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This article was downloaded by: [New York University] On: 20 February 2014, At: 08:31 Publisher: Taylor & Francis Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK AJOB Neuroscience Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uabn20 The Revisability of Moral Concepts Nada Gligorov a a Mount Sinai School of Medicine Published online: 04 Oct 2010. To cite this article: Nada Gligorov (2010) The Revisability of Moral Concepts, AJOB Neuroscience, 1:4, 32-34, DOI: 10.1080/21507740.2010.514882 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2010.514882 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions AJOB Neuroscience researchers to judge whether brain-injured patients have this capacity, neuroscience can help to establish whether these patients meet the criterion of personhood. In addition, imaging showing brain dysfunction correlating with impulsive behavior can inform judgments of moral and legal responsibility that cannot be decided on behavioral evidence alone. Neuroimaging data may aid legal experts in assessing how impulse-control disorders affect behavior and whether they warrant full responsibility, mitigated responsibility, or excuse. These examples illustrate that neuroscience should not be judged by whether it preserves or threatens the contested concepts, but by whether it clarifies the conditions under which they obtain. Kaposy claims that our valued concepts "might require the rational refusal to believe discoveries of neuroscience that put them in doubt" (23). As matters now stand, there is not enough neuroscientific evidence to undermine the ideas that persons are natural kinds and that they have free will. Nevertheless, it is possible that future neuroscientific discoveries will show that unconscious brain processes completely control our thought and behavior. This could mean that personhood and free will, as we now define them, are illusions that enable human organisms to adapt to and survive in the environment. It would be irrational to ignore this knowledge and not revise our conception of who we are. If we are not essentially persons who act on the basis of conscious will, then it would not be contradictory to question our commitment to these concepts. It would also be irrational not to revise our ethical practices in the light of this knowledge. Suppose that a number of functional imaging studies indicate that brain processes constrain the choices open to a human agent at any given time. As a constraint, this would limit the scope of agency and the content of responsibility, what we are responsible for. Although this would not explain away free will and responsibility, it could mean that we are less free and less responsible than previously thought. Such a discovery may or may not occur in the foreseeable future. But it behooves us as rational beings to be open to this possibility. Neuroscience need not force us into a state of cognitive polyphasia, where ethical reasoning conflicts with a neuroscience-influenced understanding of human beings. Unless one accepts substance dualism and libertarianism, any such conflict is more apparent than real. If one accepts the view that persons are constituted by their minds and brains and can be the authors of their actions despite deterministic or mechanistic processes in the brain, then neuroscience does not warrant giving up our belief in personhood and free will. Empirical considerations pertaining to the brain and normative considerations pertaining to human agents should not be seen as competing but complementary. The psychological and behavioral criteria that ground personhood and free will can be informed by knowledge of how the brain enables the mind in mediating consciousness and the capacity for reasoning and decision-making. Neuroscience does not have the last word, though, since it is human agents who determine the metaphysical, moral, and legal significance of information about the brain. A proper interpretation of the philosophical implications of neuroscience shows that it does not threaten to eliminate our valued concepts and practices but can help us to gain a better understanding of them.
REFERENCES Farah, M. J., and A. S., Heberlein. 2007. Personhood and neuroscience: Naturalizing or nihilating? American Journal of Bioethicse– AJOB Neuroscience 7(1): 37–48. Greene, J. 2003. From neural 'is' to moral 'ought': What are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology? Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4: 847–850. Greene, J., and J., Cohen. 2004. For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 359: 1775–1785. Kaposy, C. 2010. The supposed obligation to change one's beliefs about ethics because of discoveries in neuroscience. AJOB Neuroscience 1(4): 23–30. Wegner, D. 2002. The illusion of conscious will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. The Revisability of Moral Concepts Nada Gligorov, Mount Sinai School of Medicine The rise of scientific explanation for natural phenomena has produced some of the most exciting problems in philosophy, such as the problem of free will and the mind and body problem. Those philosophical areas seek to explain how free will and consciousness can exist in a natural Address correspondence Nada Gligorov, PhD, Assistant Professor of Medical Education, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, Box #1076, One Gustave Levy Place, New York, NY 10029, USA. E-mail: [email protected] world that seems to be determined by mechanistic laws. Advancements in neuroscience further highlight this problem because, unlike physics, the object of study is various aspects of human psychology, including our ability to be conscious, rational, and free in our decision making. The 32 ajob Neuroscience October–December, Volume 1, Number 4, 2010 D ow nl oa de d by [ N ew Y or k U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 8: 31 2 0 Fe br ua ry 2 01 4 Obligation to Change One's Beliefs About Ethics aforementioned concepts feature prominently in commonsense psychology, and because of that the revision of those concepts in accordance with neuroscience is often met with animosity. Kaposy (2010) argues that moral norms relying on free will, personhood, and rationality should not be revised in accordance with neuroscientific discovery because they play important moral and social roles. I argue that most concepts, including moral ones, are a web of changing beliefs shaped by various sources of information, including scientific discovery. As there is continuous, bidirectional influence between science and commonsense, the strength of our current commitments cannot be the basis for an argument against their revision in accordance with neuroscientific discovery. The philosophical literature has mostly settled on two ways in which concepts can be altered: They could be revised or reconceptualized. Revision of concepts could occur in the following way: Imagine we endorse a theory much like our current commonsense psychology that predicts and explains human behavior by utilizing concepts such as free will, personhood, and rationality.1 Imagine further that a different and new theory proposes to explain and predict human behavior by positing physical entities such as brain states, much like current neuroscience. If the two theories are compatible, the new theory could reduce the old theory (for more on this issue, see Churchland 1989, 48). The concepts of the old theory, here commonsense psychology, would remain. A successful reduction of commonsense psychology would vindicate the entities endorsed by that theory because it would provide additional proof that free will and rationality have a physical instantiation in the brain. Reduction of free will would not require the elimination of that concept. It would, however, entail some revision of the original conceptual framework. For example, reduction could make it true that free will is localized in the brain and is a physical process, so the concept would have to be revised to include that fact. Commonsense psychology and neuroscience, however, could be incompatible, which would preclude the reduction of one theory to the other. In that case we would have to opt for the elimination of one of the two dueling theories. Incompatibility between theories arises when they posit disparate ontologies. For example, if commonsense psychology is committed to the view that free will cannot be a physical process, or that free will cannot, by definition, be subject to the workings of a determinist natural law, then any theory that is physicalist or deterministic would be incompatible with commonsense. The incongruity between the two theories would further entail that one of them is false and its conceptual categories illusory. In such cases, the better of the two theories would win and we would have to reconceptualize to the wining theory. Kaposy (2010) cites Green and Cohen as espousing precisely such a view; 1. The view that commonsense psychology is a theory has been defended by Churchland (1989, 2–6). For opposing views, please see Searle (1992, esp. 58–63). the authors predict that people will get used to an entirely different way of interpreting and explaining how humans make everyday decisions, whereby all our decisions are a result of a mechanical process. In this scenario, the winning theory would be neuroscience. An incompatibility, like the one just described, between commonsense views about the nature of moral concepts and the neuroscience of morality is unlikely. Arguments for elimination of our moral intuitions presume a type of essentialism for moral concepts. In order to create opposition between our moral intuitions and neuroscience, one needs to support the claim that we can specify a steady endorsement of a particular commonsense view about the nature of moral concepts, which is unlikely to change in the future. In other words, in order to argue for the elimination of a particular concept, that concept should be well defined. Given that all attempts to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for notions such as free will, personhood, and even rationality have failed in the past within the philosophical literature, it seems even more unlikely that we can find consensus on those issues in commonsense. One can, as Kaposy does, approximate a view based on our current use of those moral terms: how we speak of them, to whom we attribute them, and how they feature in our explanations of other people's behavior. But any such rendering of our moral intuitions would not be enough to argue that our intuitions entail the strict commitment to particular features of moral concepts. An additional problem with determining our intuitive moral commitments is correctly drawing the scope of commonsense and distinguishing purely commonsense conceptions from philosophical or scientific ones. We see this issue illustrated in Kaposy's article. The examples given for the definitions are either drawn from philosophical writings, such as the Kantian definition of rationality, or they are neurophilosophical conceptions like Patricia Churchland's compatibilist definition of free will. It is unclear how we could determine with any certainty that Kant's notion of rationality is more representative of commonsense then is Churchland's adjusted definition of free will. Furthermore, if we were to expunge both philosophical and scientific influences from our moral notions, one could wonder whether anything would remain of our concepts (for further discussion see Gligorov 2007, esp. chap. 2). Even if we could settle on a commonsense view of moral notions, our current commitment to those concepts cannot be an indication that those will remain the same in the future. Neuroscience has already influenced our ideas about mental states. A particularly conspicuous change in commonsense is the piecemeal abandonment of the Cartesian view of mental states. In Descartes's view, mental states are characterized as conscious and nonphysical states. Although nowadays there is still great diversity of opinion, we can claim with some conviction that most people would agree that the locus of their mental states is in the brain. Thus, any importance that we had previously ascribed to the notion that mental states are nonphysical has changed October–December, Volume 1, Number 4, 2010 ajob Neuroscience 33 D ow nl oa de d by [ N ew Y or k U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 8: 31 2 0 Fe br ua ry 2 01 4 AJOB Neuroscience over time. Another obvious conceptual shift resulted from the popularization of Freud's writings and has affected how we see the relationship between consciousness and mental states. Freud's theory shaped our commonsense by introducing the category of unconscious mental state into our everyday parlance. Nowadays people often refer to unconscious thoughts and motives, and accuse each other of "Freudian slips." It should not be assumed, however, that the interaction between scientific and commonsense views is unidirectional. Neuroscience of morality finds its basis in commonsense notions of moral concepts. Any localization, for example, of mental states in the brain begins by relying on intuitive notions of the nature of those and uses them to draw correlations between our manifest psychology and its underlying physical causes. Sellars (1991, 20) argues that scientific views are the "offspring" of commonsense, with the caveat that scientific conceptual frameworks are not restricted by commonsense. In this view, the complete revision of moral concepts is in principle possible, but the more correct characterization of the relation between moral intuition and neuroscience is that of continuity and mutual influence. As Kaposy (2010) correctly points out, free will, personhood, rationality, and other such notions feature prominently in our moral norms and guide our social expectations. We expect people to act rationally; we assume that they have autonomy and can make decisions for which they can assume responsibility. But given that our commonsense categories have changed in the past, their current prominence is not enough to argue against their revision. The extent to which neuroscience will shape our conceptions about ourselves is an empirical claim yet to be verified, but religion, philosophy, and science have shaped our beliefs in the past, and it seems likely that they will continue to do so in the future.
