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{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 14, "sc": 3121, "ep": 14, "ec": 3755} | 718 | Q4871330 | 14 | 3,121 | 14 | 3,755 | Battle of Jenin | Battle | still in it. Most commanders argued that this obligated a careful advance for fear of striking civilians, and warned that using excessive force would cost the lives of hundreds of Palestinians. Lieutenant Colonel Ofek Buchris, commander of the 51st Battalion, was left in a minority opinion, saying "We're being humiliated here for four days now". When Mofaz instructed the officers to be more aggressive and fire five antitank missiles at every house before entering, one of them contemplated disobedience. Meanwhile, when asked how long he thought his forces could last given the superiority of the Israeli forces, Abu Jandal said: |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 14, "sc": 3755, "ep": 14, "ec": 4303} | 718 | Q4871330 | 14 | 3,755 | 14 | 4,303 | Battle of Jenin | Battle | "No. That's not true. We have the weapon of surprise. We have the weapon of honor. We have the divine weapon, the weapon of Allah who stands at our side. We have weapons that are better than theirs. I am the one with the truth, and I put my faith in Allah, while they put their faith in a tank".
Buchris continued to employ the tactics of softening up enemy resistance with antitank fire and extensive use of bulldozers, developing a method to expose IDF soldiers to less risk: first, a bulldozer would ram the corner of a house, opening a |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 14, "sc": 4303, "ep": 14, "ec": 4917} | 718 | Q4871330 | 14 | 4,303 | 14 | 4,917 | Battle of Jenin | Battle | hole, and then an IDF Achzarit troop carrier would arrive to disembark troops into the house, where they would clear it of any militants found inside. Buchris' battalion was advancing faster than the reserve forces, creating a bridgehead within the camp that attracted most of the Palestinian fire. During the first week of fighting, the battalion suffered five casualties. On April 8, Golani Brigade commander, Colonel Tamir, arrived from Nablus. Having crawled with Buchris to the front line, he warned that the fighting style must be changed completely – call in more troops and perhaps take the command out of |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 14, "sc": 4917, "ep": 14, "ec": 5503} | 718 | Q4871330 | 14 | 4,917 | 14 | 5,503 | Battle of Jenin | Battle | the reserve brigade's hand. A total of 30 Palestinians and 2 Israeli soldiers were killed in Jenin on that same day. By evening, division commander Brigadier General Eyal Shlein told his men that the mission must be accomplished by 6:00 PM on April 9. Buchris himself was later badly wounded.
At 6:00 AM on April 9, reserve battalion 7020s support company was ordered to form a new line, west of the former one. Its commander, Major Oded Golomb, set out with a force to take a position in a new house. He strayed from the original path, perhaps for tactical considerations, but |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 14, "sc": 5503, "ep": 14, "ec": 6147} | 718 | Q4871330 | 14 | 5,503 | 14 | 6,147 | Battle of Jenin | Battle | failed to report to his commander. The force walked into a Palestinian ambush, finding themselves in an inner courtyard surrounded by tall houses (later nicknamed "the bathtub") and under fire from all directions, and were also attacked by a suicide bomber. Rescue forces from the company and the battalion hurried to the location and were attacked with small-arms fire and explosive charges. The exchange of fire went on for several hours.
A reconnaissance aircraft documented much of the fight and the footage was transmitted live and was watched in the Israeli Central Command war room by the high-ranking officers. Thirteen Israeli |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 14, "sc": 6147, "ep": 14, "ec": 6770} | 718 | Q4871330 | 14 | 6,147 | 14 | 6,770 | Battle of Jenin | Battle | soldiers were killed, and the Palestinians managed to snatch three of the bodies and drag them into a nearby house. A rescue force of Shayetet 13 naval commandos under Colonel Ram Rothberg was quickly assembled. Mofaz told Rothberg that negotiation over the bodies might force the IDF to halt the operation and get it in trouble similar to the 2000 Hezbollah cross-border raid. On the edge of the alley leading to "the bathtub", Rothberg questioned the wounded reservists. Finally, the commando force entered the house where the bodies were being held, killed the Palestinian militants in close-range combat, and extracted |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 14, "sc": 6770, "ep": 14, "ec": 7393} | 718 | Q4871330 | 14 | 6,770 | 14 | 7,393 | Battle of Jenin | Battle | the bodies. In the afternoon, all Israeli casualties were evacuated from the area. It became the deadliest day for the IDF since the end of the 1982 Lebanon War.
During that day, the IDF censored reports on the events, leading to a wave of rumors. Partial information leaked through phone calls made by reservists and internet sites. By evening, when Chief of Central Command, Brigadier General Yitzhak Eitan, had a press conference, there were rumors of a helicopter carrying dozens of troops shot down, the death of the Ramatkal's deputy, and a heart attack suffered by the Minister of Defense.
After the |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 14, "sc": 7393, "ep": 14, "ec": 8070} | 718 | Q4871330 | 14 | 7,393 | 14 | 8,070 | Battle of Jenin | Battle | ambush, all Israeli forces began to advance by Buchris' tactics, utilizing armored bulldozers and Achzarit APCs in their push. Israeli forces also relied heavily on increased missile strikes from helicopters. Several officers demanded that F-16 jets be sent to bomb the camp, but the IDF High Command refused. The dozen bulldozers and APCs pushed deep into the heart of the camp, flattening a built-up area of 200 square yards, destroying militant strongpoints. Palestinian resistance quickly collapsed, and the remaining militants retreated into the Hawashin neighborhood.
IDF forces then began mopping up the final resistance in the Hawashin neighborhood. At 7:00 AM |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 14, "sc": 8070, "ep": 18, "ec": 139} | 718 | Q4871330 | 14 | 8,070 | 18 | 139 | Battle of Jenin | Battle & Battle aftermath | on April 11, the Palestinians began to surrender. Qabha refused to surrender and was killed, being among the last to die. Zakaria Zubeidi was among the only fighters who did not surrender. He slipped out of the area surrounded by the IDF, moved through the houses and left. Mardawi surrendered along with Ali Suleiman al-Saadi, known as "Safouri", and thirty-nine others. He later said that "There was nothing I could do against that bulldozer". Battle aftermath The battle ended on April 11. Medical teams from Canada, France, and Italy, as well as UN and ICRC officials, with trucks carrying supplies |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 18, "sc": 139, "ep": 22, "ec": 138} | 718 | Q4871330 | 18 | 139 | 22 | 138 | Battle of Jenin | Battle aftermath & Removal of bodies | and water waited outside the camp for clearance to enter for days, but were denied entry, with Israel citing ongoing military operations. The first independent observers were granted access to the camp on April 16. Israeli troops began withdrawing from the camp itself on April 18. Tanks ringed the perimeter of the camp for a few more days, but by April 24, Israeli troops had withdrawn from the autonomous zone of Jenin. Removal of bodies The IDF announced that it would not withdraw its troops from the Jenin camp until it had collected the bodies of the Palestinian dead. The |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 22, "sc": 138, "ep": 22, "ec": 752} | 718 | Q4871330 | 22 | 138 | 22 | 752 | Battle of Jenin | Removal of bodies | army would not confirm Palestinian reports that military trucks had removed dozens of bodies, nor would it comment on whether or not burials had taken place.
According to Haaretz, some of the bodies had already been removed from the camp by soldiers to a site near Jenin on April 11, but had not yet been buried. Palestinians allegedly buried others during the battle in a mass grave near the hospital on the outskirts of the camp. On the evening of April 11, Israeli television showed footage of refrigerator trucks waiting outside the camp to transfer bodies to "terrorist cemeteries". On April |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 22, "sc": 752, "ep": 22, "ec": 1349} | 718 | Q4871330 | 22 | 752 | 22 | 1,349 | Battle of Jenin | Removal of bodies | 12, Haaretz reported that
"The IDF intends to bury today Palestinians killed in the West Bank camp … The sources said two infantry companies, along with members of the military rabbinate, will enter the camp today to collect bodies. Those who can be identified as civilians will be moved to a hospital in Jenin, and then on to burial, while those identified as terrorists will be buried at a special cemetery in the Jordan Valley."
