pai as F.C.C. chairman and ensure "Net Neutrality"? The F.C.C's chairman Ajit Pai has been pushing to repeal "Net Neutrality" rules. "Net Neutrality" is a set of regulations that ensure equal access to the internet. The rules prohibited high-speed internet service providers from blocking or slowing down the delivery of websites, or charging extra fees for the best quality of streaming and other internet services for their subscribers. Are there any legal recourse for citizens of the United States to have chairman Pai removed? How can "Net Neutrality" rules be permanently secured?
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The FCC Commissioner is appointed, per 47 USC 154, by POTUS, subject to approval by the US Senate (as a member of the Commission). Thereafter he serves for 5 years. However Article 2 of the Constitution allows removal from office: The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors. But only the House of Representatives can impeach and only the Senate can remove (of the President declines to do so). There is no provision for a citizen to sue to remove a civil officer. It is, of course, legal for citizens and others to lobby politically for whatever action that want Congress to take. "Net Neutrality" rules can be more permanently fixed by act of Congress. By act of Congress, the FCC may be required to, allowed to, or prohibited from setting some set of rules. Such laws are typically broad and leave a lot of discretion to the executive branch. Congress has not passed a law mandating "net neutrality", and as ruled in Comcast v. FCC the FCC lacks "ancillary jurisdiction" over internet services of at least Comcast. There have been previous attempts to legislate "net neutrality", such as the Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006 which died on the floor of the House, which purported to guarantee "net neutrality" via an extension of antitrust law. However, the only way to make such a provision permanent is to make it be a Constitutional Amendment, since an act of Congress can be repealed or amended in such a way that it effectively doesn't exist.
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I'm not aware of any cases on point, but as a rule legal fig-leaves don't play well in court. If the webmaster simply puts up a banner saying that EU residents are not permitted but takes no other action to exclude them, then that is going to be considered irrelevant. The webmaster is still very likely required to comply with the GDPR. On the other hand if the webmaster takes other steps to exclude EU residents, such as using a geolocation service to block connections known to be in the EU, validating email addresses and blocking those from EU domains, and ejecting anyone who mentions that their residence is in the EU, then that is more likely to be seen as a good-faith attempt to avoid being subject to the GDPR. It will also have the practical effect of greatly reducing the number of actual EU residents. All these controls can be evaded, but it would be much harder for any data subjects to claim that they acted in good faith or that the webmaster acted in bad faith. Note that validating an email address or logging an IP is itself processing of personal data, so anyone implementing such a system still can't ignore the GDPR completely, but it would greatly limit the scope and make it easy to delete any such data after a short time. (Note: the term "EU resident" above is an approximation of the territorial scope).
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The provisions of the credit card account agreement will be governed by Delaware law, except to the extent to North Carolina public policy overrides it. The provisions of the online services agreement will be governed by New York law, except to the extent to North Carolina public policy overrides it. The electronic communications agreement will be governed by the law of the place with the most significant connection to any disputed issues arising under it. It could also be considered to be an extension of the online services agreement rather than a separate agreement. UDAP is an acronym referring the state deceptive trade practices acts. The unfair act involves non-receipt of paperless billing statements. Even with this level of detail, I don't believe it is possible to know in advance which of the agreements is implicated and which state's laws will be held to apply (or if the differences between the laws of the candidate states is even material on the issue in question). These issues are decided on a case by case basis when there is a mishmash of facts and the outcomes are not terribly predictable. It also isn't obvious that there is a provision covering the conduct in question in any of the three potentially relevant states. The Delaware Deceptive Trade Practices Act doesn't appear to clearly apply to financial services at all. New York's application to financial services is quite narrow and subject to an exception for conduct in conformity with federal law. A failure to provide an invoice, without more, isn't necessarily a deceptive trade practice at all. All in all, there isn't a straightforward or easy answer to this question that can be reached from the information provided.
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Counter notices are described in 17 USC 512(g)(3). It starts with the requirement for "A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber" (and a statement under penalty of perjury...). Supposing that you can't get anywhere with finding the contributor even via a subpoena, then you're stopped there: you can't swear on behalf of someone else. Paragraph (f) also says that if a person files a false infringement claim, they become liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it but it's not immediately obvious that you would suffer damage by taking the material down (not immediately obvious doesn't mean obviously not true). A case could be made, but it's risky. In Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Diebold was hit with substantial damages basically for having made up a theory that certain email discussion was infringing when it was clearly fair use. If a person actually lies about being the copyright owner, that would probably be viewed even more dimly by the courts. Your 4th argument gives you no traction: if an infringer posts infringing material and transfers copyright on the web page, but they don't hold copyright, then that transfer mean nothing. As for the other arguments, your attorney will have to suggest an advisable course of action. S/he might advise that your evidence is so strong that you should just ignore the takedown; or that you should take the content down and then sue for damages; or take the content down and lobby your congressman for a change in the law. [Addendum] I will reiterate my recommendation to get a lawyer. I believe that under the law, the risk to you would be the situation where the person prevails in an infringement suit against you. Outside of the "mere conduit" safe harbor, you have to participate in the notice and takedown scheme in order to "stay safe" (also you have to do so quickly). You have identified a potentially huge flaw in the system. Theoretically, criminal charges of perjury and paragraph (f) damages would be enough to deter ordinary wrong-doers, provided that you can really prove that someone else is the copyright holder. But the cost of litigation is not zero and the chances of winning are not 100%. The law does assume that all parties tell the truth, indeed the law requires a "penalty of perjury" statement. Since counter-notice is also part of the legal dance, I would conclude that you do have to write yourself a counter-notice. Then if there is a suit, you have satisfied the requirements of the law.
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Article II of the Constitution does say that "The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors". So it is true that a president or a federal judge could be impeached and removed from office, and it has happened to some extent 19 times – in 8 cases it went all the way to removal (as opposed to acquittal or resignation). However, this would not be a very effective way to avert a "crisis". Any judicial ruling is subject to appeal by a higher court, until you get to the Supreme Court. Moreover, impeaching a lower judge does not erase his or her rulings. So ultimately, a matter will be decided by SCOTUS. In anticipation of such a ruling, Congress might decide to get rid of some Supreme Court justice who they think might stand in the way. That was attempted with Samuel Chase, who was acquitted. Such a decision is not subject to judicial review (Nixon v. United States 506 U.S. 224). However, SCOTUS can also overturn that decision though that would be very unusual. It would also be very unusual for Congress to impeach a Supreme Court justice for having a position that they disagree with. At any rate, there is no such thing as a "deadlock" between branches of government. When the court rules, that is the end of the matter from a legal perspective. It is, in fact, entirely possible that a general will rule that the court or the president (or both) are wrong and will declare what the law now is, but that takes us out of the realm of legal discussions.
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You'll note that Maryland governor Larry Hogan was sued and ended up settling over Facebook deleted comments and blocks. And a judge ruled that Trump can't block comments on Twitter. So it seems there's an evolving consensus that politicians can't simply block or delete social media comments for differing viewpoints.
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The Constitution only regulates the powers of the government; it doesn't directly say what the people can and can't do. In particular, it doesn't say directly that nobody except Congress can coin money. However, it does give the government the power to make laws, which are binding on the population. So Congress possibly could make a law forbidding cryptocurrencies, or at least regulating them, under the "regulating the value thereof" clause. However, they haven't done so. In the case of the Liberty Dollar, there are some specific laws that apply. They were convicted of violating 18 USC 485, which forbids the making of physical gold or silver coins that resemble US or foreign money, and 18 USC 486, which forbids creating or passing any physical metal coins as money (as well as other conspiracy charges, aiding and abetting, etc). None of these laws apply to cryptocurrency because they are not physical metal coins. Given that Congress has been explicitly given the power to coin and regulate the value of money in the United States, how are cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Basis created, distributed, and redeemed such that they have not been found unconstitutional? The power to regulate includes the power to not regulate. As a slight tangent, what laws allow for the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies? In a free society, "everything is permitted that is not forbidden". We don't need a law specifically allowing the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies; it's sufficient that there is no law that forbids it.
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The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal.
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Can the President unilaterally change the design of the US flag? In researching this question, I found this page from the Government Publishing Office, which states in 4 U.S.C. §10: Any rule or custom pertaining to the display of the flag of the United States of America, set forth herein, may be altered, modified, or repealed, or additional rules with respect thereto may be prescribed, by the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, whenever he deems it to be appropriate or desirable; and any such alteration or additional rule shall be set forth in a proclamation. §1 describes the design of the flag, which I interpret as a rule or custom pertaining to the display of the flag. I'm not a lawyer though. Can POTUS change the design of the US flag without an act of Congress?
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§1 states what the design of the flag shall be (§2 mandates addition of stars when a new state is added). In essence, 4 USC 1-2 define what the flag is, and the rest of that chapter addresses what you can do with it. These are laws (passed by Congress), not rules or customs. That is, it's not a custom that the flag is 50 starts and 13 stripes, it's the law. POTUS cannot unilaterally change the law. (4 USC 3 also specifies punishments for certain kinds of flag abuse, and this too is outside the scope of that the president can do by declaration). 4 USC 5 in fact states that "The flag of the United States for the purpose of this chapter shall be defined according to sections 1 and 2 of this title", and that The following codification of existing rules and customs pertaining to the display and use of the flag of the United States of America is established for the use of such civilians or civilian groups or organizations as may not be required to conform with regulations promulgated by one or more executive departments of the Government of the United States. §§6-9 specify standard flag etiquette (violation of which incurs no legal punishment), and those are the rules that the president can rewrite.
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The powers of the President are contained in Article II of the constitution; this is a fair summary. The power to make executive orders stems from Section 1 "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." When the Supreme Court considers the legality of an executive order (which only happens when someone brings a case that the court agrees to hear) they use Justice Jackson's Test from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer (1952). The first amendment specifically forbids congress from making laws about these matters. Therefore the express will of congress (as the amendment required a 2/3 majority of Congress) is that there shall be no law about these matters. Since the President would be acting against the express will of Congress he would drop to the third limb of Jackson's test: When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.... Since, this is not a power that the President is given by the constitution it is likely that the Court would decide that he doesn't have such power.
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What you describe is essentially a Warrant Canary, which is legally murky. From a functional point of view, it is breaking the non-disclosure requirements of the NSL by omission. Proponents of warrant canaries would point to case law such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard to suggest that the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment restricts the government from compelling speech. New York Times Co. v. United States could also be read to prevent the prior restraint unless the existence of the NSL was successfully argued to be "crucial military information".
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Yes, explicitly. It even laid out the procedure and method (i.e. on equal footing) of these new states. Specifically, Article IV, Section 3, the "Admissions Clause": New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. Note that many of the things in your quoted section are forbidden to the States, but are explicitly granted to the Federal Government (in various sections). So it's not "this shall not be done", but rather "the individual states shall not do these things; Federal Government shall be the only one to do these things if they can, as else where they may be banned from doing so".
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In the US, Congress may pass an act, and this creates one kind of law (if it is promulgated: signed, ignored, or re-passed with a super-majority). Some of those acts direct the executive branch to do things, and pursuant to that act, a regulation is promulgated. Together with case law, the whole thing is "law". A bill (in the House, or the Senate) may result in an act being passed by both houses. It may go through a number of drafts between the point when it is first introduced and the time it becomes an act.
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Regulations - Yes, Acts of Parliament - very rarely In in the united-kingdom diagrams are found in regulations, for example legislation dealing with roadside symbols. There are two kinds of legislation in the UK: Acts of Parliament and Statutory Instruments (normally called Regulations). The procedure by which an Act of Parliament is passed is that it has to be approved by both Houses of the legislature and then receive Royal Assent (Royal Assent is a formality). The procedure in each House is that the main debates occur at the Committee Stage when amendments are proposed and voted on. At the next stage (Third Reading) the House votes again on whether to approve the Bill in its amended form. Statutory Instruments (Regulations) are issued by the government (executive) and are known as delegated legislation because the government only has power to issue a regulation if an Act (called the parent Act) gives it power to do so. As you would expect there are safeguards. First of all the courts can declare invalid (ultra vires) any regulation whose terms go outside the limits of the power delegated by the Parent Act. Sometime the parent Act will provide that Regulations issued by the government under delegated powers become law without further involvement of Parliament but sometimes an Act will provide for some limited further Parliamentary scrutiny. This can be either by the Positive Resolution (the regulation will not become law until Parliament approve it) or by the Negative Resolution procedure (the regulation will become law unless Parliament passes a resolution annulling it). A key point, in the context of the question, is that neither the Positive nor the Negative Resolution procedure allows Parliament to amend the regulation - Parliament only has a binary choice to approve or disapprove. Of course if they disapprove then the government can issue a new amended regulation which then goes through the same process but the Positive/Negative resolution procedure does not allow Parliament itself to amend any regulation. I think this explains why diagrams which are sometimes found in regulations are rarely found in Acts. Constitutional proprieties require any Bill to be amendable and any member of the legislature can propose a amendment. If the Bill included diagrams then there would be huge practical problems because any member who wanted to amend a diagram would have to produce his own amended diagram which he might not be able to do/might not have time to do before parliamentary deadlines. So constitutional proprieties would normally mean that in practice Bills must be solely words. Regulations however cannot be amended by Parliament (see above) so such considerations do not prevent regulations from containing diagrams. Having said that normally Bills will only contain words, there is this example of an Act which includes a diagram of a symbol. That symbol, however, is defined in an international convention so in practice no parliamentarian would want to amend it. I know of no examples in the UK where a Bill (as distinct from regulations) contains an image which a member of the legislature might want to propose an amendment to.
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Prior to that act, civil procedure in federal courts was non-uniform (historical overview). The main problem seems to be that courts were supposed to conform to the procedure of the state in which the court is located (as mandated by the Conformity Act of 1872). The "has to" reason is that SCOTUS at the time did not feel that it was authorized by the Constitution to write its own rules when Congress could have done so, see Wright & Miller Federal Practice and Procedure. The root problems seems to be the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, which in the latter case did not allow courts to set rules for actions at law, and in the former case required courts to apply rules in effect when the state joined the Union (regardless of how the rules changed subsequently).
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Art. 1 Sec. 9(8) says two different things. The first says that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States". That means that the US cannot grant a title (hereditary or otherwise) like "Duke of Detroit", "Prince of Princeton". It does not prohibit the practice of speaking of POTUS as "His Highness, the President of the United States", likewise "His Elective Majesty" or "His Excellency", but early discussions in the Senate put paid to even calling a president this, and instead he is just called "Mr. President" (just as judges are called "your honor"). An appellation such as "Chief Justice" is not a title of nobility, it is a job description. We don't have titles of nobility granted by the government. There is a constitutional amendment, the Titles of Nobility Amendment, which was considered but not ratified, which is stricter on the anti-nobility statce. Then there is second thing, that prohibits officials from "accept[ing] of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state", without Congressional approval. Accordingly, the president, sec'y of state or a congressman cannot accept a gift, such as a car, from a foreign power, unless it is approved by Congress. Every congressional "exception" was approved by Congress; moreover, such benefits are not from a foreign power. The Speech or Debate Clause Art. I, Sec.6(1) in fact gives congressmen a privilege (immunity from arrest) which ordinary citizens do not have. So there is no connection between titles of nobility and free bean soup or whatever legal exemptions Congress may give itself.
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Gym Membership Extraordinary Termination when Flaws were already present before signing? I'm going to a local gym in my town for about half a year. At the time I signed the contract I didn't have a car and bus or train is terrible where I live, so I had no other gym to choose from. The contract states terms of 1 year with a 1 month notice period to terminate it. Now, after these 6 months of training there and educating myself over a lot of weightlifting topics, I started to notice a lot of flaws in the gym. For example, I'd love to do Squats or Military Presses. Unfortunatly the gym doesn't have such a rack to take the barbell out and picking a heavy loaded barbell off the ground is pretty hard (even impossible when trying to lay the bar across my neck to squat with it). Also there are some machines I'd like to use, which are also missing. I read about extraordinary termination when the gym removes a machine (or other equipment) or does fail to replace broken ones, so I came to this question: Am I able to extraordinary terminate this contract due to missing equipment, although I technically should have know that it was missing before I signed?
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Am I able to extraordinary terminate this contract due to missing equipment, although I technically should have know that it was missing before I signed? No (I'll assume that your jurisdiction is somewhere in the U.S., although many other countries apply contract law similarly). First, your statement that technically you should have known about the flaws [before signing] reflects that the contract does not misrepresent what equipment the gym has. Second, using the gym for six months evidences your satisfaction with the contractual relation. The parties' conduct reinforces the validity of a contract, whence a party's subsequent change of mind does not entitle him or her to breach that contract. You might be entitled to terminate the contract prematurely if (1) the flaws pose a realistic risk of injury, and (2) the gym disregards any [reasonable] safety concerns you report to the gym. In this regard, [gym's] gross negligence might suffice insofar as it touches on the covenant of fair dealing that is presumed in contract law. You may want to discuss with the gym your concern about the barbell/rack issue. However, it would fall short of entitlement-to-breach if you readily know --or should have known-- that maneuvering with the barbell(s) off the ground is hazardous given the progress you have attained so far.
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It is unlikely that you could successfully sue the bank for breach of contract, but of course the first thing you should do is carefully read the agreement and see exactly what they promised. It is understandable that you would like to get your money right now, but that isn't necessarily guaranteed under the agreement. Assuming there is no statement in the agreement as to how long it will take them to deposit the reward once requested, they would have "a reasonable time period". I located on of those agreements, which says that it will be deposited 90 days after completing the requirements. If that is what your agreement says and after 90 days still no money, then you should speak to the branch manager and request timely compliance with the agreement. It would cost more than $600 to sue them, and the court won't punish them extra for missing a deadline (assuming this was not a deliberate and willful refusal on their part).
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Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual.
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Neither The contract is completed when each party has totally fulfilled its obligations under the contract. In this case, it is when the purchaser has consumed or otherwise dealt with the banana to their satisfaction. The vendor has ongoing obligations under the contract until this happens. For example, obligations that the banana is of merchantable quality and fit for purpose. If the purchaser peels the banana and discovers that it is "off" or eats the banana and develops food poisoning then the vendor still has obligations and can be sued under the contract. Yes, I realize that no one is going to sue anyone over a rotten banana but let's assume that "banana" is code for 54km of motorway construction and £1 is actually £1 billion. When is the contract formed? This is not a trivial determination and there are literally hundreds of thousands if not millions of lawsuits that have turned on this exact question. Once the contract is formed its binding on both parties; until then, either can walk away (subject to estoppel) The traditional analysis involves offer and acceptance. In your banana scenario, the shop displaying "Banana's: 50p/each" (it's a fruit shop - they always have unnecessary apostrophes) is not an offer - it is an invitation to treat. An offer is made by Ben placing the banana on the counter and proffering the £1, it is accepted by Sam taking the £1. At this point, the sale is binding on both parties. Ben has fulfilled all his obligations under the contract, Sam still has some. In addition to those discussed above, he owes Ben 50p. Strictly speaking, this is not an obligation under the contract but a debt due and payable. Consumer protection law The proceeding is a strict contract law interpretation - many jurisdictions have consumer protection legislation (and food safety laws for bananas) that impose additional protections and may change the contract law position.
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First of all, a contract is valid without a signature and even without being in writing; all that is needed is consent by the parties. Therefore, the signature is merely evidence of that consent and is only relevant if a dispute arises over the general consent or the particular terms that were consented to. A digital signature would make it harder for Bob to argue that those were not the terms he signed but if I have Bob's signature on them then the onus of proving he didn't sign rests with Bob, I don't have to prove he did. All of the methods you suggest are valid as would an email saying "Got the contract. I agree. Bob."
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am I required to send the stuff back? No, but you should be able to prove that you met the conditions of the original contract between you two. There is no gift. There is a compensation that forms part of the contract between the offeror and you. The offeror's preference to call it a "gift" does not change the legal fact that his offer and your acceptance to complete Nightwave Season 2 constitutes the formation of a contract. From that standpoint, you are entitled to keep the items he mailed to you as long as you honor your part in that contract. You are right by conjecturing that a party is not allowed to unilaterally alter a contract. Any modification has to be agreed upon by all parties to that contract. However, a consent or agreement may be inferred from the parties' subsequent conduct. Hence the best way to pre-empt or supersede any such inference consists of letting that party know that you disapprove of the belated alteration(s). The absence of a written agreement can only complicate matters, though, since it appears that neither party has an objective, directly credible way to prove the terms of the original contract. Perhaps such terms can be deduced from the subsequent emails that he has been sending you, but that is impossible to ascertain without knowing the wording of the subsequent communications between you two. Lastly, enforceability of your contract is less clear if completing Nightwave Season 2 through someone else's performance amounts to an unlawful act. Not being knowledgeable of the terms and conditions of that game (?), I am unable to state with certainty whether the offeror could lawfully recover from you the items he mailed.
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You inspected the property online and based on that inspection you signed the lease. You have a legally binding contract. Now, it is not at all like the pictures How? I mean, are these pictures of a different house? If that is so then your contract is void for fraud. However, if the pictures are of the actual house and you just imagined from them that the house would be other than it is then tough luck for you. the stairwell in the house is a huge safety hazard for children OK. Does it comply with relevant building codes? If not then the landlord needs to bring it up to standard: you cannot walk away from the contract. Is it in need of repair? If so, the landlord needs to repair it: you cannot walk away from the contract. If it is compliant and in good repair and you think it is a hazard notwithstanding then you need to manage that hazard: this is not the landlords problem. I refused to move into the house That's fine: so long as you keep paying the rent there is no obligation on you to move in. If you stop paying the rent then it would appear that you have repudiated the contract and the landlord can sue you for damages - probably the costs of finding a new tenant and the rent up until that tenant takes over.
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Can they have a clause in the fine print that in laymans terms just says 'we might just not fulfill our side of the deal'. That paraphrase appears to trivialize the actual terms of the contract (of which fine print you mention you don't know in detail). Germany's Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) at §262 entitles the shipping company --insofar as obligor-- to a choice of service, provided that the company duly informs the customer, Id. at §263. The latter section of the BGB is not explicit as to whether the obligor's notification ought to happen at the formation of the contract, although I am almost positive that that is so and is premised on the BGB itself. Since delivery at the post office and delivery at the home address are mutually exclusive (i.e., they preclude each other), by virtue of §262 the company may outline in the contract both alternatives and thereafter decide for one of these unilaterally. If the company makes its contractual [post office] alternative contingent on "being too busy with other things" and the customer proves that the company opted for post office despite not being that busy, the customer could prevail on grounds that the company contravened Treu und Glauben. See Id. at §162(2). The "I will mow your lawn" example you outline is not a good analogy. The shipping company may argue that, even if the product is not delivered at customer's home address, the customer still benefited by having to retrieve it from a location --such as a nearby post office-- that is closer from the location where the product was commercialized or manufactured. The customer would prevail only if delivery were at a location which is more inconvenient to him than if he discarded transacting with the shipping company. See Id. at § 226.
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How to handle photos made of an event where the permission to take photos was withdrawn afterwards I hosted a workshop event on Friday and Sunday. I invited a photographer to take pictures of workshop participants and I had every participant sign a permission statement that these pictures could be used in a final presentation. Now, there was one girl, which was 14 years old and her parents signed the permissions to let her take part and the permission that I can use the photos. The parents weren't happy with the workshop and they won't let her take part on the Sunday event. Also they withdrew the permission to take photos of their child. They wanted the permission back physically and I couldn't do much but giving it to them. Now I have the problem that this girl is on most of the photos and I need photos for the final presentation. Is it OK to use the photos but pixelate or obscure the child's face? Or do I need to even respect the parents' request to not use the photos? Notes: I gave the parents the permission back, also I'm 18 and this is my first workshop or event I'm planning so all the people I'm working with don't trust me very much.
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Permission is not a physical thing that disappears when a piece of paper evidencing that permission is lost or handed to another party. When someone gives you permission as part of an agreement having the necessary characteristics of a contract, then the revocation of that permission is governed by the terms of the contract itself and your jurisdiction's contract-law. You may not need any permission to use the photos you paid to have taken. (For example, in the U.S. if they were taken in a public place and you are not displaying them for profit.) Or, you might need permission due to various rules or laws protecting minors – only an IP lawyer familiar with your jurisdiction can confirm this is the case – and, unless it was drafted by a competent lawyer, it is quite possible that your "permission statement" was legally insufficient or defective. Or, you might have legally secured necessary permission and still have that permission even though you handed the "permission statement" back to the parents of the subject. In practice: Only a lawyer in your jurisdiction can offer an opinion on which of these scenarios is in fact the case. And only via litigation can you establish further confidence that legal opinion is correct.
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So I can block children under 13, but I can't tell them that? You can tell them after they fail, you cannot tell them on the asking screen. Then what is the correct way to block children under 13 to access my website and still comply with COPPA? I agree with you that it is odd that they recommend using a cookie but they do!* So you have a entry page with a simple question, "Please indicate your age" and then block based on the response. That's it. Note that the rule is neutral. This means that you do not need to disguise your purpose or try to trick people into entering their correct age. *I think that what is happening here is that any parent who wants to complain to their legislator can be met with the response, "If your kid is so sneaky that they are using different computers to lie about their age what do you want us to do about it?" The fact is, this scheme keeps innocent kids from seeing stuff they shouldn't; the sneaky ones are going to find a way.
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The data you cite as PII are simply facts that are public information; your name, photo, your school, track meets, race times, track records, and you have little recourse against the publishing and dissemination of public information, either on a site like Athletic.net that collects and scrapes public information, or against the original sources, such as news outlets and school officials. Collecting and publishing public information is clearly allowed under press freedoms and the 1st Amendment. And, concerning photos: news outlets have the clear right to photograph people in public spaces and identify them. A possible exception regarding athletic.net is the Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule ("COPPA") for children under the age of 13. But they cover that in their Privacy Policy and offer a removal policy. One other possible exception is FERPA, the federal student record law, as pointed out by user6726 in their answer; see eCFR — Code of Federal Regulations. But your parents may have signed a release to allow the information to be made public. In the event neither of those exceptions is the remedy, you would need a court order to force Athletic.net to remove information, and you would need to show very compelling evidence that such data is harmful to you in order for the court to risk violating the First Amendment. Also see Cyberstalking and RateMyProfessors.com
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As stated in the answer to What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?; if either of the participants is in Australia than unless all parties have given consent then the recording is illegal. Notwithstanding its legality, property in the recording vests in the person who made it. There is no law against him keeping it. There is no law against him publishing it unless the material contained is offensive, hate speech or defamatory (see Customer feedback gathering in Australia).
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http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/dk/dk091en.pdf is the Copyright Law in English for Denmark. You should probably try to find a Danish version to ensure the translation is accurate. Chapter 2 lists the exemptions from the general rule that you need the copyright owner's permission to use their IP. Unfortunately, the usage you have made does not meet the requirements for private use (s12): digital copies may only be shared among the members of one household, placing them on the web extends beyond your household. It may meet the requirements of educational use (s13) providing that your school has met the requirements for Extended Collective Use (s50). For photographs, this seems unlikely, such arrangements are usually limited to songs and television works. Under Chapter 6b, you are permitted to use "orphaned works", however, this requires that you have made a diligent search for the owners and have been unable to either identify or locate them. Copyright violation is subject to both penal sanctions (fines and in egregious violations imprisonment) (s76) and damages (s83). TL;DR Yes, you could be sued. Yes, the copyright holder would probably be successful. No, it is extremely unlikely they would bother.
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In NSW Australia this is covered by Division 15A of the Crimes Act 1900 which deals with Child Abuse Material. Under Section 91FA a "child" means a person who is under the age of 16 years - the situation you describe would be between consenting adults in NSW. “Child abuse material” can be text or images that are sexually explicit and would be “offensive” to a normal person (which means offensive to the particular jury) Assuming Jane is 15 or less, however, prima facie the image would be child abuse material and under Section 91H "A person who produces, disseminates or possesses child abuse material is guilty of an offence." The punishment is up to 10 years in jail. Section 91H provides a number of defences, the most relevant to the circumstances you describe being: that the defendant did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to have known, that he or she produced, disseminated or possessed (as the case requires) child abuse material. that the material concerned came into the defendant’s possession unsolicited and the defendant, as soon as he or she became aware of its nature, took reasonable steps to get rid of it. (for possession only) If, considering all the circumstances of the relationship, Joe doesn't know and could not reasonably be expected to know Jane's age then he can use the defence under S91H(1). If he did not request the picture and as soon as he was aware of Jane's age, deleted it, then he can use the defence under S91H(2). The outcome is not so rosy for Jane: she is guilty of both production and dissemination of child abuse material and (assuming she knows how old she is) faces up to 10 years in jail (14 if she is under 14) and registration on the Sex Offenders List for life. It is admittedly unlikely in the circumstances that the state would prosecute her and, if they did, it is very likely that the judge would rule that no conviction be recorded.
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Probably not new-south-wales s91Q of the Crimes Act 1900 NSW makes intentionally distributing intimate images a) without consent and b) knowing they did not consent or being reckless as to consent. The person in question has been told that intimate images sent to this destination will be shared. Their sending them after this is probably consent.
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"Only the owner of copyright in a work has the right to prepare, or to authorize someone else to create, a new version of that work." Copyright in Derivative Works and Compilations http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf So if you have not been granted authorization, you are violating the right of the owner. It's always recommended that you get permission. Practically speaking, if the owner does not give you permission, there is probably someone else with a similar photo who will! Pretty famous recent case: Barack Obama "Hope" poster
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Has anyone been convicted of campaign finance violations by paying an informant before an election? The Atlantic reports In pleading guilty to violations of campaign-finance laws, Cohen said that the then-candidate Trump had directed him to do so, arranging payments to two women who alleged affairs with Trump in order to hush them up and affect the result of the 2016 election. Cohen has plead guilty to eight felonies, including campaign finance violations by paying of a woman to keep her quiet leading up to the US Federal election. Has anyone ever been charged with - much less convicted of - unduly influencing a campaign and election results by paying an informant to not come forward with "damning" information? Has anyone ever been tried and convicted of similar transgressions in any US election?
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John Edwards was charged and acquitted on similar facts. Note, though, that Cohen isn't being charged with unduly influencing the election. As far as campaign-finance laws are concerned, there's nothing wrong with influencing an election by paying hush money to a candidate's side piece. Instead, the law simply asks that you disclose the money you spend when you file your campaign finance reports, and it prohibits direct corporate contributions to a campaign, as well as individual contributions in excess of $2,700. Cohen went wrong by coordinating his work with "Individual-1" to help his campaign by providing valuable legal services and paying hush money to "Woman-1" and "Woman-2" without the campaign paying for it and without the campaign disclosing it. Had Cohen been on the campaign's payroll, and had the hush money come out of the campaign treasury, and had the campaign disclosed it all on their campaign-finance reports, I think he would not be in any legal trouble (although there is the tax evasion, too). I think it's probably safe to say that campaigns make these types of payments to people with damaging information somewhat frequently, and they don't get in trouble because the money comes from campaign funds (why would you want to go out of pocket, anyway?) and they report the expenditures as required. Because the campaign-finance laws are so loose, "disclosing" the expenditure isn't going to give anything away, because you can basically just say "$100,000 to Stephanie Clifford for personal services."
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"Since state level crimes are prosecuted in the state they happen and potential jurors are eligible voters, would this make it impossible for anyone who voted in the election to serve on such a jury as they would obviously prefer their side to win?" No. A conflict of interest is a particularized and personal interest in the case that is different from an interest of a member of the general public or of a voter or of a taxpayer in general. Someone who wouldn't have standing to bring a case will generally not have a conflict of interest for purposes of being a juror.
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Fraud wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in financial or personal gain So, you knowingly deceived the US government in order to make a financial gain by not paying the right amount of tax. Sounds like fraud to me. Specific penalties for the IRS are here. Of most relevance is Title 26 USC § 7201 Attempt to evade or defeat tax: Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof: Shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years Or fined not more than $250,000 for individuals ($500,000 for corporations) Or both, together with the costs of prosecution Note that this is per offence. If you have done it for 6 years that is 6 offences so the maximum you face is 30 years and $1,500,000 plus the costs of prosecution. In practice, how bad can this get? This bad. You need a lawyer now.
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I don't know how that would end, but states' AGs have take action against Trump personally in other matters, and that's bubbling through the courts; latest news I found on something like that on quick search (May 15): A lawsuit accusing President Donald Trump of illegally profiting off the presidency through his luxury Washington hotel was revived Thursday by a divided federal appeals court. [...] Maryland Attorney General Brian Frosh and District Attorney General Karl Racine — both Democrats — said they hoped Thursday's ruling from the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond would jumpstart efforts by the two jurisdictions to obtain financial records showing how much state and foreign governments have paid the Trump Organization to stay at the hotel and hold events there. More than three dozen subpoenas issued to various government agencies were put on hold while Trump's appeal was pending. The lawsuit was filed almost three years ago. U.S. District Judge Peter Messitte refused to dismiss it, but his ruling was overturned in July by a three-judge panel of the 4th Circuit. The judges found that Maryland and the District of Columbia lacked standing to pursue their claims against the president. But on Thursday, the panel's ruling was overturned by the full court of 15 judges. In a 9-6 ruling, the court found that the three-judge panel overstepped its authority when it ordered Messitte to dismiss the lawsuit. "We recognize that the President is no ordinary petitioner, and we accord him great deference as the head of the Executive branch. But Congress and the Supreme Court have severely limited our ability to grant the extraordinary relief the President seeks," Judge Diana Gribbon Motz wrote for the majority in rejecting Trump's request to dismiss the lawsuit. All nine of the judges in the majority were nominated by Democratic presidents. The six judges who disagreed — all nominated by Republican presidents, including three by Trump — wrote a scathing dissenting opinion, saying the lawsuit should be thrown out. "The majority is using a wholly novel and nakedly political cause of action to pave the path for a litigative assault upon this and future Presidents and for an ascendant judicial supervisory role over Presidential action," Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III wrote. DOJ spokeswoman Brianna Herlihy said the department is disappointed in the ruling. Etc.
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Strictly speaking, that principle isn't even true everywhere in the US. The maxim "nulla poena sine lege" (i.e. "no punishment without a prior penal statute") was historically applicable to civil law systems, such as are found in continental Europe. In common-law systems, there was never a tradition in which a crime wasn't a crime unless it violated a penal law, because crimes themselves were traditionally defined by court precedent instead of by statute. In US federal court, the only allowable common-law offense is contempt of court. This is due to a court decision (United States v. Hudson), in which the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts do not have the constitutional authority to hear a case in which someone is accused of committing a common-law crime. Even so, and even though there is a federal contempt statute, the Supreme Court has ruled that contempt is an inherent power of any court, and statutes around it only regulate the power (but the power would be there even without a statute). At the state level, some states have explicitly passed laws saying something is not a crime if it doesn't violate the penal code (although this doesn't necessarily apply to contempt); see section 6 of the California Penal Code for an example. In other states, like Florida, common-law crimes still exist; Florida has a statute saying that any common-law offense is still a crime unless a statute has explicitly covered that same subject matter (section 775.01), and specifies a generic penalty for anything which is an offense at common law and not addressed by any Florida penal statute (section 775.02). While this is sort of statutory (as it's a statute giving the penal provision), it's also basically not (as no statute has to say "X is illegal," because it's enough that English common law makes X illegal).
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Where the President explicitly tells a newspaper that they should reveal their sources. Is this not illegal in the US? It is not illegal. Well, it would be a U.S. Attorney, rather than the President himself. You're thinking of shield laws, but no such law exists at the federal level. Moreover, although some people might think that the First Amendment ("freedom of the press") would protect a journalist in such a case, the Supreme Court has held that it doesn't, though the government is required to "convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest". So if a reporter were subpoenaed in federal court to reveal a source, and they couldn't convince a court to quash the subpoena under the Branzburg test, they'd have to either reveal their source or be held in contempt. In practice, many reporters have chosen the latter, and served time in jail rather than reveal the source. For instance, Judith Miller. There've been a number of proposals to create such a federal law, but so far Congress hasn't seen fit to do it. According to the Wikipedia article, every state except Wyoming has some sort of shield protection for journalists, either in statute or case law, though the protections are not necessarily absolute. So a state court or prosecutor would find it much more difficult to enforce such an order.
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She does not assume a power to pardon for state crimes. The main impediment is the practical one, since a vague order regarding victimless crimes may not be enforceable. POTUS has historically granted general amnesties, such as Lincoln's Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction which did not specify particular laws that were violated or individuals who violated the laws. Some degree of resistance to such an order (by prison officials and the judiciary) is to be expected, to the extent that the scope of an amnesty is ambiguous. The Lincoln proclamation is clear enough in its scope (it was triggered by taking an oath of allegiance and the persons to whom this remedy was not available are clearly-enough described). There are on the order of 70,000 federal criminal convictions with sentencing every year, so probably over a million cases would be subject to review. She would need to sharpen the criteria, presumably by enumerating the applicable statutes. This may include or exclude convictions for perjury or lying to a federal officer. In an individual case, it could be argued that in this case, lying did not violate the rights of another person, but in that case it did – case by case review could be required. Violation of 18 USC 228 (Failure to pay legal child support obligations) might be considered to have a victim, or not, so just saying "non-violent victimless crimes" leaves open the question whether interstate refusal to pay child support is in the pardoned set. Targeted amnesties such as violation of the Controlled Substances Act could be specific enough that they could be enforced.
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Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.
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Too poor to obey the law It's illegal to walk around naked in public, but what if someone is literally too poor to afford clothes?
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This situation is unlikely to come about in practice. If you were born into such extreme poverty, your parents would considered guilty of child neglect, and CPS/social services would take you into foster services where you would be given clothes. If you previously had clothes, but recently became poor, it is very unlikely that any creditors would repossess your last shirt off your back. It would probably be illegal for them to leave you in that situation, and a used shirt wouldn't be worth much. For the same reason, it's unlikely you would sell your last shirt to, eg. pay for food: Who would buy it? For how much? In many countries, there are extensive welfare systems and private charities that private food, free clothing and other resources to the very poor. Even before you lost your last clothes, you could go to these for assistance. So again you are unlikely to involuntarily end up in this position. Also, technically the amount of clothes you are required to wear is usually very small. I believe you are usually only required to cover the groin and breasts if female. In theory you could easily collect a discarded plastic bag, piece of paper, scrap fabric, cardboard box or some other trash to fashion a crude loincloth. Lastly, when the police do show up and arrest you, you will likely have the opportunity to explain to them your situation. They would probably try to get you some basic clothing and other assistance. But if they do end up pressing charges, you would be able to either convince the judge to let you off or challenge the law itself for failing to consider poor people like you. Generally, laws are designed such that there is always an option to follow them and nobody would be "too poor" to comply, failing to do this could make a politician extremely unpopular. Many laws with significant cost burden offer alternatives to the poor. Courts will also tend to be sympathetic to cases such as this. But as I said, the situation is very unlikely to come about.
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In the case of the US, the only anti-discrimination laws that would cover an event is the Civil Rights Act of 1964, under the rubric "public accommodation", in Title II. But that law does not prohibit sex discrimination. The extent of "public accommodation" is not clearly defined, but generally is held to be about "a place", and would include "entrance into this facility". It might be illegal in California, though, since the Unruh Civil Rights Act is more generic, not excluding sex on this point. The main issue would be whether this organization is a "business".
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Legally there is no problem. What you say is protected speech under the 1st Amendment as long as it is either true or a matter of opinion. However Ron Beyer's comment is a good one; while legal this sounds very inadvisable. You would be far better off hiring a lawyer. The Mr Dicks of this world make money from the widespread fear of legal action. He will probably fold as soon as he sees a letter from a lawyer threatening a lawsuit. Until then stalling doesn't cost him anything so he will carry on doing it. BTW, don't delay. I don't know about the US, but over here in the UK there are a number of ways that people like Mr Dick can make it hard to collect. Don't give him time to play shell games with his assets.
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Yes, of course. Anyone can walk up to a shop owner and ask them pretty much whatever questions they want; police have just as much of a right to do that as anyone else. The shop owner doesn't have to answer, but police are free to ask.
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Sometimes running away is a juvenile offense, but it is not an offense for which an adult aged eighteen or over would be arrested or punished. An adult would not be returned home.
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Let's say you leave fake drugs in someone's yard. Eg, you expect the police to be dumb enough to believe it and arrest the other person Obstructing a public officer, specifically "deliberately hindering a public officer from carrying out official duties". Trespassing.
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An existing law actually prohibits using census data "against" a person, see this recent question. The 5th Amendment ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself") is not interpreted to imply an absolute privilege to not answer, it means that your answer cannot be used against you in a criminal case. You can be compelled to testify "against yourself" if you are granted immunity from prosecution.
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If I want to protest for or against President Trump and decide to wear a Trump mask, isn't that speech protected by the first amendment? Probably. The matter of intent, in any event, is for a court to decide (if the prosecutor determines that the question should even be presented to a court). For example, someone seeking to rob a bank in a mask would probably fall afoul of this law, and it's not likely that using a mask of a political figure would enable a successful first-amendment defense. For a political protestor, it could be easy to show that the intent was to make a political statement and not to conceal identity, in which case it would not be necessary to consider the constitutional question, for a critical element of the crime would be missing. That is, if you say "I wasn't trying to hide my identity," and the court believes you, then you haven't violated the statute. That is a separate question from whether the statute is constitutional. For the law itself to be unconstitutional, it would have to be unconstitutional in every application, generally. If some applications of the law are unconstitutional, the law could stand, but prosecutions for the unconstitutional application would not succeed.
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What is the legal mechanism by which the GDPR might apply to a business with no presence in the EU? My family has a small side business selling some things through the internet. As far as I know, we aren't likely to have any customers who are EU citizens, but it's certainly not outside the realm of possibility, and I wouldn't be opposed to shipping to the EU if I got an order from someone in an EU country. However, in reading about the GDPR, I have mostly seen what appears to me to be bare assertion of the GDPR's global applicability to any business, anywhere, who transacts with an EU citizen. My business only has a presence in the US. I am not a citizen of the EU, I'm not represented in any legislative body in an EU nation, neither am I represented in the European Parliament. I am not a subject of the EU in any way, shape or form. Why would the EU expect that any of its laws would apply to my business? More importantly, regardless of what the EU regulators think, how could they possibly enforce any of it against me?
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Why would the EU expect that any of its laws would apply to my business? It doesn't. Unless you choose to do business in the EU (which is possible, thanks to the wonders of the World Wide Web). Then, and only then, do you have to comply with EU law, including the GDPR. From a comment by @BenCollins: I'm talking about non-EU online retail that does allow Europeans (particularly those not actually in the EU at the time of the transaction) to place orders. Basically, GDPR Article 3 says that the GDPR applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union The phrase "in the union" is clearly open to interpretation, but according to the website Security Now, Dr. Michèle Finck says this: Most people seem to agree that the relevant criterion is whether you're based in the EU at the moment data is collected - citizen or not (my emphasis). While Michèle Finck is a well-respected legal scholar, she is not an authoritative legal source, so we need to wait for to case-law to nail this. For what it is worth, (not much I am afraid) I think it would be against common sense to define the territorial scope so broad that brick and mortar stores in the USA risks to be prosecuted in Europe if they sold goods or services to European tourists. However, what most US based businesses that chooses to be open to business for orders that are placed by natural persons who are in the [European] Union need to know that there is this: According to European law, the GDRP does apply to them when they conduct such business. From a comment by @BenCollins: I question the notions that (a) there is a basis by which the law would apply The legal basis is European law, in particular GDPR Article 3. and (b) that it has any enforcement mechanisms outside the EU. As for enforcement, I think a good answer has already been provided by Dale M. but for completeness: The USA has treaties with EU that mean that after a legal case has been decided in a court of law in the EU, it can request that the USA enforce the judgement (typically by collecting the fine the USA-based business incurred when conducting business in Europe). To make this answer more general, here are a breakdown of the the regulation of territorial scope of the GDPR for businesses that are not located in the EU: The scope is clearly spelled out in Article 3, and if you're not "a controller or a processor in the Union", you are only subject to the GDPR if your processing activities are related to: a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. US based companies that engage in business practices that are illegal in Europe know about this, and has already taking steps to protect themselves from the being prosecuted in Europe under the GDPR by using firewalls to block access to their services from the EU. The bottom line is that if you: have no presence in Europe, and don't offer goods or services to people who are in the Union, and you don't collect personal data about European natural persons, then the GDPR does not apply to you. If at least one of the above applies then you need to follow the GDPR if you do not want to be prosecuted in the EU.
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IP addresses are personal data. That means you need a legal basis to process them, but not necessarily consent from the user. That IP addresses should be treated as personal data in most contexts is clear, regardless of whether you can associate the IP address with a user ID. That you make such an association affirms that both the IP address and user ID are personal data in your context though. As the answers in the questions you linked indicate, there are alternative legal bases to consent. The GDPR offers a choice of six legal bases (Art 6(1) lit a–f). In most cases, you would instead rely on a “legitimate interest” for logging. But it's not enough to claim that you have a legitimate interest. You must have a clear purpose for which such logs would be necessary, and you would then have to weigh this legitimate interest against the interests, rights, and freedoms of the affected data subjects. If such logs are necessary for security and anti-abuse purposes, your legitimate interest test is likely to prevail. However, you must limit retention of the logged data and the included information to what is actually necessary. For example, keeping user IDs in there might not be necessary. If the association of IP addresses and user IDs is not necessary for a legitimate interest, then you would indeed need consent. Discussion on why IP addresses are personal data. You see many answers and opinions that IP addresses might not be personal data. Some of these are technically correct, but most are misinformed or outdated. I know only a single well-informed person that still disagrees. For everyone else such as the EU Commission, IP addresses are clearly personal data. Under the GDPR, personal data is any information that relates to an (indirectly) identifiable natural person. In the context of log files we can assume that the entries usually “relate” to a person, namely the person making the request. The exception would be requests triggered by automated systems. The more interesting question is whether the person to which the log entry relates is identifiable. While the GDPR does provide further guidance on the concept of identification in Recital 26, it does not provide clear unambiguous criteria. Thus, there is lots of debate about what that precisely means. One approach is to sidestep that debate and and notice that the GDPR's definition of personal data explicitly notes that a person might be identified “in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier” (Art 4(1)). Another but otherwise unrelated part of the GDPR mentions “internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags” as examples of online identifiers (Recital 30). We can also look more deeply into Recital 26 and see that “singling out” already counts as identification. We can use the IP address to single out one person's log entries from the set of log entries, so this could be interpreted as meaning that any stable user ID renders the data personal data – and an IP address is sufficiently stable in this context. Another part of Recital 26 says that we must consider “all the means reasonably likely to be used” for identification, even if this involves additional information from third parties. This phrasing is virtually identical to the GDPR's predecessor, the EU Data Protection Directive. On the basis of that DPD, the EU's top court (ECJ/CJEU) was asked to rule on the question whether dynamic IP addresses are personal data (the Breyer case, C‑582/14, judgement from 2016-10-19). It said yes. “It did not say yes”, some people will object. And they are technically correct. When someone rents an internet connection from an ISP, the ISP will have logs that connect the user's real-world identity to the IP address they were assigned at a time. You don't have access to the ISP's logs. But, if that user violated your rights (e.g. a cyberattack or copyright infringement), then you could (depending on civil vs criminal matters) report this to the appropriate authorities or to petition the court and they would have the right to order the ISP to disclose this information. The CJEU said that if this chain (you → authorities → ISP → user identity) is grounded in law, then the IP address would be identifiable. But whether there are suitable laws to compel the ISP to disclose this data would be up to national laws, and the CJEU doesn't concern itself with that. Spoiler: such laws are pretty common. To summarize typical objections: The IP address doesn't relate to a person: Can be a valid objection, but is not typically the case for user-facing web services. The Recital 30 argument is not valid because it's about profiling, not identification, and it only says that IP addresses may be used for profiling, not that they are always identifying: Technically correct, but I think that Recital 30 merely expresses the implied understanding that of course an IP address is an online identifier and permits identification by itself. “Singling out” does not apply because SOME_REASON: Indeed, this is an ill-defined term with no case law to guide us. However, regulators such as the EDPB and their predecessor WP29 routinely use “singling out” to mean being able to distinguish one person's data from other people's data. An IP address lets us do that. The Breyer judgement is not applicable because the defendant in that case was the German state, and the state has other legal means than ordinary website operators: Nothing in that case was specific to the website operator being a state or other authority. If the website operator can contact the appropriate authority and if they have the right to order the ISP to disclose the relevant data, then the IP address is identifiable. The CJEU didn't say “yes” in Breyer, it said “if”. So I'll take that as a “no”: The CJEU concerns itself with the interpretation of EU law, not with national laws. Specifically in the Breyer case, lower courts confirmed that German law has the necessary means. In other EU member states, further checks would be necessary but it would surprise me if there wouldn't be equivalent subpoena powers. If the ISP doesn't have the data, then the IP addresses are anonymous: Indeed, the CJEU scenario collapses if there is no additional data to be linked with the IP address. However: The CJEU used this scenario as an example to show that IP addresses can be identifiable. If that particular scenario fails, there could be other scenarios that still allow identification. The question of whether IP addresses are identifiable had of course been the subject of wider debate at the time. That the GDPR explicitly mentions IP addresses can be seen as a reaction to this debate. Thus, in a sense, the Breyer case is moot. It is still useful as an explanation of how broad “reasonably likely means” must be interpreted.
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The data processor is not responsible for complying with the GDPR. You are ultimately responsible, since you are the data controller. The data processor is merely required to assist you, but it's unclear what that means in the presented scenario. Per Art 28(3)(e) GDPR, the DPA must require the data processor to provide reasonable assistance: That contract or other legal act shall stipulate, in particular, that the processor: […] taking into account the nature of the processing, assists the controller by appropriate technical and organisational measures, insofar as this is possible, for the fulfilment of the controller’s obligation to respond to requests for exercising the data subject’s rights laid down in Chapter III; However, per Art 28(1) you can only engage processors that you deem sufficient to protect the data subject's rights: the controller shall use only processors providing sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in such a manner that processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject. Here, it seems that your company failed to ensure that the processor provides the features you need for compliance. Many companies claim to be GDPR-compliant, but that doesn't mean that your use of their services will be GDPR-compliant as well. Depending on how the Art 28(3)(e) requirement was implemented in the DPA you may have a right to assistance even if the processor doesn't implement necessary features in their software, but enforcing this contract could require a lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction (but that's par for the course for international B2B contracts). It is worth noting that the GDPR right to erasure doesn't always apply. In a processing activity where no erasure right is likely to arise, it would be perfectly fine to use a data processor that doesn't offer any possibility for erasure. Similarly, it can sometimes be legal to use technologies like Blockchain or Git that make erasure difficult or impossible. However, it is the responsibility of the data controller to analyze the impact of such a choice up front, before commencing the processing activities. In some cases, this could require a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA). Note that transfers of personal data into the US are illegal or at least questionable in the wake of the 2020 Schrems II ruling. The Privacy Shield is no longer a legal basis for such transfers. Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) are technically allowed, but only “on condition that enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects are available” (cf Art 46). The ECJ's judgement calls this into question. This could be a further incentive to migrate to a more GDPR-compliant service.
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GDPR rights and obligations cover different things: A duty of the data processor towards the government of the country where they operate to present certain documentation, and to implement technical and organizational measures to protect data. These would be audited by government agencies, not the individual customer. A single data subject cannot waive them. A duty of the data processor to process and store personal data only with a legal justification. User consent is one possible justification, if it is informed, revokable, etc. So a single data subject can waive a "ban" on storing his or her data in a database along with all the other users who waived that "ban," but the duties towards the government regarding that data would still apply. A duty of the data processor to respond to an Article 15 request by the data subject in a certain way and timeframe. If a data subject writes a letter to the data processor and explicitly states that the letter is not an Article 15 request, then Article 15 does not apply. The data subject would of course have the right to make an Article 15 request at a later time.
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If you want some boilerplate text to just drop in and have done, you are going to be disappointed. But you don't need a lawyer either. Treat it as a coding job. First, list all the ways you are going to store and process identifiable user data. If someone is going to process it on your behalf, identify them too. Draw a chart showing the paths that user data is going to take. (Storage is a form of processing) Then look at the 6 bases for processing user data and figure out which ones apply to each step. E.g. if the user asks you to do something then that is one basis under which you can process their data. See how much coverage you can get without asking for consent. For each third party (e.g. Google) figure out what data is to be sent to them, and where they will be. Google has data centres in the EU specifically so you can get them to process user data without sending it outside the EU. Check the third party contracts for these services, including the confidentiality clauses. Link that to the processing they will do for you. Finally, pull all this together into a single summary of what you are going to do with the data and the bases under which you will do it.
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The GDPR as such puts obligations on the Data Controller (DC), that is the person or firm or other entity who determines the purposes for which data is processed. The entity that hires the developer and operates the web site is responsible for compliance with the GDPR and other laws and regulations, such as the e-privacy directive and its implementing laws. However, it is highly likely that in commissioning a web site the DC would specify that it be designed to aid compliance with the GDPR and other relevant laws, and if the developer did not do that it might be a breach of contract. Indeed, even if GDPR-friendliness was not explicitly required by the contract between the developer and the DC, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for the purpose would probably apply. A designer who, knowing the site is to be hosted and operated within the EU, failed to design it to facilitate GDPR compliance might well be in violation of those warranties. But that would depend on the specifics of Italian law. But note that GDPR compliance is not a matter of web site design, but of the ongoing practices of the operation of the site. There are various ways to comply with the GDPR, no specific technology or design need be used. The DC must so operate the site as to comply. If the DC fails to do that, penalties could be imposed on the DC, not on the developer.
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Corrections to your statements or quotations Your quotation "To fall within the remit of the GDPR, the processing has to be part of an "enterprise" (...)" is not from the GDPR, and is an erroneous statement. Also, the threshold of 250 employees you refer to, is only relevant with regards to the record-keeping obligations of Article 30. GDPR provisions relevant to your question The GDPR applies to individuals or students in accordance with the material scope of the GDPR, which is treated in Article 2 (2) c) where GDPR states that "This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (...) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity;" The Recital 18 of the GDPR gives some insight as to what would be a purely personal or household activity as follows: (18) This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity and thus with no connection to a professional or commercial activity. Personal or household activities could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. However, this Regulation applies to controllers or processors which provide the means for processing personal data for such personal or household activities. Interpretation To my knowledge, there are no specific guidelines regarding this matter to date from WP29. Those may be adopted in the future, or some requirements may already exist in local laws in one of the EU countries or from documentation available from local data protection authorities. If you are based in the EU, you could check this with your local data protection authority. There is, however, case law from the European Court of Justice as pointed out by Free Radical, interpreting the scope of the "personal use exception" in Directive 95/46/EC (which provisions are similar to the GDPR in this matter). If your hobby is not limited to your personal circle (yourself and the persons in your household), and thus if you plan to share the results of your data collection and processing with third parties (possibly teachers, other fellow students, or anybody else if you publish the results of your work) resulting from your "hobby" activity, you certainly would not fall in this exception to the scope. Case C-101/01 is an example of publication on the Internet made by an individual claiming to use its "freedom of expression to create internet pages in the course of a non-profit-making or leisure activity". The court clarified that: exception must (...) be interpreted as relating only to activities which are carried out in the course of private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the case with the processing of personal data consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are made accessible to an indefinite number of people Another, less optimistic interpretation from the examples given by the GDPR recitals, could derive from the spirit in which purely personal or household activity are to be understood. These examples actually refer to limited amounts of data and which are related to the individual itself (his own address book, his social networking activity, etc.), and creating limited risks relevant to the person herself and its contacts. In this view, there is a risk that a "hobby" in which you collect data about thousands of persons unrelated to you, could be considered as not being really purely personal. Actually, an interpretation of case law C-212/13 from the European Court of Justice also mentioned by Free Radical could support this reasoning. In this case, a video recording of people was stored from cameras installed by an individual on his family home for its own security purposes, but the cameras were also monitoring a public space. The court ruled that: To the extent that video surveillance such as that at issue in the main proceedings covers, even partially, a public space and is accordingly directed outwards from the private setting of the person processing the data in that manner, it cannot be regarded as an activity which is a purely ‘personal or household’ activity (...) Extending this reasoning to your question, a "hobby" consisting of collecting "huge list of names, emails, zipcodes" unrelated to you could be regarded as "directed outwards from the private setting (...)". Conclusion As a hobbyist, or a student, if you can work on fake computer generated data and achieve the same results in your personal learning purposes you should definitely consider doing so.