REFERENCES Churchland, P. M. 1989. A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gligorov, N. 2007. Eliminative materialism and the distinction between common sense and science. PhD dissertation, City University of New York, New York. Kaposy, C. 2010. The supposed obligation to change one's beliefs about ethics because of discoveries in neuroscience. AJOB Neuroscience 1(4): 23–30. Searle, J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Sellars, W. 1991. Philosophy and the scientific image of man. In Science, perception and reality, 20. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. Clarifying Conceptions of Freedom: Kaposy's Argument Against "The Inference" William Smith, Emory University Chris Kaposy's article "The Supposed Obligation to Change One's Beliefs About Ethics Because of Discoveries in Neuroscience" (2010) targets a common "inference" among neuroscientists and ethicists. Kaposy puts "The Inference" this way: "Scientific discoveries x, y, z imply that we ought not to believe claims in our ethical lives that are inconsistent with x, y, z." He claims this inference is increasingly deployed to eliminate the ethical concepts of free will, persons, and selves in light of neuroscientific evidence; he argues against it with two claims. First, he asserts that rationality requires the concepts that are attacked and concludes that we cannot be under a rational norm to eliminate a concept Thanks to Cicely Chen for reading a draft of this paper. Address correspondence to William Smith, Emory University, School of Medicine, 444 Burlington Rd, Atlanta, GA 30307, USA. E-mail: [email protected] grounded in rationality (henceforth, the "Freedom Is Rationally Necessary" claim). Second, he claims that the practical value of these concepts warrants belief therein whether or not scientific evidence undermines their epistemic warrant (henceforth, the "Freedom Is Practically Warranted" claim). Both claims strike me as naive in terms of active debates in the literature on free will and responsibility. In my view, Kaposy neither presents the best versions of these claims nor acknowledges responses that opponents of these views have been making for some time. Take the "Freedom Is Rationally Necessary" claim. Kaposy claims that we cannot be rationally required to 34 ajob Neuroscience October–December, Volume 1, Number 4, 2010 D ow nl oa de d by [ N ew Y or k U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 8: 31 2 0 Fe br ua ry 2 01

International Journal of Academic Engineering Research (IJAER) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 10, October – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijaer 19 Bitplanes Block Based Lossy Image Compression Abdelatief H. Abouali HICI, Computer Dept., El-Shorouk Academy, Cairo, Egypt, Email: [email protected] Abstract: In a former paper [21], an exact image compression based on bit-planes blocking was proposed. The proposed algorithm uses two bit codes for block representation. The outcome of the encoding process is two streams: Main Bit Stream, MBS and Residual Bit Stream, RBS. The algorithm core is searching for the greatest block of Unicode to encode in main stream and if not found until size of two by two then it will be kept as is in residual stream. In this paper, a lossy version of that algorithm is presented. The change in the base algorithm is in the definition of the unary-code-block is eased to be above certain percent. The percent is varied from plane to another as their contribution to image power varies. The testing of the proposed algorithm shows comparable results. Image degradations seems restorable even for high compression ratios. Keywords: bit-planes, image blocks, exact-image compression, encoding, decoding. 1. INTRODUCTION The success of multimedia and image processing based systems, in many cases, is highly tightened to effective encoding to digital images. Demands and the volume of digital images used in systems currently in use within the domains of : education, security, social medial, health care, retail storage, industry quality assurance, entertainment, law enforcement and many others is huge and subject to grow [13]. Therefore, effective storage, processing, transmitting, and recall needed for the development process to continue. To date, human effective storage, processing, recognition, indexing, and recall is far above all developed methodologies and devices man made. The encoding process is an effective representation, in computer vision systems, that increases system capacity to store, access, exchange, and process digital images. Image encoding is achieved by the removal of one or more of the basic image data redundancies: Coding, Interpixel, and Psychovisual [4-5]. Coding redundancy is due to the use of non-optimal code words. Interpixel redundancy results from correlations between image pixels. Psychovisual redundancy is the existence of data that is insignificant to the human visual system (i.e. visually non-essential). Encoding techniques require decoding process to retrieve the compressed image for further use by applications. In video compression, association of frame images, abstraction, and relationships adds more significant encoding step to sets of frame images [6]. Image compression techniques are exact and Lossy[7]. The exact compression techniques assure the retrieval of the decompressed image typical as the original. Lossy compression techniques allow controlled loss of power. The exact image compression techniques include, pixel packing, run-length, Huffman, LZW, arithmetic and Area coding. Lossy techniques includes Transformation Coding, differential, Vector Quantization, object based, Fractal, Block truncation coding, and Sub band coding [8-12]. Good encoding scheme means: low order of algorithm complexity for both encoder and decoder, high signal to noise ratio, high compression ratio, ability to decode at varieties of scales without additional distortion, parallelization ability, as well as the ease to implement software and/or hardware. The well-known encoding algorithms, such as JPEG and MPG, employs a set of basic encoding schemes such as Huffman, differential, quantization, and run-length [13-14]. Block based image compression schemes are numerous as dealing with whole image as a processing unit costly. Blocking coincide with images reality that are connected blocks/labels. From the well-known block based algorithms JPEG, and fractal. In JPEG the blocks are transformed to frequency domain, using DCT, followed by reduction to insignificant blocks, then quantization followed by differential and entropy encoding. Blocking offers JPEG two main advantages low cost transformation and reduces the possibilities of having higher frequencies components. Fractal image encoding based on establishing similarities between small block, ranges, and larger blocks, domains. The blocks similarities enabled the use of the iterative function systems which is the base of fractal encoding. Other blocking schemes could be found in [14-17]. Image Bit-plane is a bit pixel decomposition of an image matrix. Therefor a gray image of n-bit gray resolution contains n-planes. Least Significant Bit Planes, LSBP, contain less significant information compared Most Significant Bit Planes, MSBP. Figure (1) shows the original versus the bit-planes for 8-bit boy and Lena pictures. The bit-planes was a rich topic for both enhancement and compression algorithms as plane-pixels contains only two values 0, and 1. So, The Run Length Encoding, arithmetic and progressive transition are used in bit-planes taking the advantages of binary and similarities of adjacent bits within the same plane [18-20]. International Journal of Academic Engineering Research (IJAER) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 10, October – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijaer 20 Figure (1) Lena, pepper original and bit-planes for 8-bit gray In this paper, a lossy version of former proposed exact compression/decompression algorithm based on successive block test then encode or divide process is proposed. The algorithm uses two-bit structural encoding together with residual block storage. The encoding is two phases. In the first phase three codes are used and in the second phase third code is consumed in an adaptive run length encoding, for more optimization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The proposed basic encoding/decoding is described in section 2. Tests, results and discussion are in section 3. Section 4 is the study conclusion. 2. THE PROPOSED ENCODING/DECODING ALGORITHMS The proposed algorithm is a lossy version of a former proposed exact encoding/decoding algorithm [21]. The exact encoding and decoding algorithm are in appendix A, and B consequently. The modification is limited to the encoding process. So, the decoding process is the same for both exact and lossy. The change to the encoding is in the consideration of block all zeros and block all one. The consideration is eased from all one's and all zero's to above certain percent. Planes contributes differently to picture energy, figure (1). Consequently, percent's considered to vary from a plane to another. That is, for a given square block of size, SB with non-null count (BNNC) and block one's count (B1C) the block is considers all zeros only if: - ,0BNNC and p iBNNC CBBNNC   )1( (1) Also, a block is considered all one's only if: - ,0BNNC and p iBNNC CB  )1( (2) ip is plane allowance percent. That is, in the lossy version encoding algorithm the switch case check all zeros' refers to equation (1). Similarly, check of all one's refers to equation (2). Table (1) shows how much of accepted different bits for different block sizes on different percent's. Corollary(1): The allowance percent ip of 0.5 at a plane will lead to the plane encoded as only two-bit either 00' or 11'. That comes from the fact that a plane either one code is more than the second, or equal to. In both cases it will be considered unary code block. Consequently, RBS will be null. Corollary(2): The percent 0.5< ip <0.75 at a plane implies that the RBS nibbles will contain only the hex codes {3,5,6,9,A,C}. In the encoding process, blocks coded or split process until 2x2 size. At this size with that percent range one bit is allowed to have different value for block to be encoded as unary-code block. So, residual will be the case of codes equal counts. Table (1): Accepted different codes for a block size per percent 2x2 4x4 8x8 16x16 32x32 64x64 132x132 256x256 97% 0 0 1 5 20 81 327 1310 94% 0 0 3 12 51 204 819 3276 91% 0 1 5 20 81 327 1310 5242 88% 0 1 7 28 112 450 1802 7208 85% 0 2 8 35 143 573 2293 9175 82% 0 2 10 43 174 696 2785 11141 79% 0 3 12 51 204 819 3276 13107 76% 0 3 14 58 235 942 3768 15073 73% 1 4 16 66 266 1064 4259 17039 70% 1 4 18 74 296 1187 4751 19005 67% 1 5 20 81 327 1310 5242 20971 64% 1 5 22 89 358 1433 5734 22937 61% 1 6 24 97 389 1556 6225 24903 58% 1 6 26 104 419 1679 6717 26869 55% 1 7 28 112 450 1802 7208 28835 52% 1 7 30 120 481 1925 7700 30801 3. EXPERIMINTAL RESULTS AND DISCSSION The used test set of images is the same as of [21], aerial, cameraman, woman-house, Barbara, Lena, and house, Figure (2). The colored ones changed to gray using Matlab' rgb2gray' function as the performance noted to be same for both colored and gray. The percent array in our experiments International Journal of Academic Engineering Research (IJAER) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 10, October – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijaer 21 was based on the fact