The same day, in response to a petition presented by the Adalah organization, the Israeli High Court ordered the IDF to stop removing the bodies of |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 22, "sc": 1349, "ep": 22, "ec": 1931} | 718 | Q4871330 | 22 | 1,349 | 22 | 1,931 | Battle of Jenin | Removal of bodies | Palestinians killed in battle until after a hearing on the matter. MK Ahmed Tibi, one of many signatories to the petition before the court, said that removing the bodies from the city violated international law and was "intended to hide the truth from the public about the killing that occurred there". Following the court's decision, issued by Supreme Court President Aharon Barak, the IDF stopped clearing the bodies from the camp. It was reported that by the afternoon of April 13, the IDF had determined the location of 23 bodies in the camp which were marked on maps. On April |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 22, "sc": 1931, "ep": 22, "ec": 2530} | 718 | Q4871330 | 22 | 1,931 | 22 | 2,530 | Battle of Jenin | Removal of bodies | 14, the Supreme Court reversed its decision, and ruled that the IDF could remove the bodies. IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz confirmed to Israeli media on April 14 that the army intended to bury the bodies in the special cemetery.
On April 15 humanitarian aid organizations were granted access to the camp for the first time since the invasion had begun. Palestinian Red Crescent Society and International Committee of the Red Cross staff entered the camp, accompanied by the IDF. Officials from the Red Crescent told lawyer Hassan Jabareen that the IDF did not allow them to move around the |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 22, "sc": 2530, "ep": 22, "ec": 3119} | 718 | Q4871330 | 22 | 2,530 | 22 | 3,119 | Battle of Jenin | Removal of bodies | camps freely, and that advanced decomposition, as well as the enormous destruction in the camp, made it impossible to find and retrieve bodies without the proper equipment. That same day Adalah and LAW, the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, filed a petition asking the Court to order the IDF to immediately hand over the bodies of Palestinians to the Red Cross or the Red Crescent, saying that the bodies of dead Palestinians were being left to rot in the camp. On April 19, a day after Israeli troops withdrew from the camp, journalists reported |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 22, "sc": 3119, "ep": 22, "ec": 3744} | 718 | Q4871330 | 22 | 3,119 | 22 | 3,744 | Battle of Jenin | Removal of bodies | counting about 23 bodies that were lined up on the outdoor grounds of the clinic, before being quickly buried by Palestinians.
Tanya Reinhart notes that later Israeli media reports attempted to conceal and reinterpret their intention to transfer the bodies to the special cemetery in the Jordan Valley. As an example, she cites a July 17, 2002 article by Ze'ev Schiff in Haaretz which provided a wholly different explanation for the presence of the refrigerator trucks posted outside the city on April 11. Schiff's article said: "Toward the end of the fighting, the army sent three large refrigerator trucks into the |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 22, "sc": 3744, "ep": 26, "ec": 393} | 718 | Q4871330 | 22 | 3,744 | 26 | 393 | Battle of Jenin | Removal of bodies & Military analyses | city. Reservists decided to sleep in them for their air-conditioning. Some Palestinians saw dozens of covered bodies lying in the trucks and rumors spread that the Jews had filled the trucks full of Palestinian bodies." Military analyses The Israelis said they have found explosive-making labs and factories for assembling Qassam II rockets. One Israeli special forces commander who fought in the camp said that "the Palestinians were admirably well prepared. They correctly analyzed the lessons of the previous raid". Mardawi told CNN from prison in Israel, that after learning the IDF was going to use troops, and not planes, "It |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 26, "sc": 393, "ep": 26, "ec": 964} | 718 | Q4871330 | 26 | 393 | 26 | 964 | Battle of Jenin | Military analyses | was like hunting … like being given a prize. … The Israelis knew that any soldier who went into the camp like that was going to get killed. … I've been waiting for a moment like that for years".
General Dan Harel, Head of the IDF Operations Directorate, said "There were indications it was going to be hard, but we didn't think it was going to be so hard". An internal investigation published by the IDF six months after the battle implicitly cast the responsibility for the death of the thirteen soldiers on the soldiers themselves, for straying from their path |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 26, "sc": 964, "ep": 26, "ec": 1571} | 718 | Q4871330 | 26 | 964 | 26 | 1,571 | Battle of Jenin | Military analyses | unreported. It also said that the focusing on the rescue instead of subduing the enemy complicated things. Buchris was given the Chief of Staff citation.
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, who left the compound in Ramallah for the first time in five months on May 14, 2002 to visit Jenin and other West Bank cities affected in Operation Defensive Shield, praised the refugees' endurance and compared the fighting to the Battle of Stalingrad. Addressing a gathering of about 200 people in Jenin, he said: "People of Jenin, all the citizens of Jenin and the refugee camp, this is Jenin-grad. Your battle has |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 26, "sc": 1571, "ep": 26, "ec": 2189} | 718 | Q4871330 | 26 | 1,571 | 26 | 2,189 | Battle of Jenin | Military analyses | paved the way to the liberation of the occupied territories". The battle became known among the Palestinians as "Jeningrad".
The battle attracted the interest of the US military, which was trying to build a doctrine for urban warfare as the 2003 invasion of Iraq loomed. US military observers were sent to study the fighting. US officers dressed in IDF uniforms were reportedly present during the final stages of the battle. The United States Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory studied the battle, and a Joint Chiefs of Staff delegation was sent to Israel to make changes to US Marine Corps doctrine based on |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 26, "sc": 2189, "ep": 30, "ec": 623} | 718 | Q4871330 | 26 | 2,189 | 30 | 623 | Battle of Jenin | Military analyses & Damages | the battle. Damages The BBC reported that ten percent of the camp was "virtually rubbed out by a dozen armoured Israeli bulldozers." David Holley, a Major in the British Territorial Army and a military adviser to Amnesty International, reported that an area within the refugee camp of about 100 m by 200 m was flattened. According to Stephen Graham, the IDF had systematically bulldozed an area measuring 160 by 250 m in the Jenin refugee camp. The Hawashin neighbourhood was levelled. Many residents had no advance warning, and some were buried alive.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI) reported that an estimated |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 30, "sc": 623, "ep": 30, "ec": 1287} | 718 | Q4871330 | 30 | 623 | 30 | 1,287 | Battle of Jenin | Damages | 4,000 people, more than a quarter of the population of the camp, were rendered homeless because of this destruction. HRW listed 140 buildings, most of which housed multiple families, as completely destroyed, and 200 other buildings as sustaining damage rendering them uninhabitable or unsafe for use. AI said complete destruction affected 164 houses with 374 apartment units, and that other buildings had been partially destroyed. Israel said those numbers were exaggerations.
On May 31, 2002 the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot published an interview with Moshe Nissim, nicknamed "Kurdi Bear", a D-9 operator who took part in the battle. Nissim said he |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 30, "sc": 1287, "ep": 30, "ec": 1832} | 718 | Q4871330 | 30 | 1,287 | 30 | 1,832 | Battle of Jenin | Damages | had driven his D-9 for seventy-five hours straight, drinking whiskey to avoid fatigue, and that apart from a two-hour training before the battle, he had no prior experience in driving a bulldozer. He said he had begged his officers to let him destroy more houses and added:
"I didn't see, with my own eyes, people dying under the blade of the D-9 and I didn't see house[s] falling down on live people. But if there were any, I wouldn't care at all …
"But the real thing started the day 13 of our soldiers were killed up that |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 30, "sc": 1832, "ep": 30, "ec": 2388} | 718 | Q4871330 | 30 | 1,832 | 30 | 2,388 | Battle of Jenin | Damages | alley in the Jenin refugee camp.
"If we had moved into the building where they were ambushed, we would have buried all those Palestinians alive.
"I kept thinking of our soldiers. I didn't feel sorry for all those Palestinians who were left homeless. I just felt sorry for their children, who were not guilty. There was one wounded child, who was shot by Arabs. A Golani paramedic came down and changed his bandages, till he was evacuated. We took care of them, of the children. The soldiers gave them candy. But I had no mercy for the |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 30, "sc": 2388, "ep": 34, "ec": 365} | 718 | Q4871330 | 30 | 2,388 | 34 | 365 | Battle of Jenin | Damages & Casualties | parents of these children. I remembered the picture on television, of the mother who said she will bear children so that they will explode in Tel Aviv. I asked the Palestinian women I saw there: 'Aren't you ashamed?'" Casualties Reporting of casualty numbers during the invasion varied widely and fluctuated day to day. On April 10, the BBC reported that Israel estimated 150 Palestinians had died in Jenin, and Palestinians were saying the number was far higher. That same day, Saeb Erekat, on a phone interview to CNN from Jericho, estimated that there were a total of 500 Palestinians killed |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 34, "sc": 365, "ep": 34, "ec": 1017} | 718 | Q4871330 | 34 | 365 | 34 | 1,017 | Battle of Jenin | Casualties | during Operation Defensive Shield, this figure also including fatalities outside of the Jenin camp, in other areas of the West Bank. On April 11, Ben Wedeman of CNN reported that Palestinians were reporting 500 dead, while international relief agencies were saying possibly as many as 200; he noted that his efforts to independently verify the claims had so far come to naught since people were being prevented from entering the camp by Israeli soldiers.