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Term 1 isn't going to hold up, but that is not a GDPR matter. It's just a matter of basic consumer protection law in the EU. You can't offload responsibility for your mistakes. Looking at 2, Dale M. already pointer out that it's now how the GDPR works. You are the Data Controller. X,Y and Z are Data Processors. Article 28(1) of the GDPR is in direct conflict with your disclaimer. You accept zero responsibility, the GDPR says you are fully responsible. That's the exact opposite.
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Are cricket farms for human nutrition allowed in Germany? Is it allowed to breed and sell human edible crickets commercially? Can't find any farms by googling.
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The exact answer will depend on the details (scale of the operation, where it is happening, what purpose the crickets are being sold for etc.), but in general: Yes, breeding and selling crickets is allowed in general. Here's an article (German) on someone who plans to breed insects for food (the article only says he is breeding "Heuschrecken", which could be several different species from the order Orthoptera, but it's probably close enough): Insekten auf dem Teller - Thorsten Breitschuh baut eine Heuschreckenzucht auf ("Insects on the plate - Thorsten Breitschuh is starting an orthoptera breeding program") The article does mention some legal problems, but they mostly revolve around getting the insects certified as safe food, and complying with environment regulations during the breeding. Also, you can buy crickets and similar insects in many pet stores as animal food for reptiles, so breeding and selling them as animal food is definitely not prohibited.
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BAD idea It is one thing to upload the phonebook and associated pictures for use of the owner of the phonebook. It isn't a fair use of the phonebook pictures - and you might not have a license anyway, as some people associate photos with numbers that they don't have a license to associate with anyway. But what if instead of a photo of the person, the first photo someone associated with the person is a photo of something like... crack cocaine, a photo of someone in a very compromising situation, just genitals, or some other thing that is just as tasteless or possibly criminal to share? In that case, your company is possibly committing defamation, and in case sharing or possessing of the image itself is illegal, your company is now the actor and liable. Depending on the content of the picture, distribution of pornographic material (possibly even underage material of that sort) could be up that alley just as much as hate speech through symbols, usage of banned symbols (such as swastikas in Gernamy) and many many others.
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It's illegal under US law. 18 U.S. Code § 478 says: Whoever, within the United States, with intent to defraud, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits any bond, certificate, obligation, or other security of any foreign government, purporting to be or in imitation of any such security issued under the authority of such foreign government, or any treasury note, bill, or promise to pay, lawfully issued by such foreign government and intended to circulate as money, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. There are several similar laws for similar crimes: § 479 - Uttering counterfeit foreign obligations or securities § 480 - Possessing counterfeit foreign obligations or securities § 481 - Plates, stones, or analog, digital, or electronic images for counterfeiting foreign obligations or securities § 482 - Foreign bank notes § 483 - Uttering counterfeit foreign bank notes § 488 - Making or possessing counterfeit dies for foreign coins § 502 - Postage and revenue stamps of foreign governments According to version of the South Sudan penal code I was able to find, counterfeiting is illegal. But if I understand section 7 correctly (which I might not), most counterfeiting is not prosecutable under South Sudan law if it is not done in South Sudan. Having a counterfeit revenue stamp, however, would be, as would fraudulently altering a coin. Given that there's not an extradition treaty and that it's already illegal under US law, this probably doesn't matter much, though
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Yes You can legally make a a product with the same method. For example, sparkling wine using the same method as champagne. But it it is not made in the right region, it can not be sold under that region label. Champagne needs also the correct grapes from the Champagne, so the sparkling wine after the champagne method should never to be called champagne. Similarly, a tea may be processed just the same as Darjeeling Tea, but it can't be called Darjeeling in trade if it is not from the right region. Most countries that have marks for geographic origin respect them globally.
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You would not be liable for a fine (If you think about it, how can you be - Australia does not have jurisdiction over you as you are in New Zealand, and you have broken no NZ law - Further, you declared the item to customs so even in Australia you could not be held liable) Looking at it another way, if you had gotten on a plane with it, declared it to customs on the arrival card, they would have simply asked to see it and made a decision whether to let it in or not - they would not fine you. Customs may or may not confiscate it (ie they may let it through). I've not sent a parcel to Australia, but I have imported seeds into NZ - I made a number of calls and emails to ensure I got the process right - expected to pay quite a lot of money to do it - in the end they just came straight to me - MAF did not even examine the parcel. Being that NZ and AU are pretty similar in terms of legislation (ie both the food standards are the same) - its probably actually Ok to send it anyway - in fact the Imported Food Control At 1992 - which I believe is applicable - specifically exempts many foods imported from New Zealand from the act. The last paragraph of this AU government web page states "The only New Zealand foods that are subject to the IFIS at the border are those classified as risk foods. Equivalence determination of food safety systems covering dairy products was reached in 2007 and seafood, uncooked pigmeat, chicken meat, coconut, pepper, paprika, peanuts and pistachios were aligned in 2011. This enabled these products to be brought under the TTMRA and removed the requirement for border inspection for these products."
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In Germany, there is no concept that corresponds directly to public domain. You automatically hold the Urheberrecht (~ copyright) for all creative works that you make, and it can't be given up or transferred (§29 UrhG). The work only enters the Gemeinfreiheit (~public domain) 70 years after your death. You can however license Verwertungsrechte (economic usage rights). When you make creative works in the course of employment (see §43 UrhG), your employer automatically gets the Verwertungsrechte necessary in the context for the work, which is typically an exclusive right (no one else, not even you, can use the work). Your are not in an employment relationship with your school, so it has no rights to your works and cannot prevent you from publishing them on copyright grounds. When you see advice on the internet to check with your school first, that is U.S.-specific advice. Since you're still a minor (7–17), you only have limited capacity to enter contracts or legal transactions (bedingte Geschäftsfähigkeit). While you are able to make transactions involving your own means (e.g. buying something with your pocket money) or make transactions that are only to your benefit (such as accepting a gift), other transactions are schwebend unwirksam (~ pending ratification), until your parents agree. The relevant law is in §107 and §108 BGB. This is a problem with open source licenses. If you publish software under a license, this license is schwebend unwirksam. Someone might start using the software under the license. But then if your parents refuse ratification, the license would be invalid, and everyone would have to stop using your software and destroy any derivative works they made. This is a bit of a problem, especially since open source licenses are otherwise assumed to be irrevocable. So if you want to offer a license (including open source licenses), please give legal certainty to the recipients of the license and ask your parents for their consent first, possibly even in writing. Per §107 BGB, the license you offer with their consent will be valid.
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No it’s not illegal It’s called retailing: https://youtu.be/ywSkKkuGQ2A https://youtu.be/k8OreiHU91Y https://youtu.be/XpR6y1sNArU You are allowed to advertise the products you sell. Even if you don’t make them. You can even use their trademarks to identify them - that’s what trademarks are for.
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This might be legal to do with patients in some places, but it is probably not legal to do in general, although it might be hard to enforce the laws prohibiting this conduct against a provider in Pakistan. Different countries and sub-national governments regulate providing therapy differently. Some don't regulate it all, so you would only have to comply with the law of Pakistan on the subject, if any. Other places require an occupational license to provide therapy, and in those case, the law of the place where the patient resides could apply that licensure requirement based upon where the patient resides, where the therapist is located when the service is provided, or by some other rules. You would have to determine this on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis to be legal. Many jurisdictions also have VAT or GST taxes that would apply to fees collected for therapy services provided to someone in their jurisdiction, and this would also be a compliance issue if there was fee for the therapy. As a practical matter, you would also have to consider if there was any meaningful way that you could be punished for providing therapy services or not paying taxes in particular jurisdictions where some patients might reside or be receiving your app's services. If there was no meaningful remedy for violating those laws against your company in Pakistan, you might decide to ignore those laws because you could.
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Can a sitting president of the United States be indicted by one of the states? Some lawyers say a sitting president cannot be indicted, other lawyers disagree. Apart from that, does what they are saying apply to both federal and state indictments? I mean could the president be indicted by the state of New York, say?
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Note the following argument: the landmark 1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland, which ruled that state officials cannot obstruct “the measures of a government [the federal government] created by others as well as themselves.” “In other words,” Kalt and Amar summarize, “a single state cannot use its power to derail the functioning of the United States.” (Amar is a Yale constitutional law professor, Kalt, his student) On the other hand, you have the argument by a Hofstra constitutional law professor that the 25th amendment can be applied when the President is occupied with a criminal case, ergo, the functioning of the United States can be carried on unimpared. At the end-of-the-day there is no absolute answer as it is still being argued academically and has never been specifically settled by the courts.
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He will be thrown out of office (the "except in case of impeachment" clause means the president cannot immunize a person against impeachment); because he was pardoned by POTUS, he will not be charged of the crime that he was pardoned for – the prosecution does not get a chance to argue anything. They might however prosecute him for some other offense not covered by the pardon (if POTUS forgets a sweeping statement like "any and all crimes related to X"). I don't think a prosecutor is likely to try to argue that the Constitution means "the president cannot pardon a person who has been impeached".
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It is hard to tell if this constitute criminal conspiracy. The insight and input you contribute to the planning of the crime (and acts you may have taken to acquire the knowledge used in those plans such as a Google search and research to assist in the planning) could itself arguably be an overt act. But facts in the question regarding your participation in the planning meeting isn't specific enough to know. You've also, probably accidentally, backed into another issue because of the way that this question is framed. If you and anyone else in the group are U.S. citizens, planning to assassinate the President, at least while the President is in office for reasons in any way related to his official duties while in office as President, very likely also constitutes the crime of treason. This matters because there are quite serious criminal penalties under federal law for a failure of anyone to report an attempt to engage in sedition, when you are aware of it, even though there isn't general duty to report most crimes of which you are aware under federal law. The crime of failing to report a treasonous plot is called "misprison of treason". See 18 U.S..C. § 2382. This statute states: Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having knowledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the governor or to some judge or justice of a particular State, is guilty of misprision of treason and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both. So, even if you haven't engaged in conspiracy to assassinate the President, you are probably still guilty of a serious federal felony.
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The comments have already pointed out that the President of the United States is still a citizen, and all of the rights of a citizen are still protected for them. Additionally, the Administration is allowed to take policy positions which are antagonistic to a person or group's cause, even if that group is practicing their rights to express their views legally. To give a different example, the President and his administration may denounce the position of a group of Neo-Nazis marching legally. So, any argument that the President is acting in an official capacity while making antagonistic comments also probably fails, as the Administration is allowed to take a position on any issue they deem worth taking a stand on. As noted in another answer and in comments, the applicable laws appear to be 18 U.S. Code § 227, which provides for punishment of government officials who attempt to influence employment decisions through official acts for political purposes, and 42 U.S. Code § 1983, which provides for civil action when a person deprives, or causes the deprivation of, another person's rights under color of law. 18 U.S. Code § 227 likely does not apply for two reasons The President may show that his conduct was not purely for political purpose The official statements made do not qualify as official acts per McDonnell v. United States, as they are not a decision or action on a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy"; that question or matter must involve a formal exercise of governmental power, and must also be something specific and focused that is "pending" or "may by law be brought" before a public official 42 U.S. Code § 1983 might apply if the official statements were found to be acting under color of law, but I think the statements made so far will fail to meet the qualifications for this statute. Blair v. Bethel School District gives three qualifications for conduct that would allow recovery under this statute: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action. The President's and Administration's official speech appears to fail the second criteria. First, it is questionable whether it qualifies as an "Adverse Action" - in Blair, as well as Hartman v. Moore and Gibson v. United States, the adverse action against the Plaintiff caused actual damage or indignity. However, even if we assume the official speech qualifies as an adverse action for the purposes of the statute, it still appears to be permissible for effectively the same reasons as the first and third arguments presented in the decision: First, the adverse action Blair complains of was a rather minor indignity, and de minimis deprivations of benefits and privileges on account of one's speech do not give rise to a First Amendment claim. The actual effect of the Administration's speech has a minimal direct effect on the players it speaks against. The decision further states: The most familiar adverse actions are “exercise[s] of governmental power” that are “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature” and have the effect of punishing someone for his or her speech Official speech by the Administration is not "regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature." While this is not a complete definition for "adverse action," it gives a sense of severity, which official speech does not appear to meet. Additionally, the President's right to speech, and the Administration's authority and need to make official speech as directed by the President is a competing interest in this case, as was the interest of the Board in Blair: Third, it is significant that Blair isn't the only party in this case whose interests implicate First Amendment concerns. To the contrary, we assume all of the Board members have a protected interest in speaking out and voting their conscience... The decision does note that: The point isn't that the vote against Blair was protected speech simply because it was expressive. Almost all retaliatory actions can be said to be expressive, including those that are manifestly unconstitutional. But, while Blair certainly had a First Amendment right to criticize Seigel and vote against his retention as superintendent, his fellow Board members had the corresponding right to replace Blair with someone who, in their view, represented the majority view of the Board. Similarly, it's probable that a court would find that the President's right to speech and their Administration's corresponding authority to speech against the players' right to protest is equally weighted or even weightier, such that stifling the official speech is as bad or worse than the alleged chilling effect of the speech. Some examples of things that clearly would fall afoul of 42 U.S. Code § 1983 would be the President or the Administration misappropriating funds to use to pay NFL teams not to hire players who kneel during the national anthem, or signing an Executive Order preventing players who kneel during the national anthem from playing - in both cases, they are taking actions which fall outside the powers of their office, which would qualify as acts made under color of law and clearly chill the players' First Amendment rights.
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Not directly However, a President who is unable to discharge their duties (by being on vacation or otherwise) can be dealt with by either: the vice-President and Cabinet invoking the 25th amendment and declaring the President unable to perform their duties, by the House impeaching the President for the “high crime and misdemeanour” of not doing her job. If convicted by the Senate, the person is no longer President.
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There is no legal process whereby a demand can be made that POTUS nominate or consider a specific individual for some appointment such as a court position. There can be no law prescribing how such nominations come about, other than The Constitution which says that POTUS shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law Congress does not have the power to pass laws limiting how POTUS makes nominations, therefore whatever POTUS wants to do in this respect is a non-justiciable matter.
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Treason is basically the only crime explicitly defined by the Constitution. According to Article III, Section 3: Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. So, no. What this hypothetical president is calling for is unconstitutional, is almost certainly grounds for impeachment, and may even be criminal, but treason it ain't. And that's assuming he actually does it. Simply calling for it, without acting (or directing others to act) to bring it about, may well be protected by the First Amendment.
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If you are charged under the laws of Estonia (or Australia or Thailand or the UK) then the laws of the USA have no relevance whatsoever. It makes no difference if you are a US citizen, if the alleged crime happened in the USA or was perpetrated against the USA. If nation X has jurisdiction then you are tried under the laws of nation X. That is what sovereignty means. As to your specific example, Facebook does business in Estonia, therefore they are subject to Estonian law, as a US corporation they are also subject to US law and the law of every other jurisdiction they operate in (see why they need big legal departments?). If a legitimate Estonian warrant was served on them to disclose metadata or anything else then they are legally obliged to do so or be in contempt of court. Oh, and by the way, the first amendment right to free speech does not give you a right to anonymous free speech.
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What is the meaning of "Individual-1"? During the Cohen trial last night, Trump was described as "Individual-1." Now I know they weren't trying to hide who this "Individual-1" was because they deliberately said that Individual-1 became President in 2017, which narrows the possibilities down to one person. So I thought there must have been some legal reason why they didn't name Trump directly. Why name him "Individual-1" rather than saying who he is directly?
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Identifying someone as a criminal without charging them and thereby giving them an opportunity to clear their names has due process implications, largely because of the associated reputational damage. DOJ policy therefore advises against naming unindicted co-conspirators: Ordinarily, there is no need to name a person as an unindicted co-conspirator in an indictment in order to fulfill any legitimate prosecutorial interest or duty. For purposes of indictment itself, it is sufficient, for example, to allege that the defendant conspired with "another person or persons known." In any indictment where an allegation that the defendant conspired with "another person or persons known" is insufficient, some other generic reference should be used, such as "Employee 1" or "Company 2". The use of non-generic descriptors, like a person's actual initials, is usually an unnecessarily-specific description and should not be used. The policy comes from a case where they did identify two unindicted (alleged) co-conspirators, and the Fifth Circuit ordered the expungement of the portions of the indictment that named them, agreeing with their claim that they had a right a due process right "to protect their reputations ... against the opprobrium resulting from being publicly and officially charged by an investigatory body of high dignity with having committed serious crimes." U.S. v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975). At first blush, the description does seem to fall into the "unnecessarily specific" category, but note that the language doesn't actually say "Individual 1 became President in 2017," it says that Cohen's conduct occurred "in or about January 2017," and that Individual-1 had become President "at that point." So if the conduct occurred before noon on January 20, 2017, we'd be talking about President Obama. That's obviously hyper-technical, but we are talking about the Department of Justice here. Another possibility is that the success of the campaign/conspiracy may be necessary information for sentencing purposes. I'm not all that familiar with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but my understanding is that a sentence may be reduced if a defendant had withdrawn from a conspiracy in time to prevent its fulfillment. Because that did not happen here, Cohen would not be entitled to that reduction.
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This generally requires a court order (everything depends on jurisdiction: this is a state matter, not a federal matter). As a minor, the courts could allow your parents to change from Dweezil to William without involving you, until you are old enough that the judge thinks you might be able to have reasonable input into the matter. Once you're over 18, your parents can't change your name – you would have to do that, at least if you are mentally competent. In Washington, the courts juggle the wishes of the child, the wishes of the parents, how long the child has had the name, and the social advantages or disadvantages of the name change, and permission from the minor is required if over 14 (child input would be solicited for a child over 7). Since this involves a court order, in principle this information is available to the child. In cases involving domestic violence, the records could be sealed. A name can be changed by changing the birth certificate which means filling out a form and paying a fee, and if the child is under 1 year old, it just requires the signatures of the parents (or, a court order). This "under 1" paperwork approach seems to be widespread (Colorado, New York, others). Also bear in mind that the initial filing of a birth certificate may well not have a child's name, which may not be supplied until the parents make up their minds. Changes to the birth certificate are knowable (they don't erase anything), but can only be revealed to the subject of the record, or in case of court order. Thus a change should be discernible, if other states are like Washington.
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england-and-wales "Lead defendant" is not used, unless colloquially by some, but a comparable term would be "principal defendant" which is more than mere style as it becomes important when establishing the hierarchy of defendants for, say, culpability and at sentencing (i.e. it has some legal implications). It could also relate to the first-named on the indictment (see rule 3.32(1)(b)(ii) Criminal Procedure Rules 2020) and often this is the principal, but the prosecutor has discretion on the order of names on the indictment, because: It is important to bear in mind that defendants are called to give evidence in the order in which their names appear on the indictment. This means that a tactical decision may need to be made as to the order of defendants on the indictment, bearing in mind the evidence and the nature of the case. Source Although tagged united-states, I have followed the guidance from the LawSE Help Centre: "Even if you supply a jurisdiction tag, we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]"
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It depends on whether you can identify the person to whom a username hash belongs. If you store both username and its hash in the same database row then yes. If it is impracticable for you to identify the person by their hash only, then no. This comes from the definition of personal data — "any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person", and Recital 26: Not applicable to anonymous data. The hash is essentially anonymous data when it does not on its own allow to identify the person (with reasonable efforts i.e. without spending $$$ on detectives or forensic science).
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Would such a person be considered a "natural born citizen," for the purpose of qualifying for the presidency, from October 25th 1994? In other words, after having lived in the US for at least 14 years, could such a person run for the office of the president or the vice president? This is an unresolved issue. Some scholars believe that to be a "natural born citizen" you have to be a citizen on the day that you are born. Other scholars believe that a "natural born citizen" is someone who gains citizenship by a means other than naturalization. No binding precedents resolve the issue because the phrase "natural born citizen" is used nowhere else in the law besides qualification to be the President of the United States, and the issue can't be resolved until someone is purportedly elected because there isn't an actual case or controversy until then, and there haven't been an examples that have come up that have tested this issue. My personal guess is that the courts would make every effort to find that someone who has been elected by the citizens of the United States as President, despite the inevitable debate by the public over someone's qualification as a "natural born citizen" during the campaign, is eligible to hold that position, because to do otherwise would seem massively undemocratic. So, I suspect that retroactive citizenship at birth would be held by the courts to make someone a "natural born citizen" and eligible to serve as President. Then again, I could see this issue being resolved by the courts on basically partisan lines too with conservative judges tending to hold that a liberal candidate was ineligible for office, and liberal judges making the opposite conclusions about a liberal candidate. This is one fair reading of what happened in the case of Bush v. Gore. Would the answer depend on whether the person had been naturalized before 1994? The citizenship by naturalization is irrelevant to whether you have another grounds for claiming citizenship that was present at birth or did not arise from naturalization. On October 25th, 1994, the naturalization became redundant.
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I did a lot of digging through case law and statutes, but I don't see a definition for "biological sex" anywhere in federal law, though after looking through those cases, it seems pretty clear that courts think of "biological sex" as a definition of "sex," and that they take it to mean the sex listed on your birth certificate. Even if we could find a straightforward statutory definition, it probably wouldn't do much to inform the interpretation of this memorandum, as it would only apply to the specific section of law in which the definition was included.
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So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification.
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How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent.
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Is email verification for account creation in violation of GDPR? Is email verification for account creation in violation of GDPR? I am creating a new website, and my account creation is incredibly simple, consisting of username, password (stored as hash), and email. Email is verified at the creation process and is used for password recovery and that is it. Someone had said I may want to look at GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) and that I may be violating it, opening myself up to liability. Now, I feel that this is not the case, although I may indeed be wrong. The real question is, where is this line drawn? How is it that this could be illegal (like not stating why I need the email address?) and what can be done if this IS illegal to correct it? I was not 100% sure where to post this, so I hope this was the correct place if not, I will freely move it/repost it if you think it is better suited elsewhere. Thank you for reading. Reading about the GDPR is interesting to say the least, as a consumer I love it, as a novice part-time developer I am beyond perplexed by it.
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When someone registers at your website, they enter a contract with you. You need an email address, because you need to be able to contact them (at least for the password recovery). You probably want to verify the email address, otherwise you might not be able to contact them in the future. So the email verification is required as part of the performance of the contract. But also anti-spam laws might require you to use confirmed opt-in before you are allowed to send automatic emails. So at least Article 6(1)(b) (performance of a contract) would apply, but for the confirmed opt-in also Art. 6(1)(c) (compliance with a legal obligation) might apply. That means sending the verification mail is lawful. However you probably want to write this down in the privacy policy as Greendrake commented. Note that there must not be an option for users to agree with the privacy policy, it is just a statement which you make.
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Is it actually necessary for businesses (such as a Small Town News USA Inc) that do not reside in EU to care about GDPR? Only if they offer goods/services to or monitor behavior of people in the EU (Art. 3(2)). Note that: having a commerce-oriented website that is accessible to EU residents does not by itself constitute offering goods or services in the EU. Rather, a business must show intent to draw EU customers, for example, by using a local language or currency. If it is then how (and by whom) would compliance be audited and/or enforced? Supervisory Authorities will care of it.
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I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy.
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First of all, although the GDPR is stated to apply to any site which processes the data of any person who is in the EU, it is not clear how a site not located in the EU, does not business in the EU, and does not primarily target EU residents as its audience can be required to comply with the GDPR. To the best of my knowledge, no such case has yet been brought, much less decided. There has also been some debate on whether an IP address constitutes Personal Data under the GDPR, and if it always does so, or only under particular conditions. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that (under the predecessor Directive 95/46/EC) that a dynamic IP address was personal data. But in that case the web site was run by the German Federal Government, which surely has wider scope for getting info from a German ISP than a small private US web activist does. There is not yet any case law that I know of on the applicability of the GDPR to IP addresses in any case at all similar to the one in the question. Joe would in my view be wise to at least learn that logs are being kept, and post a disclosure of this on the site. Whether Joe needs to do more than that is less than clear at this time.
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The GDPR's right to erasure just applies in some specific situations. While messages you wrote on Slack are personal data, they are generally also part of a larger discussion with others. If your messages are removed, the discussion becomes incomplete, so that will violate the freedom of expression of those others. Art. 17(3) GDPR provides an exception for the right of erasure in such cases. So basically, whoever is the controller, you probably don't have the right to have your messages to be deleted. However, you would have the right to have your account pseudonymized like Slack replied in the Reddit post you linked to. See also my answer in "Does a user have the right to request their forum posts deleted?". Basically, it is correct that Slack can be just the processor. Even if the controller cannot get access to more than 10000 messages unless they pay. However, Slack is not allowed to do anything with those messages, except when the controller says so. In its Privacy Policy, Slack distinguishes between customer data and other data. It states to be the processor for the customer data, but controller for the other data. Because those are tied together, I am not sure this distinction can be made. If not, Slack and the customer will be joint controllers, but it requires probably a court case to decide on that. For example, the Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled (in the Fashion ID case) that putting a Facebook "like" button on your website, makes you a joint controller together with Facebook. And (in the Wirtschaftsakademie case) that also creating a Facebook "fan" page makes you a joint controller. But neither of those are very similar to the situation with Slack.
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You won't be able to get around self-doxxing yourself. § 5 Abs 1 TMG requires tele-media service providers like you to list den Namen und die Anschrift, unter der sie niedergelassen sind the name and the address where they reside or are established Similarly, Art 13(1) GDPR requires you to provide the identity and the contact details of the controller In a German context, it is generally accepted that both of these involve a ladungsfähige Anschrift, i.e. a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit (not a post box). These requirements exist for both natural persons and legal entities, and for both businesses and non-commercial activities. The TMG Impressumspflicht talks about “geschäftsmäßige, in der Regel gegen Entgelt angebotene Telemedien” but in practice this only requires that the service could be paid (not that you're actually making any money), and that the service is offered routinely/business-like (not necessarily commercially). It does not matter where your service is hosted as long as you live in Germany. The TMG and GDPR might not apply if the forum is run purely privately, e.g. if it is only made available to a few close friends or family members.
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Contacting a business email about a business matter is usually fine, but in this case we have an unsolicited marketing communication (spam), not really a business matter. The client's jurisdiction likely has more specific rules about spam. Also, it is unusual (read: presumably illegitimate) to contact individual employees rather than the company's official address with the offering. From the GDPR perspective, every processing of personal data (such as email addresses that might identify natural persons) needs a legal basis (Art 6). Let's go through them: consent? No. necessary for performance of a contract involving the data subject? No. legal obligation? No. vital interests? No. public interest? No. legitimate interest? Perhaps. The client has a legitimate interest to conduct their business. However, this legitimate interest must not be overridden by the data subject's interests, rights, and freedoms. Such as the interest in not being disturbed by spam mails. It is the Data Controller's (your client's) responsibility to balance the legitimate interest themselves to determine whether they have a legal basis, but I really don't think that they do. In conclusion, your client's idea is a bad idea: They likely do not have a legal basis for this under the GDPR. They are likely violating more specific anti-spam laws in their jurisdiction. They are working hard to get their domain put on spam filter lists. Note that already the step of collecting employee email addresses is personal data processing and needs a legal basis. Of course, the GDPR does not apply when the client is not established in the EU and only processes the addresses of persons that are not in the EU.
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Obtaining consent for cookies is not required by the GDPR at all. Instead it is covered by the e-privacy directive, which as a directive rather than a regulation, must be implements by specific legislation in each individual country. The exact requirements vary with the law of each country. An e-privacy regulation has been proposed, which would have scope similar to the GDPR, would replace the Directive, and would not require national implementing legislation. However it has not yet been adopted. Proposed versions have significantly different requirements than the current Directive. Nor does the GDPR require consent for advertising that does not involve the processing of personal information, unlike some other privacy laws such as the California CCPA. However, if the Google package sets cookies without consent that are not strictly necessary for operation of the web site, it might well fail compliance with some of those national laws implementing e-privacy. Also, even necessary cookies must be disclosed to the user, as I understand it, possibly only in general terms. Several national Data Protection agencies have said that cookie compliance is not a major priority, at least not until an e-privacy regulation is in place. But that does not mean that lack of compliance is legal. Unfortunately I see no way for a developer using the Google package to correct this issue within the package. One would either have to implement a different solution, or trust that Google will fix this before enforcement becomes a serious issue. However, the app developer could add a separate general cookie consent banner, and turn off all adds if consent is not given, I believe.
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Is criminal prosecution up to the police/state or can an individual push it? What can an individual do to get someone prosecuted (apart from reporting the matter to the police and giving testimony)? What if the police is reluctant to give traction? If this question is too general, let's scope it down to intentional damage to property in New Zealand (up to 7 years, S269(2)(a) Crimes Act 1961) and/or reckless ill-treatment of animals (up to 3 years, S28A Animal Welfare Act 1999). Important thing to note that the individual wishing to prosecute is not the owner of the damaged property, therefore civil claim probably cannot work here. Use-case scenario There is a domestic animal owned by A, living on B's property and wandering in the neighbourhood; B loves/feeds the animal, so does his neighbour C and many other neighbours except for D; One day the animal enjoys sunshine at D's property which is a huge empty paddock — quite far away from D's house but very close to B's and C's; D arrives in his car bringing over his hunting dog to where the animal is; The dog starts pursuing the animal (still on D's property) and, just as the animal runs on the street, kills it there; D leaves the animal dead, gets his dog back in the car and drives away; B and C, frustrated by what happened and grieving for the animal, want to prosecute D. The actual owner (A) does not care.
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Private prosecution is allowed in New Zealand, so one possibility would be to conduct the prosecution yourself. You could either do that as a case of destruction of property, or under the Animal Welfare Act. It is not guaranteed that your charging document will be accepted (for example, if your document lacks the required content). An alternative would be to apply political pressure to the Crown Law Office, to persuade them to pursue the matter.
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Rudeness is not a crime Thankfully, or I’d be writing this from jail. The threat or actually of intentional and unwanted physical contact is a crime. Historically these were seperate common law crimes (and torts) of assault and battery respectively. However, in most jurisdictions these have been codified and merged and redefined so there is common assault (which merges historic assault and battery and is what you are asking about), indecent assault, sexual assault etc. In general, there must be an intentionality to the contact - accidentally colliding with someone is not assault (although it can be the tort of negligence). Similarly the contact must be unwanted - participating in a game of rugby means you want to be tackled (in a legal sense, in a sports sense you don’t want to be tackled, you want to score). And finally it must intend harm - holding your hands up to prevent a collision does not intend harm even if harm may result, punching someone does. In the cases you describe, the aggressor is the “elderly person” and they have committed a crime. I am interested in the suggestion that public opinion in first-world countries like Canada is that being old and annoyed justifies you beating someone. That is not my understanding of public opinion in Australia- old people have to follow the rule of law here just like everybody else.
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The answer does ultimately reduce to the specifics of local law, which could be state, county or city. Ordinarily, the person who acted negligently would bear some element of responsibility for his actions, but local states can change that. The person did not intentionally provoke the dog, he was negligent, and they are not the same thing. So you need to get an attorney to take care of your particular problem. Municipalities are typically intolerant of dogs that bite humans. In Washington, the owner is strictly liable for any damage caused by a dog biting a human, except in the case of a person illegally trespassing, or when the attack was provoked. A dog can then be declared to be dangerous, which can have significant insurance consequences, or worse.
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Yes. In a civil case, there are two parties and the case is about finding out who has which obligations to whom. In a civil case, the plaintiff has to prove that they actually incurred damage through the actions of the defendant. A criminal case is the state vs. the defendant. The "wronged party" is the society as a whole, usually represented by the prosecutor. The victim, if there is one, just plays the role of yet another witness to find out if the defendant needs to be punished and how. There are also examples of crimes which are completely victimless but still punished by some societies. For example, in many places sexual intercourse between two consenting adult siblings is a crime (incest), even though there is no victim. Also, for some crimes it is even a crime to attempt to commit it. So one can be punished in a criminal court even though they didn't actually succeed in causing any damage to anyone. Example: I throw a rock at your car. When I hit, you can sue me in a civil court and force me to pay for the repairs. When I miss, I caused no damage to you, so there is nothing you could sue about. But what if I throw a rock at you and miss? That's attempted assault, maybe even attempted murder. When law enforcement finds out about it, I could be arrested, prosecuted and convicted to a prision sentence, even though you are perfectly fine.
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Rule 286 states: If you are involved in a collision which causes damage or injury to any other person, vehicle, animal or property, you MUST stop. If possible, stop in a place of relative safety (see Rule 275) give your own and the vehicle owner’s name and address, and the registration number of the vehicle, to anyone having reasonable grounds for requiring them if you do not give your name and address at the time of the collision, report it to the police as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any case within 24 hours. This mirrors the underlying legislation at section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988: (2) The driver of the mechanically propelled vehicle must stop and, if required to do so by any person having reasonable grounds for so requiring, give his name and address and also the name and address of the owner and the identification marks of the vehicle. (3) If for any reason the driver of the mechanically propelled vehicle does not give his name and address under subsection (2) above, he must report the accident. (4) A person who fails to comply with subsection (2) or (3) above is guilty of an offence. The penalty for this offence depends on the particular circumstances, and, as per the Sentencing Council' guidelines, it is: Triable only summarily: Maximum: Unlimited fine and/or 6 months Offence range: Band A fine – 26 weeks’ custody A Band A fine is: 25 – 75% of relevant weekly income The Offence Range has three Categories to determine the appropriate sentence depending on the: Level of seriousness
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In germany, you are likely charged if you actively interfere. Let's preface this with the fact, that in Germany, people have a duty to aid in case of accidents, as long as you don't endanger yourself. The absolute minimum is to call the emergency service and not obstruct those that render aid. However, just not rendering aid is rarely charged. However, since a few years, people that slow down to make videos of crash sites or who stop to look at an accident, and in doing so block emergency helpers, are now almost routinely charged with obstruction of emergency workers, together with possibly other charges like assault and insult. One of the most prominent cases was in 2017, where the person attacked emergency workers and police. He was sentenced to 4 months for the various assaults and bodily injury. Based on this case (where the person was just sentenced for resisting police and assault), it ultimately lead to a new law. One of many cases that started in 2023 had a similar pattern but the charge is based on the new law: § 323 c Abs. 2 StGB - not delivering aid and obstruction of aiding persons. This law allows up to one year of prison time for hindering any person rendering aid. Also, creating pictures at accident sites that depict people or corpses and sharing them in a manner that is humiliating to the victims in itself can be a breach of § 201 a StGB - injury of privacy by means of photography. This can get a sentence of up to two years, and would most likely be joined by a charge of not delivering aid and obstructing helpers. Do note that this is not covering photos that were made for example as evidence of the situation or not shared with third parties. Being in peril yourself... When you technically are in peril yourself, you don't have to render aid. Being stupid like grabbing your carry-on luggage isn't technically covered by the law, and because the person is in danger themselves, it will be very hard for the prosecution to decide if they want to prosecute. If Alice just grabs her carry-on in panic and nothing happens as she evacuates, charging will be extremely unlikely, as in, the chance is nigh nonexistent. Bob, who steps out of the way of others while he calmly takes his things is not interfering with the rescue, and thus charging him is most likely not going to happen. But Charly, who blocks the path of everybody because he wants to go to the other end of the plane to get his luggage and does not let anybody pass and thus increasing the danger of the situation (or even cause death) might break the threshold that the prosecution is willing to prosecute to make an example out of him. The more egregious his behavior was, the more they might look into if other charges can become applicable. However, those other charges are usually not from the blocking or inaction, but from an action against someone that is in the same peril as the actor. If Dora during the building fire grabbed a fire axe and smacked it over someone's head while he was trying to evacuate her, so she could get her items from another room, that would be dangerous mayhem (§ 224 StGB, Gefährliche Körperverletzung).
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Your question convolutes a number of different circumstances and legal questions. When is a person justified in using deadly force against a driver? When the person can convince a prosecutor, judge, or jury that a reasonable person would consider it necessary to prevent grievous bodily harm (and other situation-dependent defenses – for more nuance see self-defense). When can a law enforcement officer assault people with his vehicle? When he his performing official duties, and is performing them in a manner reasonably consistent with his training and official obligations. When can a driver assault people with his vehicle? When the driver can convince an inquiry that a reasonable person would consider it either not an act of assault, or else a justified act of self-defense. When are pedestrians liable for collisions with vehicles? When they are obstructing or infringing a traffic right-of-way; or when a judicial inquiry determines that they are at fault. Pedestrians in such situations could also be cited for many other offenses (Disorderly Conduct, Jaywalking, etc.).
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Has friend A got any chance of disputing the cost of the seizure as the police didn't issue the notification? I don't think so (see below for why), but you should pay a lawyer if you need legal advice. The met say A FORM 3708 seizure notice will have been given to the driver where practicable, giving full instructions on the reverse. A notice letter will also be sent to the registered keeper, if they were not the driver. In the meantime, this information will assist you. (my emphasis). Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not, so far as I can see, mention any legal requirement for the Police to issue a paper document at the time of seizure. Here's 165A in full 165A Power to seize vehicles driven without licence or insurance Subsection (5) applies if any of the following conditions is satisfied. The first condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 164, a person to produce his licence and its counterpart for examination, b. the person fails to produce them, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a motor vehicle is or was being driven by the person in contravention of section 87(1). The second condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 165, a person to produce evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143, b. the person fails to produce such evidence, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being so driven. The third condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 163, a person driving a motor vehicle to stop the vehicle, b. the person fails to stop the vehicle, or to stop the vehicle long enough, for the constable to make such lawful enquiries as he considers appropriate, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143. Where this subsection applies, the constable may— a. seize the vehicle in accordance with subsections (6) and (7) and remove it; b. enter, for the purpose of exercising a power falling within paragraph (a), any premises (other than a private dwelling house) on which he has reasonable grounds for believing the vehicle to be; c. use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred by paragraph (a) or (b). Before seizing the motor vehicle, the constable must warn the person by whom it appears that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143 that he will seize it— a. in a section 87(1) case, if the person does not produce his licence and its counterpart immediately; b. in a section 143 case, if the person does not provide him immediately with evidence that the vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of that section. But the constable is not required to give such a warning if the circumstances make it impracticable for him to do so. If the constable is unable to seize the vehicle immediately because the person driving the vehicle has failed to stop as requested or has driven off, he may seize it at any time within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time at which the condition in question is first satisfied. The powers conferred on a constable by this section are exercisable only at a time when regulations under section 165B are in force. In this section— a. a reference to a motor vehicle does not include an invalid carriage; b. a reference to evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143 is a reference to a document or other evidence within section 165(2)(a); c. “counterpart” and “licence” have the same meanings as in section 164; d. “private dwelling house” does not include any garage or other structure occupied with the dwelling house, or any land appurtenant to the dwelling house. Also what consequences could Friend A face for knowingly allowing friend B to drive his (Friend A's) car whilst he was drunk and didn't hold a valid license or insurance? A few random thoughts: B is clearly committing several criminal acts and A appears to have possibly aided and abetted them. I imagine A's insurance company might consider this invalidates A's insurance. I'm just some random bloke in the intertubes, not a lawyer.
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GDPR liability for Web Designer I am a web designer that works with a range of clients on a project basis. I complete a project and then offer my services at any hourly rate for any other work required in the future. Do I have a legal responsibility to ensure any projects are GDPR compliant which are: finished before 25th May 2018? finished after the 25th May 2018?
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If you are purely a designer (and not contracted for the daily operation of the site), the answer is "no". GDPR Article 4 defines the "roles" responsible for complying with GDPR, and there are two: Controller and Processor. The Controller is the one who calls the shots. In particular: Decides what personal data to process. This is usually the owner of the web site. The Processor is the one that actually does the processing. This is usually some company providing some sort of data processing service (e.g. SaaS, PaaS, etc.). The relationship between the Processor and the Controller must be contractual. The contract is called a DPA (Data Protection Agreement or Data Processing Addendum). As a designer, you don't fit into any of these roles. If your contract with the client is silent on liability for GDPR compliance, then you have no liability. This goes for projects completed both before and after the May 25 deadline. Of course, if there are GDPR clauses in your contract, then you must fulfil them just as have to fulfil any other contractual obligation. But unlike the controller and the processor, there are no automatic legal liability for a designer or programmer.
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The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem.
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The material scope of the GDPR (Article 2) is limited to the processing of personal data (including mere storage) by automated means or as part of a filing system. The question of whether your activity falls within this scope hinges on what you actually do with the data once you take possession of it. You have mentioned saving the contact information of people you have met at conferences, which could refer to simply retaining it for later use, or to the technological process of storing data in a computer. The former, if not done in any structured way (a filing system) would not fall within the scope of the GDPR. The latter, even if poorly executed, such as a photo stored on a business smartphone or a text document thrown onto your workstation's desktop, would always fall within scope as computerised data is processed "by automated means". When the contact information you receive identifies a specific person, as distinct from just a corporate switchboard number and company name for example, it is personal data. When you get that personal data from the person it identifies (data subject), and you're otherwise in scope, Article 13 is invoked, requiring you to provide a list of information, "at the time when personal data are obtained", unless "the data subject already has the information." This is known as the right to be informed. The requirements differ when personal data are not obtained directly from the data subject. I would argue it is unreasonable to be expected to provide the information to the data subject over a cup of coffee or in a quick business card exchange, but if you start entering it into a spreadsheet or your CRM, you need to provide the required information, which may be as simple as a follow-up email thanking them for their time and letting them know you'll keep their contact details on file, along with a link to your organisation's privacy policy, assuming it covers this use, or if not, a specific privacy notice. You will of course be required to comply with other requirements such as the principles of data minimisation and identify a lawful basis, maintain adequate security by implementing technical and organisational measures, hold contracts with any third parties who process personal data on your behalf, and have a process for upholding data subject rights and responding to requests to exercise them - among others - but you should already be doing that for your other processing activities unless exempt. Additional information Edits have been made as clarifications and questions were forthcoming. Email marketing You need to consider the applicable country's implementation of Directive 2002/58/EC as amended ("ePrivacy Directive"). For example, in the UK you could send such messages without consent to contacts at incorporated companies or public sector bodies, but would have required consent for sole traders, private individuals, or partners in an unincorporated partnership. In Ireland, you have an exemption to consent for existing customers who were offered the opportunity to opt out when their email address was collected, but must use the email address for marketing within 12 months. Each EU country will have a different implementation of the Directive. In the Netherlands, Article 17 of the Telecommunications Act implements Directive 2003/58/EC and thus provisions for direct marketing by email. Processing by automated means Processing by automated means refers to processing of personal data in electronic, rather than manual form. All electronic processing is within the material scope of the GDPR, while only manual processing that forms or is intended to form part of a filing system is. Recital 15: The protection of natural persons should apply to the processing of personal data by automated means, as well as to manual processing, if the personal data are contained or are intended to be contained in a filing system. Art. 4(2): ‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means ICO guidance What is personal data?: The GDPR covers the processing of personal data in two ways: personal data processed wholly or partly by automated means (that is, information in electronic form); and personal data processed in a non-automated manner which forms part of, or is intended to form part of, a ‘filing system’ (that is, manual information in a filing system).
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No, it's not legal. The General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) apply given that you are in the UK (regardless of where the Data Processor is based). The UK GDPR is slightly modified due to Brexit, but the same principles apply. The only plausible legal basis for this actions would be that you consent to it, and you're entitled to withdraw that consent at any time. Some may claim that Article 6.1(b) applies, i.e. that it's necessary to send marketing email in order to fulfil the contract, but GDPR is clear that bundling such consent into a contract for service simply to permit the data processor additional actions isn't allowed, as I'll demonstrate. UK GDPR requires that consent to use your personal information (in this case, your email address) for the stated purpose be freely given. Consent to use your information for direct marketing is not freely given if it's inseparable from the consent to use it for some other service, as per para 43: Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. And Article 7.4 backs this up with When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. The intent of Article 6.1(b) is that only the processing required for the service you have bought is allowed (e.g. if you supply your address for delivery of stuff you've bought, the data processor can use that address to send you the stuff, but is not allowed to add a contract term that allows them to send you unwanted stuff). Examples of emails that Article 6.1(b) would allow (in my assessment) include things such as notification of upcoming downtime, or a reminder that subscriptions are due, but not unsolicited advertisements for other products. There's a grey area that's open to interpretation, where adverts are piggybacked onto actual service messages.
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a few quick notes that come to mind. As the commenters point out: DSGVO is indeed the German equivalent name to the GDPR (English term) "Imprint" isn't a privacy related topic that much, as such it's not really changed by the upcoming GDPR The GDPR changes many things, but the requirement for up front information isn't one of them - so it would've already been a rule to follow Sometimes the question who is responsible for privacy information might not be that easy to decide when you're on platforms. I take this situation as being pretty clear though. You are basically given a blank slate, you can do with that page whatever you want, and the visitor has no clue whatsoever that it might be hosted by Github. In addition to this, Github would be classified as a data processor (providing the tool) and you as the data controller who is in charge of practically everything except for the provision of the page. I hope this helps. Btw. it's not that hard anymore to write a privacy policy these days.
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GDPR defines the responsibility of Companies to ensure that Personal Data in their possession is maintained Secure ensuring Confidentiality and Privacy towards the Data Subjects to whom it pertains. Prior to the Articles themselves, there are notes and over (49) one may read that companies must have in place (where applicable) mechanisms like CERT and any other SECURITY assuring tools/ processes. (83) again is all about ensuring Security. (94) reads that if the Controller (company) find it cannot ensure Security it must stop processing activities and report to the Supervisory Authority for guidance and support. Then we have Article 3 (f) establishing that it is the company responsibility to "... ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorized or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organizational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’)..." Bottom line... T&C Companies must ensure that Personal Data is processed by them (and that includes communications) are Secure while ensuring Confidentiality and Pricavy towards the Data Subjects. The wording "...commercially reasonable efforts..." is wrong, because it is not something that may be a legal requirement or not depending on "cost"; it is a Legal Obligation. Then "... the Internet is not an inherently secure environment and so we cannot guarantee the security of your Personal Information..."; this is just "poor legal advice" for GDPR does expect companies to make the Internet safe, it expects companies to maintain their IT Landscape safe... an analogy can be made about going through a group of sharks in the ocean while just swimming or on board of a big boat... the ocean is dangerous due to the sharks, yet if you are in a big boat, you won't even notice them. Then the "cherry on top"; "... e assume no liability for any disclosure of data due to errors in transmission, unauthorized third-party access or other acts of third parties, or acts or omissions beyond our reasonable control..."; now i really do not know which lawyer has written this, but it basically reads something like: "the law obliges me to ensure you are safe... however I am not able to". Now, I have seen similar "statements", but I must confess it was like 2 or 3 years ago... most companies have corrected them over time and since they become aware that penalties were for real. Just a final disclaimer It is a fact that while in transit (over the Internet) a message being delivered through a T&C Company Services will travel through 3rd party infrastructure contexts, rendering it at risk ... however, if it is properly encrypted (as it should) the transition time will not be sufficient for a successful breach attempt. So, yes they are capable of ensuring all they have stated they can not.
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An app(lication program) is software run on the end-users machine. That does not fall under the GDPR. Any processing (including storage) you do on user data has to be compliant with the GDPR. Allows a user to authenticate via e.g. Facebook and stores some basic data (optional) Authentication via Facebook leaves GDPR compliance to Facebook (AFAIK). It would be a good idea to provide alternative authentication methods, such as Google and an "own account" user name and password so that the user doesn't have to share information with a multinational company in order to use your service. The "basic data" will need to be processed according to the GDPR. As long as the "optional" part is "opt in" (i.e. the user needs to at least click on something) then this means you have permission to process that data. Providing this "basic data" as a JSON or CSV file should meet data portability requirements. Allows a user to upload a GPX file (a route or some other activity) Stores the above file to Google's database Allows the user to analyze that file. Since the user is actively choosing to upload each file you have permission to do this. You should make it clear in your privacy policy that the data will be held by Google. Doing so should not be a problem as Google has set up the legal framework to do this under the GDPR. You don't have to store the information encrypted, but you should use encryption (e.g. HTTPS) for any data transmission. Allowing the user to analyse the file is not an issue; either the user is doing it on their own machine (GDPR irrelevant) or you are doing it under user instruction (meaning you have consent). Since the user has uploaded GPX files they already have data portability on those files. You should tell your users that while you will employ best endeavours you don't promise to keep their files accessible and they should maintain their own private copies. That way if your entire database gets corrupted they can't blame you for loss of data. Finally, make sure there is a "Close my account and delete all my data" option.
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The question says: But by hashing a IP address you process the personal information and that you can't do without the user's permission! But processing personal data (PI) is covered not by the e-Privacy Directive (ePD) but by the GDPR. Under the GDPR processing may be lawful if it is done under any of the six lawful bases specified by Article 6. Consent is one of these. But paragraph (f) permits processing when: processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject ... This is generally known as the "legitimate interest" basis for processing. It normally requires a balancing against the privacy interests of the data subject. Where, as here, the processing is specifically to remove any traceability of the subject, and hence to protect the privacy of the subject, there doesn't seem to be much conflict, so I suspect such processing would be lawful. I have not found, after a brief search, an actual case where this has been tested, so my conclusion might be mistaken. Personal Data under the GDPR and hashing GDPR Quotes Article 4 of the GDPR defines "Personal data" (in paragraph (1) as follows: personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; The term "pseudonymisation" is defined in paragraph 5 of article 4 as follows: ‘pseudonymisation’ means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person; GDPR recital 26 reads: The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes. Hashing If a cryptographically secure hash function is used to convert an identifier, such as an IP address, into a replacement hash, there is no practical way from the hash value alone to recover the identifier. However, if a particular identifier value is compared with a stored hash value, it is easy to tell if there is a match. Finding a match does not prove that the identifier is the same -- depending on the length of the hash value being used and of the identifier, there may be many values that would give the same hash. But the chance of two random IDs having matching hashes is very small. Thus, if a controller were to store hashed versions of the IP addresses, no one could convert that back to a list of visiting IP addresses. But if soemoen had the IP address of a suspected visitor, and access to the hash function, it would be easy to check if that IP was on the list. If a keyed hash function were used, only someone with access to the key could perform this check. It is not feasible to hash all possible IP addresses as there are over 4 billion possible IPv4 addresses, and over 10^38 IPv6 addresses (over one thousand decillion). Thus creating a table to reverse the hashing in general is not feasible. Whether the possibility of checking for a match makes a hashed IP "reasonably identifiable" as representing a specific natural person under the GDPR and related laws has not, as far as I know, been authoritatively decided. Note that at most it would reveal that a person using a certain internet connection had (probably) visited a particular site.
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Child expressly wishes to live with other parent. What is legal position of that other parent? (in general terms) I am intending to phrase this in broad terms so that it may be useful to posterity, not just myself. The broad situation is: Location is England, United Kingdom Father and mother are physically separated, but still married The father lives walking distance from the mother (less than 0.5 km) Child is 11 years old, currently lives with mother, stays over some nights at father's Father has a flexible job which allows him to do school-runs or taxi after-school clubs, friends houses, so he could in theory totally look after child 100% Mother refuses any except barest minimum communication with father, so organising schedules, or any kind of negotiating etc, is difficult Child is quite articulate, aware and vocal, and expressly asks over and over to live with father, not mother Mother makes claim father has manipulated child into saying this - it's not true Mother is withholding passports There is no formal written agreement regarding living arrangements, only chaotic and changing emails back and forth. Certainly nothing signed. Question: If one day the child goes around to the father's house, perhaps in a state of upset, and says, "That's it, I'm staying," what is the legal position of the father? In particular, if the mother calls the police claiming "child abduction," what will be the police position? Will they come to the door of the father? Will they drag the child kicking and screaming back to mother's house? Please answer in general terms so that this may be maximally useful to others in similar situations.
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If one day the child goes around to the father's house, perhaps in a state of upset, and says, "That's it, I'm staying," what is the legal position of the father? An eleven year old child really has no say in the matter. A judge in a custody case may consider what the 11 year old has to say but is unlikely to give it much weight. (In contrast, a judge is likely to give a lot of weight to the views of a child who has a job, who is doing O.K. in school, and is a year or two from becoming a full fledged adult.) This is up to his parents to resolve absent circumstances not present here (e.g. the child has made bona fide allegations of child abuse, or the parents are both incarcerated). And, if the parents can't resolve the dispute, it is up to a court in a case where parenting time is at issue (probably either a legal separation or a divorce in this case). For example, while (as noted below) the police will not generally drag a child kicking and screaming to the other parent without a court order, if the child is at his father's house, the father can absolutely drag the child kicking and screaming to the child's mother's house, no matter how much the child doesn't like it. Moreover, while the father will not be violating any law, if he does not do that, a child custody judge is likely to look dimly upon a parent who intentionally withholds visitation from another parent without good cause, when the court considers what kind of child custody arrangements to put in place. And, the court has extremely great discretion in these matters. The judge is also likely to be pretty unhappy with both of the parents for failing to be capable of communicating or cooperating over child rearing related issues, because they are apparently so focused on not getting along with each other over their issues with each other. In particular, if the mother calls the police claiming "child abduction," what will be the police position? Will they come to the door of the father? Will they drag the child kicking and screaming back to mother's house? It is not generally illegal for a married parent in a situation where there is no child custody order in place to have that parent's child with them over the objection of the other married parent. Absent a court order to the contrary, the police will probably call this a "civil matter" and will be unlikely to take any action until there is court guidance, absent exigent circumstances like evidence of recent not previously adjudicated claims of child abuse or neglect. The way to resolve this would be with a court filing of some sort seeking to resolve the parenting time issue, if necessary, on an emergency basis. Post-Script Whether or not the parents want to end the marriage, this situation is long overdue for court intervention. I've had couples who "pull the trigger" too soon, but this would not be a case of that type. Either the father or the mother needs to find a solicitor (if at all possible to afford that) and get the court system involved. If there is a breakdown in communications over matters related to the child, and the child is not cooperating in the face of an ambiguous parenting situation involving two parents who can't communicate about their child, the situation is out of control. Prompt court action could prevent a more negative outcome in the future by creating stability and structure in the situation.