that loss on the higher planes implies great loss in image power. The outer high planes, 7 and 6, assigned high and equal percent's. Considering the implications of Corollaries(1,2), other plane i percent is set in accordance with the rule ip = max( 2 1ip ,0.52). Figure (3) shows the ease percent for planes of our experiments. The highest planes percent's varied from 0.99 to 0.80 with 0.005 decrease step. Assuming ),( yxf is original image matrix of size , MN, are the matrix dimension, maxq is the peak gray, and ),( yxfp is decoded image matrix. Then, the used metrics in our study are: Compression Ratio, sizeimageencoded sizeimageoriginal CR    Mean Square Error, MN yxfpyxf MSE y x * )),(),(( 2    Normalized Root Mean Square Error,     y x y x yxf yxfpyxf NRMSE 2 2 )),(( )),(),(( Peak Signal to Noise Ratio dbMSEqPSNR )/)((log10 2max10 Aerial Cameraman Woman-House Lena House Barbara Figure (2) set of images used in the study Figure (3) Experiments ease percent per planes. The former setup made up 39 experiments done on the six test set images mentioned before. The results are summarized in figures (4) and (5). The figures are the compression ratio against NRMSE, and PSNR. The overall shows house was the best and the aerial the worst. The rest four performance is between the two. The overall performance is comparable with reported in [22-24]. International Journal of Academic Engineering Research (IJAER) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 10, October – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijaer 22 Figure (4) compression ratio against NRMSE Figure (5) Compression ratio against PSNR For more focus on the performance figure (6) presents the first seven experiments on each of the test set images. Table (2) presents numerically the corresponding compression ratios. The compression ratios compared to the visual noted distortion is also comparable to recent researches [16] [23]. There is no blocking problem or areas of severe distortion could be noted. The nature of noise looks to be within the reach of filters. Moreover, filters could be designed to partially remove the noise. Figure (6) Decoded images for the first 7 experiments International Journal of Academic Engineering Research (IJAER) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 10, October – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijaer 23 Table (2) Compression Ratio's associated with figure (6) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Aerial 1.672 1.892 2.171 2.347 2.573 3.009 3.154 CameraMan 2.600 3.153 3.902 4.451 4.981 6.085 6.700 Woman's House 2.569 3.058 3.681 4.064 4.522 5.443 5.858 Barbara 1.987 2.298 2.714 2.983 3.297 3.894 4.129 Lena 2.061 2.415 2.891 3.195 3.566 4.248 4.585 House 2.910 3.598 4.626 5.657 6.776 8.742 9.807 For more clarification to the performance, compression ratios more or equal to (3,5,10,15,20) are selected and the decoded images are in figure (7). The images degradation for even the 20+ is relatively low. There are no significant blocking effects on the recalled images. The results are comparable to the reported in [22-24]. Figure (7) decoded images at compression ratios more than (3,5,10,15,20) To sum up the results in numerical form for the 39 by 6 experiments, the two extreme perfomance cases were selected and one of the average performnce are displayed in Table (3). The table show that a significant compression ratios could be reached with comparable NRMSE. Also, there are many cases where there is a significant increase in compression ratios while insegnifcant changes in images degradation. Keeping in mind that the algorithm does not include neither transformation nor multiple iterations that International Journal of Academic Engineering Research (IJAER) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 10, October – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijaer 24 makes it comparable and appealing compared to others. Discussion The presented algorithm offers a lossy compression technique with significant features compared to others. The algorithm performance is comparable to others. The algorithm is of minor differential to the exact version. In fact, the exact is a special case if the percent vector is set to 100%. All the image properties positively affect compression ratio discussed in [21] applies since the core algorithm is the same. Also, preprocessing with low pass filters positively adds to algorithm performance Table 1: Compression ratio NRMSE for Worest, Best, and Average Aerial House Camera Man CR NRMSE CR NRMSE CR NRMSE 1.6728 0.0304 2.910609 0.020399 2.600351 0.02498 1.8922 0.0455 3.597839 0.031459 3.153668 0.029818 2.1716 0.0741 4.626655 0.042435 3.902665 0.036539 2.3477 0.0818 5.656909 0.044654 4.451493 0.043716 2.5736 0.0862 6.776373 0.053694 4.981358 0.055194 3.0090 0.0973 8.741921 0.064381 6.084980 0.066724 3.1549 0.1016 9.807658 0.068514 6.700679 0.073272 3.2454 0.1255 10.60624 0.079719 7.062354 0.075402 3.6107 0.1340 11.10826 0.079535 8.047274 0.08861 3.9924 0.1467 11.97551 0.090987 9.327474 0.09604 4.1626 0.1525 12.43567 0.097699 9.715153 0.10329 5.2331 0.2098 15.134461 0.100695 12.41359 0.11142 5.3096 0.2116 16.774532 0.115704 13.10982 0.11634 5.4645 0.2168 19.130409 0.132555 13.58012 0.11977 5.8733 0.2188 19.667191 0.134330 14.54012 0.12450 6.0075 0.2239 21.39776 0.138675 14.94081 0.12713 6.2881 0.2439 22.238 0.142236 16.3467 0.14284 7.2050 0.2483 24.9233 0.143216 19.0907 0.18284 7.3697 0.2498 26.5032 0.143577 22.27127 0.20088 7.7786 0.2503 27.073 0.14317 22.77631 0.2091 8.3605 0.2526 30.333 0.169856 26.2039 0.2168 8.8570 0.2755 30.88 0.17039 26.41914 0.21689 9.0809 0.2851 34.551 0.198642 27.42235 0.21492 12.1069 0.2941 41.7626 0.2035 43.902 0.2657 12.3688 0.2990 42.8164 0.20317 47.4468 0.26891 12.6646 0.2993 44.326 0.20919 49.7379 0.27094 12.8499 0.3049 44.326 0.209199 51.73554 0.273481 13.6313 0.3074 46.1034 0.210977 65.40518 0.277392 14.2408 0.3075 47.15244 0.211869 69.06705 0.278211 14.5333 0.3049 47.26295 0.211979 72.70669 0.27795 19.6916 0.4790 58.15084 0.201913 91.98035 0.282861 20.0761 0.4736 58.7174 0.202904 96.00585 0.284234 20.2131 0.4736 60.92121 0.205302 98.08942 0.285546 21.3681 0.4724 67.47593 0.208756 104.5856 0.286996 23.0913 0.4721 69.27695 0.210641 106.1526 0.287084 23.3942 0.4724 70.364783 0.213492 108.18984 0.289048 28.5544 0.4736 90.974839 0.2210526 121.50359 0.290525 29.7232 0.4732 90.974839 0.2210526 137.42804 0.293213 31.5115 0.4584 115.0258 0.2216756 266.00101 0.299966 More complex adaption could be considered such as dropping RBS for equal code cases. In this case, the neighbor blocks could be used heuristically to infer the codes position. Also, successive plane encoding could consider more detailed process. Such as, while encoding planes in sequence starting from the MSBP and for block B in plane i there could be bits that known it will be recovered different. The difference could be 0 recovered as 1 or the opposite. Case of 0 recovered as 1 set all corresponding bits of planes i-1 to 0 to zero and vice versa. This raises the probability of having significant distortion and will enhance the apparent patches that exist in the recovered images Figure (7). Also, considering more detailed percent vector that allows per block size per plane percent could reduce the apparent patches. These changes and others could be the considered in further studies since it requires more investigation and specifications. 4. CONCLUSION A block based lossy image compression is proposed. The proposed algorithm is generalization to former presented algorithm. The generalization is easing the cases of blocks consideration as unary-coded. The algorithm was tested against six well known gray 256 level images. The easing percent used is plane dependent. That is, ease percent array of size equal to the image number of bit-planes. The tests used variety of easing percent to allow range of compression ratios. The performance of the algorithm found to be comparable with others. REFERENCES [1] Tinku Acharya and Ajoy K. Ray, Image Processing: Principles and applications, Wiley-Interscience, 2005 [2] V.P. Baligar, L.M. Patnaik, G.R. Nagabhushana, High compression and low order linear predictor for lossless coding of grayscale images, Image Vis. Comput. 21 (6),2003. [3] D. Salomon, Data Compression: The Complete Reference, third ed., Springer, New York, 2004. [4] D. Salomon, A Guide to Data Compression Methods, Springer, NewYork, 2002. [5] Sonal, Dinesh Kumar, A study of various image compression techniques, Annual Conference on Learning Theory, COLT 2007, San Diego, CA, USA, June 13-15, 2007 [6] Jens-Rainer Ohm, Gary J. Sullivan, and Heiko Schwarz Comparison of the Coding Efficiency of Video Coding Standards-Including High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC)', IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology (Volume: 22, Issue: 12, Dec. 2012), pages 1669 1684 [7] A.J. Hussain, Ali Al-Fayadh, and Naeem Radic, Image compression techniques: A survey in lossless and lossy algorithms, Neurocomputing, volume 300 26 July 2018, Pages 44-69 [8] Rafael Gonzalez, Richard Woods, Digital Image Processing 3 rd edition, Pearson Prentice Hall, 2008. [9] Tzu-Chuen Lu and Ching-Yun Chang, A Survey of VQ Codebook generation, Journal of Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing, Volume 1, Number 3, July 2010. International Journal of Academic Engineering Research (IJAER) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 10, October – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijaer 25 [10] ABDELATIEF. H ABOUALI,‖ OBJECT-BASED VQ FOR IMAGE COMPRESSION ―, Ain Shams Engineering Journal, Vol. 6, Issue 1 (2015) pp. 211216 [11] A. H. Abou-Ali, S. M. Abd-El-Moetty, B. Earl Wells, ―RE-CONFIGURABLE HARDWARE BASED FRACTAL NEURAL PROCESSOR‖, The international conference on parallel processing, PDCS-2006, 2006, CA USA. [12] Priyadarshini K S, G S Sharvani, Prapulla S B, A SURVEY ON PARALLEL COMPUTING OF IMAGE COMPRESSION ALGORITHMS JPEG and Fractal Image Compression, International Conference on Computational Systems for Health & Sustainability(CSFHS) 17-18 April 2015 [13] A. Murat Tekalp, Digital Video Processing 2 nd , Prentice Hall NJ, USA 2015 [14] Mehwish Rehman, Muhammad Sharif and Mudassar Raza, Image Compression: A Survey, Research Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology Maxwell, 2014 [15]Surendar Chandra, and Windsor W. Hsu, Lossless Medical Image Compression in a Block-Based Storage System, march 2014 Data Compression Conference [16] Nanrun Zhouab, Aidi Zhanga, Fen Zhenga, and Lihua Gongac, Novel image compression–encryption hybrid algorithm based on key-controlled measurement matrix in compressive sensing, Optics & Laser Technology, volume 62 October 2014, Pages 152-160 [17] G. R. Jothilakshmi, R. J. Christilda, A. Raaza, Y. Sreenivasa Varma, V. Rajendran, "Extracting region of interest using distinct block processing method in sono-mammogram images", 2017 International Conference on Computer Communication and Signal Processing (ICCCSP), pp. 1-7, 2017. [18] P. Praveenkumar, L. Kala, R. Nisha, K. Thenmozhi, J. B. B. Rayappan, R. Amirtharajan, "Hungarian sculptured Discrete Gould transformed bit planes-a double puzzled image", 2015 International Conference on Computer Communication and Informatics (ICCCI), pp. 1-4, 2015. [19] Ya-Pei Feng and Zhe-Ming Lu, an efficient hybrid feature for edge-preserving based on block truncation coding and tree-structured vector quantization with edge orientation classification of bit-planes, International Journal of Innovative Computing, Information and Control ICIC 