On April 12, Brigadier-General Ron Kitri said on Israeli Army Radio that there are apparently hundreds of Palestinians killed in Jenin. He later retracted this statement. Secretary-General |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 34, "sc": 1017, "ep": 34, "ec": 1618} | 718 | Q4871330 | 34 | 1,017 | 34 | 1,618 | Battle of Jenin | Casualties | of the Palestinian Authority, Ahmed Abdel Rahman, said that thousands of Palestinians had been killed and buried in mass graves, or lay under houses destroyed in Jenin and Nablus. On April 13, Palestinian Information Minister, Yasser Abed Rabbo, accused Israel killing 900 Palestinians in the camp and burying them in mass graves. On April 14, Haaretz reported that the exact number of Palestinian dead was still unknown, but that the IDF placed the toll between 100 and 200. On April 18, Zalman Shoval, adviser to Sharon, said that only about 65 bodies had been recovered, five of them civilians. On |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 34, "sc": 1618, "ep": 34, "ec": 2201} | 718 | Q4871330 | 34 | 1,618 | 34 | 2,201 | Battle of Jenin | Casualties | April 30, Qadoura Mousa, director of the Fatah for the northern West Bank, said the number of dead was fifty-six.
Based on figures provided by the Jenin hospital and the IDF, the UN report placed the death toll at 52 Palestinian deaths, half of whom were thought to be civilians. In 2004, Haaretz journalists Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff wrote that 23 Israelis had died and 52 had been wounded; Palestinian casualties were 53 dead, hundreds wounded and about 200 captured. Human Rights Watch reported that at least 52 died of whom at least 22 were civilians and at least 27 |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 34, "sc": 2201, "ep": 34, "ec": 2809} | 718 | Q4871330 | 34 | 2,201 | 34 | 2,809 | Battle of Jenin | Casualties | were suspected militants . According to retired IDF General Shlomo Gazit, the death toll was 55 Palestinians. Israeli officials estimated that of the 52 dead, 38 had been armed men, while 14 were civilians.
Human Rights Watch reported that at least 52 were killed, at least 27 suspected militants and at least 22 civilians were killed during the IDF incursion, and said that "Many of them were killed willfully or unlawfully, and in some cases constituted war crimes." Examples highlighted in the report include the case of 57-year-old Kamal Zugheir who was shot and then run over by IDF tanks while |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 34, "sc": 2809, "ep": 34, "ec": 3418} | 718 | Q4871330 | 34 | 2,809 | 34 | 3,418 | Battle of Jenin | Casualties | in his wheelchair, and that of 37-year-old Jamal Fayid, a quadraplegic crushed to death in the rubble of his home after an IDF bulldozer advanced upon it, refusing to allow his family to intervene to remove him. It also documented the killing of a Palestinian militant who had already been wounded. HRW also noted that there were three additional Palestinian deaths, and that it was unknown as to whether they were militants or civilians.
IDF and Israeli government sources, as well as the Jewish Virtual Library, reported that 23 Israeli soldiers were killed and 75 wounded. The UN report also noted |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 34, "sc": 3418, "ep": 38, "ec": 395} | 718 | Q4871330 | 34 | 3,418 | 38 | 395 | Battle of Jenin | Casualties & Massacre allegations | that 23 IDF soldiers had been killed. The only exception was retired IDF General Shlomo Gazit, who initially said that 33 soldiers had died in Jenin. This contradicted not only most IDF and other sources, but also IDF figures of 30 Israeli deaths total in Operation Defensive Shield. Massacre allegations The battle attracted widespread international attention due to allegations by Palestinians that a massacre had been committed. Reporters from various international media outlets quoted local residents who described houses being bulldozed with families still inside, helicopters firing indiscriminately into civilian areas, ambulances being prevented from reaching the wounded, summary executions |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 38, "sc": 395, "ep": 38, "ec": 992} | 718 | Q4871330 | 38 | 395 | 38 | 992 | Battle of Jenin | Massacre allegations | of Palestinians, and stories of bodies being driven away in trucks or left in the sewers and bulldozed. Saeb Erekat, a Palestinian cabinet minister, accused the Israelis of trying to cover up the killing of civilians. The CNN correspondent noted that due to the IDF closure of the camp, there was "no way of confirming" the stories. During and immediately after the battle, the United Nations and several human rights NGOs also expressed concern about the possibility of a massacre. A British forensic expert who was part of an Amnesty International team granted access to Jenin on April 18 said, |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 38, "sc": 992, "ep": 38, "ec": 1623} | 718 | Q4871330 | 38 | 992 | 38 | 1,623 | Battle of Jenin | Massacre allegations | "the evidence before us at the moment doesn't lead us to believe that the allegations are anything other than truthful and that therefore there are large numbers of civilian dead underneath these bulldozed and bombed ruins that we see."
Israel denied charges of a massacre, and a lone April 9 report in the Israeli press stating Foreign Minister Shimon Peres privately referred to the battle as a "massacre" was immediately followed by a statement from Peres expressing concern that "Palestinian propaganda is liable to accuse Israel that a 'massacre' took place in Jenin rather than a pitched battle against heavily armed |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 38, "sc": 1623, "ep": 38, "ec": 2303} | 718 | Q4871330 | 38 | 1,623 | 38 | 2,303 | Battle of Jenin | Massacre allegations | terrorists."
Subsequent investigations and reports by the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Time magazine, and the BBC all concluded there was no massacre of civilians, with estimated death tolls of 46–55 people among reports by the IDF, the Jenin office of the United Nations, and the Jenin Hospital. A team of four Palestinian-appointed investigators reporting to Fatah numbered total casualties of 56, as disclosed by Kadoura Mousa Kadoura, the director of Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement for the northern West Bank.
The UN report to the Secretary General noted "Palestinians had claimed that between 400 and 500 people had been killed, |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 38, "sc": 2303, "ep": 38, "ec": 2917} | 718 | Q4871330 | 38 | 2,303 | 38 | 2,917 | Battle of Jenin | Massacre allegations | fighters and civilians together. They had also claimed a number of summary executions and the transfer of corpses to an unknown place outside the city of Jenin. The number of Palestinian fatalities, on the basis of bodies recovered to date, in Jenin and the refugee camp in this military operation can be estimated at around 55." While noting the number of civilian deaths might rise as rubble was cleared, the report continued, "nevertheless, the most recent estimates by UNRWA and ICRC show that the number of missing people is constantly declining as the IDF releases Palestinians from detention." Human Rights |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 38, "sc": 2917, "ep": 38, "ec": 3526} | 718 | Q4871330 | 38 | 2,917 | 38 | 3,526 | Battle of Jenin | Massacre allegations | Watch completed its report on Jenin in early May, stating "there was no massacre," but accusing the IDF of war crimes, and Amnesty International's report concluded "No matter whose figures one accepts, "there was no massacre." Amnesty's report specifically observed that "after the IDF temporarily withdrew from Jenin refugee camp on April 17, UNRWA set up teams to use the census lists to account for all the Palestinians (some 14,000) believed to be resident of the camp on April 3, 2002. Within five weeks all but one of the residents was accounted for." A BBC report later noted, "Palestinian authorities |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 38, "sc": 3526, "ep": 42, "ec": 493} | 718 | Q4871330 | 38 | 3,526 | 42 | 493 | Battle of Jenin | Massacre allegations & War crimes allegations | made unsubstantiated claims of a wide-scale massacre," and a reporter for The Observer opined that what happened in Jenin was not a massacre. War crimes allegations At the same time, Human rights organizations and some media reports charged Israel with war crimes. In November, Amnesty International reported that there was "clear evidence" that the IDF committed war crimes against Palestinian civilians, including unlawful killings and torture, in Jenin and Nablus. The report also accused Israel of blocking medical care, using people as human shields and bulldozing houses with residents inside, as well as beating prisoners, which resulted in one death, |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 42, "sc": 493, "ep": 42, "ec": 1111} | 718 | Q4871330 | 42 | 493 | 42 | 1,111 | Battle of Jenin | War crimes allegations | and preventing ambulances and aid organizations from reaching the areas of combat even after the fighting had reportedly been stopped. Amnesty criticized the UN report, noting that its officials did not actually visit Jenin. The Observer reporter, Peter Beaumont, wrote that what happened in Jenin was not a massacre, but that the mass destruction of houses was a war crime. Some reports noted that Israel's restriction of access to Jenin and refusal to allow the UN investigation access to the area were evidence of a coverup, a charge echoed by Mouin Rabbani, Director of the Palestinian American Research Center in |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 42, "sc": 1111, "ep": 42, "ec": 1761} | 718 | Q4871330 | 42 | 1,111 | 42 | 1,761 | Battle of Jenin | War crimes allegations | Ramallah.