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Either party can petition the appropriate court for an adjudication of paternity (if this has not already been established in connection with the issuance of the birth certificate), and for a parental responsibility and child support order, at any time, if no such order is in place (assuming that Pennsylvania is the "home state" of the child and venue is proper). Child custody and visitation rights are determined based upon the "best interests of the child" with very little other formal guidance from the statute or even case law which also affords a judge very broad, although not unlimited discretion in resolving the issue if the parents don't reach an agreement. Any parent who is not adjudicated to be "unfit" (whose parental rights would then be terminated), is entitled to some reasonable visitation under the circumstances at a minimum. In practice, courts tend to prefer to enter an order that preserves the pre-litigation status quo is one was established for any reasonable length of time. Once a custody and visitation schedule are established (logically, this is actually done contemporaneously), a child support award is also entered based upon the number of nights per year that the child spends with each parent, the income of each parent, and the extraordinary expenses, if any of the child, pursuant to guidelines that exist under state law but are federally mandated. Generally speaking, child support payments are quite small relative to the incomes of the parties. If a parent is willfully refusing to work or underemployed so as to reduce child support, in some circumstances, income that could have been earned is imputed to that parent for purposes of determining the appropriate amount of child support. There is a small body of civil procedure that goes to the nitty gritty of how this is handled after a petition is filed, but that really goes beyond the scope of the question. In the simplest case, only the two parents are involved in the litigation. But, there are circumstances in which there can be other parties. For example, if the child has been supported by welfare, a representative of the state is a party to make sure that child support is paid reducing the need for welfare payments or repaying welfare payments already made by the state. Guardians of an un-empancipated minor or disabled parent might participate. Grandparents can sometimes have standing to participate. A non-parent who has physical custody of the child would usually have standing to participate. This all gets a little technical, and since the question doesn't suggest any facts that would call for additional parties, I will leave it at that. In the event of a substantial change of circumstances after a statutory period after the last order was entered, a court may start over, more or less from scratch, and establish a modified child custody, visitation and child support order that reflects the changed circumstances. As a practical matter, for parents who are separated from shortly after the birth of a child and can't work things out between themselves, there will probably be several to half a dozen modification proceedings until the child is an adult.
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Any legal issues for writing about your parent(s)? No. Furthermore, the answer you got from the Free Legal Aid Clinic is wrong. There is no need for pseudonyms or ambiguities such as "a family member". As long as your statements of fact are truthful, identifying actual individuals in your narrative is lawful (this applies to US as well as Canada defamation law). A word of caution, though: Your post reflects deficiencies in how you explain yourself. This has more to do with your way of articulating ideas than the possibility that English might not be your first language. Although it is palpable from your post that you do not intend to defame someone, reading it raises some concern that you might inadvertently convey a defamatory falsehood when you talk about matters which are understandably sensitive. Knowing how to transmit your message clearly and accurately is far more important --and safer from a legal standpoint-- than avoiding ironic acronyms such as "A m o m f".
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canada* What you describe is completely acceptable First, one of the goals of child support is to provide a similar standard of living in each household, so spending an amount on rent that happens to be a large portion of the child support amount is understandable. Second, the fact that the child only spends part of their time at Parent B's home is already accounted for in the computation of the amount owing. Child support in Canada is based almost exclusively on the income of the parents, taking into account the proportion of time the child spends with each parent. And this is all subject to any specific hardships of the paying parent. Only where a portion of child support is based on a special and extraordinary expenditure (e.g. a specific extracurricular activity, or medical insurance) is it expected the claimant make that specific expenditure. If they stop making that expenditure, then the child support add-on associated with that expenditure is removed. * I understand the question is directed to Arkansas, but I have provided an answer for those interested in Canadian law, in line with the guidance here ("Even if you supply a jurisdiction tag, we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions – while it might not answer your question directly, your question will be here for others who may be from those jurisdictions. If you do this, please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]").
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Note: All links in Spanish (sorry). Regardless or your father being or not the legal owner of the home, the issue at play is that of alimentos1. This is an obligation between some family relationships to help each other so if family member (the alimentista) is in dire need of help (i.e., needs the help to survive) the others have the obligation to provide the help. The relatives of the alimentista affected are, in order: The couple, always when married and only when expressly agreed upon for non-married couples. Descendants: sons/daughters and grandsons/granddaughters. Ascendants: parents and grandparents. Brothers: Only when indispensable and the minimum amount. The order determines who of all the family members is under obligation to provide the help; in case of multiple people in the same category the amount is to be divided between them in function of their income. The amount of the help is not fixed and will depend of the circunstances of the situation2; and it is possible to provide by providing the needs(shelter, food) directly. Now, until when does a father/grandfather need to provide alimentos to a son or daughter? Certainly until s/he is 183, as this is the date of full age in Spain, but it is usual to consider that the obligation exists while the alimentista is studying and lacks of his/her own means of subsistence. That is not a "free rider" situation, as alimentos may be denied by several reasons: Obviously, because the person that should provide the help does not have the means to do so without endangering his own subsistence. The alimentista gets his/her own means of subsistence. Any of the causes that would make the alimentista unable to inherit from the person providing the help4: attempted murder, coercion to change their will, and other grave crimes. The alimentista does not do enough to get his/her own means of subsistence. If a judge decides that the alimentista son/daughter is neither studying nor seriously trying to get a job, the help can be revoked. Judges seem to be progressively taking a harsher stance against descendants who refuse to do their part. The article quotes the case of a 19 years old guy whose claim to the pension was denied. As a side note, rejecting to pay alimentos is another of the causes that would cause the person doing it to lose any right to inheritance from the alimentista. If for whatever the reason you do not qualify for alimentos, the details of the agreement between your father and your grandfather for the home become relevant5: If your father has formally rented the house then your grandfather position is not relevant, as your father has all of the rights6. If your grandfather allows your father to live in the house without paying rent, then it is your grandfather rights as owner against your father rights as an occupant. No idea about the outcome of that situation. UPDATE: You still do not tell about your grandfather stance about the issue, which is important. If your grandfather agrees with your father7 then the only way to stay at home is that of alimentos. What you describe is a situation of either precario or comodato, where your grandfather allows the use of the home without compensation. The differences are: precario is for an undefined time. comodato is for a defined time/use (e.g. for X years). Now, I have to suppose that you are not part of the agreement so it is just between your father and grandfather. That makes it your father's dwelling, and beyond alimentos he cannot be forced to share his dwelling with you. But if this is a situation of precario (which is what most often happens) your grandfather has the "nuclear option"8 of threatening to evict your father, as it is a relatively easy (in the legal sense, not the personal one) procedure. In a situation of comodato your grandfather could not evict your father until the conditions of the cession expire, making threats somewhat weaker. As a final note, and given how specific this answer has become: I am not a lawyer, you have not provided enough specific info, and this is not legal advice. Talk to a lawyer. Maybe a lawyer will check the agreement and it will turn out that your father is paying rent by performing some service, voiding the precario aspect. Maybe with the details provided the lawyer can find a way to an agreement that is more amenable to all. Talk to a lawyer. Shut up. The issue at hand may be stressful, and sometimes it might be tempting to boast to your father about the issues of alimentos or precario. Don't. If there is something to be said about that, let your lawyer do the talking. Try to stay calm. Consider the effect of your actions before taking them. While there is nothing wrong with talking to a lawyer, going beyond that and beginning a legal battle with members of your own family is most of the times an ugly affair. It could easily have an effect for a very long time in your relationship with most of your family, even with those who are not directly implied. Try to stay calm. 1 Literally, "foodstuffs", but when used as a legal term it includes other basic needs. 2 There are some official guidelines but judges seem to have freedom to follow them or not. 3 I believe that there are some exceptional reasons to lose such right before becoming 18 (e.g., sons condemned of attacking their fathers and the like) but I have no specific data about those. 4 As a side note, in Spain last wills do not allow the "donor" to distribute the goods freely, as some porcentajes of the inheritance must obligatory be provided to descendants and widowers. 5 Of course, in the case that your grandfather wanted to oppose your father's decision. 6 Since one of the legal reasons to end a rent agreement is to provide a home for a first degree relative, your grandfather could expel you from your rented home to give it to your father, but not the other way around. 7 And "agree" does not mean "Is happy with the decision" but "Will not go to the court to challenge your father decision". 8 Which is a very relevant analogy, because it could be almost as damaging to your family as a literal nuclear bomb.
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No. The custodial person that is meant by this are usually the parents or another court-appointed person that stands in for their parents. I think the common law term closest is "legal guardian". The details are defined in § 1616 ff. of the German civil code.
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If both parties are legal, permanent residents of California, their marriage is recognized under Californian law no matter where it originated (provided that the marriage doesn’t violate Californian law, e.g. if Alice were a minor). Alice and Bob would file for divorce in California and the matter would be adjudicated under a Californian court and under Californian law. After these proceedings, Alice and Bob would still be married in Afghanistan (and maybe other foreign countries? That’s a tricky question, so if someone else can figure it out please leave a comment!) but the US would cease to recognize the marriage. In no case would either a Californian or Afghan court make a ruling under the other’s laws. As far as child custody, property, etc. the divorce would essentially proceed as a normal divorce case, although things could become complicated if Alice and Bob own property in Afghanistan, which would usually still be able to be appropriated by a Californian court but, once again, the matter is complex since Afghanistan still recognizes the marriage. As you can tell, a divorce of this nature is not as complicated as one might think, but nevertheless could create some complicated legal situations. Also, marriage is regulated state-by-state, so other states may have different rules regarding foreign marriages. As always, the best path of action is to consult an attorney who specializes in divorce. Edit: A commenter brought up the issue of whether California would recognize a marriage where both parties weren’t present. While this varies by state, California generally doesn’t allow so-called “proxy marriage” unless one of the parties is deployed in the military.
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canada Summary The child's will or consent is relevant to a plain kidnapping charge. The child's will or consent is not relevant to abduction charges. This answer presents Canadian law for this body of offences, divided based on who is doing the taking (because of the specific offences created for abduction by a parent). Parent or guardian taking In Canada, a parent or guardian taking a child from the other parent implicates sections 279, 280, 282, and 283 of the Criminal Code. If the child is held against their will, this supports the offence of plain kidnapping under s. 279. This is an indictable offence (the higher of two categories of offences in Canada). Very young children will not possess the capacity to consent. Older children, even those younger than 14, may be capable of consent (see the discussion at paragraphs 401-417 of R. v. Al Aazawi, 2021 ABPC 155). If the child taken is under 16, the offence of abduction (not necessarily by a parent or guardian) of a person under 16 is available (s. 280). For this offence, the consent of the child is not relevant (explicitly stated at s. 286). It is considered an offence against the parent or guardian. If the taking is by a parent or guardian of a child under 14, then this supports an offence under s. 282 (abduction by a parent in contravention of custody or parenting order) or s. 283 (abduction by a parent in the absence of a custody or parenting order). Again, under these offences, the consent of the child is irrelevant (explicitly stated at s. 286). Sections 280, 282, and 283 create hybrid offences, punishable either by indictment (higher category of offence) or as a summary offence (lower category of offence). Often the age and circumstances of the taking may support multiple overlapping charges. See e.g. M.M. v. United States of America, 2015 SCC 62. That was an extradition case in which the corresponding Canadian charges were both s. 280 (abduction—by anyone—of a person under 16) and s. 282 (abduction by a parent in contravention of a custody or parenting order). Prosecution directives for this family of offences is available. E.g.: From the British Columbia Crown Counsel Policy Manual From a directive of the Attorney General published in the Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook Taking by someone other than a parent or guardian The same plain kidnapping offence will be available (s. 279) as will the offence of abducting a person under 16 (s. 280). However, there is an additional offence of abduction of a child under 14 (s. 281), also a hybrid offence. Again, the consent of the taken person is not relevant for the abduction offences (see s. 286), and the circumstances that give rise to an abduction offence are broader when the taken person is under 14 than when the taken person is merely under 16. A comparison of the elements of these two closely related offences can be found at paragraphs 17-24 of R. v. Gibson, 2018 BCSC 1869. Visualized Age of child Person taking Section < 14 parent/guardian s. 279 (if against will), s. 280 (general abduction), ss. 282, 283 (abduction by parent) < 14 non-parent/non-guardian s. 279 (if against will), s. 280 (general abduction), s. 281 (abduction by non-parent) < 16 anyone s. 279 (if against will), s. 280 (general abduction) any age anyone s. 279 (if against will) A defence Section 285 provides: No one shall be found guilty of an offence under sections 280 to 283 if the court is satisfied that the taking, enticing away, concealing, detaining, receiving or harbouring of any young person was necessary to protect the young person from danger of imminent harm or if the person charged with the offence was escaping from danger of imminent harm.
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In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"? This is a canonical question posed for the purpose of clarifying the rules of criminal procedure in the United States relevant to who is authorized by law to determine if alleged conduct is "illegal". In an climate of local and national political scandal and intrigue being reported in popular media questions might arise by persons who follow politics asking if general or specific conduct by individuals is "illegal", according to the language or notion of the spirit of particular laws; for example, see Was attending the meeting by Trump Jr., Kushner or Manafort, an “act to effect the object of the conspiracy” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 371?; Is paying for ex-staff's silence a legal use of campaign funds? (see also What is the reason for deleting this users' answer at “Is paying for ex-staff's silence a legal use of campaign funds?”). It is important to at least attempt to reign in wild speculation as to whether an individuals' conduct is "illegal" by reiterating the facts of constitutional rights and criminal procedure within the United States. In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"?
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In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"? You are conflating several different ideas here, which is probably the source of your persistent confusion. 1) Actions are legal or not Illegal: Not authorized by law; Illicit ; unlawful; contrary to law The law sets out certain things that you must do (you must stop at a red light) and things you must not do (you must not drive under the influence). Sometimes actions fall into a gray area of the law, or aren't addressed at all, but if something is spelled out, then it's very clear whether the abstract action is legal or not. Running a red light is illegal. Driving under the influence is illegal. There are definitions and specified penalties for both. 2) A person may or may not be guilty of an illegal action Guilty: Having committed a crime or tort Abstract actions can be legal or illegal, but people commit crimes. When someone commits a crime, they are guilty of that crime. This is true whether or not they are ever prosecuted, or even if law enforcement knows who the guilty one is. If someone runs a red light at 2 in the morning on an empty street, it's still illegal and thus they are guilty of running a red - but no one will ever catch them. If someone is shot in the middle of the street, then someone is guilty of shooting them. Again, the shooter may never be found, but whoever they are, they are still guilty. 3) An individual may or may not be guilty of the crime of which they are charged. Charge: the statement of the alleged offense that brings a person to court If law enforcement (whether your local traffic cop or the FBI) believes that you are guilty of a crime, they can charge you with committing it. They may be right. They may be wrong. But the suspicion of having committed it is enough to charge you. To continue the traffic example: If an officer sees you running the red light, they can write you a ticket (effectively charging you) for doing so. They may or may not actually be right (it could have been yellow or malfunctioning, for example), but law enforcement has the power to charge regardless. 4) A defendant may or may be found guilty and convicted. Conviction: In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. This is where the presumption of innocence comes in - the default assumption is that the accused did not commit the crime that they are being charged with, and it's the prosecutor's job to prove otherwise. If the accused is found to not be guilty of the crime, then they (presumably) didn't do it - it doesn't necessarily mean the crime didn't happen, just that this specific person didn't commit it. Alternatively, the defendant can be found not guilty for other reasons - the judge or jury can determine that the crime didn't take place, took place but was justified, or the defendant wasn't in their right mind at the time. On the other hand, if they are found guilty, they're convicted and sentenced to whatever an appropriate punishment is. TL;DR Whether something is legal is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. Someone who commits an illegal act is guilty of doing so, even if they are never charged. Again, this is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. People are charged with violations of specific laws by law enforcement. Defendants can be found guilty by the court system. In other words, only the courts can determine whether a specific individual actually committed illegal behavior, but the behavior is still illegal regardless.
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The validity of the NDA is not an easy question, but a related one is more clear. A lawyer in the U.S. in most states is not permitted to threaten criminal or administrative action (e.g. reporting someone to immigration or tax officials), to gain advantage in a civil case. You can unilaterally bring criminal charges or take administrative action, but it is deemed to be unethical and against public policy to refrain from bringing criminal charges or taking administration action to gain civil advantages. An NDA of the type described arguably violated the same public policy and might be invalidated as a result. Put another way, there is a privilege to make certain reports to public officials without legal consequences and such an NDA might violate that privilege. Some of these privileges found in what are called "whistle blower" statutes specifically prohibit this kind of agreement as to some specific kinds of illegal conduct, but not others. There isn't a general rule. This said, it is not black and white. For example, a private NDA can't prevent someone from testifying under subpoena, but can prevent someone from voluntarily testifying in the absence of a legal compulsion to do so such as a subpoena. Suppose a woman is sexually assaulted at work, and is given an NDA to sign. Can the company legally require her not to disclose the conduct of an illegal activity? I can imagine this example coming out different ways in different jurisdictions. For example, some states have a legal duty (rarely enforced) that requires people to report felonies, and an NDA in this case would contradict that affirmative legal duty, while others do not. Another source of gray in the analysis is that there is a difference between not reporting a sexual assault that actually happened, and, as part of a larger settlement, executing an affidavit stating under penalty of perjury and under oath that a sexual assault didn't happen. The first is potentially an NDA that is void as a matter of public policy. The other, in principle, is a settlement that the person signing the affidavit can only enter into if it is true. There is nothing, in general, wrong, about requiring someone to confirm that certain representations are true as part of a business transaction or contract and allowing the contract to go forwards only if certain facts are true. The gray gets deeper, because whether a sexual assault happened or not is not always a subjectively black and white clear issue of pure fact. (It is subjective because an affidavit or affirmation is made to the best of the declarant or affiants' knowledge and belief, not as a matter of objective fact.) For example, someone may not have perfect memory of what happened, or there could be doubt over the question of whether the perpetrators acted recklessly (the Model Penal Code intent requirement for sexual assault) or merely with criminal negligence (which would not be sexual assault under the Model Penal Code). A statement made under oath about whether a sexual assault happened to the best of your knowledge, thus, might be a mixture of factual issues (A penetrated B at a certain date and time) and legal or not perfectly factually known ones (A acted with X intent regarding consent during that act). So, in a case where there was some room to argue either way about how to characterize what happened and about what actually did happen, there might be some room for a settling party to make a non-perjured statement consistent with the settlement and then to agree not to a true NDA, but instead to not make statements which, if the affidavit is true, would be false. In a plea bargain in a criminal case, one can plead "no contest" without agreeing that the crime factually happened, but that isn't really possibly in the context of an affidavit about what really happened, with an NDA limited to not disclosing the incident since it was already agreed as a matter of sworn fact that there is nothing to disclose that rises the level of a crime.
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Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.
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Yes, there is legal precedent against this that would only apply to a government employee. First, let's discuss the private sector. In this case, you are a private employee that comes to your place of work and accuses you of "stealing the cookies from the cookie jar" which is a serious criminal offense. They wish to talk and your boss is in the room. You plead the 5th, but your boss says you're fired if you don't talk to the cops. This is legal because you still have the right to refuse to talk, you just lose your job. A private employer has the right to free association, and wants nothing to do with cookie thieves, alleged or actual. However, in the government employ, your boss is an agent of the government. This same situation is different because the government pays the boss and the agent... so in essence the government is saying talk or be fired. This is unconstitutional as the government cannot retalitate against you for your refusal to talk. Generally, in order to talk to you, the investigator would need either a signed Garrity Statement or a Signed Kalkines Statement. The former is a statement saying that they are investigating a wrong doing but you cannot lose your job if you refuse to speak to the investigators, where as Kalkines says you must talk but you are granted immunity for your part in the wrong doing, so long as you make truthful statements. For more on this, check this legal blog. There is also the matter that a false accusation (and let me be clear... this is academic, I'm not saying the accusation in the real life topic is false, nor am I saying that the defense is false... we're merely discussing a possibility) is made to your employer and they do not offer the job on the basis of the accusation alone, this is grounds for defamation actions... and in certain jurisdictions, it's criminal defamation, so there could be jail time. It's interesting you mentioned teachers, because this happens alot. Kids do know that there are certain things that get a teacher fired quickly, so teachers do get the occasional false accusation of sexual assault (I know one teacher who has had multiple accusations over the course of her career). One of the few good things I can say about the Teachers Union is they cover the legal defense of accused teachers. The accusations do get the teacher removed from the class for sometime, but they don't lose their jobs over this matter. It's followed up but the accusation doesn't immediately lead to the teacher getting fired..
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There is actually more than one law covering whistleblowers, so the other answer is only partially correct. According to the NYT, the case in question here is also covered by the Inspector General Act of 1978 Do whistle-blowers have a right to remain anonymous? Only in a limited way. Another part of the Inspector General Act says that agency watchdogs “shall not, after receipt of a complaint or information from an employee, disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the inspector general determines such disclosure is unavoidable.” In line with that law, the inspector general for the intelligence community, Michael Atkinson, did not include the whistle-blower’s name in his report to the acting director of national intelligence, Joseph Maguire. Mr. Maguire testified last week that he did not know the name of the person [...] But the legal prohibition on disclosing the official’s name applies only to Mr. Atkinson. It does not bar Mr. Trump and his allies from trying to identify him or disclosing his name if they figure it out. (It would be illegal under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act for any official to disclose his name if he is a covert agent, but no one has suggested that he is.) The same information can be found in an OIG FAQ Q: Will OIG reveal employee identities or the fact that they cooperated? A: OIG investigators will respect the confidentiality of Department employees as provided by law. Section 7 of the Inspector General Act states that “[t]he Inspector General shall not, after receipt of a complaint or information from an employee, disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation.” During the course of some investigations, it may be unavoidable that the identities of individuals involved will become known. However, OIG strives to protect the confidentiality of Department employees who provide OIG with information. In addition, employees should be aware that reprisal against any employee for cooperating with OIG is forbidden by the Inspector General Act and DAO 207-10, Section 4. Further, OIG takes whistleblower protection very seriously and, along with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, investigates alleged reprisals against employees for making protected disclosures to OIG. So Paul's spokesperson seems to be correct.
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There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced.
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A law has to be "broad" to include a lot of possible crimes and intent of criminals and account for the good faith of non-criminals. "Intentionally access without authorization/exceed" is actually fairly specific; "intent" is the keyword. Someone making a mistake may have intent to login, but no intent to commit a crime. Someone confused by "different pages of demo and live accounts" can easily defend their actions by pointing out that they were confused. It's up to the reasonableness of the pertinent law enforcement and prosecutors to take into account the evidence that reasonable mistakes were made by little old ladies and not charge them with a crime. And for the most part, 98% of the time, law enforcement and prosecutors are reasonable.
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The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.
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Landlord wants to include a clause where tenant pays rent if property is vacant after leaving. Is this legal/enforceable? I'm asking on behalf of a friend. I don't have the contract to copy in relevant clauses. A landlord proposes to change the rental agreement. The new clause states that when a tenant leaves, they pay rent if the property is unoccupied. This way the landlord does not have a void period. My inclination is that this is not enforceable, because the former-tenant would be paying for a service that they do not benefit from. Also, this website offering tips to mitigate void periods does not list this tactic, implying that it is at least uncommon. My questions are: Is this type of clause legal/enforceable? What is this type of clause called? N.B. I found it hard to conduct my own background research, as I don't know what to search for
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Terms in a contract that are not legal or not enforcable are quite capable of causing you trouble and costing you time or money, most likely a generous amount of both. Your friend shouldn't care one bit about whether these terms would be legal and/or enforcable. If he doesn't like them, then he MUST NOT accept the changed contract. Not if these terms are illegal and unenforceable and of course even less if they are legal and enforceable. I would write back "I believe that the suggested change in terms is illegal and would be unenforceable. I also believe that the change is deeply unfair towards me and creates a considerable legal risk that I am not willing to accept under any circumstances. I therefore strongly reject your suggested change. "
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Under an assured shorthold tenancy, when the fixed term expires, it automatically becomes a periodic tenancy (also called a rolling or month-to-month tenancy) if no other action is taken. For periodic tenancies, the default requirement is: The notice you give must end on the first or last day of the period of a tenancy, except when your tenancy agreement says something different. The first day of a period of your tenancy is the anniversary date each week or month of when your tenancy began. This is often the same date that your rent is due, but not always. (the above taken from this Shelter guide.) The contract merely restates this. So in other words, yes, this is normal. In this instance, if you give notice on or before 25 Dec, you'll be required to pay rent up to 24 Jan. However, if the landlord finds a new tenant and their tenancy starts after you move out, but before 24 Jan, then you are only liable for rent up to the start of their tenancy.
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If the lease ends on 14 August then, unless there is a time in the lease, the tenant must be gone before 0:00:00 15 August. If they leave anytime on the 14th (or earlier) they are in compliance with the lease. If there is no provision for pro-rata rent if they overstay and agreement cannot be reached, if the tenant overstays the landlord can sue for whatever damage (loss) that actually caused. Specific legislation wherever you are may change this.
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The key here is the provision "through no fault of his own". A landlord who relies on this provision would need to be able to demonstrate what the cause of the delay was, and that s/he had not been reasonably able to avoid it. Nor could a landlord simply fail to take steps to repair the problem, whatever it might be. If the problem will clearly take more than 30 days to fix (Isay the building burned down), the prospective tenant would have the right to cancel the lease at once. True, in such a case the tenant would be put to the trouble and expense of finding another place at short notice, but then the landlord would have lost his income from the property. The provision allocates the losses between the parties in such a case. If the property is not available at the specified time for the lease to start, but could be available a few days later, the quoted provision would not allow the landlord to just ignore the situation and end the lease. The landlord is allowed only a "reasonable time" to fix the problem, and taking significantly longer than is needed would not be "reasonable".
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Can landlord backbill 4.5 years worth of utilities that were never billed to us bimonthly as directed in the lease? Yes, since the bimonthly billing issue appears to be within the LA statute of limitations for claims of breach of contract: 10 years (see here). But you might want to check the actual legislative language of the statute referred therein and the prior or consecutive ones --all pertaining to statutes of limitations-- so as to ascertain the accuracy of information in the first link (navigating through the bunch of LA two- or three-line statutes for this and that gets annoying). They are desperate to get me to move out since it is a rent-controlled unit and I feel like they have done this to cause issues and force me to default on rent. Is this a legal practice? I am not knowledgeable of state legislation particular to rent-controlled units, but I highly doubt it is lawful for them to proceed that way. Other details you describe reflect that the company has been --or is being-- malicious or grossly negligent. If so, strictly speaking, the company's conduct (1) ought to weaken its position or merits in trying to force you out, and (2) tends to contravene the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see below). If your lease mentions any statutes regarding rent-controlled units, you may want to search for case law at leagle.com to see how the statutes are applied. Without knowing the terms of your lease, I think your priority should at all times be the rent itself so as to avoid eviction. Does the "billing every two months" in the lease have any hold on this issue if they breached their own lease? Maybe not. The repeated, yet sole, failure to send you the bimonthly billings falls short of landlord's breach of contract. For your argument on breach of contract to prevail, you would have to prove that the landlord knowingly/deliberately let the water bills pile up prior to demanding you to pay everything at once. That would prove that the landlord is not meeting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is prerequisite in contract law.
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I am unfamiliar with a "perpetual contract" and that phase does not appear in any reported appellate court decision of the State of Oklahoma. However, usually unpaid utility bills do constitute a lien against the property that is enforceable against a subsequent purchaser, which has the same practical effect. This kind of obligation is also sometimes described as an "encumbrance". Usually, in an arms length sale of real estate through real estate agents, a title insurance company is hired and is responsible for determining if there are any outstanding liens, pro-rating utility bills, pro-rating property taxes, etc. at closing. If the title company fails to find a lien and there is one, the title company is responsible for paying off the lien that it failed to find (although it can often force the previous owner to indemnify it for the payment it has to make). It could be that since water service was not currently being delivered, that the title company did not search in the manner that it should have to find this lien, or it could be that there was no title company used and so no one ever checked. Also, if the property was conveyed with a "warranty deed" such a deed contains a promise from the seller that there are no liens or encumbrances not listed on the face of the deed that have to be paid, and the seller has liability for breach of the warranty of title. But, if the property was conveyed with a "quitclaim deed" there is no such warranty.
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There is certainly no legal problem in asking if the tenants would be agreeable with the landlord discontinuing the security service. Even if it were in the lease, a lease like pretty much any contract can be changed by mutual agreement of all parties (unless there is a law preventing such a change, which is rare and I do not think will apply in this case). A more difficult question would be if the landlord would be within his or her rights to discontinue the service without asking the tenants first, since it is not in the lease. Since the property was advertised as coming with the service, it might be held that the continued service was reasonably expected by the tenants, and thus an implicit term of the lease. But since the landlord does not plan to take such unilateral action, that remains a purely theoretical issue. The landlord could offer the tenants a small rent reduction, perhaps one quarter of the amout that was being paid to the security firm, but there is no legal requirement to do so. As to whether asking for such a change would be "rude", I don't think so, but that is a matter of opinion, and not really on-topic here.
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A "limited license housing agreement" may be an interesting attempt to get around landlord-tenant laws, typically associated with official student housing (e.g. this from Queens College CUNY). This facility near WMU is not overtly related to the university, but might be subcontracting for the university. At any rate, there is no special provision under Michigan law that exempts landlords from the provisions of the law in case they declare the contract to be an agreement as opposed to a lease. It is possible that this is copy-and-paste law that erroneously relies on provisions in landlord-tenant laws that exempt university housing agreements from provisions of a state's landlord-tenancy law. You do not need to be informed that you should / could consult an attorney before signing a legal document: this knowledge is presupposed. It is also assumed that when you sign a document, you read the document. It is reasonably likely that the lease contained language like the following (from the above contract): I have carefully read, fully understand and voluntarily sign this Housing Agreement. Once fully signed, this is a binding contract and is intended to be enforceable under its terms. I have had the opportunity to seek independent legal advice The disclaimer "This Housing Agreement is not a lease and no tenancy, leasehold, possessory or other property interest in any specific apartment or bedroom is created" has dubious legal status. The rights given by the landlord-tenant act cannot be waived, under the Truth in Renting Act, so saying "this is not a lease" does not make the lease not a lease. In Michigan there is a duty on landlords to mitigate loses when a premise is abandoned. The case Fox v. Roethlisberger, 85 N.W.2d 73 mentions such a possible duty in the context of tenancy is often cited on the web as establishing such a duty, but I disagree. Froling v. Bischoff, 252 N.W.2d 832 however establishes that there is such a general duty for any breach of contract (and even applies it to breach of a rental agreement). So whether or not you call it a lease, there is still a duty to mitigate losses. In the scenario where you abandoned the unit and the landlord waited until the end of the year to file an action for breach of contract, they could have failed in their duty to mitigate their losses (but see Fox v. Roethlisberger, where landlord did make an effort to re-rent, and simply was not able to for 9 months).
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Is it legal to eat or drink items before paying for them in Georgia, USA? My wife, two year old daughter and I went to a clothing store in Georgia. My daughter was being fussy after she saw some candy and soda that she just could not wait. So, I gave her the candy and soda. At the counter, their was an argument about the clothes that we were returning and it got to the point where the cashier simply refused service. The manager seemed to take her side. They would not even let us pay for the candy and soda (open items). So, we left those items in store and walked out without paying for them. If after they refused service, I continued to open new food items and partially eat them, could I get into any legal trouble for this act? Even if I am willing to pay for those items? My thinking was that they would be forced to charge me (provide service) for those items if the amount starts to add to about 10-20 dollars, which would make the manager think twice about if he should refuse service and let us walk out of the store without paying for the open items.
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As far as I can tell, that would be a criminal act. Georgia law § 16-8-2 - Theft by taking says: A person commits the offense of theft by taking when he unlawfully takes or, being in lawful possession thereof, unlawfully appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of the property, regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated. Georgia law § 16-7-21. Criminal trespass says: A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she intentionally damages any property of another without consent of that other person and the damage thereto is $500.00 or less or knowingly and maliciously interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without consent of that person. If you know the store is refusing to sell you a product, and you eat that product anyway, that is theft. If you don't eat the food but just open it, that's still criminal trespass. Even if you're leaving them money, you're still taking and/or damaging their property without their consent. Additionally, if they told you to leave, and you refused and instead started opening food items, you might be guilty of trespassing in the more traditional sense: A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she knowingly and without authority... Remains upon the land or premises of another person... after receiving notice from the owner, rightful occupant, or, upon proper identification, an authorized representative of the owner or rightful occupant to depart. As to whether it was legal to give the candy to your daughter before the disagreement and refusal of service, that may depend on what the standard practice is. It seems to me that in most clothing stores you're supposed to pay before consuming the product - this isn't a sit-down restaurant. But if there's nothing else going on, I think the average store would refrain from calling the police if the person did not try to hide the evidence (for example, by stuffing the empty box on a shelf) and if the merchandise was paid for before the person attempted to leave the store, regardless of whether it's technically illegal.
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Giving someone a drug without their consent can be considered infliction of bodily harm in various jurisdiction. When it caused a negative effect on the person the perpetrator did not anticipate, it might be grossly negligent (if that effect was likely to occur) or just negligent (if one could not reasonably expect that this effect would occur). Details depend on jurisdiction and the mood of the judge. It might also be a factor if the court rules that the defendant acted in bad faith (for example, by expecting that the drug would make the injured party consent to something they wouldn't have consented to otherwise, regardless of if this actually happened). Additionally, if the intention was to cure the injured party from a medical ailment (as implied by "pill with beneficial effect") it could theoretically be possible that the perpetrator also gets charged for practicing medicine without a license (if that is illegal in the jurisdiction). Should the perpetrator have a medical license, they will likely get charged with medical malpractice, because in most jurisdictions it is illegal to treat a patient without their consent (if the patient is in a condition which makes informed consent possible). Regarding adding something to your own drink and inadvertently poisoning someone else who drinks from it: In most societies, drinking from the glass of someone else is considered against social etiquette, so a possible defense could be that the perpetrator could not reasonably expect that the person would do that. But it could still be judged as infliction of bodily harm through negligence depending on the circumstances and how likely it was to happen. For example, in an environment where many glasses with similar-looking drinks stand on a table, the risk that glasses get mixed up is quite high. Details - again - depend on jurisdiction.
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I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level.
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A state's criminal jurisdiction normally applies to acts committed in that state's territory. So if you consume something in state A, you can't be charged in state B for violating state B's prohibition against consuming that thing. However, if state B has a prohibition against public intoxication, and you enter its territory while intoxicated, you could be charged for violating state B's prohibition on public intoxication. The fact that you're crossing state lines also increases the possibility that the federal government would want to get involved; the location of the federal prosecution could be in either state, although neither state's court system would be involved.
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We need to know your jurisdiction, as special local laws may apply. The general answer for the United States follows. It's routine for restaurants to pool tips for on-site employees, so that the waiters share with busboys and other less-visible personnel. Until recently, Federal law allowed the owner to be able to keep for himself tips that brought the waiter's salary over the standard minimum wage. (The Federal minimum wage for tipped employees is much lower, $2.13/hour.) Some states prohibited this, and it's no longer permitted. So the driver's tip might be shared with other workers, but not with the owners. Perhaps tip delivery drivers in cash?
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Could the store give the customer credit or must they actual return the money? The store has the legal obligation to return the money if the customer demands to be reimbursed. Section 155(4)(a) of the BC Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act explicitly provides reimbursement "to a consumer or class of consumers". The store's unilateral, inflexible decision to give the customer credit in lieu of a reimbursement is in violation of sections 8(3)(a) and 9(1) of the Act. That approach constitutes undue pressure to enter into an additional consumer transaction, more so where management is aware of the issue and refuses to fix it.
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Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition.
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Until it was found to be unconstitutional, Florida had a law against surcharges for using a credit card (the statute is still on the books, however). That was the only law against "convenience fees" related to making payments. Whether or not a business will accept a particular form of payment (check, credit card, money order, traveler's check, cash) is up to business. Apart from credit cards, there has been no law against charging for accepting a particular form of payment, but that charge would have to be part of the contract – the lease would have to specify in advance what the processing fee is for money orders vs. cash vs. credit card. The residential tenancies law of Florida does not prohibit incorporating fees into the terms of a lease (as some states do), so the lease can specify "$1500 for rent plus $10 for payment-processing, every month".
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Service provider states I terminated the agreement by moving to a location they do not service, am I liable? I signed a 24 month agreement for internet service while living in Atlanta. A month or two into the contract, my wife formally accepted a contract for a position 800 miles away (expensive move). We flew out to the new area, shopped for homes and purchased one (normal life). When we moved into our new place I called the service provider to transfer our service to our new home. Unfortunately, at that time the company stated they do not service our new property address (fwiw - my account is paid in full and good standing for services used). ...Long story short a few weeks later I get a notice for an early termination fee. I've been fighting this for 2+ months now. I've spent hours with countless phone reps and getting the boilerplate, "these charges are valid due to termination of service." I stated in many words I didn't terminate the contract, I asked for my service to be transferred to my new address." I asked the question in a few different ways and the service rep states, "moving to avoid a service charge is not valid." I asked a phone rep manager, "how can a customer be held responsible for where a service provider provides service?" The answer given was, "to avoid ETF you should call [us] before purchasing a home." This seems unreal, unjust, and possibly unconstitutional. Am I crazy? How is it that "blah blah blah big company" can place their interests above a citizen's choice of where to live (school district, neighborhood, etc.)? Am I off base for thinking that I did not terminate the service? On the contrary the service provider terminated the service by not continuing to provide service for my account. Here's the only copy of the service agreement I could find: AGREEMENT FOR RESIDENTIAL SERVICES
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This is actually pretty standard. You have a contract with a business to provide some service, and you get a bargain on the price of the service as long as you stay with them for some period, such as 2 years. You could get the 'pay as you go' option which doesn't have a termination fee, but that costs more if you are sure you can commit to what you signed up for, for that period. So it's not that you can't terminate the contract, it's that you can't just walk away from your obligation (what they call a "minimum term agreement"), cost-free. The early-termination fee is part of the cost of moving. You have to look in the Legal Agreements & Contract part of Account Details on your account to get the specific agreement that you are bound by. Generally, you are subject to that fee, unless the subscriber dies, or is in the military and is shipped out. You can also transfer your service from area to area – I assume you either are moving to an area without Xfinity service, or you elected to not use Xfinity in that location. It is legal for a business to put their business interest above that of a customer, even in the case of regulated "utilities".
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Up to any time bar in a statute of limitations: yes By using the services, your neighbour incurred the debt. The debt did not become due and payable until the bill was issued. It doesn’t matter when the bill was issued. In most jurisdictions, there is a statute of limitations with a time limit on how long after a debt was accrued it can be pursued. For Utah, the limit is 6 years so your neighbour is liable for all of the past 4 years. Given the circumstances, the utility may look favourably on proposals for discounts and time to pay but that will be a commercial decision, not a legal obligation.
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You need to look at the domain registrar's TOS to determine their polices for canceling a domain after the fact in the way they did, i.e. claiming the domain is "premium" and as such allowing them to cancel and raise the price and re-offer the domain. The registrar may, in fact, have such a policy in their TOS that you agreed to when you opened an account with them and registered a domain. "Clicking through" and accepting a TOS is a binding contract. Their policy may hinge on an "escrow" hold on the domain for a certain time until your payment clears, they do due diligence, or other reasons, and by agreeing to the TOS you allowed them to reserve the right to cancel or re-offer the registration. However, such a policy is at least (I think) ethically challenged and at most could be illegal - US and local laws in your your jurisdiction may come into play - in terms of ICANN's policies. You may have success opening a complaint with ICANN, the international organization that oversees domain registrars and works to resolve complaints such as cyber-squatting, issues with the way registrars operate, etc. See Registrant Rights and Responsibilities Under the 2009 Registrar Accreditation Agreement - ICANN. If the registrar doesn't have a clear policy on the form of cancellation and re-offer you have been subjected to, your next step is definitely looking at Dispute Resolution Options - ICANN. Keep all your documents and emails, and log all phone calls or chats with the registrar. Make screenshots of your Cloudflare account and Google's web cache. And, it might be helpful to do a Google search for that registrar and "domain cancellation" or more relevant keywords to see if anything similar has happened in the past and the outcomes; those stories may give you ideas for other options. You may also need to find a local lawyer to advise you on your next steps, or talk to a free legal aid clinic in your area.
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Various states have cancellation laws guaranteeing a certain right of convenience to cancelling a renewable contract: Arizona is not one of them. (Additionally, some states have service-specific laws such as gym membership cancellation laws, which I assume is not relevant here though in Arizona it includes cancellation by certified letter). In general, the terms as stated in the contract will hold. If the contract says that you have to physically go in to the office where you initially signed up, you have to physically go in to the office where you initially signed up, regardless of the inconvenience. If cancellation by certified letter is not allowed under the contract, then you may have to be inconvenienced. One possible alternative is to grant someone a Special Power of Attorney, or more generally, hire a lawyer to do the cancelling for you. You can't use that POA form if you don't live in Arizona.
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At least as of 2011, when regulations under the Information Technology Act related to privacy and data security were issued (some of the relevant statute sections and regulations are linked in this answer at Law.SE), there was no non-contractual right to have your data destroyed, although a terms of service for a site could give you that right contractually. Instead, usually, a term of service agreement will do exactly the opposite and give a site owner an irrevocable right to keep your data forever. I am not aware of any subsequent statutory, regulatory or case law developments in India which have changed this situation, but that kind of tweak of IT Act regulations in India wouldn't necessary make headlines outside of the local IT industry press coverage in obscure trade journals. The EU is the only place of which I am aware that has any individual right to have data destroyed or suppressed even if it doesn't violated copyright, wasn't obtained illegally and isn't fraudulent or defamatory. Even then, as I understand it, in the EU this is not a unilateral right that applies in all circumstances and is instead a specific remedy for certain situations that have a particularly intense privacy aspect to them.
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Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough).
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Online conversations are generally allowed evidence. However, EVERYTHING in the chat should be considered, as well as any later actions. Were there later conversations that said something different? Did the lease you signed have different terms? One line in a WhatsApp does not make your case a "slam dunk". It may only be one piece of evidence in a much larger context.
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I assume the lease does not clarify what the effective date for cancellation of utilities should be: when you "officially abandon" the property, or when the 30-day notice elapses. Who is responsible for the damage? At least under a principle of equity, the landlord is responsible for the damages. That is because, once you have returned the keys and officially abandoned the property, you have no control on how or whether utilities are consumed or (ab-)used thereafter. For instance, if sometime after the 30th of July a person breaks in that rental unit and extracts tremendous quantities of power or gas, that would lead to the inequitable outcome that the utilities company would charge you if your name is still in the utilities company's records. Similarly, it would be unreasonable and inequitable to expect you to essentially insure the landlord (by keeping your name on the utilities) despite his full awareness that you no longer are there.
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Would this be considered a hit and run? Our vehicle was parked at our apartment complex and I noticed that there was a large scratch and dent on it. Would this be called a hit and run? The person who did it did not leave a note or anything.
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"Hit and run" isn't a precise legal term, but there are laws against what many people call "hit and run" in California. §20002 of the Vehicle code covers property damage without injury, and violation of the section is a misdemeanor possibly resulting in up to 6 months in prison and a $1000 fine. If you cause property damage either while driving or because it was parked and became a runaway vehicle, you are required to notify the property owner. If the owner cannot be located at the scene, you must leave your contact information and a description of the circumstances, and you must notify the police. It is irrelevant whether this was on the street or in a parking lot, because the law will "apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout the State, unless expressly provided otherwise".
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As a legal matter, you need to call or visit your local police station, report that you found some lost money, answer their questions honestly and dispassionately (they don't care about your hate etc. unless it's causing an active situation they have to deal with, and even then they don't much want to hear you go on about it), and then let them deal with it. You can tell your neighbor, if he inquires, that you have handed the matter to the local police and he can inquire with them about claiming it; feel free to ask the police to affirm that's the suitable course of action. You can expect to be given legal possession of it if they are unable to determine the true owner in accordance with local law. You can ask the police for details on that, though they'll probably just tell you as a matter of procedure without prompting.
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I don't have enough to comment but I know where I live it's the landlords responsibility to take care of mold. That being said, if it is mold caused by negligence of the tenant e.g. always leaving the window open in the rain or something, then the landlord can claim compensation. Where I live the landlord keeps some of the damage deposit he must prove to the tenant why he did so within a months time of when he was supposed to return the damage deposit. For example if it cost him $200 to repair damage done by the mold, he must return the rest of the damage deposit and a letter explaining why $200 was kept, and the receipts. Where do you live? The laws really do very greatly from region to region. It has been my observation that it's not that uncommon for landlords to try and sneak something into the lease that isn't really allowed by law.
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It may very well be illegal, depending on the laws of the country. Most people have the right to enter their own country (except for practical problems, like not being able to prove you have the right) because you list your passport and/or other ID). But it may be illegal to enter outside official border crossings, for example. Or illegal to enter without having the entry registered. Or soon, it might be illegal to enter the U.K. while avoiding quarantine, whether you are British or not. But it wouldn’t be the fact that you entering that’s illegal, it would be how you did it. If you are the Dutch owner of a Ferrari then entering the Netherlands on the A40 from Germany at 170mph is very, very illegal :-)
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The Straßenverkehrsordnung(Translation) in Germany says this: § 34 Accidents (1) Any person involved in a traffic accident must: stop immediately; take the necessary steps to ensure traffic safety and, if there is only minor damage, move their vehicle to the edge of the carriageway; ascertain the consequences of the accident; assist injured persons (section 323c of the Penal Code); to other persons present at the scene of the accident who were involved and have suffered damage: a) state that they (i.e. the person referred to in the first clause) were involved in the accident; and b) if requested to do so, provide their own name and address, present their own driving licence and vehicle registration document and, to the best of their knowledge, provide details of their third-party insurance; a) remain at the scene of the accident until, by virtue of their own presence, it has been possible to identify their personal details, their vehicle and the nature of their involvement to the benefit of the other persons who were involved in and have suffered damage in the accident; or b) wait for a reasonable length of time and leave their own name and address at the scene of the accident if nobody was prepared to perform the identification; immediately facilitate subsequent identification if they have left the scene of the accident legitimately, after giving a plausible excuse or upon expiration of the waiting time (paragraph 6(b)). For this purpose, they must inform at least the persons referred to above (paragraph 6(a)) or a nearby police station that they were involved in the accident and must provide their own address, their present whereabouts as well as the registration number and location of the vehicle that was involved in the accident, which must be kept available for immediate investigation for a reasonable length of time. For minor accidents (no injuries, no suspected criminal offence, no major disagreements between involved parties, ...) you do not have to call and wait for police (you have a right to call them but they might try to discourage you from requesting that they come to the scene). For normal traffic accidents insurance doesn't come and collect evidence at the scene, instead an appraiser will document damage to your car and look at statements and witness reports and other documentation. You can just exchange all necessary information with the other party/ies and then leave with your car (possibly using a towing service). However, OP might refer to the specific case of an accident with a rented car. In that case, the contract with the rental service often mandates that you call police and request an official police documentation and report in case of an accident.
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I have beaten all but one of my traffic tickets just by going to court. In one case, the judge threw out the charge because he couldn't read the officer's handwriting on the ticket. In another, the officer charged that I was parked in a "no parking" zone on a particular street (at night), but gave a cross street where parking was, in fact, allowed.
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You can't sue her for not having insurance. You sue for the damage you suffered. You can name her as a defendant alongside her son on the theory that she contributed to the accident by letting her son use the car, and then let the judge sort out who gets landed with the liability. Depending on the rules in your jurisdiction you might have to pay her travel expenses and/or lost wages if the judge decides she wasn't to blame (and the same for her son, but that sounds like a slam-dunk). However you might be better off going for victim restitution. That way the order gets made as part of the criminal case against the son. Less hassle for you, and the state authorities are responsible for actually getting the money out of them. Edit: It turns out that Idaho has the Family Car Doctrine in its law, so the mother is legally liable for her son's accident (thanks to ohwilleke for the pointer).
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Almost everywhere, in any circumstances, it is the driver's responsibility to operate their vehicle so as not to get in an accident. When two drivers collide, responsibility can be divided among them depending on the details. However, when a driver hits a stopped object (including another vehicle), it is always the driver's fault for not operating his vehicle safely. It is possible the other vehicle may also receive a minor parking ticket or similar infraction for stopping on a shoulder or other invalid place. But that citation will not do anything at all to relieve your responsibility to operate your car without hitting obstacles.
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Is MagSafe patented such that no one else can make magnetic power supplies? I'm talking about MagSafe, the connector used on some Apple power adapters that pops out of the socket easily, and snaps into place using a magnet, so that both the cable and the socket are unlikely to be damaged in the event of an unexpected disconnection. Is this patented in such a way that only Apple can legally make a similar connector? I don't mean off-brand clones of MagSafe itself, but rather another style of connector which uses the same principle. If so, when does the patent expire?
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The connector is patented, as you see here. It contains 57 claims which define what is protected, and 35 USC 116 spells out the logic of claims (which, in a nutshell, says "this can get really complicated"). The set of claims defines what it patented, and infringement is defined in 35 USC 271 as whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent that is, there isn't anything statutorily more specific about how similar similar is. Since the claims define what is protected, this generally is taken to refer to things that are the same w.r.t. to all of the claims. "Generally" means that there is a doctrine of equivalents, exemplified by Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. 520 U.S. 17, whereby a court may find infringement when there is an insubstantial difference between the allegedly infringing thing and the protected invention. The Apple patent does not specify a specific number of millimeters between the contacts, so making a connector that is exactly the same as the Apple device (as marketed) but with different spacing on the connectors would be an infringement, because that spacing is not specified in a claim. A similar device that uses chewing gum rather than magnets to keep it together would not likely be found to be infringing since that is a substantial divergence from what Apple claims it has invented.
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However, this uses the text "rights in an invention"; does that cover copyright? Yes. (Is this the correct law?) It certainly seems to be. Does "Relate … to the employer's business" cover the entirety of software engineering, or just the particular software engineering my employer does? Imagine that you work for a company that writes trading software. In your spare time, you develop a photo editing tool. Do you think a court would find that your project "related to the employer's business"? I do not. Or does my employer own copyright on everything down to the love letters I write? Google does not own everything their employees create; they only claim to. If someone challenged them on it, a court would decide, and probably not in their favor.
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The whole purpose of a patent is that the contents of the patent becomes public knowledge, in exchange for a time limited monopoly. Therefore you are allowed to do anything, since you are not just allowed but expected to examine the patent in order to improve on it, except that you need a license to sell or give away products implementing the patent as long as it is valid. The only thing to be careful about is that by publishing source code, you might be enticing others to infringe on the patent, so I'd recommend not to do that without advice of a lawyer. PS. With software, the interpretation of "making" software in patent law may be a bit surprising. There was a major case between Microsoft and AT&T about that. The software developer isn't "making" the software. The build engineer putting everything together isn't "making" the software. The CD manufacturer making a million copies isn't "making" the software. The person installing it on their computer is the one who makes it.
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Copyright requires originality Your infinity hard drive appears to be a machine designed to violate copyright by immediately copying anything presented to it. Damien Riehl and Noah Rubin were creating original melodies. These do not have copyright until they are fixed in a tangible medium. That's what the hard drive is for. This is insurance against them being sued if they release a song and someone claims it violates that person's copyright - they can produce in court the melody with a date stamp of 2015 (or whatever). GitHub or similar would be even better evidence. In this context there is a specific allegation that melody X infringes copyright. Riehl & Rubin can then go to their records (including metadata) and say no, here is melody X version 1 through n and they all predate your release so we didn’t violate your copyright.
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A person can only patent their own original invention. If the technology which is the subject of the patent existed before it was filed, then the patent is not enforceable. This is called prior art. Note that the rights to a patent can always be placed in the public domain. Patent just means "make obvious" in Latin. So, if you obtain a patent, that does not necessarily mean you are blocking other people from using the technology. There are also various established ways for publishing your technology to guarantee that it is in the public domain.
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There is currently no direct limit. First, under the Space Liability Convention, a nation bears responsibility for an object launched from its territory. Accordingly, the Soviet Union was billed for $3M because of the crash of Kosmos 954 in Canada. A thing is not "space junk" initially, so "space junk" is not a thing that is produced in the normal sense (cars and computers are produced). Any restrictions on space debris would therefore have to be either in terms of the number of items a country could launch (there is no provision for such a limit), or requirements regarding what must be done when something becomes "space junk". The existing liability law is a country-to-country liability law, and if a Virgin Moon ship lands on your house or on Russia, neither you nor Russia can sue Virgin Moon. Russia might sue the US, if it was launched from the US. In the case of such a suit, the respondent nation has to have been negligent, and there are no standards for determining negligence. Also, actually proving the origin of a bolt is not trivial, plus, the recourse is via damage caused by the bolt, not the simple fact of there being a bolt. There is some law in the US (SPACE Act of 2015) which addresses private launches (the bill is here).
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Marks are to denominate the origin of goods. Nintendo built Gameboys for decades. Some GameBoys have aftermarket parts like the NAKI Action Light, a peripheral never made by Nintendo but was nothing but a light and a 1.5 magnification lens. It was advertised as "Fitting a Game Boy TM" and didn't use Nintendo marks. That is nominative use and allowed. Then, Nintendo actually had stocks of spare parts that ended on the open market by now. those are genuine Nintendo parts, made for Nintendo, with the marks on it. Those are proper marks. Some people bought up tons of old Game Boys and took them apart for spares. Those are still genuine parts, even if used, and the mark is proper. Nintendo didn't make all the parts for Gameboy themselves. They had contracted OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) that created parts for construction of the toys. These were in part branded and marked in the OEM factory still, the OEMs had a license to make and mark parts. Parts produced till the lapse of the license would be most likely proper as for most intents and purposes Nintendo did endorse the manufacturing in this fashion. However after the licensee lapsed or if it doesn't contain a "put the markings on it" clause, marking would not be allowed (anymore). Finally, there are spare parts that were just made to Nintendo specs, that are not originating with Nintendo, and are marked with Nintendo marks. Such copy parts infringe on the Trademark of Nintendo. There is legal space in the aftermarket spare part market: Parts that are to specs but not marked with the marks denominating the origin. Those can be advertised akin to the NAKI Action Light "fitting a Game Boy TM" without infringing on marks.
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The answer to the question "can so-and-so sue me?" is almost always "yes", regardless of context. Such a suit might be baseless, and it might get settled in your favor, but you still have to spend the time and money to defend yourself. This can be disastrous for a start-up that's trying to get off the ground, and it's how patent trolls make their money. (I'm not accusing SnapChat of engaging in such tactics as a rule, of course; I'm just pointing out that the legal system does allow for them.) Whether or not you are likely to be sued is a separate question, and one that can really only be effectively addressed by a trademark attorney with full knowledge of the particularities of your situation.
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Are there any laws in the US that ban the display of offensive symbols? Quite a few times in TV shows and movies and only once in real life I've seen people with offensive tattoo or shirt symbols such as the Swastika. Is there a law in the United States that bans the display of a symbol such as this? If so, how do people with these symbols on them go out in public without getting caught?
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Yes and no. While there are no general laws that ban the display of offensive symbols, they are prohibited in certain circumstances. Significantly, this is in the workplace. It is illegal to discriminate on the following bases in the workplace: Race Sex Pregnancy Religion National origin Disability (physical or mental, including HIV status) Age (for workers over 40) Military service or affiliation Bankruptcy or bad debts Genetic information Citizenship status (for citizens, permanent residents, temporary residents, refugees, and asylees) For instance, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 US 742 (1998), the majority found: a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination based upon race could assert a claim for a racially hostile work environment, in addition to the classic claim of so-called "disparate treatment." Since you haven't been specific about the nature of the offensive symbol, some examples might be: displaying a swastika displaying sexually offensive material displaying racially offensive material These are likely only to apply if the employer ought to have known, or did in fact know, that an employee (or in some cases, the customers) of a business would be offended, or it would amount to discrimination. Of course, a single display of only the symbol is not likely, on its own, to create a hostile work environment - it would need to be considered with the rest of the facts - but it can certainly be a contributing factor. It's a bit difficult to list all the situations where similar laws might apply, but this is one of the most prominent (and, to be honest, one of the ones that I'm personally interested in).