2018 ISSN 1349-4198, Volume 14, Number 3, June 2018 [20] Jungrae Kim, Michael Sullivan, Esha Choukse, and Mattan Erez, Bit-plane compression: transforming data for better compression in many-core architectures, Proceeding ISCA '16 Proceedings of the 43rd International Symposium on Computer Architecture Pages 329-340 [21] Abdelatief H. Abouali,‖BITPLANES BLOCK BASED LOSSY IMAGE COMPRESSION‖, International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS),Vol. 2 Issue 10, OCTOBER – 2018, Pages: XX-XX [22] Mehmet Utku, Gaurav Sharma, A. Murat Tekalp, ‖Gray-level-embedded lossless image compression‖ signal processing: image communication, Elsevier, volume 18, 2003, 443-454 [23] Ghadah Al-Khafaji, ―image compression based on quad-tree and polynomial ―, international Journal of computer applications, Volume 76 No. 3, August 2013. [24] Rajasekhar Reddy , Ravichandran KS, Venkatraman B, Suganya SD,‖ A new approach for the image compression to the medical images using PCASPIHT‖, Biomedical Research 2018; Special Issue: S481-S486 Dr. Abdellatief Hussien Abouali Received B.Sc. from the MTC computer engineering 1984 presidential Honored, Master degree from collage of engineering Cairo University in expert systems, and received Ph.D. the University of Alabama in Huntsville (UAH) USA, Multi-class vector quantization for neural network design. Served in air force research in development till end of 2012, with many applied researches in areas of computers and computers based systems. Working for ElShrook Academy computer science department, Cairo, Egypt. Fields of interest image processing, neural networks, and machine learning [email protected] , phone :+201120647588 [email protected], [email protected] International Journal of Academic Engineering Research (IJAER) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 10, October – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijaer 26 APPENDIX A: Encoding Algorithm Assume that given a square (or squared, null expanded) image matrix I of pixel resolution NxN , nN 2 (or null expanded to closest size satisfies the condition) with q bit colors/grays. Therefore, the image contains q bit-planes ),.......,,( 110 qppp of size equal to .I Definitions:  Divide a square Block B of size 2m , m is divisible by 2, that starts at location sysx bb , as }4,3,2,1{),,,( BBBBSetblockproducethatbbmBDB sysx each of size 2/m and their start locations are )2/,2/(),2/,(),,2/(),,( mbmbmbbbmbbb sysxsysxsysxsysx  consequently.  For a block B: B1C and BNNC are the block 1's count and None Null Count consequently.  Block B is said to be all zeros if block B1C=zeros.  Block B is said to be all ones if B1C=BNNC.  Encoding process of block B of size m that starts at location sysx bb , as BENC(B, sysx bb , , m ) which output plane streams MBS and RBS. BENC (B, sysx bb , , m ) { If m=2 RBS=RBS+ row-scan (B) else {SWITCH (B1C (B), BNNC(B)) Case all zeros: MBS += '00' Case all ones: MBS +='11' Otherwise MBS +='01', m/2). , m/2bm/2,b, BENC(B4m/2), , m/2b,b, BENC(B3 m/2), , bm/2,b, BENC(B2m/2), , b,b, BENC(B1),,,,( sysxsysx sysxsysx  sysx bbmBDB If size ((RBS + MBS) >= plane size) {RBS=rowscan of the plane; MBS=NULL; Return;} } Where are the main bit-stream and residual bit-stream of the sub-block i, i € {1,2,3,4}, the four subblocks of the main block out of the DB() function. Basic Encoding(I) { MSB, RBS set to NULL for all planes. I 0p N 1p N 1qp N } Appendix B: Basic Decoding: The encoded file header contains original image resolution that yields the number of bit-planes and the original image size. The size is squared and expanded to satisfy the former condition. Then a stack is initialized to recover planes through the decode block DECODEB (MBS, RBS). DECODEB (MBS, RBS) { While (stack is not empty) { Popup , sysx bb , , m If Block intersection with original image matrix is ɸ then continue Read from MBS stream two bits into tb Case tb=00 set block to zeros Case tb=11 set bock to ones Case tb=01 If m==2 read from RBS four bits to set row wise block bits. else International Journal of Academic Engineering Research (IJAER) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 10, October – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijaer 27 m/2). , b,(bpush m/2), , bm/2,(bpush m/2), , m/2b,(bpush m/2), , m/2bm/2,(bpush ),,,,( sysxsysxsysx sysx  sysx bbmBDB } } The decode procedure has two binary streams MBS, RBS and is as following: - If MBS is NULL row bit-set from RBS else { N). , (0,0push stack DECODEB (MBS, RBS). }

ENACTIVE VISION (for L. Shapiro, ed. ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF EMBODIED COGNITION Erik Myin University of Antwerp, Department of Philosophy, Centre for Philosophical Psychology & Jan Degenaar University of Antwerp, Department of Philosophy, Centre for Philosophical Psychology, and University Paris Descartes, Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception 1. Enactivism and the sensorimotor account Enactivism, ever since its first formulation by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, has always laid great emphasis on organism/environment interactions as the proper framework for studying cognition. Minds have to be understood as ―enacted‖ by situationally embedded living organisms. By proposing this approach to minds, enactivists have explicitly opposed themselves to cognitivists, who take representation as their central posit (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991). Thus, it is claimed that cognition is, rather than representation of the world, ―the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs‖ (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991: 9; see also Thompson 2007). True to the enactivist motto that ―a path is laid down in walking,‖ the role of internally stored rules and representations in accounting for cognition is thus replaced by an embodied history of interactions. By taking up this position, enactivism reveals itself as committed to a strong notion of embodiment. Such a concept has to be distinguished from other senses of embodiment. One way to use ―embodiment‖ is to emphasize the role of the particular properties of the body in shaping our cognitive capacities. Thus, to give a rather trite example, it could be argued that having ten fingers lies at the basis of the decimal system, so that even mathematics has a basis in the body. Such a use of the notion of embodiment is in no way incompatible with a traditional cognitive science approach, in which computations and internal representations are assigned a key role for explaining our cognitive capacities. In particular, one could conceive of the specifics of the body as constraining the form or content of our representations or computations. In the sense of ―embodied‖ at stake here, ―embodied‖ is used in contrast with ―representational,‖ such that saying that some capacity is embodied is to deny that it involves internal representations. One could argue, for example, that people embody the rules of their native language, in the sense that the rules are manifest, and only manifest in their utterances, or other practical dealings with language. The structure of language then is implicit in the 2 practices; it is spread out in time, not represented anywhere. Of course, one could not embody rules without having a body engaged in the relevant, rule manifesting, activities, but the emphasis here lies not on the specifics of that body, but on what could be called the primacy of embodiment over representation. We will take enactivism as stating that cognition is embodied in this strong, or ―radical‖ sense (Chemero 2009, Hutto & Myin 2013). In the domain of perception, enactivism has become associated with the so called sensorimotor contingency approach presented in O'Regan and Noë (2001). Vision, according to the sensorimotor approach ―is something we do, rather than something that happens in us‖ (O'Regan & Noë 2001). The approach rejects the view on vision as aimed at producing ―faithful metric-preserving replica of the outside world inside the head‖ (O'Regan 1992). Instead, seeing is conceived of as an ―exploratory activity,‖ ―attuned to‖ sensorimotor contingencies, or ways in which sensory stimulation changes with movement-such as when a retinal image changes when one walks around an object. Seeing a scene or an object is, in the sensorimotor approach, comparable to feeling a surface or object, where the experience is of the whole surface or object, despite the fact that momentary tactile stimulation is limited to the fingertips making contact only at particular places. Sensorimotor theorists have argued that the idea that vision should be understood as temporally extended interaction is supported by the insights it provides into the nature and character of perceptual experiences. According to the sensorimotor approach, perceptual experiences owe their identity to the patterns of sensorimotor contingencies typical of the kinds of organism/environment interactions those experiences normally arise in. For example, tactile feelings of hardness or softness are determined by particular patterns of experiences one has when engaging in such activities as squishing a sponge or pushing a brick wall. Similarly, that expertiences of seeing differ as a class from experiences of hearing is due, according to the sensorimotor theory, to patterns of sensorimotor contingencies specific to vision and audition, such as that in seeing, but not in hearing, stimulation from a particular source stops when one turns one's head sideways, or closes one's eyes. The crucial role played by patterns of sensorimotor contingency in shaping perceptual experience has been seen as supported by findings on adaptation to distorting or inverting glasses, as well as findings of experiments with sensory substitution devices (Hurley & Noë 2003; Noë 2004; O'Regan 2011). For it seems that experiential change here follows on the heels of adaptation to patterns of sensorimotor contingencies. The sensorimotor approach has been met with strong opposition and criticism, often formulated as criticism of enactivist approaches to perception generally (e.g. Block 2005; Prinz 2006, 2009). Critics of the sensorimotor approach have been puzzled, both by general claims about the role of sensorimotor contingies in shaping experience and by the appeal to phenomena such as sensory substitution and distorted vision. Some critics have reached the verdict that these phenomena support the sensorimotor approach in no way whatsoever. They have further held that the sensorimotor claims regarding the determination of experiential quality fly in the face of the simplest observations about experience in imagery, dreaming or paralysis, in which experience seems radically disconnected from any presently obtaining patterns of sensorimotor interaction. We will discuss the sensorimotor approach in the light of the broader enactivism as sketched above. We shall argue that spelling out the sensorimotor theory along enactivist lines, replacing representation by attunement due to a history of interactions, allows for a truly 3 distinctive sensorimotor approach. This enactive sensorimotor approach is in perfect harmony with evidence about core phenomena such as vision with inverting glasses and sensory substitution. Moreover, an enactive sensorimotor approach allows for the accommodation of experiences such as in dreaming and perceptual imagery. 