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What are your legal responsibilities after the police have been called? I was placed in an awkward situation recently where our neighbor called the cops on us. For reference sake, he was calling regarding a suspected domestic disturbance which occurred in the home behind ours, and he misidentified our home. However after he confronted me about it - he said he was going to call the cops (which he proceeded to do in front of me). When I began leaving he said it was a crime to leave. I am aware that in certain situations (such as car accidents, or as the person who called 911) you may need to remain at the scene until speaking with police. However, I was unable to find information regarding situations where there is no immediate threat or crime that has been observed. My question - What are your legal responsibilities when having the police called on you?
You do have the right to leave after the police were called on you, but leaving the scene could raise suspicion and make you seem guilty. It may be easier to wait until police arrive and explain your side of the story to clear things up. However, according to Canada’s Department of Justice, you can be placed under a Citizens Arrest. If someone sees you in the act of committing a crime, they are able to place you under citizens arrest and hold you there until police arrive. This individual is allowed to use as much amount of force that is reasonable. If this person did not place you under citizens arrest, you are not obligated to stay.
While you have correctly stated the usual order of events in a trial, the judge has wide discretion to modify the order if it seems that justice will be served. Even in a serious criminal case, the judge can reopen testimony after closing arguments have started if the judge finds that there is good reason to do so. Traffic cases are generally less formal, and the judge will more freely modify procedure to bring out the facts of the case. I have often seen judges at traffic court ask significant relevant questions, and if they are in fact relevant, i don't think you will get far objecting to their begin asked. I am not a lawyewr, but I also have observed several traffic cases in Maryland and in NJ.
The legal question here is whether police have an enforceable power to enjoin a person from visiting a particular person or from entering a particular jurisdiction (especially the one where they have police powers). The obligation to obey police orders generally ends at matters regarding arrest, traffic orders, or crowd control. Freedom of travel is a fundamental constitutional right, along with freedom of association. That does not mean that you can go absolutely anywhere you want and do anything you want with whoever you want, but it does mean that any restriction have to be encoded in law, and such laws have to pass strict scrutiny. Any enforceable legal restrictions would have to emanate from the courts.
An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all?
First off, the fact that they stopped you on private property is irrelevant. The traffic offense - you driving the vehicle with a suspended license - occurred on public property en route to the station. That offense does not simply disappear because you are now on private property, nor do the police need to wait for you to leave private property in order to stop or arrest you. So... forget the gas station even exists in this scenario. The real issue at hand here is whether or not the officer needs to actually see you driving the vehicle in order to make an arrest. The answer is no. There isn't any other valid reason your car would be where it is now other than it was driven there. If you are the only person with the car, then it's reasonable to assume that you were the one that drove it there. Plenty of people get arrested for this "connect the dots" way of proving they drove, especially in DUI cases. But the officer doesn't even need to assume that second part either. It all comes down to the actual definition of "driving" in the law books. Most citizens would interpret the word as meaning actually moving in a vehicle. That's wrong. Defining a driver and what constitutes driving is actually way, way broader in the eyes of the law. In Kansas, a driver is defined in such a way: 8-1416. "Driver" defined. "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Essentially, having physical control over the vehicle is generally enough to label you as the driver or that you are driving the vehicle. In a lot of states, having possession of the keys to the vehicle is enough for a court to say you had physical control of the vehicle, because "physical control" is more broadly defined as "capable of making it move and within close proximity" to the vehicle. Thus, you can be arrested for traffic-related offenses. It does not matter if the car is parked, if you're filling it with fluids, or just taking a nap in the front seat.
First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not.
Generally speaking, ex parte communications with a judge (i.e. communications to which all parties to a case are not notified) are prohibited, both by law and as a matter of judicial and attorney ethics, subject to some narrow exceptions (e.g. applications for arrest warrants prior to the arrest warrant being carried out). Generally speaking, communications with the court (which is to say with judges or their subordinates) are made a matter of public record, and if the communication is about a particular case, all attorneys in the case must be given notice of it (if someone is not represented by an attorney, the notice goes to the defendant rather than their non-existent attorney). The attorney may then communicate the communication to their client, and generally speaking should communicate it to the client. I don't see anything in the question that suggests that this proposed communication would fall outside the general rule. But, the question isn't very specific and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that an exception might apply in a case with very unusual facts. Also, usually, a request to reconsider a sentence has to be made by a formal motion filed by the prosecutor or the defendant. Generally speaking, a third-party cannot file that motion unilaterally. A third-party or victim would usually only have input into the decision through the prosecutor's office. Third parties and victims are not generally permitted to file motions to reconsider sentences that have been imposed even in states with "victim's rights" statutes, but can publicly provide input to the court before a sentence is imposed, usually at the behest of either the prosecutor or the defendant. Furthermore, generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to not have a sentence made more severe after being sentenced the first time around. Reconsideration of a sentence once it is imposed may only be in the direction of leniency. Once a sentence is imposed, it can't be reconsidered to be made more harsh.
Depends on where you are, and what law would be broken and why. In germany, there is the concept of rechtfertigender Notstand (justifying emergency). If there is a present danger to a Rechtsgut (legally protected interest), one can take necessary and proportional steps against another legally protected interest. Say I walk through a winter landscape and there is a person who has broken through the ice of a lake (a present danger of the loss of life). Nearby is a yard with a ladder leaning on a shed. I would be allowed to enter the yard (normally trespas) and take the ladder (normally theft) in the rescue attempt (life counts for more than a ladder, using a ladder is necessary/appropriate for an ice rescue). The details are, as usual for Law SE, complicated.
When will desuetude apply to Julian Assange's bail violation in U.K. law? In most legal systems, there is a timeout after that a crime can't be punished any more. It is desuetude. Currently, Julian Assange can't leave the Equadorian Embassy of the U.K., because he will be arrested for bail violation. His previous charges (extradition to Sweden for sexual crimes) were dropped. Does some type of desuetude apply in his case? If yes, when will he be free to go?
Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies.
It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on.
The legal hook is reported to be §129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes use of force to disperse an illegal assembly, which this sort of is. No statute that I can find states that police can smack lawbreakers who are forced to disperse, but as is common in common law countries, the laws of India are not fully explicit on that which is allowed or forbidden for police to do. As this article indicates, systematic limits on police use of force remain to be developed.
Legally you face no problem. The section 66A of the Indian IT Act, which used to be previously misused for penalizing anyone who dared insult a politician, has been struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India. But the police could still detain you for 48 hours (legally) without giving any grounds; they are required to do that, but the police are seldom held accountable. The supporters of the said politician can vandalize your home and office without fear of legal action. I am not a lawyer. Whatever is posted above is my opinion and data that I believe to be true to the best of my knowledge and resources available to me. Please contact a lawyer for professional advice.
england-and-wales Yes, double jeopardy applies The common law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict apply equally to foreign offences; this is black letter law in Halsbury's Laws of England. Scotland is "foreign" for these purposes. There is no analogue to the odd US dual sovereignty doctrine. The general exception to double jeopardy regarding the re-trial of serious offences under Part 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not apply here, because of an odd anomaly created by the statute due to criminal justice being devolved to the Scottish Parliament. As a result, according to the Crown Prosecution Service: There are no provisions dealing with qualifying offences [for retrial after acquittal] in Scotland as criminal justice is a matter for the Scottish Parliament. At present, the law in Scotland has not been changed so that these provisions do not apply to acquittals that take place in Scotland.
The general rule is that the ability to have a valid divorce has nothing to do with where the marriage was entered into, or the citizenship of the parties. Usually, any jurisdiction with sufficient contacts with either member of the couple has jurisdiction to enter a divorce. Hence, generally, people get divorced in the place that they live. The problem in this scenario is step 5. I think that it is highly likely that the U.S. Embassy is simply wrong, unless there is some serious irregularity in step 4. An annulment after four years of marriage, as opposed to a divorce, is highly irregular and would not be allowed in the vast majority of jurisdictions. But, maybe there are facts and circumstances that make it otherwise. This fact pattern, while it on one hand sounds like a "for a friend" question based on real facts, also sounds like some important details that may be outcome determinative have been omitted.
Relying on this version, proof of truth is only allowed in order to establish a "public interest" defense or for a "necessary defense"; but also "if an official is charged with the commission of an act in the exercise of his office". Good luck with "necessary defense". It is not a defense to say "But what I said is true". However, if the defamed person has been convicted in court of said act (the defamatory statement) then there can be no punishment.
The example that you have given in your question regarding the travel ban does not actually constitute contradiction since one federal judge chose to issue an order but the other does not, thus the actions taken does not contradict. However, what you described actually happened before with the first travel ban (EO 13769). A federal judge in Boston, Judge Nathaniel Gorton, refused to extend a temporary injunction against the travel ban. However, another federal judge in Seattle then granted a temporary restraining order Friday that’s effective nationwide. As this CBS article states: Meanwhile, in a seemingly contradictory ruling, a federal judge in Boston refused to extend a temporary injunction against Mr. Trump’s travel ban. U.S. District Judge Nathaniel Gorton late Friday declined to renew an order prohibiting the detention or removal of persons as part of Trump’s executive order on refugees and immigrants. In this case, Judge Gorton declined to extend a temporary injunction against the travel ban. So, legally, nothing changes since he did not issue any new order or temporary injunction; the EO (travel ban) will stay as it is and when the existing temporary injunction expires, the EO will be back in force. Even yesterday, the federal judge in Hawaii issued a temporary restraining order which blocked the travel ban from being enforced. However, the federal judge in Maryland only blocked part of the travel ban, ruling that the most important section — banning travel from half a dozen countries — could not be enforced. The Hawaii court ruling would still "take precedence" since the temporary restraining order blocked the whole EO. Thus, it can be seen that there are mainly three ways for federal judges to rule: Grant a temporary restraining order for the travel ban. Block part of the order. Decline to issue any order; the travel ban will remain as is. To conclude, whenever a federal judge issues a temporary restraining order, it will always be in force as it would "overwrite" the other federal rulings in which the judges blocks part of the order or do not issue any order.
Should I fight City Trash Citation for tenants trash I own a quadplex in Cincinnati. Only 2 of the 4 units were occupied, but a tenant moved out on Monday, so I'm down to 1. The one that just moved out put all their trash by the road, not in a bin. My property manager went over today to inspect the unit after move out and found a citation on the door for $750! They told me they'll pay it and charge the tenant, but don't expect to collect anything from them. The first question is, is there even a way to prove it was the tenants trash? I feel like they could say it was the other tenant or even just that it wasn't theirs. The second question is can I charge it to them and at least take it out of the deposit, which was only $600, but at least I only eat $150 at that point. The last question is, the citation said I could appeal. Do I have a chance at winning in a game of he said she said? I live in Tennessee, so I'd have to send my property manager, which will cost me more money. I'd hate to send them if I'm just going to have to pay it anyway. Has anyone dealt with this before? Thanks.
The one answerable question regards the legality of taking the damages out of the security deposit. Consulting the Ohio landlord-tenant law, the tenant has various obligations including to Dispose of all rubbish, garbage, and other waste in a clean, safe, and sanitary manner ... Comply with the requirements imposed on tenants by all applicable state and local housing, health, and safety codes The citation should indicate the specific violation, but dumping trash in the street is a health violation. The act that says that if the tenant violates his obligation, the landlord may recover any actual damages that result from the violation together with reasonable attorney's fees. Causing a landlord to be saddled with a fine is actual damage. It would be pointless to contest the fine with the city, unless you are alleging that some vandal drove by and dumped trash in the road near your apartment. (Even then, unless you already reported supposed illegal dumping to the sheriff, it is unlikely that you wouldn't be held responsible).
I am an Ontario-licensed lawyer. The following is a general information about the law and not specific legal advice. You are not my client and I have not given you advice related to your circumstances. First, even when you ask a generic question, define the jurisdiction of interest. For the purpose of your question, Canada is a collection of different jurisdictions with different rules. My answer relates to Ontario, Canada. Other Canadian jurisdictions have different rules. The Law The applicable Section 109 of Ontario's Residential Tenancies Act http://canlii.ca/t/33p is reproduced below for your convenience. EMPHASES MINE. Receipt for payment 109 (1) A landlord shall provide FREE OF CHARGE to a tenant or former tenant, on request, a receipt for the payment of any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent or any other amount paid to the landlord. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (1). Former tenant (2) Subsection (1) applies to a request by a FORMER TENANT only if the request is made within 12 months after the tenancy terminated. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (2). Regulation Ontario Regulation 516/06 http://canlii.ca/t/sjx dictates minimal form: Receipt A document constitutes a receipt for the purposes of section 109 of the Act if it includes, at a minimum, (a) the address of the rental unit to which the receipt applies; (b) the name of the tenants to whom the receipt applies; (c) the amount and date for each payment received for any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent, or any other amount paid to the landlord and shall specify what the payment was for; (d) the name of the landlord of the rental unit; and (e) the signature of the landlord or the landlord’s authorized agent. O. Reg. 516/06, s. 9. Landlord Compliance A good landlord will provide receipts immediately upon payment, and keep a copy. An very good landlord will provide additionally a summary of payments for the year, in tabulated form, and keep a copy of the yearly receipt instead of the multiple receipts for each payment. An excellent landlord will keep the tabulated information in a computer system and will issue a receipt for the whole tenancy period on termination. Keep a copy. Tenant's Application If your Ontario landlord refuse to comply with the above, file a T2 http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Tenant%20Applications%20&%20Instructions/T2.pdf *A T2 can also be filed online. Remember to ask for cost http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Interpretation%20Guidelines/03%20-%20Costs.html
The key here is the provision "through no fault of his own". A landlord who relies on this provision would need to be able to demonstrate what the cause of the delay was, and that s/he had not been reasonably able to avoid it. Nor could a landlord simply fail to take steps to repair the problem, whatever it might be. If the problem will clearly take more than 30 days to fix (Isay the building burned down), the prospective tenant would have the right to cancel the lease at once. True, in such a case the tenant would be put to the trouble and expense of finding another place at short notice, but then the landlord would have lost his income from the property. The provision allocates the losses between the parties in such a case. If the property is not available at the specified time for the lease to start, but could be available a few days later, the quoted provision would not allow the landlord to just ignore the situation and end the lease. The landlord is allowed only a "reasonable time" to fix the problem, and taking significantly longer than is needed would not be "reasonable".
Yes, this is illegal. If by "across the state" you mean some distance away but in the same state then the exact law will depend on which state you are in, but as a rule any "conversion" of property to the use of another counts as theft. In this case your aunt has "converted" the property to the use of your Nan (funny legal phrase). The fact that the people doing this are your relatives makes no difference. (When asking about the law here you should always say which state you are in.) Although theft is a crime, you could also start a civil case to get your property back without involving the police. The details depend on where you are, but try googling "(your state) small claims court". Many states have a process for collecting low-value debts or other property without needing lawyers. You need to have a firm conversation with your aunt about this. Tell her that you want your property back, and don't back down. Also call your Nan and explain this to her as well; she may not have realised that she is in possession of stolen property, which is usually a separate crime. If you want more advice on how to get your property back without starting a family row then you might ask on the Interpersonal Skills SE, but it might be better to start with "When are you planning to return my property?" and leave "You are a thief" as a last resort. Edit: As Eric Nolan points out in the comments, you may be a minor. If you are under 18 then your aunt has authority over you that she wouldn't have if you were older. For instance, if she is concerned about your use of video games impacting school-work then confiscating your console and putting it out of your reach would be perfectly legal.
As a legal matter, you need to call or visit your local police station, report that you found some lost money, answer their questions honestly and dispassionately (they don't care about your hate etc. unless it's causing an active situation they have to deal with, and even then they don't much want to hear you go on about it), and then let them deal with it. You can tell your neighbor, if he inquires, that you have handed the matter to the local police and he can inquire with them about claiming it; feel free to ask the police to affirm that's the suitable course of action. You can expect to be given legal possession of it if they are unable to determine the true owner in accordance with local law. You can ask the police for details on that, though they'll probably just tell you as a matter of procedure without prompting.
Charlie is not a party to the contract between Alice and Bob Alice and Charlie have no contractural relationship and Alice cannot require him to do anything nor is he liable to Alice in any way. Alice’s issue is with Bob who has clearly breached his contract. Alice can sue Bob for damages and may be able to end the lease. There is no trespass because Charlie is there with the permission of the leaseholder. From Charlie’s position there is no reason to believe that Bob does not have the authority to give this permission so Charlie is not in breach of the law. The police will see this as a civil matter and won’t intervene.
None of the three factors you identify is correct. With respect to reason (1): The belief that a judge is likely to be landlord friendly on the merits, while a factor favoring a bench trial is actually a pretty minor one. Empirically, actual outcomes on the merits are far less different between jury trials and bench trials than you might expect. There aren't a lot of "moving parts" in a typical landlord-tenant case that afford the trier of fact much discretion. Usually there is evidence quantifying the amount of damage to the property in dollar terms and the amount of rent owed is usually just math. It isn't like a personal injury case where pain and suffering damages are highly subjective and even liability which hinges on a common sense assessment of what constitutes "reasonable case" is very vague. There may be some wiggle room in a landlord-tenant case to disagree on the credibility of witnesses and to differ in opinion regarding what constitutes "reasonable wear and tear", but the differences in litigation costs between a jury and bench trial will usually be greater in magnitude than the differences in outcomes on the merits between the two. Of course, in the rare case where the tenant is suing the landlord for a personal injury on the premises, the difference in outcome on the merits does matter quite a bit and a judge is much less likely to enter an extremely tenant favorable damages award than a jury is to do so. But, usually, lawyers for landlords aren't thinking about this scenario very much when they write a lease because it doesn't come up very often. With respect to reason (2): The landlord actually probably has a procedural advantage over the tenant in a jury trial where having a lawyer is more important than a bench trial, but this is pretty irrelevant, because landlords are overwhelmingly more likely to win than the tenant anyway. It isn't hard to prove that somebody didn't pay all of the rent that was owed, or that they damaged the premises. Landlords care more about litigation costs than they do about their odds of winning on the merits. With respect to reason (3): And, the judge interprets of rental agreement for the jury - the jury only decides the factual issues that are disputed with regard to the rental agreement as the judge explains what it means to them. So, confusion isn't a major concern either. Instead, the biggest factors are timing and litigation costs. A jury trial is longer, because it takes time to select a jury, to prepare jury instructions, to instruct the jury, and for the jury to deliberate. A landlord-tenant bench trial might be half a day or one day long, while a jury trial on the same matter might take two or three days. Selecting and charging a jury alone takes about half a day, and instructing a jury and having it deliberate takes another half-day at least. The longer duration of a jury trial means that it takes longer for a case before a jury to be scheduled than a bench trial, because there in any given time frame, there will be more slots available for short trials than long ones. A half day bench trial might be possible to schedule two or three months out, while a two or three day jury trial might not fit into a judge's calendar for five or six months. And, a lawsuit involving a jury trial is more expensive to conduct. It probably takes something on the order of 32 more hours of lawyer time to litigate a case that goes to a jury trial than a case set for a bench trial, which is on the order of $8,000 at $250 per hour. Generally, a tenant who is being evicted or owes rent is either judgment-proof, or at least hard to collect from, so the landlord has an interest in keeping litigation costs low. The out of pocket costs other than attorney's fees are also higher in a jury trial - there is typically a jury demand fee and a need to prepare a juror notebook for each juror. The need for better quality exhibits (e.g. exhibits may need to be blown up and put on an easel, or made into a powerpoint that can be see by all the jurors, rather than just photocopied and put in a single binder for a judge).
Can a lawsuit naming multiple defendants be partially dismissed? Yes. This happens routinely. As one random example, in a recent 7th Circuit case, there was no doubt that the Plaintiff had stated a legally valid claim against two off-duty Indianapolis officers who choked a bar patron unconscious, dragged him facedown to parking lot, beat him still further, emptied his wallet, and left him covered in blood. But, the Plaintiff also named the city that employed them in its municipal police department when they were on duty as a defendant. The trial court denied the city's motion to dismiss, and a jury awarded $1.2 million of damages against the city as well. The 7th Circuit, however, held that the trial court should have dismissed the City that employed them as a defendant, since it did not have legal liability for the off duty conduct of its officers, and the City further purged itself of any claim that it adopted a policy tolerating this conduct when it fired the officers after learning of the incident. On the other hand, a plaintiff can sue defendants in the alternative and only has to dismiss a defendant when it is clear that no reasonably jury could hold that particular defendant liable. For example, suppose that a house with a structural carpentry defect was built by two framing contractors. It is clear that the defective work was all done by a single framing contractor and that it was defective, but there aren't good records of which contractor did what work. The Plaintiff can properly sue both framing contractors in the alternative for the damages caused by the defective framing work, and can leave it to the jury to decide on the merits which of the two did the defective work if the question isn't cleared upon unequivocally before then.
Why is Sim Lim Scammer in Jail even though technically his victims agree? https://coconuts.co/singapore/news/33-months-jail-sim-lim-square-conman-jover-chew-whos-getting-treatment-depression/ Sim Lim scammer is in jail for "scamming". That one is obvious. We sort of know that he is scamming. But how he scammed seems pretty legit He obfuscate unreasonable terms deep within a thick contract. Basically people buy iPhone. Then he ask people to sign a contract that they agree to pay $1500 worth of insurance. People buy it and lost thousands of dollars. Yes. This guy is a scammer. There is no doubt. But the victim technically sign an agreement. So what crime laws does the Singaporean government use against this Sim Lim scammer? How would this be different in many other countries? I've heard in insurance industry, some people sell insurance at price 100 times the normal price. The strategy is similar, namely contract obfuscation. Is there a law that makes certain contracts unnecessarily complex for purpose of obfuscation a crime?
Process And Cultural Considerations He is in prison because he pleaded guilty to the crimes he was charged with by the prosector. So, there was no trial at which evidence contesting the charges was analyzed and compared to the relevant legal standard. As the linked story reports: In court, the 33-year-old conman pleaded guilty to 12 charges of cheating that transpired from January to October 2014. The story also reports that he was suffering from severe depression at the time that he entered his plea. So, he may have been overcome with hopelessness and self-hate over ending up in his position and entered his guilty plea, in part, for that reason. Put another way, he may have pleaded guilty because he genuinely felt guilty. Also, in much of East Asia, it isn't uncommon for criminal defendants to plead guilty to charges when they feel that they indeed morally wronged the victims and were wrong in the eyes of society, even if they might have technical grounds to fight the charges legally. A decision to plead guilty in a case where there is some plausible ground upon which the defendant could dispute his guilty, isn't without justification and isn't necessarily irrational in these criminal justice systems. Determinations of guilt and innocence and sentencing decisions are both made by judges, and judges convict defendants at much higher rates than juries do, in places where there is a right to a jury trial. (Singapore, even if it has "lay judges" that are part of a panel with a regular judge, doesn't have the equivalent of a U.S. jury, and "lay judges" tend to be highly deferential to the views of the career judge leading the panel.) Pre-Western legal theory in China (and East Asia more generally, Singapore is dominated by Chinese elites even though it is ethnically diverse), there was a distinction between Confucian philosophy which placed an emphasis over decision making by enlightened "good" men, over the "rule of law" which had a connotation of being rule by devious lawyers who manipulated technicalities to pervert justice. So, societal attitudes of both every day people and elites, both in and out of the legal system, frown on and have an aversion to and skepticism of defenses to legal charges that appear to be mere technicalities that is much more vehement than it is in the West, where "rule of man" is considered undesirable and despotic, while "rule of law" is considered a key component of a just society even if it sometimes has undesirable consequences in individual cases. In addition, in much of East Asia (based upon my personal discussions with judges from many East Asian countries while I was in law school where many East Asian judges came to study during mid-career sabbaticals), judges, de facto, regardless of the applicable legal standard, often strongly presume that everything that the prosecution tells them is true and that the defendant and any witnesses supporting a defendant are probably lying. It is similar to the pro-law enforcement bias of many U.S. judges in credibility disputes, but on steroids. So, pleading guilty rather than going to trial in much of East Asia, is often simply a matter of avoiding an exercise in futility that could cause the judge to view the defendant more harshly causing the judge to impose a stiffer sentence than might otherwise be imposed for the crime. Furthermore, in Singapore in particular, and also in much of the rest of East Asia, the capacity of the general public to organize extra-legal efforts to punish someone who is widely believed to have violated social norms is considerable. In this particular case, the public had raised a substantial war chest through an internet based fund raising request, to persecute this man, and conducted an investigation whose results were used to reveal details about his personal life that he wished he could have kept private, even before charges were filed. Singapore is a city-state, so there is really no place to hide. If the public thinks that you are a crook who got away with it, the potential that the public will act on your bad reputation is great. Accepting a judicially determined punishment for your alleged crime may be the most practical way to end further extra-legal punishment for your alleged crimes. The Alleged Crime Fraud can be established if someone is actually mislead, even if the unknowingly authorize a document that somewhere contains the information. If the person promoting the scam discourages people from reading the contract language, this is particular likely, but simply having an excessively long contract that does not disclose a key term conspicuously when that key term is not otherwise brought to the consumer's attention in the transaction could also constitute fraud. Also, "scamming" or "cheating", which is what he pleaded guilty to doing, is not necessarily a charge for fraud. For example, it may be that in Singapore that charging an unconscionable price for a good or service (i.e. a price grossly disproportionate to its fair market value) is a crime in and of itself, even if there is full and knowing consent to the price. In most places, overcharging is only a crime during a natural disaster or other emergency, which is considered exploiting people in a vulnerable situation or profiteering from a disaster or crisis. But, it is also true that in most places, an unconscionable contract can be invalidated by the person victimized by it, even if the contract was validly entered into by the parties. In many places, it is a civil offense to cause a consumer to enter into an unconscionable agreement and this is punishable by restitution and a fine or penalty. Singapore is notorious for criminalizing conduct that would, in other places, only be a civil offense in other places or a basis for bringing a lawsuit or a defense to a lawsuit, so it would not be surprising to me if "cheating" was a crime separate from fraud that was easier to prove in that legal system.
"Any perceived compliance or non-compliance of other developers’ apps does not have any bearing on the compliance of your own apps." Could this mean that Google Play's policies are applied differently for different developers or apps? No, it means that you can't break the rules even if others are breaking the rules or you think they are breaking the rules. I think it is worth noting that those apps are for the Indian market. I don't know which one you are in, but google will have different rules for different countries to comply with various regulatory requirements.
Under the assumption stated, the lecherous millionaire is soliciting an act of prostitution, albeit with an unusually high price. His proposal would be just as illegal (or legal) as an offer of $100 for a sexual encounter. In most jurisdictions it would be a crime. George Bernard Shaw famously asked a woman if she would have sex with him (sleep with him, I think was the wording) for a million pounds, and she hesitated and eventually said "well yes, in that case". He then asked if she would for five pounds. Her reported answer was "Mr Shaw! What do you think I am?!" to which he rejoined "We have settled that, Madam. Now we are haggling about the price." This is much the same case -- legally the amount or nature of the price does not matter. Whether this would also constitute sexual harassment would depend on the specific laws of the local jurisdiction.
Given that this is a UK based company, the most applicable Act would be the Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971 A person who, not having reasonable cause to believe there is a right to payment, in the course of any trade or business makes a demand for payment, or asserts a present or prospective right to payment, for what he knows are unsolicited goods sent (after the commencement of this Act) to another person with a view to his acquiring them [for the purposes of his trade or business], shall be guilty of an offence and on summary conviction shall be liable to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale. This law specifically refers to [unsolicited] charges for entries in directories. You also mentioned that they're misrepresenting that a company is already a customer and sending out invoices on that basis. That would be a breach of the Fraud Act 2006 A person is in breach of this section if he dishonestly makes a false representation As to their enforceability, that answer is no. If this came before an actual judge, the judge would throw it out in a heartbeat. No agreement was made to provide a service in return for a payment and these companies rely on sending threatening letters via (seeming) third-parties precisely because they wish to avoid that level of scrutiny.
Nope, the seller can't refuse "to sell". They have sold it. They sold it right at the moment the contract was created (which, depending on where they were, would not necessarily even need to be in writing). The deposit is irrelevant. What is relevant is that now your friend must pay the full balance, and the seller must hand over the car. If the seller does not do that, that is a breach of contract which can be fixed by going to the court and obtaining an order to hand the car over.
I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.
It would appear so. California Civ. Code §1572 says that actual fraud is various acts with intent to deceive another party thereto, or to induce him to enter into the contract The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; I will suppose that the individual knows that he did not attend the university (is not delusional), and you can prove that the statement is false. It would take a bit of testifying to establish that the claimed institution was a material fact which induced customers to enter into a contract. The hardest part will be establishing damages.
There is usually a law that could be stretched to cover such a case. In Washington, RCW 9A.28.030 says A person is guilty of criminal solicitation when, with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he or she offers to give or gives money or other thing of value to another to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such crime or which would establish complicity of such other person in its commission or attempted commission had such crime been attempted or committed. The "intent" of the law is to punish people for saying "I'll give you $5000 to kill Smith". But just looking at the text, if you give someone money to encourage them to engage in a specific kind of criminal conduct (e.g. beating people up), then you've violated the law. So, handing a guy $5,000 and saying "I think you should be rewarded for your act" could easily be construed as promoting the future commission of the same or similar crime.
Which comes first: contracts or subpoena orders? Example scenario If I am a reporter and I write an article from a source who did not want to disclose his identity and I signed a contract to never disclose his identity. But the court now demands that I release the identity of this source. Which must I follow? The contract or the subpoena?
Even within the United States, this would depend upon the jurisdiction involved. Some jurisdictions recognize a legal privilege of a journalist to keep confidential sources secret (also called a "reporter's privilege"), while others do not. There is a split of authority on the question within the various circuits of the U.S. federal court system, and there is also a split of authority between different U.S. states. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have all held that a qualified reporter's privilege exists. In the recent case of U.S. v. Sterling, the Fourth expressly denied a reporter's privilege exists. Furthermore, forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes called shield laws protecting journalists' anonymous sources. Three U.S. Court of Appeals circuits, the 6th, the 7th and the Federal Circuit, do not have any controlling case law on the subject. Ten U.S. states do not have shield laws protecting journalists' anonymous sources. The U.S. Department of Justice, as a matter of policy, seeks to compel journalists to disclose their anonymous sources only under specified conditions where the need is great, but this policy is not a defense available to a journalist in a case brought by the U.S. government. In the absence of a legal privilege, the journalist could be incarcerated until the information is disclosed or the need for the information is moot, for contempt of court. Quite a few journalists in the United States, faced with that choice, have opted to be incarcerated rather than to reveal a source. If the subpoena is upheld, even if the face of a good faith effort of the journalist to quash the subpoena on the basis of a legal privilege or other grounds, if the journalist does comply with the subpoena, the breach of the non-disclosure contract is legally excused and cannot be a ground for the journalist to be legally liable to the informant.
is contract text itself subject to copyright? What are my options? It largely depends on the originality of your contract. C & J Management Corp. v. Anderson, 707 F.Supp.2d 858, 862 (2009) points to multiple references against preclusion of "a copyrightable interest in a contract". But you would need to prove that your competitor copied "original elements" of your contract including "a minimum degree of creativity and originality required to support a valid copyright". See Donald v. Uarco Business Forms, 478 F.2d 764, 766 (1973). Your post provides no information that would help identifying or ruling out this issue in your matter. Without realizing, you might have paid dearly for boilerplate language that your lawyer copied from somewhere else. Indeed, there is so much regurgitation and copy/pasting in the legal "profession" (judges included, as is notorious in judicial opinions they release and in the similarities --verbatim-- among the procedure law of many, many U.S. jurisdictions). That regurgitation is not bad in and of itself, though, since what matters is the expeditious administration of justice and the protection of your rights, rather than obtaining creative expressions authored by some lawyer. You might end up wasting valuable energy and money if you went after the competitor for something like this without first assessing the extent of originality in your contract. Focus instead on the much more detrimental fact that your competitor "plays dirty in general".
This sort of thing is very common. Particularly in the tax context, the IRS seeks to compel lawyers to reveal their clients all the time, and the courts are pretty much all in agreement that attorney-client privilege generally does not protect the identity of a client. For example: United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 505 (2d Cir. 1991) United States v. Servin, No. 17-1371 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2018) Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled Feb. 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1979) In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982) In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983) In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir.1982) More typically, the disclosure happens in front of the grand jury or in response to a subpoena, but it also can happen in open court like it did with Cohen. That happened in the second Third Circuit case above, where federal officials were investigating the source of 42,000 pounds of pot they'd found on a boat off the coast of New Jersey. There were disputes as to who owned the ship -- and might therefore be liable for the drugs -- so the DOJ needed to nail that down. There was some reason to believe that Attorney Markowitz was involved in transactions that would shed light on the ownership, so they subpoenaed Markowitz to appear before the grand jury. He showed up and refused to answer basically anything or produce any records, so the prosecutors asked a judge for a ruling on whether he was permitted to withhold his clients' identities based on attorney-client privilege. This is where the case starts to look sort of like the Cohen situation. The attorney was asserting privilege, and the judge said he would need to review the records in camera to see if the privilege applied. But he couldn't say if attorney-client privilege applies if he didn't know who the clients were, so he ordered him to identify his clients. He refused, so the judge told him to take a moment and think about it before he held him in contempt. Unlike Cohen's attorneys, the guy still refused, so the judge held him in contempt and ordered him to jail. On appeal, the Third Circuit agreed that attorney-client privilege generally does not protect the identity of a client. There are exceptions when there's already enough information known about the client that revealing the identity would expose them to criminal prosecution, but that was not the case here. The court still reversed the contempt finding, holding that Markowitz had a Fifth Amendment right not to identify the clients because doing so might expose him to criminal prosecution, but that element doesn't seem to exist in the Cohen situation. (Interesting side-note: The government was represented in this case by a 29-year-old Samuel Alito.) The weird thing about this, to me, is that the courts have a procedure to avoid making the disclosure public: "A well recognized means for an attorney to demonstrate the existence of an exception to the general rule, while simultaneously preserving confidentiality of the identity of his client, is to move the court for an in camera ex parte hearing." In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 454 (6th Cir. 1983). Why Cohen's guys didn't go that route is beyond me.
Does an agreement in a chat count as a valid contract? In most jurisdictions (and for most transactions): yes. Usually the only thing that matters for a valid contract is that there is a mutual agreement – whether that is in writing, orally, via chat or via sign language does not matter. Of course, having things in writing makes it easier to prove in court if there is a problem, so it's still advisable. What steps could I take if they don't send the money? You can: remind them to pay if they still don't pay, you can sue them. Some juridictions have accelerated court proceedings for simple cases like this (e.g. Gerichtliches Mahnverfahren in Germany), otherwise you will have to sue in a regular court that deals with contract disputes. But I have no names and I am unsure what they can or have to do after they received the package. This is going to be the main problem. It's no good to enter into a contract if you do not know who the other party is :-). You definitely need to find out who exactly entered into an agreement with you. If the sale is to a private person, find out their name and address. If the sale is to a business (seems to be the case here), find the official name and legal type of the business, and make sure whoever you deal with is authorized to enter into contracts. Otherwise the contract will be hard to enforce in court if things go wrong.
This is not a "if you breach the contract we may sue you" clause. This is a clause which says "if we find you trying to breach the contract, we can ask a court to stop you from doing so (even though you may not have actually breached the contract at that point in time)". The provision entitles the aggrieved party to specific relief - in this case, by the way of an injunction. Specific relief means relief of certain determined nature or of a specific kind, rather than a general relief or damages or compensation. Essentially, the clause that provides that if the receiving party of the confidential information threatens to disclose such information, the disclosing party shall be entitled to ask the court to specifically order the receiving party not to disclose the confidential information (as opposed to post-facto asking for damages for the harm caused by reason of such disclosure). In the absence of this provision, a court may rule that the disclosing party has no locus to take pre-emptive legal action, as no damage has been caused yet by the other party.
Basically, the privilege does apply to other members of the firm including non-lawyer staff, although the analysis that gets you there can be a bit involved in some cases. The Duty of Confidentiality As @DavidSiegel notes, there is a distinction between the duty to not reveal client secrets subject to certain exceptions, that in all U.S. jurisdictions arises primarily under Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, Rule 5.1 regarding partners and supervisory lawyers in law firms, Rule 5.2 regarding subordinate lawyers in law firms, and Rule 5.3 governing how the rules apply to non-lawyer assistants in a firm. The Attorney-Client Privilege There is a separate body of law that heavily overlaps that governs the attorney-client privilege which is the right to refuse to disclose confidential information of a client to third-parties even in the face of a court order of subpoena that would otherwise compel someone legally to disclose information. The attorney-client privilege has a couple of components. One is the privilege for confidential communications between a lawyer and a client (which extends to disclosures to other attorneys and staff in the firm with a need to know and people with whom there are joint defense agreements) and the other is the work product privilege which protects work done for a client by a lawyer or the lawyer's law firm in the course of a legal representation of the client (which is almost as strong but has some narrow exceptions that don't apply to the confidential communications privilege). The work product privilege, like the confidential communications privilege, is not waived or impaired because attorney work product (or attorney staff work product) is shared within lawyers and legal staff in a law firm as necessary to represent a client. An attorney-client relationship that gives rise to the privilege extends directly from the client to every lawyer in a law firm that works on their case in any way, or is made privy to the attorney-client privileged material regarding the client in any way. In Colorado, where I primarily practice (which is entirely typical in this regard), this is mostly codified by statute in Colorado Revised Statute § 13-90-107(1)(b) (at pdf page 544) which expressly extends its protections to legal staff by stating: An attorney shall not be examined without the consent of his client as to any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment; nor shall an attorney's secretary, paralegal, legal assistant, stenographer, or clerk be examined without the consent of his employer concerning any fact, the knowledge of which he has acquired in such capacity. There is also a great deal of case law interpreting this statute. The case law establishes, for example, that the privilege belongs to the client and not the attorney or the employees of the attorney. In federal courts when dealing with questions of federal law, the attorney-client privilege is governed not mostly by state statutes and case law but by the federal common law authorized and developed under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and Federal Rule of Evidence 502. FRE 501 states: Rule 501. Privilege in General The common law — as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and experience — governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision. FRE 502 states: Rule 502. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product; Limitations on Waiver The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection. (a) Disclosure Made in a Federal Proceeding or to a Federal Office or Agency; Scope of a Waiver. When the disclosure is made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency and waives the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or information in a federal or state proceeding only if: (1) the waiver is intentional; (2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject matter; and (3) they ought in fairness to be considered together. (b) Inadvertent Disclosure. When made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding if: (1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (b)(5)(B). (c) Disclosure Made in a State Proceeding. When the disclosure is made in a state proceeding and is not the subject of a state-court order concerning waiver, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal proceeding if the disclosure: (1) would not be a waiver under this rule if it had been made in a federal proceeding; or (2) is not a waiver under the law of the state where the disclosure occurred. (d) Controlling Effect of a Court Order. A federal court may order that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the court — in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding. (e) Controlling Effect of a Party Agreement. An agreement on the effect of disclosure in a federal proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is incorporated into a court order. (f) Controlling Effect of this Rule. Notwithstanding Rules 101 and 1101, this rule applies to state proceedings and to federal court-annexed and federal court-mandated arbitration proceedings, in the circumstances set out in the rule. And notwithstanding Rule 501, this rule applies even if state law provides the rule of decision. (g) Definitions. In this rule: (1) “attorney-client privilege” means the protection that applicable law provides for confidential attorney-client communications; and (2) “work-product protection” means the protection that applicable law provides for tangible material (or its intangible equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.
Adam cannot simply void the contract because he has a chance to publish in a more prestigious journal. What he can do depends on the provisions of he contract to which Adam agreed. It is likely, but far from certain, that the agreement permits Adam to cancel it under specified circumstances. If it does, and if those circumstances now apply, Adam can cancel and then submit the paper to the other journal. It is possible that the contract gives he first journal (J1)_ exclusive rights only for a limited period of time. If this is so, and if that time has passed, then Adam may submit the paper to the other journal (J2) without violating the agreement. It is likely, but not certain, that the agreement has provisions permitting the paper to be republished in another journal. If it does, than Adam may republish by complying with those provisions. They will probably include a requirement that the J@ publication include a notice similar to this: This paper was originally published in J1 in the {date} issue. J2 would have to be willing to include such a notice. The agreement between Adam and J1 will specify some things that J1 must do, as well as things that Adam must do. If J1 has failed to carry out a significant part of its obligations, for example if it never published Adam's paper, Adam may be able to rescind the agreement for materiel breach. Exactly what failures on J1's part allow this varies by jurisdiction. Adam would be wise to consult a lawyer before taking this step. Adam may request permission from J1 if none of these situations applies, and J1 may give permission. It would probably insist on a notice like the one mentioned above. But J1 does not have to grant such permission. If none of the situations above apply, and Adam cannot get (or does not ask for) permission from J1, then submitting the paper to J2 would probably violate Adam's agreement with J1. J1 could sue Adam, and perhaps J2 also. If the people running J2 know of this situation, they may well refuse Adam's paper. Adam may be able to write a new paper, based on the same research as his original paper, perhaps with more recent research added. That would not be covered by Adam's agreement with J1, and he could submit that to J2.
Yes. The formation of a contract requires (among other things) that the parties intend to be legally bound. Their sending the offer from a corporate email address shows this. You replying in the same way shows your intention. Signatures are optional. Consider, verbal contracts are binding; how do you sign those?
Can a jury's vote be nullified , if majority of the jury is found to have leaning towards a certain political and racial group hence causing a bias? In U.S. multiple ways have been politically implemented through which minorities don't have a huge representation , even in the jury. So , can the person who is trying to be convincted of a crime , ask to nullify jury's vote , unless the political and racial views of each jury member is clearly stated . In the vice news documentary - https://youtu.be/3oIKv_TIk0I , It has been mentioned that the group of people who burned down a mosque , are asking the judge to change the location from which jury has to be selected because the area from which their jury is to be selected is less conservative and if such a condition has been provided then will it not be unconstitutional , because doing so will bring down justice wrt political alignment.
Historically (long, long ago to the point that there is no leading case establishing this rule), you could challenge a verdict based upon a failure of a judge to dismiss a juror for cause (or for improperly dismissing a juror for cause) when this was an abuse of discretion. Race is an improper reason to dismiss a juror for cause. Political views often mandate dismissal of a juror for cause if they prevent a juror from being impartial or create an appearance of bias in the jury. More recently, race or sex (but not political opinion) based exercise of peremptory challenges (which are otherwise not for cause) was a ground upon which a verdict could be challenged. The leading case is Batson v. Kentucky (1986). Just last year (2017), in a case out of Colorado, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed a verdict to be overturned because of racially discriminatory (and again, not political) motives a juror expressed for convicting a defendant in the course of jury deliberations. Jury deliberations themselves had previously been sacrosanct and not subject to investigation in the absence of an outsider interference (e.g. a third party bribe presented to a juror).
Generally, a local county judge’s decision is not binding on the judgement of another judge unless it is that of an appellate division. The law of the case principle could be referred to as an argument if it would have been decided by another judge in the same case (some courtships work on a rotary basis with different judges sitting over a single case). This would mean that the court would give greater deference to that decision; however, applying the principle is a matter of administrative preference to save resources of the court. Whether or not the other judge would reconsider the matter would be within their discretion absent binding authority to the contrary as a “law of the case” is not binding. In fact, even if it would have been the same judge with the exact same facts deciding the matter in a final judgement, there wouldn’t be much to do. One could argue that deciding differently is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which, if the judge fails to explain the different decision on the exact same facts may have a reasonable probability to get overturned provided the unconstitutionality finding was correct in the first place. If the matter was, in fact, unconstitutional, appeals may overturn a contrary judgement if the issue is brought up in the lower court and enters the court record. It may have some weight still to cite the decision of the other judge as the argument may be given more weight than if merely delivered as the argument of counsel.
The last part, about equal suffrage in the Senate, does not expire. The question is whether it can be itself amended out of existence. There has been no test of that possibility. This article argues that this may not be subject to amendment. There is only one way to find out for sure. The idea is that the original intent was that this is supposed to be an absolute clause, but of course that only speaks to original intention (and the original intention is not clear, as the article discusses).
Jurors cannot directly disqualify each other. However, they can inform the trial judge if they have reason to believe that one of their peers should be discharged. The judge will then allow the lawyers for both sides to ask the juror questions before deciding to dismiss them. In some jurisdictions, the judge may be required to hold a hearing to examine the evidence. Jurors may also be charged with contempt of court for interfering with a defendant's right to a fair trial, and could be disqualified from jury service in the future. Your examples of juror misconduct point at bias or refusal to deliberate, e.g. when the juror has made up their mind ahead of time (but not because they are using faulty logic). Depending on the jurisdiction, the trial may continue with a smaller jury. In some jurisdictions, the judge will have to declare a mistrial if no replacement juror can be found. See: Juror misconduct
Sometimes rights conflict with each other, and the courts decide which right takes priority. The Sixth Amendment provides that a defendant is entitled to "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor". The Fifth Amendment says "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself". And the First Amendment gives the right to free speech, which includes the right to not be compelled to speak. If you're on trial and try to get someone else to confess on the stand, his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination trumps your Sixth Amendment right to have him testify. But if he couldn't take the fifth (for example, if he had already been acquitted), your Sixth Amendment right would override his First Amendment right to free speech.
No. Indonesia Law uses Civil Law structures which use an Inquisitorial Trial. The chief difference is that in the United States (which has a Common Law Structure) the judge usually does not decide the case, but interprets the law (Trier of Law) and with a few exceptions, will determine the sentence once guilt is found. The Jury decides the case (Trier of Fact) and pronounces guilt (It is the right of the defense to request a Bench Trial, which gives the Judge both roles. The prosecution cannot object to this request). In a Civil Court, the big difference is that their is no Jury and the Judge has both roles (Trier of Law, and Trier of Fact). As the name suggests, rather than two sides fighting each other (adversarial), the two sides are answering questions posed to them by the Judge or usually a panel of Judges are used and the Judge may initiate further investigation in the evidence. The United States does use Inquisitional Trials from time to time, but they are often seen in misdemeanors, traffic courts, and small claims courts. The latter is a popular daytime TV genre (think Judge Judy) while misdemeanors and traffic court decisions are often time funny and make great Youtube videos. There are not many great Adversarial media as many throw out rules for time sake (real U.S. trials have many long boring periods during testimony) and story/drama sake. I would recommend "My Cousin Vinny" which was written by two lawyers who were fed up with Hollywood messing up how court room drama works and is hilarious to boot. When viewing either, take them with a grain of salt.
Each state has its own election laws, so you will get 50 different answers depending on what state you are interested in (perhaps 49, since Washington doesn't have polling places - depends on what you mean by "poll watcher"). This page is a starter list of legal resources. This page starts you on deconstructing this notion of "poll watcher". Colorado is one state that explicitly allows partisan observers, here are the rules. No person is compelled to be an observer, so I don't understand who you think might be abusing a poll watcher. Perhaps you are referring to the possibility that an election official will prevent an observer from doing their job. Or perhaps you are thinking that being a poll watcher abuses the intent of some law. Whatever you have in mind, there are laws in each state that say what is allowed and what is forbidden, so you have to address this at a local level. No state has a requirement that observers must come from or swear allegiance to the majority party of that polling jurisdiction (e.g. county, or precinct). Any attempt by election officials, or anyone else, to block observers from the minority party would be rebuffed by the courts. The courts will not attempt to divine inner motivations for sending an observer. Most states allow partisan observers. Michigan distinguishes "challengers" and "poll watchers", and there are distinct rules and powers for the two sets. A crucial difference is that a watcher cannot legally challenge a claimed right to vote or a precinct board action, but a challenger can. There are rules of conduct imposed on both kinds of observers, one of them being that you cannot challenge a voter for the purpose of annoying or delaying the voter. This is a misdemeanor (a crime) under MCL 168.727, and as a criminal prohibition, the state would have to prove intent beyond reasonable doubt. Blog posts by the observer might provide sufficient evidence, but speculation by the majority party would not.
The Board of Estimates still gave small boroughs like Staten Island more representatives per voter than large boroughs like Manhattan. Therefore it violated the one man, one vote principal which is evaluated with respect to all representatives having votes in a body, not just those that hold a majority. The analysis is to take all at large seats that don't violate the one man, one vote rule off the table and look at the fairness of the allocation of the remaining seats. This was an easy case, not a hard one, for the U.S. Supreme Court. The leading case are: First, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that malapportionment claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were not exempt from judicial review under Article IV, Section 4, as the equal protection issue in this case was separate from any political questions). As Wikipedia explains (links to selected full text opinions added): The "one person, one vote" doctrine, which requires electoral districts to be apportioned according to population, thus making each district roughly equal in population, was further cemented in the cases that followed Baker v. Carr, including Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) which concerned state county districts, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) which concerned state legislature districts, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) which concerned U.S. Congressional districts and Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) which concerned local government districts, a decision which was upheld in Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989). Evenwel v. Abbott (2016) said states may use total population in drawing districts (as opposed to eligible voters).
Is it legal to put a billboard on residential property? A billboard is put on top of a person's roof or on his vacant land. It is zoned residential. This person lives on a main road and the billboard is visible to cars travelling on it. He hasn't received permits or licenses to do so. Is this legal on a federal level according to U.S. laws? Is this legal in all states or do some states prohibit this? What about county and local laws? Do some counties and cities have ordinances that prohibit residential billboards? Or is a person allowed to construct signs on their own personal property as it is their right to do so with their land as they please? If this is unlawful, what are some of the potential consequences that the landowner could face? Would they just be fines and how large might those fines be? Should this person be researching all local county and city ordinances to see if this is legal in his area, or should this be considered fine anywhere within the USA? Does it matter what size the billboard is? For instance, does a 7'x7' billboard carry less lawful risk than a 30'x30' billboard?
Laws regarding billboards and advertising are very local in nature and are typically handled under city/county zoning ordinances. Start with calling your local county zoning office. They will tell you the city/county laws regarding your particular residential zoning overlay, if city or state laws supersede county laws, and recent changes in law that might matter and if the sign might be grandfathered. There can be different types of "residential" zoning and the city/county will tell you this; some allow limited commercial use and signage, and some don't. The housing subdivision you are in may also have covenants; you'll know if there are covenants if you received information when you bought property in that subdivision. 1,2,3,4,8: These depend on local laws. 5: Very generally speaking, land owners typically do not have absolute rights to land usage; that is the rationale behind zoning laws (among others, like health and public safety, building codes, national defense, etc.), because some types of land usage impact adjacent users and the general public. 6, 7: Potential consequences include fines and requirements to take the billboard down, but again, those possibilities are very localized. The size of the billboard could come into play; again, this will be very localized. Some signage may be grandfathered, too. In order for the city/county to look at the situation and possibly take action, you may have to file a written protest with the zoning office; they would help with the process. You may have to present your case at a public city council or county commission meeting, but that basically involves saying such and such is happening and you want the city/county attorney to look into relevant laws. It would help your case if you had a list of names of others in the area who are also unhappy about the billboard. I doubt you will need legal representation to lodge a protest, but if it comes to that, Google for free legal aid in your area. If the city/county attorney won't take action (which is possible, as this involves prosecutorial discretion as to if the city/county wants to press the issue with the landowner), you can look for free legal aid in your area and consider your options.
This overstates the case. A company must pursue infringements, arguably even when it isn't economically sensible in isolation to do so, to prevent its trademark from being diluted. But, that isn't the case "when it's blatantly obvious that there is no infringement." There is no benefit from pursuing cases that aren't even colorable infringements. The notion is similar to adverse possession. If you let someone openly use your real property without your permission, eventually, the squatter becomes its legal owner. Also, as in the case of adverse possession, an alternative to suing someone for infringing is to make their permission non-infringing by writing them a letter expressly authorizing them to use your mark. Permissive, licensed use does not dilute a trademark.
Zoning is controlled by the municipality (and possibly state, given where KC is) so you would have to check the rules for the municipality of interest and look at the specific zoning designation (e.g. RP-OE, R-2, MXD). Here for example is a page of code from Overland Park, which tells you that RP-4 land can be used for a private park, but agriculture is not a listed permitted use. You might argue with city hall over whether a giant garden is agriculture, and you might even win the argument (if it is a garden where you don't harvest product). Private / non-commercial is not likely to be the controlling factor over agricultural use.
It depends; Permission may be Required This depends on both the facts on the ground, and the laws of the relevant jurisdiction. Residential fences are often governed by specific local laws at the municipal or county level in the US, so no generally applicable answer is possible, short of a book giving laws for each locality. Common-Law Rules Under the common law, followed by many but far from all US jurisdictions, the key question is whether a fence is a "partition fence" or not. A partition fence is one built on or near the property line that is owned jointly by the owners of the properties it divides. A fence near the property line is probably a partition fence if: The two property owners jointly built or paid for the building of the fence; Parts of the fence are on each side of the property line; The owners have agreed that the fence is common property; or Both owners "use" the fence, as by connecting it to another fence running in a different direction, or by relying on it to contain domestic animals. A Fence is probably not a partition fence if: It is entirely clear of the property line; Only the owner on whose property it rests maintains it; and Only the owner on whose property it rests uses it. The owner of one of the properties may not remove, demolish, or modify a partition fence without permission from the other. Removing or modifying a partition fence without the permission of the owner of the adjacent property is a tort, and can lead to damages for the value of the fence begin awarded. The owners must each maintain a partition fence, often each caring for his or her side. Failing to do so may be a tort. If a fence is not a partition fence, the owner of the land is also the sole owner of the fence, and may modify or remove it without permission from, or notice to, the owner of any adjacent or nearby property. However, the above common-law rules may be modified by local laws, and one would be wise to check, or consult a lawyer who knows how to check, before making any demands. Sources The page "Removal or Destruction of Fences" from US legal reads: A fence is an enclosure creating an adequate blockade around a particular land for the purpose of prohibiting intrusions from outside. A landowner can remove a fence, separating his/her land from that of his/her neighbor, when such fence is located wholly upon his/her own land. However, a landowner is not empowered to remove a partition fence without the adjacent landowner’s consent. A partition fence is the joint property of adjacent landowners. A fence erected on the line between the lands of adjoining owners generally belongs to the parties as tenants in common. Generally, a partition fence is built equally on both sides of the line. Until the contrary is shown, the partition fence is presumed to be the common property of both owners. An owner of adjoining land can remove a partition fence upon formal notice to adjacent landowners. For an improper removal of a partition fence, an aggrieved party can bring an action for damages. The standard for measuring damages for such removal or destruction is its value at the time. The value is determined by replacement costs minus depreciation for age and use. Moreover, when someone builds a fence on another person’s land without any authority to do so, the landowner can remove or destroy such fence. A person is liable for removing, destroying, or injuring a fence belonging to another person just as one who commits such acts against any kind of property belonging to another is liable[i]. Such person is considered a tortfeasor. However, an individual cannot remove or destroy a fence on another individual’s land without his/her consent. The page "Property Line and Fence Laws in Maryland" from FindLaw reads, in relevant part: Maryland doesn't have specific rules dealing with fences. Instead, the state follows the common law practice that a fence built along a boundary line is owned in common by both property owners when both use the fence, unless otherwise agreed. A property owner is said to use a fence when they "hook-up" to the fence with another row of fence, or keep animals in the enclosure created by the fence. A fence built and used only by the builder is that person's sole property. When you purchase a new home, you take a property with an existing fence built and used by prior owners. Simply put, if you buy a property with a co-owned fence, you likely need to continue your maintenance of the fence. The page "Is it legal for the neighbor to remove a fence on our shared property line?" from Justia's "Ask a Lawyer" feature reads: If both landowners paid to install a fence directly on a property line in the past, then yes, they need your permission to remove or replace the fence. Many fences are not built on a property line, but are instead just on one property or the other. If you have had your land surveyed, you may be able to determine your exact property line. You or your neighbor are free to build new fences without permission as long as neither the fence nor any construction or excavation encroaches on the other's property. Fences are a common property dispute, and can have long term effects. If a fence encroaches significantly on someone else's land for many years, this can actually become the new legal property line in some cases. According to the "Fences" section of the page "Disputes between your neighbours" from th New Zealand Law Society: In New Zealand this is regulated by the Fencing Act 1978. Except where modified by individual agreements: Fences must be on the boundary line, though there is provision for give and take where the true boundary is difficult to fence. The cost of building or repairing a fence is borne equally between adjoining owners, unless one owner damages it, in which case the cost of repairs will fall on that owner. You can compel your neighbour to contribute to the cost of the fence bordering your two properties by following the procedures set out in the Fencing Act ... Developers of new subdivisions usually exempt themselves from contributing to the cost of a fence. Under the Property Law Act 2007, it is possible to apply to a District Court for an order to remove or alter a fence that is detrimentally affecting land or obstructing a view. Usually the cost of any removal falls on the person applying for the order. The Booklet "Fences and the Law from the Legal Services Commission, South Australia states, on page 2: Fences should be regarded as a joint asset between neighbours. Even if your neighbour has not paid for the fence they are still a joint owner. This is because a fence on the boundary is legally considered to be part of the land on each side. If you intend to remove or alter an existing fence, you should have your neighbour’s permission or a court order. If you want to put up a fence where there has not been one before, your neighbour has a right to object. It makes no difference if you intend to pay the total cost
The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to.
The Act requires that After the installation of a solar collector, a person owning or in control of another property shall not allow a tree or shrub to be placed or, if placed, to grow on that property so as to cast a shadow greater than 10 percent of the collector absorption area upon that solar collector surface at any one time between the hours of 10 a.m. and 2 p.m., local standard time. The subsequent paragraph pertains to notice that can be given to property owners, and ultimately the tree would be deemable to be a public nuisance and subject to removal. However (25984): This chapter does not apply to any of the following: (a) A tree or shrub planted prior to the installation of a solar collector. (b) A tree planted, grown, or harvested on timberland as defined in Section 4526 or on land devoted to the production of commercial agricultural crops. (c) The replacement of a tree or shrub that had been growing prior to the installation of a solar collector and that, subsequent to the installation of the solar collector, dies, or is removed for the protection of public health, safety, or the environment. (d) A tree or shrub that is subject to a city or county ordinance. In other words, if you place a collector where an existing plant can eventually cause shade on the collector (it can be a short tree), you have no remedy. This follows the doctrine of coming to the nuisance.
Can he use another commercial product that is copyrighted, e.g. a map of a location (the map is a political map and has nothing to do with trees), for his tree research purposes, if such a map won't be part of the book he works on? Yes. Copyright protects particular expressions of ideas and knowledge, not the ideas and knowledge themselves. Using a map for research purposes when the map or a modified version of it does not appear in the final work does not make the final work a "derivative work" covered by copyright.
It depends on how you got the right to participate in the event. Let us assume that you "sign up" for the event, and agree to certain conditions in exchange for being allowed to participate. In that case, there could be a condition prohibiting you from tracking the route, or publicizing the track: you have to read what the agreement says. Agreement might be necessary if the track is on private property (you need permission, otherwise you're trespassing). If this is a run on city streets, you can (possibly) follow along on the public sidewalk, and as a non-participant, you aren't bound by any agreement so you can upload whatever you like. You might also be a non-participant follower in the street, which might not be allowed by the city, but that is between the police and you and not the organizer. Running down the middle of the street is not generally legal, but the police might not care enough to ticket you.
Are employers liable for employee safety if the workplace is declared a "gun free" zone? If a company prohibits their employees from carrying a firearm while on their property, are they legally liable for the safety of their employees in an active shooter situation? If they refuse to allow their employees to protect themselves, should the company not then be required to protect them? If not, why? Example: I have a concealed pistol license (CPL) which, in my open-carry state, allows me to carry a pistol in most public places and private businesses unless prohibited by law (the Constitutionality of which is another debate) or designated by the business owner as "gun free." My employer has specific rules against employees bringing weapons of any kind into the building or even into their parking lot. If there is a violent situation at work, such as a mass shooter, and I get injured by that shooter, is there any recourse to be taken against my employer for failing to protect their employees from shooter themselves?
Employees of an employer aren't governed by a fault based liability regime in the United States (subject to some usually quite narrow exceptions that vary from state to state, which sometimes also limit tort liability). Instead, employers are required to have worker's compensation insurance policies in place, in exchange for not having any tort liability whatsoever to employees. (An employer who doesn't have worker's compensation in place is strictly liable to the worker for all injuries suffered by an employee whatsoever at work, without the prohibition of a worker's compensation insurance policy plan on paying things like pain and suffering damages as well.) Worker's compensation insurance provides coverage (in principle) for all medical costs incurred, all lost wages, and in the event of a death support for dependents if any and a modest death benefit sufficient to provide a funeral if there are no dependents. Often, in practice, worker's compensation insurance payments tend to be rather stingy. One of the most common big worker's compensation claims these days, especially in office and retail workplaces, is for employees who are seriously injured or killed in crimes at work. Often, a worker's compensation insurer will give an employer a discount if they have a "gun free" zone, because, statistically, doing so greatly reduces the average amount of harm experienced by employees at work. The presence of employees with guns in the workplace, as an actuarial matter, greatly increases the insurance company's risk of having to pay claims.
Almost certainly, there is no such right. It's illegal under 18 USC 831 to possess "nuclear material" without specific authorization. 18 USC 832 forbids the possession of a "radiological weapon". If there is intent to use the device to cause death, serious bodily injury, or damage to property or the environment, that's also a violation of 18 USC 2332i. I don't think these laws have been explicitly tested against the Second Amendment, but related cases suggest they would hold up (if the challenge wasn't simply dismissed as frivolous). The Second Amendment doesn't grant a blanket right to own weapons. Federal law, 18 USC 922 (o) makes it unlawful to own a "machinegun" (as defined in the statute), and in the case of Hollis v. Lynch, the Fifth Circuit held that this law was constitutional, because, as they said, the Second Amendment only protects weapons that are in "common use [...] for lawful purposes like self-defense." This case doesn't seem to have been appealed further, but the reasoning cited by the Fifth Circuit comes from the Supreme Court's opinion in D.C. v. Heller. If machineguns aren't in "common use", and therefore not protected, surely the same would apply to nuclear weapons.
You may want to ask Reich what he personally was talking about. There is a distinction within the US between states which prohibit mandatory union membership versus allow mandatory union membership. In about half of the states, a union cannot force an employer to accept a contract which obligates that a person join the union. These are known as right-to-work laws. No state requires all workers to join a union, and no state forbids the formation of unions.
I don't know of any federal law that is violated. US labor law is generally favorable to employers, compared to many other countries, and gives employers a lot of freedom in setting policies and rules, The theory is that an employee who doesn't like it can go and work somewhere else, and an employer with unreasonable policies will eventually be unable to get people to work for them. In particular, it surprises some people that employers aren't legally obligated to reimburse travel expenses at all: The FSLA does not have any rules regarding an employer's obligation to reimburse an employee for business-related travel expenses. No federal law requires reimbursement. So it would be perfectly legal for the company to require employees to pay for all their own meals when traveling on business. Given this, I'd expect that the company would have pretty broad discretion to place conditions and restrictions on reimbursement, including what they will and won't pay for. If an employee had a disability or religious beliefs that required them to eat meat, and the company wouldn't grant them an exception, they might have a claim under the ADA or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act respectively. But if it's just that they happen to prefer meat, I don't think there's a law to guarantee them such a right. Some states could have their own laws that might be violated, though I tend to doubt it. If you have a particular state in mind, please specify.
Can the employer fire Bob if they refuse to provide saliva sample for a marijuana test? Maybe, if drug testing is an enforceable condition of Bob's contract of employment. An employer's drug testing policy has to be justified according to the nature of the work carried out and requires an employee's consent. If Bob is required to occasionally operate machinery, for example, then it may be proportionate to include mandatory testing in his contract of employment. Workers can’t be made to take a drugs test but if they refuse when the employer has good grounds for testing, they may face disciplinary action. Source ETA Employers have a legal duty of care under s.2 of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, the health, safety, and welfare of their employees. Employees have a comparable duty under s.7 to take reasonable care of themselves and anyone who could be affected by their work. This duty of care may extend to requiring an employee to give their consent for drug testing / screening - as long as the process is fair to all, proportionate and justified, in all the given circumstances, to enable the employer to discharge this duty.
You must follow the lawful and reasonable directions of your employer As an RN you have obligations under the law that are independent of your employment. Almost certainly, one of these is not to practice in an area which you are not skilled or qualified to do so (unless you are under adequate instruction and supervision). Remember, as an RN you, personally, are legally responsible if your advice leads to harm and you were not acting reasonably. There are plenty of nurses who have gone to jail for delivering a lethal dose of medicine that was wrongly prescribed by a doctor. Even if your advice is unlikely to lead to this, you can still be deregistered - seems a waste of a lot of education just to become an Uber driver. Further, most jurisdictions make it illegal to mislead or deceive in trade or commerce. This one won’t send you to jail. So, it appears that the instructions are unlawful and it is not misconduct if you were to, politely, refuse them. This would not give your employer grounds to fire you. However, you should document your concerns and reach out to your union and possibly consult a lawyer.
It is mandatory for the employer to provide sufficient restrooms (“cabinets d'aisance”), as per article R4228-10. Other provisions regulate evacuation, ventilation, heating, disabled access, etc. There is no provision regarding when employees are permitted to use the restrooms. There can't be a single rule that works for every profession: some jobs don't let you leave your post whenever you like (e.g. machine operator, driver, guard, teacher, etc.). The most common dispute regarding restroom use is whether employees should be paid during that time. Some employers want to count restroom use as unpaid pause time. Strictly speaking, that's legal: an employee who is in a restroom is not at the employer's disposal, therefore this doesn't count as work time. However enforcing this is often logistically difficult and wildly unpopular, so in practice it's only done in places where employees must clock out to reach a restroom. I could only find one case with actual jurisprudence. In 1995, an industrial butchering company (Bigard) decided to limit restroom breaks to three fixed times a day. This was, as you might expect, unpopular; the employees went on strike, and eventually the labor court struck down this measure. That's a precedent, but it doesn't seem to have made its way to the appellate court. Your case is also slightly different in that the restrooms would only be inaccessible for an hour, which is shorter than in the Bigard case. So legally speaking, it isn't clear who will win. You'll have a better chance of success by banking on the unpopularity of the measure. Talk with your colleagues and your representatives and shop stewards. Point out that employees who are trying to hold it in are unlikely to be at the top of their productivity.
Patents are not that relevant in this case. Software patents are unenforceable in most parts of the world anyway. What matters here is copyright. Every work contract has a clause that everything an employee creates as part of their employment is copyrighted by the company. So using company-owned code to build an own project would be a copyright violation. There are also other legal tools in some jurisdiction which can be used against employees trying to misuse intellectual company property. But that's a topic for Law Stackexchange. Also, this isn't really related to a BYOD policy. Being able to bring your own device to work and then back home might make data theft more convenient, but isn't required. There are many other ways to steal sourcecode, like USB drives or uploading them to the internet. To prevent the first you would have to design your software development offices like a supermax prison facility with meter-high walls (so nobody can throw a device over it) and strip searches on everyone leaving the building. This is neither feasible nor reasonable for anything below matters of national security. To prevent the second, you would have to completely prevent internet access from developer workstations, which would greatly impede the productivity of any software developer. So most companies do not even try to physically prevent employees from stealing sourcecode. They rather rely on the legal safeguards and on maintaining a mutual trust relationship with their employees. It might seem counter-intuitive to some, but when you do not treat your employees like potential criminals they are in fact less likely to betray you.
Must I pay new employee for reading the safety manual? I live in California. Soon I will hire a household employee to cook meals for me in my home. Per California OSHA law the employee must be given and read a kitchen safety manual. Must I pay the employee for the time spent reading the kitchen safety manual?
Executive Summary Yes, you must pay your employee (if the person is indeed an employee) to read the manual. This is because, (1) as you note in your question, reading the manual is a state OSHA required part of the job, and (2) hourly employees must be paid at least minimum wage for all hours they work and there is no exception for time spent reading safety manuals. Furthermore, household cooks who are employees who are paid by the hour are not exempt from the minimum wage. There is no really plausible exception to the requirement to pay a minimum hourly wage that would apply to someone who is an employee in this position. For example, this person could not plausible be classified as a salaried employee or manager in this scenario for FLSA purposes. You could, of course, set a reasonable expectation regarding how much time should be allocated to reading the manual, so long as the expectation you set is indeed reasonable - five minutes would be unreasonably short, but 20 hours to memorize it would be unreasonably long. Is The "Employee" An Independent Contractor? It is conceivable that the person you describe as an employee is really an independent contractor, rather than a employee, and hence not subject to minimum wage laws. For example, you do not have a duty to determine that a catering company that serves many customers and is its own business providing food for you on an irregular basis, or a third-party restaurant that delivers either itself or through a third-party delivery service, is paying minimum wage or complying with work safety laws like OSHA, because they are independent contractors. But, there is nothing in your question that suggests that this is the case. (Note that if this person is an "employee" and not an "independent contractor" that it is also important that you obtain worker's compensation and pay withholding taxes for your domestic employee; often this is done via a third-party payroll service.) Applicable Law The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., requires you to pay every hourly employee the federal minimum wage, plus overtime if applicable, from "Portal to Portal" (i.e. from showing up to work until leaving work, because commuting time is not counted as work for purposes of the FLSA). Hours worked is defined as follows by the FLSA at 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), contains no exception for time spent reading a safety manual: In determining for the purposes of sections 206 and 207 of this title the hours for which an employee is employed, there shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from measured working time during the week involved by the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the particular employee. This states with respect to employees in domestic service at 209 U.S.C. § 206(f): Any employee— (1) who in any workweek is employed in domestic service in a household shall be paid wages at a rate not less than the wage rate in effect under subsection (b) of this section unless such employee’s compensation for such service would not because of section 209(a)(6) of the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C.A. § 409(a)(6)constitute wages for the purposes of title II of such Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.], or (2) who in any workweek— (A) is employed in domestic service in one or more households, and (B) is so employed for more than 8 hours in the aggregate, shall be paid wages for such employment in such workweek at a rate not less than the wage rate in effect under subsection (b) of this section. The referenced Section 206(b) is the currently effective federal minimum wage (currently $7.25 per hour). The cross-reference to the Social Security Act states that employment taxes paid by the employer (such as the employer part of FICA taxes) do not count towards paying the minimum wage. California has a parallel state minimum wage of $10 in 2017 which is substantially similar except in amount.
I have the same line in a contract that was just sent to me. So I did some quick research into this. However, I AM NEW TO THE SYSTEM AND DO NOT KNOW IT WELL!!, so please do not act on this information without seeking further advice from the relevant professionals. From what I can gather, the "Arbeitszeitgesetz (ArbZG)" is the law that governs working hours in Germany. Here is a link: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/arbzg/gesamt.pdf I used Google Translate to translate this information and found that in §3 it states that "The default daily working time must not exceed eight hours. It can only be extended up to ten hours if within six calendar months or 24 weeks an average of eight hours working day is not exceeded." This would lead me to believe that even if overtime is not paid as extra on top of your salary, they must give you the time off at another time to keep the average working day to 8 hours. **However, as the working week is Monday - Sat, the average working hours per week may be calculated as 48 hours per week, and not 40! Once again, I am not fully sure of my information, so use at your own risk!!
I believe that under federal law, the franchise owner cannot avoid overtime in this way. A similar case was considered by the Labor Department in 2005 (FLSA2005-17NA): This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning the application of the overtime requirements of section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to employees who work at two different health care facilities operated by one management company. It is our opinion that all hours worked at any of the facilities must be combined for the purpose of calculating hours worked under the FLSA. The letter explains the logic pretty clearly, with citations. When an employee is "jointly" employed by two or more employers, then the hours are all combined for overtime purposes. 29 CFR 791.2(b) explains how "jointly" is determined: Where the employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more employers, or works for two or more employers at different times during the workweek, a joint employment relationship generally will be considered to exist in situations such as: (1) Where there is an arrangement between the employers to share the employee's services, as, for example, to interchange employees; or (2) Where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer (or employers) in relation to the employee; or (3) Where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer. Paragraph (1) applies: the two employers (the two restaurants) have an arrangement to share the employee's services (the owner is explicitly dividing their hours). Paragraph (3) also applies: both employers are under common control, since the same person owns both. They certainly are "not completely dissociated". The same logic would seem to apply even if the two locations are different restaurants, or different types of businesses. The 2005 letter explains further: Factors that are relevant in finding joint employment include, for example, whether there are common officers or directors of the companies; the nature of the common management support provided; whether employees have priority for vacancies at the other companies; whether there are any common insurance, pension or payroll systems; and whether there are any common hiring seniority, recordkeeping or billing systems. These also seem likely to apply in your hypothetical cases.
I've been wondering if it is possible to hire / create a company with someone who would open a restaurant in my place and manage it according to my guidelines. Yes, of course. You can do it just like you described: Create a company, hire employees, (let them) open the restaurant. You, as the owner of the company, could set up whatever guidelines you have in mind, and your employees would be bound by them (limited only by general laws, such as on health and safety). Some caveats, however: You will need money to set this up - for buying / renting space for the restaurant, for paying your employees, obtaining supplies, initial marketing etc. It may take a while until the restaurant earns money (if ever), and you'll need money in the mean time. Someone will need to manage, that is make decisions. You can do that yourself, but then you will work for the restaurant (which you write you do not want to do). Or you can hire someone to do it for you, but that will cost more (in salary), plus you will have to find someone you can trust. That's a tradeoff for you to make. I guess it'd be like an intellectual property. That depends, but usually there will be little in terms of intellectual property. If you have a unique idea for the restaurant, you could patent it, but there are many restrictions on what you can protect, and ways around it, plus this also costs money (a lot if you need a lawyer's advice). Apart from that, you can register a trademark for the restaurant, but that only protects the name / logo, not any ideas. Finally, some of your ideas might be considered trade secrets, but again the protection is limited. In general, there is no blanket "idea protection". If you have a good idea for a restaurant, in most cases other restaurants will be able to copy them, possibly with slight changes - take that into account.
Who entered the contract with the restaurant? In order for the restaurant to collect from a person, that person must have entered into a contract for the meal. That is, from the restaurant's point of view, they must have indicated that they would like some food and, since everyone knows how restaurants work, they know that the food will have to be paid for. Whether a given person entered a contract will depend on the specific facts. If they opened their mouth and said to the waiter something like “I’ll have the chicken”, they almost certainly entered a contract and they are obliged to pay. This is even if they had an expectation that someone else would pay for them - the restaurant is not involved in any other contracts or arrangements you might have with third-parties. You ordered, you’re on the hook. In a situation where you didn’t order, the answer is still probably yes, you have to pay. Again, because you know how restaurants work, by eating the meal that was placed in front of you rather than saying, “Just so you know, your contract for this meal is with that guy over there, is that okay?”, you probably entered a contract by your action of eating the meal. More broadly, when a group collectively enters a contract with the restaurant, they are probably agreeing with the restaurant that they will be jointly and severally bound. That is, each is responsible for all and the restaurant can pursue any or all of the people they have a contract with. A minor dining with their parents is probably not entering a contract with the restaurant. Not because minors can’t enter contracts (they absolutely can) but because of the normal expectation that the parent is entering the contract. This is because of a principle that contract terms may be implied by custom. That is, if there is a general understanding that this is the way things are done, then that will be something the law will enforce. This is a simple expedient adopted in order to make the world work - if every term of every contract had to be explicitly detailed in advance this would be a) unworkable and b) impossible. Even if there is no contract, the restaurant has equitable remedies like unjust enrichment. The diner has had the benefit of the meal and it would be unjust if the restaurant was left out of pocket. Equitable remedies can be even more complicated than contract law so we’ll just leave it at that. As for whether the restaurant will accept a promise from one diner that another will pay, that’s up to them.
If an employee takes home information that his or her employer considers confidential, that would be a matter of company policy. The employer could discipline or fire the employee if it learned of the incident, and chose to act. If the information is considered to be a trade secret, or part of one, disclosing it or mishandling it so as to risk disclosure could be a crime under US law. However, only in unusual cases is criminal action taken on such matters, normally it is left to civil lawsuits or internal company action. I do not know if Canada has a similar law.
I would recommend talking to an adult person in HR. I'm quite sure they will notice that what your manager wants to do is more than dodgy, and doing something dodgy may be in the interest of your manager, but not in the interest of the company. The best thing is to go to HR, acting as if a mistake has been made, and point out to them what your start date was, and that the new contract has the incorrect starting date, and they need to fix this mistake or you can't sign the contract. If they insist you sign it, then you DON'T sign it. If they say you will be fired if you don't sign it, then you tell them that in that case you would get legal advice. BTW. You definitely don't sign this as it is. PS. This answer was posted on workplace.stackexchange, not law.stackexchange, so please don't complain if there is no legal content.
Would breaking a rule in the handbook constitute breach of contract? Generally speaking, yes. Of course, most employment contracts are "at will" so a breach of contract often isn't necessary to terminate employment. Does my employer's updating the handbook constitute a unilateral change of contract? It depends upon what is changed in the update to the handbook. Typically an employment contract would have a term that says something to the effect of "employee shall devote his full time effort to perform the duties he is directed to perform by employer in a satisfactory manner." If the employee handbook says, "part of every employee's duties includes cleaning up his work area at the close of business each day, locking his file cabinets and shutting down his computer", this would typically simply be a definition of the duties of the employee which the employer reserved the right to change in the original employment contract, and not a unilateral change of contract. On the other hand, if the employee handbook says, "vacation days may not be taken during December" when the employee's contract simply said that "you have ten vacation days per year", that might constitute a unilateral change of contract which might not be enforceable for an employee with a fixed term of employment who was not an employee at will, without additional consideration. Locale is UK but (I assume) contract law is pretty universal so answers specific to any region are welcome. I have answered based upon general contract and employment law, but the UK frequently sets mandatory standards for different kinds of contracts and modifies common law rules related to contracts (much more so than the U.S.), so it wouldn't be very surprising if this were modified by a statute of which I am not aware. We have UK lawyers who contribute to Law.SE and they can chime in if there are particular statutes in the UK that apply to this question.
If an adult is raped by a minor, is it statutory rape? Say an adult is raped by a minor, and does not give legally applicable consent regardless of knowledge of age of the minor. Do statutory rape charges against the adult still apply?
This article1 directly addresses the question, "If a juvenile rapes an adult, does the adult thereby commit statutory rape?" It concludes: When an adult is raped by a juvenile, the offense of statutory rape imposes criminal liability on the adult for the same intercourse by which the adult is a victim of rape. In this way, the offense of statutory rape criminalizes being raped; it criminalizes being the victim of rape. It criminalizes the failure to prevent or resist being raped by a juvenile. And neither defenses specific to statutory rape nor defenses of general application satisfactorily preclude liability. 1. Christopher, Russell L. and Christopher, Kathryn H. (2012) "The Paradox of Statutory Rape," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 87: Iss. 2, Article 1.
england-and-wales Is this illegal? YES, NO, MAYBE Context is everything, and it depends on whether this was just playful (for want of a much better word) or sexual touching. Assuming that the "grandma" is actually her grandmother, the likely offence - if there is one at all - would be sexual activity with a child family member contrary to s.25 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003: A person (A) [i.e. grandma] commits an offence if — (a) [s]he intentionally touches another person (B) [i.e. the child], (b) the touching is sexual, (c) the relation of A to B is within section 27 [which includes grandparents], ... (e) — ... (ii) B is under 13. Touching is defined at s.79(8): (8) Touching includes touching — (a) with any part of the body, ... (c) through anything [e.g. panties] ... Sexual is defined at s.78 as: penetration, touching or any other activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that — (a) whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of its nature sexual, or (b) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual. A key point to prove is whether s.25(1)(b) is met or not, so again: context is everything. Is it legal only for women to do? NO - Both males and females (over the age of criminal responsibility of 10) can commit any sexual offence apart from rape which is purely male-specific for anatomical reasons.
For the record, factual impossibility is rarely a defense to a crime. In United States v. Thomas the court decided that men who believed they were raping a drunken unconscious women were guilty of attempted rape, even though the woman was dead at the time. In this case there is no facts that made the offense impossible to commit. The suspect clearly submitted a false prescription and obtained the drugs he or she wished to obtain. There is no impossibility. Instead the police officer, as the saying goes, has the suspect "dead to rights". This is not legal advice. Consult an attorney for that.
In Texas, sex offenses are defined in Texas Penal Code § 21.01, et seq., and rape and kindred offenses are defined as sexual assault § 22.011 and aggravated sexual assault § 22.021. None of those laws prohibit the conduct described (assuming adults who are not in a teacher-student relationship with full mental capacity), nor do they prohibit the video as long as there is no intent or threat to disclose it. Of course, not recognizing that it is the same person both times in an in person meeting when they have sex is highly implausible.
Indecent exposure is a misdemeanor under Maryland law (11-107). There is no statutory definition of indecent exposure, since it's been a long-standing offense and part of common law. Messina v. Maryland cites various definitions of indecent exposure, noting Ordinarily, the place where the exposure is made must be public. What constitutes a public place within the meaning of this offense depends on the circumstances of the case. The place where the offense is committed is a public one if the exposure be such that it is likely to be seen by a number of casual observers In that instance, the question was whether the law required multiple victims to constitute a crime, and the court said that it did not. What you propose does seem to fit the characterization "likely to be seen by a number of casual observers". There have been a number of upheld convictions of people exposing themselves on their own property but in a manner that can be seen from the street, so the defense "I was on my property" doesn't go anywhere. Accidentally being seen while inside and naked would not be a crime because, as Messina said, "Indecent exposure, to amount to a crime, must have been done intentionally". The question is whether you know that you will be seen: "An exposure becomes indecent, and a crime, when defendant exposes himself at such a time and place that, as a reasonable man, he knows or should know his act will be open to the observation of others". It's not absolutely guaranteed that you would be prosecuted, but it's pretty clear that what you propose does constitute indecent exposure.
The relevant US law is 18 USC Chapter 110. The law forbids minors depicted as engaging in "sexually explicit conduct", or forbids "child pornography", the latter section also defining "sexually explicit conduct". A minor appearing in a movie containing porn is not prohibited.
Not disclosing transgender identity is not a crime of any kind, not rape, not fraud, not anything else. There is really no qualification to this statement. There is pretty much no plausible scenario in which concealing a transgender identity leads to liability for fraud of any kind and this never constitutes rape by deception. What is a crime and is regularly prosecuted, is retaliating against the person or property of someone who they discover is transgender while having sex. Incidents like these happen with some frequency and they alway create criminal liability for the person retaliating and never for the transgender individual in the cases where the transgender individual isn't killed (dozens of time each year in the U.S. the transgender individual is killed in a situation like this one).
I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question.
Can I terminate an employee for qualifying for a job through a "degree mill?" We have recently put together an HR unit, which reviewed all our employees and found that one has an unsatisfactory qualification (BA in Public Relations from an unaccredited college). HR suggested terminating her contract with a notice. HR tells us that her degree from an unaccredited university should still be considered an academic qualification because the document is still legal. I am not satisfied with the HR reasoning: We cannot fire her for misconduct because she has not made any false claim. She claimed to have this qualification (the document) and she does. It was our responsibility to check the validity/quality of the qualification. We cannot extend misconduct claims to paid salary because there is no evidence that she failed to have the skills claimed. I feel deceived and fooled, and cannot simply let it go.
You don't have enough information. What you have is a feeling. And feelings are a lousy reason to engage in a legal action. Now, you have a very strong feeling, and that makes it seem to you like the strength of the feeling alters the above advice. Yes, it does. Very strong feelings are an exceptionally terrible reason to engage in a legal action! I never lose. My superpower is to set aside feelings, gather all the facts, including the ones I don't like, and so doing, know what the judge will say. What you need is more info. For instance, out of your prejudice, you have decided for yourself that "unaccredited" is the same thing as "degree mill". It isn't. There's a huge gulf between: an eccentric university whose brilliant management is too busy actually teaching to play the political games necessary to get an accreditation certificate, and that process may be corrupt in that state. This could be especially so if the university largely serves minorities, and the barriers to accreditation are borne out of bigotry. If so, you could blunder your company right into the middle of some other state's discrimination problem. a fake college whose solitary purpose is sneak immigrants in to take employment, by misusing student visas. a college who uses new media to teach, and their methods are too cutting-edge for the stodgy old accreditation institutions to accept. a college who represented themselves as genuine to the students, and indeed made a fair effort to book-teach them, but the person whose job was to secure accreditation didn't know what they were doing, and found an accreditation agency which wasn't genuine. Exactly what you presume: a student swaps a huge pile of money for a degree, presumably that pile of money is in the form of a private student loan at stupid interest rates. It's likely the person actually did all the real work of college, the accreditation issue is news to them, and if anyone was hoodwinked, it was them. All this misses the point: accreditation is not the important issue. What matters is whether the student applied themselves, organized themselves well, did their best, and willfully extracted a good education. A person can "do the minimum" all the way through Harvard, and be not half the employee as a go-getter at Boston Community College who exceeded the course material and snuck over to Harvard's library for more. Damn the credentials, you want the successful student. Oh wait, this is the Law SE. Why do you want the successful student? Because you have a fiduciary duty to do what is in the best interest of the company and place good employees. To follow your own Don Quixote crusade against people whose colleges had faulty accreditation, is a conflict of interest. You aren't even interested in ascertaining whether this person is a good employee. And that, really, is the bottom line. You (or rather, anyone but you) should be looking at that person's PRs and 360's, and looking at their overall performance for the company. The company's criteria for keeping or replacing should be the probability of finding someone significantly better at about the same pay rate. If this person is an earnest performer, you may have trouble doing that. It's that simple. Employees must do what is in the company's best interest. There's an old joke. Kevin asks the sales manager, "Why do you keep Morty? I've seen his written memos and reports, the guy is a terrible speller." "Yeah, but he outsells all the other salesmen 3:1," said the manager. And I pay him to sell, not to spell."
You can be fired in Canada for criticizing the employer, or even complaining about the weather. There is a distinction between Termination Without Cause and Termination With Cause. In the latter case, which requires a serious reason related to the employee's conduct, you can be fired without advance notice and with no severance pay. If the employees actions are fundamentally inconsistent with their obligation to the employer or are substantially prejudicial to the business in a way that damages employer's business or reputation, they may be terminated with cause. Examples of cause would include insubordination, theft, or abusing customers. If you want to fire a person without cause (and assuming that this is an indefinite employment contract as opposed to a fixed-term contract), you have to give "reasonable notice". There is a statutory minimum, but the courts usually apply a higher common law standard which means that you need to hire a labor lawyer to know what that period is, though 24 months is apparently a relatively safe figure (not always safe). The factors entering into that decision are described here (kind of job, length of service, age, availability of similar jobs; plus, how the termination was handled). You may also owe severance or termination pay, related to length of service and wages. Here is a calculator for Ontario. This article covers some instances in Québec where social media criticism did result in successful suspension, indicating that the employee's duty of loyalty is not entirely null when it comes to social media. In the BC case of Kim v. ITU, the court found that the dismissal over social media posts critical of the company was not for cause. However, part of the company's failure in this case was that they failed to respond immediately to what they saw as inappropriate behavior (boorish Twitter behavior). Assuming that the statements made are accurate and expressed respectfully, the prospects for Termination With Cause are significantly diminished. The prospects for some disciplinary action (suspension for a period of time) remains high -- multiple terminations were modified to long suspensions.
Yes! Some states have laws against it. RCW 9A.60.070, for example, makes it a gross misdemeanor in Washington. (2) A person is guilty of knowingly using a false academic credential if the person ... falsely claims to have a credential issued by an institution of higher education that is accredited by an accrediting association recognized as such by rule of the student achievement council: (a) In a written or oral advertisement or other promotion of a business; or (b) With the intent to: (i) Obtain employment; ... (5) Knowingly using a false academic credential is a gross misdemeanor. If a state does not have a law specific to the issue, it depends on whether the statement is made under penalty of perjury under state law. It is not uncommon to have an employment application that asks for educational information and which you sign under penalty of perjury. In addition, if the employer is a federal agency, for example, or if there is otherwise an argument that the resume is within jurisdiction of a branch of the Federal Government, the crime of making false statements could theoretically be used against a person. In reality, in a state without a law specific to this issue, it is much more likely to be a really bad idea that will tank a person's career than it is to result in a criminal charge. Except perhaps if they do it during an FBI investigation or as part of a security clearance process.
Termination is a matter of fact That is, it has either happened, or it hasn’t. Whether it has or hasn’t depends on a multitude of factors including the terms of the contract, the actions of the parties, and communication between them. These factors are so case specific that it is impossible to generalise. Further, within a given case, reasonable parties may differ on if a contract has been terminated, which party initiated the termination, and if that termination was lawful. Usually, these cases involve mutual allegations of repudiation by the other party and rightful termination in response by our side. These issues are likely to be the major ones that the court or tribunal will have to determine. A claim for damages would need to be pursued as part of the overall case but the deadline for raising them is a procedural matter for the court or tribunal. Failing to raise them as an issue in pre-litigation correspondence would not be a bar to raising them in a claim or counter-claim. However, failing to raise them at the earliest opportunity denies the offending party the opportunity to mitigate the damage and, if they can show that there were actions they could have reasonably taken to mitigate but couldn’t because they weren’t informed, then that may reduce or eliminate the damages payable.
There are not enough facts to draw a conclusion First, it’s not clear that the document you signed amounts to a contract. For example, what consideration did the school give you in return for the permission you gave them? Providing you with an education doesn’t count - they were legally obliged to do that already. If it is a contract then whether and how it can be revoked would depend on the terms of that contract witch I’m guessing you don’t have a copy of. Notwithstanding, as a minor, you have the right to void the contract until a reasonable time after you turn 18. Even if it is now many years since that happened, it might be reasonable since you only just discovered the website. If it isn’t a contract, then it would be revocable at any time. Practicalities Make a fuss and they may take the photos down even if they are not obliged to. They presumably have plenty of photos of kids who aren’t you and aren’t complaining and if you make it so it’s easier to change the website than to deal with you, thy’ll change the website. I suspect their inertia is because they once paid a web developer to create the site, it has never since been updated, they don’t know how to do it, and they don’t want to have to pay someone to find out. Otherwise, why would they have photos of ex-students rather than current students? If so, an offer by you to cover the costs, might solve your problem.
if they do admit to to such fraudulent behavior, either in writing or over the phone, what legal action can I take against them? First of all, the intermediary with whom you are dealing will not admit fraud in writing or over the phone. Most likely the intermediary knows where, when, and how to give a candidate or employee directions that are sought to advance the intermediary's fraudulent purposes. The intermediary's practices sound in violation of Georgia's Fair Business Practices Act (FBPA), OCGA 10-1-390 et seq. The Attorney General is in charge of receiving and processing/channeling all complaints pursuant to the FBPA. See 10-1-395(c). Apropos of your mention of scamming and "foreign nationals", you might want to report the intermediary with the USCIS if you reasonably suspect the intermediary's fraudulent practices extend to obtaining visas for its employees. 18 USC § 1546 sanctions the act of "procur[ing] by means of any false claim or statement" any document of authorized stay or employment in the US. You will have standing to sue the intermediary only if it does something unlawful to you. Even if you end up suing the intermediary, there is a chance that your case would be presided by some corrupt judge/narcofelon whose "philosophy" in court consists of favoring "employers and [...] anybody who's powerful". In line with one of the comments, you might also want to consider denouncing the intermediary publicly. When doing so, you need to ensure that you prove or are able to prove the statements of fact you make about the intermediary. In this publication, I made statements of fact that I can readily prove by showing evidence, such as excerpt(s) of a contract with the crooked intermediary as well as excerpts of his deposition. The only reason why I refrained from disclosing other fraudulent practices this intermediary incurred is that neither these were not recorded nor did he reflect them in writing (your evidence need not be in the form of sworn/notarized documents or court filings; records such as emails would be fine). It is comforting that you are not planning on dealing further with that kind of employer. On paper the intermediary might assure you that you retain full control of your resume, yet that will not prevent him from pressing you in ways you could hardly prove later on.
This refers to state law (not federal law) RCW 9A.60.070, titled "False academic credentials". It is against the law to issue a false academic credential, and also to use a false academic credential. Getting to the penalty part, issuing a false academic credential is a class C felony, but knowingly using a false academic credential is only a gross misdemeanor. A false academic credential is a document that provides evidence or demonstrates completion of an academic or professional course of instruction beyond the secondary level that results in the attainment of an academic certificate, degree, or rank, and that is not issued by a person or entity that: (i) Is an entity accredited by an agency recognized as such by rule of the student achievement council or has the international equivalents of such accreditation; or (ii) is an entity authorized as a degree-granting institution by the student achievement council; or (iii) is an entity exempt from the requirements of authorization as a degree-granting institution by the student achievement council; or (iv) is an entity that has been granted a waiver by the student achievement council from the requirements of authorization by the council. Such documents include, but are not limited to, academic certificates, degrees, coursework, degree credits, transcripts, or certification of completion of a degree. It then depends on the way in which you modify the transcript. One thing you could do is add text indicating that you received a BA degree, when in fact you did not receive any degree: this would be a false academic credential. If you want to go all the way for a felony charge, you have to issue and not just use a false academic credential. To issue a false credential, you have to do one of the following things: (a) Grants or awards a false academic credential or offers to grant or award a false academic credential in violation of this section; (b) Represents that a credit earned or granted by the person in violation of this section can be applied toward a credential offered by another person; (c) Grants or offers to grant a credit for which a representation as described in (b) of this subsection is made; or (d) Solicits another person to seek a credential or to earn a credit the person knows is offered in violation of this section. whereas the misdemeanor of using a false credential is (paraphrasing para 2) falsely using or claiming to have a credential issued by an accredited institution for certain purposes. Those purposes include advertisement of a business, or with the intent to get a job, license, promotion, admission to educational program, or getting a government position. However, there is also a law against forgery, which is if a person with intent to injure or defraud: (a) He or she falsely makes, completes, or alters a written instrument or; (b) He or she possesses, utters, offers, disposes of, or puts off as true a written instrument which he or she knows to be forged. A forged instrument is defined as "a written instrument which has been falsely made, completed, or altered", and a "written instrument" is (a) Any paper, document, or other instrument containing written or printed matter or its equivalent; or (b) any access device, token, stamp, seal, badge, trademark, or other evidence or symbol of value, right, privilege, or identification. and forgery is a class C felony. You can be charged with both crimes.
Education level is not an FHA protected category. However, whenever you give one broad group preferential treatment over another, you'll raise eyebrows. Someone might argue, for example, that while your incentive does not explicitly mention a protected category like race or sex, it might disproportionately impact one group in a protected category over another. In fact, the Supreme Court in 2015 addressed this question in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project. They found (albeit by a 5-4 vote) that disparate impact could, under certain circumstances, be the basis for a discrimination claim under FHA. The Wikipedia article on this subject is informative. As for your case, it really depends on what you are trying to accomplish with the policy, and what you reasonably predict it will do. For example, given that in most areas, white people more often have graduate degrees than black people, then if this policy did in fact end up advantaging white tenant over black tenants, someone might claim that you are in effect discriminating on the basis of race. I would not want to be on the defending end of that claim. In general, if you want to be safe from FHA's wrath, you need to evaluate each applicant on their individual merits as a tenant, not their membership in some group. Whenever you treat one person differently from another person, you should have a reason that clearly derives from your business interests as a landlord, and you should write it down. Legal questions aside, it seems like a really bad idea to offer incentives like this. I can't imagine it achieving any legitimate business goal, and I can easily imagine it making tenants or applicants feel cheated and devalued. And when people feel cheated and devalued, even if they haven't legally been wronged, they often seek legal redress. Or slash your tires. The fact that grad degrees would not be required under your policy isn't relevant. In the eyes of the FHA, any disparate treatment on the basis of a protected category is discrimination. The only real question here is whether this is disparate treatment on the basis of a protected category.
Will my employers contract hold up in court? When I started a new job back in July of 2017, I signed a contract that had the following bindings or restrictions if I was ever to leave the company: Cannot work for a competitor within 25 miles of current companies location for the next two years Cannot offer my services to any organization within 25 miles of current companies location for the next two years Now, when mentioned “my services” this can be related to my profession of website design. This contract seems incredibly binding, 2 years in length, and I’m looking to see if it would actually hold up in an Arizona court.
Arizona recognizes non-compete agreements. Taser Intern., Inc. v. Ward, 231 P.3d 921 (2010) reflects the relevance of the existence non-compete agreement. However, the mere existence of a non-compete clause does not guarantee it will be judicially enforced or recognized. The not-binding opinion Treeline Design Group, Inc. v. Gonshorowski reflects an instance where a covenant not to compete for two years [after termination of employment] is unreasonable and unenforceable. In line with the other answer, the Treeline decision states that determining the reasonableness of a covenant not to compete is a fact-intensive inquiry For additional Arizona cases related to non-compete agreements, search for non-compete at leagle.com.
No enforceable contract can contain illegal clauses and work Contracts can not remove some rights and never can bypass obligations. Talking to the police at times is a requirement by law, as is taking to the labor board. Responding to a subpoena is legally forced by the court. An NDA might limit the amount what you can say, and a contract might limit who you can sue, but can not ban you from suing at all. In germany, a contract that tries to curtail such requirements would be Sittenwidrig and make all clauses that try to limit the rights fully Void and nill ab initio - in fact, it can be used as evidence against the drafting party that they tried to do so. So to stay legal and keep the clause working in the limited fashion where it is not demanded, the clause cuts the contract to explicitly exclude such situations.
The statute of limitations for a breach of contract applies. This is four years in Washington State. But, if a claim isn't made within a much shorter period of time after the last work is done (typically a few months at most), the contract waives the contractor's right to a mechanic's lien in the property to enforce those contract rights. This deadline in 90 days in most cases in Washington State (with quite a bit of case law spelling out when you start counting). The contract can, of course, provide for other deadlines and consequences for not meeting them, and frequently would, especially in a construction loan financed project.
Can my accountant bill me for previous work he agreed to perform for free? No. The difficult part will be for you to prove that he agreed to do the job for free. Hence the importance of having this kind of "gentlemen's" agreements in writing. You have the burden of outweighing --even by means of circumstantial evidence-- the common presumption that professional work is done for compensation, not for free. However, just like it might be hard for you to prove the aforementioned "gentlemen's agreement", it would also be hard for him to prove that you agreed to (or knew, or should have known, you would have to) pay the amount he is billing now. In the event that you are unable to prove he agreed to work for free, you might want to dispute the reasonableness of the amounts he is pursuing so belatedly. It is noteworthy that the work at issue being "really simple" would not be the only factor for assessing how much he may recover. Other factors such as the accountant's qualifications or the market rate for similar services would be weighed in awarding recovery (if any). Can I legally ignore these invoices? It does not make any sense that he sends me invoices for work done 4 years ago. You may ignore the invoices regarding older work, that is, those for which the period of limitations has elapsed. For most cases, section 4 of the Ontario Limitations Act provides a two-year period to bring a claim. Since the accountant himself did the job, and most likely he was --or should have been-- aware of the payments due for his services, he would be unable to prove that his "discovery" of claims (see section 5 of Limitations Act) regarding older tax filings meets the period of limitations. Equivalently, see here the paragraph starting with "For example, if the courts determine that [...]".
The law regarding proof of service allows service of summons by publication in case a defendant "is not a resident of the state, but has property therein and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action". Plaintiff must file an affidavit saying that he believes that you are not a resident, and he either mailed the summons to you or states that your residence is unknown. Knowing how to contact a person is not exactly the same as knowing their residence, so the statement in the affidavit might be true. There is a one year limit on your right to defend and reopen if not served personally. The statute of limitations tolls after the cause of action has accrued (which I suppose would be defective service of the summons, viz. perjury in the affadavit). For recovery of real property, the time would be ten years. The court rules allow that "At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued". (This is clearly a matter that your attorney needs to address).
I would recommend talking to an adult person in HR. I'm quite sure they will notice that what your manager wants to do is more than dodgy, and doing something dodgy may be in the interest of your manager, but not in the interest of the company. The best thing is to go to HR, acting as if a mistake has been made, and point out to them what your start date was, and that the new contract has the incorrect starting date, and they need to fix this mistake or you can't sign the contract. If they insist you sign it, then you DON'T sign it. If they say you will be fired if you don't sign it, then you tell them that in that case you would get legal advice. BTW. You definitely don't sign this as it is. PS. This answer was posted on workplace.stackexchange, not law.stackexchange, so please don't complain if there is no legal content.
Notwithstanding in this case takes its ordinary meaning - "despite": Despite anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, any provision of this Agreement which provides for me to assign any of my rights to a Work shall not apply to any invention developed on my own time without using equipment, supplies, facilities or trade secrets… Without having the text of the rest of the relevant parts of the contract, my initial interpretation is that the effect of this, is that you would not need to assign your rights to Works produced in your own time without connection to your paid employment. Also, if this was subordinate to the other clauses you mentioned, then it would have little or no effect. Finally, the general legal principle is that works produced in your own time with no connection to your employment (resources, knowledge or otherwise) are not assigned, unless specifically stated. That is, the contract would generally explicitly state that works produced in your own time with no reliance on your employment are assigned to the Employer. However, such a term is almost certainly unreasonable and could be challenged in court if the employer ever attempted to enforce it.
is it legally acceptable to state that 7.5 hours is the standard amount No. Because you are a contractor not employee, there is no "standard" to refer to. You are only entitled to what your contract provides for, that is £N per day no matter how much time you worked. That said, if there is no word "overtime" in the contract, you cannot use one to justify how much you charge. You can, though, charge for weekend days (unless the contract explicitly prohibits working on weekends). what should be done about going into the future with this work and asking for a revised contract? 1) Learn the lesson; 2) Make up your mind about what you want to be paid for: hours, days or output; 3) Discuss/negotiate contract terms with your clients.
Do I have the right to ask Github to hide my Contribution activity according to General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Do I have the right to ask Github to hide my "Contribution activity" on my public profile page?
The "Contribution activity" is extracted from repositories hosted on Github. Looking at the privacy statement, Github considers itself as a hosting service for those repositories. See EU Directive 2000/31/EC Article 14 for the exact definition and conditions: Article 14 Hosting Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that: (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information. Article 2(4) GDPR defines that the GDPR does not apply (to Github) in this case This Regulation shall be without prejudice to the application of Directive 2000/31/EC, in particular of the liability rules of intermediary service providers in Articles 12 to 15 of that Directive. Extracting data from the repositories to create a nicely formatted contribution activity list, would still be considered hosting as defined at Directive 2000/31/EC, because Github does not (manually) redact or modify commits. So if you want to hide your contribution activity, you must delete the contributions. And you should not ask Github to do that, but ask the owners of the repositories. And they might have good reasons to deny your request. If an owner of a repository denies your request without a good reason, you can ask Github to do so. But Github would then probably deny that request, because they explain in their privacy statement that modifying the history is not possible: The email address you have supplied via your Git commit settings will always be associated with your commits in the Git system. If you chose to make your email address private, you should also update your Git commit settings. We are unable to change or delete data in the Git commit history — the Git software is designed to maintain a record — but we do enable you to control what information you put in that record. edit To further clarify why Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC applies, see case C-236/08 (Google v. Louis Vuitton) where the European Court of Justice clarifies the meaning of that article (ECLI:EU:C:2010:159): In that regard, it follows from recital 42 in the preamble to Directive 2000/31 that the exemptions from liability established in that directive cover only cases in which the activity of the information society service provider is ‘of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature’, which implies that that service provider ‘has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored’. Accordingly, in order to establish whether the liability of a referencing service provider may be limited under Article 14 of Directive 2000/31, it is necessary to examine whether the role played by that service provider is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data which it stores. The way Github creates/shows the contribution activity is in my opinion technical, automatic and passive. That means it is not liable, and that implies that the GDPR does not directly apply, unless data is unlawful, and someone notifies Github of that: The restriction on liability set out in Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31 applies to cases ‘[w]here an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service’ and means that the provider of such a service cannot be held liable for the data which it has stored at the request of a recipient of that service unless that service provider, after having become aware, because of information supplied by an injured party or otherwise, of the unlawful nature of those data or of activities of that recipient, fails to act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to those data. Surely the GDPR might be the reason data is unlawful. But you need a reason, in particular based on Article 17 ("right to be forgotten"). For example if personal data of a 12 year old child is processed without permission of it's parent. Without such a reason the legitimate interest of the repository owner will probably prevail (who wants to keep the git history complete).
An Art 15 Subject Access Request (SAR) “shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.” It would be a grave violation of privacy for an email provider to search its users' account contents. It is therefore likely that the email provider would refuse to fulfil that subject request, unless required to perform a search via a court order. Instead, the SAR could be directed to the account holder (Alice or Dave), if they are subject to the GDPR. Depending on the exact legal framework, emails might be protected under confidentiality of communications rules, making such searches similarly illegal to wiretapping. At least in germany, I am fairly certain that an email provider would be criminally liable if they were to disclose emails from their users' email accounts to a third party.
You're misreading the law. You need to keep reading the section you referenced (emphasis added): The disclosure...shall be made in writing and delivered through the consumer’s account with the business, if the consumer maintains an account with the business, or by mail or electronically at the consumer’s option if the consumer does not maintain an account with the business Thus, the option to have the disclosure sent by mail only applies to consumers who do not have an account with the business. Since presumably a large number of sites only maintain personal information for users with accounts, such sites need not provide a mail option. Further, it doesn't say there needs to be a button: you just need the ability to say you'd like it mailed to you in the request somehow, and then they need to comply when you do.
If you process any personal data, you do need to provide notice to the data subjects per Art 13 or Art 14 GDPR. Personal data is any information relating to a (directly or indirectly) identifiable natural person. It seems you are processing personal data including as addresses, PayPal accounts, and IBANs. Thus you're in scope of the GDPR. The GDPR does have an exception when data is processed for “purely personal or household purposes”, but that very likely does not apply to you. The German Datenschutzkonferenz (DSK), a cooperation of the German supervisory authorities, has published a handout on information obligations, listing which information has to be provided in a privacy notice: https://datenschutzkonferenz-online.de/media/kp/dsk_kpnr_10.pdf Such a privacy notice can be fairly short if you're don't doing anything special, in particular if you only use the data as necessary to fulfil the sale contract and then as legally required (e.g. for keeping financial records). There are privacy notice generators that can help with the boilerplate, but be aware that some are significantly outdated, and that in any case you have to fill in the information about your concrete processing activities. You have guessed correctly that you will need to inform your customers about your data retention periods. Your privacy notice will get more complicated if you also want to use this data in other ways, for example for marketing purposes. That would also require you to think about appropriate legal bases (e.g. legitimate interests, or consent).
Update: On 1 October 2019 the CJEU ruled in Case C‑673/17 (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband vs. Planet49 GmbH) that cookies require explicit consent regardless of personal data is being processed. (Where the exceptions don't apply). (paragraphs 68-70 of the ruling). That does probably invalidate my answer below. However, because I have based my answer on information provided by the Dutch DPA, I will not update my answer until that DPA has responded on this. Basically, your thoughts are all correct. The Dutch DPA (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens) has written a manual how to use Google Analytics compliant with the GDPR without having to ask for consent. But unfortunately it is not available in English. Based on Art. 28 GDPR, you need a Data Processing Amendment with google. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Scroll down to the data processing amendment Open it Accept it Click Save Anonymize your visitors IP Address. A full IP address is considered personal data. It is possible to remove the last octet before it is processed by google. Add { ‘anonymize_ip’: true } to the tracking code on your website Create a screenshot of the change, so you can prove later at which date you made this change. Disable Data Sharing with google. By default Google uses the data for 5 different purposes. Each of them would require consent from the visitor of your website. So you need to switch that off. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Scroll down to the data sharing settings Uncheck all checkboxes (Google producs & services, Benchmarking, Technical support, Account specialists and access for sales experts) Click Save Disable Data Collection for Advertising. This has to be disabled at a different location, for the same reason as the previous step. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Choose Property settings Choose Tracking info Choose Data collection Turn off these two options (remarketing and advertising reporting) Click Save Disable the User-ID feature. This is probably turned off by default. But it is important to keep it turned off. So you need to verify this. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Choose Property settings Choose Trackinginfo Choose User-ID Disable it Click Save Even though you don't need consent to use Google Analytics, you still need to inform your users, for example by adding a few lines to your privacy policy explaining: You are using Google Analytics cookies. You have a data processing agreement with google. You have enabled IP anonymization/masking. You have disabled data sharing. You are not using any other google services in combination with Google Analytics. The Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens still recommends to offer an opt-out for Google Analytics, but it would not be required. As the Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens is a DPA as defined in chapter 6 of the GDPR, you have to assume their advice really is GDPR complaint. In the past they also had performed other investigations to the privacy policies of google.
The GDPR only require explicit (hard) consent if you use the cookie to store personal data. Given the conditions you cite, the data you store is not personal data, so this cookie does not require consent. In theory, someone having access to both session cookie and "analytics cookie" could relate the two, but that is highly non-trivial. You may have to do DPIA to demonstrate that this is non-trivial, or that you have mitigation in place to mitigate staff abusing such access. But provided things are as you say, the "analytics" cookie does not require consent.
“From your perspective you should not worry about asking permission to use reCaptcha as it is not you who is processing the data it is google and any GDPR compliance falls on them.“ This is plain wrong. If a user visits your website you are the controller of data collected on your website. Regardless of what entity collects that data. However in my non-legal opinion reCAPTCHA falls under Article 6 section 1d and 1f. Also Recital 49. 1d: “processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person;” While you could argue in some cases (most probably) reCAPTCHA is used to reduce spam to a business entity thus not a “natural person”. 1f: “processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.” Here is where the real ruling applies “Legitimate interests”. You as a business have a legitimate interest in reducing spam into your business. Not only does spam take up your time but it also takes up your resources. As to the extent in which spam takes up is dependent on the usage in question. But nearly everyone can safely assume reducing spam (one of the cornerstones of the GDPR) is a legitimate interest. Recital 49 (excerpt): The processing of personal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security, i.e. the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data, and the security of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those networks and systems, […] by providers of electronic communications networks and services and by providers of security technologies and services, constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. This could, for example, include preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications networks and malicious code distribution and stopping ‘denial of service’ attacks and damage to computer and electronic communication systems.