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No, it is certainly not legally safe to sell a shirt with such an image printed on it. There are two compatible facts to consider: Wikipedia is correct that the image is not covered by copyright in the United States. The image is likely protected by trademark law, which Wikipedia also notes, directly under the public domain information: This work includes material that may be protected as a trademark in some jurisdictions. If you want to use it, you have to ensure that you have the legal right to do so and that you do not infringe any trademark rights. Copyright Copyright provides a monopoly on the reproduction of creative works, but copyright only applies to sufficiently creative works. In cases such as these, Wikipedia is expressing the opinion that the work in question is too simple or too utilitarian to meet the threshold of originality and/or creativity for copyright. For the U.S. specifically, consider 37 CFR 202.1 which enumerates some categories of work excluded from copyright protection: The following are examples of works not subject to copyright and applications for registration of such works cannot be entertained: (a) Words and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring; mere listing of ingredients or contents; [...] (e) Typeface as typeface. Category (a) excludes the word "Marvel" or "Nirvana" from copyright protection, while category (e) excludes the creative choices that went into the styling of the text. (Note that fonts -- the software that creates/renders a typeface on a page -- are copyrightable in the U.S., but a font's "output" of typefaced text is not similarly protected.) Therefore, in the U.S., that "Marvel" image is likely not copyrightable, since it is just a single word with a particular stylized typeface (the use of which does not make it copyright-eligible either). This may be different from other jurisdictions, some which do recognize the use of the typeface as protectable element under copyright. Trademark Trademark law is a completely distinct area of law that applies to the use of logos, phrases, and other elements to identify a vendor in commerce. The words "Toyota" and "Camry" are not eligible for copyright protection, but the government affords the Toyota Motor Corporation a monopoly on the use of those words to identify the source and model of a car. If you built your own car and tried to attached the name "Toyota Camry" to it without their permission, you would be liable for trademark infringement. Similarly, logos that are too simple to qualify for copyright may still be covered by trademark law, if the company has registered them as trademarks or otherwise uses them distinctively in trade. This is likely the case here. If you put that rectangular Marvel logo on a shirt, you would be misrepresenting your product as being authorized by Marvel Entertainment and be liable for trademark infringement.
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The fact that something is illegal does not imply that it is illegal to post pictures of it happening. In general, under U.S. law, free speech protects almost all forms of communications subject to a handful of narrow exceptions and this is not one of them. There are many legitimate reasons one might want to post video of a fight (e.g. to identify crime perpetrators for purposes of prosecuting them), but no legitimate purpose is legally necessary. Surely as a platform Reddit cant hide against it being a platform of free speech in this case? They most definitely can. Reddit is also not responsible for user posted content under Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act, even if it were illegal for the person posting it to post the content
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So for your first question, yelling "Stop Thief" loudly at the thief is perfectly legal (Like Yelling "Fire" in a crowded theater, it's legal if the theater is infact, on fire... the quote implied that it was a prankster who drew amusement from the reaction of the people who took him seriously). This may alert store employees, who have a specific kind of Citizens Arrest Power known as "Shopkeeper's Privilege" and is a reduced liability compared to Citizens Arrest. This is also pretty basic self defense agains people who are not engaged in any physical action against you but are starting to scare you. Suddenly shouting draws attention to you and discourages them from their behavior "I SAID DON'T TOUCH ME" being suddenly shouted in a Wal Mart is going to get notices from the immediate crowd drawn to you, and by poximate location, the person who is making you uneasy. For your second question, maybe, it depends... since the cop is clearly chasing the guy, you meet the qualification to use non-deadly force in stopping the criminal (i.e. you are witnessing a person committing a crime, in this case, resisting arrest or persuit) and it would certainly be reasonably non-deadly force if you were to trip, grab, or push the fleeing suspect. Citizens Arrest doesn't specify a minimum time to qualify, so if the officer is seconds behind, and you detain the criminal in this action until the gap is closed, it still counts.
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Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz.
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Yes It is perfectly legal to physically wash US currency under US law. The kind of "money laundering" that is illegal is obscuring the history of funds, making proceeds of crime appear legitimate, or just making the source of funds hard to trace. That violates 18 USC 1956 and/or 18 USC 1957 There may be other relevant laws as well. This is "washing" money only in a metaphorical sense. See also this US Dept of Justice page
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There isn’t a legal restriction Which is to say they could show replica’s if they wanted to; they just don’t want to. This is fairly typical - art museums display art, not reproductions of art. They also tend to be interested in displaying the art they have, not telling the life story of the artist.
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First, copyright does not apply to "brands". Copyright exists in literary works which includes art - a picture (any picture) usually has a copyright belonging to the creator of the picture. Brands are protected by Trade Marks. To be clear: A picture of you is protected by copyright belonging to the creator The phrase "Mickey Mouse" is protected by trade mark belonging to the Disney corporation A picture of Micky Mouse is protected by copyright and trade mark. (when) would it be legally OK for me to do so without the copyright owner's permission? You can use copyright material without permission if you meet the fair use criteria in your jurisdiction. You can use trade marks if there is no risk of people confusing your goods and services with the trade mark holder's and you do not cause damage (including loss of potential income) to the trade mark holder or it is fair use (e.g. you are writing a review of a Micky Mouse cartoon). Is it legal if I do not distribute them to others at all? No, this would be OK as copyright fair use, but not as trade mark fair use. Is it legal if I give them to my family/relatives for free, e.g. as a gift? No, not fair use for either copyright or trade mark. Is it legal if I give them away to others for free (meaning I'm losing my own money on them)? No, see above. Is it legal if I sell them to others at-cost (i.e. for the same price I obtained them, meaning I'm not making any money from them)? No, see above. If the answer is "yes" to any of the above, can the copyright holder explicitly prohibit me from doing so, or would such a prohibition be unenforceable (e.g. if this would be fair use)? It isn't allowed. Yes they can stop you. No, it isn't fair use; there is no "fair use" defence for trade mark infringement here - you are depriving them of income because you are not buying their T-shirt! Any other factors that are relevant but which I'm forgetting? Will they sue you for doing these things? Probably not.
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Is it fair use to buy a Mac, not use it, and build a hackintosh? There have been threads like https://apple.stackexchange.com/questions/107324/is-installing-mavericks-on-hackintosh-legal with some user's commentary amounting to "I purchased 4 iPhones! I'm entitled!" So far as I can tell, none of the options discussed consider buying a Mac to pay Apple for the hardware one would use an OS on. It was always building a hackintosh in lieu of buying a Mac. Is deliberately purchasing a Mac and not using it before installing a hackintosh something different and possibly covered by fair use or other doctrine? Or is it still a matter of "You might easily get away with it, but you have Apple's legally backed strong disapproval and the bit about not running on any hardware but Apple?" still the basic picture?
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You cannot run MacOS legally on any computer that is not Apple-branded. It is a DMCA violation. There are technical measures in place that check that the OS is running on an Apple branded computer. These measures are easily circumvented, but they need to be circumvented, which makes it a DMCA violation. A company selling computers with MacOS installed (Psystar) was ordered to pay $2,500 per computer for the DMCA violation (they never paid Apple, they didn't even have money to pay their lawyers). In practice, Apple will ignore you as long as you don't make claims that what you do is legal. Buying a Mac with legally owned version of MacOS and not using is makes absolutely no difference. And it would never be fair use. It is either copyright infringement or it is not, bue it is never fair use. "Fair use" is not about "being fair". It is about a very specific set of excuses that you can have why your copyright infringement shouldn't be punished. You are not using MacOS for parody, or just tiny extracts. For example, if you copied ten lines of source code from MacOS, Linux and Windows to demonstrate in a computer science course how different operating systems handle the same task in different ways, that would quite likely be "fair use".
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Legally, yes, if you get a license from Blizzard (unlikely, and if so, they'll probably want either money or a portion of your profits). Otherwise, not legally. This is exactly the situation that IP law (e.g. copyright and trademark) was created to address. Blizzard created the game and so they have rights to control and benefit from derivatives there of. There are some exceptions, but prints, buttons, and keychains are not likely to meet the requirements for those.
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Generally speaking, you must be Licensed, or enter a written agreement, in order to use any logos from any company, especially any time the reference is referenced commercially. There are exceptions to the rule, and some are more lenient than others, but you should always check before showing any company's trademarks or brand icons. For example, Intel® allows third parties to refer to them by name, but displaying a logo requires a license or written permission, per their Trademarks and Brands guideline. You'll find that most companies are probably willing to overlook violations of Licensing as long as the product is placed in a favorable light, since's that's basically free advertising, but you'll want to take the extra few moments and simply call them and ask. A ten minute call could save you tons in legal fees and/or fines. From what I've seen, most companies will allow use of their company name for most commercial and non-commercial uses, but reserve some logos only for licensed partners, and others still only for themselves. They will also generally specify appearance guidelines, such as rendering ® and ™ only the first time on each page of printed material, as well as a specific guideline for sentences and phrases that the name may or may not appear in. They also usually specify that such phrases may not imply that the company is a partner or representative of the company, etc. You can see Intel's Trademark Symbols and Acknowledgements page for an example of what you'd expect to be required to do. This page also gives some example sentences of acceptable and unacceptable phrases. For example: Correct Usage Look for PCs with Intel® Core™ processors. Incorrect Usage Look for PCs with Intel® Core. Mostly, they're concerned about making sure ™ is used correctly, as well as specifying that they make processors, not entire systems. You'll want to try and stay on the good side of their legal department, and represent fairly.
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Your app is a simple case of copyright infringement. All the Pokémon are copyrighted, the lettering and names are also protect by trademarks. Trying to claim fair use will be outright impossible: you'll use huge portions of the individually protected Pokemon (the iconic ones like Pikachu) and you are usurping a market they are already in. They have given licenses for apps (Pokemon Go). Pokemon are artistic and some form of fiction. The last straw might be if you'd do a rather obvious parody, but even then, I see no way to show Fair Use with what you stated. No disclaimer can change that, and publishing your work might open you to a huge lawsuit with damages for each individually protected Pokemon you infringed on. With between 750 $ minimum and 150,000 $ absolute upper limit per infringed item (last is for willful infringement), you don't want to infringe on Pokemon, as you could be very easily liable for a number in the 6 to 9 digits! Even if Nintendo might only try to get the statutory damages for all the 900 Pokémon, that is a number of at least 675,4000 $. And that's before looking at Trademarks. Pikachu has about 6 live word marks and there are 111 different Pokémon trademarks filed (some expired or dead)!
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I'm not a lawyer, but under the law as it's written, I see two problems: 17 USC 121 allows "authorized entities" to make and publish accessible copies of works. An "authorized entity" is defined as a nonprofit organization or a governmental agency that has a primary mission to provide specialized services relating to training, education, or adaptive reading or information access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities. So if you, as a private citizen, decide to do this, it could conceivably be copyright infringement. You might have to set up some kind of non-profit organization to make it legal. It's also OK (I think) if you make such copies for your own personal use, so long as you don't redistribute them. So far as I can tell, nothing under 17 USC 121 requires the original publisher to provide an "authorized entity" with a copy in any particular format (PDF, paper, or otherwise) for making accessible copies. Basically, the law seems to have envisioned organizations of sighted people purchasing paper copies, transcribing them, and republishing them; not blind individuals doing electronic transcription for themselves. It might still be worth contacting Hal Leonard and asking what they can do for you, but unfortunately it doesn't look like the law requires them to do anything for you. As Nij points out in the comments, this really seems to be a question about the company's policy, rather than the law.
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There is something wrong-sounding about that claim. Owning a thing (such as a book) means that you can dispose of it however you want. If it is a physical book, then unless this is a book of top secret classified information, the US government has no control over the item, nor does the copyright holder have any right to prevent you from giving away your copy. Electronic books, however, are another matter, since often you don't buy such books, you buy a license to use the book (like a software license). The license terms of an electronic book could be subject to various controls, and the license might be non-transferable. The underlying logic of this is that under the doctrine of first sale, you are allowed to do whatever you want with intellectual property that you buy, and therefore to restrict re-distribution of electronic IP, software especially is typically not itself sold, and just the permission to use it is. If this is an electronic book, the copyright holder would be able (though not necessarily willing) to permit you to transfer your copy to someone else. Of course you can't give a copy to two people unless you have two licenses.
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Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.
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There is something called the exhaustion doctrine that says that once the holder of a patent sells a patented device, they have relinquished control over that particular instance of the patent implementation. Anyone who legally purchases this hardware has the right to run whatever software they want on it, as long the software is otherwise legal (software designed to defeat DRM would be an example of software that is is not legal).
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Can I forbid the government from using my patented invention? (this is a purely hypothetical situation, for literary research) I've filed a patent on a certain technology for facial recognition/analysis, and as the patent holder I want to use my exclusivity to ensure it's not used to harm anyone. Unfortunately, the nature of the invented technique can be easily misused for what I believe are evil purposes. Military, then law enforcement agencies, have begun connecting me with manufacturers who want to incorporate my technique into their software suites, to which I am firmly opposed. Mind, the patent is still in review, so getting inquiries this soon strikes me as odd. My question is, can I deny the military use of my invention should the patent be approved, and if not, are there any ways in which I can sabotage or otherwise render it difficult for them? Perhaps by requesting an impractically large royalty or purposely presenting a subtly faulty implementation to their manufacturing firm?
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Can you prevent the government from using your patent? The opposite is actually true. If you patent something, and it is felt to be potentially of national security interest, then they can take your invention for the nation, produce it, and prevent you producing it or sharing the design indefinitely (though it will be reviewed annually). This has happened to about 5000 patents so far. https://www.wired.com/2013/04/gov-secrecy-orders-on-patents/ Even where it is not of national security interest, and the government (or its contractors!) is not using it directly as covered in user6726' answer, they can still take your patent under the equivalent of eminent domain... well, I'll quote from http://patentplaques-blog.com/eminent-domain-excercised-on-patents/ During World War I, the military took all patents relevant to wireless technology and put them in a mandatory licensing pool. Anyone was then able to use the patents and the patent holders received royalties. The pooling of the patents led to innovations including the mass production of vacuum tubes and a national FM radio network. So, in short, the government can use your invention for its own purposes; it can prevent you from using it; and it can force you to give it to others. They don't do this too often, but if you're working in an area that you think will be of especial interest to them, it's something to be aware of. In general, they will compensate you somewhat for your trouble, but not as much as the open market could have.
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No, you can’t For at least 1 and up to 4 reasons You don’t own the copyright in the photograph. You risk the tort of passing off by implying that Jim endorses your company when he in fact knows nothing about it. While it may be well understood in the memosphere that there is no such endorsement, you are taking it outside that context. In jurisdictions with laws against misleading and deceptive conduct, the same facts that lead to passing off are also likely misleading and deceptive. In jurisdictions which protect personality rights or require model releases, you don’t have consent.
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The first question is whose law you are concerned with, since in principle you might have violated copyright law in any country, and might be sued under the laws of multiple countries. The US has a concept of "fair use" which is notoriously difficult to apply. When you are sued in the US, you can defend against the allegation by arguing certain things: telegraphically, this includes purpose and character of use, nature of the work, substantiality in relation to the whole, and effect on market. Plus there is a 5th factor to be considered, transformativeness. The court then weighs these factors to decide if the use is "fair". By reading existing case law on the topic (conveniently available from the US Copyright office) you might develop a fact-based opinion of the risk: you would be vastly better off hiring an attorney who specializes in US copyright law to do an analysis for you. Do not hire a programmer to give you legal advice (do not hire an attorney to debug code). You would "fail" on the test of substantiality in that you are copying a highly substantial portion of the original work(s). You would "win" on nature of use (research especially non-profit and commentary are the underlying purposes that drive fair use law). It's not clear how you would fare w.r.t. nature of the work, which is intended to distinguish the extremes "news report" and "literature and artistic work" where copying news is at the fair use end of the spectrum. It is not clear how you would fare on "effect on market", but probably not so badly: are you avoiding some licensing fee? Coupled with the tranformativeness consideration, you are most likely having no effect on the market, since the product that you will distribute is not the original work, but a scientific conclusion about the work. Germany has different laws, and this article would be relevant if you cared about Germany. There was a change in the law that expanded the analog of fair use pertaining to research use. That law allows 15 percent of a work to be reproduced, distributed and made available to the public for the purpose of non-commercial scientific research. That, b.t.w., does not refer to what you are planning to do (unless you also publish quotes); for personal scientific research you may reproduce up to 75 percent. Since this is a new law only a year old, you could become part of the cutting edge in testing the limits of the law. So the standard disclaimer applies: ask your attorney. But note section 60d of the law which legalized data mining, and is squarely on point: (1) In order to enable the automatic analysis of large numbers of works (source material) for scientific research, it shall be permissible to reproduce the source material, including automatically and systematically, in order to create, particularly by means of normalisation, structuring and categorisation, a corpus which can be analysed and to make the corpus available to the public for a specifically limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research, as well as to individual third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research. In such cases, the user may only pursue non-commercial purposes. (2) If database works are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall constitute customary use in accordance with section 55a, first sentence. If insubstantial parts of databases are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall be deemed consistent with the normal utilisation of the database and with the legitimate interests of the producer of the database within the meaning of section 87b (1), second sentence, and section 87e. (3) Once the research work has been completed, the corpus and the reproductions of the source material shall be deleted; they may no longer be made available to the public. It shall, however, be permissible to transmit the corpus and the reproductions of the source material to the institutions referred to in sections 60e and 60f for the purpose of long-term storage.
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I've found Google's filtering based on licence to not be very reliable, at least not reliable enough to trust from a practical legal perspective. Using a photo that you don't own the copyright to is a risk. You may be infringing copyright by doing so. The owner may eventually ask you to stop, or they may sue you for damages. Further, some copyright infringement is criminal 17 USC 506. In my opinion, it would be unwise to use a work commercially that you don't affirmatively know you have permission to use.
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The whole purpose of a patent is that the contents of the patent becomes public knowledge, in exchange for a time limited monopoly. Therefore you are allowed to do anything, since you are not just allowed but expected to examine the patent in order to improve on it, except that you need a license to sell or give away products implementing the patent as long as it is valid. The only thing to be careful about is that by publishing source code, you might be enticing others to infringe on the patent, so I'd recommend not to do that without advice of a lawyer. PS. With software, the interpretation of "making" software in patent law may be a bit surprising. There was a major case between Microsoft and AT&T about that. The software developer isn't "making" the software. The build engineer putting everything together isn't "making" the software. The CD manufacturer making a million copies isn't "making" the software. The person installing it on their computer is the one who makes it.
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Your issue is trademark, not copyright. If these other guys use their mark (product name) in commerce but did not register it, they have an unregistered trademark which you could be infringing. Between two users of the same trademark, the first to use in commerce wins. (There is a territorial component but with the Internet, meh.) If the trademark is registered that gives them a presumption of validity. Trademark infringement is concerned with consumer confusion. If someone uses someone else's trademark in a way that confuses consumers as to the origin of the goods, that's a problem. What this means is that if I make tires with the name Sportie and someone else makes soap also with that name Sportie there is not a high likelihood of confusion. Likewise a hotel in Washington called Runner's Cove probably doesn't infringe a shoe store in Florida with the same name. Fantasy games and fantasy books sold over the Internet? Sounds like a potential problem that you might want to clear up before the second book.
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As you have agreed, by contract, not to reverse engineer the product, technically it would be a "breach of contract" to do so, assuming such terms are enforceable where you live (or wherever the EULA selects as the choice of forum).
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The standard for fair use of trademarks is as follows: (1) the product or service in question is not readily identifiable without use of the trademark (2) only so much of the mark as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service is used (3) use of the mark does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner. I think you might run into a problem with (1). In other words the trademark owner would argue that you could have used fake trademarks to satisfy your product description needs, so you are using their trademark unnecessarily.
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Would economic and healthcare-related pressure constitute duress in the annulment of a marriage? I've found the legal definition of duress to be quite well-specified in the case of criminal law, but little of that seems directly applicable to the civil domain. That said, I'm unsure as to if a situation like the following might qualify: Let us suppose Alice and Bob are in a relatively new relationship, but very much in love. However, Alice is unable to work due to a serious, but treatable (although not under government-sponsored healthcare) condition. Bob, on the other hand, has a decent job with excellent insurance coverage, but it extends only to family and spouses (ie, not domestic partners). Under normal circumstance, the two would never consider marriage so early-on, but the combined stress of Alice's condition worsening or the economic pressure of Bob paying for her treatments out-of-pocket has lead the couple to see marriage as the only viable option. If their relationship comes to an end at some point, would they be able to seek annulment under duress instead of facing the legal ramifications of divorce?
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Short Answer: This is Not Duress This would not constitute duress or a ground for an annulment under U.S. law. In general, economic considerations, or moral duties arising from love and affection, or a felt obligation to "do the right thing" following a pregnancy, or a need to bring other family members (or oneself) out of dire poverty, do not constitute duress that would constitute a ground for an annulment. Duress would typically have to involve a threat of unlawful physical harm to the person getting married, or to a loved one of a person getting married. Historically Duress Was Not A Ground For An Annulment Historically, duress was not considered a ground for an annulment at all. For example, historically, the duress of a "shotgun marriage" (literally, a threat to kill the man who got an unmarried woman pregnant if he didn't marry her), would not have been considered a ground for annulment, although it might be today. Similarly, if a king married one of his daughters to the son of another king in exchange for not invading and ruining his country, the daughter could not annul that marriage, even if it was entered into because the two kings agreed that she would be killed if she did not agree and told her so, despite the fact that both she and her father were under duress at the time. Annulments Are Rare And Are Rarely Sought For Duress Annulment of a facially valid non-common law marriage is very rare. For example, in 2017, there were 308 marriage annulment cases in Colorado and 5 civil union annulment cases, in a year in which Colorado had a population of 5,607,000 people. In the same year it has 25,290 divorce cases, 922 legal separation cases, 6,308 cases seeking an adjudication of parental rights and responsibilities involving unmarried couples, 1,957 paternity cases, 56 civil union dissolution cases, 5 civil union legal separation cases, and 6 cases seeking judicial permission for a minor to marry. There are approximately 41,500 marriages each year in Colorado, so the annulment rate is about 7 per thousand marriages in Colorado, which would be fairly typical nationally. There are about 12 annulments per thousand divorces in Colorado. Duress would be grounds for an annulment in only a tiny share of those rare annulment cases that are filed. In part, in the modern U.S., this is because the wide availability of unilateral no fault divorce, and the abolition of most marital immunities from civil and criminal liability, makes the use of duress to compel someone to marry a pretty futile exercise, that has a high potential for criminal law consequences for someone who attempts to use duress to force someone to get married. Some typical grounds annulments other than duress would involve (in approximate order of frequency) (1) the marriage was entered into under conditions that one or both of the parties felt was a joke or were temporarily too impaired to really understand because they were drunk or under the influence of drugs (legal or otherwise), or (2) an individual who was married didn't have the capacity to appreciate fully what marriage means due to a developmental disability, or due to dementia, or (3) the couple is legally prohibited from marrying (e.g. due to age, because they are a long lost brother and sister, or mother and son, or one or both of the parties was married to someone else at the time), or (4) the marriage was entered into based upon a misunderstanding of one or both parties regarding the sex or gender of the other party (i.e. a woman who thought she was marrying a cisgender man but actually married a transgender man) or the identity of the party (the marriage ceremony was with the wrong twin, for example). Duress would be a less common ground for an annulment than the first three reasons, but might be more common than the fourth reason set forth above. Annulment And The Doctrine Of Laches Also, annulment is equitable relief that can generally be barred by the doctrine of laches. For example, if two people are married via a facially legal marriage license and aren't legally prohibited from marrying, did so while tripping on LSD and thinking that they were just joking, but then continue to live as husband and wife for eight years and have kids together, a court would probably deny them an annulment, even if an annulment would have been granted if the issue had been raised immediately, even in a state that is not a common law marriage state. Similarly, a marriage entered into at age 13 that was legally recognized due to a lie on a marriage license application, would probably be annulled at age 18 or 20, but laches would probably prohibit an annulment of that marriage at age 40. The "put everyone back where they started prior to marriage" premise of an annulment is easy to implement when people have been legally married for only a few days or months, especially if they have never actually shared their lives economically and haven't had kids together during the marriage, but is much harder to implement when they have lived together for a long time as husband and wife. Footnote On Sham Marriages For Immigration Purposes As an aside, an immigration agency determination that a marriage is a sham that does not afford the immigrant eligibility for citizenship is rarely, if ever, grounds for an annulment under other civil or criminal laws. For example, a sham marriage determination by immigration officials would not end eligibility to file a joint tax return, or end the ability to claim a spousal privilege to exclude a spouse's testimony in a court case, or change the presumption of paternity for children born during the marriage. Canon Law Compared Duress is grounds for an annulment for religious purposes under Roman Catholic canon law (Canon 1103), as are the circumstances described in the OP (Canon 1101, Section 2), which aren't considered duress under canon law either. But, a church annulment would have no secular legal effect; it would only affect a person's status in regard to Roman Catholic prohibitions against divorce. Why Seek An Annulment? It is also unclear what you think that the legal ramifications of a divorce as opposed to an annulment would be in this case. The biggest would seem to be that Alice would lose any right to alimony or an equitable property division if this were an annulment rather than a divorce, so generally speaking, an annulment would be harmful to her legally. Historically, annulment was, in part, an extraordinary remedy for cases where divorce was simply not available at all, at least without special legislation authorizing the divorce of a particular man and a particular woman, and in part, a natural outgrowth of the process of a court trying to determine as a factual finding, whether or not two people had gotten married, or had not gotten married. But, in an age where no fault divorce is widely available on an essentially unilateral basis, the need for annulments has largely evaporated.
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If a line in your will bequeaths something that you don't have the power to give (e.g. you bequeath something that you don't own at the time of your death), that line has no legal effect. If I died and left you the house at 10 Downing Street in London, for example, you wouldn't actually be getting it. If your will contains enough of those lines and/or they seem excessively unreasonable, it may cause the validity of the will to be challenged on the basis that you weren't competent to prepare and sign it. If the people reading it think it's reasonable, it may have a social effect based on what it conveys to them, which could lead to voluntary compliance with your wish (especially if the main obstacle to that being realized is a mistaken understanding of and desire to respect your wishes). That could help make peace, for example, if a surviving parent's remarriage would otherwise be opposed by children (or the surviving partner) or others based solely on a mistaken understanding of the wishes of the deceased. It could also make for a really awkward moment, depending on the views of and relationships between survivors. Addressing user662852's comment on the question: You can also use a will to name a guardian for anyone you have guardianship over, which is usually more important for children (e.g. see "Why Every Parent Needs a Will.").
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united-states Almost every U.S. jurisdiction (perhaps all of them) recognize the affirmative defense of "duress" to a criminal prosecution. The precise scope of what actions are sufficient to establish that duress is present vary. A credible threat that someone will kill you or your child is generally sufficient in every state that recognizes the defense. There is also a closely related defense known as "choice of evils." This said, eight years is a very long time and usually the defense of duress is available only if the threat was imminent or immediate. So, it is probably less likely than not that a finder of fact would conclude that it was impossible to seek to involve authorities in the situation, for all of the time in that eight year time period, without reasonably risking the threatened harm. Also, while you call his acts "treasonous", in reality the crime of treason is defined very narrowly in the U.S. Constitution to taking up arms against your country and providing aid and comfort to people who are doing so, and the fact pattern suggested probably does not constitute treason under U.S. law. Finally, while his circumstances only dubiously are sufficient to assert a defense of duress over the sustained eight year time period, this doesn't mean that authorities couldn't choose to refrain from prosecuting him, or that the couldn't seek only lesser charges with mitigating circumstances conceded in sentencing, in an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Often this exercise of prosecutorial discretion would be conditioned upon cooperation in the case brought against other defendants in related cases. In an exceptional case, the pardon power could be invoked for relieve him from criminal liability as has been done in some past insurrections in U.S. history like the Whiskey Rebellion and the U.S. Civil War. Even treason is a pardonable offense at the federal level. At the federal level in the United States, the President can issue a pardon even if someone has not yet been convicted of the crime in question. england While I am not an expert on the exact details of English law, in general, it is harder to claim the defenses of "duress" and "choice of evils" under English criminal law than it is under the criminal laws of most U.S. jurisdictions. See here.
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The basic option that one has when a contract has been breached is that the harmed party sues the damaging party, seeking compensation. Sometimes, contracts contain arbitration clauses which limits how disputes can be resolved – for example "disputes shall be subject to binding arbitration by Jones Arbicorp". Whether or not such a clause is legal would depend on the jurisdiction. A clause which states that there can be no legal remediation of breach means that the contract would be unenforceable, and is not in fact a contract. Courts generally strive to construe anything that looks like a contract as being a contract, and they can set aside a particular aspect of a contract. If the other party attempted to have the suit thrown out because of a "there is no remedy" clause, the court would most likely find that to not be a valid term in the contract. It does depends on what exactly the clause says. Your attorney would need to look at the language of the contract to advise you as to the best course of action (asking us for legal advice makes the question off-topic).
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There is no prospect for equitable relief in such an outcome. The Texas state government enjoys sovereign immunity, except as specified under the Tort Claims Act. Under that law, immunity is waived only in the case of damage caused by negligence of a state employee, and is limited primarily to vehicle accidents and physical injuries. So the state cannot be sued for passing a law found to be unconstitutional. An individual would not enjoy such immunity, but given the law, there is no identifiable defendant to seek relief from (everybody is a potential defendant). An former abortion provider who now declines to perform an abortion can't be sued, because doctors in general have no obligation to perform particular medical procedures (most doctors in Texas won't perform an abortion, even before SB8), and the course will not render a judgment against a doctor on the grounds that they obeyed an existing law but should have known that it would be found unconstitutional.
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Yes. The term for this situation is a "civil dispute." It can be resolved via a civil claim. In New Jersey, for claims under $3000, you can use the Small Claims courts. The process is designed to be followed without the assistance of counsel. Let the internet be your guide.
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You seem to have put a lot of thought into this - which is good. However, the short answer is: There is no legal solution. To address your points: And legally, my future wife has the right to divorce me even if I did nothing wrong (no-fault). Yes (at least in most jurisdictions). And then, according to the US Census Bureau [1], mothers usually get primary custody (unless she is on drugs or abusive, which she isn't). And according to the Indiana Parenting Guidelines [2], babies only get one night per week with the non-custodial parent. And even as a teenager, only alternating weekends. Here, it depends. What you describe is indeed what happens often, but not always. Rules vary a lot, and change, but there is an increasing trend to have joint custody in case of a divorce. The details vary, but joint custody can extend to joint physical custody or shared parenting, where both parents take turns looking after the child. This is possible in the United States. In practice, in case of separation the parents will have to work out a parenting plan - ideally together, or in court if needs be. What the result is will depend on circumstances, and on the opinion of the court what is in the children's best interest. This may or may not mean joint physical custody. Child support payments are based on custody, so I would need to pay her child support. And since she always planned on her husband financially supporting her, then I would need to pay her alimony too. And because of imputed income, I couldn't afford to take a lower-paying job with more flexibility. Again, this depends. For example, with joint physical custody, there may be only small or no child support payments if both parents care for the children about equal time. And even if child support is due, there may be no alimony payments if the mother can work (even if she chooses not to). Again, a lot depends on the specific case and jurisdiction. Also, while it is not possible to reduce child support in a pre-nup (because theses payments belong to the child), you can (to some extent) limit alimony payments in a pre-nup. Is there any way out of this situation? How can I ensure, starting now before my children are born, that their primary caregiver is me? Here we are leaving legal territory. The short answer is: There is no way to ensure this, certainly not using legal means. The only good approach is to get to know your partner first, and make sure you have similar views on how to approach parenting. If she wants to be a stay-at-home mom, and you want to share both work and parenting (such as in a shared earning/shared parenting marriage) then you need to think (and speak) about how to reconcile these views. You may find that you are just not compatible on that point. Then take appropriate consequences. To put it plainly: In my opinion, if you do not trust your partner to respect your wishes on parenting together, she is probably not the right person for you to have children with.
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They recently took me to court (I am now 20) to have me start paying for the bill, under distress I signed paperwork stating that I'd start paying them, however I find this entire situation very aggravating. Short Answer You are almost surely screwed at this point and can't do anything but abide by the settlement that you agreed to when you signed the paperwork. Preface Regarding The Applicable Jurisdiction I am answering based upon the majority rules of law in U.S. states, because there is almost no other country in the world where you could end up in this financial situation due to universal healthcare systems that exist in most countries other than the United States. Also, this isn't an area of law with a great deal of state to state variation, although the law isn't exactly the same in every single U.S. state. The Minority Defense You quite possibly had a minority defense before you signed the paperwork. The minority defense is based upon an inability to give adequate consent to a contract. Whether the minority defense would have worked in this case, however, is a close call, because there are exceptions to the rule that would probably apply in this case. Settlement, Ratification and Duress The legal standard for "duress" in contract law usually means situations where there is literally a gun to your head or they're going to kill your dog or something like that, not the kind of economic pressure or persistent harassing collection efforts that I suspect you are referring to in this case. Of course, if they did steal your dog and threaten to kill it if you didn't sign the paperwork, then you really would have signed it under duress and you should probably both take legal action to repudiate that paperwork (because agreements entered into under duress are generally voidable, rather than void), and you should probably report the incident to the police as a crime. So, anyway, the paperwork you signed is probably enforceable, despite the pressure that they put on you to sign it. Once you sign a settlement agreement as an adult (which is almost surely what you did) you have ratified the agreement made when you were a minor and forfeit any way to fight it. You are stuck with what you agreed to at this point and there is nothing you can do about it short of going bankrupt. I would not recommend going bankrupt over a debts owed to a single medical provider unless that debt is so huge that ruining your credit for seven years and paying a bankruptcy lawyer is worth it to get out of this debt. For most twenty-year-olds facing debts for a few chiropractor treatments this would not make sense. Lesson learned: Talk to a lawyer before you sign paperwork, not afterwards, because once you've signed on the dotted line, there is usually little or nothing that a lawyer can do to help you at that point. Guarantors As a guarantor of the obligation to pay for your care, your mother would no doubt be on the hook in any case, whether or not you settled, and whether or not you went bankrupt. Unless the settlement agreement that you signed says otherwise, they can still attempt to collect the bill from her as well as from you. Of course, as you make payments towards the total balance due, the total balance due goes down. Your mother, as a guarantor, is only obligated to pay the portion of the bills that remain unpaid when they try to collect the debt from her. The Necessaries Exception To The Minority Defense Even though the minority defense might apply in this situation, most states recognize an exception to the minority defense when a purchase of "necessaries" is made by a minor. Bills for medical care would usually count as "necessaries", because you would have had no choice but to buy if you had been an adult anyway, so your lack of consent to pay isn't something that caused you material harm. Honestly, in the medical industry, an agreement in advance to pay a negotiated price is the exception rather than the norm. Often the providers themselves have no real clear idea what their patients are billed for their services, although chiropractors tend to be more informed about the financial arrangements than medical doctors in most cases. Void Contracts v. Voidable Contracts In any case, minority is a defense to a contractual obligation that would ordinarily only make the contract voidable, rather than void. In other words, a minor can repudiate a contract that is voidable on account of minority and successfully get out of it within a reasonable time of becoming an adult (or sooner while you are still a minor through a parent or guardian or next friend), but it is not automatically invalid. There is a good chance that a court would consider a two year delay in trying to repudiate the contractual obligation too long, even if it concluded that the necessaries doctrine did not apply because, for example, the court considered this to be elective, luxury care rather than medically necessary services. Unjust Enrichment Claims Also, in addition to suing for breach of contract, the chiropractor might be able to sue for quantum meruit. This legal theory is not based upon mutual consent the way a contract claim is, although this is sometimes called a "quasi-contract" or "implied contract" claim (it is also sometimes called a "restitution" or "unjust enrichment" claim). As a result, minority is not usually a defense to a quantum meruit claim. Instead, a quantum meruit claim is based upon preventing you from being unjustly enriched, (1) from benefits that you received, (2) that were not unwelcome, (3) from the efforts of someone else who did that work, (4) with a reasonable expectation of being compensated for the work, (5) in situations where there is no binding contract between the parties. (Different lawyers and different courts might break up these elements into more or fewer components, but the gist of the claim would be the same in pretty much any state.) In a quantum meruit case, damages are based upon the fair market value of the services rendered, rather than an agreement of the parties, since there was no mutually agreed price under a contract that they are seeking to enforce. Quantum meruit claims are frequently brought as a backup claim to a claim for breach of contract by failing to pay for services, in cases where the contract claim may be infirm for reasons such as minority.
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Can i use brand logos on a website template I'm going to be selling? I'm working on a website template that I intend to sell on a marketplace where people can buy and sell templates (i.e. ThemeForest). I'd like this template to have a "Featured In" section where I'd like to put some logos from publishers (i.e. NYTimes, TechCrunch). These wouldn't be actual logos people who would buy my template would keep - they'd be just placeholders. Is this something I can legally do? To give you a 100% clear idea, here's an example from Slack.com:
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The standard for fair use of trademarks is as follows: (1) the product or service in question is not readily identifiable without use of the trademark (2) only so much of the mark as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service is used (3) use of the mark does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner. I think you might run into a problem with (1). In other words the trademark owner would argue that you could have used fake trademarks to satisfy your product description needs, so you are using their trademark unnecessarily.
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The length of a literary work doesn't determine if its use is fair use. Copyright does not cover names, titles of works, catchwords/catchphrases/advertising slogans etc. or lists of ingredients (like in a recipe or chemical instructions), however, the procedure can be copyright. The work must also be original. If the tweet copies something that already exists then there is no copyright in the tweet - if the thing that is copied has copyright protection then the tweet itself may be a violation. That said, assuming that the Tweet enjoys copyright protection, the owner will be the author: presumably the owner of the Twitter account. For anyone else to legally use it, the use must be either: Licensed by the copyright owner Fair use (USA) or Fair Dealing (most everywhere else in the English speaking world) For Item 1, the Twitter terms of service say: You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). In case you don't know what that means, Twitter gives you this plain English summary: Tip: This license is you authorizing us to make your Tweets on the Twitter Services available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. So, you can get permission from the copyright holder or from Twitter. Well, Twitter has given permission: Except as permitted through the Twitter Services, these Terms, or the terms provided on dev.twitter.com, you have to use the Twitter API if you want to reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the Twitter Services or Content on the Twitter Services. Providing you use their API, you can "reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the ... Content ..." Therefore, fair use/dealing considerations are irrelevant.
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Amy may use the names, and possibly the logos, of software products and their makers in producing instructional and educational materiel about such software. This is an example of nominative use. (Product names are not protected by copyright, and so copyright infringement will not be relevant. Trademark protection will be.) Nominative use means using the trademark as the name of the product or service associated with the mark. This is generally permitted. In many jurisdictions nominative use is limited to the use of the smallest amount of the trademark that will severe to identify the subject. This often means that use of the text name is permitted, but use of the logo, and the trade dress (the specific colors and fonts used on a name to make it a recognizable trasement, suh as the srylized script used for "coca-cola") is nort permitted withotu permission. The question says that "Amy has a cheat sheet (based on console commands or key bindings)..." If any wrote the cheat sheet herself, there is no problem. If she copied it without permission, that is quite likely to be a copyright infringement on its own, unless the sheet is a list of facts in a natural or obvious order, with no creativity involved in its creation.
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No it’s not illegal It’s called retailing: https://youtu.be/ywSkKkuGQ2A https://youtu.be/k8OreiHU91Y https://youtu.be/XpR6y1sNArU You are allowed to advertise the products you sell. Even if you don’t make them. You can even use their trademarks to identify them - that’s what trademarks are for.
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Simply admitting that the images are not yours does not give you the right to use them. The fact that you are not profitting from them does not change this. There is no magical statement or disclaimer that will change this. If your use of the images constitutes Fair Use (since you're not mentioning how you're using them, it probably doesn't), you can include a fair use disclaimer. Sample dislaimers can be found online. A disclaimer should include the following: A statement that the work in question is not yours That the use falls under Fair Use and why Section 107 of the copyright act
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No If they have prior usage then they have the trademark already and are the only ones who can register it. Trademarks arise through use - registration is not required.
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Check your license from shutterstock what you are allowed to do with these images. They allow you, for appropriate payment, to publish their original images on your website. There is no reason why you couldn't ask them for a license to create an image derived from their original and publish it on your website. Anyway, according to your description, you created a derived work of the shutterstock images. Which is copyright infringement unless your license from shutterstock allows this. You have of course copyright on your modifications, but shutterstock also has a copyright on your work, because it is derived from theirs. If you have no license to create a derived work, then publishing it makes the situation worse. To answer your question: Legally, by getting an appropriate license. Illegally, by creating a work with so little similarity that you are not suspected.
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Bringing fair use into this sounds iffy if you are partnering -- that is a commercial relationship which should be defined. If they did send you a file with their logo for a specific purpose, you can assume that you are allowed to use it for that specific purpose. If they did not send you the file, you can assume that they did not give you permission, or they would have included the file ...
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Lying in Court in the UK A defendant provable lied in court. We had no right of reply to prove the lies were false. Nothing has been done afterwards. He was found guilty, but received a very light sentence probably based on these lies. Is this normal?
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Is this normal? Pretty much. Witnesses lie in court all the time (in my experience, defendants, law enforcement officers and medical doctors are the most likely to lie). Dealing with a witness who lies in court under oath effectively is one of the most challenging tasks lawyers face. It is an inherently challenging hurdle to proving or defending a case. The facts as presented in court often differ in some material way from reality. It is a pretty tough thing to accurately measure, but my gut estimate would be that this happens in a least 30%-40% of cases that produce contested trials, although not infrequently, a judge or jury will not find the false testimony to be credible. On the other hand, it isn't at all uncommon (probably at least 10% of the time) for a judge or jury to believe the liars to be telling the truth, and to find the people who are telling the truth to be less credible. There is absolute immunity from civil liability for lying in court testimony, although it could, in theory, give rise to contempt of court sanctions from the judge in some circumstances, or to a prosecution for perjury. But, perjury prosecutions are, in practice, very rare, and a good share of them arise from false statements made in documents under oath, rather than from courtroom testimony. There is probably less than 1 perjury prosecution per 1000 provable lies made under oath in courtroom testimony on material issues that end up influencing the outcome in a case. I totally sympathize with how frustrating this situation is having been there in cases that I am litigating many, many times. But, in short, life isn't fair.
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Truth is a defense to defamation Bob must prove the truth of his statement if Rob sues - there is a reverse onus for this defense. Because this is a civil trial the burden is balance of probabilities. Provided Bob can prove Rob stole his bike he will win. A conviction for doing so is pretty good (but not necessarily conclusive) evidence. Absent that, Bob would need other evidence. Of course, if Bob has said that Rob was convicted of stealing the bike, he’s going to lose.
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It depends on the jurisdiction but, very broadly speaking, the person might be ill such that: they did not know what they were doing or that what they were doing was wrong (insanity) their ability to understand their actions or make a reasoned decision or self control was highly impaired but not to the degree of insanity (diminished responsibility or perhaps provocation) they were unconscious when they acted (automatism - e.g. an offence committed while 'sleep walking') Clearly they lack the same culpability as a person with "good mental health", who consciously committed a criminal offence, knowing it was wrong. That does not mean the ill person can 'get away with it'. Claiming diminished responsibility as a defence to a murder charge may mean the person will instead be tried for manslaughter, which is also punishable by imprisonment. Depending on the circumstances a court (and subsequent people in authority) might be persuaded that the person is so dangerous they must be indefinitely detained and treated without their consent. Doesn't this sort of allow psychiatrists to make up the law, because they can decide if something is considered a mental condition? Just because a psychiatrist comes along doesn't mean the court will do what the psychiatrist says is best - the court will hear both sides of the argument, establish the facts, interpret the law and deliver a verdict. Some people would argue that someone who would commit such crimes (such as rape) couldn't possibly be in their right mind. Certainly, but so far as I'm aware that defence is very rarely used and never successful.
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Online conversations are generally allowed evidence. However, EVERYTHING in the chat should be considered, as well as any later actions. Were there later conversations that said something different? Did the lease you signed have different terms? One line in a WhatsApp does not make your case a "slam dunk". It may only be one piece of evidence in a much larger context.
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Yes, "The offender will receive a criminal record." But, you ask, "How is this squared with s14(1) of the 2000 Act?" Well, you will note that it states that it "shall be deemed not to be a conviction for any purpose other than the purposes of the proceedings." The key here is "other than the purposes of the proceedings" which means that, although there is no further punishment for your crime, you have still been convicted officially and it will be noted (on your record) as per the proceedings, and may be brought up in any subsequent proceedings ( "and of any subsequent proceedings which may be taken against the offender under section 13 above." ). You will also note section 12(7): "Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a court, on discharging an offender absolutely or conditionally in respect of any offence, from making an order for costs against the offender or imposing any disqualification on him or from making in respect of the offence an order under section 130, 143 or 148 below (compensation orders, deprivation orders and restitution orders)." Which further shows that an absolute discharge is not an absolute pardon, and should not be thought of as such. Rather, "You are very much guilty, but of such a minor crime that the experience of a trial has probably been enough, so we'll let you go without additional punishment."
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No, but... Common law does not apply in countries that follow the legal school of Code Civil, aka civil law legal system, such as Germany or France. Some basic principles are common between them and common law: While there's generally no right to a jury, the innocence part actually stems in both cases from ROMAN law: in dubio pro reo - in the case of doubt, (you have to decide) for the accused. The similar Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat - Proof lies on him who asserts, not on him who denies - is the source: It was butchered into "innocent until proven guilty", but the sentiment is the same. Other countries that have no relation to common law are based on Sharia and Fiqh. There is absolutely no relation to Roman law either. However, there is a presumption of innocence, or as one of the largest Scholars of Islamic law Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib said in the mid-600s: "Avert the prescribed punishment by rejecting doubtful evidence." However, what is considered doubtful is quite different. On the other hand, presumption of guilt was the foundational principle in other legal systems!
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By my understanding you should not be held criminallly liable. In order to be held guilty of a crime the prosecution needs to show the elements of the crime are met. One of these elements is "mens rea" - ie guilty mind/intent. According to your question you lacked intent to commit the crime, so the prosecution can't prove it, so their case must fail. Note that in some places there are "crimes" which are strict liability - I'm ignoring these abominations here, as they are generally a grey area between criminal and civil law where freedom is not at stake and do not seem in the spirit of your question.
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An "inquisitorial" system is one where the Judge or Magistrate actively questions the accused and witnesses to attempt to determine the facts. The Judge may also determine, at least in part, what witnesses to call in what order. An "adversarial" system is one in which each side presents its case, and the judge acts as an umpire deciding on procedure, and possibly makes the final ruling (or directs a jury to do so) but is not actively involved in questioning witnesses or deciding what witnesses to call. I don't see anything which would prevent a common-law jurisdiction from establishing an "inquisitorial" system by statute except longstanding tradition, but as far as i know no such jurisdiction has ever had such a system in place for dealing with criminal matters. The informal procedures in some small claims courts do have judges more actively involved than in other courts. I think this is also true in some family courts as well. I think I have heard of some civil-law jurisdictions which use something like an adversary system, but i am not sure of that. Certainly a civil-law country could pass a law setting up such a system if it chose to.
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How often is bail money returned? I have been reading a little about the housing mortgage crisis of 2000s. I have found some articles on the internet, some inference and intuition that has lead me to believe that many banks in fact wanted individuals (poor credit rating or not) to default on their mortgage payments. Often using predatory tactics to induce certain behavior upon borrowers. In similar suit, the various USA governments have enough motive to keep large sums of money that initially are expected to be returned to the payer upon completion of obligation. Does anybody have stats that show how often bail money is returned vs kept by the system?
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I don't know precisely what the default rate is, but I represented a bail bondsman for several years so I do have a good sense of the economics of that business. Basically, bail bond business make very little profit after their expenses (rent, payroll, licensing, cost of use of money put up as bonds, etc.) on the non-refundable fees that they charge for the bonds themselves (typically about 10% of the bond amount although prices vary on a case by case basis). Additional fees are charged for security measures taken by the bail bond company to insure the client's attendance such as ankle bracelets or fees paid to bounty hunters to recover the client if he absconds. The profits come almost entirely from seizing collateral (often motor vehicles, firearms and homes) that someone paying for a bond pledges in the event that the bail bond is forfeited, for example, because the criminal defend absconds rather than appearing at a hearing or trial, in addition to the non-refundable fee charged to provide the bond in the first place. (It is a bit like movie theaters which break even on their movie ticket revenues and make their profits by selling food and drinks.) A typical bail bond business owner will sell the motor vehicles and firearms pledged as collateral to pawn brokers and independent used car sales lots, and will keep the (typically very bottom of the market) real estate and rent it to low income tenants. In other words, most bail bond company owners eventually build wealth by becoming slum lords with real estate pledges as collateral for bonds that go bad. Another revenue stream for a bail bond business is bounty hunter work, partially for their own absconded clients which can result in a partial or full restoration of the funds provided by the bail bond company that often does not result in a refund to the client whose collateral was seized as a result of the default, and sometimes for other wanted felons upon whom law enforcement has placed a bounty because they are not set up to recover the subject of some of their outstanding warrants in an economically viable way. Usually, bounty hunting one's own absconding clients is more profitable than chasing reward money from law enforcement agencies for other people subject to arrest warrants. Default rates are ultimately a function of how selective a bail bond company is about the clients for whom it posts bonds and about how closely the company supervises the client who is out on bond to make sure that he (or she) complies with his (or her) pre-trial release order terms. But, even if the client absconds and the bail posted by the bail bond company is forfeited and can't be recovered within any applicable grace period, the bail bond company can still avoid losses by having collateral securing the risk of a forfeiture of the bond that is worth significantly more that the amount of the bond posted by the bail bond company. As a typical bail bond company website (which sounds more clear than it is when you really try to pin down what they are saying and for what it is worth is not my former client's website) explains: Most of the time bail collateral takes the form of property. If the court is collecting on a property-based bail collateral because of a failure to appear in court, it typically involves the seizure and sale of the individual’s home. Property bail takes weeks to collect on, and equity in the estate being sold must be determined to equal at least 150% of what is owed the court. Collateral will be returned when the case is completed, whether the the person is found innocent, the charges are dropped, the person is sentenced or bail is exonerated. If the individual for whom the bail collateral was offered fails to appear in court at the agreed upon time and date, the collateral will be seized or collected by the court or the bail bond company. The full amount of the collateral may not be returned to the individual if a premium has been put in place when using a bail bond agent. This premium is negotiated between the bail agent and the arrested party or person bailing the arrested person out. Bail collateral will typically be returned within five business days after the individual has paid off all financial obligations and their case has been concluded. Until this happens a bail bond agent can hold the bail collateral. A financial website explains the situation this way: When a defendant uses a bail bond agent to post bail, the defendant must pay the bondsman’s fee, and may also have to hand over collateral or sign a security agreement. Should the defendant comply with bond conditions, the bond agent will return the collateral or release the lien created by the security agreement upon the conclusion of the case. However, the bond agent’s fee (the 10% to 15% of the total bail amount) is not returned no matter the outcome. Bond Forfeiture and Bounty Hunters Should a defendant who used a bond agent’s services fail to appear in court or otherwise violate bail terms, the agent can usually try to find the defendant, take that person into custody, and physically take the defendant back to police custody. Courts typically grant bond agents a grace period after a defendant violates bail terms. If the agent can return the defendant to court within that grace period, the court usually will not require the agent to pay the full bail amount. As part of this process the bail bond agent can employ bounty hunters, also called bail enforcement agents, to track down and apprehend the defendant. Bounty hunters, like bail bond agents, are not government employees or law enforcement officers. They do not have general arrest powers, but can arrest a defendant who used the bail bond agent’s services. This is because as part of the contract defendants sign with the bail bond agent, defendants typically agree to allow the bond agent, or bounty hunters working for the agent, to enter their home, arrest them, or take other actions that would typically be illegal without the defendant’s consent. Note that state laws on both bail agents and bounty hunters can differ significantly, and not all states allow for bail bond agents or bounty hunters. For example, suppose that son is arrested for a felony and released prior to trial on a $20,000 bond for which his parents pay a non-refundable $2,000 non-refundable premium and sign off on a $20,000 second mortgage on their house with a $200,000 fair market value which is also subject to a $160,000 first mortgage. If son defaults in a way that triggers his parents' obligation to pay the $20,000 placed at risk by that default, and the parents don't have the money, the bail bondsman takes the house subject only to the $160,000 first subprime mortgage and nets $40,000 of equity (the $20,000 surplus would rarely be enough to cause another buyer to bid at the foreclosure sale). The bail bondsman then refinances the $160,000 first mortgage at the much lower interest rate he qualifies for with his higher net worth and better credit rating, and then rents it (often initially back to the parents who pledge the house as collateral in the first place) at a market rate, which, for a house like that is probably on the order of $2,000 a month, until he decides to resell it (perhaps assembling many similar houses on the same block over time and then selling the entire block to a developer who wants to scrape the houses to build an apartment building on the entire block instead, at a significant premium). Even if I a mistaken and the collateral can only be seized when the bond is actually forfeited and not merely when it is placed in peril by a failure to appear when the grace period has not yet run, or if the actual amount of the bail bond debt is repaid after the collateral has been foreclosed upon and sold to a third party, insuring that there is sufficient collateral to back the full amount of the bond if it has to be repaid to the bail bondsman, this still prevents the bail bondsman from losing any money in the worst case scenario if the bond is forfeited. Indeed, this will usually make the bail bondsman a healthy profit because the value of the collateral is generally significantly in excess of the value of the bond, at the cited bail bond company at least 150% of the amount potentially owed (also providing a cushion if the fair market value of the collateral has been overestimated), but not so high relative to the value of the bond that another bidder will bid at a foreclosure sale. So the bail bondsman will sometimes make a profit on the collateral seizure and sale to a third-party, even if the bond debt ($20,000 in this example) is ultimately repaid to the sponsors of the client because the client is returns to court custody before the grace period expires. Sometimes a bail bondsman will also take a guarantee of repayment of the bond amount if there is a default, in place of some or all of the collateral if the guarantors' incomes are sufficient to comfortably be able to pay the full bond amount, at least in installments over time, even if the guarantor has few assets of value to pledge, but this is much more common for small bonds of, for example, $500 or $1,000 or $2,000 than it is for a medium bond amount for a felony of about $10,000 or a higher amount of $25,000 or $100,000 for serious felonies when the court is worried that the client is a flight risk, where the bail bondsman will typically post bond only of the client's supporters can offer sufficient collateral to cover the full amount. This is very similar to the reason that a hard money lender doesn't worry too much about the ability of the people borrowing from the hard money lender to pay during the typically short loan term because any unpaid loan balance can be recovered by seizing collateral for the hard money loan which is worth significantly more than the value of the loan. The New Yorker interviewed a bail bondsman who claimed that less than 1% of his clients defaulted, in 2013, but in my experience this is highly implausible and unusual (as the story notes, even prime secured mortgage loans have a higher default rate than that most of the time), even though it certainly isn't impossible if one is very selective about who one takes on as a client. The more likely possibility is that the bail bondsman is actually talking about clients who abscond or violate bond conditions who are not returned to the court within the grace period, or about the percentage of transactions in which the bail bondsman actually loses money after foreclosing on collateral and collecting from guarantors, if necessary. A New York Times in a 2018 article does not provide a forfeiture rate figure, but does explain that as long as the client is returned to law enforcement authorities within a grace period that can vary from a few months to two years on a state by state basis, the forfeited bond will usually be returned to the bail bond company. One company cited in the 2018 New York Times article with $800 million of revenues had zero losses as a result, a data point that I strongly suspect reflects not a zero bond forfeiture rate but a complete recovery of forfeited bonds from bond collateral and guarantors, with profits on some bond collateral seizures exceeding, on average, losses from bonds extended with insufficient collateral or with guarantors who can't make good on their obligations or go bankrupt. According to this 2018 New York Times article, California is one of the only states that requires a premium refund when a client is re-incarcerated voluntarily during the grace period. This policy white paper from the Obama Administration notes that: Though failure-to-appear rates declined from 25 to 17 percent between 1992 and 2009, pretrial re-arrest rates actually increased from 14 to 16 percent for released felony defendants in large counties. This 15-17% failure to appear rate is a much more accurate estimate of bond defaults prior to before considering grace periods. A law review article from 1994 explores the economics that drive the bail bond industry in more detail than is possible in a Law.SE answer.