On the other side, Israeli media sources and analysts suggested media bias and propaganda efforts were the source of the allegations. Haaretz editor Hanoch Marmari stated, "some correspondents might have been obsessive in their determination to unearth a massacre in a refugee camp". Mohammed Dajani of Al-Quds University said that the Palestinian Authority wanted "to turn Jenin into an 'Alamo episode'. Here the press was a willing partner [as] they aspired to make Jenin a symbol of resistance to Palestinians". In May 2009, the IDF released a videotape showing what it called "a phony funeral that the Palestinians organized in |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 42, "sc": 1761, "ep": 42, "ec": 2363} | 718 | Q4871330 | 42 | 1,761 | 42 | 2,363 | Battle of Jenin | War crimes allegations | order to multiply the number of casualties in Jenin," wherein a live person is wrapped in a green sheet and marched in a procession. LAW, the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights, held a press conference on May 8, disputing the conclusions drawn by Israel. LAW stated that Mohammad Bakri who was in Jenin on April 28, making his documentary film Jenin, Jenin, shot the same footage from the ground, and that it shows a group of children playing "funeral" near the cemetery. LAW added that, "The media uncritically took up the Israeli spokesmen conclusions, without investigating what |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 42, "sc": 2363, "ep": 42, "ec": 3001} | 718 | Q4871330 | 42 | 2,363 | 42 | 3,001 | Battle of Jenin | War crimes allegations | the footage actually shows."
Harel and Issacharoff wrote that the IDF's misconduct with the media, including Kitri's statement, contributed to the allegations of massacre. Mofaz later admitted that the limitations imposed on the media were a mistake. Head of the Operations Directorate, General Dan Harel, said: "Today, I would send a reporter in every APC". IDF Spokeswoman, Miri Eisen, said the decision not to allow reporters into the camp was a difficult one: "The press people said 'Listen, the journalists aren't going to like it' and the operational people said 'We don't care about the journalists right now and about our |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 42, "sc": 3001, "ep": 42, "ec": 3598} | 718 | Q4871330 | 42 | 3,001 | 42 | 3,598 | Battle of Jenin | War crimes allegations | image, we don't want them inside.' It had to do with the way we were working operationally inside the camp. We had infantry coming in from 360 degrees which means that you're firing in all different directions. It's not like a journalist can be [safe] on one side or another. It's a very difficult type of combat to coordinate with the forces, let alone with somebody you don't know who's inside."
Lorenzo Cremonesi, the correspondent for the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera in Jerusalem, writes in a 2009 article, that he slipped past the army barricades and entered the Jenin camp |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 42, "sc": 3598, "ep": 42, "ec": 4151} | 718 | Q4871330 | 42 | 3,598 | 42 | 4,151 | Battle of Jenin | War crimes allegations | on April 13, 2002. He says the hospital was almost deserted as doctors played cards in the emergency room and that he spoke to 25 lightly wounded patients who told heartrending stories but when asked for names of the dead and urged to show where the bodies were, became evasive. "In short, it was all talk and nothing could be verified," wrote Cremonesi. "At the end of that day, I wrote that the death toll was not more than 50 and most of them were combatants". Cremonesi criticized Israel's exclusion of the media from Jenin and from Gaza during the |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 42, "sc": 4151, "ep": 46, "ec": 433} | 718 | Q4871330 | 42 | 4,151 | 46 | 433 | Battle of Jenin | War crimes allegations & UN fact-finding mission | 2009 war, saying, "If you hide something from me, that means first and foremost that you want to hide it, and secondly, that you have done something wrong." UN fact-finding mission On April 18, as Israeli troops began pulling out of Jenin and Nablus, UN envoy Terje Roed-Larsen entered the camp. He told reporters that the devastation was, "horrific beyond belief," and relayed his view that it was "morally repugnant" that Israel had not allowed emergency workers into the camp after the battle with Palestinian gunmen had ended. On April 19, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1405 |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 46, "sc": 433, "ep": 46, "ec": 1095} | 718 | Q4871330 | 46 | 433 | 46 | 1,095 | Battle of Jenin | UN fact-finding mission | to send a fact-finding mission to Jenin. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres told Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, that Israel would welcome a UN official "to clarify the facts", saying "Israel has nothing to hide regarding the operation in Jenin. Our hands are clean". Abed Rabbo said the mission was, "the first step toward making Sharon stand trial before an international tribunal".
The composition of the fact-finding team was announced on April 22. Led by former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari, the other two members were Cornelio Sommaruga, former president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (controversial in Israel for |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 46, "sc": 1095, "ep": 46, "ec": 1764} | 718 | Q4871330 | 46 | 1,095 | 46 | 1,764 | Battle of Jenin | UN fact-finding mission | previous "Red Swastika" remarks), and Sadako Ogata, the former UN high commissioner for refugees who was Japan's special envoy on Afghan reconstruction.
Official Israeli sources expressed surprise that they were not consulted as to the composition of the team, adding that, "We expected that the operational aspects of the fact-finding mission would be carried out by military experts." On April 22, Israeli Defense Minister, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer expressed his disappointment at the team's make-up, and his hope that the mission would not overstep its mandate. Peres asked Annan to deny reports that the mission would look into events outside the refugee camp, |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 46, "sc": 1764, "ep": 46, "ec": 2400} | 718 | Q4871330 | 46 | 1,764 | 46 | 2,400 | Battle of Jenin | UN fact-finding mission | and that the findings would have legal validity. Annan said the findings would not be legally binding, and that the mission would only investigate events inside the camp, but may have to interview residents currently displaced outside.
On April 23, Gideon Saar, the cabinet secretary, threatened to ban the team from entering Jenin. In private discussions, Giora Eiland, Major General and Head of the IDF Operation Branch, convinced Shaul Mofaz that the team would ask to investigate officers and soldiers, and that it might accuse Israel of war crimes, paving the way for the sending of an international force. Sharon accepted |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 46, "sc": 2400, "ep": 46, "ec": 3038} | 718 | Q4871330 | 46 | 2,400 | 46 | 3,038 | Battle of Jenin | UN fact-finding mission | Eiland and Mofaz's position, and announced Israel's decision that the UN team was no longer acceptable on April 24, citing the lack of military experts. The US rebuked Sharon's decision, and a White House official said, "We were the sponsors of that and we want it implemented as written. We support the initiative of the secretary general."
Annan initially refused to delay the mission. Expressing Israeli sentiment that the world ignored its victims, Ben-Eliezer said: "In the last month alone, 137 people were slaughtered by Palestinians and nearly 700 wounded. Is there any one who is investigating that?" Saeb Erekat accused |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 46, "sc": 3038, "ep": 46, "ec": 3612} | 718 | Q4871330 | 46 | 3,038 | 46 | 3,612 | Battle of Jenin | UN fact-finding mission | Israel of "trying to sabotage the mission. I believe that they have a big thing to hide." On April 25, the UN agreed to postpone the arrival of the team by two days, and acceded to an Israeli request that two military officers be added to the team. Annan said talks with Israel had been, "very, very constructive and I'm sure we'll be able to sort out our differences". Peres said that a delay would give the Israeli cabinet the opportunity to discuss the mission before the team arrived.
Avi Pazner, an Israeli Government spokesman, said he expected the UN mission |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 46, "sc": 3612, "ep": 46, "ec": 4235} | 718 | Q4871330 | 46 | 3,612 | 46 | 4,235 | Battle of Jenin | UN fact-finding mission | to investigate "terrorist activity" and guarantee immunity for Israeli soldiers. Israel Radio reported that Israel was also pushing for the right for both sides to review the team's report before its presentation to Annan. Following a lengthy cabinet meeting on April 28, Reuven Rivlin, the Israeli Communications Minister, told reporters that the UN had reneged on its agreements with Israel over the team, and so it would not be allowed to arrive. Speaking for the cabinet, he said that the composition of the team and its terms of reference made it inevitable that its report would blame Israel.