You wrote: As far as I believe, it is permitted under GDPR to record and store non-anonymized web server access logs, as these can be useful for security reasons. True, Recital 49 GDPR: The processing of personal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security, i.e. the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data, and the security of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those networks and systems, by public authorities, by computer emergency response teams (CERTs), computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), by providers of electronic communications networks and services and by providers of security technologies and services, constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. This could, for example, include preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications networks and malicious code distribution and stopping ‘denial of service’ attacks and damage to computer and electronic communication systems. You asked: My question is whether this anonymization process counts as processing personally identifiable data under GDPR? IP addresses are personal data in some cases, so yes, you're processing personal data. Then, these anonymized logs will be fed into an analytics tool to provide stats on unique visitors, page hits, etc. These are purposes considered compatible with initial purposes according to Article 5.1.(b): Personal data shall be (...) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for (...) statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose limitation’); As a matter of fact, you might be required to anonymize the data for those purposes, see Article 89.1: Processing for (...) statistical purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that technical and organisational measures are in place in particular in order to ensure respect for the principle of data minimisation. Those measures may include pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner. If I were to anonymize the logs and continue to use them exclusively for security reasons, would that change anything? No, you would be processing data in a manner compatible with initial purposes (ensuring network and information security). Or does it not matter what I do with them once they are anonymized? Yes, it does. If you're not using them for "archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes" then you're using them for purposes incompatible with initial purposes. You would need to find new legal basis for processing. does this extra anonymization process on top then take it over the line meaning that consent and a privacy notice would be required? It depends on what you want to do with anonymized data. In your case, for security purposes or security and statistical purposes, you don't need the consent and there is no requirement for the privacy notice (but sure, it would be nice to publish one). For other purposes it might be different.
Impact on visitations after license is revoked due to failure to pay child support The background (United States): Wife took four children and left husband due to abuse After a very contentious separation, husband was awarded partial custody (every other weekend, one evening a week) Husband was ordered to pay child support Because it was very difficult for the parents to come to agreement, and because of the history of abuse from the husband, the details of child exchange were determined by court order. The children have to be exchanged at the same (public) location in all cases, at the pre-determined days/times without exception. The now-ex-husband is frequently behind on child support Ex-husband was recently given 30 days by the state to get caught up on child support or have his drivers license and registration suspended. There is a good chance that ex-husband will not get caught up in time. Main Question: if the child exchange time and locations are fixed, and the husband can no longer legally drive, does this effectively nullify his visitation rights? (presuming he insists on picking up the children himself in his own car with a suspended license/registration) The drop off location is near her house, not his, and even if public transportation were an option he would not be the type to use it. He's more the type that would ignore the suspension of his license and go pick up the kids in his car anyway. He is also the kind to try to attempt to manipulate the wife into doing what he wants regardless of what a court order says. Emotional abuse and manipulation were a big part of his game, but fortunately she has gotten much better at ignoring it. Follow up questions: If he has his license revoked and attempts to pick up the children as always, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she allows him to pick up the kids? Would there be any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses to allow him to pick up the children himself with a suspended license/registration? If he attempts to convince her to drop the kids off somewhere else (presumably at his house) due to the suspension of his license, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses?
if the child exchange time and locations are fixed, and the husband can no longer legally drive, does this effectively nullify his visitation rights? No. He can get a ride from someone or get an Uber or Lyft or Taxi or take a bus. The drop off location is near her house, not his, and even if public transportation were an option he would not be the type to use it. He's more the type that would ignore the suspension of his license and go pick up the kids in his car anyway. He is also the kind to try to attempt to manipulate the wife into doing what he wants regardless of what a court order says. Emotional abuse and manipulation were a big part of his game, but fortunately she has gotten much better at ignoring it. What he is inclined to do and why have nothing to do with whether or not it is legal. If he has his license revoked and attempts to pick up the children as always, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she allows him to pick up the kids? Practically speaking, no, particularly in light of a court order to transfer custody. Theoretically, it is remotely possible, even though it is very unlikely. In theory, she could be held liable for negligent child neglect by allowing this to happen, particularly if the children were then harmed in an automobile accident. If he was visibly drunk or intoxicated at the time of the transfer, however, her risk of criminal liability would be considerable. Would there be any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses to allow him to pick up the children himself with a suspended license/registration? Potentially, she could be held in contempt of court for refusing to follow a court order. Her better course would be to call the police when he arrived to report that he is driving with suspended license, to not transfer the children and wait until they arrive (seeking cover inside a home and advising the 911 operator again if the situation starts to escalate into a potentially violent situation), and to explain to the police that he is also attempting to endanger the children by trying to drive with them on a suspended license. There is a good chance that he would be arrested and that the police would leave her with the children. The police might, rather than arresting him, drive him home with the kids and tell him not to drive and cite him for driving with a suspended license. Then, she should make an emergency motion to the court, regardless of how it is resolved by the police, seeking permission to formally give her a right to refuse to transfer if he arrives unaccompanied with a suspended license. If he attempts to convince her to drop the kids off somewhere else (presumably at his house) due to the suspension of his license, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses? Probably not. This time he's not following the court order, not her. It would still be advisable for her to file an emergency motion with the court explaining the situation.
What can we do to dismiss such report? Does she just show up at a local police department telling them that she's fine and it was her own decision? In short, yes. She shows up at a local police station, tells her side of the story including the whole bit about things getting destroyed and her getting kicked out, cites the missing persons report, and make it clear that she's not missing but an independent adult who is free and making her own decisions. Since she's over 18, she can do that. (Bringing proof of age might be helpful.) The mystery of the missing person will be considered solved from the police side. She does not have to give a specific address where she's living, just convince the officer that she's OK and making an intentional decision to create distance between herself and her mother. She could also try calling (the same local station which is convenient to her current location) before showing up to see if that satisfies the officer, and only go in if needed. Would I get in trouble for being in a relationship with her daughter since I was 20 and she was 16? We had never met in person until now, to avoid any trouble. Shouldn't be a problem, as long as it's a mutually willing (non-coercive) relationship. Her mother said the police also wanted to talk to me separately. I do not want to get involved in this at all. Can I reject it? Yes, you can reject it. You do not have to answer ANY question a police officer asks; you have the right to remain silent and/or to say only "I have the right to remain silent." To reduce the probability that they'll even ask questions, you might prefer not accompanying your girlfriend when she goes to clear the missing persons report, if she goes in-person. This adds more weight to her assertion that she's going there to clear it of her own free will, not because you're forcing her.
How I understand your question You have asked about mechanisms to "ensure the return" or something that will "trigger a law-enforcement or legal action if the child does not leave the US on the end of the submitted trip schedule." So I take it as premises of your question that there is a parenting agreement regarding schedule and return, and this trip will happen. Dale M's answer provides advice about what he recommends to a person in such a situation. However, I recognize that many parenting orders include a term that allows international travel that can't be unreasonably refused by the other parent,1 or that allow international travel with no consent necessary.2 There is no mechanism There is no mechanism to pre-register a potential violation of a parenting agreement with a foreign state. I cannot cite to a source to prove a negative, but I am familiar with the operation of the Hague Convention and non-Hague Convention regimes and none that I have encountered have such a mechanism. I have also spent some time looking to see if I have missed something, and am still convinced there is no such mechanism. 1. 2020 BCPC 16: "He shall not unreasonably withhold his written consent to such a trip. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, Y.N. has liberty to apply for a court order. If the court, on such application, finds that W.G. has unreasonably withheld his consent to such a trip, he is hereby put on notice that he may be ordered to pay Y.N.’s expenses incurred in bringing the application." 2. 2018 ABQB 1031 ("Each party shall be entitled to travel internationally with the children without the consent of the other party upon providing 30 days notice of such travel along with a full itinerary including flight information, destination, where the parties are staying and contact information."); 2010 ABPC 410 ("I will allow T.C. to travel outside the country without the written consent of the father."); 2021 ONCJ 440 ("Either party may travel with the Child outside of Canada during his or her parenting time. The Father requires the consent of the Mother, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The Mother may travel internationally with the Child without the consent of the Father, but she must advise him accordingly."); 2020 ABQB 434 ("either party may travel during their respective vacation or ordinary parenting time in Canada or internationally to any Hague Convention Country, without the consent of the other party"); 2017 BCSC 1463 ("The claimant is at liberty to travel with the Children both in Canada and internationally without the consent of the respondent.")
If you have a license and drive but forget your license and get pulled over what happens? You could receive a summons or citation (a.k.a. "ticket") for failing to carry a driver's license. Section § 46.2-104 of the Virginia Code states that it is a traffic infraction with a $10 fine to not have your license while driving. The operator of any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer being operated on the highways in the Commonwealth, shall have in his possession: (i) the registration card issued by the Department or the registration card issued by the state or country in which the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is registered, and (ii) his driver's license, learner's permit, or temporary driver's permit. Every person licensed by the Department as a driver . . . who fails to carry his license. . . for the vehicle which he operates, shall be guilty of a traffic infraction and upon conviction punished by a fine of ten dollars. (Emphasis added.) Do you get a penalty for forgetting it at your house? Yes, if you have a valid license that you left at home, you can get the case dismissed by showing the license to the the court (presumably a clerk), but you will still have to pay "court costs." However, if any person summoned to appear before a court for failure to display his license . . . presents, before the return date of the summons, to the court a license or permit issued to him prior to the time the summons was issued . . . or appears pursuant to the summons and produces before the court a license or permit issued to him prior to the time the summons was issued . . . , he shall, upon payment of all applicable court costs, have complied with the provisions of this section. Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-104 (2016).
Will UKVI allow a concession for this specific situation? Only your wife's UKVI caseworker can definitely answer this with any certainty, but as you say CR2.3 (b) does seem quite compelling but (c) less so - unless the medical records support her condition was "life-threatening" ...any period spent outside the UK will not count towards the 180-day limit if the absence was for any of the following reasons: [...] (b) travel disruption due to natural disaster, military conflict or pandemic; or (c) compelling and compassionate personal circumstances, such as the life-threatening illness of the applicant, or life-threatening illness or death of a close family member; [...]
No Such a contract would be an attempt to evade the court order mandating a given level of support, and would not be enforceable. However it is not the case that no contract can deal with Child Custody or Child Support. A couple could surely make a contract to pay more than a court had ordered, that in no way violates the order. A contract could specify a default or initial amount of support, to be paid until and unless a court orders a different amount. Similarly a contract could specify initial custody, pending any court decision to the contrary, but it cannot preclude the court from making an order in accordance with the best interests of the child.
Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.
2201.4 Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated at all or such times as shall be indicated by official traffic control devices. I'm failing to see the "... except when pulling over for the police" subclause. Equally there is no "... unless you think you should" subclause. If you choose to have a hearing the evidence will show unambiguously that you drove the wrong way in a one way street and you will testify as to your reasons for doing so. For you to avoid the violation you would need to convince the examiner that a) you are telling the truth and b) that your mindset is in any way relevant. Unless the officer clearly directed you to pull into that spot, the decision to do so appears to be yours. I'd pay the fine if it was me.
Is it illegal to sell tobacco online without a license, and can you grow it on your balcony legally? Wanted to know if it is illegal to sell products that contain tobacco online in the state of Maryland, USA. Let’s say I was starting up a cigar shop. I’m growing tobacco out on my balcony, and decide that my tobacco is fine enough to sell. Since I don’t have the money to pay rent/electricity at a shop, I open up the shop online. Is it illegal to sell tobacco without a license?
No. You may not legally sell tobacco without a license. Tobacco is subject to excise taxation at the state and federal level and to requirements to verify the age of the customer in every state. You must be licensed to comply with these requirements.
Federal deceptive advertising regulations do not apply to restaurant menus, and sale of escolar is legal in the US. Legal recourse would have to be via state law. Such legal action is conceivable, for example it would be "menu fraud" to sell chuck steak as "Kobe beef", and the practice of selling shark meat disks as scallops is likewise illegal. Fish are problematic since multiple species can be commonly called by a single name (sole, halibut, cod, snapper, sardine, herring). It is possible that in a certain market, "white tuna" is standardly understood to be albacore tuna, therefore it would be fraudulent to sell escolar as "white tuna". That would be the point that has to be proven in a legal action, that the term has a specific interpretation. Analogously, there are a number of creamed vegetable products sold as "hummus" which contain no chickpeas (by original definition, hummus is chickpeas and not soybeans). By dint of such variant use over time, it is not deceptive to sell mashed soybeans as "hummus". The tuna industry may well hope to limit the use of the term "tuna", but there is no regulation defining "white tuna". It should be noted that there is a regulation, 21 CFR 161.190 for canned tuna, dictating that only albacore tuna may be called "white meat tuna".
I'll give you the situation in Washington, which is probably similar to the situation elsewhere. RCW 68.50.130 say that you have to follow the law in disposing of a body. To perform a cremation, you need a license. The regulations established by the Department of Licensing say that cremations take place in a crematory, and the facility must be licensed. We turn to the definition of crematory, which is a building or area of a building that houses one or more cremation chambers, to be used for the cremation of human remains This applies to hydrolysis facilities as well, but not composting facilities (which can simply be "real property").
Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.
Typically, these notices are required where the individual packaging lacks the statutory nutritional and warning labels. If this is the reason for the prohibition, selling them separately is a breach of public health law. It may also be a breach of contract with the vendor of the collective pack. Breaking them up and placing them in vending machines, even if those are not accessible to the public is probably unlawful.
I can't see anything to say this is a state-wide ban. Do they have to give an opportunity to return unused fireworks for a refund? The ban imposed by Portland Fire and Rescue appears to relate to the use, not possession, of fireworks so I assume that the stores' / State's regular refund policies would apply. Due to unusually hot temperatures and dry conditions, PF&R is announcing an immediate ban on the use of all legal and illegal fireworks...
It’s legal The regulations provide limits on various bacteria. If the product is made from raw milk, the manufacturer must implement a testing regime for those bacteria. If it’s made from treated milk, they avoid this cost.
Copyright The photographer, not the subject(s) own the copyright in the picture. So, unless this was a selfie, you have no rights in the picture. Privacy If the photo was taken in circumstances where a reasonable person would expect privacy, then revealing it to others might be a tort of privacy breach. In most common law jurisdictions this area of the law is undeveloped. However, if the photo was taken from a public place (even if you were in a private place), or with your permission, this doesn’t apply. Intimate images In some jurisdictions, the distribution of intimate images without the permission of the subject is a crime. Intimate does not include a photo that is merely embarrassing. Bullying This is probably bullying behaviour but bullying per se is generally not illegal. It might be illegal if the bullying is motivated by a protected characteristic (race, age, gender, sexuality etc.) but that usually requires a context - employment, public accommodation etc. it might also be illegal hate speech even outside such an institutional framework. Similarly, within an institutional context like a workplace or school there might be policies around bullying; these might have the force of law but are probably quasi-contractural matters. However, a private person doing it because they don’t like you and want to humiliate or embarrass you is probably not doing anything illegal.
Do the GDPR and Cookie-Law regulations apply to localStorage? We use the localStorage API to store information about the login data to keep the user logged in through various sessions (we do not store personal information), furthermore the localStorage data is not accessible by third-parties. Should we show the banner asking for permission to use cookies (the legislation requires to use the name cookie also for similar technologies) anyway?
The official EU-legislation does not use the word "cookies", except in the recitals. The "Cookie-Law" is part of the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 2002/58/EC and is amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, where the relevant text of Article 5(3) is found: Member States shall ensure that the storing of information, or the gaining of access to information already stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned has given his or her consent, having been provided with clear and comprehensive information, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia, about the purposes of the processing. This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order for the provider of an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide the service. This is a Directive, which is not directly binding, member states must implement it in their own law. But there will not be large differences to the text above. The guidance from the UK's ICO includes useful examples in particular about the exceptions to obtain consent. There is an exception to the requirement to provide information about cookies and obtain consent where the use of the cookie is: (a) for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network; or (b) where such storage or access is strictly necessary for the provision of an information society service requested by the subscriber or user. The best example is a shopping cart: This exception is likely to apply, for example, to a cookie used to ensure that when a user of a site has chosen the goods they wish to buy and clicks the ‘add to basket’ or ‘proceed to checkout’ button, the site ‘remembers’ what they chose on a previous page. This cookie is strictly necessary to provide the service the user requests (taking the purchase they want to make to the checkout) and so the exception would apply and no consent would be required. And there is a negative example which is unlikely to fall within the exception: Cookies used to recognise a user when they return to a website so that the greeting they receive can be tailored In your question you explicitly state localStorage to keep a user logged in. LocalStorage is "storing of information in the terminal equipment of a subscriber". If you want to keep a user logged in, the user has performed a log in step. So you provide a service to keep the user logged in, which is exactly what the user wanted. So the exception would apply and you don't need to obtain consent. For example this stackexchange website also keeps me logged in, so the exception would apply here. However, you must make sure that you don't use the cookie/localStorage in a way which is incompatible with the exception. For example it would probably not be allowed to use the same cookie to count unique visitors to your website. If personal data is processed to store login data, Art. 6(1)(b) GDPR would probably apply; Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; So the GDPR would also not require you to ask for permission.
No. Art. 17(1) GDPR lists conditions when erasure can be requested. None of the listed grounds would apply in this case. However, you might have to explain why you process the data (for moderation purposes as you explained above), and why that is lawfully. In particular Art. 5 and Art. 6 need to be taken into account. In your case, processing will be based on Art. 6(1)(f): (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Even if the data subject would be a 9 year old child, the legitimate interests of you and other forum users outweigh the objection of the data subject. Based on Art. 5, there will be a moment when the data has to be deleted. For example 1 year after the last login attempt.
From the WP 29 Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption - 00879/12/EN WP 194: Persistent login cookies which store an authentication token across browser sessions are not exempted under CRITERION B. This is an important distinction because the user may not be immediately aware of the fact that closing the browser will not clear their authentication settings. They may return to the website under the assumption that they are anonymous whilst in fact they are still logged in to the service. The commonly seen method of using a checkbox and a simple information note such as “remember me (uses cookies)” next to the submit form would be an appropriate means of gaining consent therefore negating the need to apply an exemption in this case. So a cookie to keep a user logged in, requires consent. But the checkbox "Keep me logged in" is appropriate to gain consent. So in your case you do not need to display a cookie banner.
Yes, you could do this be means of the EULA, provided you are not in the EU yourself. You only have to comply with the GDPR if you are offering a product or service to people that are in the EU. If you are making it clear that whatever you offer is not available to Europeans, you make your site exempt from the GDPR.
The GDPR does not set fixed retention periods. Instead, it says data may not be kept for longer than necessary. What is necessary depends very much on the specific context of the processing activity, in particular on the purpose of processing. The GDPR allows retention for as long as necessary. For example, businesses (including financial institutions) are required to keep financial records. This requirement stems from EU member state law, which also sets specific retention periods. If a business wants to keep personal data in financial records for longer than this retention period, they can't just point to the law to authorize this processing – they must instead find a different purpose why they need to keep the data, and then find a suitable Art 6 legal basis. In some cases, retention periods might not be coupled to a fixed duration, but to certain events. For example, personal data for online accounts should typically be kept until the account is closed, which is potentially indefinite. This follows directly from the GDPR approach of limiting data storage by necessity, not by duration. All processing needs a clear purpose + a legal basis. In the context of a genealogy site, the site should analyze carefully what data they collect for what purposes. These purposes might enable potentially unlimited retention. But such processing must also be covered by a legal basis, and I doubt that the site would have a legal basis to make such storage irrevocable. If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(a) consent, then the data can only be used as consented to, and consent can always be withdrawn in the future. If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract, then the data can be used for compatible purposes in the sense of Art 6(4), but that would require a new legal basis (e.g. legitimate interest). If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(f) legitimate interest, then the data can be used for Art 6(4) compatible purposes but the data subject has the Art 21 right to object to processing. While a genealogy site may have a legitimate interest in keeping supplied data in order to use it for future research, I think this is a fairly weak legitimate interest that can be easily overridden by an Art 21 objection, which in turn could require Art 17 erasure of the data. The genealogy site should also keep in mind principles like data minimisation and data protection by design and by default, so just keeping data for the off chance that it might be useful in the future is not GDPR-compliant. Data can only be collected and processed for “specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes”. The Art 89 privilege for research purposes also imposes conditions. There is a pretty big carveout in these GDPR requirements for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes, and statistical purposes. Specific rules for this exemption are given in Art 89 GDPR. The main value of this exemption is that Art 89 research purposes are always considered compatible with the purpose for which the data was originally collected (cf Art 5(1)(b)), though this might not cover data that was collected under the legal basis of consent (cf Art 6(4)). Other GDPR rules stay intact, and Art 89(1) imposes extra steps to consider: Special attention MUST be given to the data minimisation principle. If the research purpose can be achieved without identifiable data, the data MUST be anonymized. If the research purpose can be achieved with pseudonymized data, pseudonymization MUST be used. Appropriate safeguards MUST be implemented (though this just re-iterates the general requirement in Art 24). In some cases, the research purpose stands in conflict with data subject rights like the right to be informed or the right to object. If so, EU or member state law can provide exemptions from the data subject rights, but can also impose further conditions or safeguards. It is not possible to rely on the Art 89 exception without taking member state law into account. Art 89 does not modify necessity-based retention. Now on to the main question: how long can the personal data be kept for research purposes? While Art 89 research purposes allow us to extend the retention period because we have a new and compatible purpose of processing, it does not affect the general principle that data may only be kept as long as necessary for that purpose. In a scientific context, it would be common to preserve many data sets indefinitely for the purpose of enabling reproducibility of the scientific findings. A privately-run genealogy service might not benefit from Art 89. This “research” angle doesn't seem to be a good fit for a genealogy site. Such a site would typically not be collecting personal data for specific research purposes. At best, it would be operating as an archive of personal data which can be mined by future generations of researchers. But the GDPR specifically only considers archiving purposes in the public interest, which might not cover privately run archives. Archives rely on specific privileges in national laws, and severely restrict access to the information. For example, I'm leafing through the law on public archives in a German state. It forbids access for 10–100 years, depending on the date of death of the data subject and on the age of the documents. This leads me to believe that a privately run genealogy site cannot reasonably rely on the Art 89 exemption, and must instead rely on an ordinary processing purpose + corresponding Art 6 legal basis. This doesn't directly prevent indefinite storage, but means that it will be easy for a data subject to invoke their right to erasure. It is not quite enough to say “we will keep the data indefinitely”, it is also necessary to have a clear purpose for this retention.
I don't believe GDPR makes a distinction between 'real life' and 'online'. It's all real life. You can tell anyone that they don't have consent to keep your personal data, but that doesn't mean they always have to delete it. There are six lawful bases for processing of personal data, so if an organisation is using and can justify one other than consent then they don't necessarily have to delete your data when they ask. The six bases are listed by the UK Information Commissioner's Office: (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/#ib3
The cookie consent requirement comes from the ePrivacy Directive, not from the GDPR. While the GDPR defines consent, cookie consent is required regardless of whether the cookie actually contains personal data. Instead, it says we can access information stored on an end users device under the following circumstances. Technical access to the information is used for the sole purpose of performing a transmission over a network, e.g. using a browser cache. Accessing the information is strictly necessary for providing a service explicitly requested by the user, e.g. session cookies or a consent-declined cookie. The user has given consent to the access, where consent is defined by the GDPR (freely given, informed, specific, …). The first scenario likely doesn't apply because your cookies aren't likely to be “technical storage or access” in the sense of ePrivacy, and because the tracking cookies wouldn't be used for the sole purpose of carrying out a transmission. The second scenario doesn't apply because tracking cookies are not strictly necessary to interact with the webshop, as evidenced by the possibility to opt out. The service explicitly requested by the user is the webshop or website, not the A/B testing. This only leaves consent as possible grounds for storing or accessing information on the user's device. It is already the storing or access that is covered by ePrivacy, not only later use as a persistent identifier. Your suggestion – to first set the cookie and then delete it if it shouldn't have been set – is more compliant than many set-ups I've seen, but is still technically non-compliant. It is also likely to fail in practice under non-ideal network conditions: if the request to see whether GDPR applies times out, or if the user closes the browser tab before the cookie will be deleted, the tracking cookie will remain without consent. I would instead suggest to consider the following points. It seems that by itself, Optimizely Web cannot be used in a compliant manner since it doesn't provide sufficient control over how cookies are managed. Thus, you should avoid loading such tracking scripts unless consent has been given, or unless this processing falls outside of EU/UK law. Currently, you defer loading of tracking scripts until you know if you have to ask for consent. This can be avoided if you always ask for consent :) This can also be avoided if you load the tracking scripts from a server that can independently determine whether the requests comes from the EU. For non-EU requests and for users with opt-in, the server can return the original tracking scripts. Otherwise, the server returns a dummy script. This server can be independent from your website's hosting. By combining the jurisdiction decision with the loading of the script, one roundtrip is saved and latency is reduced. Finally, no one is forcing you to use Shopify, and ePrivacy/GDPR is not required to accommodate their limitations. You do have different choices: use Shopify, at the cost of slow pages and limited A/B tests use a different A/B test provider that can be used without setting cookies use edge computing to do stuff in between of the browser and the original server use a different webshop platform ignore EU laws Well, one of them is clearly unethical. But you do have choices, and which choice you take is a business decision. Slow pageloads and consent banners are likely costing you conversions, but Shopify might be providing massive value that outweighs all that.
By itself, a chess position is not personal data. Personal data is “any information relating to an … identifiable natural person”. Since the file in question includes the name of the opponent, it is clearly personal data about the opponent. If the files are used for “purely personal or household purposes”, the GDPR won't apply per Art 2(2)(c). If the files are shared more widely – especially if the files are published – then GDPR becomes relevant. The person/entity who is data controller has to consider GDPR compliance. Data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data (the “why” and “how”). The first question would be under which legal basis this personal data about another person can be shared. The GDPR offers multiple legal basis, notably “legitimate interests” and “consent”. Consent is always an option, but must be freely given (entirely voluntary). Legitimate interests can serve as a legal basis after a balancing test between your interests and the data subject's rights and interests. This balancing test also depends on the reasonable expectations of the data subject, which in turn depends on the more general context. For example, in a chess community where such sharing is completely normal there would likely be a legitimate interest for you to share games as well, if the games occurred in the context of this community. But if you play a game with a friend who is not part of this community, the friend cannot reasonably expect that their name and associated personal data would be shared. The second question would be how you would satisfy further GDPR compliance obligation, in particular the Art 13/Art 14 right to information. When collecting personal data, it is necessary to provide certain information such as your identity, what processing is being carried out, and how the data subject can invoke their GDPR rights (a privacy notice or privacy policy). This might be difficult or awkward to do. Practical solutions to these problems: If you want to share a game but aren't sure that the opponent is OK with this, remove identifying aspects such as names. For example, you could crop a screenshot, or describe the game in textual notation without listing the opponent's name. Play the game via a chess website that publishes the game. This way, the website is the data controller, and you and the opponent are the data subjects. This avoids having to act as the data controller yourself. This might work for private interactions, but not e.g. if you run a chess club and require members to play via that website – you might still be in a data controller role then and have full compliance obligations.
Animal Rights and the Law I'm constantly told by an animal rights friend that we don't have any legal protections for animals, and that they are treated as property. My response is often that I can go into an Apple store, buy an iPhone and smash it right in front of them, and that will be fine (aside from perhaps being escorted out of the Apple store because it's bad publicity, etc.) But I can't go into a pet store, buy a puppy and smash it in front of them, I'd get arrested. Her retort is often that we have legal protections for pets, but not for livestock. So, here are my questions: Is it true that I cannot buy a puppy and smash it deliberately for my perverse amusement (regardless of whether it's in front of them or not)? If I cannot, can you point me to the relevant laws? Is it true that I cannot buy a cow or a pig and throw it into a woodchipper similarly for my perverse amusement? If I cannot, can you point me to the relevant laws? This question is for the United States. If I must specify a state, I'd be interested in the state that has the least legal protections and the one with the most.
Is it true that I cannot buy a puppy and smash it deliberately for my perverse amusement (regardless of whether it's in front of them or not)? If I cannot, can you point me to the relevant laws? Is it true that I cannot buy a cow or a pig and throw it into a woodchipper similarly for my perverse amusement? If I cannot, can you point me to the relevant laws? You can't do either of these things. Every state has some sort of law banning cruelty to animals. For example, in Colorado, the laws prohibiting cruelty to animals are codified at Sections 18-9-201 to 18-9-209, Colorado Revised Statutes. The core language of the statute is codified at Section 18-9-202(1)-(1.5) (as of July 1, 2014) which states (in language that is not atypical nationally) that: (1)(a) A person commits cruelty to animals if he or she knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence ovedrives, overloads, overworks, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, unnecessarily or cruelly beats, allows to be housed in a manner that results in chronic or repeated serious physical harm, carries or confines in or upon any vehicles in a cruel or reckless manner, engages in a sexual act with an animal, or otherwise mistreats or neglects any animal, or causes or procures it to be done, or having the charge or custody or ay animal, fails to provide it with proper food, drink or protection from weather consistent with the species, breed, and type of animal involved, or abandons an animal. (1)(b) Any person who intentionally abandons a dog or cat commits the offense of cruelty to animals. (1.5)(a) A person who commits cruelty to animals if he or she recklessly or with criminal negligence tortures, needlessly mutilates, or needlessly kills an animal. (1.5)(b) A person commits aggravated cruelty to animals if he or she knowingly tortures, needlessly mutilates, or needlessly kills an animal. (1.5)(c) A person commits cruelty to a service animal if he or she violates the provisions of subsection (1) of this section with respect to a service animal . . . whether the service animal is on duty or not on duty. The rest of the statute mostly spells out sentences and other remedies and definitions applicable to these offenses. For what it is worth, the laws against cruelty to animals, and the now obsolete laws prohibiting cruelty to slaves that existed when slavery was legal in the U.S., were quite similar. So, yes, an animal (pet or otherwise, there is almost no formal legal distinction between pets and non-pets, even though in practice, people evaluate what is cruel to a pet and to a farm animal differently) is property. Yes, someone who owns an animal may intentionally kill it or maim it, or have someone acting at the owner's instructions do so. But, an owner must do so humanely under the circumstances and must do so for a good reason (such as for food, to put down a sick or injured or dangerous animal, or for experimental research). Ranking states is a bit difficult. There are some states that have felony cruelty to animals statutes and some that don't. I don't have the time to look for an exhaustive survey of the law state by state (one summary is here). There are some states that are quite specific (like Colorado) and others that are more general in language. Idaho has an express provision that killing animals that are harrying livestock is an acceptable reason. Some of the difference boils down to how the law is applied in practice, rather than to the language of the statutes on the books. The overall gist of the statutes, however, is pretty similar: don't be cruel in how you do it, and don't harm animals if you don't have a good reason for doing so. There is also a lot of conduct (for example, separating mothers and young children, amputating body parts such as claws or tails or reproductive organs without consent, or confining and leashing them) that would cause emotional harm to animals and which would be grave human rights abuses, that is not prohibited as cruelty to animals. Similarly, there are many farming practices that are accepted as not violating these laws like the process of creating veal or foie gras that could be characterized as cruel but are accepted as not violating the laws against cruelty to animals. To a great extent, these exceptions, which are rarely codified, are simply a matter of custom and practice and tradition, rather than having any well reasoned logical derivation from statutory language.
It is not possible for someone to forfeit their rights because the GDPR is compulsory law. In the EU, laws can be regulatory or compulsory. In case of an agreement, regulatory laws can be set aside, if both parties agree on that. But compulsory laws cannot be set aside. Of course laws can also be partly compulsory. For example provisions which cannot be changed in disadvantage of a consumer. So there is freedom of contract, but it's freedom is reduced by law for the common good or for example to avoid misuse of bargaining power. In particular consumer related laws are often compulsory because it has little power against the other parties. Companies can have their negotiations done by lawyers, so they can make a well informed an well negotiated decision. As an extreme example, you cannot kill someone, even if that person has given you written permission. See also "Peremptory norm" on wikipedia for international law examples.
No It's your device, you can do what you like with it (subject to the law - you can't hit people with it. Unless they want to be hit: whatever turns you on, turns you on). However, if you do operate it outside their instructions then they would not be legally liable if it failed and injured you or someone else or set fire to the cat or whatever. The "prohibition" would limit their legal liability.
Under 42 USC 2000a(a): All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. So a business may be generally prohibited from discriminating against you on the basis of your religion, but I don't know of any law that requires stores to accommodate whatever aversion or hostility you may feel toward gay people or their allies. On the contrary, such businesses have a First Amendment right to display such decor. So legislation that required them to stop speaking out in support of nice gay people would be struck down as unconstitutional.
It is almost certainly legal for the sitter to keep the money. She was ready to provide the service, and it is not her fault she couldn't (and she may have turned down other opportunities because she had this one). I think your fiance's claim would be against the firm providing the security service (they are the ones that frustrated the contract). I foresee the following problems: What are her losses? She was prepared to pay $315 (which she has paid), and the dog has been looked after. Where is the loss? (She may be able to argue that it was worth $315 to her, not to have to owe her mother a favour. I don't know if that will fly.) The contract with the security firm almost certainly waives liability for this sort of thing. She would have to convince the court that the contract terms were unreasonable/unconscionable (or whatever the term is in the local jurisdiction). There are two obvious options here: a) see if there is legal cover on her household insurance (or her pet insurance); b) forget it (it's only $175 all told).
Is blocking certain people while allowing everybody else to view some content discrimination Yes. and violate anti-discrimination laws Probably not, at least in the US. There is no federal law prohibiting "discrimination" in general. There are specific laws regarding discrimination against certain groups in certain contexts. They would probably not apply to an individual determining who is allowed to view their social media posts. That said, there are some specific contexts where this might be illegal. They would generally involve non-personal use of the account. The courts recently ruled that Donald Trump may not block people on his Twitter account, because he's using it in an official presidential capacity rather than just his individual capacity. Also, racial discrimination in housing is illegal, so if you're selling your house and you block all black people from viewing your house photos, that would probably be illegal as well. Also is not being able to consume information available on a public platform a violation against right to freedom. I'm not sure what you think a "right to freedom" would entail. But I don't think you have the right to demand that a person allow you to access their social media accounts.
This would be infringement. It generally doesn't matter that you're giving things away for free. Keep in mind that the point of these laws is not only to prevent third parties from making money off the creator's ideas, but also to protect the creator's ability to make money. If you're providing free knock-off Winnie the Pooh products, that cuts into the market for the creator's legitimate products.
So for your first question, yelling "Stop Thief" loudly at the thief is perfectly legal (Like Yelling "Fire" in a crowded theater, it's legal if the theater is infact, on fire... the quote implied that it was a prankster who drew amusement from the reaction of the people who took him seriously). This may alert store employees, who have a specific kind of Citizens Arrest Power known as "Shopkeeper's Privilege" and is a reduced liability compared to Citizens Arrest. This is also pretty basic self defense agains people who are not engaged in any physical action against you but are starting to scare you. Suddenly shouting draws attention to you and discourages them from their behavior "I SAID DON'T TOUCH ME" being suddenly shouted in a Wal Mart is going to get notices from the immediate crowd drawn to you, and by poximate location, the person who is making you uneasy. For your second question, maybe, it depends... since the cop is clearly chasing the guy, you meet the qualification to use non-deadly force in stopping the criminal (i.e. you are witnessing a person committing a crime, in this case, resisting arrest or persuit) and it would certainly be reasonably non-deadly force if you were to trip, grab, or push the fleeing suspect. Citizens Arrest doesn't specify a minimum time to qualify, so if the officer is seconds behind, and you detain the criminal in this action until the gap is closed, it still counts.
Can a police officer ban a person from a public park? Can a Utah police officer ban a person from a public park even if the person is only suspected of breaking the Law?
Utah has a lot of public parks, so to point in the right direction, I will assume that this is a public park in Salt Lake City, it's just a plain old grassy field, and it's not during a special event. A person is suspected of some crime like selling drugs, not arrested, but told by a police officer to go away and never come back. This is way beyond the power of the police. After due legal process, a proven (not just suspected) public menace could be ordered by the court to stay away from the park. A police officer can, of course, order a person to leave a park when they violate a park rule, in fact rule number 1 is "It is unlawful for any person to do or to allow or permit any of the acts prohibited by this chapter in any park in Salt Lake City", so the police cannot legally turn a blind eye to rule violations. Violation of park rules is an infraction which can earn you a ticket of up to $299. However, the officer can tell you to go away, rather than giving you a ticket or arresting you. But an police order cannot issue a unilateral restraining order. Apart from city laws, there are general state laws regarding trespass and destruction of property. The state criminal trespass law says that A person is guilty of criminal trespass if...knowing the person's... entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or remains on to which notice against entering is given by...personal communication to the person by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner In this case, the owner is the city, and the officer has apparent authority to act for that owner. In the case of private property, the owner or his agent has very broad authority to give notice requiring you to leave (e.g. if you don't like their politics or their shirt); but in the case of public property, the government has more narrowly circumscribed authority to kick you out.
Police have discretion in the enforcement of the law Which is to say, police get to decide which crimes they make arrests for, which they handle with warnings, which they report and which they ignore. This applies whether they are in uniform, undercover or off-duty. If they abuse this discretion then they are liable to disciplinary action. If they apply it corruptly or otherwise illegally then they are liable to criminal sanction.
It would not work. There is apparently a common misconception in Georgia that this would be the case, based on Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III (b)(1) of the Georgia constitution, which says: No county may exercise any of the powers listed in subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph [including police protection] or provide any service listed therein inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county affected. What many people miss is the clause right before that: "Unless otherwise provided by law." Georgia courts have held that the law does provide otherwise when pursuing someone for a traffic offense: The plaintiff contends that when the collision occurred, the policeman-deputy sheriff had no authority to be pursuing the Mitchell car because he was outside the county in which he had a power of arrest. While ordinarily a peace officer has power of arrest only in the territory of the governmental unit by which he was appointed, there are two exceptions to the rule present in this case. Code Ann. s 92A-509, which deals with arrests for traffic offenses, provides by implication that certain officers (including deputy sheriffs) have arrest powers for these offenses outside their appointed territories. City of Winterville v. Strickland, 127 Ga. App. 716, 718, 194 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1972). What that case decided in 1972, the principle was in place well before the boys began their hijinks. I don't know of any state where the law is different, though the answer would be different if the boys crossed into another state.
In general, yes, police could do this. I am not aware of any US state or locality which requires an officer to execute a stop as soon as a traffic violation is observed. Whether the police would act in such a way is another question, but in some areas maximizing citation revenue is a high priority, so police in such areas might act in such a way. If police think a person's actions are "suspicious" and think that the person might be involved in some crime more serious than a traffic violation, it would be common procedure to follow without making a stop or arrest to get a better idea of what the person was doing. Many police I have encountered seem seriously concerned to stop someone driving in what they consider an unsafe way as quickly as possible, and so stop violators promptly, but I don't say that motivates all police all the time.
"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.
You were trespassing The community college is a public institution but they can decide what part of their land you can walk on and in what circumstances. Just like the military is a public institution but they don’t let you walk across their shooting ranges. To be clear, in the absence of clear “no dogs allowed” signage, you were not trespassing until you were told about the policy. At that point, you were legally obliged to remove yourself (or more precisely, your dog) from the campus as soon as possible. When you refused to do so, you became a trespasser. It’s trivially easy to find out who you are. One photograph, one reverse image search they’ll know everything about you right down to your shoe size. Even if you don’t use social media, I’m sure some of your family and friends do. In most US states, trespass is a misdemeanour and also in most states members of the public can arrest someone who is committing a misdemeanour in their presence. They can use reasonable force to do so and can hold the arrestee until they can transfer them to the custody of a law enforcement officer. Admittedly, this seems unlikely but it is possible. If you have caused damage, you can be sued. It seems that your discussion with the college staff was somewhat protected so the loss of productivity of those staff members is a loss that the college suffered and that they could sue you for. Again, not likely but possible. Alternatively, they could just report you to the police who may or may not bring charges. Note: this assumes the dog is a pet. If it’s a disability assistance animal, it can’t be excluded. See: Are sidewalks on a university public or private property? Can a local government charge a fee to enter a public downtown area during an event? Trespassing or Public Property? Is a mall considered a "public place" for copyright purposes?
You cannot booby trap your property, see Can I booby-trap my property against police? You can, however, protect your property in any reasonable way that will not cause harm to innocent trespassers. So things like fences with obvious barbed wire, road spikes that would damage tires but not people etc. From the images it seems like the nature of the spikes are such that they would injure someone who stepped on or fell on them and probably cross the line into booby trap territory.
No For the same reason that requiring a licence to drive might, in some circumstances, result in harm to a person who cannot drive because they don’t have a licence. The city (or any government) has legislative immunity for the laws they put in place even if those laws have negative consequences to some people. All laws have negative consequences to some people, for example, laws against theft are extremely prejudicial to thieves. Similarly, the executive is immune for exercising their discretion in the enforcement of the law. This is the basis of the police not having a general duty to protect. However, police have a specific duty to protect when they have taken an individual into their care and control.
Party Wall Act - unclear interpretation of party fence wall definition? I'm looking at sections 1(1)(b) and 20 of the Party Wall Act, and they just don't make sense to me, definitionally. Problem #1: s.20 seems to provide an impossible or meaningless definition s.20: “party fence wall” means a wall (not being part of a building) which stands on lands of different owners and is used or constructed to be used for separating such adjoining lands, but does not include a wall constructed on the land of one owner the artificially formed support of which projects into the land of another owner The phrase excluding "a wall constructed on the land of one owner the artificially formed support of which projects into the land of another owner" could be read ambiguously. IT EITHER MEANS: "a wall constructed entirely on the land of one owner (A), the artificially formed support of which projects into the land of another owner (B)"; OR IT MEANS: "a wall constructed partly - but not entirely - on the land of one owner (A), the artificially formed support of which projects into the land of another owner (B)" The problem is, both of these are problematic, whichever is chosen. If the first interpretation is correct, then the wall being excluded cannot ever have been a candidate party fence wall in the first place, because to even consider it as a party fence wall, the wall must stand on more than one person's land ("a party fence wall means a wall .. which stands on lands of different owners..."). No walls will ever be excluded if the first interpretation is correct. The clause would be meaningless. If the second interpretation is correct, then we have the opposite problem. If it is intended to signify a wall constructed in part but not entirely on (A)'s land, then basic wall construction dictates that the wall's support will always project into another owner (B)'s land, because walls are supported under their full width. Every wall that could be a party fence wall will be excluded if the second interpretation is correct. The definition wouldn't cover any walls at all. This is a quick sketch of the 3 ways a wall could be placed and supported near a boundary: Layouts #2 and #3 aren't party fence walls because the wall itself is completely within the property boundary of B, so it doesn't "stand on lands of different owners". Layout #1 can be a party fence wall, - but only if the exclusion clause has an ineffective/nullifying interpretation: "_a wall built on just one owner's land entirely/exclusively/only". If that's correct then no wall that looks like layout #1 ever gets excluded, so Layout #1 will always be deemed a party fence wall. (If we had made the alternative assumption, that it means "built partly but not entirely on an owner (A)'s land" then the Layout #1 wall is clearly built partly on (A)'s land and its support clearly projects into another owner (B)'s land, so Layout #1 could never be a party fence wall. In which case nothing could.) What approach to reading the exclusion clause wording would allow it to have a sensible meaning, which presumably should exclude some walls but not others? Note: I'm asking about the meaning in law of the legislative wording, rather than "what it might be believed or assumed to mean", as these could be completely different.
The phrase in question is clarifying that if the wall (excluding the support) is on one person's property, and the support crosses into another person's property, then it is not a party fence wall. Why make this clarification, given that if a wall doesn't stand "on lands of different owners", it can't be a party wall anyway? Architect's Legal Handbook: The Law for Architects suggests that this is because there is a different rule for walls which separate buildings, hence the need to highlight the difference (emphasis mine): ...rights of adjoining owners do not arise where only the foundations project on the to the adjoining land if the wall concerned is a boundary wall, not being part of a building, but they do arise if such a wall separates buildings belonging to different owners.
Dale M's answer is not supported at all by history, or any mode of constitutional interpretation. I also don't find it likely. I'd say that if a duly ratified amendment said as much, that would be the law. It is certainly correct that the court could try to narrow the meaning. It's also possible to simply not follow the Constitution (as we do with state immunity and the 11th amendment). But to assume that would be done here is just speculating blindly. Of course, this question doesn't warrant much more attention than blind speculation, so my comment is not a very offensive accusation. As a few counter points, we have radically change the form of our government many times within the current constitution. Reconstruction, The New Deal and so on, all represented huge changes. Most importantly, the 17th amendment can easily be viewed as more radical than the question's proposed amendment. It completely flipped the political system upside down, orienting power in the people and the federal government, and treating the states as some weird intermediary: but we now see it as a relatively boring enactment. Certainly we could come to see the formal abolishment of the amendment process similarly, especially if it were (which it would need to be) accompanied with a new found comfort with non-textual interpretation to effectively "amend" through interpretation, i.e. If the textualists lost badly this amendment would seem like a relatively natural way of announcing their demise. Remember that Scalia's whole point, is that strict originalism (not saying he was actually so strict himself) would democratize by forcing change through the amendment process. If we rejected that notion (as deceptive, for example) we could (as in its not completely ridiculous to imagine) announce that rejection with the proposed amendment.
Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave*. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. *As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant).
"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.
We have no way of knowing when this happened, but it is probably a fact, recorded some time in the past. Utility companies very frequently obtain a right-of-way (easement) which gives them certain rights to your property. Typically, this happened a long time ago when a previous owner agreed. As for gas pipelines, that typically includes "don't plant trees" restrictions. The easement is usually recorded in the county office where deeds are filed. The legal basis is generally "because you agreed, or some previous owner agreed". You can get a copy of the easement to see if "no trees" is actually part of the agreement. If yes, no point in arguing, if not, you could hire a lawyer if they are demanding that they are threatening you. They are allowed to be concerned and to ask you to cut trees regardless, but if it's not required by the terms of the easement, you can say "No, I'd rather keep my tree".
If Party C amends their filing, does party A become a joint applicant, a third party or something else? A is a non-party. It is unclear from your description why C would need to amend the filing, but there is no need for A to become a joint applicant. By virtue of C's buyout of A, only C has standing to sue B. Your description does not specify B's reason for non-payment, but generally speaking that does not defeat's C's standing for suing B. Had B's contract with A reflected that B's intent is to not be in a contract relation with C, the matter might involve (1) rescinding B's contract with C; (2) a judgment on grounds of equity; (3) C's claim against A for the latter's omission; or (4) a combination of these. But the description has too many gaps in that regard, thereby precluding a more precise assessment. Does Party A need to make a demand from party C and restart the whole application? No. A has no viable claim against C. And A's sale to C implies that A can no longer have a viable claim against B either.
This recently came up in a local PA homeowner association. Legally they own the roads in their development, but they have erected stop signs to make it clear who has the right of way and asked the township police to enforce them. A resident challenged the right of the police to enforce traffic laws on private property, but lost his appeal (albeit at the municipal level). The judge explained that the residents and any visitors had a reasonable expectation that the traffic signs would be obeyed, and that therefore violating them was just as dangerous as violating them on public roads, and that the same law and penalties would therefore be applied.
Joint tenancy means that you both have equal (full) rights to the entire property, so just as you don't his permission to live there or to invite guests, he doesn't either. Unless they threaten you in some way (and you get a court order barring them from entering), there is no legal means to deprive an owner of their property rights, while they are still an owner.
What does Gonzales v. Raich mean for property rights? In 2002, Angel Raich had her home raided by federal agents who seized her six cannabis plants. At the time, medicinal cannabis was legal in California, so Raich claimed the federal government didn’t have authority to interfere with her six plants- which were obviously for personal consumption, and neither affected interstate nor intrastate commerce. What authority did Gonzales v. Raich provide to the federal government concerning individual property rights?
In lay terms, the Raich case cites authority pursuant to the "Commerce Clause" of the Constitution of the United States; specifically, that the government has the power to regulate interstate commerce, to the degree that crops of individuals (whether directly or indirectly, or not at all, in commercial circulation) can be regulated by Congress, citing the Filburn case, which had nothing to do with "marijuana" or "cannabis", or "THC" or "CBD"; in essence, the government has the power to tell a private individual which crops they can cultivate or not, depending on the intent of Congress in enacting the law. The premise being that since the intent of Congress in regulating "marijuana" within the scope of the CSA was for the express purpose of maintaining higher prices (including so-called "black market" prices) for "marijuana", an individual cultivating "marijuana" which was not intended to enter the "stream of commerce" nonetheless impacted the price of the crop (or commodity) by cultivating the crop at all (i.e.g., greater supply of available product reduces the price of the product in any market, whether "black market" or not; having access to the product by means of private cultivation reduces the resources necessary to acquire the crop) - thus resulting in the overall price of the crop not being higher, thwarting the intent of Congress in regulating that specific crop or commodity. Of importance, Congress has concluded that "marijuana" had (and still does not have) any medical purpose (various bills have been written over the years to exempt "marijuana" from Schedule I classification in the CSA; "medical marijuana" exemptions, etc.), or at least no medical purpose recognized by Congress (save for specific research done by Dr. ElSohly, and a very limited number of private individuals (patients) to consume the crops produced by Dr. ElSohly, et al. pursuant to licenses issued by a federal administrative agency). It is interesting to note that the United States holds a (potentially defensive) patent (and has so for several years as of 2018) on various medical applications of CBD via the National Institutes of Health. The "property rights" aspect of your inquiry can be categorized into two parts which are independent of each other, that is both actions can be ongoing simultaneously The government has the power to regulate the cultivation of any crop or commodity on private property pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the intent of Congress, irrespective of if that crop enters the stream of commerce proper or not The government can pursue medical research, apply for and be granted patents (intellectual property), by the government itself, for technologies relating to the medical use of crops or commodities defined by Congress as not having any recognized medical application (e.g., the identical crop or commodity at 1.), potentially for defensive purposes, investment in a potential future market (i.e.g., licensing of patented technologies to pharmaceutical or private equity concerns) for profit, or other undisclosed purposes
"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.
The answer is "it depends on the protection." Even illegal aliens are afforded certain rights by the US Constitution. For example, that fact is one of the reasons for the prison in Guantanamo Bay. Another consideration, for protections or rights that are available to citizens but not to aliens, is that the determination of citizenship or alienage must be subject to the right of due process. Without that, the executive branch of government would be able to, for example, remove or exclude anyone from the United States, or commit anyone to indefinite immigration detention, simply by asserting that the person is an alien, without review by the judicial branch. There is a discussion, with references, here: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alien. This mentions the fifth and fourteenth amendments, as well asthe fourth, as applicable to aliens. Pertinent quotations (emphasis added): Aliens also receive treatment very similar to the treatment that U.S. citizens receive in the context of the judicial system. For instance, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution apply to aliens residing within the United States. As such, the courts guarantee aliens the right to due process of law and equal protection of the laws. Courts have generally construed the Fourth Amendment as applicable to aliens as well. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures. Congress has the preeminent power in terms of passing statutes that regulate immigration and alienage. Consequently, the United States Constitution enables Congress to delineate the rights, duties, and liabilities that accompany legal immigrant status. Congressional power in this realm, however, must comply with the qualification that any law resulting in disparate treatment between aliens and citizens must bear some relation to a legitimate goal impacting immigration law. When a law treats an alien differently from a U.S. citizen, courts treat the law as inherently suspect and apply strict scrutiny when considering the law's constitutionality. States possess the power to confer additional rights on aliens within their respective jurisdictions. While states may not pass regulations affecting aliens that directly conflict with federal laws or the U.S. Constitution, states may pass other regulations if they bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. State law controls the right of an alien to hold real property in the particular state. Under common law, the alien had property rights similar to those of citizens. Currently, most states have enacted statutes following the common law, but a few have forbid aliens, ineligible for U.S. citizenship, from holding or acquiring real property. These laws have resulted in some successful challenges by aliens who claimed the laws were unconstitutional. ... When invoking federal question jurisdiction, federal statutes provide aliens with access to the federal court system in the following three scenarios: allegations of civil rights violations by the federal government, allegations of Equal Protection Clause violations by the federal government, and allegations of violations of the Refugee Act of 1980. A strict reading of the text sheds some light on the matter. For example, many constitutional rights are specified by limiting the power of congress; such a limitation applies to all people under the jurisdiction of federal law. For example, the First Amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Similarly, some rights explicitly granted by the constitution are typically granted to "the People," without reference to nationality. The Fourth Amendment: The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (The question of whether "the People" implies "of the United States" may explain the qualifier "generally" in the sentence above discussing applicability of the Fourth Amendment.) Some rights are granted specifically to "persons"; the courts appear to have concluded that this applies to everyone regardless of nationality. The Fifth Amendment: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. Finally, some rights are expressed as procedural rules applying to the courts. As with limitations on congress, these apply to anyone who is party to a relevant action. For example, the Sixth Amendment applies to "all criminal prosecutions": In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. The Seventh Amendment applies to all "suits at common law": In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by Jury shall be preserved, and no fact, tried by a Jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
What do you mean by "a public building"? Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter. Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason. As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation.
It is illegal to threaten to report a person for violating the law (it is illegal to threaten a person). There are laws in California that limit official cooperation with ICE investigations, therefore the police will not arrest a person for being an illegal immigrant. This is basically a limit on use of state and local resources, and the state has the power to control its purse strings. The state has no power to mandate that individuals not report a suspected or imagined violation of federal law to federal authorities, and there is no California law purporting to have that power.
You are in a tough spot. The main risk is "civil forfeiture" of the duplex if you have sufficient knowledge that it is being used for purposes of drug dealing and take no action. See, e.g., a case from October 1, 2021 when a house was seized on this basis. But the tenant has property rights under a lease that you can't abridge unless you can prove that there is a violation of the law. And, it isn't obvious if you know enough to trigger civil forfeiture exposure based merely on uncorroborated statements from another tenant that observe only conduct often associated with drug dealing and not deals themselves. Still, the knowledge you do have might trigger a duty to inquire if you want to escape civil forfeiture liability. Under the statute, to defeat a civil forfeiture action (assuming it has been used for drug dealing), you must show: (e)(1) A property interest shall not be subject to forfeiture under this Code section if the owner of such interest or interest holder establishes that the owner or interest holder: (A) Is not legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, did not consent to it, and did not know and could not reasonably have known of the conduct or that it was likely to occur; (B) Had not acquired and did not stand to acquire substantial proceeds from the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture other than as an interest holder in an arm's length commercial transaction; (C) With respect to conveyances for transportation only, did not hold the property jointly, in common, or in community with a person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture; (D) Does not hold the property for the benefit of or as nominee for any person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture, and, if the owner or interest holder acquired the interest through any such person, the owner or interest holder acquired it as a bona fide purchaser for value without knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction; and (E) Acquired the interest: (i) Before the completion of the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, and the person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture did not have the authority to convey the interest to a bona fide purchaser for value at the time of the conduct; or (ii) After the completion of the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture: (I) As a bona fide purchaser for value without knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction; (II) Before the filing of a lien on it and before the effective date of a notice of pending forfeiture relating to it and without notice of its seizure for forfeiture under this article; and (III) At the time the interest was acquired, was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture or likely to become subject to forfeiture under this article. (2) A property interest shall not be subject to forfeiture under this Code section for a violation involving only one gram or less of a mixture containing cocaine or four ounces or less of marijuana unless said property was used to facilitate a transaction in or a purchase of or sale of a controlled substance or marijuana. The language in bold is the most threatening part that effectively establishes a duty of inquiry and a duty to take action if your inquiry establishes that drug dealing is going on. If you can't establish that you were ignorant of wrongdoing, and reasonably so, under the circumstances of being told by one of your tenants that something is going on, you are at great risk of losing the duplex to civil forfeiture if the DA can prove that drug dealing is taking place by far less than a reasonable doubt standard. You might want to hire a private investigator to look into the situation carefully, and to try to evict the allegedly drug dealing tenant if the private investigator corroborates the fellow tenant's claims.
The earliest I know of is Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (N.C. Super. 1787), which dealt with a North Carolina statute that confiscated land held by British subjects and required the courts to dismiss any lawsuits attempting to reclaim confiscated property. The North Carolina Superior Court held that because the state constitution conferred a right to a jury on questions of property ownership, the legislature could not require the courts to dismiss lawsuits requesting such a resolution to property disputes: By the Constitution every citizen has a right to a decision in regard to his property by a trial by jury. The act of Assembly, therefore, of 1785, requiring the Court to dismiss on motion the suits brought by persons whose property had been confiscated against the purchasers, on affidavit of the defendants that they were purchasers from the commissioners of confiscated property, is unconstitutional and void. So the British subject was entitled to a trial, but the admission that he was a British subject meant that he was an alien and enemy of the government, and therefore not permitted to hold property.
No. Oregon does not recognize this as within the scope of its self-defense law justification, except insofar as its owner is allowed to use non-deadly force to protect property. But, a sentient AI is also not a proper party to a criminal case and can't commit a crime.
Do private contracts supersede local/state/federal laws? Using the classic example, "promise your first born child". Let's say I entered into a contract with another party (individual or group) and the contract states that I offer a service or product in exchange for another service or product (money probably). There is a clause in the contract that states if the other part is unable to fulfill his/her/their end of the contract, then the other party must give me their first born child. Will this contract hold up in a court of law in the United States? This is assuming the other party was willing and able to enter into this contract with me.
No, a contract cannot require a breach of law. Any such contract is invalid, but a clause may limit the extent to which it is invalidated, to only such terms as actually or require a breach of law.
If you do not get anything from this "contract", and all it says is that you will pay someone a sum of money "on demand", it does not meet the basic requirements to form a contract, and in particular, there is no consideration being received by you. It would therefore not be a contract and would have zero legal force. If you do receive consideration, demonstrating that you signed the contract under duress will require specific legal advice, and you need a practicing lawyer in your jurisdiction.
So you entered a contract that was a bad deal. The law says: tough People are legally allowed to make bad deals. The law will hold you to the bad deal you made. If it only worked for good deals, no one would ever use the law because you don’t want to break a good deal. Providing it has all the required elements of a contract, it will be enforceable. Put up with him or pay him out.
The "contract" (sometimes called a charitable pledge or a pledge to make a donation) is not enforceable under contact law because there is no consideration. From a contract law perspective, it isn't really a contract at all. This fact pattern is literally the "standard" example of a "contract" that is unenforceable for lack of consideration. The promises made in the charitable pledge might be enforceable under an equitable doctrine called promissory estoppel, if someone detrimentally relies upon the promise made in the contract and it is not inequitable to do so. As a practical matter, however, donees almost never sue to enforce a pledge to make a donation. A donative pledge should also be distinguished from a transfer document, which is also not a contract. In a transfer document, the donor is unilaterally giving something to someone, and the recipient is signing merely to affirm that they accept the transfer being made to them, rather than rejecting the donation and disclaiming it.
Contracts can say all sorts of unenforceable things, you provided an example of one of them. A person cannot be compelled to stay and work somewhere they no longer wish to work. At the risk of getting my wrist slapped for straying too far into the land of opinion, a clause like this is likely intended to take advantage of naive teenagers who will provide free employment referrals because they think they have to.
The liability shield is the big one, and it can't be achieved with a contract. Just because the contract says you're not liable, that doesn't make it true. If I sign a contract with my friend that says "Nate Eldredge is hereby the King of France", that won't make me the king, nor will it force anyone except maybe my friend to acknowledge me as the king. By its nature, a contract can only bind the parties to the contract, and has no effect on the rights of anyone else. Suppose, then, that Alice and Bob agree to start a pizza delivery business, using a contract like you suggest. Their delivery car crashes, injuring Carol, a bystander, who incurs medical bills that exceed the assets of the business. Carol decides to sue Alice and Bob personally. Sure, Alice and Bob have a contract, and maybe it prevents them from suing each other, but it certainly doesn't prevent Carol from suing them; Carol never signed it. So Carol can still go after Alice and Bob's personal assets. Thus contract law cannot give them a liability shield. However, the government can, since it makes the laws about who can sue whom under what circumstances. And it has made laws saying that Alice and Bob can be protected from such suits, but only if they form a company according to the process that the law sets forth. So that's what they have to do.
Whether or not this would be allowed would generally call for a more fact rich situation than the one presented in the original question, that would cast light upon why a retailer might be inclined to refuse to accept payment. Hypothetical legal questions that presume that people are acting irrationally for no good reason are generally ill posed and don't have meaningful answers. Sometimes, there might be a legitimate privacy interest implicated if the invoicing party acknowledged a payment from a third party. For example, suppose that the invoice was for a paternity test and payment would confirm that the incapacitated person actually obtained a paternity test. Sometimes, there are legal rights beyond payment that are implicated and the reasonableness of a refusal might hinge on those rights. For example, suppose that the invoice was for an option to keep using an oil well. Payment of the invoice by the deadline would keep the oil well operating and the land owner sending the invoice might prefer that it not be paid so that the oil well would be shut down. Quite a few contracts are structured in this way. Maybe the invoice was for the right to purchase a first edition of a book when it was finally released, for example, and not paying it would free up a copy for someone else at a price that had increased in the meantime. Or, suppose that the invoice were for unpaid taxes and payment of the taxes would prevent property from being seized for sale by tax authorities, and the taxing authority would prefer that the invoice was not paid so that the valuable property could be liquidated. But, it is hard to imagine that there would be any reason that an ordinary retailer with an ordinary bill would ever refuse payment, although I suppose that this might trigger an interest or penalty amount owed under the contract for late payment. If that were the case, the principal of mitigation of damages, which says that a party to a contract must take all reasonable steps to mitigate their damages, might obligate the retailers to accept the payment or forfeit the penalty amounts that the retailer could have avoided as damages by accepting payment. I doubt that an undelivered tender of payment from a third party would eliminate the obligation, but, it might limit the damages that could be claimed as in the scenario above.
does the individual have a legal case against the company? Unfortunately, no. Some details and terms you use are unclear (e.g., "phantom" equity, "manifest" core technology, and so forth), but your overall description reflects that the individual sabotaged himself by signing a contract that does not mention the promise of equity through which he was persuaded to engage. A written contract usually supersedes any prior agreement --regarding the subject matter of that contract-- between the parties. That superseding effect means that the contract formalizes or overrides, accordingly, said agreements or promises. Since the initial promises of equity are not reflected in the "interim" contract, the investor's subsequent silence upon individual's reproach/reminders is from a legal standpoint irrelevant. At that point only the terms of the contract matter. The individual might consider alleging mistake in the sense of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 151-154 such that would make the contract voidable and perhaps "make room" for other theories of law. However, that seems futile unless the interim contract contains language that (1) provides specific conditions for its expiration, or (2) reflects the company's [mis-]representations that induced the individual to sign it. Neither seems to have occurred in the situation you describe. There is always a possibility that the contract might favor the individual's position and he just has not noticed it. But the only way to ascertain that is by reading the contract itself.
Is it legal to provide online therapy outside of your country? I am based in Pakistan and I want to provide therapy for depression around the world using an app. I want the people around the world to use this app. Is it legal to provide online therapy in different countries?
This might be legal to do with patients in some places, but it is probably not legal to do in general, although it might be hard to enforce the laws prohibiting this conduct against a provider in Pakistan. Different countries and sub-national governments regulate providing therapy differently. Some don't regulate it all, so you would only have to comply with the law of Pakistan on the subject, if any. Other places require an occupational license to provide therapy, and in those case, the law of the place where the patient resides could apply that licensure requirement based upon where the patient resides, where the therapist is located when the service is provided, or by some other rules. You would have to determine this on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis to be legal. Many jurisdictions also have VAT or GST taxes that would apply to fees collected for therapy services provided to someone in their jurisdiction, and this would also be a compliance issue if there was fee for the therapy. As a practical matter, you would also have to consider if there was any meaningful way that you could be punished for providing therapy services or not paying taxes in particular jurisdictions where some patients might reside or be receiving your app's services. If there was no meaningful remedy for violating those laws against your company in Pakistan, you might decide to ignore those laws because you could.
Are online stores supposed to state the true “order cost”/value of an order on the package/envelope for the customs? Yes Is it common practice to slash 10x off of the price for the customs to not add various fees? Common? Probably no. Uncommon? Also, probably no. Isn't that illegal? Yes Of course, they can claim it was a mistake if ever found out, but if they do it consistently, that seems difficult... Not to mention there must be electronic proof of how much each order actually cost the customer? Yes Look, robbing banks is illegal but people still rob banks. Similarly, ripping off HM Revenue & Customs is illegal but people still do that too. In fact, far more people do that than rob banks.
Generally, such sanctions prevent certain sorts of transactions in goods and services with nationals or entities of the nation under sanction. The exact list of transactions prohibited or restricted varies. If Open source software were being provided as a service, so that the recipient paid directly for a license, or for customization or configuration work, or for some sort of consulting or assistance, such transactions could be banned or restricted by a sanctions regime, but might not be. (If the sanctions included that particular class of transactions.) However, if it is merely a matter of an open source product being published, for anyone to download, install, and use, I don't see how that would be barred or restricted by any sanctions of the sort recently in use.
If the Kenya legislature passes such a law, they can impose such a requirement on Kenyans who want to create such social media groups. Note that this is a license from the Kenyan government, not a copyright or trademark license. In effect, it is a tax on running a social media group, along with various regulations. I have no idea if this bill is at all likely to pass. If it does pass, it might be hard to enforce, as it would probably require cooperation from Facebook and other social media platforms, and the companies which run those platforms are not located in Kenya, and might not cooperate.
These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information.
The answer to this depends very much in which country you are in, and how you go about implementing it. First of all, this might seem obvious, but copyright only applies if you copy something that is covered under copyright. If you copy an idea - that having a library that solves problem X is useful - and that is the only aspect you copy, then under U.K. Copyright law, there is no copyright infringement, as ideas are not copyrighted. However, if you copy aspects of the library interface, or the object model of the original library, then it's a derived work, and the copyright of the new work is only partly yours. If you translate the source into a new language, then the copyright is largely still with the original author. Every country implements copyright law in their own way. One of the principle differences are in the available "fair use" clauses. You may find that you are entitled to a fair use clause for creating a "compatible" library, or you may be allowed to quote small aspects of the original in your new work. You need to check up on your countries laws.
Let’s work it through Is the work copyright? Yes. Are you making a copy or a derivative work? Yes. Do you have permission? No. At this point, it is prima facie copyright violation. However, various copyright laws have defences for breach. You don’t say where you are but as the USA is the most permissive in this regard we’ll use the USA. If it’s not legal there, it’s not legal anywhere. If it is legal there, it’s still likely to be not legal everywhere else. is it fair use? Almost certainly not. Wizards of the Coast (the copyright owner) already do this. While this service is free for creatures from the Monster Manual, it does drive traffic to their web site where they sell stuff. They also licence (presumably for money) others to do the same. Your usage would negatively affect the copyright owners market. This counts against fair use. Because it’s already being done, your work has virtually nil transformative value. This counts against fair use. You are copying a substantial part of the work. This counts against fair use. You are not using it commercially but neither is it for educational use. This is unlikely to matter. On balance: not fair use. TL;DR This is copyright violation.
Although the USA don't like it, there's a department called INTERPOL which is composed by about 150 countries. When a crime is committed and you need to involve another country to solve it, the sovereignty of each County prevents a police officer from one country acting upon another country. That's when the INTERPOL comes in. They usually requests the police from that country to act up. A judge from that country will grant their local police access to the data to be delivered to the country that requested it. Can the police get a search warrant for data 'in the cloud'? Yes. If the servers are located within the boundaries of your own country, it's a normal procedure. But like the above answer states, it's easier to subpoena the records than to execute a search warrant. In a subpoena, the company itself is bound to provide everything the police asks. Can the police get a search warrant for such third party systems? Yes. If there's enough probable cause, the investigation can lead to allow the police to try and discover files that are held by servers that store the cloud data. But if the servers are located outside the country and the company does not have any office opened in the country, a search warrant won't have validity in another jurisdiction and the police can't act without breaking the sovereignty principle. That's where the INTERPOL services are handy. The department is built in the principle of polices from different countries helping each other. The downside is that it's too bureaucratic and it takes a lot of time. For instance if he has a virtual machine hosted by Amazon, would they serve the warrant on Amazon, or on the suspect? Like mentioned by @Viktor, if the company has an office within the bounds of your country, it's easier to subpoena the records because that way the company will filter and provide only the data linked to the suspect being investigated. That is, the subpoena will have both the name of the company (Amazon) and the name of the Suspect, so the company can provide only the necessary files. Update If the police lack sufficient evidence for a search warrant, but an interpol country was, for some reason, willing to work with the police to collect and provide that information would they be able to use it even if they wouldn't have been able to subpoena a US country? Hypothetically speaking, I see your follow-up as a company that do have a local office and the Federal Police was turned down by a judge on a warrant/subpoena. In that case, there's no reason for another's country police to act on their own country. The suspect is a foreign suspect, the crime is a foreign crime and the police has no reason to work on it. But for the sake of argument, let's say that the local police was turned down by a judge for lack of evidence or something and the suspect has been investigated by a foreign country or whatever. If the information that the local police desires to obtain is available through the INTERPOL, it's most likely to be accepted since it's a data stored by an international police department. In your scenario, the foreign police was granted a legal right to search and collected the data for legal purpose. Maybe they can't use it in their own country, but since they followed a safe chain of custody and provided the information to the INTERPOL, that information has legal validity and it is not fruit of the poisonous tree if the chain of custody was maintained.
Requirement to disclose information during jury selection During jury selection and you are a potential jury member, are you required to answer the question if asked whether you own a firearm or are a member of the NRA?
If you are directly asked a question, you might sit there silently or explicitly refuse to answer, and the judge may order you to answer (refusing the order would be contempt). A non-responsive answer when being individually examined by an attorney is to be corrected by re-asking the question, to get a complete answer. However, if the pool is asked a generic question ("Is anybody here a member of the NRA ~ does anyone here work for Google, raise your hand") silence (or not raising your hand) would be perjury. See People v. Meza 188 Cal.App.3d 1631, People v. Blackwell for example.
It's not clear which "they" reported having no records, but you need to check with the court that convicted you. The police often destroy records decades before the courts will. Even if the court has no such record, I would be concerned about a record of your conviction existing in the national databases like NCIC. To address that, I would file a motion to expunge your conviction and then either get an order saying that the motion was granted, or that there is no conviction to expunge. I wouldn't rely on anything other than a court order. Until then, my instinct would be to simply answer honestly any questions put to you when registering as a voter or firearm owner. I don't believe it's illegal to submit an application when you have a criminal record, though I'm confident it would be illegal to lie on the application. (The actual answer to this question would depend on your jurisdiction, which you haven't provided. You should consult a lawyer to get a reliable answer.) It also occurs to me that you may simply be mistaken in believing that you were convicted. Frequently, courts will allow someone to enter some kind of conditional plea but refrain from entering a conviction if they behave themselves or meet some other criteria. If the court is satisfied with the defendant's performance, the charges may be dismissed altogether and eventually automatically expunged.
Yes. Opening statements and closing arguments are part of the record, but they are not evidence on the merits of the case. Courts often cite them in their rulings on various issues, especially because they are strong indicators of a party's theory of the case and what the jury was being encouraged to consider when rendering a verdict.
The California jury instructions for the crime of perjury give more detail on what it means to commit perjury: it's not just that you make a statement that is false, you have to willfully state that the information is true even though you know it is false. If you have a belief that you will be convicted for perjury (or any crime) by testifying, you may invoke your 5th Amendment right (I assume you are not testifying as the defendant in a criminal matter). You might (theoretically: see below on immunity and perjury) be granted immunity from prosecution, in which case there is no 5th Amendment right to refuse to testify (you are not putting yourself in criminal jeopardy), and the court can order you to testify. Or, you might not be granted immunity and still be ordered to testify. The federal immunity statute, 18 USC 6002, also needs to be scrutinized. When ordered to testify, "the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination", but it generally cannot be used against him: no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case However, there is an exception: except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. In other words, you cannot be immunized against a perjury charge. In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 defendant refused an order to testify, on the grounds that they (allegedly) believed that the government's grant of immunity was not broad enough, i.e. that there were areas where they might be questions and forced to criminally implicate themselves. They refused, and were held in contempt. The opinion recognized that the 5th Amendment "protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used" (emphasis added). In Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, the court held that The Fifth Amendment does not relieve a witness from answering merely on his own declaration or judgment that an answer might incriminate him; whether he must answer is determinable by the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion, and unless there is reasonable ground, as distinct from a remote or speculative possibility, to apprehend that a direct answer may prove dangerous to the witness, his answer should be compelled. Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 asserts that "the constitutional protection is confined to real danger, and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law, citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (itself quoting Lord Chief Justice Cockburn): "the danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things; not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct" Although the wording of the immunity statute does not allow immunity from prosecution for perjury, the 5th Amendment right can only be invoked against a real legal jeopardy. They can be compelled to testify, they probably cannot be immunized against a perjury conviction (certainly not at the federal level). We would need to know the entire circumstances of the case to be able to assess whether the "knowing to be false" part could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
§Sec. 54-212 of the ordinance states (a) It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, sell, offer or display for sale, give, lend, transfer ownership of, acquire, carry or possess any assault weapon or large capacity magazine in Cook County So if the gun is an assault weapon, it is not legal to sell. That ends the legal inquiry. Beyond that, we can only conjecture as to possibilities, for example (1) you may be mistaken in your assessment of some particular firearm, (2) the authorities don't know yet so haven't taken action or (3) they do know and they have taken action. Your link did not lead to any obvious things that count as an assault weapon, perhaps you could be more specific.
Are licenses not required to explicitly state Nah, not at all. Licenses state whatever they want. There is no authority to compel license writers to include any particular statements. In case a license you wanna use does not make sense, you either seek clarification or do not use it.
You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on.
This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.
Is a school in loco parentis when students are outside of school? I am a senior in high school and like many other classes we are doing a "scavenger hunt" (teams of students have to compete various tasks and earn points for these tasks) outside of school. Our school got wind that there were illegal things (e.g., filming a sex act of a girl under the legal age of consent, and the use of marijuana) on the scavenger hunt list. They are now launching an investigation with authorities and have called/emailed all senior parents. I am in no way in trouble and do not mind the scavenger hunt being cancelled, I just want to know if the school has the right to do this?
Anyone has a right to report illegal activities that it is aware of to the authorities. This is in fact where 99.9% of police investigations start. In addition, students of a school (or, more generally, members of any organisation) are eligible to be investigated/disciplined by the school in accordance with the rules of the school providing that the investigation and punishment are in accordance with the law. This would normally permit (require?) notification of any child's parent or guardian. In loco parentis does not arise - the school is acting as a responsible citizen; not as a substitute for the children's parents.
It is not prohibited in California under EDC §49011, though your local board could make it prohibited. In-person solicitation of goods or money during school hours is prohibited in NY state, under Regents Rule 19.6, but recruiting children during school hours is allowed.
From the sound of it, you have stated that you gained access to school data, possibly including private information about other students, professors, schedules, grades, disciplinary information, financial tuition or salary info, etc., that you were not authorized to have. The question of whether it was properly secured is rather beside the point. The school will now need to know the precise scope of your snooping: whether you were able to modify any information (i.e. change grades), what purpose to your snooping, etc.
The real question is do they have to refund the rest of the summer camp fees if Bob is expelled due to his own intentional misbehavior? Not if the contract was written by a good lawyer, or even by a merely competent lawyer. In that case, the contract will provide that there is to be no refund in the event of expulsion.
In addition to the general considerations of (1) who is allowed to use non-deadly physical force to maintain order in a shop (which I think that one could do if "deputized" by the property owner or to protect the property of another as well), and (2) the use of non-deadly physical force to make a citizen's arrest (which many of these scenarios would justify as the disorder would be a crime if committed by an adult), (3) I suspect that there is also some point at which a bystander may intervene to prevent harms associated with an unsupervised minor being at large and in need of supervision. Generally speaking, intervention with the minimum reasonable non-deadly physical force to prevent property damage, or an assault, or a threat, is going to be permissible. As to the third reason: for a mentally normal ten-year-old that might be a stretch; for a four-year-old or a clearly impaired older child it might not. One could approach the child, say, "where's your mom or dad", "do you have a babysitter or sibling around?", "what is your name?", or "are you lost?" and detain the child until a satisfactory answer is provided or a suitable authority arrives, to prevent the problem of a child being lost, abducted or hurt by the child's own actions. It would be quite hard for a parent, guardian or babysitter to complain about this kind of conduct when the child was unsupervised and is released as soon as you confirm that this really is a responsible adult or older minor who is responsible for the child. It would be important in doing so to not secret away or isolate the child, to try to determine the location of the child's caretaker, to refrain from doing anything that would harm the child, and to seek assistance from an authority within a reasonable time. Typically, if no caretaker appeared, a cop would come and the cop would oversee the situation until a social worker could come. For example, Colorado has the following statute that would apply once a cop arrived (omitting lengthy provisions that apply to newborn children): § 19-3-401. Taking children into custody (1) A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court: (a) When the child is abandoned, lost, or seriously endangered in such child's surroundings or seriously endangers others and immediate removal appears to be necessary for such child's protection or the protection of others; (b) When there are reasonable grounds to believe that such child has run away or escaped from such child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has not made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home; . . . (1.3) A child shall be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home. (1.5) An emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered as described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the child from the child's home. If such an emergency exists, a child shall be removed from such child's home and placed in protective custody regardless of whether reasonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. (2) The taking of a child into temporary custody under this section shall not be deemed an arrest, nor shall it constitute a police record. A child is considered neglected or dependent under circumstances including the following (provisions related to drug or alcohol abuse by parents omitted): § 19-3-102. Neglected or dependent child (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; I don't have easily at hand legal authority authorizing a third-party who is not a law enforcement officer to take custody of a dependent or neglected child until a law enforcement officer arrives, but I strongly suspect from the context that this is allowed either under common law, or a statute that I have not located, or some legal fiction (e.g., that the citizen is implicitly deputized by the law enforcement officer after the fact), or simply as a matter of custom and ordinary practice not codified in any authoritative legal source.
The basic authority of university staff is summarized here. What seems to be at issue here is whether you have a property right to "access" to the university, as an alumnus. Legal protection of alumnus rights is pretty minimal, contrasted with student or employee rights. There could be a line in the sand pertaining to whether you've paid for something, or are the privileges that you've enjoyed simple part of a PR stunt? If you pay the university for access to university facilities (borrower privileges, for example) then it would be harder to revoke that privilege. Most universities grant a certain level of added privilege, such as an alumnus email account, without any requirement to pay. (They hope to create some good will which translates into donations). So it would really depend on what the basis is for claiming access to university resources, as an alumnus. There is no general obligation of a university to grant alumni various privileges, but they may have created a reasonable expectation and legal right to such privileges, as part of their advertising: that can only be judged by looking at all of the facts. There might be rules within the university which address alumni, so obviously reading the university rules is important. That is really how you would determine whether the coordinator is overstepping her authority. If the university admits that it no longer has jurisdiction over you, then that might be the end of the case, unless that was an error based on less than the totality of the facts. If an accused completely and irrevocably severs relations with a university, the university would have no power over the accused. If there is still a relationship, or if the severance is revocable (i.e. you can become a student again), the university retains some power over an accused. If a student violates the federal regulations pertaining to sex discrimination, the university could be in trouble if they do not address the situation. If the accused leaves the university for a quarter, that does not erase past acts, so the university could be in trouble if they don't address the situation in case of an intervening term off. Thus a legally-viable option would be for a university to permanently remove (unprotected) relations with an accused – not access to transcripts, because of FERPA, but certainly the right to re-enroll or the right to use the library as an alumnus. Again, though, it would depend on what the university rules say. It is highly unlikely that the coordinator has the authority to find facts and mete out punishment (determine that an accused did the act), and this is usually determined by a committee, subject to approval by higher administration. However, an administrator does have the right to limit an individual's relationship to the university in a manner that protects the university's interest. For example, in the event that a person is accused of sexual harassment, the university can temporarily relieve a person of teaching and advising duties, until the case is resolved and there has been a final finding of fact. In general, universities are very protective of their interests and will absolutely squash anything that they think will get them into legal trouble. All that is necessary is that there be a credible basis for the claim – often, that means simply "an accusation". If a complainant vigorously pursues a case, the university could be in trouble because the law allows punishment (loss of funds) in case of a single past violation of the regulations. Their interest therefore is being sure that they have remediated the situation (the stronger course of action), or the complainant has given up (risky since the complainant can change their mind).
I believe that you have misinterpreted the case, not least because the Hudgins v I.R.S case involves this only peripherally. The original case Diviaio v Kelly was dealing with a request for the number of photographs taken of the plaintiff and if these had been disseminated outside the CIA. This is in no way shape or form a request for records (the records were found to be legitimately exempt). I see no problem in your FOI request. In fact, I can foresee the response: These, http://www.maine.gov/legis/ros/meconlaw.htm, are the laws we use to justify these actions. In a common law jurisdiction, a person (including the government) does not have to prove they are abiding by the law. The onus is on you to prove they aren't; they do not have to help you make your case.
In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful?
Can my work force me to pay for their compulsory in-house training? My contract with work states if I leave within 18 months I must pay for the mandatory training they sent me on of £1800. I am already qualified in my field and this course was just to learn their way of doing things no actually qualification was gained. Also I worked in this role previously so had some experience of what to do. As I had no choice to attend the course as they would not of hired me if I had refused to go on it, are they legally allowed to make me to pay for it now?
are they legally allowed to make me to pay for it now? Unfortunately, yes. Contract law entitles them to charge you that amount only because --as it appears from your inquiry-- you signed the contract with (or despite) your awareness of that clause. Perhaps from other terms in your contract you might have the possibility to overcome that liability. For instance, apropos of the fact that you possessed the requisite knowledge beforehand, whether the company intentionally misled you into thinking that you would gain any valuable knowledge from the training (other than the very particular way the company wants certain tasks to be performed). However, that is hard to assess without knowing more details of your situation.
UK: For all I know you cannot be fired unless you are hired. They must hire you. Once a job offer is made and accepted, they must hire you. If they don't, call a lawyer. I personally know someone who got hired, and when he arrived for his first day's work at the new company, he found that the whole department that he was supposed to join had been laid of. The company had to hire him. PS. "Financial difficulties" means you call a lawyer urgently. Once they are bankrupt your chances of extracting money are not good.
Your premise is a little off, which changes the question somewhat. The actual clause in the 2016 Junior Doctors contract Section 3 (52) states: Where a doctor intends to undertake hours of paid work as a locum, additional to the hours set out in the work schedule, the doctor must initially offer such additional hours of work to the service of the NHS via an NHS staff bank of their choosing. The requirement to offer such service is limited to work commensurate with the grade and competencies of the doctor rather than work at a lower grade than the doctor is currently employed to work at. Additional work, such as; event and expedition medicine, work for medical charities, non-profits, humanitarian and similar organisations, or sports and exercise medicine do not fall under the scope of additional work as a locum. (note that 'locum' has a standard definition of 'a person who stands in temporarily for someone else of the same profession, especially a cleric or doctor' but is not defined in the contract itself - its a well known term that does not require further definition, but it plays an important part in your question) So, a few things from that section: Where a doctor intends to undertake hours of paid work as a locum This immediately sets limits on what the clause means - the intention is to limit locum work, not general work. The requirement to offer such service is limited to work commensurate with the grade and competencies of the doctor rather than work at a lower grade than the doctor is currently employed to work at A FY2 or later junior doctor can go elsewhere to work as a house officer if they cannot find work as a senior house officer, again restricting the clause to similar working conditions and not general work. This is very very similar to any company putting a non-compete in their contract for, say, a software developer - you need the companies permission to go do contract work for another software company for example. To specifically talk to your point about being a gardener, this clause does not cover that because the employee is not acting as a locum in their professional capacity at that point. The intention of this clause is to fill the gaps in the NHS staffing plan caused by 11 years of mismanagement and underfunding - no longer can an in-contract doctor or nurse work their 38 hour rota and then go fill a lucrative shift with a private hospital, they must offer any hours under 48 to the NHS via the employee bank - this means the bank can pay minimal wages to cover shifts it had to pay locums a lot more to cover before 2016.
If you are on Tier 4 (students on full-time degree), you have more restrictions besides the number of hours. One of this is no self-employment (which includes freelance and consultancy or creating your own company).
Yes You asked for work to be done in the expectation you would have to pay for it and they did the work - that’s a legally binding contract. It appears that you did not agree on a price and possibly not on a time for making payment. If that is so, you agreed to pay a reasonable price in a reasonable time. They have issued an invoice stating what and when they believe is reasonable. You dispute parts of that invoice. That’s fine, people are allowed to have disputes. You have paid the undisputed amount I hope? Notwithstanding, your negotiations with the other party can go back and forth and things can be put on and taken off the table. But you don’t have a deal until you have a deal. At any time, either party can walk away and assert their rights. Or make a take it or leave it offer, commonly called playing hardball. Since it is undisputed that you owe them something, they can refer the debt to “collections (be that internal or an external debt collector). You should pay the undisputed amount immediately and you can continue to dispute the remainder. They will make a deal, initiate legal action, or let the matter die.
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/experts/article-1698485/Can-I-discuss-my-pay-with-colleagues.html In short, there are no laws prohibiting or rendering such contract clauses unenforceable, but an employer cannot rely on such a contractual clause to abrogate its obligations under the Equality Act 2010.
the company does have the right to "verify the eligibility of the person and terminate the service to the ineligible at any time" is pretty unambiguous. They have assessed your eligibility, determined you don't have one and have terminated the service. They are completely within their rights to do this. If you feel that they have assessed your eligibility wrongly then you can dispute their assessment - either through whatever dispute resolution is detailed in the contract or by going to court if the contract is silent. The fact that they previously assessed you as eligible (or didn't actually make an assessment) is irrelevant.
Do I give my letter 60 days from the end of the contract, or 60 days before September? My boss told me that it would be 60 days before the end of the contract, but I wanted a second opinion. Your boss is wrong. The contract requires a party to give a 60-day notice only if the party intends to override the default condition that "the contract shall run for the full term named above". Since your contract ends on June 30th and you plan on working there up to and including that date, you are abiding by the [contract] default condition. Therefore, you are not required to send a notice for something you are not intending to do (namely, to terminate the contract ahead of schedule). The information you provide here does not reflect any language in your current contract relating to subsequent contracts/renewals. The existence of such language might or might not change the assessment. That issue aside, you might want to ensure that the preliminary offer made to you verbally be somehow reflected in writing. It will not be more binding than the verbal offer, but that evidence could prove useful in the event that the new employer unexpectedly changes its mind at a time when your current employer has discarded you for contract renewal. Your prospective employer should become aware of how its request for a reference from your boss jeopardizes a renewal with your current employer.
Does the EU "2-year guarantee" apply to security vulnerabilities? As we all know, Android security is a mess. Google fixes security bugs, but it's a matter of luck whether your vendor or carrier decides to deploy the fix to your phone or tablet. In the European Union, there is a mandatory 2-year guarantee for all goods: Faulty goods must be repaired, replaced or refunded if a defect which already existed on receipt of the goods is found at most 2 years after purchasing the good. Has anyone every tried this w.r.t. security vulnerabilities? I.e., purchase a new, shrink-wrapped device (perhaps a cheap device that was released a few years ago but is still being sold) and then, after using it for about a year, force the trader to take it back because it no longer receives security updates? On the one hand, all conditions for the 2-year guarantee should be satisfied: The device was bought less than 2 years ago, the defect was already present when the device was bought, and the device can no longer serve its intended purpose (surf the web without getting your device compromised, your passwords stolen and, thus, your bank account emptied). On the other hand, I have never heard or read about such a case, so I might be missing something obvious...
No, it does not. There is indeed a 2-year guarantee for all goods, but "goods" is defined to be a "tangible movable item" according to Directive 1999/44/EC Article 1, subsection 2(b). In less legalese, a physical item; software doesn't count. While there has been discussion about extending this protection to software, I'm not aware of this having been done yet. Even if it were, determining whether goods are "faulty" ultimately comes down to whether it conforms to the contract of sale (Article 2). I think it's likely that vendors in this area would put a disclaimer for unforeseen security vulnerabilities, or something to that effect.
There are three main aspects to this: Its their website, and their terms of service. They can enforce those terms, or change them (in some appropriate manner). You have no recourse if they remove you, block you, or delete your account, for example. That's the measure that you would probably have, virtually every time. To claim damages, or litigate beyond just website access control, requires a legal claim. But there's a catch there. To claim damages, they need to show actual damage, which they wish to be compensated for. If you misused their website but no actual harm can be shown, the total damage claimable is zero, whether or not you followed their rules. Merely entering dishonest information isn't by itself harm. So they would have to show they suffered damage/harm because of that, which is directly attributable to your behaviour, was foreseeably harmful etc, or similar. They also need to consider legal costs, and ability to enforce, especially if you are in a different country. If for some reason the computer use was also illegal, then a criminal act could be committed and they could notify law enforcement. For example suppose you did this in the little known country of Honestania, where the law says that to prevent trolling and online abuse, anything posted on social media under any but your own legal name is a crime. Or suppose you'd been banned from the system and ignoring/evading such a ban was criminal computer use or criminal trespass due to the forbidden/unauthorised access (which can happen in several places). But this is purely for completeness; I guess you'd know if you were taking it further, into criminal computer use.
The first thing to notice is that the £100 offer appears to be a legit offer. That is to say, accepting it will create a binding agreement between you and the company. There is no reason yet for the company to believe that you have suffered more damages, and you do have reasonable options to prevent them (ask bank for a new card - that's not going to cost you £100). The second observation is that the GDPR does not really affect the first observation. The GDPR itself does not give rise to additional civil claims or special damages. Yes, the GDPR states that the company is in the wrong, but parties can make agreements how a wrongful deed is made right again. And their offer appears to do so. Note that accepting the offer does not take away your continuing GDPR rights. It just affects their past error. You can still ask them whether they have your card data on file today.
Possibly The game company has almost certainly excluded liability under the contract you entered. There may be some consumer protection that you have that they cannot exclude - I don’t know enough about German law to meaningfully comment. Notwithstanding, if you were to initiate legal action against the, as yet, unknown wrongdoer, you could subpoena the relevant records from the game company with a court order. No matter what privacy or other protections the other person has, the game company must obey the order or be in contempt. Without such an order the game company is right that they can’t disclose details of other users. As a practical matter, it will cost several hundred € to initiate legal action and several thousand to pursue it to the end. And you might lose. A better response is to treat the lost €80 as a relatively cheap life lesson - many people lose a lot more learning to recognise scams.
This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't
Obviously you may end up voiding warranties, losing on-going support from the manufacturer, or there may be a contract you agreed to stating that you won't do it, but assuming none of that is relevant (e.g. a salvaged Tesla doesn't get support/warranty anyway) is there any law preventing you from modifying your property to remove the limits placed on it? This assumes away one of the biggest issues, which is doing this is almost certainly a breach of contract unless the contract term is void as against public policy (which it probably isn't). So, the manufacturer can sue you for money damages probably equal to the difference in value between the limited and unlimited hardware in the marketplace. The manufacturer might also be able to obtain an injunction against this practice, which could result in the incarceration of someone who knowingly violated this court order for contempt of court, once an injunction is secured from a court to enforce the contract. There is also an anti-hacking statute in the United States, whose plain language appears to prohibit taking actions that override a digital system's security features. Unlocking these hardware features would appear to violate this statute. This is part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and is codified at United States Code Title 17, Section 1201. As Wikipedia explains: 17 U.S.C. 1201 is often known as the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions. These provisions changed the remedies for the circumvention of copy-prevention systems (also called "technical protection measures") and required that all analog video recorders have support for a specific form of copy prevention created by Macrovision (now Rovi Corporation) built in, giving Macrovision an effective monopoly on the analog video-recording copy-prevention market. The section contains a number of specific limitations and exemptions, for such things as government research and reverse engineering in specified situations. Although, section 1201(c) of the title stated that the section does not change the underlying substantive copyright infringement rights, remedies, or defenses, it did not make those defenses available in circumvention actions. The section does not include a fair use exemption from criminality nor a scienter requirement, so criminal liability could attach to even unintended circumvention for legitimate purposes. The statute is quite lengthy and full of technical definitions and narrow exceptions and exceptions to exceptions to the general rule. These legal issues have mostly gained media attention in the context of farmers who seek to hack into the built in software of their farm machinery in order to repair it where the manufacturing companies have not cooperated. There have been legislative fixes proposed that would make these prohibition void as against public policy for some specific purposes like doing repairs. There have also been efforts to characterize this kind of business practice as an anti-trust violation. But, none of that legislation has passed in the United States, to the best of my knowledge and belief. But, I am not aware of any high profile legal precedent that has addressed this point but I wouldn't rule out the possibility that there is one. The closest case I could find on point (from the High Court in Australia) is Stevens v. Sony, which holds "that a device allowing PlayStations to play games with a different region code did not violate the anti-circumvention laws, because the mechanism in the PlayStation did not directly prevent the infringement of copyright." I am not personally familiar with non-U.S. law on this topic. Wikipedia reviews some of the applicable law in the E.U. and Australia. According to this Wikipedia entry, pursuant to European Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of May 22, 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, E.U. member nations must adopt domestic anti-circumvention statutes that meet certain minimum E.U. standards set forth in the directive. Also according to the same Wikipedia entry: "Australia prohibits circumvention of "access control technical protection measures" in Section 116 of the Copyright Act." In Australia, "Penalties for violation of the anti-circumvention laws include an injunction, monetary damages, and destruction of enabling devices."
The GDPR only mentions cookies once (Recital 30). (It says that cookies are personal data if they are associated with natural persons.) As far as cookies go, nothing has really changed since 2002, and the exception granted in the EU cookie directive Article 5(3) is still valid: This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order for the provider of an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide the service. If your site complies with the 2002 directive today, it will be GDPR compliant. All the "EU Cookie Law Compliance" plugins I've checked out let the admin configure the site to comply with the 2002 directive, and most let you choose between implicit consent (which is, and still will be, OK if you or third party services do not use cookies for profiling or to collect personal data), soft consent, or hard consent. The latter is however mandatory if you or third party services use cookies to for profiling or to collect personal data. However, if at least one of your cookies are used for profiling (and if you use Google analytics, you are), or if they are used to collect personal data, the exception from explicit consent quoted above does not apply and implicit consent (i.e.: "continued use of the site amounts to implicit consent to the use of cookies") has never been legal for the site. So while nothing has changed since 2002, there is a lot of misinformation about cookies floating on the Internet, and a lot of sites have their cookie banners set up wrong. You may want to do a new cookie audit for your site to verify that you comply with existing legislation.
That's an old idea that has been tried several times before (such as the first, being Unvarnished: Website Lets You Review People (And Trash Them) | HuffPost, which no longer exists); and one of the latest incarnations is Peeple (mobile application - Wikipedia). There are lots of legal liabilities, including defamation and harassment/stalking, even with the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act | Electronic Frontier Foundation which (mostly) protects the website owner from others' speech posted on the site (your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction). The only way such a site would survive is to do what Peeple and other sites have done: greatly limit the speech allowed, such as limiting to only positive reviews, giving the subject complete control over what does appear on their profile, only allowing "opt-in" profiles, verify identities, etc. You would have to implement full GDPR compliance; but various lawsuits will either shut you down before you get far enough to launch or soon after and force you to greatly limit the scope of the site. Most lawyers would advise you to find something else to do with your time and money.
Profit from a celebrity domain name if I have the same name? Here is my situation. I have a fairly unique first/last name in the States but it is common in another country. I live in the States. I own a .com, which is my full name. It is an empty page right now. I own a second website where I sell stuff via affiliate marketing. There is an up-and-coming celebrity from another country with my exact name. Therefore, my name's domain gets ~2K hits per month. Is there a legal issue if I forward all traffic from my name's domain to my selling stuff website?
As long as you are not claiming to be this celebrity, which would be impersonation, then you are not doing anything wrong or illegal. Since it is your own name, you can use it.
There are three questions relevant to this issue: Who owned the copyright in the first place? Was the copyright transferred? If not, was a license given to the site to use the content? In general, under most countries' laws, the person who creates an original work owns the copyright. The person with the copyright has the right to copy and distribute the work, and the right to prevent others from doing so. In some cases, such as where a work is created as a "work for hire" by certain employees under certain circumstances, the initial copyright is held by a third party. You will need a lawyer familiar with your jurisdiction and your circumstances to determine if this is the case. Finally, even if you own the copyright, you can license others to use your content. This may be in an express written document, or it may be an implied license--implied, for instance, by the act of posting it on their blog. The existence and scope of such a license is, again, something that will have to be determined based on your country's specific laws and your specific situation. The bottom line is: if you submitted articles to that blog, you can't complain that they posted them. Depending on the license in effect, you might be able to get them taken down, or you might not. You need a lawyer, not the internet, to tell you what your rights are in this very specific case.
You can hire someone to locate the defendant with the information that you have, or you can apply to a court for permission to serve them with process via "substituted service" because their physical address can't be determined. But, in general, better business practice is to not enter into contracts with people with whom you have more than a name that might be false, and an email address, unless you have some means of non-judicial enforcement of your agreement (like the practical ability to shut down access to an internet subscription). If you don't even know if someone's name is real and have done nothing to confirm that then you also have no assurances that they have any assets from which you could collect if you won a breach of contract lawsuit. If you deal with large numbers of people in low value contracts, it may be worth treating the fact that some contracts are effectively unenforceable as a cost of doing business. But, if a contract is important, it was foolish from a business perspective to rely on a contract on that basis alone, even if it is legal to do so.
"...the listing ad of property is not a property of website." Why do you think that? Just because a website exists does not mean you can legally scrape it. Read the Terms of Service of the site; there is a good chance the TOS forbids scraping or copying of any part of the website in any manner, including scraping. If the property listings are from a third party service that provides real estate listings to websites, then those property listings are licensed to that website, and by scraping them you will likely be violating the TOSs of those two services. By illegally scraping the content of a website, you are opening yourself up to being involved in copyright infringement and/or being liable to be the subject of a civil lawsuit.
Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins? Well, they can, but they have no legal backing to make it happen. Their chances of succeeding are about as good as me requesting a Ferrari, a Yacht and a Mansion. I can make that request. People will laugh. I will not get it. I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related You have no way to know who owns what email address. And it's none of your business. Your only interest should be in whether the address is owned by the person that is creating the account. You probably already do that by sending a confirmation link to the email address when people sign up. I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request The only way you have to comply with such a request is if the owner can prove their identity. As far as I understood, the "Finnish city" was three degrees away from that. They could not provide any proof they are who they said they are, they could not provide a finite list of accounts they claimed to own and they could not even provide proof they own those accounts. They literally just wrote an email with zero legal meaning. I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one The correct way to handle this is have a feature on your website where the account owner can delete their own account. GDPR compliant. Then you make a text template explaining how to use that feature and reply with that template to every request, no matter how stupid (like this case) they are. If they cannot identify themselves to you by proving they have access to their "own" email, they have no business wasting your time. Legally, they could provide you with a different method of identification. In case of a Finnish school, that would probably need to be power of attorney from all children's legal guardians and a specific way to identify the accounts that is consistent with the data given (for example if they entered their full name and address on your website). You would probably in your rights to demand a certified translation if it's all in Finnish. Apart from the fact that you as a private US citizen have no real means to check the validity of all that paperwork, personally, if I saw hundreds of pages of certified translated paperwork, I would probably just comply. Not sure it it were actually enough, but it certainly gets an A+ for effort to delete data from a private website. But a real lawyer might give better advice with a real case on their hands. Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) Indeed. You should not delete people's data because a random punk on the internet sent you an email. You need to identify who the request is from and if they are allowed to make such a request. Whether you have a legal duty to actually keep data, is up to you or your lawyer to find out. It depends on your data and laws. It is perfectly legal to make a website with a textfield that deletes any data you enter after a second. Destruction of data you own is only a problem if you break other laws with it. For example the IRS might not be amused if you destroyed invoices and other proof of taxable income. "Some dude claimed I must in an email" is not going to fly with them. That said, again, please, identify who you deal with, find out if their claim is valid. Don't do stuff because random internet punks write you an email. Because the next mail you get, will be from a Nigerian Prince. Please wisen up before opening that one. People on the internet, through stupidity or malice, might not have your best interests at heart. Don't believe random emails.
The answer depends in part what venue you're talking about, e.g. Reddit, Facebook etc. The details are revealed somewhere in the Terms of Service for that venue. The general pattern is that you are allowed to use that venue, provides you grant permission for the service to do what they do with your content. You cannot legally send them a take-down notice for your stuff, because a take-down notice requires you to say that the stuff was posted without your permission (and that is false – and you can be punished for making that statement). There could be a venue where they do not hold you to an irrevocable license, in which case you could revoke that permission (but not Reddit: you granted them a "royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive, unrestricted, worldwide license to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, perform, or publicly display your user content in any medium and for any purpose, including commercial purposes, and to authorize others to do so"). I've seen a site that actually asserts ownership of user-contributed content (I don't know if their TOS ended up being litigated) – if is not at all hard to write a TOS that includes transfer of copyright, rather than granting of a license. The only hard parts are (1) figuring out what you want in terms of permission to use and (2) whether your answer to (1) means nobody will use your service. SE and Reddit TOS probably are as close as you need to get for what you describe.
Pretty much everything you need to know about the ownership and licensing of your material on Medium is in the Medium TOS you contractually agreed to when you signed up with the service. Basically, you granted Medium a license to use the work, but you did not agree to an exclusive license nor turn over copyright to them. Part of that Terms of Service – Medium Policy reads: Content rights & responsibilities You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. By posting content to Medium, you give us a nonexclusive license to publish it on Medium Services, including anything reasonably related to publishing it (like storing, displaying, reformatting, and distributing it). In consideration for Medium granting you access to and use of the Services, you agree that Medium may enable advertising on the Services, including in connection with the display of your content or other information. We may also use your content to promote Medium, including its products and content. We will never sell your content to third parties without your explicit permission. You’re responsible for the content you post. This means you assume all risks related to it, including someone else’s reliance on its accuracy, or claims relating to intellectual property or other legal rights. You’re welcome to post content on Medium that you’ve published elsewhere, as long as you have the rights you need to do so. By posting content to Medium, you represent that doing so doesn’t conflict with any other agreement you’ve made. By posting content you didn’t create to Medium, you are representing that you have the right to do so. For example, you are posting a work that’s in the public domain, used under license (including a free license, such as Creative Commons), or a fair use. We can remove any content you post for any reason. You can delete any of your posts, or your account, anytime. Processing the deletion may take a little time, but we’ll do it as quickly as possible. We may keep backup copies of your deleted post or account on our servers for up to 14 days after you delete it. Pertaining to presenting Medium content in an iFrame on another site, this is reasonably close to not allowing that: You may not do, or try to do, the following: ... (2) access or search the Services by any means other than the currently available, published interfaces (e.g., APIs) that we provide;... You can use Embed Code Generator | Embedly to embed an iFrame of a Medium page on another site. But contacting Medium via the email at the bottom of the TOS would tell you for sure if it is OK. Comments on your pieces on Medium do belong to the owner. And You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. appears to cover the idea of copying your material from Medium to your own site. If in doubt, ask them.
The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details.
In 1970, how was Ted Cruz's citizenship determined? Above answer explains issue using current law situation, but I am interested what exactly was law in 1970 when Ted Cruz was born. An article in Salon claims (which is possibly invalid claim): As late as 1961, the Supreme Court ruled that the 1802 Naturalization Act only made a child born abroad a citizen if the father was a citizen. We know that only mother of Ted Cruz was US citizen; his father was a naturalized Canadian. "Possible duplicate" answer cites 8 U.S. Code § 1401(g) which says: A person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five years, at least two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years[.] My question is, when this current interpretation became law? Was it before 1970 when Cruz was born, or after? This also suggests that Salon article is wrong (which is entirely possible)? TL;DR: Salon's article would apply to person born before 1932, not to Cruz.
This is answered here. According to Wikipedia, birthright citizenship was extended to children with citizen mothers and noncitizen fathers in 1934; the text of that law seems to be found here. The 1961 Supreme Court ruling that Salon is referring to seems to be this one, but they are interpreting the law as it stood in 1906, not 1961. Petitioner, whose mother is a native-born United States citizen and whose father is a citizen of Italy (their marriage having been in the United States), was born in Italy in 1906 while his parents were temporarily residing there, and entered the United States with his mother later the same year.
Clearly, British laws against e.g. murder, theft, fraud, and most other crimes were received into state law because those matters are under the jurisdiction of the states. States (and also to some extent federal criminal statutes) received British common law definitions of various crimes and defenses, but not British penal statutes (which often didn't define those crimes in the late 18th century). The statutory law of Britain did not apply as U.S. law at either the state or federal level upon the U.S. Declaration of Independence, except in isolated cases where a state, or the federal government expressly adopted it by reference in their own statute. The existence of British law, both statutory and through case law, informs how the U.S. common law was understood (something that was predominantly a matter of state law) and how concept in the U.S. Constitution, U.S. federal statutes, and state constitutions and statutes were understood (especially when terms from British statutes are used in a similar matter in U.S. state and federal statutes and constitutions). But, British statutes did not have direct force and effect in the U.S. after independence. As much as anything else, this simply reflect how the nature of statutes v. common law was understood in the late 18th and early 19th century. Nobody expected that British statutes would be directly applicable, so they weren't. There may have been instances where common law rules actually had their roots in British statutes that were mostly forgotten in long layers of British common law case law, and many statutes expressly adopting British case law also expressly incorporate selected relevant British statutes of generally applicability. But, no British statutes were applicable "automatically" in the U.S. For example, before Congress enacted the Naturalization Act of 1790, would a person born outside the US to a US citizen father have been a US citizen by dint of the US "inheriting" the British Nationality Act 1772 mutatis mutandis? No. Basic ways of thinking about what nationality or citizenship even was or meant would have been received, but not by receiving the British Nationality Act 1772 as U.S. law. And before Congress enacted the Crimes Act of 1790, would an American who levied war against the US, gave aid and comfort to its enemies, or counterfeited US currency have been convicted and sentenced under the Treason Act 1351? Not really. From the adoption of the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776 until the adoption of the Articles of Confederation on June 11, 1777, as a practical matter, the revolutionary forced had very little actual control of the courts in an enforceable way, there was an insurgency against the British underway, and it was an ad hoc effort from day to day and month to month that was muddled through without a formal structure or guidance at a colony by colony level, or even more granularly within a colony. In the period from June 11, 1777 until the new U.S. Constitution was implemented in 1789-1790, under the Articles of Confederation, the situation was fluid and irregular. State governments made most statutory and common law, adopting their colonial era colonial statutes but not necessarily British statutes that their local legislature didn't adopt. Central government laws usually acted on the states, not directly on individuals, much like treaties today. There was little or no directly applicable central government legislation. Many topics, like citizenship, were simply ignored in this era. The U.S. Constitution adopted in 1789, and the initial acts of the First Congress to implement it, were a response to the realization that after the war and its immediate aftermath had settled down, that the newly formed country needed to regularize, institutionalize, and deal with a lot of governance issues and legal questions that nobody had had the time or resources or authority to deal with while a war had been going on. For much of this time period the Revolutionary War was in progress and it wasn't always obvious who even controlled the courts or had practice authority to enforce court judgments. The Revolutionary War was not concluded until 1783. It was an improvisation at first, and not necessarily a uniform one, since the Articles of Confederation conceived of the U.S. as many countries in an alliance with each other rather than an actual single nation that had to address legal issues uniformly. Prior to the establishment of the federal court system under the U.S. Constitution of 1789 that remains in force, the only institution of the central government was Congress and its committees, which functioned as a legislative body, a body selecting people with executive authority, and as a court of last resort from state court judgments. Everything was carried out at the state level except for courts-martial. Structurally, the Articles of Confederation were a fused system, akin to the U.K. Parliament which had its highest court of appeals and its prime ministership fused with the legislative authority of parliament, layered on top of 13 separate sovereign state governments.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2423, transporting a minor across state lines is a crime when done with the purpose to engage in illegal sex or child pornography: (a) Transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. --A person who knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. (b) Travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct. --A person who travels in interstate commerce or travels into the United States, or a United States citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States who travels in foreign commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. (c) Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. --Any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels in foreign commerce or resides, either temporarily or permanently, in a foreign country, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. I can't find anything suggesting that the intent to obtain an abortion would implicate this or any other law, though there have been attempts, such as the perennially introduced, but never-passed Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act.
As for the ex post facto question, an ex post facto law is one that makes an act illegal when it was legal at the time of the commission. Let's now look at the clause: (b) Effective date.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and the amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply regardless of whether the conduct alleged occurred, or is alleged to have occurred, before, on, or after such date of enactment. What amendment is made in section subsection a? Section 230(e) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following: “(5) NO EFFECT ON SEX TRAFFICKING LAW.—Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or limit— “(A) any claim in a civil action brought under section 1595 of title 18, United States Code, if the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a violation of section 1591 of that title; “(B) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of section 1591 of title 18, United States Code; or “(C) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of section 2421A of title 18, United States Code, and promotion or facilitation of prostitution is illegal in the jurisdiction where the defendant’s promotion or facilitation of prostitution was targeted.”. This does not make any act illegal. It say "we don't mean by this that...", and does not make any act illegal. The basic definition of the crime is here: §2421A(a) Whoever, using a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, owns, manages, or operates an interactive computer service (as such term is defined in defined in section 230(f) the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(f))), or conspires or attempts to do so, with the intent to promote or facilitate the prostitution of another person shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both likewise §2421A(a). The bold part is standard language invoking the Commerce Clause, which is the source of federal authority in what would otherwise be a state matter. The italicized part, referring to intent, indicates that the website owner/operator has to have a wrongful intent, so it's not just a penalty against those who own or operate a website for content produced by the users of the site, if those users advertise prostitution or sex trafficking. The First Amendment has a number of limits, for example you are not free to threaten or defraud, or advertise murder for hire, of advertise employment, housing or lodging (etc) discriminatorily (e.g. "Women need not apply" is illegal). The question would be whether the government has a compelling interest in limiting free speech (I think the court would say yes), and is this the narrowest restriction possible that accomplishes that interest (again, yes). So it would probably pass strict scrutiny. The purpose of the act is both to tune up the Communications Decency Act and to extend the Mann Act, which makes certain forms of interstate sex a crime. So, 18 USC 2422 (a)Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both"; (b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. This expands the federal limits on prostitution in a standard way.