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Do I have standing to sue a credit bureau or lender after being approved for a loan but being prevented from signing due to their error? Unfortunately, no. The email you got from the loan agency reflects that no contract was formed yet. The email merely is the loan agency's expression of interest to proceed toward the formation of that contract. Absent that formation of the contract, even if for reasons beyond your control, you are not entitled to the benefits or consideration(s) the contract would provide. Nor would the lender be entitled to your compliance with the terms of that contract, terms which might not even be informed --let alone known-- to you. There is no legal obligation from one party to the other. Lastly, the agency's or bureau's faulty process/questionnaire is not actionable either. Lender's reluctance to employ an alternative method is within his freedom of contract.
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In the US, a house Title determines ownership, the name on the mortgage determines who owes the bank money. But a new mortgage will need the title holder to be on the document, because you cannot use someone else's real property as collateral. As to who can evict someone, it's the property owner, not the mortgage holder.
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This is a good example of the life of the law being experience and not reason. While there is a logical argument that this isn't theft, in reality, this conduct would universally be considered an open and shut case of shoplifting and anyone who tried this would surely be convicted of a crime with consequences far more severe than creating a tort debt for conversion of the property. Also, you do intend to permanently deprive the store of its property. The fact that you intend to remedy that by paying for it doesn't change that. You aren't borrowing the property with an intent of returning it.
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My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here.
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Consult a lawyer These issues are quite common and their impact depends on your jurisdiction (usually local governments handle this) and the attitude of your potential lenders/buyers. In most cases, local governments have the power, in extremis, of ordering the demolition of unpermitted work. However, this is normally done only when the work is irredeemably unsafe or adversely affects the amenity of neighbours. More common might be an order to make good any defective work, possibly to current rather than historical codes after which they will retroactively grant the permissions. Some lenders will refuse to lend if there are unpermitted works. Others will only lend against the unimproved land value less the cost of demolition. The same is true of insurers. As for buyers, well, its making you stop and think, isn't it? Common solutions are to make your offer contingent on the current owner cleaning all this up before you close or offering less to cover the risks you are assuming. This may cause you to miss the property but that's the risk you run.
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user6726's answer about civil action is good, as you appear to have lots of evidence that document-based in terms of bank records, etc. And media shaming would work; but you could be sued in retaliation, even if you're right. But try calling a prosecutor - such as a county attorney - rather than an arm of law enforcement. The police are always overworked and can be reluctant to try and put a case together for the local prosecutor. Contacting a county attorney is free and doesn't require you to get a lawyer, and it can be a surprisingly effective tactic against a criminal. A phone call or a detailed letter to the county attorney for the person's county of residence that explains the criminal activity may be the key to getting some movement in the situation. You have lots of hard evidence to hand the attorney about an individual who is committing fraud, and that evidence may make simply make the case for the attorney, as it is documented evidence they can immediately verify and use, either at the county level, or be passed to the district (state) prosecutor. A loss of $4000 is significant, and may be a felony in that state. But the "$6,000 in products that were not shipped" is intent on the criminals' part and is not a loss to you. If it is a county with a large population, the attorney will have many assistants who may have time to pursue the case. An attorney for a small county may be looking for an easy case. And who knows? The attorney's office may already know the person - if it's a county with a small population, or if that person already has a criminal history (which you could research yourself in that county's records) - and that makes the case even easier for the attorney.
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I have heard that this interest rate is illegally high for a loan. Is this correct? Yes. This is an annualized interest rate of 715,586,124,880,210%, which is far, far in excess of the maximum interest rate allowed by law. The maximum legally allowed interest rate in British Columbia is 60% per annum. So, an interest rate of 65 cents or more in a five day period on a loan of $100.00 is illegal. I don't know his current address. Lending money without collateral to people without knowing their current address is just plain stupid when it comes to lending practices. Nobody does that without a primarily donative intent. Would have holding collateral been a legal solution? Potentially. This is essentially the business model of a pawn shop. In the case of a pawn shop, the borrower delivers tangible personal property to the pawn shop owner who takes custody of it, which serves as collateral for a small loan with a set, legal interest rate, for a fixed period of time much greater than five days (typically several weeks or to several months). If the loan is not repaid, the collateral becomes the property of the lender in full payment of the loan, and the parties haggle in advance over the fair market value of the collateral against which the customer may borrow the full amount. A pawn is essentially equivalent to an outright sale of tangible personal property (almost always used) in exchange for cash, with a right to rescind the deal for a modest interest charge within X number of days after the sale. Since the pawn shop owner has some asset of the borrower to collect from in the event of non-payment, and the loan is "non-recourse" (i.e. collection rights are limited to taking ownership of the collateral), it isn't important to even know the address of the borrower, and no lawsuits are necessary for the lending pawn shop owner to be made whole if the loan is not repaid. The down side of running a pawn shop is that the owner needs to have considerable skill to value the collateral at a price sufficient to repay the loan together with a fair share of the administrative expenses of the operation on a case by case basis, for the very modest profit margin associated with a typical pawn shop. Most people who are skilled enough to value tangible personal property accurately enough to make money running a pawn ship are also skilled enough to do other things that pay better. Late Charge: Any payment not remunerated within 10 days of its due date shall be subject to a belatedly charge of 5 percent (%) of the payment, not to exceed $500 for any such late installment. Late charges are considered in the maximum interest rate calculation, so you need a much longer term loan and a much lower interest rate for this to be legally permissible. Collection fees: If this note is placed with a legal representative for collection, then Borrower agrees to pay an attorney's fee of ten percent (10%) of the voluntary balance. This fee will be added to the unpaid balance of the loan. Not sure what is meant by the "voluntary balance." It isn't inherently improper to include the costs of collection in a loan agreement, and indeed, I think that this may be the default rule of law in British Columbia without any contractual term under loser pays rules of civil procedure. But, a court can decline to award more than the "reasonable" legal fees incurred to collect a debt, and it is not at all clear that even the minimal amount of legal fees one could incur to collect a debt would be reasonable to collect a loan of $100 and interest. Likewise, while there are "hard money loans" (i.e. loans secured only by collateral and no personal obligation to pay that can be enforced against an individual's assets in court), where it is customary for the legal costs of drafting the loan documents to be paid by the borrower rather than the lender, for the most part, this simply makes no sense, because even 12 minutes of legal time (0.2 hours in the typical legal billing format) is an excessive amount to charge for a $100 loan for a five day period of time. This would typically be $50-$60 or more. It would probably be treated as an interest charge and hence would be illegal in British Columbia. Would a term like "if the lender needs to resort to legal action to enforce a term of this agreement, the borrow will reimburse him for all related expenses and his time" be enforceable? Reimbursement for out of pocket court filing fees and any photocopying costs and process server costs is likely to be enforceable. Reimbursement for the lenders own time to enforce the loan in the event of a default is probably not enforceable in the case of a $100 loan, even at minimum wage. Making small loans has historically been a marginal economic sector for precisely this reason. Even if the default rate is low, the administrative costs associated with making and enforcing (in the event of defaults) a small loan and the administrative costs associated with making and enforcing these promise for a much larger loan are similar. But the dollar amount of interest generated by a small loan is much smaller relative to the administrative costs involved than the interest on a large loan. Credit card companies and similar lenders make small loans affordable by automating the lending process, screening borrowers based upon credit ratings, making many loans each month to the same borrower, and making loans to many, many borrowers to spread the risk out. But making small loans on a one-off basis is not a profitable venture. Business models that charge enough to be profitable with small loans, like payday lenders and car title lenders in the United States, usually have some sort of collateral or de facto collateral (like a post-dated check), and tend to be shut down by regulators because their interest rates typically need to be on the order of 150%-400% per annum to make a profit, due to high administrative costs involved in making small loans relative to the amount of the loan. But interest rates this high are considered exploitive and are illegal. Another business model, which essentially describes the business model in the question except for the enforcement method, is called "loan sharking". The main difference between legitimate or almost legitimate small loan lending and loan sharking, is that loan sharks enforce their loans by having organized crime enforcers beat up people who don't pay, rather than using lawsuits to deal with loan defaults. This is, of course, completely illegal and a serious crime.
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Broadness of definition of treason in the US constitution Does article 3 only refer to adhering to state enemies, or can these enemies be corporate, or individual? Corporate as akin to private armies before the barons got checked (even say aiding ISIS though it was never fully a state actor de jure), and individual as those that have enough resources to cause equivalent damage to state use of force (say aiding Osama and 9/11)?
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The term "enemy" in the U.S. Constitution's definition of treason is generally considered to be a term of art that means a party against whom Congress has authorized the use of military force or a declared war. The only such country in existence at this time, to the best of my knowledge, is North Korea. Terrorist organizations which had affiliated involved in the 9-11 attacks (including ISIS and Boko Haram) are also covered. Russia is not an "enemy" of the United States, within the meaning of the constitutional definition of treason. Neither are any individuals or corporations in Russia, unless they are affiliated with a 9-11 terrorist organization. An important statutory definition of "enemy" might also be considered informative to a court presented with this question, which is slightly broader (as it requires "hostilities" but does not require a full fledged war and does not require Congressional action): According to 50 USCS § 2204 [Title 50. War and National Defense; Chapter 39. Spoils of War], enemy of the United States means any country, government, group, or person that has been engaged in hostilities, whether or not lawfully authorized, with the United States; (3) the term "person" means (A) any natural person; (B) any corporation, partnership, or other legal entity; and (C) any organization, association, or group. In this context, "hostilities" would generally mean physical warfare acts like shooting Americans, or blowing up American property, in a warlike manner.
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"Conflict of interest" has a specific meaning w.r.t. various federal laws, which have financial gain as their underpinning. The so-called conflict which your referring to is an abstract moral duty, eforced at the polls every few years: there is no conflict of interest. "Obstruction of justice" is defined in 18 USC 73. The law does not require a person to passively submit to an investigation, thus you can file motions with a competent court to resist a subpoena. If there is a criminal investigation of a US criminal statute, it is illegal to willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute Saying "you don't have authority to tell me to do that" is not obstruction of justice. I have not seen any (credible) claim that it is unconstitutional for the president to order an investigation of election fraud, for example Executive Order 13799. That commission was disbanded, but a new commission could be ordered via the same mechanism. Congress has the power to defund any such commission, and there was an unsuccessful attempt to use that power in the previous instance.
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I think you'll find the definition of "human shields" used in practice in Western courts narrower than what Russia claims (it is), e.g. In the Review of the Indictments in the Karadžić and Mladić case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia qualified physically securing or otherwise holding peacekeeping forces against their will at potential NATO air targets, including ammunition bunkers, a radar site and a communications centre, as using “human shields”. Having said this, turning your own civilians into "incidental targets" for enemy fire (or "collateral damage" as it's more popularly known) when said fire is (legitimately) targeting armed forces, is usually not particularly smart. But there's a line between that and war crime.
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Is a country an institution or an entity? Neither. It's a sovereign state (a "political entity", not an entity in the sense of a legal persona).
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The constitution has the "Treaty Clause" (article II, section 2) which states that the president "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur". There is no legal concept of "signing" a treaty in the US, and only ratification counts. It is unclear what limits there are to enforcement of treaties in lieu of statutory enactment. Medellín v. Texas held that While a treaty may constitute an international commitment, it is not binding domestic law unless Congress has enacted statutes implementing it or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be “self-executing” and is ratified on that basis This was a reversal of prior trends going back to Ware v. Hylton based on the Supremacy Clause, that all Treaties … which shall be made … under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby But Medellín doesn't mean "never": you have to "parse a treaty's text to determine if it is self-executing", which is a different ball of wax.
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Yes. The First Amendment protects all speech, outside a few historically recognized exceptions, which include libel, perjury, incitement, and true threats. There is no exception for speech that injures the speaker himself.
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Has it ever been formally established that giving any group, X, a priority of credulity in court over any other group, Y, would amount to granting the group X a title of nobility? No. This has never been formally established. In the 100 years between the ratification of the US Constitution and "Coffins v US", were there any laws or court decisions which would give any groups de facto nobility over other groups by demanding that their accusations against some other groups must be assumed (if formally stated) true until proven false? Effectively so. For example, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor works that way and that have been classes of people who have been historically not eligible to serve as witnesses. There are also many procedural circumstances historically (e.g. confessions of judgment) that operate in this manner. Did the argument that this amounted to granting of titles of nobility (which was prohibited) ever come up in any court cases? No.* The core litmus test under the title of nobility prohibition has been that a privilege granted by the government is hereditary and is not simply ordinary property. Without a hereditary component, the title of nobility prohibition does not apply. A lengthy analysis of this jurisprudence can be found in the answer to the Law.SE question "What exactly is a title of nobility?" While this question isn't a true duplicate of that one, the pertinent legal authorities are all discussed in the answers to that question. Obviously, it isn't possible to know every legal argument that was made orally in a trial court or legal brief for all of the United States for all time by everyone and anyone, often leaving no historical record whatsoever. There are no recorded appellate court opinions of which I am aware, however, that engage with this legal argument and rule upon it (which is usually what someone really means when they say "did this argument ever come up in a court case"). Post-Script This post also confounds a "presumption of guilt" with a per se rule regarding credibility determinations, but while both go to the issue of how evidence is evaluated by a tribunal, the two concepts otherwise have nothing in common, and sometimes it isn't clear which is which. For example, in many U.S. jurisdictions, a marriage certificate in existence at the time someone is born, accompanied by the passage of time under a short (often five year) statute of limitations, conclusively prevails on issues of paternity, over a DNA test that is 99.999% certain to be correct as a matter of genetics. You could interpret that as meaning that marriage clerks are always more credible than genetic scientists. But, of course, that isn't really the intent. Instead, this is effectively a substantive rule of law couched as an evidence rule. Similarly, the requirement that real property can only be conveyed in writing could be interpreted as an evidence rule, but it is more realistically viewed as a rule concerning the definition of what a transfer of real property really is that is useful to make a bright line rule. Thus, an oral statement can be a promise to transfer real property, but it doesn't really happen until there is a signed deed or other conveyance. A traffic ticket basically has a presumption of guilt in some jurisdictions, because if you fail to appear you are found guilty in absentia even without evidence, something that is not permitted as a matter of criminal procedure in the U.S. for more serious offenses for which you can be incarcerated. But, on the other hand, if you do appear, the prosecution has the burden of proving that you committed the offense alleged in the ticket. Perhaps the closest example there is to a presumption of guilt (either rebuttable or conclusive, depending upon the statute and facts) is a statutory rape law, which in theory, presumes that someone under a certain age does not have the capacity to consent to intercourse, rendering the offense rape. But, a more straightforward way of understanding those laws is that sex with a minor in the circumstances described is itself illegal without regard to any conclusive presumption of lack of consent. There are also many laws prohibiting certain people from testifying about certain matters in certain circumstances. For example, spouses may not testify against each other in court over a spouse's objection in many kinds of cases. These rights are called "privileges" and are not considered to be titles of nobility. The U.S. Code of Military Justice, intentionally allocates legal rights in these quasi-criminal proceedings in a manner that treats people with different military ranks unequally. Officers have different legal rights than enlisted soldiers, for example. But, since military offices are not hereditary, these rights are not titles of nobility.
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The law does not say. It is up to the judgment of the judge to determine what constitutes "Le fait de provoquer directement à des actes de terrorisme ou de faire publiquement l'apologie de ces actes". I would not have predicted that the act constituted "faire publiquement l'apologie", but if that expression can reasonably construed as meaning "indicating approval of", then I understand the conclusion. The law does not mention SSIDs, that simply falls under the penumbra of "publicly approving of terrorism", and there isn't a specific list of forbidden acts. Analogously, Holocaust denial is against the law in France, and there is not a specific list of things that you can't say, there is a general rule from which specifics can be inferred. Publicly saying "Free Kurdistan!" could be construed as supporting PKK and thus approving of terrorism, but that would be quite a stretch. Using the SSID Pkk21, on the other hand, could be a problem.
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Can a jury change a price? Suppose the following facts: Alice contracts to buy a car from Bob for $10,000, in a negotiated and relatively simple written contract between competent parties. Alice takes the car. Edit after Mowzer's answer: Assume Alice has taken full legal possession of the car, which Bob permitted based on her contractual promise to pay $10K. Alice does not pay. At some point thereafter, Alice crashes it or it is otherwise destroyed so the car can't be returned. The destruction was not due to any negligence or tort on Bob's part nor any defect in the car. Bob would rather have the $10K than have the car back anyway; that's why he sold it. Bob sues Alice for breach of contract, alleging the facts above. At trial, Alice does not dispute the basic facts about the contract or what happened. The jury awards Bob $5,000 on his breach of contract claim. As a second example, consider the following fact pattern (if commenters think this is sufficiently different, I can make it a separate question; otherwise it seems likely to be labeled a duplicate): Downtown League (DL), a popular non-profit, hires Candace, an out-of-state singer, to perform at their gala fundraiser event for $10,000; $100 due and paid at signing and the rest due 20 days after the event. Downtown League is in charge of all promotion and ticket sales; Candace only has to show up and perform. The gala event doesn't sell nearly as many tickets as was anticipated, despite a last-minute push to get people to show up and buy tickets at the door. The bad weather doesn't help. Candace shows up and performs for a small audience, fulfilling her part of the contract. Downtown League realizes they cannot both pay Candace and have a successful fundraiser. Downtown League does not pay Candace. Candace sues for breach of contract and Downtown League doesn't dispute the facts above. Candace sues in the jurisdiction where Downtown League is headquartered and where the event was held, to resolve any questions about jurisdiction. The jury finds Downtown League to be in breach of contract. The jury awards Candace $4,900 in damages on that breach of contract. Is the jury just allowed to do that, effectively changing the price agreed to? What would happen next, if anything? Are there clear precedents/sources that bear on this? Assume a trial court with no relevant cap (i.e. the jury could have awarded $10K or more if they wanted to). The essence of the question is that Bob/Candace fulfilled his/her obligations under the contract, and Alice/DL did not. The juries appear to have changed what Alice/DL's obligations are under the contract (e.g. because they're sympathetic to defendants Alice/DL or because the defendants have painted plaintiffs as selfish for even trying to enforce the contract, etc.) and want to give defendants better deals than they originally signed. Can they do that, and arbitrarily change the terms of the contract after the fact? If they do, what happens next (if anything)?
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You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment.
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Bill and Jane are free to enter into a contract where, among other things, each provides valuable consideration; in this case Bill provides valuable lawn mowing services and Jane provides valuable money. In week No 1 they have negotiated the terms and the contract is complete when Bill mows the lawn and Jane pays the money. If Bill turns up next week without Jane's instruction then there is no contract and Jane does not have to pay anything; I don't think this is what you are asking but I include it for completeness. If it is understood that this arrangement continue week after week then either there is an ongoing contract or, more likely, a series of independent contracts. If there is an ongoing contract, then it can be renegotiated but it cannot be changed unilaterally by Bill. That is, he cannot unilaterally increase the price to $2. If there is a series of contracts then the terms of each of those contracts will be the same based on the course of dealing. Basically, the parties have accepted over a long period of time that the rate for a mow is $1 and Bill would have to get Jane to accept the revised rate before he mows the lawn. For your example, Jane owes Bill $1 but if she wants him back next week she will have to agree to Bill's rate.
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So I found information from a law firm in Florida about Hit and Run Cases. You definitely want a lawyer as it is a $500 fine and/or 60 days in jail for your case (property damage, no injury or loss of life). The good news is that if you can argue the case correctly, it's very easy to get a Not Guilty verdict. Under Florida Law, a Hit and Run must meet the following criteria to legally find someone guilty: Disputes as to the identity of the driver; Lack of knowledge that a crash occurred; Lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property; The failure to stop was not willful, but was dictated by circumstances; The defendant stopped as close as possible to the site of the accident; The other driver refused to receive identifying information The other driver became belligerent, necessitating that the defendant leave the scene to call police; The assistance rendered was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the statute. Given that you had no lack of knowledge that a crash occurred (2) AND lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property (3.) AND you would have stopped but for the circumstances of the event prevented you from recieiving knowledge of that the crash had occured (4) you already fail to meet 3 of the 8 criteria. This should be easy to argue in and of itself, but where you need a lawyer to assist is in criteria 7. While you were never fearing the other driver to such a degree that you needed to call the police, his behavior was interpreted by you as "road rage" and you had a reasonable fear to not wish to engage him. It's not rules as written, but it could be that the rules allow for leaving the scene because of the plaintiff's behavior and could be valid in other forms. I'll admit, this will vary wildly on the judge's own interpretation of that rule, BUT it's worth a try. Keep in mind with all of these, the Prosecution will be required to prove all 8 facts against you, while you only have to disprove one, to some level of doubt. As an armchair jury, I have no facts to support your story, but I have no facts to doubt it either. And when doubt happens, you must assume innocence. It would help if you had any hint of the officers attitude at the time. Was he friendly? Dismissive? Distracted? What was the guy who hit you's attitude towards the situation? Was he constantly yelling at you and the officer? Was he quiet and separated? Either way, get a lawyer because 60 days of jail time and a $500 fine is not something you want to fight by yourself. Make calls (the ticketing officer should have a work number or other contact information on the ticket.). Notify the insurance company of the fact that it was cited as hit and run but not proven... it could make the difference of who's company is to pay (It will be his if there was no Hit and Run).
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I can't speak for the US but in Australia this would not be binding. You entered a contract for the vacuum cleaner the terms of conditions of which were made known to you at the time of purchase – the ticketed price, any store or website displayed terms and whatever was written on the outside of the box. Any alleged terms that were not made known when you entered the contract e.g. because they are inside the box are just that: alleged. In addition, the manufacturer would have committed an offence under Australian Consumer Law by misleading you that such terms were binding. This could lead to a fine in the multiple millions of dollars if the breach is widespread and egregious enough.
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Almost certainly the answer to this is no because SB.8 talks of the $10K as being (minimum) statutory damages. (The actual provision 171.208(b)(2) is for damages "not less" than $10K, i.e. the court can award more in the first suit.) If e.g. someone breaks the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by making spurious claims against a group of people, they are each entitled to up to $1,000 statutory damages each (and class action is specifically allowed/mentioned). Generally, you can't avoid paying damages to an injured party by paying them to someone unrelated (before). There's nothing in SB.8 to suggest otherwise, the wording is: a court may not award relief under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection (b)(2) in a previous action for that particular abortion performed Only proof of payment (not even having lost another suit on the same incident in another county) precludes a judge from awarding the statutory damages. (Claimants can file suits in their county of residence per 171.210, which me not knowing the Texas civil procedure too well, seem to allow multiple parallel lawsuits to proceed.) Now SB.8 is special in that limits relief to the first who sues (or maybe the first who wins) while enabling a very large class to claim injured status and sue... which in itself doesn't make a lot of sense when speaking of statutory damages, but it's a novel kind of relief, so who knows what courts may decide. (It would be interesting if a court determined that that first-claimant limit in SB.8 is unconstitutional, under either Texas or federal constitutions. In some other state laws, there is sometimes a limit on the total amount of damages out of a single incident, but it's not awarded on a first-winner basis, instead there's a provision to "allocate to each claimant his equitable share of the total".) Granted a defendant could come with a legal strategy that look something like: when sued in Texas county arrange for a "friendly" organization (members) to immediately sue in another county. Fight the first lawsuit so as to delay judgement, but immediately concede the one from the "friendly" organization members, so that only the "friendlies" get the statutory damages (first), possibly e.g. donating them back to the defendant thereafter. Whether this would work really depends on details in the Texas civil procedure law, which I'm not too familiar with.
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What misrepresentation? Alice said she buried the money there. That the money is not there now is not evidence that she didn’t. it’s evidence that something happened to it between then and now. However, let’s not let the flawed example obscure the question. Let’s pretend instead that Alice said the money was there now. Misrepresentation Pre-contractural false statements of fact by one party that induce the other to enter the contract give a cause of action in contract law; they are not a tort. There are torts that are similar like deceit and negligent misstatement. The link provided is talking about fraud - the criminal equivalent of deceit (and the word fraud is often used when technically it’s talking about the tort of deceit). The out-of-pocket rule applies to torts so Bob can recover his losses. Personal time invested is not an out-of-pocket loss as it represents an opportunity cost, so, Bob cannot recover what he or his excavator might have earned instead. He can recover his fuel costs and depreciation on the excavator as those are “real” out of pocket expenses. If Bob had been an employee of a plaintiff company, they could recover his wages but not what they might have sold his time for. That’s just how it is with torts. Misrepresentation is a different beast. It’s a contractural claim so the damages are the “benefit of the bargain”, in this case $500. However, this is only available if the misrepresentation was fraudulent (Alice knew the money wasn’t there), Alice had no reasonable grounds for believing the statement to be true, or at the court’s discretion. Further Bob must prove that it was this statement that caused him to enter the contract and that he would not have entered it otherwise. Alice’s statement may give Bob more than one cause of action and it’s up to him which he chooses to pursue. If he spent less than $500 on fuel he stands to get more with a misrepresentation claim but if his out of pockets are more than $500 he’s better off with a negligent misstatement claim. In either case, these are tough causes to prove.
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Technically anyone can sit on a jury. Lawyers are not automatically excluded from juries anymore, as being called for jury duty is a right and a duty that the law abhors automatically excluding people from. That is the official line on this. However, in reality, lawyers will always be stricken from serving by one of the lawyers trying the case. Each lawyer has a certain number of preemptory strikes (the ability to get rid of a juror for any reason, aside from those protected by law, such as race, religion, etc). They also have unlimited "for cause strikes," which are when a juror is biased in some way. Lawyers trying the case almost always try to use a cause strike to get a lawyer off, saying that they are biased toward either Defense or Plaintiffs based on the type of law they practice. The judge will usually not let them use a cause strike, saying that an attorney is ethical enough to apply the facts to the law and not sway the jury based on their personal biases that everyone has; plus, we're officers of the court so we have a duty to be ethical. Hence, they are typically forced to use a preemptory strike to get a lawyer off, but they will, every time. (If the lawyer just tried a similar case, then they'd get to use for cause.) The real reason that the lawyer from one side or the other definitely wants a lawyer off is that the jury instructions presented by each side to the judge are crafted in a way that each word carries specific meaning and, with that, is designed to lead to a certain way of thinking. Once the lawyers have fought over the instructions and the judge decides what will be presented, the jury only gets them in writing...in some states not even in writing, they only get them read to them without a copy to take back to the room. If a lawyer is in the jury, that person will undoubtedly be able to explain exactly what the law requires for a finding, or exactly why a certain finding should be had. They will advocate one way or another; this is undeniable. The instructions are purposefully confusing. The reason is this: when we fight over jury instruction, inherently, one of us will want an instruction that is hard to understand, for a lay person. This is because we want them to apply the law as it is commonly (mis)understood, not as it truly is, because that's not good for our case. To have a lawyer on the jury would defeat the finely crafted instruction and its potential to confuse. They would undoubtedly explain the instruction to the jury. One may think this would be helpful, however, juries are told that any special knowledge they have about anything pertaining to the case shall not be shared as it could sway the jury. This is most true when it comes to a lawyer sitting. When a jury doesn't understand a jury instruction, their only recourse is to send a question to the judge. In states where they have the instruction in writing, all he can say is "read carefully;" he cannot give his interpretation of what the instruction means. If a judge did give his own interpretation that is grounds for a mistrial or an appeal at least. A lawyer on the jury would be able to explain, "Oh, what this really means is X," and this is bad from one side's perspective, almost always. We all have biases, and even finely determined rules of law can be subtly pushed toward one direction or another with the use of a certain word over another, or the placement of one element before another. Generally, unless the side who would most want the attorney off had exhausted their preemptory strikes, and lost the argument to remove for cause, there is very little chance a lawyer will serve. The fact of the matter is that both sides are very likely to want a lawyer stricken from the jury pool, (even from the side who may believe the lawyer to have leanings in their favor). It is essential to control as many factors as possible in a jury trial, and an attorney on the panel is just a wild card. The potential always exists that if a lawyer ends up on the jury, they could explain the elements of the case to their fellow jurors, who may then not rely as fully upon the carefully crafted language in the instruction(s). This could backfire on either side when certain portions of the language used may be intentionally vague or difficult to parse though for someone who doesn't practice law. Anyone interested in the process of choosing and striking jurors (in the U.S.), through the process of voir dire, this is a fairly comprehensive article on the topic.
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if a manager emailed an prospective employee a contract containing the pay rate of $20/hr, if the prospective employee crossed out $20/hr and replaced it with $25/hr, then went to work and gave the manager the contract which he failed to carefully read, continued working for a few months, would the employee be entitled to $20/hr? A party ought to timely alert or notify the other counterparty about any disagreements or proposed changes. This is especially recommendable when evidence suggests that the counterparty's expectation that the party only would sign the contract was reasonable. In the example you outline, the employee's unilateral alteration of the compensation/rate in the contract seems unlikely to favor the employee's position. That is because typically employer and employee negotiate compensation prior to formalizing their agreement. In that case, the employee would need stronger evidence with which to overcome the employer's credible argument that he did not knowingly accept the altered rate.
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How to legally contribute to open source projects (and other public stuff) in Germany? Being a software developer it is very important to contribute to public projects and participate in public professional activities. This includes open source projects (which may belong to other companies or a developer himself), Stack Overflow answers, hackathons and other meetings, professional blog publishing, TopCoder contests participations, etc. Moreover, links to GitHub and StackOverflow accounts have become a common item in IT resumes. I'm going to work in Germany in a position of Software Developer. My employer tells me that EVERY professional activity belongs to the company and for EVERY activity I mentioned before I need to get written permission, which could be withdrawn at any moment. And it doesn't matter if I do it on my free time on my computer at home or not. Citation from my contract: (1) Der Mitarbeiter darf ohne Zustimmung von COMPANY_NAME keine gewerbsmäßigen ader nicht gewerbsmäßigen fort dauernden oder gelegentlichen Konkurrenz Geschäfte für eigene oder fremde Rechnung unmittelbar oder mittel- bar betreiben oder sich daran beteiligen oder solche Dienste in irgendeiner Art oder Form leisten. Das gleiche gilt für jede Art der Beteiligung an einer anderen Firma sowie für die Mitwirkung in Organen einer anderen Gesellschaft, es sei denn, es handelt sich um die Beteiligung an einer börsennotierten Gesellschaft bis zu einem Umfang von 5 %, solange mit dieser kein Stimmrecht einhergeht. (2) Gewerbsmäßige Nebentätigkeiten bedürfen der schriftlichen Genehmigung von COMPANY_NAME. COMPANY_NAME kann die Genehmigung jederzeit widerrufen, wenn seine Interessen durch diese berührt werden (3) Zu Veröffentlichungen und Vortragen bedarf es der Einwilligung von COMPANY_NAME, wenn dadurch seine Interessen berührt werden können. I find it a little bit weird to get written permission from employer to write an answer on Stack Overflow or to participate in development of open source game with friends in my spare time. But my employers tells me this is OK. Moreover, they're trying to convince me that clauses above are pretty standard for Germany and exist in almost every contract with any company. So the question: is it really so strict in Germany? What is the most legal way to participate in public activities in such situation? PS I fully understand that answers are not official legal advice, so feel free to share opinion.
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(IANAL, of course) My employer tells me that EVERY professional activity belongs to the company and for EVERY activity I mentioned before I need to get written permission, That's true for software (and inventions) that may be relevant for them, but not for other professional activities. which could be withdrawn at any moment. No, not in that very general sense. they can give the permission to publish possibly relevant pieces of code on SX, and they can withdraw that permission for the future. But they cannot take it back for the past. Once they tell you they don't want your invention, there's no way back from that decision (and there are legal deadlines for claiming relevance). Even if they require written permission for you to take a side job, they must give it unless they can show a valid reason against you taking the side job in question. And that would be a per-side-job decision. And it doesn't matter if I do it on my free time on my computer at home or not. That is indeed the case for copyright of software and for inventions. clause is to protect your employer from you helping anyone who is their competitor/you being their competitor while the employment lasts. This is pretty standard and, I believe, not only legal but would be the case also if they had not spelled out this to you. The lines between what is and what is not competition are sometimes a bit complicated* So, if your employer specializes in subway station surveillance systems and you work on face recognition and then help out your local pigeon breeder's association by implementing automatic door opening by camera + automated face recognition of the [unwinged] members that's close enough to touching the interests of your employer that I'd consider it off-limits unless you had talked to your employer and they are happy with this project (after all, they could be preparing similar products unknown to you). OTOH, overhauling the crappy Excel macros for the regional annual breeder's competition would be fine. And in general, the lower your position there and the further from the actual focus of the company, the more normal it is to have another job (think janitors, canteen staff of a software company as opposed to a janitor in a hire-a-janitor-service company) The general duty not be in competition with your employer also in general prevents you from being involved in a competitor business to the extent that you have noticable influence over that competitor. So the second part of clause 1 shouldn't be too surprising, neither. (update) OTOH, what may make this particular clause invalid is the requirement also for publicly traded shares that they cannot come with voting rights. I somehow suspect that thus prohibiting you from "normal person small scale ownership" of publicly traded stocks (not all of them even have non-voting shares) is undue and invalid (too broad a restriction). However, if that clause is invalid the legal default of "no competition to employer" still applies. Here's a (German language) web site of a lawyer that discusses these questions See also here https://www.hensche.de/Rechtsanwalt_Arbeitsrecht_Handbuch_Wettbewerbsverbot.html Unlike the 1st clause, this is AFAIK not a spelled out default of German employment law, but it may be a spelled out version of a Tarifvertrag (unionized group contract). In any case it is probably legal to have this clause in the contract. The point is that the employer can only forbid the side job if it is against their reasonable interests, a general "no side jobs whatsoever" would be invalid. Side note: they may even be of the opinion that employment law forces them to have some such clause: the employer has a legal responsibility to ensure that you are not working more than the number of hours allowed by law. I've had such a permission that stated the constraint that the permission is valid only as long as I ensure that I stay within those legal limits and my working ability for employer is not compromised. https://www.hensche.de/Rechtsanwalt_Arbeitsrecht_Handbuch_Nebentaetigkeit.html https://www.fachanwalt.de/ratgeber/nebentaetigkeit-als-arbeitnehmer-anmelden-zustimmung-und-muster-antrag https://www.haufe.de/personal/arbeitsrecht/top-thema-nebenbeschaeftigung/nebentaetigkeit-und-arbeitsrecht-was-erlaubt-ist_76_418602.html Copyright law for employees in Germany is somewhat difficult. the one exception is copyright of software where §69b UrhG transfers the transferrable rights automatically to the employer. Whether the software is written out of office and outside working hours is irrelevant, as long as it is done in "fulfillment of the employee's role or the employer's orders" (famous court case) so again, if at work you code facial recognition systems and in the evening the pigeon breeders accounting system, the latter is not related to your work. Your open source game is also OK unless you are employed as game developer. Also that not all code is subject to copyright. An obvious explanation on SX explaining a typical pattern would not be a creative work (though the full answer may very well be) in the first place. But for creative works other than software such as plans how to implement features, technical drawings, etc. working hours or not seems to be more important for assigning the rights and the rules seem to be more similar to employee invention law ArbnErfG): if it is outside working hours and possibly relevant for the employer, the employee has to offer it to the employer before trying to sell to someone else. The clause that employer must give permission to publication of content that is possibly relevant for them seems to me to be in line with these general rules. https://www.zeit.de/karriere/beruf/2011-06/arbeitsrecht-urheberrecht https://eventfaq.de/25510-urheberrechte-im-arbeitsverhaeltnis/ http://www.urheberrecht-leipzig.de/urheberrecht-nutzungsrechte-des-arbeitgebers-an-kreativen-leistungen-der-mitarbeiter.html * I've been advised in a situation where I still believe I was not competing, and even had a written permission, that this is the stuff that makes lawyers rich, and both employee and employer poor.... Take home message: even if you believe to legally have the right to publish on SX/contribute to an open source project, think again whether you'd want this to be the source of a conflict with your employer - or whether there isn't a win-win possibility that makes everyone happy instead. What is the most legal way to participate in public activities in such situation? I'd advise to be open about what public activities you'd like follow. Whatever the contract says, your employer can always give your more permissions. In the past, I've found the majority of employers being happy to see me contributing (some had similar clauses to yours and just wanted to know, some was happy about an open source project I brought, some like to be able to say where their employees volounteer, etc.). Although there was one who wasn't (and that did contribute to my decision to leave there). From that experience, I'd personally discuss this early on now: in case the employer turns out to be too intrusive (speak to Betriebsrat or lawyer or your union if you have one to make sure they really overstep their rights) for my liking, for me that would be a reason to cancel the contract which is easier & faster during probation period.
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"The company you are working for ..." Stop. We're done. An employer owns the IP created by an employee in the course of their employment: the hackathon is in the course of your employment.
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First of all, although the GDPR is stated to apply to any site which processes the data of any person who is in the EU, it is not clear how a site not located in the EU, does not business in the EU, and does not primarily target EU residents as its audience can be required to comply with the GDPR. To the best of my knowledge, no such case has yet been brought, much less decided. There has also been some debate on whether an IP address constitutes Personal Data under the GDPR, and if it always does so, or only under particular conditions. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that (under the predecessor Directive 95/46/EC) that a dynamic IP address was personal data. But in that case the web site was run by the German Federal Government, which surely has wider scope for getting info from a German ISP than a small private US web activist does. There is not yet any case law that I know of on the applicability of the GDPR to IP addresses in any case at all similar to the one in the question. Joe would in my view be wise to at least learn that logs are being kept, and post a disclosure of this on the site. Whether Joe needs to do more than that is less than clear at this time.
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It's not clear exactly what you're asking, when you say "the company I work for" – i.e. are you asking "can they fire me?" (almost certainly they can, even if their TOS thinking is legally misguided – unless in your country there are laws that prevent firing employees). To be certain, you need to hire an attorney who is sufficiently savvy about web page technology that they can accurately judge what you are doing, and whether you can fruitfully resist their demands. You seem to be skeptical of their position because you are "not affecting their servers in any way". The TOS is not about affecting their servers, it is about affecting their intellectual property. It appears that your code does a number of the prohibited actions such as and perhaps most importantly "modify". If you have distributed a program that allows users to modify company content on their own computers, then the user might be in violation of the TOS, but not you (since you're not running a server that redistributes). However, I am betting that in order to create and test the program you had to violate the TOS. Additionally, you could be vicariously liable for the infringements of others, especially if this program can only be used to infringe on copyright, and you know this fact. That is pretty much the end of the legal part. As for how you should respond, your attorney, and not Law SE, deals in recommendations.
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You need to be very clear with B that you intend to continue to operate A. You need to be clear whether you are to be an actual employee of B, or a hired contractor for B. If an employee, you need to agree with B how much time you can devote to A while employed by B, or to put it another way, how much time (per day, week or whatever) you are expected to devote to B before doing stuff for A. Are there to be restrictions, such as a ban on your doing things for A while at B's worksite? Above all, you need to agree on who owns what rights to both the existing A code, and any new code will be held by you, and what rights will be held by B. All the above should be in a written agreement, and you would be wise to have a lawyer draft or at least review the language. If B will not agree to this, you will have a choice to make: put A on hold while working for B, or not accept B's offer. Do not lie to B about what you are doing with A. Oh, and if you had any sort of non-compete agreement at the job you quit four months ago (let's call them C) be sure that you comply with it, or are prepared to fight it. If there is any question, this is another area where you would do well to consult a lawyer. Many non-compete agreements claim more than local law allows, and are not enforceable. Many others are very much enforceable. It depends on the wording of the agreement, and the provisions of the law where you are located. Also, do not use any confidential data from C without C's written permission.
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I'll quote from my answer on a similar question from Programmers.SE: ...[T]he Github TOS have this to say about material hosted on their site: By setting your repositories to be viewed publicly, you agree to allow others to view and fork your repositories. Hosting on Github means that the author grants others the right to "view" and to "fork" the repository. Here, "fork" probably just means "use Github's fork feature", which creates a repository clone, hosted on Github. GitHub's use of "fork" here probably refers to the software feature of the website github.com called "Fork," which allows users to create a verbatim copy of a repository on github.com. The TOS do not require the author to grant any other specific rights, like the right to prepare derivative works or to redistribute copies of the work, so "fork" here probably is not used the general sense of "produce a derivative work." Thus, the code's presence on GitHub does not grant you rights to reuse the work in ways protected by copyright (commercial or otherwise) without a explicit license from the author.
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The only issue relevant to your age is the (ir)revocability of the license. GPLv3 purports to be an irrevocable license. To be really irrevocable, the license would need to grant certain rights in exchange for something of value, that is, you need a license that passes muster as a contract. Copyright licenses are typically treated as contracts, but it is not clearly established in law that licenses are contracts or are not contracts. Out of the goodness of your heart, you can grant permission to use your property, but you can also withdraw that permission. If you have a contract granting perpetual permission to use your property in exchange for something of value, then you can't later withdraw that permission. In the case of Jacobsen v. Kratzer, the sides advances opposing theories that the license was a "bare license" vs. was a contract. (The matter was ultimately settled out of court). This article puts together the legal factors surrounding the notion of license as contract, see p. 21 ff, and esp. §IV for arguments that licenses should be contracts, to be fully enforceable. A contract for non-essentials formed with a minor is not enforceable, until you are 18. You could therefore revoke the license, until you are 18. Anyone who uses the software does so at their peril. However, if the license is not a contract, no existing legal doctrine (in the US) whereby the permission is irrevocable. In other words, yes you can, at their peril. The whole license-as-contract issue is very complicated, and I'm only focusing on the revocability issue. There is a separate question whether one can sue a user for both copyright infringement and breach of contract. The case of Artifex v. Hancom, see also this analysis, found that (in the particular case), plaintiff can pursue the matter as both infringement and contract breach.
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No, in germany there is no universal requirement as to form (Formfreiheit). This includes associating a signature with a name in block letters. In principle you can enforce a contract in court even if the written contract does not identify the contracting parties by spelled out name, but by signature only. It stands to reason there is no benefit in omitting the full names. The legislature implemented elevated form requirements for certain legal transactions by mandating the use of a notary. Here, again, there is no requirement as to put a plain text name next to your signature. The link between signature and person is established via the notary’s documentation. You could put an alias “Donald Duck” next to your signature, the notarial deed will indicate that in fact Kalle Richter signed the document. As far as I am aware all european-union legal transactions will need to go through their official channels. It is simply not possible, for example, to establish a European Economic Interest Grouping on a scrap of paper. Thus there is no issue and in turn no regulation. One thing is for sure, the european-union does not impose a “minimum framework” on its member states. I recollect there are some directives regarding electronic signatures, but that is a different story now.
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Can a warrant, subpoena, court order, etc. require you to violate terms and conditions or a contract? There's been a lot of attention lately to websites getting subpoenas to hand over user information, and then potentially getting a gag order as well for the subpoena. I'm wondering (just for curiosity's sake) if a website (or any individual/company) can be legally required to either violate a contract or a ToS agreement. For example, if a service's ToS agreed to use a certain level of encryption for passing around private data, could a court require that encryption be changed or lifted? Or could it only subpoena the encrypted data.
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Yes. Contracts do not excuse a site from obeying the law, and the law requires sites to obey court orders. "It violates my contract with a third party" is not a valid reason to disobey a court, and disobeying a court order is contempt. On the other hand, contract law (at least in the U.S. and U.K.) says that contracts that violate the law or public policy are invalid, and so you could not win a breach of contract suit if the defendant could not legally comply with the contract. Now, a contract might require the company to attempt all possible legal ways to get the court to revoke its order, or to avoid the order in the first place (for instance, if Google does no business in China, a U.S. court might not excuse them from a contract because they capitulated to the Chinese government). However, when push comes to shove, private contracts are lower priority than court orders.
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An individual does not have authority to "issue" a restraining order. In the U.S. only judges can issue such orders. The guidelines and policies for obtaining a restraining order vary by jurisdiction, although in the end a judge can issue any order he wants. So in theory you might be able to find a judge who will issue an order for any or no reason. In practice I'd be surprised if many judges would abuse their office to gratuitously harass people in this fashion, though there are probably a few amusing/disturbing examples out there to the contrary.
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In the United States . . . Scope of Search Warrant: To what extent can they search you and your belongings? The scope of a search is limited by what is stated in the warrant. Not only must a warrant be supported by probably cause, it must also describe with particularity, "the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." See U.S. Const. Amend. 4. For example, they cannot search a house if the warrant specifies the backyard, nor can they search for weapons if the warrant specifies marijuana plants. However, that doesn't mean that officers can seize only those items listed in the warrant. If, in the course of their search, police officers come across contraband or evidence of a crime that is not listed in the warrant, they can often seize it. When it comes to containers, the police are allowed to search anything that items could be inside. So, if they're looking for stolen TV's, they can't search a jewelry box or under the floor boards. However if they looking for something small, like bomb parts, just about everything is fair game. To search you, the warrant would need to authorize the search of your person, or the police would need an independent justification to search you. For example, if they found explosives that were illegal to posses, they could conduct a search incident to arrest. Can they search your entire computer? Yes, assuming computers are within the scope of the warrant. Compelling people to produce passwords of encryption keys: If they find encrypted files can they detain you until you decrypt them? This depends on your jurisdiction as it is a developing area of law and deal with 5th amendment. This is something that would not be done through a search warrant and would involve a separate proceeding. In this situation, constitutional privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. V, may be implicated. Case where Court held producing passwords violated the 5th Amendment: The government's postindictment grand jury subpoena ordering the defendant to provide all passwords associated with his computer in order to secure evidence of child pornography allegedly contained in the computer, which spawned the three counts contained in the indictment, required the defendant to make a "testimonial communication," and thus the subpoena violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, where the government was not seeking documents or objects but instead was requiring the defendant to divulge through his mental processes his password that would be used to incriminate him, the district court in U.S. v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2010), held. The court explained, an act is "testimonial," and thus protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when the accused is forced to reveal his knowledge of facts relating him to the offense or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs with the government. It is the extortion of information from the accused, the attempt to force him to disclose the contents of his own mind, that implicates the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, the court said. Case where Court held producing passwords did not violate the 5th Amendment: The district court in U.S. v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012), recognizing that production of a document may fall within the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination since it acknowledges that the document exists, that it is in the possession or control of the producer, and that it is authentic, held that the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not implicated by requiring her to produce the unencrypted contents of a computer where the government knew of the existence and location of the computer's files; a preponderance of the evidence established either that the computer belonged to the defendant or that she was its sole or primary user, such that she had the ability to access its encrypted contents; and the government had offered her immunity, precluding it from using her act of producing those unencrypted contents against her. The court determined, also, that a preponderance of the evidence, in a motion to compel production of the unencrypted contents of the computer, found during a search of the defendant's residence, showed that either the computer belonged to her or that she was its sole or primary user, such that she could access its encrypted contents, supporting the decision to compel her to produce those unencrypted contents, where the defendant acknowledged, during a telephone conversation with her ex-husband, that she owned or had such a computer, the contents of which were accessible only by entry of a password, and the computer, which was found in her bedroom, was identified with her name. This issues probably will not be decided one way or the other until the supreme court rules on it. If they find a password safe can they force you to give them a password and >then can they log into all accounts you have stored in it? When you say password safe, I am assuming you mean password management software. If so, see above. If you don't give them the password but they find it written down somewhere, can they still use it? Yes, assuming their warrant allows them to search papers or it is in plain view. Out of curiosity, do police ever actually do this? Find a password protected file on a computer and go through all the papers in the desk and try all possible passwords until they find one? I'm not sure, but it wouldn't surprise me. Even if they don't have a warrant that covers papers, police have been known to bend the rules. I think someone with police experience could have a better answer for this.
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Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.
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There are not enough facts to draw a conclusion First, it’s not clear that the document you signed amounts to a contract. For example, what consideration did the school give you in return for the permission you gave them? Providing you with an education doesn’t count - they were legally obliged to do that already. If it is a contract then whether and how it can be revoked would depend on the terms of that contract witch I’m guessing you don’t have a copy of. Notwithstanding, as a minor, you have the right to void the contract until a reasonable time after you turn 18. Even if it is now many years since that happened, it might be reasonable since you only just discovered the website. If it isn’t a contract, then it would be revocable at any time. Practicalities Make a fuss and they may take the photos down even if they are not obliged to. They presumably have plenty of photos of kids who aren’t you and aren’t complaining and if you make it so it’s easier to change the website than to deal with you, thy’ll change the website. I suspect their inertia is because they once paid a web developer to create the site, it has never since been updated, they don’t know how to do it, and they don’t want to have to pay someone to find out. Otherwise, why would they have photos of ex-students rather than current students? If so, an offer by you to cover the costs, might solve your problem.
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Yes, a contract implied in fact can supersede a written contract: if it both (1) arises after the parties have entered into their initial agreement and (2) if the subject matter of the agreement is not subject to the statutes of frauds (i.e. to a statutory requirement that agreements of this kind must always be in writing). A course of dealings before a written contract is signed if the contract states that it is the entire agreement of the parties, or appears from context to be the entire agreement of the parties, may not be considered pursuant to something known as the parole evidence rule (which is actually a rule of substantive law and not evidence, despite the name). An agreement that is required by statute to be modified in writing, something called a statute of frauds, might or might not be susceptible to being modified in this way. Sometimes, failure to comply with a statute of frauds is excused if the parties have partially performed the unwritten agreement, sometimes the statute is applied more strictly and cannot be overcome. Indeed, in Colorado, where I practice law most of the time, there is actually case law that specifically provides that even if a written contract states that it may only be modified in writing, that any oral or implied in fact agreement which could form a contract in the first place may supersede the written agreement. Proving that the course of dealings actually constituted an actual modification of the contractual obligation, may, in practice, be a challenging matter, however. In practice, there is probably a stronger argument on the available facts in the question, that there has been a waiver of the requirement for further provision of the service that may not be undone retroactively, but may be reasserted prospectively with fair notice to the other party, with the written contract remaining in force. The judge or jury would have to listen to the facts from the parties about their course of dealings and communications, about the nature of the "requirement", and about the pertinent terms of the written contract, and more generally, the larger context of the transaction, and then would decide which interpretation seemed closer to the truth, or if another explanation of what happened was more plausible. This dilemma and uncertainty is generically a problem any time that the parties course of dealings deviates significantly from a written instrument. These kinds of cases are never clear slam dunks for either party in the event of litigation.
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When a US Senator or Congressperson poses a question to a private company about some behavior or action of the company, does that carry any legal weight? In other words, (a) is the company required to answer? and (b) if the result is "bad" (however that is defined), can the Senator or Congressperson impose any penalty. Is it all just "showboating" on the part of the politician? Individual members of Congress cannot compel a company to testify, although a failure to respond might result in legislation being adopted in a way contrary to the preferences of the person being asked, while a response might influence legislation in a manner that the person being asked likes. Congressional committees have subpoena power which if disregarded may be enforced in federal district courts on pain of the non-responsive person being held in contempt of court, which is essentially equivalent to the power of a court to subpoena someone's testimony.
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The validity of the NDA is not an easy question, but a related one is more clear. A lawyer in the U.S. in most states is not permitted to threaten criminal or administrative action (e.g. reporting someone to immigration or tax officials), to gain advantage in a civil case. You can unilaterally bring criminal charges or take administrative action, but it is deemed to be unethical and against public policy to refrain from bringing criminal charges or taking administration action to gain civil advantages. An NDA of the type described arguably violated the same public policy and might be invalidated as a result. Put another way, there is a privilege to make certain reports to public officials without legal consequences and such an NDA might violate that privilege. Some of these privileges found in what are called "whistle blower" statutes specifically prohibit this kind of agreement as to some specific kinds of illegal conduct, but not others. There isn't a general rule. This said, it is not black and white. For example, a private NDA can't prevent someone from testifying under subpoena, but can prevent someone from voluntarily testifying in the absence of a legal compulsion to do so such as a subpoena. Suppose a woman is sexually assaulted at work, and is given an NDA to sign. Can the company legally require her not to disclose the conduct of an illegal activity? I can imagine this example coming out different ways in different jurisdictions. For example, some states have a legal duty (rarely enforced) that requires people to report felonies, and an NDA in this case would contradict that affirmative legal duty, while others do not. Another source of gray in the analysis is that there is a difference between not reporting a sexual assault that actually happened, and, as part of a larger settlement, executing an affidavit stating under penalty of perjury and under oath that a sexual assault didn't happen. The first is potentially an NDA that is void as a matter of public policy. The other, in principle, is a settlement that the person signing the affidavit can only enter into if it is true. There is nothing, in general, wrong, about requiring someone to confirm that certain representations are true as part of a business transaction or contract and allowing the contract to go forwards only if certain facts are true. The gray gets deeper, because whether a sexual assault happened or not is not always a subjectively black and white clear issue of pure fact. (It is subjective because an affidavit or affirmation is made to the best of the declarant or affiants' knowledge and belief, not as a matter of objective fact.) For example, someone may not have perfect memory of what happened, or there could be doubt over the question of whether the perpetrators acted recklessly (the Model Penal Code intent requirement for sexual assault) or merely with criminal negligence (which would not be sexual assault under the Model Penal Code). A statement made under oath about whether a sexual assault happened to the best of your knowledge, thus, might be a mixture of factual issues (A penetrated B at a certain date and time) and legal or not perfectly factually known ones (A acted with X intent regarding consent during that act). So, in a case where there was some room to argue either way about how to characterize what happened and about what actually did happen, there might be some room for a settling party to make a non-perjured statement consistent with the settlement and then to agree not to a true NDA, but instead to not make statements which, if the affidavit is true, would be false. In a plea bargain in a criminal case, one can plead "no contest" without agreeing that the crime factually happened, but that isn't really possibly in the context of an affidavit about what really happened, with an NDA limited to not disclosing the incident since it was already agreed as a matter of sworn fact that there is nothing to disclose that rises the level of a crime.
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Can two LLCs use the same name if they're incorporated in different states? I want to incorporate an LLC in a state. (From what I understand, that happens on a state level, not federal). If I incorporate in state A, someone else in state A can't create a company with the same name. However, someone in state B can (at least that's how I thought it worked). So if I incorporate in a state that's not my home state, someone else can start their own company in my home state, but incorporate it there, and then we'd have two companies in a state operating under the same name. Is that correct? If it is, I'm guessing there's not much I can do about it, besides maybe trademark the company name.
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It is certainly possible to incorporate companies with the same name in two different states. If neither company does business in the other person's state under that name, it isn't actionable for either company. If one company was already doing business under its name in a state where another company is formed under that name, it would usually be possible to force the new company to cease and desist from using that name, either with an action directed at the infringer and the Secretary of State (or other official charged with business incorporations in a state) of that state, or in an action directly against the infringer alone. Also, even if a trademark isn't formally registered, it can arise at common law simply through use of a name in a particular market in a particular place. This is harder to prove and the remedies for violating a common law trademark a more limited, but it is not entirely unenforceable.