The UN Security |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 46, "sc": 4235, "ep": 46, "ec": 4809} | 718 | Q4871330 | 46 | 4,235 | 46 | 4,809 | Battle of Jenin | UN fact-finding mission | Council convened the following day to discuss Israel's decision not to grant entry to the UN team. Meanwhile, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee lobby in Washington was called to pressure Annan and George W. Bush. On April 30, Annan urged that the UN team, which had been waiting in Geneva to start its mission, be disbanded, and it was on May 2. On May 4, Israel was isolated in an open debate in the Security Council. The deputy US ambassador to the UN, James Cunningham, said it was "regrettable" Israel had decided not to cooperate with the fact-finding team. |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 46, "sc": 4809, "ep": 50, "ec": 144} | 718 | Q4871330 | 46 | 4,809 | 50 | 144 | Battle of Jenin | UN fact-finding mission & Report | Nasser Al-Kidwa, the Palestinian observer to the UN, said the council failed to give Annan its full support, and had caved to "blackmailing" by the Israeli Government. The General Assembly passed a resolution condemning Israel's military action in Jenin by 74 votes to four, with 54 abstentions. The Bush administration supported Israel as part of a deal in which Sharon agreed to lift the siege of the Mukataa in Ramallah. Report On July 31, the UN issued a report indicating that at that time 52 Palestinians had been killed and that it was possible that as many as half of |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 50, "sc": 144, "ep": 54, "ec": 605} | 718 | Q4871330 | 50 | 144 | 54 | 605 | Battle of Jenin | Report & Reconstruction | them were civilians. Reconstruction In the aftermath of the invasion, many camp residents ended up living in temporary shelters elsewhere. The camp itself became the site of intense efforts at documenting, recording and expressing the experiences of those displaced and affected by the incursion. In discussing how to properly honor those who had fallen, one proposal suggested leaving the destruction, at least in the Hawashin neighborhood, exactly as it was, as a memorial and testament to struggle and sacrifice. Camp residents, however, insisted that the camp be rebuilt almost exactly as it had been, while also establishing a museum of |
{"datasets_id": 718, "wiki_id": "Q4871330", "sp": 54, "sc": 605, "ep": 54, "ec": 911} | 718 | Q4871330 | 54 | 605 | 54 | 911 | Battle of Jenin | Reconstruction | memory in the Old Hijaz Railway building. They rejected the proposal of the Israeli housing minister to rebuild the camp at a nearby site with enlarged roads, viewing it as an attempt to erase the political reality of the camps whose existence they see as living testaments to the 1948 Palestinian exodus. |
{"datasets_id": 719, "wiki_id": "Q4087434", "sp": 2, "sc": 0, "ep": 6, "ec": 657} | 719 | Q4087434 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 657 | Battle of Kilsyth | Background | Battle of Kilsyth Background Between mid 1644 and 1645, Montrose had fought a successful disruptive campaign around Scotland, intended to tie down Scottish government troops and prevent their aiding the Parliamentarian side in the English Civil War. Leading a force built around an Irish Confederate brigade under Alasdair Mac Colla, Montrose had beaten the Covenanters at Tippermuir, Aberdeen, Inverlochy, Auldearn and Alford. Following the bloody Royalist victory at Alford on 2 July 1645, there remained only a single intact government force in Scotland, under the command of the experienced professional soldier William Baillie.
Baillie and his army were at Perth, attending |
{"datasets_id": 719, "wiki_id": "Q4087434", "sp": 6, "sc": 657, "ep": 6, "ec": 1247} | 719 | Q4087434 | 6 | 657 | 6 | 1,247 | Battle of Kilsyth | Background | the meeting of the Scottish Estates. He had been given command of a mixture of new, untrained levies from Fife, a number of regular regiments withdrawn from England, and the remnants of several regiments already defeated by Montrose at Auldearn and Alford. His cavalry, led by Lord Balcarres, was mainly regular dragoons. In addition to these troops, the Earl of Lanark had raised a new levy of 1,000 infantry and 500 cavalry from the estate of his brother, the Duke of Hamilton, in Clydesdale, and was en route north to join the main body.
When news of this troop movement reached |
{"datasets_id": 719, "wiki_id": "Q4087434", "sp": 6, "sc": 1247, "ep": 6, "ec": 1880} | 719 | Q4087434 | 6 | 1,247 | 6 | 1,880 | Battle of Kilsyth | Background | Montrose, he decided to confront these forces individually, before they could join up. Marching from Dunkeld he skirted Baillie's force at Perth and travelled via Kinross, Glenfarg and Alloa, crossing the Forth near Stirling, and circumnavigating Stirling Castle. By nightfall on 14 August, the army was camped in a meadow near Colzium, by Kilsyth, in the area around Colzium Castle. This area is still known as Cavalry Park in memory of the event.
Baillie learned of Montrose's advance almost immediately, but it took a little time for its purpose to become apparent. Realising that his opponent had gained an advantage and |
{"datasets_id": 719, "wiki_id": "Q4087434", "sp": 6, "sc": 1880, "ep": 10, "ec": 32} | 719 | Q4087434 | 6 | 1,880 | 10 | 32 | Battle of Kilsyth | Background & The battle | that Lanark's forces were in danger, he moved his men southward, reaching Stirling by the line of the modern A9 road. On the same night as Montrose reached Colzium, Baillie was only three miles off at Hollinbush. He arrived late and his men had little rest.
Overnight, his scouts located the Royalist encampment, and at dawn the next morning his troops were on the move and, marching directly across country, reaching the village of Banton. This gave the Covenanters the higher ground around the eastern rim of the hollow occupied by the Royalist infantry. The battle The Royalist troops were clearly |
{"datasets_id": 719, "wiki_id": "Q4087434", "sp": 10, "sc": 32, "ep": 10, "ec": 630} | 719 | Q4087434 | 10 | 32 | 10 | 630 | Battle of Kilsyth | The battle | visible, undisturbed by the arrival of the main army of their enemies. Having a healthy respect for his opposition, and appreciating that his own forces had already marched several miles in full kit, Baillie decided to take positions where he was and wait for Lanark's force to appear. If Lanark arrived on the field, Baillie would have Montrose trapped between his force and the reinforcements; and if Montrose decided to attack Lanark as he arrived, Baillie could advance against the Royalist army from the rear. A direct attack by Montrose against the Covenanter line would face daunting high |
{"datasets_id": 719, "wiki_id": "Q4087434", "sp": 10, "sc": 630, "ep": 10, "ec": 1278} | 719 | Q4087434 | 10 | 630 | 10 | 1,278 | Battle of Kilsyth | The battle | ground held by a numerically superior opponent.
Although Baillie's decision was sound, he was not allowed to adhere to it. His orders were subject to the approval of the "Committee of Estates", consisting of the Earls of Argyll, Crawford and Tullibardine, and the Lords Elcho, and Balfour of Burleigh, together with a number of Calvinist clergymen. Worried by the possibility of Montrose escaping to fight another day, they ordered a flank march around the Royalist position. Baillie protested against the redeployment, but was overruled.
Clashes soon broke out as the Covenanter army made their flank march, with the left wing of |
{"datasets_id": 719, "wiki_id": "Q4087434", "sp": 10, "sc": 1278, "ep": 10, "ec": 1948} | 719 | Q4087434 | 10 | 1,278 | 10 | 1,948 | Battle of Kilsyth | The battle | Baillie's force (now the rear of the flanking column) attacking the MacLean infantry occupying cottages on Montrose's left flank, and the cavalry on the Covenanter right flank (or van) attacking the Royalist cavalry. Other Covenanter and Royalist units joined the fray, acting without orders. Montrose seized the unexpected opportunity, and sent his cavalry and Highlanders against the now disrupted Covenanter column. The mass of the Royalist infantry subsequently joined in the attack. Baillie's army soon broke and ran.
Approximately three-quarters of the Covenanter troops perished. Baillie himself fled south with an escort of cavalry, but was caught in |
{"datasets_id": 719, "wiki_id": "Q4087434", "sp": 10, "sc": 1948, "ep": 14, "ec": 257} | 719 | Q4087434 | 10 | 1,948 | 14 | 257 | Battle of Kilsyth | The battle & Aftermath | the notorious Dullatur Bog, a marshy area lying between the head waters of the Kelvin and the Bonny. He managed to escape, although he left most of his escort behind, and reached safety at Stirling Castle. During construction of the Forth and Clyde Canal, the bodies of several troopers, one still seated on a horse, were recovered from the bog. Aftermath Lanark's forces were told of the defeat, and dispersed. Lanark himself and the Committee of Estates escaped across the border to England. Briefly, Montrose found himself undisputed master of Scotland, and proceeded to Glasgow, where he summoned a parliament |
{"datasets_id": 719, "wiki_id": "Q4087434", "sp": 14, "sc": 257, "ep": 18, "ec": 91} | 719 | Q4087434 | 14 | 257 | 18 | 91 | Battle of Kilsyth | Aftermath & Battlefield | in the name of the King. Unknown to Montrose, the victory was too late; the Battle of Naseby had already been lost and the Royalist cause was in ruins. Montrose made an attempt to move south in support of the king, but was himself decisively defeated at Philiphaugh.