2. Enactive sensorimotor vision Let us first return to the sensorimotor contingency account, as presented in O'Regan and Noë (2001). ―Vision,‖ it was said there, is ―a mode of exploration of the world, mediated by knowledge of (...) sensorimotor contingencies‖ (p. 940), the latter being characterized as ―the structure of the rules governing the sensory changes produced by various motor actions‖ (p. 941). It was emphasized that the knowledge involved is ―implict,‖ leading to a view of perception as a ―skillful activity.‖ The sensorimotor approach was presented as being opposed to approaches based on the assumption ―that vision consists in the creation of an internal representation of the outside world whose activation somehow generates visual experience‖ (O'Regan & Noë 2001: 940). In order to get a firmer grip on the sensorimotor approach, it is helpful to look in some more detail at how the sensorimotor approach has been applied to a number of perceptual phenomena, in O'Regan and Noë (2001), and on later occasions (e.g. O'Regan 2011). As a first one of such, consider expanded vision. By ―expanded vision‖ is meant the kind of visual experience as when standing in front of a scene and overseeing it, looking at a large screen, or holding a book opened in one's hand and having the experience of seeing both pages. Expanded vision is characterized by the experienced spatial and temporal continuity of what is seen. Essentially, seeing a scene is having the feeling of being in roughly simultaneous visual contact with a certain extent of the world. Though expanded vision comes very naturally to us, certain by now well-known facts seem to stand in the way of a straightforward explanation of it. One relevant fact is that subjects are not continuously accessing the whole scene in the same high-quality way, due to such factors as differences in the spatial distribution of receptors in the retina, and the presence of the blind spot (O'Regan 1992, 2011). The absence of homogenous simultaneous access is further highlighted by results from studies on change blindness and inattentional blindness, for they show that large changes in a scene can go unnoticed, for example when other changes are particularly conspicuous. One way to explain expanded vision in the face of these facts it to relegate the homogeneity to something like the ―internal representation of the outside world‖ (reiterating O'Regan & Noë 2001). An inhomogeneous and gappy retinal image would be ―filled in‖ to produce a homogenous complete representation, to which or through which simultaneous access would still be possible. The sensorimotor approach denies the need for such an inner simulacrum of temporal or spatial continuity. Instead it accounts for continuity in terms of sensorimotor regularities. One should not be misled by the fact of instantaneous access: perceivers have high quality momentary access to only limited parts of the scene, while momentary access to other parts of the scene is of low quality. What is crucial, according to the sensorimotor approach, is that perceivers are set up to react to sudden changes in visual characteristics, so that, normally, 4 any such significant change will not go unnoticed, but will lead the perceiver to focus on it. The trick to a successful change blindness experiment is to tamper with this ―grabbiness‖ or ―alerting capacity‖ (O'Regan, Myin & Noë 2005) of environmental changes, by introducing an even larger visual alteration such as a blank screen between two pictures of a scene before and after changes. Seeing the scene in an expanded way, then, is not the consequence of an expanded representation, but of one's capacity to interact with the scene. Next, consider seeing an object. Sensorimotor theorists, following Donald MacKay, have compared the visual experience in object vision to the tactile experience of holding a bottle. The actual tactile contact with the bottle is only limited to where the fingers touch the bottle. Nevertheless, the experience is of a bottle, and not of disconnected bits of hard material. Again, one could invoke a homogenous representation to account for the experience of the whole object. Again the sensorimotor approach prefers an account in terms of being ―attuned‖ to a sensorimotor pattern (O'Regan & Noë 2001). The experience of feeling the whole bottle is then explained by the fact that one is attuned to the changes in stimulation that will occur when one makes certain movements. No representation needs to mediate, underlie or be causally involved in such a state of attunement. The same is claimed for seeing an object. To perceive a 3-D object currently seen only from one side as a 3-D object, one then does not need a representation: it suffices that one is attuned to the kinds of changes in stimulation that will result when either the object moves or when one moves with respect to it. Thirdly, take seeing a color. It is a well-known fact, named ―approximate color constancy,‖ that we more or less see the colors surfaces actually have, even if the stimulus that reaches the eye is a product of both the surface's color and the contingent current illumination. Color experience is not a response to the local light as it currently reaches you; it is sensitive to a permanent surface property. A fundamental challenge for color science is to explain how this can happen. An enactive sensorimotor approach to color experience, in line with the accounts of expanded vision and object vision above, hooks on to the temporal extendedness of color perception (Broackes 1992; Noë 2004; O'Regan 2011). The permanent property of color is identified with a reflectance profile: the way the surface reflects light under different lighting conditions. One can find out about the reflectance profile property by moving the colored object around or by observing surfaces under changing lighting conditions. Over time, one becomes sensitive to the underlying reflectance profile of a surface on the basis of minimal cues. Just as one can recognize a familiar person from a glimpse, one can recognize a reflectance profile on the basis of the behavior of the surface in a minimal set of lighting conditions. Such a minimal set, moreover, is almost always available, as it exists when different nearby objects reflect differently on a surface (Ruppertsberg & Bloj 2007). In short, being capable of seeing colors then consists of being attuned to reflectance profiles, or to the changes in stimulation one would receive under various circumstances (see Phillipona & O'Regan 2006). This way of looking at color illustrates the overall sensorimotor take on the qualitative character of perceptual experience. The sensorimotor approach claims that both the character of sensory qualities within a modality, such as the difference between softness and hardness, as well as differences between the character of modalities as a whole, are determined by differences in classes of sensorimotor contingencies typical of perceptual interactions. The experiential quality of softness differs from the quality of hardness, because of the different effects of pressing or squeezing. Similary, touch differs from vision, among other things because tactile, but not visual experience of an object comes to an end when immediate bodily contact is lost. 5 In the different cases of application of the sensorimotor approach surveyed in the above, the notion of ―being attuned to sensorimotor contingencies‖ has played a prominent role. This raises questions about its precise meaning. What does it mean that a person is attuned to the sensorimotor contingencies of ―red‖ or ―softness‖? A way of answering that question offered in O'Regan and Noë (2001) appeals to the exercise of the ―mastery‖ or ―knowledge‖ of sensorimotor contingencies, building on the already mentioned characterization of ―vision as exploratory activity mediated by knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies.‖ A problem with an appeal to knowledge is that it allows a representational interpretation, while the representationalist framework was resisted in the context of inner simulacra accounting for expanded vision. On such an interpretation, having knowledge about sensorimotor contingencies involves representing those sensorimotor contingencies. Perhaps the specification, in O'Regan & Noë (2001) and elsewhere, that the knowledge is meant to be ―implicit,‖ is aimed at excluding such an interpretation in favor of an approach based on practical know-how, or skills. However, as pointed out by Daniel Hutto, insisting that knowledge is meant to be ―implicit‖ is not compatible with supposing that the knowledge plays a ―mediating‖ role (Hutto 2005). An appeal to mediating knowledge would imply commitment to an intermediating representational stage. Consistency with the initial nonrepresentationalism of the sensorimotor approach can be regained by conceiving of ―attunement to sensorimotor contingencies‖ as embodied in the strong sense mentioned at the beginning of this entry. Attunement to sensorimotor contingencies then means that an organism has acquired, on the basis of a history of interactions, a sensitivity in its perception and action for the ways stimuli change with movement. In line with the strong notion of embodiment, the development of perceptual attunement is not conceived of in representationalist terms: the past is not playing its role in the present as represented past – as mediated by representations of the past. Enactivists relying on the strong notion of embodiment will insist that what a history of attunement has yielded is just that: attunement. Of course, attunement is attunement to certain external conditions. Call this the external aspect of attunement. Moreover, attunement is impossible without changed conditions in the organism. Call this the internal aspect of attunement. The mere existence of external and internal aspects of attunement do not necessitate representational descriptions, however. It is not because an organism has become attuned to certain circumstances that it represents those circumstances by some internal means. This is obvious in noncognitive evolutionary adaptations: a bird's wings partially constitute the bird's internal conditions for moving appropriately in an aerial environment, but this does not imply that the bird or its wings represent these external conditions. Analogously, in the cognitive case, there is no logical need to describe the internal conditions that mediate cognitive attunements as representing the external circumstances of attunement. The upshot is that, once the strong notion of embodiment is adhered to, a historical or developmental aspect comes to the fore, in a nonrepresentationalist shape. Representationalists cannot deny a role for an organism's history, but they may insist that an occurrent representation of the past needs to stand in for the real past, if the past is to yields an influence now. An enactive sensorimotor approach-that is, one defining attunement in the strong sense of embodiment-denies that the changes laid down in an organism's history need to be representational. Without being representational, these changes can still retain their causal powers and allow for a bridge between the past and the present. 6 The enactive sensorimotor approach thus has the advantage of offering a reading of ―attunement to sensorimotor contingencies‖ which is consistent with the antirepresentationalism present in the sensorimotor analysis of expanded vision, object vision, and the experience of properties such as softness or color. 