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The location of your residence entrance is irrelevant for the law, what matters most is your "street address", i.e. mailing address. That is the address (therefore city) that you use for voter registration, and basically how you identify "where I live". If you lives 5 miles out in the country in an unincorporated area, you'd still use Needles (e.g.) as you mailing address: but you would not be able to vote for a mayor of Needles, just based on your mailing address. Both municipalities might claim jurisdiction based on the physical location of the property, especially for matters of building code. It should not be possible for both municipalities to tax the full value of your property, but they could split the assessment proportionally. The cities themselves are not collecting the tax, the county is (though property straddling a county line raises an interesting question).
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When a company is incorporated, shares are issued to the shareholders in accordance with the application i.e. a company always has shareholders. However, shareholders do not make the decisions about the management of the company: the directors do. The directors are appointed by the shareholders (and may include some or all of the shareholders) and are answerable to the shareholders and must act in the best interests of the company as a whole but they do not follow the instructions of the shareholders, they act on their own best judgement. If you have not yet incorporated your business then you are operating a common law partnership. Profits and losses are distributed in accordance with the provisions of the partnership deed or, if there isn't one, equally. Each partner is jointly and severally liable for the acts and omissions of every other partner: that means that if your partner makes a "questionable decision" that costs the business say $1 million, then any or all of you can be sued and the person(s) who has $1 million is the person(s) who will pay.
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As was mentioned in a comment, in the United States, businesses are generally registered at the state level. The information collected, and the extent to which or manner in which the public has access to it, varies from state to state. There may still be states where that's a paper-only process, but I'd guess in most of them it's accessible online, at least for basic information. For example, in Michigan the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs has a Business Entity Search tool. If a business deals directly with consumers, it may be a member of the Better Business Bureau. Even if it isn't, but consumers have complained about it, the BBB will make public the information it has about the purported business. If a company is publicly traded (that is, it's corporation that issues stock, and the stock is traded on a stock exchange), it is required by law to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC's EDGAR tool will display the company's filings, which should include annual and quarterly reports. If the company is or wants to be a government contractor, it generally needs to register with the General Services Administration, and certain information about successfully registered entities is publicly viewable in that system. (Conversely, the same system also lists "Excluded Parties" who are prohibited or partially restricted from doing business with the government.) Depending on what the business does, it may also be subject to registration with and regulation by additional state or federal agencies. For a full picture, however, unless you're dealing with the obvious agent of a Fortune 500 company, you'll probably want to get information from a private credit-check service as well; for example, as also mentioned in a comment, Dun & Bradstreet for the business itself, or for a really small business a personal credit report on each of the owners and officers.
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No If they have prior usage then they have the trademark already and are the only ones who can register it. Trademarks arise through use - registration is not required.
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No. Both your country of origin and your new home country will only care of your name as in the documents issued by each of them respectively. Mind though that absence of obligation to synchronize your names does not mean that you can freely use both identities within one country. For example, opening a bank account in the US using your original passport/name when you are already officially using another name there would be a very grey area bordering with identify fraud as it would effectively enable you to operate two different identities to gain any benefits not otherwise available.
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I assume you're talking about corporations, not LLCs ("limited liability companies"). LLCs aren't corporations and don't issue shares of stock, and in any event Facebook is a corporation. Information relating to the shares of a corporation is typically outlined in the articles of incorporation, but practices and governing law varies by state and by corporation. Delaware, where most large US corporations are incorporated, requires the certificate of incorporation to list the total number of shares to be issued and the number of shares in each class, as well as information about the "powers, preferences and rights, and the qualifications, limitations or restrictions" of the share classes. See 8 Del. C. § 102(a)(4). Facebook's October 2010 articles of incorporation can be found here, and information about its classes of stock can be found in Article IV.
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Most limited liability companies (LLCs) are small, closely held firms that are owned entirely or in substantial part by active employee-manager-owners with modest capital contributions. LLCs with large numbers of owners typically have a large share of non-employee investor ownership and are most common in oil and gas firms and in real estate firms that either develop, or buy and hold, real estate. Most large accounting and law firms and many other professional service firms are organized as LLCs or LLP (limited liability partnerships), which are owned by the senior employees whose contributions as employees dwarfs their contributions as investors. (Non-lawyers and non-physicians aren't allowed to have ownership interests in law firms and medical practices, respectively). These are the largest firms in the world with significant employee ownership. Start up tech firms organized as LLCs also often give equity stakes to employees even below the senior-managerial employee level. Rank and file employees are sometimes given an ownership interests in firms, but this is more commonly done through an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) or certain other tax encouraged mechanisms for employee ownership in corporations (e.g., incentive stock options), or in the context of a firm organized as a cooperative (which is taxed essentially like a C-corporation but with an entity level deduction for cooperative dividends paid to members), than it is as an LLCs. One important reason for this is that pass-through taxation (which applies to LLCs not electing to be taxed as corporations) is not workable as a means of imparting ownership to large numbers of rank and file workers, because the compliance paperwork of sending out dozens or hundreds of K-1s to these workers is daunting, and because the prospect of a disconnect between allocated income and loss, and actual distributions (e.g. taxation on "phantom income" of the entity that is not distributed) is problematic.
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What happens if open hardware infringes existing patent? For example, maker community builds a machine implying/related to technologies/concepts under patent, and licenses these under GPL. What are the consequences? Example: electronic beam welding patent by NEC vs. MetalicaRap community effort.
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I've answered this in the context of US patent law, but similar principles apply elsewhere in the world. As stated in 35 USC 271, "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent". Thus, a patent provides the patent owner with the right to exclude others from performing these actions, and the right to sue anyone who does perform these actions (both to stop them from infringing the patent, and to collect monetary damages for their infringement). Creating an infringing product and then licensing it under the GPL (or any other scheme) does not change the fact that it infringes a patent. 35 USC 271 also states that "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer". This means that, even if the creator of the infringing product does not perform any infringing acts in the US, the act of offering it for free use could be construed as induced infringement of the patent, and they could still be sued for that infringement.
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This supposes that the patentable concept can’t be learned form the operation of the whole program and hiding the invention while making use of the invention in public is not a disclosure. However, in the US there is a famous case In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 783, 113 USPQ 289, 292 (CCPA 1957); Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1882); Ex parte Kuklo, 25 USPQ2d 1387, 1390 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992) that concluded a public demonstration that didn’t expose the inner workings did start the clock on a bar to patentability. See previous question https://patents.stackexchange.com/questions/20886/would-the-demonstration-of-an-invention-be-considered-public-disclosure The answer (from me) has the caveat that this is a pre-AIA case and courts might come to a different answer under that current law. The U.S. has viewed public use, especially commercial public use, as disqualifying (after a grace period) but the rest of the world puts its emphasis on actual disclosure of the inventive concept so this result might be different elsewhere. One thought experiment would be to analogize with an article in a widely available journal with the words Don’t read the article that starts on page 19 on the cover. From a disclosure point of view I do not think that is different from it being possible, but illegal, to read.
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You will want to speak with a patent attorney, not a labor attorney. Some of the facts you are presenting are entirely wrong. Patents have inventors, copyrights have authors. Inventorship has strict rules. Inventorship cannot be denied without consequence in almost any jurisdiction, but you'll need to get local legal advice. In the US, "A patent is invalid unless it lists the first and true inventor or inventors of the claimed invention." (See Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551, 1553, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997); 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented). See also 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115-16, 256.) Assignment--the "ownership" of the patent--is different. It's very common to have you sign an agreement as a condition of your employment that you grant full assignment to your company for any patentable material created under their employ. If you did not, it is possible that the company would need to give you consideration for the right to assignment, e.g., they would have to pay you something to own the patent. If you are no longer there, that "something" can be substantial, because the patent is invalid without it, and they have little leverage over you. Bring all written records, emails, etc. to a licensed attorney who specializes in patent litigation.
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Yes. This is a frequently asked question on the foundation's homepage, and answered without ambiguity (source): Can I use a Raspberry Pi in a commercial product? This is a very common question, and the answer is yes! Once you have bought a Raspberry Pi, it's yours to do with as you wish. You would be in good company too, as in fact the Raspberry Pi is regularly used and sold for commercial applications third parties. Note that this the default consequence of a contract of sale in all jurisdiction I know of (but I am not a lawyer): The seller does not retain property rights in the particular item, and by the mere selling of the item implies there are no other rights that might prevent the buyer from using it as they wish. Apart from the particular computer now in your property, there are other legal requirements: "Copyleft" softweare: Large parts of the Raspbian software are licensed under "copyleft" licenses (importantly, versions of the General Public License, GPL). These licenses are meant to provide your customers with the means of reproduciing and building upon the "copylefted" software. You will need to provide your customers with the source code to those software items, the tools and documentation needed for building, and a written notice. Your own programs need not be licensed under a "copyleft" license, provided that you don't build on (distribute "derative works" of) "copyleft" software. The open source licenses involved are not meant to exclude commercial use, and there are helpful compliance guides available ( a, b ). Non-free software: Make sure to not include non-free software, like Mathematica or Oracle Java, which are not licensed for commercial redistribution. Trademarks: Your use of the words "Raspberry PI" or the raspberry logo is subject to restrictions, as is usual with trademarks. Speaking of the logos: You can request permission to use their "powered by Raspberry Pi" logo. Market regulations: You need to abide by regulations, for example safety and electromagnetic interference. Repackaging the Pi might mean you'll need to test and recertify your product, I'm not an expert. Video codecs: Some Raspberry Pis (up to 3) include specialised video decoding hardware. If you want to use it with the MPEG2 codec, you'll have to buy an activation key for small one-time fee per device - £2.40 for MPEG2, £1.20 for VC-1; other codecs are already activated. I don't think you'll need a license even for commercial, for-sale devices, but I am not your lawyer. Just to be clear, nothing prevents your buyers from cloning your software. (This is not a consequence of you providing the Raspbian source code - they can just clone the contents of your SD card.) While you can retain copyright in your own code, you'll probably have no effective means of detecting infringement. However, the physical design of the rest of your device will not be affected. Your business model needs to account for this fact.
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Software qua property is protected by copyright *perhaps patent, in some jurisdiction). The general rule is that whoever creates the thing (book, song, software) has the exclusive right to the thing. If an employee of Company 1 writes software for Company 2, that employee might (rarely) hold the copyright, but typically that scenario would involve a "work for hire", where the employee is hired by Company 1 to do such tasks as part of his duties with Company 1 (which might then be given to Company 2). This would then be a work for hire, and the copyright is held by Company 1. If the actual author was an independent contractor, he would hold the copyright – see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed for analysis of the subtle nuances in making that determination. The concept "work for hire" which crucially involves the "employee" relationship would not be applicable to Company 2 paying Company 1 for a product, and as long as the actual author is an employee of C1, C1 has not created a "work for hire" in the legal sense. Without some explicit disposition of copyright, Company 2 is in a sketchy position. Since C1 holds copyright, they must grant a license to C2 so that C2 can legally use it; or, C1 must transfer copyright to C2. This does not happen automatically, and (if C1 does not want to remedy the situation after the fact) C2 would need to take C1 to court to force a resolution to the situation. At that point, the issue would be what C1 implicitly promised, even though they didn't put it in writing. It is likely that the initial exchange was along the lines "Can you make us a program that will do X?", and the answer was "Sure, that will cost Y", and then "Okay, go ahead, looking forward to the product". The courts would not simply say "Well, you didn't explicitly require a license, so you don't get to actually use the software that you paid for". However, it's a somewhat open question whether the court would order a license (of what nature?) or a transfer of copyright. The disposition would depend heavily on the facts of the case (what was said, what C1 actually did, what kind of business they are, what did creating the work involve...).
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Disclaimer: I'm from the US and don't claim to know German or Turkish law. So let me discuss some general principles here, but details may well be different in Germany and Turkey. You're mixing together three very different things: trademark, copyright, and patent. Copyright protects the expression of an idea, in this case, the exact computer code, images, etc. If you didn't copy his code, the chance that you would coincidentally write identical code is remote. The fact that you both have a line of code that says x=x+1 wouldn't give him any grounds for a lawsuit. He'd have to show substantial portions of the code were identical. If you didn't deliberately copy his code, this isn't going to happen. Barring some extraordinary and unbelievable coincidence, you can't violate copyright accidentally. Trademark protects names and symbols used to identify a company or a product. If you decided to call your software company "Microsoft", then that other Microsoft could sue you for trademark infringement. Likewise if you copied somebody else's logo or other distinctive graphics. This is very different from copyright. It is quite possible to violate someone's trademark accidentally. Especially if he gave his company or product a rather generic name. Like if someone called his product, say, "Password Manager", someone else might make a product with the same name without ever having heard of the original. Ditto if he has some simple logo or other graphics. If you did accidentally duplicate a name or graphic elements, well, in the US a court would likely order you to change your name or graphics and that would be the end of it, unless you refused, in which case you'd end up in court. US Courts have ruled that very generic names have limited trademark protection. An example I saw recently was "Main Street Auto Repair". A court said that the owner of that name could prevent someone else from opening a shop in the same town with the same name, but he couldn't sue someone in another town who happened to use the same name. This is why, by the way, companies often use made-up words for their product names. In your case, this should be a trivial issue. If he is claiming trademark to the look of the main menu screen, just change the colors or move some buttons around. If it actually went to court, you should be able to argue that the similarity was accidental and when you were informed you promptly changed it, and that should be the end of it. Depending, I guess, on how hard-nosed the judge is, etc. Patents are different still. A patent gives the owner the exclusive right to use an invention or process for a specified period of time. It doesn't matter if you invented the same thing entirely independently. Whoever filed the patent first has exclusive rights. There have been cases where an inventor lost out to someone with a similar invention because he submitted his patent application one day later. If this other person has patents that you are infringing, you are pretty much out of luck.
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Yes, you may The layout of the board and its appearance are not protected by copyright, because they are not expressions or any other type of copyrightable content. Even if they were (say if some protested art was displayed on the board) you are displaying this for instructional purposes, and not harming any market for the board, so fair use is likely to apply (in the U.S.). The device could be protected by patent, but you are not copying or imitating the board, nor showing anyone how to do so, so that would not apply. You are not selling or advertising the board, nor knock-offs of it, so trademark protection would not apply, even if a protected trademark is visible on th board. Just in case, be sure to make clear that your video is not authorized or endorsed by the maker of the board.
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The reason why I could not find the patent is that there are several different kinds of patents. Mechanical patents, for example, are "utility" patents. The cut glass pattern referenced in the question is not a utility patent, it is a design patent. Each patent type has its own numbering system. To search for a design patent, typically a "D" is inserted before the patent number, like "D63795". This results in the correct patent being discovered:
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Was the banning of Alex Jones a violation of 18 U.S. Code § 241? 18 U.S. Code § 241 - Conspiracy against rights If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; ... They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; ... Recently Alex Jones received bans from Youtube, Facebook, Spotify, and Apple. I heard that this occurred soon after an annual meeting of the heads of these companies, and it seems that the coincidence of these bans was likely the result of an agreement between the companies. It seems that 2 or more persons have conspired to oppress Alex Jones because he has exercised his right to freedom of speech. This law seems to prohibit oppressing someone because they exercised their right to free speech. 1) Does he have a right to free speech? 2) Was he exercising his right to free speech on their platforms? 3) Did they ban him because he was exercising his right to free speech on their platform? 4) Does their ban constitute "oppression"? If yes, which body has jurisdiction over this and what actions would Alex Jones need to take in order to achieve justice?
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The right to free speech is a right that is guaranteed against the federal and state governments only. It is not a right that is secured against private individuals and corporations. It is also neither absolute nor unconditional, as there are a number of exceptions/limits. Alex Jones could not walk into your home and start "exercising free speech" and leave you with no recourse whatsoever to remove him from your home. If you don't consent to him being there, you may legally tell him to leave and have him removed by force if he fails to comply. Facebook etc. are the "homes" of the relevant corporations. They simply told Alex Jones to get out and go somewhere else. He retains his right to free speech; he simply never had a right to speak wherever he wanted. An always relevant XKCD.
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In this case the Plaintiff, James Maloney, has previously been charged with a crime for possession of nunchucks. He is apparently suing to enjoin further enforcement of the law under which he was previously charged. US Federal courts will only take up a "case or controversy", which means an issue where actual, not theoretical rights are at stake, and in order to vindicate a constitutional right, it must either have previously been violated, or there must be a plausible and immediate threat to it. Claiming that a law is unconstitutional as part of a defense to a charge of violating that law is a common and probably the best known method of challenging a law (or a government action) for unconstitutionality. But there are other ways. One way is to apply for an injunction against enforcement of the law. That is the procedure that was followed in, for example, the recent case where there was a ruling against the ADA in a district court. In order to use that procedure, the plaintiff must present evidence that there is a credible threat that the law will be invoked against him (or her) if the action which the plaintiff claims is protected by a constitutional right is taken. In short, one need not put oneself in a position where one goes to prison or is found guilty of a crime if one loses the case to challenge the constitutionality of a law or of a government policy or action. But one must establish that it is a real "case or controversy", with real parties in opposition to each other, and real rights at stake, not a mere law student's exercise, nor a collusive case, with both "sides" having the same actual goal. In the case reported, the previous criminal charge helps to establish that this is a real issue.
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This article is a useful introduction to restrictions on political advertising in the EU, where §3.4 (p 33) covers Italy. Silenzio elettorale is covered by art 9. of Norme per la disciplina della propaganda elettorale. The statutory situation is not entirely clear to me, but the main controlling fact relevant to the internet question is that AGCOM issues rules. An English legal analysis (from an Italian law firm) is here. Their undernourished analysis of the silence period is Finally, Italian legislation prohibits political propaganda on election day and on the day before. Although AGCOM is not competent for ascertaining infringements of said prohibition, it considers important to call everyone to turn the attention on these provisions. Indeed, they are important to guarantee effective protections of the constituents. As such, in the Authority’s opinion, the prohibition applies to all media. Clearly, the law applies to internet platforms. What is not clear is whether the prohibition as applied to web pages is against "adding content", or does it require the elimination of previously-distributed content and scrubbing of links to such content. Perhaps the matter will be clarified in court one day.
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The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details.
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In the United States, blasphemy is really not a crime even if it severely offends certain people and tends to cause them to want to riot and kill the person who offends them. Most Americans who are familiar with the law and the U.S. Constitution strongly support this policy and think it is obviously right. Not every country interprets its freedom of speech laws (if it even has freedom of speech laws) in this way. For example, Canada has a law against blasphemy, as do almost all countries which have an official state religion (which is called the "establishment" of a religion). Also many countries have seemingly contradictory constitutional provisions and courts have to resolve their relative priority. For example, many Muslim countries have constitutions that simultaneously contain a right to freedom of speech and a provision that says that Sharia law is the supreme law of the land (e.g. both Afghanistan and Iraq recently enacted constitutions that say both of those things). A court could decide that the Sharia law provision prevails over freedom of speech in the event that the two conflict, or could reach the opposite conclusion. Nothing on the face of a constitution like that will tell the court how to resolve the issue. Many other countries have laws against intentionally and publicly offending someone's religious beliefs, which is similar to, but not the same as, a blasphemy law. Blasphemy, narrowly interpreted, means saying something that contradicts the doctrines of the nation's official religion, without regard to whether it is offensive - so, for example, saying that Mary the Mother of Jesus got pregnant the ordinary way, rather than having a virgin birth, would be blasphemy even if no one was offended by you saying that in a country where Roman Catholicism or Lutheranism or the Anglican Church was the official religion. A narrow Blasphemy law offends the idea of separation of church and state because it makes the government the ultimate determiner of what the doctrines of the nation's official religion says and allows a government to have an official religion. It is also notable that there are two parts to the freedom of religion in the United States. One part is the "free exercise clause" which allows people to practice the religion of their choice. The other part is the "establishment clause" which prohibits the government from favoring one religion over another or even favoring being religious over being not religious. The "free exercise clause" is similar to the stance that the Koran takes towards "People of the Book" but applied to any kind of religious belief not just Jews and Christians. Many conservatives in the United States are strong supporters of the free exercise clause, but think that the establishment clause should only apply to the federal government (so the state and local governments can establish a religion). Other conservatives think that the establishment clause should only prevent the government from preferring one denomination of Christianity over another denomination, even though the drafters of the constitution and courts ever since then have made clear that this was not the intent of the establishment clause. Article 11 of the Treaty of Tripoli, signed by the President and ratified by the Senate so that it took effect in 1797, just six years after the Bill of Rights was adopted, for example, specifically noted that the freedom of religion in the United States included Muslims. Many countries have a freedom of religion that protects free exercise but does not have an establishment clause. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights similarly protects only free exercise and does not prohibit governments from having an established religion. Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. The U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights is usually not enforceable in the courts unless a country decides that it will enforce it. It does not usually have the effect of causing the laws of a country to be invalidated the way that an unconstitutional law would be invalidated. Put another way, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and most other international human rights treaties are usually determined by courts to be not "self-executing". So, it is up to the legislative process in a particular country to decide how to implement human rights if it does so at all. In contrast, Europe has a treaty that is part of the Council of Europe organization with similar provisions, that is binding on member states even if it violates their laws (i.e. it is "self-executing").
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"Checking someone's digital footprint" could be stalking, depending on the circumstances. The better question to ask is about the legality of a certain action, and not the specific name used in a jurisdiction (although indeed in Washington there is a defined crime of "stalking"). I don't know what you mean by "checking someone's digital footprint", and it is not defined by law. Looking at RCW 9a.46.110, we can first discern that it does not matter for the definition of the crime where these people live or where the robbery took place. If two people from Alberta travel to Alaska and harass or murder a person from Texas, Washington law does not enter into the equation. The crime that you're asking about is the snooping, so for Washington to have jurisdiction, the snooping has to be "in" Washington. That does not mean that both parties have to be in Washington – there can be complex jurisdictional laws if the accused is in another state or country. The accused can easily be prosecuted in his own state, he can also be prosecuted in a foreign country, if he is caught there or if he is extradited to that country. For the act to be stalking, the first element is that "He or she intentionally and repeatedly harasses or repeatedly follows another person; and...". Harassment is defined in that section as a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner, or when the course of conduct would cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of his or her child. Since there was no communication between the parties, there is no harassment in the legal sense. There is no "following" either, therefore the act fails to constitute stalking w.r.t the first elements. Since the crime is defined by a conjunction of elements and your scenario fails on the first conjunct, it is not "stalking" (it is also not "harassment" as defined in RCW 9A.46.020, 9A.46.060.
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No. I can't give a more detailed answer without reference to a specific statute. But just about every state anti-bullying statute in the U.S. restricts the definition to...well, bullying. There is a good summary of state bullying and cyberbullying statutes here. The laws are varied, but they invariable contain words like "harassment", "abuse", "threatening," "fear," and "hostile environment." Would it be possible to "cyberbully" someone on Stack Exchange under some of these statutes? Sure. You could do it in comments; in answers; even in questions. "Question: Is Bill in my algebra class a dork, or a tool?" Comment: "This is a terrible question, and I'm going to burn your house down. Downvoting." You could probably fit something like that under some of the broader statutes--although they still for the most part haven't been tested for First Amendment issues. But I don't know of any statute broad enough to include downvoting a question or answer, on a site people post on knowing that the whole purpose of posting is to allow their posts to be upvoted and downvoted. If there was such a statute--and again, I don't know of any--it would almost certainly be unconstitutional. There is no law against hurting people's feelings, at least in the United States, and a law that allows people to seek legal redress for someone saying "I disagree with you" is pretty much the poster child for a First Amendment violation.
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It is not a crime to say, "The people want to bring down the regime." This specific tweet is almost certainly not illegal. Even if this guy is subjectively trying to overthrow the government, this would probably be an impossible prosecution for a lot of reasons. First: 18 USC 2385 deals with "overthrow or destruction of the government." Does "regime" mean the government or does it just mean the Trump administration? I'm guessing it just means the administration, and if that's the case, you're dealing with a matter of public concern rather than a true threat of overthrow. Especially because this comes right after the election, you've got strong arguments that this is commentary on a matter of public concern, e.g., "the people want to end the Trump regime," or maybe "the people wanted regime change and therefore voted for Trump, or that you need a change in the constitutional form of government to do away with the Electoral College." Whatever it means, commentary on a matter of public concern cannot be punished under Section 2385. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). Second: 18 USC 2385 deals with overthrow by "by force or violence." To say you want to bring down the regime says nothing about how you want to bring down the regime. Third: The invocation of the Arab Spring could sort of cut in either direction, as it involved regime changes effected both through nonviolent protest and violent revolution. Fourth: Even if we interpret this as Ayloush saying that regime change would be good, that he personally wants regime change, or that other people should want or work toward regime change, that's still not enough to get you into the conduct prohibited by Section 2385, which does not prohibit "doctrinal justification of forcible overthrow." Here's some relevant language from Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961): [T]he mere abstract teaching of Communist theory, including the teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future which is both sufficiently strong and sufficiently pervasive to lend color to the otherwise ambiguous theoretical material. This seems like pretty solidly First Amendment-protected political speech.
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Stand your ground: process The recent controversy over the Drejka shooting in Clearwater Florida, involves a shooter invoking 'stand your ground'. As I understand the matter, LEOs (law enforcement officers) are forced to make a decision of whether or not to arrest and charge a shooter based on available evidence \ testimony. The Sheriff decided not to arrest the shooter. I understand that burden of proof has been shifted to the state to prove that unreasonable force was exercised: is this true only in a court of law where the shooter has been charged, or is it also true in the course of LEO's evaluation of events to decide whether to arrest and charge the shooter? Put another way: Do LEOs need probable cause comprising a conclusion that unreasonable force was exercised to make an arrest / charge once 'stand your ground' is invoked? I realize that this is a highly charged topic and no inference should be drawn regarding my position regarding the matter.
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So first things first, whether or not Stand Your Ground is in play, the burden of proof is always on the State to prove any crime did happen and any defense does not. Another thing that I think you confused in your question is it seems apparent that you think Stand Your Ground is Self Defense. This is not true. In the United States, self-defense is always a legal right for a victim of a potential crime, regardless of if your state has Stand Your Ground or Duty to Flee laws. Self-Defense typically can include justifiable homicide as you are not privy to the intent of the bad actor. Under Duty To Flee laws, you cannot claim self defense if you could reasonably get away from a criminal action safely... if given the choice between fight or flight, you must flee the scene. Stand Your Ground contradicts this and says that if you are in a public place and a criminal is trying to make you a victim, you have every right to defend yourself without any duty to remove yourself from the situation first... basically at this point, you can make either choice and not worry about losing justifiable Homicide. Making a criminal arrest of a Stand Your Ground claimant at the seen is not necessarily required. While the claim may be disputed, in the case of firearms, using an illegally owned weapon is typically ground for arrest regardless... (probably not in cases where the illegal gun was introduced to the scene by the dead criminal... and the victim picked it up in a scuffle... though this requires some measure of sorting out). Legal Fire Arms are very well documented and the fire arm in question will be confiscated as evidence. If it is found that it was not a justifiable homicide, the person in question is probably at the address tied to the gun. Now, again, Stand Your Ground only applies to steps needed for Self-Defense, it is not self-defense itself. Self-Defense authorizes only the amount of force needed to safely resolve the situation, up to and including leathal force, but it does not require you to kill the perpetrator in every instance it is invoked. For example, if merely pointing a gun at a perpetrator is enough to stop the crime, you do not get to pull the trigger. That flips it back into homicide. Similarly, if I pull my gun and the guy advances anyway, I may fire and if the guy is on the ground and out cold (thus, no longer a threat), I don't get to walk up, and put a second bullet between his eyes, execution style. This too is murder. As a bit of anecdotal evidence, when I was living in Florida, I worked for a man who just recently purchased a firearm for self-defense (in the home only) and he said that when he was filling out paperwork with the police, the cop looking over his paperwork said, "Now remember, if you have to use that, shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." Now, I wasn't there when to cop said it, I don't know what his tone was. I took it as the cop being a little funny, but maybe a little inappropriate. I cannot speak to how much that is indicitive of FL Police culture. It was hearsay on my part... I just thouht it was funny and... demonstrates the attitude towards self-defense. Essentially, by the time cops arrive at the scene, they HARD PART is over... they merely have to collect evidence and take witness statements. If the shooter is cooperating and his story checks out, it will look very bad if they detain a crime victim who defended himself. It's just bad PR. Ultimately, his job is to collect all evidence, not determine if the case should go to trial. As I mentioned, the gun was legally owned in the specific case, and more than likely the CCTV tape is collected, but not yet viewed. Hindsight may be 20/20 but at the time, I do not think it's fair to say that the cop knew this might not be such a clear cut case. In such cases, the cop may not make an arrest because there is not any crime that he can charge the man with and he is cooperating. And keep in mind that in the heat of the moment for the shooter, he may not even realize he did something that might break his self-defense case. Cops can detain a person claiming Stand Your Ground for just about any legitimate reason, even suspicion of homicide that the detainee will claim is self-defense.
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No Federal law and most states have an notice of alibi rule that requires a defendant to identify witnesses who will testify as to their alibi and where the defendant claims to have been. The validity of these rules was upheld by the Supreme Court in Williams v Florida: The Fifth Amendment would not be violated if, after the alibi witness had given evidence, the court granted a continuance to allow the prosecution to seek rebuttal evidence (this point was conceded by Williams's lawyers). Consequently, all the notice-of-alibi law did was allow the prosecution to do so before the trial, instead of having to interrupt the trial. It did not provide the prosecution with more information to use against a defendant than they would eventually get in any event.
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I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!).
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In general, you do not have civil recourse against the government for (lawful) legal process that you are the victim of. "Counterclaim" would only be applicable when A sues B, and B makes a counterclaim against A – the police don't sue you, they arrest you, and the prosecutor prosecutes you (or decides not to). If the police beat you up, you could sue them for violating your rights, under what is known as Section 1983. Given the scenario you describe, this comes closest to involving false arrest, meaning that there was no probable cause for arrest. Otherwise, the police have immunity for their actions. But if there is a legal arrest warrant, there is probable cause (existence of probable cause is the standard for issuing an arrest warrant), so no claim against the police will succeed. I am leaving out the anomalous concept of an unlawful arrest warrant, where a judge issued an arrest warrant but there is in fact no probable cause. Such a case would be covered by Section 1983, where either the judge or the swearing officer (or both) violated your rights.
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Self-Defense Law In A Nutshell Self-defense (or defense of others) with deadly force is generally authorized when a reasonable person would believe that the use of death force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm to a person (i.e. there aren't non-deadly options that can accomplish this end) and a reasonable person would believe that the use of force will prevent death or serious bodily harm to a person, subject to exceptions that would not apply to a private individual using deadly force in a stampede situation. Incidentally, every state and every country absolves someone of liability for homicide when deadly force is used in self-defense, or in the defense of others (not necessarily family), although the exact details of when this is justified varies slightly. For example, in D.C. v. Heller, the right to self-defense is considered a natural or universal right. The analysis would be somewhat different if the shooter were in law enforcement, and would be different again in the case of a shooter who was in the military with more or less clear orders. But, that legal standard doesn't get you to an answer. The Complex Phenomena Called Stampedes The analysis would be extremely fact rich, in the sense of exactly who one would attempt to shoot, what that would be likely to accomplish, and what other alternatives would be available. And, to do that, you also need to understand the phenomena of deadly stampedes which are complex and often somewhat counter-intuitive phenomena. While there are circumstances where it could be legal self-defense or defense of others to shoot a stampeding individual to save someone's life, there are also many stampede circumstances where a use of force would not be justified. In practice, most stampedes, as a matter of physics, can only be stopped by removing a crush of bodies from the rear, where they do not know that they are causing a deadly stampede, while those at the front who end up directly harming others are frequently physically incapable of stopping. Essentially, in a typical stampede that causes death, the problem is an inability of the people at the front to communicate to the people at the back to slow down. And, when a stampede is caused by a genuine threat to the people at the back like a fire or a terrorist, there is nothing that would persuade the people at the back to slow down anyway. So, usually, shooting to kill someone at the front of a stampede would not achieve the intended result of protecting someone in its path. The person shot would either continue to surge forward while dead under the crush of bodies behind them, or would have their dead body trampled over by the next person in line who also has no physical ability to do anything other than to surge forward. So, usually, using deadly force to shoot someone at the front of a stampede will be futile and only cause an unnecessary death. Given that using deadly force in a stampede, if directly at people in the front, is almost always futile, the question for the judge or jury deciding the case becomes whether a reasonable person would know that at the time, which would have to be decided a case by case basis. Sometimes it is obvious from someone in a vantage point to shoot at the front of a stampede that this would be futile and sometimes it isn't. This question would be highly fact specific and depend a lot upon exactly what information about the situation was available to the person shooting a person in the stampede. The situation where deadly force might not be futile would be one in which there is no actual life threatening harm that people are fleeing in which the deadly force is directed at the people in the back who are driving the stampede (even though they don't know it), to shock them into ceasing to do so. But, in that situation, if the shooting is done by someone who understands the situation well enough to know that this is what is actually necessary, that person also may be capable of firing warning shots or shooting to injure with the same effect, so justification might also be in doubt. Protecting Targets of Mobs v. Protecting Targets of Stampedes A similar situation where the use of deadly force might be justified is something visually similar to a stampede, but quite different in what would work factually. This is a mob that is about to attack someone, possibly armed with pitchforks or knives or clubs or broken bottles or a noose. In the case of a mob, the use of deadly force to protect someone threatened by the mob would almost always be a justified use of force in self-defense or the defense of others, because shooting someone in the front is likely to be both necessary and effective.
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Police officer failing to act is specifically protected by Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005)? Almost every general rule of law has exceptions. In particular, there are exceptions to the general rule that there is not a legal duty to take action to enforce a law. Law enforcement officers have a duty to guard the physical health and safety of someone in their custody. When they are acting as a team, this duty is owed by all of them. Law enforcement officers are responsible for crimes that they commit. An "aiding and abetting" charge implies that the jury must find that the officers present were intentionally working together as a team to commit a crime, rather than acting as individual. In the same vein, you can be liable for conspiracy or felony murder by serving as a look out for a murderer, even if you don't actually pull the trigger. These officers actively prevented third-parties from intervening or creating a credible threat that they would intervene if a bystander stepped in to help Floyd and as part of the same patrol owe duties with respect to each other's conduct that unrelated third-parties dod not.
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The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal.
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Are you required to comply with a police officer's order to put your baby down in an uncertain situation and allow yourself to be handcuffed? Of course. If holding a baby could immunize people against arrest, every criminal would have a baby around whenever possible. Similarly, suppose an officer legitimately fears for his or her life or safety, or the lives or safety of others, on the basis of a suspicion that someone carrying a baby is about to produce a weapon and use it against someone. Courts, at least in the US, give wide and explicit deference to police officers in stressful situations like that, and they recognize that even if, in hindsight, it is perfectly clear that there was no danger, the officer must be allowed the leeway to act on his or her suspicions in case they are correct. The officer will of course have some obligations to ensure the welfare of the child after separation from the adult, but the only immediate recourse the adult has is to appeal to the officer directly, or perhaps the officer's supervisor if he or she is available. Any other enforcement of the officer's obligation will have to take place in the courts after the fact.
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When can an NDA be legally broken? This question is purely theoretical, I promise. Let's say a person signed a Non-Disclosure agreement under certain terms, and then, somehow, they witnessed an illegal act but were forbidden to report it to the police by the agreement. If they reported the act, could the other party of the NDA take legal action? The general question is, when, if ever, is a person legally protected to reveal information directly violating an NDA?
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There are many reasons that a contract can be void or voidable. Wikipedia will give you a good rundown. The reasons which apply to contracts generally will apply to NDAs specifically. This answer focuses on non-disclosure agreements. Various legal authorities and courts have found contracts to be void in the following circumstances: 1. Crime 2. Torts 3. Public safety 4. Public Health 5. Matters of substantial public concern The Model Penal Code prohibits what it calls compounding. The crime involves accepting payment in exchange for not reporting a crime. Section 242.5. Compounding A person commits a misdemeanor if he accepts or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit in consideration of refraining from reporting to law enforcement authorities the commission or suspected commission of any offense or information relating to an offense. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this Section that the pecuniary benefit did not exceed an amount which the actor believed to be due as restitution or indemnification for harm caused by the offense. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition recognizes a privilege to disclose trade secrets in certain circumstances like public health/safety and commission of a crime or tort. Section 40, comment c: The existence of a privilege to disclose another's trade secret depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, including the nature of the information, the purpose of the disclosure, and the means by which the actor acquired the information. A privilege is likely to be recognized, for example, in connection with the disclosure of information that is relevant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime or tort, or to other matters of substantial public concern. In Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Company, 457 F.2d 850 (10th Cir., 1972) the court cites the Restatement of Contracts, § 577 A bargain, performance of which would tend to harm third persons by deceiving them as to material facts, or by defrauding them, or without justification by other means is illegal. A more recent case cited Lachman as authority to find "nondisclosure agreement not binding in respect to criminal activity." Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) Fomby-Denson v. Dept of the Army, 247 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir., 2001) Is a case you could look at to see a review of some state courts which have "declined to enforce private agreements that barred the reporting or prosecution of possible crimes."
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The employee must, during and after employment, without limitation in time, observe a duty of confidentiality regarding [...] the Company's internal affairs such as business plans, profitability, pricing, employees, methods, processes, routines, code and the like as well as other information that the Company typically wants to keep secret The pure information that the company had at some time a security problem with their product is internal knowledge you only gained through working there. By what is written here, you are indeed prohibited from speaking about it. If it were public knowledge, you could point to a press release and say "I did that, that was me fixing the problem". That would work. Because it doesn't share anything that isn't public anyway. But you cannot share things the company wants to keep secret. Finding out whether that contract is legally enforcable in your country and juristiction is the job of a real lawyer, but just as written, they are right. You signed a contract to not do that, not talk about it an certainly not publish it on the internet. So you should not do that, unless a good lawyer you trust tells you otherwise. That said, "I found a security flaw" is about as impressive as "I found a dollar on the floor". Maybe you can talk about your knowledge to prevent something like it happening. That says nothing about whether or not it happened in your old company, and for me as an employer it is much more valuable to have you on board with structured knowledge you can apply, than with your memories of being lucky once.
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Hacking into a computer owned by someone else and accessing the data stored on it without permission is a misdemeanor according to StGB 202a (de|en). But only if it's successful. So a failed attempt isn't a misdemeanor yet. When you notice that someone might have committed a criminal offence (regardless of whether you are a victim or just a witness), then the usual procedure is to report it to the police. If they consider the crime serious enough to investigate, then they will request the identity from the ISP. But the copyright lawsuits which are filed in bulk by law firms working with media companies are not crime reports. They are civil lawsuits. A civil lawsuit is when someone had a tangible damage because of something someone else did, and now they want money in compensation. When there is no damage, then there is nothing to sue for. So when you want a judge to file an injunction to force an ISP to give them the identity of one of their users, then you would first have to explain to them how much financial damage you had because of that person and that this is enough damage to make it worth everyone's time. That might be quite challenging for nothing but a failed SSH login attempt. But it might be possible if a single person made so many login attempts that it incurred you non-negligible bandwidth cost or even caused a denial-of-service.
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The question says that the OP "asked" company A for confidentially. It does not say that the agreed to it. If they did not, the asker has no case, and they could publicly admit having used his idea and s/he still would have no case. If Company A agreed to confidentiality, and did so in writing (or if the agreement can be otherwise proved) then there might be a case. Proving communication of the idea to Company B would indeed be a hard part of bringing the case. Company B could also defend by showing independent invention of the concept. History has many examples of the same idea being independently arrived at by multiple people at about the same time. Ideas are more common, and therefore of less value standing alone, than many inventors think. To seriously pursue such a case, it would be a very good idea to consult a lawyer experienced in IP law in your jurisdiction. NDAs (and this agreement, if it existed, would be a form of NDA, even if it wasn't called that) are often governed by state law, but trade secret law is partly Federal (see 18 U.S.C. § 1832). A lawyer could advise more specifically and accurately on the chances of success, the probable costs, and the possible amount of recovery, based on the specific facts. But as described, the case is far from a sure thing. More specifically, most US states have enacted some version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The USTA sec 1.2 prohibits using or sharing a trade secret gained through "improper means". Section 1.1 defines this: "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means. Promising to observe confidentiality and then breaking that promise would seem to fit. Section 1.4 defines a "trade secret" as: "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy The idea described in the question might fit this definition. The UTSA provides successful plaintiffs with several possible forms of relief, including injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees. The details will be decided by the court in each case.
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The document may, but probably doesn't say what it is you are witnessing. For example, a person witnessing a statutory declaration in NSW attests: their qualification to be a witness (JP, solicitor etc.) that they actually saw the declarant sign it that they asked the declarant if they believed their declaration was true that they have known the declarant for more than 12 months OR the declarant provided a photo ID and either their face matched the photo or they had a valid reason for not showing their face. If it doesn't say then what you are witnessing is that the signature was made by a person whom you could identify if necessary (e.g. if the person denied the signature).
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It is not legal to give false responses on such a declaration. The point of anti-discrimination laws is that they say when it is legal vs. not legal to discriminate against an employee, and Alex is expected to have faith in the legal system to protect his legal rights. Dissatisfaction with the outcome of the law may be understandable, but still does not legally justify falsifying information given to an employer. In certain cases (look for the fine print and mentions of "penalty of perjury") you can be fined and imprisoned for lying. More commonly, your employment can be terminated when you are discovered. You may also be held liable for consequences of such lies. Your employer's health insurance contract might require truthful and accurate reporting of medical facts and a lie about your condition could result in termination of coverage.
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At least as of 2011, when regulations under the Information Technology Act related to privacy and data security were issued (some of the relevant statute sections and regulations are linked in this answer at Law.SE), there was no non-contractual right to have your data destroyed, although a terms of service for a site could give you that right contractually. Instead, usually, a term of service agreement will do exactly the opposite and give a site owner an irrevocable right to keep your data forever. I am not aware of any subsequent statutory, regulatory or case law developments in India which have changed this situation, but that kind of tweak of IT Act regulations in India wouldn't necessary make headlines outside of the local IT industry press coverage in obscure trade journals. The EU is the only place of which I am aware that has any individual right to have data destroyed or suppressed even if it doesn't violated copyright, wasn't obtained illegally and isn't fraudulent or defamatory. Even then, as I understand it, in the EU this is not a unilateral right that applies in all circumstances and is instead a specific remedy for certain situations that have a particularly intense privacy aspect to them.
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Yes P was standing in a hallway to which he had apparently been lawfully admitted Indeed. And what were the conditions imposed on P for that lawful admittance? If one of those was "no photography" then P would not have been lawfully on the premises once they started taking pictures; at that point, they would have been a trespasser. Similarly, if they were admitted under conditions of confidence. As a trespasser, the information they obtained would not have been obtained legitimately and would fall foul of protection on trade secrets. Of course, P's actions can be "wrong" without being unlawful.
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Damage to rental property after abandonment/final checkout with landlord We recently moved from one rental to another. Due to finding our new place rapidly, we submitted our 30 days notice on July 15 which was also our starting day at the new place. We had nearly moved everything out on July 23 with some minor cleaning left to do after that. On July 29 we had the final walk-through with the landlord and handed over the keys with him saying that we would be receiving the full security deposit back but we still paid rent till Aug 14 since that was 30 days. At this point it seems that we had officially abandoned the property according to the lease: Tenant has abandoned the Property if: 1. Tenant has physically vacated the premises, removed substantially all personal property, OR ... We no longer had any access to the place and the landlord began performing upgrades to the place, entering and using the premises at will with no communication with us. Now comes the sticky part. We cancelled the utilities to the place on July 30 since we could no longer make use of the property in any way and had fully abandoned the property. However, the landlord apparently did not start the utilities in his name so they were shutoff (even though we know he and his contractors were entering the place and using it). Since the electricity was off, sometime around Aug 7 the sump pump stopped working during a storm and the basement was flooded with ~1 ft of water causing significant damage to the premises. Who is responsible for the damage? We think that since we had completely abandoned it, no longer had access to it, he was using it for his own purposes, and even said that if he could get someone to move in he would (he had been showing it during the July 23-28 period when we had all but moved out), we were right to terminate the utilities in our name. He says that since it was within the final 30 days we were still responsible. This is in Pennsylvania, US. Any terms in the lease needed can be provided.
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I assume the lease does not clarify what the effective date for cancellation of utilities should be: when you "officially abandon" the property, or when the 30-day notice elapses. Who is responsible for the damage? At least under a principle of equity, the landlord is responsible for the damages. That is because, once you have returned the keys and officially abandoned the property, you have no control on how or whether utilities are consumed or (ab-)used thereafter. For instance, if sometime after the 30th of July a person breaks in that rental unit and extracts tremendous quantities of power or gas, that would lead to the inequitable outcome that the utilities company would charge you if your name is still in the utilities company's records. Similarly, it would be unreasonable and inequitable to expect you to essentially insure the landlord (by keeping your name on the utilities) despite his full awareness that you no longer are there.
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The thing I was trying to zero in on was the work/refresh/renovation that needs to be done between tenants, and if they landlord can expect to do it while Tenant A is still paying (up to the date of the 'lease change'), but expecting that Tenant A has vacated before that date, or allows the work to be done while they are still occupying? The first tenant is not required to relinquish possession of the premises while the first lease is in force. The landlord's right of access to the apartment remains unchanged from those specified in the lease and in state landlord-tenant law. So basically the landlord has to wait until the first tenant leaves before doing most of the work. If the first tenant relinquishes possession of the premises before the end of the lease period, the landlord can keep charging rent until the premises has been re-let to a new tenant. But if the landlord has agreed to stop charging rent when the first tenant moves out, the landlord may be bound by that agreement. If the landlord has signed a second lease with a new tenant beginning immediately after the first tenant's mutually agreed early move-out date, then the landlord basically has no time available to fix up the apartment except with the consent of one tenant or the other.
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Your rights and responsibilities in this realm are a matter of local law, sometimes down to the level of the city, plus whatever is stipulated in the lease. In San Francisco, for example, No Person shall have upon any premises or real property owned, occupied or controlled by him, or her, or it any public nuisance [which includes] Any visible or otherwise demonstrable mold or mildew in the interiors of any buildings or facilities This does not say whether the owner or the occupant is liable for remediating the situation. Shower mold is gross but not a health hazard (the SF ordinance just lumps all mold into one category). Since you have no written lease, there is no automatic clean-up requirement. There might be a law requiring a tenant to clean the premise to its original condition, for instance in Washington, tenant must Upon termination and vacation, restore the premises to their initial condition except for reasonable wear and tear or conditions caused by failure of the landlord to comply with his or her obligations under this chapter. Landlord duties are here: there is no duty to provide ventilation. However, the bathtub appears to be in a common area and not your particular unit. The landlord duties also require the landlord to Keep any shared or common areas reasonably clean, sanitary, and safe from defects increasing the hazards of fire or accident so in Washington, it's his problem and not yours. In general, even if a tenant is responsible for some form of cleanup, that does not constitute legal license for a facility upgrade. It might cost a couple hundred dollars to hire a person to wash ordinary mold accumulation, and does not justify getting a $5,000 new tub. Since this is in a common area, you would not be solely liable for whatever the damage was. The part where you say "crack in a common bath tub" is a large red flag: it suggests to me that somebody negligently broke the bathtub, and then caused behind-the-wall damage by letting water infiltrate without notifying the landlord. If you broke the tub and let it rot, you could be liable. If the tub was broken already and the landlord didn't bother to do anything about it, that is his negligence. The three questions that you should try to answer are: (1) what are the duties of landlord and tenant in my jurisdiction, (2) what was the actual harm done, and who did it, (3) what is the ordinary cost of whatever repair was done.
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Normally, the person who uses the electricity and pays for it is the "customer", that's you, not your landlord nor the maintenance company. Check out section 6.3.3 (A) of the MOCOPA agreement: the Distribution Business shall agree with the Customer or developer the position and space for the Metering Equipment, and shall, in so much as it is within its reasonable control, ensure it remains reserved. The location must be accessible to the Customer so they can read their meter and to the MOCOPA Operator (via the Customer). Consideration shall be given to the accessibility of the location to all users. The Distribution Businesses’ service termination equipment and the Metering Equipment should be located between 0.5 and 1.8m above finished floor level subject to unavoidable constraints such as vandalism or fire risk mitigation Essentially, after the locks have been changed the last time, the building is no longer compliant with MOCOPA agreement requirements: I don't see any provisions that would allow to substitute the customer access to the metering equipment with an access via a proxy such as cleaning personnel. Start by sending a letter by registered mail to the maintenance company, requesting them to provide you the access to the meter. Mention the agreement you have found as grounds for your request. You might want o clarify upfront with your electricity provider who exactly you are supposed to contact, the maintenance company would be my first guess. Chances are, you'll be given the access code. If they still refuse, they should state the reasons for doing so. Check their answer carefully, and if you are not convinced, you could take legal action (you may want to bring the response letter to a lawyer first). Having a copy of the letter you'd have sent will be a requirement for the legal action to be effective.
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The key here is the provision "through no fault of his own". A landlord who relies on this provision would need to be able to demonstrate what the cause of the delay was, and that s/he had not been reasonably able to avoid it. Nor could a landlord simply fail to take steps to repair the problem, whatever it might be. If the problem will clearly take more than 30 days to fix (Isay the building burned down), the prospective tenant would have the right to cancel the lease at once. True, in such a case the tenant would be put to the trouble and expense of finding another place at short notice, but then the landlord would have lost his income from the property. The provision allocates the losses between the parties in such a case. If the property is not available at the specified time for the lease to start, but could be available a few days later, the quoted provision would not allow the landlord to just ignore the situation and end the lease. The landlord is allowed only a "reasonable time" to fix the problem, and taking significantly longer than is needed would not be "reasonable".
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If the tenant were alive, you couldn't stop them from taking away their personal property, could you? No matter how overdue the rent was. Nor could you deny them access to the property, except through formal eviction. AFAIK the estate generally has the same rights that the decedent did. So if the tenant would have had the right to remove their property, then their estate should have that same right. I'd be concerned about legal risks to you if you try to withhold it - I wouldn't want to do so without having advice from my lawyer that it was okay. (Answers on this site are not legal advice and most of the users are not even lawyers.) The decendent's personal property should now be part of their estate, so if it has any value, the representative should have to sell it if necessary to settle their debts. Thus even if you release the property, some of its value may still come back to you. Of course, if the decedent had other debts, and their assets don't cover them all, you may not be able to recover everything you're owed - that's one of the risks you run when you decide to become a landlord. In particular, the personal representative is not obligated to pay off the overdue rent out of her own pocket.
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In general, a German landlord needs to give at least 24 hours notice before he can enter a home, and allowance from the renter. The renter also has the "Hausrecht", not the landlord. There are exceptions, most of them to prevent damage from an ongoing danger threatening the house. A clear example would be a broken water pipe. 1 week notice also appears to violate tenant laws - I hope you have a written contract about the subletting.
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Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity.
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Did the "9 out of 10 doctors" people have to ask exactly 10 people? Let's say I were an advertiser trying to come up with a scientific way to back my gum company's "9 out of 10 doctors recommend xyz gum" claim. Do I need to ask exactly 10 doctors and hope that exactly one of them says they don't recommend it? Can I ask 100 doctors, find one that doesn't recommend it, then choose 9 other doctors that did recommend it for my statistic, ignoring the other 90 doctors that all also recommended it? Most gum is sold nationwide in the same packaging so let's not assume I'm in any specific state.
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The original add to make this claim was Trident Sugarless Gum, which basically shopped for dentists to make the claim and stopped when they had four who agreed, and one who didn't. And in fact even then, it was still playing with the exact meaning. The original quote is "Four out of Five Dentists recommend Trident Sugarless Gum to their patients who chew gum." They left out some critical information. First, that the question the doctors were asked was "would you recommend this product if the patient insists on chewing gum?" That insistent patient changed their answer fundamentally... as they would have joined Doctor Number 5, who recommended never chewing gum, even if Trident Sugarless Gum was the least unhealthy gum too chew... cause if the patient is going to to take a full recommendation on gum chewing, any dentist worth their salt would recommend you not chew gum. This appeared in the mid to late 1950s and America instantly realized that 4 dentists out of five who answered a poorly phrased question badly does not speak for the bulk of Dentists who saw the answer for what it is. By 1960, at least one Variety Show parodied the commercial by making a gag commercial for a Chinese Restaurant that insisted that "9 out of 10 doctors recommend eating Chinese food." Cue the Camera focusing on 9 happy looking Chinese doctors and one scowling White Doctor as their panel. As a final note and because I'd be re-missed not putting this in here, 9 out of 10 Doctors insist the 4th Doctor's scarf was way too long.
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It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin A medical condition like an allergy is not necessarily a physical disability. The school is arguably fulfilling its obligations under WHS legislation by banning nut products if that is what a risk assessment indicates. It may also be necessary to ban milk products if that is required for your daughter's safety. If (and I do not know) nuts pose a greater risk than milk then banning the former and not the latter may be perfectly justified. Ask to see the risk assessment.
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The criteria for refusing service in California is the patron being “obviously drunk”. 5 150ml mimosas is not a lot, even in an hour - it has approximately the same alcohol content as 2 425ml beers. I certainly wouldn’t be “obviously drunk” after that. Only 18 year olds and over can serve or act as bartenders for on-premises consumption. Whether someone under 18 can pour drinks for someone else to serve is not clear. However, it’s probably ok as the legislative intention appears to be to put a responsible adult at the point of service. The government authority responsible is Alcoholic Beverage Control.
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Not for unqualified use This falls under “possession with intent to dispense”. It’s OK if the first aid kit is for use by: a practitioner authorised to dispense drugs (a doctor, nurse practitioner, paramedic or pharmacist) a person registered under the quoted chapter (which can include first-aid officers in remote or isolated locations, like ships) the specific person for whom the medication was prescribed
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Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.
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The CDC does not authorize shots or vaccine distribution. The FDA authorizes vaccine distribution, or distribution of medicines in general. A medicine is authorized for use in a certain way, which is an "instruction" directed at the medical professional. So-called "off-label" use is discussed by the FDA here. Such use if legal, it simply stretches the limits of what the FDA was allowed to approve (e.g. was found to be safe and effective for X, was not similarly tested for Y). Patients are free to take whatever medicines they want if they can find them, and if they are not on the Controlled Substances list. Hence it's legal to take DMSO, but it's not legal to peddle it as a cancer cure. The prescription regime for covid vaccinations seems to be somewhat relaxed, in that it is likely that many people get a vaccine without a (meaningful) doctor's exam, instead, you show up and get the shot. This is normal with flu shots. The upcoming 3rd shot approval is addressed to doctors, so they can then recommend third shots.
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A partial answer (for a manufacturer) is "look it up" – that may tell you if a determination has been made by the FDA. If so, it is not new and may require a less extensive review the next time it is included in a new drug product. For example, if a particular inactive ingredient has been approved in a certain dosage form at a certain potency, a sponsor could consider it safe for use in a similar manner for a similar type of product (the FDA says). The legal part doesn't explain how it is scientifically determine that an inactive ingredient raises safety concerns but to take on example, wheat gluten is in the Inactive Ingredient Guide. This article gives a bit of analysis of the factors that sponsors have to consider in shouldering their burden of proof. If you want to manufacture a new vaccine, you have to show (the FDA) that it is safe. If you dilute the vaccine with water, that ingredient is not a "safety factor". Benzalkonium chloride could be (you would have to show that it isn't), and if it is, that regulation requires you to list it. What's not specified clearly is how many adverse reactions per million doses constitute being a safety factor.