The battle and the Royalist campaign of 1644-1645 in general feature in the 1937 novel And No Quarter by the Irish writer Maurice Walsh, told from the perspective of two members of O'Cahan's Regiment. Battlefield Ordnance Survey maps mark the battlefield as being in the vicinity of Banton Loch which was |
{"datasets_id": 719, "wiki_id": "Q4087434", "sp": 18, "sc": 91, "ep": 18, "ec": 250} | 719 | Q4087434 | 18 | 91 | 18 | 250 | Battle of Kilsyth | Battlefield | created in the 19th century. The battlefield has been inventoried and protected by Historic Scotland under the Scottish Historical Environment Policy of 2009. |
{"datasets_id": 720, "wiki_id": "Q4871444", "sp": 2, "sc": 0, "ep": 6, "ec": 585} | 720 | Q4871444 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 585 | Battle of Kings Norton | Prelude | Battle of Kings Norton Prelude On Monday 17 October 1642 King Charles I was marching south through Birmingham. While passing through the town some of the Royal carriages were pillaged and the contents sent to Warwick Castle a parliamentary stronghold.
Rupert, whose soldiers had been cantoned in Stourbridge after Rupert's victory at the Battle of Powick Bridge during his successful expedition to Worcester in September, left the town on 17 October to join Charles with 9 troops of horse and about 300 foot. If any reliance is to be placed on one surviving tract of the encounter, Rupert's march crossed the |
{"datasets_id": 720, "wiki_id": "Q4871444", "sp": 6, "sc": 585, "ep": 14, "ec": 62} | 720 | Q4871444 | 6 | 585 | 14 | 62 | Battle of Kings Norton | Prelude & Battle & Aftermath | path of a Parliamentary party under the command of Lord Willoughby of Parham on his way to join the Earl of Essex's parliamentary army. Battle Lord Willoughby who was in command of about 800 horse and foot met Prince Rupert somewhere between Stourbridge and Birmingham, probably in the Kings Norton area. The resulting battle was "very fierce and cruel". It was the Royalists who disengaged having lost between 50 and 80 killed with 20 taken prisoner. The Roundheads kept possession of the battlefield and lost between 17 and 20 men. Aftermath Both parties continued on to their destinations: Rupert joined |
{"datasets_id": 720, "wiki_id": "Q4871444", "sp": 14, "sc": 62, "ep": 14, "ec": 324} | 720 | Q4871444 | 14 | 62 | 14 | 324 | Battle of Kings Norton | Aftermath | King Charles, while Lord Willoughby joined Essex. The historian J. W. Willis-Bund speculated that it may have been Willoughby who provided the information on Rupert's (and the King's) movements, which lead Essex to move his army towards Worcester on 19 October. |
{"datasets_id": 721, "wiki_id": "Q3072388", "sp": 2, "sc": 0, "ep": 6, "ec": 581} | 721 | Q3072388 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 581 | Battle of Mile Hill | Background | Battle of Mile Hill Background After the failure of Army of Northern Virginia to deliver a decisive blow to the Army of Virginia at the Battle of Ox Hill following the Second Battle of Bull Run, Robert E. Lee decided it unwise to pursue the Federals any further towards their fortifications near Washington D.C.. Instead, he planned to move into Loudoun County to obtain forage and provisions and to reorganize the army before his planned invasion of Maryland.
At the time, Loudoun County was occupied by Federal troops operating from the Union garrison at Harpers Ferry. As such, J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry |
{"datasets_id": 721, "wiki_id": "Q3072388", "sp": 6, "sc": 581, "ep": 10, "ec": 298} | 721 | Q3072388 | 6 | 581 | 10 | 298 | Battle of Mile Hill | Background & Battle | was sent in advance to screen the army's movements and to clear Loudoun of enemy resistance. To this end, on September 1, the 2nd Virginia Cavalry, under the command of Col. Thomas T. Munford, was assigned to secure the town of Leesburg and the river crossings in its vicinity. Battle The following day, as Munford approached the eastern end of Leesburg, he split his command, sending a squadron under the command of Captain Jesse Irvine, Jr. directly through town, while he, with the rest of his regiment turned north off the Leesburg Pike (present day Route 7) towards the Edward's |
{"datasets_id": 721, "wiki_id": "Q3072388", "sp": 10, "sc": 298, "ep": 10, "ec": 927} | 721 | Q3072388 | 10 | 298 | 10 | 927 | Battle of Mile Hill | Battle | Ferry river crossing.
Irvine and his command rushed into town to find Samuel C. Means and his Unionist Loudoun Rangers guarding the courthouse. The Rangers, having been severely manhandled by E.V. White and his partisan Rebels a few days prior at Waterford, put up little resistance before retreating north up King Street (Route 15), though not before suffering four wounded. The Rangers fell back on Cole's Maryland Cavalry, who were positioned to the north of town at the Big Spring (near present day Tutt Lane), with Irvine's command in hot pursuit. Cole's dismounted command began to engage Irvine, but moments later |
{"datasets_id": 721, "wiki_id": "Q3072388", "sp": 10, "sc": 927, "ep": 10, "ec": 1548} | 721 | Q3072388 | 10 | 927 | 10 | 1,548 | Battle of Mile Hill | Battle | Munford's command attacked from their rear flank, having been able to circumvent the Union position by riding around its left flank along the river and approaching its rear via Smart's Mill Lane, which Cole had foolishly left unguarded.
Cole attempted to mount his command to engage Munford, but many of his troops were killed or wounded before they could reach their horses. Those that did, briefly engaged Munford before retreating towards the Catoctin Mountain and the road to Waterford, which cut through a gap in the ridge. Munford gave chase for two miles, driving the Federals through the gap into Loudoun |
{"datasets_id": 721, "wiki_id": "Q3072388", "sp": 10, "sc": 1548, "ep": 18, "ec": 174} | 721 | Q3072388 | 10 | 1,548 | 18 | 174 | Battle of Mile Hill | Battle & Results & Battlefield | Valley before retiring, having successfully cleared Leesburg and the river crossings in its vicinity. Results Of Munford's 163 troops on the field, he suffered 2 killed and 5 wounded, while of the Loudoun Rangers 30 or so men, 1 was killed, 6 were wounded and 4 captured. Cole's Cavalry, estimated at 150 strong, reported 6 killed, 27 wounded, and 11 captured, though a significant amount of those casualties were officers. Battlefield The main portion of the battle started approximately where the present day U.S. Rt. 15 Bypass converges with Business Rt. 15 near the Harrison Farm (this being Cole's initial |
{"datasets_id": 721, "wiki_id": "Q3072388", "sp": 18, "sc": 174, "ep": 18, "ec": 750} | 721 | Q3072388 | 18 | 174 | 18 | 750 | Battle of Mile Hill | Battlefield | position). The battle then moved southwest across present day Morven Park and Ida Lee Park to Old Waterford Road. None of the battlefield is protected as such, but Morvin Park remains undeveloped, as does much of Ida Lee Park, so if one follows the Civil War Trails signs to the historical marker off of Tutts Lane, a good feel for the setting of the battle can be had.