It may help to start by clearing up some false premises in the question/comments: The Fourteenth Amendment does not "expressly list protecting citizens as a core responsibility of Government." The IRS does not define "U.S. person" as "someone that is born." The Internal Revenue Code has no bearing on whether corporations are considered people for purposes of political contributions. Then we need to clear up the main logical fallacy on which the question is built: Even if we accept that the Fourteenth Amendment requires government to protect citizens, and even if we accept that fetuses are not citizens, that doesn't mean states can't protect fetuses. That argument -- "States may protect citizens, therefore states may not protect noncitizens" -- is a straightforward example of denying the antecedent and pretty obviously untenable once you stop to think about it. Houses aren't citizens. Elections aren't citizens. Can state laws protect them? Foreign exchange students aren't citizens; can state laws protect them? How about the Canadian ambassador? The answer is quite well settled. The Tenth Amendment ensures state governments' right to enact virtually any laws to promote health, safety, and welfare, so long as those laws do not run afoul of some constitutional limit. Existing Supreme Court precedent makes clear that that authority -- known as the "police power" -- is virtually boundless. See, e.g., Bos. Beer Co. v. State of Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 27 (1877); Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. State of Ohio, 173 U.S. 285, 297 (1899); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 398–99 (1895). While Roe v. Wade has long provided just such a constitutional limit against the exercise of that power to regulate abortion, it appears clear that protection is about to vanish. Without Roe, states looking to protect "potential life" will be free to enact virtually any law that would advance that goal.
You haven't actually asked a question, but I presume that you want to know how the 11-year-old son could accompany his mother to the US if she moves to the US as the fiancée or spouse of a US citizen. The US Department of State has a page about this on their site. It says: Overview: What Is a K-1 Visa? The fiancé(e) K-1 nonimmigrant visa is for the foreign-citizen fiancé(e) of a United States (U.S.) citizen. The K-1 visa permits the foreign-citizen fiancé(e) to travel to the United States and marry his or her U.S. citizen sponsor within 90 days of arrival. The foreign-citizen will then apply for adjustment of status to a permanent resident (LPR) with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Because a fiancé(e) visa permits the holder to immigrate to the U.S. and marry a U.S. citizen shortly after arrival in the United States, the fiancé(e) must meet some of the requirements of an immigrant visa. Eligible children of K-1 visa applicants receive K-2 visas. Later, it says: Does My U.S. Citizen Fiancé(e) Need to File Separate Petitions for My Children? No. Your eligible children may apply for K-2 visas based on the approval of Form I-129F, Petition for Alien Fiancé(e), that your U.S. citizen fiancé(e) filed on your behalf, but your U.S. citizen fiancé(e) must list the children on the petition. Separate visa applications must be submitted for each K-2 visa applicant, and each applicant must pay the K visa application fee. After your marriage, your children will need to file separately from you for adjustment of status. They cannot be included on your application for adjustment of status. More information about adjustment of status is available on USCIS’s website under Green Card (Permanent Residence). Important Notice: Under U.S. immigration law, a child must be unmarried. In order to file for adjustment of status for your child following your marriage to your U.S. citizen spouse, the child’s stepchild relationship with your spouse must be created before the child reaches the age of 18. (Emphasis and links in the original have been removed.) If she marries before moving to the US, then the process is somewhat different, but it is still possible for minor children to be included. You can read more about that at Immigrant Visa for a Spouse of a U.S. Citizen (IR1 or CR1).
The comments have basically covered this, but: It's a slightly weird parallel structure ("who shall not be at least 25, and been a citizen for 7 years, and who shall not be a resident"). The Constitution is not written in fluid 21st-century English. But the obviously correct way to parse the sentence is that no one can be a representative who isn't a 25-year-old or older who's been a citizen for at least 7 years; furthermore, no one can be a representative who wasn't a resident of the state they represent when they were elected. With some parts of the Constitution (like the Second Amendment), the drafting results in actual disputes about the intended meaning. With other parts (like here), only one reading makes any sense. It's the same with the requirements to be President. The Constitution says "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President," which could be read as "you're not eligible unless, when the Constitution was adopted, you were either a citizen of the US or a natural-born citizen." But that's a silly reading, so "at the time of the Adoption" is read as only applying to "a Citizen of the United States:" natural-born citizens are eligible period, and people who were born before the US was a thing but were citizens by the time the Constitution was adopted were grandfathered in.
Under the Constitution, the president has to be a natural born citizen of the US, a resident for 14 years (relevant in the early years), and 35 years of age or older. Any action to preclude a candidate has to be based on these qualifications. Art. II of the constitution spells out the powers of the executive branch. His primary power is to carry out laws enacted by Congress, therefore executive orders have to be based on some statute, or specific Constitutional authority (e.g. as commander-in-chief). No law allows the president to nullify the fact that Biden is a natural born citizen of the US, a resident for many time 14 years, and 35 years old. Congress has not passed a law declaring that Biden has been previously impeached and removed from office (another way to stop a person from being elected). There being no such authority, an order to that effect would not be legal. In addition, executive orders give orders within the executive branch, and the executive branch isn't in charge of certifying the next president: POTUS cannot give orders to the House of Representatives, or to the Supreme Court.
Canceling gym membership while in recovery I was trying to cancel my gym membership because I had a surprise surgery that put me out of physical activity for a few months, and I couldn't leave the house for one month, but they told me that no matter what I need to come in to cancel without exceptions. Can they say this? Now they're trying to charge me for the months that I was unable to attend for but still "had a membership" because I "never canceled". I regret not trying to email them after the phone call, I would have much preferred to have a record of this.
Conditions pertaining to cancellation of a contract are contained in the contract, that is there is no general "right to cancel a contract", apart from certain 3-day window rights in some jurisdictions. For example, Washington state has some specific cancellation laws, summarized here. If the contract does not allow for cancellation, then you can't cancel the contract. I assume that your contract does have a cancellation clause: then you could have to see what that clause actually states. As it turns out, Florida has a law (Fla Stat. 501.017) which regulates health studio (gym) contracts, requiring certain clauses above the signature box. One required clause per (1)(b)2 is that notice of intent to cancel by the buyer shall be given in writing to the health studio. However, If the health studio wishes to enforce the contract after receipt of the notice, it may request the department to determine the sufficiency of the notice. This means that if they want to enforce the contract after a cancellation, they may request "the department" (Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services) to rule whether the notice was according to the contract (as mandated by law). It will also contain under (1)(d) A provision for the cancellation of the contract if the buyer dies or becomes physically unable to avail himself or herself of a substantial portion of those services which he or she used from the commencement of the contract until the time of disability, with refund of funds paid or accepted in payment of the contract in an amount computed by dividing the contract price by the number of weeks in the contract term and multiplying the result by the number of weeks remaining in the contract term. The contract may require a buyer or the buyer’s estate seeking relief under this paragraph to provide proof of disability or death. A physical disability sufficient to warrant cancellation of the contract by the buyer is established if the buyer furnishes to the health studio a certification of such disability by a physician licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459, chapter 460, or chapter 461 to the extent the diagnosis or treatment of the disability is within the physician’s scope of practice. A refund shall be issued within 30 days after receipt of the notice of cancellation made pursuant to this paragraph. It appears, then, that you simply need to give notice in the correct form (written, with a doctor's notice). In case the club does not have the required provisions in the contract, the contract violates state law and is unenforceable.
The community charges $300 annually for access to the community pool, to which I only actually used the first three years living here. It likely does not matter whether you used the pool or not. I was handed a case by a police officer today saying I have exactly 30 days upon receiving the letter to pay dues for the community pool for the past 8 years that I have not used it. I imagine the result of failure to pay the HOA fee is a lien on the property. I don't know whether foreclosure is an option but it might be. The communities HOA has made it incredibly difficult to contact to ask for a copy of the rules and regulations, since their automated phone system demands a pin of some sort to which it swiftly disconnects you if you do not have it. This is not likely to be a valid excuse for not paying the HOA dues. You almost certainly owe them regardless and you probably also owe any late charges or penalties associated with not paying on time. My question is, can they legally force me to pay this fee? Nobody can force you to pay. But if they present their case in court and win, the judge can force you to pay, have your assets seized, garnish your wages, or put you in jail if you refuse. That comes pretty close. Is there another way to obtain a copy of the community rules and regulations? Of course. Send certified letters requesting the CCRs to: The HOA office The government office where the deed is recorded If the CCRs are valid and binding something to that effect will be recorded on the deed. If so, the current valid and binding CCRs may be filed with the government or may only be available from the HOA. I am not a lawyer. If you have $2,400 to pay I suggest you pay it and stay current on all future payments. HOAs that actually notice missing fees are not to be trifled with. If you think they are making your life miserable now, you ain't seen nothing yet.
It is almost certainly legal for the sitter to keep the money. She was ready to provide the service, and it is not her fault she couldn't (and she may have turned down other opportunities because she had this one). I think your fiance's claim would be against the firm providing the security service (they are the ones that frustrated the contract). I foresee the following problems: What are her losses? She was prepared to pay $315 (which she has paid), and the dog has been looked after. Where is the loss? (She may be able to argue that it was worth $315 to her, not to have to owe her mother a favour. I don't know if that will fly.) The contract with the security firm almost certainly waives liability for this sort of thing. She would have to convince the court that the contract terms were unreasonable/unconscionable (or whatever the term is in the local jurisdiction). There are two obvious options here: a) see if there is legal cover on her household insurance (or her pet insurance); b) forget it (it's only $175 all told).
Off the top of my head, unless there's a provision that says otherwise, no, they cannot do that. Obviously, I can't tell you if there's a provision that says otherwise. Consult a lawyer for more specific advice.
I can't speak for Latvian law, but it's not unusual for someone to be expelled from or denied entry to a political party in the UK for supporting a rival party at the same time. As one example, Alasdair Campbell was expelled from the Labour Party after he admitted voting for a rival party in elections. From that link, Labour Party rules say that someone "who joins and/or supports a political organisation other than an official Labour group or other unit of the Party" will "automatically be ineligible to be or remain a Party member". So it's not about voting, which is secret, but about supporting a rival party. Similarly, at least one member has been expelled from Labour for supporting the Scottish National Party on social media. Such decisions may have an element of the political (using it as a pretext to getting rid of someone you don't like). But there is no suggestion that such an action is illegal, if it is in the party rules. Political parties have a lot of discretion as to who is allowed to be a member, and who they expel. It's not like buying a gym membership where you are entitled to gym services or your money back; legally you sign an agreement to follow the rules when you join, and joining doesn't entitle you to much.
This is a legal question, a business question, and an ethical question more than it is a bike question. Obviously there are risks when anyone rides a bike. And some people might have invisible conditions that would place them at special risk when riding a bike. But, as a shop owner, if a special risk is immediately visible, you open yourself up to a charge of negligence if you fail to take that risk into account. This happened in Canada, and I'm not knowledgeable about Canadian law. It's also interesting that this happened at a Giant company store, not a mom-and-pop bike shop. The fact that the store is operated by Giant may have made the operator more liability-conscious, but it also means they were better prepared to deal with liability than a mom-and-pop store. If I were in the position of selling a bike to someone who exceeds its load rating, I might want them to sign a document acknowledging that fact, and indemnifying me for any damage or injury sustained as a result, but I wouldn't make them promise to lose weight. But I'm in the USA, not Canada, and jurisdiction matters.
If that person becomes incapacitated or is deemed unfit to make their own decisions, will I be required to be physically present (for example, to sign something) to make those decisions if called upon? While it is customary for someone making decisions as weighty as removal of life support, to come to the hospital or care facility in person and discuss the issues with treating physicians, it isn't required. When you are physically there it is easier for you to personally assess the patient's condition rather than just taking someone else's word for it, and you have more informal access to everything that is going on in terms of people coming in and out of the patient's room, providers you wouldn't have known to speak to initiating conversations with you (e.g. there is typically an ER nurse for each shift, several residents doing rounds checking on a patient, and often also an outside specialist doctor involved in the treatment team). It is also usually easy when you are physically in a hospital to locate someone knowledgable and familiar with the kinds of issues you are facing at the moment to provide spiritual and religious guidance if you feel this would help you make your decision, while your neighborhood clergy person may not have a good understanding of these issues since they don't come up as often for someone is doesn't frequently spend time around people being treated in hospitals or hospices. And, this kind of pastoral counseling requires not just religious knowledge but an understanding of the options that are being presented through the lens of what is religiously and morally important about the differences between the different options. When I was an attorney for a hospital handling these issues for the hospital, we would have been willing to work with an out of state medical power of attorney agent without their physical presence. But, the fact that this was deep in the Rocky Mountains far from other urban areas (i.e. Grand Junction, Colorado) may have influenced a willingness to be flexible since it would often take a lot of time and money for someone to arrive in person. Also, while the medical power of attorney gives a specific person authority to act, an advanced medical directive is simply a document that goes into a patient's medical record that advises treating providers of the patient's intent and doesn't actually need next of kin approval or a medical power of attorney agent's say so to implement, although better practice is to seek that consent first in case there are any reasons why that advanced medical directive might have been procured improperly from someone lacking capacity or subsequently revoked. There usually will be forms for a medical power of attorney agent to sign, not authorizing a particular medical procedure, but authorizing treatment in general and providing personal and financial information about the patient in connection with admitting that person. But, these days, hospitals are relatively comfortable with handling that paperwork via fax or scanned copies sent via email, and some of the more flexible hospitals will even accept photos of signed documents sent via text message.
As someone who acts for both landlords and tenants I would say that I have never seen exclusions for personal injury or death in a commercial lease. I would recommend that you have the whole lease reviewed by a solicitor dealing in commercial property, particularly as, as has been stated in another reply, exclusion of liability for personal injury or death is prohibited by UCTA. This would suggest there may be other provisions which, if not prohibited, are unreasonable and you should be aware of the commitments you are taking on prior to signing This pure speculation, but the fact that those clauses would not be in a standard lease precedent does make me wonder if the landlord has done a DIY job and produced a lease from the internet suitable for another jurisdiction.
Who can legally sign an easement in the event of the death of the land owner? I own property in Snohomish County, Washington, United States (MY PROPERTY) that requires use of a driveway on a neighbor's property (NEIGHBORING PROPERTY) for access. The owner of NEIGHBORING PROPERTY passed away a couple months before I took possession of MY PROPERTY, and there is no documented easement. The previous owner had a reverse mortgage and the loan is owned by HUD (Department of Housing and Urban Development). The family has opted to release the deed to NEIGHBORING PROPERTY in lieu of foreclosure. According to the county, NEIGHBORING PROPERTY is still owned by the deceased. Does the family have the legal right to sign an easement, or will I have to wait until someone purchases NEIGHBORING PROPERTY from HUD?
If the property has been transferred to HUD in a reverse mortgage foreclosure, the family has no authority to sign anything and the country records are simply not up to date (it is not unusual for county real estate records to be one to six weeks behind being up to date based upon how busy the recording office is and how many staff they have, often they are further behind in the summer and around Christmas when employees tend to take vacations). HUD can sign the easement, and so can any successor owner. Whether they will or not is another question. Even if the foreclosure were not quite complete, any action taken by the family after the foreclosure was commenced would be invalidated once the foreclosure was completed.
If, as your question stipulates, there are no public rights of way (such as an easement) to the enclaved public area, then you must gain permission from the private landowner to cross their land before accessing the public area. If it's possible to fly over the private land using something like a helicopter or a plane, as long as you fly high enough, That wouldn't require permission.
Gated communities are generally part of homeowner's associations that have covenants, rules and regulations regarding how you can use your property. In all likelihood, blocking sidewalk, and perhaps even parking in your driveway, is prohibited by these HOA limitations. HOA's have the right to ticket and fine you for violating its rules. The fines, if not paid, can be converted to liens and used to foreclose upon your property. You can also be banned from using HOA common areas if you do not refrain from violating HOA rules and/or don't pay your fines. This is perfectly legal. If you live in gated community, you are required to follow their rules. Even if you didn't live in an HOA, blocking a sidewalk is usually a violation of municipal ordinances and is tortious activity that can be the basis for a lawsuit against you.
I would assume that the seller ('Transferor') still owned numbers 7 and 11 at the time of the sale. If so, this clause means that the owners of 7 and 11 (now and in the future) have a right of way on the path coloured blue on the plan. The land still belongs to number 9, but the owners cannot build on it so as to block the path. (As mckenzm comments, "on foot only" is an important qualification; the neighbours do not have a right to install utilities under the path, and the owner can put in obstacles that prevent bringing cycles down it).
Your rights notwithstanding, the government has the power to do such things under appropriate circumstances. First, you would have to be in violation of some ordinance, for instance in Columbus OH you are a violator if the grass is over 12". This should generate a notice informing you what the issue is and giving a deadline for remedy. If you don't comply by the deadline, they are then empowered to send out guys with tools, and the city will bill you for the work. You could call them and ask what the deal is. They might say "We put the notice on your gate", or "we mailed it to you". From a legal POV, the onus is on them to be sure that you're notified. It would be a good idea to verify that this isn't a scam. [Addendum] Bryan TX kindly provides a video about code enforcement, and gives a link where you can go directly to the section of interest (starting 0:43). Your description of the situation is at variance with what they say is the law (12"; 7 day advance notice whereafter they will correct the violation. They also say no notice is required for second violation within a year; $100 administration fee added to costs; lien will be placed on property if unpaid). I assume that your back yard is publicly visible: they recognize that "when the area observed is plainly visible, from a vantage point where the Code Officer has the right to be there, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy". That could include visible from a neighbor's property if the inspector has permission from the neighbor to be there. Otherwise, there's a simmering 4th Amendment problem (assuming that they didn't get a search warrant).
Just think of the subtenant cum owner as two separate people with two separate roles. Tenant = T Subtenant = ST Old owner = OO New Owner = NO The rights of the tenant vis-avis the new owner will be informed by the lease and the local laws. Generally, if the sale happens in the middle of the existing lease, the NO is obligated by the terms, as is the T. NO cannot just kick T out, and T cannot just break the lease. The lease may say what could happen and local laws will apply. Likewise, ST has whatever contract with T that previously existed. Pretend NO and ST are different people. If T owes NO $1000 per month, and ST owes T $400 a month, that continues even though ST and NO are the same person. Depends on what kind of dispute. See above. All contracts continue, subject to whatever the lease with the original owner and the subtenancy agreement say abut modifying or breaking the lease and sublease. Local laws apply. Note, if the subtenancy was "off the books" or was done when not allowed by the original owner, and if it was not in a place that the local law says owners cannot deny subleasing, then tenant might not have any protection. ST, now that he is owner could just move out and stop paying. On the other hand, even if he is the owner, he cannot just say "I am the owner now, so I am moving back in for free" because the original lease gave the tenant use of the whole property. But ST could just drop out because T always owed OO, and now NO, the full rent. Do you mean if rather than sublease, they were both on the original lease? Interesting, but just imagine it as the obligations before the sale = the obligations after the sale. I don't know though. There are some tax implications for an owner occupied rental.
You can’t die “during” a sale The formation of a contract is instantaneous, if the buyer dies they have to die before there was a contract in which case the seller keeps the car or after there was one in which case the buyer’s executor and the seller must do everything necessary to complete the sale (or breach the contract and get sued). This has nothing to do with any administrative obligations that either party owes to a third party like the DMV. Failing to properly transfer title may lead to complications and disputes latter on but it doesn’t directly affect the contract.
"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.
How do lawyers decide how much to settle on during lawsuits? Please excuse my severe lack of knowledge in the world of law, as I am brand new, and am happy to edit my question should it not be correct in any fashion. This is a rather broad question. Suppose I am suing my employer for mistreatment at work (no lunch break, poor treatment, not fulfilling conditions of employment contract, etc.). How does my lawyer calculate a monetary amount on which to settle in the lawsuit? I saw a case recently of this variety, and the plaintiffs reached a settlement $1.3mil. How did the parties involved calculate $1.3mil exactly? I know this question is rather broad. I am not asking for the correct amount to ask for when suing someone, for that is subjective and different for each case. Rather, I am asking about the process. How do lawyers calculate how much to ask for in a lawsuit, and do they take into account just the prices of physical damage and money lost (e.g. damage to property, money lost from opportunities missed, etc.), or do they also factor in an amount to compensate for other factors? In the above example, I seriously doubt it cost a group of employees working for minimum wage $1.3mil to be mistreated at work, so how did they settle on $1.3mil?
Settlements are brought about by an analysis of the relevant litigation risks. To take a simple example, suppose both sets of lawyers agree that the plaintiff will likely collect about $2.6 million if s/he wins the lawsuit, and that the chances of prevailing are about 50-50. That would produce a settlement figure of $1.3 million (0.5 x $2.6 million). The main reason that settlements fail is because the two sides don't agree on the above parameters. For instance, if the defense felt that the plaintiff would be awarded no more than $1 million, it would not settle for $1.3 million. Or it may agree with $2.6 million as the potential liability figure, but feel that the plaintiff's chances of winning are only one in three.
Yes You asked for work to be done in the expectation you would have to pay for it and they did the work - that’s a legally binding contract. It appears that you did not agree on a price and possibly not on a time for making payment. If that is so, you agreed to pay a reasonable price in a reasonable time. They have issued an invoice stating what and when they believe is reasonable. You dispute parts of that invoice. That’s fine, people are allowed to have disputes. You have paid the undisputed amount I hope? Notwithstanding, your negotiations with the other party can go back and forth and things can be put on and taken off the table. But you don’t have a deal until you have a deal. At any time, either party can walk away and assert their rights. Or make a take it or leave it offer, commonly called playing hardball. Since it is undisputed that you owe them something, they can refer the debt to “collections (be that internal or an external debt collector). You should pay the undisputed amount immediately and you can continue to dispute the remainder. They will make a deal, initiate legal action, or let the matter die.
The amount requested has little or nothing to do with the amount, if any, eventually awarded. Once can sue "for 100 million dollars" and be awarded 100 dollars, and although it is rarer, one can be awarded more than the amount asked for when suit is field. That initial amount now serves as a peg to hang sensational news stores on, and nothing more. The plaintiff, and the plaintiff's lawyer, may consider that such publicity serves them well. Such inflated amounts are not grounds to dismiss the suit, so there is no downside to including them, except possibly negative publicity if people mock the demand.
If you sue a person for a tort X, one of the things you have to prove is that the defendant did do X. A baseless belief that it must have been so-and-so will do you no good. You do not have to have iron-clad evidence of your allegations, for a civil suit, but you have to show with a preponderance of evidence that the claim is true. A combination of "hates me" and "provably did this a number of times in the past" could well suffice. As for damages, it depends on what harm you actually suffered. If you get fired and you show that it was because of a false allegation, you would probably have to take this to the big court, since small claims court handles amounts in the $5,000 range (jurisdiction-specific).
united-states You may be confusing the right to an attorney if you cannot afford one that is applicable only in CRIMINAL cases, not civil cases like you are discussing. You may be able to get an attorney to take your case on a contingency basis but there are two things to keep in mind: The attorney has to have some expectation that the case is winnable. The amount to be recovered must be worth the risk of taking on this case. In other words, for the attorney it's more of a business question that a legal one. Many attorneys will give you a free 30 minute, more or less, consultation. Perhaps you might give that a try.
Meta Considerations I'm not aware of any such cases and I don't think that there are any, because if there was, the case would have generated more publicity around a "glamorous" issue in the law. Despite the fact that constitutional law makes it much easier to bring defamation cases when one is a private individual suing a non-media defendant in a matter of private concern, any search of the case law reveals that the defamation cases that actually get brought are those against media defendants and those involving matters of public concern. Private individuals rarely suffer enough harm to make it economical to bring a defamation suit, and people whose lives are not a matter of public concern rarely have deep pockets to hire attorneys to bring defamation lawsuits. Only Nominal Damages And No Attorneys' Fees Could Be Recovered First of all, even in a negligence per se case, where an award of nominal damages (i.e. $1 and court costs excluding attorneys' fees) is allowed as matter of law to the prevailing party, I don't think that an award of more than nominal damages would be upheld in the face of affirmative evidence that there was no actual harm to the reputation of the person defamed as a result of the publication of the defamatory statement. In defamation per se cases, nominal damages are awarded when "there is no proof that serious harm has resulted from the defendant's attack upon the plaintiff's character and reputation" or "when they are the only damages claimed, and the action is brought for the purpose of vindicating the plaintiff's character by a verdict of a jury that establishes the falsity of the defamatory matter." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 620 cmt. a (1977). This would apply in a case of complete disbelief. Since the American rule applies to attorneys' fees in defamation cases, this would make every such suit an economic loser – which doesn't mean that someone might not act in an economically irrational way to defend their honor or something like that. Suing Increases The Harm Rather Than Mitigating It The publicity of a public trial undermines that approach in the kind of case in the hypothetical as well. Absent a lawsuit, there are one or two people who don't even believe it who heard the defamatory statement. But, if you bring a lawsuit, given the likelihood that the media will cover such a case, millions of people will hear the defamatory statement and they may very well believe those statements because they don't know any better. Even if you are ultimately vindicated at the conclusion of a trial, many people will have heard the defamatory statements after the suit is filed, but will never find out that you were vindicated many months later following a trial. Massively spreading defamatory statements about yourself that nobody would otherwise have heard about is just stupid as a matter of litigation tactics. The Presumption Of Harm To Reputation May Be Rebuttable Secondly, it isn't obvious to me that the presumption of harm to reputation in a negligence per se case is a conclusive presumption as opposed to a rebuttable presumption. For example, one can generally argue in a defamation case that someone's reputation before the defamatory statement was made is so irretrievably bad in the area related to the defamatory statement that it is impossible to damage someone's reputation any further, and so far as I know, that argument is not prohibited in negligence per se cases. For example, an intentionally false defamatory statement (which he can prove is false with an iron clad alibi and which the maker of the statement admits was made up at trial) that Ted Bundy once punched a prostitute in the nose giving her a black eye at the Moonbeam Bar at a particular date in the midst of Ted Bundy's serial killing spree, while constituting negligence per se might not state a claim for relief given that Ted Bundy's reputation for not being a violent criminal is already hopelessly tarnished by his multiple murder convictions for similar conduct. Milkovic Can Be Evaluated In Context Third, I am inclined to think that Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1, one of the holdings is that "statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual are protected," together with cases such as the New York Times case reflect an evolving understanding in the law (quite distinct from the British concept of defamation which has a bit of an "if you don't have something nice to say don't say anything at all" to it), that defamation is simply a special kind of fraud claim in U.S. law, and that the tort of defamation is only constitutional in the United States because it is a form of fraud claim. If defamation is and must be merely a special kind of fraud, then the reliance element of a fraud claim is probably constitutionally required in a case where the existence or absence of reliance can be discerned as a matter of fact, without resorting to generalities as the court in Milkovich had to since the statement was published to a large number of people. It would not be unreasonable (and arguably constitutionally mandatory) to read a gloss on the "statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual are protected" standard of Milkovich, to include an implied "by the people to whom the statement was published" clause, which would have one meaning when a large number of people in the general public heard it, and another in a context when only one or two people actually heard the statement, or when it was only heard by a group of people who would interpret it differently than the general public would. And, if so, that would be a complete defense and would not just reduce the claim to one limited to nominal damages. This is not a great stretch. For example, in California the words of an alleged libel must be considered "according to the sense and meaning under all the circumstances attending the publication which such language may fairly be presumed to have conveyed to those to whom it was published." Macleod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal.2d 536, 546-547; Selleck v. Globe International, Inc., 166 Cal.App.3d 1123, 1132. Libel Per Se No Longer Exists For Media Defendants Absent Actual Malice At one point it looked like the case Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 481 U.S. 323, 349-350 (1974) might constitutionally eliminate libel per se, but this was premature. Gertz does not apply in cases involving matters of private concern to private individuals where the defendants are not media defendants. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (where a defendant's speech concerned a private individual and a matter of private concern, states could allow plaintiffs to recover presumed and punitive damages even absent a showing of actual malice). But, Dun & Bradstreet didn't address the question of whether the presumption of damages in a libel per se case was a conclusive presumption or a rebuttable one, because if it is a rebuttable presumption, then it could be overcome in the hypothetical of the question. And, it also doesn't address the question of whether the Milkovich analysis in a libel per se case must be context specific. In a case involving a media defendant and a private individual plaintiff the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 481 U.S. 323, 349-350 (1974) that: States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for supposed damage to reputation without any proof that such harm actually occurred. The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Additionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion, rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact. More to the point, the States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury. We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded in the constitutional command of the First Amendment. It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury. We need not define "actual injury," as trial courts have wide experience in framing appropriate jury instructions in tort actions. Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the injury. We also find no justification for allowing awards of punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held liable under state-defined standards of liability for defamation. In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused. And they remain free to use their discretion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions. They are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence. In short, the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury. See also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 459 (1976). In the cases where it applies, Gertz requires proof of actual damages and bars the award of punitive damages, as a First Amendment requirement, and since actual damages are entirely absent in the case of the defendants in the question's hypothetical, if Gertz applied to them, they would not prevail. Now, Gertz in 1974 when it was decided, had limitations – it involved media defendants for whom actual malice could not be shown, but it did eliminate the public figure/public concern requirement. But, it isn't obvious to me that the Gertz limitations have not been expanded since then. Libel per se no longer exists in cases governed by Gertz (i.e. media defendants for whom there is no showing of actual malice). From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So.2d 52 (Fla. App. 1981). Texas has expanded Gertz somewhat and held that even in cases where it does not apply, actual proof of actual damages is required to recover exemplary damages, even in libel per se cases where damages are presumed. Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. 1984).
How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.
I'll answer out of order for a more logical presentation. Why would lawyers "leave the practice altogether", "[b]efore these lawyers lower their prices further they will"? Only about 30% of people earn a four year college degree. A lawyer is a college graduate who had to be in roughly the top 50% of his or her undergraduate class to be admitted to law school, so that puts him or her in the top 15% of academic ability. To actually finish law school and pass the bar exam, a lawyer has to be in roughly the top 12% of academic ability compared to the general public. Lawyers have strong reading and writing skills, reasonable communication skills, understand complex business and family matters, and are reasonably well organized compared to members of the general population. They also come with background checks completed in advance to weed out risks of criminal or otherwise dishonest or high risk employees. These are highly transferrable skill sets and a J.D. is a good substitute for an M.B.A. in many positions. Newly minted lawyers who choose to work in business management or a kindred field can typically secure middle management jobs in business and finance without much difficulty assuming that they weren't disbarred or had their licenses suspended for dishonorable reasons, or in a field related to their undergraduate major in college. So, if a lawyer can't earn a minimum compensation as a lawyer that rivals what the lawyer could earn in middle management, the lawyer will leave law and work in a non-legal post. Many lawyers do just that. And, indeed, since grant based financial aid is very rare for law school, most newly minted lawyers who aren't independently wealthy have huge student loan debts ($200,000 at the completion of an undergraduate degree and law school wouldn't be unusual), so if they want to avoid a default or an extremely long repayment period for a debt that can't be discharged in bankruptcy, they aren't free to accept a very low income even if they are willing to live modestly. The floor of what a lawyer can make in terms of compensation before having to seek better paying non-legal work is on the order of $40,000 to $60,000 of net compensation before taxes per year depending upon the local cost of living. In the long run, average legal incomes need to be even higher, because if too many people end up earning only marginal compensation, more potential lawyers will choose other career paths (e.g. as loan officers at banks, in insurance sales, in real estate brokerage work, as small business owners, as middle managers in big businesses, as H.R. officers, as financial analysts, as management consultants, etc.) which provide greater or similar returns with less student loan debt, fewer years of education, and less risk. Why can't fees be lowered "enough on individualized, bespoke services to meet the unmet need at an affordable price"? Lawyers have bills to pay - a fully furnished and equipped office, at least a part-time per lawyer staff person, suits and dry cleaning, bar dues, and compensation for themselves (the floor on which was discussed above). But, providing "individualized, bespoke services", rather than mass producing services with a paralegal heavy practice (the way most debtor oriented consumer bankruptcy shops run, and the way prosecutor's offices and public defender's offices run), then it takes a lot of hours to provide those services. (The average prosecutors office has expenses of about $50 per felony case or less, not including law enforcement efforts to gather evidence and put the facts together coherently, and public defenders have even lower expenses per average felony case, perhaps $35 or less.) Even the most basic legal services (e.g. writing a simple will, defending a simple residential eviction or collection case or a DUI) takes 4-8 hours of lawyer time to accomplish, and you can't spend 100% of your time providing legal services either, as you have to devote some time to marketing, evaluating potential clients, supervising bookkeeping and administrative tasks, continuing education, etc. So, at most, a lawyer can handle at most about 200 very simple cases a year, or fewer cases that have any sophistication, and sometimes people don't pay their bills or don't pay on time. A 10%-25% bad debt rate would be pretty typical in small firm practice. Realistically, each lawyer needs about $90,000+ of gross collected revenues to cover expenses and make a floor compensation amount. So, a lawyer has to collect at least $500 to make a very modest living and just barely get by on a typical very small case provided at an extreme discount. A lawyer needs more like double that amount of gross revenues per very small case to make a decent living, and that all assumes that marketing efforts can reach enough people to keep the lawyer busy. If a lawyer's marketing or AR collection rates fall, fee collections per case have to rise. The trouble is that lots of people can't afford to pay a lawyer $500 to $1,000. This isn't affordable to them. Keep in mind that 40% of Americans don't have the ability to pay an unexpected $400 expense, and that the percentage is much higher in a place like Alabama or West Virginia. A $500-$1000 legal fee expense for even a very simple matter is something that most people with "unmet legal needs" simply cannot afford to pay no matter how badly they need those services. These are the people with "unmet legal needs", and the cases they face are often cases like defenses of criminal charges likely to result in some sort of conviction, or no asset bankruptcies, or defenses of foreclosure or eviction or collection cases, non-employment related immigration cases, or child custody cases, or defense child support collection actions, in which case there is no significant pot of money from which fees can be paid, even if a lawyer's client wins. (In cases where there is a significant potential "pot of money" like money owed for work done or a personal injury case, legal needs usually are met.) Also, while lots of Americans can't afford even a $400 legal bill, there is a pretty significant group of businesses and upper middle class and wealthy individuals who can afford to pay tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars per legal matter, and for whom a lawyer can provide value added to the client even at that price. For example, businesses and landlords that need commercial leases to be negotiated, documentation of and negotiation of multi-million dollar business financing deals, tax planning for a complex conglomerate, personal injury litigation in cases with clear liability and serious injuries, business disputes, representation of clients in connection with the bankruptcies of medium and large businesses, employment litigation, white collar crime defense, etc. This kind of work requires a lawyer's marketing effort to be much more modest and dramatically reduces the time spent evaluating new cases. A lawyer may need only five or ten cases like that per year instead of 200 small potatoes cases, while earning much better compensation. So, the legal needs of those who can afford to pay are met, and the legal needs of people who can't afford to pay lawyers at any fee that a lawyer can break even at (realistically closer to $125-$175 per billable hour after bad debt and time generating work and idle time until new clients are secured is considered), and who don't have economic circumstances from which legal fees can be extracted in their cases, go unmet. Until such time as legal work can be provided with fewer attorney hours, or by someone who has less well paying alternatives to practicing law, and with less expensive educations, it will remain this way indefinitely without some sort of subsidy or insurance coverage. Also, keep in mind that practicing law provides an irregular income in small firm practice due to irregular payment timing and ebbs and flows of new clients, so to keep to any reasonable set of fixed living and overhead costs paid, a lawyer must have months that generate much more than the lawyer's "monthly nut" in order to generate savings for lean months. Finally, a lot of the very low paid lawyers are retirees, part-time employees who are also homemakers, are people moonlighting as lawyers in addition to another job, or are charitably inclined independently wealthy people. So, they have additional sources of income and aren't supporting themselves from full time work as lawyers. These are the only people who can afford to work as lawyers for lower amounts of income per year. But, even then, independently wealthy people normally have the best access through social and family networks to people who have an ability to pay them to work on high dollar matters, so they normally end up in high paying jobs where their "rain making" capacity is part of why they are paid so well, rather than giving their services away on a charitable basis. Observation An important corollary of this analysis is that the problem of unmet legal need cannot be solved simply by producing more lawyers, because if you produce more lawyers and all legal need capable of paying for the work is met, the new lawyers will simply pursue non-legal careers.
Is it plagiarism to make a parody? I created a comics/cartoons Facebook page a few time ago, and I also published my work on reddit. And I made a humoristic comic featuring Spider-Man and Deadpool (two characters owned by Marvel Comics for those who know). (you can find it here: https://www.reddit.com/user/yacinem98). But someone there told me that it was plagiarism to use these characters (especially if I put the "Original Content" tag over the image with my signature). So I'm asking if this work is considered as a parody/satire or plagiarism? I also made humoristic comics featuring characters from Star Wars and others from Akira Toriyama's Dragon Ball Z manga but hesitated to publish them due to this. (as the person who warned me told me that big companies owning these characters won't let it slip if my comics make it big)
This is not plagiarism Plagiarism is the use of another person's ideas or work (especially direct quotes or close paraphrases) without attribution. While it is not strictly a legal concept, in academia and certain other contexts, it is considered serious misconduct and a form of academic dishonesty that can be grounds for revoking a degree or award, for refusing to grant an academic title, or good cause for terminating even a tenured professor from his or her employment. Plagiarism used to obtain an academic credential, which, in turn, causes someone to secure a job is considered a form of employment application fraud by many employers that could result in the termination of the person's employment, particularly if the credential is a master's degree with a thesis requirement or a PhD and the plagiarism is in the thesis or dissertation which was required to obtain that degree. If an academic credential is relied upon as a credential when seeking a political office, plagiarism is often considered grounds to vote against the candidate or to ask for their resignation. In a parliamentary system, cabinet officers who were found to have engaged in plagiarism for a credential relevant to their ministry assignment will often resign at the request (actually a polite demand) of the prime minister (or in the case of the prime minister of other influential party members or the President or constitutional monarch). Referring to someone else's ideas or work is actually welcome in academic writing, and attribution may be by footnote or endnote, by a short form reference in a text accompanied by a bibliography, by a hyperlink, or in the body text in the vicinity of the reference. As applicable to you, and as is common particularly in editorial cartoons and video or audio reporting/comedy, there are some references which are so widely known that making them is an implied attribution even if none of the formal methods of attributing a reference are used. For example, if someone says "A Rose By Any Other Name Is Just As Sweet", there is an implied attribution to the Shakespeare sonnet, even if no formal attribution is given and this is not considered plagiarism. Similarly, in physics, if someone says regarding an experimental result in a physics paper, "Who ordered that?" or "God doesn't play dice with the universe." or one talks in economics about "lassiez faire", those quotations and ideas are so famous that a lack of formal attribution does not constitute plagiarism. In a fictional work, such an unattributed but clear reference is considered an "homage" rather than plagiarism. In a related notion, in fiction, the "scène à faire" doctrine of copyright law provides that certain tropes derived from other writers works are not considered copyright violations (and are also not considered plagiarism) if they are genre conventions using by many different works in the genre that help define it. Visual or express references to Spiderman, Deadpool and Star Wars or Dragon Ball Z characters, presented to an audience in which many members of the audience are familiar with these famous characters are not plagiarism because there is an implied attribution. Everybody who recognizes these characters at all knows obviously that you are not really claiming to have created them and that their true creator is widely known. Even though you tag it as an "original work", it is clear that you are not claiming to have invented these characters and this is clear to anyone in the intended audience. If you wanted to be squeaky clean on the plagiarism front, you could including a fine print disclaimer with each comic having the characters stating that "Spiderman is a character created by Stan Lee and . . . for Marvel Comics and I make no claim to being an original creator of this character.", or something similar as the case may be. Copyright issues Your comics are almost by definition "derivative works" because they are based on the copyrighted work of others, so they are infringing the copyright of the persons owning copyrights to those works, presumably without a license from the owner of the copyrights to do so. But, parody is one of the best established, clearest and broadest categories of fair use, which is a defense to a claim of copyright infringement, to the extent that it is almost a separate defense. So long as what you are writing is truly parody, and not merely humorous "fan fiction" (i.e. an infringing derivative work in which you use the characters and worlds originally developed in the source author's works as an expansion of the original author's works in that world, rather than as a parody of the original work), you have a strong fair use defense and have not violated copyright law. A "humoristic comic" use of protected characters is not necessarily satire or parody, although it could be, as satire and parody are usually (although not always) funny, at least in a grim humor kind of way. If Spiderman and Deadpool are being used to make fun of government policies rather than, for example, fighting crime, there is a good chance that it is satire and protected. If Star Wars characters are being used to mock the original franchise (e.g. in a piece pointing out all of the safety regulation violations in the Death Star such as a lack of hand rails), this would safely be parody. But, if one of these characters is merely used to present new examples of the kind of humor present in the original works, the satire and parody defenses of fair use and whatever it is called in the trademark context, would not apply. It wouldn't hurt to put a disclaimer stating, "This comic is intended as satire and parody, and is produced without a license from the copyright owners of the original works implicitly referenced in this comic.", so that your intent is clear. This isn't an absolute defense. Saying it is a parody or satire does not make it so. But, this could clarify your intent in a close case where your parody or satire intent is more obscure than you had hoped that it would be. Trademark issues The case of trademark law is trickier. Most famous fictional characters of major multi-media fiction producing empires like Marvel Comics, the Star Wars franchise, and major anime series, are protected not just by copyright but also by trademarks covering all developed work countries in many major product markets including but also apart from just comic books, and furthermore these trademarks have extra protections associated with "famous" trademarks, and are "incontestable" due to their age. Despite widespread inaccurate beliefs to the contrary, a trademark is not an exclusive right to use a word or image or other distinctive thing with "secondary meaning" that associates it with the trademark owner. Instead, trademark rights protect the owner only from the use of a trademark to sell goods or services in a product market covered by the trademark in a geographic area to which the trademark extends. The classic trademark violation is trying to, for example, sell knockoff shoes as "Vans" when they are not made under license from or in association with the company that owns that brand name, in a way that misleads the customer (it is legal to have a labels that says "compare to Vans" thus making clear that it is not actually a product belonging to that brand). There is also a less well established and less clear, but meaningful, parody exception to trademark infringement. Using trademarked famous characters in a non-parody way in connection with the marketing and content of a comic would be a trademark infringement as well as a potential derivative works violation of a copyright. You could also argue that you aren't using the trademark to sell a product (so called "nominative use"), but are instead being used to compare your product or to reflect their presence in daily life. However, if these characters are integral to your comic and its appeal, as opposed to a mere nominative use, this won't help you either. For example, if you have a completely original character say in passing "Spiderman never pooped in his suit.", that would probably be an homage or a nominative use which would be acceptable. But, if you had Spiderman and Deadpool engage in some physical humor of the kind they do in the comics and movies, this would probably be an infringement. Practical considerations The corporations that own the rights to the characters you have mentioned are billion dollar companies with an intense interest in protecting their intellectual property, so, in a close case, even if you ultimately win, you could end up in a very expensive legal battle against an opponent with deep pockets and a strategic and economic interest in pushing the extent of their intellectual property protections to their maximum extent. So, even if you are probably in the right, you may want to tread carefully in areas that are probably gray areas because you can afford to fight that kind of litigation without outside help which may not be available if your case doesn't look obviously sympathetic on the merits.
A document can be distributed under more than one license. Just because it has been made available under a CC license for free, doesn't mean that IEEE can't negotiate a different license with different terms that allow them to sell the content. (This is similar to the way that a software library can be available for free under a license that permits non-commercial use, but also be made available for a fee for commercial use.) If you want to know whether IEEE is legally selling Aaron Swartz's manuscript, you can contact Morgan & Claypool, the publisher that owns the copyright, and ask them whether this use by IEEE has been authorized by them. For the other documents you mention, contact MIT Press. Etc.
I'm not a lawyer, but under the law as it's written, I see two problems: 17 USC 121 allows "authorized entities" to make and publish accessible copies of works. An "authorized entity" is defined as a nonprofit organization or a governmental agency that has a primary mission to provide specialized services relating to training, education, or adaptive reading or information access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities. So if you, as a private citizen, decide to do this, it could conceivably be copyright infringement. You might have to set up some kind of non-profit organization to make it legal. It's also OK (I think) if you make such copies for your own personal use, so long as you don't redistribute them. So far as I can tell, nothing under 17 USC 121 requires the original publisher to provide an "authorized entity" with a copy in any particular format (PDF, paper, or otherwise) for making accessible copies. Basically, the law seems to have envisioned organizations of sighted people purchasing paper copies, transcribing them, and republishing them; not blind individuals doing electronic transcription for themselves. It might still be worth contacting Hal Leonard and asking what they can do for you, but unfortunately it doesn't look like the law requires them to do anything for you. As Nij points out in the comments, this really seems to be a question about the company's policy, rather than the law.
It seems that you don’t understand what parody is. If you do understand, please explain how it’s even possible to parody computer code. What you can do with “open source” code depends on the licence the copyright holder(s) release it under. For some very permissive licences you can do what you suggest, for most, you can’t.
Expression is tied up with fixation. Copyright subsists in a work that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression from which they can be reproduced, perceived, or communicated. 17 USC 102 This expression is protected, not the idea. However, copyright infringement can occur even when there is not an exact copy. First, courts use a substantial similarity standard to determine if infringement has occurred. Second, when a character or plot is sufficiently developed, taking that character or that plot can be infringement, even if not expressed in the exact same manner. "We do not doubt that two plays may correspond in plot closely enough for infringement [...] the less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) Some characters or plot elements are so common to a genre that they are either not considered "original" enough to get copyright protection, or can be taken by others without being considered infringement. This is the scènes à faire doctrine. "Stock scenes and hackneyed character types that "naturally flow from a common theme"—are considered "ideas," and therefore are not copyrightable. But as plots become more intricately detailed and characters become more idiosyncratic, they at some point cross the line into "expression" and are protected by copyright." Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F. 3d 1257 - Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 2001 See Amanda Schreyer's An Overview of Legal Protection for Fictional Characters: Balancing Public and Private Interests for many more cases and examples of the idea-expression dichotomy in action with respect to fictional characters.
Plagiarism is an academic category about the thoughts from another scholar/author. Copyright is a legal category about the words of another writer. When a student or a degree candidate present a paper or a thesis, they implicitly or explicitly claim that it is their original work, except for sections which are marked as the work of others. With a thesis for a degree, there may be a form where the candidate confirms this in writing, which brings the law back into the academic sphere. There are many situations in a school or even university context where there is no such claim of originality. Imagine the exam question "what is the third law of thermodynamics?" There would be no need for the student to give a source, because nobody asked for it and nobody could possibly believe that the student just invented that law. If the question was about who discovered the third law, they should say so. Schools which prepare their students for academic work should introduce both concepts and train their students in proper citation at some point. But not too early.
In a hypothetical case like you are describing, you could make a contract with them regarding the duplication of the content, irrespective of copyright law. Their violation of that contract would not necessarily be a copyright violation (which would allow statutory damages), but you might win a breach of contract lawsuit. But if someone took it from them and made copies, you would likely not have a case against that person because copyright would not protect you and you have no contract with them. In addition, you could obtain a very "thin copyright" in a particular new presentation of the material. This would mean that copyright law would apply, but only to the particular presentation (e.g. new footnotes, a particular layout, etc...) If considering doing this IRL, you should consult a copyright attorney.
What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea.
In Washington state, what can beneficiaries of a will do if the executor does not notify them? My aunt died six months ago. She was married and without children. In hospice care she said she had left things behind for her brothers and sisters in her will. Also during this time, her surviving husband - and executor of her will - said he doesn't want anything to do with her side of the family after her death. It has been six months since her death and no beneficiaries on her side of the family have been contacted about her will. A call to the King county supreme court showed no records of her will, so it was never filed with the court. They did show that their house was put into a trust in 2017, when they got her terminal cancer diagnosis. I'm assuming that they planned their estate so as to avoid probate. We believe it's possible the husband is simply choosing to not notify the beneficiaries of the will since there is bad blood between him and the aforementioned. What would be the best course of action now? It has been six months with no communication from him or his estate lawyer, and no will has been filed with the court. Since it's not entering probate, is there any guarantee that he has to faithfully execute the conditions of the will at all or notify any of the beneficiaries? Without probate, can he simply choose to not execute the will?
What would be the best course of action now? It has been six months with no communication from him or his estate lawyer, and no will has been filed with the court. Since it's not entering probate, is there any guarantee that he has to faithfully execute the conditions of the will at all or notify any of the beneficiaries? Without probate, can he simply choose to not execute the will? A will has no effect or validity until it is admitted to probate. You can't do anything with a will outside a probate proceeding. Usually state law requires that a will that is in someone's possession be lodged with the court, whether or not they plan on opening up a probate estate, but this requirement is widely ignored. Unlike a will, a trust can be administered without court supervision, without being admitted to probate, although usually, the trust is required to file a notice of its existence with the court if it has become irrevocable (a requirement that is also widely ignored). The trustee of a trust has a fiduciary duty to administer the trust in accordance with its terms and to keep the beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about it. Again, sometimes the notice to the beneficiaries is overlooked. Also, it wouldn't be unusual for someone to inaccurately say that a will provided that a certain thing happen, when, in fact, that was a provision in a trust. People are sloppy in ordinary conversation about the distinctions between wills and trusts. If a trust was drafted to avoid probate, the will is probably just a "pour over will" which states that if there is any property that is not in the trust as her death that it is hereby transferred to the trust. Normally, a person would not have both a trust designed to avoid probate and a will with substantive provisions at the same time. If you suspect that you know who the trustee is, the first step would be to write a formal letter that you can prove was sent and received (e.g. via certified mail or FedEx), asking if there is a trust, and if there is one, if you are a beneficiary of that trust, and asking for the trust agreement (or at least the parts of it pertinent to you status as beneficiary). If the person that you suspect is trustee is a trustee, he has a legal duty to let you know these things (which doesn't mean that he necessarily will do so). If you fail to receive cooperation or a response after this initial inquiry, you may need to hire counsel to attempt to obtain this information through the courts.
One place to look is the incest statute, 18-6602, which says: Persons being within the degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are declared by law to be incestuous and void, who intermarry with each other, or who commit fornication or adultery with each other, are punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term not to exceed life. The relevant statute pertaining to consanguinity and marriage (32.205) states: Marriages between parents and children, ancestors and descendants of every degree, and between brothers and sisters of the half (1/2) as well as the whole blood, and between uncles and nieces, or aunts and nephews, are incestuous, and void from the beginning, whether the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate. A literal reading of the law with attention to the bold part tells you that the prohibition of marriage between brothers and sisters of full or half blood does not preclude marriage between blood-unrelated sibling. It does, however, not grant the same right to aunts and nephews etc. (including those by adoption), which could engender competing claims about legislative intent. It would then be relevant to look at the Washington analog of this statute, RCW 26.04.020, which prohibits marriage: (1)(b) When the spouses are nearer of kin to each other than second cousins, whether of the whole or half blood computing by the rules of the civil law. (2) It is unlawful for any person to marry his or her sibling, child, grandchild, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew. Here, the blood-relation rule applies to (second) cousins and is absolute for aunts and sibling. It would seem that various legislatures had different intents, in forming these statutes. In Oregon, ORS 106.020 prohibits marriage When the parties thereto are first cousins or any nearer of kin to each other, whether of the whole or half blood, whether by blood or adoption, computing by the rules of the civil law, except that when the parties are first cousins by adoption only, the marriage is not prohibited or void In this case, the Oregon law explicitly equates blood and adoption, and then could cast doubt on the concept of "whole or half blood" as actually referring to blood relationship (although, Oregon is not Idaho, or Washington). Given the literal reading of the Idaho statutes (and without there being any clarifying case pertaining to relationship by adoption), it may take a court order to compel the county clerk to obey the law, especially if the clerk is dispensing life choice recommendations. That is especially so if the law is not clearly established. Montana likewise restricts (40-1-401) a marriage between an ancestor and a descendant or between a brother and a sister, whether the relationship is by the half or the whole blood, or between first cousins That statute also says Parties to a marriage prohibited under this section who cohabit after removal of the impediment are lawfully married as of the date of the removal of the impediment. However, there is no obvious way to get legally unadopted, especially when the parties are adults. An additional wrinkle is that in Idaho under 32-209, valid marriages entered into elsewhere are valid in that state unless they violate the public policy of this state. Marriages that violate the public policy of this state include, but are not limited to, same-sex marriages, and marriages entered into under the laws of another state or country with the intent to evade the prohibitions of the marriage laws of this state. But it is established law that same-sex marriages are legal. The bold section is clearly unconstitutional; the question then is whether if you took this to SCOTUS, they would strike down the entire statute (a number of states still have such language on their statute books, e.g. Montana still declares that marriage is between a man and a woman). At any rate, a lawyer is probably mandatory.
If two parties have a contract, where one party is required to do X in exchange for the other party doing Y, then the terms specified in that contract would determine what happens. You would have to see exactly what it says, especially if the other party has the option to not give you money. A contract might say "A shall at his option give B $5,000 by date X; if A elects not to make payment, notice must be given 60 days before X". Failing to give timely notice is thus breech of contract. However if the clause only says "A shall at his option give B $5,000 by date X", then there is no requirement for advance notice. And this assumes that there is a contract whereby both parties have some obligation to the other. A gift, on the other hand, carries no obligations on the giving party. There may be some social code to the effect that they should have told you by now, but failing to give advance notice is at most rude and certainly not legally actionable.
A deed executed during life trumps a will. The other siblings would have to argue: Your mom did not have the capacity to execute the deed (which is a very low standard in terms of her capacity). The deed was procured from undue influence from you (which requires them to meet a high bar of proof). The deed was really the implementation of an agreement for you to hold the property in trust for everyone (which requires some affirmative evidence of this intent).
You need to speak to a lawyer. First of all inheritance laws vary greatly from one location to the next, so you need someone who is familiar with your local laws and processes. You also need to collect all paperwork that's related to the inheritance. Typically an estate need to get "settled" and there is an official statement that (often issued by the town or a local court) that spells out all the details and conditions (if any). Try to document any type of follow up discussion or dispute in as much detail as possible including dates, means of interaction, topics, etc. Once you have all this, have a lawyer or equivalent look it over. They then can assess the legal situation and advice you on the best course of action.
The GDPR has an exemption for purely personal or household activity. Creating a family tree seems purely personal as long as you don't publish it. You're also allowed to freely share the tree as long as it stays within that purely personal scope. Your proposed restriction of only showing data of blood relatives seems excessively strict. But assuming that this exemption wouldn't apply, there'd probably still be no problem. The GDPR does not require you to always obtain consent. It requires that the purposes for which you process personal data are covered by some legal basis. Consent is one such legal basis, but legitimate interest is another. You can likely argue that you have a legitimate interest to create a tree of your (extended) family. The legitimate interest must be weighed against the rights and freedoms of the affected persons. For example, contact information could be used for stalking. The balance of the legitimate interest check can be changed if you adopt suitable safeguards. Your idea of only sharing data with close relatives would be such a safeguard, but it might not be necessary. When you rely on legitimate interest, the affected person can object to further processing, furthermore they can request to be erased from your records. A request for erasure can be denied if there are overriding grounds to keep the data. E.g maybe only contact information has to be deleted but names, dates, and relations might be kept. You should notify persons when they are included into your records. It is your obligation as the data controller to make these decisions. If someone disagrees they can sue you or lodge a complaint with a supervision authority. Note that dead persons are not natural persons in the sense of the GDPR, and have no privacy. However, national laws may provide such protections.
It sort of depends on what the will says, for example if the will says "shall receive 1% of the value of my estate at the moment of my death", that answers your question. That's a bit unlikely, more probably it just says "shall receive 1% of my estate", in which case this refers to "the totality of what is left to disburse to beneficiaries", that is, after obligations have been discharged (debts, taxes, funeral expenses, expense of estate administration). You also have to disburse specific benefits first, for example "$10,000 to Aunt Luddy", "the car to cousin Billy". Thereafter, percentages (implied such as "equally" or explicit such as "2%") are then computed over the remainder. Ideally, you will know the current value of everything left and can do the math and transfer title all at once. This might be a bit impractical for an entire estate, but it is practical for an estate composed of a bunch of divisible assets. All of the securities can be transferred on one day; the house may be sold a month later and assets re-distributed according to the formula at that point. In other words, you don't need a fixed instant for computing and distributing the estate, you just need to distribute each asset according to the terms of the estate.
You may be interested in a recent New York Times article, "The Lonely Death of George Bell", which described in detail the case of a man who was found dead in his apartment (of natural causes). It took a long time for him to be positively identified, and no near relatives could be located. Affairs were handled by a city official called a "public administrator". Bell's valuable possessions were sold at public auction and the funds added to his estate. Items of no significant value were discarded (a junk removal business was hired to clean out his apartment; a few items were kept by the workers). They did eventually find his will, and at least some of his heirs, so his estate went to them. The public administrator had Bell cremated by a local crematorium, with the ashes stored permanently in their columbarium. The cost was paid out of Bell's estate. If he hadn't had any assets, or hadn't been positively identified, the article mentions that he would have been buried in a "potter's field" at the city's expense.
How strict should I be with "to the best of my knowledge"? The Question: In many legal documents, there is a section for you to sign where you declare that the document is correct to the best of your knowledge. If something small or relatively unimportant is incorrect in the document, would you sign it? Some Context: I'm completing a loan application where both I and my wife are joint applicants. Included in the document is a table showing our current debts, which is mostly our mortgage. The table also has a mark on each row indicating if the debt belongs to the primary applicant (me) or the "other" applicant (my wife) and then a "total", which is the sum of all the debts. For some reason, the table lists the mortgage for me, and then again for my wife, so the total is about 2x what it should be (a large sum). I informed the loan officer that this was incorrect and did not reflect the actual debt that we carry. They indicated that they cannot change it because the table is auto-populated using data pulled from our credit report and the mortgage is listed twice because both of our names are on the mortgage. Instead they countered that many people sign this and that it isn't all that important because I'm just disclosing my debt. So I offered to not sign that portion since it was so unimportant. They obviously would not allow that. I understand that the purpose of this section was to say "hey, here's all my debts, I'm not stretching myself too thin." So if my reported debt is high and the bank is willing to give me a loan anyway, then this section of the document shouldn't matter to me. However, I don't feel comfortable signing a legal document saying "this is all correct" when I know it isn't correct. Am I being unrealistic?
If something small or relatively unimportant is incorrect in the document, would you sign it? if my reported debt is high and the bank is willing to give me a loan anyway, then this section of the document shouldn't matter to me. I would not consider it unimportant. The item at issue relates to debts you have (or admit), and it is part of a document whereby you seek to incur further debt. The fact that an inaccuracy of that sort seems immaterial to you does not guarantee that it will be inconsequential. For instance, the inaccurate duplication might be pigeonholing you as a high-risk exposure, allowing the bank to impose on you harsher restrictions now or in the future (especially in the event that you fall behind on the payments). Moreover, knowingly consenting to that inaccuracy could complicate your requests to correct errors (if any) in subsequent credit reports. The rating agency could refute your request by saying "This loan document with your signature on it reflects that you owe this high amount", and the loan officer will not be there to help you. There could be additional ramifications, but these are two I can think of right now. The loan officer's pretext that the inaccuracy stems from auto-populated fields means nothing if that explanation is not clearly stated by the bank in the document you are signing. The document constitutes (or is an important part of) an explicit contract between you and the bank. Others' carelessness about contracts they sign won't help you if things turn ugly later on.
There is, in general, a rule that all matters connected with a single transaction or event should be included in a single legal case. Different jurisdictions apply this diffidently, and I haven't yet researched this in Maryland specifically. Also, if you agree to pay a part of what the landlord claims, you will quite likely be asked to sign a settlement agreement as part of the transaction. This is likely to include a release of all claims connected with your tenancy at the apartment. If it does, and you sign the agreement, you will be giving up any claim you might otherwise have because of the failure to properly notify you. You may want to consult a lawyer about this. A one-time consultation might not be very expensive. If you sued the landlord, you could do so in small claims court, where legal costs are significantly lower than in other courts.
This is very common in all sorts of legal documents, not just the United States Code. Another familiar example where this is seen is on checks. It serves as a sort of "redundancy check", to help catch errors where either the words or the numerals could have been incorrectly transcribed. Of course, one could ask why similar redundancy isn't used to avoid errors in other contexts; there doesn't seem to be a good answer for this besides "tradition". Some people feel the practice is obsolete and should be abandoned, e.g. https://www.butlersnow.com/2020/04/five-5-reasons-to-stop-writing-numbers-like-this/.
The contract is enforceable No one is in any doubt that the parties to the contract are you and Smith Homes and everyone knows that Smith Homes means Smith Homes LLC. The written document is only evidence of the contract, the contract is the entire commercial relationship. Contracts are not invalid because they have typos or minor irregularities- otherwise virtually no written one would be. The law can be very pragmatic sometimes.
Law does not have an all-encompassing syntax and structure that, if not followed, makes it null and void. If a reasonable person could determine that (in the example of the sign you have) you are required to get written permission from any or all of the Paulding County Commissioners, then the sign is enforceable. I honestly don't see anything wrong with the sign you are displaying, it is reasonably clear. If, for example the notice contains an ambiguity or unclear phrase, the "spirit" of the law or sign is upheld. If the sign had said something to the effect of "No trespassing without permission". It doesn't say who you need permission from, but you can reasonably ascertain that you must have permission from somebody in control of the land. There is no line in the sand here. Often when a dispute in a contract comes up where it could be interpreted more than one way, it is often interpreted in favor of the person who did not write the contract. "Offer ends October 30 or while supplies last" Isn't really "ill-phrased" either. I assure you that those statements are vetted by highly paid lawyers from many jurisdictions. I'm not sure what "nonsense" you would be referring to in there. If the vendor runs out of promotional materials the promotion ends... If they had said "free hats to the first 100 customers on December 31st", you can't show up as the 101st customer and demand a hat, nor could you show up on January 1st (even if there were not 100 customers the previous day) and demand one either.
Although your "title" may not of itself have legal force, that doesn't necessarily mean you can do as you please in every situation without fear of liability. For example, if you falsely claim to be a medical doctor or lawyer, you could find yourself liable for civil damages to defrauded clients; you may also violate criminal laws. (An anonymous bureaucratic form probably won't create that problem, because as another answerer pointed out nobody really cares or pays attention to titles most of the time. But stranger things have happened; and by "form" you could mean "tax form" or some declaration made under penalty of perjury. Lawyers generally avoid blanket "that's fine" answers, because there are almost always many ways that it might not be fine.)
Yes. This is legal. The only possible liability for a truthful and accurate disclosure of fact is a defamation action (in the absence of a privacy clause in the contract) and this is truthful so it would not violate anyone's legal rights. Credit reporting agencies routinely collect such information and court actions to collect unpaid debts are also a matter of public record. Credit reporting agencies in this business also have some additional obligations (such as the obligation to remove an entry after a period of time and an obligation to present rebuttal statements from the person affected). But, you should understand that merely publicly sharing truthful information about a factual matter is not really what a "blacklist" means. Normally, a blacklist includes an implied understanding that certain actions will be taken as a result of placement on the list rather than merely sharing information for what it is worth. An example of a law prohibiting a true blacklist from Colorado is the following: § 8-2-110. Unlawful to publish blacklist No corporation, company, or individual shall blacklist, or publish, or cause to be blacklisted or published any employee, mechanic, or laborer discharged by such corporation, company, or individual, with the intent and for the purpose of preventing such employee, mechanic, or laborer from engaging in or securing similar or other employment from any other corporation, company, or individual. Incidentally, I'm not convinced that the statute would be constitutional if enforced under modern First Amendment jurisprudence, although one U.S. District court case from 1971 did uphold its validity in the face of a somewhat different kind of challenge. Resident Participation, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971).
In the US, code that you write in the course of employment is the property of your employer. Otherwise, anything that you create is your property. The gray area is things that you write during your employment but not in the course of your employment (hence the terms of the employment contract are vital). Something that you write before becoming an employee is not "in the course of employment". However, if you use that code in the in the course of employment, you invite the argument that in fact the code was written in the course of employment. That argument can be squelched if you have an agreement with the employer that acknowledges that you are licensing your code to the employer in exchange for ... some consideration. It could be $1, or a similar unit of currency.
What to do if you have a possible 'zombie' relative An elderly uncle of mine spent the last 10 years of so in assisted living until dying in his late 90s. He has a sister (who has mild dementia) and a brother who has been not reachable for ages, along with a few nephews and nieces. Lately he has had a guardianship under the state, but our state is so underfunded that I don't think the guardian did anything. Medicaid paid at least some of his assisted living. He died about a year ago and I assumed that the state would initiate probate (possibly so that they could get some or all of the estate to make up the medicaid expenditures). I'm not sure that his estate has positive value above what might be owed to medicaid, but I'm not sure. Well, recently I got notices that he owed taxes on his property, so I'm not sure if probate was ever started. I don't think there is a will and I'm not sure that there is any named executor. I think I ought to initiate probate or at least see if probate has started. How do I do this? He lived in Alaska if that makes any difference.
While the state, or a creditor, can initiate a probate if no one else does (if the state does so, the official in charge of this is called the "public administrator"), neither are required to do so. Also, sometimes a guardianship is converted to a probate, but this doesn't appear to have happened. This is a thankless job that probably doesn't make sense to bother with if estate liabilities exceed the assets of the estate, but most states have a "non-claim statute" that bars creditors claims, other than liens including property tax liens, after a certain amount of time after the death. So, even if the estate may have been insolvent at death, if enough time has elapsed, many of the potential claims may now be barred, making the estate solvent again. Siblings generally have priority for appointment over a nephew, so to be appointed yourself, you would ordinarily have to receive a renunciation of their right to serve as executor before applying to do so yourself, but some states disregard that priority if no one has taken action after a certain period of time. You would initiate probate by contacting an Alaska lawyer in the vicinity of the place he was domiciled at death. The lawyer can review the guardianship court file, determine if an executor was appointed, and determine if there are assets that could justify opening an estate relative to lien debts including Medicaid liens. If there are not, letting the assets be lost to a property tax lien may make more sense that spending money to transfer his property in an orderly fashion to his creditors with nothing in it for any of his family.
Yes, subject to the deadline for presenting claims to the estate of the decedent (within sixty days of publication of public notice). If a timely claim is filed against the estate, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code allows a defense in to deficiency claim debt such as this one that the method of the sale of the collateral was unreasonable, but this is rarely a complete defense and is rarely successful in practice. Lack of notice would not automatically invalidate the debt (and the instrument creating the debt probably waives the co-signers right to notice of a sale contractually).
Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.
I see lots of possible issues here, including: Will the Apprendi decision be given retroactive effect? Were the constitutional issues raised at the time of trial, and if not will a court permit them to be raised later? Will a court agree with the law review publication? Will the facts in your case be sufficiently similar to the cited case? Beyond those, in a section 1983 suit many public employees have qualified immunity unless the legal point was already "well established" when the violation occurred. To pursue this you will need to work with a lawyer skilled in this area. No one on this forum can possibly given you a reliable answer as to whether you have a reasonable case.
If three people inherited a house in equal shares, then a new deed should have been prepared and filed with the appropriate governmental authority (the county in most US states) before probate is closed. When that is done the authority of the executors over the house as executors has ended. However, if I understand you correctly, the two former executors are also two of the three heirs to the house. Thus they own a 2/3rds interest in the house. At least they can sell their interests without your consent, leaving you a minority owner with the purchaser owner a majority. In some jurisdictions they may be able to force a sale, paying you your share of the purchase price. But this would be because of their majority ownership, not because of their former status as executors. Addition: In some states co-owners who are joint tenants may not sell their interests without the consent of the other co-owners, but this is jnot true in North Carolina According to the site of the Hutchens Law office: ownership as tenants in common provides each party with the right to sell, gift, devise, or otherwise convey their interest in the property without the permission of the other owners. This means that the ownership interest is freely alienable or transferable. As a result, an owner may sell or give their interest in the property to anyone they want, or they may willingly or by judgment use their interest in the property to secure or satisfy a debt with a creditor. Therefore, parties entering into an agreement to purchase property as tenants in common should be aware that they may ultimately end up owning the property with a stranger. If this were to happen, there is a way out, but it may be costly. At any time, if the parties can't agree, any owner may petition the court for a partition of the property. The court could require one owner to buy another out or force the sale of the property. The court will decide the ultimate outcome based on equity. ... [I]f the intent of co-owners holding interest as joint tenants is to automatically transfer their interest at death to the survivor, the language must be on the conveying instrument as right of survivorship is not automatic with joint tenancy in North Carolina and if the language in not included, the decedent's interest will pass to his heirs. ... However, any owner has the right to convey their ownership interest during their life; and if they do, the survivorship agreement ends, and owners simply become joint tenants by operation of law. In North Carolina there seems to be little practical difference between co-owners who are tenants in common, and those who are joint tenants without a right of survivorship. But whichever form of co-ownership is chosen: tenants in common, joint tenants without a right of survivorship, or joint tenants with a right of survivorship, each of the co-owners has a right during his or her lifetime to sell, give away, or use as collateral on a loan his or her share of the property, without consulting the other co-owners. They cannot force the other co-owner(s) to sell, except by starting an action of partition in a court, when a judge would decide. An unrelated buyer might be unwilling to purchase only a 1/3 or 2/3rds interest, because the remaining co-owner(s) would still have full rights to use and occupy the house, can could sell to a different buyer. All co-owners are responsible for their proportionate shares of all expenses, including mortgage payments, repairs, and taxes.
Currently there is nowhere in the USA where polygamy is legal. So regardless of their sexual or gender expression or orientation, being married to MORE THAN ONE person at the same time is illegal. If, however, it turned out that someone had more than one spouse at their death, I'm sure that property distribution would be a matter for the probate court to sort out. As far as legally-married "trans spouses", for lack of a better term, I don't see why that would that impact inheritance in any way?
Yes, this is illegal. If by "across the state" you mean some distance away but in the same state then the exact law will depend on which state you are in, but as a rule any "conversion" of property to the use of another counts as theft. In this case your aunt has "converted" the property to the use of your Nan (funny legal phrase). The fact that the people doing this are your relatives makes no difference. (When asking about the law here you should always say which state you are in.) Although theft is a crime, you could also start a civil case to get your property back without involving the police. The details depend on where you are, but try googling "(your state) small claims court". Many states have a process for collecting low-value debts or other property without needing lawyers. You need to have a firm conversation with your aunt about this. Tell her that you want your property back, and don't back down. Also call your Nan and explain this to her as well; she may not have realised that she is in possession of stolen property, which is usually a separate crime. If you want more advice on how to get your property back without starting a family row then you might ask on the Interpersonal Skills SE, but it might be better to start with "When are you planning to return my property?" and leave "You are a thief" as a last resort. Edit: As Eric Nolan points out in the comments, you may be a minor. If you are under 18 then your aunt has authority over you that she wouldn't have if you were older. For instance, if she is concerned about your use of video games impacting school-work then confiscating your console and putting it out of your reach would be perfectly legal.
I think the key word here is "assume". A person, N, who is clearly the next of kin of a recently deceased person D may not assume that s/he is D's sole heir, or indeed is D's heir at all. N must wait until D's will (if any) is known, and an executor or administrator is lawfully appointed. Only the executor may lawfully dispose of D's property, by conveying it to specified beneficiaries, selling it, giving it away, or by any other means. Anyone who does so without the proper executor's authority is probably technically guilty of theft, although in a case like the one in the question, a prosecution would be very unlikely. But N would be liable to any heir H for the value of items properly left to H but disposed of by N. H might not choose to pursue such a claim, but would be legally able to. N should remember that the value, monetary or sentimental, of objects may not be known to N, and may be much greater to H than N is aware of. I suppose that in the case of objects of slight value which must be dealt with promptly, such as perishable food on D's premises, reasonable steps would not be objected to.
Is a press release a privileged and/or copyrighted document with ownership rights? I recently left the firm I was working with for a few years. I have my own advisory firm now. I took part in several deals that closed. I was an active participant and got paid on those deals. I am mentioned and quoted in press releases for those deals. I wrote the press releases that were for my deals. Additionally, some of them were never even "released" to the press. We would simply use them to send to clients to show past successes. I have my own website now and I have a Media/News section where I have the press releases posted and/or linked to. The previous employer has contacted me, telling me to "take those down! You cannot use my press releases." Now, I am pretty sure he is out of his element and has no clue what he is talking about. Is a press release a privileged and/or trademarked document with ownership rights?
First, the press release is copyrighted from its inception and may have been work for hire (a close call since you wrote them for an LLC and the LLC had a deal with them). There is a copyright in someone, although the absence of a copyright notice limits the remedies available for infringement. Second, a link is not a copyright violation. Third, copyright protects an exact manifestation of an idea or description of a fact, not the idea or fact itself. Fourth, there are two different doctrines that could protect an exact copy of a press release. One of two doctrines, which applies if the press release has been released to the public, is an implied license. Press releases are meant for the general public and reprinting them when that is their intended purpose is an implied grant of permission. In the same way, if you have an unfenced front yard to a concrete path leading to your front door, anyone who wishes to meet with you has an implied license to walk up to your door and knock. Whether this implied license can be revoked or not is a harder question. The other of the two doctrines, which is not limited to press releases that have been released, is "fair use". In this situation, when the work was short, has been released to others, has limited literary value, transmits unprotected facts relevant to you, relates facts that may also be a matter of public record (the sale anyway), and you aren't trying to profit from the text of the press releases themselves just from the facts that they convey, the case for fair use is pretty decent even though this is a business use. Ultimately, however, to be squeaky clean and avoid litigation, you can link rather than regurgitate the press releases, and can write your own statements about the facts in them from scratch. This information is not privileged or trademarked. If you didn't sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) or if they were released to the public, they aren't subject to trade secret protection either. If they were only released to the customer whose sale was involved and there is an NDA they could conceivably be trade secrets but even then the case would be very weak since the information doesn't create value by virtue of being kept secret.
could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? No, unless by "technology" you mean the employer's materials or resources (see condition 3 of the clause). Your remark that "this is completely and utterly unrelated to [employer's] business model" survives items 1 and 2. Likewise, working on your idea outside hours survives the corresponding part of item 3. Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? No, unless the software you develop is "based on [your] knowledge [etc.] of (COMPANY)".
The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.
Possibly Your employment contract is only one part of your deal You are also bound by the company’s constitution and any shareholder agreement that may exist. Companies often have wide ranging powers to repurchase their own shares at fair market value or following a pre-specified formula. It’s not uncommon for private companies to get an option to purchase shares automatically from ex-employees.
If I did not sign promotion bonus document, my career would be over. Is this duress? No. The premise is hardly true or even logical, and what you describe falls short of duress. Not every imbalance of bargain power implies duress. First, it seems that you could have declined the bonus, thereby preempting the sanction/remedy for leaving within 12 months. Second, it seems hard to prove (and unrealistic) that your career would have been over if you refused to sign the document. The employer can easily refute that allegation by pointing out that there are many others who did not sign that employer's document and yet work elsewhere as investment bankers. You would need certain, additional context to reasonably allow for a conclusion that your career altogether depends on what happens with this single entity. Third, your mention that "the bonus mitigates the horrendous weekly hours" reinforces the idea that signing the document was your preference (namely, for the purpose of obtaining some additional, non-compulsory stimulus) rather than employer-inflicted duress. The rationale and decision for acceptance of those conditions reflects that you knowingly exercised your freedom of contract. A party is not entitled to void a contract only because he belatedly changed his mind about conditions of which he was aware beforehand.
Q1 and Q2 are definitely not copyright violations. Copyright protects original expression. Your questions are yours; the only things you are using are the names, and copyright doesn't cover them on their own. The quotation in Q3 might conceivably come under copyright. However in practice it is very likely to be fair use (unfortunately nothing is definitely fair use until a court rules on it, but I can't imagine a short quotation in a quiz being an issue).
The copyright holder has the rights in whatever he created. If you have created something new based on his idea, the law will generally not be interested; but if your expression is recognisably a copy with a few changes, he can prevent publication or demand royalties. If you are uncertain which side of the line you fall, you should ask a lawyer (or, more cheaply, write to the author and ask if he objects).
The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission.
Can non-employees ask prohibited questions of a job candidate? This answer on Academia gave rise to a legal question. Situation: Academic employer is hiring for a position As part of formal process of hiring they allow students (not employer's employees) to ask the candidate questions. Students ask questions which – if asked by a real interviewer – would be in violation of protected status (gender, family status, pregnancy, etc.). Does the fact that the question is asked by students (albeit ones participating in formal hiring process) protect the employer from being sued for hiring discrimination, the way they could be if an official interviewer employed by the employer asked the same question?
In the US, there are separate regulations pertaining to different forms of discrimination for employment, thus there is no one-size answer. For sex, 29 CFR 1604.7 states: A pre-employment inquiry may ask “Male........., Female.........”; or “Mr. Mrs. Miss,” provided that the inquiry is made in good faith for a nondiscriminatory purpose. Any pre-employment inquiry in connection with prospective employment which expresses directly or indirectly any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to sex shall be unlawful unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification. Let us take it for granted that sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification for an academic position. Thus the question is lawful only if there is a legal underlying interest. Suppose the question were "As a man, would you be able to able to effectively empathize with your nursing students?": this does not serve a legally allowed purpose, and only serves to indirectly restate a sexually discriminatory premise. This University of New Hampshire guidelines pages summarizes the basic interview prohibitions succinctly. Notice that the language of the regulation is stated purely in terms of the existence of such an inquiry – it does not restrict such inquiries "as made by the CEO", or "as made by the hiring committee". It simply says that such an inquiry is not to exist. It is thus the university's obligation to assure that all administrators, faculty members, graduate students, undergraduates, staff members, and members of the general public who are allowed to participate in pre-hiring interviews know what kinds of questions are legal versus illegal.
Yes Businesses (and consumers) can choose who to do business with and what information they ask for and disclose and when they do that. If you’re uncomfortable with how they do business, don’t deal with them. If they don’t like how you do business, they are free not to deal with you. This is called discrimination. However, it is not unlawful because only discrimination against a person due to membership of a protected classes is unlawful. This person “won’t answer my questions” is not discrimination based on a protected class (unless they are a monk who has taken a vow of silence).
It depends on the nature of the strike. If a strike is "protected" (allowed under the NLRA), you cannot be fired but if the strike is illegal, you can be. If the strike is legal and was at least in part over an unfair labor practice, you must be immediately reinstated after the strike ends. If the strike is over economic issues, you might have been replaced with a permanent employee so you are placed on a preferential hiring list. However this right to reinstatement can be lost if you engage in serious misconduct in connection with the strike or picketing.
The interviewee is not an employee At least, not yet. As such, employment law does not apply to them. For the interviewer(s), we have insufficient information As a general rule, and insofar as practicable, the rest break must be in the middle of each four-hour work period. In an eight hour day, one rest break normally falls on either side of the meal break. However, the rest breaks can be taken at any time by mutual agreement.
Not all discrimination is illegal. For instance, landlords discriminate against those who can't afford to pay the rent. They might discriminate against former tenants who destroyed several walls during their lease period. They discriminate against those with bad credit, and often might discriminate against the unemployed. Landlords often do discriminate against frat students/college students in general. In fact, at least in the US, discrimination is generally allowed unless it's discrimination for one of a few specifically prohibited reasons (such as race). A lease is a negotiation on both sides; it requires both the landlord and the tenant to be satisfied with each other. As for why different places have different laws: Toronto is not actually in the United States. That means it has different people, a different culture, different primary values, and a different legal tradition. It's not surprising that laws are different; if laws were the same everywhere, the world would be a boring place indeed.
An existing law actually prohibits using census data "against" a person, see this recent question. The 5th Amendment ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself") is not interpreted to imply an absolute privilege to not answer, it means that your answer cannot be used against you in a criminal case. You can be compelled to testify "against yourself" if you are granted immunity from prosecution.
The real question isn't whether there is a law, but whether you want to keep your job. If you want to do something that you believe will affect your company negatively, and you ask whether it's legal or not, the question alone should show you it's a bad idea. And another question is whether you can be sued, and what it will cost you even if you can win a case, and the answers to that are "yes" and "a lot".
Only in a civil case Yes, in a civil case, Alice generally can call Bob as a witness to take the stand. In many cases, this is done very early, locking in their testimony, before expert witnesses or other evidence by the plaintiff are presented to try and undermine the testimony. Alice may ask only questions that have relevance to the case. Let's take for example a dispute about a contract: Alice may ask Bob if he engaged in negotiations to form the contract, about the matter of the contract, if he signed the contract, or how he (or his employees) fulfilled (or not) the contract. Pretty much everything that pertains to the contract or the execution thereof. This does not extend to the settlement of the case or attempts thereof. Alice may not ask if Bob has an affair with Clarice unless that somehow is material to the contract at hand. Alice may not re-ask questions where an objection was sustained in the same way. However, Bob might not need to answer all questions (there are things that are banned from being asked), especially as Bob's attorney will object to questions. A few examples of competent questioning can be seen towards the end of My Cousin Vinnie, though this is a criminal trial. Never in a criminal trial In a criminal trial, not only can the prosecution not call Bob to the stand, he has to elect to go to the stand to even be questioned by the prosecution. That is because he can "plead the 5th". There is a tiny exception for civil cases, where they can do so there too.
Can someone holding a job with access to classifed information travel abroad? In Russia there are some categories of employees with access to classified information (mostly in the military) who are legally BANNED from travelling abroad (due to the knowledge they possess) while in service and usually several years after the service or retirement. Is there a similar restriction to TRAVELLING ABROAD applied for citizens in western countries: For those who currently serve and have access to military secrets For those who retired and had had such access
In the U.S., at least through the end of the twentieth century, there were SCI clearances for which personnel were required to notify the relevant program agency in advance of any foreign travel. I think this may still apply to people in the PRP. (More than once I heard a joke was that this was so that if a transport they were on was hijacked the U.S. could shoot it down to prevent them being taken hostage and tortured for the information.) In a similar vein: I was told (but can't confirm) that some information was considered so sensitive to national security that any individual "read in" had to have a minder present during any medical procedure in which they would be sedated to prevent them from inadvertently divulging secrets while impaired by anesthetics. Plenty of U.S. security clearance contracts require signers to keep classified data they encounter secret for the rest of their life (or until it is properly declassified), not just while on the job or while the program is funded. When people are entrusted with information that in the wrong hands would easily compromise multi-billion-dollar weapons or intelligence systems, or put the lives of other people in imminent jeopardy, the general policy of the U.S. government is to take all reasonable measures to ensure that information is kept safe. Nobody is forced to acquire such sensitive information: Those clearance contracts are signed voluntarily.
The expression "Russian person" appears in Article 11 of the original, which says No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by: (a) entities referred to in points (b) or (c) of Article 5, or listed in Annex III; (b) any other Russian person, entity or body; (c) any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a) or (b) of this paragraph The "Whereas" clause first introduces the word "person" saying Those measures comprise the freezing of funds and economic resources of certain natural and legal persons, entities and bodies and restrictions on certain investments, as a response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol Article 2 then gives various prohibitions, which are broader that the March prohibitions against certain transactions "to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia". Since the regulation applies to things that are not human and cannot be citizens, it does not mean "citizen". It does include "a human", as well as artificial persons such as corporations, or government bodies. A Russian citizen who lives and works entirely in e.g. Germany is not in the prohibited set if they are not shipping prohibited goods to Russia. The Syrian Commander-in-Chief of the PLA (who is not a resident of Russia) is, however, prohibited from obtaining "dual use goods" to be taken to and used in Russia. Article 11 is different in wording from other articles stating various prohibitions, which repeat that long expression with "in Russia or for use in Russia". Art. 11 says that under certain circumstances, contract claims shall not be satisfied if the claims are made by (a) entities referred to in points (b) or (c) of Article 5, or listed in Annex III; (b) any other Russian person, entity or body; Apart from the explicit list in Annex III, (b-c) or Art. 5 is (b) a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union whose proprietary rights are owned for more than 50 %by an entity listed in Annex III; or (c) a legal person, entity or body acting on behalf or at the direction of an entity referred to in point (b) of this paragraph or listed in Annex III. Therefore, the expression "any other Russian person, entity or body" refers to something much more expansive. On the face of it, it has to mean that no "Russian person" in any sense can sue for non-performance arising from this regulation.
Involuntary servitude is illegal in Spain/Europe Has been for more than 100 years. Once an employee resigns their only obligation is to work the contracted (or statutory) notice period or pay the employer the equivalent salary.
Yes, and this is very common - Cuba, North Korea and Iran are often excluded. Mind you, this is from a US perspective. The banned country may have other ideas about the legality of the ban under its laws. But if you weren't planning to do business with that country anyway, that's not exactly going to hurt you.
There are no EU rules on whether and under which conditions unaccompanied minors are allowed to travel, and the competence hence rests with the Member States. You are probably more proficient with Slovak rules on the matter, but judging by the information provided by the UK Government, there should be no regulatory hassle. The most probable source of problems will be the airline, but at least BA lets persons 12-17 years of age travel alone.
In england-and-wales there is no legal requirement, in the private sector, to advertise vacancies and employers can recruit whoever they choose as long as they do not commit unlawful direct or indirect discrimination and follow their own internal HR policies. Re: In the western hemisphere is it quite legal for employers to do things like... Exclude close family/marital relations of existing employees? YES Exclude internal applicants from consideration for jobs for which they have relevant qualifications? YES Hire non-local (here defined as those who can commute to work from their existing home) candidates in preference to local ones similarly qualified? YES Hire foreigners where they have suitable work permits? YES Summarily hire members of the business owner's family? YES as long as they are not "phantom" employees only put on the books soley to evade tax liabilities by, for example, paying a salary when they don't do any actual work.
There is a legal requirement for US citizens to have a US passport when entering and leaving the US, though there are some exceptions. (The exceptions mostly concern other kinds of documents that are acceptable when traveling by land or sea to Canada, Mexico, or the Caribbean.) The law is 8 USC 1185(b): (b) Citizens Except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States passport. There is no penalty for violating this law. And, of course, US citizens have an inherent right to enter the US. In practice, therefore, if a border officer recognizes that you are a US citizen without the required documentation, they are supposed to inform you of the requirements and then waive the requirement of section 1185(b) so you can enter. For more discussion, see What is the penalty for US citizens entering/leaving the US on a foreign passport? on travel.stackexchange.com. There was formerly a regulation allowing US citizen children of foreign diplomats to travel to the US on their foreign passports. This was removed in connection with the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. It was at 22 CFR 53.2, which read as follows in 2006: (e) When he is under 21 years of age and is a member of the household of an official or employee of a foreign government or of the United Nations and is in possession of or included in a foreign passport; However, in 2007, paragraph (e) concerned the NEXUS program, and the paragraph concerning children in the household of foreign officials and employees was absent. The change was published in the Federal Register on 24 November 2006. The Department of State's [Foreign Affairs Manual] indicates that they continue to follow this policy despite the change in regulations; at 9 FAM 202.1-2 VISA-RELATED ISSUES WTIH U.S. CITIZENS, item (c) appears to have been last modified in 2011: c. Applications for Visas for Certain Dual National Children: (1) You should advise parents who apply for visas for dual national children that regulations prohibit the issuance of a visa or other documentation to a U.S. citizen or national for entry into the United States as an alien. The children of foreign government officials, however, may use their foreign passport for entry into the United States. (2) After the U.S. citizenship of a child has been determined by a citizenship officer, the consular officer may, to avoid delay or difficulty, give a written statement to the parents for presentation to carriers or immigration officials. The statement should make clear that the bearer of the foreign passport is a dual national child of a foreign government official or employee who is traveling to the United States on official business and as such may enter the United States on the foreign passport as an exception to the provisions of INA 215(b) regarding valid passport requirement. (3) A child under 12 years of age who is included in the passport of an alien parent in an official capacity may be admitted if evidence of U.S. citizenship is presented at the time of entry. A determination of the childs citizenship should be made by citizenship officer prior to departure from a foreign country and the parent should be instructed to have evidence of such citizenship available for inspection by the admitting Department of Homeland Security Officer. If this is indeed how your daughter got her US visa then the State Department's willingness to issue the visa presumably implies that CBP should allow her to enter with her Israeli passport and that visa.
You'd have to look careful for example at the Taiwanese law. Does it disallow companies in Taiwan to hire minors, or does it disallow minors to take jobs in Taiwan? In 99.99% of all cases the effect would be the same, but in this case the minor is in Taiwan, and the company in the USA. If their law disallows minors to take jobs, then the matter is clear. If it disallows companies to hire minors, then there is the question if the US company hiring a remote employee is covered by this or not. On the other hand, if employment is against Taiwanese law, how can they enforce it? Normally enforcement is against the company, not the minor.
Is receiving intimate stimulation while driving illegal? I feel as though I've seen this scene in movies or tv shows more than once: Someone is driving along, seemingly enjoying themselves. They get pulled over by the cops and then another person's head rises up from where it was hidden from the camera - in their lap. *Cue now you're in trouble sound effects... It's pretty obvious to me why this is a dangerous practice, but I'm interested to know what law explicitly prohibits it. I'm most interested in Australian law, as that's where I live, but almost as interested in US, Canadian or UK law, as these are often the setting of such movies.
Is receiving intimate stimulation while driving illegal? Under Michigan law, it seems illegal. What you describe is one particular case of a general family of scenarios where recklessness or negligence are elements of a driver-related offense. Thus, it would be inefficient and redundant to enact a statute to prohibit that specific hypothetical situation. MCL 257.626(2) sanctions the operation of a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, and as you mention It's pretty obvious to me why this is a dangerous practice MCL 257.626b sanctions the operation of a vehicle in a careless or negligent manner likely to endanger any person or property, but without wantonness or recklessness. A prosecutor might try to file charges also on the basis of MCL 750.335, which sanctions "open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior".
In the USA communication between an attorney and their client is "privileged". This makes it illegal for, amongst other things, the police to listen in to conferences between a suspect and their attorney. However in practice there is often little to prevent the police actually doing so.
Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally "yes." States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic "driving while black" situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible.
Yes Under Texas law (and pretty much everywhere else) the driver of the vehicle is responsible for ensuring that it is roadworthy. This does not mean that someone else cannot also be liable - the mechanic who fixed the wheel and their employer would also be liable. The claim for damages from a motor vehicle accident lies in the tort of negligence and the standards that the driver has to attain to avoid liability is that of a reasonable person. A reasonable person is not an average person who (probably) just gets in a car and drives but a prudent person who considers the risks to themselves and others and takes reasonable steps to mitigate them. Like looking at the wheels of an unfamiliar car. If the defect were obvious to a layperson from a visual inspection, they would be liable if they had not conducted such an inspection. Similarly, continuing to drive when a car is making a "Knocking" noise even if you didn't know what it was is not something a reasonable person would do. If you knew what the noise was and kept driving we are now moving from negligence into recklessness and the realms of criminal liability like manslaughter.
The person who is changing lanes has the responsibility to make sure that they have space to move into. Suppose there was a person in front of you in the destination lane who hit the brakes suddenly - if you change lanes and rear-end them, that's your fault, because you failed to leave enough distance. I don't see how it's any different in this case, where the person is behind you and accelerates suddenly. A turn signal doesn't give you the right to change lanes at will, you are responsible for making the maneuver safely. It's poor driving etiquette for the other guy to cut you off like that, but it's up to you to ensure there's space as you move over. From your description of the incident, it sounds like your actions initiated the sequence of events, and it was also your actions that prevented the accident. From that, it seems highly likely you'd be found at fault if the accident had happened - in that scenario, your actions would have created the situation, and you also would have failed to take action to avoid the accident.
In England and Wales, under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (as amended by section 59 and Schedule 12 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) it's a criminal offence to do an act capable of encouraging or assisting someone to commit suicide. I think that applies to Scotland too, and there is similar law in Northern Ireland. Encouraging suicide is also a criminal offence in some other common law jurisdictions, e.g. in Australia. While in other common law jurisdictions, if there isn't such a law, the person might instead be prosecuted for manslaughter - or not at all. The minimum, maximum and recommended penalties may well differ between jurisdictions. I don't know what you mean by "vengeance rampage" but I'm not aware of any jurisdictions where it is lawful for a person to cause harm to someone for revenge. States tend to reserve for themselves a monopoly on the use of force.
There are several elements working in your friend's favor. The first is "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." In an entrapment case, the police have recordings or documents claiming that the "girl" was underaged. If there is no such smoking gun from the (real) girl, the case (probably) would not be prosecuted in the U.S. He doesn't have to prove that she told him she was 18; "she" (or the police) has to prove that she told him she was "not." The second factor is "remoteness" in time, and distance. Two years after a U.S. state sent me a "nasty letter," I asked my lawyer if the state would ever come after me. He answered, "If they were going to do this, you would have heard further by now." The other factor, distance and cross border, (three countries: Turkey, the U.S., his home country) further militates against prosecution except for highly aggravating circumstances such as drug dealing, gambling, or sex for pay. A third factor is that your friend would not come close to qualifying as a "serious offender." This would be someone like a drug dealer, or the head of a "call girl" ring. The cops concentrate their effects on big "busts" like this that make their careers, not "small fry" like your friend. But of course they use the publicity from the big catches to scare everyone else. While there is no "guarantee" against "the worst possible consequences," the chances of them happening are similar to his getting hit by lightening, and less than his chances of being hit by a car crossing the street. No one stresses out about those chances. He shouldn't either. I am not a lawyer but I have done paralegal work in a law office.
tl;dr Hitting the pedestrians is a separate crime, even if they shouldn't be there. Background On a highway, you might have a legal right of way and therefore a claim against the pedestrians for failing to yield. Since the states (and not the federal government) own and operate the interstate highway system, your specific answer depends on the state law. In North Carolina, for example, pedestrians walking along or upon a highway have a statutory duty to yield the right of way to all vehicles. So you could probably videotape and press misdemeanor charges against them individually. That said, contacting the police and waiting (or taking an alternate route) is the best recourse. Having the right of way (or feeling ethically justified) doesn't allow you to commit an offense like hitting a pedestrian. The fact that the pedestrians aren't supposed to be in your way is of little consolation in the charges you'll face if you injure or kill one. The court will see this as a legal/ethical problem, but one that won't go in your favor. In particular, you deliberately directed your vehicle into the crowd with the knowledge that the action might cause harm. One doesn't have to imagine the Austin Powers steamroller scenario to know that injuries are possible when cars go through crowds. That will pull all of the "involuntary"-flavored mitigations off the table. In particular, driving a car into a crowd might be considered "an inherently dangerous act or omission, done in such a reckless and wanton manner as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty." In the worst case scenario, where someone died as a result, a North Carolina prosecutor might push for second-degree murder (which operates on a "recklessness-plus" standard and might not be as crazy as it sounds since driving into the crowd is likely reckless, and driving in slowly with them yelling at you to stop could push a jury over the top). In that case, as a defendant, you'd hope your charge could be mitigated down to something like death by vehicle (which is similar to "vehicular manslaughter" in other states), and you'd shoot for the misdemeanor version of death by vehicle since you weren't driving under the influence. However, a key element of proving death by vehicle is that you unintentionally caused the death---and the fact that you deliberately drove into the crowd might ruin your defense. In the case where you just hurt someone, you'd likewise hope to mitigate intentional charges to unintentional ones. A claim for false imprisonment is unlikely to succeed. False imprisonment is called a variety of things---like felonious/misdemeanor restraint, unlawful detainment, etc.---depending on where you live. To prove it (and generalizing a bit since this varies by state), you typically have to show (1) detention or restraint against your will, and (2) unlawfulness of the detention or restraint. A big challenge here is that courts often interpret this to mean detention or restraint by exercise of force or threat of force, as in Harris v. Stanioch, 150 Wash. 380 (1928) for example. The protesters are just in the way, so it's unlikely this would hold up. Self defense almost surely won't be a viable excuse. The idea of driving the car slowly through the crowd relies on the notion that you should be able to escape the alleged detention. The escape you're considering in driving through the crowd likely comes at the expense of making contact with members of the crowd. Making unprivileged contacts might be allowable in self defense. However, self defense probably hold up either. Setting aside notions of proportional defense, you have to be defending yourself against something: force or threats of it by the protesters. So if they don't use force, or threaten it, against you, then your defense is going to be really shaky.
Does flashing high beams give police probable cause to stop a vehicle? Is it illegal to flash high beams to signal other cars? If police see you doing so is it a valid pretext for a traffic stop?
Generally yes, but it depends on both context and jurisdiction. For example, if you arrived from a different street segment at 4-way stop at the same time as another car, and give a flash to indicate "go ahead," that by itself is not likely to be sustained as sufficient to justify a stop. If you come up close behind another car and flash your high beams as part of aggressive driving (e.g. message "get out of my way") then that may form a key contribution to a justification for pulling you over for aggressive driving. Many states also prohibit use of high beams when other cars are around because they have a tendency to blind other drivers (and blinded drivers are more likely to be in an accident), so if the officer observes you committing that offense it would be probable cause to pull you over for that. Here's an example from NY State where flashing high beams, alone, did not provide probable cause for an officer to pull over a vehicle. NY's law about high beams blinding other drivers specifies that the high-beams have to interfere with the other driver's operation of the vehicle for it to be an offense. See also citations near the end of this decision, which says: The Court of Appeals has indicated: "The mere flashing of lights, alone, does not constitute a violation of the statute (see People v. Meola, 7 NY2d 391, 397 [1960]; People v. Hines, 155 AD2d 722, 724 [1989], lv denied 76 NY2d 736 [1990]; People v. Lauber, 162 Misc 2d 19, 20 [1994]). Also, if you are flashing the police car, the officer may think you are trying to get his/her attention for some reason and that you are initiating a traffic stop. However, do be careful. This driver in Texas flashed his high beams at another car (which turned out to be a police car) because he thought the other car had its high beams on (the officer says it was just a new car; at least two other drivers had apparently flashed the officer for the same reason). The officer then applied the same law that driver was concerned about, forbidding the use of high beams that blind others. The driver was tased, shot, and killed as the officer applied the instant death penalty for his offenses, and the penalty was ruled justified. A dead driver cannot practically contest that stop later on, even though the family might try. See also Headlight Flashing: Legality on Wikipedia.
Almost everywhere, in any circumstances, it is the driver's responsibility to operate their vehicle so as not to get in an accident. When two drivers collide, responsibility can be divided among them depending on the details. However, when a driver hits a stopped object (including another vehicle), it is always the driver's fault for not operating his vehicle safely. It is possible the other vehicle may also receive a minor parking ticket or similar infraction for stopping on a shoulder or other invalid place. But that citation will not do anything at all to relieve your responsibility to operate your car without hitting obstacles.
The apportionment of fault will be highly case specific, based on ordinary principles of negligence. In one example, the fault was apportioned with 60% of the fault to the late left turner and 40% of the fault to the driver advancing imprudently into the intersection on a green light. See Pierce v. ING Insurance, 2006 NSSM 31 (my annotations and emphasis): [11] I believe that Mr. Pierce [the left-turning driver] was late in entering this intersection. I do not accept that he could not have stopped on the amber which he asserts. However, I am not prepared to find that he is solely responsible at law for the collision. [12] As stated above, I am unable to conclude with precise exactitude which signal light was on when Mr. Pierce [the left-turning driver] entered the intersection. I can conclude that the amber light had ceased and the green light for Mr. Williams [the through driver] had turned on at some point prior to the collision. The intersection is a well known intersection and given Mr. MacKinnon’s evidence of the relative speed of Mr. Pierce’s vehicle and what I understand to be the distances involved, I cannot accept that the signal light was green and turned to amber as Mr. Pierce entered the intersection. [13] On the other hand I am struck by two inescapable facts. First, the fact that Mr. MacKinnon who was stopped next to Mr. Williams did not proceed through the intersection because he knew it would not be safe to do so. While to some extent I take Mr. Boyte’s point that Mr. MacKinnon was, because of his experience with the intersection “hyper aware” to the prospect of drivers being late, I cannot entirely dismiss the fact that he obviously exercised prudence in not proceeding. The fact that Mr. Williams did not see Mr. Pierce’s vehicle is not an answer. In fact, just to the opposite in my view. [14] In my opinion, there is clear a duty on drivers stopped at an intersection to ascertain that the intersection is clear before proceeding once a light turns from red to green. Had Mr. Williams discharged this duty, the collision could well have been avoided. Your scenario is even more stark—not just a single late left turner, but an entire line of late left turners, readily apparent as an obstacle to safe advance. I would not be surprised if a judge were to attribute even more than 40% fault to the driver entering on the green. The Court of Appeal for British Columbia has even said (Pirie v. Skantz, 2016 BCCA 70, para. 14): ... where a through driver ... should have become aware of the left-turning driver’s own disregard of the law in circumstances that afforded him a sufficient opportunity to avoid the accident through the exercise of reasonable care, the through driver may be found wholly or primarily at fault for the accident.
"I don't know" is a better answer than most, but you should only say that if it's the truth. The three most important rules to follow when being questioned by a police officer are as follows: Do not lie. Do not incriminate yourself. Be cooperative (to the extent that you're not lying or incriminating yourself). "Do you know why I pulled you over?" or "Why do you think I stopped you?" are perfect opening questions for law enforcement to ask because there is no good answer. Any answer you give puts you at a disadvantage for the rest of the stop because you've tacitly accepted the officer's assumption that you did something wrong. The best response would be to simply reply back with their own question. "Why did you pull me over, officer?" If you say it right, it's rational, polite, and cooperative without actually answering anything. Your position from the very beginning should be that you did nothing wrong (even if you know that you did). It's the officer's job to make the case. It's not your job to help them.
An affirmative defense is a way of avoiding conviction by acknowledging you did the act claimed, but that such act was among the exceptions provided by the law which makes such acts otherwise an offence. That is, you affirm (acknowledge, admit) your action of using the device, but you are claiming that your use of the device (handsfree as a GPS guide) is okay, and therefore you should not be convicted. For all intents and purposes in this situation, your "2" and "3" are the same thing. The device is supported by something other than you holding it, and you are able to keep both hands on the wheel while using it in this way. Finally, a plain language reading of the definition for "hands-free accessory" suggests that using an object in the car to support the device where it can be seen, or using a feature of the device that speaks directions which you can hear, neither of which requires moving your hands off the wheel, will be considered such an accessory. It is also worth pointing out that such usage of a device (placed in a cradle or on the dashboard or turned up so it is heard) will be well-known to the legislators, and there is a reasonable interpretation of the law that would allow such usage. If this ever went to court, and somebody used this defence for this situation, they would probably be okay.
This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate."
Unlikely, but specific facts may change this. The fact a vehicle gets the approval of the NHTSA and/or other safety regulatory bodies will probably mean that it already passed a certain level of safety testing, and any reasons for a recall will only surface after orders of magnitude greater sample and/or testing time. Therefore, the probability of causing endangering participants in traffic and others are negligible. The duty of notice will most likely be on the manufacturer under a product liability theory. Driving continuously and/or repeatedly after notice may be a different matter if it actually results in harming one — theoretically even oneself.
Maybe. In many but not all situations, the police have a certain latitude in how they charge an incident. In many but not all socieities, speeding is seen as less morally repugnant than, say, theft or tax evasion. "Can happen to anyone, oops," the excuse goes. So a credible expression of remorse might cause the police officer to issue a caution or verbal warning instead of a ticket. Unless you are in a place where there is a grossly antagonistic relationship between the police and the citizens, or where the police department relies on fines for funding.
When stolen property is illegally seized, must it be returned to the party which stole it? Consider this recent ruling: U.S. Supreme Court rules against police over motorcycle search In it, the court ruled that the police unlawfully searched a stolen motorcycle parked on private property in Virginia because they did not have a court-approved warrant. The case involved a stolen motorcycle that was covered by a tarp and was parked on private property next to a house in Charlottesville, Virginia. The man who stole the motorcycle was convicted for receiving stolen property. Now, in this case, SCOTUS returned the case to a lower court, which will allow the police to argue exigent circumstances, or maybe rule that there were alternative measures that the police could have done. So, suppose the court rules completely against the police. Barring no other evidence, the case is thrown out, the man's conviction is overturned, and he's free. What happens to the bike? Is it returned to the person who stole it, or is it returned to the original owner on its title? In this question... Evidence found during police search of incorrect address listed on search warrant There is discussion that the police do not have to return "contraband". So, maybe that answers my question - but I don't know the legal definition of contraband. Stolen property may be contraband (having a motorcycle certainly isn't) but the police can't show that the motorcycle was stolen, because legally, they can't use any evidence they have of it (fruit of the poisoned tree). I guess if the cops keep the motorcycle, and the man then tried to claim it, they could get him for receiving stolen property again (new case), but the man who owns it probably wants his bike back. So that doesn't seem like a viable option. How does this work?
Generally speaking, the police will not return property known to be stolen to someone other than the owner of the property, even if it is illegally seized in a search that violates the 4th Amendment. While stolen property is not strictly speaking, contraband, it also isn't something that the person who would seek its return would be entitled to reclaim. This is particularly true when, in a circumstance like this where the motorcycle's ownership can be confirmed with a VIN number on file with a government agency linking the VIN number to the true owner of the vehicle, so the fact that it is stolen can be confirmed with great certainty. If the police do not return the property voluntarily, which they would not do, the person in possession of it would have to bring a suit for possession against the police who are in possession of it. In the face of a civil lawsuit to regain custody of the property from the police after they failed to return it, the police could insist that the true owner be joined to the action and could also raise the issue of unclean hands or similar defenses. A court filing claiming property known to be stolen by someone who is not the true owner would also provide evidence of the stolen property charge that would probably not be tainted "fruit of the poisonous tree" and instead, would be treated as an independent confession to the crime that was dismissed for lack of evidence after the original seizure under the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule.
The "original" owner remains the only legal one. Party A goes to jail. You get entitled to recover the money from A (unless you knew that the item was stolen — in which case the money will go to the government and you may go to jail with A).
An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all?
Does the person being searched have the right to demand the computer be turned off before it is taken on the grounds that the warrant is only for the computer, not for the activity he is currently involved in? No. A warrant will often specify that both information (which they have a reasonable suspicion is on the computer) and the computer itself (as contraband) are in the scope of the warrant. Even if it only specified specific information as the target, they can seize the computer that it may be on. The seizure takes place as-is. You don't get to tidy anything up. Things that the officers see while seizing the device or upon waking it from hibernation mode would be admissible under the "plain view" doctrine (or even just simply within the scope of the warrant, if what is on the screen is the information they're looking for).
There are essentially no such limits on the use of such evidence. The police are free to use evidence from one case in whatever other cases it may be helpful, and criminals have no right to turn over evidence to the police on the condition that it not be used against them. The Exclusionary Rule has no application here, because it only governs evidence that was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because the defendant here consented to producing the evidence, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. Nor does the Fifth Amendment prohibit the use of this evidence. The right against self-incrimination only applies to compelled self-incrimination; if a defendant wants to voluntarily confess or turn over inculpatory evidence, he is free to do so.
How far can one go to defend him/herself from an unreasonable search and seizures, in the same sense of one defending him/herself from an unlawful arrest? Not very far. Basically all you can do is try to talk the officer out of it. He thinks he sees evidence in sight... If the police officer reasonably believes that there is evidence of a crime in plain view, then the officer can proceed to seize the evidence. If the property owner tries to use force to prevent the seizure, then the officer can arrest the property owner. ... the property owner ... highly believes there is no possible way he could have seen the evidence from outside his property. It doesn't matter what the owner believes (unless the owner can somehow convince the officer before the search). What matters is what the court believes. But the owner cannot bring the matter to court before the officer enters the shed. If the officer insists on entering the shed and the owner can establish in court that the officer couldn't see the evidence and that there was no other lawful basis for a warrantless search or seizure, then the evidence will be inadmissible. The owner might also be able to prevail in a civil suit for the violation of civil rights, but the bar for such a suit is very high, so the likelihood is very small.
Nobody can say exactly what happens. I would assume that everyone in the house would be considered a witness. They might ask your friend "did you ever see your roommate carrying computers, monitors etc. into your apartment"; something like that would be likely. It's highly unlikely that she would be treated as a suspect since she doesn't work where things have been stolen. If the police comes with a search warrant, I would expect that the search warrant would extend to the roommate's room and all shared areas, like the kitchen, a common living room and so on. It's unlikely that a search warrant would allow searching your friend's room. She might want to move anything that she doesn't want the police to see (like private photo albums) into her own room. She should definitely move anything that she doesn't want the police to see (like drugs, goods that she stole, illegal weapons) into her own room. And obviously they can search your room without warrant and without your permission; they are not allowed to, but unless you have a locked steel door, they can. That would be a violation of your privacy, and any results of the search couldn't be used as evidence against you , but I think they could be used as evidence against your friend.
The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted.
Redundancy with no consultation I was recently made redundant after working at the company for just over a year. I was given no indication before hand that I personally might be made redundant (although other departments in the company had just gone through redundancies, but this was over a month before) and did not go through a consultation period, I was called into a room with HR and my manager and basically told I was being made redundant and that while given a months notice I was not expected to work it and made to leave the building. My question is that it was my understanding that the process of redundancy was the employees had to be notified about the potential redundancy or at least have a consultation period so they can ask questions or raise any objections? This was in the UK.
There is a requirement of consultation, and if they don't follow the rules you can make a claim to an employment tribunal. Then urge following internal grievance procedures, and before you make a claim you need to tell the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service that you plan to do so. However, if 20 or more employees are made redundant at once, then the consultation can be with a representative employee (either union or elected).