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"I don't recall" will protect you from perjury only if it's true. Let me try an example. You're asked: "Did Mr. Blatter hand you an envelope full of cash?" You say: "Not to my recollection." Now the government introduces a videotape of you receiving and counting the money, and a thank-you note you wrote to Blatter saying "Thanks for the awesome bribe!" You can defend yourself from perjury charges if you can convince the finder of fact that you had forgotten all of those things...but it's not very likely, is it? "I don't recall" isn't a magic bullet. It's like any other statement: it's perjury unless it's true.
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Is it legal for a website to require registration in order to submit a DMCA? This is about one of the big file sharing websites that currently has 30+ links to my original content. I sent them an official DMCA, they replied to make a registration on their website and use their own form in order to submit the links. I already sent them an official DMCA, are they allowed to do this? Furthermore, they rejected my registration twice, because the email doesn't match to some domain. Is that legal too? I thought they are required to remove the links when they are officially notified my a DMCA.
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To answer part of your question, the takedown and restoration process of the DMCA is not required. It is a legal way a hosting site can stay in the clear for copyright infringement. Therefore, if the site didn't take down what you complained about, they're participating in copyright infringement (if that's what's happening). Since they did not take down the material (assuming your DMCA was in the right legal form), if you do sue over copyright infringement you can sue the site as well as whoever uploaded your stuff to the site. I don't think that linking to your stuff would itself be copyright infringement, so I'd suggest consulting a lawyer specializing in IP.
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In the U.S., you are not required to include your real name on a copyright registration: If you write under a pseudonym and do not want to have your identity revealed in the Copyright Office’s records, give your pseudonym and identify it as such on your application. You can leave blank the space for the name of the author. If an author’s name is given, it will become part of the Office’s online public records, which are accessible by Internet. [...] In no case should you omit the name of the copyright claimant. You can use a pseudonym for the claimant name. But be aware that if a copyright is held under a fictitious name, business dealings involving the copyrighted property may raise questions about its ownership. Consult an attorney for legal advice on this matter. Therefore, a pseudonym seems like a perfectly legitimate name for a copyright notice, considering that it is also a legally valid name for an official registration with the U.S. Copyright Office. As noted above, this may complicate your ability to prove your right to litigate against copyright infringement, but it does not actually diminish your right to do so if you can successfully validate your identity as the copyright holder.
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Admission of copying proves one of the elements that the plaintiffs would normally need to prove in an infringement suit, making a law suit less risky from their perspective. This may very well invite lawsuits that would otherwise not be filed. But, this is pure speculation. Your legal rights are the same, independent of how much you choose to reveal in advance of a lawsuit. If your copying doesn't amount to a substantial taking, then it isn't infringement, whether you admit to copying or not.
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It is not obvious what the answer is. There are two fundamental questions – what will Youtube do in response to a particular action, and how can you put an end to the infringement? Youtube's response is driven by federal law, 17 USC 512. There is some danger to Youtube that you could sue them for contributory infringement, and this law specifies the conditions under which they can be immunized against such a suit. Referring to the stage of the DMCA take down process that you are at, they will put the material back up unless its designated agent first receives notice from the person who submitted the notification under subsection (c)(1)(C) that such person has filed an action seeking a court order to restrain the subscriber from engaging in infringing activity relating to the material on the service provider’s system or network. As a prelude to filing such an action, the infringer must file a statement that the subscriber consents to the jurisdiction of Federal District Court for the judicial district in which the address is located, or if the subscriber’s address is outside of the United States, for any judicial district in which the service provider may be found, and that the subscriber will accept service of process from the person who provided notification under subsection (c)(1)(C) or an agent of such person Observe that the person has to consent to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction. Small claims court is a state court (copyright small claims court does not yet exist). Under 28 USC 1338, "No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights". For the most part, federal law preempts state law, but that guide might point to something about your case (an added right) that overcomes federal preemption. Supposing that that is the case, you might file a suit in state court over that added right: then, it is literally true that you "filed an action seeking a court order to restrain". You could also just go ahead and file an action in state court, because sometimes the court just does what it thinks is right, even if it doesn't have jurisdiction. Even if the suit is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, you will have "filed an action seeking a court order to restrain". However, Youtube may not be impressed, the way they would be if you picked Federal District Court. At this point, your options (for getting the material taken down) require filing a suit against the infringer. You can file an infringement suit in the UK, but the material will probably be restored on Youtube until they eventually receive a court order demanding that the material be taken down. You can file a suit right now in the relevant federal court in California and notify Youtube, and they should leave the material taken down. Since you are not suing Youtube in small claims court and the infringer is also not in California, you could not sue in small claims court (somebody has to be in California) unless you are suing Youtube (and will lose because they cannot be sued, per safe harbor rules).
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Is it legal to make a video compilation of websites that use our product for promotion of our company? [...] We would only be showing brief clips of client's products, strung together for a short video. This will most probably be both copyright violation and trademark infringement. Copyright is generally violated if you copy a creative work produced by someone else - which is what you want to do. Trademarks are generally violated when you use someone else's trademarks (such as their logo or company name) to promote your product - which, again is what you want to do. There are various exceptions available - copyright may not apply if the work is very simple, trademark use may be allowed e.g. in comparative advertising, etc., etc., but the rules for this are complex, unclear and very different in various jurisdictions. You could risk it and hope no one sues you (and maybe no one will), but the safe route is to ask permission first.
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You can put anything you like in a ToS document, but not everything you might put there will be enforceable. By posting something on the web, you are inviting anyone to read it. In some jurisdictions that may include the right to make and store a personal copy, although not multiple copies or a copy for commercial use. You can taker technical measures to prevent automated access and automated downloads (scraping). There was a case (hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp, 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019)) in which access restrictions were held binding in a US court, but in that case the site owner had notified the would-be reuser (a competitor) directly. The laws on this sort of thing may differ from country to country, and are not as well-settled as older parts of the law tend to be. The question asks: can I list in my terms of service that all users acknowledge I own their posts ... The only way in which the host could "own" the posts would be if the users transferred copyright to the host, or granted the host an exclusive license. Under US law this would take a written and signed document. Clicking an "I agree" box or button might constitute a valid signature. A statement that "by using this site you agree ..." would pretty clearly not. You might prohibit bots copying from your site and posting duplicates, but to prohibit users re-posting their own messages elsewhere is harder, legally, and leas reasonable in my view. Under US law you could not actually file suit for copyright infringement until you had registered the copyright, but that is not true in many other countries.
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It's hard to say, under the Twitter TOS. They do not claim that copyright is transferred to them: "You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. What’s yours is yours — you own your Content (and your photos and videos are part of the Content)". But you do license the content: By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). This license authorizes us to make your Content available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. You agree that this license includes the right for Twitter to provide, promote, and improve the Services and to make Content submitted to or through the Services available to other companies, organizations or individuals for the syndication, broadcast, distribution, promotion or publication of such Content on other media and services, subject to our terms and conditions for such Content use. Such additional uses by Twitter, or other companies, organizations or individuals, may be made with no compensation paid to you with respect to the Content that you submit, post, transmit or otherwise make available through the Services. The totality of conditions, including the Twitter Rules, is ever-evolving and not apparently contained in a single link. From what I can tell, there is no condition that prohibits a user from copying tweets into a book. There are numerous statements about "respecting copyright" which refer to taking material that is not licensed to Twitter and redistributing: nothing about redistributing licensed material.A plain reading of the first bold sentence says that you can make your content available to the world, not restricted to "retweeting".
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You can't Under clause 7(b) of the CC-SA-BY 3.0 the licence is irrevocable providing that the licensee complies with its terms. However, ... It appears that your work is part of a Collection (as defined and under clause 4(a), the licensee has this obligation: If You create a Collection, upon notice from any Licensor You must, to the extent practicable, remove from the Collection any credit as required by Section 4(c), as requested. While you cannot have your work removed, you can have the attribution removed so that no one knows that it is your work - this would seem to meet your desire of having no association with the website. "To the extent practicable" should include anonymising you. As a bonus, if they don't do this "to the extent practicable" then they are in breach of the licence and it's automatically revoked - you can then proceed with DCMA takedown notices and/or sue for copyright breach.
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Are there any contemporary examples of jurists "riding circuit?" Historically, in Great Britain and the United States, some judges would "ride circuit," traveling around a region holding court on some schedule rather than asking plaintiffs to travel to a fixed courthouse to bring cases. To the best of my knowledge, this practice no longer exists in the UK or the United States. Are there any contemporary examples - specific countries, specific regions, etc. - in which jurists routinely travel around a region addressing cases? I've done some searching online, and all I can find are references to US Supreme Court Justices historically riding circuit or courts of assize in England and Wales.
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This is still common practice in most, if not all, of the mountain west states in the United States in rural areas, although, obviously, nobody rides horses from court house to court house these days. I don't know if it is done in rural areas in other states. Typically, general jurisdiction trial court judges in these areas are assigned to a multi-county district, but there are court houses in each county. Judges in the district rotate between county court houses to preside over court cases on a schedule worked out with court administrators.
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While you have correctly stated the usual order of events in a trial, the judge has wide discretion to modify the order if it seems that justice will be served. Even in a serious criminal case, the judge can reopen testimony after closing arguments have started if the judge finds that there is good reason to do so. Traffic cases are generally less formal, and the judge will more freely modify procedure to bring out the facts of the case. I have often seen judges at traffic court ask significant relevant questions, and if they are in fact relevant, i don't think you will get far objecting to their begin asked. I am not a lawyewr, but I also have observed several traffic cases in Maryland and in NJ.
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You did not state a jurisdiction, but this sign is of the style specified by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) which is used throughout the United States, so I will assume a jurisdiction which follows the MUTCD. The "Share the Road" sign is numbered W16-1P. (The MUTCD version just has the words and not the car/bike symbols; the latter might be a recent update or a local variation.) Its description reads: In situations where there is a need to warn drivers to watch for other slower forms of transportation traveling along the highway, such as bicycles, golf carts, horse-drawn vehicles, or farm machinery, a SHARE THE ROAD (W16-1P) plaque (see Figure 2C-12) may be used. So, as is generally the case for yellow warning signs, it does not have any effect on the laws which apply. (It is generally only white regulatory signs that do that.) Whether or not it is a "good idea" to share a lane, it is legal. Both cars and bikes are entitled to use the road, and if it's a road with only one lane in this direction of travel, then necessarily they must share it. Of course, they wouldn't typically travel side by side indefinitely, but they will be abreast briefly when a car passes a bike. California law, as an example, requires only that the car stay at least three feet away from the bicycle as it passes, when possible.
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There have been instances where the US Supreme Court has held over cases to the next term, and instances where they ordered a case re-argued in the next term. Brown vs Board of Education was a particularly well known case that was reargued. I believe that such occasions are rare, and that the court makes a significant effort to decide each case in the same term where certiorari is granted. Once exception is when the Court has a vacancy and is waiting fora new Justice to be confirmed, and the Justices in office are tied. Then cases with 4-4 splits are often held and re-argued. More often, the Justices decide, after granting certiorari, that this was a mistake, and dismiss the case altogether. The phrase used is that the writ is "dismissed as improvidently granted" or "DIGed". This has the same ultimate effect as if certiorari had never been granted -- the lower court decision is left standing, and no Supreme Court precedent is created. This is still fairly rare. To the best of my knowledge there is no rule requiring decision within any specific time, but I have never heard of a case held over for more than one term.
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Because cases challenging actions of almost any Federal agency or department are typically filed at the head office of that agency or department, which is usually in DC. Similarly, national organizations of all kinds who are affected by some government action often file a case from their own national headquarters, which is often in DC. Thus the DC circuit has a much larger volume of cases and appeals than its population would suggest. According to the Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018 Tables the numbers of Appeals Court cases by circuit were: ` Commenced Terminated Pending ` . 2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018 Circuit DC 1,184 872 1,190 1,029 1,446 1,289 1st 1,538 1,213 1,488 1,322 1,408 1,299 2nd 4,450 4,316 4,382 3,937 3,252 3,631 3rd 3,477 2,926 3,745 2,969 2,297 2,254 4th 6,136 4,166 6,185 4,506 2,497 2,157 5th 8,270 7,217 8,235 7,359 5,021 4,879 6th 5,164 4,401 5,195 4,900 3,197 2,698 7th 3,332 2,754 3,452 2,652 1,669 1,771 8th 3,571 2,850 3,154 3,040 2,102 1,912 9th 11,504 10,804 12,032 12,030 12,789 11,563 10th 2,275 1,862 2,296 1,848 1,216 1,230 11th 8,050 5,982 7,686 6,240 3,905 3,647 Total 58,951 49,363 59,040 51,832 40,799 38,330` Similar data is available for other years, and for district court cases. These seem to show that caseloads for the DC or "Federal" circuit are comparable to those of the smaller circuits. This does not take into account any question of complexity levels. Also, it looks to me as if the percentage of District Court cases which are appealed to the Circuit Court level is higher in the DC circuit than in most of the other circuits.
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Maybe, Hence the Lawsuits In the absence of clear statute law these all circle around tort law. For the scooter companies, trespass to chattels, and for the affected landowners (who hire the removalists) trespass to land and nuisance seem applicable. In essence, I can’t take your stuff (trespass to chattels) but you can’t leave your stuff on my property (trespass to land) or impeding access to it (nuisance). If you do, I am entitled to the reasonable costs of dealing with it. Note that, as owner, you remain responsible for you stuff even if you rented it to someone else. Both sides are pushing hard into unexplored areas of law so we await the judgement with interest. Then we’ll know.
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Yes Ideally a case will be conducted by the same judge throughout, however, there are a multitude of personal, professional and administrative reasons why this might not happen - litigation can take years and like every other workplace people come and go, have changing family circumstances, sickness, vacations etc. A litigant should not be alarmed and trust that the new judge has got themselves up to speed. For most people, litigation is a rare and confusing experience, for judges it’s just another day at the office.
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In my experience, varying jurisdictions can and do differ as to the myriad ways these disputes are resolved. Contract law is one area where the judge has a lot of discretion. This is definitely true in state courts, even from judge to judge, and can even be true in the federal level-The 9th Circuit has some wildly different appellate decisions when compared to the 1st Circuit, and so on. I say this not to be argumentative, but to highlight the importance of careful and concise drafting that fully explicates the bargained for exchange, as there can be a vast amount of judicial subjectivity that goes into determining which rules pertain to certain situations. "Conflicting or competing clause" cases are now some of the most commonly litigated contract disputes. This is largely because the last 20 years has seen a huge influx of people "drafting" (more like piecing together) contracts without benefit of qualified counsel. This is particularly true because lay people do not generally create a specific insturment like an attorney would - from scratch, with definitions and terms specific to the transaction. Rather, they go online and find "form" or model contracts that they feel are close enough (which are almost always missing key components), and then they type in their own terms, or even write them in. Because this is so common, most jurisdictions follow the rule that hand written terms supersede pre-printed terms; likewise, type written terms will take precedence over pre-printed terms. Specific terms also carry more weight than general terms. Specific terms will usually be given precedence over general terms, as these are seen as creating a specific exception to the general terms. For example, if Clause A in your scenario said: Written notice must be provided at least five days in advance of (any) change... (leaving out "to price"), then clause B would prevail because it would be more specific than the more general term (A), which in my scene would pertain to any change whatsoever (this is assuming the whole of the agreement did not shed light on the issues more fully). In your hypothetical, these are both specific terms. In that case, the court would first examine the entire contract and all addendum, specs, plans, etc. when interpreting competing or conflicting clauses applying the fundamental principal that a contract should always be interpreted as a whole - not clause-by-clause - and not section-by-section. Contracts will often have numerous parts with portions incorporated specifically by reference, or numerous documents that may be integral to the transaction, If the parties agree to what constitutes the various parts of the contract (even if not incorporated) the entirety of the transactional documents may be considered by the trier of fact (and law). Once examined, if a proposed interpretation makes other portions of the global agreement meaningless, illogical or unenforceable, and another party's interpretation is in keeping with the document as a whole, that is the interpretation that will typically be adopted. Assuming this analysis doesn't work to resolve the issue, then the court would look to see if there is an order-of-precedence clause, which is a clause that lays out what parts of the contract / types of clauses take precedence over others (ex. written requirements take precendee over performance requirements, addendum hold less import than the signed agreement, schematics hold less import than addendum, and so on). Assuming this there is no order of precedence, the court will look first to see if the contract was negotiated back and forth, with terms being modified with each draft. If Yes, then the court will except extrinsic evidence (parole evidence) that goes to the intent of the parties bargained for exchange. If not, the contract term(s) will be construed against the drafter and in favor of the one who signed the others' instrument. So, as you can see, there is no clear answer to what seems to be a simple issue. This just goes to show: Lawyers seem expensive when you decide to hire them - Lawyers are expensive when you have to hire them, because you decided not to in the first place!
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Is it possible to create a trust without any beneficiaries Is it possible to create a trust without any beneficiaries or one in which the beneficiaries could not 1) change the terms of the trust, and 2) retrieve anything from the trust?
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Non-Profits Need Not Have Owners But Must Have A Lawful Purpose Any non-profit company, for example, a 501(c)(3), is ownerless and can be run by a self-perpetuating board if desired, rather than having delegates that provide an outside source for new board members. In that case you have to set forth a purpose of the company or trust, to which its assets and profits must be used, and it must be managed in accordance with that purpose. You can also have a "private foundation" that is effectively ownerless, again with a designated charitable purpose. Generally speaking, the law limits how much compensation can be paid to officers and employees of such a company and restricts self-dealing transactions by such a company. You probably cannot create a valid trust or business with no beneficiaries and no designated charitable purpose which is supposed to merely accumulate its profits and assets. Ownerless Cooperatives Are An Oxymoron Your reference in this and other posts to an "ownerless cooperative" is basically an oxymoron. A cooperative is an entity owned by a class of people who have a contractual relationship with the entity (usually consumers or producers) who are the owners of the company with voting control and who are entitled to an adjustment of their transaction prices with the cooperative via a rebate or surplus check proportionate to the dollar volume of their dealings with the cooperative (Northwest Mutual, must rural electric companies, and most credit unions would be examples of consumer cooperatives, Ocean Spray is a good example of a producers cooperative). An ownerless entity is pretty much by definition not a cooperative. An excellent overview of forms of entity organization other than investor owned stock corporations can be found in The Ownership of Enterprise by Henry Hansmann. The Life Of The Law Is Not Math Or Logic Honestly, it sounds like, in your several posts on the subject, that you are attempting the hide the ball of an ulterior purposes which is material to the legality and organization of an entity. The law is not like science or mathematics. You can't prove a bunch of isolated propositions and then string them together logically. The law operates on an entire comprehensive "fact pattern" and even if every step of your chain of reasoning to an ultimately result is supported by legal authority, this does not mean that this will be the result you get when you put all of the pieces together. That kind of logical reasoning doesn't work in a legal context. The heading of this section is a paraphrase of a famous statement about the law by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience... The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. from "The Common Law" (1881) at page 1. Blockchains Are Not The Legal Innovation That They Claim To Be Using blockchain technology to manage "tokens" of voting control in an entity is ultimately completely irrelevant. Blockchain technology is just another alternative to certificated shares, shares kept on an ownership ledger, or shares kept through secondary shareholding intermediaries or brokers. The technology used to keep track of voting control or economic ownership is irrelevant, and some common entities (e.g. homeowner's associations) have ownership that is basically determined via a crude public blockchain called the county clerk and recorder's records. People who think that blockchains provide any significant legal innovation into anything (e.g. here) are fundamentally misguided and typically are not people familiar with the law who have misconceptions about how the law works. Also, contrary to the hype, blockchains are not fraud-proof and indeed, involve serious systemic risks of instability because an error in an old transaction can disrupt lots of current claims. Claims such as those made here that blockchain transactions are irrefutable are naive and basically false. A block chain is a bit like a real property record system without an adverse possession rule to make ancient glitches irrelevant. Moreover, blockchains are a solution to a non-problem. Authenticating ownership and voting rights, economic entitlements, and corporate actions is something that has never posed a very significant economic problem ever since writing was invented. These are economic problems that were already effectively solved in the days of the Minoans, and widespread ownership of well authenticated entities by numerous ever shifting groups of owners was a problem well in hand by the days of the British East India Company. Anonymous Ownership Or Contribution Records Are Illegal Truly anonymous ownership, however, is legally prohibited, even though ownership need not be made a matter of public record. In the case of for profit entities, by securities regulation which requires disclosure for purposes of exercising voting rights and for disclosing large blocks of ownership as required by law, and for purposes of tax law. In the case of non-profit entities, it is prohibited by virtue of laws regulating private foundations that impose tax requirements when certain concentrations of contributions come from a small, related group of people. In the case of political organizations, campaign finance laws require disclosure.
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Shareholders own the company There may be different classes of shares in a company with different rights (voting, dividends, preferential distribution etc.) but if you own a share you own (part of) the company. Just as a side note, there are companies that are not limited by shares - their ownership structure is different. Similarly, there are unit trusts where ownership of a share entitles you to distributions, making you a beneficiary but the owner is someone else (usually a holding company).
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They cannot force a contract on you after the fact. You should leave these numbskulls alone, they are clearly up to something that makes them likely to be sued. I am adding the following: it's not illegal as far as I know to declare anything you want to a person as long as it isn't a threat. "You are now beholden to give me your firstborn makle child." lol, no.
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It sort of depends on what the will says, for example if the will says "shall receive 1% of the value of my estate at the moment of my death", that answers your question. That's a bit unlikely, more probably it just says "shall receive 1% of my estate", in which case this refers to "the totality of what is left to disburse to beneficiaries", that is, after obligations have been discharged (debts, taxes, funeral expenses, expense of estate administration). You also have to disburse specific benefits first, for example "$10,000 to Aunt Luddy", "the car to cousin Billy". Thereafter, percentages (implied such as "equally" or explicit such as "2%") are then computed over the remainder. Ideally, you will know the current value of everything left and can do the math and transfer title all at once. This might be a bit impractical for an entire estate, but it is practical for an estate composed of a bunch of divisible assets. All of the securities can be transferred on one day; the house may be sold a month later and assets re-distributed according to the formula at that point. In other words, you don't need a fixed instant for computing and distributing the estate, you just need to distribute each asset according to the terms of the estate.
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In the second case, is there anything to declare to the taxes? Yes, just like in the scenario of depositing in your bank account. Otherwise it would be easy for everybody to avoid the heavy tax burden by bartering or transacting without the use of official currency. The Code général des impôts in its Article 13 includes in the concept of bénéfice ou revenu imposable the market value of profits and benefits in kind ("y compris la valeur des profits et avantages en nature").
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Yes. It is fairly common for there to be one owner at law, but another person who has a beneficial interest - such as a long-term cohabiting partner. This may arise because the parties set it up that way, or perhaps more often when courts find that there is a "constructive trust" or a "resulting trust". See for example the concurring opinion of Lord Hope of Craighead in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, Parties are, of course, free to enter into whatever bargain they wish and, so long as it is clearly expressed and can be proved, the court will give effect to it. But for the rest the state of the legal title will determine the right starting point. The onus is then on the party who contends that the beneficial interests are divided between them otherwise than as the title shows to demonstrate this on the facts. The resulting court process may find that the beneficial interest exists, or not, and what fraction of the property it represents. It's common to find situations where one party put up most or all of the whole purchase price of a house, which was then registered in both names, and they then disagree about whether it should be split 50-50 or otherwise - that's an example of the beneficial ownership differing in proportion from the (equal) legal ownership. (See Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 at paragraph 51 for an explanation of this particular pattern.) The same sort of case arises when a cohabiting partner does not own the house, but still contributes to the mortgage and other bills - then, depending on the facts at hand, there may be a "constructive trust", and the partner is entitled to a share of the sale price of the house even though they are not its legal owner. A "resulting trust" might arise when someone contributed money for the purchase of the property, even though they didn't end up as a registered owner, but the parties acted in other respects as if they were joint owners.
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The child C cannot receive anything as a "gesture despite the Will" if everything in the Will is left to B; unless B agrees to a Deed of Variation the Executor is legally bound to follow the instructions in the Will. C may have a claim if he is dependent on A at the time of A's death and A has failed to make provision. It is possible that A's sibling S might also have a claim if dependent. Although you have tagged the question as United Kingdom, inheritance and intestacy law differs widely between England and Scotland. Such a Will should be drafted by a specialist trust and executry planning solicitor to avoid the risk of contentious probate.
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No contract can limit a court's jurisdiction An NDA is a contract: it cannot prevent the application of the judicial process. Should your dispute reach a courtroom, the NDA and the documents it seeks to protect are all admissible and you should subpoena them from the defendant and submit those copies to the court (that way you are not breaking the terms of the NDA). What is not admissible is bona fide "without prejudice" documents: that is documents that contain admissions and offers made in a genuine attempt to settle a dispute. This privilege is established by the context of the document, not by if it does or does not have the words "without prejudice" on it (except, of course, that their presence/absence is part of the context).
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Is there a legal definition of race in the US? As an example, let's say someone with 1/16 of African American heritage applies for a minority scholarship at a US university. Can the university then proceed to sue the scholarship recepient on the basis of deception? If so, is there a US law which defines what constitutes belonging to a certain race or ethnicity?
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Even if you're a white guy, you could get a report from 23andMe and you'll probably find out that you have at least 1/100 "African American" heritage. The way America is now (and especially the university system) it is more relevant what you "identify as" than what you are. What exactly is the wording on the scholarship application form? If it says "Do you identify as African American?" then feel free to say you do. In this case, the contract is clear that what you identify as is what is important. If the application says "Do you have at least 50% African DNA?" and you lied about it then they could sue you, but I doubt that's what it says. So check the wording and if you answer truthfully, they can't sue you. What you "identify as" is completely up to you.
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In this case the Plaintiff, James Maloney, has previously been charged with a crime for possession of nunchucks. He is apparently suing to enjoin further enforcement of the law under which he was previously charged. US Federal courts will only take up a "case or controversy", which means an issue where actual, not theoretical rights are at stake, and in order to vindicate a constitutional right, it must either have previously been violated, or there must be a plausible and immediate threat to it. Claiming that a law is unconstitutional as part of a defense to a charge of violating that law is a common and probably the best known method of challenging a law (or a government action) for unconstitutionality. But there are other ways. One way is to apply for an injunction against enforcement of the law. That is the procedure that was followed in, for example, the recent case where there was a ruling against the ADA in a district court. In order to use that procedure, the plaintiff must present evidence that there is a credible threat that the law will be invoked against him (or her) if the action which the plaintiff claims is protected by a constitutional right is taken. In short, one need not put oneself in a position where one goes to prison or is found guilty of a crime if one loses the case to challenge the constitutionality of a law or of a government policy or action. But one must establish that it is a real "case or controversy", with real parties in opposition to each other, and real rights at stake, not a mere law student's exercise, nor a collusive case, with both "sides" having the same actual goal. In the case reported, the previous criminal charge helps to establish that this is a real issue.
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The term "racism" is a political one, not a legal one, which refers to a belief. It is not illegal in the US, and it is a belief that is protected under the First Amendment. There is a legal construct, "discrimination on the basis of race", which enters into laws. For example, you may not discriminate in employment on the basis of race: but those law don't distinguish discrimination in favor and discrimination against. Hate crimes are crimes which additionally discriminate on the basis of some protected class (see "discrimination"). Assaulting a person because they are white, black, Catholic, atheist, male or female is a hate crime. Everybody falls into one or more protected categories (everybody has some race, religion including lack, and sex) – hate crime laws add "because of", for those extra penalties. Assalting a white, black, male or female person is not a hate crime, by itself. The government is not the only source of reigning in of speech that you don't like, in fact, it isn't way of suppressing speech that you don't like at all, at least as long as we have the First Amendment. An employer has the right to hire a racist, or to fire a racist, at least until the law changes.
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From the link, it appeared that: Payments were made so that exam answers would be corrected before marking Payments were made to have an athletic offer extended for a person who would not otherwise qualify. Fraud and bribery are both applicable crimes. Victims are not necessary for either crime.
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It ultimately depends on what Congress said when the relevant law was passed pertaining to that form of discrimination, how the enforcing agency has written the regulations, orders that have been issued, and how the courts have interpreted the law and regulations. EEOC Notice 915.002 states that Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"), an employer may ask disability-related questions and require medical examinations of an applicant only after the applicant has been given a conditional job offer. Such questions must be "job-related and consistent with business necessity". There is a statutory underpinning to this declaration, 42 USC 12112(d) that The prohibition against discrimination as referred to in subsection (a) shall include medical examinations and inquiries and Except as provided in paragraph (3), a covered entity shall not conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability. except that A covered entity may make preemployment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions. EEOC also says that In general, it is assumed that pre-employment requests for information will form the basis for hiring decisions. Therefore, employers should not request information that discloses or tends to disclose an applicant's race unless it has a legitimate business need for such information. Such inquiries are illegal in the sense that the EEOC "prohibits" it, and in the case of disability there is a direct statutory mandate to prohibit it. There is a legal principle, "Chevron deference", that says that the courts should defer to an agency's interpretation as long as Congress hasn't directly addressed the question and the interpretation is not unreasonable. Title 29(A)(35)(B) states the standards for detecting age discrimination for entities receiving federal funds, and while age discrimination is illegal, asking a person's age is not prohibited by specific regulation. The EEOC provides this manual regarding general race and color discrimination, and the section on "Evaluating employment decisions", where they say determining whether race played a role in the decisionmaking requires examination of all of the surrounding facts and circumstances. The presence or absence of any one piece of evidence often will not be determinative. So asking a person's race is not per se a violation of the law, but it is an act interpreted by the EEOC to be evidence of race discrimination. On the other hand, asking about disability is totally illegal so there's no "totality of evidence" to the process. The footnotes in the manual point to relevant case law: there is no case law that says "asking a questions about a protected category is per se proof of discrimination", but it can be used as part of a pattern of evidence.
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In general, in the US, employers have very wide latitude in how they decide whether or not to hire someone. There are specific factors like race, sex, national origin, disability status, etc, on which they cannot discriminate, but otherwise they can do as they please. It would be perfectly legal for a company to decline to hire you because you had previously sued them.
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No, absent a state law to the contrary (and I am aware of no such law in this case) it is not illegal. Universities, as institutions, are permitted to express opinions on political issues, especially political issues that are pertinent to their operations. Indeed, they often do so. (Political candidates are arguably a different matter and certainly involve a more complex analysis to determine if the Johnson Amendment applies to a public university, but that isn't at issue in this case.) Governmental entities may not take religious positions, but may take political ones. Generally, even public colleges like Rutgers have this autonomy. Indeed, lobbying is frequently necessary for the survival of a public university - it has no choice but to lobby and a free hand regarding the issues upon which it does lobby.
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Here is a list of language-regulating bodies. There is none for English, but they exist for Spanish (Real Academia Española), French (Académie française) and Swahil (Baraza la Kiswahili la Taifa for Tanzania, Chama cha Kiswahili cha Taifa for Kenya). No language regulator addresses the issues which arise in the interaction between natural language and the needs of legal interpretation. Instead, these bodies generally strive to maintain the historical "purity" of the language. Rather than "define" a word like "sandwich", they decide whether to outlaw (or disparage) the word because it comes from English. The vast majority of language-related problems in law which arise in common-law countries pertains to characteristics of common law and the practice of establishing precedent. There are philosophical conflicts, for example between those to adhere to the text versus those who try to discern original intent. If we had an official agency that precisely defined what a "weapon" is, we would still have the struggle over interpretive philosophies which renders moot any rulings from the national language regulator. In the US, part of the problem of word-definition is the widespread practice of localized redefinition in statutes – the laws that say "In this subsection, 'weapon' has the meaning defined in 18 U.S. Code §920" (fictitious: §921 defines "firearm" undefined "weapon"). Tracking the scope of definition and range of variation of a word within a body of codified law is very difficult. The rule in common law is that words that are not statutorily defined are given their "ordinary" meaning. There is no authoritative resource for "ordinary meaning" in English (there is no such thing as "the" dictionary). In the US, it would require a constitutional amendment to immutably impose a particular dictionary standard for deriving word meaning (e.g. Webster's Fourth New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged, forthcoming) and there would be ensuing political protests. A legally precise definition of "repair" would be very difficult to understand, and would require hiring a lawyer in order to engage in the activity of "repairing broken windows", from a legally-safe perspective. And that is just word meaning. Ambiguity in sentence-meaning cannot be resolved by listing the sentences.
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Letting agent lying (UK) We visited a property to rent, we made an offer which was accepted, paid deposit + admin fees, received the tenancy agreement with a special clause which says that we can't use the balcony!!! (they ask us to pay before sending the agreement... But it is apparently common practice in the UK). The private balcony appears on the online advert and we didn't specifically ask if we could use it during the visit (because it seemed obvious to us... as in, I didn't ask if I could use the shower). And now they are literally lying to our face... They sent me an email saying: At the time of the viewing there was a second party at the property; they enquired as to the availability of the balcony. [Letting agent] at this point mentioned that it was not included as part of any tenancy. At this point, [Me] asked [Letting agent] ‘why the balcony was not included’ – [Letting agent] advised that he was not sure of the reasoning but he would find out why. The conversation above never happened! And now I don't want to sign the agreement and they're trying to steal from us In line with the above I must inform you that as per your signed reservation fee letter (attached) that should you wish to withdraw from this administration at any stage within the process, £700 will be retained from the funds paid. Do we have any grounds for getting our money back??? I cannot prove that they lied during the viewing...
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Yes; While contracts can be made in written and oral form bigger acquisitions normally are in written form. Also consider this: They can't prove that they told you that the balcony is not usable. Thats a big negative in buying a property and they would need to have it documented. If they still refuse consider seeking professional help. In my country lawyers offer "fast help" that isn't legally binding but costs you only 10$ and helps you finding out if your case has any possibility to get accepted/if you're right. EDIT: Regarding the reservation fee: You can dismiss that. You didn't reserved that object, you reserved a house with balcony.
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Your landlord has an obligation to allow "quiet enjoyment" of the premises. Essentially this means that, unless they are damaging his or her property, the tenants are entited to act as though it were their own property. Many people take drugs at home. Between the tenants and the landlord this is not something the landlord is allowed to get involved in. If you believe there is criminal activity going on, you can but are not obliged to report it to the police.
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The simple answer is, get a lawyer and explain your case, and pay him to solve the problem (or tell you that it's hopeless). The two main questions would be whether the appraiser have any duty to you, and whether his action was within the scope of what he is supposed to do. If you hired the appraiser, he has a duty to you. I will assume it was you that hired the appraiser (if it was the bank, that's a different matter). Then the question is whether his action or non-action is within the scope of the job. If the place is infested with termites, that is probably irrelevant because an appraiser is not a termite inspector. On the other hand, if he failed to measure the structure, or erred substantially in the measurement, that kind of negligence could be legally actionable. The seller (not the appraiser) is required to "disclose", so it's not obvious that there is any thing that an appraiser could disclose that relates to a map.
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You didn't post the details of what exactly is involved with a "vampire initiation fee": is this simply the purchase of an physical object? Or the purchase of a service, such as the placing of a spell or the providing of the service of alleged protection from vampires? Or is this some form of a real "Advance-fee scam" where money and banking credentials or personal information is involved? (See link below). But in the big picture, one person's scam is another person's persuasive business sales pitch for an unusual item or service. Simply being able to pay for such an item or service doesn't make the sale - or the contract to sell it - illegal everywhere. It may be the case that selling an "vampire initiation fee" does not happen to be illegal in Nigeria. Illegal in the US, possibly yes. illegal there? Maybe not. Contract laws differ; in the US, contracting for something that is illegal voids the contract. In Nigeria, maybe not. Though the "vampire initiation fee" doesn't sound to me like a classic Advance-fee scam (Wikipedia), Google search on 419 scams and the results will tell you that it will be nearly impossible to get a prosecutor in that country to deal with anything like that, even if it is a real scam that promises lots of money for an upfront fee. Prosecutors have much better things to do. And you might have to go to Nigeria to make your case; see other answers that more fully outline the laws and legal aspects. Good luck. And it's better to spend your money on some garlic and a mirror. 7/03/18 Update re: the email transcript linked in question That's not a scam; the person is simply trying to sell you on the initiation fee. There is no crime. There is no promise of more money for a small fee (and bank credentials or personal information) like a typical 419 advance fee scam. You're not producing useful evidence for a prosecutor by engaging in the email and mostly agreeing to pay him. It's not illegal for you to send money by Western Union for the vampire fee. Even if you did send money, you're not being defrauded because you already know the vampire initiation is fake, and as a result you couldn't logically prove to a prosecutor or court that you were scammed. He's not guilty of fraud as no money has changed hands for a (fraudulent) service. Emailing with him might make you feel good by wasting his time, but that's all.
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The tenant is responsible for damage beyond “fair wear and tear” which this obviously is. If it is as bad as you suggest then it may require professional forensic cleaning which can run to thousands of pounds. At some point, things like carpets etc. can be cheaper to replace than to repair. There is no upper limit (beyond, at the extreme, the cost of demolition and rebuilding the dwelling), however, there may be a practical limit being the amount the tenant can pay before going bankrupt.
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Non-residential tenancies are subject to Fla. Stat Ch. 83 Part I. This is statutorily a tenancy at-will unless a contrary agreement is in writing signed by the lessor: the duration of the lease is yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly as determined by the periodicity of rent payments. There are various legal conditions related to rent default and causes for removing tenants, also conditions about premises that are wholly untenantable. Unlike residential leases, there are not any special statutory conditions surrounding the landlords presentation of leases. Florida law contemplates and allows the possibility that there are no written documents, and for non-residential tenancies has very little to say about it (only pertaining to the distinction between at-will vs not at-will leases). Therefore, the matter follows the general rules for contractual disputes: whoever makes the best case for their claims wins. If Bob has a scanned copy, that is excellent proof. If Alice alleges and proves that the scanned copy was modified, that disposes of Bob's evidence. If Alice presents a copy of the contract that says otherwise (I do mean copy), then this anomaly has to be explained. Bob can claim that they tore up Alice's original and renegotiated the deal, but he needs to prove that claim. If Alice presents the original contract, Bob's story becomes much less plausible. There are millions of variants of what might happen: the point is, there is no requirement to present the original signed document to support a claim in a contractual dispute.
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In the lease agreement we stipulated that rent would be 50% off until the building received full services and then the full rent payment would be due. Ouch. I bet the lease agreement also says something like "no other agreements verbal or otherwise are in effect for this agreement." So what you did was release the landlord from the responsibility to make the building habitable. Pretty sure you will need a lawyer to unwind this.
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It's hard to imagine a jurisdiction where this would be legal, assuming that the facts are as you present them. Mainly, it comes down to what the lease actually says. If the lease says something that implies that landlord permission is required, then the tenant has to get permission. You can call it a "dog permit", it just boils down to "landlord permission". Unless the lease also states "permission for a pet can be withdrawn at any time, sor any reason" or something to that effect, then the dog is permitted. At the end of the lease term, the landlord can refuse to renew the lease and/or can instead offer a no-dogs lease. The landlord's only recourse would be to petition the court for breaking the lease, in having a dog without permission, at which point the tenant would present whatever evidence they have that there was permission (hopefully something more substantial than a statement "I asked if I could bring my dog and the landlord said 'hmmmm' with an approving tone"). The courts will not give any credence to "Yeah but I rescinded the permission" unless there is a clause that explicitly allows it.
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When is it illegal to play someone else's copyrighted song on an instrument? I am learning guitar and found out that Justin Sandercoe (from famous guitar teaching website justinguitar.com) has been forced to remove some of his lessons because the song he was teaching his audience how to play was copyrighted. Is this because he makes money off ads? When exactly is it illegal to perform a song on an instrument I am learning? If I don't pay a mechanical royalty am I not allowed to perform the song for myself in my own home with no one around as guitar practice? What if it's a small private party and someone busts out the guitar and plays a well known song? What draws the line for when it is illegal to perform a known copyrighted song?
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The crucial limitation is 17 USC 106(4) which gives the creater of the work the exclusive right to authorize in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly You can play music copyrighted privately, but not publicly, without a license. Look at the definition of public performance in 17 USC 101: (1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.
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The Moonlight Sonata itself is well out of copyright. Most countries have copyright terms equal to or less than 70 years after the author's death, 1827 in the case of Beethoven. However, particular performances of the Moonlight Sonata may be under the copyright of the performer or even the arranger. Also, downloading from Youtube is against their terms of service. Overall, using the Moonlight Sonata is fine, just make sure you find a good legal source for it.
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Copyright infringement requires that you actually copy elements from an earlier work produced by a different author. If you created a similar, or even identical, work independently, it is not copyright infringement. When considering whether or not infringement has occurred, the court is likely to consider whether the defendant could reasonably have had access to the plaintiff's work. If the court finds that they could have, then the defendant would be required to produce evidence of original authorship. Consider the My Sweet Lord/He So Fine case, where the court found the defendant had subconsciously copied the plaintiff's song. Had Harrison been able to produce evidence of original authorship, the judgment could have been different. In your example, it is unlikely that an suit in copyright infringement could be decided against you, as you've stated the text is generated randomly. However, more evidence of this randomness might be required to support your case. Of course, whether a computer or automated process can produce works independently is still questionable; I'm not aware of cases that have tried this. The US Copyright Office has said that Works produced by mechanical processes or random selection without any contribution by a human author are not registrable. Of course, whether this has a bearing on your particular scenario is undecided, and I'm not sure how it would be decided. It is almost certain that the worst case outcome would be an injunction requiring you to cease publicising the product, or perform reasonable checks prior to publication to ensure that the product of your program infringes on works; it would be unlikely that you would have costs ordered against you, especially if the program is truly random, and the random text was given as much, or more, publicity than the coherent text.
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You don't need to "publish" your song to obtain copyright protection. Original works are protected by copyright at the instant they are fixed in a tangible medium. This means that if you type the lyrics, write an arrangement of notes, or record yourself playing the song, the song is copyrighted.
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It depends on the terms of your contract with the musicians. Copyright in the performance belongs to the performer so you need to ensure the copyright is transferred or appropriately licensed to you. It is public domain. Copyright for US works published before 1978 is a maximum of 95 years from date of publication. Although written on Christmas Day 1896 it wasn't published until 1897. Copyright, therefore, could have lasted until 31 December 1991 at most. No.
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Musical compositions can be, and if recent almost always are, protected by copyright. This is separate from the copyright on a recording of a performance of the work. If you reuse a musical passage, the new work may be a derivative work, that is a work based on an earlier work. Or an extended musical quotation could be considered to be copyright infringement. If this is in the united-states the use of a section from a previous work might be considered to be a fair use (fair-use). This is a specifically US concept in copyright law, although several other countries have a concept of fair dealing which is somewhat similar, although narrower. Whether a use is a fair use is an inherently fact-based determination. There is no clear and simple bright line for what is and is not a fair use. US law (17 USC 197) specifies four factors which are to be weighed by a court in considering the matter: The purpose and character of the use. If your use is commercial that weighs against fair use, but does not at all preclude it. This factor also includes whether the use is transformative or not. A transformative use is one that takes the part used for a very different sort of purpose than the original. Parodies are normally transformative, for example. A quote for purposes of commentary and analysis, or criticism is normally transformative. Transformative uses are more likely to be considered fair uses. The nature of the copyrighted work. Creative works such as fiction and music are more strongly protected than works such as textbooks and news stories. This probably weighs against fair use in the case described. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. If only a short section of a longer work is used, that weighs in favor of fair use. However very short quotes can still fail, to be held to be fair uses. In Harper vs Nation a quote of about 300 words from a 500 page book was held not to be fair use because it was "the heart of the book". The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. A use that significantly harms the market value of the original, or serves as a replacement for it, weigh strongly against fair use. This was a major factor in Harper vs Nation. Each case of claimed fair use is evaluated by looking at all four factors, and the specific facts of the case. From the description in the question, such a use might well be held to be fair use. Musical quotations often are. But there is no way to be sure unless a court evaluates the specific case. A lawyer specifically experienced in not only copyright law, but copyrights on music, might be able to give more specific advice. Or you could, of course, seek permission from the copyright holder, quite likely the original composer or artist. If you get permission, there is no further issue. There might be a charge, but when the use is minor, and has no commercial effect, the charge might be small or even zero provided that the source is acknowledged.
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general things on copyright Copyright law is very similar globally, due to the Berne convention on copyright. Ány country's copyright law grants the copyright to an author. Copyright is the exclusive right of an author to authorize ("license") copies, performance, and derivative works. In case multiple authors jointly create a work, they own the right in their respective parts, or jointly. The copyright holder can deny making derivatives. If a derivative is made without authorization, it is copyright infringement. If the author was asked, denied the authorization and it is made anyway, it is wilful copyright infringement. Relinquishing your rights in the altered work does not make it not copyright infringement. The only way to not commit copyright infringement is to get a license. Naming the original author of a work you adapted is not just politeness, it is mandatory in all copyrights that follow the Berne convention on copyright. Licensing Fees The Verve's agreement to get the license was specifically to pay all the proceeds to the Rolling Stones, but that was an extraordinary case. License fees for recording a cover version (with the unaltered lyrics!) are usually mandatory to be available. for example in the united-states, it is mandatory to grant a mechanical license to create cover recordings for a licensing fee, for which for example the Harry Fox Agency is collecting and distributing the required payments and royalties. Those Royalties are about 9.1 cents per copy for a sub-5-minute song's recording. This license does not allow to alter lyrics. However, synchronization (tone and video) is not mandatory to be granted, and those start at a flat 4-digit and are rather open-ended. Without a sync license, you may not make video recordings of a work being performed. A public performance of a work requires a different license. A performance license is required for any public performance, and those are not regulated either, but typically not too expensive - yet alteration again is not within the scope of such a license. Granting a performance license is typically handled by Performing Rights Organisations such as ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, taking the required fees and distributing the royalties. Making an adaptation or alteration is a derivative work. Making a derivative work requires a license that is different again. Those can only be granted by the copyright holders, and if they say no... Close the folder. The price of copyright infringement Wilful copyright infringement, especially after you were told no, can be super expensive: In the US, the rightsholder can get 150 000 USD and the lawyer fees for willful infringement. The rightsholder can sue in the US if they are there. Recoverable costs plus damages are also available in the UK, capped at 60 000 GBP for costs and 500 000 GBP in damages.
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You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license.
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Can I legally (but without license) sell merchandise with text and images based on a video game? I am setting up an online shop (or, say, a table/kiosk at conventions) to sell merchandise like t-shirts, mugs, etc, and I want to have merchandise with text and images either from or based on popular video game franchises. I would not be using the game logo or title of the game itself, but I would want to use specific images from inside the game (or the silhouette/likeness/"representing symbol" of characters in the game). For example, a mug with a catch-phrase and logo from Mass Effect that says "I should go..." and "get a refill" on opposite sides with the Paragon/Renegade/Paragade logo on it. As another example, maybe a headset with the Zelda franchise's Navi on the earmuffs and "Hey! Listen!" printed across the band. However I highly doubt I would be able to obtain a "merchandising license", or even get any form of response from a company like EA/BioWare or Nintendo if I inquire. Am I opening myself up to possible lawsuits? Assuming yes, or that I would receive a "cease and desist" (because even on shaky legal ground I have no doubt a company would toss one at someone to hope they just complied), if I were sued (and leaving competency out of it) is there any sort of legal defense? Clearly I have zero knowledge of parody/fair use/trademark/copyright (other than that the concepts exist), and I cannot afford a lawyer... so I'm sorry if this has been answered here before. I've found this question and these ones (could this one even apply in any way? I dunno, that's why I'm here), but I'm hoping my case is different enough to not get downvoted into oblivion as I am not saying "I want to sell things that say 'Overwatch' and use the trademarked logo" and I don't know if using the content in this manner constitutes satirical/parody purposes of any kind. Alternatively, can I make any kind of promotional material (a poster, a video, take free pictures of people and digitally insert images, a free phone app) with likeness/symbols/images from their favourite video games? i.e. is there a significant difference between this and directly monetizing? Sorry again. I anticipate the first comment being "get a lawyer" or "that's illegal", but any kind of elaboration would be amazing. NOTE: I somehow missed the "Law Stack Exchange is for educational purposes only and is not a substitute for individualized advice from a qualified legal practitioner" part until after clicking post, but if anyone is still able to advise me (educationally, of course) I would suuuuuuuper appreciate it.
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Short Answer No, you may not do this legally without permission in the form of a license from the owners of this intellectual property. Your video game based merch business plan is a horrible, horrible idea. There is no reasonable way that you could have known just how horribly awful and bad an idea this was without talking to someone familiar with the law. So, I'm not saying that this was a stupid or unreasonable question. But, now, you know. And, you should run away from this idea as fast as you can. Long Answer What you are proposing to do is blatant infringement of copyright (and trademarks) through the creation of derviative works, on a systematic basis, for profit, without permission, in a manner that does not constitute a parody or satire or any form of fair use. This kind of economic activity is precisely what copyright and trademark laws are designed to prevent. The case against you for liability could only get more clear if you were selling pirated copies of the game itself. You would have no legal defenses (other than statute of limitations if they waited to many years to sue you, which they almost certainly would not). You would be liable for statutory damages of up to many thousands of dollars per infringing item and the attorneys' fees the intellectual property owners incurred to sue you. The owners of the games could probably get a court order to destroy all of your merchandise, and a restraining order and injunction to force you to immediately shut down your business at any time. They could obtain all of those remedies without sending you a cease and desist letter before suing you. The moderately likely worst case scenario economic liability that you would face would be on the order of 100 times the amount of profits you could hope to make in a best case scenario, and the likelihood that you would incur some significant civil liability is on the order of 85%-90% (with almost of of the little or no civil liability percentage attributed to scenarios in which the company doesn't notice that you are infringing upon its intellectual property rights). Also, the more profitable you are and the higher the volume of goods you sell, the more likely you are to be sued. The liability risk to profit ratio grows with each additional dollar of profit you make. There is a good chance (perhaps 65%-75%) that they could establish that your violation was willful and wanton in these circumstances, which would also prevent you from discharging any part of the massive judgment against you in bankruptcy. So, there is a better than 50% chance that you'd be stuck with an intellectual property rights infringement debt, which could easily run into the high hundreds of thousand or even many millions of dollars, plus post-judgment interest at a rate similar to the market rate for high risk junk bonds, for the rest of your life. In terms of the economic harm involved to you, this would be almost as bad as having all of your property seized and then being sold into slavery for the rest of your life, if a coin toss bet comes up tails, but you get to keep the coin if it comes up heads. A settlement in which you turned over every penny you ever made in the venture, destroyed all of your products, shut down the business and paid them an additional low five figure amount in lieu of penalties and attorneys' fees would be a very generous offer. You would also face a real risk (perhaps 10%-15%) of some low level felony criminal liability (perhaps several years in prison). This is a business plan that is so toxic with immense, near certain liability risks of the worst possible kind that you should put on gloves before picking it up and tossing it into your nearest available fireplace or campfire. This business plan poses more liability risk to you than opening up a nightclub, bribing your contractors and code inspectors to ignore all fire and electrical codes, painting the walls with turpentine, padlocking all of the exit doors from the outside, changing a $1 cover and selling booze at cost to get huge crowds, and then booking bands with lots of fireworks in their stage shows on a nightly basis. (Yes, I really had a client who was stupid enough to come up with this business plan until I talked him out of it.) From a civil liability perspective, you would have less exposure to economic liability if you started a business that involved abducting random cats and dogs and goats off the street and charging customers to forcibly rape and then mutilate them, while filming it for distribution on the Internet with your real name and fingerprints in a watermark on every image and close ups of the animals collar tags and the goats' brands. The likelihood of criminal liability would be quite a bit greater (perhaps 60%-80%), however, even though the punishment if you were convicted of felonies for the bestiality business would be similar to the punishment for a conviction for copyright and trademark infringement. (Thankfully, I have yet to see a client try to implement this business plan.) Go hire someone to secure a license from the intellectual property owner for you (perhaps an IP lawyer or an agent or broker), or forget about it. This is an industry where you absolutely must be legitimate, and you have to go big or go home. The economies of scale are simply too immense to ignore. If your anticipated gross sales aren't at least $500,000 a year or so, you probably shouldn't even consider doing it whether it is legal or not. A license, if you could get it, would probably cost $6,000 to $12,000 in professional fees to negotiate (if you could accomplish this feat at all), perhaps a similar amount for an upfront fee to the intellectual property holder, and probably 10%-35% of your profits on an ongoing basis. This is because the market rate of licenses of this kind are geared towards what large scale distributors selling wholesale to Wal-Marts, department stores, and national mall chains could bear (I have some clients that happily pay these kinds of license fees so they can sell branded products, manufactured in China and then imported, on a high volume national basis.) The license fees would be a huge bargain by comparison to your economic exposure to infringement liability. But, if even the licensing fees (if you could negotiate a deal to pay them) are too expensive, then, this business plan doesn't make economic sense even with permission in the form of a license from the intellectual property owner. In that case, you should instead go into the lemonade stand business or buy a food truck, or become an Uber driver, or open a coffee shop or a liquor store, or something like that, with less liability risk and a more proven business model. If you must make video game merch without permission, do it in a back alley of a small town in rural Mexico on a cash only basis (where lots of people do stuff like this without getting caught), rather than an online store, where any bored paralegal or network manager in the video game company's law firm can find you at a moment's notice and might win a promotion or a raise or a bonus for doing so.
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Marks are to denominate the origin of goods. Nintendo built Gameboys for decades. Some GameBoys have aftermarket parts like the NAKI Action Light, a peripheral never made by Nintendo but was nothing but a light and a 1.5 magnification lens. It was advertised as "Fitting a Game Boy TM" and didn't use Nintendo marks. That is nominative use and allowed. Then, Nintendo actually had stocks of spare parts that ended on the open market by now. those are genuine Nintendo parts, made for Nintendo, with the marks on it. Those are proper marks. Some people bought up tons of old Game Boys and took them apart for spares. Those are still genuine parts, even if used, and the mark is proper. Nintendo didn't make all the parts for Gameboy themselves. They had contracted OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) that created parts for construction of the toys. These were in part branded and marked in the OEM factory still, the OEMs had a license to make and mark parts. Parts produced till the lapse of the license would be most likely proper as for most intents and purposes Nintendo did endorse the manufacturing in this fashion. However after the licensee lapsed or if it doesn't contain a "put the markings on it" clause, marking would not be allowed (anymore). Finally, there are spare parts that were just made to Nintendo specs, that are not originating with Nintendo, and are marked with Nintendo marks. Such copy parts infringe on the Trademark of Nintendo. There is legal space in the aftermarket spare part market: Parts that are to specs but not marked with the marks denominating the origin. Those can be advertised akin to the NAKI Action Light "fitting a Game Boy TM" without infringing on marks.
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Yes The relevant legal concepts are copyright, contract law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. You are liable to be sued by the people affected for damages and/or be prosecuted by the government for the felony under either or both laws. Let's start here: "I bought a game". No, you didn't; you bought a licence to use the software in accordance with the terms of service (licence) that you freely agreed to. All modern ToS will not allow you to reverse engineer the software. If you breach those terms of service then you have broken a contract - that is what allows them to sue you. They will no doubt argue that the prevalence of cheat routines developed by people like you reduce the number of people willing to play the game - say 100,000 users x $10/month * 12 months = $12,000,000. They will also ask the court to impose punitive damages to discourage this sort of thing. Which brings us to the copyright violation. You are allowed to copy their software provided you comply with the ToS. But you didn't. Therefore you are in breach of the Copyright Act and subject to additional civil and criminal sanctions. Finally, your "cheats" access their servers in a way that the ToS doesn't authorize. This puts you in breach of the CFFA - breaking this carries serious jail time penalties. Not to mention that in the US, a criminal conviction will preclude you from many jobs, including, naturally, any with access to company computer systems. Putting aside the illegalities, cheats are unethical and ruin the game experience for hundreds of thousands of people who don't use cheats. You are a criminal - stop being one!