Cole's initial position has been mostly obliterated by construction and widening of the Rt 15 highway system, as well as the partial condemnation of the Harrison Farm by the public school system to |
{"datasets_id": 721, "wiki_id": "Q3072388", "sp": 18, "sc": 750, "ep": 18, "ec": 987} | 721 | Q3072388 | 18 | 750 | 18 | 987 | Battle of Mile Hill | Battlefield | build Smart's Mill Middle School and Frances Hazel Reid Elementary School. Likewise, the approach Munford took up Smart's Mill Lane has become a housing development, though a piece of the old road survives within the modern subdivision. |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 2, "sc": 0, "ep": 6, "ec": 592} | 722 | Q27958189 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 592 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Background | Battle of Tápióbicske Background After the Hungarian Revolutionary Army’s Spring Campaign started well with a victory at the Battle of Hatvan, the Second Army, consisting of I, II and III Corps, started to advance southwest in the direction of Pest and Buda. They met at Jászberény on 3 April. General Artúr Görgei, the interim commander-in-chief of the Hungarian armies, issued marching orders. György Klapka was to depart with I Corps at 4 the next morning towards Tápióbicske via Nagykáta. János Damjanich with III Corps was to set off at 5 am Nagykáta.Lieutenant-Colonel István Szekulits, with II Corps, was to move off |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 6, "sc": 592, "ep": 10, "ec": 32} | 722 | Q27958189 | 6 | 592 | 10 | 32 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Background & Prelude | at 6 am towards Farmos. The army headquarters was to be at Nagykáta. The Hungarian plan for the Spring Campaign, as elaborated by Antal Vetter, was that VII Corps, commanded by András Gáspár, had to attract the attention of the Austrian Windisch-Grätz by making a feint attack from the direction of Hatvan. Meanwhile the other three corps (I, II and III) would encircle the Austrian forces from the south-west, and cut them off from Pest and Buda. It was important that these three corps should not be detected by the Austrians as they advanced towards Windisch-Grätz. Prelude Klapka’s troops finally departed |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 10, "sc": 32, "ep": 14, "ec": 44} | 722 | Q27958189 | 10 | 32 | 14 | 44 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Prelude & Battle | two hours late, at 6 o'clock. On the way he received news that Jelačić's troops had spent the night at Tápióbicske but departed, leaving only their baggage and a few soldiers in the village. So, without thinking about the danger of revealing the campaign plan to the enemy, Klapka decided to fall on them by surprise and take this apparently easy booty. But in the meanwhile, without Klapka's knowledge,Colonel Leopold Sternberg had arrived in Tápióbicske with his cavalry brigade, as had an infantry brigade under the command of Major-General Daniel Rastić. Battle Klapka's force was led by the Dipold brigade |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 14, "sc": 44, "ep": 14, "ec": 660} | 722 | Q27958189 | 14 | 44 | 14 | 660 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Battle | in the vanguard, followed by the rest of the army in this order: the Bobich, Sulcz and Zákó brigades (named after the officers who led them), then the cavalry division led by Colonel Arisztid Dessewffy. The vanguard crossed the Tápió river, then entered Tápióbicske in company columns. But here it was caught by surprise by the crossfire of the Croatian border guard units of the Rastić-brigade, hidden among the houses of the village, and suffered heavy losses, retreating in disorder towards the Tápió bridge. The soldiers of the fleeing Dipold-brigade ran into the Bobich-brigade which had just crossed the river |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 14, "sc": 660, "ep": 14, "ec": 1306} | 722 | Q27958189 | 14 | 660 | 14 | 1,306 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Battle | and deployed its horse battery. Their infectious panic routed Bobich’s infantry and artillery as well, then also the Sulcz and Zákó brigades.
This predisposition to panic was a common problem in the Hungarian revolutionary army because, especially in the first months of the Hungarian War of Independence, they often used irregulars alongside the regular soldiers. The panicking irregulars caused major problems, for example in the Battle of Schwechat.) This was due to the poor quality of their training, or the short period of their instruction, caused by the urgent need for new troops to replace losses and the pressures of defending |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 14, "sc": 1306, "ep": 14, "ec": 1946} | 722 | Q27958189 | 14 | 1,306 | 14 | 1,946 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Battle | a country attacked from every direction, and the unpreparedness and lack of training of the officers; all of these down to the fact that the Hungarian army was only a few months old, while its enemy, the Habsburg army was the product of many centuries of uninterrupted institutional tradition.
The Hungarians also lost an entire battery because the gunners confused the attacking enemy infantry with theirs, due to them having the same colour uniforms. Seeing all these misfortunes, Klapka sent the I. (Császár) and VIIIth (Koburg) hussar regiments to attack the Croatian Ban's Hussars, who were pursuing the Hungarian infantry. At |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 14, "sc": 1946, "ep": 14, "ec": 2489} | 722 | Q27958189 | 14 | 1,946 | 14 | 2,489 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Battle | the head of the I. Hussar Regiment was Major Alajos Sebő, a very good officer, while at the head of the Croats was Major Hermann Riedesel, a strapping man, one of the best duelists in the imperial army. The two men knew each other. Riedesel challenged Sebő to a duel, and this he accepted, despite fearing that he would certainly be killed, as he said later, to set a courageous example for his regiment, which was known as one of the weakest in the Hungarian army. After they had charged each other twice, neither of them was wounded, but on |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 14, "sc": 2489, "ep": 14, "ec": 3110} | 722 | Q27958189 | 14 | 2,489 | 14 | 3,110 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Battle | the third charge, after Riedesel had injured his hand or arm, Sebő made his smaller and quicker horse push the Austrian officer’s horse, causing him to lose his balance, then struck him down with his sword, slashing Riedesel's face, who fell down dead. Twenty years later this duel inspired the great Hungarian novelist, Mór Jókai, in his description of the duel between two of his fictional characters, the Hungarian hussar Richárd Baradlay and the Austrian officer Otto Palvicz in the 23rd chapter of his novel The Baron's Sons (A kőszívű ember fiai), depicting the Battle of Isaszeg.
After Sebő's success, the |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 14, "sc": 3110, "ep": 14, "ec": 3698} | 722 | Q27958189 | 14 | 3,110 | 14 | 3,698 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Battle | Hungarian hussars drove the Croat cavalry back, but were halted by the imperial artillery and a brave attack by the Croat border guard battalion, which forced them to retreat to the other side of the Tápió river. This again caused chaos among the Hungarian troops, who started a hasty retreat, which was contributed to by the fact that Klapka lost contact with his troops while trying to cross the river far from them. The Rastić and Sternberg brigades crossed the river via the bridge, took 10 Hungarian cannon and 4 ammunition caissons, and captured two Hungarian officers and 123 men. |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 14, "sc": 3698, "ep": 14, "ec": 4311} | 722 | Q27958189 | 14 | 3,698 | 14 | 4,311 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Battle | The Croat batteries fired at the retreating Hungarians, who were fortunate that the terrain on this side of the river was quite broken ground, so their cavalry could not do its job of pursuing the retreating forces. At this dramatic moment Görgei arrived on the scene, and tried unsuccessfully to stop the I Corps soldiers’ retreat and to get them into battle order.
The battle seemed to be lost, until Damjanich's III Corps arrived on the battlefield. Before they deployed, Colonel Arisztid Dessewffy, with the remaining cavalry and artillery of I Corps which had not fled, managed to stop the advancing |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 14, "sc": 4311, "ep": 14, "ec": 4903} | 722 | Q27958189 | 14 | 4,311 | 14 | 4,903 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Battle | imperials amidst heavy fighting. Following Görgei's order, Damjanich then took command of Wysocki’s division of his corps, and together with the Leiningen brigade, started to charge. In the meantime, the fleeing troops of I Corps also regrouped. When the Hungarian soldiers of the 3rd and 9th Battalions of the III. Corps, arrived at the bridge after chasing the enemy back to the other side of the river, they started to argue about who would cross it first, losing precious time. The commander of the 3rd Battalion, Major Károly Földváry – a hero of several battles of the Hungarian War of |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 14, "sc": 4903, "ep": 18, "ec": 25} | 722 | Q27958189 | 14 | 4,903 | 18 | 25 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Battle & Aftermath | Independence (he also distinguished himself in the Battle of Vác) – wrested the flag of the 9th Battalion from its commander's hand, and led both battalions across the bridge under a hail of bullets from the imperial troops. After chasing them from the outskirts of the village, the whole Wysocki division crossed and joined the pursuit. The retreating imperial troops set the village on fire to slow down the advancing Hungarians. The cavalry of III Corps led by Colonel József Nagysándor tried to pursue the retreating Austrians, but the terrain prevented them from doing this. Aftermath The Hungarian victory was |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 18, "sc": 25, "ep": 18, "ec": 654} | 722 | Q27958189 | 18 | 25 | 18 | 654 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Aftermath | made bitter-sweet by the fact that they could not recapture four of their guns which had been taken by the Austrians. Additionally, György Klapka, normally a very capable general, had made a considerable tactical error in giving the order to attack Tápióbicske, because in doing so he had revealed the location of his troops. Because of this, Görgei did not dare to give the order for the encirclement of the main imperial forces at Isaszeg and Gödöllő. According to László Pusztaszeri, Klapka thereby prevented a decisive Hungarian victory over Windisch-Grätz. Róbert Hermann believes that although Görgei was uncertain what to |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 18, "sc": 654, "ep": 18, "ec": 1277} | 722 | Q27958189 | 18 | 654 | 18 | 1,277 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Aftermath | do, he finally decided to order his troops to continue their movements according to the initial plan.