As an interviewer and a hiring manager, I can safely say that you can be rejected for a position for many reasons, even if you meet all the criteria - there may simply be someone better than you that they have also interviewed. Being rejected when meeting the criteria does not necessarily mean you were discriminated against, and in order to successfully claim discrimination you would have to show that you were rejected for a discriminatory reason. Very few companies hire the first candidate that they interview who has the relevant skills and experience - I have interviewed probably 60 candidates in the past 12 months for several positions, and we generally interview at least 5 or 6 candidates per position before making a decision. We do not, and would never consider just hiring the first candidate who interviews that meets the criteria. Some of the people we reject are of protected classes and also met the criteria - but that doesn't mean we discriminated against them, they just weren't the best candidate we interviewed. Being of a protected group and having the relevant skills and experience does not guarantee you the job, it just "guarantees" (in quotes because thats the intention of the law, and reality may differ - hence why discrimination cases do happen) that you cannot be rejected on the basis of the protected group. If you were rejected because of the protected group, and you can show that (including obviously thin reasons such as withdrawing a position and then advertising it again the next week), then thats discrimination. If you were rejected for any other reason, then that does not necessarily constitute discrimination. You could easily meet all of the criteria, have excellent experience but still come across as a candidate who would be difficult to manage (argumentative, lack of self-motivation, lack of attention to detail etc etc etc) and thus be rejected. It's not all about simply meeting the criteria, which is why we interview rather than hire on the basis of someones CV and qualifications.
It is very unlikely that such a sentence ("A 6 month non-compete/solicitation is required") is enforceable, because it is way too broad. The reasonable interpretation of the sentence is that the employer has thereby put the employee on notice that such an agreement will be required, and the actual terms of that agreement will be spelled out at that time, but that sentence does not constitute an "agreement". Ad actual agreement has to be supported by consideration, and have a reasonable scope (including place and activities). Texas law disfavors restrictions on job-changing, so an agreement would have to go beyond just saying that "a non-compete is required". Since the letter asserts that it is not a contract, there is no clear contractual obligation (they can fire you anytime they want, it seems).
As far as I can see this means that I sign away any rights I currently have to any IP and also that I sign all rights to any IP I create whilst working for the company. The hiring manager says that I have this wrong and that it only means anything related to work that I would undertake during my employment with the company. Based on the quoted language, the hiring manager is correct. The key phrase is "all rights to all material created in the course of your employment with the Company" This means things created as part of your new job. It does not mean copyrights or other IP you now own, nor does it mean rights to things you create outside of work hours, unrelated to your job, not as part of any work assignment, and not created on work premises or using work equipment. You might want to confirm this by talking with a local lawyer with some IP experience and some employment law experience. A one-time consult should be available at a fairly small cost. The section about "whether now existing or created in the future" refers not to existing IP, but to existing kinds of IP and existing laws. If the UK should pass a new "algorithm rights " law next year, this language attempts to make sure that such rights are covered without needing you to sign a revised contract. Note that this phrase occurs as part of the definition of the term "Intellectual Property Right", and it is limited by the phrase "in respect of the material created by you in the course of your employment." A contract that attempted to claim all existing IP you may hold that is unrelated to your employment, or one which tried to claim IP having no relation to your future employment might be held void as against public policy. In any case, if it was ambiguous, any such ambiguity should be resolved against the drafter of the contract (here the company) and in favor of the other party. A separate email might be taken into account as showing what your "meeting of the minds" was with the company insofar as the contract language is ambiguous. It will not, however, be effective in changing the plain meaning of the contract.
It depends to a large degree on local employment laws. Depending on how the counteroffer was worded, it might have constituted anything from a binding legal contract for employment for some reasonable minimum term, or a totally non-binding suggestion that was worth less than the air breathed while pronouncing it. Some things to consider would include: What are local employment laws like? Do they require that termination be for cause? If so, what are causes for termination? Does termination require any kind of remediation beforehand? Note that in an at-will, right-to-work state in the US, odds are that the employee can be fired for any time and for any reason, supposing the employer hasn't accidentally entered into a contract by extending the counteroffer. What did the counteroffer say? Did it stipulate that the offer was not for a definite term and that the company reserved the right to terminate the employee for any reason, or no reason at all? Odds are any sufficiently serious business in an at- will, right-to-work state would use standard legal language in any offer or counteroffer to ensure that they are on the right side of this, so odds are the counteroffer was accepted with no obligations at all on the company. Does the termination affect eligibility for unemployment benefits? I would say most likely not, as the termination would probably be recorded as being for no reason legally speaking (if they admitted to terminating the employee for seeking other employment, interested government officials could take a dim view of the company's actions). You'd probably have at least some unemployment compensation coming your way. Some professional - not legal - advice. Never accept a counteroffer. Only get another offer in the first place if you are committed to leaving your current employer no matter what. If your company really insists, you should insist on a minimum definite term of employment written into a legal contract which is signed by an executive and notarized. No company will agree to this (unless the term is shorter than you'd want as a full-time W-2 anyway) but if they do, hey, you have some security (if the company agrees to this, have your own lawyer - whom you pay with your own money - review the document). Even then, I would be very, very careful about staying at a company after getting a counteroffer. Don't do it. Ever. Never accept a counteroffer. One comment asks why I recommend never accepting a counteroffer. There are at least two reasons: The reason you are looking for a new job should be that there is something about your current job that isn't completely satisfactory and that you haven't been able to fix. Either you have grown out of the position, don't like the work, feel you're underpaid, don't get along with somebody, etc. If you were unable or unwilling to fix any of these issues without having another job on the table, having another job on the table shouldn't be what makes you willing and able to fix them. Why work somewhere that you'd constantly need to go job hunting to address workplace issues? Unless the company makes firm agreements about how long they're going to keep you around, you have no guarantee that they'll keep you. Presumably, you didn't have one before, and you don't have one at the new job, but the fact that you are currently employed might support the assumption that your employment would be continued at your current employer and the offer might support the assumption the new employer plans to employ you indefinitely. When you put in your notice, it makes the company more aware of the fact that you could leave at any time; while a perfectly rational actor would realize that this doesn't change the situation at all, companies are run by people and people often act irrationally. Perhaps your manager is vindictive, perhaps your manager is scared that you will still leave after accepting the counteroffer. Maybe your manager knows there are layoffs coming but needs you for the busy season. Hiring replacements can be time-consuming and expensive - and employees who are getting offers of employment elsewhere and putting in notice might be seen as risks. I'm not saying that accepting a counteroffer has always turned out badly. Falling coconuts kill 150 people every year. Still, I am not going to add a coconut rider to my insurance policy and I am not going to accept a counteroffer.
First Part OR 324 is quite the right article for this. If the employer doesn't want that you work (because he has nothing to do for you) it's his problem, not yours. He still has to pay if you are there and ready to do work. This is for instance also mentioned in this article. The meaning of this is obvious if having a contract with a fixed number of work hours per day/month/year. Second part Prove that you have a fixed work contract. If the shift plans are made in advance you have a proof that you have a certain number of hours to work (and thus an expected income). If I interpret this here correctly, this is "echte Arbeit auf Abruf" (true work on request), because if your employer wants your work, you have to be there according to the shift plan, as opposed to your employer asking "who is ready to work tonight?". So your employer must pay you the hours agreed on in the shift plan, regardless of whether he has work for you or not (but you must explicitly tell him that you are willing to take work). Third part Can the employer change the shift plan, and to what extent? The employer must announce changes to work hours as soon as possible, and changes on short notice are only acceptable in emergency cases. A reduction in work hours due to not enough work shall not reduce the employee's salary. The business risk is entirely with the employer and he must not shift that responsibility to his employees. (That was common in the late 19th and early 20th century, with all the officially self-employed home workers in the textile industry). Here is a federal court decision that affirms this (BGE 125 III 65 S. 66).
If I may paraphrase the scenario: The customer has a contract with the insurer The customer is contemplating undergoing a certain procedure and is unsure if it is covered under the contract The customer calls the insurer to ask this specific question The insurer says "yes" The customer undergoes the procedure The insurer refuses to pay on the ground that it is not covered under the contract. Let's put aside issues of evidence and what can be proved and assume these facts are not in dispute. There is no question that the contract has been renegotiated; it hasn't. This avoids the necessity of considering if the insurer's employee has the authority to do this or it the customer can rely that they do even if they don't. There are two possibilities: The procedure is covered and the insurer must pay under contract The procedure isn't covered and the insurer must pay under the tort of negligent misstatement. The insurer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee. The insurer owes a duty of care to a customer who asks such a question to answer it correctly. It is foreseeable that the customer would act on the insurer's advice and incur costs that they may have avoided if the correct advice had been given. Nothing is ever certain in the law but this is as close as you can get.
In the UK, you would need a new contract, because the old company will not be able to pay you and will possibly cease to exist, but that contract must not put you at any disadvantage. Basically, all terms would have to be the same, and the time at the previous company would have to count as continuous employment.
Why aren't athletes charged with assault? Athletes get into brawls and whatnot all the time. Mike Tyson even bit a guy's ear off. Why aren't they charged for assault and sentenced to jail time? I understand that athletes might get hurt within the context of the game, and that they can't sue anyone for that (because they knowingly take those risks by playing the game). But punching someone or biting their ear is clearly outside the context of the game – why no criminal charges? Edit: This is a good example. Clarification: I'm asking whether or not it's technically legal to do these sorts of things. Not whether they are or should be enforced.
(Note that some of the below may be UK specific, but the general principle applies in many other jurisdictions) Well the first thing is to stop working from this from the wrong direction: There is no law that makes it legal to assault someone: the law only makes it illegal to assault someone (eg in the UK, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 apply). The law states that it is illegal to assault someone. So let's explore how sport works. In most legal systems, you are able to give consent for certain activities or risks. This is also why certain other activities (for example, things a couple may enjoy in their own home) are not necessarily assault if consented to. Essentially, therefore, your consent gives the person doing the hitting the legal excuse (a little different to a normal excuse for forgetting your homework or being late to work): or a defense that their actions were reasonable. This stops the issue being the law, therefore, and becomes an issue of what does/doesn't constitute an "excuse". It is not therefore a question of "What law allows you to commit a crime during sport?" instead it is really one of "Exactly how much consent can a person give, to allow consent to be used as an excuse, and at what point is that consent no longer an excuse?" For example in R v Brown (UK Case Law) it was established that you cannot give unlimited consent. Similarly in every jurisdiction I'm aware of, that consent is only able to be given within the realms of the rules of the sport. As soon as the rules are broken, a crime may have been committed. I won't go into the details of R v Brown here, as I'm not convinced that it's suitable for SE (although I'm sure you can find it), but to give a more sport-related example, R v Donovan established that No person can license another to commit a crime, if (the jury) were satisfied that the blows struck ... were likely or intended to do bodily harm ... they ought to convict ... only if they were not so satisfied (was it) necessary to consider the further question whether the prosecution had negatived consent. Again, similar case law or exemptions exist in most jurisdictions. Essentially what this establishes is that if the intent is to cause harm, rather than to undertake the sport or activity to which consent has been given, it is still a crime The question after this is then generally one of whether it is in the public interest to prosecute, and often (but not always) the victim's wishes are taken into account. In some cases, the sportsman is prosecuted: for example this British football player who assaulted an opponent. In other cases there is either insufficient evidence, or insufficient interest in the prosecution. In many cases where the rules are broken but no serious harm is done, for example where rules are broken accidentally or in a minor way, the police or prosecution service (or equivalent) may simply regard the matter as sufficiently dealt with. This is the same as with most other cases, where not every instance of assault is necessarily prosecuted: two teenage brothers fighting may not result in a prosecution, or an assault in the street may not carry enough evidence. And to indirectly answer the question - the reason players are often not prosecuted is because "In the public interest" incorporates an element of public opinion. If a certain action has become (or always been seen as) acceptable, it is unlikely to be prosecuted. For example minor fouls in games, or accidental fouls causing injuries. The other primary reason is that the victim chooses not to press charges (although this isn't required, and the police are able to press charges themselves, it is often taken into account)
Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition.
Cheating in video games is not against the law. (If it's not for profit) IANAL The legality of cheating in video games has already been challenged in a court of law. You see, Nintendo didn't want people to cheat. Fearing it would lower the financial value of their games if you can beat them in just a few minutes. It was argued in court that a video game is no different than a book. If you want to read the end of the book, skip to your favorite chapter or skim quickly through a boring part you can. The conclusion is the game is yours to enjoy in anyway you want. Nobody can tell you how to play your game. There's an interesting and short documentary about the legal history of cheating in video games by the gaming historian. Also it doesn't matter what the TOS says. TOS is not legally binding Good news: another federal judge has ruled that violating a website terms of service is not a crime. But there's bad news, too — the court also found that bypassing technical or code-based barriers intended to limit access to or uses of a website may violate California's computer crime law. However, I've read you can be sued for breach of contract, if the site can prove any damages based on your cheating. I found that answer here on Law.SE and they didn't provide a source so I can't verify if it's true.
Hate Speech is not a crime in the United States. Rather, they have "Hate Crimes" which are charged only when the prosecution wishes to show that the crime was motivated by hatred of a protected class of people (I.E. the killer shouts a slur at his victim.). They cannot be charged in absence. Spoken word, advocacy for policies that favor one protected class over another, and other signs of hatred are not in and of themselves crimes. Unless a content provider is physically within Australia's borders, their is little legal recourse. The United States does not extradite anyone to a country to face charges for crimes that are not criminal offenses in the United States. Since the site promotes these ideas but has not used the ideas as a motivation to engage criminal activity, they would not extradite the accused individual(s).
When it comes to preventing disciplinary issues, the military much prefers simple solutions that work. This will at times result in rules which ban things that aren't really a problem, along with the things that really are, but to tailor the regulation to ban only what needs to be banned can result in rules that take two lawyers and a judge to puzzle out. Your drill sergeant hasn't got time for that. And there are magazines that the military will see as needing to be banned. Porn (even though the on-base store sells it) was prohibited when I went through boot camp. I don't know if it was from a moralistic stance, or the simple fact that someone will steal someone else's copy of Playboy, which will probably result in a fight. Shortly before I enlisted in the military, the recruiter held a meeting at which a former drill sergeant told us about what to expect in boot camp. He touched on the things that we were told to leave at home. I asked whether a paperback novel was allowed or not, and he said that there isn't enough spare time in six months of boot camp to finish a book. It may seem, from the outside, that disallowing a novel is an unreasonable abridgement of your rights, but the actual effect on you is minimal. Boot camp only runs from two to three months, and the last time I checked nobody ever died from a lack of entertainment. There are hills more worthy of dying on than this. Gaming materials are probably be contraband because they might be used for gambling. That can lead to an outright brawl, and while a good fighting spirit is quite welcome, fisticuffs in the barracks are not.
You have pretty well enumerated when it is legal. On the face of it it appears that the 11 year old acted illegally. So, if he is not being prosecuted, why not? Age of criminal responsibility. Below a certain age (I don't know about Alabama but in NSW it is 12) a person cannot by law be held criminally responsible because they are deemed to lack the emotional and mental maturity to distinguish right from wrong; this is particularly relevant when the same action can be legal or illegal depending on rather nuanced circumstances. Public interest. A DA may consider that prosecution of this child in these circumstances is not in the public interest. Prospect of conviction. A sensible DA may decide that there is very little prospect that a jury will convict notwithstanding that there is adequate evidence to prove guilt. This is a subset of the public interest; it is in no one's interest to spend time and money on a trial that will probably end with an acquittal.
I'll use California penal code 837 as an example, though most other states have similar statutes: A private person may arrest another: For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence... 839 says: Any person making an arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to aid him therein. Generally, someone making an arrest is allowed to use "reasonable force" to effect the arrest. The question then becomes, is the act of interrupting a football game a public offense? Once a fan at a football game enters the field, assuming it is a violation of the license granted to the fan, they are trespassing. These fans are often drunk when performing their midfield dance so that is another public offense for which they could be arrested. Once arrested, the interloper must be turned over as soon as possible to a magistrate or peace officer. The person making the arrest is always subject to being sued. It is a question for a trier of fact to determine if unreasonable force was used in effecting the arrest. My guess is that in most of these cases security simply ejects the exuberant fan from the premises and the fan never looks back. If a lawsuit were to be filed it would be based on unreasonable force being applied during the arrest. California penal code 240 defines assault as "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another." Certainly, one could be charged with assault in effecting a citizen's or private arrest but it would go back to the definition of reasonable force and what force was necessary to effect the arrest. If someone resisted arrest I think it more likely that that person could face an assault charge.
Legally you face no problem. The section 66A of the Indian IT Act, which used to be previously misused for penalizing anyone who dared insult a politician, has been struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India. But the police could still detain you for 48 hours (legally) without giving any grounds; they are required to do that, but the police are seldom held accountable. The supporters of the said politician can vandalize your home and office without fear of legal action. I am not a lawyer. Whatever is posted above is my opinion and data that I believe to be true to the best of my knowledge and resources available to me. Please contact a lawyer for professional advice.
Disabled fiancée is harassed by her father and I'm a witness. Am I an accomplice from not helping? Quick context summary: I've been with my fiancée for years. Although we call ourselves as such, we are not legally married nor recognised as a couple. We're living around 500 kilometres/311 miles away from each other, but we always call each other on Skype every week-end. She's suffering heavy physical disability, which means she's sitting in a wheelchair and can't move much. Travelling requires a special car, as well as caregivers (or her parents) to provide cares when needed. In France, apart from yourself, only a family member (or your legal partner) can fill a complaint about physical or verbal harassment. If you're a friend or an acquaintance, you can't do anything. In France, if you're witnessing someone being in a dangerous situation (e.g. someone's getting mugged in an alley for example), you need to do what you can to help without putting yourself in danger (such as calling for help, or fighting if you believe you can save them). Otherwise, you will be considered an accomplice. ~~~~~~~~~~ In-depth story: My fiancée's father is an alcohol and drug addict. More than once, he pretended that he would get cured, when he actually didn't follow the instructions. When he's sober, he's quite calm (almost a decent man). But most of the time, he's drunk or drugged up (or both simultaneously). When he is, he would harass my fiancée and his wife. It's mostly verbal harassment (calling them by names, insulting them, telling them how useless their effort is), although sometime he would physically harass my fiancée too (although not sexually, but only her because she's stuck in a wheelchair). Once in a while (approximately once per month), she would call me on Skype, crying, morally broken, desperate. Sometime, I could hear him during our call session too. My fiancée's mother called the police once, but all they did was keep him a few hours before releasing him because he wasn't much of a trouble. Then he kept doing what he's been doing all this time again. They didn't even bother meeting with my fiancée, despite being one of the 2 victims. Now, my fiancée has been thinking about filling a complaint more than once. However, because of her heavy physical disability, she can't go to the police station herself. Her mother isn't motivated enough to do so (I don't know why, maybe she ain't got the time; plus the father would stop them), and since they're living in the middle of nowhere, nobody can help them. When I told my law teacher about it, he told me I had to help her. Although I'm her fiancé, I can't fill a complaint for her either, because we're not legally recognised as a couple. Either she or her mother has to go to the police station, but: She can't travel by herself. Her mother can't leave her alone at home like that either. Right now, I'm a witness of what's happening, but so far there's nothing I was able to do to help them except looking for information (which isn't helpful). Am I an accomplice if I don't actually try to help?
You are 500km away and you neither intend to do her harm, nor are you personally doing her harm. You are not an accomplice by any means. You may, appropriately, feel a moral obligation to do as much as you can to help, but not doing everything that you wish you could does not make you an accomplice.
I am sympathetic to your problem but there is probably not a legal solution: at least not an easy or cheap one. To help you clarify a whole mish-mash of issues I will address each of your points. frequently calls false noise complaints on neighbors resulting in police action. If the person genuinely believes that these complaints are valid, even if they do not end up being substantiated, he is within his rights to make such complaints. If you can document an ongoing pattern of unproven complaints this might amount to harassment and you could then seek a court order that he stop the harassing behaviour. However, if even a few of these complaints are proven this would become much harder. stands in front of the building in a menacing way as people enter/exit. He is entitled to stand wherever he likes in whatever "way" he likes. This is only an issue if the person entering/exiting has a reasonable fear that he will he will visit actual harm upon them, o, of course, if he actually does visit physical harm upon them. If so, then this is assault and can be reported to the police or be the basis of a civil action. hates black people. So, he's a bigot - this is not actually illegal. Discriminating against someone on the basis that they are black is illegal, hating them on that basis isn't. hates Middle Eastern people and Muslims. Ditto. constantly pounds on the floor/walls/ceilings. It can't be "constantly" - it might be often or even frequently, if you intent to take legal action hyperbolic language is not going to aid your case. To make a real complaint about this you would need to diarise each occurrence. Notwithstanding, unless he is damaging someone else's property or is violating a noise ordinance this is not illegal. screams curses at children. Clearly reprehensible behaviour: not clearly illegal. Unless this is assault (see above) or qualifies as offensive behavior under the criminal code wherever you are (unlikely) then he can scream whatever he wants at whoever he likes. Again, a pattern of such behavior may constitute harassment. Continues to park in handicap parking despite not being handicap, and receiving very expensive parking tickets. This is illegal and he is being punished for it. Unfortunately the expression Don't do the crime, if you can't do the time. has a corollary: if you are willing and able to take the punishment then you do as much crime as you want. And to add to the list, I suspect he's been putting nails in my car tire, always on the same tire, on the inside wall of the tire; I just replaced my 5th tire in 3 months. This is a crime. If you can get evidence to prove it then you can report him to the police and/or sue him for the damage. You have stated in your comments that you will be asking another question specifically about filming him, so I won't address this here. Is there some sort of legal incentive I've not clearly communicated to management to evict him? That depends on if any of his actions are actually grounds for terminating his lease and, if they are, the landlord wants to do so. A remote landlord who is getting his rent on time and not having their property damaged has no incentive to evict a tenant: no matter how annoying they are to others. It is possible, that you have a case for breaking your lease and/or suing your landlord for damages as you are not getting "quiet enjoyment" of the property. A suit along those lines may resolve the matter because either you or he will be evicted. Consult a lawyer. If he actually is insane, what sort of liability for his actions does he have? The same as anybody else. Liability for civil wrongs is an objective test of what a reasonable person would be liable for: it is not based on the specific characteristics of the person.
Witness demeanor is absolutely relevant, both to evaluate the credibility of a witness and in a matter such as a child custody case, to evaluate the merits of what constitutes the "best interests of the child" which hinges, in part, on the interpersonal social skills of a parent in dealing with the parent's children. Before I start investing time and energy into acting classes . . . Generally speaking, I would not encourage you to take acting classes. There is nothing that you can learn in a few weeks or months that will fool a judge. Instead, your inept acting effort will only make you look dishonest because, you are being dishonest. If you are "hyper-rational and put too much emphasis towards factual accuracy rather than feelings and emotions of another person", you are better advised to focus on how your personality can have positive aspects, rather than trying to hide who you are in reality. For example, you can emphasize how you have a detailed child care plan, are on top of the children's medical and educational needs, are stable in your work life, and may be able to interact productively with any of the children who share your tendencies in a way that a more neurotypical person might not. In a family law case, the marriage itself, if the couple was married, is assumed to be a lost cause. And, pretty much nobody in a family law court has exemplary interpersonal skills. If they did, their relationships wouldn't have fallen apart, or at least, they would have worked out mutually agreeable parenting arrangements without court assistance. You are better off acknowledging that you are not perfect and showing the court that you have good coping mechanisms than to fake being the person that you believe that the court wants you to be. Someone who has personality and temperament issues who doesn't admit that those are issues is a much bigger concern than someone who has issues but is aware of those issues and demonstrates a conscious attempt to work around or cope with those issues.
Parents have a legal obligation to care for their minor children: it is illegal to harm a child through action or inaction. State law and associated welfare programs are complex: you can start here. If surgery is medically necessary, her insurance should cover it. If her parent do not have medical insurance, they still have the obligation of care; though various governmental programs may alleviate the problem, such as the state medical assistance program. The parents may therefore be in violation of the law, and anyone may report this to DSHS (specifically through Child Protective Services). This obligation terminates when the child turns 18 (assuming that someone does not petition for adult guardianship). Legislation is not crystal clear as far as what constitutes "injury of a child ...under circumstances which cause harm to the child's health". CPS has no authority to compel parents to pay for a medical treatment, but they can go to the courts on behalf of the child. At that point, it's hard to say what the court would order. For example, if the parents are capable of providing medical insurance and just willfully chose to not cover their child, the court could order them to get insurance. It is virtually guaranteed that the courts would not order the immediate amputation of the child's feet, and there would be no legal basis for ordering the parents to pay for the procedure in a decade, after the child is an adult. However, if you are suggesting that there is an immediate treatment (which the parents have opted to not provide, hence the prospects of later amputation), then it is reasonably likely that the courts would order the parents to provide for the treatment (if it would be possible for them; otherwise, the state may intervene and provide for the treatment).
The UK does have free lawyers for those who cannot afford an attorney. In fact, it is even more liberal than the US, including representation in civil cases for the most part as well (there are a few exceptions, like libel, and from what I've read, even that is changing). Rather than the main source of free representation being called public defenders, they are referred to as Legal Aid, which is a government funded agency much like public defenders are in the United States. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that legal aid will be made available to those who lack sufficient resources, in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. In the event legal aid is too busy to accept a new client, the court will appoint a solicitor from a list of private firms/practitioners that will act in the same capacity. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) guarantees the right to a fair trial in both civil and criminal proceedings. This has been interpreted as providing for a general requirement of some measure of “equality of arms” between the state and the individual or between the parties in the case, and the overall structure of the article, as well as the case law of the Court, stresses the vital connection between the right to legal assistance and the general interest in guaranteeing the right to a fair trial. When faced with a criminal charge, the right to legal assistance is explicitly set out in Article 6 (3) (c). An entitlement to free legal aid in civil cases is available in cases where the absence of legal support would make any equality of arms impossible and would effectively deprive an applicant of access to the proceedings as such, for example, when a case can be filed to a court only if assisted by a lawyer in circumstances when an applicant cannot clearly afford one. My guess is, if your friend was denied counsel under legal aid, she has too much income or to many assets to qualify, or she is involved in a case that does not qualify. That said, the right to counsel in in the UK is a right for the indigent in most types of cases (even civil) and is becoming more and more fundamental as imposed by findings of the European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence. Here is a link where you can at least begin to get some information. https://www.gov.uk/legal-aid/overview
Your description of the facts is vague enough that we can't offer an informed judgment, but to remedy this, I will paraphrase your account of the facts (you can decide whether this is what you were trying to say). I was sitting outside of the Sprint store today waiting for my step daughter to come out. While waiting, two police officers walked up to my car and asked me to turn off my vehicle and come inside. When I voluntarily went inside, the store staff said that they called the police because they had had some sort of problems with people applying for service and absconding with the phone to resell on the black market, and they thought that was part of some such criminal plan. Because of that, they refused to give her a phone or service contract. But then they also told us to never come back, threatening arrest for trespassing. I have never been in that store before. Were my rights violated? No, neither by the police nor by the manager. The police, or the store manager, can legally request you to come in for a conversation: what matters most is whether you were forced to come in against your will. By your report, you were not, so your rights were not violated. The police are irrelevant to the remainder of the question. What remains is whether your rights were violated because the manager told you to go away and never come back under pain of prosecution. The store is private property, meaning that the owner has wide latitude to grant or deny permission to enter. If they hate pink hair and your hair is pink, they can legally "ban" you. If they suspect you of involvement in a criminal activity, that can most certainly legally ban you. That does not mean that it was a righteous or justified decision on their part, or a good business choice, but it is their legal right. So, no, your rights were not violated.
From what I can determine, there has not been a legal challenge to the practice that reached a high enough level to get on my radar, so it's not clearly prohibited or allowed. Turning to the relevant federal regulations, the implementation of the Fair Housing Act, the law hinges in part on an Aggrieved person includes any person who— (a) Claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (b) Believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur. In order to sue a university because they offer sex-separated halls, floors or rooms, a plaintiff would have to show that they have been harmed by being given such a choice. Reading the prohibitions in §100.50, there is no obvious "Discriminat[ion] in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities", and it does not "otherwise makes unavailable or denies dwellings". Cases like McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (a case putting an end to the "separate but equal" doctrine) include reference to the fact that appellant was harmed ("The restrictions imposed upon appellant impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession"). Analogously, the relatively rare black-only residences of UC Davis and Cal State LA might be targeted in a discrimination suit, if plaintiffs can make the required legal argument that there is harm.
"If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you." (said while grabbing the handle of sword) This is a famous conditional threat where the speaker/actor was not found to express intent to do harm; perhaps better called a negative condition. This probably confuses matters but if you are to search for more answers this could be a good place to start. One of the elements of common law assault is that the threat must be able to be carried out immediately; it must be imminent. I do not have a cite for this but I recall that this means that conditional threats are excluded from assault. So calling a politician on the phone and telling them that if they do not drop out of a race you will hurt them is not assault. So, "You cut that out now or you’ll go home in an ambulance" sounds a lot like, "stop or you will get hurt." The victim has the opportunity to avoid the danger; the threat is not imminent. But the facts here are interesting because the speaker touched the victim while speaking which might mean fear of imminent was real. But they were in a crowded room in front of cameras - could the victim really feel that threat was imminent? Plus, the "you will go home" implies a future harm. Oh, and the speaker does not say "I will hurt you," maybe she was actually trying to protect the victim from someone else's actions. Like when my teacher knew someone was waiting outside the classroom to fight me and she told me, "if you go out there you will get hurt!" I would hope that a jury would consider this hard bargaining.
Shouldn't a legal entity such as the council, which is asking you to respond to one of their letters, include a pre-stamped envelope? If I receive a letter from a legal entity such as the council, which is asking me to fill in a form and return it to them via post, shouldn't they include a pre-stamped envelop where I can send the letter back without having to pay for the postage myself? My reasoning behind it is that I don't have a choice not to respond to this letter, because if I don't, I will be penalized. This means that I am forced to do something which will cost me money.
If you don't respond to the letter, you will be penalized. So why would they send you a pre-stamped envelope? Paying for communications is just part of your everyday life and shouldn't come out of tax payers' money.
Dale M is correct. Lawyers get calls all day long from people who want free advice and have no intention of entering into a paid representation. That is what your letter sounds like. I write separately just to add that you may have better results if you make explicit that you are aware of their rates and prepared to pay them. Even then, though, it may be that whatever you'd pay for the two hours to walk you through this is not as valuable as time they'd spend on other matters. If I have to prioritize between a repeat client and someone who will probably not pay for anything more than having one question answered, that's an easy choice.
I gather that you either a) don't want the bike or b) are physically unable to retrieve it. You are acting like a spectator here. You ARE involved. By doing nothing, you are creating trouble for others, and failing to create a good. They must go through an extensive process to protect the rights of an owner they don't know who even is. What you should do, is to send a paper letter to the landlord at that complex. Dear landlord, You may have a bicycle at Location Here inside Apartment Complex Name Here. I am the owner of the bicycle. I had to leave the region, and I had to leave the bicycle behind. I cannot come back and claim it. Perhaps you know someone who could use a bicycle. Please give the bicycle to them, or dispose of it as you see fit. Here is the key to the lock. Signed, Your name Why a paper letter? Because you can't email a key! If you sent an email and key separately, they'd get confused. Plus, the signature on paper is legally binding, so they don't have to worry about it being a trick. Tape the physical key to a piece of paper, to keep it from rattling around and chewing a hole in the envelope. (it could be the paper the letter is written on, note that a printout of a Word document is fine). Paper letters have gone out of style, I know; you can work out how to send them, but an older person will help you do that faster, since well, we used to do everything that way. Now if you do want the bicycle, that gets harder. You will have to have one of your roommates give a key to someone who can retrieve it for you and store it for you. And you/they may need to coordinate with the landlord to even get access to it / find out if it's still there. This is probably a waste of your time.
I make a copy of any important receipt printed on thermal paper, since the terms of many sellers and manufacturers require receipts for disputes. But I'm not aware of any law that says they have to make it convenient to maintain a receipt or other proof of purchase. However, when a company makes their terms unclear, unexpected, or difficult to comply with it seems there is often a lawyer ready to step up and file a class action lawsuit. Here's one archive to give you an idea of what companies will settle. In the United States the FTC is also empowered by law to "protect consumers," which means that if "disappearing" receipts become a widespread problem for consumers they could take action on the government's authority: The Federal Trade Commission Act is the primary statute of the Commission. Under this Act, the Commission is empowered, among other things, to (a) prevent unfair methods of competition, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; (b) seek monetary redress and other relief for conduct injurious to consumers; (c) prescribe trade regulation rules defining with specificity acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and establishing requirements designed to prevent such acts or practices; (d) conduct investigations relating to the organization, business, practices, and management of entities engaged in commerce; and (e) make reports and legislative recommendations to Congress. Given the above, I wouldn't be surprised to see either a class-action lawsuit or FTC rule that requires retailers to provide "durable" receipts, or some convenient substitute.
The key language to be taken notice of in that code is 'by fraud or deception'. If the property manager has provided reasonable notice of a clear-out, then the code doesn't apply due to lack of fraud or deception. But at the end of the day, just go and check the mail room on a Thursday afternoon and you shouldn't have any problems.
There is a good chance that the letter in question is in the public domain. Prior to 1978, the copyright laws were very different. Also, if it was published in 1963 or earlier and there was an initial claim of copyright but the copyright was not renewed, it would also be in the public domain. A convenient table summarizing when various pertinent categories of works enter the public domain can be found here. It might be possible to construe depositing the work with the Library of Congress as either a "publication" of the work (which if it happened before 1964 would put it in the public domain), or as a relinquishment of the copyright to the public domain, although I am not a specialist familiar with the legal effect of different forms of donations to the Library of Congress and it could depend upon the facts and circumstances of that particular donation to the Library of Congress. If worse came to worse, I imagine it might be possible to seek a declaratory judgment that your use was a fair use with substituted service on the heirs, and seek a default judgment, although that would not be optimal. The general problem that you face is that the work in question is what is called an "orphan work". Many other countries have special procedures to allow the use of orphan works, but the U.S. has resisted such legislation except for a narrow exception applicable only to libraries and archives at 17 U.S.C. § 108.
Given the facts as stated in the question, it appears that Spirit owes a refund. If the portal or site through which the service was sold also handles other flights that do provide wi-fi, there may not have been an intention to sell an unavailable service, and so this may not have been fraud. It is not proper to knowingly sell a service that is not available, but if it is an error, it is not strictly illegal, but the contract has not been fulfilled. One could, in such a case, attempt to place a charge-back with the credit card through which payment was made, if a card was used. Failing that, one could take the matter to small claims court. Before opening a court case, I would send a physical letter by certified mail to the airline's customer service address, with a copy to its HQ address, explaining what happened and requesting a refund by a specified date. If there is a customer service email, a copy to that as well.
On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.
Can a company refuse service to a share holder? Assume a large public company. Would the director, or majority share holders of a company be able to legally refuse service to a share holder (on non protected-class grounds)? Would the quantity of shares owned have any difference? I'm asking in regards to UK law, but would be interested to hear if it's any different in the states.
This is from a Canadian point of view, but the rules regarding how corporations run is generally pretty standard. I took a few classes in corporate governance, but I'm working mostly from memory, so hopefully most of the information is accurate! A corporation is its own entity, separate from any shareholders, and it can make whatever policies it wants. Unless you are an officer or on the board of directors, your participation in the company usually will be limited to voting in shareholders' meetings and receiving dividends. Refusal of service is a policy matter, so the fact that you are a shareholder (or anyone else, for that matter!) should be irrelevant. In fact, you might be denied service because you're an officer due to conflicts of interest. If the company was unincorporated, you may have more rights, but you'd probably be subject to some sort of agreement.
The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.
No Restrictions on Trading. I understand that Robinhood may, in its discretion, prohibit or restrict the trading of securities, or the substitution of securities, in any of My Accounts. Doing this is explicitly permitted by the contract.
The company continues to own all its assets australia The appointment of a liquidator to does not change what the company owns - it just changes who is in control (the liquidator rather than the directors) and the purpose for which it is being run (realisation of assets for the benefit of creditors rather than as a going concern for the benefit of shareholders). The laptop still belongs to the company. The liquidator's job is to sell all commercially realisable assets and distribute the proceeds to the creditors. When they have done that (which can take years), they get a release from the court, and the company is deregistered 3 months later. Any assets of a deregistered company belong to the shareholders. A 3-year-old laptop is not a commercially realisable asset, so it's not something a liquidator would be interested in. You could tell the liquidator you have it, and they are welcome to collect it at any reasonable time. They will probably say, "keep it."
TL;DR: It is a $100.000 lawsuit. Talk to a lawyer. If getting out of lawsuits was as easy as acting through a company and selling it afterwards, nobody would ever get paid damages. In addition to that, any answer will depend heavily on a lot of data that you do not disclose (location, kind of company, what is the basis for the lawsuit, etc.). Talk to a lawyer. But, a couple of points to help you understand the situation: the only reason she was 51% shareholder was because my father wanted a certain tax exemption for minority women owning businesses. It does not matter the reason, she was the shareholder. And in fact, I would not publicly use that reason as an excuse before checking with a lawyer, because perhaps it could be considered fraud1. she gave up her rights to the business. Exact wording of the agreement will be important for your lawyer. Did she return ownership of the stock? Or did she just agreed not to manage the business? In C corporations, stockholders are only liable for the money invested (i.e., the value of their stock may drop to zero, but no one can sue them for more). In other kind of companies (unlimited companies), owners can be forced to pay (fully or partially) for the debts of the company. does it matter if she sells her shares at this point or will she still be sued? Who exactly is going to buy the stock? It does not sound like the company is publicly traded, but just a small operation. Unless her 51% is worth more than she is being sued for -or the buyer thinks that the lawsuit will fail-, people won't be interested. Of course, it might be tempting to "forget" telling about the lawsuit to prospective buyers, but that probably will end with the buyer suing your mother when they discover that she has not fully disclosed the status of the company. Talk to a lawyer. 1But explain all of the details to your lawyer, s/he may make use of them and convince your father to take full responsability. And your lawyer will not inform the authorities. Talk to a lawyer.
Normal ways of owning a house don't allow this In common law jurisdictions (so, be careful if you set this in Louisiana which has mixed civil/common law) the normal ways that residential property is owned would either require the agreement of all parties to sell or one party could sell their share but they could not force the other party to do so. However, there are lots of ways that property can be abnormally owned. First, there is the transitional period where the property is legally owned by the Estate of the deceased for the benefit of the beneficiaries and administered by the executor of the will or the administrator if there is no will. If the house was bequeathed specifically to the beneficiaries then the executor must arrange for the legal transfer. However, if there is no will or the will just bequeaths assets without identifying them then the executor/administrator has discretion on whether to transfer the house or to sell it and distribute the proceeds. If this is shortly after the death and the sister was the administrator, she could decide to sell. The house could be owned by a company. If so, the director(s) would be able to dispose of it. The director(s) are appointed by the shareholders and if the sister had more than 50% of the shares, well. This is not a particularly common way of owning residential property because it has tax disadvantages but it is a common ownership method for industrial or commercial property: many companies own the land where they do business. Perhaps the house is a small part of a large factory complex? The property could be inside a trust with the brother and sister as beneficiaries but the sister as trustee. Trusts can be discretionary (i.e. the trustee decides who gets what) or unit trusts (like having shares in a company - you get it in proportion to your holding). The latter is the way publicly traded property trusts work. While the trustee has to operate in line with the trust deed and for the benefit of all the beneficiaries, the sister may, reasonably or unreasonably, decide that selling the house is in those interests.
It is legal and quite common. Your choice as consumer is at the point of selecting insurance company. If you dislike ES enough, that would be a reason to select a different insurance company. It would be surprising if your ES contract disallows pharmacy pick-up, but even if it did, that would also be legal. This does not mean that the government doesn't have the power to break up Express Scripts, under anti-trust laws. There is no clear rule regarding how successful a company can be in attracting customers.
Yes The directors of a company have a fiduciary duty to act within the law for the benefit of their shareholders - not to their customers, not to the government, not to the environment and not to the public. A lawsuit against the company will incur financial loss irrespective of if it is won or lost. It is difficult to see how it is in the shareholder's interest for the company to be enabling the funding of a lawsuit against it.
Can the U.S. government sue medical marijuana dispensaries for copyright infringement? US Patent 6630507, which was assigned by The United States of America as represented by the Department of Health and Human Services, is loaded with the many medicinal values of cannabinoids, including Tetrahyrocannabinol. According to the patent: Cannabinoids have been found to have antioxidant properties, unrelated to NMDA receptor antagonism. This new found property makes cannabinoids useful in the treatment and prophylaxis of wide variety of oxidation associated diseases, such as ischemic, age-related, inflammatory and autoimmune diseases. The cannabinoids are found to have particular application as neuroprotectants, for example in limiting neurological damage following ischemic insults, such as stroke and trauma, or in the treatment of neurodegenerative diseases, such as Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson's disease and HIV dementia. Nonpsychoactive cannabinoids, such as cannabidoil, are particularly advantageous to use because they avoid toxicity that is encountered with psychoactive cannabinoids at high doses useful in the method of the present invention. A particular disclosed class of cannabinoids useful as neuroprotective antioxidants is formula (I) wherein the R group is independently selected from the group consisting of H, CH.sub.3, and COCH.sub.3. ##STR1## Many companies use the various cannabinoids, specifically THC and Cannabidiol, to earn a profit. Can the U.S. government sue medical marijuana dispensaries, or any company that uses Cannabinoids, for copyright infringement?
First, a preliminary correction. Patents are different than copyright. 35 USC §271 defines patent infringement: Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. Can patent holders sue patent infringers? Yes. See 35 USC §281: A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent. Does the US Government own US Patent 6630507? Yes. The assignee is "The United States of America as represented by the Department of Health and Human Services". What does this patent claim? "Claims" are the things that the patent protects for exclusive use (or making or selling of) by the patent owner. Quoting from Joseph D. Summer, Patenting Marijuana Strains: Baking Up Patent Protection for Growers in the Legal Fog of this Budding Industry: [US Patent 6630507] patents a method of use of a non-psychoactive cannabinoid compound for treating some diseases. The patent does not claim a composition of matter or a compound, but rather a method for using specific cannabinoids for treating oxidative stress. Are dispensaries infringing? Not for direct infringement (but see the next section). They are not selling the method of treatment. The closest a dispensary comes is selling the raw material that may be used in such a treatment. Who would be liable? Doctors or hospitals prescribing or administering the claimed treatment? No. 35 U.S. Code § 287(c) says: With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b), the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 shall not apply against the medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical activity. This says that even if a medical practitioner infringes a patented medical method when they use that method, they cannot be punished. But, direct infringement did happen, and thus, providers of the materials necessary for that direct infringement may have committed contributory infringement 35 USC §271(c). This is where a dispensary may be liable. If they provide the products or compounds that the claimed method requires, to somebody who directly infringes (even if that direct infringer happens to be shielded from liability), the dispensary may be liable for contributory infringement. This would depend on whether the particular compound is "a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use".
From the legal perspective, the question is whether the substance is legal in Australia. The legal root of the matter is the Therapeutic Goods Administration. Dosages above 100 mg are on "Schedule 4" meaning they require a prescription. There are also apparently state regulations. In Queensland, there is an amendment to the Drugs Misuse Regulation 1987 to ensure that the substance 5-Hydroxy tryptophan (5-HTP) is captured in Schedule 2 with the exception of preparations that contain 100mg or less of 5-HTP per dosage unit Schedule 2 is "Substances, the safe use of which may require advice from a pharmacist and which should be available from a pharmacy or, where a pharmacy service is not available, from a licensed person". The fact that it is very difficult to verify what the current regulations are may explain the "friction", which may make online purchases difficult. The underlying reason for government regulation is to keep people safe. Politics SE is an appropriate place to debate the balance between safety and usefulness.
The issue you identify isn't really a copyright issue. The same issue would arise if the product contained public domain images in the advertisements that aren't present in the work itself. Essentially, the question comes down to whether there was actionable deceptive advertising. Usually, these claims arise under specialized consumer protection statutes that offer remedies and means of enforcement different from an individualized fraud lawsuit, and usually a deceptive advertising claim is easier to prove than traditional fraud lawsuit. Traditional fraud lawsuits normally require a showing of damages caused by reasonable reliance upon the misrepresentation, which is uneconomic to prove in the case of an individual small consumer purchase. Usually, deceptive advertising of consumer products is established in a lawsuit by a government official in charge of regulating deceptive advertising or a class action lawsuit, and often statutory damages are assigned to each violation rather than requiring detailed proof of economic harm for compensatory damages from some but not other images being present. Often fine print in the advertisement or in a purchase form before buying the product discloses the disconnect. Also, the mere presence of an image in an advertisement doesn't necessary imply that it is included in the product. So prove of deceptive advertising liability in these cases is often difficult even with these relaxed standards. There are many gray area and close cases, and often, businesses settle these lawsuits rather than litigating them. A more specific answer would require knowledge of which jurisdiction's laws apply, which is often a non-trivial question in Internet based advertising lawsuits.
The federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) may apply to you and provide certain rights. HIPAA does seem to cover part of this, though if it covers you particularly and the lab that performed the test is a separate question. On the Department of Health and Human Services website discussing HIPAA, they outline requirements discussing pre-employment drug tests. Basically, your authorization is required in order to release the results of the drug test to your employer and there is nothing prohibiting the employer from conditioning employment on your provision of that authorization. This seems to indicate that the drug test is a medical record. In another section on the same web site concerning your medical records, it outlines that the Privacy Rule gives you the general right to inspect, review and receive a copy of your medical records if the health care provider is covered by the Privacy Rule. You can read about the privacy rule on yet another section of that web site. Generally speaking, the privacy rule applies to any health care provider that transmits health records electronically. Certain exceptions to the rule apply, however determining what those exceptions happen to be is a more difficult task. You will notice from the hhs.gov web site that any entity that is covered by the privacy act is required to give you a privacy practices notice (with certain exceptions). If you didn't receive a privacy practices notice then the entity conducting the drug test is probably not covered by HIPAA. If you did receive a privacy practices notice then the entity conducting the test is covered by HIPAA and you have a right to review your records.
Short Answer if you use medical marijuana prescribed by a doctor. Are you automatically an unlawful user of a controlled substance and cannot possess, use, buy, sell, gift, or transfer firearms? Basically yes. If you use medical marijuana prescribed by a doctor on a regular basis you are a prohibited person pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), and you are therefore subject to severe federal penalties for possessing, using, buying, selling, giving and transferring firearms (although case law has held that if, for example, you inherit a firearm, you can promptly negotiate its sale to a third party to divest yourself of ownership of it through a third party broker if you do not use the firearm or possess it; the statute is not intended to operate as a property forfeiture law). Long Answer Not many cases address this question. One of the leading cases is U.S. v. Bennett (10th Cir. 2003). It held that is someone is a regular user of illegal drugs at the time of the offense then that person is a prohibited person, even if he was not under the influence at the moment of offense. In an analysis that really needs to be quoted at length (some case law citations omitted) to capture exactly what was held: The sentencing guidelines define a “prohibited person” in relevant part as a person “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n. 6. The statute does not define the phrases “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance” or “addicted to any controlled substance.” It does, however, define “addict” as an “individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so far addicted to the use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his addiction.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(1). Mr. Bennett believes the district court erred in not defining the language “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance” the same as “addicted to any controlled substance.” He argues he is not an “addict,” as defined under 21 U.S.C. § 802(1), because he used methamphetamine and marijuana rather than narcotic drugs. Mr. Bennett's argument presupposes the definition of the word “addict” under 21 U.S.C. § 802(1) is synonymous with the phrase “addicted to any controlled substance” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). We need not consider whether this presumption is correct because we conclude, whatever the precise meaning of the phrase “addicted to any controlled substance,” its meaning is distinct from the meaning of the phrase “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance.” The words “unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” are written in the disjunctive, implying each has a separate meaning. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (“Cannons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise; here it does not.”). Even Mr. Bennett agrees the statute “breaks down a prohibited person into two groups: a. User, or b. Addicted.” We therefore conclude the district court did not err in defining the phrase “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance” differently from the phrase “addicted to any controlled substance.” In a related argument, Mr. Bennett argues he is not a “prohibited person” because he passed all drug tests while on bond. He claims this evidence demonstrates he was not an “addict” because “he definitely didn't lose the power of self-control.” We have already concluded the phrase “addicted to any controlled substance” is distinct in meaning from the phrase “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance.” The government only argues that Mr. Bennett was an unlawful user of a controlled substance. In any event, although Mr. Bennett did not fail any drug tests while on bond, we conclude the district court properly held him to be a “prohibited person.” The guidelines do not require a person to be an unlawful user of a controlled substance while on bond in order to qualify as a prohibited person. An individual's status as a prohibited person is measured “at the time the defendant committed the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B). While a court may use evidence of a defendant's unlawful use of drugs while on bond to infer he was a user at the time he possessed a firearm, see Solomon, 95 F.3d at 35, such evidence is not necessary. The government need only show the defendant was an unlawful user of drugs or addicted to drugs at the time he committed the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). In other words, the government must show a defendant's drug use was contemporaneous with his firearm possession. After reviewing the evidence, discussed in detail below, we are convinced the government met its burden in this case. As mentioned previously, the government believes Mr. Bennett's extensive drug history qualifies him as an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance. Mr. Bennett does not dispute he used controlled substances. Instead, he argues the sentencing guidelines are unconstitutionally vague because the phrase “unlawful user” in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), adopted by the guidelines in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n. 6, “is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different ways.” A criminal provision “must explicitly convey what it outlaws.” A provision that “either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.' ”. Where, as here, a vagueness challenge does not involve First Amendment freedoms, we examine whether the provision is impermissibly vague “in the light of the facts of the case at hand.” We conclude the sentencing guidelines are not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Bennett's conduct. A confidential informant told police Mr. Bennett was distributing methamphetamine. Upon searching Mr. Bennett's residence, the police found “a digital scale with white powder residue, [a] small baggie of suspected marijuana, numerous marijuana pipes and bongs, possible drug ledgers, assorted small containers containing white powder residue, small plastic bindles, and suspected marijuana seeds.” The police also found a small amount of marijuana on Mr. Bennett's person. Mr. Bennett admitted during an interview with police he used, purchased, and sold methamphetamine. Mr. Bennett also admitted to a probation officer he used marijuana and methamphetamine on a daily basis up until his arrest. As a result of the police investigation, Mr. Bennett pled guilty to two misdemeanor charges of possession of a controlled substance, i.e., marijuana and methamphetamine. Based on this evidence, we conclude the district court correctly found Mr. Bennett was a “prohibited person” under the guidelines. His regular and ongoing use of marijuana and methamphetamine during the same time period as his firearm possession qualifies him as a “unlawful user of ... a [ ] controlled substance” and therefore a “prohibited person.” The guidelines are not vague under the facts of this case. U.S. v. Bennett, 329 F.3d 769, 776–78 (10th Cir. 2003). A subsequent trial court decision from the District of Utah further elaborated on the standard set forth in Bennett considering rulings from the 5th and 9th Circuits as well: Mr. Grover refers this court to a decision by a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Herrera, which was subsequently vacated by an en banc panel of the court. The decision of the original panel is the only federal decision to expressly reach a definition of “unlawful user.” After analyzing the text, structure, and legislative history of § 922(g)(3), as well as the relevant case law, the court held: an ‘unlawful user’ is one who uses narcotics so frequently and in such quantities as to lose the power of self control and thereby pose a danger to the public morals, health, safety, or welfare. In other words, an ‘unlawful user’ is someone whose use of narcotics falls just short of addiction, as that term is defined by the Controlled Substances Act. Although the original Herrera court did not arrive at its conclusion by interpreting the phrase “unlawful user of” to be synonymous with “addicted to” (this was the argument of the dissenting judges on the en banc panel that subsequently vacated the decision of the three-judge panel), the end result is essentially the same. The panel did not define the meaning of use that “falls just short of addiction.” Thus, in asking this court to adopt the definition announced by the original Herrera panel, Mr. Grover is asking this court to equate the definition of “unlawful user,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), with the definition of “addict” in 21 U.S.C. § 802(1). For the reasons stated above, this court declines to equate the definition of “unlawful user,” as used in § 922(g)(3), with the definition of “addict” in 21 U.S.C. § 802(1). Furthermore, this court expresses serious doubt that any precedential weight may be accorded to the original panel decision in Herrera. Although the en banc majority did not expressly reverse the original panel's holding, it decided whether the defendant was an “unlawful user” only by asking whether “drug use [occurred] with regularity and over an extended period of time.” The majority never discussed the definition reached by the original panel, which roughly equated the definition of an “unlawful user” with that of an “addict,” requiring the additional element of loss of self-control. In sum, the phrase “unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), may be interpreted as either joining separately definable or synonymous terms. The Tenth Circuit in Bennett clearly ruled that the phrase is written disjunctively, meaning that the phrases “unlawful user of” and “addicted to” have separate meanings, and are therefore not synonymous. This conclusion is consistent with the common, everyday meaning of the terms—a person may be a user of controlled substances without being addicted to them, and conversely, a person may be addicted to controlled substances even when no longer a user of them. Although Bennett did not expressly define the phrase “unlawful user of,” it did explain that the defendant's “regular and ongoing use of marijuana and methamphetamine during the same time period as his firearm possession qualifies him as an ‘unlawful user of ... a[ ] controlled substance’ ....” Consistent with the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Purdy, Bennett impliedly defined three elements for qualification as an unlawful user of a controlled substance: (1) regular use of any controlled substance (or, in the words of Purdy, “[use of] drugs with regularity”); (2) on an ongoing basis (or, in the words of Purdy, “over an extended period of time”23); and (3) during the same time period as (or, in the words of Purdy, “contemporaneously with”) the possession of a firearm. Combining language from both Bennett and Purdy, this court holds that an unlawful user of any controlled substance, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), is an individual who regularly and unlawfully uses any controlled substance over an extended period of time that is contemporaneous with the possession of a firearm. U.S. v. Grover, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302–03 (D. Utah 2005). On the other hand, evidence of a single use of marijuana six hours before the arrest with a firearm was not sufficient to show that someone was a controlled substance user, as this could have been "an isolated occurrence." U.S. v. Augustin, 376 F.3d 135 (3rd Cir. 2004). In general, evidence that one has a medical prescription for marijuana would tend to show that one is a "controlled substance user" and hence a prohibited person with respect to firearms. The only real out in this case would be the Congressional appropriations bill prohibiting the expenditure of federal funds to prosecute people who are using marijuana in a manner that is legal under state law and related U.S. Attorney statements to that effect. But, it is not at all obvious that these protections extent to prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The case closest to addressing the question of whether someone was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) for possessing a firearm while regularly using marijuana on a basis that was legal under state law, considering among other things, a Second Amendment challenge, is Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2016), certiorari denied 137 S.Ct. 1396, 197 L.Ed.2d 555. The 9th Circuit in Wilson v. Lynch held that the provision of federal Gun Control Act prohibiting sales of firearms to individuals whom sellers had reasonable cause to believe were drug users, and the accompanying regulation and administrative policy effectively criminalizing the possession of a firearm by the holder of a state marijuana registry card (in Nevada) did not violate the Second Amendment. The 9th Circuit reached this conclusion because the government had a substantial interest in preventing gun violence, and because empirical data and other evidence supported strong link between drug use and the risk of irrational or unpredictable behavior, including gun violence. Therefore, the 9th Circuit held that it was reasonable for federal regulators to assume that registry cardholder was more likely to use marijuana that an individual who did not hold such a card. In sum, it is safe to assume that someone with a medical marijuana prescription that is legal under state law is still a "prohibited person" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and is subject to severe penalties for possessing a firearm.
A basic rule of trademark law is that a trademark is protected only for use in the same industry, or in regard to the same general sort of thing. "Maxwell House" for example, is the name of a brand of Coffee, and no doubt a trademark. If A business used it as the name of a brand of mobile home, it would not infringe the mark of the coffee brand. "Java" as a term for coffee , has been slang for any and all coffee at least as far back as WWII. I doubt that it is a currently active trademark in any case. It is, however, the name of a currently active programming language. Calling a new computer technology "Java" would probably infringe that (although the makers of javascript, a quite different computer language, seem to have gotten away with it). But it is hard to see how a realty company would so infringe. Of course there might be details which would cause this name to be infringing in fact, that I have no way of knowing. You could play safe with Sumatra Realty instead. Evin a quickly dismissed suit for trademark infringement could cost a startup time and money that might be a fatal handicap.
In the US, it depends on why you are doing this, and how you go about performing the operation. There are approved devices and procedures, and there is the other stuff. In an emergency that is life-threatening or threatens severe debilitation, it is permitted for a physician to try an extreme measure – if the state has a "Right to Try" law. Otherwise, a review and official approval by the relevant IRB is required. The devices are regulated by the FDA, but the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, so the feds don't have a say in whether a procedure is allowed. Nevertheless, use of unapproved devices can be taken to be evidence of failing to meet the required standard of care, in the case of a malpractice suit or punitive action by the state regulatory board. There is no specific law prohibiting removing lots of organs and replacing them with prostheses, though arguable what happened was that the brain was removed (it's not that a replacement shell was built around the person). Ordinarily, intentionally "killing" a person is illegal (except in case of sanctioned execution or self-defense). There is zero case law that would tell us whether removing a brain from a body "kills" the person. Most likely, there would be a prosecution for unlawfully causing a death, and either the legislature would tune up the law w.r.t. the definition of "causing death", or the courts would do so.
The constitutional basis for all US patents is Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the US Constitution, which grants Congress the power: To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. See "Intellectual Property Clause" from Cornell's WEX Legal Information Institute. US Patent law requires an applicant to include with a patent application "disclosures". As the page "Patent Disclosure: Everything You Need to Know" from UpCounsel states: [A] patent disclosure is a public claim of data about an invention. In general, it is any part of the patenting process in which data regarding an invention is disclosed. A good disclosure tells someone else how to create the product. [Emphasis added] The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the right to offer exclusive rights to people for their inventions for set periods of time. This is only if and when the inventor agrees to adequately disclose the invention in writing. [Emphasis added] A formal patent disclosure ... stipulates a set of claims regarding the invention, as well as other data that reveals the unique nature of the product. It should be expressed in writing with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as part of the patent application. What Is Included in a Patent Disclosure? The Specification. A primary disclosure or "specification" is a main document in a patent application. It describes the ways in which the invention is innovative compared to similar inventions and explains the scope of monopoly the applicant believes he or she has to the invention. The specification describes the item and the way to make and to use it, in clear and exact terms. Someone in the field must be able to reasonably create it with these instructions. Further, the specification notes the patent application filing date on which inventor can the rely. It also offers evidence that the invention belongs to the person in question. The Enablement. This explains how to create the object and how someone in the field can do so. The instructions cannot be vague or unclear, but must be exact and detailed. When the patent expires, the enablement should still be usable. This section should include any figures or drawings, with explanations. Again, you will want to show how your invention is special. So, you might want to include many details and different variations of the invention. Later, many of these variations may be deleted from the document as unnecessary. This section may be numerous pages long. Best Mode Requirement. The path revealed must be the best way of creating the item within the author's awareness at the time of filing. Therefore, it may include specific or unique techniques. There should be no concealment. A poor-quality disclosure can risk the appearance of concealment. [Italics added] Claims. This area tells the reader the exclusive rights the patent offers to the inventor.... The official page "Duty of Disclosure, Candor, and Good Faith" from the USPTO cites 37 CFR 1.56 on the duty to disclose information material to patentability. This regulation provides, in the relevant part: A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. The public interest is best served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when, at the time an application is being examined, the Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all information material to patentability. Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section. The duty to disclose information exists with respect to each pending claim ... These disclosures include the state of prior art, as kown to the applicant and the applicant's associates. The page "BEST MODE: Noncompliance with the Duty of Disclosure is Not an Option" states: When you apply for a patent in the United States, you have a legal duty to disclose prior art that could be used to reject your application — in essence, information that may be used against you by the examiner of your application. While persons accused of a crime have a right to remain silent, so as to avoid self-incrimination, inventors applying for a patent have no such right. To the contrary, an inventor’s failure to comply with the duty of disclosure risks any resulting patent being unenforceable. The page "THE PATENT BARGAIN AND THE CURSE OF RETROACTIVITY" states: One of the requirements for the USPTO to issue a patent is that the applicant’s claimed invention be fully disclosed in the application and published in the patent. This is sometimes referred to as the “patent bargain.” This is at the opposite end of the spectrum from trade secrets law, under which a company can sue for © misappropriation of a trade secret but only if it takes reasonable measures to maintain confidentiality of the trade secret. ... Under patent law an inventor must fully disclose his or her invention before enforceable patent rights come into being. This disclosure requirement is sometimes termed the “patent bargain,” under which an inventor gains the right to exclude others from practicing a patented invention in exchange for disclosing the invention so that it may be known by the public and indeed practiced after the patent term has expired. ... [Emphasis added] In general a patent application is not just a description of a specific industrial process. It includes the research by which that process was discovered or developed. That research can benefit others in the same field, and so "promote the progress of science and the useful arts" in helping others to do further research and make further discoveries, which can often be done without infringing the patent itself. Of course, once patent protection expires, anyone may use the patent, and the final patent documents are supposed to include sufficient information that "one skilled in the art" will be able to build the invention or use the process that had been patented. This is in contrast to the situation which would exist had the inventor retained the discovery as a trade secret. In that case no one would have been able to use the patented discovery until some other person independently discovered and disclosed it.
What documents and testimony establish identity and what happens if they're lost? Birth certificates, social security cards, and driver's licenses identify a person, but what happens if these are all lost? Say a homeless person loses all of their documents in the shuffle, what could they do to recover them? Even further, if this person has no family or work colleagues who will vouch for them, is it possible that their identity is lost forever? Can a person lose their citizenship in this manner? Could they be arrested or even deported?
The general rule Birth certificates, social security cards, and driver's licenses identify a person, but what happens if these are all lost? Say a homeless person loses all of their documents in the shuffle, what could they do to recover them? Even further, if this person has no family or work colleagues who will vouch for them, is it possible that their identity is lost forever? Generally, these can be replaced. For example, I was robbed at gunpoint a couple of years ago and the robbers took (among other things) my driver's license and Social Security card, which were never recovered (I did recover one prescription slip from a dumpster about a mile away that was wrapped around a syringe, because the robbers were also injection drug users.) I went by myself without any ID to the DMV which had an online record of my driver's license containing my age, height, weight, sex, race, noted that I needed vision correction and also had my most recent driver's license photo and a fingerprint. I explained what happened without any corroboration, and they promptly issued me a new driver's license. The same process would have applied had I had a state ID in lieu of a driver's license because I wasn't licensed to drive for some reason (e.g. if I was blind). The process in Texas would be very similar (I don't know if they have finger prints though). My daughter had to do the same when she lost her driver's license while camping. With the driver's license, I was able to go to the Social Security office and have them reissue a Social Security card. One of my children's birth certificates was lost, and I could simply go to the Vital Statistics department with a name and date of birth and get a new one. The replacement birth certificate and driver's license involved a modest fee (which would be pretty daunting for a homeless person), but the replacement Social Security card was free. It's a pain in the neck to do this, and it took several hours to sort out (the time lost would not be a problem for a homeless person), but loss of my identity was not a serious possibility. If you have (or had before you lost it) a photo ID such as a driver's license, or state ID, or student ID, or passport in a system, reconstructing your identity isn't that hard. If you don't know who you are either. If you have amnesia, so you don't know the information needed to recover your records, it can be much harder to work out a lack of any ID. This happens something on the order of several times a year. Sometimes it is resolved promptly when the person regains their memory or is tied to a recent outstanding missing persons report, or is identified after a local TV broadcast seeking input from the public. But, if the person is not local, no one filed a missing persons report, and the memory loss turns out to be permanent, it can take months or years to get it sorted out. But, you will generally be assumed to be legally present in the U.S. until proven otherwise if you speak fluent English. Also, you can't easily be deported if no one can determine your nationality (including you), even if you don't speak fluent English. For example, if the only language you spoke fluently was an Amazonian tribal language and no one could figure out this fact, it would be hard to deport you without evidence of your country of origin, which by assumption, does not exist in this scenario. Officials sometimes try to crowdsource recordings of someone speaking or writing in these situations to determine their place of origins, which can take many months and isn't always successful. But, if your first language was Klingon, you would be quickly identified and not deported, because that language is widely recognized and a Google search would reveal that it has only two native speakers, both of whom are children who were born in the United States (I know their father as a casual acquaintance). Citizenship, arrest and deportation Can a person lose their citizenship in this manner? Could they be arrested or even deported? You cannot lose your citizenship in this manner, although it can be harder to prove your citizenship, if you need to do so. You shouldn't be arrested for simply not having ID (although it does happen) if you aren't driving a car without a license. Also, lots of people without ID are arrested all of the time for other charges, and then refuse to provide anything but a false alias to the police. But, they are usually not deported unless there is some reason to suspect that they are not U.S. citizens. A modest but significant number of people every year (on the order of dozens to a couple hundred) are arrested and deported in circumstances like these and the system can put someone in that situation in a very Catch-22 situation for which there a few if any legal remedies after the fact by way of compensation. Deportations Of U.S. citizens with strong foreign ties The hard cases are usually those when you have someone who is a child who has never had a photo ID, or is an adult who never had a photo ID in the U.S., especially if that person is someone who has lived much of their life abroad despite being born in the U.S., or is most fluent in a non-English language because their parents spoke that language when they were growing up, or was born abroad and naturalized as a citizen later (often as a relative of the primary person who earned the right to citizenship by taking citizenship tests). Establishing that you are the same person as the one in a birth certificate or naturalization certificate is not always easy. Naturalizations often aren't accurately cross-referenced with immigration records. And, the track record of ICE agents meaningfully following up on claims of citizenship is very poor. Identity assumption cases Another much less common hard case that still happens sometimes, involves a situation where you are born in the U.S. or to a U.S. citizen, giving you U.S. citizenship, and you have a birth certificate, but you live abroad for a long time, and in the meantime, someone similar in age, sex and race to you has assumed your identity to claim citizenship status. Then, there is someone else with a long paper trail that supports your identity actually belonging to them including photo IDs and maybe even a passport, and you have only your birth certificate that someone else claims is theirs with doesn't have a lot of provable biometric features other than your parent's names, which may be hard to use to establish that you are the true person corresponding to the birth certificate if they are deceased, and may require DNA testing or testimony from them even if they are not deceased. Persons declared dead A third class of people who have a thorny time re-establishing their identities are people who went missing, were declared dead legally by a court as a result, and then resurface. This can pose a problem even after they undeniably establish their identity due to rules relating to the finality of court orders. A fictional example of this is the title character in the live action TV series the Iron Fist in the Marvel Comics Universe. But, there are also real life examples, such as a man in Ohio a number of years ago who was in a similar situation (except for the fact that he didn't have superpowers, was middle aged, and wasn't an heir to a billion dollar fortune). These cases are very rare. There is probably less than one per year in the entire United States.
Was the case Sealed? Or is it considered to be Private? Those are two different cases. I was not able to find any laws regarding sealing, or expunging records of Name Changes, but was able to find the Utah Law for Criminal Records. I can only assume they draw from one another. All that being said, assuming your whatever case is sealed, then Some records are sealed. In these kinds of cases, even information about the existence of the case is not publicly available. A person seeking access to a sealed record must petition the court for permission to unseal the records. Rule 4-202.03 states that, ....no one may access a sealed court record except by order of the court. A judge may review a sealed record when the circumstances warrant. From that I can assume that, The records are not public. The records will not show up in a routine check The records will be known only if a there is a court order. Comparing it with the Expungement Act, Continued Use of Sealed Records After sealing, BCI continues to index and maintain all expunged records of arrests and convictions, but the records will not be released to the public. BCI will not divulge any information contained in the expunged records to any person or agency without a court order, unless authorized by statute to do so. Upon request, the following organizations may receive information contained in expunged records: the Board of Pardons and Parole Peace Officer Standards and Training federal authorities, unless prohibited by federal law the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and the State Office of Education Both cases above require a court order to get that seal record information. However, from what I gather only expunged criminal records can be access upon request by the Division of Occupational Licences. Bottom line, it sounds like you are safe to mark is no previous name, but you may lose your license in the future if something goes south. I will recommend you to get a professional look into the word of the law and provide you with a written statement of the actual law. Another thing you can try is write to the court who sealed your case, present them the situation and explain what you have found so far, and ask for guidance.
In essence, Schwab is stating that they are not a law enforcement agency and they have neither the interest nor the legal right to pursue criminals. They state that they will assist law enforcement but also tell you that, from their experience, law enforcement while they have the legal right also don't have any interest in doing so. This is completely correct. I'm not going to comment on what you should do to protect yourself from identity theft. With respect to the reverse transfer: you are on very shaky legal ground here - you transferred funds without authorization and you are not legally allowed to do this even to recover your own losses. If you had limited this to just recovering your own funds then you would be extremely unlikely to be prosecuted but by taking more than was yours you have technically committed a theft of your own. That said, it seems unlikely that law enforcement will be interested - Schwab are not making a complaint and I doubt that the original thief will - for obvious reasons. However, its possible (even likely) that this was not the thief's bank account - this is likely to be an innocent third party's account that the thief was using to obfuscate their crime. If so, the money you took (both the original amount and the extra $50) you took actually belongs to that innocent party - your money had probably spent very little time in that account.
Identification rules vary from state to state, but there is no state which would require a person in Mr. Walker's position to identify themselves to law enforcement. The passenger is compelled to produce identification to law enforcement through the threat of illegal violence.
What factors might a court consider in these circumstances? Is it true that anyone can just walk up and file a document in any case, with no requirement to identify themselves? If nobody admits to filing a document, it is likely that the court would grant a motion to strike the document and disregard it (revising a past ruling if the issue was raised within the six months allowed for reconsidering rulings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) or the state equivalent). A court document must, on its face, indicate a filing person and be signed to be accepted by the clerk of the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or the state equivalent. But, if the document appears on its face to be legitimate, the person filing it will not generally be required to prove their identity. This happens even less often now than it used to (in the past, fake filings were often made by members of "sovereign citizens" movements to harass governmental officials), because in both the state courts were I practice and in federal court, documents must usually be filed with the court by lawyers via e-filing using a password protected e-filing account. Usually, only parties without lawyers and out of state lawyers who are still in the process of setting up their e-filing account file court documents in person. When documents are filed in person, they are also often delivered via courier rather than by the person who actually signed the documents. And, as a matter of practical reality, third-parties almost never file fake documents in court (in part, because there is usually someone present who is in a position to call attention to the fraud to the court). Still, this can happen, although it is very rare. I've only seen a situation like this come up once in twenty years of practice. (My account below oversimplifies some of the technical details of what happened to get to the gist of the points relevant to this question.) In that case, a lawyer was representing an ex-husband in a post-decree alimony modification case that had been appealed filed a bill of costs that she sought to recover on behalf of her client for the appeal, but she filed it in the wrong court (she filed it in the appellate court where she had represented her client, rather than, as required, in the trial court where another attorney had represented the ex-husband). When an order awarding him costs was not entered by any court, the ex-husband filed an (untimely) bill of costs in the trial court under his appellate lawyer's name using the appellate filing as a model, without her consent, by forging her name on the document. The lawyer didn't discover this (because she was retained only in the appeal and had never entered an appearance in the trial court and thus didn't have access to the trial court file, and because the court doesn't automatically send you a copy of your own filings) until I responded on behalf of the ex-wife to the forged bill of costs alleging that it was untimely which I served a copy of upon the ex-husband's lawyer as required by the rules. At that point, the ex-husband's lawyer immediately called me and the court to explain that she did not file this document and that it was forged (otherwise should could have been sanctioned for knowingly filing the bill of costs knowing that it was out of time and was frivolous at that point and could have been deemed to be responsible for further trial court proceedings of the ex-husband in the case, like keeping him appraised of deadlines, court rulings and filings by other lawyers in the case, since it appeared that she'd participated in the trial court case). Ultimately, the court declined to award the costs because they were filed in an untimely manner and because they were not really filed by the lawyer as claimed. So, the the court disregarded the bill of costs and denied this relief to the ex-husband. (If I was the judge, I would have hauled the ex-husband into court and held him in contempt of court sua sponte, but in this very busy court where hearings in divorcees are often scheduled two or more years out from the scheduling date, the judge didn't have the time to devote to issues like that.)
You have not committed a crime or a violation of non-criminal law when you swear something under oath believing in good faith that what you are saying is true, and you are mistaken. The law does not expect omniscience. Also, making a false statement under oath is only sanctionable if you make a false statement of a "material fact." Whether or not you have a Social Security number is not a "material fact" in the context of a passport application where the material facts are that you are the same person as the person described in your birth certificate, that the parents there are to the best of your knowledge your parents, that the birth certificate is authentic, and that you have not renounced U.S. citizenship. The question about a Social Security number is there for administrative convenience, not to make any determination about your right to a passport. You should apply for a Social Security number. If you already have one, your actions consistent with not having one will only corroborate the fact that you were ignorant of that fact when you applied for a passport, and you will have your existing Social Security number provided to you. As a practical matter it is unlikely that you have one. There are no forms that your non-U.S. parents would have to be filled out that would have required one, and you know that you haven't applied for one in the past. Before Social Security numbers of dependents were required on U.S. tax forms, most people didn't get Social Security numbers until they got their first job.
There's the question whether something is lost property or abandoned property. You'd be allowed to keep abandoned property, but keeping lost property without looking for the owner is in many places considered theft. A car on your land is quite likely abandoned by the last driver (people don't usually lose cars). But the question is whether it is abandoned by the owner; if the car looks like it has some value then it is unlikely to be abandoned by the owner and more likely that it has been stolen. I'd report the car to the police; then it's up to them to find the owner or not. If they can find him, and the car was not abandoned, but actually lost (unlikely) or stolen (more likely), you have the satisfaction of being an honest person helping either a very stupid car owner or a crime victim to get their property back. If they can't find him, usually the property will then belong to the finder.
health care checks. Hotel check in. Employment? maybe. Background Checks? doesn't matter. It actually does matter, because there is sometimes a law governing the documents that may be shown for a given purpose. For example, the I-9 form, for verifying someone's eligibility to accept employment in the US, has a well defined lists of documents that an employer must accept, and the passport card is one of those documents. A similar situation exists for Transportation Security Administration screening of air passengers. On the other hand, laws concerning proof of age for buying various products will vary from state to state, and retailers may or may not be required to accept any particular document. In the case of alcohol sales in North Carolina, for example, there is a brochure that lists "acceptable forms of identification" on page 17 and explicitly says that "passports may be in the booklet or card form." But that does not seem to create a legal requirement for the retailer to accept passport cards, because page 19 outlines the retailer's right to refuse, saying among other things that "there is no legal recourse by a customer who you have refused a sale." US passport law (22 USC Chapter 4 and 22 CFR parts 51 and 53) doesn't have anything to say about the passport's or passport card's role as an identification document; it speaks only of the more specific role as a travel document. So the general answer to your question, appears to be no. There is no law generally requiring people to accept a passport card if they also accept passports or driver's licenses. But in most specific instances, there may be a general requirement such as "government-issued identification" that includes passport cards in addition to passports and driver's licenses, or there may be a list that explicitly includes passport cards along with driver's licenses and passports.
Can a statement of one's beliefs constitute defamation if those beliefs can't be proven true? I believe that a group of businesses is engaging in anti-competitive behavior and that they are acting in a coordinated effort to maintain artificially-inflated prices and are publishing dishonest advertising through third parties to bring customers to them. I would like to start a similar business in their area offering the same service at a significantly lower rate, and station someone in front of their places of business who would approach clients and let them know about our service and the relative rate difference etc. I would also like to tell these clients about the anti-competitive and dishonest behavior that we believe those businesses are engaged in, and that this is the reason for the significant difference in rates for the service. I understand that if we were to say: These businesses are engaging in anti-competitive behavior and have attracted you through dishonest advertising. that we would likely have a burden of proof in any defamation claim. But if we state the true facts more accurately in this way: We believe that these businesses are engaging in anti-competitive behavior and have attracted you through dishonest advertising. Would we still have some potential burden of proof (to prove the belief, not to prove the behavior itself?) in a defamation claim? Or are we free to believe whatever we want? What if the behavior can be proven false?
Can a statement of one's beliefs constitute defamation if those beliefs can't be proven true? You might think that it is impossible to prove what's going on in your mind. But this is done all the time. Thoughts can be inferred from words and actions. For example, theft requires an intent to permanently deprive someone of property. If someone hides merchandise under their shirt and proceeds to the exit, there's generally not a reasonable doubt about whether they intended in their mind to steal it. Defamation laws vary by state. However, the First Amendment sets a baseline that all states must follow. Defamation requires a false fact. Pure opinion is not defamation. However, it is possible to defame via a statement which is an opinion, if that opinion implies undisclosed facts which are false. If you say that you "believe" the companies are deceptive, this clearly implies you know something that makes you believe that. You can get around this by disclosing the entire factual basis for your opinion. If you say that the New York Giants are deceptive because their stadium is actually located in New Jersey, that's not defamation, because people can judge for themselves whether that's actually deceptive. But if the team was actually located in New York, you could be liable. Would we still have some potential burden of proof The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, but it's only preponderance of the evidence in most cases, meaning the jury just needs to find it 50.001% likely that you are liable. But if the plaintiff in a defamation case is considered a "public figure" the standard of proof is raised, and they must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that you acted with "actual malice" (which more or less means that you didn't actually believe what you were saying.) According to this paper it's an open question as to whether a corporation can be a public figure (although I don't know if their analysis is still valid since it's from 2001); the answer might depend on which circuit you are in, and even if you know how your circuit has decided the matter, the Supreme Court might rule the other way. And if your case goes all the way to the Supreme Court, you're going to be paying a lot of legal fees over the course of many years. You should also know that even if it's not defamation, you might not be off the hook. There's something called "tortious interference of business". If you're going to literally have people stand in front of businesses to try to drive their customers away from them and to you, I would highly suggest you get a lawyer from your area to determine whether and how you can legally do this.
No, the truth of the statement is the defense. It is true that The New York Times reported that A did X, even if it is false that A did X. Your claim is about the NYT, not about A. If you just repeat the false allegation (republishing it), that is libel.
united-states Simply insulting someone without saying something false is not defamation in the U.S. (historically it was the subject of criminal defamation liability to might light of someone's disabilities or call them out in an insulting way, but later U.S. constitutional law jurisprudence interpreting the First Amendment in the late 20th century rendered these laws unconstitutional). If a statement might damage someone's reputation if taken literally, and the statement is false, it can be defamatory and give rise to civil liability (or criminal liability in the few states that still have criminal defamation statutes), if the people to whom the statement is "published" (i.e. the audience of the statement) could reasonably believe that the statement was intended to be taken literally. Whether a statement can be taken literally is an "all of the facts and circumstances" analysis. Statements meant only as hyperbole or parody or metaphorically, if a reasonable audience person would understand the statements in that sense, do not impose liability based upon what they would mean if taken literally. Other Countries As noted in the question itself, not all countries treat statements like this the same way. Germany imposes criminal liability for all manner of insults. England and Wales imposes defamation liability in many circumstances when U.S. law would not. And, many countries in Asia are closef to the German model of liability for insulting speech than they are to the U.S. model.
Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on.
In the abstract, two businesses that cooperate in violating a third party's copyright could both face liability. Applying that information to the facts you gave would amount to legal counsel. If you don't want to tell the client 'no,' you should speak to a lawyer about your potential liability. Beyond the legalities, do you really want your portfolio to advertise that you design sites by ripping other sites off?
There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake.
It is not legal to give false responses on such a declaration. The point of anti-discrimination laws is that they say when it is legal vs. not legal to discriminate against an employee, and Alex is expected to have faith in the legal system to protect his legal rights. Dissatisfaction with the outcome of the law may be understandable, but still does not legally justify falsifying information given to an employer. In certain cases (look for the fine print and mentions of "penalty of perjury") you can be fined and imprisoned for lying. More commonly, your employment can be terminated when you are discovered. You may also be held liable for consequences of such lies. Your employer's health insurance contract might require truthful and accurate reporting of medical facts and a lie about your condition could result in termination of coverage.
The answer would vary considerably. Consumer protection laws in some jurisdictions would find such a scheme to be an actionable deceptive trade practice, while consumer protection laws in other jurisdictions would find that it was not an actionable deceptive trade practice. One of the trickier points is quantifying the injury. How are you harmed if you buy a good at 20% off when it is really 20% off? How are you harmed if you don't buy a good at 20% off and then later buy the same good at 20% off when you were expecting it to be full price? Some consumer protection laws require that you show injury, and in those cases, it probably wouldn't be actionable. But, other consumer protection laws make false statements actionable, even if there is no reliance upon the statement or harm caused, in which case statutory damages might be recoverable.
Can I sue my employer for wrongful firing? So I am looking to possibly take legal action against a former employer of mine that had--in my opinion wrongfully terminated me. I'm wondering if this is possible based on my case. Here is my case: I worked for an asphalt/grading company from September 2016 to May 2018 (almost two years). During that time under my first boss "John," I had advanced to becoming the lead of my department and I had the highest production rate--this data was tracked on a per-task basis. Come February 2018 the company announced a huge internal fiasco which caused a change in management, my boss "John," quit along with the CEO and a ton of other employees were fired. At this point I got a new boss "Dave," and a new general manager "Joe." In the near 2 years of my employment I had the highest production rate, fewest errors and I had completed bonus tasks outside my job, on top of which I had no written or verbal warnings during this period. My first boss John had also written me a formal letter of recommendation commending my performance before his resignation. However come February my new boss Dave had yelled, cursed and scolded me in an open office environment and had said "We don't just hand out raises," as well as called me a "Greedy Fuck," for asking for my performance to be reviewed for a raise. On top of this he admitted to believing an accusation that I was a "Problem Child," told to him by another employee before he had even met me. I had reported these problems to HR officially after they had occurred. Following this I had several conversations and was being forced to perform various duties for my boss that were outside the skill-set of someone in my position that were previously performed by my previous boss John--not to be confusing, I have these skills, but I declined to do the tasks because my boss did not understand the duties of my position and workload. After this I was out of office one day due to various personal issues and could not call in to work on time--so I called in the same day 1 hour after the start of my shift to say that I would not make it. Then the next day I had filed a complaint with the general manager about the issues I had with Dave and that I needed to speak with him immediately by saying, "I understand, that you have a meeting in 5 minutes, but I need to speak with you immediately." To which he replied, "If you aren't going to respect my time then get the fuck out, get the fuck out!" Again I replied, "Let me finish, I understand you have a meeting, I just needed to tell you I need to speak with you, even if it's after your meeting." After this no meetings, no more problems, silence for weeks and then I was terminated May 14th by the general manager Joe. The reason for termination by Joe was "Low Performance," "Refusing to schedule a Job to be completed," and "Not calling in sick prior to my shift." I told Joe that none of the reasons for termination were true, to which he replied, "I don't care, it doesn't matter, it doesn't matter, you're terminated." I left, slammed his door shut out of anger for lying and not listening to me, then calmly collected my things, clocked out my time and left. HR and Joe gave me the contact for an executive George, whom was also terminated the next day May 15th. I've had no contact since. NOTE: Unfortunately I don't have any proof apart from HR documents in my personal file as well as the companies tracked statistics as well as various testimonies from previous employees and current employees.
Most employment in the US is "at will". That means that the employer or the employee can terminate the relationship without notice for any reason or for no reason. There are certain statutory protections that limit this, however, such as federal protections against discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic. Arizona may have other protections. So the first thing you need to do (or your lawyer needs to do) is determine whether your employment was at will. If so, then it doesn't much matter if the reasons they gave you were lies, unless you can show that their actions constituted illegal discrimination. (If they lied about you to someone else, though, you might be able to go after them for libel or slander.) If your employment was not at will, then you may be able to challenge the reasons for the firing if the firing violated the conditions under which your employment could be terminated. Even if your employment was at will, your firing might fall under one of the exceptions listed in the Wikipedia article: public policy, implied contract, or good faith/fair dealing (although the article gives conflicting information about whether Arizona has an implied contract exception; the text says that it does not, but the map shows that it does). To analyze the facts of your case in connection with Arizona employment law, you really need to talk to a lawyer with a practice in Arizona employment law. The lawyer will want to review your contract or other written agreement, if there is one.
was there a good way to publicly shame Bob, and prevent him from getting his next job, without breaking Carol’s confidence? Apparently not. The conclusion that Bob's violations of company policy are short of breaking any laws leaves little to no reason for publicly shaming him. Details on the company policy, the facts, and the statements might make a difference, but your description is generic in that regard and would require us to speculate on what they could be. Could there have been grounds for a lawsuit? It largely depends on the terms of the publications, their veracity & import, and --if false or unfounded-- their effect on Bob's prospects and/or whether the statements are defamatory per se. Would a truth defense for a statement such as, “We completed an investigation of Bob for professional misconduct,” require disclosing the investigation? Yes. A defendant has the burden to prove the [affirmative] defense(s) on which he intends to premise his position. Note that the statement “We completed an investigation of Bob for professional misconduct” in and of itself is not really a truth defense because it is inconclusive as to whether Bob was found to have incurred misconduct. The sole fact that Bob was investigated does not justify imputing to him disreputable conduct. Would a defense that the investigation gave them legitimate reasons to believe that the insinuation they made is true require them to disclose it? Yes. Bob is entitled to gather from the defendant the bases for the latter's allegations. Otherwise defamers would systematically elude their liability by sticking to generic allegations only. Are there other good defenses that could have gotten the lawsuit dismissed as frivolous? That requires us to speculate because we are given no details about the underlying events, Bob's pleadings, the evidence obtained during discovery, and so forth. That being said, a prevailing defense does not imply that the lawsuit is frivolous. Would the identities of the witnesses have been redacted? No. The fact that Bob did not break any laws suggests that the matter does not warrant measures akin to witness protection. Nor does your description reflect that the communications are protected by some privilege. Is it credible that Ethan had a good legal reason to keep this “in the family” for Carol’s sake? That is unanswerable because, inter alia, it is not about the law, it is unclear what exactly "Carol's sake" entails, and the substance of the company's other scandals as well as Ethan's reason(s) are unspecified. Ethan's "good legal reason" does not necessarily have to protect or advance "Carol's sake".
Law (regardless of its type) supersedes contract, provided it has jurisdiction over the persons bound by that contract. Contract provisions that are counter to law are generally held to be void. State law has authority over an employer's policies or hand book. However, there may be exceptions in state law (so I would double check). A frequent exception (at least in California law, which I am most familiar with) is for very small businesses. Another exception, from C.R.S. § 8-4-101(5), is if you are considered a "contractor" rather than an employee, per the government's determination. It is possibly worth your time to let you employer know of this conflict before termination if possible, so that they can adjust their policies, rather than in an adversarial position after termination, if only to avoid the headache.
Yes, this is a valid concern As written, every piece of IP you produce while employed belongs to the employer. This includes your hypothetical game. It also includes your weekly shopping lists, your Christmas card to your Great-Aunt Nellie, the … a-hm … private video you make of you and your significant other. As written this is overly broad and probably unenforceable. However, it’s always better to have clear and legally enforceable clauses in your agreements because unclear, arguably unenforceable ones lead to disputes. To be fair, the employer has probably lifted some (bad) boilerplate and hasn’t actually thought through what it means. Get it redrafted.
It depends to a large degree on local employment laws. Depending on how the counteroffer was worded, it might have constituted anything from a binding legal contract for employment for some reasonable minimum term, or a totally non-binding suggestion that was worth less than the air breathed while pronouncing it. Some things to consider would include: What are local employment laws like? Do they require that termination be for cause? If so, what are causes for termination? Does termination require any kind of remediation beforehand? Note that in an at-will, right-to-work state in the US, odds are that the employee can be fired for any time and for any reason, supposing the employer hasn't accidentally entered into a contract by extending the counteroffer. What did the counteroffer say? Did it stipulate that the offer was not for a definite term and that the company reserved the right to terminate the employee for any reason, or no reason at all? Odds are any sufficiently serious business in an at- will, right-to-work state would use standard legal language in any offer or counteroffer to ensure that they are on the right side of this, so odds are the counteroffer was accepted with no obligations at all on the company. Does the termination affect eligibility for unemployment benefits? I would say most likely not, as the termination would probably be recorded as being for no reason legally speaking (if they admitted to terminating the employee for seeking other employment, interested government officials could take a dim view of the company's actions). You'd probably have at least some unemployment compensation coming your way. Some professional - not legal - advice. Never accept a counteroffer. Only get another offer in the first place if you are committed to leaving your current employer no matter what. If your company really insists, you should insist on a minimum definite term of employment written into a legal contract which is signed by an executive and notarized. No company will agree to this (unless the term is shorter than you'd want as a full-time W-2 anyway) but if they do, hey, you have some security (if the company agrees to this, have your own lawyer - whom you pay with your own money - review the document). Even then, I would be very, very careful about staying at a company after getting a counteroffer. Don't do it. Ever. Never accept a counteroffer. One comment asks why I recommend never accepting a counteroffer. There are at least two reasons: The reason you are looking for a new job should be that there is something about your current job that isn't completely satisfactory and that you haven't been able to fix. Either you have grown out of the position, don't like the work, feel you're underpaid, don't get along with somebody, etc. If you were unable or unwilling to fix any of these issues without having another job on the table, having another job on the table shouldn't be what makes you willing and able to fix them. Why work somewhere that you'd constantly need to go job hunting to address workplace issues? Unless the company makes firm agreements about how long they're going to keep you around, you have no guarantee that they'll keep you. Presumably, you didn't have one before, and you don't have one at the new job, but the fact that you are currently employed might support the assumption that your employment would be continued at your current employer and the offer might support the assumption the new employer plans to employ you indefinitely. When you put in your notice, it makes the company more aware of the fact that you could leave at any time; while a perfectly rational actor would realize that this doesn't change the situation at all, companies are run by people and people often act irrationally. Perhaps your manager is vindictive, perhaps your manager is scared that you will still leave after accepting the counteroffer. Maybe your manager knows there are layoffs coming but needs you for the busy season. Hiring replacements can be time-consuming and expensive - and employees who are getting offers of employment elsewhere and putting in notice might be seen as risks. I'm not saying that accepting a counteroffer has always turned out badly. Falling coconuts kill 150 people every year. Still, I am not going to add a coconut rider to my insurance policy and I am not going to accept a counteroffer.
Yes I would reach the same conclusion as DaleM, i.e. that the arbitration clause still applies to the dispute in the question, but for a different reason.<1> While the severability principle is indeed a concept in arbitration law, I don't believe that is the relevant doctrine here.<2> Termination Of Employment v. Termination Of An Employment Contract What terminates when a period of employment ends is the employment itself, not the contract of employment. The contract remains effective as to rights and obligations arising during the course of the employment covered by the contract. (This concept would also sometimes be described in terms along the lines of "the right to a remedy for the workplace injury and the right to have disputes related to that resolved in arbitration are vested rights" that are not modified when the contract term of employment ends.) This concept isn't particular to the arbitration obligation. For example, if contract of employment that did not contain an arbitration clause provided that the employee was paid $200 an hour for the first six months and $220 an hour for the second six months of a one year fixed term employment agreement, but the employer failed to adjust paychecks according after the first six months and continued paying the employee at $200 an hour instead (assume to avoid the issue of waiver that this wasn't readily apparent on the face of the paystubs provided to the employee), the employee could bring suit thirteen months after the employee's employment terminated for the $20 an hour not paid as agreed during the last six months of the contract even though the employment period had ended. The contract still remains in force to govern the rights and obligations of the parties arising during the period of employment. Examples Of Termination Of The Contract Itself In contrast, sometimes one contract is replaced, even retroactively, with another contract, in what is called a "novation" of the original contract. This truly does terminate the old contract, so that only the replacement contract remains. So, if, for example, the original employment contract contained an arbitration clause, but this was replaced by a new employment contract without an arbitration clause three months later (in the sample case, before the worker was injured<3>), then the arbitration clause would not apply because the contract, and not just the employment was terminated. Similarly, support that the workplace injury was the second dispute between the employer and employee that had come up. The first was a dispute over the rate of pay received which was resolved by a settlement agreement negotiated by lawyers for the parties before either arbitration or litigation in court was commenced, which expressly terminated all rights, known and unknown, of the parties arising under the contract, and the second was the workplace injury for which the relationship of the injury to work was only discovered later on. In this case, the contract and not just the employment had been expressly terminated, and so the arbitration clause would not apply to the workplace injury dispute (which would be barred by the settlement agreement and which may or may not have had an arbitration clause of its own). End Notes <1> At least assuming that the dispute would have been subject to arbitration if a dispute were litigated while the employee was still employed. There can be circumstances when a workplace injury is not subject to arbitration even if the employer and employee undoubtedly agreed to an arbitration clause that applies to the dispute in question. For example, workplace injuries arising from sexual assault are not subject to arbitration in the United States. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402. <2> The severability principle usually concerns a determination of the enforceability of an arbitration clause in the face of certain kinds of arguments that the entire contract as a whole is voidable. It also does not apply in cases where there is a dispute over whether any contract of any kind was formed in the first place. For example, if someone presented the court with a contract containing an arbitration clause and sought to compel arbitration, and the defense to a motion to compel arbitration was that the defendant had never met or had any connection with or communication with the defendant or anyone related to the alleged contract. <3> The hard case, where the novation takes place after the injury, is complicated by legal doctrines regarding the conditions under which a vested legal right can be waived, which may or may not be met depending upon the circumstances under which the novation was entered into by the parties and presents conceptually distinct legal questions in addition to the legal questions already present in the simple case where the injury takes place after the novation.
An employer doesn't have the authority to authorize its employees to violate the law. An employee who personally participates in a crime has both criminal and civil liability for the employee's actions. Private sector employers have vicarious respondeat superior civil liability for the actions of their employees taken in the scope of their duties. In other words, anything that an employee of a private sector employer is liable for, the employer is also liable for. Governmental employers do not have vicarious respondeat superior civil liability for the civil rights violations of the employees. Direct civil as opposed to vicarious civil liability, and criminal liability for an employer (governmental or private) is generally limited to acts carried out by employees of the entity at the direction of senior management or pursuant to a policy, explicit or implicit, of the employer. This said, it is the nature of large employers to break tasks into component parts spread over many employees in different parts of the employing entity. In some circumstances, an individual employee's role may be such that the employee lacks sufficient information about the overall course of action of the employer to know that their actions are part of an overall course of conduct by the employer that constitutes a crime or tort. For example, to retreat to an old school example, suppose that there is an employee who sits in front of a shredding machine all day and feeds paper into and clears paper jams, etc. whose job is to shred whatever documents are put in a bin next to his work station. This guy, who makes no decisions regarding what is to be shredded and has no real knowledge of why documents are being shredded, probably doesn't have criminal or civil liability if his labor is used to illegal destroy some documents. For all the shredder guy knows, he could simply be destroying redundant copies of documents to free up space in the filing cabinets while a single archival copy is retained. Typically, criminal laws require some level of mens rea (i.e. intent) which may be intent to do something in particular, it may be knowledge of certain facts, or what have you. An employee is generally only going to face criminal liability is the employee who carries out the wrongful act on behalf of the employer does so with the requisite knowledge and intent set forth in the criminal statute.
Termination is a matter of fact That is, it has either happened, or it hasn’t. Whether it has or hasn’t depends on a multitude of factors including the terms of the contract, the actions of the parties, and communication between them. These factors are so case specific that it is impossible to generalise. Further, within a given case, reasonable parties may differ on if a contract has been terminated, which party initiated the termination, and if that termination was lawful. Usually, these cases involve mutual allegations of repudiation by the other party and rightful termination in response by our side. These issues are likely to be the major ones that the court or tribunal will have to determine. A claim for damages would need to be pursued as part of the overall case but the deadline for raising them is a procedural matter for the court or tribunal. Failing to raise them as an issue in pre-litigation correspondence would not be a bar to raising them in a claim or counter-claim. However, failing to raise them at the earliest opportunity denies the offending party the opportunity to mitigate the damage and, if they can show that there were actions they could have reasonably taken to mitigate but couldn’t because they weren’t informed, then that may reduce or eliminate the damages payable.
What legal entity(s) would be best for startup funded by kickstarter or other investment? Assuming someone is going to start a business that is to design, build and manufacture a small electronic handheld device. They post campaigns on Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and other crowd-funding organizations. It's hopeful that these campaigns do good and a lot of start-up capital is raised. It is intended that the resultant entity producing these devices be a corporation or other LLC for liability purposes and not a sole-proprietorship. Would the time be right to form the LLC first, before starting the campaigns on the crowdfunding sites? Or would it be permissible for the entity to be formed IF and once the funding is available? For instance, if the campaign on Kickstarter raises 800 thousand dollars, can an LLC then be created, a bank account opened, and the funds deposited there? Or must the entity be created prior to the asking for startup funds? I know it's kind of a chicken-and-egg situation, but there isn't a lot of funds available yet for hiring attorneys and drawing up papers before the money is raised. Or should this be something for just forming a very quick LLC and then worrying about the right entity after the funds come in? I'm assuming it would NOT be a good idea to just accept the funding as a person (sole proprietorship). I live in Texas, but I assume that the business entity would or could be formed in Nevada or Delaware or anywhere there are more favorable conditions.
I'm assuming it would NOT be a good idea to just accept the funding as a person (sole proprietorship). Correct. Would the time be right to form the LLC first, before starting the campaigns on the crowdfunding sites? Or would it be permissible for the entity to be formed IF and once the funding is available? For instance, if the campaign on Kickstarter raises 800 thousand dollars, can an LLC then be created, a bank account opened, and the funds deposited there? Or must the entity be created prior to the asking for startup funds? An entity should be (really must be) formed before funds are raised. This is not a hugely expensive thing to do. For a lawyer drafted one, you are talking on the order of $500-$2000, plus some state filing fees which are modest. I know it's kind of a chicken-and-egg situation, but there isn't a lot of funds available yet for hiring attorneys and drawing up papers before the money is raised. Or should this be something for just forming a very quick LLC and then worrying about the right entity after the funds come in? If you can't afford the money necessary to hire a lawyer to form an entity without crowdfunding, you aren't ready to open a manufacturing company. You really shouldn't consider trying to start a project of this magnitude unless you have at least several tens of thousands of dollars of personal funds on hand prior to the crowdfunding effort. You should also have a detailed business plan in place with fact checked budget lines and reality checked revenues estimates before stating your campaign. If you plan to have patents, you need to at least begin the process of applying to protect them legally, with pre-campaign funds too. Realistically, most people at your stage do a small round of friends and family and personal savings fundraising and often also find an angel investor or two, before going to the general public in a crowdfunding effort. If you can't convince those people that your project is worth investing in, you are probably not ready to run a manufacturing company which will require you to successfully make many similarly difficult pitches to a variety of people. What legal entity(s) would be best for startup funded by kickstarter or other investment? At the state law level a C-corporation and an S-corporation are the same. The distinction is made with a separate tax filing with the IRS in S-corporations. Crowd funding is a term that is often ambiguous and can be used in a multitude of contexts. If it is more than a gift (i.e. in exchange for stock or bonds) there are also securities regulations exceptions that the offering must be tailored to. If the funds are donations for a charitable project, a non-profit corporation would usually be the right choice and 501(c)(3) status needs to be obtained in advance. If funds are raised in exchange for equity interests or non-U.S. citizens/permanent residents own some of the interests, a C corporation would usually be the only permitted choice. If the funds are raised in exchange for interest paying loans/bonds, or the funds are non-tax deductible gifts rather than investments, then financing isn't a concern for choice of entity, and either an LLC or an S-corporation is usually preferred (or perhaps a limited liability limited partnership in lieu of an LLC which has a different control structure). If funds are raised for an operating business with assets that are leased or tend to depreciate in value and has less than 75 owners, and has owners who are also senior employees of the company, an S corporation will usually be the best choice. If funds are raised for a business that will hold assets expected to appreciate in value, or has a financing or control structure more complex than equal shares of common stock plus bonds, an LLC will usually be preferred. Assuming someone is going to start a business that is to design, build and manufacture a small electronic handheld device. A C-corporation or S-corporation rather than an LLC or LLLP is probably preferred for a venture like this one, with the tax classification dependent upon the means of financing and the nature of the owners. Usually, you would use an S-corporation if possible, and a C-corporation if not. A two entity structure, with an LLC owning the IP (if any, other than a trademark for the products), and then licensing it to an S-corporation operating company, would also often make sense in this scenario. I live in Texas, but I assume that the business entity would or could be formed in Nevada or Delaware or anywhere there are more favorable conditions. Not really. A Texas entity would be just fine in this context. A Delaware entity has higher registration fees and legal fees to prepare one, and the advantages it provides for big businesses will often be disadvantages in the kind of entity you are considering. The benefits of Nevada and Alaska trusts are much greater than the benefits of Nevada and Alaska corporations or LLCs. Also, the Texas entity may be more suited to addressing Texas community property issues.
Publishing government records is pretty classic First Amendment-protected activity. Keeping in mind that one can find a lawyer to sue for anything, I think that person would likely be operating well within the law. One thing in particular that I'd recommend staying aware of is how one might attempt to monetize this endeavor. There have been a lot of sites publishing arrest records, court records, and mugshots, and then charging people to have them removed to keep them from popping up in a Google search for those people's names. That is -- rightly -- regarded as sketchy behavior; while several states have passed laws prohibiting that business model, I don't believe any such law exists in Washington State at this point.
I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.
If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected.
Given that you're centrally keeping customer financial assets, you're looking at a banking license. At that point, the question is not whether you need a lawyer, but how many. "Note that the issuer/bank would not itself offer currency exchange". Neither the Fed nor the ECB do, and quite a few smaller commercial banks also do not offer currency exchange. Doesn't matter, still banks. How many of the banking laws apply would depend on the customers, and services offered to these customers. So far you've only excluded currency exchange, which means that pretty much every banking law might still apply. You seem slightly hung up on the digital part. That's not how the law works. You'll need a banking license where you're operating your bank, not where its infrastructure is located. And yes, not meeting the requirements for registering a bank (whether financially, regulatory, or legally) will stop your idea in its tracks. This is one of the cases where "talk to a lawyer" might not be the appropriate response, but "hire a legal team".
No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.
A business must be incorporated for a legal purpose (reason), and that reason must be stated when the business is registered; but that purpose can be to be incorporated and exist as a business. It's common for businesses to be registered "for the purpose of conducting lawful business."
It may be illegal under product labelling regulations that apply to that kind of product (or under a general deceptive trade practices act), but even then, only if you are interpreting the numbers, whose meaning is not clearly spelled out, correctly. But, to be actionable as fraud it must, among other things, be a misrepresentation as to a material fact (which if the goods, such as cordless drills, are not perishable it probably isn't) and the recipient of the misrepresentation must have justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation (which is necessary not true in the case of a representation that it was made in December 2018 on a product sold no later than July of 2018). It is also not entirely clear that this is a "made on" date. It could refer, for example, to the the twelfth batch or lot or shipment of products made in 2018, and not to the month of December, or it could refer to a product made in 2018 at factory number 12. @NateEldredge in the comments also makes the plausible observation that it could be a week number which is a common system in manufacturing which would put it in a more reasonable March 2018 time frame. You probably shouldn't do anything, because you haven't been harmed by this cryptic string of numbers embossed on the product, and even if you were, your damages would not be worth the time or money involved to pursue it as anything other than part of a class action lawsuit.
Can one reasonably respond to a bogus employer demand letter without a lawyer? A strange situation has came to me recently. Me and my former employer have not parted on the best of terms, and a few months later, I have received a letter from an attorney representing my former employer, which demands payment for damages, and the listed reason is a complete non sequitur and feels bogus, for example done as spite to waste my time and/or money. Is there any resource for individuals to respond to this type of demand letter, before a lawyer is contacted, perhaps to request clarification, or must all interaction be through a lawyer after receiving the first letter? Location is USA
must all interaction be through a lawyer after receiving the first letter? Consistent with others' answer, no, you don't need a lawyer. But your question in and of itself is indicative of the steep learning curve you would need to undergo in order to avoid "shooting yourself in the foot", as the saying goes. By this I am not encouraging you to get a lawyer (in fact, here on stackexchange and elsewhere I promote litigation in pro per). Instead, I encourage people to learn about the applicable statutes, procedural laws, how to conduct legal research, and to draft/present their arguments in court. Here are some suggestions regarding your response letter: Avoid sarcastic admissions such as "Right, for sure I am at fault for the employer's [fill_in_the_blanks]". If you ask for a clarification, clearly state that you expect reasonably sufficient detail as well as any and all records that substantiate the alleged damages. Although that won't strictly limit the allegations the employer can make in court proceedings, the attorney's reply might help evidencing the employer's vexatious approach later on. Avoid wording that may be misinterpreted as consciousness of guilt. Be assertive and truthful. Keep in mind the lawyer is gauging (1) how easily he can intimidate you, and (2) whether he can make additional claims to harass you via court proceedings. From now on, all your interactions with the attorney and the employer should be in writing (preferably email, given its reproducibility). When unethical individuals are aware that their position is devoid of merit, they are very tempted to indulge in false accusations (of threat, for example). Thus, communications in writing constitute objectively verifiable proof of who is acting unlawfully. Even if the attorney premises on your contract (or employment agreement/manual, or company's guidelines) the alleged damages, the clauses at issue might be illegal and therefore void. For instance, from 2007-2012 my former employer (an Indian IT intermediary) prohibited me --via contract-- to disclose my salary. The contract contained the typical lawyered babbling, but that doesn't mean that all of it was legal. In 2013 I realized that the prohibition violated Michigan law, and he had no option but to strike the entire clause. That being said, I didn't sue him for that, but for other more important matters which are currently pending review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Absent any further context in your inquiry, it is hard to make additional suggestions on how to proceed.
The appropriate course of action would be to demand an evidentiary hearing, present evidence, and appeal the judge's ruling if it is contrary to the evidence in the record. Abandoning your attorney because the judge is sounding ominous would be foolish indeed. You can't do anything about the judge or about DSS.
Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings & proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints.
In general, "a signed piece of paper" is not "a contract". It may be a record of a contract, but the contract itself is the meeting of minds where an agreement is reached and doesn't depend on the existence of the piece of paper. (Depending on the jurisdiction, some sorts of contract are required to be in writing, but this doesn't usually apply to employment contracts; it's usually contracts involving land.) What is far more worrying to me is that you don't know how much they are going to pay you. That suggests there hasn't been a meeting of minds, and there is no contract. (It might be that "the going rate" is good enough to form a contract - to determine that would require advice from a local lawyer.) I suggest you don't write up a formal agreement, but nag your boss to decide how much they are actually going to pay you.
Certainly, "Tortious interference" comes to mind. While it's a difficult one to prove, there are typically 6 elements: The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties (possible problem here). Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. (or refuse to enter one). Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. (no right to do so via some other aspect of law). The contractual relationship is breached. (the normally-accessible-to-anyone transaction is prevented). Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs The only real "stretch" here is that Tortious Interference is written for cases where you already have an existing business relationship or contract in place. You're talking about a situation where a vendor normally proffers its service to any member of the public, and you'd argue there's an implied contract that they do business with any comer. In real estate particularly, it gets a lot more complicated because of Fair Housing laws. The apartment could get in big trouble being caught refusing to do business with someone, if the reason for the refusal was sourced in something related to race, creed, religion, sexual orientation and a bunch of other no-no's. Even if that's not your motive, if they (plural: victim and attorney) can convince a judge or jury that it is your motive, you and the apartment could owe them a lot of money. Fun fact: conspiracy to commit a Federal crime is a felony, even if the crime isn't. Regardless... I think if you are paying the vendor to snub the customer, courts would find that to be a perverse and unjustifiable behavior, and would see harm in that, especially if it was part of a pattern of behavior that constituted harassment. They would tend to assume the worst motives unless you could show other motives. I suspect they could even get a restraining order blocking you from interfering in their business relationships anywhere. You would also be subject to discovery, and would be compelled to disclose anywhere else you interfered, and pretty much anything they want to ask you. You can't refuse to answer ... unless ... your answer would incriminate you of a crime. But that's the kiss of death in a civil trial, because the jury hears that, and infers you are a crook. Game over lol.