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As far as copyright goes... Pixabay: Yes (with minor exceptions) Pixabay's license is quite broad, and allows for unattributed commercial use with a small number of exceptions. You can't "use images with identifiable brands to create a misleading association with a product or service" or "portray identifiable people in a bad light or in a way that is offensive," but otherwise it would allow for use in a video (there are other exceptions, but they wouldn't really apply to such use). Flickr: It depends on the license By default, images are not licensed for additional use other than viewing on Flickr. However, users are free to license their images as they wish, and Flickr explicitly supports various Creative Commons Licenses, many (but not all—particularly the NC licenses) of which would support such commercial use. Depending on the license, additional requirements, such as providing attribution, may apply. Note that there are non-copyright concerns that might come up in specific situations, such as trademarks (I mentioned one potential issue in my explanation of the Pixabay license) or model releases. Another answer to this question has some good information on these concerns.
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There is a general belief that a term being trademarked means that it's illegal to use the term without permission from the trademark holder, but that is false. It is illegal only if it is done in a manner that suggests endorsement by the trademark holder. For instance, selling a football as a "Super Bowl football" would be trademark infringement, as it implies NFL involvement in the production of the football. Simply talking about the Super Bowl, such as saying "Our construction company built the stadium the Super Bowl is being played in" is not trademark infringement. Simply using a trademarked term to discuss the thing it refers to, without implying endorsement, is known as "nominative use". However, even if one would be on solid legal footings and could win a lawsuit on the basis of nominative use, one might avoid using a trademark to avoid the hassle of being sued.
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Rather than saying "for Project®" which might fairly be interpreted to indicate an affiliation with Microsoft, you ought to say something like "intended to be compatible with Project® (not affiliated with or endorsed by Microsoft)." can you imagine a worse scenario than Microsoft sending a Cease and Desist notice? In that case, I can imagine re-branding to "MYBRAND for E-Mail" as the logo/name and a textual reference to "The [MyBrand for E-Mail] Add-In for Microsoft® Outlook®.". What is the worst case scenario? You could be sued by Microsoft for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and if you lost, forced to change your product name and to destroy all existing inventory, forced to disgorge all profits you have ever made from selling your product ever, forced to pay their attorneys' fees and costs (which won't be cheap) in addition to your own legal team, have your products seized and destroyed when imported by customs agents follow an ex parte court hearing (i.e. one you had no notice of) secretly brought by Microsoft, and forced to pay punitive damages equal to double the profits you made in addition to the profits themselves. You might not even be able to discharge the judgment against you by going bankrupt and the punitive damages would probably not be tax deductible. Microsoft has every right to do this even if you fully comply with their cease and desist letter. A criminal trademark prosecution would be unlikely in this fact pattern.
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Imagine if the answer was a simple yes: adding a disclaimer was enough to exempt you from any and all copyright and trademark law suits. If that was the case, there would be no point in copyright or trademark law at all, because everyone could just include this disclaimer and never be sued. That doesn't mean every disclaimer is useless, but it does mean that copying and pasting some vague wording without understanding what it means is very unlikely to help you very much. The example you give is a good example of doing just that; the terms it uses are real, but they've clearly been thrown together without real understanding: Copyright is the right to control and profit from a creative work. This is relevant because images of Pokemon characters created for games, manga, etc are copyrighted by their creator. Trademarks are words, symbols, images, etc exclusively associated with a particular company or product. Trademark law aims, among other things, to avoid customers thinking they are getting an official product when they are not. "Nintendo" and "Pokemon" are both themselves trademarks. They are also the names of different companies. My limited understanding is that "The Pokemon Company" will be the owner of all the copyrights and trademarks related to those games, manga, etc. Naming them is a way of showing that you have researched this and understood their rights. "This app is not affiliated , endorsed or supported by Nintendo in any way". This is a disclaimer on the trademarks. Whether this is sufficient to protect against claims of counterfeiting depends on how prominent it is compared to other branding - you need to make it obvious to users that the product is unofficial, not bury this in small-print for the lawyers to find. "also some images used in this app are ... supported under fair use" - fair use is a US legal concept which allows copyrighted works to be used in certain specifically limited ways. Saying your use is covered does not make it true, you need to actually understand what provisions of the law allow your specific use. "no copyright infringement intended" This is a fluffy apology that has no legal standing. A more useful statement might be "every care has been taken to adhere to copyright and trademark law, if you notice a violation please contact X"; but you're still relying on goodwill, and it won't stop someone sending the lawyers in if they decide to. Which brings us back to the real question: The apps mentioned before are in the store since 2015 and they haven't been removed yet. The real reason for this has nothing to do with the poorly-written disclaimers, it is that Nintendo / Pokemon co haven't bothered. If an app is directly competing with an official app, or receiving a lot of attention (even if no money), the lawyers will descend; if it's a buggy image gallery with a dozen downloads, they might decide they have better things to do. If they do notice, they might just get Apple and Google to de-list the app, but not spend the time and money pursuing a legal case. On the other hand, at any time they might decide they need to tighten up control of their intellectual property, and make an example of a few authors picked at random. The only way to avoid that is to actually avoid violating their rights, rather than just saying so in a disclaimer.
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This kind of quotation, for commentary, criticism, or reference, is generally allowed without obtaining permission. In the US, this falls under fair use (see 17 USC 107. In the UK and most commonwealth countries, it falls under fair dealing. In other countries there are various exceptions to copyright that will probably cover this. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Facts and ideas are never protected by copyright, so this is not going to be an issue. See 17 USC 102(b), which provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. As a comment by user Trish reminds, game rules are facts and are not protected, although their exact wording may be.
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Likelihood of jury selection procedure in this story I had some questions about how jury selection works upon reading the following story that was shared to Facebook: A couple of years ago I got called for jury duty and made it through a couple of rounds of dismissals before the remaining candidates were led into a room to meet the judge and defense attorney. It was an assault case—a drunk man had assaulted a woman friend of his outside of a nightclub. There were 30 potential jurors in the room, 12 were women. The first question the defense attorney asked of the women in the room was this: "Have you ever been assaulted by a man?" All 12 women in the room said yes—and were asked to publicly describe the abuse. Right there, in front of everyone. All 12 women were dismissed from the pool of potential jurors. Not a single woman was eligible to be on that jury—we could not be deemed "impartial" because of each woman's individual history of being abused by men. I think about that case a lot and wonder if any of the men were asked if they had ever assaulted anyone. And more and more I see what "a jury of peers" really means in this society—abusive men excusing the behavior of other abusive men. Basically, I wonder how often the jury selection happens like it was described in that story. Specifically, my questions are: How often are jury members subject to separate examination by defense counsel (or prosecution counsel) during jury selection? How frequently are jury members dismissed in the presence of other members? Alternatively, how often are dismissed jury members informed of the selection or elimination of fellow jury members? Is the defense counsel able to eliminate (all twelve) jury members from consideration (for cause) without objections by prosecution counsel?
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Short Answer This account would be a fairly extreme outlier relative to normal practice in jury selection, but it is certainly something that could possibly happen (except for one small detail that isn't very relevant to the core issues that it raises; this detail is discussed below in the last heading of this answer). The substantive points made in the Facebook post about what the facts recounted say about the state of women's conditions and attitudes about women in our society, and the poster's skepticism that a judge who made decisions like these really acted appropriately, are well founded, fair, and appropriate to raise. These concerns are within the heartland of what the case law on these kinds of issues discusses and struggles with, although because of the procedural posture of this issue, there isn't a lot of case law on this issue. Long Answer My Sources Of Knowledge I have participated in choosing perhaps half a dozen juries in which I was counsel, and I have observed the process in other cases one or twice and have previously been in a couple of jury pools myself (I've never been actually selected to serve). I'm also familiar with accounts of others practitioners regarding their experiences with jury selection, I know what I was taught in law school about the process, and I am familiar with the academic and practitioner oriented literature about the process. I am answering based upon U.S. law, because I don't have intimate familiarity with petite jury selection in other common law countries, although the broad outlines of the process are similar. As a caveat to this answer, however, recognize that judges have very broad discretion in the jury selection process and that not all judges adhere to "best practices". Further, in many states, judges are partisan elected officials who tend to end up in there positions because of, rather than in spite of, their extreme views and positions of legal issues over which they have discretion relative to the average lawyer or judges in places where the judicial selection process is less partisan. Your Questions How often are jury members subject to separate examination by defense counsel (or prosecution counsel) during jury selection? This usually happens in any case more serious than a simple traffic offense. It would be unusual to examine every single member separately in a separate room, but normally quite a few jurors a questioned separately on one point or another. This process is called voir dire (a situation in which U.S. legal terminology borrows from French rather than Latin). How frequently are jury members dismissed in the presence of other members? Jury members are usually dismissed in the presence of other members, but the specific juror responses to the reasons for doing so may or may not be discussed in the presence of the other jurors. Less sensitive questions (e.g., do you still live in this county, are you a U.S. citizen, do you speak English, do you have scheduled health procedures during the anticipated trial or a trip with a non-refundable ticket or similar issue, and a few other "categorical" exclusions) are usually discussed in the presence of other members, as are responses to general questions that are unlikely to be grounds by themselves for a dismissal for cause, but could inform peremptory challeges of jurors. The better and more common practice is for sensitive questions, such as a previous incident of being assaulted, to be discussed out of earshot from the other panel members, but in the hearing of the judge, at least one lawyer for each side and the court reporter who includes the bench conference in the trial transcript. Alternatively, how often are dismissed jury members informed of the selection or elimination of fellow jury members? Normally, jury pool members leave the courtroom and get on with their day once they are dismissed. But, if they choose to stick around, they will learn who is selected to serve on the jury, and who is eliminated from the jury pool. Is the defense counsel able to eliminate (all twelve) jury members from consideration (for cause) without objections by prosecution counsel? Terminology First of all, here and in your prior questions it is important to distinguish between the jury pool (a group of randomly chosen people who might end up being jurors) and the jury (a group of people ultimately selected to decide a case after challenges for cause and peremptory challenges are complete). The Voir Dire Process There is, in principle, no limit on the number of members of the jury pool who can be dismissed for cause, and if they run out, everyone goes home for the day and comes back the next day with a supplemental batch of jury pool members. In an obscure civil case or minor low profile felony case, the jury pool would typically be 30-60 potential jurors. In a death penalty case or case that has famous parties (e.g. a civil case involving Taylor Swift held in Denver recently), the jury pool would typically be several hundred people and the first round of voir dire would happen over the course of several days or even weeks. Any time that either party requests that a juror be dismissed for cause, the other party can choose to not object, or can object and argue that the juror should not be dismissed for cause. The judge doesn't have to dismiss a juror even when both parties agree to strike the juror for cause and not infrequently will refuse to dismiss a juror even when both parties agree to strike a juror for cause. This is because the judge has an institutional incentive to discourage jurors other than the one that a party has moved to dismiss from the jury pool from giving a lame excuse to try to get out of jury duty, even if the parties, who don't have that institutional concern, don't care about that. Why Might A Prosecutor Fail To Object? The downside of objecting to a request to dismiss a juror for cause is that it creates an almost automatic appellate issue for the party seeking to dismiss the juror if the juror is not dismissed. So, a prosecutor might not object to a questionable request to dismiss a juror for cause in order to reduce the likelihood that a conviction obtained by the prosecutor would be reversed on appeal. Giving the defense the jury it wants also makes it more likely that if the case starts going badly that the defendant will agree to a plea bargain mid-trial rather than risking a conviction by the jury, because any conviction obtained is more likely to hold up on appeal. A defendant may appeal a ruling denying a motion to dismiss a prospective juror that is denied after a conviction, if any, is entered. If the jury acquits the defendant (the unfavorable outcome the prosecutor would like to avoid by not having a juror dismissed for cause), the prosecutor can't appeal the case, and if the jury hears evidence, the case can't be dismissed without prejudice or retried unless there is a conviction that is reversed or there is a mistrial (the mistrial rules are bit complicated). So, if the prosecutor was really appalled by the dismissal for cause of so many women and felt that this would impair the prosecution's chance of obtaining a conviction materially, the prosecutor would have to dismiss the criminal charges so as to vacate the trial, before evidence was presented to the jury, and then refile the charges (assuming that this would be possible consistent with statutes of limitation and speedy trial requirements). But, this would be an extraordinary move with high stakes, because the prosecutor has a long term strategic interest in not pissing off a judge in any case because that could cause the judge to exercise the judge's discretion against the prosecutor in future cases. The judge and prosecutor may have to deal with each other in future cases for decades and will do so on a regular basis every few weeks or months. A judge is likely to be pissed off in this situation because dismissing a case ready to go to trial and scheduled for trial with a jury fully selected because the prosecutor was unhappy with the judge's rulings on motions to dismiss jurors for cause would not be appreciated by the judge who naturally believes that the rulings made on those motions were sound even if that belief is unreasonable. I strongly suspect that this was the reason that the prosecutor allowed all twelve women in the jury panel to be stricken for cause in the case that you describe (assuming, of course, that the Facebook account is factually accurate, which is sometimes the case and sometimes not the case – even if the gist of the account was accurate, it wouldn't be surprising if some technical details or nuances were incorrectly recounted). It Would Not Be Normal For A Prosecutor To Not Object In This Case Despite these procedural considerations, it would be very unusual for a prosecutor to not object to striking all twelve women on a jury panel for cause in these circumstances and it would be very unusual for a judge to agree to strike all twelve women on the jury panel for cause in these circumstances whether or not the prosecutor objected. Generally speaking, merely having had a prior experience of having been assaulted would not be sufficient to strike a prospective juror for cause. Normally, the prosecutor and/or the judge would ask the prospective juror if this experience made it impossible for that particular juror to be impartial in this particular case, and normally most of the prospective jurors asked that question would say "no". Usually, in that situation, the judge would not agree to dismiss that prospective juror for cause. Most prosecutors would expect their objections to a request to dismiss a prospective juror for cause in this situation to be taken seriously by the judge and for only a few of these requests that cast the most doubt on the impartiality of a potential juror to be granted. And, most prosecutors would not consider the appellate risk involved in opposing a request to dismiss a prospective juror for cause in the typical scenario that I outlined above very troubling, because a judge has fairly broad discretion on dismissals of jurors for cause in the face of a marginal fact pattern. The fact that the judge allowed this also suggests that the prosecutor may know that the judge is very unenlightened and has misogynist leanings and that fighting the judge's ruling in this case would be a lost cause that is hard to appeal. (Of course, if any of the women had previously been assaulted by the defendant in this particular case and personally knew that defendant well, that would normally cause the potential juror to be dismissed for cause.) After Challenges For Cause Keep in mind also that after dismissals for cause are completed, a certain number of jurors equal to the number of peremptory challenges allowed to the prosecution and defense combined plus the number of jurors who need to be left over to decide the case would be put in the second stage of narrower jury pool. In this second stage, during which the narrower jury pool is honed to the actual final panel of jurors who will hear the case, each side exercises their allocated number of peremptory challenges (normally alternating back one forth, one juror at a time). While peremptory challenges can generally be made without good cause, you can not make a peremptory challenge solely based upon a potential juror's race or sex. If a side dismisses all women, or all men from the jury pool, there is a presumption that this is what was done by the party striking the jurors that must be overcome with convincing reasons not based on race or sex. The same analysis, strictly speaking, doesn't apply to motions to dismiss jurors for cause because in those cases a non-discriminatory reason has been definition been advanced by the party seeking to dismiss the prospective juror and accepted by the judge as convincing based upon the voir dire evidence. One reason not to fight very hard to dismiss a juror for cause is that many of those jurors who seem most favorably inclined to your case, although not necessarily all of them, are likely to end up being dismissed in a peremptory challenge in any case. A Footnote on Ex Parte Proceedings Ex Parte Voir Dire Is Improper The author of the OP also clarified that: When I asked, "How often are jury members subject to separate examination […]?", I meant that only one party (or counsel for one party) is examining the jury at a time. E.g., first the judge and prosecution counsel examines the jury (without defense present) then the judge and defense counsel examines the jury at some other time. Normally, the judge asks boilerplate routine questions first, then one side asks questions, then the other side asks questions. But, it would be almost unheard of (and it would be improper and unethical) for this to happen without lawyers for both sides present to see what transpires during the other side's questioning, even if the prosecution wasn't planning to make challenges for cause, so as to gather up information needed for the preemptory challenge phase of jury selection. To have a proceeding without both sides having a lawyer present is called an ex parte communication with the judge which both the judge and the lawyer doing so have an "ethical" duty to avoid in this part of the jury selection process. An ethical duty means that the judge could be, in theory, kicked of the bench or temporary suspended or public reprimanded or require to take a judicial ethics class for doing so; and that the lawyer could similarly be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or publicly reprimanded or required to take a legal ethics class for doing so. Conducting the proceeding ex parte could also be grounds for a mistrial ruling that would not prevent the defendant from being retried (because it would have been done at the request of and for the benefit of the defense counsel), or for an appeal in the appropriate cases. (There are ex parte proceedings which are ethical and permitted such as applications for search warrants and arrest warrants, but juror selection is not a proceeding to which an exception to the general rule applies.) The Prosecution Could, In Theory, Waive The Right To Participate In principle, the prosecutor could waive the right to be present while the judge and defense lawyer examine prospective jurors, but this would be almost bizarre conduct that would only happen if someone was calling about an incredibly urgent development that threatened to shut down the courts or put the prosecutor or co-workers or family at immediate risk of physical harm happened. For example, a prosecutor might waive a right to be present if the prosecutor wasn't planning on objecting to any jurors for cause and was learning that the 9-11 attacks were underway, or that a mass shooting at the prosecutor's offices had happened or was in progress, or a prosecutor having a spouse who the person they stepped out to talk with was in a newly discovered hostage situation, or the prosecutor suddenly feeling an intense need to vomit or being on the verge of passing out or feeling like a heart attack might be in progress. Even then, however, it would be more common for a judge to call a recess for a little while in any of those circumstances. The Case Description Is Probably Incorrect Or Misleading On This Point The ex parte examination of prospective jurors, which was apparently described, would be so far outside the norm of typical jury selection conduct, that I suspect that this part of the account is inaccurate or was confusingly worded. For example, the post's wording arguably misleadingly implied that there was an ex parte proceeding as part of the jury selection process, but it wouldn't be necessarily inconsistent with a scenario in which a prosecutor was already present with the female jurors "before the remaining candidates were led into a room to meet the judge and defense attorney." For example, it could be that what really happened was that a member of the prosecutors office was introduced to the in the jury assembly room, and led the prospective jurors to the correct courtroom without making any comments to them, and then they met the judge and defense counsel, which would be entirely proper and not unusual.
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As an interviewer and a hiring manager, I can safely say that you can be rejected for a position for many reasons, even if you meet all the criteria - there may simply be someone better than you that they have also interviewed. Being rejected when meeting the criteria does not necessarily mean you were discriminated against, and in order to successfully claim discrimination you would have to show that you were rejected for a discriminatory reason. Very few companies hire the first candidate that they interview who has the relevant skills and experience - I have interviewed probably 60 candidates in the past 12 months for several positions, and we generally interview at least 5 or 6 candidates per position before making a decision. We do not, and would never consider just hiring the first candidate who interviews that meets the criteria. Some of the people we reject are of protected classes and also met the criteria - but that doesn't mean we discriminated against them, they just weren't the best candidate we interviewed. Being of a protected group and having the relevant skills and experience does not guarantee you the job, it just "guarantees" (in quotes because thats the intention of the law, and reality may differ - hence why discrimination cases do happen) that you cannot be rejected on the basis of the protected group. If you were rejected because of the protected group, and you can show that (including obviously thin reasons such as withdrawing a position and then advertising it again the next week), then thats discrimination. If you were rejected for any other reason, then that does not necessarily constitute discrimination. You could easily meet all of the criteria, have excellent experience but still come across as a candidate who would be difficult to manage (argumentative, lack of self-motivation, lack of attention to detail etc etc etc) and thus be rejected. It's not all about simply meeting the criteria, which is why we interview rather than hire on the basis of someones CV and qualifications.
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She can ask, but she does not have a right to be excused New York law for jurors does not have an automatic right to be excused because of familial care needs. There is a right to be excused for medical or financial hardship - which you might be able to argue here if, for example, you were at risk of losing your job. There is also a right for automatic postponement of 2 to 6 months (to allow you to arrange care, for example) but you have to request this a week in advance. Unfortunately, as they say on their website: "Jury duty, like paying taxes, is mandatory." That said, judges have discretion to excuse jurors and normal practice is for the judge to state the estimated length of the trial and ask for reasons why a juror cannot serve. If they satisfy the judge the juror will be excused.
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As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them.
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While trials don't have a set time, generally the length of a trial is based on its complexity (and to a certain degree, also the gravity of the charge). Simpler cases (e.g. breaking and entering) will generally take less time to hear than more complex cases (e.g. a violation of proper calculation procedure of an SEC mandated income report concerning transfers of capital accrued by partially owned subsidiaries). For example, last year I was called to jury selection for a drunk driving case that was estimated to last 2 days; this year, I was called for jury selection, which took over a week before I was dismissed as a potential jury, for a murder trial that was estimated to last over a month. However, I'm sure that OJ's celebrity did play a role in the length of his trial; if nothing else, then it would have lengthened the jury selection and voir dire process significantly.
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One option would be for an attorney to spend one of their peremptory challenges, which they could do as long as the juror is not a member of a racial minority (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79). Even then you can, you just have to give a valid reason other than race. Otherwise, the side wishing to strike for cause has to show that there is reasonable doubt that the prospective juror can be impartial (basing their decision just on the evidence presented and the law as explained by the court). Turning the accused / juror relation around, one might be able to strike for cause if the stripper was accused of some form of grave immorality and if the spinster was a leader of a radically puritanical religious sect that held that strippers must fry for said grave immorality crimes. The underlying assumption is that any prospective juror will be impartial, unless they say (or said, or have done) something that shows otherwise.
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An indictment is issued by a grand jury when they are convinced, on the basis of evidence presented to them by the government, that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime. However, the indictment only has to state the charges, i.e. the grand jury's conclusion; it doesn't have to describe the evidence that led them to this conclusion. In particular, the grand jury can hear the testimony of witnesses under oath, and has subpoena powers to compel testimony. But testimony before a grand jury is sealed and must not be revealed by anyone except the witness themself. A good source for learning more about the grand jury process is the Handbook for Federal Grand Jurors. The authoritative source is the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title III. So, there must have been some evidence that he committed a crime, at least in the grand jury's view. But we, the public, don't get to see it at this time. If the case goes to trial, evidence will be presented publicly at that time, though it won't necessarily be the same evidence that convinced the grand jury to indict. (Note that this answer is about the US federal criminal justice system, since that's what's involved in the Collins case. Some states may have a similar system; others may not.)
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This is an example of an affirmative defense In a criminal case, the prosecution must prove each and every element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the law provides an exception that amounts to if you do X you commit a crime unless Y, the defense has to prove (to a lower burden) that Y happened. An affirmative defense only kicks in if the prosecution has proved their case; which is usually because the defense concedes it if they are relying on an affirmative defense. An affirmative defense also must be introduced as soon as possible; preferably before charges are laid but, if not, at the commital/arraignment - courts take a dim view (up to excluding them entirely) if they are introduced late. As to whether a case like this goes to trial that depends on the evidence available to support Y and the weight that the prosecutor and then the committal/arraignment judge/grand jury gives to that evidence. If they believe that a jury would believe it, they will not take it trial; if they don't, they will.
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My college changed my major without my consent, can I sue them? I am a college student at a new University located in Mauritius. Before I applied, I checked on their website the list of major offered. I saw: "Electrical Engineering" which was one of the main reasons why I applied. I got a fully funded scholarship as being part of the inaugural class. What is different about this university is that during the first year, you do not follow a major immediately, instead, you follow a mandatory leadership training for 1 year. Then after my first year, the asked us to pick a major. At that time, they still had the option: "Electrical Engineering" which I immediately picked. Then 4 months later, when I came back to Mauritius after the annual break, they announced that the "Electrical Engineering" degree now became "Electrical POWER SYSTEMS Engineering" . Being confused, as there were no other options available and I was not ready to drop out, I followed that major because no other degree were closed to why I came to this college initially. This Electrical and Power systems engineering was the only close option to Electrical Engineering. It has been 2 years now and I realised that the content of the degree is diverging really far from what is actually "Electrical Engineering" . I really want to drop out now but I feel that I have been a victim of "false advertising". And the consequence is that I wasted 2 years of my life following a degree that I don't like, not passionate about and not all field that I want to pursue my career on later. My college changed my major without my consent, can I sue them?
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I don't know too much about Mauritian contract law, but I'd assume you'd have to identify some legal obligation that the school breached. Here, the school offered you a full ride in its electrical engineering program, and has delivered on its promise. The fact that you don't like the program anymore probably doesn't make then liable for anything. In terms of false advertising, it's hard to say anything without seeing their advertisements.
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Ohwilleke's answer (i.e. 'there isn't a simple answer') covers the general principles clearly. But for your specific situation (England and Wales, appeal to the High Court Chancery Division or Court of Appeal), the answer is "Do nothing irrevocable if possible; if necessary, apply for interim directions to the Court". The Chancery Masters are used to this sort of application, and though somebody will presumably be diappointed by the decision, the trustees have no liability.
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Given your reference to "consumer court", I assume this is in India, so you are also concerned with the Consumer Protection Act. Under the act, your complain would have to be about one of a number of things, including most likely (iii) the services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or availed of by him suffer from deficiency in any respect; where furthermore "deficiency" means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service; and "service" means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service; There have been conflicting reports as to whether education is a "service", but the recent ruling (2 Feb 2021) by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in the case Rajendra Kumar Gupta vs Dr. Virendra Swarup Public School states its position: It is settled law, as stated in the aforementioned precedents set by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Commission, that Educational Institutions do not fall within the ambit of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and education which includes co-curricular activities such as swimming, is not a "service" within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 The Supreme Court of India in Maharshi Dayanand University v. Surjeet Kaur rejected an interpretation by NCDRC which concluded that education is a service, instead saying The respondent as a student is neither a consumer nor is the appellant rendering any service...The case decided by this Court in Bihar School Examination Board (supra) clearly lays down the law in this regard with which we find ourselves in full agreement with In the Bihar decision, (1) the defendant was the examination board and (2) the Board is a statutory creation. Para. 11 The object of the Act is to cover in its net, services offered or rendered for a consideration. Any service rendered for a consideration is presumed to be a commercial activity in its broadest sense (including professional activity or quasi-commercial activity). But the Act does not intended to cover discharge of a statutory function of examining whether a candidate is fit to be declared as having successfully completed a course by passing the examination. The fact that in the course of conduct of the examination, or evaluation of answer-scripts, or furnishing of mark-sheets or certificates, there may be some negligence, omission or deficiency, does not convert the Board into a service-provider for a consideration, nor convert the examinee into a consumer who can make a complaint under the Act. We are clearly of the view that the Board is not a service provider' and a student who takes an examination is not a consumer' and consequently, complaint under the Act will not be maintainable against the Board. The Maharshi case likewise involved a legislatively-created educational institution. In Anupama College Of Engineering vs Gulshan Kumar, the Supreme Court cited an order from P.T. Koshy & Anr. v. Ellen Charitable Trust & Ors (which appears to be unpublished) that In view of the judgment of this Court in Maharshi Dayanand University v. Surjeet Kaur [(2010) 11 SCC 159] wherein this Court placing reliance on all earlier judgments has categorically held that education is not a Signature Not Verified commodity. Educational institutions are not providing any kind of service, therefore, in matter of admission, fees etc., there cannot be a question of deficiency of service. Such matters cannot be entertained by the Consumer Forum under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Given the definite policy of the NCDRC, you cannot file a complain in consumer court. Theoretically, you could appeal up to the Indian Supreme Court, if you can distinguish your case from the Maharshi U case. Two issues raised in that case and the Bihar case that is foundational for the later case are whether the institute is a statutory institution or a private business, and whether you are a paying customer (paying tuition, not just fees). Even the most recent NCDRC ruling leaves open a distinguishing factor, that the putative deficiency relates not to education, but to an extracurricular activity made available by the institution. I conclude that the Supreme Court of India has not made a broad ruling that "education is not a service", it has ruled more narrowly that in certain cases, a specific education-related entity is not providing a "service" If you sue, it will be dismissed, and you will have to appeal to the highest court. You'll need to hire a good attorney to figure out if there is any realistic hope of getting further clarification.
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Variations of contracts must be consented to by all parties. This means that if the company sent your friend varied terms, it would have included means by which she would have consented - this may be by continuing to use a service. You cannot unilaterally change the terms of a contract. You could try to charge the company PoS terminal storage fees, but it's highly unlikely to be enforceable if they don't agree to it. In theory if they are aware of the change and they accept them in some way then they are bound to the terms just as she would be, even if they later claimed that they were not aware of them. There is some precedent - in Russia - for this with a bank and it made the news some time ago. There's plenty of cases in which people who don't read EULAs or loan contracts thoroughly are still forced to honour their obligations to their creditors under them.
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The answer isn't really legal (though some jurisdictions regulate the use of such titles through statute), but academic. It depends on specific countries. Italy, for instance, allows all graduates, including undergraduates, to use the title doctor. However, in general the title doctor is reserved for those in medical professions, upon graduation, or holders of post-graduate doctoral degrees - the PhD, DLitt., LLD, and so on. The purpose is, for medical graduates, to allow them to identify themselves as medical practitioners. However, for doctoral graduates, the purpose is to recognise your contributions to the academic field. The JD is a qualifying degree - you've hardly contributed to the field. The JD is absolutely not similar to a doctoral program. It is far more similar to the LLB, however its origins are rooted in the equalisation of professional degrees in the USA - the LLB was conferred upon those who had already completed their first degree, and so the change to a JD was merely so that they could confer a "second" degree.
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Being disabled has nothing to do with it. If he is harassing students then after there is a complaint and investigation, then he can be banned from campus, and arrested for trespassing if he returns. But there would have to be a formal complaint made to the authorities first.
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I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly.
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Without commenting on the relatively strange situation itself, it is still useful to actually read what was actually said than what was described in a letter from a third person, even if the relayed information is technically true. The supposed basis for the claim of a zero salary is from an email allegedly sent by the department head (appendix 15): In short, you are not teaching in 2022/2023 and you have not submitted the required outline of your research or other engagement. I am very sorry that we cannot establish that you will be doing any work expected of a faculty member. Thus we cannot pay you. Starting with the Fall semester, your pay will be reduced to zero and you will be placed on unpaid personal leave. Essentially, the professor is being put on an unpaid leave because allegedly he is not doing any work. Consequently, minimum wage laws are not engaged even if the professor is not exempt as teachers since he is not being required to do any work. In the U.S., employers generally can do this (unless a work contract provides otherwise); in many circumstances, it is called being laid off (though the term has attracted a permanent connotation in parts of North America) or being suspended. An indefinite unpaid leave can be considered constructive dismissal if the employer does not reasonably allow the employee to return to work. It may not be constructive dismissal if the unpaid leave is prescribed by binding employer policies or because the employee refuses to work (and the employer allows the employment relationship to continue). Even if it is constructive dismissal, it is not automatically wrongful.
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Do any states provide legal authority for administrative agents to perform official state actions when they are "not working"? Context: A state OSHA compliance officer drives onto private property in an unmarked vehicle, exits their vehicle, announces "who's in charge?", then states that they are "not working"; that they just happened to be driving by, and that they decided to stop and perform an inspection. Questions: Do any states provide legal authority by statute for an OSHA compliance officer to inspect a site when they are in their own words "not working"? Can any statutes, administrative regulations, judicial decisions be cited as authority for an OSHA compliance officer to perform official state actions when they are not official on duty or assignment; "not working"? What is the test to determine if an individual is acting in their official capacity or acting in their individual capacity? Is an individual who identifies themselves as an agent of the state who in their own words is "not working" at that moment a private citizen acting as an individual and not acting in their official capacity as an agent of the state? What is the legal "bright line" for state administrative agency employment as to acting in their official capacity as an agent of the state? Do administrative agency employees act in the official capacity of an agent of the state when they are not officially on duty? When does the work day officially conclude for a state administrative worker?
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Taking California as an example, California Labor Code section 6314 (a) provides: To make an investigation or inspection, the chief of the division and all qualified divisional inspectors and investigators authorized by him or her shall, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the employer, have free access to any place of employment to investigate and inspect during regular working hours, and at other reasonable times when necessary for the protection of safety and health, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner. So, the only requirement is that the inspector has been authorized by the chief of the Division of Occupational Safety and Health. In principle the chief could limit this authority to those periods when the instructor has been assigned to work, but I don't see any evidence that this is the case. In particular, you can find here the policy manual on inspection procedures that inspectors are assigned to follow, and it says nothing about "only perform an inspection when you are on duty". (You might also note the discussion on page 2 about unprogrammed inspections and the criteria for performing them. One indication is "Complaint about, or observance by anyone of, an imminent hazard", which could include a hazard observed by the inspector himself.) So to your specific questions: Do any states provide legal authority by statute for an OSHA compliance officer to inspect a site when they are in their own words "not working"? Yes, California provides authority for an inspector to inspect a site "during regular working hours, and at other reasonable times when necessary for the protection of safety and health". That is the only time-related restriction in the statute. I don't think that the inspector's comment that he's "not working" has any legal significance. What is the test to determine if an individual is acting in their official capacity or acting in their individual capacity? I do not know of any reason to think that any such legal distinction exists. If Joe Smith has been authorized as an inspector by the Chief of the Division, then Joe Smith can perform inspections and is to be given free access to do so. End of story. What is the legal "bright line" for state administrative agency employment as to acting in their official capacity as an agent of the state? Based on what I said above, I think this question is meaningless.
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It's the interstate commerce clause. Because of how the modern economy works. there's really pretty much nothing that's confined to a single state in its effects and doesn't affect other states. Almost any law can be justified as a regulation of interstate commerce these days, especially if that law is actually directly about commercial activity. The big case to cite here is United States v. Darby (312 US 100). This case tested a federal minimum wage law which banned shipping goods in interstate commerce where they were produced by people paid less than minimum wage, and also banned the employment of those people at less than minimum wage in that context. The Supreme Court found this law constitutional, even though the manufacturing employees weren't personally engaged in interstate commerce, because the employer was engaged in interstate commerce and regulating production was a permissible way to regulate that commerce. Now, after that decision, there was a major broadening of what was allowed to be regulated under the interstate commerce clause. In Wickard v. Filburn (317 US 111), the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate test to see whether something could be regulated as interstate commerce was whether it had a "substantial economic effect" on interstate commerce. Under this rule, federal regulation under the commerce clause is very far-reaching. It supports extending a minimum wage to domestic service workers (Marshall v. Rose, a Fourth Circuit case from 1980); it supports extending EEOC rules to state employers (EEOC v. Wyoming); it supports a lot of things.
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We need to assume that the stop was legal (not a high hurdle to clear), that is, there was some reason to stop you. Even so, following Utah v. Strieff, police don't actually have to have a reasonable suspicion to stop you and if in the course of an ID check they discover that you have a warrant out for your arrest, the arrest is still legal. So if the police stop you, RCW 46.61.020(1) says: It is unlawful for any person while operating or in charge of any vehicle to refuse when requested by a police officer to give his or her name and address and the name and address of the owner of such vehicle, or for such person to give a false name and address, and it is likewise unlawful for any such person to refuse or neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any police officer or to refuse upon demand of such police officer to produce his or her certificate of license registration of such vehicle, his or her insurance identification card, or his or her vehicle driver's license or to refuse to permit such officer to take any such license, card, or certificate for the purpose of examination thereof or to refuse to permit the examination of any equipment of such vehicle or the weighing of such vehicle or to refuse or neglect to produce the certificate of license registration of such vehicle, insurance card, or his or her vehicle driver's license when requested by any court. Any police officer shall on request produce evidence of his or her authorization as such. There is no law that says "you have to provide ID only if accused of a crime", or "police can pull you over only if you are suspected of a crime". Various traffic infractions will get you pulled over but are not crimes; random sobriety checks are legal. However, note that the requirement to provide ID applies to the operator. There is no law requiring citizens to carry identification papers (but there is a law requiring a vehicle operator to carry a specific form of ID). In some states there are "stop and identify" laws which allow police to demand ID from a person suspected of a crime, but Washington does not have such a law.
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Is this legal? Yes Or does it mean that employee will be in breach of his/her contract? Yes You are assuming that if the evidence is allowed to be presented then that automatically means that keeping it for that purpose is not a breach of the contract. This is not necessarily so; it can be both at the same time. That said, it is unlikely that an employer would attempt to sanction an employee for this as the courts would (rightly) see it as an attempt to pervert the course of justice. As in most things in the law it is possible for all parties in a matter to be on the wrong side of it. If you want to come to the tribunal with "clean hands" then the best thing to do is make a record (not a copy) of the relevant documents and return then to the employer. Before going to the tribunal get your solicitor to subpoena the documents that you want - they will have to produce them and you have them without breaking your contract.
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There are regulations governing occupational safety, whereby e.g. an employer can be fined for forcing employees to work in a literally toxic environment, for instance breathing chlorine gas. You could file a complaint with a state or federal agency (OSHA). You would need to hire a labor lawyer to get advice about your specific circumstance, to see if there is indeed a provision that covers what you describe, though I doubt it would. OSHA's blurb on disease don't obviously cover your situation (they describe situations that govern healthcare workers in intimate contact with infectious materials). However, certain diseases such as TB or Ebola cause a general health quarantine to be imposed, so if a worker comes in with such a disease, action would be taken by the health department. This does not cover sniffles, and probably not pertussis (but that's a local decision). There are also regulations pertaining to disabled employees, whereby an employee who is disabled by having a severely compromised immune system can be entitled to reasonable accommodation, for example allowed to work in a closed room away from others (if the job is not a receptionist job). That entitlement only applies to the employee, and is controlled by objective health danger (requires a doctor's note), and not the comfort level of the employee.
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This is not legal advice, It is not even primarily a legal opinion. It is a legal position. The lawyer, acting on behalf of the agency from which you requested information, is giving the reasons why that agency is declining your request. The lawyer is presumably either an employee of the agency, or has the agency as a client. In any case, this is notice of the position that the agency would be likely to adopt if you took further legal action, such as a suit to compel disclosure. Lawyers provide such position statements ion behalf of clients or employers all the time. Such statements indicate why certain action is taken, what basis the client or employer has for taking or not taking certain action, and often indicate the nature of the defenses or theories that will be used should a lawsuit follow, although the client or employer is free to change the theory at the pleading stage. Not only is it not unethical for the lawyer to respond in this way, the agency is, I am fairly sure, required by the law to provide a valid reason when a request is declined. That is what they have done, provide a reason that they claim is valid, with some legal reasoning about why it is valid. Note that I express no view on whether the reason given is in fact valid, or would be sustained in a suit. That would be a different question.
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While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court.
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I can't prove a negative, but it seems quite clear from my research that providing name and badge number is policy, not law. i.e. Many departments have a policy that their officers will provide name and badge number on request, but the punishment for failure to do so would be at the employment level not the legal level. This site has a fairly good selection of various police department policies I will note that Massachusetts appears to be an exception as mentioned by jimsug in his comment to another answer, they do require police to carry and show ID upon legal request (I did not look up what a "legal request" is)
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No evidence is required for an indictment by a grand jury? I just read the indictment of Christopher Collins, a congressman, for relaying insider information on a company with publicly traded stock, and for "lying" to a federal agent, ie for denying he relayed the information. So, in other words, to deny commission of a crime is a "lie" apparently if the agent thinks you committed the crime. In any case, what surprised me was that the indictment had no evidence in it. There were no affidavits by first party witnesses and the physical evidence, emails and text messages, were completely unprovenanced and obviously edited and not in any kind of original form as they would come from a telephone company. Moreover, the apparent witnesses to the crime were only referred to by codes such as "CC-3" and there were no affidavits by any of these people, either signed or anonymous. The indictment was essentially 30 pages of innuendo and empty allegations unsupported by any concrete evidence. So, maybe I misunderstand the idea of an indictment. I thought that to bring someone to trial, the indictment had to include evidence, not just charges. However, the indictment linked above just seems to have charges in it. Is my understanding incorrect?
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An indictment is issued by a grand jury when they are convinced, on the basis of evidence presented to them by the government, that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime. However, the indictment only has to state the charges, i.e. the grand jury's conclusion; it doesn't have to describe the evidence that led them to this conclusion. In particular, the grand jury can hear the testimony of witnesses under oath, and has subpoena powers to compel testimony. But testimony before a grand jury is sealed and must not be revealed by anyone except the witness themself. A good source for learning more about the grand jury process is the Handbook for Federal Grand Jurors. The authoritative source is the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title III. So, there must have been some evidence that he committed a crime, at least in the grand jury's view. But we, the public, don't get to see it at this time. If the case goes to trial, evidence will be presented publicly at that time, though it won't necessarily be the same evidence that convinced the grand jury to indict. (Note that this answer is about the US federal criminal justice system, since that's what's involved in the Collins case. Some states may have a similar system; others may not.)
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What does one do if, a party at trial denies having made a statement in a published article? A combination of a) and b). The plaintiff should gather other evidence with which to disprove the denials of authorship, or at least to question the reliability the publisher's testimony. The jury needs that evidence in order to discern who is credible. Whether decisive or not for credibility purposes, any material inconsistencies the plaintiff is able to point out from the witness's testimony(-ies) tend to guide the fact-finder (i.e., the jury) on matters of credibility. Whenever possible, the evidence should include admissible documents from when the events took place. For instance, records reflecting the submission & editing process of that article. Those documents typically are obtained by subpoenaing the publisher and/or relevant non-parties, accordingly. That will reduce the chances of testimony deficiencies, whether these stem from witnesses' perjury, lack of memory, inability to clearly articulate what they know, or inability to testify at all (due to witness's illness or death by the time the matter goes to trial).
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The General Rule Even if the charge is presented to a grand jury and it declines to indict, exactly the same charge that one grand jury declined to indict upon can be presented to a future grand jury and produce a valid indictment. A charge upon which a grand jury declines to indict is often not presented to a future grand jury as a matter of prosecutorial discretion or prosecutor's office policy, but generally this is not a mandatory rule. There may be some jurisdiction in the U.S. where this is not the case, and such a statute would not be unconstitutional if it were, but I am not aware of any state where this is prohibited, and I do not believe that this is the case in federal court. Justifications For The General Rule One reason that it is not a mandatory rule is that there is no practical way that a defendant could enforce the rule if it was a mandatory rule. Grand jury proceedings are secret (at least until an indictment is produced and then only as pertinent to the defendant indicted on the charges producing an indictment). Generally, even the judges in the court calling a grand jury have no access to its proceedings until it issues an indictment, and then has only slightly more latitude to review its proceedings than a defendant in the case. Agreements To Dismiss A Case Distinguished A prosecutor with jurisdiction over a criminal case that is presented to a grand jury could reach an agreement with a defendant that is binding not to prosecute on a charge in the future, but again, that would be an affirmative act of a prosecutor agreeing to honor a grand jury "no bill" and there would be no legal requirement that the prosecutor do so. Practical Limitations Note, however, that there is a downside to repeatedly bringing a case to a grand jury after receiving one or more "no bills". A prosecutor has a constitutional obligation arising under the Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to disclose all exculpatory evidence known to the prosecutor to the defense, upon request. Usually, when a grand jury declines to indict there is something in the evidence presented to it that is exculpatory. A repeated presentation of charges that one or more prior grand jury rejected that ultimately produces a grand jury indictment would usually be strongly suggestive of the fact that there is exculpatory evidence in existence that may not have been disclosed to the final grand jury and that needs to be disclosed to the defense prior to trial. Also, many criminal charges have a statute of limitations, and charges cannot be presented to a grand jury after the statute of limitations for the offense has expired.
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As a comment by @DavidSchwartz notes, this is not wrong. Questions of law but not fact are allowed. It is worth noting that the line drawn is arbitrary. In Colorado, where I practice, jurors issue written questions (pre-reviewed by the judge and counsel for all parties before being presented) to witnesses at the close of the testimony of each witness called by a party to testify. This is very helpful to counsel, as it provides indirect evidence of whether the jury understands what they are being told, and often juries will directly ask questions that for tactical reasons, both parties have refrained from asking that go to the heart of the matter. It also frequently clarifies misunderstandings that trained legal professionals assumed were not made about terminology. This is more problematic in criminal trials, where jury questions could provide evidence pushing a case over the threshold of proof needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution failed to provide, than in civil cases with a preponderance of the evidence standard. Also, as a matter of reality, when jurors ask questions, counsel often loathe to object even when they have valid grounds to do so, for fear of offending the decision-maker, unless it is really critical to keep certain information away from the jury.
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Errors in the Question Of course, this is not actually what really happens. What really happens is that the original crime is not tried. It is simply ASSUMED to have taken place and there is a presumption that the original actor was guilty of some crime. Obviously this is incorrect and unjust. This is incorrect. To convict a person of being an accomplice, in either US or UK courts, there must be evidence proving that the crime took place. This an essential element of the crime. It need not be proved who committed the crime as a principal, although there is often evidence about that. But an essential element of the crime of being an accomplice is that the underlying offense is a crime and did occur. Like all other elements of a crime, this must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it would seem that from a theoretical point of view, an accomplice should only be charged and accused once someone else has first been convicted of a crime. Only then should the accomplice be accused of helping that person. That is not the theory that the legislatures of either the US or the UK have adopted. Indeed I do not think that any common-law country has adopted this theory. The law could be changed, and one might argue that it should be. But what the law should be, as opposed to what it is, is not generally on-topic here, as opposed to in politics.SE. Accomplice The LII Definition of "Accomplice" is: A person who knowingly, voluntarily, or intentionally gives assistance to another in (or in some cases fails to prevent another from) the commission of a crime. An accomplice is criminally liable to the same extent as the principal. An accomplice, unlike an accessory, is typically present when the crime is committed. Nothing there suggests that the principal must be convicted first. The Wikipedia article "Accomplice" says: An accomplice differs from an accessory in that an accomplice is present at the actual crime, and could be prosecuted even if the main criminal (the principal) is not charged or convicted. An accessory is generally not present at the actual crime, and may be subject to lesser penalties than an accomplice or principal. ... The fairness of the doctrine that the accomplice is still guilty has been subject to much discussion, particularly in cases of capital crimes. Accomplices have been prosecuted for felony murder even if the actual person who committed the murder died at the crime scene or otherwise did not face capital punishment. In jurisdictions based on the common law, the concept of an accomplice has often been heavily modified by statute, or replaced by new concepts entirely. In The Wikipedia article "Accessory (legal term) In the section on "England and Wales it is said: A mens rea {guilty state of mind] is required even when it is not required for the principal offender (for example, when the principal commits a strict liability offence). The defendant must intend to do the acts which he knows will assist or encourage the principal to commit a crime of a certain type. In R v Bainbridge (1960) 1 QB 129 the defendant supplied cutting equipment not knowing exactly what crime was going to be committed, but was convicted because the equipment supplied was not used in the ordinary way, but for a criminal purpose instead. The accomplice must also know of all the essential matters that make the act a crime ... In the section "United States" it is said that: U.S. jurisdictions (that is, the federal government and the various state governments) have come to treat accessories before the fact differently from accessories after the fact. All U.S. jurisdictions have effectively eliminated the distinction between accessories before the fact and principals, either by doing away with the category of "accessory before the fact" entirely or by providing that accessories before the fact are guilty of the same offense as principals. The Model Penal Code's definition of accomplice liability includes those who at common law were called accessories before the fact; under the Model Penal Code, accomplices face the same liability as principals. It is now possible to be convicted as an accessory before the fact even though the principal has not been convicted or (in most jurisdictions) even if the principal was acquitted at an earlier trial.(Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.1(e) (2d ed. 2003).) 18 U.S. Code § 2 - Principals provides that: (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. Note that there is no requirement that a principal be first tried or even identified to convict one who abetted a crime. All accomplices are abettors, although not all abettors are accomplices. The Model Penal Code (MPC) published by the American Law Institute says, in section 2.06 of the code, that: § 2.06. Liability for Conduct of Another; Complicity. (1) A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. (2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (a) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or (b) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the Code or by the law defining the offense; or (c) he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense. (3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he (i) solicits such other person to commit it, or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it, or (iii) having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or (b) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. (4) When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. ... (6) Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (a) he is a victim of that offense; or (b) the offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or (c) he terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and (i) wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or (ii) gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense. (7) An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. (Emphasis added) The official commentary on subsection (7) says: Subsection (7) speaks to the relation between the prosecution of the accomplice and the treatment of the person who is alleged to have committed the offense. In accordance with modern developments, this subsection provides that the accomplice can be prosecuted even though the other person has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different crime or degree of crime, has an immunity to prosecution or conviction, or has been acquitted. The MPC was the result of a 10-year review of the laws then existing in the various US states. It was an attempt to rationalize existing laws and provide a consistent framework for criminal law in the US. It was offered to the states for adoption in whole or in part, and several states have adopted significant sections of it, and others have been guided by it in revising their legal codes. Section 2.06 (7) makes it clear that no previous prosecution of a principal is required for prosecution of an accomplice in any state that has adopted the MPC. Effect of the Theory of the Question The question asserts: Therefore, it would seem that from a theoretical point of view, an accomplice should only be charged and accused once someone else has first been convicted of a crime. Only then should the accomplice be accused of helping that person. If courts adopted that as a rule, it would mean that if the principal escaped, or died, no accomplice could be prosecuted. Indeed consider the case of a crime boss, who is often an accomplice to the crimes of his (or her) henchmen. Such a boss would need only to have the actual criminal sent out of the country, or killed, to be quite safe from prosecution under the proposed rule. Hardly an improvement to my eyes. Such a rule would also mean that an accomplice could not be pressured, by means of a threat of prosecution, to disclose the actual criminal, or testify against that criminal. Again, not desirable. Use of UK Law I would add that in my answer to the linked question, sources from several US states were cited, and no UK sources. Indeed UK law does not seem to have been cited in the comments either, but this is a matter on which US and UK law are quite similar.
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Saying "they didn't have an affair", in isolation, would not be defamation. But we have to look at the context. Daniels had previously stated publicly that they did have an affair. So when Cohen said that it wasn't true, he was (claims Daniels) effectively calling her a liar. Calling someone a liar is potentially defamatory. You can read Daniels's complaint here. See paragraph 67: Both on its face, and because of the facts and circumstances known to persons who read or heard the statement, it was reasonably understood Mr. Cohen meant to convey that Ms. Clifford is a liar, someone who should not be trusted, and that her claims about her relationship with Mr. Trump is 'something [that] isn't true.' Mr. Cohen's statement exposed Mr. [sic] Clifford to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and shame, and discouraged others from associating or dealing with her. As to whether calling someone a liar is defamatory, there's a long article on the subject here. There are at least some cases where courts have held that it is. Gutterman, Roy S. "Liar! Liar? The Defamatory Impact of 'Liar' in the Modern World." Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 27 (2) 253-286, 2017.
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Two lawyers in a (administrative) hearing suggested that I would have to "lay a foundation" in order to introduce an email as evidence. Is this a general rule of evidence? “Laying the foundation” is a term of art used to explain the process of meeting the requirements for having particular types of evidence admitted. Most courts, administrative bodies, and other tribunals require that all evidence they admit be relevant and authentic. This applies to all types of evidence including oral testimony and to physical pieces of evidence that a party is trying to admit (such as printed e-mails). The rules of evidence that most states have adopted are modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence. These rules are a codification of evidence law principles designed to only have relevant and authentic evidence admitted in hearings. So, as general rule, you must ask a witness questions to show how his testimony is relevant and authentic. For example, to meet the relevance requirements, a prosecutor in a DUI case would ask a police officer questions that showed he was the one who pulled over the person accused of drunk driving. His testimony about why he pulled over the suspected drunk driver is relevant because “it has [a] tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact [he is testifying about] is of consequence in determining the [case].” Fed. R. Evid. 401 (the test for relevant evidence). This evidence would meet the authenticity requirements in evidence law by having the witness: 1. Be competent to testify. Fed. R. Evid. 601. 2. Take an oath to testify truthfully. Fed. R. Evid. 603. AND 3. Testify about what they personally observed and not speculate. Fed. R. Evid. 602. There are more specific foundational rules for: hearsay evidence (see Fed. R. Evid. 801 through 807) and physical pieces of evidence such as voice recordings, documents, and e-mails (see Fed. R. Evid. 901 through 1008). If so, could someone explain when it applies, and what in particular is necessary to satisfy the rule? As you explained in the comments to your question, this hearing is a special education impartial hearing in New York State. According to New York State Regulations of the Commissioner of Education § 200.5(j)(3)(xii)(c), the rules of evidence do not apply. This regulation explains that a more relaxed standard applies: The impartial hearing officer may receive any oral, documentary or tangible evidence except that the impartial hearing officer shall exclude evidence that he or she determines to be irrelevant, immaterial, unreliable or unduly repetitious. The impartial hearing officer may receive testimony by telephone, provided that such testimony shall be made under oath and shall be subject to cross examination. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, to admit your e-mails under this standard, you only need to show the administrative law judge that the evidence is relevant, material, reliable, and not unduly repetitious. A much easier standard task than having those e-mails admitted under the Rules of Evdience. The best thing to do would be have the person who received or sent the e-mails present at your hearing and able to testify as a witness. Then, do the following: Before the hearing, have your witness print a paper copy of the e-mails. Provide a copy of the e-mails to the opposing side at least 5 business days before the hearing. See § 200.5(3)(xii) (“Each party shall have the right to prohibit the introduction of any evidence the substance of which has not been disclosed to such party at least five business days before the hearing.”). Mark the e-mails with an exhibit number or letter (usually the plaintiff uses numbers and the defense uses letters). At the hearing, call your witness and have him/her sworn in. Ask to the judge/hearing officer to approach the witness, and give a copy to the e-mails to him. Also give a copy to the judge/hearing officer and opposing counsel. Show the e-mails to the witness. Ask the witness if he recognizes the exhibit you handed him. Have the witness explain how he recognizes it. His testimony should explained the following: That these are e-mails he printed. When and how he printed them. Who they were sent to and sent from. Who the e-mail addresses belong to (many times this is indicated in a person's e-mail signature). What the e-mails are about and why they are important at the hearing--to show that they are relevant.
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In the UK and USA (and I imagine other jurisdictions) there have been laws that explicitly provide for orders obliging entities to (A) provide access or information and (B) keep the order secret. For example, in the USA the Stored Communications Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Right to Financial Privacy Act authorise the FBI to issue National Security Letters (Wikipedia, EFF, EPIC, Lawfare). These are an administrative subpoena, without prior approval from a judge, for meta-information (e.g. phone numbers dialed or email recipients addressed but not the content) of communications relevant to national security investigations. They typically contain a non-disclosure requirement prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing its existence or the FBI's demands. There have been challenges on First Amendment grounds to the non-disclosure aspect but, so far as I'm aware, they have all ultimately failed. Some of their non-disclosure requirements may eventually expire under other laws. In response, so-called 'warrant canaries' (Wikipedia) have been developed (and gone a bit further than the original idea) - these are intended to allow entities to relatively passively warn of such an order having been received if not the detail of the order. However, they can be legally risky in that they might be seen by a court as trying to circumvent the non-disclosure requirement and therefore breaking it.
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