On the other hand, after the battle on 4 April, Jelačić falsely reported a Croat victory over the Hungarians. This misled Windisch-Grätz, who did not understand what was happening on the south-eastern front, and contributed to him ordering the Ban of Croatia (Jelačić) to pursue the Hungarians, who in reality were not fleeing but nearing Gödöllő. He was totally unclear about where the Hungarian forces really were, and feared that their main forces would get around him either from the south, cutting his lines |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 18, "sc": 1277, "ep": 18, "ec": 1874} | 722 | Q27958189 | 18 | 1,277 | 18 | 1,874 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Aftermath | of communication with the capital, or from the north, liberating the fortress of Komárom from the imperial siege. So Windisch-Grätz scattered his forces on a 54-kilometer front, which made it impossible for his troops to support each other effectively (some units were more than a day's march apart). In contrast, the Hungarian front line was only 22 kilometers long, and so at all times during the battle Görgei could concentrate up to two thirds of his force at any point of his front line. Windisch-Grätz's error reduced his chance of victory against the Hungarian main forces in the Battle of |
{"datasets_id": 722, "wiki_id": "Q27958189", "sp": 18, "sc": 1874, "ep": 18, "ec": 1925} | 722 | Q27958189 | 18 | 1,874 | 18 | 1,925 | Battle of Tápióbicske | Aftermath | Isaszeg which followed two days after Tápióbicske. |
{"datasets_id": 723, "wiki_id": "Q570456", "sp": 2, "sc": 0, "ep": 6, "ec": 553} | 723 | Q570456 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 553 | Battle of Warsaw (1831) | Background | Battle of Warsaw (1831) Background In 1830 a series of revolutions struck Europe: the July Revolution in France, the Belgian Revolution and smaller revolts in Italy threatened to overthrow the framework of European politics established at the Congress of Vienna. As the Russian tsars were among the strongest advocates of that status quo, the uprising in Poland and the ousting of the tsar as the king of Poland by the Sejm and Senate of Poland on 25 January 1831 were considered a serious irritant. Russia could not send its armies to Belgium or France before the rebellion in Poland was |
{"datasets_id": 723, "wiki_id": "Q570456", "sp": 6, "sc": 553, "ep": 6, "ec": 1168} | 723 | Q570456 | 6 | 553 | 6 | 1,168 | Battle of Warsaw (1831) | Background | quelled. For that reason the capture of Warsaw was Russia's main target in the war from the start of hostilities.
In the course of the uprising, the army of Russia unsuccessfully tried to capture the capital of Poland on two occasions. First in February 1831, forces under Field Marshal Hans Karl von Diebitsch stormed the eastern suburb of Praga. After a bloody battle at Grochów, the Polish Army successfully retreated to Warsaw, and the capital remained in Polish hands.
Unable to capture Warsaw by a frontal assault, von Diebitsch devised a plan to outflank it and enter the city from the west. |
{"datasets_id": 723, "wiki_id": "Q570456", "sp": 6, "sc": 1168, "ep": 6, "ec": 1767} | 723 | Q570456 | 6 | 1,168 | 6 | 1,767 | Battle of Warsaw (1831) | Background | In early 1831 he sent his forces upstream on the Vistula, where the Russian divisions were to cross the river and head back north, towards Warsaw. The new plan was thwarted by the Polish defence in three successive battles around Wawer, Dębe Wielkie and Iganie. The Russians withdrew towards Siedlce, where von Diebitsch fell ill and died of cholera.
The successor of von Diebitsch as Commander in Chief of Russian forces in Poland, Count Ivan Paskevich, decided to wait for the Polish forces on other fronts to be defeated before he resumed his march on Warsaw. In June 1831 General Antoni |
{"datasets_id": 723, "wiki_id": "Q570456", "sp": 6, "sc": 1767, "ep": 6, "ec": 2391} | 723 | Q570456 | 6 | 1,767 | 6 | 2,391 | Battle of Warsaw (1831) | Background | Giełgud's attack on Wilno failed, and his corps was forced to cross the border with Prussia to avoid complete destruction. Only a small detachment under General Henryk Dembiński managed to rejoin the main Polish force. This secured Paskevich's northern flank and allowed his forces to devise a new plan of attack. Instead of attacking the city directly and risking yet another defeat, he intended to surround Warsaw, cut it off from other Polish-controlled areas, and force it into submission.
Between 17 and 21 July 1831 he crossed the Vistula near Osiek with his main force, and moved towards Warsaw through Gąbin |
{"datasets_id": 723, "wiki_id": "Q570456", "sp": 6, "sc": 2391, "ep": 6, "ec": 3010} | 723 | Q570456 | 6 | 2,391 | 6 | 3,010 | Battle of Warsaw (1831) | Background | and Łowicz. Meanwhile, other Russian forces from other theatres were also directed towards the city. General Gregor von Rosen's Corps (12,000 men and 34 guns) marched almost unopposed from Brześć Litewski and reached Praga on 10 August. General Theodor von Rüdiger's corps (12,000 men and 42 guns) crossed the Upper Vistula at Józefów on 7 August and captured Radom.
The new Commander in Chief of the Polish Army, Jan Zygmunt Skrzynecki, was also hesitant to fight a major battle. Instead, he ordered Warsaw to be fortified and allowed the Russians to cross the Vistula unopposed. In his opinion, the war could |
{"datasets_id": 723, "wiki_id": "Q570456", "sp": 6, "sc": 3010, "ep": 10, "ec": 75} | 723 | Q570456 | 6 | 3,010 | 10 | 75 | Battle of Warsaw (1831) | Background & Training, equipment and morale | only be won diplomatically, by interventions of the United Kingdom, Austria and France. Should those fail, Skrzynecki believed Warsaw would hold out at least several weeks under a siege, after which the main bulk of the Polish Army would still be intact to fight a decisive battle against the Russians, who by then would be cut off from their rear by the Vistula. On 10 August 1831 Skrzynecki was forced to resign and was replaced by Henryk Dembiński, the military governor of Warsaw. Training, equipment and morale Both sides were trained in a similar manner and used similar equipment. The |
{"datasets_id": 723, "wiki_id": "Q570456", "sp": 10, "sc": 75, "ep": 10, "ec": 760} | 723 | Q570456 | 10 | 75 | 10 | 760 | Battle of Warsaw (1831) | Training, equipment and morale | standard rifle for both sides was the Model 1808 flintlock musket (a copy of the Charleville musket) and its modification, the Model 1826 Musket, with effective range not exceeding 250 metres (820 ft). Some units of the Polish infantry were still armed with hunting rifles or war scythes, but contrary to common misconception the scythe-wielding kosynierzy were but a small minority of Polish forces. The artillery used by both sides was mostly six-pounder and twelve-pounder licornes; heavier artillery included twenty-pounders ("half-pood") and 10-pounders ("quarter-pood") cannons. Apart from Russian-made artillery, both sides also used to a lesser extent foreign guns. The forces |
{"datasets_id": 723, "wiki_id": "Q570456", "sp": 10, "sc": 760, "ep": 10, "ec": 1394} | 723 | Q570456 | 10 | 760 | 10 | 1,394 | Battle of Warsaw (1831) | Training, equipment and morale | of both sides were a mixture of old, battle-hardened soldiers trained in regular units before the war, and new, unproven recruits.
The Polish Army was made up primarily of volunteers and organised along the lines of Napoleon Bonaparte's army, which meant that there was no corporal punishment in the military handbooks and the soldiers were highly motivated. The good morale of the first months of the uprising was long gone by the early days of September. A long string of defeats, partial victories, and retreats coupled with high command's indecisiveness and frequent changes in command structure (between 12 and 20 August |
{"datasets_id": 723, "wiki_id": "Q570456", "sp": 10, "sc": 1394, "ep": 10, "ec": 2003} | 723 | Q570456 | 10 | 1,394 | 10 | 2,003 | Battle of Warsaw (1831) | Training, equipment and morale | the post of Commander-in-Chief changed hands four times) meant that the soldiers' morale was low. Also, most of the generals in Warsaw lacked faith in the aims of the uprising set by the more liberal-minded members of Sejm and instead were "only doing their job", hoping the status quo would return as soon as the tsar was forced to stand by his promises. The generals supporting continued fighting (Jan Nepomucen Umiński, Henryk Dembiński, Józef Bem, and Kazimierz Małachowski) were in charge in early September, but they were outnumbered by generals who were willing to sign an armistice with the Russians, |
{"datasets_id": 723, "wiki_id": "Q570456", "sp": 10, "sc": 2003, "ep": 14, "ec": 231} | 723 | Q570456 | 10 | 2,003 | 14 | 231 | Battle of Warsaw (1831) | Training, equipment and morale & Initial clashes | even against the will of the Sejm.
By contrast the Russian forces' morale was extremely high. The Russian commanders had ample experience in siege operations; Paskevich himself had captured at least six fortified cities in his career, including the capture of Erevan and Abbas-Abbad Fortress in the Russo-Persian War of 1826 and the battle of Akhalzic and siege of Kars during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828. Initial clashes Facing logistical problems, the new Polish Commander-in-Chief Jan Krukowiecki, who had replaced Dembiński in mid-August, ordered a sortie on the right bank. Like his predecessor, Krukowiecki was a conservative and believed the main |
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