Let's say that the mediation doesn't succeed to achieve voluntary compliance satisfactory to both sides. What happens next? Under Sec 706(e) it appears that the complainant has to litigate himself in a civil court, and potentially be exempt from any fees and have an appointed attorney. Not really. The EEOC at that point (within a certain time period) either decides to litigate the case itself, or if it chooses not to litigate itself, authorizes the employee to litigate the case at his or her own expense, and if the employee prevails, the remedy awarded by the Court includes what the court determines to be the employees reasonable attorneys' fees. The details of the process and the relevant deadlines are available at the EEOC's website. Basically, if the case isn't resolved in mediation, the employer makes a position statement, the employee responds, the EEOC investigates (using its subpoena power, if necessary) on average for ten months, and the EEOC either prosecutes the case itself, or it issues a "Notice-Of-Right-To-Sue" which allows the private employee to hire a lawyer and sue the employer. How often does it actually happen? The EEOC handles about 90,000 charges per year and wins about $525 million a year in judgments and settlement awards (parallel agencies at the state level handle additional cases in a similar manner). The vast majority of the cases are settled or result in a Notice of Right To Sue letter, with only 100 to 400 lawsuits per year actually filed by the agency resulting in $22 million to $168 million a year of awards in court cases. About 25% of these cases go to trial. The rest settle before trial or are resolved in motion practice before trial (including default judgments, when the employer simply doesn't respond to the lawsuit). Once the EEOC brings a lawsuit, settlement is the most common resolution. So, there are a lot of cases, although there is only about one EEOC claim per 1,000 employees in the workforce subject to EEOC jurisdiction per year. Whether this is a lot of complaints or not many, is really a matter of opinion. Only about one in twenty-five people will ever file an EEOC claim in his or her entire life, although this will vary considerably based upon a person's race, national origin, religion and sex. A non-Hispanic white Christian male of European descent is much less likely to file an EEOC claim during his lifetime than someone who does not fit that description. Realistically, a majority of cases that aren't abandoned by the employee in the administrative process (which is a significant share of the total) or found to have no factual basis (a small but significant percentage) are settled for fairly modest dollar amounts (an average of about $10,000 to $20,000 per claim). The bigger dollar cases for a single employee usually end up being brought in a private lawsuit rather than by the EEOC itself. About 14,000 of those charges each year result in a Notice of Right to Sue letter followed by a civil lawsuit filed by a lawyer for the employee. It isn't terribly easy to determine from official statistics what proportion of cases resulting in a Notice of Right to Sue letter rather than an EEOC lawsuit ultimately do not result in a lawsuit being filed by the employee. About 250 of these cases (not quite 2%) go to trial each year. The rest settled or are resolved in motion practice before trial (including default judgments, when the employer simply doesn't respond to the lawsuit). Once an employee brings a lawsuit, settlement is the most common resolution. Folk wisdom in the employment litigation field is that the average settlement of a case of ordinary strength on the merits that is settled fairly early on in the process is about six months of wages. An estimate that the employees in private lawsuits secured more than $200 million a year in settlements and money judgments is probably a gross underestimate. It could easily be $500 million to $1 billion per year. But, there are no good statistics available since settlement amounts are overwhelmingly confidential. The EEOC sues on behalf of the employee in cases it chooses to litigate itself on a weekly basis, and likewise declines to prosecute and certifies the case to allow the individual to prosecute the case with a private attorney all the time. Is there any relevant case law? Yes. Pretty much every relevant detail of the process has been litigated in case law that has produced reported decisions because there have been many thousands of employment discrimination cases litigated under the Act. There are probably at least two dozen to four dozen new published appellate decisions in the federal circuit courts each year on these kinds of cases, if not more, and those decisions have come at a pretty steady rate for the past half century. There are hundreds of published decisions interpreting these statutes in almost every one of the federal circuits. On quite a few issues, there are splits of authority between different circuits regarding how to interpret the law that will ultimately be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, or by Congress, or that may remain unresolved forever. How will the civil court try the case? Will the judge reference the Civil Rights Directly? It is a little unclear what you are asking here, but I will do my best. Regardless of whether the EEOC or the individual employee brings the case, it is filed as a Complaint in federal court like any other federal lawsuit, litigated according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and resolved in the vast majority of cases either by a judge in a pre-trial motion, by a settlement between the parties, or by a jury trial presided over by a judge. In a jury trial, the judge tells the jury what the applicable law says and the jury decides if the employee has proved a case against the employer when applying that law after hearing the evidence presented at trial and then decides what damages award to make, on a very short jury verdict form. In a bench trial (i.e before a judge without a jury), the judge makes those determinations in a lengthy written ruling setting forth the factual and legal basis for the judge's determination on the merits. Jury trials are much more common than bench trials in these kinds of cases, partially because plaintiffs want juries to make a damages determination, and partially out of a perception (not entirely inaccurate) that judges tend to be pro-employer on average. What is a likely punishment? Punishment is mostly the wrong term. It is a lawsuit for money damages to compensate the employee for harm actually suffered. The jury (or the judge if the case can be decided before trial in a motion for summary judgment or if a jury trial has been waived) determines the amount of compensation, if any, which should be awarded for lost wages, non-economic compensatory damages, etc. and the judge then awards attorneys' fees and court costs based upon the submissions of the parties after the trial is over based upon a determination of what is allowed by law and what is reasonable. To some extent, an employer's obligation to pay attorneys' fees and costs acts as a proportionate punishment for not immediately settling a case where the employer is found to be in the wrong. To some extent, non-economic damages can constitute a punishment. But, when an employer is found to have discriminated intentionally, which is most of the time, punitive damages can also be awarded, although they must be proportionate to the amount of actual compensatory damages awarded, typical one or two times the compensatory damage award unless that award is very small. Statutory liquidated damages are sometimes awarded in lieu of certain kinds of punitive and compensatory damages awards in age and sex discrimination cases under the Equal Pay Act. There are also dollar limits on awards based upon the size of the employer. Why is the process convoluted by adding an extra step in form of the commission? Mediation is allowed as a compromise to encourage negotiated resolutions that avoid litigation costs before everyone has spent a lot of money on lawyers. In practice, a surprisingly large number of cases result in pre-trial mediation resolutions, often in cases where an outcome if the case had gone forward to a trial would have been uncertain. The involvement of the Commission is a compromise between having a system where all cases are prosecuted at state expenses and one in which all cases are brought privately with an opportunity to win attorneys' fees if one prevails. The EEOC has usually used its authority to bring cases that are clearly cases of improper employer conduct where due to the small dollar amounts involved or the number of employees affected, an individual lawsuit would not provide an adequate remedy since private lawsuits would not be brought otherwise. It is very hard for a private attorney to justify bringing an employment discrimination lawsuit over a case where the damages are likely to be in the $5,000 to $25,000 range because the employee doesn't make much money unless liability is 100% clear (e.g. there is an admission on videotape from the employer), despite the fact that a prevailing party can get non-economic damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs. So, it is particularly hard to bring employment discrimination cases on behalf of employees who don't earn much even when they aren't discriminated against. The availability of EEOC enforcement prevents employers of low wage workers and workers in temporary employment whose damages are small from ignoring the Civil Rights laws with impunity. A private lawyer does something on the order of $30,000 to $150,000 of billable work to bring an employment discrimination case involving a single employee-client to trial, and a lawyer defending such a case for an employer will typically incur more legal fees for their employer client than the employee's lawyers do, while the employer's lawyer defends the case all of the way through a trial, even before considering any amounts actually awarded to a prevailing employee in a case where the employee wins. Each side's legal fees, individually, will usually exceed the amount of compensatory and punitive damages awarded combined in a fairly small dollar case for an employee who wasn't paid very much, or at least didn't lose a huge amount of money economically due to illegal discrimination (for example, because the employee wasn't promoted while a less qualified candidate was promoted). This is an important reason why lots of cases settle and why the EEOC is necessary. The EEOC process also provides a means by which arbitration agreements with individual employees can be circumvented because the EEOC is not a party to those agreements and is not bound by them. Why isn't discrimination simply prosecuted by the state's attorney? After all racial discrimination very much fits the definition of a public wrong. Government agency resources aren't unlimited, so the government can't prosecute every credible complaint, so the EEOC has to pick and choose how to get the most bang for its available resources. In practice, the EEOC can only afford to pursue about one in ten of the employment discrimination cases subject to its jurisdiction that go to trial with its own lawyers. The cases it can't afford to bring, it delegates to the private sector rather than simply leaving those cases unprosecuted as would happen in the criminal justice system. This also provides a way for an employee who has a lazy or unenthusiastic government lawyer assigned to their case at the EEOC who doesn't take what the employee sees as a strong case seriously a way to get relief for employment discrimination despite the fact that the EEOC isn't willing to back them up. Private lawsuits are a check and balance against bad EEOC decisions about how strong cases are as well as a way for the EEOC to avoid financing the legal fees of people who can afford to sue on their own. Is the enforcement any good? Lots of employees over the years have gotten lots of money, although probably not 100% of the amount of the economic harm they suffered (and, of course, employee and employer attorneys have gotten paid a lot of money in the process as well, which is good if you are a lawyer, but is dead weight loss from an economist's point of view). But, more importantly, the behavior of employers has changed greatly as a result. In practice, most lawsuits, and almost all lawsuits not brought by the EEOC itself, involve either wrongful termination or failure to promote someone, rather than discriminatory hiring, since it is hard to show an individual right to be hired for which an individual is entitled to compensation. Even in EEOC cases, most are brought for discriminatory advertising or openly admitted discrimination in hiring, rather than covert discrimination by an employer in hiring on a non-permitted basis. The EEOC brings a handful of cases alleging covert discrimination in hiring against medium or large employers each year, in part, just to provide a credible threat to anyone considering doing so, often with a combination of tips from insiders (particularly those from hiring officials who are fired in retaliation for not following a discriminatory hiring policy) and with undercover "test applicants" who submit functionally identical resumes for the same job when many job openings are available. But, this is usually a tiny share of the total volume of employment litigation brought under the Civil Rights Acts. There is a certain irony in this, because employers who are willing to hire someone who belongs to a "protected class" in the first place, who hence, are probably not the most discriminatory employers in the market, are more exposed to a realistic risk of a discrimination lawsuit, than employers who refuse to hire anyone in a "protected class" in the first place, so long as the employer keeps its mouth shut about this practice and is willing to lie and come up with false pretexts for its actions. Dishonest gross racists and clear misogynists are under punished, while less culpable employers who are more honest but still a little bit discriminatory in the cases of a few well paid employees are over punished relative to more culpable employers. Also, employment discrimination laws provide the most monetary compensation to the most competent and well paid employees who probably have the greatest capacity to mitigate their damages by seeking other employment from less discriminatory employers, while providing the least compensation to the marginal employees for whom discrimination in employment most impacts their quality of life. Indeed, often the most marginal employees aren't even willing to risk filing a complaint with the EEOC for fear of being blacklisted in the future in a manner that is impossible to prove. Still, at a minimum, by making it illegal to publicly state a discriminatory reason or to state a discriminatory reason to someone who could testify against you in court, the laws in question have changed the internal normative standards that managers of medium and large sized business apply on a day to day business such that at least lip service and public commitment is given to the requirements of the civil rights laws. This change in corporate culture has probably had more of a real world effect than actual suits for damages have in regard to discrimination in hiring. The benefits of the voluntarily discontinuation of discrimination in employment as employers internalized the norms established by the civil rights laws for the most part has provided far more benefit to employees who were previously discriminated against than litigation and settlements resulting from the EEOC process. For example, when Sandra Day O'Connor (future Supreme Court justice) was a young lawyer, fewer than 5% of attorneys were women and she was often mistaken for a secretary or receptionist by clients. Now, about half of all young associate lawyers (even at very large firms who graduated from very prestigious law schools) are women. Almost all of this change was due to a change in professional norms that were a direct result of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (women had legally been allowed to be lawyers since the 1920s almost everywhere and earlier in some places), rather than through case by case litigation. The Civil Right Act opened up a huge new lucrative profession to women and minorities, and the experience of the legal profession was the norm and not the exception. Before the act, women were pretty much limited to school teaching, being librarians, nursing, secretary work, food service, day care, piece work sewing and laundry work. After the Civil Rights Act, their employment opportunities dramatically increased. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is likewise, more or less single handedly, responsible for today's black middle class which would have been an order of magnitude smaller otherwise. There are economic arguments that discrimination laws do or do not do much good, but those arguments rarely consider the fact that the law, when it was first enacted, dramatically changed corporate culture and the moral viewpoints and norms of the middle and upper middle class who act as employers making hiring decisions across the nation. Until the Civil Rights Act was enacted, tradition and prejudice kept a huge share of the population out of most of the marketplace in a manner completely contrary to what a naive Economics 101 analysis would predict.
What's the use of contracts if you can't take a contract violator to court? A clear, thoughtful contract can be a deterrent to misconduct, and Australia is one of many jurisdictions where pro se litigation is allowed. Self-represented litigants certainly have to undergo a steep learning curve and are expected to comply with a code of conduct, procedural law, and so forth, but my point is that hiring a lawyer is not compulsory. Even if for some reason the defrauded party declines to sue the tortfeasor (thereby forfeiting the recovery of the losses), there is a societal obligation to alert others about the tortfeasor's misconduct. Making the contract available to others facilitates alerting them on objective grounds so they don't become the tortfeasor's next victim, and it simultaneously helps for setting the record straight that the damages/losses were not one's own fault. Without a contract, it would be more difficult for others get a sense of whether misconduct occurred at all. Or worst, halfway down the line, you don't have any money left to pay your lawyers, and they leave the case. Hence the importance to litigate in pro per from the start. It is easy for a person retaining a lawyer to postpone (be it due to family obligations, workload, and so forth) his learning of the law. But that postponement only makes the client more vulnerable to his lawyer's subsequent withdrawal when court proceedings are midway: the client would have the dilemma of either finding another lawyer to resume the case --predictably at a higher cost--, or cram the learning curve in trying to keep up with the proceedings.
I believe that you have misinterpreted the case, not least because the Hudgins v I.R.S case involves this only peripherally. The original case Diviaio v Kelly was dealing with a request for the number of photographs taken of the plaintiff and if these had been disseminated outside the CIA. This is in no way shape or form a request for records (the records were found to be legitimately exempt). I see no problem in your FOI request. In fact, I can foresee the response: These, http://www.maine.gov/legis/ros/meconlaw.htm, are the laws we use to justify these actions. In a common law jurisdiction, a person (including the government) does not have to prove they are abiding by the law. The onus is on you to prove they aren't; they do not have to help you make your case.
GDPR - am I a data controller as an app owner if I do not have access to the data? Let's assume that I created a mobile app for iPhone that is tracking rides on a bike so that means the app is collecting GPS coordinates of the phone and later this mobile app shows some statistics about that. Also let's assume that the application keeps this gps data locally on the mobile phone only. So the app is processing that data in the way I programmed it but I as a person do not have access to that data. I assume in such case I am not the data controller according to GDPR because I do not have access to that data is that correct? What if additionally to that I will program my app for example in such way that it will sometimes send current GPS coordinate to an online service controlled by external company such as Apple in order to transform GPS coordinate to a name of a street and city so that app can display street/city name to the user (reverse geocoding service). But still my app would send this data directly to Apple server so I will still not have any access to that data. Does this change anything and does GDPR now apply to me? Am I becoming data controller in such case if I have no idea when the app sends that GPS coordinate data to Apple and I do not know what coordinates it sends? I also do not know if Apple save this request on their servers or if they just automatically convert received gps coordinates to a name and return the answer without saving the request. I guess probably they do not save it but I can't be sure as I have no access to Apple service code. Or perhaps Apple is the data controller in such case or nobody is the data controller and GDPR does not apply at all?
Let's assume that I created a mobile app for iPhone that is tracking rides on a bike [...] So the app is processing that data in the way I programmed it but I as a person do not have access to that data. I assume in such case I am not the data controller according to GDPR because I do not have access to that data is that correct? Yes, as far as I can see that is correct. The GDPR defines a data controller as someone who "determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data" - you just provide a tool, you don't control for what purposes your customers use their ride data. This is also discussed in this question: How does the GDPR apply to software developed by one company and used by another? What if additionally to that I will program my app for example in such way that it will sometimes send current GPS coordinate to an online service controlled by external company such as Apple [...] But still my app would send this data directly to Apple server so I will still not have any access to that data. Does this change anything and does GDPR now apply to me? Yes, and yes. In that case, you are telling Apple to process data for you, so you would become the data controller (because you "determine[s] the purposes and means of the processing of personal data"), and Apple is a data processor for you. That means also the usual mechanisms kick in - you need to inform your users about this processing, you need to make sure Apple plays by the rules, etc. etc. I also do not know if Apple save this request on their servers or if they just automatically convert received gps coordinates to a name and return the answer without saving the request. This is exactly the kind of situation the GDPR is meant to address. Under GDPR, saying "I do not know what X does with the data" is not an option. This is something many companies tried in the past, that is why GDPR explicitly assigns responsibility to the data controller (i.e., you). As explained in a EU document, What is a data controller or a data processor?: The duties of the processor towards the controller must be specified in a contract or another legal act. For example, the contract must indicate what happens to the personal data once the contract is terminated. A typical activity of processors is offering IT solutions, including cloud storage. [...] So, no, you cannot just say "I do not know if Apple saves this request". Instead, you must make a contract with Apple which says whether (and how, and for how long...) they save the request, and you must inform your users about this in your privacy policy. And if Apple refuse to make such a contract with you, you must find a different company to work with.
It is not different. But one company can decide to approach compliance differently from another. Here, TomTom has chosen a fairly safe/conservative interpretation, whereas Google and Apple decided that more data collection is appropriate. A “find my device” style functionality appears to be entirely unproblematic if the user books that particular service (regardless of whether the service is paid or gratis) and provides consent for the location data collection. The legal basis for such a service could then be Art 6(1)(a) consent or Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract to which the data subject is party. Personally, I believe that Google is not sufficiently transparent about how Find My Device works, but that TomTom could provide a compliant service if they wanted to. That TomTom doesn't offer this service primarily shows that they don't think developing this service is worth it. Wiping a remote device is unrelated to this issue and doesn't seem to provide GDPR challenges. At least in a business context, remote wiping may be an appropriate security measure and may then even be mandated by the GDPR (e.g. see Art 24 or Art 32).
If the GDPR applies, then the e-privacy directive (EPD) (formally Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002) almost surely also applies. However, this being a directive rather than a regulation, the implement6ing laws may vary in different countries. The relevant provision is Article 5 paragraph (3) which reads: Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to store information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia [among others] about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to refuse such processing by the data controller. This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user. This governs cookies and any other local data, that is, data stored on or read from the user's equipment. What this means is: A site operator must disclose, in detail, what cookies or other local data the site stores on or reads from the user's device. Even strictly required data (cookies) must be disclosed. A site may not store or read any local data until after consent has been obtained. The user must have the option to consent to or refuse consent to individual data items separately. Giving consent may not be a condition of permission to use the site. Consent must be opt-in, not opt-out, that is the default must be "No consent". Local data (including cookies) that is "strictly necessary" for the operation of the site is exempt from the requirement of consent, but not from the requirement of disclosure, and that means specific disclosure. It must be at least as easy to cancel consent later as it was to give consent initially. Do my Stripe cookies count as essential cookies? If the Stripe cookies count as essential, is it legal to provide no option to turn them off? Have I met my legal requirements in terms of disclosure? The terms and conditions and privacy policy were generated by Termly. I don't know stripe well enough to be sure, but they might. What do they do that is essential for operating the site? Yes. No, not if the disclosures in the question are the only ones you make. As I understand it, you must provide at least a link to a page that shows each specific cookie that you read or set, and what data is stored in that cookie, even for strictly required cookies. Update: I should mention t6hat although the above describes my understanding of the current legal requirements, I have read that enforcement of those requirements does not seem to be a priority for the relevant authorities at this time. Other aspects of data protection, such as proper security to avoid data breaches, and having a proper legal basis for processing, and other GDPR requirements, as opposed to e-Privacy requirements, seem to get more attention and resources from the relevant authorities. Having read the comment by the OP, it does seem that at least some of the stripe cookies are strictly required and need not have consent. The stripe cookie policy linked to is better than many sites currently offer. It does not go into fully specific detail, but it may be that the dashboard does, and that together the two are fully compliant. Linking to this policy (and if possible directly to the stripe cookie dashboard) would seem to me to cover most of the issues here.
The law of each country where you offer the app for download applies, and you have to consider: Privacy Policy (GDPR in EU, CCPA in California, APPI in Japan, LGPD in Brasil, and more - check each country to be on the safe side) Disclaimer versus AGB/Terms and Conditions (e.g. Germany), not required but recommended Impressum (Germany, Switzerland, Austria) Value Added Tax (VAT) which is taken care of e.g. by Google Play for most countries but not all (e.g. not for Japan) in case the app is not free Consumer Protection Law - applicable (and different) everywhere There might be more, but these are the important ones I am aware of.
You are responsible for any processing of data that happens under your control – but are you the data controller in this scenario? Since you have no meaningful influence over whether or not this backup happens on the operating system level, there could be a strong argument that you aren't a data controller for these backups. And if you aren't a data controller for that processing activity, you aren't responsible for compliance. However, if you were to integrate directly with relevant Google APIs in order to facilitate backups that could make you a controller. Then, Google would either have to be your data processor (won't be the case here), or you would need a legal basis for sharing the user's data with Google. For example, you could ask for the user's consent before activating such features.
In the question, you write: The GDPR requires consent of the subject for collection or storage of personal data (in this case, IP addresses in a log file). No, it does not. To quote Miss Infogeek: GDPR DOES NOT MAKE CONSENT A MANDATORY REQUIREMENT FOR ALL PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA. Consent (Article 6 (1)a) is indeed one of conditions that can be used to comply with the GDPR requirement that processing must be lawful, but it is not the only condition available to the controller to ensure lawful processing – there are alternatives (before the list of conditions it says that "at least one of the following" must be satisfied). All the conditions for lawfulness of processing are spelled out in Article 6 of the GDPR. One of alternatives are Article 6 (1)f. It says says it is legal to process personal data if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (my emphasis) As noted in the question, logging IP addresses for the purpose of security is an extremely widespread practice. It is a legitimate interest to comply with standard security practices. It is the default, and most (all?) web-sites do this. I.e. it is legal to do this without consent (if this is not the case, I am pretty sure the outcry had been heard all over the Internet by now).
Not Allowed Under the GDPR The suggested method does not seem to comply with the GDPR, and would not be lawful for a Data Controller that is subject to the GDPR. Specific Provisions Let's consider some specific provisions of the GDPR: Article 4 Article 4 paragraph (11) states: "consent" of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her; If the choice is "obscure" then it is not clear, and legal consent has not been given. Article 7 Article 7 paragraph 3 reads: The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent. It does not appear in the situation described that the data subject has been clearly informed that consent is being given. Recital 42 Recital 42 reads in relevant part: In accordance with Council Directive 93/13/EEC a declaration of consent pre-formulated by the controller should be provided in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language and it should not contain unfair terms. ... Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment. The specified means do not seem to comply with R42 Recital 32 Recital 32 reads: Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement. This could include ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. ... If the data subject’s consent is to be given following a request by electronic means, the request must be clear, concise and not unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided. The format in the question seems to rely on inactivity as a way of giving consent, and is surely not clear.
In short, no. Article 20 of the GDPR covers the “Right to data portability”, which essentially says two main things: The data subject had the right to an exported copy of their personal data in a common format And The data subject has the right to have this data transmitted directly from one controller to another where technically feasible. Neither of these rights as stated in the GDPR require the data controller to provide a button to initiate either a data export or a transfer to another controller.
Can the federal government tell San Francisco that they cannot allow non-citizen immigrants to vote San Francisco passed a law allowing non-citizens to vote in school board elections. Representative Jeff Duncan introduced a bill that would strip all federal funds from any locality that allows non-citizens to vote. From his webpage, The Eliminating Foreign Intervention in Elections Act has two key components: Empowers the U.S. Census Bureau to collect and publish information on which States or localities have noncitizen voting policies in place. Defunds localities that allow noncitizens to vote in elections for State or local office. Is this constitutionally allowed? My research The constitution has several prohibitions against denying certain people the right to vote. For example the fifteenth amendment "prohibits the federal and state governments from denying a citizen the right to vote based on that citizen's 'race, color, or previous condition of servitude'." wiki However I can't find any positive statements of who gets the right to vote, or any mention of who decides that. I assume that because the tenth amendment gives the powers not delegated to the federal government to the states or the people, that this is up to the states to decide. Technically, Duncan's bill doesn't actually prohibit San Francisco from making this law, it just imposes very coercive penalties for doing so. The case of South Dakota v. Dole lays out five criteria for considering if withdrawal of federal funds is unconstitutionally coercive. The last criteria is "The condition must not be coercive." The debate around this fifth criteria seems to center on how much money is being withdrawn. This question might hinge on whether San Francisco gets enough money to count as "irresistable pressure." I have a somewhat tenuous chain of logic laid out here. Any one of the links could be flat out wrong, or I could be just completely missing the point.
In National Federation Of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the court addressed the matter of withholding funding, with respect to obligatory expansion of Medicaid, where ACA required states to expand Medicaid coverage, or lose all federal Medicaid funds. The effect, as described in the ruling was "[t]he threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget", which constitutes "economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion", and "The Medicaid expansion thus violates the Constitution by threatening States with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding if they decline to comply with the expansion". A law which withholds more than Medicaid funding would therefore clearly be at least as coercive as ACA. It is some interest that the ACA ruling put specific comparative numbers on the effect of the highway funding law underlying SD v. Dole, which they decided was "less than a half a percent" of the state budget. In contrast, in the case of Medicaid funding, their estimate was that Medicaid costs are about 20% of a state's budget, and the federal government pays 50%-80% of that. That means, picking low numbers, the effect of withholding Medicaid funding would be about 10% of a state's budget. The line between persuasion and coercion then seems to lie between .5% and 10%. The presumably introduced bill is here, for reference. The core paragraph is (a) None of the funds made available in any Act may be used to make payments to any unit of local government that permits individuals who are not citizens of the United States to vote in elections for State or local office. However, the introductory clause identifies the purpose as being To prohibit Federal payments to a unit of local government that allows individuals who are not citizens of the United States to vote in elections for State or local office, and for other purposes. The substantial difference is that propositions are not offices: the bill introduces ambiguity in legislative intent (the words of the statute say one thing, the potentially enforceable sections introduced into US Code say something else). The bill does not define "unit of local government", so we could search for existing definitions of that term. 31 USC 6701: primarily "a county, township, city, or political subdivision of a county, township, or city, that is a unit of general local government as determined by the Secretary of Commerce for general statistical purposes" (I don't think school, fire, hospital and water districts count). Alternatively 42 USC 12746: a city, town, township, county, parish, village, or other general purpose political subdivision of a State; the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau, the Marshall Islands, or a general purpose political subdivision thereof; a consortium of such political subdivisions recognized by the Secretary [HUD] in accordance with section 12746(2) of this title; and any agency or instrumentality thereof that is established pursuant to legislation and designated by the chief executive to act on behalf of the jurisdiction with regard to provisions of this Act. To get the desired effect, the sponsor wants the definition in 2 CFR 200.64, which includes school districts (and that chunk is about federal grants, thus apt for the bill). The statutory authority for this interpretation is 31 USC 503.
The 14th amendment guarantees equal protection under the law for all citizens of the US. It's my understanding that this means from the Federal Government, and doesn't exactly apply when it's a "states' rights" kind of issue. Your understanding is incorrect. The primary original purpose of the 14th amendment was to prevent states from passing laws that treated former slaves differently from other citizens, and indeed to clearly declare that they were in fact citizens, thus reversing the decision in Dred Scot v Sandford 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). That decision held that black people could not be US citizens and had no rights granted to citizens under the US Federal Constitution. Of course the amendment is applied in a much wider scope than merely granting citizenship to the former slaves freed by the 13th amendment. The Equal Protection Clause** generally requires that laws not make arbitrary and unjustified distinctions between people, nor treat different people in the same legal situation differently. The clause does not, however, prevent laws from treating who are in some significant legal sense in different positions differently. What is and is not a violation of the clause has been the subject of many legal cases and much debate. The clause requires "state action" to be invoked. and is generally only applies to state and local governments, and those in their employ or acting on their behalf. However, the US Supreme Court held in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) that the 5th amendment imposes a similar requirement of equal protection on the Federal government. The amendment, and the equal protection clause, do not guarantee any particular outcome in judicial cases. It is not clear from the question what equal protection issue, if any, might be at issue in the particular matter described. If the issue is one of treatment under the laws of a country other than the US, even though the people involved are US citizens, the US constitution, including the amendment will not apply.
The only way that a member of the House of Representatives, or a U.S. Senator can be removed from office (other than by resignation, death, or expiration of a term of office without being re-elected) is by a two-thirds vote of the chamber removing that member. The relevant provision of the United States Constitution is Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 which states: Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member. So, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives may be removed by a two-thirds vote of the U.S. House, and a U.S. Senator may be removed by a two-thirds vote of the U.S. Senate. This has been done five times since 1789 in the U.S. House, most recently in 2002. It has been done fifteen times since 1789 in the U.S. Senate (the most recent 14 times in 1861 and 1862 in connection with the U.S. Civil War). The case of William Blount in 1797 established the precedent that expulsion of a member by a chamber, rather than impeachment, is the proper process to remove a member of Congress. Members of Congress may not be recalled, and are not automatically removed from office upon conviction of a crime. Apart from the expulsion process, there is no way for voters or states to remove U.S. Senators not from their own state, something that doesn't make sense to be possible in the overall context of the structure of the United States government under the U.S. Constitution. Senate Rule XXIII in part provides that ``if the impeachment shall not, upon any of the articles presented, be sustained by the votes of two-thirds of the members present, a judgment of acquittal shall be entered;'' A quorum of the full Senate and not just those sworn in for the trial is required. The Senate rules in the case of an expulsion of a member are analogous.
Yes and No. The Federal U.S. Government as well as each individual state and territory claim Soverign Immunity to a limited degree. In the case of Federal Government, they claim Soverign Immunity to a near limitless degree (more on this in a moment), while States and Territories claim "State Soverign Immunity" which grants them immunity with respect to all soverign powers granted under the U.S. Constitution. To clarify, each U.S. State is seperately soverign in all matters not explicitly allocated to the Federal Government by the U.S. Constitution and all constitutionally written laws. Where the Constitution does not in writing claim a power for the federal government nor reserver a power for the state government, the power is assumed to be state government. So a State can claim immunity for a police situation but not a law it makes regarding immigration or foriegn policy, since that is the exclusive wheelhouse of the Feds. Per the 11th amendment, states can only be sued in state court by citizens of the state, while non-state citizens wishing to sue a state must sue in the Federal Court (Which for the purposes of the trial may adopt the defendant State's laws and regulations for the purposes of questions of fact and law brought up in the suit). All U.S. States and the Federal Goverment additionally wave Soverign Immunity under specific conditions outlined in laws. In the case of the Federal Government, the laws governing when this immunity is waived are governed by the Federal Torts Claims Act (1946) and the Tucker Act (1887). The FTCA covers intentional torts by the Federal Government, while the Tucker Act typically covers matters related to contractual obligations or monitary interactions with the federal government. Things that may be sued for include but are not limited too: Intentional Torts committed by Government Agents in their Official Capacity (i.e. When the FBI violates your rights or maliciously investigates you). Contractual disputes where the Government is a party to the Contract, either in written or implied terms. Constitutional Claims (i.e. The Government may have violated the Constitution. These tend to be for non-monitary relief such as mandemuses, though the 5th Amendment's Taking Clause can be invoked of the government took property and does not justly compensate.). Individual Agencies of the Government when the monitary claim is not drawn from the U.S. Treasury (the agencies own allocated budget is used to pay). Refund for taxes paid In all cases, a Judge will determin if the Government, under the laws, can be sued. If in the example of a government employee being sued, the Justice Department will first make a determination if the employee was acting as an agent of the government when they committed the tortious act, and then will declare themselves Respondent Superior through the agency of employement. From there, the case becomes a suit against the Federal Government and FTCA immunity waiver is determined by a Judge. For example, lets say you (Mr. Rapt) sue Special Agent Jimmy Jones of an intentional tort that he committed in the course of his duty as an FBI agent. The DOJ will first declare that they are Respondent Superior in the case of Rapt v. Jones, thus turning the case to Rapt v. United States Government, Department of Justice, Federal Beura of Investigations, and Jones (Rapt v. United States, et. al.). From here, the Judge who gets the case then determins if the U.S. Government under FTCA can be sued by Rapt, based on Rapt's citizenship status (usually permanent legal residents are covered as citizens for this point, but I can say for certain in this particular law), ripeness (the suit must be filed within 2 years of the incident or first knowledge), and immunity waiver under FTCA. In the case of the State Government, they should have similar laws, but I'm not going to identify all 50 individual laws here. Additionally, the 11th Amendment permits U.S. Congress to waive a State's immunity to suit in certain cases (mostly comes up with the Due Process Clause in the 14th Amendment.). As a fun point, in all cases where a government appears as a defendant in a suit, it is automatically a Bench Trial, as the government usually include a waiver of their right as defendant to a jury trial. The thinking here is that, as a country that was founded by rebelling against the government, a jury of 12 of the government's citizens aren't going to give them any slack at trial, where as a judge (who they pay) is much more likely. TL;DR: Both questions are yes. The immunity is waived under federal law for certain cases, but it is a judge who will make the ruling if the specific case meets the aformentioned waived immunity.
Is there any legal precedent for suing a city to amend or terminate an agreement due to fiscal nonfeasance? There is not really any legal precedent for prevailing in such a lawsuit. Obviously, of course, the detailed facts and circumstances matter. If a state statute prescribed other terms, for example, and expressly gives someone standing to enforce the statute, then that is another matter. In many states, standing to enforce violations of municipal laws governing their finances and contracts is vested by statute or the state constitution in the state attorney general. Is there any legal recourse for a resident who believes their city is committing financial nonfeasance? Probably not. Certainly not in court. Usually, individual citizens or taxpayers do not have standing to bring suit related to acts which affect all citizens or taxpayers equally or proportionately, but do not constitute an individualized injury to the particular taxpayer. Municipal governments have broad discretion to enter into contracts with other municipalities on rates that they deem fit which do not have to approximate cost or be profit maximizing. Some states and cities allow citizens to petition to have legislation that has been adopted (agreements are generally adopted by city ordinance) to be placed on the ballot for a vote if a sufficient number of people vote on it within a sufficient time of the ordinance or law being passed (this is called a "referendum power"). But, most do not. Otherwise, your sole recourse is to get a majority elected to city council and a new mayor, to change the policy when the agreement expires. wouldn't the city have to prove that there IS a benefit to the city? No. Assuming for sake of argument that someone suing the city had standing to sue, the burden of proof is always on the person bringing the lawsuit. Ordinances are presumed valid unless this is disproven beyond a reasonable doubt. For example: It is an axiom of our judicial system that legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional. Parties attacking their validity carry a heavy burden of proof: invalidity must be established clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt People v. Beaver, 549 P.2d 1315, 1316 (Colo. 1976) The constitutional test in the face of an equal protection challenge (assuming for sake of argument that there was standing) would be a "rational basis test" and there would be a rational basis for (1) saying that the city benefit from its neighbor not having adequate fire protection which could spread to them, (2) on the basis that the marginal cost might be low, and (3) on the basis that the municipality probably has a legal duty to aid a neighboring municipality if it has the ability to do so in the absence of an agreement without necessarily having a right to compensation under a doctrine called mutual aid when the proper conditions are met (sometimes formalized by agreements and/or governed by state statutes such as the Tennessee's Mutual Aid and Emergency and Disaster Assistance Agreement Act of 2004, Tennessee Code Annotated § 58–8–101, et seq.,). The rational basis test is met if you can describe some rational reason why the law might make sense for the city to pass (which is not expressly prohibited by law or a constitutional right), even if the rational reason is not empirically correct, and even if the rational reason wasn't the actual reason for passing the law. This ordinance would almost certainly pass the rational basis test. In general, a disagreement over the price term of an agreement being too high or too low almost always fails. A municipality is not obligated to negotiate a "fair market value" or "fair" price for services that it provides to other municipalities.
Generally, the legislature is not restricted to passing laws that are a good idea. This has been remarked on by the Supreme Court (in Justice Stevens's concurrence, emphasis added): But as I recall my esteemed former colleague, Thurgood Marshall, remarking on numerous occasions: “The Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid laws.” There are some limits: for one thing, the law must pass the rational basis test, which, while extremely favorable to the legislature (Congress could probably ban coffee consumption, for instance), does impose some limits and might result in at least some of your examples being struck down—I cannot imagine a court finding that the government had a rational basis for taxing everyone 120% of their income, for example. However, the states do have a recourse in many cases, especially if Congress were to reduce the penalties for crimes: most "common" crimes (assault, battery, murder, theft, etc.) are state crimes, so Congress wouldn't have the power to change the penalties for those. Most cases where these things become federal crimes involve conduct affecting multiple states, and the person committing the crime would likely also commit at least one state crime. States also aren't required to assist the federal government in its enforcement of federal law. For instance, quite a number of states believe that the federal prohibition of marijuana is unjust, and won't enforce those laws within their boundaries.
For the US, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act provides that just about any US citizen living abroad who has previously resided within the US is entitled to vote in federal elections as though they still lived at their last US address, provided they'd be eligible to vote if they still lived at that address. If you're overseas on duty in a uniformed service of the United States or as a spouse or dependent of such a person, it's based on your legal residence instead. This is a right of US citizenship; dual citizenship doesn't affect it. This State Department website has details; there's a special process you can generally use instead of the state absentee process. UOCAVA applies to all federal elections (including primaries); state and local election eligibility is up to the state. For Canada, citizens of Canada living there seem to have the right to vote regardless of any possible loyalty issues with another country. Canadians living outside Canada for over five years can't vote, but if you live there it seems as though it is allowed. So, the answer is seemingly "yes." For a definitive answer, contact the US consulate and Canadian election officials.
The law is not settled and will shortly be before the High Court (sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns) but theoretically: yes! The provision on Disqualification is s44, specifically subsection (i): Any person who: (i) is under any acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience, or adherence to a foreign power, or is a subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power, shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator or a member of the House of Representatives. Which, on the face of it, makes eligibility to sit in the Australian parliament dependent on the citizenship laws of every other country in the world: all 195 of them. Indeed, right now, any citizen of Australia (which is itself a qualification by virtue of s16 or s34), is allowed to live and work in New Zealand, and to vote after a year's residence - that is they are "entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject [but not a citizen] of a foreign power". Therefore, interpreted that way, no Australian is entitled to sit in parliament. Of course, a simple referendum1 could change the Constitution to fix that - except, a referendum must be called by parliament and we no longer have one. Personally, I think it is unlikely2 that the High Court will rule in such a way that would plunge the nation into a constitutional crises by deciding no one can sit in parliament or that who can sit is determined by the laws of foreign nations. Notwithstanding, at present there are 5 MPs who have been referred to the High Court (2 of whom have already resigned), 2 more who will be referred when parliament resumes in September, 21 known to have been born overseas who have not confirmed that they have renounced any foreign citizenship they might have and an unknown number who may have foreign citizenship by descent. Each of the cases is distinct: some were born overseas, some have foreign citizenship by descent, one is a 3rd generation Australian whose mother registered him as an Italian citizen when he was a child (17) and he claims he never knew. How the High Court will rule will almost certainly vary with the particular circumstances but its anyone's guess what they will decide. However, it appears that the drafters of the constitution intended that it should capture all dual-citizens, not just those who sought dual-citizenship by a deliberative act. If a person is found to be ineligible then different things happen depending on if they ware a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives. For a Senator, the High Court would recount the results of the election - because of the strange way voting works for the Senate, only educated guesses can be made about who would replace whom (especially since the same citizen issue may apply to other candidates on the ticket). For a Member of the House of Representatives, a by-election would be held - because the Liberal/National government has a majority of 1 and 3 of their members are in the gun the results will be ... interesting. 1 Referenda in Australia are not simple. The Australian Constitution is specifically designed to be difficult to change while at the same time granting broad powers to parliament. It takes a nationwide vote and must be carried by a majority of voters nationwide and a majority in a majority of the six states (i.e. 4 or more). Since federation in 1901 there have been 44 referenda of which only 8 have been carried. In is generally accepted that a referendum is impossible to pass unless it has bi-partisan support: and sometimes not even then. 2 And by "unlikely" I mean "impossible" - a conclusion that the constitution must be read in such a way that parliamentary democracy becomes impossible would be contrary to law. Update in light of the High Court’s ruling: No Providing a potential parliamentarian has taken “all reasonable steps” to renounce foreign allegiance they are permitted to serve even if the foreign power refuses to allow them to renounce citizenship. In practice, this means writing to the foreign embassy and renouncing citizenship.
Witnessing a theft in France When I witness a theft, for example, a pickpocket in a busy RER, am I bound by law to report the theft? Am I required/protected by law to defend the victim/intervene in the act?
Under Article 223-6 of the Criminal Code Anyone who, being able to prevent by immediate action a felony or a misdemeanour against the bodily integrity of a person, without risk to himself or to third parties, wilfully abstains from doing so, is punished by five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000. The same penalties apply to anyone who wilfully fails to offer assistance to a person in danger which he could himself provide without risk to himself or to third parties, or by initiating rescue operations. Pocket-picking is a special case of theft that violates "bodily integrity"; so this article does seem to create a conditional legal duty to intervene. There does not appear to be a specific law creating a duty to report crimes to the police, but that might be implied by the duty to initiate rescue operations.
The law 'doesn't care' how the call is recorded. What matters is whether or not you should inform / should have informed the participant(s) in the circumstances. In circumstances where you are acting as an ordinary member of the public, in the course of a purely personal or household activity, not in a journalistic capacity, regulated business or other circumstances where the rules may differ: In the UK it is not unlawful for a private person to record a phone call without the permission or foreknowledge of the other participant(s) - provided the recording is for 'personal use'. If you intend to share the content of the call with a third-party or make it public, then you must inform the person ahead of recording it. If you try to use a covertly recorded call as evidence in court, the court may or may not exclude it depending on the circumstances.
Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.
The law says don't drive an unsafe vehicle on the road. You disobeyed the law. There were methods of having your tyres fixed without driving on the road (e.g. taking the tyres to the mechanic in a different vehicle, calling a mobile mechanic etc.) so you have no defence of necessity. In all likelihood you will be convicted and penalised. You need legal advice. Whether it's fair or not is a philosophical consideration, not a legal one.
If you wrote for example "I had thoughts about taking the axe from my garage and decapitating my neighbour", and your neighbour read that, he would reasonably be worried and contact the police. I would take that as a death threat, and the death threat is by itself illegal. There would be some range where I could claim that you were making a death threat and making excuses to avoid legal responsibility. You can have all the thoughs you like, you can write them into your private diary where nobody can read them, but as soon as you publish it, it becomes "speech" and some speech is illegal.
The obligation to notify the supervisory authority (CNIL in your case) no longer exists. It was part of the previous regulatory framework, but it is not part of GDPR (which takes affect tomorrow). If you use CCTV that may monitor employees (i.e. they sometimes enter the HQ to consult with the owner), your obligations under the GDPR is basically to inform the employees that the CCTV cameras are there. I.e. Data subjects are entitled to understand when their personal data is being processed, covering the transparency aspect of processing. The use of CCTV must be communicated via signage which indicates the areas covered and instructions for further information.
There is no law against a person creating and distributing such a poster, to the best of my knowledge. However such a poster pretty clearly implies that the person shown is guilty of a crime, or at least strongly suspected. If the store somehow made an error, pulling the image of a person who did not use the stolen card or there is some other error, the person pictured might well suffer a significant loss of reputation, and might sue for defamation. Damages could possibly be significant. Such suits have, I believe, happened when surveillance photos were posted but there later proved to have been an error. Mary might wish to double check how sure the store is that the photos are of the person who actually used the stolen card.
Anyone has a right to report illegal activities that it is aware of to the authorities. This is in fact where 99.9% of police investigations start. In addition, students of a school (or, more generally, members of any organisation) are eligible to be investigated/disciplined by the school in accordance with the rules of the school providing that the investigation and punishment are in accordance with the law. This would normally permit (require?) notification of any child's parent or guardian. In loco parentis does not arise - the school is acting as a responsible citizen; not as a substitute for the children's parents.
What is the legal penalty for "contempt of Congress"? In reading a recent article that suggested Steve Bannon might be found in "contempt of congress", I realized that there's no information on what the penalty for that might be, unlike the statutorily defined penalties for contempt of court. Further searches on the matter only seem to confuse the issue, with most sources saying nothing about the legal penalties, and others alternating saying it's a federal misdemeanor, or it amounts to nothing. So what are the potential legal consequences for being found in contempt of [US federal] congress?
2 USC 192 imposes a penalty of $100-$1000 and 1-12 months in prison. That assumes a trial and conviction. Officials were found in contempt under the previous administration, but there was no criminal prosecution (DOJ would have to prosecute, which they declined to do).
There is no definitive answer, which can only be determined by SCOTUS if faced with a case. DOJ has opined twice that "the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions". The Impeachment Clause (art.I, §3, cl.7) says Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indict­ment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law The exegesis of this clause is that this means a sitting president cannot first be prosecuted for a crime, but must first be removed from office. The counter-argument is that "nevertheless" indicates that this clause only states that a president can be removed and then prosecuted, and that removal does not preclude further action. In other words, the law has yet to be determined on this matter.
Part of the problem you'll find is that there are so few impeachments in U.S. History (Only 21 articles of Impeachment have ever been drafted, of which only 8 resulted in convictions) and SCOTUS is so selective on cases it chooses to hear, that only one case has ever been heard and that was upheld (Nixon v. United States). In that case, SCOTUS ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the legal question before it (was the new trial format a proper trial by the senate), but did not have an opinion one way or another to suggest that SCOTUS could not review other cases that come before it. One of the reasons they also haven't is in order to have a legal case in the U.S., the plaintiff must suffer actual harm. More impeachments ended without a conviction than with either acquittal (8), resignation before trial conclusion (4), and expulsion from senate (1, and will never occur again as Congressional office holders are not impeachable following this particular case). Since no harm was caused and courts do not rule on hypotheticals, a case with actual harm (conviction) must occur in order for SCOTUS to even consider hearing the case. Nixon does not bar SCOTUS from hearing more appeals resulting from Impeachment, it only bars those relating to the manner in which the senate chooses to hold the trial.
Impeachment of a president does not on conviction automatically disqualify the convicted party from becoming president again. However, after conviction, the Senate can vote to add to the punishment of removal from office "disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States." This requires only a simple majority vote. Does impeachment by the House of Representatives, with or without subsequent removal from office by the Senate, actually disqualify one from being re-elected to the same Presidential office? See above. It requires impeachment by the House, conviction by the Senate, and a separate vote by the Senate to impose the punishment of disqualification. It's conceivable that the Senate could disqualify the convicted party only from becoming president, though it looks like in the two prior instances where this punishment was imposed it was the broader disqualification. But if a person disqualified only from being president is in an office that would normally be in the line of succession, that person is simply omitted from the line of succession. This happens routinely with naturalized citizens, and there's no reason to think it would be any different for a former president who had been disqualified only from the office of the president after being convicted on articles of impeachment.
Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.
There is a saying that you can't sue city hall: that is applicable here. Governments enjoy sovereign immunity, and cannot be sued for their errors of judgment unless they specifically allow it. Safety regulations are an example of a situation where the government hold all of the power and shoulders none of the responsibility. If a government forbids sale or use of a substance on some grounds (could be safety, could be economic impact, could be something about preventing the moral decay of society), and the grounds later turns to be false, you cannot sue the government because of lost business opportunities. Generally speaking, that which is not prohibited is allowed, so there would have to be an affirmative duty for the government to prevent all forms of harm. If there were such a legal duty, there is a miniscule legal foundation for suing the government for shirking its duty. That is not a completely hypothetical possibility, in that the state of Washington imposes a constitutional duty on the legislature to provide public education, and the Supreme Court has done things to enforce this duty (the contempt of court fines are up in the realm of $80 million). Since there is no jurisdiction that imposes a duty on the government to absolutely prevent all harm, you won't be able to sue the government if they fail to outlaw a thing that is eventually proven to harm someone.
There is no crime of "police misconduct" in the US, but murder or theft are certainly crimes which would qualify as "police misconduct". To take a real case, an officer in Georgia was convicted of aggravated assault, violating oath of office, and making a false statement (not murder, though he did kill the victim). In principle, he would also be liable in a lawsuit by the victim's family. However, these would be separate legal processes, the criminal prosecution being conducted by and at the discretion of the government prosecutor, and the monetary lawsuit being conducted by and at the discretion of the victim's family (on behalf of the victim). It is possible that an officer will be convicted yet not found civilly liable, or vice versa; or both, or neither. The victim (or family) doesn't necessarily have any connection to the criminal case, although they typically can testify during the sentencing phase. In some jurisdictions (e.g. California), the victim has a right to testify at a sentencing hearing. The result of a lawsuit can never be imprisonment – that has to come from criminal prosecution, and criminal prosecution does not result in a monetary reward to the victim (any criminal fine goes to the government).
There are literally hundreds of such laws. Most of them (perhaps all, if we exclude firearms-related crimes in Title 26) are contained in Title 18 of the US Code, part I. The problem is that your definition of "public insurrection" is too broad, since it would include lying to federal agents (a crime), insofar as the reason for 18 USC 1001 is to prevent impeding federal investigations by giving them false information. Assaulting a federal agent impedes government and is a crime. There is pretty much a federal version of any state-level crime of violence. There is the riot act, and a specific law against insurrection and rebellion. Chapter 115 is probably the most relevant: this is where the various "overthrowing the government" laws are.
I suspect bait-and-switch selling, what can I do as a consumer? I’ll keep this as generic as possible in terms of which store and which products were involved, but here’s the situation: Location, product(s) and retailer: I’m in Canada, the seller is a chain store that is well known in their industry, they have a large presence online and with multiple retail locations both in Canada and in other countries. The purchases were made on their Canadian website. The product in question is a consumer product (a type of tool) of which there are many versions; the key difference between the different versions is the materials used. The different versions are easily distinguishable in pictures because they are differently coloured. For this situation we’ll consider two versions of the product: version A is an upgraded version of the “standard” version B, version A usually costs around double what version B does. The situation: I’m part of a facebook group that pertains to one of my hobbies. Someone on one of those groups shared a link to the online store of the retailer, who was selling version A of the product around 40% less than normal retail price (it’s common to share such links on this group when you find good deals). The advertised image on the website was that of version A and the description (basically a specs sheet) clearly stated the materials used were those of version A. It was a good deal, not too good to be true (stuff goes on sale all the time) but some group members contacted the store’s customer support to make sure. Customer support confirmed that it was indeed version A. So far, so good, everyone’s happy, a few of us bought the item thinking that it was version A. (you probably figured out where this is going) A few days later packages start arriving in the mail and everyone received version B. We had a good deal on version A at 40% off, but even at that price it’s slightly more than what version B would cost… so one was happy. We contacted customer support who apologized, they said they did not carry version A (in fact, they never carried it in Canada) and that it was simply a mistake on the website. The website has now been updated to show the image and description of version B. Because they do not sell version A, they say that there’s nothing they can do to provide us with the products that were advertised. They offered everyone who contacted them to return the item for a refund. Additional info: Some people who bought the items took screenshots of the webpage which was clearly advertising version A, and of the email sent to them by customer support confirming that it was indeed version A. My question: What can I do in this situation? Does it qualify as bait-and-switch selling? How would I leverage that against them? Ideally, I’d like to somehow force them to honour the listing and provide us with version A, however many of us already took the hassle-free route of simply returning for refund and since the items are worth about $140, there’s not enough financial motivation to call up a lawyer to sue them.
A lawsuit is designed to put you in the position you were in before the sale happened. Since the company has already offered you a full refund, suing would achieve nothing except cost you fees; your time and frustration are not legally recompensable. It may be that some consumer-protection office can fine this company for misleading advertising; the case would turn on whether the mistake should have been noticed before customer support sent a false confirmation. If you want to start the process, you should make a formal complaint to your local trading standards/customer service office. You will get no reward except relief to your feelings.
Since you bought these online the Consumer Contract Regulations are going to be in effect here (if the price of the goods was over £42 anyway), (legislation) Where your cutting the tags off and wearing them outside for an hour comes into play is that would probably be considered "excessive handling" and they might be able to make a deduction from the amount of the refund. Your business can make a deduction from the value of the goods if you consider the customer has handled the goods excessively. You can’t deduct monies from the refund simply because the goods have been removed from the packaging or because the goods have been tried on or checked. In essence, distance selling purchasers are entitled to handle goods in the same way that they would in a normal retail store. That therefore includes touching the item or trying it on. Since no retail store is going to let you cut the tags from a pair of shoes and walk outside for an hour in them I'd say that test is probably met here. How much can they deduct? As the CCR puts it (emphasis mine): (9) If (in the case of a sales contract) the value of the goods is diminished by any amount as a result of handling of the goods by the consumer beyond what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of the goods, the trader may recover that amount from the consumer, up to the contract price. Which is likely where the "saleable condition" aspect is coming from - if they aren't in a condition where the retailer can sell them on they've essentially lost their full value. If the retailer makes returned goods available for sale on the site at reduced prices (like the "Amazon warehouse" deals) then a deduction of the difference in sale price between that and full retail is more likely.
I only address the core legal question. The first question regards where the review appeared: on the facility's own web page, or on some third party web page? In the latter case, there is the possibility that soliciting a modified review in exchange for something of value violates the terms of usage for that web site. There are also US federal regulations pertaining to advertising, as well as state regulations. The federal regulations are here. The main question is whether what you say constitutes an endorsement, as specified here. They define an endorsement as: any advertising message (including verbal statements, demonstrations, or depictions of the name, signature, likeness or other identifying personal characteristics of an individual or the name or seal of an organization) that consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party other than the sponsoring advertiser, even if the views expressed by that party are identical to those of the sponsoring advertiser. The regulation in fact gives some helpful examples (reading them helps to clarify what an "endorsement" is), the last of which involves a dog: Example 8: A consumer who regularly purchases a particular brand of dog food decides one day to purchase a new, more expensive brand made by the same manufacturer. She writes in her personal blog that the change in diet has made her dog's fur noticeably softer and shinier, and that in her opinion, the new food definitely is worth the extra money. This posting would not be deemed an endorsement under the Guides. Assume now that the consumer joins a network marketing program under which she periodically receives various products about which she can write reviews if she wants to do so. If she receives a free bag of the new dog food through this program, her positive review would be considered an endorsement under the Guides. The distinction at issue is whether the suggestion of receiving something of value might influence a person's statements. You can pay for a positive review, as a reward for saying nice things, as long as the reviewer had no reason to think that they would get get something in return for a review. Taking your review to be an endorsement, as required here, Endorsements must reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser. The regulation does not require you to reveal every thing that came into your mind in writing the review, but it is pretty clear that suppressing the concern about vaccination paperwork and the star count constitutes a dishonest statement of opinion of the endorser. Material connections must also be revealed: When there exists a connection between the endorser and the seller of the advertised product that might materially affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement (i.e., the connection is not reasonably expected by the audience), such connection must be fully disclosed. For example, when an endorser who appears in a television commercial is neither represented in the advertisement as an expert nor is known to a significant portion of the viewing public, then the advertiser should clearly and conspicuously disclose either the payment or promise of compensation prior to and in exchange for the endorsement or the fact that the endorser knew or had reason to know or to believe that if the endorsement favored the advertised product some benefit, such as an appearance on television, would be extended to the endorser In the 7th example under material disclosure, they describe a blogger who received something of value in connection with a review: the blogger should clearly and conspicuously disclose that he received the gaming system free of charge I should point out that these regulations are written by the FTC, and the implied interpretation (such as that the blogger should disclose... with no clearly stated penalty for failure to disclose) is an FTC interpretation. 15 USC 52 prohibits false advertisements for services affecting commerce. This is the jurisdictional aspect of their complaint against Cure Encapsulations, where defendants paid for reviews on a third-party website (this case involves a relationship between defendant and a fourth-party company that apparently hunts for and pays reviewers). This is apparently the first instance in which the FTC has gone against a business for paying for reviews on a third party web site, so it's not a foregone conclusion that they will prevail in court. Still, Chevron deference means that they will probably win at least on the jurisdictional question. The main difference is that in the Cure Encapsulation case, the violation was even more egregious in that the individuals were not even customers, and in this instance the would-(not)-be review was not the honest opinion of the endorser.
In fact, the first recognition of the First Sale doctrine came about precisely because a publisher attempted to do something of the nature of what you suggest. In Bobbs-Merrill Co. vs Straus, the Bobbs-Merrill Corporation attempted to enforce the following restriction, printed on the inside of a book it published: "The price of this book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright." They made the mistake of attempting to enforce it against, among others, R.H. Macy and Co., who they then had to take to court - and lost. This established the First Sale Doctrine, which then later (in 1976) was codified (in 17 U.S. Code § 109. Textbooks recently tested another element of this; in the 2013 case, Kirtsaeng v John Wiley and Sons Inc., the Supreme Court held that the First Sale doctrine trumped a notice forbidding selling a book outside of a particular territory or region (Kirtsaeng imported textbooks from Thailand, where they were much cheaper than in the US, and resold them at a profit in the US).
I can't speak for the US but in Australia this would not be binding. You entered a contract for the vacuum cleaner the terms of conditions of which were made known to you at the time of purchase – the ticketed price, any store or website displayed terms and whatever was written on the outside of the box. Any alleged terms that were not made known when you entered the contract e.g. because they are inside the box are just that: alleged. In addition, the manufacturer would have committed an offence under Australian Consumer Law by misleading you that such terms were binding. This could lead to a fine in the multiple millions of dollars if the breach is widespread and egregious enough.
I am not aware of any law making this illegal. You need to avoid any "bait and switch" tactics, though, like initially offering cola for $1 and then not actually letting them buy it for that price.
In Australia, the overall representations of the website must not be misleading or deceptive when it comes to the provision of goods or services, in order to comply with Australian Consumer Law. The length of the terms matters. In a very recent case against a homeopathy website, it was noted that (at [47]): The terms and conditions were exceedingly lengthy and it was highly unlikely that any visitor would trawl through them merely to access another part of the Website for free. In this case the significance of the length was not specifically tested. The position of the terms also matters. In another case against a major retailer, it was noted (at [37]) that the conditions visible: a user accessed a link at the bottom of each page of the HN Website titled “Website Terms and Conditions”, such that it was unlikely either condition would be found by a normal reader reading the HN Catalogue or viewing the HN Website This specific matter related to a very specific claim made by the retailer, and so I can't say whether it applies in general to website terms and conditions. Apart from the above cases, I can't find any good examples where the exact form of a website's terms have been considered in determining a case. There are some United States cases referred to in the Wikipedia article for browse wrap. These seem to have been judged in favour of the website operator only when the terms are conspicuous, and/or when the user has had repeated exposure to them (or a link to them), for example over a number of pages. Even where the terms are linked at the bottom of the website, and a user is not required to scroll to the bottom to use the site, terms have been found unenforceable. As far as I know, there's no statutory requirements - in Australia, at least, and quite likely anywhere else - that specify the manner and form that disclaimers may take.
No it’s not illegal It’s called retailing: https://youtu.be/ywSkKkuGQ2A https://youtu.be/k8OreiHU91Y https://youtu.be/XpR6y1sNArU You are allowed to advertise the products you sell. Even if you don’t make them. You can even use their trademarks to identify them - that’s what trademarks are for.
How do concepts like intent, discrimination, and bias apply to an Artificial Intelligence agent? Background I work at a financial institution in the United States and have been researching the regulatory impacts of Artificial Intelligence recently - specifically the simple purpose-specific systems we have today like Alexa, Siri, or the AI that navigates your Tesla when you switch on autopilot. Based on some googling [1] [2], the current standards seem to be that there aren't a lot of specific regulations that apply to the AI agent (with the exception of self-driving cars), but the normal regulations that apply when using a human agent would apply if you substitute an AI-based decision process. The top answer on a related topic here on StackExchange seems to support the idea that the regulations applied to the human apply to the AI agent as well (at least in Hong Kong). We're currently shying away to research into the legal implications of AIs that can learn any task, much like a human. These are sometimes referred to as Artificial General Intelligence (AGIs) and the most aggressive estimate I've seen in my research places them emerging sometime in the next 100 - 200 years. A problem for future generations! The Question: This raises a couple of questions in my mind about a couple of legal concepts that have clear definitions when applied to a human or certain kinds of AI, but get fuzzy with other ones. Specifically: How do you determine an AI agent's intent? How can you tell if an AI agent is biased in its decisions? How would the concept of discrimination apply to an AI agent? How would you prosecute it? A Specific Example: For instance, take the anti-discrimination provisions of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). In the case of a decision-tree based AI agent discrimination is obvious - if you add in a rule that makes different decisions based on race, gender, age, or other protected factors you have a discriminatory model. In the case of a statistically driven Machine Learning model, this is less obvious. For instance, a neural network based model could accept address data as part of its decision. After examining hundreds of thousands of credit applications, the machine learning model could potentially derive information about income distribution from address or similar fields and end up discriminating against applicants that match certain traits. In this case you accept no information on age, sex, or ethnicity but still discriminate based on these factors since the model found some problematic trends in the data that it was trained on. Recap: With this in mind, my questions are: What are your thoughts on regulations that refer to intent or bias as they relate to AI agents - particularly ones that don't operate on explicitly defined rules? Is there any precedent in this space that we could look to to guide decisions on AI risk? Does anyone have thoughts on where regulation in this space might head? Update (7/18) I've removed the portions of this question with a technical lean and posted a question about the technical aspects of detecting and fixing a discriminatory model to ai.stackexchange.
Firstly, true artificial intelligence does not yet exist. The term "artificial intelligence" is a bit of a buzzword, used to refer to things like neural networks and decision trees, which are really just elaborate statistical calculations. They do not have a "mind of their own" by any stretch of the imagination, though it is possible to make them appear as if they do, in the time-tested tradition of constructing convincing but simple automatons that goes back centuries. Once true AI appears and begins to act as an independent agent in the public sphere, likely new legislation will be produced to address it, so our speculation based on the present situation is unlikely to be proven accurate in the end. The law will tend to view AI as a tool or calculation of the human operators, therefore liability for whatever damage or offense the AI causes rests with the operators. This is little different from prosecuting the person who pulls the trigger, rather than the gun. But two caveats apply: Because computer systems are often very complex, it is easy for operators to argue that any harm is unintentional. Especially machine learning approaches that have become popular recently, which often produce unpredictable or unintuitive, if not downright non-deterministic results (indeed, they are often employed to find solutions that intuition could not), are very complex. While understanding the principles of their operation is quite easy for a technical person, predicting the exact result for any given input is much harder, due to sheer volume of numerical calculation involved. So it is hard to prove any outcome is intentional, unless someone went on record stating the intent. Because such systems are often implemented by an organization rather than individuals, it is often the organization that ends up being liable, not the programmer. As for your specific example, it is actually not that important whether the model discriminates explicitly or implicitly. Even a model that makes decision completely at random can still be considered discriminatory in certain settings. This is because US law has a concept called disparate impact, where impact on a protected group alone can be sufficient to argue a policy is discriminative. Is there any precedent in this space that we could look to to guide decisions on AI risk? I think autopilots (both planes and cars) are a good example. Another one is automated fraud detection and credit scoring used by financial and insurance industries. In particular you would want to look at disputes where the client disagrees with the results from the statistical model. By my argument that what is commonly referred to as AI is not really AI but dumb software, it is worth looking at disputes including much simpler devices: For example the controversy surrounding the reliability of breathalyzer devices and their admissibility in court. Does anyone have thoughts on where regulation in this space might head? In the immediate future, I think it would be nice to see more accountability from programmers and designers. For example, programs which can cause significant damage (like car autopilots or forensic tools such as breathalyzers) should be required to pass more stringent QC than usual, and they should be produced by specially trained, qualified and certified programmers. I think it is also too easy for corporations to escape responsibility from harm caused by their software tools by just shrugging and claiming it was an accident. Ultimately no one can guarantee a complex program will always perform 100% as intended, but that is not an excuse to write very sub standard programs and have inadequate testing. Thus courts should be more skeptical when an "AI" like a self-driving car causes an accident and the company claims it's not their fault. As complexity and ubiquity of such "AI" systems in everyday life grows, accidents due to software bugs or design issues should become more and more common, so I expect that eventually legislation will be produced to address them (or alternatively, lobbying will overwhelm the process sufficiently so as to bring about a sort of unregulated cyber-anarchy for big tech corporations).
Isn’t this discrimination since nationals do not have to apply? Yes it is discrimination. But that does not make it illegal. In fact discrimination is in general legal unless it is based on some characteristic which is specifically forbidden as a basis for discrimination (e.g. race). And in general, all of the countries in the world allow and enforce discrimination based on nationality; for example non-nationals will not be able to run for Head of State (and additional restrictions may apply). The EU members allowing similar rights to the citizens of other EU countries is the exception, not the rule, and once the UK stops being bound by EU treaties it can impose its own legal system on non-nationals. And while EU treaties give lots of rights to EU member-countries citizens, they still allow for discrimination based on nationality (for example you cannot run for Prime Minister or MP of Spain as a foreign EU resident). Isn’t the UK Government breaking the law? This could go against EU treaties, but the point is that the UK will no longer need to comply with them. is the UK Government responsible for the harm and distress caused to the individual health and mental wellbeing? No, the UK Government is not responsible if you do not like its laws to the point that it affects your health. Is there any ground for challenging this scheme legality in court? Unlikely. In any case it will not be because you are frightened by it, any challenge would be in the grounds that the government actions act against some other UK law. For example, if the decision to make such a list was made by the Executive but it contradicts some law approved by the Parliament. If this list does not contradict any law, then there are no grounds for challenging it. Would there a breach of my human rights if I was not to apply for settle status and then subsequentially got deported (taken away from my children, home, business, etc.)? How about if I was refused, re-entry or access to public services (NHS for example)? If you do not apply you will not have any evidence that you were settled, and the government could legitimately believe that you are irregularly in the country and try to expel you; you probably would have an opportunity to prove that you were settled even if you were not in the list but that could be way slower, more expensive, riskier and stressful than just registering now. Get this clear: that settled person list is to help you to show that you were a UK resident before Brexit and to give you the protections that are being negotiated between the UK and the EU for expatriates. Probably you could choose not to enlist, but it would work against you.
Excluding "ridiculously unacceptable conditions", it is legal to have "non-uniform" contract terms (where a company treats different classes of individuals differently), provided that the basis for distinction is not statutorily prohibited (race, religion, age, sex... depending on jurisdiction). There is a extremely slim chance that apparently legal income-discrimination can be a proxy for another form of illegal discrimination. However, "ridiculously unacceptable conditions" are unlikely to be found to be enforceable, regardless of any demographic properties associated with the condition. E.g. a clause requiring the surrender of a first-born female child would be unenforceable as "unconscionable". The specific circumstances surrounding such a finding by the court can't easily be summarized, since it relies heavily on prior case law, statutes, and legislative declarations. The underlying premise behind using the doctrine of unconsionability in such a case is that the clause in question is not something that a reasonable person would agree to, but they have no power to disagree. In the US, the case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture is the leading case on this view. The clause in question was about a payment plan for furniture and the condition that no furniture could be paid off until all of it was. The consequence of the clause was that all of the furniture could be repossessed if any payment was missed, regardless of how much had already been paid. Various factors went into the court's ruling (that the condition was unenforceable), such as "absence of meaningful choice", "terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party", :gross inequality of bargaining power". In the circumstance that you allude to, it is not obvious that the courts would follow Williams in making their ruling – it would depend on the extent to which one could reasonable conclude that the customer understood and freely accepted the term. There are upper limits on what a court can enforce, so a contract requiring a party to commit suicide would be utterly unenforceable (in most countries), and a contract requiring a party to break the law would be likewise.
"Discrimination" is in some way treating people differently from other people. Much discrimination is a sound idea. Not letting someone fly a plane who does not have pilot training is discrimination, but not a bad kind. So is not allowing someone to do surgery who has not trained as a doctor. Unlawful discrimination is discrimination that a particular law in a particular country declares to be forbidden. Different countries have different laws for what kinds of discrimination is unlawful under what circumstances. Discrimination on a basis not forbidden by law is legal, even if immoral. For example, a restaurant could, in most if not all countries, ban left-handed people from being served there. This might be immoral, but would not be illegal, because no law has made it illegal. Commonly, discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, national origin, sex, or political opinion is unlawful. In some jurisdictions discrimination on the basis of disability is unlawful. Other bases may be unlawful in some places. There may be exceptions. Employment discrimination may not have the same standards as housing discrimination, and admission to public places or ability to run for public office may be different yet. All this will vary based on the particular laws of particular places. Note that some of these protected classes are things about which people have no choice, such as sex and national origin, others are matters of choice such as religion and political opinion. Laws may create a protected class on any basis. Note also that many things about which people have little or no choice, such as height, handedness, or intelligence, are not protected categories in most places. To the best of my understanding being vaccinated or not is not a protected class in most if not all of Europe, so legal distinctions may be made based on vaccination status. In such jurisdictions, discrimination in favor of those who are vaccinated is legal, although some may think it wrong. A few US states have made it unlawful to restrict various public or private services or access to places on the basis of vaccination status. I am not aware of any country in Europe that has such a law.
Trump was an officer of the government, and Twitter wasn't. The First Amendment forbids the government and its agents from viewpoint discrimination, but private companies are not bound by it and can discriminate as much as they please. (There was a question as to whether such discrimination might affect whether the company enjoys a shield from liability under 47 USC 230, but even so they have the right to block and censor as they wish if they are willing to risk that liability.)
This may be allowed, or prohibited, it all depends. At the federal level, there is no specific prohibition against asking this question, however it may be found to violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act if the result discriminates in employment based on race. At the state level (in Washington), WAC 162-12-140 gives examples of fair and unfair pre-employment inquiries. W.r.t. arrests, it deems such questions as fair under limited circumstances: Because statistical studies regarding arrests have shown a disparate impact on some racial and ethnic minorities, and an arrest by itself is not a reliable indication of criminal behavior, inquiries concerning arrests must include whether charges are still pending, have been dismissed, or led to conviction of a crime involving behavior that would adversely affect job performance, and the arrest occurred within the last ten years. Exempt from this rule are law enforcement agencies and state agencies, school districts, businesses and other organizations that have a direct responsibility for the supervision, care, or treatment of children, mentally ill persons, developmentally disabled persons, or other vulnerable adults. See RCW 43.20A.710; 43.43.830 through 43.43.842; and RCW 72.23.035. In other words, asking just about arrests is unfair and illegal. You can look up the law of other states here. In California, you can't ask about an arrest until late in the process as part of an individualized investigation, and can't be an automatic "arrest? No job!" rule. In contrast, Arkansas has no prohibition against arrest as job disqualifier.
"Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights" on the website you linked to is very clear that the Charter of Fundamental Rights only means the EU institutions can't discriminate based on age, and that EU law is not allowed to be age discriminatory. It doesn't mean that individual acts of age discrimination are illegal: In contrast, the provision in Article 21(1) does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws in these areas of Member State or private action, nor does it lay down a sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-ranging areas. Instead, it only addresses discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers conferred under the Treaties, and by Member States only when they are implementing Union law. The practice of youth and senior discounts is older than the charter of fundamental rights. The charter will be interpreted in the light of continuity, it definitely wasn't the intention to outlaw price discrimination. There are specific laws that make price discrimination based on certain principles legal, e.g. UK equality act: Age discrimination - when discrimination is allowed in the provision of goods or services
The relevant eu article is article 102 tfeu which forbids those who are in a dominant market position from abusing that position (e.g. price fixing, discriminatory practices as in this case when google made their products more likely to appear in a search than competitors). The case summary is http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/SUM/?uri=CELEX:62008CJ0236&qid=1498637439183#SM The statement of the commission declaring the fine is http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm
Is this pdf a copyright infringment? The Pontifical Biblical Commision of the Vatican produces documents in several languages - but not in all of them. For instance, the document L'interprétation de la Bible dans l'Église (The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church), published in April 15, 1993, is in German, Italian, Portuguese, Swahili, and Ukrainian. I was looking for a copy in Spanish (as I do not know any of those languages), and found this pdf. It mentions no translator, nor does it acknowledge the copyright of the Vatican on the original document. But, does the electronic text in the Vatican website (in any language) has copyright? Well, as this was published in 1993, probably in a printed book, it must have a copyright. There is no mention to it however in the website. Now, assuming the document has a copyright, is the pdf version in Spanish infringing the copyright of the original document? Reasons why it should: it's a translation, which require official permission. it's the whole document, and so not under fair use Am I right? If so, would the only way to produce a legal pdf version of a full (copyrighted) document of the Vatican website require to ask permission for it?
According to Wikipedia, the organization that holds Vatican copyrights has the following policy: [N]ews organizations can quote from the pope's speeches, encyclicals and other writings without charge. They can also publish full texts free provided they cite Vatican copyright ... but if a text is published separately ... payment is due. You say that no Vatican copyright was cited, which is too bad - they'd have a good argument that they already had permission. it must have a copyright Correct. Published or unpublished, it has a copyright from the moment it was fixed. it's a translation, which require official permission. Translations are considered derivative works, which is a right protected under copyright. So you need permission, fair use, or some other law that allows you to use it. it's the whole document, and so not under fair use Well, not so fast. There are four factors included in fair use, and that's only one of them. The factors are: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; Is the website offering this work for religious purposes, or for profit? (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; I'm not really sure where religious works fall under this factor, honestly. (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; The whole work is used, so this factor would be against fair use. (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Is there a market for this work? Does the Vatican sell it, or use it to drive traffic, or anything? If so, this factor would be against fair use. If not, the translation probably does not affect the market for the work, and this factor would be in favor of fair use.
These files are not public domain Read it carefully, it only says “public domain musical compositions in a MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) file format.” The compositions are public domain, the MIDI files aren’t - they are a derivative work (a translation) covered by their own copyright. Specifically, “© Copyright 2001 University of Arizona. All rights reserved” right next to a big “Contact us” link. Literary and artistic works that are derived (legally) from existing works have independent copyright even if the original no longer does. Mozart, for example, did not write his compositions in MIDI format. Now, it may be the intention of the University of Arizona that you can use it but, if so, they have not made this clear. It’s possible that the authors (mistakenly) thought that because the originals were public domain, their derivatives would be too. The music school should have talked to someone from the law school. All of the purposes that they talk about on the “Purpose” page are equally applicable to widely licensed (e.g. everyone) or narrowly controlled (e.g. staff of the University). Overall, a prudent person would assume that these works are copyright of the University of Arizona and can’t be used without permission or a fair use exemption. Your proposed usage is not fair use. However, there is a big “Contact us” link on every page so you can always ask for permission.
Please Note: This was written before the title change of this question and may no longer be applicable According to the Harvard website: In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 US 340 (1991) the United States Supreme Court held that copyright does not extend to a mere compilation of facts. In this case, it was a telephone directory much the same as the one in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the Court also ruled that something more than simple "sweat of the brow" labor was required before copyright protection would ensue, with some modicum of authorial originality necessary. Accordingly, it was held in Feist that copyright did not extend to a telephone directory, no matter how laborious a task its compilation was. The decision in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) is highly significant, therefore, in that it permits copyright or quasi-copyright protection to be extended to non-copyrightable material through the use of contract. One would have to consider each meta tag independently. For example, the "description" tag could by copyrightable since it is written for more than just the 'facts', such as a subtle advert for the site that is more than an objective description. However the 'og:type' would not be copyrightable since it would just be considered a fact. Now, if you are using it on another website and sourcing it properly, you could probably use it under "Fair Use" Uses That Are Generally Fair Uses Subject to some general limitations discussed later in this article, the following types of uses are usually deemed fair uses: Criticism and comment -- for example, quoting or excerpting a work in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment. News reporting -- for example, summarizing an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report. Research and scholarship -- for example, quoting a short passage in a scholarly, scientific, or technical work for illustration or clarification of the author's observations. Nonprofit educational uses -- for example, photocopying of limited portions of written works by teachers for classroom use. Parody -- that is, a work that ridicules another, usually well-known, work by imitating it in a comic way. A copyright would exist on the image. One would have to know what license currently applies to the image to know for sure, however, the "Fair Use" to copyright would still apply. With Fair Use, the entity type that uses the image is important. There is much more leniency when a non-profit uses copyrighted information than when the information is used in commercial activity. (With, of course, more exceptions.)
Copyright exists from the moment of creation of the work Copyright notices and dates are neither required nor meaningful. They are a courtesy to others. They can also have typos.
The creator of the derivative work has copyright in the derivative work. The copyright would protect only the new elements of the derivative work. Wikipedia is a good place to start. In the case of a book with updated grammar, depending on the extent of the changes, it would probably be easier to copy the original directly than to eliminate the updates from a copy of the derivative work.
I presume the input is text: "my original text" is assumed to mean you wrote (created) the text. That means that you hold the copyright to the text, and only you can authorize a derivative work (such as a synthesized recording). Therefore, you hold the copyright to the recordings as well. The crucial consideration governing that right is that you "created" the work, meaning that there is a modicum of creativity. However, if you did not create the text and your only function is to host an automatic process where users can create a synthesized recording, then whoever created the text has the right to the text and derivative works (i.e. the synthesized output). Automated processes like (unassisted) OCR or wav-to-mp3 conversion would not count as being "original", nor would automatic text-to-speech, so you don't gain copyright just from making an automatic work-creating tool available. On the assumption that the conversion involves a component of Chrome, you can use the service per the terms of service, though you cannot "reproduce, duplicate, copy, sell, trade or resell the Services". This might limit the extent to which you could make this conversion available to others, depending on how, exactly, you could do such a thing (does it duplicate the service?). As they say, Google owns all legal right to the Services, but Google obtains no right from you for any content created through their service. There is no restriction in the TOS against using the service for commercial purposes. Even if there were, that would not assign copyright in the recording to anyone else, it would just mean they could sue you for violating the TOS.
But while some libraries allow unrestricted use of their Public Domain content, others do not and limit the use of their copies to Non-Commercial use. It is my understanding that NC only applies to the digital copy, not the work itself. Your understanding is correct. An ancient text, or one long out of copyright, does not get new protection by creating an image of the text. At most the image itself is protected, not the underlying text. In the US, and other jurisdictiosn that follow the rule of the 1999 Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp case there is no copyright protection on the image because it has no original content. Some EU courts have indicated that they will be following the logic of bridgeman. To the best of my knowledge no EU decision grants copyright protection to an otherwise out-of-copyright work because of its presence in a digital library or collection. However, if a person gained access to a digital library or collection subject to a TOS agreement which includes "no commercial use" terms and then published a text from it commercially, that person might be subject to a breech of contract or similar suit by the library. Such a suit would need to include proof of damages.
First of all derivative works are not exactly "illegal". They are fully legal if the owner of the copyright in the original work has given permission. If no permission has been given, they may be copyright infringements. But they may fall under an exception to copyright. Under US law, the most common exception is "fair use". See this question and answer for more on fair use. But particularly relevant in this case is that a parody is usually a fair use, although as in every fair-use decision, there is pretty much no clear-cut, hard&fast rule on what is and is not fair use. In the UK and much of the EU (or maybe all of it, I am not sure) there is a somewhat similar concept known as "fair dealing". It is also an exception to copyright. So it is possible that such works fall under fair use, fair dealing, or another exception to copyright, or that the rights-holder has given permission. Secondly, copyright infringement is a tort, not a crime, under most circumstances. It is enforced when, and only when, a copyright-holder chooses to take action, sending a take-down notice or copyright complaint, of filing suit for infringement. Some rights-holders choose as a matter of policy not to take such actions, thinking that such derivative works actually benefit them. That is their choice to make. Some rights-holders don't have the time or money to track down and take action against most infringements, and will only act if they think the derivative work will in some way cost them a lot of money or harm their reputation. Some rights-holders may just not have heard, yet, of specific possible infringing derivative works. As for Acta2, it has not yet been approved, the Wikipedia article linked in the questions says: In order for the text of the directive to become law in the EU, it must be approved by the European Council on 9 April 2019 The article also mentions significant continuing opposition. If it is approved, it is not clear, to me at least, how it will affect sites hosting such content, nor how it will interact with the copyright law of individual EU nations. If approved, it will no doubt take some time before enforcement is widespread. And of course it will only apply when EU law applies. If both site and author are outside the EU -- say if both are from the US -- it seems that it could not apply.
Is it illegal to lock the wheel of a car? Is it illegal to lock the wheel of a car and demand money for unlocking it because the car was parked in an area of reserved use by the person placing the lock in the car?
It might be illegal, depending on where you are. If it is known to the person who owns the vehicle occupying your space prior to doing so that wheelclamping may be the result, then the common law doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to a willing party, harm is not done") would lead to a conclusion that one who knowingly places themselves in a situation where harm may befall them is not entitled to bring a claim of tort against the other party (in the United States assumption of risk is a similar doctrine, but doesn't apply here because wheelclamping is an intentional act). In your situation, this means that the owner occupying your space cannot bring a case in tort against you. While it is generally applied to harm to people, there is precedent (albeit in British case law) for the doctrine to be applied to vehicles, and specifically, to the situation you describe - see Arthur v Anker and Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest. While cases from other jurisdictions are not binding, I have not been able to find any similar cases in the United States, and so it is possible that such cases will be persuasive. Note that this is highly jurisdiction-specific, and there may be laws in your state that make it unlawful - at least one high-profile case involving a McDonalds and its parking lot operator cites California law authorising only law enforcement to impound vehicles, and considering wheelclamping such an act. However, I have not been able to find the record of a judgement on this matter. It is also likely that if the payment you request is excessive, the owner would be able to seek relief, in the form of reducing the payment owed to a reasonable amount. However, if the parking space was not marked in some way to signal that it was reserved for use, then the owner of the vehicle may be entitled to seek injunctive relief and damages from a court. This would be on the basis of, if you only wheelclamped the car and declined to remove the wheelclamp upon the owner's request, the tort of detinue. But, if you attempted to request payment from them, then as Dale mentioned in his answer, you have committed extortion (wheelclamping is actually listed as a crime of extortion).
The short answer: The title is, more or less, a record of who "owns" the vehicle. It's you if you own it free and clear, the dealer if you're leasing it, and it depends what state you're in if you're financing the car. The registration is a permit to operate the vehicle. In all three situations above, you would hold the registration (you could also not register your vehicle if you're not using it, for instance by filing for a certificate of non-operation in California).
Let me give you a simple, even if rather silly example: You take me to a civil court. You tell the judge "gnasher regularly parks his blue car in front of my home, and the color blue violates my sense of beauty. Judge, make him stop it. " A question of fact would be: Is my car actually blue? Not green, or red? And do I actually park my car in front of your home, and do so regularly? A question of law would be: Am I allowed by law to park my car in front of your home, even when my car has a color that you don't like? If this goes to a civil court, the judge would look at it and probably say: "Even if all the facts that 'Gimme the 401' claimed are true, as a matter of law there would be no case for gnasher to answer, since these actions would be permitted by law". If the judge decided that it is illegal to park cars in offensive colours in front of someone else's home as a matter of law, the court would then have to decide the facts: Whether what you claimed is actually the truth. (And while this example is silly, there have been people claiming that the neighbour's use of WiFi interfered with their health. And by law it is illegal to interfere with someone's health, so the facts would have to be examined).
I can't find any specific laws or cases in the United Kingdom. In Australia, bag searches must be consensual - shopkeepers and even security staff have no power to search your person or belongings. It is for this reason that you will often be asked by security staff to open your bag, and move belongings around inside that may obstruct their view. If they attempt to force you to surrender your bags for search by physical force or by intimidation, you may be entitled to bring a claim for the tort of assault and/or battery. You need only prove that these occurred, without actual loss or damage. In any case, they do not have the power to arrest or detain you unless they believe you have committed a crime, and in those circumstances, only reasonable force may be used. You are under no obligation to remain in the store. If they detain you against your will and you are later found not to have shoplifted, you may be entitled to bring a claim for the tort of false imprisonment, which is, again, actionable per se (you need not actually show damages) and serves to vindicate a person's right to liberty.
Yes But not because they are mandated, just because your car has one. Because there is one factory fitted and it is a piece of safety equipment anyone you pay to maintain your car would be negligent if they didn’t make sure it’s working.
For starters, you can't "use the antitheft law" because you are not a criminal prosecutor. I'm not sure that the criminal statute would support a civil action for replevin, at least until you've paid all the fees that the towing company is explicitly authorized to charge and they still refuse to release the vehicle. And if that was the case, you wouldn't need the criminal statute — the title to your vehicle should be sufficient. See Baltimore County Code (2003) §18-2-203 for the police department's authority to remove and store cars with expired registration "by contract." See also §§ 21-16-111.1 et seq. and §§21-16-123 et seq. regarding police initiated towing and licensing of towing companies. The latter set of statutes and the fee schedule fixed by the county are available here.
Illegal weapons Weapons are defined and are made illegal by statute. In many states, it is illegal to possess brass knuckles. For example, California penal code 12020(a)(1) makes it illegal to possess "any metal knuckles", "writing pen knife", "any leaded cane", among other things. I don't know of any state where it is illegal to pick up a stick, or keys, etc. So, yes, there is a legal distinction between your four scenarios. The mechanic is committing a crime by merely possessing the brass knuckles. The others are not committing a crime by the mere possession of the things you mention (unless there are states where they've been made illegal). Effect on a self-defense analysis Courts would have the jury go through the same self-defense analysis in each of these cases, regardless of the legality of the weapon used. We've described that analysis here. A pure self-defense analysis does not factor in the legality of the weapon that is used. But, if the weapon has been made illegal because of its disproportionate ability to injure, etc. that might weigh against the reasonableness of the force that was used when choosing to use that weapon in self-defense. Possession of an illegal weapon might also weigh against the credibility of the owner of that illegal weapon.
If you have a license, it is legal. See the Precious Metals Act, 2005 in particular §4 which says that no person may acquire, possess or dispose of, either as principal or as agent, any unwrought precious metal, unless (a) he or she is the holder of a refining licence and acts in accordance with the terms and conditions of his or her licence; (b) he or she is an authorised dealer; (c) he or she is a producer who has won or recovered such unwrought precious metal; (4 he or she has obtained a certificate from the Regulator authorising him or her to acquire or to dispose of such unwrought precious metal; (e) such unwrought precious metal does not exceed a prescribed mass and is acquired in accordance with a special permit issued by the Regulator for scientific or beneficiation purposes or to make jewellery; or he or she is the holder of a precious metal beneficiation licence and acts in accordance with the terms and conditions of his or her licence Subsection (e) still requires a permit or license.
Can I sue If I was served a real burger after requesting a veggie burger My husband and I were served a meat burger after requesting a veggie burger. I specifically asked what were the ingredients in the veggie burger. The district manger happened to be in the store, therefore the cashier asked her. She explained and then we ordered. When we began eating the burger it tasted different. I walked up to the cashier and asked was this a veggie burger? He said no. I stated that was what I ordered. He said he would make a new burger. My husband and I complained to the manger. After we left, my daughter who was still in the restaurant reported that they started laughing at my husband and me. My daughter asked why were they laughing, when her parents were in the car sick from eating meat. They stopped laughing. My daughter asked for the corporate headquarters phone number.
Can I sue If I was served a real burger after requesting a veggie burger I agree that this inquiry significantly overlaps with the post of which this one is marked by NuclearWang as possible duplicate. Thus, the answers (such as why breach of contract is inapplicable) and comments provided there largely apply here. I will only address the slight differences. I walked up to the cashier and asked was this a veggie burger? He said no. I stated that it was I ordered. He said he would make a new burger. A claim of fraud would fail in court because you will be unable to prove that the restaurant knowingly misrepresented to you (that is, despite knowing it to be false) that it was serving you a veggie burger with the intention that you would rely on that representation. Two hints indicate that the restaurant didn't act with that fraudulent intention: (1) When asked, the cashier told you that yours was not a veggie burger; and (2) he promptly indicated his intention to mend their mistake by telling you that he would make a new burger. A claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) would also fail. You wrote: After we left, my daughter who was still in the restaurant stated that they started laughing at my husband and I. The fact that the employees waited till you and your husband left reflects that they refrained from intentionally inflicting any emotional distress. A significant factor that will favor them is the fact that they stopped laughing once your daughter asked them why they were laughing: My daughter asked why were they laughing, when her parents were in the car sick from eating meat. They stopped laughing. Even if you genuinely feel disrespected by their subsequent laughter, there are no legal remedies because their laughter insofar an expression was neither obscene nor disparaging nor threatening/harassing. Laughter can be an understandable way, and possibly a psychological need, to relieve the stress from a situation like this in a context of hours of hard work in exchange for low wages with which to pay their bills. Moreover, the same fact [that they waited till you and your husband left] contradicts the allegation that they laughed "at" you. Strictly speaking, the restaurant could viably sue your daughter for defamation if the restaurant incurs any losses (including court-ordered sanctions against the restaurant) as a result of falsely attributing to it the hostile or belittling behavior implied by the particle at. By this I intend to illustrate how certain actions under pretext of extreme "sensitivity" can backfire. People elsewhere are victims of much worse misconduct or offenses that have detrimental effects and long-lasting ramifications. The court system is --if only in theory-- intended to redress wrongs which are more serious than a mistaken order at a burger restaurant.
Yes, it is legal to sell something that uses another product as one of its ingredients. And yes, you can include the name of the product in the ingredients list. That said, if you do it and are successful enough you will probably get a cease and desist letter! The Supreme Court held a long time ago in Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty that a buyer can purchase a trademarked good, repackage it, and then resell it. The defendant of course by virtue of its ownership had a right to compound or change what it bought, to divide either the original or the modified product, and to sell it so divided. The court reminds us that trademarks are not copyrights; they not confer a right to prohibit the use of a word or words. ...unquestionably the defendant has a right to communicate... that the trade-marked product is a constituent in the article now offered as new and changed. In this case the name of the original product was included on the package in non-distinct lettering; stating that the original product was contained in the new product. I mention this because the ultimate decision is fact-specific.* So the Supreme Court tells us that we can repackage trademarked goods. The court also tells us a bit about the label - we cannot call out the trademarked name as this might confuse consumers: If the [trademarked name] were allowed to be printed in different letters from the rest of the inscription dictated by the District Court a casual purchaser might look no further and might be deceived. So, what about that FDA, what do we need on the label? You find this answer in 21 CFR 101.4(b)(2). (b) The name of an ingredient shall be a specific name and not a collective (generic) name, except that: (1) Spices, flavorings, colorings and chemical preservatives shall be declared according to the provisions of §101.22. (2) An ingredient which itself contains two or more ingredients and which has an established common or usual name, conforms to a standard established pursuant to the Meat Inspection or Poultry Products Inspection Acts by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, or conforms to a definition and standard of identity established pursuant to section 401 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, shall be designated in the statement of ingredients on the label of such food by either of the following alternatives: (i) By declaring the established common or usual name of the ingredient followed by a parenthetical listing of all ingredients contained therein in descending order of predominance except that, if the ingredient is a food subject to a definition and standard of identity established in subchapter B of this chapter that has specific labeling provisions for optional ingredients, optional ingredients may be declared within the parenthetical listing in accordance with those provisions. (ii) By incorporating into the statement of ingredients in descending order of predominance in the finished food, the common or usual name of every component of the ingredient without listing the ingredient itself. Here is an example of (i): But also note the picture of the box. That Hershey's Kisses trademarked image indicates that there is an agreement between the companies. So only use this image as an example of 21 CFR 101.4(b)(2)(i) ingredients labeling - the box cover is not an example of nominative use. *This is nominative fair use and has been discussed in other questions on this site. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc.: one party may use or refer to the trademark of another if 1) The product or service cannot be readily identified without using the trademark; 2) The user only uses as much of the mark as is necessary for the identification; 3) The user does nothing to suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.
Is the question just whether a company can contact its customers to ensure that they're happy with the company's services? If so, the answer is generally yes. I can think of no reason why this would change based on the fact that someone saw her using the services of a competitor. Your mother seems to be treating the phone call as an accusation, but it appears to be standard customer-relationship maintenance. If she chooses to approach it differently, she can use it to improve her bargaining power with Gym 1.
It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on.
A business has the right to refuse service, except in the case of unlawful discrimination. "Sued us" is not a protected characteristic. Unless part of the settlement was that the business must serve that customer in future, there is no way this could be considered contempt.
That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant.
The simplest solution is to hire an attorney to do this for you. If you want to do it the hard way, you need to try to figure out why your motions were denied. For example, did you file proper motions, or did you just write on a piece of paper "I need all of Walmart's records"? Why do you think that a court will / should supply you with an Open Record (of what)? A real lawsuit is not like Judge Judy where you tell your story and hope the judge has sympathy on your plight. Did the judge say / write anything about why he is denying your requests?
The government guidelines on naming food products states that if an ingredient is different to what consumers expect, it must be made clear by either: including the ingredient as part of the product’s name stating the ingredient close to the product’s name on the label For example, if a pesto sauce has been made with parsley instead of the traditional basil, the product must either be: called ‘parsley pesto sauce’ have the ingredient ‘parsley’ stated next to or directly under the product name So, it seems that the phrases like "our cheese is made of 100% plant ingredients" or "plant based cheese" (without quotation marks or asterisks) are compliant with these conditions. As an aside, the names of 15 cheeses are legally protected, but this relates to their geographical origins - not the product’s actual ingredients.
Landlord never asked for key back, now saying he will deduct from damage deposit cost of changing locks I lived in a shared house but had my own individual lease. I moved out last month. The landlord knew when I was moving out and I sent him a message confirming I had moved out and provided my new address. He never replied but almost 3 weeks latter he contacts me asking for the key to the front door. I can’t recall what I did with it. I may still have it. I was under the impression we would meet to inspect the place to get my damage deposit back. Now he’s saying that he will deduct the cost of changing the locks if I don’t return the key by tomorrow. This is ridiculous as clearly it hasn’t been an issue for two weeks and in theory I could have made a copy if I wanted to sneak back in anyway. To my understanding where I live it’s the landlords responsibility to make time to do a move out inspection. I took pictures of the place to ensure I have evidence no damage was done. Also the landlord failed to do a written report on the move in inspection. Does the landlord have anything on me? Can he charge me for not returning the key? What if I find it latter? From https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/housing-tenancy/residential-tenancies/ending-a-tenancy/moving-out It’s the landlord’s responsibility to schedule the condition inspection (or “walk-through”) What should I reply to the landlord?
If the landlord gave you a key, and you can not give it back to him he has every right to charge you for correcting the oversight. I put to you that if you can't provide it back to him, he can't be certain that it has not fallen into the wrong hands, and he would be prudent to change the lock - and indeed, he may not even have another copy of the key in which case he really does not have a lot of alternatives. If you look at the section on "Claims for Damages or Loss" pdf there is a section B - Damage which confirms that Loss includes less tangible impacts including "loss of a service or facility provided under the tenancy agreement" Section C of the same document goes on to assert that "The purpose of compensation is to put the person who suffered the damage or loss in the same position as if the damage or loss had not occurred". There is arguably a question of the amount of loss suffered, and they can't sting you for punitive damages, but they can charge you a reasonable amount to get a new key cut (or possibly to replace the lock) - but that was not your question, and would probably arise if the amount he charges was unreasonable in the circumstance. Depending on if he has already taken action - and if not, how much the bill would be - promptly remedying the breach by finding and returning the key or equivalent action might save you some money.
The simple answer is, get a lawyer and explain your case, and pay him to solve the problem (or tell you that it's hopeless). The two main questions would be whether the appraiser have any duty to you, and whether his action was within the scope of what he is supposed to do. If you hired the appraiser, he has a duty to you. I will assume it was you that hired the appraiser (if it was the bank, that's a different matter). Then the question is whether his action or non-action is within the scope of the job. If the place is infested with termites, that is probably irrelevant because an appraiser is not a termite inspector. On the other hand, if he failed to measure the structure, or erred substantially in the measurement, that kind of negligence could be legally actionable. The seller (not the appraiser) is required to "disclose", so it's not obvious that there is any thing that an appraiser could disclose that relates to a map.
The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to.
Do the police have to pay to fix your front door? If they took a year to analyse a mobile phone, can you claim due to the excessive amount of time it took? What if the device is returned broken, or wiped? What court costs can you recover? Can you recover loss of income? You've asked a few questions; I'll attempt to deal with them all, and I'll refer to each item as I do so. Damage to property This could apply to damage to property (items 1 and 3, which are more or less the same thing). The answer? The police may pay damages. Here's a recent example from 2008: Police in Britain paid out more than half a million pounds last year to repair doors, ceilings and even mantelpiece ornaments smashed in raids that were based on wrong information. ... The Home Office said that compensation policy was decided at force level but most police authorities draw tight legal lines round repayments. A spokesman for the Gwent force said: "The critical factor is simply whether forced entry is legal, proportionate and reasonable given the circumstances." Items seized as evidence In general, you are not entitled to compensation for an item that is seized for an extended duration of time (2). The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) ("PACE") states: (1) Subject to subsection (4) below, anything which has been seized by a constable or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20 above may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances. (4) Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose. If it's just the data on your phone they want, then they would be required by PACE to copy it and then return the device. Legal costs A successful defendant (4) is entitled to compensation in some cases, including costs incurred for expert witnesses. Schedule 7, para. 3 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 inserts additional provisions to the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985: (3)Condition A is that the accused is an individual and the order is made under— (a)section 16(1), (b)section 16(3), or (c)section 16(4)(a)(ii) or (iii) or (d). (4)Condition B is that the accused is an individual and the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in a court below which were— (a)proceedings in a magistrates’ court, or (b)proceedings on an appeal to the Crown Court under section 108 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (right of appeal against conviction or sentence). (5)Condition C is that the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in the Supreme Court. (10)In this section— “legal costs” means fees, charges, disbursements and other amounts payable in respect of advocacy services or litigation services including, in particular, expert witness costs; “advocacy services” means any services which it would be reasonable to expect a person who is exercising, or contemplating exercising, a right of audience in relation to any proceedings, or contemplated proceedings, to provide; “expert witness costs” means amounts payable in respect of the services of an expert witness, including amounts payable in connection with attendance by the witness at court or elsewhere; “litigation services” means any services which it would be reasonable to expect a person who is exercising, or contemplating exercising, a right to conduct litigation in relation to proceedings, or contemplated proceedings, to provide.” Basically, you can include the legal costs noted above: where the accused is an individual and the order is made under section 16(1), 16(3), or section 16(4)(a)(ii) or (iii) or (d) of the POA; where the accused is an individual and the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in a court below, which were either proceedings in a Magistrates Court, or proceedings on appeal to the Crown Court under Section 108 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 (right of appeal against conviction or sentence); or where the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in the Supreme Court; where the accused is an individual and the legal costs were incurred in relevant Crown court proceedings, as defined in POA s6A(11), and the Director of Legal Aid Casework has made a determination of financial ineligibility in relation to the accused and those proceedings (POA s16A(5A)). Compensation for loss of employment Loss of a job in and of itself is not generally grounds for compensation. What if you were arrested for some highly sought-after skill - say, computer vulnerability testing - and were acquitted by means of an affirmative defense? You might end up with a job that pays more. You are not entitled to any statutory relief. But, let's say it's something unflattering, and the police continued to broadcast your arrest and charges even though they were aware it was false. There's precedent for aggravated damages, as per Patel v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 645. In this case, the Claimant was stopped and searched upon entry to the UK. After being denied entry, the Claimant appealed the decision... the primary judge found that the immigration officers had falsified information pertaining to the Claimant's suitability to enter. Although this was appealed, I haven't been able to find the subsequent ruling; it's possible it was settled outside of court. However, this shows that judgement can - and has - been made against a defendant who causes pecuniary loss through malicious and contumelious conduct. I think I've covered everything, but it's hard to be sure. Consider your question into several separate questions in future :)
The fault lies with the people who vandalized your house. In general, whoever causes you damage is responsible (liable) for that damage. This is true whether or not you are selling your house, having guests over, letting a friend stay over for a night or a week, or whatever the circumstance is. Insurance is there to cover many such losses: if a friend trashes your house in a drunken rage, your insurance will cover the damage, but they will invoke the doctrine of subrogation whereby they get to go after the friend, and you have to cooperate. In a situation where nobody has a clue who did the damage, the only possible way that the agent has any responsibility is if they were negligent in their duty to take care of the house. For your specific case, you'd need to discuss the forensic facts with your attorney. But generally speaking, the issue would be whether the agent had breached his/her professional duty of care, which is best understood as comparing his actions (or lack) compares to actions of other professionals in the same circumstance. If a house has 3 or 4 sets of visitors simultaneously, it is really not possible for an agent to supervise all of them at once. So the question would be, was this the result of one concentrated vandalism attack, or serial vandalism. The former is more in the realm of "stuff happens", and the latter is indicative of an endemic lack of care. To repeat, the fault lies with the miscreants who vandalized your house. You, or your insurance company, may nevertheless have to bear the financial burden. Your insurance company will certainly have an interest in spreading responsibility to the realty firm, if warranted by the facts.
The security deposit goes with the lease, so he will transfer the deposit to the new owner, who will return it to you when the time comes. Unless, in your state, security deposits are put in escrow accounts, and again you will get it back at the end of the lease..
There is certainly no legal problem in asking if the tenants would be agreeable with the landlord discontinuing the security service. Even if it were in the lease, a lease like pretty much any contract can be changed by mutual agreement of all parties (unless there is a law preventing such a change, which is rare and I do not think will apply in this case). A more difficult question would be if the landlord would be within his or her rights to discontinue the service without asking the tenants first, since it is not in the lease. Since the property was advertised as coming with the service, it might be held that the continued service was reasonably expected by the tenants, and thus an implicit term of the lease. But since the landlord does not plan to take such unilateral action, that remains a purely theoretical issue. The landlord could offer the tenants a small rent reduction, perhaps one quarter of the amout that was being paid to the security firm, but there is no legal requirement to do so. As to whether asking for such a change would be "rude", I don't think so, but that is a matter of opinion, and not really on-topic here.
This likely comes down to contract law (note: I'm not a lawyer; this isn't legal advice). If his rental contract is not with you, you'll need to refer this to the property owner's representative. I don't see why just sharing the house would give tenants any eviction rights over other tenants. Even if you are the owner (cf “my house”), it would be unusual for independent tenants to be party to each other’s rental contracts. The other tenants are irrelevant to any eviction attempt, except perhaps as witnesses in court.
Do toll fees have to be indicated ahead of time in the United States to be enforceable? Do toll fees have to be indicated ahead of time in the United States to be enforceable? By indication, I mean some type of road sign. By "ahead of time," I mean early enough on the road to allow drivers to choose an alternative route. If the answer is state specific, I am mostly interested for in the states of California, Florida, and Massachusetts.
In California, the law for public bridges and highways appears to be as follows (emphasis mine): CA St & Hwy Code § 30843 (2017) Any person who operates a motor vehicle over a toll bridge or toll highway crossing and the approaches thereto constructed or acquired by any bridge and highway district, at the entrance to which appropriate signs have been erected to notify traffic that it is entering upon a toll bridge crossing or its approaches and is subject to the payment of tolls beyond the sign, is guilty of a misdemeanor in each of the following cases: (a) If the person refuses to pay the tolls. (b) If the person turns, or attempts to turn, the vehicle around in the bridge, approach, or toll plaza where signs have been erected forbidding the turning. (c) If the person refuses to pass through the toll gates after having come within the area where signs have been erected notifying traffic that it is entering the area where toll is collectible or where vehicles may not turn around and where vehicles are required to pass through the toll gates for the purpose of collecting tolls. So it appears the "last exit before toll" signs are sufficient. It doesn't say anything about posting the actual cost of the tolls.
One widely-used book on the topic is Brown's Boundary Control and Legal Principles. I have the 4th edition published in 1995, and the relevant chapter is 8, "Locating Easements and Reversions". The law varies from state to state. In New England, it is likely for interstate, US, and state highways, the state will own the roadbed in fee. Smaller roads are likely owned by the adjoining private owners, with the public holding a right-of-way that allows the government to build and maintain a road; the adjoinders are restricted from using the right-of-way in any manner that would interfere with the transportation use. The meaning of "right-of-way line" depends on context, but is likely to be the line between the pubic's right of way and the portion of the adjoining private property that is exclusively under the control of the private property owner. If the public records do not reveal the width of the road, there is likely to be a statute that states a default width of the road. This is discussed, for Vermont, in The History and Law of Vermont Town Roads by Paul Gillies
My guess is the answer to this question is going to be in your lease. You likely signed a lease that agreed that you would pay accept this practice and spelled out what ever rights you have to challenge the billings. My guess is they are as limited as the courts will allow in Florida. And the only way to ensure access to those records would be to get the court to compel they provide you with the records. Perusal of the Water codes in Florida does not appear to directly engage this practice(I could have missed it). However it appears that there is code regulating the management of electrical limits the billing to no more than the actual costs to the customer of record(probably your real estate management company.) According the the NCSL (This refers to electrical service. I am assuming there is similar language used elsewhere for plumbing, or that the intent of the law is uniformity of these codes in all utility billings. Where individual metering is not required and master metering is used in lieu thereof, reasonable apportionment methods, including submetering may be used by the customer of record or the owner of such facility solely for the purpose of allocating the cost of the electricity billed by the utility. The term “cost” as used herein means only those charges specifically authorized by the electric utility's tariff, including but not limited to the customer, energy, demand, fuel, conservation, capacity and environmental charges made by the electric utility plus applicable taxes and fees to the customer of record responsible for the master meter payments. The term does not include late payment charges, returned check charges, the cost of the customer-owned distribution system behind the master meter, the customer of record's cost of billing the individual units, and other such costs. Any fees or charges collected by a customer of record for electricity billed to the customer's account by the utility, whether based on the use of submetering or any other allocation method, shall be determined in a manner which reimburses the customer of record for no more than the customer's actual cost of electricity. Each utility shall develop a standard policy governing the provisions of submetering as provided for herein. Such policy shall be filed by each utility as part of its tariffs. The policy shall have uniform application and shall be nondiscriminatory (Fla. Administrative Code §25-6.049). Now here is where the 3rd party comes in. The 3rd party is the one levying fees for the management on your landlord. Granted if you follow the strings ill bet you find that the billing company is owned by the same company that owns your rental management firm. So your landlord can collect no more than what it costs to provide you with the service, but part of providing the service is employing this 3rd party utility management firm.
In Spain, most traffic offenses are usually considered administrative sanctions and involve just a relatively small fine, and perhaps losing some points in your licence. In those cases, if the driver if the vehicle cannot be established (your example, or a far regular one of a parking violation in which the officer did not see who did park it and will not wait by the side of the parker until the driver appears), the fine just goes to the registered owner. When the fine is reported to the registered owner of the vehicle, he can report who was the actual driver who broke the law at the time of the offense. I do not know what would happen if the person named does not recognize his responsability, but my guess is that the owner has to pay the fine (HINT: do not lend your car to someone who cannot be trusted). If the infraction is so excessive that it becomes a matter of penal law then there must be a trial and then the accused must be established without reasonable doubt, so in that case such a stunt maybe could work.
This varies greatly by state, but the pedestrians "right of way" is quite a common misconception. Pedestrians do not always have the right of way, but you're also not allowed to just run them over if they're in the middle of the street. That's why states have jaywalking laws, and a lot of people don't realize that they can be ticketed for it - because it's a huge safety concern for a pedestrian to walk in the street outside the designated areas. The NCSL provides a Pedestrian Crossing 50 State Summary that outlines the laws regarding pedestrian crossing. Particularly, there are two lines that frequently repeat throughout all the states: Pedestrians may not suddenly leave the curb and enter a crosswalk into the path of a moving vehicle that is so close to constitute an immediate hazard. Pedestrians must yield the right-of-way to vehicles when crossing outside of a marked crosswalk or an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection. Bottom line: if there is a pedestrian randomly in the middle of the street somewhere, you are fully obligated to attempt to not hit them with your vehicle. Feel free to curse them out (if that's your thing) because in most states they are themselves breaking a law. If an accident can't be prevented due to a pedestrian's actions, then the pedestrian is fully at fault and you will not be held responsible in any way.
There is a national standard that requires states to treat traffic control signals in a consistent manner. The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways defines nationwide standards for all roads open to public travel. States were required to adopt this standard as their legal State standard by 2012 or have in place a State standard that is in substantial conformance with the National Manual. In this manual you can find the standards for all traffic control devices, how they're to be placed and their meaning. Section 4D.04 Meaning of Vehicular Signal Indications, section 3C, describes what CIRCULAR RED and RED ARROW are meant to indicate (the bottom of page 451): Vehicular traffic facing a steady RED ARROW signal indication shall not enter the intersection to make the movement indicated by the arrow and, unless entering the intersection to make another movement permitted by another signal indication, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line; but if there is no stop line, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection; or if there is no crosswalk, then before entering the intersection; and shall remain stopped until a signal indication or other traffic control device permitting the movement indicated by such RED ARROW is displayed. When a traffic control device is in place permitting a turn on a steady RED ARROW signal indication, vehicular traffic facing a steady RED ARROW signal indication is permitted to enter the intersection to make the movement indicated by the arrow signal indication, after stopping. The right to proceed with the turn shall be limited to the direction indicated by the arrow and shall be subject to the rules applicable after making a stop at a STOP sign. Later in the same document, page 453, the language is more direct and indicates that turning shall not be permitted when facing a RED ARROW signal indication except as outlined above where other devices permit the movement: A steady RED ARROW signal indication shall be displayed when it is intended to prohibit traffic, except by a pedestrian signal head, from entering the intersection or other controlled area to make the indicated turn. Except as described in Item C.2. in Paragraph 3 of Section 4D.04 [the quoted text provided above], turning on a steady RED ARROW signal indication shall not be permitted. Unless there are other traffic control devices (signs) allowing it, one may not enter an intersection when facing a red arrow. Of course, someone authorized to direct traffic can override the traffic control devices. You can examine the standards adoption practice of the various states to see how any particular state has implemented the standard. New York, in particular, has adopted the national standard along with a State supplement. As an example supplement, New York's supplement for "Application of Steady Signal Indications" deals with protected U-turn movements where right turn on red is permitted by inserting the following language: If a protected U-turn movement is provided, and right turns on red are allowed from the conflicting approach from the left, a RIGHT TURN ON RED MUST YIELD TO U-TURN (R10-30) sign (see Section 2B.54) may be used to advise road users making the right turn on red of the operation.
Payable in advance means that you are paying for services prior to receiving them. Compare with payable in arrears, where you pay for something after receiving the service. In your situation, payable in advance means that the payment you make is for the period to come, rather than for the period just elapsed.
The state of Washington does not have an absolute requirement that vehicles must be registered. What it has is RCW 46.16A.030 (2): (2) It is unlawful for a person to operate any vehicle on a public highway of this state without having in full force and effect a current and proper vehicle registration and displaying license plates on the vehicle. Therefore you already have a means to comply with the law: simply refrain from operating this vehicle on any public highway of the state of Washington. In other words, don't drive or park it on public roads; keep it on private property. (In many states, "operating" includes parking; I could not immediately find out whether this is the case in Washington.) So now your question instead becomes: "What is the state's obligation to make it possible for me to lawfully drive this particular vehicle on the public roads?" And the answer to that is much more clearly, "none". Driving in general is considered a privilege and not a right, so your "personal liberty" is not at issue. The state is not doing a good job of providing a service which they generally do provide, which is certainly annoying, but is not a legal issue, and does not give you the right to break the law. I have considered proceeding with the restoration, and drafting an "Affidavit in lieu of registration" document detailing my numerous attempts to follow the process, and indicating a sincere desire to comply, but my concern would be having the vehicle impounded if/when I get pulled over. Yes, it probably would be. I have even considered asking local law enforcement to just issue me a citation so that I might appear in court and plead for an opportunity to be given the means to comply. (i.e. move to the head of the line...) You would still lose, unless the judge is particularly sympathetic. I have also considered writing to my state representative. That's a better idea - at least it doesn't involve violating the law. And legislators usually do make some effort to help constituents when they have problems with government offices. However, if the issue is simply that the State Patrol is overloaded with work, there may not be much they can do. Is there a statute of limitations for asserting ownership that might alleviate my concerns about proceeding with the project? The requirement to have an inspection before getting a title seems to be from RCW 46.12.530 (2): "The department may require additional information and a physical examination of the vehicle or of any class of vehicles, or either." So there is no exception written into statute. The implementing regulation looks to be WAC 308-56A-150. There are several criteria listed for when inspection is required, and I'm not sure which would apply to your vehicle. It may perhaps be "(g) ownership in doubt (WAC 308-56A-210)" which applies when you do not have the documentation described in WAC 308-56A-265. Or it may be the catchall "(c) One on which the identification number needs verification as requested by the department, county auditor, or authorized agent". You'll have to research this further. There doesn't seem to be any exception based specifically on the long time period that the car has been unregistered, or the fact that no theft is known to have been reported in the past 20 years, or anything like that.
Can you block the sidewalk in front of your house in a gated community? We been getting window stickers in a gated community about parking on our driveway and partly blocking sidewalks. Is it legal or not?
Gated communities are generally part of homeowner's associations that have covenants, rules and regulations regarding how you can use your property. In all likelihood, blocking sidewalk, and perhaps even parking in your driveway, is prohibited by these HOA limitations. HOA's have the right to ticket and fine you for violating its rules. The fines, if not paid, can be converted to liens and used to foreclose upon your property. You can also be banned from using HOA common areas if you do not refrain from violating HOA rules and/or don't pay your fines. This is perfectly legal. If you live in gated community, you are required to follow their rules. Even if you didn't live in an HOA, blocking a sidewalk is usually a violation of municipal ordinances and is tortious activity that can be the basis for a lawsuit against you.
Are political Flags ("Trump 2024") prohibited under the HOA's no signs rule? Why or why not? Probably. The Florida statute seems to imply that a flag is a type of sign and usually a political sign, even in the form of a flag, is still considered to be a sign. The Florida statute, in any case, only excludes the U.S. flag, not any other kind of flag. The First Amendment doesn't apply to an HOA declaration, although one could argue that FS 718 is a content based restriction of speech by exempting only the U.S. flag on particular days, and not other kinds of flags on other days, but that doesn't make a remedy clear. Allowing political signs isn't an obvious remedy for a 1st Amendment violation in FS 718.
This depends on the law of the specific jurisdiction, but there is non-trivial similarity in those rules across the US. The general rule is that the person who owns the property must maintain the property. There are often local ordinances that explicitly say that, for example this which is the legal mechanism behind this guidance on tree-trimming. A municipality can do the trimming, or they can send official letters to property owners telling them to trim the bushes. It does not matter whether the sign is on your property via an easement, what matters is where the tree is. You are not responsible for trimming your neighbor's tree if the stop sign is on your property.
I doubt that you will find an official answer to that question. No law allows you to block passing (even if passing is illegal). Therefore, you must allow passing. There are laws against obstructing traffic. Japanese law addresses this, defining obstructing progress as starting to move or continuing to move in circumstances that would likely cause another vehicle or streetcar to have to suddenly change speed or direction in order to avoid danger You'd have to specify how you intend to "not let" a person pass you, but I can't imagine what you could do that would not be "obstructing progress". A recent anti-road rage law allows license revocation for violation.
You can start here, with the attractive nuisance doctrine, which is aimed at children and the fact that they don't have adult common sense. The extent to which you are at risk depends on your jurisdiction. However, a fence does not necessarily protect you, because children can find a way to get around a fence, instead you need to eliminate the risk (so you also have to identify the risk). This article reviews some of the outcomes in attractive nuisance cases: there is no simple rule like "put up a fence and you're safe". Insurance is more predictable, as long as you read the fine print.
I gather that you either a) don't want the bike or b) are physically unable to retrieve it. You are acting like a spectator here. You ARE involved. By doing nothing, you are creating trouble for others, and failing to create a good. They must go through an extensive process to protect the rights of an owner they don't know who even is. What you should do, is to send a paper letter to the landlord at that complex. Dear landlord, You may have a bicycle at Location Here inside Apartment Complex Name Here. I am the owner of the bicycle. I had to leave the region, and I had to leave the bicycle behind. I cannot come back and claim it. Perhaps you know someone who could use a bicycle. Please give the bicycle to them, or dispose of it as you see fit. Here is the key to the lock. Signed, Your name Why a paper letter? Because you can't email a key! If you sent an email and key separately, they'd get confused. Plus, the signature on paper is legally binding, so they don't have to worry about it being a trick. Tape the physical key to a piece of paper, to keep it from rattling around and chewing a hole in the envelope. (it could be the paper the letter is written on, note that a printout of a Word document is fine). Paper letters have gone out of style, I know; you can work out how to send them, but an older person will help you do that faster, since well, we used to do everything that way. Now if you do want the bicycle, that gets harder. You will have to have one of your roommates give a key to someone who can retrieve it for you and store it for you. And you/they may need to coordinate with the landlord to even get access to it / find out if it's still there. This is probably a waste of your time.
There is a form, which both parties to the sale sign. Note that it does entail paying sales tax. There are other aspects to the sale which reinforce the "It's not my car anymore" message, such as returning the plates and getting a receipt for the plates. Even doing the sale in a DMV lot would not help you.
Damaging someone else's property is not protected free speech in the US. Nor is using someone else's property without permission and against the owner's wishes. Scenario 3 would surely be vandalism or "Malicious Mischief" or some similar offense, even if the paint can be fairly easily removed. The same would be petty surely true of scenario 2, as it would take at least some effort to remove the sticker, and it could be a safety hazard until it is removed (obstructed vision). Scenario 1 would probably not be even a minor crime, unless perhaps the person trespassed to attach the string. But the person has no right to insist that the car's owner not remove the sign. I am assuming that the car is owned by someone else, and the the person placing the sign, sticker or paint acted without permission from the owner or any authorized person.
Can you record a public school official with or without their consent? Some states such as Massachusetts have 2 party consent laws which restrict secret recordings by only one party, therefore, you have to ask public school officials if they consent to being recorded. The issue is they usually say no. I was wondering if it was legal to record public officials doing their job as they are employees of the public school district, which in turn is part of the state DoE? If you can record police officers while they're doing their public duty, you should be able to record public school officials during private meetings inside their offices, right? EDIT 7/20/18: While reading some case law, I came across this quote: “The filming of government officials engaged in their duties in a public place, including police officers performing their responsibilities, fits comfortably within [the] principles [of the First Amendment].” Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 Not sure why no one pointed this out, but does this not give the right to record any public official in a public place (i.e public property such as school grounds)?
I would say no, it's not the same. There's a reasonable expectation of privacy that you have in an office that isn't present when you're standing on a roadside or in a city park. In Glik v. Cunniffe, the First Circuit said "The filming of government officials engaged in their duties in a public place, including police officers performing their responsibilities" was in the spirit of the First Amendment. And this is not limited to police; an arrest "in the course of filming officials in the hallway outside a public meeting of a historic district commission" was found to be a First Amendment violation in Iacobucci v. Boulter (1st Cir. 1999). But a private meeting in an office is not a "public place" as it is meant in Glik (even if the building is owned by the government.) And the Glik decision says "To be sure, the right to film is not without limitations. It may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions."
Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings.
In the United States, You have no expectation of privacy in public. Anything you can see from a public place, you can take a picture of, even if the "victim" is in their own home but has the blinds open. If you are standing on a public sidewalk or street, you would legally be able to take a picture with certain exceptions. An exception to this would be: if with just your eyes you can see into a private home, you can take a picture of that, but if you require a telescopic lense with some sort of IR adapter to "see through" blinds. That MAY be considered illegal. For real world examples of this question, check out PINAC. Another example is "Creepy Camara Guy", https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vs6iLtl0BAw. This guy basically goes around recording videos of people in public in a VERY obnoxious way. But he is within his legal right. (Note: Video unavailable: "This video is no longer available because the YouTube account associated with this video has been terminated.")
Yes, this can land you in jail, no matter what In France, per article 226-1 du code pénal recording without consent may be punished by one year in jail and 45000€ fine. Any recording without authorization of all parties involved (including the owners or administrators of buildings recorded either outside or inside due to copyright of the architectural image) can also land you in legal trouble either criminally or in civil court. The consent is implied if the parties involved knew about it and had means to deny authorization but didn't, but mind that any recording, secret or not, can be considered non consented, which probably discourage anyone from recording anything in France. However you can still show these images obtained illegally in a court and the judge has the right to declare such recording justified (no statute about this, it is totally up to the judge) and thus allow you to use it as evidence both in civil or penal matters. It does not, however, protects you from being sued latter for the exposure of the recorded party, but the acceptance as evidence by a judge may serve as defense. This means that many forms of recording in France, including tourists taking pictures of the Eiffel tower, obviously without authorization of the administrators of the tower or any potential passer-by, is in fact committing a crime, although obviously the law in simply not enforced for these cases. However, if a filmmaker records the Eiffel Tower and makes millions in box office, the tower administration will probably go to the trouble of collecting some money threatening to press charges if not paid.
According to this article, the Malmö Administrative District Court found that the intent of the user is immaterial to whether a camera is being used for surveillance, so even if that is not why you are doing this, it counts legally as "surveillance". The law requires a permit from the länsstyrelse (county? government), according to the Kameraövervakningslag (2013:460) (article 8 states the requirement for permit, art. 16 tells you who to apply to). I believe that a tennis court would be considered a "public place", even if privately owned. Art. 17 tells you what goes into an application (there is probably a form), and art. 18 says that the kommun gets to weigh in. Presumably it would be critical to have a consent form signed before any recording happens, and you would include that in the application.
No, but... It is not an offense to photograph people, especially if they are just caught at the edge or out of the center of the photography. However you do not have a right to photograph people either. In fact, under German law, you have to gain the consent of people that are the centerpiece of a photo for publication, or make the photo for a number of enumerated reasons. Among such is news reporting or documenting an ongoing crime - such material is made in the public interest. If you make a photo without consent or qualified reason, possession of the photo in general is no problem but you have no right to publish the photo. To prevent such publication, the photographed person may demand deletion or destruction of the photo - however, following the demand is not explicitly required. Such a demand however is equivalent to an explicit demand to not publish the picture. As such, it gets really tricky for the photographer. Publication without a release (or a no-release statement) or one of the few excusing reasons is a punishable offense, which can land you in prison for up to one year. This stems from Art. 2 GG, §22, §23 and §33 Kunsturhebergesetz. Hindering rescue services with your camera and creating photos of injured and vulnerable people is illegal under the same reasoning. Getting into the way of the police can constitute obstruction of emergency helpers atop of that. More on that specific part of German law can be learned in this question. Do note that such photography can also be a crime under §201a StGB, especially if your photography shows someone as vulnerable. Another possibility for the approaching police might have been, that the policeman was interested to find out if you might have photographed or filmed the incident that led to the arrest. In that case, he might have requested a copy for evidentiary reasons.
Better Call Saul is set in New Mexico where as long as one-person involved in the conversation is aware that it is being recorded, it is legal. Known as "one-party consent". This varies state to state. http://www.detectiveservices.com/2012/02/27/state-by-state-recording-laws/ http://www.aapsonline.org/judicial/telephone.htm If neither Jimmy nor Chuck knew the conversation was being recorded, then it would be illegal.
Editing is protected speech under the First Amendment. The government may not require any license to perform such services, though an author could impose whatever credentialing requirements she chooses. If you have created a business to provide those services, that business may need to be registered with/licensed to business in the state generally, but again, it would not require any special licesnse to perform editing services. Whether you provide those services as an individual or as the agent of a business entity, any income you derive from editing is subject to taxation the same as any other income you receive.
Is it legal to record conversations with police? If I am stopped by the police for questioning on the street, would I be within my rights to record the conversation on my phone to avoid any looseness with accounts of what was said on either side? Would the police officer be allowed to refuse my request to record the conversation? And what if my phone just happened to be on my body recording before any conversation was initiated? (I am asking this from the perspective of an Australian in Victoria - but I'm sure the answer from other jurisdictions would be interesting also.)
In New South Wales it is entirely legal to film police (or anyone else). However, as discussed (What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?) audio recording is more restricted: you must either have the permission of all the participants in a conversation or be a party to the conversation. I do not imagine the law is any different in Victoria.
Is there any way I can defend myself against penalties when mistakes are made in my favor? Another option, in a similar vein to your suggestions, is to make a contemporaneous record of the conversations. Then send an email* to the public official detailing what was said and agreed, along with a request that they reply with any observations or amendments within a certain time frame. That way you have a date-stamped document properly addressed to the other party to use as evidence or leverage. *or a recorded delivery letter etc
This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs.
It's illegal if the intent is to deceive. Under S50(1) of the Police Act 1996: Any person who with intent to deceive impersonates a member of a police force or special constable, or makes any statement or does any act calculated falsely to suggest that he is such a member or constable, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both. Their intent would need to be proven. It will be fact-specific; in some cases far easier to prove than in others. The criminal justice system is overburdened and underfunded so it is no surprise that these trolling videos are given no priority whatsoever. Further complicating the matter is the need to correctly identify the individual to prosecute. Doing so would require a fair amount of police time, time that could perhaps be spent on more urgent priorities given the relative lack of harm these videos are doing compared to more serious crimes. However, in this video (Would You Help a Police Officer Having An Asthma Attack?) an S50(2) offence would seem to have been committed by the actor wearing the police clothing: Any person who, not being a constable, wears any article of police uniform in circumstances where it gives him an appearance so nearly resembling that of a member of a police force as to be calculated to deceive shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. It does appear that both offences are being committed in these various videos, and the only reason people aren't being prosecuted is practical: there are more serious crimes to focus on, and the police would need to identify who exactly committed this crime--given these all happened at least two years ago, it would be challenging to say the least. They also seem to commit the separate crime of wasting police time, for example by approaching cops in the street and falsely confessing to crimes. Under S5(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1967, wasting police time is a criminal offence. Bringing proceedings in court requires the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) since those proceedings could have a chilling effect on the propensity of the public to report genuine matters to the police in the future. It is likely that while "wasteful employment" of police time was caused by these people, so committing the offence, it is likely viewed simply as "part and parcel" of the job and the officer likely didn't spend any time at all investigating the confessions (depending on their nature). Of course, even if the officer did spend time investigating the false confessions, the DPP would need to give their consent so unless the person has a demonstrated history of doing this (that would stand up in court) or the time wasted was of a particularly serious nature (e.g. the man who falsely claimed to be the Yorkshire Ripper), it seems unlikely consent would be granted.
The law 'doesn't care' how the call is recorded. What matters is whether or not you should inform / should have informed the participant(s) in the circumstances. In circumstances where you are acting as an ordinary member of the public, in the course of a purely personal or household activity, not in a journalistic capacity, regulated business or other circumstances where the rules may differ: In the UK it is not unlawful for a private person to record a phone call without the permission or foreknowledge of the other participant(s) - provided the recording is for 'personal use'. If you intend to share the content of the call with a third-party or make it public, then you must inform the person ahead of recording it. If you try to use a covertly recorded call as evidence in court, the court may or may not exclude it depending on the circumstances.
First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not.
I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.
You acted illegally in assaulting your fellow student. When you are in public, a person can legally take your picture, and you are not allowed to assault a person because you do not like their legal actions. Any degree of force is excessive except in certain responses to illegal fource, and even the threat of force is excessive. You also have no right to demand that a person prove that they didn't take your picture, and certainly no right to enforce that demand with physical violence.
Treason, Sedition and the US Bill of Rights In 2018, where are lines drawn between treason, sedition, and constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and assembly? Publishing a neutral, fact-based article on a contentious topic, citing sources and giving each side an opportunity to respond, but which can be construed as portraying the USA in a negative light. Publishing a biased, opinion-based article on a contentious topic, selectively citing sources without giving each side an opportunity to respond, and which intentionally portrays the US in a negative light. Same as 2, but in this case you are working in collaboration with foreign entities and/or agents in support of their goals. Same as 3, but you are being paid or receiving some other concrete consideration. Same as 2, but your activities include organizing groups of other citizens to participate. Same as 4, but you organize groups of other citizens to participate. Same as 5, but beyond publishing, you engage in civil disobedience to subvert the usual rule of law. Same as 6, but beyond publishing, you engage in civil disobedience to subvert the usual rule of law. Same as 7, except activities include rioting, looting or other serious criminal activities. Same as 8, except activities include rioting, looting or other serious criminal activities. Assume that all anti-American sentiment is aligned with a specific foreign nation's interests. Consider each case: the foreign nation is a close ally of the US the foreign nation has neutral relations with the US the foreign nation is a bitter rival with cold relations to the US the foreign nation is in a state of open, declared war with the US
Relevant Law Treason Treason is constitutionally defined as waging war on the United States, or giving aid and comfort to its enemies. The definition doesn't formally say so, but only someone who owes allegiance to the United States (i.e. a U.S. citizen) can be guilty of treason. The federal treason statute states: Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. 18 USC Section 2381. The main limitations are in bold. The word "enemy" has a technical meaning in the area of treason and foreign relations, which means a country or insurgent group with whom the United States is at war. Thus, the following are not "enemies" of the United States: the foreign nation is a close ally of the US the foreign nation has neutral relations with the US the foreign nation is a bitter rival with cold relations to the US But, this one is an enemy of the United States: the foreign nation is in a state of open, declared war with the US Hence, a U.S. citizen giving aid and comfort to ISIS (with whom we have a Congressionally authorized war) as it tries to mount a terrorist attack on the U.S. might very well be treason, but assisting Russia (with whom the U.S. is not at war) in assassinating an American would not be. I don't know if North Korea is a current "enemy" of the United States or not. The Korean War is not over, but I don't know if the U.S. declaration of war on North Korea is still in force. It is also a lesser felony to failure to report treason in progress to the authorities, with treason itself defined in essentially the same way. 18 USC Section 2882. Thus, U.S. citizens have a legal duty enforceable with criminal law to affirmatively report treason. Rebellion or insurrection Also rebellion or insurrection is a crime defined as follows: Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. 18 USC Section 2383 The bold language greatly restricts the applicability of this crime. This is not something you can really do by yourself, you need to be part of an organized insurgency group actively trying to overthrow the U.S. government by force. Affiliation with a foreign power is irrelevant to this offense. Sedition Sedition (actually seditious conspiracy) is defined as: If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 18 USC Section 2384. The highlighted portions are the least culpable ones that qualify for the offense of seditious conspiracy, which are subject to some significant case law glosses of interpretation. At a minimum seditious conspiracy must involve defiance of the authority of the United States. Simply committing serious crimes against the United States (e.g assassinating a high government official or blowing up a government building), while acknowledging that the United States is the legitimate government of the United States acting within its authority and not seeking regime change (not just new personnel but a new constitution not adopted by constitutional means), is not sufficient. Your involvement with a foreign power is neither necessary nor sufficient for conduct to be seditious. Advocating the overthrow of the United States government Advocating the overthrow of the United States government is also a crime in some circumstances (subject to significant judicial case law glosses): Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government; or Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so; or Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof— Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction. If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this section, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction. As used in this section, the terms “organizes” and “organize”, with respect to any society, group, or assembly of persons, include the recruiting of new members, the forming of new units, and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs, classes, and other units of such society, group, or assembly of persons. 18 USC Section 2385. Collaboration with a foreign power isn't an element of this crime and is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish it. The key limitations and most inclusive provisions are in bold. The First Amendment significantly limits that application of this crime as applied, but it is not unconstitutional in all circumstances. Your Examples Numbers 1-2 would never be crimes of any kind as described and not reading anything else into them. Numbers 3-6 are not illegal per se, but you may be required to register as a foreign agent and these activities may be illegal for someone holding certain government offices. Nothing in 1-6 would constitute treason or sedition or rebellion. Civil disobedience is a description that speaks more to the reason and motive for the action than the action itself so it is hard to say what you mean by 7-8. Somebody could call blowing up the Capitol "civil disobedience" or could mean protesting in violation of a curfew ordinance. Some of those activities could constitute a seditious conspiracy. With respect to 9-10, the acts involved are more clear, but the motive and context remain in doubt. Some of this activity could conceivably be a seditious conspiracy, but we don't have enough context here to know.
Yes Impeachment proceedings (as are all activities of Congress) are legal proceedings in that they are enabled by the Constitution. While it is true that they are not judicial proceedings, the activities of the legislature as with the executive (like a police interview) and judiciary (like a trial) are legal processes and the Fifth Amendment rights apply. During the McCarthy “red scare” era, pleading the fifth was commonplace by witnesses to Congressional hearings. However, pleading the fifth does not mean you can avoid testifying. If subpoenaed you would need to turn up and answer the questions, pleading the fifth when the answer could incriminate you in a criminal matter.
In the US, there are no (and can be no) laws against hate speech. You also cannot sue a person for using an ethnic or similar epithet. A false accusation, however, might be grounds for a defamation lawsuit. Word connotations do not matter, what matters is the denotation, for example calling someone a "rapist" denotes a specific criminal act. Even calling someone a rapist isn't necessarily defamatory, since hyperbole abounds especially on the internet, so in order to actually be defamation, the statement would have to be understood as a particular accusation (a form of unlawful sexual assault). A defamatory statement has to be made with reckless disregard for the truth of a statement, which is not the case in the situation you describe (perhaps the person correctly said that so-and-so is a therapist, but was ineffective in their use of English).
Eugene Volokh categorizes this as "crime-facilitating speech" in his articles, "The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes", and "Crime-Facilitating Speech". He characterizes the situation like this: Some chemistry textbooks discuss how explosives are made, some posts to computer security discussion groups discuss security bugs in a leading operating system, and some works on criminology or forensics discuss how hard-to-solve murders are committed. May the explicitly politically connected speech be treated as more valuable than the scientific speech? The Supreme Court has never decided a case squarely involving the suppression of scientific speech, but it has repeatedly described scientific speech as constitutionally equal in value to political speech. He presents a split amongst the circuits and statutes regarding mens rea for crimes stemming from such speech. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue. In one example case, the 9th Circuit ruled that merely distributing computer code "with the knowledge that it would likely be used for bookmaking" could be punished. Other cases have held that speech must "purposely" rather than incidentally inform people how to commit a crime in order for that speech to be punished.
In most countries, there is a standard format for citations. The guiding principle behind these is to make it easy to verify the law says what you claim it says. So you only need to give information needed to find the law you are citing. Usually, citations go the opposite of your example -- they start with the most general reference, and get more specific. Also, most citations only give information for sections that are numbered or lettered. Unless sentences are numbered or lettered, I would not cite them. For example, to find something in the US code, we need to know the: Title/Chapter/Section/subsection...and so on. For example, the federal law prohibiting the ownership of machine guns is in US Code, Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Ch 44 Firearms, § 922 Unlawful Acts subsection (o)(1). Since sections are numbered consecutively, we usually leave out the chapter: 18 USC § 922(o)(1). In Ukraine, it appears law is organized into Codes, Chapters, Articles and Sections. Since Articles are numbered consecutively, we can leave out the Chapters. Thus, the citation for the definition of murder would be Ukrainian Criminal Code, Art 115 § 1. Caveat: I am not an expert in Ukrainian law and may be wrong on some details, so you should look at some Ukrainian legal sources to double check.
united-states Is a personal text (like a diary), submitted without the consent of the author, admissible evidence? Usually, it is admissible evidence. There is no legal right to keep your diary private. Production of a diary may be compelled by subpoena and admitted into evidence subject only to general considerations regarding whether particular entries in the diary are inadmissible for some other reason (e.g. lack of relevance, they recite the contents of an otherwise privileged discussion, they contain hearsay, they recite the terms of a settlement offer, the recite inadmissible prior act evidence, etc.). If the diary revealed information that could place the diarist at risk of criminal prosecution, the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination could arguably be claimed even in a civil case, but at the risk of an adverse inference to be drawn from that decision in civil matters. I haven't ever seen how that issue is resolved legally.
The restrictions of the First Amendment have been made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. For the right to assemble, this was recognized in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). But note that the right only protects peaceable assembly. When it is alleged that improper violence or other properly unlawful action has occurred, the state may make that criminal, and indeed laws against rioting have existed throughout the history of the US. Whether a law is criminalizing peaceful assembly or prohibiting unlawful violence is a question that depends on th wording of the law, and the way it is applied In the De Jonge opinion the Court wrote: The broad reach of the statute as thus applied is plain. While defendant was a member of the Communist Party, that membership was not necessary to conviction on such a charge. A like fate might have attended any speaker, although not a member, who "assisted in the conduct" of the meeting. However innocuous the object of the meeting, however lawful the subjects and tenor of the addresses, however reasonable and timely the discussion, all those assisting in the conduct of the meeting would be subject to imprisonment as felons if the meeting were held by the Communist Party. ... While the States are entitled to protect themselves from the abuse of the privileges of our institutions through an attempted substitution of force and violence in the place of peaceful political action in order to effect revolutionary changes in government, none of our decisions goes to the length of sustaining such a curtailment of the right of free speech and assembly as the Oregon statute demands in its present application. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, under the New York statute defining criminal anarchy, the defendant was found to be responsible for a "manifesto" advocating the overthrow of the government by violence and unlawful means. Id. pp. 268 U. S. 656, 268 U. S. 662, 268 U. S. 663. In Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, under the California statute relating to criminal syndicalism, the defendant was found guilty of willfully and deliberately assisting in the forming of an organization for the purpose of carrying on a revolutionary class struggle by criminal methods ... Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Gitlow v. New York, supra, p. 268 U. S. 666; Stromberg v. California, supra, p. 283 U. S. 368; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 283 U. S. 707; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 297 U. S. 243, 297 U. S. 244. The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press, and is equally fundamental. As this Court said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 92 U. S. 552: implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. The First Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees that right against abridgment by Congress. But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions -- principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 272 U. S. 316; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 287 U. S. 67; Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra.
In the United States at least, the answer is clearly "Yes". Absent some restrictive agreement to which the would-be blogger is explicitly a party, a person has a protected right to comment or report on events and publish opinions of them. The question does not mention a location or jurisdiction, and I am not suren what the law on this point might be in non-US jurisdictions.
When was pretrial detention first declared constitutional? I assume that early on in American history, pretrial detention was at some point challenged for its constitutionality. Is that the case? I have also heard that pretrial detention is illegal as a means of punishment, what case does that standard come from?
The eighth amendment, by prohibiting excessive bail, implies that pretrial detention is constitutional in at least some circumstances: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Some may be surprised to learn that this was not at all innovative. There is a virtually identical clause in the English Bill of Rights, a century earlier: That excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted. From this it should be clear that pretrial detention was already widely accepted as necessary in some cases (in fact, it was the norm for centuries), so it is unlikely that anyone thought that the constitution or bill of rights had sought to abolish it. The assertion that pretrial detention is illegal as a means of punishment follows directly from two principles, namely: That the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. It is not appropriate to punish someone whose guilt has not been proven. That the purpose of pretrial detention, in keeping with the presumption of innocence, is not to punish. Rather, it is primarily intended to secure the presence of the accused at trial and to prevent the person from committing more crimes. Wikipedia has more information at its articles on bail and the eighth amendment's excessive bail clause. Consequently, there is unlikely to be any case in which the constitutionality of pretrial detention, generally, is at issue. Rather, you will find cases in which particular elements of an individual's pretrial detention are alleged to violate some constitutional right, which, in addition to the protections already mentioned, includes the right to a speedy trial.
Can the prosecutor and/or the judge be sued for dereliction of duty, and for non-uniform application of the law? No. Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their actions in the course of their duties in connection with the court process. Prosecutors have effectively absolute discretion in their charging decisions and in their decisions to reduce the charges sought against a defendant (prior to jeopardy attaching when a jury is sworn in). Can the outcome of a bench trial be appealed on grounds that the judge did not inform the defendant of his rights Yes. or that his rights were taken away by unwarranted modification of the charges? No. Incidentally, there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in a case where six months or less of incarceration is sought as a penalty, and there is no federal constitutional right to counsel unless incarceration is a possible penalty. The Utah State Constitution distinguishes between criminal matters and non-criminal matters in several respects mostly found in the state's bill of Rights (Article I of the State Constitution) in Sections 8, 10, 12, 13, and 19. But, it is fundamentally the right of the state through its prosecutors to decide what charges to press against someone, and they are well within their rights to change their minds. Often, this will be in your favor because reducing an offense to a civil infraction rather than a misdemeanor will have far fewer collateral consequences related to having a criminal record.
Your assumption is incorrect -- the Bill of Rights proper does not apply to the states, and pre-14th Amendment only bound the federal government. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 US 243. States could do whatever they wanted, subject to federal legislation on the matters given to the federal government and subject to their own constitutions. After the Civil War, the federal government was much less OK with so-called "black codes," restricting the rights of freedmen based on explicitly racial distinctions, with not even a fig leaf of justification that it applied to all citizens. The federal government could prevent federal discrimination, but no tools existed to prevent state discrimination. Hence, the 14th Amendment, which bound the states to adopt certain standards in their lawmaking and let Congress take action against those that didn't.
It is possible that there is such a booklet in some jurisdiction, and that local police are required to carry that booklet and show it to persons on demand. This link (apparently) publicly provides the police manual for the city of Seattle, except it is 5 years and a major lawsuit out of date. No provision seems to exist that requires showing authority to detain, when requested. There is no general requirement for all police and all laws, in the US, and the full set of state, county and city codes would be impractical to lug around. If required by law to carry and display some such document, then by law a person can demand to see a police officer's authority to detain. Even without such a law, you have a First Amendment right to challenge the detention, but that does not also enable you to resist arrest. A detention is not invalidated by the fact that the detainee is unsatisfied that the detention is legal.
It is not the case that treason must be tried by a military tribunal. See for example US v. Kawakita, which was an ordinary civilian jury trial. I cannot even imagine why one would think that there is any such requirement. Here is the federal law against treason, and nothing says "offenses must be tried in a military court". Perhaps that misconception was based on the use of military tribunals during the American Revolution, which preceded the creation of a US legal system.
In the US, if a person enters a guilty plea, a judge may proceed to convict and sentence the accused without any form of trial. In the case of minor offenses with possible penalties of less than six months in jail, there is no US constitutional right to a jury trial. and the accused may be convicted and sentenced after a bench trial with no jury. In the case of infractions that are not criminal, such as many traffic offenses, a judge or magistrate may make a judgment and impose a penalty after a brief and often informal hearing. In some non-US jurisdictions, there is no right to a jury trial even in serious cases. In most such jurisdictions some form of due process and some hearing or trial is required for conviction. However, in various authoritarian regimes, people may be "convicted" of "crimes" without anything like a trial before an independent tribunal. In short, this depends on the nature of the case, and the laws of the jurisdiction involved.
Even if unlimited resources were available, in order to have a fair trial, the prosecution and defense both need time to prepare their cases, research the law, conduct investigations, gather evidence, interview witnesses, seek out experts, order forensic tests, etc, etc. And there will be pretrial motions that have to be prepared, argued, and judged. You have to figure out what's going to happen to the defendant during that time, be it detention, release, bail, or some other alternative. Shortages of personnel obviously exacerbate the delays, but even without that issue, it's not like the courts could try every defendant on the spot. That would be something like the Wild West, or the Dark Ages; certainly not what the modern world considers justice.
In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful?
Is altering the manufacture date of anything a fraud? Today I bought a cordless drill from Amazon. I immediately noticed something weird: on the label, under the inevitable "made in china" text, there is what looks like a manufacturing date. However, it's wrong because it reads "2018-12". Assuming the possibility of it coming from the future is unlikely to say the least, it might have been made on purpose. Why would they do that? I think it could be in case they weren't able to sell that unit, so that they could pretend it is newer than it really is. This might be unpleasant for the customer, expecially considering the aging that the included lithium batteries are subject to. My question is: is this behaviour by the manufacturer illegal? What should I do now?
It may be illegal under product labelling regulations that apply to that kind of product (or under a general deceptive trade practices act), but even then, only if you are interpreting the numbers, whose meaning is not clearly spelled out, correctly. But, to be actionable as fraud it must, among other things, be a misrepresentation as to a material fact (which if the goods, such as cordless drills, are not perishable it probably isn't) and the recipient of the misrepresentation must have justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation (which is necessary not true in the case of a representation that it was made in December 2018 on a product sold no later than July of 2018). It is also not entirely clear that this is a "made on" date. It could refer, for example, to the the twelfth batch or lot or shipment of products made in 2018, and not to the month of December, or it could refer to a product made in 2018 at factory number 12. @NateEldredge in the comments also makes the plausible observation that it could be a week number which is a common system in manufacturing which would put it in a more reasonable March 2018 time frame. You probably shouldn't do anything, because you haven't been harmed by this cryptic string of numbers embossed on the product, and even if you were, your damages would not be worth the time or money involved to pursue it as anything other than part of a class action lawsuit.
If you cannot legally purchase a gun in Utah due to any restriction, such as residency, and you engage someone else to knowingly buy or gift you a gun (such as a "straw man" purchase from a dealer or private sale), that is illegal. From the same link you posted (my emphasis): Can I buy a firearm as a gift for someone? Yes, as long as the receiver is not a prohibited person and the gifting is not being used to circumvent a background check or other laws. Calling a purchase intended in place of another is a straw purchase.
No, they are not exempt Consumer protection laws (in general) apply to anyone doing business with consumers in that jurisdiction. You need to follow that law and apply to the company for a refund in compliance with the law. If they refuse, you can report them to the German regulator who may, or may not, take action against them. If you paid with a credit card, PayPal etc., once the company has broken the law, you can apply to them for a reversal of the charge. Similarly, most online platforms like eBay or Amazon will reverse the charge if you used them.
Are online stores supposed to state the true “order cost”/value of an order on the package/envelope for the customs? Yes Is it common practice to slash 10x off of the price for the customs to not add various fees? Common? Probably no. Uncommon? Also, probably no. Isn't that illegal? Yes Of course, they can claim it was a mistake if ever found out, but if they do it consistently, that seems difficult... Not to mention there must be electronic proof of how much each order actually cost the customer? Yes Look, robbing banks is illegal but people still rob banks. Similarly, ripping off HM Revenue & Customs is illegal but people still do that too. In fact, far more people do that than rob banks.
It is not a bait and switch, nor false advertising. It might be a violation of contract, depending on the exact wording of the TOS or other agreement with the site. Probably not. "Bait and switch" refers to the tactic of advertising a specific product at a good price to draw one into a store (or to a site) and then claiming to be out of the advertised item, and attempting to sell the buyer a different item, usually one that is not as good a bargain. Even then, this is only illegal in most places if the seller did not have enough stock to meet reasonably anticipated demand. A notice such as "quantities limited" or "while supplies last" generally makes this legal. If no attempt is made to "switch" the customer to a different product, there is also usually no illegality. Whether this is false advertising depends on exactly how it was advertised. If the TOS or ads contained wording such as "no purchase is final until confirmed with airline" then there is probably no false advertising, but the exact definition depends on the specifics of local law, and the details of the facts will matter a good bit.
Providing the antenna was installed in accordance with the law it's hard to see what basis they could either void their lease or seek damages. The antenna poses no risk to health (non-ionising RF radiation is harmless) and you have no rights in any view it may be blocking there is no damage. The only thing that I can see is if there was misrepresentation at the time the lease was formed. That is, the developer knew that there was going to be an antenna and specifically said there wouldn't be. This falls flat if a) they never mentioned antennas or b) the decision to install it was made after the lease was formed.
If the tool circumvents Windows' copy protection (which is a computer question, not a legal one, but I cannot imagine a circumstance in which this isn't access-circumvention), then it is a violation of 17 USC 1201, which forbids "circumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title". It is both illegal to use, and to "manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic" in such a program.
Main Question: Most likely not under Magnuson-Moss or U.C.C.. Question 1: If a charge payable before hand was not set forth in any written warranty, it is most likely not legal to deny remedy to the consumer. However, even if it was, it is possible that it would not meet the federal minimum standards for warranties as, per paragraph (d) a warranty has to provide for remedy without a charge. If there is absolutely no way for you to obtain the information to prove that a remedy is due — for e.g. no third party has legal or technical capacity to diagnose the vehicle — that is likely also a term to be found unconscionable and void, and may be found fraudulent, malicious and/or oppressive which may entitle one to collect punitive damages. (It is worth obtaining written confirmation of whether this decision is made in accord with their policies or on a line that they announce to be recorded) Question 2: Most likely same as Question 1. Question 3: Most likely same as Question 2. According to 15 U.S.C., subsection (a) of Section 2302 entitled "Full and conspicuous disclosure of terms and conditions; additional requirements for contents: "In order to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products, any warrantor warranting a consumer product to a consumer by means of a written warranty shall, to the extent required by rules of the Commission, fully and conspicuously disclose in simple and readily understood language the terms and conditions of such warranty. (4) A statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a defect, malfunction, or failure to conform with such written warranty—at whose expense—and for what period of time." (5) A statement of what the consumer must do and expenses he must bear. (6) Exceptions and exclusions from the terms of the warranty. (7) The step-by-step procedure which the consumer should take in order to obtain performance of any obligation under the warranty, including the identification of any person or class of persons authorized to perform the obligations set forth in the warranty. (12) The characteristics or properties of the products, or parts thereof, that are not covered by the warranty. (13) The elements of the warranty in words or phrases which would not mislead a reasonable, average consumer as to the nature or scope of the warranty. It may, in addition to any or all of the above, be a violation of paragraph (8), (9), (10) and/or (11) based on specific fact patterns. To the 2nd point added: If the manufacturer stated that the vehicle would run at least a certain number of miles on a full charge for a certain number of miles driven or number of years, and did not stipulate it otherwise, they would have to remedy this. It is highly likely that they tried to evade making such written statement (if not written, it's not a warranty under Magnuson-Moss). If they did, and they did not define the scope of what they would have to do in the case of a defect or malfunction, they would have to remedy it by repairs within a reasonable time; if they fail, they would have to refund or replace. This does not mean that it is likely worth pursuing the matter in court other than maybe in small claims (See: ohwilleke's reply to this question for a general explanation). Moreover, most auto manufacturers put arbitration provisions in their sale contracts and/or their warranties and generally it may be required of one to opt out of it within 30 days of entering into the agreement. If that took place, first the dispute would likely need to be disputed through a qualified dispute resolution mechanism of the manufacturer, dealer, distributor and/or sellers choice depending on who gave the warranty. The specific State's lemon laws may provide for civil penalties for willful violations which may or may not be a very high bar to meet depending on the State's case law, and which is more likely to make it worth for "lemon" lawyers to take the case, but generally they are not a great deal more like hyenas of this segment of the law. It may still be worth considering for one depending on the specific facts, including State jurisdiction and the impeding nature of the nonconformity. (Please specify a State for the State's lemon laws applicable in this hypo)
Does the United States legally not recognize phds from any specific country? For example, If I got a PhD from a school in Pakistan or North Korea would the United States still legally recognize it?
No. Nor would the United States recognize your degree if you got them from the UK or France, or even from within the United States. The United States does not legally protect or sanction PhD holders as such, and has no role in the awarding of nor forming guidelines for PhD programs (other than funding, directly or indirectly, much of the research that is required). Your comments suggest that you think there are legal issues with falsely claiming to hold a doctorate; there are not, outside of normal fraud concerns for deception (wherein someone relies on you or your expertise to their detriment, based on your ), which can affect legitimate doctorate holder's as well (for example, someone with a doctorate in Music presenting themselves as an expert in Economics, for the purposes of soliciting investments, say). For example there are a variety of performers who do not hold doctorates, but legally have stage names containing "Doctor" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_stage_names has a dozen), because they are committing fraud in doing so (a claim of "I liked this song when I thought it was written by a PhD" would be laughed out of court, because holding a PhD has no bearing on musical composition). There are, however, legal issues with falsely claiming to be a member of certain legally regulated and licensed professions in the United States, such as lawyers and physicians. I believe that this is the source of your confusion, as these professions often have protected titles that contain the term "doctor", such as physicians (MD, for Medical Doctor, and dentists(DDS, for Doctor of Dental Surgery). It should also be noted that physicians are almost universally addressed as "Doctor", but very few actually hold doctorates, the MD being a non-academic professional degree that doesn't require doing any new research.
In the US, it is illegal to sell screwdrivers to Gaza without a license, see 31 CFR 595.409. There are numerous rules pertaining to the Palestinian Authority staring here. Dept. of State has a partial list of countries and their associated restrictions, if you want "like Gaza", and note that they warn you that this is not a complete list. If you are specifically interested in weapons-related restrictions, the US Munitions List is here. There is no generic "anti-drone" system, so you would have to look at the specifics of a system to see if it is on the restricted list, or not.
There is a relevant rule, the "posting rule", according to which an acceptance is effective once posted (this is a quirk of acceptances). This would be as soon after 7 May 2016 as Bobby sent his letter, presumably well before the deadline. So yes, a professional lawyer would be needed. If Bobby is in Australia, it might be more complicated; if Bobby is in Norway, it's simpler because they don't have the posting rule.
The United States would be one such country. I'm sure it is not the only one. In the case of countries with constitutional courts there is basically no one to second guess their interpretations which is also true when the apex court in a country provides an opinion. Since no one can overrule many of these courts, they are allowed to do what they want.
If both parties are legal, permanent residents of California, their marriage is recognized under Californian law no matter where it originated (provided that the marriage doesn’t violate Californian law, e.g. if Alice were a minor). Alice and Bob would file for divorce in California and the matter would be adjudicated under a Californian court and under Californian law. After these proceedings, Alice and Bob would still be married in Afghanistan (and maybe other foreign countries? That’s a tricky question, so if someone else can figure it out please leave a comment!) but the US would cease to recognize the marriage. In no case would either a Californian or Afghan court make a ruling under the other’s laws. As far as child custody, property, etc. the divorce would essentially proceed as a normal divorce case, although things could become complicated if Alice and Bob own property in Afghanistan, which would usually still be able to be appropriated by a Californian court but, once again, the matter is complex since Afghanistan still recognizes the marriage. As you can tell, a divorce of this nature is not as complicated as one might think, but nevertheless could create some complicated legal situations. Also, marriage is regulated state-by-state, so other states may have different rules regarding foreign marriages. As always, the best path of action is to consult an attorney who specializes in divorce. Edit: A commenter brought up the issue of whether California would recognize a marriage where both parties weren’t present. While this varies by state, California generally doesn’t allow so-called “proxy marriage” unless one of the parties is deployed in the military.
As long as they have diplomatic immunity, they don't have a residency status. If either parent didn't have diplomatic immunity, then the child is a subject to the jurisdiction and they become a citizen at birth. The short explanation with the reasoning can be found on the uscis website. Namely Children born in the United States to accredited foreign diplomatic officers do not acquire citizenship under the 14th Amendment since they are not “born . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” and If one parent was an accredited diplomat, but the other was a U.S. citizen or non-citizen U.S. national, then the child was “born . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” and is a citizen.
Any duty that exists is not legally enforceable in the courts in the U.S. (there are one or two cases in Canada imposing a similar duty in extraordinary rendition cases). Also, the arguably legal duty to provide diplomatic assistance to one's citizens doesn't apply in countries like North Korea where the U.S. has no diplomats. In practice, the U.S. government will do everything reasonably within its power to secure the release of a U.S. citizen held by a hostile foreign power (even a U.S. citizen who has behaved badly), because that's in the DNA of how the U.S. State Department always acts. But, at this point, short of an extreme Special Operations mission to abduct a prisoner that voluntarily defected from the U.S. while stationed in South Korea, there really isn't anything that the U.S. could do even if ordered to do so.
Sure, but Qatar is not in the jurisdiction of the ECHR! For the ECHR to apply in a jurisdiction, Qatar would need to have signed it or be in the EU or at least have been in it. It never has been. In fact, not even Den Haque would have power over Qatar unless they allowed it to - and that court rules on matters of war crimes... Qatar does not guarantee the same rights you might be familiar with from most western countries. In fact, not even all western countries are the same. In America, you can use the Sieg Heil gesture, in Germany, you can end in jail for it.. Same for Propaganda materials.
Child Arrangements Order non-biological relative living arrangements I have been granted a UK Child Arrangements Order for a child who is not biologically related to live with me. By Virtue of this order (Childrens Act 1989, Section 12, Paragraph 2) I have been granted Parental Responsibility. However I do not understand this aspect of the act: Where the court makes a child arrangements order and a person who is not a parent or guardian of the child concerned is named in the order as a person with whom the child is to live, that person shall have parental responsibility for the child while the order remains in force so far as providing for the child to live with that person What does the statement "so far as providing for the child to live with that person" mean in relation to parental responsibility? Thanks
This means that you have the right to make arrangements to do things like arrange for the child to travel to your home (possibly as an unaccompanied minor on a plane or train or bus), to enroll the child in a school of your choice near your home and to sign permission slips on behalf of the child as necessary for school activities, to arrange to have the child's possessions moved to your home, to locate a local pediatrician and dentist for the child and consent to the child's medical treatment by those health professionals, etc. Basically you have whatever parental authority you need to have that is incident to being able to do what is necessary to have the child live with you. You might not have parental authority in matters that are not related to something necessary to having the child live with you, for example, consenting to the child's marriage under the age of majority, or to the child enrolling in military service where parental permission is required, or to representing the child as guardian in connection with an inheritance case.
I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.
Sorry for your loss. It appears that this is generally possible. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Title I, Chapter 55, Article 55.011: Art. 55.011. RIGHT OF CLOSE RELATIVE TO SEEK EXPUNCTION ON BEHALF OF DECEASED PERSON. (a) In this article, "close relative of a deceased person" means the grandparent, parent, spouse, or adult brother, sister, or child of a deceased person. (b) A close relative of a deceased person who, if not deceased, would be entitled to expunction of records and files under Article 55.01 may file on behalf of the deceased person an ex parte petition for expunction under Section 2 or 2a, Article 55.02. If the court finds that the deceased person would be entitled to expunction of any record or file that is the subject of the petition, the court shall enter an order directing expunction.
Such sad and tragic circumstances, my sympathy to all involved. General I do not know the specifics of English law as it applies but I believe it is similar enough to New South Wales, Australia that the general overview that follows is not likely to be far wrong. Before a court intervenes there has to be a dispute and someone with standing must bring an action to the court. We can surmise that a dispute arose about the best medical treatment for the child between the child's parents and the child's medical professionals - if there was unanimity there would have been no legal proceedings. Ultimately this is an issue of the welfare of the child. Medical professionals are under a legal obligation to report issues of child welfare to the relevant authorities. In the UK, the government authority responsible for child welfare is the Department of Education. We can presume that they intervened in accordance with their policies and procedures and their understanding of the law and the dispute could not be resolved. It is likely the DoE that brought the matter to the courts or the parent's disputing a DoE decision. The court will decide such issues in the best interest of the child. In deciding what that is, they will consider all the evidence including the parent's wishes, the child's wishes (not relevant in this case but it can be for older children), other relatives, medical opinion etc. They will also consider what the law is, including precedent and make their decision. If you read the linked article about the high court trial the judge is quoted as saying: “It is with the heaviest of hearts but with complete conviction for Charlie’s best interests that I find it is in Charlie’s best interests that I accede to these applications and rule that GOSH may lawfully withdraw all treatment save for palliative care to permit Charlie to die with dignity.” “I dare say that medical science may benefit objectively from the experiment, but experimentation cannot be in Charlie’s best interests unless there is a prospect of benefit for him.” “Charlie’s parents have sadly but bravely acknowledged and accepted that the quality of life that Charlie has at present is not worth sustaining, for he can only breathe through a ventilator, and although they believe that he has a sleep/wake cycle and can recognise them and react to them when they are close, they realise that he cannot go on as he is lying in bed, unable to move, fed through a tube, breathing through a machine.” “Understandably, Charlie’s parents had grasped that possibility, they have done all they could possibly have done, they have very publicly raised funds. What parents would not do the same? But I have to say, having heard the evidence, that this case has never been about affordability, but about whether there is anything to be done for Charlie.” “But if Charlie’s damaged brain function cannot be improved, as all agree, then how can he be any better off than he is now, which is a condition that his parents believe should not be sustained?” This decision was reviewed by the European Human Rights Court who “endorsed in substance the approach” taken by the British courts and declared “the decision is final”. Is it "symptomatic of a Single-Payer healthcare system" Probably not. Almost universally, child welfare cases are decided on the "best interests of the child". This judge in this case within this legal and cultural system decided as he did - and I do not doubt that it was a difficult and emotional task. Change the judge, change the case, change the law and change the culture and you may change the decision but, then again, maybe not. Perhaps in a place with a different culture towards health care, the medical practitioners would not have formed the opinion that the experimental treatment was not in the best interest of their patient and there would have been no dispute that required government intervention. Legal basis Governments can pass laws that impact the people in their jurisdiction. The UK government has passed laws that allow them to interfere in the normal relationship of parental authority. The UK government is not unique - all countries have such laws. Further, the UK government controls who enters and leaves their borders and in what circumstances. Did the NHS (or the hospital) take custody of the child away from the parents? Almost certainly not - this was not a custody battle. Or does the NHS get to decide upon the welfare of its patients once they are in the system? Of course. Every medical professional/hospital/clinic everywhere in the world has a legal and moral responsibility to provide treatment in the best interests of their patients. They will get sued if they don't. Why were the parents not able to take Charlie away on their own recognizance, like (presumably) adults can refuse treatment and leave the hospital? Because an adult can decide for themselves, a child cannot. Other people have responsibility for deciding for the child and when, as here, people with overlapping responsibilities (parents and medical professionals) have divergent views, the government intervenes through executive or judicial action.
First off: if someone in DHS is telling you this, your first, best, and really only option is to get advice from an attorney specializing in family law. Regardless of what we tell you here, without representation you will have a hard time with officials who believe otherwise. That said: I don't find anything exactly matching what you describe. The Uniform Adoption Code (AR Code § 9-9-200 (2014)) does not specifically address sibling groups at all. Adoptive parents do have rights to streamlined adoption of a sibling of a child they already adopted, under the Streamlined Adoption act (AR Code § 9-9-701 (2014)). In the section related to Placement of Minors (AR Code § 9-28-108 (2014)), however, is likely what the case worker was describing. Subsection (b) (2) reads, in part: (2) When it is in the best interest of each of the juveniles, the department shall attempt to place: (A) A sibling group together while they are in foster care and adoptive placement This is discussing foster care and adoptive placement, of course. I think the key wording is When it is in the best interest of each of the juveniles; that would be your argument (that it is not in their best interest). I see a 2011 case, for example, discussing a sibling group of four children not entirely different from yours; while there are not children with special needs, there is a child with major behavioral issues, and one of the (three) foster parents is considering adopting one of the children and "would be open" to considering others, but clearly isn't expecting to be required to do so. Note: I am not a lawyer, and particularly not one specialized in family law This is based on my reading of the 2014 Arkansas code. That is almost 2 years old. That said, I don't see any news articles or similar discussing limitations in sibling group placement in Arkansas recently, which is the sort of thing that usually would get attention. That said, this has also been something that HHS has been trying to encourage states to push for – more sibling group placement and awareness of sibling group issues – so it's entirely possible something could have changed.
In the UK, no offence is committed, however many public locations cite the Data Protection Act 1998 as a reason to stop people taking pictures. DPA does not mention this topic at all, and is a red herring (however informing the location of this is unlikely to help, I have discovered) In fact, in the UK, the only laws that appear to exist cover either specific locations and properties (eg military installations) or using photography to take pictures of individuals in areas where they have an expectation of privacy. The Photographer's Rights Guide published by digitalcameraworld in 2012 is still current as far as I can see. It has this specific guidance: Photographers Rights: Taking Pictures of People in Public Are you breaking any law when you’re taking pictures of people in public? Probably not, but the position under UK law is uncertain. There are currently no general privacy laws under UK law, but the UK courts must take into account the European Convention on Human Rights, which gives everyone the right to respect for their private and family life. As this is an area of law that has been developing rapidly over the last few years, it is hard to be certain what will constitute an infringement. The key issue is whether the place the image is taken is one where a person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, it has been suggested that the right of privacy of a child could be infringed by publishing a photo of them with their parents in a public street. It is therefore advisable to be careful when taking photos intended for publication, even where the subject matter is in a public place. Failure to obtain a model release for the use of an image will certainly make it harder to sell the picture to stock libraries. Photographing children The same laws apply to adult and child subjects, but a child does not have the legal capacity to consent and a parent or guardian must therefore do so on their behalf. Be aware that schools, leisure centres and places where children and adults gather usually have their own photography restrictions. Although decent photos of children (see our tips for better pictures of babies, children and teenagers) taken in a public place may be fine for non-commercial use, seek permission from the child’s parents or guardians and don’t shoot covertly with a long lens. For commercial images, you’ll need to get a model release signed by the parents. Also read the section on the powers of police and security guards.
The question is definitely specific to a jurisdiction. I think this is legal in the jurisdiction you specify. Wikipedia shows incest in New York defined as: Persons known to be related to him or her, whether through marriage or not, as an ancestor, descendant, brother or sister of either the whole or the half blood, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece. I don't think "our children have married" means the couple is related "as brother and sister through marriage". In England and Wales, this would definitely be legal. Wikipedia lists the relationships that cannot marry, and co-parents-in-law are not on the list. (The table is probably out of date, in that the "for men" and "for women" column should almost certainly be merged.)
The agreements are already binding Can a minor make a contract? John has a reasonable time after becoming an adult to void any ongoing contracts; if John continues to receive the benefit of or perform his obligations under any contracts he entered as a child after that reasonable time, they are no longer non-binding. Such an announcement as you describe would not prevent John from voiding voidable contracts in the future. The people who theoretically benefit from the announcement have not given John any consideration for it so they cannot hold him to this promise.
Is income tax due when the work is done, or when it is paid? For example, I do some work for my employer in the 2016-2017 tax year, but they take a while to pay me and I only actually get paid in the 2017-2018 tax year. In which tax year should that income be included - the year when the work was done, or the year it was paid for?
It depends on whether your tax accounting is on an accrual basis or cash basis. The UK government (at least) refers to the former as traditional accounting. In that method of accounting, whatever it's called, you book the income when you invoice the work (that is, when it accrues). If you're paid in the next year, your balance sheet will show the outstanding balance in accounts receivable. Similarly, you book expenses when you incur them, not when you pay them. So if you bought a new computer for your business with a deferred payment plan, you book the entire expense at the time of the purchase, not the time of payment. Cash accounting is simpler. You can only use it if your total turnover from all of your businesses is less than £150,000 annually. You also cannot use cash accounting if your business is a limited company or limited liability partnership, or is on a list of certain types of businesses: Lloyd’s underwriters farming businesses with a current herd basis election farming and creative businesses with a section 221 ITTOIA profit averaging election businesses that have claimed business premises renovation allowance businesses that carry on a mineral extraction trade businesses that have claimed research and development allowance dealers in securities relief for mineral royalties lease premiums ministers of religion pool betting duty intermediaries treated as making employment payments managed service companies waste disposal cemeteries and crematoria For more information about traditional accounting, see https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/how-to-calculate-your-taxable-profits-hs222-self-assessment-helpsheet.
Under German law, yes sure. As long as you keep to all regulations. You have to declare your taxes. This is income, whether it comes from inside Germany or not and whether it is paid into a German bank account or foreign. You have to have a health insurance and likely need to pay into the social security and pension funds. As your employer most likely does not do this for you as a German employer would be required to, you will need to pay both the employee and the employer's part yourself. So yes, if you pay your taxes on it and have health and social security insurance, Germany does not care where the money comes from. Now whether the company in Mauritius is legally allowed to hire and pay you under their law? I have no idea. Please note that filling out all the right forms correctly is not for the faint of heart. And finding out that you did it wrong only years later is painful and costly. Also calculate your costs before you do anything. Paying both parts for your health insurance for example can easily be up to 400€ a month more then a German employee at a German company, so run your numbers. You may be better off being officially self-employed or even incorporated. Just because it's legal, does not mean it's a good idea. Hire a professional to advise you on the economic and bureaucratic side of this.
The company probably owes U.S. and state corporate income taxes because income from services performed in the United States are usually considered "effectively connected" with the United States. The fact that the servers are located in the U.S. is pretty much irrelevant, relative to the fact that the services are performed while located in the United States. I can't think of a single tax case that has ever turned on the location of the servers in a company. Unlike a U.S. company, a foreign company is not taxed by the U.S. on its worldwide income, nor is the individual, a non-resident alien (having an F-1 visa rather than a green card) taxes on the individual's worldwide income. But, a non-U.S. person is still taxed on income that is effectively connected with the United States. Generally speaking income from property is not effectively connected with the United States merely because it is managed by someone located in the U.S., so if the company had owned an apartment in Brazil that it received rental income from, for example, that would not be subject to U.S. taxation. Also income from intangible property (like interest payments on loans or dividends on publicly held stock) is generally not subject to U.S. taxation if paid to a non-resident, non-citizen of the U.S. But, generally speaking, income from the performance of services is taxable in the place where the services are performed. For example, Colorado can impose state income taxes on income earned by a Texas baseball player while playing at a stadium in Denver. The lack of a salary or employee status shouldn't change the fact that the income received by the company from performance of services in the U.S. is effectively connected with the United States. When the owner performs services in the U.S., the company is performing services in the U.S. and so it is subject to taxation in the U.S. Dividend payments from the offshore company probably wouldn't be subject to U.S. taxation in this scenario, but the company itself would be subject to corporate income taxes in the U.S. from the profits it earned from the services performed in the U.S.
Typically it works like this: Sales Tax: Owed in the state that the sale is made (in your case, New York). This is difficult in the internet age with businesses operated with no physical presence in a state. Technically sales (and local taxes) are due depending on where the item that was sold is delivered, so if you shipped an item made in Texas to New York, New York sales taxes would be due on that item. These taxes would be paid to the state of New York. Same for all 50 states. This is a huge burden on small businesses and is not usually enforced. Most small businesses only collect sales tax on items sold to the state that the business is operating from (in your example, you would only collect Texas state sales tax). Income Tax: This is the corporate tax levied by the state that the business is operating in, in this case it would be Texas. Since Texas does not have a state income tax, there would be no income tax. However Texas does have a Franchise Tax that would be due (this is due from all business organized or operating in Texas) The state that the business is registered in may have its own taxes which would be on the income of the business and would be specific to the state that the business is registered in. These can also be in the form of registration fees, annual fees, franchise fees, etc.
If you are given a paid job, and you do the work, then "consideration has been provided", and 1682 will not apply. As to "referral fees" those sound more like kickbacks, but it depends on what, if anything, the person gets for the fee.
Is there any sort of implied expiration date for a contractor's completion for medium size contractor jobs (< $10k)? Absent a provable deadline, the question would be whether the delay is reasonable (or habitual) under the circumstances. The contractor's presumption that he can do whatever he wants regarding unspecified aspects of a contract is inaccurate. Those matters can still be decided on the basis of contract law and/or under principles of equity. See also the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which is frequently cited by U.S. courts, at §235(2) and §243 regarding non-performance of a contract. Will my verbal complete-by date hold up in lieu of any written complete-by date? It depends on each party's credibility. Proving that he essentially ignored your follow-up requests will make it harder for him to credibly refute your assertion about the verbal deadline. In case none of your follow-up efforts (or none of his responses) are in writing or if he denies that you repeatedly called him, you might want to subpoena his phone service provider --if the matter goes to court-- and file as evidence the resulting production of records.
united-states They thought of that. See IRS Pub 550, page 36: You are treated as having made a constructive sale of an appreciated financial position if you: • Enter into a short sale of the same or substantially identical property, So when you short-sell 1 BTC while still holding 1 BTC, it's taxed as if you simply sold your 1 BTC. This makes sense as the transactions are essentially identical in effect. I don't think it matters that the 1 BTC you held was used as the collateral for the 1 BTC you borrowed. In particular, although short sales are usually reported and taxed as of the date when they close, constructive sales are an exception and are taxed on the date of the constructive sale itself: You must recognize gain as if the position were disposed of at its fair market value on the date of the constructive sale. This gives you a new holding period for the position that begins on the date of the constructive sale. Then, when you close the transaction, you reduce your gain (or increase your loss) by the gain recognized on the constructive sale. So this doesn't help in deferring your taxes.
if you sell less then 25 1oz Maple Leaf gold coins, you do not have to file a 1099-B at the time of the sale. You still have to report the proceeds on Schedule D when you file your income taxes for the year.
Would I be infringing on a trademark if my company name is later trademarked? If I incorporate an LLC, and then someone federally registers a trademark with that name, would I be infringing on a trademark and have to change my name? Or will they be unable to register the trademark if a company is using the name? I ask because I keep hearing that I'm supposed to register the company before trademarking, but in my case, I think the trademark is more important. I still want to register the LLC first to make it the trademark owner, but I'm worried that someone will snag the trademark after I register the company. Will I still have protections if my LLC is registered and someone snags the trademark? Will I be able to use the trademarked name on products?
If you form an LLC, and then someone later obtains a registered trademark in the same name, the registered trademark would be enforceable everywhere except in the markets and places where the LLC developed common law trademark rights prior to their registration. Your LLC formation would also put a bump in the road in their trademark application. You can, of course, do both, although it is unclear to me why you feel such urgency in the likelihood of an infringement, which suggests that there may be relevant facts that aren't revealed by your post.
In the US at least, copyright does not normally protect titles and other short phrases, they are considered not original enough. (See the US Copyright office Circular #33). However, titles, brand names, and slogans may be protected as trademarks, as may logos. A trademark is a word, phrase or symbol used to identify goods or services to customers and others. They key issue in a trademark case is: "might reasonable people be confused into falsely attributing the infringing item with the trademarked item, or into thinking that is is associate, endorsed, or sponsored by the makers of the trademarked item, or comes from the same source". When the name is the same and the general area and genre is similar, trademark protection seems plausible. Marvel is known to be quite protective of its IP, and might well have trademarked such a title. A successful suit by a trademark owner could lead to an injunction (a court order) against future use of the infringing m,ark, and significant money damages, depending on the detailed facts. A name such as "Black Pirate" is fairly generic, and might not receive much protection. On the other hand, if that name has become associated with a detailed and specific character or content, it might have acquired a "secondary meaning" and be more strongly protected. Consulting an experienced trademark lawyer or other expert might well be a very good idea.
General Rules The rules on this vary somewhat by country. In some counties the is no trademark protection unless a mark is formally registers. In others use "in trade" offers a degree of protection even in the absence of registration. The US follows the second rule. Some of Europe follows the first. But in pretty much all countries trademarks (aka trade marks) are only protected when they are "used in commerce" and are only protected against other uses "in commerce". This mans that a phrase or design or other possible mark is only protected when it is functioning as a mark, that is it is used by the maker to identify or advertise a product or service (hereafter I use "product" to mean either or both). Moreover a mark is only protected when an alleged infringer uses the mark (or a similar mark) in such a way that people might reasonably be confused into thinking that the infringer's product comes from the same source as the products of the owner of the mark, or is approved, sponsored, or endorsed by the owner of the mark. A simple literary or pop-culture reference is normally not trademark infringement. This is both because a well-known phrase is not usually protectable as a mark at all, and because a reference to it is normally not infringement, even if the mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion is a very important concept in trademark cases. Examples The phrase "Elementary, my dear Watson" Is often used as a reference to the Sherlock Holmes stories and novels. But it was never used to brand or advertise those stories, so its use in a novel or video game now would not be infringement. Even if a game used that phrase as a title, it would not be infringement, because the phrase is not protected. All this would still be true even if the Sherlock Holmes stories were still being published. The tagline "In space, no one can here you scream" was used extensively to advertise the movie Alien. It had some protection as a mark (in the US), and might well have been registered for fuller protection (I haven't checked the US register of trademarks, or any other for this phrase). A game titled with this phrase might well be infringing. A game where a character speaks the phrase at some point probably will not be infringing. Caution All that said, exactly where the limits of infringement lie depend on the detailed factual situation. Before investing sizable amounts of money or time and effort on such a project, it might be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable about trademark law in one's particular jurisdiction, and make sure that the risk of suit is not to great for one's tolerance.
Yes, it is legal to sell something that uses another product as one of its ingredients. And yes, you can include the name of the product in the ingredients list. That said, if you do it and are successful enough you will probably get a cease and desist letter! The Supreme Court held a long time ago in Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty that a buyer can purchase a trademarked good, repackage it, and then resell it. The defendant of course by virtue of its ownership had a right to compound or change what it bought, to divide either the original or the modified product, and to sell it so divided. The court reminds us that trademarks are not copyrights; they not confer a right to prohibit the use of a word or words. ...unquestionably the defendant has a right to communicate... that the trade-marked product is a constituent in the article now offered as new and changed. In this case the name of the original product was included on the package in non-distinct lettering; stating that the original product was contained in the new product. I mention this because the ultimate decision is fact-specific.* So the Supreme Court tells us that we can repackage trademarked goods. The court also tells us a bit about the label - we cannot call out the trademarked name as this might confuse consumers: If the [trademarked name] were allowed to be printed in different letters from the rest of the inscription dictated by the District Court a casual purchaser might look no further and might be deceived. So, what about that FDA, what do we need on the label? You find this answer in 21 CFR 101.4(b)(2). (b) The name of an ingredient shall be a specific name and not a collective (generic) name, except that: (1) Spices, flavorings, colorings and chemical preservatives shall be declared according to the provisions of §101.22. (2) An ingredient which itself contains two or more ingredients and which has an established common or usual name, conforms to a standard established pursuant to the Meat Inspection or Poultry Products Inspection Acts by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, or conforms to a definition and standard of identity established pursuant to section 401 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, shall be designated in the statement of ingredients on the label of such food by either of the following alternatives: (i) By declaring the established common or usual name of the ingredient followed by a parenthetical listing of all ingredients contained therein in descending order of predominance except that, if the ingredient is a food subject to a definition and standard of identity established in subchapter B of this chapter that has specific labeling provisions for optional ingredients, optional ingredients may be declared within the parenthetical listing in accordance with those provisions. (ii) By incorporating into the statement of ingredients in descending order of predominance in the finished food, the common or usual name of every component of the ingredient without listing the ingredient itself. Here is an example of (i): But also note the picture of the box. That Hershey's Kisses trademarked image indicates that there is an agreement between the companies. So only use this image as an example of 21 CFR 101.4(b)(2)(i) ingredients labeling - the box cover is not an example of nominative use. *This is nominative fair use and has been discussed in other questions on this site. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc.: one party may use or refer to the trademark of another if 1) The product or service cannot be readily identified without using the trademark; 2) The user only uses as much of the mark as is necessary for the identification; 3) The user does nothing to suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.
This has very little legal effect. It means that someone forgot to update their annual registration and pay the fee and could be resolved in half an hour with a small late fee payment. It is a sign of slight sloppiness, but is only sometimes evidence of something more serious. For example, if a company moves to a new location without remembering to inform the Secretary of State, it might not get the annual report notice and thus fail to file. And, a company rarely has an occasion to double check that it is in good standing. Usually, the only legal consequence is that the company can't commence a lawsuit without bringing itself into good standing and that another company can steal its business name (if it can do so without violating a common law trademark arising from use of the name). It does not significantly change the rights of parties dealing with the company in terms of property ownership, contract rights, etc. This said, closer scrutiny than a company without that issue might be in order and the fact that you are checking at all means that there might have been other reasons apart from this fact to be concerned.
The trivial answer is yes, at least under certain circumstances, as the example you give shows. First, the concept of substrings is not particularly useful in trademark law. IF that were the case, then we wouldn't be able to have a company called "Gaudiest Clothing Brand" because it contains the substring audi. But, you might say, what about looking at words instead of characters, as with the example of "Linux" and "The Linux Foundation." In that case, I offer the example of "Target," which is a word found in literally thousands of US trademarks. You'll notice that the first item on this list where word mark is simply target, rather than a phrase containing that word, doesn't even belong to the well known chain of stores. This brings us to another important aspect of trademark protection, which is that the mark's purpose is to identify a producer of goods, a provider of services, or particular goods or services themselves. You could probably start a bookstore called McDonald's, unless you're near Redmond, Washington, but you certainly would not be able to use that name for a chain of hamburger-based fast food restaurants. Back to the subject of Linux, one possible explanation here is therefore that Linux is a trademark for an operating system, while The Linux Foundation is a trademark for a non-profit foundation that is concerned with the operating system. The trademarks don't represent competing entities. Consider, for example, the disclaimer on volkswagenownersclub.com: VolkswagenOwnersClub.com is an independent media publication. VolkswagenOwnersClub.com and its owners are not affiliated with or endorsed by Volkswagen AG or Volkswagen of America, Inc. Volkswagen is a registered trademark of Volkswagen AG. All rights reserved. All information Copyright 2006-2010 (Also consider, for example, the case of Apple Corps, Ltd. and Apple Computer, Inc..) As far as I can tell, however, "Volkswagen Owners' Club" is not directly relevant to this question, because it is not a registered trademark, and the question concerns two registered trademarks. I am not sure whether two such trademarks could coexist if there were an adversarial relationship between their owners. In this case, hwoever, the trademarks are used together because the owners have a collegial relationship. They work for a common goal, the promotion of the product identified by one of the trademarks. The foundation's use of the trademark is therefore undoubtedly with permission. In fact, the Linux foundation is Linus Torvalds' employer, and one of the foundation's purposes is to manage the Linux trademark that Torvalds owns. Now the question of derivative trademarks, such as My Linux is clouded by the fact that Linux is an open source operating system. In principle, you can't modify a product and then sell it using its original trademark unless you have permission. For example, I don't suppose I could rebottle Coca-Cola with some added salt and pepper and sell it as *Phoog's Coca-Cola" unless I had permission from the owner of the trademark. With Linux being an open-source project, however, the terms of the open source license probably explicitly permit people to use the trademark under certain restrictions if they offer, for example, a customized distribution of Linux
Summary from comments. (Hat tip @jqning) Daniel Nathan Ballard writes here: [It] is not only improper it is UNLAWFUL and may result in serious repercussions... Such a misuse may constitute false advertising... (“It is no doubt true” that affixing the ‘Trade Mark Registered U.S. Patent Office” notice on goods that are not protected by a federally registered trademark creates “a prima facie case of fraud against the public… .”). ... Such use is also a form of “unclean hands” that can bar the user’s registration of the mark. ... Such a use may also bar the maintenance of an infringement case. ... And the fraudulent use of the trademark registration symbol DOES provide other marketplace participants with standing to oppose the user’s registration of the mark. http://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/use-of---symbol-but-not-federally-registered-1125746.html
NO The Names of actual people can neither be trademarked nor can a name have a valid copyrighted. There is no valid market class for names of people, making it impossible to register a trademark in that category. As a result, neither copyright nor trademark will prevent someone from attempting to name a kid "Nintendo" or "Sony Music". While you could try to name your kid Nintendo, unless you are in the US, most countries like germany or japan do safeguard what you can name a child. Those countries will deny your name as endangering the (mental) health of the child or in other way making the child a target for mockery. Compare to names in all lowercase, line breaks, and infinitely long names.
Is a Supreme Court ruling the same as a law When the U.S. Supreme Court decides something, does it apply everywhere right away or do we have to wait until laws are passed? Either way, what part of the Constitution says that, or which laws? Links please.
Short Answer Yes, Supreme Court decisions apply everywhere right away. (Unless the decision says it doesn't.) No, we do not have to wait until new laws are passed. Explanation Judicial Review Marbury v. Madison (1803) established the principle of judicial review under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. This allows the court[s] to interpret laws passed by legislatures. And this is the basis for applying the ruling everywhere (in the U.S.) immediately. From Marbury at 178: if a law be in opposition to the Constitution [...] the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. [...] the Constitution of the United States confirms [...] that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. Judicial Restraint (Nominally) courts either interpret or invalidate existing law. In the former case, the law will persist (with the new clarity added by the decision). In the latter, the law will be struck as unconstitutional and, therefore, no longer exist.
In brief: In common law systems, are there specific laws? Yes. Are they written down? Yes, here are the laws of Australia and New Zealand. Or are there only previous court rulings? No. Elaboration: Broadly (and rather vaguely) speaking there are 3 sources of law in a common law jurisdiction: Statute law which consists of the Acts passed by the legislature Administrative law which consists of the rules and regulations made by the administrative arm of government under the powers granted them by the constitution or delegated by the legislature Case law which consists of the decisions made by the courts; this can be decisions based on Long-standing precedents whose origins are lost in the mists of time Interpretations of statute and administrative law It is important to remember that the courts only get involved to resolve conflicts (civil or criminal) - they do not unilaterally make decisions on the law. Judges (if they are wise) never give opinions on the law - that is the role of solicitors and barristers who are the paid advocates of the parties. The role of a judge is to decide how the law fits the circumstances of the particular case before them. To do this they interpret the statutes, administrative rules and decisions made by other judges on similar cases. The decision of a superior court is binding on a subordinate court, persuasive on an equivalent court or a court in a parallel jurisdiction and subject to review by a superior court. The overwhelming majority of cases do not make new case law - most of the arguments in court are about why (or why not) the established law applies to the current facts; they are not about what the law is. Occasionally a decision will be made that modifies the previous interpretation or even more rarely represents a paradigm shift - those are the cases that matter!
Very few terms have a single "legal" definition or meaning that applies to all laws, and can be looked up as if in a dictionary. Rather, when a specific meaning is needed in connection with a particular law, that law will include a definition. But that definition will often not apply to the use of the same term in other laws or other contexts. Here I suspect that the OP has found the definition section of a US Federal law regulating commercial transport in interstate commerce. Obviously in such a law, those terms would be defined in the context of commercial transport. That does not mean that the same meanings will be applied in other laws. Driver's licenses and other traffic and motor vehicle regulations are largely matters of state law in the US. Definitions from a federal law, or indeed any law but that state's Motor Vehicle Code (or whatever a given state calls such a body of law) will simply not be relevant. The argument sketched in the question simply does not follow.
Separation of powers means that the judiciary can't pass laws or executive orders. It doesn't mean that the judiciary can't interfere with their passage and enforcement. Quite the opposite -- the checks and balances inherent in the system ensure that the judiciary can interfere in some cases. One of the checks is the concept of judicial review: the courts' power to review each branch's actions for compliance with the constitution -- and more importantly, to strike down actions that are unconstitutional. When a court strikes down part of a law, though, they aren't writing a new law, or even repealing a law. They are overturning parts of the existing law -- basically declaring the unconstitutional parts of it void, to be treated as if they didn't exist. In India's constitution, Article 13 provides the main basis for this power. Article 13.(2) (in Part III) states: (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. This article, aside from making it clear that laws passed by the State can be void, also gives the Supreme Court the inroads it needs to do the overturning. The catch is, the Court can not overturn most laws passed by Parliament, just the ones that Part III can be construed to prohibit. (While the judiciary is not explicitly named, it's the only branch that can officially say whether or not a law is constitutional. It'd be a conflict of interest anyway for Parliament to do it. Parliament, in passing the law, presumably wanted it to be enforced, and thus has an interest in avoiding too much scrutiny.) So the Court can already declare an unconstitutional law void, because it already is...and that's before we even get to Article 142. Let's take a look at the article anyway: (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself. Note that (2) explicitly grants the power to issue subpoenas, contempt citations, etc. So we can't claim that's what (1) was intended for, and have to ask what it means. The Court decided that the article gives it the power to order the government not to violate your rights, as such an order is "necessary for doing complete justice". And as the final arbiter of the meaning of the very text that defines it into existence, it has that prerogative. And due process is one of the rights protected. Article 21 (also in Part III): No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. "Procedure established by law" is a much weaker phrase than "due process", and technically meant that anything that the government scribbled into law was good enough. But case law has all but removed the distinction. (See Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India.) Basically, any procedure for depriving someone of life or liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. (Otherwise a law declaring you a criminal, to be arrested on sight, would be constitutional.) "Someone filed a complaint" simply wasn't gonna fly.
Indian Constitution provides for a Federal government in which power of states and centres are clearly enunciated. If there is a dispute over any issue Supreme Court can decide whether State government is correct, or whether Central government is correct. Any law of Parliament affects the entire population of India, and so all states are affected by that law. If any state government considers that the law is not as per constitutional norms, it can easily go to the Supreme Court for decision. So, the observation of the Supreme Court that a state is bound by the law of Parliament, is incorrect. If an individual can file such a case, a state is also entitled to file it. The Supreme Court should decide it on the basis of merit. So I think the observation of Supreme Court in this case is not correct.
This would establish a new precedent (I assume) You assume correctly. However, a precedent is only binding on lower courts and persuasive on courts at the same level so a trial judge precedent is not very far-reaching. Does this statute takes precedence over (overrules) the previous court precedent? Not exactly. The precedent was good for the old (common) law. Now the law has changed and the old precedent is irrelevant. Courts only interpret the law and legislatures are free to change the law within the limits of their constitutional power. Indeed, a fair number of laws are enacted because the legislature does not agree with how courts are ruling.
At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case.
Decisions that break with precedent do happen with some regularity, but far "from all the time" in the US. When they do happen, they are generally only at the top level of a state or federal court system, that is a State supreme Court (or equivalent, some states use a different term) or the US Supreme Court. There are several factors which discourage judges from simply ignoring precedent. First of all, all the training a lawyer receives teaches him or her to respect precedent, and to find rules by examining past cases. precedent is literally the stuff with which a lawyer works, rather more than the wording of statutes (although those are also important). Secondly, as a lawyer works as a litigator, judges will usually ground their decisions on precedents, particularly in appellate cases, explaining their decisions largely in terms of how they conform to or extend precedents. Thirdly, if a lower court judge fails to follow precedent, that judge will often be criticized by an appellate judge or justice, often in the course of an opinion overturning the lower-court judge's ruling. This does not feel pleasant to such a judge. Fourthly, decision that fail to follow precedent are often (although not always) criticized by legal scholars, particularly in law review articles and treatises. Fifthly, lower-court judges who often fail to follow precedents, are less likely to be recommended by senior judges for promotion to appellate positions. However, the actual appointments are controlled by politicians (in most cases) not other judges, so this factor may not be as strong it it would first seem. Only once a judge gets to the level of the Supreme Court of a state, or the Federal Supreme Court, is that judge (now a Justice) expected to alter precedents as needed, and most justices have said that they make such changes only reluctantly. I am not aware of any US state or federal statute or regulation that specifically;y requires judges to follow precedent. The most common way to alter precedent is not to overrule or ignore it, but to distinguish a prior case. This happens when a judge says something like: In the previous case of A v B when had situation X which lead to outcome Q. But in this current case we have the very different situation X1. In the case of X1, the outcome should be S instead of Q. If the new case becomes persuasive the old case A v B may apply to only one specific set of facts that almost never comes up, and the new rule apply to almost all other possible situations. The old case may cease to be cited or applied without ever being formally overruled. And, of course, where the rule is statutory, it may be changed if the legislature alters the law. If the rule is constitutional, it may be changed by a constitutional amendment. For example the 1830s case Barron v Baltimore held that the US bill of rights did not apply to the states, only to the Federal Government. But after the 1868 14th amendment, courts started to incorporate much of the bill of rights into the Due process clause of the 14th, and apply it against the states. This took place gradually, mostly during the period starting with 1898, up until about 1970, but with some incorporation coming as late as 2010 (Heller)
Would having a lodger be considered letting? Would a restrictive covenant for letting on a property prohibit lodgers?
It would come down to the exact wording and context of the restrictive covenant, but probably yes.
The overwhelming majority flats in England are leasehold, not freehold; older buildings typically have 80 or 100-year leases, newer buildings usually have 999-year leases. Therefore you are dealing with the freeholder as a landlord for the matters that a HOA would deal with in the US. Depending on your landlord you may want to reconsider your statement that HOAs "are pure hell". It is possible for the leaseholders to collectively buy the freehold although it is time-consuming and expensive and happens very rarely. If they do they set up a body similar to a HOA.
Your options are generally limited by where you have (or can establish) residency, along with where your communal property is held. There are (decreasing numbers of) jurisdictions known as "divorce mills" that have notoriously lenient rules for establishing residency and completing divorces.
Because an owner cannot tell another owner what they can and can't do with their own property The quoted paragraph clearly sets out some of the things the leasehold arrangement allows: "... set out the rights and responsibilities of the residents, such as funding the maintenance of the building and placing restrictions on antisocial behavior." When you own land, you own it; and no one can tell you what you can and can't do with it, not even your co-owners (governments excepted). Want to run chickens? Sure: it's your land. Spinal Tap your stereo to 11 at 2 am? Sure: it's your land. Become a hoarder? Sure, it's your land. When there's a single dwelling on the land, none of that is a problem. When there are multiple dwellings on the land, as in a block of flats (apartments for the Americans among us) then some of these are likely to be problematical. But they aren't problems the law cares about because you all own the property. Different common law jurisdictions have arrived at different solutions to this problem but the UK has particular difficulties because people have been owning land there for a long time. A lot longer than in the USA, Australia or New Zealand. This is quite an elegant solution: all the owners own the land but each of them have a lease over their own flat and that is a contract the law will enforce.
Contracts are illegal if they require a signatory to break the law, so the contract here is detailing that this specific clause does not apply if following it would contradict the law. It's basically saying that no signatory may hold the other for breaking contract terms if the reason for breaking the contract terms is because the law specifically says these things are required. For example, if the contract reads "The hotel does not allow guests to have animals in the room", this creates an illegal situation if said animal is a guide dog assisting a blind person, which must be allowed under laws for Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). By changing this clause to "The hotel does not allow guests to have animals in the room, except as required by federal, state or local law." Then it is now acceptable. A able bodied guest will still be in breach of contract if a cat is brought into the room, but a blind person would not be in breach because the law says you cannot use this to bar a blind person with a guide dog, and the contract must comply with the law. The Cat Person can be thrown out for breech of contract, but the blind person cannot because this exception allows the blind person to bring the dog into the rented room.
The key language to be taken notice of in that code is 'by fraud or deception'. If the property manager has provided reasonable notice of a clear-out, then the code doesn't apply due to lack of fraud or deception. But at the end of the day, just go and check the mail room on a Thursday afternoon and you shouldn't have any problems.
Section 8 of the Housing Act 1988 provides that (2) The court shall not make an order for possession on any of the grounds in Schedule 2 to this Act unless that ground and particulars of it are specified in the notice under this section; but the grounds specified in such a notice may be altered or added to with the leave of the court. Section 7 of the same Act also provides that (1) The court shall not make an order for possession of a dwelling-house let on an assured tenancy except on one or more of the grounds set out in Schedule 2 to this Act; [...]
Laws and regulations often limit or restrict remedies in various ways that may not be intuitive or correspond to popular ideas of legal rights. In the case of the recent US eviction moratorium, the obligation to pay rent was not changed. The only effect is that no action for eviction could be brought for a residential property during the effective period of the order, in situation to which the ordeer applied. The order says (see link above): This Order does not relieve any individual of any obligation to pay rent, make a housing payment, or comply with any other obligation that the individual may have under a tenancy, lease, or similar contract. Nothing in this Order precludes the charging or collecting of fees, penalties, or interest as a result of the failure to pay rent or other housing payment on a timely basis, under the terms of any applicable contract. To invoke the order a resident must sign a statement declaring under penalty of perjury that: I am unable to pay my full rent or make a full housing payment due to substantial loss of household income, loss of compensable hours of work or wages, lay-offs, or extraordinary [38] out-of-pocket medical expenses; I am using best efforts to make timely partial payments that are as close to the full payment as the individual's circumstances may permit, taking into account other nondiscretionary expenses; If evicted I would likely become homeless, need to move into a homeless shelter, or need to move into a new residence shared by other people who live in close quarters because I have no other available housing options. as well as various other declarations. The order's justification section says in part: Evicted renters must move, which leads to multiple outcomes that increase the risk of COVID-19 spread. Specifically, many evicted renters move into close quarters in shared housing or other congregate settings The order later specifies that: This Order shall be enforced by Federal authorities and cooperating State and local authorities through the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3559, 3571; 42 U.S.C. 243, 268, 271; and 42 CFR 70.18. However, this Order has no effect on the contractual obligations of renters to pay rent and shall not preclude charging or collecting fees, penalties, or interest as a result of the failure to pay rent or other housing payment on a timely basis, under the terms of any applicable contract. ... While this order to prevent eviction is effectuated to protect the public health, the States and units of local government are reminded that the Federal Government has deployed unprecedented resources to address the pandemic, including housing assistance. It would seem that civil suits for payment of debts arising from unpaid rent are in no way prevented, only a remedy of eviction is blocked. That block would apply to any state or local courts, as well as any federal courts. Eviction cases are not normally brought in federal courts. But seizure of bank accounts or garnishment of wages could be obtained, if permitted by state law in a particular case. So might other remedies authorized by state or federal law.
Are plain clothes police officers allowed to use force to make an arrest? Disclaimer: I'm not related to this case in any way shape or form, I'm just a citizen trying to look at this without bias. Recently there was an issue in Massachusettes where a group of skaters were asked to leave the premises, a police officer confiscated a board from one of the skaters, but the skaters said they were leaving, they just wanted the board back. Obviously, the skaters are in the wrong for skating on public/city property (and grabbing the board from the officer), but I don't think a trespassing charge like that should outweigh possible misconduct of a group of officers. During the disagreement, another skater went to rip the board out of the officers hand and run off, at which point a non-uniformed cop stepped in and tackled the skater. While going down, the officer and skater exchanged blows, when asked by the court, the skater said he wouldn't have punched him had he known it was a cop. So instead of getting an assault/battery charge, he now is trying to be pressed with assault/battery of a police officer (albeit, non-uniformed, non-identifiable). However the new has been putting a focus on the use of force in the case. Considering, while the first tackle was going down, another individual was seen in the video cussing out the officers and walking away. At which point, you hear an officer yell grab him and the skater runs off, to get tackled by another officer. My main question here is, how can a non-uniformed/non-identified cop try to stick an assault/battery of an officer charge on someone, if the only people at the scene who know he is an officer, are the other officers. I used to skate, but am trying to look at this unbiased, as I've seen plenty of citizens try to step in and be vigilantes, so the thought that the one skater believed he was being tackled by a random bystander doesn't seem super far-fetched. Attached is the news article of the incident, which includes a break-down video of the altercation.
Police officers are authorized to use force regardless of what they are wearing, to effect an arrest. One issue will be whether the defendants should know that they were under arrest, but there is no requirement to utter particular phrases when dealing with a combative lawbreaker. There will be an internal investigation at some level to determine whether the officers violated any department policy, and no doubt the video and testimony of those in the are would be relevant. There probably is some policy to the effect that you have to distinguish yourself from a street vigilante (you have to state your authority), though I can't find any specific online publicly-available department rules. There is no law that requires an officer to say that he is one, or to show his badge, before starting an arrest.
Based on the question, this was not perjury; if the officer did not review the footage, the fact that his testimony was in error indicates a mistake, nothing more. To even consider a perjury charge, the prosecuting authorities would need evidence that the officer knew the testimony was wrong when he gave it. You do not indicate the jurisdiction, so nobody can say whether an appeal would lie (since new evidence has come to light), whether the conviction could be quashed for procedural failure (if multiple requests for evidence were really not received) or whether a complaint could be made against the prosecutor, the defence lawyer, or even the judge. But no case has ever been strengthened by brandishing about words like 'perjury' without being able to substantiate them.
I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at *11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at *2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on.
can really anyone in Germany call the police on others without proof of anything? Anyone anywhere can call the police without proof of anything as long as they have a phone. The question is, what will the police do about it. Police in Germany are more professional and less corrupt than in many countries in the world (e.g. they are much less corrupt than police in much of the United States or police in Southern Italy or Mexico, or in much of the "third-world"). Most German police are unlikely to exercise their power unless they are genuinely deceived into thinking that you committed an actual crime. But, German cops are human too. Some German cops are bad cops and even good cops aren't perfect truth detectors or bias free. and if so what are my rights? There has to be some evidence to arrest you or prosecute you, but testimony from people who claim to be eye witnesses is a form of evidence and proof. People are routinely convicted of crimes (everywhere in the world) based solely upon the testimony of other people with no additional proof. This is usually a good rule. As a society we don't want the criminal justice system to let people who commit crimes that are witnessed by lots of truthful witnesses and testified to, to go free just because there is no non-testimonial evidence. But because people lie (or are simply mistaken about the truth) sometimes, it isn't a perfect way of determining who is guilty and who is innocent. You also have the right to lodge a complaint of criminal defamation with the police in Germany and in Germany hundreds of thousands of such cases are prosecuted by police every year. Making false accusations against you (or even just insulting you in an extremely offense manner) as they did is a minor crime in Germany. and the person I mentioned had 2 of his employees with him but I am sure and I know for a fact they are on his side and I had no witnesses with me so how can I prove I am innocent? if they agreed on making up a story against me? The possibility that people will be wrongfully arrested and wrongfully convicted of crimes because people lie and authorities believe the people who are lying is a constant risk. The best you can do is to tell your story consistently and honestly and hope that you are believed. But it is impossible to eliminate the risk that people will lie and be believed and that you will suffer the consequences, even if you are doing everything right. In the long run, you may want to avoid people who you think would lie and make false accusations around you, and to have the presence of either friendly witnesses and/or audio/visual recording at times when you are in their presence. You may also, as a long run strategy try to figure out if there was anything you could have done to prevent them from being out to get you so badly that they would make false accusations against you. While I don't want to blame the victim, and often enough, especially for example, if you are a foreigner or otherwise different in a homogeneous community some people are doing to hate you for no reason, sometimes their real motivation may be a failure to follow social norms that are not actually illegal, or a misunderstand that could be cleared up.
The only time cops are violating the law for cowardice is when they fail to intervene in misconduct by another cop, see, e.g., here at page 10 (two police carry out a blatantly unlawful arrest, but there is also liability for the two other junior officers watch and do nothing about their superiors' misconduct), or when an arrested or incarcerated person has been placed in peril by the cop, see, e.g., here (police arrest woman and put her in a squad car on train tracks and fail to try to rescue her when a train is about to and then does smash into the squad car where she is helplessly handcuffed and locked in). This said, cops are routinely disciplined or fired for cowardice as an employment matter (see, e.g., here where a policeman who fails to rush in to stop a school shooting in progress was "suspended in the immediate aftermath of the attack and later resigned" and also here in a similar case). But, they are rarely disciplined or fired for being too aggressive even if it crosses the legal line unless the facts are unequivocally clear.
The non-cougher committed an unjustified assault, and could be arrested or sued for his actions. The actions were clearly not the minimal level of force needed to prevent continued assault or to effect an arrest (the dude who entered and coughed clearly is guilty of assault). This is regardless of covid. Instead, the other guy decided to beat on the first punk. The courts might retaliate against the cougher by fining him or sending him to prison: that is what the law is all about (putting the use of force under the control of laws, not individual emotion). It would be legal to use some degree of force to arrest the guy, and it would be legal to use some degree of force to prevent the guy from continuing with his assault. The puncher was not engaged in self-defense, because there was no credible continuing threat and his response was way over the top. The particular response here, vigilante justice, was disproportionate, and not justified by the circumstances. A police officer might have arrested both of them, had one been present (but police have discretion, so he might have gone with the "you started it" theory). Legally, they were both wrong.
If you consent, the evidence can almost certainly be used against you. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) ("Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search.") If you refuse consent, it is not clear whether the evidence can be used against you, as we don't know why the officer is asking to frisk you. A stop-and-frisk must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you have just committed or are about to commit a crime, and that you are at that moment armed and dangerous. If they reasonably suspect you have just committed a crime but do not reasonably suspect you are armed and dangerous, the police may stop you, but they may not search you. That point is worth emphasizing because several other answers are incorrectly assuming otherwise. For one example, in Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016), the police responded to a report of domestic violence. Based on their reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect had committed that crime, the police stopped and frisked him. Because they had could reasonably explain why they thought he had committed a crime, but could not reasonably explain why they thought he was armed and dangerous, the court said the stop was legal, but the frisk was not: Whereas the purpose of a Terry stop is to further the interests of crime prevention and detection, a Terry frisk is justified by the concern for the safety of the officer and others in proximity. Accordingly, whereas a Terry stop is justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, a frisk of a person for weapons requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. A lawful frisk does not always flow from a justified stop. Rather, each element, the stop and the frisk, must be analyzed separately; the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. Even then, the search is basically limited to a minimally intrusive patdown to ensure you don't have any weapons on you, and the officer is generally not permitted to actually search inside pockets or the like, though the search may escalate based on what the officer is able to feel during the patdown. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993) ("If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, ... its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.") The refusal to respond generally operates as a refusal to consent. The police are therefore free to conduct whatever search they could have conducted without your consent. If they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that you're carrying a gun, they can probably frisk you to see if that's the case. If they have a warrant to search your pockets, they can search your pockets. If they don't have any of that, they need to keep their hands to themselves.
You should file a complaint with the police. If you complain to the police then they might do something. If you don't complain then they certainly won't. Are food trucks licensed? You might try complaining to the license authority. However go to the police first because the licence authority are unlikely to do anything without a police complaint. Even being just another statistic helps increase the pressure for action on the wider issue of racism in society. If all else fails you can just post the incident on YouTube and see what happens. Its an unreliable method of enforcement and can backfire, but it has been known for international embarrassment to kick reluctant authorities into action.
Trespassing or Public Property? I'll start with some background info for my question. I'm a photojournalist based in Michigan. I was on (what appeared to be) a public sidewalk. I was taking photos of the Oakland County Jail for a story I was working on. I was outside the OCSO jail getting some photo and video for a story when several LEOs approached me. One addressed herself as a lieutenant. She told me I was in a "secure jail area" and had to stop taking photos. My argument was that I was on a public sidewalk, exercising my 1st amendment rights. She responded, telling me that if I didn't leave, I'd be arrested for trespassing. Another officer said I could take photos if I went to the other side of a sign. I complied, and continued my work. He ordered that I go to the other side of a sign that was farther away. Were they right?
In the scenario you described, you were both right: Police have no authority to demand that you leave a public space because you are photographing, nor does the government have the right to prevent you from photographing anything that is visible from a public space, including government facilities or employees. However, the police would likely have followed through on their threat to arrest you. In that event, any vindication for wrongful arrest and violation of your civil rights would only come (if ever) at the end of protracted and expensive litigation in the courts. (A plethora of examples is accumulated by watchdog groups like the ACLU and Photography Is Not A Crime.)
You can basically take pictures of anything from your property if it is "public" (i.e. easily visible from your property). People on the road are in public, and have no reasonable expectation of privacy. The basic restrictions on photography are (1) you cannot trespass (you aren't), and (2) you cannot take pictures of certain government operations (e.g. airport border crossing – certain aspects of government prohibition may require lawsuit to rein in government policy that is at odds with the 1st Amendment; also secret military installations, for which there is specific law, 18 USC 795). Commercial exploitation of people who you photograph is strongly protected in California, and that is it.
Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.
Yes, in Orange County, CA, in a residential zone or on residentially-developed property, this is a code violation. Specifically you are looking at Title 3, Division 13, Article 1, Sec 3-13-4(11): Sec. 3-13-4. - Prohibited Conduct. Except as provided in section 3-13-6, exemptions, it shall be unlawful for any responsible party having charge or possession of any real property in county territory to:... (11) Keep, store, or maintain upon any premises under his/her control any abandoned, wrecked, dismantled, or inoperative vehicle, or part thereof, except as permitted by Table 3-13-6(c). You may store/work on this vehicle from a building or location that is not visible from the street, but you cannot work on or store the vehicle on the street or driveway. You might also be able to erect a 6' tall opaque fence around the car, provided the fence meets standards. The code making this illegal is a county ordinance for Orange County, CA, which is not applicable to other counties in California (other counties/cities may have their own ordinances). Codes which cover this sort of activity are generally made at the county or city level. They vary dramatically from location to location, and are often different based on the zoning of the property within the county or city.
The statute in question is section 26708 (13)(B): A vehicle equipped with a video event recorder shall have a notice posted in a visible location which states that a passenger's conversation may be recorded. It doesn't require it be visible to all passengers and doesn't make any provision for visually impaired passengers. I am not licenced to practice in California but know of no cases clarifying how "visible" the notice needs to be. I wouldn't suggest trying to hide the notice, though.
I'll preface this by saying I live in Australia where the lowest jurisdiction that can make an act a criminal offence is the state; local governments simply do not have that power here, Question 1: If I understand this right you have a law that you do not enforce that carries moderate sanctions and you are asking that a law that you do not enforce with greater sanctions will be a greater deterrent? Well ... no (see here). If you want to stop the behavior you have to enforce the sanctions that you have in a fair and impartial way. I would suggest that you make it very clear that starting in early September the laws will be enforced - that gives people fair warning. Then, each weekend in September you bring in enough police (State Troopers?) to enforce the law. Its not going to take many $250 fines to make people stop. Question 2: No comment. Question 3: No comment. Question 4: Sounds like a good way of getting the city sued for negligence; just because people are breaking the law does not make it legal to hurt them. If you are serious then fencing the entire area may be worthwhile but the area would still need to be policed.
We have no way of knowing when this happened, but it is probably a fact, recorded some time in the past. Utility companies very frequently obtain a right-of-way (easement) which gives them certain rights to your property. Typically, this happened a long time ago when a previous owner agreed. As for gas pipelines, that typically includes "don't plant trees" restrictions. The easement is usually recorded in the county office where deeds are filed. The legal basis is generally "because you agreed, or some previous owner agreed". You can get a copy of the easement to see if "no trees" is actually part of the agreement. If yes, no point in arguing, if not, you could hire a lawyer if they are demanding that they are threatening you. They are allowed to be concerned and to ask you to cut trees regardless, but if it's not required by the terms of the easement, you can say "No, I'd rather keep my tree".
In the UK, no offence is committed, however many public locations cite the Data Protection Act 1998 as a reason to stop people taking pictures. DPA does not mention this topic at all, and is a red herring (however informing the location of this is unlikely to help, I have discovered) In fact, in the UK, the only laws that appear to exist cover either specific locations and properties (eg military installations) or using photography to take pictures of individuals in areas where they have an expectation of privacy. The Photographer's Rights Guide published by digitalcameraworld in 2012 is still current as far as I can see. It has this specific guidance: Photographers Rights: Taking Pictures of People in Public Are you breaking any law when you’re taking pictures of people in public? Probably not, but the position under UK law is uncertain. There are currently no general privacy laws under UK law, but the UK courts must take into account the European Convention on Human Rights, which gives everyone the right to respect for their private and family life. As this is an area of law that has been developing rapidly over the last few years, it is hard to be certain what will constitute an infringement. The key issue is whether the place the image is taken is one where a person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, it has been suggested that the right of privacy of a child could be infringed by publishing a photo of them with their parents in a public street. It is therefore advisable to be careful when taking photos intended for publication, even where the subject matter is in a public place. Failure to obtain a model release for the use of an image will certainly make it harder to sell the picture to stock libraries. Photographing children The same laws apply to adult and child subjects, but a child does not have the legal capacity to consent and a parent or guardian must therefore do so on their behalf. Be aware that schools, leisure centres and places where children and adults gather usually have their own photography restrictions. Although decent photos of children (see our tips for better pictures of babies, children and teenagers) taken in a public place may be fine for non-commercial use, seek permission from the child’s parents or guardians and don’t shoot covertly with a long lens. For commercial images, you’ll need to get a model release signed by the parents. Also read the section on the powers of police and security guards.
Switching sides I'm writing a drama and need some help. Can a criminal lawyer in a rape case switch sides from the person they are representing to the victim if they have been fired by their client?
No. As the defendant's lawyer, they will have been privy to privileged communications. As such, it would be unfair to the defendant if they now started prosecuting. Also note that a victim very rarely has their own lawyer in a criminal case. The prosecution lawyer is acting for "the Crown" (essentially, "society as a whole"). (There are exceptions, if the victim is bringing a private prosecution - but this is very rare for serious cases such as rape).
There is a big difference between knowing something and proving it. A lawyer who knows a client is guilty can take steps to prevent the state from proving guilt. (E.g., motion to exclude evidence, cross examining witnesses.) The belief that a client has committed a crime does not necessarily mean one knows what specific crime was committed. Is a killing Murder 1, Murder 2, or manslaughter? There are defenses even when an act may be a crime. E.g., self defense, insanity, justifiable. Lawyers are not permitted to assist in perjury. E.g., allow the client to testify to something he knows is false.
A Lawyer In A Court Case Needs Court Permission To Withdraw Once a lawyer is representing a client in court, the lawyer can cease to represent the client, either by "withdrawing" or in a "substitution of counsel" (which is far less regulated), but a lawyer can only withdraw and leave the client unrepresented if the lawyer obtains the permission of the court presiding over the case to do so, after giving appropriate formal notice to the client. And, the court is within its rights to refuse to allow the lawyer to withdraw from the representation in most cases, and certainly if the reason for the lawyer's withdrawal is that the lawyer is not getting paid. Why would a court deny a lawyer permission to withdraw? A case in which a former client is self-represented is a nightmare to deal with at trial from a practical perspective for a judge, screws up the judge's calendar if the trial has to be delayed to allow a new lawyer to get up to speed after being hired, and is also much more prone to lead to reversible error that could cause the case to be overturned on appeal. For example, usually when a lawyer is present and the prosecution seeks to admit inadmissible evidence, the lawyer objects on the proper legal ground and the judge evaluates the objection and keeps the evidence out. But, if no one objects, letting in the evidence can still lead to a reversal on appeal if doing so was "plain error", and the "plain error" or objection preservation analysis on appeal becomes even trickier if the defendant representing himself objects to the evidence coming in, but for the wrong reasons - for example, objecting to inadmissible hearsay on the grounds that it is irrelevant when it isn't irrelevant but is inadmissible, but mentions that the person questioned "wasn't even there" when the statement was made. Also, since there is a right to counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases, when a lawyer withdraws (especially for non-payment) the court now has to determine whether or not the client is indigent (which non-payment would typically support an inference of) and if so, the court must appoint a new lawyer who would have to do lots of redundant work to get up to speed in a case. Failure to do so would be fertile grounds for potentially setting aside a conviction. This is particularly a concern when the only issue is nonpayment of fees, so nothing about the representation itself is fundamentally flawed. Judge's don't have much sympathy for the lawyer in these cases in criminal matters, because the ordinary custom and practice is to work for a flat fee that is mostly paid up front. A judge who forces a lawyer to keep working a case like that is prioritizing fairness for the client over coddling the lawyer's bad business management of the lawyer's firm, protecting the public from having to hire a public defender at the public's expense in the case in a manner that might involve wasteful redundant legal work, and protecting the public interest in keeping an eye on police misconduct. But, if a lawyer is not getting paid early in a case, for example, entering an appearance on an emergency basis around the time of an arrest and then seeking to withdraw a week or two later when the client fails to make a promised retainer payment, the lawyer will usually be allowed to withdraw by the court. Generally speaking, the closer the case gets to the trial date, the more likely it is that the court will refuse to allow the lawyer to withdraw. The Impact Of A Withdrawal On A Lawyer's Reputation It is not as a general rule harmful to a lawyer's reputation to withdraw from representing a client. As noted before, there are circumstances when it is mandatory to do so (see Rule 1.16(a) below), and most of the reasons for withdrawing that are permitted but not required (see Rule 1.16(b) below) would also not damage a lawyer's reputation. For example, nobody is going to fault a lawyer for withdrawing from a case because he contracted cancer (a lawyer in my office suite had to do this, then returned to practice during a multi-year remission, and then had to withdraw again shortly before his death), or because a client has become non-responsive. Indeed, one of the main motives for a lawyer to withdraw other than not getting paid, is that the client's conduct makes it impossible for the lawyer to represent the client in a manner that doesn't harm the lawyer's reputation. For example, a key part of a lawyer's reputation is his ability to make a statement of fact or law, when not under oath to the court or to another lawyer in a case, which people will consider trustworthy without having to verify it formally. But, if a lawyer's client lies to the lawyer causing a representation made by the lawyer to end up being false, the lawyer may want to cease representing the client so that the lawyer does not end up innocently making a false statement that damages the lawyer's reputation in the future. Similarly, one of the most common reasons for a lawyer to withdraw other than not being paid is that the client simply stops responding to telephone calls, stops showing up to meetings with the lawyer, doesn't respond to mail or email, fails to appear at court for hearings, or at mediation sessions, or at probation officer meetings, etc. Since a lawyer is required to get a client's signature and/or approval for certain steps of a case, and often to show up in person at hearings as well, the lawyer is required to withdraw to preserve the lawyer's reputation because not doing so would force the lawyer to have violations of court rules that the lawyer is responsible for meeting on behalf of a client. It would be rare for a good lawyer to make it through a career without having to withdraw for a reason like this at least half a dozen times over a career. Obviously, there are reasons for a withdrawal that can hurt a lawyer's reputation. If the lawyer withdraws because he won't be able to make court dates because he will be serving a jail sentence himself or will be in drug rehabilitation or is facing embezzlement charges, that isn't good for the lawyer's reputation. Similarly, if the lawyer withdraws following a judge's implication that the lawyer has engaged in misconduct in a case, or following a client letter to court accusing the lawyer of something unsavory, that hurts the lawyer's reputation. A client discharging a lawyer from a case can be good or bad for the lawyer's reputation, if it happens infrequently, although frequently being fired by clients is always bad for a lawyer's reputation. If the client seems crazy or mean spirited, being fired won't hurt the lawyer's reputation. If the client seems reasonable or seems to have good cause to fire the lawyer, it does hurt the lawyer's reputation. But, in general, good lawyers withdraw from representing clients, not exactly on a regular basis, but certainly many times during the course of an ordinary, highly reputable career. A typical, good quality, ethical lawyer with a busy practice will withdraw from representing a client in the middle of a case perhaps once every two to four years on average, and more often if the lawyer handles a lot of small cases and a high volume of clients. Put another way, a typical reputable lawyer probably withdraws from representing 0.5%-2% of the lawyer's clients mid-case. Of course, if a lawyer routinely withdrew mid-case from say 5%-20% of that lawyer's cases, that would reflect poorly on the lawyer who, even if each individual withdrawal is proper, is not doing a workmanlike job of screening potential clients. Reasons For Withdrawal Allowed Under Arkansas Law The authorized reasons for withdrawing from a representation in Arkansas are set forth in Rule 1.16 of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct: (a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law; (2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or (3) the lawyer is discharged. (b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if: (1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client; (2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent; (3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud; (4) a client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement; (5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled; (6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or (7) other good cause for withdrawal exists. (c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation. (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. Ethical Reasons The Question First of all, to clarify, the question when asking about "ethical reasons" is asking about personal, not legally enforceable reasons based in personal morality that a lawyer might withdraw. This terminology can be a bit confusing because violations of legally enforceable rules of professional conduct for lawyers, are commonly called "ethics rules". But, violations of "ethics rules" were discussed above, and this part of the answer is about non-legally enforceable reasons rooted in a lawyer's personal moral compass that might cause a lawyer to withdraw from a representation of a client in the middle of a case. The question says this about "ethical reasons": Ethical reasons: When they were hired the lawyer thought the client was innocent (e. g. he thinks the wife accuses the husband of rape just to piss him off), but in the course of the process they came to the conclusion the client is guilty (e. g. the husband actually raped his wife). Defending an innocent client was OK with the moral standars of the lawyer, defending a criminal, who committed a particularly nasty (according to the beliefs of the lawyer) crime isn't. and In the section ethical reasons I mean a situation, when the lawyer has the gut feeling that the client is 100 % guilty, but the court may think otherwise. In real life there are situations, when you have a feeling like that, but you can't prove it. Nonetheless, you act based on that feeling (even if there is no evidence that could prove this feeling to another party). The evidence may be not enough for court or police, but it's enough for them. Criminal Lawyers Routinely, Ethically Represent 100% Guilty People No criminal lawyer who deserves to be practicing law, and honestly, almost no lawyer period, would consider it unethical to represent someone who is 100% guilty in a criminal case. Indeed, the prevailing assumption is that 95%+ of criminal defendants are guilty of something, and criminal defense lawyers actually kind of dread representing a client who really is 100% innocent, because the acceptable standards of success in the case that won't result in injustice and acceptable litigation options in the case, are so much narrower. The fact that a client is 100% guilty, in and of itself, even if the lawyer thought originally that the client was innocent, is absolutely not an honorable reason for a lawyer to withdraw, and the reputation of a lawyer who withdrew from a representation simply on the grounds that the client really did commit a heinous crime, would be shattered. The most esteemed lawyers are those who represent the clients who are charged with the most heinous crimes. Lawyers aren't in the business of deciding whether someone is guilty or innocent. That is the job of a judge and jury. They are in the business of putting the client's best foot forward. Indeed, frequently, a lawyer will intentionally refrain from having a client tell the lawyer about the facts necessary to actually know if the client is guilty or not. Lawyers are not primarily in the business of getting innocent people acquitted. They are primarily in the business of getting people who are guilty of something, or are culpably engaged in activity that is arguably a crime and arguably not a crime, the best available outcome under the circumstances. This involves insisting that the prosecution do everything it is required by law to do in order to prove its case in a lawful manner, negotiating with the prosecutor over what particular crime is the most appropriate way to classify particular conduct, and pushing for the most lenient possible sentence. For example, criminal defense lawyers routinely push to have clients who are 100% guilty acquitted because the evidence against the defendant was obtained illegally by the police. Part of a lawyer's role in defending a criminal case involving a guilty defendant is to perform the larger civic role of constantly monitoring the law enforcement system for police misconduct that incidentally benefits the client (and that is one reason why a court doesn't want to let a lawyer withdraw when the defendant is likely to be guilty but there are indications of police misconduct in the case). Arkansas Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 which governs a lawyer's legal duty to raise only meritorious claims and defenses specifically addresses the difference between civil and criminal cases in this regard: A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established. The official comment (number 3) to this rule, related to the criminal case exception states: The lawyer's obligations under this Rule are subordinate to federal or state constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule. What Sort Of Personal Moral Considerations Are Appropriate? The main ground for withdrawing from representing a client for "personal" moral reasons is that (from Rule 1.16 above): a client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement Typically, this involves matters of litigation tactics that are not illegal or fraudulent, but that are likely to hurt an innocent third party, to further victimizes the person harmed by the crime, or appeals to prejudice or hate or corruption that could do long term damage to the legal climate or other people. For example, suppose that there is strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that a husband killed his wife, and the husband can't provide an alibi for his whereabouts at the time of the crime because he has amnesia, but the lawyer knows that the wife was actually killed by your client and the husband was actually saving the life of the burglar who in a car accident leaving the scene before the burglar bonked the husband on the head causing the husband to lose his memory. Your client was a burglar who was caught red handed for the burglary with items in his trunk and DNA evidence in the house, but your client lied and said that the wife was dead when he entered the house. A lawyer might conceivably limit how far he would be willing to go to point the blame at the husband even if the client wanted the lawyer to pursue that angle. Or, the victim might be a child who after being victimized had a frail emotional state. The client might push the lawyer to rudely and aggressively question the child and to intimidatingly investigate the child's friends, in an effort to cause the child to have a breakdown and refuse to cooperate further with the prosecution, but lawyer might not be willing to use that tactic even though it might work. Or, the client might be on trial in a county with a lot of KKK members some of whom will probably lie about their biases and end up on the jury. The client might want the lawyer to make an argument that implies with dog whistle type statements that the victim was a gay Jewish black man who didn't deserve to live anyway, while the client was the descendant of a plantation owner who was active protecting KKK interests in the county, and effectively nudge the jury to engage in jury nullification and acquit the client even if they believe that he is guilty. But, the lawyer might not be willing to use that tactic. But, no lawyer worth his salt would ever withdraw in the middle of a case from representing a client simply because the lawyer learned that the client was a KKK leader who was 100% guilty of the crime, and not because of a disagreement in the tactics that the client insisted that the lawyer use.
Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.
Attorneys are universally required to tell the truth at all times and generally, they do. They are not allowed to lie on behalf of their clients or themselves. This doesn't mean that someone else's attorney necessarily has your best interests at heart. And, attorneys can, for example, fail to mention options that exist, but might not be the best for the attorney's client. Also, if an attorney's client lies to him or her about the facts, the attorney could conceivably say something inaccurate while believing it to be true. In the kind of meeting you are describing, however, most likely, the attorneys are simply going to explain your parents' estate plan, over which you have no control or say in any case, and there is no reason for suspicion or paranoia.
There is a firm difference between giving advice on "what the best decision is likely to be" and "what decision to make". The former is what lawyers must do, which comes from: Conduct and Client Care Rules: Whatever legal services your lawyer is providing, he or she must— discuss with you your objectives and how they should best be achieved: give you clear information and advice: Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006: legal work includes— advice in relation to any legal or equitable rights or obligations: So, there is nothing in the law that requires lawyers to advise you on "what decision to make". Instead, they explain to you the range of possible decisions and what ramifications / implications / consequences they have. They won't make the choice for you — it's always yours. Is it legally correct that a lawyer is not permitted to provide advice on what decision to make It is not strictly true that a lawyer "is not permitted". Rather, they are not obliged to do so. And they have a damn good reason not to: there is a huge difference between being responsible for legal facts based on which you make decisions, and being responsible for decisions themselves.
england-and-wales Scenario 1: If a person is acquitted of an offence, and evidence later shows that someone else committed it instead then there's nothing in law preventing that second person being prosecuted - assuming all the relevant conditions are met. Scenario 2: If a person has been convicted of an offence, but evidence later shows that someone else may have committed it (independently and in isolation rather than as a co-conspiritor), then in all likelihood the former defendant may have grounds for an appeal on the basis that they have suffered a miscarriage of justice. One option is for their case to be reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Commission who may refer the case back to the court to determine whether the conviction should be quashed in light of new and compelling evidence. Scenario 3: "Infinite" indictments are theoretically possible (in as much as infinity is possible) but only if there is enough evidence against each and every person to justify them being indicted. If prior indictments resulted in convictions, then loop back to Scenario 2.
The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence.
Is it murder to kill someone who's just about to die? A person is falling into a pool of lava. If another person were to shoot them as they're falling, would the killer be charged for murder?
Since we don't have a system of robot justice, it's impossible to say whether a prosecutor would file charges in this bizarre circumstance, since filing charges is discretionary. However, this situation does fit the description of murder. It is intentional, it causes death (maybe, vide infra), it is not legally justified (as self-defense, or as an act legally sanctioned by a state executioner), the victim is a person. It is not sanctioned by any "death with dignity" statute. The one issue that might be effectively argued by the defense assuming the irrefutability of the factual claims of your scenario is that perhaps the relevant crime is assault with a deadly weapon, since it probably could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim died from the shooting, and not from being incinerated by lava. It depends on where the person is shot, and with what.
If I were a federal prosecutor (which I'm emphatically not), I might try to charge you under 18 USC § 32 (a) (5): a) Whoever willfully— [...] (5) interferes with or disables, with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, anyone engaged in the authorized operation of such aircraft or any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of any such aircraft; [...] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Since you clearly know, or believe, that this has the potential to interfere with piloting, which would obviously be a serious danger to people on board the aircraft, I'd argue you would be acting with "reckless disregard for the safety of human life." If your conduct results in anybody's death, then life imprisonment and/or the death penalty are also on the table, under 18 USC § 34.
In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful?
You have no reponsibility to save someone (unless you put them in that position / were responsible for his safety, this is called owing a "duty of care", e.g doctor to patient, road user to road user etc) Legally you are not a murderer. But morally, your actions are reprehensible.
The definitive answer to the question "could I be charged" is always YES. I refer you to the Manassas City teen charged with child pornography. Child pornography laws were put in place to protect children and prevent them from being exploited by having sexual pictures of them taken and distributed. In this case, the picture in question is of the young man’s own genitals, which would make him both the perpetrator and the victim. Apparently the lead detective in the Manassas City teen's case was himself a pedophile and just wanted an excuse to use force to photograph the teen's erect penis. Why would you assume this "girl" is a "17 year old girl" or a "15 year old girl" and not a 39 year old pedophile Manassas police officer?
It would be murder (assuming the facts surrounding her getting shot would support a murder charge, of course, and it wasn't something like an accidental discharge.) The fact that she was on life support for a time is irrelevant. Under Maryland law § 2-102 it doesn't matter how much time has elapsed: A prosecution may be instituted for murder, manslaughter, or unlawful homicide, whether at common law or under this title, regardless of the time that has elapsed between the act or omission that caused the death of the victim and the victim's death. It's a Wisconsin and not a Maryland case, but according to State v. Below, 799 NW 2d 95 - Wis: Court of Appeals 2011, it doesn't even matter if life support was wrongly terminated; the defendant is still guilty: [E]ven if the Defendant can establish that the termination of Madison's life support was "wrongful" under Wisconsin Law, that wrongful act would not break the chain of causation between the Defendant's actions and Madison's subsequent death.
The question starts with a wrong statement, that international law does not allow the use of force against unarmed border violators. It does. There are human rights involved, and any one border policy may be against international law and conventions, but generally speaking the use of (lethal) force may be allowed. When a person dies, the proper disposition of the body is governed by the laws of the country where the body rests. This can become problematic when the body rests on a border fence, possibly inaccessible from the side on whose territory it is. Once the body is recovered, there may or may not be an autopsy, again according to national law.
This isn’t self defence Self defence involves reasonable steps to end an imminent threat. How does causing the assaulter to die in 2 weeks of Covid deal with the imminent threat?
Can any crime be a federal crime in the US? As an example, can the US Congress declare that jaywalking is a federal offense? Or would the jaywalker have to cross a state border in order for the crime to become prosecutable by federal authorities?
Legally, no, Congress can't pass laws just because it feels like it. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution contains a set of powers Congress has.* Other sections give Congress additional powers. Elsewhere in Article I, Congressional consent is required for states to make interstate agreements, keep military forces in peacetime, and impose tariffs. It's implied that Congress may suspend habeas corpus in the event of rebellion or invasion. Article III provides another authority for Congress to establish courts, allows Congress to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and allows Congress to fix a penalty for treason. Article IV lets Congress make rules about interstate recognition of judgments and official records and gives Congress the power to make rules governing property owned by the United States. Many amendments give Congress even more powers (generally by saying something like "Congress has the authority to enforce this amendment"). The 13th Amendment says Congress can ban slavery. The 14th Amendment says Congress can enforce its provisions (which require states to give due process and equal protection). The 15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th Amendments expanded voting rights and gave Congress the power to enforce them. Etc. So Congress has a lot of powers, but the key is that their powers are enumerated. For any federal law, you can ask what authority Congress used to enact that law. However, there's a world of difference between what powers Congress technically has and what powers they practically have. The final enumerated power is to pass all laws which are necessary and proper for carrying out some other power. Sometimes, this is a fairly direct extension of the applicable power. Nothing in the Constitution explicitly says Congress can pass a law against harboring deserters, but it's a law which is important for ensuring that the US can field an army. Sometimes, though, the link is very tenuous. If you read federal laws, they often contain the phrase "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce." Just about everything can be tied to commerce in some way or another, and interstate commerce is something Congress has the power to regulate. Regulating interstate commerce is the justification for DOT regulation of long-haul trucking, which is clearly commercial. It's also the justification for antidiscrimination laws, because discrimination had a serious chilling effect on travel within the country (hard to visit a city if there's no hotel that will accept you). It's also the justification for banning the growth and consumption of marijuana for personal use, under the theory that even though it's illegal to trade it across state lines, there is in fact an (illegal) interstate market and growing your own might in some way affect that market. The courts very rarely strike down laws on the basis that they fall outside Congress's enumerated powers. They did in a case in the 1990s about the Federal Gun-Free School Zones Act, but Congress then amended it to say it only applied to guns if the gun or any of its components at some point traveled in interstate or foreign commerce (which is almost every gun). More recently, the Supreme Court upheld a law against personal growth of marijuana for personal consumption. The powers in Article I, Section 8 are: The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; To borrow money on the credit of the United States; To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes; To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States; To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures; To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States; To establish post offices and post roads; To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries; To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations; To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water; To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; To provide and maintain a navy; To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;--And To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
The US legal system deals with this by punishing you for the crimes of which you are convicted. That is, those where the evidence (whatever it is) convinces a jury that you are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If there is insufficient evidence, for whatever reason then you would not be convicted. The prosecution can, subject to admissibility, put forward whatever evidence they like in order to convince the jury. This can include a pile of ash that they allege contained convincing and unambiguous evidence of guilt. Of course, if that's all they've got the prosecution would probably be censured by the judge for wasting everybody's time and money, more likely, a prosecutor wouldn't lay charges in the first place. As to punishment for an evidence tampering conviction: you have been convicted of evidence tampering, not drug production so you will be punished for evidence tampering, not drug production. The legislature sets different punishments for these for a reason, possibly a reason known only to them but a reason nevertheless. The judge has discretion to apply anything between the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed. A conviction for evidence tampering in a drug case rather than, say, a jaywalking case, is likely to get a more severe sentence all else being equal.
We need a jurisdiction, because burglary is a statutory crime. Since this is a residence, in Washington, under RCW 9A.52.025(1), the trespasser might have committed residential burglary: A person is guilty of residential burglary if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, the person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling other than a vehicle. While other states may have a provision requiring intent to commit a felony, or intent to commit a crime other than trespassing, the Washington statute does not say "felony" or "other than trespassing". A person can enter unlawfully by accident, or with no intention to be there unlawfully, in which case the person committed the act without the requisite criminal intent. If a person intends to enter but not remain, and they enter, they have committed the misdemeanor of trespassing. The question of whether unlawful entering with the intent to unlawfully remain satisfies the "intent to commit a crime" called for in the Washington statute has not been directly addressed in case law, as far as I know. While the state generally shoulders the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the crime, in Washington, under RCW 9A.52.040, the accused may bear the burden of disproving intent (this is a permissive inference on the fact-finder's part): In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without such criminal intent. This does not mean that the state shoulders no burden of proof regarding intent, according to State v. Newton: A jury may, however, infer the defendant's specific criminal intent from his or her conduct if it is not "'patently equivocal'" and instead 'plainly indicates such intent as a matter of logical probability' In this instance, the burglary conviction was overturned because no evidence shows his intent was anything other than to show her she could walk The relevant fact is that the accused was under the influence of PCP, and believed that God had told him that his disabled mother could walk, and he broke into the residence to tell her this. Pursuant to State v. Bergeron where the conviction for attempted burglary was upheld, the court held that The intent to commit a specific named crime inside the burglarized premises is not an "element" of the crime of burglary in the State of Washington... The intent required by our burglary statutes is simply the intent to commit any crime against a person or property inside the burglarized premises The court observed in this case that "there is absolutely no evidence in the record to prove what specific crime it was the defendant intended to commit inside". What distinguishes Bergeron from Newton (the latter, not precedential, citing the former) is that there was a good case that Bergeron had an intent to commit some crime, though not a specific identifiable crime; but for Newton, there was no evidence that defendant intended to commit any crime whatsoever, even remaining unlawfully. In the hypothetical instance, the fact that the criminal smashed a vase is evidence of an intent to commit a crime (destruction of property). It's unlikely that a mere assertion "I just did that on the spur of the moment" would carry any weight. If the circumstances make it more likely that he entered intending to do something wrong, such as vandalism, the elements of burglary are present/ If the defendant claims some innocent reason for trespassing, such as escaping a riot, he may avail himself of a defense (RCW 9a.52.090) that The actor reasonably believed that the owner of the premises, or other person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him or her to enter or remain If there is no evidence of a riot, such a defense is not credible. Alternatively, if the house is for sale, the "I thought it would be okay" defense is more credible.
Be careful: from the Wikipedia article, it appears that there is a state criminal trial and there will be a federal criminal trial. In addition, there is a federal civil suit which incorporates some stats law claims. The defense in each trial may be different. Have you read the complaint in the civil case? As an example, count 1 alleges, in paragraph 214, that the defendants' actions were "without legal cause." An obvious defense is to show that the actions were actually justified under the law. The law under which they would have been justified would be state law. It's still possible that the state law justification isn't sufficient, but that is another point to be argued in court. If they can't prevail in showing that state law did authorize their actions then the act was certainly unlawful under both state and federal law. Do defendants have standing to invoke self-defense given the context or did they give this up at some point in time? Standing is a threshold that plaintiffs must meet. But defendants can certainly argue self defense. Whether they can prevail on that argument depends on the facts of the case as determined by the court, in particular by the "finder of fact," which is the jury in a jury trial and the judge in a bench trial. The facts that I'm aware of in the public record suggest that the defendants would not prevail on such an argument, but that doesn't deprive them of the right to advance it in court. If someone claims that Arbery was grabbing for the shotgun then the defendants have a right to introduce any evidence of that fact that they may have. It is for the finder of fact to judge the credibility of the evidence.
If I attempt to carry such a product into the country, but then honestly declare it at the border (I would like to declare 10 kg of marijuana, sir), can I be prosecuted for attempted smuggling? This depends on the jurisdiction and its definition of "smuggling." In the US, as an example, smuggling implies fraud or "clandestine" action. Openly bringing a forbidden item and declaring it would not meet the definition of this crime. Or will I simply be faced with the choice of turning around or forfeiting my goods and continue without trouble? Depending on the product in question, probably not. In the marijuana example, even if you are not guilty of smuggling, you are guilty of possessing and transporting a controlled substance (see 21 USC subchapter I). You could also be charged with intent to distribute, which would likely be a more serious crime. You could also be charged under the laws of the state in which the port of entry is located. With regard to the methyl alcohol example, I do not know whether bringing it to the customs desk at a port of entry would constitute a crime.
The US Supreme Court only has jurisdiction in federal matters. So if someone is suing under federal law, or there is a constitutional question, the Supreme Court is the place to go for a definitive answer. However, states have their own laws. The Supreme Court cannot tell New York that it must apply the attractive nuisance doctrine, as it is neither a matter of federal law nor a constitutional matter. New York is free to make its own laws on the subject, and the New York courts are free to interpret those laws as they see fit. In fact, federal courts are required to defer to New York's interpretation if New York's laws apply to the case, even if the case is in federal court for some reason (like diversity of parties.) See the Erie doctrine (which, coincidentally, involves yet another case about railroad injuries.)
It's a bit of an oversimplification. You're correct that there is a federal law against murder, 18 USC 1111. However it applies only to a murder committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This covers situations like crimes committed on federal lands such as national parks or federal buildings, or crimes on US-flagged ships at sea, aircraft in flight, or in space. It does not apply to "ordinary" crimes committed at most locations within the US. 18 USC Chapter 51 covers a few other situations, such as murder of a federal officer, foreign diplomat, by incarcerated or escaped federal prisoners, US nationals murdering each other while abroad, and so forth. The idea is that these restrictions keep the laws within the enumerated powers of Congress as stated in Article I Section 8 of the US Constitution. A federal statute covering all murders throughout the US would probably be unconstitutional for this reason. So while what he says is not strictly correct, it is true that in the vast majority of cases, murders are covered by state laws and not by federal laws. Even if one was to agree with Ramaswamy that medical abortions are a form of murder, even still, no federal murder law currently on the books would apply to a typical abortion, except under very unusual circumstances.
The US has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in the US. Canada has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in Canada. As added complications, if you are a Mexican citizen then Mexico has jurisdiction and if your victim is Chinese then China has jurisdiction. If you get arrested on an Interpol warrant in Spain then Spain has jurisdiction. And so on ... Your implicit assumption is that jurisdiction is exclusive, it isn't. Any country (or sub-national jurisdiction) that claims jurisdiction has jurisdiction, at least to the extent of testing that claim. Whether any given polity has jurisdiction depends on the particular law involved, some laws are only applicable within that countries borders others are extra-territorial, some are applicable to citizens but not non-citizens or vice-versa, etc.
Can a Guardian (parent) force a 17 year old to move out of their house in Colorado? My Father, who has custody of me, has threatened to force me to move out of his house. If I am 17, and live in Colorado can he make me move out? He doesn't seem to care who I move in with but I think he is assuming I'll move in with my Mom (who does not have legal custody)
I assume you are not legally emancipated. To evict anyone, there is a legal process – nobody can just kick a tenant out, without the appropriate court order. These guys describe the process for evicting an adult child (where the child does not have a lease and is a tenant at will). A custodial parent has a legal obligation to provide, among other things, a place for the child to live. Kicking a child out is contrary to that obligation, and could constitute child abandonment ("neglect" under CRS 19-3-102), and that is a crime. A court would not grant a parent's motion to evict a minor child. If a landlord takes the law into his own hands, as it were, he can be sued under CRS 38-12-510.
An individual does not have authority to "issue" a restraining order. In the U.S. only judges can issue such orders. The guidelines and policies for obtaining a restraining order vary by jurisdiction, although in the end a judge can issue any order he wants. So in theory you might be able to find a judge who will issue an order for any or no reason. In practice I'd be surprised if many judges would abuse their office to gratuitously harass people in this fashion, though there are probably a few amusing/disturbing examples out there to the contrary.
Since you are 17 years old, any contract that you sign is according to US law voidable by you or your guardian until some time after you are 18. So if he tries to sue you, you can just void the contract and he has no leg to stand on. The money he paid you is just bad luck for him. He won’t have any copyright or license to use your code in that case. BTW. You have a verbal contract which is quite valid. With no other evidence, any court would assume that the contract was that you delivered what you delivered, that he has a license to use the code, and he paid the money that he paid. If you void the contract, he has nothing.
Yes, it is illegal in North Carolina, which defines your sex as what's on your birth certificate. At any point in your transition, even when it's long complete, you'll still have to use the restroom for the gender on your birth certificate (hypothetically assuming the law is still in place). See e.g. this CNN coverage and this followup. Will you actually be arrested? Probably only if there's a complaint. The police haven't yet figured out how they're supposed to enforce this law.
Of course a city can enforce their own laws. The possible laws that LA (or any other city) could enforce against the video producers and vbloggers are many: zoning laws (enforcing laws against operating a commercial film set or business in a residentially zoned area); the requirement for an open burning permit, either all year or during times of fire danger; excessive noise ordinances, either 24hr or in a time span from late evening until morning; ordinances regarding excessive traffic and street parking; ID age checks for drinking, if police can get access to the property through warrant or other means; and investigations of criminal behavior shown in the videos. "Basically, after today, if we film in this house we could face up to six months in prison because we need permits," https://www.popbuzz.com/internet/social-media/jake-paul-banned-from-vlogging-in-house/ He could be talking about filming permits, traffic permits, burn permits, occupancy permits, etc. Cities and municipalities can quickly enact new ordinances that criminalize behavior that impacts the neighborhood as a whole after taking into account complaints from neighbors and advice from police regarding activities of the problem residents. Another aspect of the story is that it appears that Jake Paul is a renter. That means the city and neighbors can put pressure on the landlord to encourage Paul to obey the law; failing that, the landlord could possibly evict Paul in a very short amount of time due to possible damage and other clauses in the lease regarding illegal activity, if the lease stipulates anything like that.
This is going to depend very much on exactly what is in writing. Note that your father could, if he chose, directly leave both the house and the IRA to his partner. If you become the homeowner after your father's death, and the "3-year right to use" and the cost sharing provisions are not in writing, then neither is legally binding. You and the partner may choose to honor your father's wishes, but if he does not put them in the will or another legal document, neither of you is bound. The question says: I cannot evict her if needed, as she is a senior citizen, living in my home, with no lease. I do not know of any jurisdiction in which there is a general ban on evicting a senior citizen in all cases. There will be some restrictions no doubt, but they will depend on the local laws. And of course you may not wish to exercise all the legal rights you may have. You would ultimately, have the right as homeowner to evict the partner. I don't what procedures would need to be followed legally -- that will depend on the specific jurisdiction, which the question does not list. As the homeowner, you would be legally responsible for maintaining and paying taxes and other expenses on the house. The partner would be either your tenant or your guest. Once you have title (and that will take some time after your father's death, in all probability) if the "right to use" was never put in writing, you could ask the partner to sign a lease. The terms could be whatever the two of you choose to agree on. If she becomes a tenant under such a lease, she has both legal rights and legal responsibilities, and each of you has the protection of a clear agreement. You would be wise to consult a lawyer to learn exactly what the local law does and does not permit. Your father might well be wise to put his wishes more clearly in writing while he still can.
The applicable state law is here. Section 461-A:2 guides the interpretation of the chapter: I. Because children do best when both parents have a stable and meaningful involvement in their lives, it is the policy of this state, unless it is clearly shown that in a particular case it is detrimental to a child, to: (a) Support frequent and continuing contact between each child and both parents. (b) Encourage parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of raising their children after the parents have separated or divorced. (c) Encourage parents to develop their own parenting plan with the assistance of legal and mediation professionals, unless there is evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or neglect. (d) Grant parents and courts the widest discretion in developing a parenting plan. (e) Consider both the best interests of the child in light of the factors listed in RSA 461-A:6 and the safety of the parties in developing a parenting plan. II. This chapter shall be construed so as to promote the policy stated in this section. The law gets no more specific than to refer to the fact of being a parent. The law does not favor males over females, or vice versa, and the law does not discriminate between a parent who is a minor versus a parent who is a legal adult. The rights of parents are equal, ab initio. However, the recognition of the rights of a father does depend on the legal establishment of paternity whereas the law takes maternity to be self-evident. This may have been dealt with at birth, or may require a legal process if paternity is contested. If that part is sorted out, then disagreements about custody etc. which can't be worked out through agreement possibly with a mediator can be resolved in court. The court will determine what constitutes the "best interests of the child". That is all there is to it, legally. That does not mean that a judge making a decision is absolutely immune from thinking that the minor father is less able take care of the child. Starting next year, a minor can seek emancipation, but until then (and until there is emancipation), the minor's parent have veto power over the father's wishes.
This likely comes down to contract law (note: I'm not a lawyer; this isn't legal advice). If his rental contract is not with you, you'll need to refer this to the property owner's representative. I don't see why just sharing the house would give tenants any eviction rights over other tenants. Even if you are the owner (cf “my house”), it would be unusual for independent tenants to be party to each other’s rental contracts. The other tenants are irrelevant to any eviction attempt, except perhaps as witnesses in court.
Can restaurants call cops on customers who leave fake "Jesus money" as tip? I've been reading that in the US there's a thing where certain kinds of people leave fake bills with just a corner showing just the dollar amount and the rest hidden under a napkin or peeking out of the check holder, but upon closer inspection turns out to be not real money. Such fake bills contain christian-adjacent texts which read things to the effect of "Jesus's love is more important than money". I don't think anyone can tell for sure if any such person who leaves these fake bills does it as a way to propagate their religious beliefs, or to be a cheapskate with an "excuse", but the bottom line is they're leaving fake bills instead of real bills, and it's not cool to the servers. Some say that the Secret Service will only investigate if the bills appear to be at least not obviously fake in full view, but the way these bills are used, only the real-looking portion is left in the open until the server comes over to collect them. Is such use of "Jesus money" illegal? Can servers (or managers) of restaurants call the police on the customers for doing that?
If only the tip is left in such "fake" money, it would not be theft as there is no legal obligation to leave a tip at all (except in those establishments that add a tip or "service charge' to the bill.) If the "money" is not an attempt to imitate real cash, it wouldn't be counterfeiting (leaving monopoly money for example would not be counterfeiting). The server would be understandably angry. The restaurant might refuse to seat the people who left the "fake" another time, if the servers identified them to the manager, but nothing would require them to do so. This is all on a US basis, I have no idea if tips might be legally required in other countries.
Expunction may be possible for instance if you are acquitted, later proven innocent, pardoned, and various other things that fall short of being convicted and doing the time. The entire law is here (Texas code of criminal procedure 55.01). There is also the option of an order of non-disclosure, overviewed here. A requirement for such an order is that you were placed on and completed deferred adjudication community supervision, which from what I can tell is not what happened. "Background check removal" may range between simply taking your money and doing nothing, to doing what you could do yourself to get free of traces via radaris, intelius, spokeo, and so on to "request removal" from that web site. This will not make your record unavailable, because these websites don't have any special powers to reach into and manipulate state records.
Essentially, if there is no written agreement or receipt of payment, the only records that exist will be in the payment itself. If it was paid by cash, there's probably no recourse without additional facts. However, if it was paid electronically, then even if there's no narration (description) that claims that the payment was for rent, it is still possible that you would be able to file a summons requiring the recipient bank to produce the information relating to the entity that holds the account the money was sent to. The information they have may be limited, but generally this would include: Name Address Date of birth (for natural persons) Phone number The above information is typically required under anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist funding legislation. Additionally, if it was paid electronically, the regularity of the payments and the regular amounts may be persuasive. Finally, it's not proof, but you can swear an affidavit or a statutory declaration attesting to the truth of your assertions, but without additional evidence (the aforementioned transaction information), it doesn't really hold weight on its own.
Nobody know what constitutes "scamming", because it's not a legal concept. There is no sense in which receiving a gift itself constitutes "scamming". Since scamming is vaguely about dishonesty, there is an imaginable scenario where you could be liable for a false representation, for example if you impersonated someone else in order to receive something of value, you could be prosecuted in California. You should not assume that a police officer saying "That's not our problem" is proof that you committed no crime or civil tort. Your lawyer can give you advice as to whether you have anything to worry about, legally. The other stuff about being called a scammer or having pictures posted might be a violation of Facebook's TOS, and you can always complain to Facebook central authorities. Technically, uploading a picture that someone took is a violation of copyright law, if you didn't give permission to do so. It might run afoul of some state~provincial or national privacy law, depending on where this takes place.
What would be the most reasonable thing to do? Live with it. Oh, and stop breaking the law with your automated emails. Illegality on their part does not justify illegality on your part. Also, it’s likely that this activity has caused your email address to be blocked automatically which may explain why they aren’t contacting you. From a legal point of view, that’s the only reasonable option. You do have valid grounds for a lawsuit for the value of the watermelon but the cost of filing will be a couple of orders of magnitude greater than the value of the melon so doing so isn’t “reasonable”. If you want to vent, the internet offers a wide variety of social media platforms for which that seems to be their primary focus. But that’s got nothing to do with the law.
According to the United States Treasury Department: Money laundering is the process of making illegally-gained proceeds (i.e. "dirty money") appear legal (i.e. "clean"). Typically, it involves three steps: placement, layering and integration. First, the illegitimate funds are furtively introduced into the legitimate financial system. Then, the money is moved around to create confusion, sometimes by wiring or transferring through numerous accounts. Finally, it is integrated into the financial system through additional transactions until the "dirty money" appears "clean." I have no idea if the $10m are proceeds of crime so we apply the duck test - "If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck and swims like a duck; its probably a duck" A person has gifted another person $10m - there is nothing illegal about giving someone a gift, however, this is a pretty substantial gift. I am calling it a gift because there is no enforceable contract that requires repayment. There is an expectation that the receiver will invest this money for a period of time, hey, if I had $10m I'd probably invest it too. And then return it to the giver; with or without the earnings (you do not say). Again there is nothing wrong with reciprocating a gift; reciprocity is a cornerstone of most societies, however, this is a pretty detailed understanding of what reciprocity means. Quack, quack, quack - its money laundering. Many jurisdictions in the world have "unexplained wealth" laws which basically require a person to explain their unexplained wealth or have it confiscated. If it isn't money laundering it is certainly at risk of this.
It doesn't even have to be pennies. Any cash denomination is open to discretion. The Federal Reserve tells us "There is, however, no Federal statute mandating that a private business, a person, or an organization must accept currency or coins as payment for goods or services. "
Extrajudicial implies there is some weight of law behind the casino behaviors you describe. I don't think there is. For example, refusing to cash out chips could just be a management intimidation tactic to try to coerce the customer into agreeing to be "questioned." Which the customer would be under no legal obligation to do. Card counting can't be proven if the counter is not using a device of any kind. The casino can refuse to serve the customer and expel the customer but they can't unilaterally keep the customer's money by not cashing the customer's chips without a judgment. I am not an attorney. This answer is not legal advice.
Mistake of Law: Requisite of Intent - Distinguishing Nuance Background: I am not a law student, I am a graduate student in mathematics who intermittently enjoys reading about law because I find it axiomatic, deductive and occasionally creative - similar to mathematics. You could say it is a hobby for me. Context: I was reading about 'mistake of law' defense on a website (I do not know how credible or outdated this website may be). In short, here is what they had to say - "Mistake of Law: A mistake involving the misunderstanding or incorrect application of law with regard to an act or transaction. The defense of mistake of law raises two issues. The first issue occurs where, because of a mistake of law, the defendant did not have the requisite intent to commit a crime. The second issue occurs where, because of a mistake of law, the defendant did not know that an act that he committed intentionally was criminal. It is important to understand the distinction between these two issues because, while mistake of law will usually be allowed as a valid defense in the former situation, it will generally not be allowed in the latter situation." It had a quiz at the end so you could test yourself to see if you understood the subtle difference. I answered the first two questions correct, but only because there were similar examples in the article that set a precedent for how I answered. I have a few closely related questions regarding the two scenarios in the quiz, and the defense in general. I provide screenshots of the quiz below: Analysis: From the highlighted definition / explanation of 'mistake of law' defense above, and the green highlighted explanations in the pictures - this website is implying that the distinction between a successful application of mistake of law defense and unsuccessful mistake of law defense entirely boils down to 'requisite intent' - although they do not give a clear definition of this. My interpretation of the arguments for defense in the scenarios is as follows: Argument for Scenario 1: Defendant comes into possession of lost property. Defendant falsely believes that a law exists stating that if lost property is not claimed within two months finder gains ownership of lost property. Defendant waits two months. Because of the mistake, at this time defendant falsely believes lost property becomes defendants property. As defined in the question larceny requires the intention of permanently depriving an owner of their property. By (4) - at the time defendant made the transaction that would constitute permanently depriving plaintiff of ostensible property, defendant believed ownership was transferred to defendant. Defendant did not have intent to commit larceny By definition defendant is not guilty of larceny. Argument for Scenario 2: Defendant comes into possession of lost property. Defendant believes "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is". Defendant sells necklace - purposely and permanently depriving the owner of their property. By definition, defendant has committed larceny. Actual Questions: In scenario 2, to say "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is" seems like a laymen way of saying the defendant believed that finders of lost property immediately acquired ownership. It also seems from the analysis that had this been the defendants statement - it would have been a 'successful' application of the defense. Is the wording of the defense the tipping point of what makes this an 'unsuccessful' application? Both of these examples and scenarios are 'isolated' to help get a point across to a reader, that said - just because we have argued that defendant is not guilty of larceny in scenario 1, could the charge be adjusted to a crime that does not specifically require intent? Could a judge 'overrule' that defendants 'mistake' was 'unreasonable'? By the contrived example of scenario 1 it seems it would be a valid to defense to simply claim that every defendant thought a law existed that somehow removed their intent to commit the crime as defined, but surely this cannot be. No longer specific to the examples above, do mistake of law defenses actually occur in modern legal situations? Closing Remarks: Please note that I am new to this stack exchange community. I tried my best to keep my question on-topic as defined in the help page - but please feel free to offer advice regarding social norms of this community, e.g. feel free to tell me if my question is silly child's play and this community is for more serious questions. I also had a hard time choosing appropriate tags since 'legal defenses' is not a tag, please adjust as needed.
I don't think that's an accurate interpretation of the statement. The key difference between the two scenarios is the defendant's legal assessment of who owns the necklace. In the first he thinks he is the owner and can claim mistake of law; in the second, he he thinks someone else is the owner, so he cannot. To say he believes "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is" is very different from saying he thinks he's the owner. He doesn't think he's the legal owner, he just thinks he has legal rights that include some rights associated with ownership. So if the defendant's statement had actually been, "I thought I was the owner," that would have been a successful defense when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. The defense was actually, "I thought I was allowed to deprive the owner of the property," which is an admission of guilt when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. There are a couple questions here: a. A different crime that did not require intent -- or even required a different kind of intent -- could still lead to a conviction. A legislature is free to define larceny differently, so it could say that anyone who recklessly or negligently deprives another of property is guilty. Or it could say that your state of mind doesn't matter and that depriving another of property is larceny regardless of intent. b. In most cases, the mistake of law defense requires that the defendant honestly believe in the mistake; unlike mistake of fact, it does not require that his belief also be reasonable. Either way, the question of reasonableness would probably be a question for a jury, so a judge wouldn't be able to reject it (except in a bench trial). c. Mistake of law is a potential defense to any crime that requires an intent to do something that requires an assessment of what the law is. So if it's illegal to intentionally have sex with a woman who is not your wife, and you mistakenly believed you were in a legal marriage, sex with your non-wife would not be a crime. It has potentially very broad implications, but keep in mind that in many cases, the mistake a defendant would have to claim would be pretty far out there. If it were illegal to intentionally let anyone under 21 years old into your bar, I guess you could argue that you only let a 20-year-old in because you thought the law started calculating at conception, but I doubt you'll convince a jury. Mistake of law defenses still pop up pretty regularly. Here's one just yesterday from the Tenth Circuit. And this one is a Kansas case where a conviction for carrying a weapon while a felon was overturned because the court wouldn't allow a mistake-of-law defense. The Kansas case, though, uses the more modern definition of mistake of law, which also includes reasonable reliance on official statements from the government. In that case, the felon's parole officer had told him that it was OK to carry a pocketknife, but in reality, the law titled "Criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon" prohibited carrying knives, as well.
There is a big difference between knowing something and proving it. A lawyer who knows a client is guilty can take steps to prevent the state from proving guilt. (E.g., motion to exclude evidence, cross examining witnesses.) The belief that a client has committed a crime does not necessarily mean one knows what specific crime was committed. Is a killing Murder 1, Murder 2, or manslaughter? There are defenses even when an act may be a crime. E.g., self defense, insanity, justifiable. Lawyers are not permitted to assist in perjury. E.g., allow the client to testify to something he knows is false.
Keep in mind that a warrant doesn't require proof that you stole the property or have the property. Instead, the warrant is just authorization to look for that proof. The standard for securing a warrant is probable cause, which is a much lower bar to clear than people seem to think. It just requires that given everything the officer knows, there's a "substantial probability" that a piece of evidence will be in a given place at a given time. If the officer swore to a judge that a reliable source had told him that the letter was stolen, then seen in your front yard, and not seen since, I wouldn't be at all surprised if the judge gave him a search warrant.
Comments here and here suggest that "irreconcilable differences" can be used to explain "withdrawal when the client fails to compensate the attorney", but it can mean many other things. The point of the phrase is to not divulge the reason. Amidst the various scenarios discussed under Rule 1.16(b), subsections (3) and (4) permit withdrawal when the client fails to compensate the attorney [...] When it comes time for an attorney to prepare the motion for withdrawal for such reasons, however, [...] an attorney may consider citing the ubiquitous “irreconcilable differences” in the motion to withdraw, rather than divulging pernicious information about the client. However, it can mean many other things as well. The point of the phrase is to not divulge the reason for withdrawal.
The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se.
Do I have any recourse for invalidating all or part of the contract? No. There is a presumption in contract law that when a contract is reduced to writing then what that writing says is what the parties agreed. Also, if you signed it, then you are legally stating: I read it, I understand it and I agree to it - don't sign things you don't understand. If your lawyer has produced something you don't understand then have them redraft it until you do. Would a successful suit against the lawyer for malpractice or negligence make any difference? No. A suit against you lawyer may get you damages from your lawyer but it will not affect the rights of third-parties. What is best practice for avoiding flawed contracts like this in the first place? Read and understand the contract. Educate yourself enough in the law so that you can do this. Your lawyer is there to give you professional advice; you are there to make your own decisions.
In the case you link, this was given as an opening statement by the defense. Opening statements do not contain evidence. The defendant may or may not testify on their own behalf during the trial - this testimony, if given, counts as evidence, even if it is somewhat self-serving. And anything which tends to casts doubt as to the defendant's guilt is evidence that they didn't do it, even if it isn't proof. If there is reasonable doubt, then "he didn't do it" is not illogical. And it would seem unfair to allow the prosecution to say "he did it" but not allow the defense to say "no he didn't".
What remedies are therein the United States? I would imagine that the witness could be prosecuted for perjury. My guess is that the plaintiff could prosecute the witness for the lost damages. Are there any other remedies like reopening the original trial or declaring a mistrial so that the plaintiff could sue the (deep-pocketed) defendant, or would this be double jeopardy? Perjury prosecutions are like unicorns. They are rumored to exist but are almost never seen. A prosecutor would be exceedingly unlikely to bring charges in such a case, but it might not hurt to ask. Even if the criminal prosecution prevailed, however, the defeated plaintiff would be no better off, or might get out of pocket court costs as restitution at most. You could request that the witness be sanctioned for contempt. But, this leaves the loser in the original case no better off unless the judge made the highly unusual decision to award compensatory damages as a contempt sanction. Similarly, if you have reason to believe that the attorney knew that the testimony offered was false, that would be grounds to grieve the lawyer which could result in the lawyer's suspension or disbarment, but that is very difficult to prove and again would not advance the unjustly defeated plaintiff's cause. Assuming that the time to move for a retrial (usually two weeks) expired when the new evidence was discovered, you could move to set aside the verdict (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 or the equivalent state rule). The deadline for such motions based upon fraud by an adverse party is usually six months. Sometimes an independent action to set aside the verdict for fraud on the court could also be brought (sometimes within two or three years), which is an uphill battle, but probably the best option if all other deadlines have expired. The witness probably has absolute immunity from civil liability outside that court case for the testimony offered, so a civil action suing the witness for lost damages would be dismissed. The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply, but a similar doctrine called "res judicata" (a.k.a. "claim preclusion") prohibits retrying a case that was tried on the merits between the same parties, if it has become a final order. So, filing a new case is ruled out assuming that no appeals were filed within the deadline for doing so. And, even if the deadline for filing an appeal has not lapsed, it probably wouldn't prevail because the key new evidence wouldn't be in the record. It would be better to file to set aside the judgment in a motion and to appeal if that motion was denied.
Is it legal to deny employee reimbursements for meat? WeWork appears to have instituted a policy where they prohibit their budgets from being used for purchases of red meat, pork and poultry, citing sustainability. www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jul/13/wework-meat-events-expense-ban “New research indicates that avoiding meat is one of the biggest things an individual can do to reduce their personal environmental impact, even more than switching to a hybrid car.” The ban appears to apply for both company-sponsored events, which seems like a reasonable policy with a clear business case — noone's entitled to free lobster (incidentally, seafood isn't prohibited by the policy, possibly because studies have shown that pescetarianism is one of the healthiest diets), as well as reimbursable per-diem expenses, which sounds like overreaching into the personal lives of employees eating on their own time during business travel. … staff will not be able to expense any meals that include poultry, pork or red meat. Is it legal for a company to have a travel policy denying its U.S. employees from reimbursement for solo sessions of meat eating during business trips?
I don't know of any federal law that is violated. US labor law is generally favorable to employers, compared to many other countries, and gives employers a lot of freedom in setting policies and rules, The theory is that an employee who doesn't like it can go and work somewhere else, and an employer with unreasonable policies will eventually be unable to get people to work for them. In particular, it surprises some people that employers aren't legally obligated to reimburse travel expenses at all: The FSLA does not have any rules regarding an employer's obligation to reimburse an employee for business-related travel expenses. No federal law requires reimbursement. So it would be perfectly legal for the company to require employees to pay for all their own meals when traveling on business. Given this, I'd expect that the company would have pretty broad discretion to place conditions and restrictions on reimbursement, including what they will and won't pay for. If an employee had a disability or religious beliefs that required them to eat meat, and the company wouldn't grant them an exception, they might have a claim under the ADA or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act respectively. But if it's just that they happen to prefer meat, I don't think there's a law to guarantee them such a right. Some states could have their own laws that might be violated, though I tend to doubt it. If you have a particular state in mind, please specify.
It is not illegal to treat the employees differently. As long as nobody is being paid for less than the time worked, this is legal. Treating employees differently because of protected characteristics is unlawful discrimination. However, the duration you have worked there is not a protected characteristic. It is perfectly legal for the employer not to mandate new employees clock in and out. It would even be legal (if not a great idea) to hire new employees for twice as much.
I believe that legally they can't force her to use sick leave since she has met the 40 hours minimum required as a salaried employee. Is this correct? Unfortunately, as far as the Department of Labor (DoL) is concerned, the employer is correct here, provided that this is company policy. First, there is no "40 hours minimum required", the DoL simply says that a salaried (exempt) employee must be paid the full salary for any week in which the employee performs any work, regardless of the number of days or hours worked. This is then limited by the "allowable deductions: Circumstances in Which the Employer May Make Deductions from Pay Deductions from pay are permissible when an exempt employee: is absent from work for one or more full days for personal reasons other than sickness or disability; for absences of one or more full days due to sickness or disability if the deduction is made in accordance with a bona fide plan, policy or practice of providing compensation for salary lost due to illness; to offset amounts employees receive as jury or witness fees, or for military pay; for penalties imposed in good faith for infractions of safety rules of major significance; or for unpaid disciplinary suspensions of one or more full days imposed in good faith for workplace conduct rule infractions. Also, an employer is not required to pay the full salary in the initial or terminal week of employment, or for weeks in which an exempt employee takes unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. (Source: dol.gov) Emphasis Mine This means that as long as the employer has a policy or practice requiring the employee to use Paid Time Off (PTO) for sickness (sick-days), then the employer is allowed to make deductions from the employee's salary for those days. So in short, yes, the employer can require that the employee use PTO to cover sick days, regardless of the actual number of hours worked in that week, month, year, etc. There is currently no federal requirement for employers to provide paid sick leave, although some states like California may have local laws.
BC employers are required to give workers three days of unpaid personal illness & injury leave per calendar year. However, this protection only applies to workers who have held a job for more than 90 days. If you have not held the job for that long, it does not appear that any protections apply to you. Note that (as of March 2021) there are separate rules concerning COVID-19 exposure & illness. There may also be protections that apply to you if you are a union member, or if you work in a federally regulated job (banks, national trucking companies, airlines, and some others.)
It probably depends on whether the employer is covered by a relevant non-discrimination statute. Most employers in the United States are covered, but some are small enough to be exempt. Federal law exempts employers with under 15 employees and religious organizations. There might also be a relevant state law. It also would depend upon whether the EEOC or a court found that "be blessed" was a compelled religious statement in violation of a worker's beliefs, and whether allowing the worker not to say it would be a "reasonable accommodation." This is a strong case, and I suspect that the worker would win on both counts but it isn't a completely open and shut case. There is arguably a secular meaning to the word "blessed" and a court could conceivably find that there is a legitimate and indispensible business purpose for insisting that every single person in the worker's position need to make this statement, although I doubt that a court would do so.
Can an employer be required to provide an escort from office to vehicle? No, at least, not on the theory articulated in the question. I can imagine some circumstances where it is conceivable that there might be a duty arising from some other source, like an OSHA regulation applied to a firing range business, or an express contract with the employee (some employers provide an escort as a matter of right in the evenings or at other high risk times, as an employee benefit, especially college and university employers, in part, because they have worker's compensation liability while an employee is still on a large campus, in part because it helps attract employees who may feel vulnerable, and in part because of an attitude that the employer wants its employees to be safe at dangerous times of day and this shows that the employer cares about them), or a court injunction related to a labor-management dispute where the employee is a scab. There is no such employer duty, but an employer does have strict liability in almost every case (there are some minor exceptions for very small employers and criminal conduct by an employee who is injured when the criminal conduct is clearly outside the scope of duty of the employee) for injuries and death in the course of employment from any cause whatsoever pretty much (including criminal actions of third-parties) which is generally fully insured by worker's compensation insurance. The exact details of when someone ceases to be at work for worker's compensation/employer liability is buried in case law and regulations (for overtime and minimum wage purposes, the standard is "portal to portal" but workers compensation/employer liability need not be identical, although once you are clearly no longer on the employer's premises and commuting after a day's work is done or before a day's work starts, you are clearly not covered). But, any place where there is employer liability at all, it would be worker's compensation covered. Usually, if the employer is required to have worker's compensation but doesn't, the employer likewise has strict liability for the same harms, but the damages that may be awarded are not limited to those that worker's compensation policies would cover. This leaves the employee with at risk travel between the office and the vehicle. It seems reasonable as well that as the employer prohibits the employees self defence, they would be responsible for the employees defence between office and some safe location (i.e. vehicle). This theory pretty much always loses. An employee walking in an ordinary, non-wartime environment without a firearm is not "at risk" in a meaningful sense, any more than someone who didn't choose to carry a firearm who goes about their daily life (or is prohibited from carrying one due to past conduct such as a felony or a domestic violence protection order or a domestic violence misdemeanor or a condition of parole, probation or bond pending criminal charges). Also, the employee is not being prohibited from engaging in any kind of self-defense or protective action whatsoever (or from asserting self-defense rights if a firearm is carried contrary to an employer rule) just from carrying a firearm at that particular moment (on pain of losing a job, not forfeiting a legal affirmative defense under criminal statutes), which is one of many means by which a person can protect themselves from crimes.
In the United States, specifically in Norwalk, Connecticut, where I live, may I volunteer for an individual, and may an individual use volunteers? For example, may I volunteer as a personal chef for a celebrity, ie, cook them meals for free, and may they accept my services without compensating me? I think the answer depends on whether I'm an independent contractor or an employee. The answer is not nearly as simple and straighforward as the employee v. independent contractor distinction suggested in the question. People who work for free fit in a number of categories, some lawful and some not, even though the definition of employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (regulations here) and parallel state legislation is facially very broad (people who suffer to let others work for them, more or less) and many of the exceptions are quite narrow. The nature of the categories is a nice illustration of how much social context and nuance is buried in a seemingly straightforward black and white legal rule like the minimum wage. Any time there are common practices that a statute doesn't expressly contemplated that aren't routinely the subject to litigation, you should doubt whether the statute really applies to them (although often enough it does), and courts are more likely in these circumstances than most to devise a definitional oriented, or implied, or common law exception to encompass the common practices as being lawful. The facts in the original question aren't rich enough in character to really determine which category applies, and those facts "smell fishy" as far as whether it would really fit in any legal category of unpaid work, in part, because the motives of the "volunteer" are very unclear. The legal categories include: People work for free in furtherance of their own charitable intent (e.g., working for free at a United Way fundraiser). People working for free who have bona fide donative intent (painting a mural on your boyfriend's wall as a birthday present). This is one possible category that the original question seems to be considering as possibility. Note that donative intent doesn't preclude an expectation that there will be unspecified, not legally enforceable, reciprocity in the future, in the form of reciprocal generosity, or in the form of owing someone an ill defined "favor" that doesn't amount to a true quid pro quo barter transaction. You might have donative intent towards a celebrity because you are a fan, because you appreciate their work or contributions, and because you desire to be part of the inner circle of a celebrity or wish to become a friend of a celebrity and want to do so out of friendship, since the celebrity is an awesome person that it would be nice to have in your life. This category could also include cases of moral but not legal obligation, or cases of seeking to do penance to the person for whom you volunteer out of non-legally binding guilty or shame (as distinct from a threat that you will be embarrassed). Family members doing chores for each other out of a duty of care and support on the part of a parent or spouse, or a duty to obey a parent arising at common law, on the part of a child, and similar family obligations. Closely related is unpaid work as a fiduciary (e.g. an executor, power of attorney agent, or trustee) with a donative or family relationship motivation. Parties to contracts remedying damage that they have done for which they would otherwise have contractual responsibility (e.g. cleaning your own apartment, or an apartment upon which you guaranteed someone else's lease, before the tenant moves out, so you won't have deductions from your security deposit, or so you won't be sued for damages). Similarly, work incurred to protect or add value to your own property. People who work expecting to be paid and have a legal right to be paid who don't get paid after the fact due to the insolvency of the employer, or discharge of the debt in bankruptcy, or the expiration of a statute of limitations or claims deadline in a probate proceeding. People performing court ordered community service and inmates in prison pursuant to a conviction. Self-employed business people who don't make a profit, either personally, or in a capacity as an officer or director of an entity owned by the self-employed person. But, if this involved providing services for no compensation, without a more involved business with expenses as well as receipts, as an alleged independent contractor, for a single other person, this is probably a case where the law would find that someone is actually an employee and not an independent contractor, and where the contract is void for want of consideration. The form over substance analysis that holds that is employment subject to the minimum wage for purposes of the FLSA and state law seems like the most likely scenario in the original question, but the facts aren't detailed enough to tell definitively. Unpaid interns and students learning while doing something of value (generally permitted, but the analysis of the FLSA and state law is rather involved). This is another category that plausible could apply to the original question. People within other express FLSA exceptions that are also present in state law. The illegal categories include: Slaves. These rare cases are usually prosecuted criminally intended to punish keeping slaves (often accompanied by human trafficking charges). Indentured servants (basically slaves for a term of years who aren't allowed to quit, often to someone who paid a major expense such as travel costs to a new country for you, in order to repay the debt). These rare cases are usually prosecuted criminally intended to punish this practice (often accompanied by human trafficking charges). Inmates in jails who have not yet been convicted of a crime, and who are awaiting trial, who are required to work without pay. People working for free due to duress or blackmail, not expressly authorized by law, and not merely the generalized economic duress of needing money to live (e.g. doing household chores for a bully because he threatened to beat you up if you don't). These cases, if they are litigated at all, are usually prosecuted criminally under extortion statutes. More generally, you are not a true "volunteer" if you work is in any meaningful sense involuntary, even if it does not support a provable case beyond a reasonable doubt of true criminal extortion. People in normal employment relationships who are paid for some work but required to do additional unpaid work as condition of employment. Most civil FLSA litigation involving completely unpaid work, involves this category of unpaid work. I'm sure that there are other possibilities that I have not considered and listed, but generally, the legality of working for free is evaluated on a category by category basis. Situations where payment is predominantly in kind (e.g. room and board and clothing) can be complex to analyze and these arrangements are frequently subject to special rules. The primary statutory minimum wage exemptions are as set forth in the exemptions provision of the FLSA: §213. Exemptions (a) Minimum wage and maximum hour requirements The provisions of sections 206 (except subsection (d) in the case of paragraph (1) of this subsection) and 207 of this title shall not apply with respect to— (1) any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity (including any employee employed in the capacity of academic administrative personnel or teacher in elementary or secondary schools), or in the capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited from time to time by regulations of the Secretary, subject to the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, except that an employee of a retail or service establishment shall not be excluded from the definition of employee employed in a bona fide executive or administrative capacity because of the number of hours in his workweek which he devotes to activities not directly or closely related to the performance of executive or administrative activities, if less than 40 per centum of his hours worked in the workweek are devoted to such activities); or (2) Repealed. Pub. L. 101–157, §3(c)(1), Nov. 17, 1989, 103 Stat. 939. (3) any employee employed by an establishment which is an amusement or recreational establishment, organized camp, or religious or non-profit educational conference center, if (A) it does not operate for more than seven months in any calendar year, or (B) during the preceding calendar year, its average receipts for any six months of such year were not more than 331/3 per centum of its average receipts for the other six months of such year, except that the exemption from sections 206 and 207 of this title provided by this paragraph does not apply with respect to any employee of a private entity engaged in providing services or facilities (other than, in the case of the exemption from section 206 of this title, a private entity engaged in providing services and facilities directly related to skiing) in a national park or a national forest, or on land in the National Wildlife Refuge System, under a contract with the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture; or (4) Repealed. Pub. L. 101–157, §3(c)(1), Nov. 17, 1989, 103 Stat. 939. (5) any employee employed in the catching, taking, propagating, harvesting, cultivating, or farming of any kind of fish, shellfish, crustacea, sponges, seaweeds, or other aquatic forms of animal and vegetable life, or in the first processing, canning or packing such marine products at sea as an incident to, or in conjunction with, such fishing operations, including the going to and returning from work and loading and unloading when performed by any such employee; or (6) any employee employed in agriculture (A) if such employee is employed by an employer who did not, during any calendar quarter during the preceding calendar year, use more than five hundred man-days of agricultural labor, (B) if such employee is the parent, spouse, child, or other member of his employer's immediate family, (C) if such employee (i) is employed as a hand harvest laborer and is paid on a piece rate basis in an operation which has been, and is customarily and generally recognized as having been, paid on a piece rate basis in the region of employment, (ii) commutes daily from his permanent residence to the farm on which he is so employed, and (iii) has been employed in agriculture less than thirteen weeks during the preceding calendar year, (D) if such employee (other than an employee described in clause (C) of this subsection) (i) is sixteen years of age or under and is employed as a hand harvest laborer, is paid on a piece rate basis in an operation which has been, and is customarily and generally recognized as having been, paid on a piece rate basis in the region of employment, (ii) is employed on the same farm as his parent or person standing in the place of his parent, and (iii) is paid at the same piece rate as employees over age sixteen are paid on the same farm, or (E) if such employee is principally engaged in the range production of livestock; or (7) any employee to the extent that such employee is exempted by regulations, order, or certificate of the Secretary issued under section 214 of this title; or (8) any employee employed in connection with the publication of any weekly, semiweekly, or daily newspaper with a circulation of less than four thousand the major part of which circulation is within the county where published or counties contiguous thereto; or (9) Repealed. Pub. L. 93–259, §23(a)(1), Apr. 8, 1974, 88 Stat. 69. (10) any switchboard operator employed by an independently owned public telephone company which has not more than seven hundred and fifty stations; or (11) Repealed. Pub. L. 93–259, §10(a), Apr. 8, 1974, 88 Stat. 63. (12) any employee employed as a seaman on a vessel other than an American vessel; or (13), (14) Repealed. Pub. L. 93–259, §§9(b)(1), 23(b)(1), Apr. 8, 1974, 88 Stat. 63, 69. (15) any employee employed on a casual basis in domestic service employment to provide babysitting services or any employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the Secretary); or (16) a criminal investigator who is paid availability pay under section 5545a of title 5; (17) any employee who is a computer systems analyst, computer programmer, software engineer, or other similarly skilled worker, whose primary duty is— (A) the application of systems analysis techniques and procedures, including consulting with users, to determine hardware, software, or system functional specifications; (B) the design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing, or modification of computer systems or programs, including prototypes, based on and related to user or system design specifications; (C) the design, documentation, testing, creation, or modification of computer programs related to machine operating systems; or (D) a combination of duties described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) the performance of which requires the same level of skills, and who, in the case of an employee who is compensated on an hourly basis, is compensated at a rate of not less than $27.63 an hour; or (18) any employee who is a border patrol agent, as defined in section 5550(a) of title 5; or (19) any employee employed to play baseball who is compensated pursuant to a contract that provides for a weekly salary for services performed during the league's championship season (but not spring training or the off season) at a rate that is not less than a weekly salary equal to the minimum wage under section 206(a) of this title for a workweek of 40 hours, irrespective of the number of hours the employee devotes to baseball related activities.
Under federal law, an employer may impose direct deposit as a condition of employment. The Electronic Funds Transfer Act at 15 USC 1693k only says that employers may not require an employee to have a bank account at a particular bank: No person may— (1) condition the extension of credit to a consumer on such consumer’s repayment by means of preauthorized electronic fund transfers; or (2) require a consumer to establish an account for receipt of electronic fund transfers with a particular financial institution as a condition of employment or receipt of a government benefit. If the employee is allowed to choose their bank, then such a condition is legal under this law. The government's interpretation of this law is clarified in 12 CFR 1005 Supplement I at 10(e)(2): Payroll. An employer (including a financial institution) may not require its employees to receive their salary by direct deposit to any particular institution. An employer may require direct deposit of salary by electronic means if employees are allowed to choose the institution that will receive the direct deposit. Alternatively, an employer may give employees the choice of having their salary deposited at a particular institution (designated by the employer) or receiving their salary by another means, such as by check or cash. That said, individual states can create their own legislation, and many have made it illegal under state law for an employer to require direct deposit. You didn't name a particular state so I can't be more specific, but there is a chart here created by a payroll company showing the legality of such policies by state. Note that in some sense, the employee is not really being "compelled" or "mandated" to have a bank account - if the employer insists on using direct deposit, the employee is free to go look for a different job. US law does tend to recognize that there is a major power imbalance in employer-employee relationships, so there are many regulations; but at its root, it's treated as a contract between two independent parties who may each set whatever conditions they want, and enter into the contract only if they can agree. In contexts other than employment, I would expect even fewer restrictions on how a bank account could be set as a condition for something. For instance, it could be a condition for using a particular product or service. Again, if you don't want to open a bank account, you are free to not use that product or service.
Suppose an effective truth serum existed. Could defendants in the following situations have their confessions ruled inadmissable? Suppose a "Hollywood style" truth serum existed, whereby if a person is given the serum, that person is compelled to truthfully answer any question put to them. The following facts are true in all of the scenarios: Clyde Criminal commits a crime Victoria Vigilante catches him in the act, injects him with truth serum, and leaves him for the police Victoria Vigilante leaves, Officer Olivia arrives a few minutes later Clyde's best bet is to exercise his right to remain silent until the serum wears off. But what would be the value to the prosecutor of Clyde's confession if he confessed under these various circumstances: Before Olivia speaks, Clyde confesses to the crime. After Olivia reads Clyde his Miranda warning, but without being asked any questions, Clyde confesses. After the Miranda warning, Olivia asks Clyde "What happened?". Clyde confesses. After the Miranda warning, Olivia asks Clyde "What happened?". Clyde says "I would prefer to remain silent, but I can't stop myself from telling you..." Clyde then confesses. Before Olivia arrives, Victoria questions Clyde and records his confession. Victoria then leaves Clyde and the recording for Olivia to find.
Miranda rights do not attach until the suspect is subject to custodial interrogation. "Custody" means that the suspect reasonably believes that he is not free to leave the conversation. "Interrogation" means that the officer is engaging in direct questioning or other conduct that would reasonably be expected to elicit a response. A suspect is free to waive his Miranda rights and begin speaking without a lawyer, but a waiver must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary. "Voluntary" means that the waiver is obtained without coercion (torture, threats or promises) by the government. None of the five scenarios indicate that Clyde ever believes he is in custody, so he has no Miranda rights in any of them, making his confession admissible in all of them. But to play it out further, let's assume that Officer Olivia arrives and immediately slaps handcuffs on Clyde: No interrogation, no Miranda rights. The confession is admissible. No interrogation, no Miranda rights. The confession is admissible. Miranda rights attached at the beginning of questioning. Clyde waived by confessing. Reading the Miranda rights established that the waiver was knowing. We don't have any facts suggesting the waiver was not intelligent. The waiver was not obtained by government coercion, so it was voluntary. The waiver was effective, so the confession is admissible. Same as 3. No interrogation, no Miranda rights. The confession is admissible. The key thing to keep in mind here is that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was to avoid misconduct by the government, and it has generally been implemented only to that end. The key case here is Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), which involved a guy who approached a police officer and asked to talk about a murder he had committed. The officer Mirandized him, and he told them all about the murder and where he buried the body. It turned out that he was a chronic schizophrenic and was going through a psychotic break at the time of the confession, which he had only offered because "God's voice" told him to. As with your truth serum scenario, the question became whether the Miranda waiver satisfied the voluntariness requirement. The Colorado Supreme Court held that "capacity for rational judgment and free choice may be overborne as much by certain forms of severe mental illness as by external pressure." But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the defendant's due-process rights nor his right against self-incrimination are offended by non-governmental influences, even when they undercut the defendant's free will. Since then, other courts have relied on Connelly to hold that voluntariness was not defeated by: a suspect's flu, hangover, hunger, or exhaustion, U.S. v. Elwood, 51 F.3d 283 (9th Cir. 1995); a suspect's heroin use, Elliott v. Williams, 248 F.3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001); a suspect's heroin withdrawal, U.S. v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1992); a suspect's orders from his father, N. Mariana Islands v. Doe, 844 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1988); or a suspect's unusual susceptibility to suggestion or intimidation, U.S. v. Guerro, 983 F.2d 1001, 1004 (10th Cir. 1993). tl;dr: Because the truth serum was not administered by the government, the confession is admissible in all five scenarios.
There is no direct equivalent to the American-style plea bargain, but there are some similar procedures: Basis of Plea A defendant can offer a written guilty plea to a lesser offence with the same (or closely similar) facts as the offence charged, which has to be accepted by the court to take affect. The prosecutor must consult with and seek the views of all victims, and if the plea is accepted it must not be misleading or untrue. The Attorney General's Guidance provides more information on the process and the detailed requirements (which are too long to repoduce here). Assisting Offenders The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 offer the option for a "minor-player" defendant to assist the prosecution and/or police by providing information to secure convictions of the principle offenders in return for immunity from prosecution (section 71), a restricted use undertaking (a version of immunity) (section 72) or a reduced sentence (section 73). Immunity requires full and frank disclosure of all previous offending (referred to as "cleansing"), but for whatever reason the defendant does not "cleanse" they may still be eligible for a lesser sentence. Either way the assistance - either as evidence at trial or as intelligence given in confidence - should be substantial and verifiable to be eligible. Statistics There is, as far as I can, no publicly available detailed statistics on these procedures, presumably the reason is that vast majority of the former cases go unreported and, despite some being public, there is a real risk of retribution to the informant in the latter.
This is covered by Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 11, which says that Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement). The judge is not required to include a disclaimer (like "other than the plea deal itself") in interviewing the defendant. By asking the question in an unqualified way, the judge will decide whether there were promises made that are outside the scope of the plea bargain.
A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer.
Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.
An appeal to ignorance asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false. That is not in any way the situation here. The defendant knows if he/she has or has not so the only available answers under oath are "yes" or "no" - the jury knows this too so any other answer will be seen as disingenuous. However, this information (affirmative or negative) is off limits to the jury as it could prejudice their decision, hence the mistrial. A quick judge could instruct the defendant not to answer and instruct the jury to disregard the question but if a conviction results the defence team could use the fact that it was asked as grounds for appeal. A judge must decide if the interests of justice are better served by a retrial or a tainted conviction.
Yes and no. There are numerous cases where criminals, upon breaking in to somewhere, find evidence of a worse crime and notify authorities. This will provide reasonable suspicion enough for entering the scene. Generally, in testimony, Statements against Interest are more believable because a burgler wouldn't admit to breaking and entering if he had a way to explain why he was there in the first place. (Example: Alice breaks into a Warehouse and sees a mutilated body and blood everywhere. Alice immediately stops her theiving ways and calls 911 to let them know about the scene. Whether or not Alice stays, a dead body is enough probable cause to secure the crime scene without warrant. Its in Alice's interests to stay and help as there is trace of her at the scene and she would be pegged as a suspected murderer. If she's picked up and admits to calling the cops, it's good, but staying and helping out after the call will likely get her off on the charges related to the murder.). It could also work if they are persuing one crime and discover evidence of a second unrelated crime. (i.e. Alice robs the factory and gets away. The Factory Foreman calls the cops to investigate the crime scene, which at this point, does not need a warrant. While investigating, the Cops find security footage that Bob, the night guard, killed Chuck, a late night worker, removed his body, and cleaned the scene, all before Alice broke into the factory. The outcome of the case being made against Alice does not affect their need to prosecute Bob, as they obtained that evidence while looking for Alice in a valid investigation, not Bob, thus it is legal). Under these situations a crime that leads to a separate valid crime involving a different party is admissible. There are two possible reasons that the attorney might think this: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: This is the obvious element... the kids committed a crime with the hopes that the cops would use the evidence found by them in their commission of a crime to get the real bad guys. The attorney parent thinks this is stupid because the kids broke in specifically to do this and thus any evidence is now tossed out of court. This isn't usually the case in how this scenario will play. Generally the cops are more than happy to look at evidence obtained by criminals that points to another crime. In fact, this is how a lot of gang enforcement units and drug enforcement units operate... pick up a small fish and cut a deal for evidence against a bigger fish (turning state's in the criminal lingo, as the witness is becoming State's Evidence to another crime). As long as it's given to the cops as part of legitament evidence seeking, the cops can follow the leads where ever they... er... lead... Chain of Custody: This is probably, if properly thinking, what the attorney parent is thinking that's a bit more probable. Lets say these kids found a dead body with a sword in it and take the sword to the police... this could get dicey as the kids have contaminated the evidence in possible ways that the killer's lawyer could get thrown out. One thing CSI doesn't always show (though there are a few episodes where it comes up, but not many) is that when something is taken in as evidence, it is carefully documented, sealed, and tagged with a check in/check out list. Every time the seal is broken, the person breaking the seal notes the time, date, and reason and when does, reseals it with a new seal, and signs the time and date of the seal again. This is so at trial, the attorneys know exactly who opened up the evidence, what they did, and what possible contaminants were introduced. You even have to sign into a crime scene before you go up to the yellow tape. A good defense lawyer would call into question any evidence from anything the kids handled to get the evidence tossed (i.e. Your honor, these Meddling Kids handled the sword without following the chain of evidence. They even let their dog handle it. They had already harrassed my client earlier today by insunuating that he was involved with a hoaxed paranormal activity to scare people away from the factory. Since they claim they found the sword, but did document it at the scene, we don't know anything about it prior to the police's chain of custody. I motion that the evidence be dismissed.) If this is successful, anything from the sword is now no longer admissible as if the sword had never been found (including blood of the victim on the blade and finger prints of the suspect on the hilt)... in effect the evidence was prossessed as best the police could but the veracity of the story of it's discovery is too questionable to be considered. The defense does not have to be right, he just has to show there could be another explanation for the sword and the evidence linking his client to the crime committed by it. In short, without specific details, the attorney parent could be right or could be wrong, or more humorously, right, but for the wrong reasons. Edit: U.S. only. See other answers for other jurisdictions.
You misunderstand the significance of the phrase "innocent until proven guilty." This is in part because you are not considering the entire phrase. The full phrase is that an accused party is "presumed innocent until proven guilty." This does not mean that the accused is innocent, only that criminal procedure must take as its starting point that the accused did not commit the crime. The major implication of the presumption, and indeed its original purpose, is that it places the burden of proof on the prosecution. This means that if a prosecutor asserts that you stole something, you do not have to prove that you did not. Rather, the prosecutor must prove that you did. The only reason to present evidence of your own is to rebut the prosecutor's evidence. Another practical implication is that a decision to detain someone awaiting a criminal trial may not be based on the assumption that the accused committed the crime. On the other hand, that decision is not based on the assumption that the accused did not commit the crime. There is a presumption of innocence, but no assumption of innocence, and the government is not obliged before the person is convicted to treat the person as if there is no accusation or charge. Wikipedia has a decent discussion. If we modify your question accordingly, it becomes How can two people be presumed innocent until proven guilty if their stories conflict? Now the answer should be clear. The prosecutor must develop evidence that shows which one of the people has committed the crime. If the prosecutor cannot do that, neither person may be punished.
How to remove an entry from Boston Herald database A Boston Herald database posted information about government employees' salaries here. Can a person named in the database remove their entry?
That would require a change in the law. Names and salaries of public employees have been held to not be highly personal information exempt from the public records law. See Attorney General v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, Hastings & Sons Publishing Co. v. City Treasurer of Lynn, 374 Mass. 812. This is part of the "diminished expectation of privacy in matters relating to their public employment" attaching to public employment.
The written document is given very high priority, so parties will be held to what is in the document. Both parties sign at the bottom, as a way of signalling their agreement with the terms specified in the document. If conditions are added or subtracted (by crossing out), especially with pre-printed forms, the "customer" (person who didn't write the contract) can initial such modifications, as a way of clearly signalling that they indeed agree to the deletion of such-and-such clause. Since both parties have a copy of the signed agreement, this is not strictly necessary. The potential issue would be that an unscrupulous person could cross out a clause after the contract was signed, and claimed that they aren't bound by that clause. A comparison of the two copies would then reveal that the unscrupulous person was attempting fraud. There is nothing special about handwriting in or crossing out conditions, except that it poses a potential evidentiary problem as to what exactly was agreed to, if for example one party threw away their copy and then maintained that the crossed-out clause had not been crossed out. (So, keep your copy). In case you are proposing a scenario where one party is unaware of a change, i.e. at the very last minute Smith crosses something out and signs it, and Jones did not see that happen, then both copies would be the same and Jones would be legally bound to what's in the paper. Smith should announce to Jones that a clause was being deleted. We might suppose that there are innocent reasons why Smith made changes without making an announcement to Jones, in which case the parties do not have an agreement. There may be amicable ways to deal with that situation, but push could come to shove, in which case the written form of the document is generally taken to be the most important piece of evidence (though not always the only admissible evidence, unless you're in Colorado, Florida or Wisconsin).
As a US Citizen, you don't get a I-94 recording of entries and exits but : The FOIA site of the CBP, mentions Information Regarding Entry and Exit Note: CBP does not have records on the entry and exit of persons arriving or departing the U.S. before 1982. To be filled with CBP However, this doesn't mentions if this is only applicable to Aliens or US Citizens are included or not. But this CBP help page mentions travel records for US Citizens
As was mentioned in a comment, in the United States, businesses are generally registered at the state level. The information collected, and the extent to which or manner in which the public has access to it, varies from state to state. There may still be states where that's a paper-only process, but I'd guess in most of them it's accessible online, at least for basic information. For example, in Michigan the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs has a Business Entity Search tool. If a business deals directly with consumers, it may be a member of the Better Business Bureau. Even if it isn't, but consumers have complained about it, the BBB will make public the information it has about the purported business. If a company is publicly traded (that is, it's corporation that issues stock, and the stock is traded on a stock exchange), it is required by law to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC's EDGAR tool will display the company's filings, which should include annual and quarterly reports. If the company is or wants to be a government contractor, it generally needs to register with the General Services Administration, and certain information about successfully registered entities is publicly viewable in that system. (Conversely, the same system also lists "Excluded Parties" who are prohibited or partially restricted from doing business with the government.) Depending on what the business does, it may also be subject to registration with and regulation by additional state or federal agencies. For a full picture, however, unless you're dealing with the obvious agent of a Fortune 500 company, you'll probably want to get information from a private credit-check service as well; for example, as also mentioned in a comment, Dun & Bradstreet for the business itself, or for a really small business a personal credit report on each of the owners and officers.
My understanding is that "the record" only refers to the official record of the proceeding, e.g. the transcripts that would be kept on file and used as the basis for formal decisions. Such records are usually prepared after the fact by a court reporter based on their shorthand notes or audio recordings, so this indicates that the reporter should simply leave out the statement in question when creating those records, perhaps replacing it with a marking saying "(stricken)" or something of the sort. "Stricken from the record" doesn't indicate that the statement is to be kept secret or scrubbed from all history in some Orwellian fashion, merely that it should not be considered in any legal decision-making process (e.g. a judge's ruling). The decision should be made as if the statement had never been uttered. Anyone else in the courtroom -- lawyers, journalists, members of the public -- is free to remember it, write it down, publish it, shout it from the rooftops, or etch it into stone tablets, if they wish. No penalties exist for doing so. I also don't think there is any requirement to delete it from the court reporter's preliminary notes or audio recordings; again, only from the final official transcript. (There could be other situations where it is forbidden to record or divulge what was said: secret grand jury proceedings, material under seal, gag orders, etc. But those would all require some sort of regulation or order outside the usual meaning of the phrase "strike from the record".)
Given a large database of email addresses that you can't prove have given consent to receive email, the only legal thing to do with it, is to (securely) delete it. (I am going to switch your question about a larger company to a bank: in the UK, big pharma is forbidden from advertising to individuals.) In principle the rules are the same for a huge bank and everything down to a self-employed plumber. In practice the plumber will be told "don't do that again" rather than fined. This case was treated under the Data Protection Act, which has a maximum fine of £500,000 – so a big bank would probably have been fined more, but not necessarily much more. Under GDPR, fines are related to turnover, so the fine would be a lot bigger for a large bank. The incident is a year old now. Details here.
To what degree are such emails admissible in court as evidence, and what weight do they carry? Your own statement, when offered by you as evidence, is hearsay, unless it comes within an exception to that rule. Recorded recollection might be one of the better exceptions. There is also a chance that you could get it in as a business record of the company if you were using a company email account and the company stores all of its email communications. The documents also sometimes come in to provide fair context for a conversation with a party-opponent's statements that are admissible. It appears that Canada does not follow the modern British rule (which repealed the hearsay rule in civil cases in 1995), which if it were available, would come in without any difficulty at all. But, Canada does have what it calls a "principled exception" (which is somewhat broader than the parallel U.S. residual hearsay exception) that is generally available if the document can be shown to be reliable and there is an unavailable witness, or if there proponent of the document can show that it is reliable and necessary for other reasons. Even if the document itself is not admissible since it is hearsay, you could still testify as to what the boss said from your own recollection, and then have your lawyer ask you why you are sure that this is what was said. You would answer that you contemporaneously wrote a confirming letter to the boss spelling out what was said and you reviewed it to refresh your recollection before testifying at the hearing or trial. These kinds of confirming letters are used quite frequently in business and employment litigation. And, in my experience, these statements tend to be surprisingly effective and persuasive, because, while they do not foreclose the possibility that the person writing it was lying or inaccurate in the confirming email account, it does rule out the possibility that you forgot exactly what was said, and you provided the boss with an opportunity to dispute you which the boss didn't feel an obligation to correct. If one party has a coherent account in confirming emails of what was said, and the other party is trying to remember what happened a year or two earlier without notes from the witness stand, the person with the coherent, documented account is almost always going to come across as more credible unless the other side can show that your confirming emails are not infrequently gross misrepresentations of what really occurred. (I've also dealt with witnesses like that now and then.)
are employers legally allowed to punish (e.g. fire, reprimand, etc.) an employee who shares wage/salary information with their colleagues? No. Section 8 of the BC Labour Relations Code preserves for the employee "the freedom to communicate to an employee a statement of fact [...] with respect to the employer's business". More conclusively, section 64 entitles a person to disclose --except for purposes of picketing-- "information [...] relating to terms or conditions of employment or work done or to be done by that person". Wage/salary information clearly is a condition of employment. the only answer to that question relies on a law from a different province (Ontario) and so is not relevant in BC. That answer is relevant to Canada (also the question was about Canada). That answer cites a statute from Ontario because that is the jurisdiction that the asker specified. It would be tiresome as well as futile to provide the statutory equivalent of every province on a matter that the provinces are very unlikely to legislate materially differently.
Am I required to report my Multiple Sclerosis to the DMV? I was recently told that in every state, you must report to the DMV if you have MS. However, I can not find anything to verify this. Is this correct? Specifically, I live in Alabama, but would be curious if the general claim is true.
Alabama has published an administrative interpretation of §32-6-7, §32-6-7.1, Code of Ala. 1975 regarding medical standards for driver licensing. This allows them to take medical conditions into consideration in denying, not renewing, or restricting a license. This includes, for example, the ability to consider the fact that a person has high blood pressure. The review standard basically says that if they review a person and determine that there is a significant medical impairment, they can restrict driving privileges. 760-X-20-.10 addresses MS and related conditions, which basically restates that. There is nothing in the statutes that requires a person to report a specific medical condition of theirs. A doctor could, however, report that a patient is not fit to drive, which could trigger a DMV evaluation. P. 13 of the state Driver License Manual sums it up saying When it appears that you have some physical or mental impairment which might affect your driving ability, you may be required to furnish a statement from a doctor showing your medical history and present condition as it pertains to your driving ability. This does not translate into a requirement to self-report medical conditions that potentially affect ability to drive. It is highly unlikely that any state singles out MS, but every state has the potential to restrict driving if a person is medically unsafe to drive.
Arizona Revised Statute 28-1591 has a specific exemption for service of a parking or standing violation: B. This article does not require that either the initial notification or a subsequent summons and complaint for a parking or standing violation be issued or served as required by this article. This section carves out an exemption for parking infractions in that they don't need to be personally served. If there is no response to the complaint left on the car, the statute further states: If it is necessary to issue a summons and complaint because there is not a satisfactory response to the initial notice of a parking or standing violation, the summons and complaint may be sent by regular mail to the address provided to the department by the individual made responsible for the alleged violation by the applicable statute or ordinance. Service of the summons and complaint is complete on mailing. When service is complete the court of jurisdiction has personal jurisdiction over the defendant and can enter a default judgment. You are correct in the rest of your statement regarding moving violations reported by camera systems - the violator must be personally served. If personal service is not achieved then the complaint is dismissed with no record. This article has a good explanation of the process for service for moving violations. The article references precedence established in Tonner v. Paradise Valley Magistrate's Court. Arizona requires personal service in order to create personal jurisdiction for the court. Alternatively, the defendant can waive the personal service. In Arizona, if one takes an action recorded on a traffic camera that causes a complaint to be issued that person will receive in the mail a form that is a waiver of service. Signing such a form and returning it tells the court that you waive personal service. Refusal to sign and return the form does not remove the requirement the state has of personal service. If the state wishes to pursue the case they will need to provide personal service. If the state does successfully conclude personal service then the defendant will be liable for the initial fine as well as the cost of service. From the article and the case: Without completed service, the court does not obtain jurisdiction. “The incomplete service left the trial court without jurisdiction, i.e., without authority to enter the judgment.” Id., Supplemental Opinion, 187 Ariz. 487, 488, 930 P.2d 1001, 1002. Ignoring a personally served citation, i.e., a ticket, allows the court to enter a default judgement. In the case of a citation that was not personally served and where personal service was not waived means the court never had jurisdiction in order to render a default judgment. There is a time limit within which personal service must be completed for a complaint. I've found sources that claim both 120 days and 180 days from when the court was made aware of the complaint. Some sources also claim that the court must be notified and processes started within 10 days of the date of the infraction. If service is not completed within that time frame then the complaint is dropped and no record is retained. So, yes, parking tickets do not have to be personally served according to statute and, yes, a person in Arizona has to be personally served with a moving violation citation. Failure to achieve proper service results in dismissal of the complaint.
new-york-state No. New York's DUI law forbids the operation of a motor vehicle when your "ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by the consumption of alcohol", but it defines "motor vehicle" to exclude "electrically-driven mobility assistance devices operated or driven by a person with a disability." If you are using a wheelchair because of a disability, you are therefore not subject to the DUI statute.
We cannot advise you to pay the fine or contest it, but we can say that the law is. A notation like "no tag" is not the same as a formal charge that would be filed against you if you were prosecuted, under Georgia Code 40-2-8. The law says (b)(2)(A) It shall be a misdemeanor to operate any vehicle required to be registered in the State of Georgia without a valid numbered license plate properly validated, unless such operation is otherwise permitted under this chapter Hence driving with expired tags is against the law. The state indicates that the penalty for non-renewal is "10% of Ad Valorem Tax due + 25% of License Plate Fees", the latter being $20. There is also a fine of $25 for operating a vehicle without a valid county decal; you presumably know what the current ad valorem tax on the vehicle is.
You are required by state law to register and license a personal (or commercial) vehicle because state laws govern vehicle licensing, not the federal government as you cite. See Motor vehicle registration - Wikipedia. States have the right, well established in case law, to require registration, taxation and insurance for all vehicles on all public roads. The various websites and "sovereign citizen" arguments on the web that say you don't need to register or license a vehicle are wrong. In some special cases, states issue waivers for what are known as farm or ranch vehicles driven solely on private property, and those cases may or may not pay taxes or require insurance.
Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it.
You are completely in the wrong. It is against the law to operate a motor vehicle without a license. It is against the law to have a motor vehicle that is not insured. It is against the law to violate the conditions of your probation which almost certainly provide that you are not allowed to operate a motor vehicle until your license is reinstated and you have insurance in force. Your personal belief that you didn't break the law is not a valid reason not to pay a fine on a ticket that is ratified by a court. The cop was right when he told you that you were crazy.
Can you get a ticket? Absolutely. You're relying on the knowledge of the person issuing you the ticket. How knowledgeable are they? In my experiences around the world, people enforcing laws on a day to day basis know surprisingly little about the law (although they often think they know everything). I think this part of the code you mentioned might be relevant: 5200.(a) When two license plates are issued by the department for use upon a vehicle, they shall be attached to the vehicle for which they were issued, one in the front and the other in the rear. But "the department" likely refers to the Department of Motor Vehicles in the State of California, which never issued you anything. But that may not stop eager law enforcement personnel from issuing you a ticket. If you do receive a ticket, I think you'll successfully be able to fight it and win. It will be obvious to a judge that there is nothing you could have done to reasonably avoid the issue. Just make sure you have documents showing that you only moved very recently. According to the the State of California's official Department of Motor Vehicles website, you have only 20 days to get your registration (and likely the state's mandatory insurance) switched to your new state. See https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/brochures/howto/htvr09#reg I have no idea how vigorously they enforce the law there. It's likely up to the whims of the people in charge of enforcing it.
What keeps people from trying to reach a negotiated or mediated divorce settlement? Two people close to me are going through a divorce. I am trying to understand why they are spending so much money on lawyers' fees rather than even trying to reach a negotiated or mediated settlement. This question is asked in order to get some broader perspective. In general, what can keep two people who both want a divorce from pursuing a negotiated or mediated route?
Acrimony Mowzer makes some good points. Another one is the parties may just hate each other. In some strands of legal theory, it's considered a type of transaction cost that keeps people from bargaining before and after litigation.
I am a notary public in Vermont and have had to deal with people who had name variations. Readers of Law StackExchange like to citations to reliable sources; I'm not going to do that, just describe my experience. Many states do indeed allow a person to adopt a new name through usage. Government agencies and large commercial agencies don't like that, and they can and do thwart the law by imposing their own administrative procedures. If you don't like their procedures, fine, give a lawyer a $20,000 retainer, have the lawyer sue, and wait three years. And after spending all that money, the court might find that although it isn't a crime for a person to change their name by usage, there is no law requiring the administrative agency to accept it. If you don't have tens of thousands of dollars to waste or years to wait, you have two choices. Get married, and use the marriage license as evidence of your name change. The format of marriage licenses is different in every state, so how well this works depends on the state. The other option is to get a court-ordered name change.
Not successfully It is not required that a person knows they are dealing with an agent of the principal rather than the principal directly - an agent speaks with the principal’s voice. Robert has consented to allow Elizabeth to act as his agent. It actually doesn’t matter if he consented before she acted or afterwards, he has agreed to be bound by Elizabeth’s actions. Rachel & Jared have agreed to enter the lease and indicated as much by signing the document. It doesn’t matter who signed it for the landlord or even if it was signed - leases have to be in writing but there is no common law rule that they need to be signed.
This appears to be a complaint about lawyers using the legal process to achieve what their client wants. Forgive me, but this seems to be like complaining that doctors only want to cure the client's disease, architects only want to design the client's buildings and generals only want to kill the client's enemies. Your lawyer is not your business strategist or your life coach! A civil case is always about the money. If you are pursuing a civil case over a principle then you are going to spend a lot of money and probably lose. The use of a lawyer should always be part of your wider negotiation strategy in the same way that your armed forces are part of your diplomacy; in both cases the threat of use is usually better than the actual use. A civil case always follows a failure to successfully negotiate. Not all by any means, but most, civil cases would be better settled by agreement than litigation by all parties. If you believe that your objectives can best be served by a social media campaign, political pressure, etc. then go for it. Your lawyer can advise you what the risks are wrt to defamation etc. but ultimately how you choose to pursue your goal is up to you. Lawyers, understandably, look for legal solutions. A public relations professional is far better placed than a lawyer to inform your media strategy.
Short Answer Chain of custody is a common challenge to the admissibility and weight of evidence. Qualification This sounds like a real case. Not a hypothetical. The outcome can go either way. It sounds like it's heading for litigation. The result will depend on the facts and legal arguments. If this is meant to be a hypothetical there are too few facts described to be able to analyze it. I suggest you hire an attorney and forget about getting the question answered here. Generally speaking, it's impossible to prove a negative. So on that basis, proving they did not tamper with the data will be a challenge at best. Lawyers can always challenge evidence. And chain of custody is a common challenge to the admissibility and weight of evidence.
Admissibility is one thing, enforcement is another. My observations, which are more detailed than casual, is that Family Courts are a different breed, and more than most any other court, "they do what they want." I have associates who had agreed to stipulations, detailing how a child might be handled, only to have a family court decide at some point to implement some completely different plan, and in doing so run against what both parents were interested in doing. Prenuptial agreements appear to be meaningless, as this is not about the assets of the couple, it is about the state's interest in the child. Even then, the courts seem to act in manners which appear to not be in the best interests of the child (and sometimes even say so.) Back to your question, would an agreement be admissible? Yes. Does it mean much? In my opinion, and based upon the preponderance of evidence, no. Do whatever you have to do to stay out of family court. Being married doesn't matter. Working together for 21 years does. In the future, you should state the jurisdiction you are in. It does change the answer, but in this case only subtlety.
The most likely reason the other driver doesn't want to go through insurance is to avoid a raise in his premiums. However, there could be more serious consequences, up to and including having his insurance cancelled, for example, if the son was not supposed to be driving the car, or based on the criminal nature of the offense. However, there can be serious consequences to not dealing with insurance. Some (if not all) insurance policies require him to report the accident; by failing to do so, he may risk losing his insurance. More importantly to you, if he does not report a claim to his insurance, his insurance will not pay it. This is important to you, because insurance companies, as a general rule, pay claims. Random people don't always; they ignore you, they move out of state, they go bankrupt. If this is a serious amount of money, you need to talk to a lawyer before you enter into a contract with this person, to make sure that it's enforceable, and that if you don't get paid, you have some recourse.
A settlement can include whatever terms the parties agree on, short of terms prohibited by law. Usually one party gives up at lest some claims. Then other party nay also give up,claims, or make a payment, or both. There may be other terms as well, including confidentiality of the details. It is not uncommon for both parties to give up all claims against each other. Settlement agreements are legally binding on both parties. We cannot advise on what kind of settlement a particular person should take in a particular case. For tht, consult a lawyer.
Can records of custody court cases be searched in NYC? If so by whom? Person A has a need to find person B. They do not know person B's name or other identity, but know they are somewhere in New York City, New York, USA. But they know the following about B: within last 4 years, B was a parent involved in a court case where their older adult child won custody of their younger underage child from them. Some information about the children is known but not precise identity (let's say birthday and first name for one of them is known; as well as ages). The only way I can think of to find person B would be to review every single court case involving custody in New York City, and see if the information about the winners matches the known info. Question #1: is this even possible? Is there some sort of central database which contains details of all recent court cases involving custody of children in New York City? Question #2: If this is theoretically possible, who would have access/privilege to do this? Any random person? A registered lawyer? Police? Court officer? I am assuming that custody case info would be somewhat protected, unlike criminal cases, but do not know enough to be sure.
Question #1: is this even possible? Is there some sort of central database which contains details of all recent court cases involving custody of children in New York City? Yes, it is possible. The court clerk for each respective court in the State of New York maintains a list of every case pending that court that goes back many years in electronic form, and there is some minimal classification by case type although the classifications used might not precisely match what you are looking for - it might be necessary to include more than one kind of case and some classification categories might be over broad for your purposes. There are probably at least three courts that could have jurisdiction over this kind of case in New York City. The Supreme Court (i.e. the trial court of general jurisdiction) which has jurisdiction over custody cases that are incident to a divorce or legal separation and in certain other cases, for example, criminal felony child abuse and neglect cases take place in the Supreme Court; the Family Court, a court of limited jurisdiction which lacks jurisdiction over divorces and legal separations but often handles custody matters involving unmarried couples, custody determinations incident to allegations of child abuse or neglect, and post-decree child custody matters; and the Surrogate's Court, which handles custody determinations incident to deaths and incident to some incapacity determinations (as guardianships of minors) and if I recall correctly, incident to adoptions. It also isn't inconceivable that a de facto custody decision could also be made in another court incident to issuance of a protective order or criminal case. It is also quite possible that there may be multiple related cases in the same or separate court. For example, there might be a child abuse and neglect case terminating person B's parental rights in family court, and then a guardianship of a minor case appointing the adult child as guardian of the minor child in Surrogate's Court. It is quite possible that more than one database (or portion of a centralized database) would have to be reviewed, rather than a single database. When I practiced law actively in New York there was not a single database, but that was more than 20 years ago and given the explosive improvement in information technology that has taken place since then, it would not surprise me at all if some or all of the relevant databases have since been consolidated. They do not know person B's name or other identity, but know they are somewhere in New York City, New York, USA. But they know the following about B: within last 4 years, B was a parent involved in a court case where their older adult child won custody of their younger underage child from them. Some information about the children is known but not precise identity (let's say birthday and first name for one of them is known; as well as ages). Notwithstanding my answer to question #1, it wouldn't be easy. While birthdays and ages would be present in documents filed in the various court cases, they would not be indexed centrally. The index of case names would contain the names of the parties to the case, the general case type, and the case number, and possibly the assigned judges and the attorneys who entered an appearance in the case. Difficulties Involved In Searching By First Name Unless the first name was very unique, locating it in a central index could be very difficult. Also, it isn't at all uncommon for the day to day name that someone uses to differ from the person's legal name used in the court case caption, or for the person's name to be misspelled due to lack of accurate information or clerical error, or for a nickname of someone to be used instead of their legal name. For example, suppose that the person you are searching for has the legal name: Jonathan Ralph Lee. This could easily have an indexed first name of Jonathan, Jonathon, Johnathan, Johnathon, Jon, John, Ralph or some totally unrelated nickname in the central index. I know someone, for example, whose legal name is "Claire" who uses the name "Denny" which has no source in any part of her legal name, in all circumstances except legal documents, because at one point in her life that is what other people and she started to call her (for reasons that are not entirely clear to me), and it stuck. A nickname totally unrelated to a legal name is particularly common among people who immigrate to the U.S. or have parents who do, whose legal name is not commonly used in the U.S. For example, I know someone born in Korea whose true name is Hei-Hyun who used the name June, which she used in English as a second language classes when she was first learning English abroad, in almost all circumstances except in legal documents. In those cases, either the legal name or the nickname could easily appear in court documents. Everyday use of a middle name rather than a true first name is particularly common when father and son have the same true names apart from Senior and Junior or the third, for example, and when the first name is less common or otherwise embarrassing or overlaps with a classmate. I've also known people who used a first name growing up and then later transitioned to a middle name at some point (often upon moving to a new school or new place) and people who have transitioned in the opposite direction under similar circumstances, in each case in connection with a desire of the person involved to "reinvent" themselves. Other Information Which Would Greatly Help In Searching It would be extremely helpful (cutting the number of cases involved dramatically) to know which borough within New York City this took place in, because at the level of court administration, each borough of New York City is a separate county with a separate set of court clerks and all case indexes would reveal the borough in which the case was brought. The more you can narrow the time period, the easier it is for you to conduct the search. If you knew the name of the school that the younger child who was subject to the custody order attended at any time and the younger child's first name and ethnicity, attempting to locate and review school yearbooks and newsletters in the relevant time period (often children are identified by name in newsletters listing children who won academic or attendance or sports awards, or who participated in special field trips, for example) would provide a much more solid basis for a further search of records related to person B, because this would give you a full name for the child and would also establish the most likely borough in which the records would be located. Often a list of parent names at the school can be found in PTA newsletters or lists in school newsletters of parent volunteers who are being thanked. If you knew the address of person B or the younger child or the older child at some point, this would be very helpful. If they lived in a home that they owned you could search property records to find a name of person B or someone related to person B. If they rented, you would still narrow down the likely school that the younger child attended, the likely courts in which the action could have taken place, and you could go in person to the neighborhood and ask former neighbors. Either a first name or a surname for person B, the parent, would also be extremely helpful, although a full name and borough of residence for person B would be much better and might limit the search, if you were authorized to make it, to just a handful of names. Knowing person B's gender would also help. If person B is the father, usually the child's surname will be the same as the father, while if person B was the mother and not married to the father, this would be much less common. The more you know about the precise nature of the proceeding, the better. It would be very unusual for an adult child rather than a parent to be awarded custody of a minor child outside of an abuse and neglect proceeding terminating person B's parental rights, or an adoption proceeding in which person B voluntarily relinquished his or her parental rights. So, the odds are good that you would want to search records in Family Court or Surrogate's Court, rather than in the Supreme Court which handles matrimonial actions. If person B were prosecuted criminally for child abuse or neglect, there is a very good chance that the person is incarcerated in a state prison at this time and so a search of prisoners with the right partial name who were incarcerated at about the right time and were of the right gender could be fruitful. This would be particularly helpful if person B is a woman because there are far fewer incarcerated women than there are men, and there are far few women's prisons than there are men's prisons. Knowing the name of the judge who handled the case would be extremely helpful and would greatly narrow the scope of the search. Also, if you identified the case with sufficient specificity in a request to the judge who handled the case to allow you to gain limited access to court records, it is quite likely that the judge would be able to identify the exact case involved with the help of court clerks from memory or partial memory of the case, making it much more likely that the judge would let you access the information that you needed. Media accounts of a case and appellate opinions arising from case (which are often publicly available in redacted form) are much more likely to identify the name of the judge than the name of the parties in a case involving a minor child. Knowing who represented person B as a lawyer, or in the alternative, knowing that person B was not represented by a lawyer, would help narrow the list considerably. If you knew who the lawyer was, calling the lawyer's office and asking in a manner that explained your need to know would probably be more likely to provide information that obtaining it directly from the court system. Knowing the name of the opposing counsel would be almost as helpful. If you new that person B acting pro se in the case, you could eliminate from the list all cases in which all parties were represented by a lawyer. This search could be made considerably more powerful if you knew the gender of person B as this would allow you to narrow the search to cases where someone of person B's gender was not represented by a lawyer. If the case was an abuse or neglect case, it would have been prosecuted in the name of the State or the People, so you would look for cases where the defendant was not represented by counsel without regard to the attorney for the plaintiff. Question #2: If this is theoretically possible, who would have access/privilege to do this? Any random person? A registered lawyer? Police? Court officer? Usually cases involving juveniles are closed to the general public, so to access them, you would need to be an "interested party", and neither a "random person" nor a lawyer admitted to the bar in New York State could do so without that connection. It might be possible to search case names that might contain the name of the child or the sibling without being allowed to access the contents of the file in some cases, I am not entirely sure on that point. If the case were incident to a case in which the child or the sibling was not a named party (e.g. the probate of a parent), this might not be sufficient to even identify the right case, however. A good summary regarding access to court records in New York State is available here. In some of the pertinent parts, it states: A number of statutes limit access to court records where the interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in disclosure: A. Family Court Records Access to court records in the Family Court is governed by Section 166 of the Family Court Act, which provides that the records of any proceeding in Family Court are not open to indiscriminate public inspection. In order to access a particular Family Court record, the requesting party must make an application to the Court and set forth the reasons for the request. It is solely within the discretion of the Court whether to permit the inspection of such records. Certain individuals, such as the parties and their representatives, are permitted access to Family Court records without application to the Court. 22 NYCRR205.5 Given that "B was a parent involved in a court case where their older adult child won custody of their younger underage child from them.", it is conceivable that one could articulate a reason for the need to do the search that a Family Court judge would authorize, but that would depend to a great extent on the precise nature of the reason for the search. It helps that the person you are actually searching for is an adult who would have been a named party in the case, and not the actual minor child. But, a Family Court judge would probably be pretty reluctant to authorize a search on behalf of someone who didn't even know the name of the person being searched for and instead only knew the first name and age of one of that person's children. In part, this is because it indicates that the "need" to locate person B is not very strong, and in part, this is because the search would be much more intrusive requiring review of actual court filings in many cases rather than merely reviewing the index of cases. It further states: B. Civil Actions Like criminal proceedings, civil actions are presumptively open pursuant to the guarantees under the First Amendment. Unlike criminal actions that present constitutional considerations for criminal defendants, in civil actions the First Amendment guarantees must be measured against the public interest in requiring disclosure. Family Court Proceeding The declaration in Section 4 of the Judiciary Law of a presumption of public access to court proceedings does not differentiate among the courts, and therefore applies to the Family Court, subject to any other statute that gives special treatment to Family Court proceedings. As such, there is also a presumption of openness to all Family Court proceedings, and Section 205.4 of the Uniform Rules [22 NYCRR] expressly provides that the Family Court is open to the public, including the media. However the presumption can be overcome on a case-by-case basis by an overriding interest that closure is essential to preserve higher values. See e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 US. 596, 608; Matter of Ruben R., 219 A.D.2d 117 (1st Dept.),lv. to app. denied 88 N.Y.2d 806 (1996) (holding potential trauma to mental and physical well-being of children required closure of child protective proceeding to public and press); Matter of Katherine B., 189 A.D.2d 450 (2d Dept. 1993) (holding public properly excluded from child protective proceeding where compelling testimony established that child would be adversely affected). Section 205.4 (b) of the Uniform Rules [22 NYCRR] provides specific factors that a judge may consider in determining whether to close the courtroom or to exclude specific individuals, such as preserving courtroom decorum, avoiding a disruption in the proceedings, and serving the orderly administration of justice, including privacy interests of individuals before the court and the need to protect litigants from harm. Matrimonial Proceedings Domestic Relations Law § 235(2) grants the court the discretion to exclude the public if "the public interest requires that the examinations of the witnesses should not be public." Because matrimonial proceedings include matters concerning child custody, visitation and maintenance, aside from potential embarrassment to the litigants in a public proceeding, the public interest standard may protect minors from public testimony. See CPLR 4019; Matter of Lincoln v, Lincoln, 24 N.Y.2d 270 (1969) (trial court had discretion to interview the child in a custody proceeding in private). Adoption Proceedings Given the nature of adoption proceedings, the proceedings are confidential and held in closed courts, and the records pertaining to adoptions are sealed pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 114. See Matter of Walker, 64 N.Y.2d 354 (1985) (setting forth the considerations for deeming adoption records confidential). Mental Competency Proceedings The media has a qualified right of access to competency hearings, whether held pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law or the Criminal Procedure Law. See Matter of New York News v, Ventura, 67 N.Y.2d [sic] C. Matrimonial Actions Section 235 of the Domestic Relations Law provides that neither an officer of the court with whom the proceedings in a matrimonial action or a written agreement of separation is filed or an action or proceeding for custody, visitation or maintenance of a child are filed, or before whom testimony is taken, or his clerk, either before or after termination of the suit shall not permit a copy of any pleadings, affidavits, findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment of dissolution, written agreement of separation or memorandum thereof, or examination to be taken by any person other than a party, or the attorney or counsel of a party, except by order of the court. D, Confidential Records Records contained in a court file that are deemed confidential may not be disclosed absent a court order including the following: . . . • Court records in sex offense cases that might identify the victim. See Civil Rights Law § 50-b. • Mental health records, including records of commitment, retention and discharge proceedings of the mentally ill and mentally retarded (see Articles 9 and 15 of the Mental Hygiene Law; CPL 330.20) and clinical records submitted in connection with the proceedings (see Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13[c]). . . . • Records of adoption proceedings. See Judiciary Law § 90.10. • Other records or documents that have been sealed or designated confidential by the court. I am not completely clear on the extent to which the case name itself is suppressed, as opposed to merely the contents of the case file in some of these situations, but where the name of a child is suppressed due to confidentiality this often extends to the name used in the caption and indexing of a court case that is available to lawyers not involved in the case and the general public. A court official would have authority to look at the information, but probably wouldn't be allowed to disclose it to you in any situation where you or a random lawyer was not allowed to do so, for the reasons set forth above. I can imagine circumstances in which the police or the prosecutor's office would be allowed to review sealed juvenile custody case records in furtherance of a criminal prosecution or potential criminal prosecution, but I couldn't tell you how they would go about getting that authorization as I have never practiced criminal law and am not familiar with that level of procedural detail in New York State. But, it is hard to imagine law enforcement coming to your aid in the circumstances you describe, although without knowing the reason that you want to locate person B, it is hard to know for sure.
In 50/50 custody you have the right to stand your ground to ensure the safety and well being of your children. You do not need to involve police unless it is an emergency. "911 Operator, what is the emergency". Only call them when you feel your children are in grave danger. For example, you know for sure that the other parent is drunk and driving, or the other parent is drunk and on the ground unable to move and the child is in danger, etc. If you involve the police over your partner excessive drinking than, and they find that she was not excessively drinking, you will face false accusation charges and her lawyer will try to make you look like the bad guy trying to take away her children. how drunk does my ex have to be for me to deny a drop-off? Is it entirely based upon outward signs or blood-alcohol level? You should not search for drugs or alcohol, or administer tests, as to avoid the accusation of an illegal search. You can, however, based on your judgment of common sense assess the situation and see how drunk (s)he is and make your decision based on that circumstances. Make a 1-page log to document the date, time, situation description (3-5 sentences of what you see and why you make that decision.) It would be wise to have a witness around, so write down the person name as well for reference, (NOT MANY PEOPLE LIKE TO BE WITNESSES, But you can write down the people names that you know were around that incident.) Don't tell your partner that you are making the log. Suprise them in the court when you have a full page of incidents due to drinking. Am I correct in assuming that in order to protect myself from being accused of denying visitation, that (in the future) I need to involve the police if I suspect her of being intoxicated? *Always protect yourself! Be Your Own Advocate. * Don't involve the police unless its am emergency, read the first comment above. If I involve the police, do I need to be sure that she is extremely intoxicated in order to avoid a "false alarm"? (Obviously, this scares me as I'd prefer she didn't drink at all) This drinking incident is alarming itself. However, you should consult with your family law attorney. I would say that document five issues if it exceeds 5 in one month than filing a motion with the court to adjust the drinking problem, and that you request the child to be with you 60/40 custody. You must be able to demonstrate that you have the time, commitment and resources to take over the 60/40 custody. What options do I have, if any, if she drinks around him in her own home? Is she within her legal right as long as she doesn't get in a car, doesn't pass out or does something blatantly abusive? File a motion to adjust the custody, speak with your family law attorney.
Yes in general Generally, almost all western jurisdictions (be they civil law or common law) have some way to get medical records into evidence, be that via subpoenaing, or by discovery requests or court orders. In most cases, the party that brings the suit is also the patient or their legal representative, and they give (or imply) consent to the use of the records. And in cases where the defendant's medical records are required, usually, the defense wants those in too to prove some condition. And then there are cases where the state or their representatives brings the charge. They usually can bring a warrant or court order to obtain the documents. Then there are Medical records that had been made specifically on the behest of the state. Here, the warrant is usually filed to obtain the samples or access to the body to be investigated, the record itself forms the basis for the investigators to proceed - and is not under client-doctor confidentially in the first place. It had been made specifically for the state and it is a state-owned medical record, be they made on request of the executive power (police) with a warrant signed by a judge or on behalf of the judicative after a court order to evaluate capacity (see below). However, medical records can generally only be obtained if the records are relevant to the case at hand and only to the degree necessary: You can't request the medical records about a person's fertility status in a case that discusses damages for his broken arm. As a result, the medical record available in court might be only an extract from the original, with irrelevant passages sealed or redacted. Unlike many people think, it's quite common to get some medical records into court in some way or another: As the basis of injury cases If you have a case of physical injury, the injuries themselves need to be proven in court. This is done generally by getting the medical records - thus they can be subpoenaed by a party, usually the injured party here. Then a medical expert can discuss them, be they a court-appointed one or paid by either of the parties. In this category also fall mandatory reports of certain types of wounds or situations. As such, the treating doctor has to provide a medical report with enumerated types of injuries, like bullet wounds or where child abuse might be the reason. Very necessarily in malpractice cases Malpractice is pretty much injury on steroids: the injuring party made the records and would never want to give them up to the one suing them - if they could. Alice shall remove Appendix. It goes haywire and the day after Charly needs to cut Bob open again. Now Bob sues Alice for malpractice. Bob needs medical records from both Alice, the doctor who botched it, and Charly, who was fixing Alice's error. Generally, both records are subpoena-able to the degree relevant and necessary, and indeed the opposing medical opinions on the operation and records form the very basis of the case for either side. Without the ability to subpoena the - in this case unmodified - records from the injuring doctor, proving - or defending - a case of malpractice would be impossible: the very truth of the allegation should be in the medical records. It's routine in cases around death What is the very last medical record a person can ever get? An autopsy record! That's a very sensitive medical record, but they routinely are used in homicide cases. Oftentimes, the investigators also subpoena the medical records of the victim from their doctors to corroborate the autopsy record, while the defense might subpoena them to try and disprove it. Even in civil cases, like the OJ-Simpson civil damages case, autopsy and medical records from an accompanying criminal case can and will be "pulled" (copied over) from the other trial's docket. Regularly in child protection cases Whenever child protection is on the line, be them protective orders or who a child will live with after the child protection service (whatever its name is) is in on a case, then medical records are often required to bolster one side. Those records could be medical records from quite many doctors, be they physicals or psychological evaluations... Sometimes the medical records required here are only created due to court-ordered medical or psychological evaluation by a doctor. Whenever incompetence defense is called When the lawyer claims temporary incompetence or insanity, courts generally order a psychological evaluation. These medical records are evidence, but usually don't need to be subpoenaed: they have a waiver form to be disclosed to the court almost built-in. Are they available to the public? Medical records are part of truth-finding, but they are also quite sensitive. As a result, most medical records can not be gotten from the court and enter the dockets under seal. Another option is, that they enter the docket partially or even mostly redacted, with passages blackened.
You will have to litigate this issue anew in the divorce. When there has been a major change in circumstances, issues related to custody can be relitigated, even if there isn't a remarriage. In this case, both the marriage and the fact that nine years have passed since the original order constitute a substantial change in circumstances. At the time the order was entered, there was an 18 month old with parents who didn't live together. The child is now 10 years old and has lived with both parents without regard to any custody order for at least seven years. These are completely different circumstances so custody issues must be revisited. As @mkennedy notes in the comments, it is even likely that the court or someone acting on behalf of the court would consider the opinions of the child at this point, which obviously wasn't possible the first time around. Generally speaking, the way that the "best interests of the child" standard that applies in a case like this one is interpreted is to come as close to maintaining the pre-divorce status quo as possible in light of the separation of the parents. The most relevant section of the Missouri Revised Statutes to this issue is as follows: § 452.410. Custody, decree, modification of, when Except as provided in subsection 2 of this section, the court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless it has jurisdiction under the provisions of section 452.450 and it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or sections 452.375 and 452.400, any custody order entered by any court in this state or any other state prior to August 13, 1984, may, subject to jurisdictional requirements, be modified to allow for joint custody in accordance with section 452.375, without any further showing. If either parent files a motion to modify an award of joint legal custody or joint physical custody, each party shall be entitled to a change of judge as provided by supreme court rule.
The main rules in a civil case are the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, and a set of largely unwritten rules governing issues such as the order in which matters are presented in a trial and courtroom conduct. Basically, the rules of evidence are really a subset of a larger set of written and unwritten rules about courtroom conduct the unwritten parts of which are assumed to be known by people using them. Robert's Rules of Order do not apply to courtroom proceedings. The judge also has the "direct contempt" power to summarily punish disrespectful conduct in the courtroom without a trial, with fines or incarceration, even if it wouldn't be a crime outside the courtroom. But what if a party to the proceedings who does not "have the floor" wishes to do things like the following: Obtain a restatement (perhaps because it was unintelligible, or perhaps as a ploy for emphasis) of something uttered by another. If you are a party asking a question (or more likely an attorney for a party asking a question on behalf of a party) it is not improper to say, "I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you." It is also not generally improper for a non-questioning party to interject and state that they can't hear a witness to a judge. Obtain clarification of a statement. This can be done by a party only when it is the party's turn to cross-examine or redirect as the case may be. A judge can ask for clarification, but a party cannot do so when it is not their turn. Determine or clarify the purpose of an ongoing statement or line of questioning Generally the party not asking a question objects and the court asks the party asking the question to clarify the reason. Sometimes, in a jury trial, the party asked to clarify will say "may we approach the bench" and a private discussion will be held between counsel for both sides and the judge regarding an ongoing issue. Determine whether the judge will allow something later in the proceedings. (E.g., "At some point I hope to speak to point X. May I do that now? Or will I be afforded that opportunity at some later point before the conclusion of this hearing?") Lawyers are expected to know this for the most part without having to ask. Also, usually before the court starts to take evidence, and at breaks, the judge will ask "are there any preliminary matters that need to be addressed?" or "are there any procedural matters that need to be addressed?" and questions such as this can be raised at that time.
This depends on your state, but most likely they would stay the father. Many states abide by the Uniform Parentage Act, and part of that act states that if a man has been acting in the role of Father for a long enough period (I think 18 months, but not certain) then he is considered the legal father regardless of parentage. Similarly many states say if he was married to the mother he would be considered the legal father regardless of parentage. If you want an exact legal response I would ask on the Law StackExchange, including marital status and the state they're in, but most likely he will legally have a right as father if he wants it. If the mother is interested in the well-being of the child she would want him involved in the child's life anyways. Even if they separate they can hopeful agree on shared custody for the sake of the child without needing any legal discussions to come into place. If he separates from her without antagonizing her and makes it clear he wants to play a role in the child's life and set rules for doing that there is a good chance this can be settled without any lawyers or legal discussions to begin with!
So I suppose we basically need to disclose the exact geolocation of the datacenters that store this kind of content. That is incorrect. You need to identify a place of business where federal investigators may inspect the records without first making an appointment for access. The location of cloud storage is not particularly relevant. is it possible in any way to achieve compliance with 18 USC 2257A while using Google Cloud Storage (Or perhaps any other cloud storage service)? Yes. You must store the records as required by the statute and by the regulations issued under the authority of that statute, 28 CFR Part 75. I only scanned the regulations, but it seems that the "location" of the records is the place where they are available for inspection, not necessarily the place where digital files are stored. (The regulations also provide that you may indeed keep the records in digital form.) But consider, for example, what would happen if the FBI came knocking for an inspection and a local utility company accidentally severed the fiber cable on the next block. Such a network outage happened at my company a few years ago, and the incident disabled all of our redundant networking, so we had no internet access whatsoever for several hours. The investigators would probably tolerate such a disruption, but it is probably better to have a copy on site in addition to any off-site copies you might have. Regardless, you should hire a lawyer with relevant experience, because you need advice from someone who can find out whether there has been any litigation that may have a bearing on your rights and obligations, and you should find out what state and local law have to say about this, if anything. This is a criminal statute, and trying to protect yourself from criminal liability without qualified legal advice is quite possibly going to leave you vulnerable.
Although the USA don't like it, there's a department called INTERPOL which is composed by about 150 countries. When a crime is committed and you need to involve another country to solve it, the sovereignty of each County prevents a police officer from one country acting upon another country. That's when the INTERPOL comes in. They usually requests the police from that country to act up. A judge from that country will grant their local police access to the data to be delivered to the country that requested it. Can the police get a search warrant for data 'in the cloud'? Yes. If the servers are located within the boundaries of your own country, it's a normal procedure. But like the above answer states, it's easier to subpoena the records than to execute a search warrant. In a subpoena, the company itself is bound to provide everything the police asks. Can the police get a search warrant for such third party systems? Yes. If there's enough probable cause, the investigation can lead to allow the police to try and discover files that are held by servers that store the cloud data. But if the servers are located outside the country and the company does not have any office opened in the country, a search warrant won't have validity in another jurisdiction and the police can't act without breaking the sovereignty principle. That's where the INTERPOL services are handy. The department is built in the principle of polices from different countries helping each other. The downside is that it's too bureaucratic and it takes a lot of time. For instance if he has a virtual machine hosted by Amazon, would they serve the warrant on Amazon, or on the suspect? Like mentioned by @Viktor, if the company has an office within the bounds of your country, it's easier to subpoena the records because that way the company will filter and provide only the data linked to the suspect being investigated. That is, the subpoena will have both the name of the company (Amazon) and the name of the Suspect, so the company can provide only the necessary files. Update If the police lack sufficient evidence for a search warrant, but an interpol country was, for some reason, willing to work with the police to collect and provide that information would they be able to use it even if they wouldn't have been able to subpoena a US country? Hypothetically speaking, I see your follow-up as a company that do have a local office and the Federal Police was turned down by a judge on a warrant/subpoena. In that case, there's no reason for another's country police to act on their own country. The suspect is a foreign suspect, the crime is a foreign crime and the police has no reason to work on it. But for the sake of argument, let's say that the local police was turned down by a judge for lack of evidence or something and the suspect has been investigated by a foreign country or whatever. If the information that the local police desires to obtain is available through the INTERPOL, it's most likely to be accepted since it's a data stored by an international police department. In your scenario, the foreign police was granted a legal right to search and collected the data for legal purpose. Maybe they can't use it in their own country, but since they followed a safe chain of custody and provided the information to the INTERPOL, that information has legal validity and it is not fruit of the poisonous tree if the chain of custody was maintained.
GDPR - What exactly should I do to prevent revenue loss? I've seen many sites blocking cookies right away and expecting users to click the "Accept cookies" button to activate them. But then I came to stack exchange to ask this question and there's a note on the footer "This site uses cookies to deliver our services and to show you relevant ads and job listings. By using our site, you acknowledge that you have read and understand our Cookie Policy, Privacy Policy, and our Terms of Service. Your use of Stack Overflow’s Products and Services, including the Stack Overflow Network, is subject to these policies and terms." There's no button whatsoever to agree with the cookies or not, so that means that by default the cookies are enable here and if the user is using the site, it means they're already agreeing with the cookies policy? Can I do the same to my website? If not, can I block the whole page then, leaving a notice in the middle of the screen telling the user something like "This site uses cookies to...." With the following options: ( ) Agree and proceed. ( ) Don't agree. Take me out of this site. So it basically means that if they don't agree with the cookies policy, they won't have access to the content either (Fair enough) and will be recommended to leave.
You must get opt-in affirmative consent to process personal data, including tracking people's use of your site or providing targeted advertising. The banner on StackExchange is likely in violation of the GDPR. Do not copy it. It does not have an explicit opt-in, only an opt out which is onerous (leave the site, then manually go in and delete any cookies they set, which may be hard to identify if they are from 3rd parties). The sites you mention that have a gateway are a more correct implementation. Consent must be acquired before processing of data begins, and it must be explicit.
You premise is correct. The processor is someone that processes data on your behalf, and since the GDPR definition of processing is extremely broad, that is about every third party subcontractor that you use for data processing, including various cloud providers. I'm afraid it will soon become a huge mess with a gazillion contracts to sign. I disagree. Yes, the GDPR says that a contract between the controller and processor must exist, but Article 28 of the GDPR does not say anything about how the controller shall document these instructions. Basically, in cases like the one you describe where John Doe relies on a web agency for having a contact form on the web, there will be a standardized (by the web agency) service agreement between the John Doe (controller) and the web agency (processor). There is nothing stopping the parties from agreeing that this service agreement that John Doe accepted as part of the onboarding procedure is also the DPA as required by the GDPR. Putting something like the following in the service agreement would do it: The parties agree that this Service Agreement between You (controller) and Us (processor) set out Your complete and final instructions to Us in relation to the processing of Personal Data and that processing outside the scope of these instructions (if any) shall require prior written agreement between You and Us. You also agree that We may engage Sub-processors to process Personal Data on Your behalf. The Sub-processors currently engaged by Us and authorized by You are listed in Annex A. I think we will se a lot of amendments in service contracts as the GDPR gets better understood, but I don't really see a flood of DPAs in addition to these amended service contracts.
I don't believe GDPR makes a distinction between 'real life' and 'online'. It's all real life. You can tell anyone that they don't have consent to keep your personal data, but that doesn't mean they always have to delete it. There are six lawful bases for processing of personal data, so if an organisation is using and can justify one other than consent then they don't necessarily have to delete your data when they ask. The six bases are listed by the UK Information Commissioner's Office: (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/#ib3
I think you could count decline-events, but not track users who declined tracking. But I also think such information isn't useful for demonstrating compliance. Therefore, you should avoid storing extra data about people who do not give consent. When consent is required for analytics. The GDPR provides a general framework for processing personal data. The ePrivacy Directive (ePD) overrides this general framework when it comes to cookies and similar technologies related to accessing information on the end user's device. Per ePD, such access is only allowed when it is strictly necessary to provide the service explicitly requested by a user, otherwise consent is required. Thus, analytics cookies require consent and setting an analytics-declined cookie is strictly necessary. But this consent requirement relates specifically to storage cookies, not to collecting analytics data. Thus, you might have a legitimate interest in collecting data with cookie-less analytics, which could involve counting cookie-consent decline events. Unfortunately, most analytics systems collect very broad categories of data and cannot be limited to a necessary subset. Even such limited analytics (unless they are truly strictly necessary for operating the site) should support an opt-out. I don't think you could legitimately gather analytics about such opt-out events. GDPR audits. Your motivation for collecting statistics about consent-decline events is to be prepared for a GDPR audit. This is probably not necessary, but it depends. It might be useful to distinguish between internal/voluntary audits and data protection audits by the supervisory authority. You might voluntarily review your compliance to convince stakeholders that you're compliant, and such voluntary audits might be part of the appropriate technical and organizational measures a data controller has implemented in accordance with Art 24, Art 25, and Art 32 GDPR. You should collect any statistics you need for this purpose, e.g. to ensure that the opt-in rate looks realistic. But since you can set the parameters of this audit, it makes no sense to collect data “just in case”. Under Art 58(1), your supervisory authority can audit your data processing and can compel you to provide any information it requires. This is similar to how a tax authority can compel you to produce business records for auditing purposes. This is closely related with your general obligation to be able to demonstrate compliance with the GDPR (Art 5(2)). More specifically, the controller is required per Art 7(1) to be able to demonstrate that the data subjects have given valid consent, but does not prescribe how to demonstrate this. How to demonstrate that valid consent was given. For demonstrating that consent was given, there are no clear best practices. However, this topic is briefly discussed in EDPB guidelines 05/2020 on consent. They recommend that you retain records about the following: that a data subject in a given case has consented how consent was obtained when consent was obtained information provided to data subject at the time that the controller's workflow meets all relevant criteria for valid consent Some of these are process-level concerns about how you ask for consent. For example, you might record video walkthroughs of your consent management solution to demonstrate how consent can be declined, given, and revoked. You should definitely keep a version history of the text and information that was displayed to users when they were asked for consent. I think you should also be able to explain in your front-end code how the result from your consent management solution is used to load relevant features (and that they aren't loaded before consent is given). If a feature or service is made conditional on consent, it might be good to have a short written analysis that consent is still freely given under the requirements of Art 7(4). But other aspects relate to the individual data subject and the individual consent-giving event. Some consent management solutions send a small record about the consent to a backend server where it is stored with a timestamp, so that it can be later traced that and when consent was given. I've also seen consent management tools that show a timeline of events to the user (when consent was requested, and when consent for which purpose was given and revoked). I think such detailed insight into an pseudonymous individual's consent status is a very powerful way to demonstrate compliance. What is not relevant here is information about data subjects who declined consent in the first place. Consent means opt-in. The default is that no consent is given. To demonstrate that consent was obtained in a valid manner, information about data subjects who didn't consent isn't necessary or useful. So I expect that you would be fine in an audit without collecting such data. In fact, the lack of a clear purpose and necessity for collecting this data could be argued to be without legal basis and violate the GDPR's data minimization principle. And even when recording information about those data subjects who did consent, the EDPB guidelines remind us that this “should not in itself lead to excessive amounts of additional data processing”.
I'd rather not, but this might be compliant if you make sure that the personal data under your responsibility remains secure and protected even if it is processed abroad. Since the UK has left the EU, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish between implications of the EU GDPR and the UK GDPR. These are functionally equivalent, but in the matter of international data transfers the practical details have diverged. In my answer that you cited, I argued that any website processes personal data, and is thus potentially in-scope for the GDPR. If you cause another organization to process this personal data outside of the UK, you are performing an international data transfer (called “restricted transfer” in UK guidance). For example, such non-UK processing occurs if you use cloud services that run outside of the UK. The UK ICO has guidance on international data transfers. As in an EU GDPR context, you can only perform the transfer if the data remains suitably protected, or one of the exceptions applies. The data remains suitably protected if the target country was attested and “adequate” level of data protection, or if you have implemented appropriate safeguards. As of 2022, the list of countries considered adequate is generally equivalent to the EU list of adequacy decisions. Notably, the US is no longer on that list after the Schrems II decision that invalidated the Privacy Shield Agreement. Since this decision was made before Exit Day, it also applies in the UK. This leaves “appropriate safeguards” for UK→US restricted transfers. In the linked ICO page, read the section Is the restricted transfer covered by appropriate safeguards?. In brief, you will need to perform a Transfer Impact Assessment, and sign Standard Contractual Clauses with the US data importer. In a Transfer Impact Assessment (TIA), you check that the data remains protected despite the transfer into a country without an adequate level of data protection. There is no official guidance on conducting a TIA, but the IAPP has a template and the EU EDPB has recommendations on supplemental measures to protect data transfers, which might reduce the risk and affect a TIA in your favor. It's worth noting that the EDPB recommendations were written in the wake of the Schrems II ruling, and can be summarized as “compliance is impossible when using US-based cloud services”. But this is your assessment, and TBH it seems the UK is a bit more relaxed than the EU in this regard. The Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) are a pre-formulated contract that binds the foreign data importer to handle the data properly. In essence, this translates relevant aspects of the UK GDPR into contract law. Many service providers already provide a Data Processing Agreement that includes SCCs by reference, but you'll have to make sure that these contracts have been entered in a legally binding manner. Sometimes these apply automatically as part of the terms of service, sometimes you need to explicitly sign these documents. But SCCs are one detail where UK GDPR compliance and EU GDPR compliance diverges a bit. The old EU SCC templates from 2004/2010 can no longer be used and have been replaced. For compliance with the EU GDPR, the new 2021 SCCs must be used. For compliance with the UK GDPR, you have two options. You can either use the 2022 International Data Transfer Agreement (IDTA), or you can use the 2021 EU SCCs along with the 2022 UK International Data Transfer Addendum which modifies the EU SCCs in some details. Don't want to deal with TIAs and SCCs? Switch to a hosting provider that only processes the personal data under your control in the UK, or in a country with an adequacy decision (e.g. EU, Canada, Israel).
Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task.
Yes, you still need consent (opt-in). Cookies usually require consent, but not always. There are two relevant laws at play here: GDPR makes general rules about the processing of personal data, and ePrivacy has specific rules about cookies and similar technologies, regardless of whether the cookies involve personal data. The ePrivacy directive was implemented in your EU member state (or the UK) in national law. The national laws contain the authoritative rules on this matter. But in general: Accessing or storing any information (such as cookies) on the end user's device requires consent. Consent is defined by the GDPR. You do not need consent if the access/storage is strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user (“functional cookies”). Using cookies to store site preferences such as user language is strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user, so you do not need consent for this. You must still make your use of cookies transparent to the user. Setting cookies for marketing purposes is not strictly necessary to provide the service, so you always require consent for them. Registered users don't automatically give consent. You now raise the interesting question if this is also the case if the user is already registered. Yes, you still need consent (opt-in). This is due to the way how the GDPR defines “consent”. Consent is not general or vague agreement. Agreement with your terms of service or privacy policy is not consent in the sense of the GDPR. Instead, consent is defined in Art 4(11) GDPR to be (emphasis mine): any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her Art 7 GDPR adds further conditions for consent. (1) You are responsible for demonstrating that the user has given valid consent. (2) The request for consent should be clearly distinguishable from other matters (i.e. not buried in a larger document) and should be presented “in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language.” (3) Withdrawing consent must be as easy as giving it. (4) In general, you cannot make access to a service conditional on unrelated consent. I.e. you can't force your users to consent to marketing cookies in order to use the app. The users must have an actual choice, or the consent isn't freely given. Supervisory authorities have produced extensive guidance on the matter of consent. If you're in the UK, consider the ICO Guide to Consent and Guidance on the use of cookies and similar technologies. If you're in the EU/EEA, consider the EDPB Guidelines 05/2020 on Consent (PDF). To summarize why agreement with your terms of service is not consent to marketing cookies: Agreement to such large documents is not sufficiently specific. The consent would not be sufficiently informed. You cannot expect users to actually read all your legal documentation. You must present information in an intelligible manner, possibly with multiple layers (compare WP29 Guidelines on Transparency, endorsed by EDPB). Agreement to your terms of service is not an unambiguous indication that the user wants these cookies. If consent to marketing cookies is a condition of using your service, the consent is likely invalid. The consequence is that cookie consent is usually obtained via separate consent management tools that provide detailed explanations about different categories of cookies, and let the user select which specifically categories of cookies they want to consent to, if any. Outside of cookies, consent is just one legal basis among many. In this context, you might ask “if getting consent is so difficult, but GDPR requires that I have consent, how does that work?” It is a common misconception that the GDPR requires consent for everything – the ePrivacy requirement that most cookies need consent is one of the exceptions. In general, GDPR offers a choice of six categories of legal bases for processing in Art 6 GDPR, and consent is just one of them. In many cases, an online service will process personal data because it is necessary to fulfil a contract with the user, or because there is a legitimate interest for the processing (and the legitimate interest outweighs the user's interests). For example, reasonable security measures such as keeping logfiles can be based on a legitimate interest and do not require consent.
I understand that storing any hash or IP that can identify "user uniquely" is against GDPR. That is not correct. However any data which is identifiably associated with a an individual human, including any data which could be used to identify that human, is generally "Personal data", and may not be processed (which includes storing it) without a lawful basis, if the GDPR applies. Any of the six lawful bases allowed by the GDPR may be used, including consent, and the legitimate interest of the data controller. The GDPR does not generally specify that particular technological solutions are permitted or forbidden. If this usage pattern could reasonably be used to identify a particular person, or to single out a person from among a group of people, it is probably personal data, and a lawful basis would be required. Otherwise, not. As for whether such a person is "identifiable" if use of this technique permits the Data Controller to identify two visits at separate times as having been made by the same person, when the later visit is still in progress or is recent, the IP for that visit will still be available, and thus could be associated with the first visit as well. And even if that is not done, such a technique could permit building a profile of such a person, including the actions taken on different visits. I think that would be enough to make this "personal data".
Course of action in a criminal case when there is no conceivable defense I am not a lawyer or a law student; my work is in mathematics, but I like to learn about criminal law as a hobby. I have spent some time googling and searching to find an answer to my question but have found no results. Here is what I am interested in knowing: Suppose a public defender is assigned a criminal case — let's say the charges are gross misdemeanor or nonviolent felony — and there is quite literally no conceivable defense for the client. The prosecution has compelling evidence for all elements of the crime, action, and any required culpability. At this point, what do you do for your client? My best guess would be to put heavy effort into plea bargaining, but this scenario is something that is hard for me to learn about in my hobbyist pursuits because it isn't very well documented. It seems like something you learn from experience, and could depend greatly on the individual attorney and their relationships with the prosecutors in the jurisdiction. The only thing I can find that relates to my question is information about the strategies of lawyers who defended notorious murderers who were overwhelmingly guilty. I would like the scope of my question to be something less serious and less complicated than that. In most of those cases, the defenses' main goal was to keep them out of a death penalty, and the trials were long and complicated. Also, to be thorough, please feel free to note / comment on any of the following in an answer: You know there is practically no conceivable defense for your client; how does that change your efforts in plea bargaining? Let's say the prosecutor won't budge - not a single plea offer. You know there is practically no conceivable defense for your client - what do you do when the case goes to trial? At any point, is it a matter of ethics to make it clear to your client that there is no conceivable defense for their case and your primary service as their counsel will be to provide guidance through the confusing and complicated legal / court process and help make sure their rights to a fair trial are upheld? Now suppose you are not necessarily a public defender but a private attorney for hire. Someone comes to you looking to hire you for counsel on the type of charges outlined above. There is little to no conceivable defense. Do you take the case? If so, do you tell them this before negotiating a price? I understand my question is certainly subjective. The answer could vary greatly from case to case, dependent on countless variables. I do, however, still think it is constructive and on topic because it can be answered on a high level as to how to initially assess those variables and form a strategy. I am open to feedback for how to improve my question. Please edit tags as needed.
The Plan For A Clearly Guilty Client Without Bargaining Power This question underestimates how much of a criminal defense lawyer's work involves sentencing rather than a determination of guilt or innocence. Suppose as the OP does that the prosecution can easily prove beyond a reasonable doubt that your client is guilty, you client has no plausible defenses, and the prosecutor won't budge on a plea. As a criminal defense lawyer, you may well advise your client that there is no percentage in fighting guilt on the charges, and have your client plea guilty. This prevents the prosecutor from spelling out for many hours in excruciating detail exactly why your client is guilty and the harm the resulted from the crime, which could harden the judge in the sentencing phase. It also frees up a client's often scarce resources for legal work that is likely to be more fruitful and for things like paying fees associated with alternative sentencing programs and paying restitution. It is an empirical fact that judges sentence criminal defendants who plea guilty, even in the absence of a plea bargain, less harshly on average, than criminal defendants who insist on going to trial. (When there is a plea bargain "sentences following convictions at trial are five times larger than sentences received by those who plead guilty".) Often the sentencing premium for going to trial is stunningly large to the point where it has been argued that it amounts to an unconstitutional burden imposed upon the right to a jury trial. Then, you focus entirely on the sentencing phase of the case. There's More Discretion In Sentencing Than Guilt Verdicts Short of first degree murder and a handful of other crimes, there is almost always some discretion on the part of the judge regarding the sentence to be imposed, no matter how clearly guilt is established. Often a judge has the power to sentence someone guilty of a minor felony to probation or a "boot camp" or "community corrections" or even a fine without incarceration, rather than a prison term. Often a judge has a wide range of possible lengths of incarceration (especially in misdemeanor cases and for very serious felonies). Often the corrections department has considerable discretion over which facility to commit a client to and some are better than others. So paying attention to the facility assignment process also matters. Where a defendant is facing both state and federal criminal charges, it sometimes makes sense when conviction on all charges is likely, to plea guilty immediately to the federal charges so that the defendant is already in federal prison before pleading guilty to or going to trial on the state charges, so that if the defendant is sentenced to serve time for the state and federal charges concurrently because they arose from the same incident, the time is spent in the more pleasant federal prison rather than the less pleasant state prison. (This is the case because violent crimes are overwhelmingly prosecuted under state law, while a large share of federal crimes are white collar or are for immigration and non-violent drug offenses. So, your fellow inmates tend to be less vicious in federal prison.) Not infrequently, state prosecutors will even drop state charges to conserve their scarce resources, if they know that the defendant is already facing a significant term of incarceration following a conviction on federal charges. A criminal defense lawyer thus almost has something to argue at sentencing because there is almost never only one possible result of a sentencing hearing even if all of the facts are not in any dispute whatsoever. The judge's interpretation of what those facts should imply in terms of a sentence is always up for debate and argument. What Do Lawyers Do In The Sentencing Phase? As a criminal defense attorney in a case like this, your job is: to present your client in the best light possible, to locate witnesses who will testify that he has support in the community and that he is basically a good guy despite this particular lapse, to marshal testimony that extended incarceration will be a hardship to someone dependent on him, to have him sincerely apologize to the victim and try to do something immediately to make it up to the victim and to show regret and contrition, to support him in not violating terms of pre-sentencing release if any, and perhaps even to see if charges that might otherwise bring him into a recidivist sentencing regime can be sealed or vacated for any reason. You present mitigating evidence regarding IQ or mental health conditions or prior military service or poverty or provocation that explain your client's conduct even if it doesn't excuse it. You try to get the prosecutor to agree that a harsh sentence isn't necessary here, or even to support an alternative sentencing option. Prosecutors are frequently more sensitive to their win-loss record of securing convictions than to precisely how the people they convict are punished. You scrutinize the pre-sentencing report for any inaccuracies and prepare to prove that they are inaccurate. You litigate which category your client belongs in under the sentencing guidelines that apply, if any, which are often the subject of much less case law and hence for more room for interpretation. For example, in a recent case handled by another lawyer in my office (I don't do criminal work myself, but have colleagues who do), the client's sentence was reduced by more than 95% from what the prosecution requested because they had meant to charge 300 counts of a municipal ordinance violation for which each day counted as a violation, but actually charged our client with only 2 counts of the municipal ordinance violation and the judge held the prosecution at sentencing to only a sentence based upon the offense actually charged in the relevant documents. You prepare to explain to the appropriate people how maintaining community ties through visitation will reduce his odds of recidivism if he is located at a more favored correctional facility rather than a less favorable one. You prepare to explain to the appropriate people that your client's survival would be a risk based upon the gangs present at a less favored correctional facility, or that he would be more likely to join a gang and thus commit more crimes upon release at a less favored correctional facility. You get your client to be cooperative in paying any restitution he can afford to pay even before the court orders him to do so. You find decent clothes for him to wear to his sentencing so he doesn't look like a thug and teach him what not to say at sentencing that would piss of the judge. Do his hair in a way that makes him look as vulnerable and inoffensive as possible. Cover his tattoos and remove his piercings as much as possible. If your client is black, find a white or Asian-American relative or mentor or girlfriend or supporter to stand at his side and support him in court. This shouldn't matter but it almost always does. If your client doesn't speak English well, find a relative or mentor or girlfriend or supporter to testify in fluent English in support of leniency and make sure that there is an interpreter lined up for his sentencing hearing. You remind the judge of other more serious cases involving the same offense to which your client's can be compared, or of the sentences imposed on more culpable co-defendants to suggest that your client's sentence should be less severe. You downplay the harm caused and emphasize your client's future prospects. You help the judge relate to your client anyway that you can. You may need to research the judge's background and history of sentencing decisions to find out what this particular judge does or does not find persuasive in sentencing hearings. Sentencing Is As Important As The Charge Of Conviction A criminal defense attorney who presents a solid sentencing case may leave the client who receives a near minimal sentence on that charge with a lighter sentence than one who plea bargains to a lesser charge but then botches the sentencing phase resulting in the client getting near maximal sentence on the lesser charge. Consider, for example, the attorney who represented Brock Turner, a Stanford student convicted of raping an unconscious woman in public in the face of overwhelming evidence against him who none the less, was sentenced to just six months of incarceration (reduced further for good behavior in jail). Another attorney could have plea bargained down to simple assault and still left his client with a more harsh sentence. Turner's attorney was so effective in securing a lenient sentence that the sentencing judge was recalled for the first time in 87 years in California for his leniency. Conclusion So, the notion that a good criminal defense attorney's job is over when the client has no chance of establishing his innocence is just fundamentally wrong. Roughly 90% of criminal defendants will plead guilty and half of the rest will be convicted. The vast majority of these criminal defendants are guilty of something, even if not the exact offense of conviction. The criminal defense attorneys' job isn't mostly about getting acquittals for clients who are the vast majority of the time guilty of something, it is about securing a non-excessive sentence for the conduct committed. Even in the majority of cases that don't conclude with a plea bargain, most of the job is about the sentencing phase, where there is almost always more judicial discretion, and not about the guilt-innocence phase of the case.
Yes. The jurisdiction I am familiar with is England and Wales. Conviction requires evidence (witness testimony is evidence) which proves the case "beyond reasonable doubt". It is open to the jury to find the witness so convincing that they find that they are sure the defendant committed the crime. In general of course, prosecutors prefer to have some supporting evidence (either additional witnesses, or circumstantial evidence - like DNA.)
The terminology used may vary some by jurisdiction, but in many it will be said that Bob provoked the confrontation, or that Bob was the aggressor, or that Bob was engaged in a felony and so cannot claim self-defense. This fact patter is highly unlikely to arise in real lie, because if Bob has even a half-competent lawyer, the issue of self-defense, sure to fail, will not be raised. Doing so only wastes the court's time, and may well make them think worse of Bob, which may cost him. In less open-and-shut cases, the general rule is that one who provokes a confrontation, or who is the aggressor, may not claim self-defense. But the exact rule varies by jurisdiction, and the line will be drawn in different ways in different jurisdictions. In some one who seeks a confrontation may be denied a right of self-defense.
Yes to attempted murder and conspiracy to murder. No to murder Although the particular example you raise looks like entrapment and law enforcement can’t do that in the United States. Putting that aside, factual impossibility is not a defense in common law jurisdictions. Conspiracy to murder someone who can’t actually be murdered (because they are already dead or, as here, don’t actually exist) is still a crime. Legal impossibility, however, is a defense. Something is legally impossible where it is impossible to meet one of the elements that define the crime. Most crimes require that something physical be done, for example, murder requires the perpetrator to kill the victim (among other things), so you can't commit murder on a dead or non-existent victim. However, crimes in the nature of "Conspiracy to X" or "Attempted X" often only rely upon intention even if it is impossible to do the thing intended. To illustrate the difference: if it’s illegal to smuggle cocaine across the border and I, being an idiot, get caught smuggling what I think is cocaine but is actually table salt, I’m guilty of attempted drug smuggling. This is factual impossibility but a legal possibility. I'm not guilty of drug smuggling because that crime requires that I actually smuggle drugs. This is both a factual and legal impossibility. if, however, the day before I do it, the law against cocaine is repealed, then whether I smuggle table salt or actual cocaine, I’m not guilty of either crime even if I think it’s still a crime. This is legal impossibility.
Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings.
Are defendants legally obliged to provide all culpatory evidence to prosecution? The question here is whether or not all evidence requested by prosecution must be provided by the defense? If the defense plans on only using the evidence of the prosecution, does the prosecution get to demand evidence the defense would rather not release? No. Usually only specific kinds of evidence related to specific kinds of claims such as alibi evidence, an insanity claim, or expert testimony must be disclosed prior to trial by a defendant in a criminal case. A defendant in a criminal case does not have to disclose evidence harmful to the defendant's case prior to trial as a general rule. Sometimes there is a requirement to disclose witnesses anticipated to be called, or exhibits to be possibly used very shortly prior to trial, but that is more the exception than the rule. Does the answer depend on the whether or not the case is criminal or civil? Yes. A plaintiff in a civil case can compel disclosure prior to trial of all evidence in the custody, control, or possession of the defendant that is relevant or is reasonably calculated to be relevant to a disputed issue identified in the complaint, answer, and other pleadings (e.g. counterclaims, replies to counterclaims, third-party complaints, cross-claims, etc.). The scope of discovery is slightly different in jurisdictions that don't follow the federal model. This can include pre-trial depositions of the parties, although a defendant can claim the 5th Amendment at the risk of being exposed to an adverse inference communicated to the jury at trial if the defendant does so. Furthermore, most jurisdictions require the pre-trial disclosure of expert testimony that will be used at trial, of exhibits that will or may be used at trial, of witnesses who will or may be called a trial, of all documents that are relevant to a disputed issue identified in the complaint, answer, and other pleadings, of all insurance coverage that could cover the claim, of all persons with knowledge of the disputed facts, and of an expected damages calculation. In the federal system, however, one need pro-actively disclose only witnesses and documents that support your case without being asked. Is there consistency on this or is it at the discretion of the judge? The rules of procedure applicable to a case govern the scope of discovery, but judges have considerable discretion to determine that requests are excessive relative to what is at stake in the case, are irrelevant, or unduly burden some other legitimate interest of the person subject to discovery. Is there punishment for non-compliance? Yes. First of all, a failure to disclose when there is a duty to do so is a ground to exclude presentation of that evidence at trial. Secondly, in civil cases, attorney fees incurred to obtain the discovery can be awarded, facts that might have been disclosed can be declared to be true as a matter of judicial sanction where there is not disclosure, claims can be dismissed, etc. The main relevant federal rule in civil cases is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. It is an unlawful request that must nonetheless be followed with only a hypothetical remedy left to the defendant as is the case in most of these united states to comply with an obviously unlawful arrest that doesn't present an immediate threat to life? I don't understand this long and convoluted sentence. The part about an unlawful arrest seems divorced from the issues in the rest of the the question. It isn't clear what kind of unlawful request is involved either.
Although there have long been requirements to disclose certain types of defenses -- alibi, insanity, etc. -- common law jurisdictions have more recently moved in the direction of greater disclosure obligations for the criminal defendant. Virtually every jurisdiction now requires the defendant to disclose his witnesses and his evidence to the prosecution at some point before the trial, at least if the defendant has made discovery demands of the prosecution. For more information on common-law discovery rules, see here.
Intent is an element of the offense of murder. If the prosecution can't prove the required level of intent for murder, the defendant may still be convicted of a "lesser included offense" like Manslaughter or perhaps Criminally Negligent Homicide, or even an offense that doesn't require an actual death like Aggravated Assault or an offense that doesn't require proof of an injury like Deadly Conduct. If the defendant is claiming that the intent was not voluntary because of some hypnotic effect then that is basically an insanity plea. Defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity face an indefinite commitment to a mental hospital, which can amount to decades of involuntary hospitalization. To learn more about this situation, read about the case of John Hinckley Jr. I personally doubt any jury would actually believe a hypnosis defense, especially without a woo-woo jury foreman, some outstanding work by the defense attorney, and a team of expert witnesses that includes an unrelated hypnotist and a psychologist who didn't believe in hypnosis until examining the defendant in this case... so a Mulder and a Scully.
Legality of "tenant negligence" to make tenant pay for repairs Background: I am a college student in South Carolina, USA. I'm currently in a dispute with my landlord, over what I think is an unfair assumption of negligence about a plumbing leak. Our water bill last month was ~$400+ dollars due to a leaky toilet. The problem is that only 1 of my roommates was living in the apartment at the time, and did not equate the sound of a running toilet with wasting water. I received a call from the city water department midway through the month claiming that our water meter was off the charts, and that we had a leak somewhere. We called maintenance, and they came to fix it, citing a broken water pump in the toilet. He also stated over the phone that we should not have to pay for it, and that either the town or the landlord should have to. Now, both the city and the landlord is pointing at the other one claiming that the other side should have to pay. Below are the relevant lease portions from the lease I signed with the landlord, which seem specific in what they cover, but are pretty vague in what "tenant negligence" is. They are claiming a running toilet is common knowledge of something broken, however I don't think that's the case. The toilet was not broken due to negligence and was broken due to reasonable wear and tear. Furthermore, I think it's important to note the this landlord company is infamous for being absolute crooks. They control a construction company that owns ~50% of the housing in my college town, and have their tenants sign outrageous leases and charge absurd rent because they have a monopoly on the nicest locations in town. They are also currently in a legal battle because they were caught artificially inflating repair costs to make more money off of their tenants. f. Plumbing & Appliances TENANT is responsible for reporting leaks and stoppages immediately to LANDLORD. It is recommended that TENANT have their own plunger. Misuse or carelessness of drains , toilets, dishwashers, or garbage disposals will not be tolerated. Stoppages and repairs that result from TENANT negligence or placing items* not meant for garbage disposal, toilet, dishwasher, or drains will be charged at a minimum of sixty U.S. dollars ($60.00) to TENANT. * Do not pour grease down drain, flush paper towels or feminine products in toilet, or put foreign objects in disposal. Food items not meant for disposals include without limitation banana peels, corn shucks, egg shells, onion, and celery. Use only detergent intended for dishwashers when operating dishwasher. Also TWENTY‐FOUR: MAINTENANCE Malfunctions or repairs that occur to the PREMISES must be reported within twenty‐four (24) hours of the incident in writing through the Tenant Portal or such maintenance will be considered to have been caused by the TENANT. TENANT agrees to keep and maintain the PREMISES in a good, clean condition and to make no alterations or additions thereon without prior written consent from LANDLORD. LANDLORD will do inspections as needed. Repair costs necessitated because of the neglect of TENANT or their guests are the responsibility of the TENANT. What is my possible course of action here? Clearly the toilet had been broken for more than 24 hours, but I've read that normal wear and tear cannot be assigned to the tenant? Every other time I've complained about anything regarding the apartment they've been either dismissive or extremely rude, and I'm tired of being taken advantage of since I have already signed a lease here.
As you say, the roommate who was there "did not equate the sound of a running toilet with wasting water". That, I am afraid to say, is negligent: normally, when you hear constantly flowing water, you do something about it. Somebody has to pay for the water, and assuming the water is in your name, that is you. You could yell at the roommate, but legal negligence is irrelevant to the water bill. However, if there were any resulting damage (for example to wiring or walls), that is where the question of negligence would come up: you probably would be found liable for damage to the building that resulting from letting the condition persist. But unless the fill valve broke at the tank and leaked water onto the floor (which would be clearly obvious) there won't be any damage that you are liable for. I assume that the leak developed from an old part giving out. This would be normal wear and tear, for which you would not be responsible (assuming you didn't cause the problem, for example by putting concentrated bleach in the tank). You you are saying that the landlord is trying to charge you for the repairs, and on this point, the landlord is on thin ice. A landlord cannot just make up rules about assigning liability for damage: that is a matter to be determined by the courts. A tenant can do things to a fill valve that can cause a leak; and the seal has to be replaced every few years. The tenant is not liable especially for routine replacement of the fill value seal, and does not become liable because they failed to inform the landlord in a prescribed manner. Not reporting a leak within 24 hours does not contribute to the underlying failed part. You could probably contest the legality of that bit of maintenance clause 24, in that the landlord cannot unilaterally declare who is responsible for damage. At the trial, both sides will present relevant evidence, and the judge / jury will decide whether the tenant's negligence caused the seal to fail.
The one answerable question regards the legality of taking the damages out of the security deposit. Consulting the Ohio landlord-tenant law, the tenant has various obligations including to Dispose of all rubbish, garbage, and other waste in a clean, safe, and sanitary manner ... Comply with the requirements imposed on tenants by all applicable state and local housing, health, and safety codes The citation should indicate the specific violation, but dumping trash in the street is a health violation. The act that says that if the tenant violates his obligation, the landlord may recover any actual damages that result from the violation together with reasonable attorney's fees. Causing a landlord to be saddled with a fine is actual damage. It would be pointless to contest the fine with the city, unless you are alleging that some vandal drove by and dumped trash in the road near your apartment. (Even then, unless you already reported supposed illegal dumping to the sheriff, it is unlikely that you wouldn't be held responsible).
Most leases have a provision allowing a landlord to make entry without notice in an emergency, but the better course of action, as noted in a comment by @BlueDogRanch, is to call the police and ask them to make a "welfare check." You would ordinarily be permitted to cooperate with police by unlocking doors in furtherance of their welfare check. The police are trained to do this properly in a way that properly balances the need to aid someone who is sick or ill, the need to preserve evidence if there was a death or crime that needs to be understood legally, and to protect the legitimate privacy interests of the tenant. You are not. You could incur liability for failing to prevent death or aggravating injury, could be wrongfully implicated if physical evidence from you contaminates the scene or you destroy evidence showing the true cause, and could be sued for invading the tenant's privacy if it was found that you entry was unreasonable and that it wasn't really an emergency, which is always easier to conclude with 20/20 hindsight. As it is, your biggest potential source of liability is delaying in calling the police seeking a welfare check. They often respond quite quickly to these by the way, although it is not the very highest priority for law enforcement.
Under the Residental Tenancies Act of 2004, the landlord is obligated to carry out necessary repairs to both the structure and interior of the dwelling. The Act provides that this obligation (as with others) cannot be "varied, modified, or restricted" by a rental contract. Meanwhile, the tenant is obligated to not do any act that would cause a deterioration in the condition the dwelling was in at the commencement of the tenancy (with "normal wear and tear" explicitly disclaimed from the tenant's responsibilities). The landlord is not obligated to repair damages caused by the tenant violating that obligation. So the landlord is generally responsible for repairs (and, in fact, if the tenant had needed to arrange for the door to be repaired themself, they would have been able to deduct the cost from rent). If the tenant had broken the door, it would have been a breach of their responsibilities. But if a neighbor, or even the tenant's partner, had broken the door, it would not have violated the tenant's obligation and so the landlord would remain responsible for the repair.
The Rent Ordinance para (e) explicitly precludes that possibility: Any waiver by a tenant of rights under this Chapter 37 shall be void as contrary to public policy. If he attempts to enforce such a clause or in any way dislodge you from the unit, he is liable for a substantial penalty. The legality of a rebate scheme is not clear, but probably would also be deemed illegal, because there already exists provision for buyout, which has specific restrictions. For the rest of the week, tenant buyouts are subject to these provisions. The problem is that the horse may have left the barn. The landlord has to have provided you with a Pre-Buyout Disclosure Form (which is to be signed and filed) before any negotiation / discussion with the tenant. Since we're talking about obeying the law, it has to occur to the landlord that there is a buyout option, and then he has to give you and file the disclosure form before he opens his mouth. He also has to know what the requirements of a buyout agreement will be in the future. Starting on Monday, the law regarding buyouts changes (it doesn't clearly make an agreement impossible, but it's a reminder that the law can be changed). In terms of legally-enforceable agreements, you could agree to a buyout in the far future, but the agreement might not be enforceable under future law. For example, the disclosure form requires new information to be provided, so if he doesn't do that, the disclosure is invalid (the preamble to the amendment points out that the change in law was directed at legal actions that were considered to violate the spirit of the law). Hence a buyout for two years in the future is legally risky.
Would I sue seller or manufacturer for a new appliance that does not function correctly? You have viable claims against both seller and manufacturer, and you may sue both of them in the same complaint. Hopefully the tech's assessment that you "should get a new machine" is in writing, since that evidence seems dispositive (i.e., decisive) and immune to manufacturer's potential denial. Regardless of what approach you choose, the award you might be granted is subject to the prohibition of double recovery. It seems that the seller's directions were purposefully dilatory. Coupled with its subsequent pretext about expiration of the 30 day period, seller's conduct is in violation of legislation regarding unfair and misleading practices. Your post does not specify which jurisdiction in the US you have in mind, but consumer protection laws are rather uniform all over the country. If the provision of 30-day return period is reflected in a document such as the invoice, or in seller's signs/advertisements, you also have a claim of breach of contract for seller's failure to abide by the corresponding clause or policy. A similar rationale applies with respect to the manufacturer. The manufacturer is not entitled to arbitrarily postpone compliance as to the warranty. Seller's 30-day deadline serves as comparison in your argument that the manufacturer's open-ended schedule is excessive, a schedule which is on top of the delay from the interactions with both techs. if I win, what do I do with the dishwasher? Wait for the party who reimburses you or replaces the dishwasher to determine whether it opts to take the defective dishwasher. That party is responsible for transportation costs and related expenses if it decides to pick up the appliance. If the party is not interested in retrieving the defective appliance, make sure it signs a waiver. Otherwise you would be at risk that that party maliciously tries to turn the tables by alleging that you unlawfully got a second dishwasher for free.
Unfortunately, your relative is more in the wrong here First, the COVID situation does not change anyone's rights and obligations under a contract (see What effect does an event like the current Covid-19 pandemic have on contractural obligations?). So the landlord (through their agent) is obliged to provide the property and your relative is obliged to pay the rent and to occupy the premises (most residential leases contain a requirement for the tenant to live in the premises and not leave it empty). Your relative (through you) has indicated that she will be in breach of her contract. The agent has considered her position and has offered two (IMO generous) alternatives: Allow her to continue with the lease without taking possession providing the rent is paid. To release her from her obligations under the contract and return the rent. To put it in perspective, if your relative simply "walked away", she would be liable for the rent until a new tenant was found and, if that new tenant was paying less rent than she was, the difference for the duration of the lease plus the costs of finding a new tenant - advertising, agent's fees (usually 1 month's rent) etc. Now, the landlord has an obligation to minimise your costs so advertising the property could just be prudent. However, if they lease it when your relative's contract has not been properly terminated then it is they who are in breach. Surely they can't take the rent and offer to re-let the property at the same time? Surely they can. What they can't do is relet the property without properly terminating your relative's lease. Would they even be entitled to retain the deposit under these circumstances? Absolutely. The deposit is to cover their losses if your relative breaks the lease - as she has indicated she is going to do (this is called anticipatory breach). Finally, I'd rather not go down this route but is there any protection for my relative for not being forcefully 'evicted' - since she's paid the deposit, rent - and those haven't been returned? Having never taken possession, she is not being evicted.
Your question is not particularly clear, but it sounds like you're describing a situation where: The tenant doesn't pay the rent The landlord files an action to evict the tenant, and The tenant files a request for a jury trial. The act of filing for a jury trial doesn't guarantee that the tenant won't be evicted, but it will likely make the eviction process more time-consuming and expensive for the landlord. I'm assuming the tenant is entitled to a jury trial--otherwise this would be useless as a stalling tactic. In that case, the question you really want answered is, can the landlord force the tenant to waive any right to a jury trial by contract, for example in the lease? In California, the answer is no. The linked document suggests that you may be able to specify some form of ADR, which would avoid the expense of a jury trial, but the California courts won't let you get away with a straight jury trial waiver.
Provisional Patent Scope Strategy As I understand it the rigor required of a provisional patenta is less than that of a non provisional patent. A US provisional patent is to be filed this month for a device and I would like to understand if there is a disadvantage / penalty if the claims / description is too: 1) Narrow: the concern here is that if the device description is very detailed, then any required evolutions to the device between provisional and the non provisional utility patent may be invalidated when opened. 2) Broad: the concern is that non provisional patent is invalidated because claims are too broad (not specific enough) and jeopardize the foundation and filing of the non provisional patent. If it is possible that either of these scenarios can jeopardize the non provisional patent, how does one go about honing one's judgement of whether the scope (claims) are in the 'Goldilocks' zone: not too broad, not too narrow? Any examples are appreciated: Thank you
As I understand it the rigor required of a provisional patent [application] is less than that of a non provisional patent. While this is true in a sense, there is a lack of nuance here. Provisional patent applications are not examined for formalities. Generally, this is interpreted as being able to omit claims. However, if you're really wild, you can even use a different page size. However, a provisional still needs to be treated during the drafting stage as if it were a non-provisional. This is because the provisional needs to be able to support the non-provisional. Notably, while you do not need to file claims with the provisional, you should still have claims drafted for use in the non-provisional. This is because the description of the provisional needs to be able to support the claims of the non-provisional. If you insufficiently describe your invention in the provisional, it will be as if you never filed the provisional: it will be useless and you'll have lost a year of priority. For this reason, it is not entirely accurate to say that the rigour of a provisional is less than that of a non-provisional patent application. Merely, the filing formalities and fees are lower. What is the risk if the provisional is too narrow? You will not have an earlier priority date for anything not described in the provisional. If you provide in your provisional that your invention must have features X and Y, then you would likely not have support in the non-provisional for your invention just having X alone. So be careful with what you describe as essential (as indeed you would with a non-provisional). That said, if you avoid suggestions that features are essential, and take care to describe broader embodiments as potentially standalone, more detail is always better. What is the risk if the provisional is too broad? The risk is that the provisional will inadequately describe your invention. Claims in the non-provisional will therefore not be entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the provisional. Intervening prior art will therefore deprive your claims of novelty. How do I get in the Goldilocks zone? Dale M's suggestion of hiring a patent attorney, while flippant, is certainly the right answer. But in general, more detail is better. As long as you describe your invention in its broadest embodiment without optional features, then describe each further embodiment while noting that the added features are beneficial but optional, you should be fine. Although this makes for a dull drafting experience, it makes for a strong provisional.
The page "States Where Holographic Wills Are Legal" from legal zoom lists some 26 united-states states in which holographic wills are valid, plus 9 more that will recognize such wills when they are written elsewhere. Beyond that, some states consider a holographic will valid for only a limited time, such as one year, after its date. The idea seems to be that a holographic will is supposed to be for emergency situations, when there is no opportunity to have a will drafted and witnessed in the usual way. Under the common law, holographic wills were valid, if they met a few requirements, such as being entirely in the handwriting of the testator. This satisfied the legal principle that the law "favors testacy over intestacy". But such principles never prevail over specific statutes, and the states that disallow holographic wills have generally done so by statute. Holographic wills can be harder to prove, cause court contests, and can perhaps be more subject to fraud, or legislators may have thought so. In any event, they have been made invalid in many jurisdictions. My understanding is that in a state that does not recognize a holographic will, a will not properly witnessed will often be ignored in favor of the legal heirs, that is those who would inherit if there were no will. I am not at all sure about the case where there are no legal heirs, and the state would inherit in the absence of a will. Perhaps there probate judges have more discretion. Examples I could not find much caselaw or many news reports about holographic wills, and no case where there were no heirs-at-law, and the alternative was for the estate to go to the state (escheat), although some sites mention the possibility. It seems that few cases dealing with holographic wills are not only brought to court, but appealed so that published opinions on them can be found. The page "New York Holographic Will" (from a law office site) says: A holographic will is a unique type of will that will only be considered valid if it is made under certain extreme conditions. In all other circumstances, a holographic will will not be valid and will not be probated. If this happens, then your estate will be treated as if you died without leaving a will. In New York if you do not leave will your estate will be disposed of according to the laws related to intestate succession. NY EPTL § 4-1.1. ... If you die leaving only a holographic will and the court determines it to be invalid, then there is a possibility that your property will end up in the hands of New York state. If you are not survived by any relatives, then your property will escheat to the state. The page "Handwritten wills can translate into probate problems" says: In one Arizona case, a partially typed and handwritten document was invalidated. A grandmother’s wishes were tossed aside, and her granddaughter did not share in her legacy. Ther page "Holographic Will Florida" (From a lawyer's blog) says: Holographic wills are invalid in Florida and therefore your assets will pass according to the Florida Intestacy Statute. Your assets located in the State of Florida will pass by the Florida Intestacy Statute even if you validly executed your holographic will in another State that allows holographic wills and then you later move to Florida. ... Finally, if there is nobody that applies, meaning you have no family at all, the property will escheat (transfer) to the State of Florida. The *National Law Reviewe article "Court Holds That Holographic Will Was Not Valid As There Was No Signature" says: In In the Estate of Hohmann, the decedent died without leaving an executed will, but his caretaker found a hand written document wherein the decedent stated his wishes for his property. No. 04-20-00237-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 9216 (Tex. App.—San Antonio November 25, 2020, no pet. history). ... The court held that the hand-written document had not been signed and was not valid: Here, we see no evidence in the written instrument indicating that Raymond intended the phrase “R. Hohmann Estate” to serve as his signature. In the case Estate of FRANCES BURNS BLACK, Deceased. (L.A. No. 31280. Supreme Court of California. March 1, 1982.) Richardson, J. wrote: Where, as here, there is no conflict in the evidence, "'the validity of the holographic instrument must be determined entirely by reference to the applicable statutes and principles of law.' [Citations.]" (Estate of Baker (1963) 59 Cal. 2d 680, 683 [31 Cal. Rptr. 33, 381 P.2d 913].) Unanimously in Baker, we stressed that "The policy of the law is toward 'a construction favoring validity, in determining whether a will has been executed in conformity with statutory requirements' [citations]." (Ibid.) Moreover, we affirmed "'the tendency of both the courts and the Legislature ... toward greater liberality in accepting a writing as an holographic will. ...'" (Ibid.) "'Substantial compliance with the statute, and not absolute precision is all that is required. ...'" ... In construing section 53 we bear in mind the primary legislative purpose of the holographic will statute which was identified by us in Estate of Dreyfus (1917) 175 Cal. 417, 418-419 [165 P. 941], as the prevention of "fraudulent will-making and disposition of property" by virtue of the recognized difficulty of forging an entire handwritten instrument. ... As noted by Professor Osborn: "An extended holograph ... is perhaps the most effective means of proving practical execution, even more than witnesses, and the law relating to holograph wills recognizes this fact. ..." (Osborn, Questioned Documents (2d ed. 1929) p. 682 ... Our liberal statutory interpretation and emphasis on "substantial compliance" expressed in Baker has been well understood, for there have been few reported decisions subsequent thereto which have adopted the hypertechnical application of section 53 to holographic wills which we disapproved in Baker. ... No sound purpose or policy is served by invalidating a holograph where every statutorily required element of the will is concededly expressed in the testatrix' own handwriting and where her testamentary intent is clearly revealed in the words as she wrote them. Frances Black's sole mistake was her superfluous utilization of a small portion of the language of the preprinted form. Nullification of her carefully expressed testamentary purpose because of such error is unnecessary to preserve the sanctity of the statute. Moreover, rejection of the instrument as a will would have the unfortunate practical consequence of passing her estate through the laws of intestacy to the daughter of her predeceased husband by a former marriage -- in fact, a stranger to her -- thereby excluding those whom she described in the holograph as "my very dear friends" and "my adopted family" and the charity which was apparently close to her heart and which she specifically wished to benefit. In the case of Wilson v. Polite 218 So. 2d 843 (1969) JONES, Justice wrote: It was alleged in said petition that the said writing was not valid in law as a will, because it did not comply with Section 657 of the Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated (1956) in that it was not subscribed by the said Clara Thompson. ... The sole question is whether this instrument constitutes a holographic will. No person has an inherent or constitutional right to make a will disposing of his property. Such is a privilege extended to the citizens by the State. 94 C.J.S. Wills § 3, p. 680 (1956); ... It is a requisite to a valid will that it be executed as prescribed by statute. ... No matter how earnestly one may desire and intend to make a will, a paper, although fully intended by the writer to be a will, is ineffective and invalid unless its execution meets statutory requirements. The purpose of statutes prescribing formalities for the execution of wills is not for the purpose of restricting the power of testator to dispose of his property, but it is to guard against mistakes, impositions, undue influences, fraud, deception, etc., which would divert the property of the testator from those intended by him or her to inherit same. The formalities are for the testator's protection also, as well as the beneficiaries'. ... We have before us here what is claimed to be a holographic will. To be such it must be executed in accordance with the specific requirements of the statute. It must be laid on the table beside the statute to determine whether its execution is in accord therewith. If it is not executed as provided by the statute, it is not a will, regardless of the intention of the alleged testator. ... An instrument offered as a holographic will must be a complete and executed document, although absolute precision of execution is not necessary, and all that is required is a clear showing on the face of the instrument of its execution in conformity with the law. ... In summary, the court has construed the statute regarding holographic wills to mean (1) it must be signed at the end of a document, testamentary in character, which shows on its face that the testamentary purpose therein expressed is completed, (2) nothing which follows the signature may be considered, (3) if the writing does not meet the requirements of the statute the intent of the writer is immaterial. The part of the document in question which precedes the signatures thereon fails to show on its face that the testamentary purpose was completed. On the contrary the purported signatures appear in the middle of a sentence. ... No where is there a court authorized to make a will for any decedent and that is exactly what we would be doing if we said we were going to strike out those words in this instrument which keeps it from being a will. (There was a strong dissent in this case, which I omit.)
If I make a working prototype and upload it on youtube will it prevent others from getting a patent on the idea? Generally yes. If the core information is accessible to the public, it becomes "prior art" and cannot be patented anymore by someone else. That includes you. Depending on local legislation, you have a small time window to apply for a patent (after disclosure) but if you don't, it's public domain and everybody is free to use it. If it's mainly code, you may be able to upload to Github and attach a license to it but that offers only limited protection. Globally? That depends on local legislation which there are too many of, to answer this here.
The connector is patented, as you see here. It contains 57 claims which define what is protected, and 35 USC 116 spells out the logic of claims (which, in a nutshell, says "this can get really complicated"). The set of claims defines what it patented, and infringement is defined in 35 USC 271 as whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent that is, there isn't anything statutorily more specific about how similar similar is. Since the claims define what is protected, this generally is taken to refer to things that are the same w.r.t. to all of the claims. "Generally" means that there is a doctrine of equivalents, exemplified by Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. 520 U.S. 17, whereby a court may find infringement when there is an insubstantial difference between the allegedly infringing thing and the protected invention. The Apple patent does not specify a specific number of millimeters between the contacts, so making a connector that is exactly the same as the Apple device (as marketed) but with different spacing on the connectors would be an infringement, because that spacing is not specified in a claim. A similar device that uses chewing gum rather than magnets to keep it together would not likely be found to be infringing since that is a substantial divergence from what Apple claims it has invented.
It's a fact that anyone can sue anyone in civil court for anything, including patents and Intellectual Property rights. Have you read about Patent Trolls? See Patent troll - Wikipedia and patent trolls - Google Search. You could possibly be sued for patent infringement even after being granted a patent for your own invention, because the judgement whether a patent is sufficiently unique and different from any other given patent and can be subjective at times. That's the wiggle room the patent trolls use to sue. They go to court in an attempt to convince the court that the patent office erred and they deserve damages for infringing on their patent and profits. And the court could rule on damages or court costs, and possibly to relinquish profits or pay for losses that a third-party suffers. Specific legal advice is off-topic on Law SE. So the best thing to do is get real legal advice about the patent process and prior art searches, and, after your patent is granted, what you may have to deal with if you get a C&D letter or are taken to court for infringement.
I've answered this in the context of US patent law, but similar principles apply elsewhere in the world. As stated in 35 USC 271, "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent". Thus, a patent provides the patent owner with the right to exclude others from performing these actions, and the right to sue anyone who does perform these actions (both to stop them from infringing the patent, and to collect monetary damages for their infringement). Creating an infringing product and then licensing it under the GPL (or any other scheme) does not change the fact that it infringes a patent. 35 USC 271 also states that "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer". This means that, even if the creator of the infringing product does not perform any infringing acts in the US, the act of offering it for free use could be construed as induced infringement of the patent, and they could still be sued for that infringement.
"Providing on-demand services through use of personal computing services" is a preamble of a patent claim. In the case of one Uber patent, US9230292, claim 1 starts with A method for providing information about an on-demand service on a computing device, . . . The preamble tells the reader what the claimed invention does; the rest of the claim (300+ words in this case) tell the reader the steps it takes in doing it. Two patented inventions can produce the same result and a method could produce the result promised in the Uber preamble but do it without performing all of the steps in the Uber claims, and therefore not infringe the patent.
Venue The location where you file the claim is the court that will hear it unless: you both agree the judge orders a different venue based on submissions from the parties (unlikely in a small claim) Costs Costs awards in small claims are rare and generally do not extend to the legal fees and if they do, the amount is capped. Costs for reasonable expenses of witnesses are slightly more common. In general, costs are limited to what is reasonable - to get the costs of travel and accommodation for the Liverpool solicitor, the party would have to argue that there was no available equivalent representation available locally. This might be arguable if you need a QC expert in say, international maritime law, it seems unlikely for a small claims matter. Personal Comment Don't go to court for £100 - settle the damn thing or walk away. In the time and worry you spend on it you could earn that sum five times over.
How do I let others to share my research paper but without modifying its content? I'm about to publish a paper. It will be in PDF format. I want others to copy and share that file. But I don't want them to modify the content. What copyright license I should use for that?
The CC-ND license seems to be what you are looking for. However, Sec. 2(a) has two conditions, one allowing copying and distribution of the unmodified original (as stated in A), but also allows the user to modify but not distribute a modified version of the work (they may "produce and reproduce, but not Share, Adapted Material"). This would mean that a reader could rewrite your paper, as long as they keep it to themselves. If this bothers you, I think you could not rely on a standard named license, instead you'd have to provide your own – such as CC-ND 4.0 without clause (2)(a)(B). Rewriting a legal document is a risky proposition, even for a legal professional, because you have to carefully think through all of the implications of any new punctuation, adjectives, and deletions. If you contemplate deleting clause (2)(a)(B), you should come up with a line of reasoning that compels you do delete it in order to accomplish your goal, and check that the deletion doesn't thwart that goal. That is why people pay money to lawyers (and also why you need to make your goal clear to that lawyer, lest the agreement be inconsistent with your goal).
In the US, at least, facts - like the speed of light, the name of a dinosaur or the moons of Jupiter - are not copyrightable. But the words or pictures, designs and original work used to express and present those facts in books, websites and other publications by individuals and publishers are copyrightable. (Original work doesn't need to be published to be copyrighted; it is copyrighted at the moment of creation.) See How can "factual" intellectual property be protected? Plagiarism can be copyright infringement; it's copying and presenting work of someone else's as your own. But not all copyright infringement is plagiarism in the sense that someone is claiming others' work as their own: if you're selling a T-shirt with an unlicensed design, you're not really claiming the design is yours; you're just trying to make money. If you use all or part of an image or a quote or a song from a copyrighted source in your own work, you need permission and attribute the source. Or, you have to decide if the amount of the copyrighted material you are using might be Fair Use and you don't need permission. But decisions on what might constitute Fair Use are ultimately decided in court, because that's where can you end up when a person or a publisher sues you for alleged copyright infringement.
Generally, as the copyright holder, you can grant anyone a license to any or all of the copyright rights you have over your work (copying, distribution, derivative works, etc.). If you want to articulate unambiguously exactly what rights you are licensing, and optionally require attribution, you could use one of the Creative Commons licenses, which are designed for creative works. Some that would likely be a good fit for you are: Creative Commons Attribution license (CC BY) - Grants full rights to any recipient to use, modify, and distribute. Requires that all reuse mentions you somewhere in the work's credits. Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike license (CC BY-SA) - Grants the same full rights as the CC BY license except that any new derivative work made by a recipient must also be licensed under the CC BY-SA license. With the CC BY license, another person's modifications could be under a different license; under CC BY-SA, all modifications must be licensed under CC BY-SA when distributed, so the work and all its future transformations must be shared under the CC BY-SA license, forever (until your copyright expires, of course). This falls under the broad umbrella of copyleft licenses. CC0 - Functionally places your work in the public domain where it can be used by anyone with no restrictions (other than moral rights). CC0 allows you to renounce all claim to copyright on your work (to whatever extent possible in your jurisdiction), and/or freely license all the rights you hold in your work to the maximum extent possible (for jurisdictions where renouncing your copyright is not possible). There are also Creative Commons licenses that disallow commercial use and disallow the creation of derivative works, but you are probably not interested in those, since you want to grant full rights. One other factor to consider is whether you want to license the musical work itself or only the sound recording. By default, you might only be licensing the recording, which means other people cannot record a new cover of your music. (See Does a Creative Commons license allow me to record a cover of a song recording?) If you want to allow that, simply make a separate declaration when you license the work, saying something like, "In addition to the sound recording(s), I also license the underlying musical work under identical terms, to allow recipients to record their own covers based on this song."
It is not possible to say that this is generally fair use, although sometimes it would be. A copy for personal use is still a copyright right violation on its face, and fair use does not categorically exclude non-commercial or personal use of copyrighted works. It is a highly fact specific inquiry. The likelihood of anyone discovering that you have done so and deciding to sue over it is slight, but that doesn't mean that there isn't potential copyright infringement liability. Compare this to speeding. People do it all the time, and even driving one mile per hour above the speed limit is still a traffic violation. But it is rare for less serious violations to be ticketed.
Yes, a work with no license is All Rights Reserved, reserved meaning the creator of the work. Who is the creator of the work ? Everyone who contributed it, unanimously. Yes. If people contributed any copyrightable part of your work, in theory you cannot add any license or grant any right to use/reproduce/whatever the work without their unanimous agreement. That's very cumbersome, and almost nobody really does that, but it's what the law is. Big serious companies and repos require contributors to waive their rights on the code they contribute, by agreeing to a contributor's agreement. For example, python/cpython requires you to give your contribs a license allowing the python org to do essentially what they want with it, even though you retain copyright over them. If your project is not so serious, I suggest it should be enough to make the license clear, and that by contributing people are agreeing to place their contribution's code under the license. If it's a free license, that's all you need.
As the quote in your question notes (albeit in contrapositive form), Asimov's fiction may be made legally available for free download on the net with the permission of his estate. It is either that case that Princeton University's physics department (or whatever individual person or agency put up the story online) has obtained permission from Asimov's estate to distribute the story on their website, or they simply distribute it without legal permission, and Asimov's estate has not taken legal action to have it removed, which they may or may not choose to do in the future. Consider also that the Princeton distribution does not appear to have been meant to be in any way public: looking one directory level up (Princeton University Physics 115A and B: Physics for Future Leaders) shows a course overview with syllabus and lecture notes, without any apparent link to the story. Probably, it was put online for use exclusively by students taking that particular class, and the professor(s) just didn't put any controls to stop it from being accessible to anyone who knew the URL. This doesn't really change that fact that its public accessibility is, strictly speaking, copyright infringement, but it may be a favorable factor toward a finding that distribution outside of the class was innocent infringement, which can lessen (or, rarely, nullify) the penalty. (And it may be quite possible that distribution within the class was defensible under fair use/dealing, which considers educational context as a favorable factor.)
Generally speaking, if a person sends you an email you can publish it. Like if they call you a bunch of nasty names, or threaten you in some way, that information is yours and you can publish it. However, I'll give you three scenarios where you should not publish an email sent to you (and I'll edit to add more if they come up). Private facts. There is a tort called publication of private facts. A plaintiff must establish four elements to hold someone liable for publication of private facts: Public Disclosure: The disclosure of facts must be public. Another way of saying this is that the defendant must "give publicity" to the fact or facts in question. Private Fact: The fact or facts disclosed must be private, and not generally known. Offensive to a Reasonable Person: Publication of the private facts in question must be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Not Newsworthy: The facts disclosed must not be newsworthy. Stated differently, the facts disclosed must not be a matter of legitimate public concern. From Digital Media Law Project Note one thing - the offensive fact does not need to have been completely private for you to be liable, it must not have been generally known. In other words, someone like you who has a really low "public" bar needs to be careful. Also note that your buffer system might not help if the facts you publish are about someone other than the email sender; you are the one who published them. Stolen Information If someone sends you some intellectual property of a third party it is not yours to publish. Trade secrets, copyrighted works, prototype photos, etc. The sender might be breaking the law by sending the stuff to you but you're the one who published it so you can join as co-defendants. Barrett Brown was indicted for sharing a link to some stolen information. A link! He's in prison on other charges. Copyright held by the original sender (ht to @Dave_D) If the sender is the original author of the email, then the sender holds the copyright to the body of the email. Publishing the email violates the copyright. However, you could account for this in your buffer. Maybe. I am not sure is that is explicit enough.
(For the data you use, you might not have to follow the license. But let’s assume you have to.) The license only applies to the content you distribute (or publicly perform, but that’s likely not relevant in your context): "Distribute" means to make available to the public the original and copies of the Work or Adaptation, as appropriate, through sale or other transfer of ownership. It doesn’t matter what’s saved on your server, it only matters what’s published (i.e., distributed). So you don’t have to publish the database. You have to attribute the content from the database when and as long you show (i.e., distribute) it. Not earlier nor longer than that.
What happens if I shoot a police officer in self-defense during a SWAT raid? No-knock SWAT raids are very popular, especially in the US. But how do you know that the heavily armed persons are policemen? Isn't it very easy to mistake them for robbers? What if I try to defend myself and my family and start shooting, killing one of them in a believed act of self-defense? You could recognise them by the label on their uniform that says "SWAT", but this is not a valid indicator. Anyone could wear something like this. The only real way to identify the "intruders" as lawful police officers is their badge, but this won't help. What would happen to me if something like this happened? Are there any special legislations considering this topic?
This area of law is dependent on affirmative defenses that states may choose to provide. I found two law review articles that present the situations in Georgia and Indiana.1, 2 Georgia Georgia Code 16-3-23 provides a defense for the occupant in this situation. Epstein argues that this statute is somewhat ambiguous but it most likely even applies when the occupant only has a reasonable belief that the entry is unlawful (i.e. the entry doesn't have to actually be unlawful).1 Indiana Indiana Code 35-41-3-2 provides a similar defense. The Indiana Legislature enacted 35-41-3-2 in response to a court decision that did not allow a jury to consider self-defense to an unlawful police entry. Patterson analyzes Indiana's statute and comes to the same conclusion as Epstein did about Georgia's: "the statute allows an individual to use force on a reasonable belief that a police official is unlawfully entering their home".2 Policy conflict Both Epstein and Patterson note the policy conflict that arises when states allow both no-knock warrants and affirmative defenses when an occupant reasonably believes an entry may be unlawful. They both suggest that states with such defenses available remove the permission for no-knock entries. 1. Epstein, Dimitri (2009) "Cops or Robbers? How Georgia's Defense of Habitation Statute Applies to No-Knock Raids by Police," Georgia State University Law Review: Vol. 26: Iss. 2, Article 5. 2. Patterson, C. (2014) "Don't Forget to Knock: Eliminating the Tension Between Indiana's Self Defense Statute and No-Knock Warrants," Ind. L. Rev., 47, 621.
Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules & Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility.
Authority A lot of this falls under life skills and common sense, rather than law per se. If you've lived and worked in skyscrapers and laboratories and corporate environments these are things you just come to know. Maybe some of this comes from being a Boy Scout growing up as well. Calling 911 Usually there would be a law prohibiting employment retaliation against someone making a legitimate report to law enforcement, but an employer might reasonably suggest when it is and is not appropriate to do so. Outright stopping someone from calling 911 when it is appropriate to do so would probably constitute obstruction of justice or something similar. Private Security There are a variety of tasks normally performed by private security in a business. Routine patrol to make sure that nothing is amiss and that only authorized people are in the building; excluding trespassers with non-deadly force if necessary; maintaining awareness of neighborhood security threats (e.g. protest marches, repeated crime incidents where employees go) investigating property crimes on the property after reporting the to law enforcement for insurance purposes (which usually has a policy of not investigating small dollar crimes reported to them themselves); maintenance and monitoring of security cameras; organizing fire wardens, scheduling fire drills and scheduling real fire department inspections of the premises when required; response to disturbances (if necessary notifying police); confirming that doors that should be locked are locked; alerting emergency services of fires and crimes in progress or observed; greeting legitimate employees and guests; supervising outside maintenance people; and providing minor first aid, and getting someone to health care when an ambulance is not necessary and calling for one when it is not. Their objective is to serve the company's needs, but often, those heavily overlap with the public's need in the area of security and safety. Fire Wardens A "fire warden" in an office building is responsible for: passing on information from the fire department that employees in the fire warden's unit need to know; to be alert to identify and remedy fire code violations that are identified in inspections (e.g. fire extinguishers that are no longer certified, alarm signals that are broken or need new batteries); to understand and communicate how to respond to a fire alarm and to distinguish between scheduled tests of the equipment and true drills; to supervise the conduct of fire drills and non-drill evacuations; to make sure that everyone knows the meet up location following a true fire; and to keep track of who gets out, who was never at work in the first place when there was an evacuation, and who was unable to escape. A "fire warden" is basically a responsible civilian who coordinates with the fire department which does real inspections and responds to real fires. In contrast, any competent person calls the fire department when there is a real fire that requires response and/or rescue. Any competent person might put out a fire in progress, but a fire warden would be told standard operating procedure for follow up response after an emergency fire or incident is dealt with as a putting out a visible fire in a complex urban or commercial environment is often not sufficient to know that the threat is gone. Often a fire warden would insist that the fire department be called even though there was no visible ongoing threat. This is particularly important in high rises, commercial kitchens and industrial buildings.
Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.
In addition to the general considerations of (1) who is allowed to use non-deadly physical force to maintain order in a shop (which I think that one could do if "deputized" by the property owner or to protect the property of another as well), and (2) the use of non-deadly physical force to make a citizen's arrest (which many of these scenarios would justify as the disorder would be a crime if committed by an adult), (3) I suspect that there is also some point at which a bystander may intervene to prevent harms associated with an unsupervised minor being at large and in need of supervision. Generally speaking, intervention with the minimum reasonable non-deadly physical force to prevent property damage, or an assault, or a threat, is going to be permissible. As to the third reason: for a mentally normal ten-year-old that might be a stretch; for a four-year-old or a clearly impaired older child it might not. One could approach the child, say, "where's your mom or dad", "do you have a babysitter or sibling around?", "what is your name?", or "are you lost?" and detain the child until a satisfactory answer is provided or a suitable authority arrives, to prevent the problem of a child being lost, abducted or hurt by the child's own actions. It would be quite hard for a parent, guardian or babysitter to complain about this kind of conduct when the child was unsupervised and is released as soon as you confirm that this really is a responsible adult or older minor who is responsible for the child. It would be important in doing so to not secret away or isolate the child, to try to determine the location of the child's caretaker, to refrain from doing anything that would harm the child, and to seek assistance from an authority within a reasonable time. Typically, if no caretaker appeared, a cop would come and the cop would oversee the situation until a social worker could come. For example, Colorado has the following statute that would apply once a cop arrived (omitting lengthy provisions that apply to newborn children): § 19-3-401. Taking children into custody (1) A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court: (a) When the child is abandoned, lost, or seriously endangered in such child's surroundings or seriously endangers others and immediate removal appears to be necessary for such child's protection or the protection of others; (b) When there are reasonable grounds to believe that such child has run away or escaped from such child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has not made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home; . . . (1.3) A child shall be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home. (1.5) An emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered as described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the child from the child's home. If such an emergency exists, a child shall be removed from such child's home and placed in protective custody regardless of whether reasonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. (2) The taking of a child into temporary custody under this section shall not be deemed an arrest, nor shall it constitute a police record. A child is considered neglected or dependent under circumstances including the following (provisions related to drug or alcohol abuse by parents omitted): § 19-3-102. Neglected or dependent child (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; I don't have easily at hand legal authority authorizing a third-party who is not a law enforcement officer to take custody of a dependent or neglected child until a law enforcement officer arrives, but I strongly suspect from the context that this is allowed either under common law, or a statute that I have not located, or some legal fiction (e.g., that the citizen is implicitly deputized by the law enforcement officer after the fact), or simply as a matter of custom and ordinary practice not codified in any authoritative legal source.
Bobstro gave the practical answer, that it's a stupid idea for many reason. This is for the US in general, states may have laws that say otherwise. It is not illegal to provoke someone or a government official (police), it's done all the time in protest (not riots). It is not illegal to run from a cop who has not detained you in any way, or has not issued an order to you. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that people not suspected of criminal activity can ignore a police officer who approaches them. Wisconsin has even said, that even after a police officer knocked on your window, you can still leave. However, it may give probable cause, especially with the statement of "Oh shit! The police!" It IS illegal to run from a cop who has detained you or issued a lawful order. The order "STOP" is a lawful order, and from that point on, you are committing a crime if you do not stop. For your case, check out the NYTimes article "Supreme Court Roundup; Flight Can Justify Search By Police, High Court Rules".
Good Samaritan laws are not applicable to the facts Good Samaritan laws give a person civil immunity if they render aid in good faith and that aid turns out to do harm. For example, in a person incorrectly performs CPR in a genuine effort to save a life, Good Samaritan laws prevent them for being sued if the cause damage or fail to save the life. The legal paradigm in your facts is self-defence The doctrine of self-defence extends to the protection of others and allows the use of reasonable force to do so. If a jury considers that the choke hold was a reasonable response to the situation and the maintenance of it to the point of death was also reasonable then the defendant will be not guilty. There would be a lot of evidence around this and it’s difficult to see how this would go. However, for a more straightforward situation, if the defendant verbally challenged the attacker, the attacker persisted in the attack, the defendant struck the attacker, the attacker fell and cracked their skull and died, this is likely to be self-defence. Self-defence does not prevent prosecution. It is a defence that can be raised. Of course, if it seems likely that self-defence will succeed, that may be enough to dissuade the police/prosecutor from proceeding anyway.
In Massachusetts law it says the following: The term ''police officer'' as used in this section shall mean a police officer in uniform or, if out of uniform, one who has identified himself by exhibiting his credentials as such police officer while attempting such arrest. So, showing a badge or ID card or possibly even an official business card would be sufficient under the law.
Can a service provider force a price increase? My ISP has notified me that my Internet service package "will no longer be available" and that they will upgrade my service to a new package, at a higher price. When I signed up over 5 years ago, I signed a contract agreeing to a specific service at a specific price and I was locked-in for 24 months, lest I be charged a penalty for early breach of contract. I'm still using the same service although I am now free to leave without penalty. Under EU consumer law (or Croatian law for that matter), can I demand that my original be grandfathered? Assume that I do not wish any change of service, and that I obviously do not wish to pay more for an upgrade I didn't ask for. If possible, please provide relevant links or references.
When I signed up over 5 years ago, I signed a contract agreeing to a specific service at a specific price and I was locked-in for 24 months, lest I be charged a penalty for early breach of contract As the original 24-month fixed term has expired long ago, the service provider is no longer obliged to provide the service at the original terms. They may terminate the contract at any time, and equally you are allowed to quit any time as well. The notice you have now got is essentially a termination notice combined with an offer for a new contract. You can accept it, or give them a counteroffer, or walk away to another ISP.
First of all, there is no breach - they said they would pay it "over the course of the first year"; in what way is the first week not part of the first year? Second, breaching a contract doesn't always allow the aggrieved party to terminate it: in fact, being able to terminate is only for the most egregious of breaches or ones that are specifically spelled out as giving a right to termination. For example, failure to deliver (or pay) on time or in full would not allow termination, only damages.
No, it does not. There is indeed a 2-year guarantee for all goods, but "goods" is defined to be a "tangible movable item" according to Directive 1999/44/EC Article 1, subsection 2(b). In less legalese, a physical item; software doesn't count. While there has been discussion about extending this protection to software, I'm not aware of this having been done yet. Even if it were, determining whether goods are "faulty" ultimately comes down to whether it conforms to the contract of sale (Article 2). I think it's likely that vendors in this area would put a disclaimer for unforeseen security vulnerabilities, or something to that effect.
There may be violations of consumer protection and/or advertising statutes here by the online store, but the common law position is that: The website's owner is making an invitation to treat Based on that, you are making an offer The contract comes into place when the website's owner accepts your offer. The time of contract formation is "when the parties give objective manifestation of an intent to form the contract." You would need to read the site very carefully, in particular their terms and conditions, acknowledgement page and/or email to see if they are actually accepting your offer or if there are conditions attached. If there is no clear, unconditional acceptance then there is no contract at that time; this applies even if you have paid for the goods. If this is the case (and I strongly suspect that it would be for most online stores), then their acceptance of your offer and the formation of the contract probably does not come into effect until they "give objective manifestation of an intent to form the contract" by shipping the goods. Up until that time there is no contract and their only obligation to you is to promptly refund your money.
When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints.
Has this contract been translated (badly) from another language because the construction of the clause is cumbersome and confusing? Does the contract say that I can have guests over 1 night without charge? Without charge, yes. However "Without Landlord's prior written consent, Tenant has no excuse to accommodate ..." so you need the landlord's permission for overnight guests. If so does it only start charging on nights after the first? No, if a person stays more than 1 night (with the landlords permission) then this triggers the landlord's right to charge. See below for how much they can charge. Is it supposed to be 10% of monthly rent $137 per guest per night? "With temporary commendation, day-based, and additional 10% of rent each person is applied." The term is ambiguous, I can see three ways that this would be interpreted: If you have a guest who stays more than 1 night in a month they can charge 10% for that guest for that month (i.e. 2 to 31 days all for the same price). For 2 people for 2 days this would be $1,400 x 10% x 2 = $280. They can charge 10% of the monthly rent per night that the guest stays. $1,400 x 10% x 2 x 2 = $560 As, 1 except the rent would be pro-rata. $1,400 x 10% x 2 x 2/31 = $18.06 Assuming that the landlord put forward this contract the interpretation adopted in the absence of other evidence would be the one least advantageous to the landlord i.e. 3. However, there is other evidence - the landlord accepts that the rate is pro-rata - he has just failed to account for the 10%, so 3. again. How is overnight defined? Well, is it defined in the contract or by the law where you are? If not, it would take its normal English usage - "for the duration of the night". If they arrive before sunset and leave after sunrise the next day then they have stayed overnight. What if they came over at 9am and slept in the day? It says nothing about requiring your guests to sleep. If they party overnight then they are overnight guests. If they sleep all day but don't stay overnight they are not overnight guests. What about 2 am? If sunrise is after 2am then this is not overnight.
No Or at least not necessarily. Contract terms are legally one of three types: Conditions, Warranties, or Intermediate. Breach of any term allows the aggrieved party to sue to recover damages - monetary compensation to restore them to the position they would have been in had the breach not occurred. Breach of a condition also (or instead) allows them to terminate a contract. Breach of a warranty does not. Intermediate terms are terms that might be a condition or might be a warranty depending on how egregious the breach was. A contract can explicitly make a term a condition, the historical and still used phrase being that X is “of the essence”. If the contract is not explicit (most aren’t), then that is the concept that the court uses to decide - is the term “of the essence”, that is, absolutely fundamental to the performance of the contract. Similarly a term can be explicitly a warranty, usually by saying party Y “warrants” something. Most incidental or procedural terms are warranties - if breached, they never give rise to a right to terminate. Most terms are intermediate, particularly most terms about time. Normally, intermediate terms are warranties but if a breach is egregious enough, then this can elevate the term to a condition. Payment terms are a classic: if you are a day or a week late in making payment, the other party can’t cancel the contract. If you are a year late, they can. Somewhere in between, your breach changes the term from a warranty to a condition. For your situation, the early delivery is clearly a breach of a warranty, not a condition. If it even is a breach - the contract may say that they are obliged to deliver by 1 December: delivery on 1 November is clearly in compliance with that term. If it is a breach, you do not have the right to terminate the contract and if you tried you would be breaching the contract yourself by repudiation. By the way, repudiating the contract is definitely breaching a condition. A huge number of contract disputes turn on who validly terminated and who repudiated the contract. If it is a breach, you can sue for damages which, since they have not charged you for November, would be what it cost you or what you lost by having their bin on your premises for a month. My guess that this would be in the order of zero.
The agreement linked in the question seems to be or to purport to be, for a non-final, non-production version of the board. I have seen such agreements used, both for hardware and software, used when beta-test versions of products are being distributed to those who agree to do such testing, often in exchange for a reduced price on the final product, or an early look. I have also seen similar language used when an evaluation version of a product is provided free, or at a much reduced price. In such a use, it would be a reasonable contract, it seem to me, and I see no reason why if it were agreed to by both parties in such a situation, it would not be binding. Often such agreements also include a non-disclosure aspect, but this one does not seem to do so. I cannot see how such an agreement could be made applicable automatically, without both parties having chosen to agree to it, and indicated this by signing, clicking, or in some other positive way. I doubt that it could be made automatically applicable, on an "by using this product you agree" basis. I don't know of any physical consumer product, or appliance, sold with such an agreement in ordinary commerce. I am not sure what would happen if a manufacturer wanted to require all purchasers to sign such an agreement. I don't know if it would be binding. I would think that the purchaser's rights under the First Sale doctrice, could be modified by a valid contract agreed to by the purchaser. I do not think that they could simply be revoked by a contract of adhesion, which the purchaser had no choice to decline before making the purchase. As the OP says this was not signed or agreed to in any way, I can't see how it binds the OP.
Are property taxes attached to the property itself or the owners at the time? Are the new owners of a property liable for taxes that accrue before they purchase it, or is this the responsibility of the previous owners? How would a real estate buyer be protected against a surprise tax bill once the sale is done?
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, unpaid property taxes give rise to a lien that runs with the land. So, the new owners have an "in rem" responsibility to pay those taxes that can be collected against them solely by foreclosing on the tax lien and seizing the property if the tax isn't paid. Whether the previous owners also have any responsibility for the unpaid property taxes depends on state law which varies and on the terms of the real estate purchase and sale contract and deed in the transaction. Where I live, the real estate buyer is protected against a surprise tax bill once the sale is done in two main ways. First, the title company provides insurance against unpaid real estate taxes and will deduct any potential unpaid real estate taxes from the funds provided to the seller at closing unless the country treasurer has verified in writing to them that there are no real estate tax arrears for that parcel of property. Second, if the property is conveyed by a warranty deed that does not exclude a warranty that there are no property tax liens in existence for the relevant years, then the buyer has a right to sue the seller for the unpaid back taxes if that warranty turns out not to be true. Almost all sales of real property for full consideration between unrelated parties are carried out by a general warranty deed of this type that doesn't exclude property tax liens except for the current calendar year. If there is no title company involved in the transaction and/or the property is not conveyed by a warranty deed (e.g. it is conveyed by a quitclaim deed), then you could still avoid this risk by checking with the county treasurer to see if any back property taxes are owed on the parcel being sold and getting a certification in writing from the county treasurer of that fact, before agreeing to close on the sale. The title insurance company, or you, if there is no title insurance company, should also check the county real estate records normally maintained by a county clerk or recorder, to confirm that the seller really owns the property sold and that it has not been sold in a tax sale which would eliminate the back tax obligation but which would also mean that the seller no longer owns the property.
This could be a violation of the Fair Housing Act, but Fair Housing v. Roommate.com, 521 F.3d 1157 says that we find that the FHA doesn’t apply to the sharing of living units The crux of the argument is that a room in a house is not a "dwelling", since it is not a complete living unit. Whether or not courts outside the 9th Circuit follow suit remains to be seen. Florida state law (760.29) states exceptions to its anti-discrimination laws, covering for instance Any single-family house sold or rented by its owner, provided such private individual owner does not own more than three single-family houses at any one time. If that is the case, then the exemption exists if the rental a. Without the use in any manner of the sales or rental facilities or the sales or rental services of any real estate licensee or such facilities or services of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any such licensee or person; and b. Without the publication, posting, or mailing, after notice, of any advertisement or written notice in violation of s. 760.23(3) Another exemption exists if Rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his or her residence. Your attorney (hint) will be able to interpret that complicated section of the law.
You may contact a towing company; they will ask who you are, and will politely inform you that since you aren't the property owner, they aren't authorized to take someone else's car that is trespassing on the property. [Addendum] The first step in unraveling the legalities of the situation is seeing that only the property owner can give permission to enter (park) on the property. That permission can be rescinded, but only by the owner. The owner seems to have given permission and has stated in advance some conditions under which permission might be rescinded. The towing company could be called (by the owner) to act as the agent for the owner and remove the offending vehicle; but the towing company cannot just up an do this on their own. If they were to spontaneously tow a vehicle without officially acting on behalf of the owner, they would be liable for damages, owing to their having torted some guy's chattels. So the company will want to know that they are protected, in acting as the agent of the property owner. One way to do that is to verify that the person calling the towing company is the owner. Another would be to get the caller to swear that they are the owner and indemnify them against damages, in case they get sued. That pound of cure is more costly and annoying than the ounce of prevention of making sure that you're towing a car with proper authorization, so it's unlikely that they would just tow the car on your say-so. You might try suing the complex owner for some kind of breach of contract, if you think you have a contractual right to a parking space and they are negligent in doing what's necessary to meet your contractual right. The lease says "we may...", not "we will", so they haven't promised to absolutely enforce this rule. Or, of course, you could call the manager and mention that there's still a problem.
Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions, (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear. (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease.
If I need to pay property tax on the house, are there any exemptions, based on the fact that I have no income? No. There may be property tax exemptions for other reasons, but there is not a property tax exemption for lack of income. The most common property tax exemptions in New York are listed here. They are: STAR (School Tax Relief) Senior citizens exemption Veterans exemption Exemption for persons with disabilities Exemptions for agricultural properties The stunningly long full list of property tax exemptions can be found here. The long list mostly reflects, however, a variety of property exemptions for non-profits and governmental entities, enacted in a piecemeal fashion. Given that you are relying upon a home search website, rather than official records, I suspect that the gaps are simply due to incomplete data for the website.
There is no such thing as an "implicit" out clause in a contract like this. The onus was clearly on them to consider all the facts before agreeing to lock in an interest rate. The facts have not changed since the lock and you did not misrepresent the facts so they should honor their agreement or pay you damages. Your options are to take the deal, get a new deal elsewhere or take them to court to enforce the deal or recover damages. Those aren't particularly great options but that's the situation.
Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough).
You are responsible The “public mains” are the infrastructure owned by the utility (and are the utility’s maintenance problem). From those, to the point where it enters the building (or your unit for a multi-unit building), they are the landlord’s problem. Within your leasehold they are your problem. Notwithstanding, a leaky tap is probably a worn washer which is caught by the “fair wear and tear” clause anyway.
Why hasn't civil asset forfeiture been ruled unconstitutional? If news articles like this and this are accurate, then U.S. law enforcement can confiscate private property, including cash, without convicting someone of a crime – or even charging them – under a theory called "civil asset forfeiture." The Constitution (5th and 14th amendments) clearly states that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. This is clearly depriving citizens of property, and there appears to be no due process, so how has civil asset forfeiture survived challenges in the courts? That is, why isn't this a violation of the 14th and 5th amendments? (Last sentence added and italiziced to distinguish from other question How exactly does civil asset forfeiture work in the United States?)
Civil forfeiture typically pits the government against property, not the government against an individual, and in the US (also anywhere else), only people have rights: property has no rights. The first relevant instance to reach the Supreme Court was an early case, The Palmyra (25 US 1), where a ship was confiscated because it had been used in privateering against the US. Although the owner had been convicted of nothing, the court still allowed the confiscation since The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily to the thing, and this whether the offense be malum prohibitum or malum in se The defendant here is the ship itself, not the owner of the ship (known as in rem proceeding). The case law is replete with cases like "US v. $500,000", and such forfeitures have long been part of the arsenal to be used against wrong-doing, a law authorizing this having been one of the first acts of the US Congress, especially applicable to ships and cargo involved in piracy. The courts have repeatedly allowed such confiscation, at least in certain circumstances. In one more recent case, Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, the court stated that It has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property intrusted by the innocent owner or lienor to another who uses it in violation of the revenue laws of the United States is not a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment followed by a huge list of citations. Because of the doctrine stare decisis (courts respect prior rulings in similar cases), once a pattern is deemed constitutionally acceptable, it is very hard change that interpretation of the law. It should be noted that J. Thomas recently hinted in a dissent that there is a Due Process problem with civil forfeiture, raising strict scrutiny type objections to civil forfeiture, specifically that forfeiture was typically more narrowly applied – limited to customs and piracy, and justified by necessity, because the party responsible for the crime was frequently located overseas and thus beyond the personal jurisdiction of United States courts also observing that founding-era precedents do not support the use of forfeiture against purely domestic offenses where the owner is plainly within the personal jurisdiction of both state and federal courts Essentially, the reason why civil forfeiture (in its current revenue-generating incarnation) hasn't been ruled unconstitutional is that a persuasive argument has not been made to that effect. The court can't just decide this on its own, and in the most recent case, the constitutional issue was only raised at the Supreme Court, not in the Texas appellate court where it should have been raised. The most significant problem is that it isn't clear what constitutes "due process of law". There is, in all jurisdictions, some kind of legal process (see this report for an overview of the kinds of process involved). The standard of proof that allows forfeiture is pretty low (being a civil case, it is not "beyond a reasonable doubt"), and there are various impediments discouraging anyone from suing to prevent forfeiture (which until 2000 included a substantial bond requirement and the threat of having to pay the government's attorney's fees if you lose). Since there is a process whereby forfeiture can be challenged, a more sophisticated argument is needed, based on Due Process.
Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.
Note the following argument: the landmark 1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland, which ruled that state officials cannot obstruct “the measures of a government [the federal government] created by others as well as themselves.” “In other words,” Kalt and Amar summarize, “a single state cannot use its power to derail the functioning of the United States.” (Amar is a Yale constitutional law professor, Kalt, his student) On the other hand, you have the argument by a Hofstra constitutional law professor that the 25th amendment can be applied when the President is occupied with a criminal case, ergo, the functioning of the United States can be carried on unimpared. At the end-of-the-day there is no absolute answer as it is still being argued academically and has never been specifically settled by the courts.
I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision.
Assuming that all of these locations are in the same state, this is not an issue of federal law and is not governed by the U.S. Constitution. The geographical jurisdiction of state and local law enforcement officers is exclusively a matter of state law and has no single correct resolution. Different states handle the issue differently. Even if state law or the state constitution prohibited the arrest, this violation of state law or the state constitution, would not give rise to a federal claim for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which may vindicate only federal rights, and could not form a basis for a collateral attack on a state court conviction in a federal court habeas corpus petition which is likewise limited to vindications of federal law rights. Any remedy would have to be secured in the state court system invoking state law rights (assuming for sake of argument that state law provides such a remedy), or in a diversity lawsuit in federal court applying state substantive law, if the defendant was from another state and the amount in controversy was in excess of $75,000.
Of course it doesn't work. You haven't discovered an end-around to property ownership I gave someone a car and want it back (they refuse) You no longer own this car. It is now titled in their name. Your interest in the car is now exactly zero whether or not they paid for it. I use a shell company to buy my own debt Okay. This has nothing to do with the car. You're now out of the cash it took you to set up this new entity. How are you doing this? I assume it means paying off your creditors with money you already have. You will also have to come up with some type of bogus documents that explain to the future court why this was even done. If you have the money, why do you have debt? My shell company sues me for conveying the car to conceal it from creditors Um, Ok. Now you're also out filing fees. Let's assume you know how to do this without paying an attorney to do it for you. I settle Makes sense, since you're suing yourself. The shell company now gets a court order to seize the car Seize the car how? This is a stretch. A judgement would be against you for the value of the car. You can't settle a lawsuit using assets you do not own. A court won't order something repossessed because of an unrelated squirrelly lawsuit. An exception would be a bankruptcy court that rules the item was sold or disposed of outside the court's orders. I would expect an astute court to hit you with contempt or sanctions for trying to use it to further your interests with some sort of end-around to property ownership. Expect more fees for this use of the court's time. The shell seizes the car No. Now I have the car back No.
The Limitations Act of 1980 and its predecessors apply to civil actions brought by private individuals. It is not a criminal statute of limitations. I will answer with regard to civil cases, rather than criminal ones. Section 40 of the Limitations Act of 1980 incorporates by reference a schedule of transition provisions that govern this question, and when a cause of action is not governed by the 1980 Act it usually defaults to the predecessor 1939 Act. The problem is both bigger than just the fraudulent breach of trust unlimited statute of limitations under Section 21 of the Act, since the deadline only runs from when an action accrues that can be long after the act giving rise to the claim actually happened, and smaller, because the act (and also its predecessor 1939 act) allow statutes of limitations to be extended for equitable reasons under certain circumstances. The 1881 Limitations Act, Section 27 had an exception to the general rule for concealed fraud tolling the statute so long as it was concealed, which probably carried over into the 1939 Act. Section 9 of the transition provisions states in the relevant part that: (1)Nothing in any provision of this Act shall— (a)enable any action to be brought which was barred by this Act or (as the case may be) by the Limitation Act 1939 before the relevant date; The 1939 Act limitations ran from when the act was committed, not when it was discovered, until the 1963 Act changes that. A full analysis of the breach of trust issue is found in this law review article.
In a civil rights action in which someone prevails (which is by no means certain in this case, but not impossible either), there is at a minimum an award of nominal damages (i.e. $1) and the reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs incurred in the lawsuit. A jury could also award a prevailing party non-economic damages, and/or exemplary damages (a.k.a punitive damages) in connection with a violation of civil rights. There might also be injunctive or declaratory relief stating that this was a violation of civil rights and requiring the government to adopt practices to prevent harm going forward. It is hard to see how there would be any economic damages at issue in this case, but it isn't impossible to imagine some circumstances in which they could be proven, perhaps.
Do I have legal standing to force a website to remove my Personally Identifiable Information (PII)? I recently learned a high school coach of mine used a website (athletic.net) to track meets, etc, and posted there is quite a bit of PII (full name, High school, graduation year, events competed in, etc.). I would obviously like this deleted but according to their forum Q&A section they can't / don't do that: "Coaches use Athletic.net for meet entry, tracking athlete results and progress, as well as compiling school history and records in the sport. For all of the above reasons, athlete profiles, and results are never deleted." Do I have any legal standing to make them either delete, anonymize, or privatize (make not publicly searchable) the information posted about me?
The data you cite as PII are simply facts that are public information; your name, photo, your school, track meets, race times, track records, and you have little recourse against the publishing and dissemination of public information, either on a site like Athletic.net that collects and scrapes public information, or against the original sources, such as news outlets and school officials. Collecting and publishing public information is clearly allowed under press freedoms and the 1st Amendment. And, concerning photos: news outlets have the clear right to photograph people in public spaces and identify them. A possible exception regarding athletic.net is the Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule ("COPPA") for children under the age of 13. But they cover that in their Privacy Policy and offer a removal policy. One other possible exception is FERPA, the federal student record law, as pointed out by user6726 in their answer; see eCFR — Code of Federal Regulations. But your parents may have signed a release to allow the information to be made public. In the event neither of those exceptions is the remedy, you would need a court order to force Athletic.net to remove information, and you would need to show very compelling evidence that such data is harmful to you in order for the court to risk violating the First Amendment. Also see Cyberstalking and RateMyProfessors.com
In the U.S., you are not required to include your real name on a copyright registration: If you write under a pseudonym and do not want to have your identity revealed in the Copyright Office’s records, give your pseudonym and identify it as such on your application. You can leave blank the space for the name of the author. If an author’s name is given, it will become part of the Office’s online public records, which are accessible by Internet. [...] In no case should you omit the name of the copyright claimant. You can use a pseudonym for the claimant name. But be aware that if a copyright is held under a fictitious name, business dealings involving the copyrighted property may raise questions about its ownership. Consult an attorney for legal advice on this matter. Therefore, a pseudonym seems like a perfectly legitimate name for a copyright notice, considering that it is also a legally valid name for an official registration with the U.S. Copyright Office. As noted above, this may complicate your ability to prove your right to litigate against copyright infringement, but it does not actually diminish your right to do so if you can successfully validate your identity as the copyright holder.
We don't have a lot of details, but if you're in the United States, the answer is probably yes. There are rarely any meaningful rules of evidence in student misconduct cases, so pretty much anything can come in. There may be some small difference in the answer depending n whether you're dealing with a public university or private, but in either case, I can't think of any reason why they would not be able to introduce the evidence if they had it. If there's a question about its authenticity, I imagine that would just be up to the misconduct board to decide. If Person X says "Person Y sent this to me," and Person X seems credible, that's probably going to be enough.
Art. 15(4) GDPR says: (4) The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. If I was the controller in this situation, and I believed that this would endanger the students that have criticised the professor, I would base my argument for not complying on this. In addition, Art. 85 GDPR requires member states to: [...] reconcile the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to freedom of expression and information [...] So you may be able to argue that the students posting messages are engaging in "processing for journalistic purposes and the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression", depending on the laws of the particular member state. (edit: this could be difficult since you mention it is a private database). The second case seems just like the first in terms of GDPR, but may constitute defamation. Defamation (or libel) laws differ wildly in each country; he Wikipedia article on Defamation explains the situation in each member state in more detail. In the third case: if the professor submits a request based on the rights of a data subject other than himself, they don't need to comply. These requests need to come from the data subjects themselves, not just a random person assuming authority. (although I suppose it's possible for them to give power of attorney to the department head if they wanted to) Personal data and the rights that GDPR provides to data subjects always relate to a natural person, not an institution or a company.
Yes If you are in the EU, or your players are in the EU and your service is targeted at some part of (or all of) the EU, then this pretty clearly falls within the scope of the GDPR. Such a service would be collecting data associated with natural persons. At least some of it would be made public along with an online identifier, and other parts would be processed and stored, even if disclosed only in anonymized form. (By the way it is a non-trivial task to anonymize data well enough that it is no longer persona data under the GDPR. But let's suppose yoru methods are good enough.) Under GDPR Article 6 the DC must have a lawful basis for such processing. If the basis is "consent" then the consent must be freely given, whch means giving consent may not be a condition of using the service. Under GDPR Article 13 a notice must be sent to the Data Subject (DS) when the data is collected from the subject, including some 11 items or categories of information about the collection process, the Data Controller (DC), the purposes of processing, the legal basis of processing (which the DC must define), who will receive the data, the data retention period, and various rights of the DS. Such a service must be prepared to respond to data access and data erasure requests, under articles 15-17, and data restriction requests under article 18. It must provide a method for a DS to easily make such requests. Other GDPR provisions may well apply in addition to these, but that is enough to show that such service is very likely to be within the scope of the GDPR, unless none of the DSs are present in the EU or the related market area.
It follows from case law from the ECJ, e.g. C‑70/10 (28 January 2010) and C-582/14 (19 October 2016), that IP-addresses are personal data. Since my interpretation of the case law differs from the interpretation offered by @Greendrake, I'll go into the relevant case law in a bit more detail than I did in my initial answer. TL;DR: Yes, IP-addresses in server logs are personal data and you need to declare IP-address logging in your privacy policy. As I said, we need to examine the case law I mentioned in the introduction to find out whether IP-addresses are personal data. The first of those are ECJ C-70/10. In this, the court concludes that all IP-addresses are "protected personal data": It is common ground, first, that the injunction requiring installation of the contested filtering system would involve a systematic analysis of all content and the collection and identification of users’ IP addresses from which unlawful content on the network is sent. Those addresses are protected personal data because they allow those users to be precisely identified. (my emphasis) Then, in 2016, the ECJ ruled in a more narrow case ECJ C‑582/14 specifically ruling on dynamic IP-addresses: The court goes through a number of deliberations, then concludes: Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered by an online media services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the public constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that person. It is very clear from this text that the court does not challenge or invalidate ECJ C-70/10 on static IP-addresses. The court is very careful, in its ruling to point out its ruling is specifically about dynamic IP-addresses. So the ruling of ECJ C-70/10 still stands for static IP-addresses, these are always protected personal data. I believe this case law is summarized in Recital 30 of the GDPR. This recital lists the identifiers that may make natural persons identifiable: Natural persons may be associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags. (my emphasis). Since it follows from case law that static IP-addresses always makes the data subject identifiable, and dynamic IP-addresses may make the data subject identifiable, I will conclude, based on jurisprudence alone, that: Unless you are able to filter your logs to exclude static IP-addresses. I think you must consider IP-addresses protected personal data under the GDPR. However, in ECJ C‑582/14, the ruling about dynamic IP-addresses hinges on the controller having legal means to identify the data subject by connecting the IP address to some other data. The court seems to think that getting access to ISP logs is the only means of doing that. This is wrong. In 2015, the Norwegian computer scientist Einar Otto Stangvik identified 78 Norwegians who seem to have downloaded abuse material starting only with their IP-addresses. Stangvik did this while working as a consultant for Norway's larges newspaper VG. I know Stangvik and I am familiar with the methods he used. I've tried them myself, and they work. Stangvik did not have access to ISP logs, he did not do anything illagal, and the 78 natural persons identified only by means of their IP-address, combined with other data the Stangvik had legal access to. I will not go into details, I will just say this: If you know how to do this, getting to the natural person when you know the IP-address is not difficult or labour-consuming. To return to the question: It also follows from the GDPR that logging of IP-addresses falls under its definition of "processing". Your privacy policy should list all personal data personal data that is collected by yourself and third parties ("processors" in the terminology of the GDPR) that you rely on. Your hosting company is such a third party, and you need to declare the logging of IP-addresses in your privacy policy.
(Assuming the jurisdiction is the US.) Your question I was wondering whether there are any limitations on using photos of private individuals on websites. is the least of your potential problems. Photos of the public taken in public are mostly legal to use and publish, and you own the copyright on the photo, and generally don't need a model release. But your plan of posting the photo with accompanying information about (alleged) fraud: There's a fraud conducting business in my state and I want to create a website that warns others of his fraudulent practices. is potentially legally problematic. As phoog indicates in his comment, you need to be aware of defamation, both at the federal level and among states, as some have criminalized defamation (Wikipedia). Libel is the publication of provably false facts by one person about another person. For a full outline of defamation (libel and slander, and including private and public figures), see Libel and Slander | Nolo.com. What you want to do is publish "facts" about this alleged fraud on the website with a photo of the individual, linking the fraud allegations to them. That is potentially libelous. The facts of the fraud may be provably true, or they may be provably false; that remains to be seen. But the facts don't matter when considering what actions the person can take against you if you publish such information on your website. If this business and the individual(s) feel they are not committing fraud, they can sue you for libel in civil court, alleging that you have damaged their reputation and impacted their business by publishing those facts on your website with the photo identifying the person and their business. If they take legal action, and you can prove the business and the individual(s) are committing fraud with provable facts - hard evidence of fraud, such as legal documents and court judgments - than you should (no guarantees) be able to successfully defend yourself in a libel suit brought against you by that person. Even if the business and the individual(s) are aware of facts that prove their fraud, and know they will probably not prevail in court, they can still take you to court, and it will cost you whatever time and money it takes to defend yourself. My responses above concern what legal actions the alleged could take against you if you published the website with the photo and information about the alleged fraud. No one here is advising you to put up the website with the photo and the "facts" as you see them, even if you have hard proof of the facts of the fraud; you should find legal representation before taking any action with the website. And, no one here is advising you to open any legal action against the person; that's your choice in terms of determining your case and if you can show actual harm that was caused by the alleged fraud by the individual, and you should find legal representation before taking any action.
Probably not Now, some US constitutional rights do get interpreted very broadly, and it's possible this might be the case here too. But fundamentally, this situation is not equivalent to the security contractors example you mentioned. The crux is that Facebook already has every right to delete your posts for whatever reason they want. A security contractor does not have any intrinsic right to conduct searches (warrantless or otherwise) on your person, residence or effects. Facebook can choose, at their sole discretion, to delete all your posts, delete none of your posts, or delete some of your posts according to whatever metric they came up with. In this case, the metric is 'did the government flag this as misinformation'. The government isn't censoring you - Facebook is, and Facebook is allowed to do that (they happen in this case to be following the government's advice on what specifically needs censoring, but where they choose to get their advice is also purely their business). A security contractor, by contrast, can't do much of anything to you, except when they have been specifically deputized by the government to do so by some legal process. If this happens, then they are said to be acting 'under color of law', and suddenly First (and Eighth, etc) Amendment restrictions do begin to constrain their actions. Facebook is not getting any kind of state power delegated to them, and thus they aren't considered to be acting 'under color of law'. They aren't doing anything they were not already allowed to do.
How long do you have to collect a unpaid debt? If a client refuses to pay an invoice for work completed, how long do you have to file a claim? I have a written contract but they sent me a letter canceling the agreement.
The statute of limitations in Oregon appears to be six years (per the link provided by Nate Eldgredge in the comments). This would be extended if there was a partial payment or written affirmation of the debt by the debtor.
In general you can dispute and negotiate any bill from a professional. The stronger your arguments for disputing it, and the more coherent your demands for adjustment, the more successful you will tend to be. This is like any business negotiation. One partner at a very large U.S. law firm once admitted to me that their corporate clients almost always ask for – and receive – billing adjustments. Of course, when push comes to shove, unless you're accusing the lawyer of fraudulent billing, then typically by contract you are liable for the bills. However, non-lawyers often assume that they will lose any dispute with their lawyers because it seems like lawyers have free access to the legal system. The reality is that there is a significant threshold that must be met before a law firm will sue a client for payment. That threshold will depend on the firm's opportunity costs, the costs of litigation, their assessment of reputational risks, how much they expect to actually collect, and sometimes just how ticked off they are.
If you are going to sue, and can prove they overcharged - consider going to the small claims court. It should cost you $15 + time - unless you loose quite badly - in which case its conceivable the court could award costs against you (I don't know if this is true of the small claims court in NY). You can represent yourself, so no heavy legal bills. It will take a a few hours of your time to prepare and have the hearing. Of-course, very often, just by filing you will get the opposing party to sort out the issue - and probably won't even need to go to court.
It is not necessary for an agreement to be verbose and written by a lawyer, for it to be binding. There is some danger in having untrained people writing up agreements (they don't know the distinction between "what the law says" versus "what we had in mind"). The agreement is binding, but their interpretation of the contract language does not automatically prevail. The statement "ALL TUTORS ARE PAID 8 HOURS, unless told otherwise" is slightly problematic since it is not true (you can't pay time, you pay money for time spend). With no other statements about time and payment, and just looking at the words, this says that an employee will be paid for 8 hours work, period. Unless they say something different. That could mean "even if you work 20 hours, you only get paid for 8" (illegal under various labor laws), or it could be "even if you only work 2 hours, you get paid for 8" (the most reasonable interpretation). The interpretation "You are limited to 8 hours of work per pay period / contract" is not a reasonable interpretation: that isn't what the clause says. Such a limit could be clearly expressed ("can work up to 8 hours" is a clear way to state the limit), and since they didn't say anything like that, that is not how the courts will read the clause. They can, however, inform you otherwise, e.g. say "your minimum automatic pay is now 2 hours", or "we will only guarantee 2 hours work", and at that point that's what the number is. Since this is (presumably) a take-it or leave it contract which they wrote up and you didn't actually negotiate, any unclarities are legally interpreted in your favor. If you have worked more than 8 hours and they are using the contract language to argue that you won't be paid for the overage, that is not at all likely to hold up in court. Under terms of the contract (interpreted as stating a minimum guarantee of hours), they can inform you that your new minimum is 0 hours. Also, unless there is some kind of tenure clause, they can terminate the contract at will, and maybe they'll hire you under a different contract. What the terms of employment were for you in the past does not matter, what matters is what the current terms are. If you did not pay attention to the fact that they changed the terms of the agreement as of this quarter, that is not their problem. If they decided to change to "actual hours worked" after the current contract was formed, and they informed you of that fact later, then thereafter that is what the agreement is. Until you are notified of that change, the guaranteed minimum is what it says in the contract. In case their argument is "The university sets this policy, the department made a mistake in not informing you", the university has to take responsibility for the errors of their inferiors.
To start with, this is a highly technical issue upon which different jurisdictions may differ, and in which different rules may apply in different circumstances either by agreement or by statute. Also, similar situations are sometimes treated differently in this regard in bankruptcy and out of bankruptcy. The majority rule is that the lender may choose which remedies - such as collateral and guarantee rights, to enforce, and the lender may choose in which order to enforce them. For example, most jurisdictions allow a lender to collect from a guarantor even when collateral is available to the lender, in lieu of foreclosing on the collateral. Sometimes, however, special rules apply. For example, if the guarantor is a government agency (e.g. the Small Business Administration or the Veteran's Administration), often the lender is required to take all reasonable efforts to collect from the borrower and recover the amount owed from collateral, before the guarantee can be invoked. Similarly, sometimes the law distinguishes between an accommodation party who receives no consideration in a transaction who signs as a direct debtor, and one who signs in a guarantor capacity. Those jurisdictions may require a good faith effort to collect from direct debtors (often including attempts to foreclose upon collateral) before attempting to collect from guarantors who sign as such. There are also arrangements, such as credit default swaps or a situation when a consumer provides a credit card payment authorization which a creditor can use in the event of a default (or the large dollar amount equivalent of such an arrangement called a "letter of credit"), in which the line between what constitutes collateral and what constitutes a guarantee can be blurred.
The issue of who pays directly for the items and/or to contractors is irrelevant. The important thing is to memorialize the agreement/arrangement in writing so as to preempt or solve eventual disputes. A clearly written agreement signed by the parties would supersede any presumption of conditions and rights arising solely from the parties' conduct.
Small claims court was created for such matters. There is the possibility of a fee waiver, and if you prevail, you could get some of your costs covered (though there are other hoops to jump through if you need enforcement). A formal letter (written by you) stating that you intend to seek a legal judgment against him/her in the amount owed might be sufficient motivation for the person to pay what is owed.
A contract need not be written to be valid and enforceable. However, if there is no written contract, then in a dispute the burden of proving (via a preponderance of evidence) a contractual obligation falls on the party asserting it. In the scenario you describe it sounds like that would be impossible for the processing company.