3. Attunement in action How does the enactive sensorimotor position relate to evidence to which sensorimotor theorists have appealed, in particular findings about adaptation to distorting glasses or about sensory substitution? Critics of the sensorimotor approach to perception and perceptual awareness have challenged it on this front, claiming that neither findings about distorting glasses or about sensory substitution confirm the sensorimotor approach (Block 2005; Prinz 2006; Klein 2007). By means of lenses or prisms, the light entering the eyes can be inverted in a left-right and/or an above-below dimension. This introduces systematic changes in the perceiver's visual sensorimotor interaction with the environment. It has been reported that after extensive wearing of inverting glasses (within 6-10 days), visual abilities can be re-acquired and one may once again learn to see where things are (e.g. Stratton 1896, 1897; Taylor 1962; Kohler 1964; Dolezal 1982; but see for example Linden et al. 1999 for negative findings). A phenomenon consistently reported throughout the literature is that, on first wearing inverting glasses, the stability of visual experience breaks down with head movements, as if the scene moves in front of one's eyes. This confirms that visual experience depends on sensorimotor contingencies, or on the relation between sensory stimulation and bodily movement (Taylor 1962), and not on sensory stimulation alone. For since sensory stimulation is only spatially inverted, dependence on sensory stimulation only predicts inverted, but not unstable experience. Over the days, free-moving subjects adapt to the new situation and movement of the head no longer disrupts visual stability. The subject has become attuned to the novel sensorimotor contingencies, so that environmental movements lead to a distinctively visual experience of movement of the scene, while movement of the perceiver's own point or direction of view does not. The crucial role of sensorimotor contingencies is further evidenced by the finding that, when studies use a chin rest to avoid head movement, adaptation is very restricted. Indeed, it seems that only adaptation of proprioceptive experiences-and no adaptation of visual experience- takes place in studies in which subjects perform actions when head movements are thus avoided (for some examples see Harris 1965). We can make sense of this by distinguishing kinds of sensorimotor contingency, such as those related to exploratory activities such as looking from performatory activities such as grasping (Gibson 1964): genuinely visual adaptation to wearing inverting glasses depends strongly on active visual exploration. It is also clear that the distortion brought about by glasses affects different kinds of sensorimotor contingencies differently. Since the early reports of Stratton (1896, 1897), the focus of analysis in inversion studies has often been on the altered relation between vision on the one hand, and touch or bodily experiences on the other. However, inverting glasses introduce a conflict within spatial vision itself (Degenaar 2013). Head movements and eye movements involve different patterns of sensorimotor contingencies, some of which are changed and some of which remain unaffected under the distortion. A subject wearing the 7 glasses has to adapt to the altered patterns, while leaving the existing attunement to the unaltered patterns intact. Instead of leading to a prediction of a complete ―inversion of experience‖ (Klein 2007), a sensorimotor position thus leads to the expectation that experience, while certainly changing in systematic ways, will also retain continuities with experience before the goggles were put on. Sensorimotor theorists have emphasized that the sensorimotor view of vision as a set of sensorimotor capacities naturally allows for partial adaptation, and have pointed to such observations as that wearers of distorting goggles might have learned to see the positions of moving cars correctly, while still seeing the license plates as in a mirror (O'Regan & Noë 2001; O'Regan 2011). Partial adaptation challenges the idea that vision is based on a unitary image or representation in the brain. It is thinking of vision in this distinctively nonsensorimotor way which leads to an expectation of ―re-inversion‖ of experience. The contrast between this way of thinking and a sensorimotor approach becomes even stronger when the latter is of the enactivist variety, for an enactivist sensorimotor approach is more fully, or at least more explicitly, nonrepresentational. Sensory substitution devices enable a new mode of interaction with the environment, for example by transforming an image recorded by a camera into a pattern of tactile stimulation on the subject's skin (e.g. Bach-y-Rita 1984) or into a pattern of auditory stimulation (e.g. Auvray et al. 2005; Auvray, Hanneton & O'Regan 2007). It has been found that after practice with such tactile-to-visual or tactile-to-auditory substitution devices, in some cases blind or blindfolded subjects report the experience of objects in distal space, and describe vision-like experiences such as that objects increase in apparent size on approach. Following a training period, persons using a sensory substitution device have been found to acquire such capacities as involved in locomotor guidance, object localization, and object categorization (see Auvray & Myin 2009 for further information and pointers to the literature). As in the adaptation to inverting glasses, active exploration is required here: subjects must be able to control the camera in order to develop this kind of spatial experience (Bach-y-Rita 1984; Auvray et al. 2005). Sensorimotor theorists have referred to this adaptation as evidence for the approach, because it shows the pivotal role of sensorimotor contingencies in visual behavior and attunement. If a set of sensorimotor contingencies-such as those concerning change in size upon approach or retreat-are transferred from vision to touch then they seem to enable vision-like behavior and experience once the subject is attuned to the contingencies. It is this positive point which is key: that, despite the novel modality these contingencies become embedded in, strikingly, they are able to entrain behavioral and experiential change. Critics of the sensorimotor approach have always been keen to point out that many, or at least some, aspects of experience remain linked to the modality the sensorimotor patterns are transferred to (e.g. Block 2005; Prinz 2006, 2009). Such an objection to the sensorimotor approach disregards that the approach, just as was the case for inverting glasses, predicts a mixture of continuity and change in experience after having learned to perceive with a sensory substitution device. Sensory substitution devices add to the sensorimotor repertoire of the stimulated sense, without destroying the repertoire already present. Existing functionality-existing attunement to sensorimotor contingencies-remains in place. To the extent that aspects of the experiential character remain those of the old' modality, this can be explained by the persistent attunement to the old' sensorimotor contingencies. In other 8 words, the sensory modality a sensory substitution onto which the device is grafted, can show a level of ―tenacity‖ (Myin, Cooke & Zahidi, in press), or a lack of deference to the new sensorimotor context (Hurley & Noë 2003). 4. Derivative experience This nuanced sensorimotor perspective on inverting glasses and sensory substitution exemplifies how experience, at any moment, is a product of both the current stimulation and currently obtaining sensorimotor contingencies, and attunement due to a history of interactions. This basic tenet of the sensorimotor position allows it to meet an often formulated complaint that the sensorimotor approach cannot account for perceptual or perceptual-like experience under circumstances in which occurent sensorimotor interactions differ from those characteristic of the experience. The range of cases invoked by critics includes dreaming, visual imagery and the perceptual experiences of paralyzed people. Invoking these as counter-examples to the sensorimotor approach neglects the explanatory role played by the history of interactions. An appeal to this history of interactions, and the process of attunement it entrains, is essential in the sensorimotor account of all forms of perception. The fact that one feels the whole bottle on the basis of minimal sensory contact, precisely transcends one's currently occurring sensory stimulation because of one's previous exposure to the sensorimotor contingencies of touching and exploring bottles. Because of this history, one is familiar with, or attuned to, a general pattern of sensorimotor contingencies typical of bottles, characterized by such regularities as that one will encounter more hard stuff when one slides one's fingers to either side. Dreaming, visual imagery and experience in paralysis, then, are cases in which the explanatory balance tips more fully in the direction of past sensorimotor contingencies. What one experiences under such circumstances is dictated almost exclusively by one's attunement to previous interactive regularities, rather than by one's current stimulation. In the sense in which the character of experience in such circumstances is due to past, rather than to current interactions, such experience is derivative. The derivative status of experiences in dreaming, imagery or paralysis, far from revealing them as being distant from sensorimotor interactions, in fact shows them to be deeply entrenched in them. 5. Conclusion An enactive sensorimotor account can answer common criticisms, and it has been shown, for example by the investigations of Philipona and O'Regan (2006) on color, that the approach offers rich prospects for empirical expansion. Of course, there is need for further clarification and elaboration of the theoretical basis of the approach. Relevant steps are taken for example in the work of Buhrmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran (2013) on the key concept of sensorimotor contingencies. The above makes clear that the sensorimotor approach, spelled out fully along enactivist lines, offers a strong, substantive and fruitful perspective on perception, for vision as well as for other modalities i . References 9 Auvray, M., Hanneton, S., Lenay, C., O'Regan, J.K. (2005) ―There is something out there: distal attribution in sensory substitution, twenty years later,‖ Journal of Integrative Neuroscience, 4 (4), pp. 505-521. Auvray, M., Hanneton, S., O'Regan, J.K. (2007) ―Learning to perceive with a visuo-auditory substitution system: localisation and object recognition with The vOICe',‖ Perception, 36, pp. 416-430. Auvray, M., Myin. E. (2009) ―From sensory substitution to sensorimotor extension,‖ Cognitive Science, 33(7), pp. 1036-1058. Bach-y-Rita, P. (1984) ―The relationship between motor processes and cognition in tactile vision substitution,‖ in Prinz, W., Sanders, A.F. (eds.) Cognition and Motor Processes, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 149-160. Block, N. (2005) ―Review of Alva Noë, Action in Perception,‖ Journal of Philosophy, 102, pp. 259–272. Broackes, J. (1992) ―The autonomy of colour,‖ in Charles, D., Lennon, K. (eds.) Reduction, Explanation, and Realism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 421-465. Buhrmann, T., Di Paolo, E., Barandiaran, X. (2013) ―A dynamical systems account of sensorimotor contingencies,‖ Frontiers in Psychology, 4: 285. Chemero, A. (2009) Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Degenaar, J. (2013) ―Through the inverting glass: first-person observations on spatial vision and imagery,‖ Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (in press). Dolezal, H. (1982) Living in a World Transformed: Perceptual and Performatory Adaptation to Visual Distortion, New York: Academic Press. Gibson, J.J. (1964) ―Introduction,‖ Psychological Issues, 3 (4), pp. 5-13. Harris, C.S. (1965) ―Perceptual adaptation to inverted, reversed, and displaced vision,‖ Psychological Review, 72 (6), pp. 419-444. Hurley, S.L., Noë, A. (2003) ―Neural plasticity and consciousness,‖ Biology and Philosophy, 18, pp. 131-168. Hutto, D.D. (2005) ―Knowing what? Radical versus conservative enactivism,‖ Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4, pp. 389-405. Hutto, D.D., Myin, E. (2013) Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kohler, I. (1964a) ―The formation and transformation of the perceptual world,‖ Psychological Issues, 3 (4), pp. 19-173. Linden, D.E.J., Kallenbach, U., Heinecke, A., Singer, W., Goebel, R. (1999) ―The myth of upright vision. A psychophysical and functional imaging study of adaptation to inverting spectacles,‖ Perception, 28, pp. 469-481. Myin, E., Cooke, E., Zahidi, K. (in press) ―Morphing senses,‖ in Matthen, M., Stokes, D., Perception and its Modalities, New York: Oxford University Press. Noë, A. (2004) Action in Perception, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. O'Regan, J.K. (1992) ―Solving the real' mysteries of visual perception: the world as an outside memory,‖ Canadian Journal of Psychology, 46(3), pp. 461-488. ----- (2011) Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness, New York: Oxford University Press. O'Regan, J.K., Myin, E., Noë, A. (2005) ―Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of corporality' and alerting capacity',‖ Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 44, pp. 369-387. O'Regan, J.K., Noë, A. (2001) ―A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness,‖ Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, pp. 939-973. 10 Philipona, D.L., O'Regan, J.K. (2006) ―Color naming, unique hues, and hue cancellation predicted from singularities in reflection properties,‖ Visual Neuroscience, 23, pp. 331339. Prinz, J. (2006) ―Putting the brakes on enactive perception,‖ Psyche, 12(1). ----- (2009) ―Is consciousness embodied?,‖ in Robbins, P., Aydede, M. (eds.) Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ruppertsberg, A.I., Bloj, M. (2007) ―Reflecting on a room of one reflectance,‖ Journal of Vision, 7 (13): 12, pp. 1-13. Stratton, G.M. (1896) ―Some preliminary experiments on vision without inversion of the retinal image,‖ The Psychological Review, 3, pp. 611-617. ----- (1897) ―Vision without inversion of the retinal image,‖ The Psychological Review, 4, pp. 341-360; 463-481. Taylor, J.G. (1962) The Behavioral Basis of Perception, New Haven: Yale University Press. Thompson, E. (2007) Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Varela, F.J., Thompson, E., Rosch, E. (1991) The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Further reading The sensorimotor approach to perception has been developed in somewhat different directions by Kevin O'Regan and Alva Noë, for example in the recent books Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) by Kevin O'Regan, and Out of our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009) by Alva Noë. Among other divergences, O'Regan's book offers more links to empirical research, while Noë's book tries to adavance a case for the idea that consciousness in not confined to the brain. Evan Thompson's Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007) has a chapter in which Thompson, one of the founders of enactivism, offers a sympathetic, but critical assessment of sensorimotor enactivism. Finally, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013) presents arguments for construing enactivism and the sensorimotor approach in a radical, representation or content-eschewing way. i The authors warmly thank Kevin O'Regan for his very useful comments on this text, and for continuing discussion relating to many of the topics dealt with here. For financial support we are grateful to the Research Foundation Flanders (project ―Computation reconsidered‖, G0B5312N), the Research Council of the University of Antwerp (project ―Imagery as Perceptual Activity‖), and the European Research Council (Kevin O'Regan's Advanced Grant ―FEEL‖, 323674).

/21/11 1 The New Pair by Ferdinand Fellmann The times when we considered separation from our partner as the height of autonomy are over. For younger people in urban areas, the freedom of being single still has its allure. But the exclusive relationship, either as a pair or even as a married pair, has regained its attraction. Obviously, the traditional roles, the economically dependent woman who stands by the side of the „strong man‟, no longer represent the pair bond. Both partners now have their own career and their own, often differing, political convictions; yet in the public realm they appear together and demonstrate their preference for being together. As the "couple-look" becomes a common component of society as shown by Barack Obama and Michelle, the perfect symbol of the New Pair, the following questions become increasingly urgent: What holds the New Pair together? Is the relationship merely a matter of convenience and can it be terminated at any time? What contribution does intimacy make to the pair bond when sexuality at the present time is treated by both genders as relatively uncomplicated and inconsequential? And finally, is the rehabilitation of the pair contingent on their desire to have children, which promises many young people a piece of authentic life in this cold risk-society? These questions are not merely relevant to psychology but are fundamental for philosophical anthropology. To understand human nature it is indispensable to look at the differences between sexes and the mating systems. Getting to the evolutionary bottom of these questions is a valuable endeavor because it shows that the pair is an integral component of the human world. It will never be obsolete, but must continually be re-programmed. Despite the introduction of marriage „for love‟ in Romanticism, the civil marriage remained, until the late 20th century, internally influenced from the division of labor and bound to the dominating sexual morals of the patriarchy. It is thus not surprising that marriage and family would be perceived as shackles with the progressive emancipation of woman and her newly found equality in the workplace. Since both partners now stand economically on their own feet and woman‟s self-confidence is no longer inferior to man‟s, the pair bond is relieved of external factors and can be experienced entirely as a site of affection. Whether or not home life is really so free and harmonic, as it appears outwardly, can be doubted. Daily 2 quarrels are all too familiar: each stands for the fulfillment of his or her own desires and intimacy is transformed into a matter of negotiation. However, despite all of the disadvantages, which could well be phenomena resulting from the transition itself, one thing is for sure: the New Pair stands for love that is for love‟s sake. Current external factors are still in play, but they do not constitute the deeper motivation for pair-bonding. This is due to the polarity of genders. Despite the widespread fear of inequality that leads many intellectuals to deny that differences between men and women exist, the difference makes the pair essential, at least as a permantent yearning. That most continue to yearn for the New Pair relationship, even after a painful separation, is empirical confirmation of the essential nature of the pair. In the sexual revolution of 1968, and in particular with the introduction of the birth control pill, sexuality migrated from marriage (where it often had a dreary, joyless existence) to free love. Sex without commitment or consequences, as it was celebrated by Erica Jong in her Fear of Flying, constituted the highest form of individual autonomy. But that was only for a short time. With the removal of taboos, sex became an article of consumption that could never bring about the satisfaction promised in the advertisement. It became increasingly clear to young men and women that new partners brought variety but no real emotional enrichment. These disillusioning experiences lead to a rehabilitation of the committed pair relationship. The New Pair moves far away from free love, yet without returning to the compulsory marriage of former times. Both partners have learned to act out their sexual needs and erotic desires within the committed relationship. The pair itself is, in no way, in shackles; contrarily, it is a stimulant for unanticipated satisfaction. Instead of repeating again and again the common rituals of fleeting encounters, the long-term relationship offers a space for an intensely experienced, multi-faceted sexuality. Curiosity and fear, desire and pain, and surprise and disappointment make up the ambivalence of normal sexuality, experienced by man and woman together in the pair. Each recognizes in the reflection of their partner previously unknown personality traits and feels confirmed in his or her own individuality. Personal identity, when formed from the decision to take a life partner, is a prerequisite for values such as fidelity and solidarity; these values paradoxically prove subversive in western open societies. These values immunize one against the repression of social structures and make one resistant to the seduction of the hidden 3 persuaders in the consumer marketplace. We have thus arrived in a time in which the New Pair has become a site of civil resistance. It sounds paradoxical: the pair-bond as the source of personal autonomy. This apparent contradiction is resolved if one takes into consideration that autonomy is more than mere moodiness and obstinacy. „My way‟ leads to an end only if it can be followed by someone else; if not, it leads to autistic solipsism. When a man and a woman interact intimately each partner feels good for being accepted in his or her entire individuality. And that is not all. To the polarity of the sexes belong more than two: the common child. Evolution has laid this in the genetic cradle of man and woman. This biological radical was not always present in the mind of modern man. During the sexual revolution of 1968, children were perceived as troublemakers. Not only by men, but also by women, both of them intent on discovering their own body as an erogenous zone. For the „new woman‟ the desire to have children signified her subjection to biology, which she had used every means possible to overcome. It is not surprising then that a Letter to an Unborn Child attained cult status for feminists. Despite the momentary win for feelings of self-worth that came from the sexual revolution, the desire for children cannot be suppressed in the longterm. And the alternative, to prove autonomy as a single mother, was also not ideal. The burdens of the fatherless child are too heavy, especially for the children of divorced parents. The way is again free for the return to the pair with children, where man and woman mutually realize their desire for a child. The common decision for a child is emotional and an enormous gain for both. The emancipated woman can connect sexuality and pregnancy and experience eroticism, and the man profits from this expansion of Eros, far beyond the act of conception. The father experiences the phases of the pregnancy and birth as part of himself and is now free to express his caring emotions, previously only entitled to the mother. This continues in the common raising of the child; the ideal of a generative sexuality between the parents appears to become a reality. What could be a more creative way of life than being in a loving pair with equal partners and experiencing a close connection with your children, in which everyone‟s needs are fulfilled? Obviously, the New Pair, as every other form of life, also has its dangers, and they should not be concealed. The intense emotionality, which also involves the children, can lead to the elimination of two important differences: the difference between man and woman and the difference 4 between parents and children. Empathy and mutual understanding strongly bind those involved together, but differences also have a social function that is all too often underestimated. As the polarity of the gender brings together the parents, the parental authority marks the limits which are necessary for the development of the child. It is thus detrimental for both sides if parents discuss their emotional needs too intimately with the children. A type of teddy-bear love emerges that leads to the adult‟s infantillization and the self over-estimation of the child. To avoid this, differences must be maintained and enacted. Without differences no society can develop the social dynamic needed in order to deal with the challenges of the times. Here, philosophical anthropology should remember that the modern denial of differences in nature robs humans of the very foundations of humanity. References Fellmann, Ferdinand. Das Paar. Eine erotische Rechtfertigung des Menschen. Berlin, 2005 (English Translation in progress) Fellmann, Ferdinand. "The Origin of Man Behind The Veil of Ignorance." Forthcoming in Biological Theory, The MIT Press 5:3,

UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT A NEW THINKING ABOUT GOD: FROM THE DASEIN TO THE DAGOTT Carlos Arboleda Mora* RESUMEN Este artículo trata de reformular las relaciones filosofía-teología rotas desde la Edad Media, mostrando cómo la crisis de la metafísica conceptual y representacionista y de la ontoteología tradicional, han permitido, con la ayuda de Dionisio y del neoplatonismo, repensar la ontología a través de la teología negativa y de una vía mística. Ya desde Heidgger se llega a ver la realidad como un don del cual la filosofía indicaría la posibilidad ontológica y la teología su realización efectiva. Así, el Dasein heideggeriano, ABSTRACT This article attempts to reformulate the broken philosophy-theology relationships since the Middle Ages, showing how the crisis of conceptual and representational metaphysics and traditional ontotheology have allowed, with the help of Dionysus Areopagite and the neo-Platonism, to rethink the ontology through negative theology and a mystical way. Since Heidgger the reality is seen as a gift from which the philosophy would indicate the ontological possibility, and the theology, his effective accomplishment. In this way, * Doctor en Filosofía de la UPB, Licenciado en ciencias sociales de la Universidad Gregoriana de Roma en 1980. Magister en Historia de la UNAL de Colombia. Profesor de la Universidad escritos / Medellín Colombia / Vol. 19, N. 42 / pp. 019-051 enero-junio 2011 / ISSN 0120 1263 20 superada la sombra del ego, podría ser Dagott, es decir, pura apertura a la donación de Dios. PALABRAS CLAVE Ontoteología, Dionisio Areopagita, Neoplatonismo, Dagott, Dasein, Filosofía de la religión. the heideggerian Dasein, once the shade of the ego is overcome, may be Dagott in other words, pure opening to the God's donation. KEY WORDS Onto theology, Dionysus Areopagite, NeoPlatonism , Dagott, Dasein, Religion s Philosophy. Introducción Una metafísica renovada es esencial para la teología actual, pues no se puede hoy hablar teológicamente si no hay una nueva forma de pensar, un nuevo camino que nos lleve al mostrarse del Ser o Incondicionado. La filosofía y la teología han de tender puentes entre ellas, pues las dos tienen como tema al hombre y sus resultados no pueden ser contradictorios ya que son "diferentes momentos de una pasión común, diferentes voces en una común canción" (Caputo 2006 69). La filosofía y la teología nacieron juntas y sólo cuando el hombre creyó que era potente y que podría alcanzar la felicidad solo, construyó su propio sistema en el que Dios sobraba y, por tanto, sobraba la teología. Pero también sobró la filosofía, pues el hombre era creador técnico y científico y no necesitaba de reflexiones inútiles e improductivas. Hoy se va viendo que la filosofía y la teología pueden marchar juntas y que lo que la primera propone como posibilidad, la segunda lo da como efectividad y realización. Bien se sabe que la filosofía y la teología más originarias se dan antes y en los presocráticos, cuando el logos era místico y no racional conceptual. Allí se vislumbró el misterio del ser que estaba presente desvelándose o que se desvelaba estando presente. El acceso al ser era celebrativo, místico, de plena unión con él. Orgiástico, si se quiere, pero real y lejano, sólo la celebración lo hacía presente, sin necesidad de ayudas conceptuales. La CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 21 verdad del ser se vivía y celebraba, no se conceptualizaba. Sus enseñanzas emanan de la experiencia original que no separa lo vivido y lo racional: El saber científico conoce al mundo como grupo de entes sujetos a manipulación; la ciencia se interpreta a sí misma como técnica racional al servicio del dominio sobre el mundo. La physis es un objeto más y la razón se reduce a razón instrumental. Heidegger se pregunta por la base de un saber que identifica su destino con la capacidad científica y técnica de dominar. En opinión de Heidegger, hay una pérdida de aquella arkhé que los Presocráticos consideraron fundamental: la diferencia entre el ser y el ente. La crítica es que ha habido un olvido de esa diferencia y haber concebido al ser como si fuera un ente más. Las condiciones que determinan trascendentalmente la única imagen que el hombre moderno puede tener del mundo y de sí mismo, expulsan de la realidad todo lo que no es cosa; a lo que corresponde necesariamente la valoración de la ciencia físico-matemática como saber total que garantiza la realización efectiva del dominio y la explotación universales (Pagallo 2005). La creencia occidental del progreso filosófico hizo que se pensara en la superación de los presocráticos y se volviera al concepto que retiene y contiene al Ser como una superación de los primitivos filósofos y teólogos. Pero en filosofía y teología no hay progreso como en las ciencias exactas, lo que hay es siempre una vuelta reflexiva sobre lo más originario del ser humano. Uno de los aciertos de Heidegger es haber replanteado el regreso a los orígenes como un volver al pensar original y plantear como tarea contemporánea, un pensamiento más original o nueva manera de pensar. Ese regreso lo hace Heidegger pensando en la angustia de una humanidad afectada por la cienciocracia moderna que olvida que los entes pueden salir a la luz porque la Luz es la que dispone el Lichtung (el claro) donde se manifiestan los entes; la ciencia, por el contrario, ilumina los entes y oscurece la humanidad del hombre, pues en su afán de dominio, se aleja de la Luz y oscurece el mundo. El hombre mismo es ese claro donde se da la manifestación más primaria y esencial del ser mismo y olvidar esto, es olvidar el ser mismo del hombre: ser el lugar donde se manifiesta el Ser. El análisis del hombre es, por tanto, obra de la filosofía UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 22 y de la teología, como el lugar de la manifestación y así el hombre viene a ser el centro, pues su razón de ser es la manifestación del Ser en él. Pero lo que para Heidegger es el Da-sein, el Ser ahí, para el teólogo es el DaGott, el Dios que ahí se manifiesta. Dios se manifiesta en el hombre, vive en el hombre, se da al hombre, es la razón de ser del hombre. Exagerando un poco, se puede decir que cuando muere un hombre, es Dios mismo el que muere allí. 1. La ontoteología y la idolización de Dios. La crisis provocada por los Maestros de la sospecha, retomada por Heidegger en su crítica a la metafísica occidental, hizo estremecer la cultura occidental, pues se pensó que era la última palabra en cuestiones de metafísica y de teología. La crítica filosófica llevada a cabo por ellos, hizo creer que la metafísica era cosa del pasado y que no había posibilidad de un pensamiento más allá de la ciencia y de la tecnología. Sólo era posible pensar en términos científicos, experimentales y sujetos a verificación y repetición. La teología, al tratar con realidades no demostrables en forma racional, se trataba de una invención ideológica. El fenómeno religioso podía deconstruirse, pues era mera ideología, neurosis, ansias de poder, proyección de las aspiraciones humanas, negocio burdo. Esta crítica fue tan demoledora que algunos filósofos y teólogos aceptaron sin más sus conclusiones. Así surgieron los filósofos faranduleros que repetían que la única tarea digna hoy era completar la crisis de la metafísica, luchar contra las religiones y vivir en las comodidades del sistema capitalista. Sólo quedaba el reino de Disney World. Los teólogos crearon una efímera pero rentable Teología de la muerte de Dios donde se enseñaba cómo vivir en un mundo sin Dios y en un universo secular y posteísta (aunque plantearon problemáticas que contribuyeron a la nueva forma de pensar a Dios). Era mejor vivir en una "esfera de la privacidad" con todas las comodidades tecnológicas y sin compromisos morales que implicaran una molestia a la calidad de vida moderna. Lo más central de dicha crítica, sin embargo, no eran esas posiciones burguesas sino la demolición de la metafísica CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 23 clásica por obra de los maestros de la sospecha en su enjuiciamiento de la conceptualización, de la representación y sus consecuencias en la metafísica teológica, dejando así sin piso todo fundamento de la teología y de la moral. Heidegger acepta y confirma dichas críticas al mostrar el olvido del Ser en la metafísica tradicional, pero afortunadamente hace una propuesta de una nueva manera de pensar que abrió un camino que hoy muchos filósofos empiezan a recorrer. Heidegger hace una crítica de la metafísica occidental por su explicación del ser y su concepto de verdad que se manifiestan en un olvido del Ser tal como se ve en la ciencia, la técnica y la reducción del arte a pura estética. Esta metafísica comienza en Platón a partir de la realidad de la idea del Bien como fundamento y continúa en Aristóteles, cristianos y modernos. Descartes, con la idea del sujeto y de la representación (autoconciencia del ser humano, cogito), inicia la época de la imagen del mundo donde el ser se encuentra en su imagen construida por la subjetividad. La idea de fundamentación logra su plenitud en Leibniz con el principio de razón suficiente. Sólo lo que es puesto en un representar fundamentado puede tener valor de ente. En Kant sólo puede ser cosa lo que pueda ser considerado así por el yo según las categorías trascendentales. Según éste, sólo hay realidad cognoscible dentro de la subjetividad y la fundamentación (juicios sintéticos a priori). El yo plenamente autoconsciente condicionará toda objetividad y se logrará el saber absoluto en el concepto hegeliano. En Nietzsche, tratando de ser antimetafísico, continúa la subjetividad como se ve en la voluntad de poder. La metafísica se deja distinguir en él de modo más claro, como la metafísica de la incondicionada subjetividad de la voluntad de dominio. El dominio actual lo ejercen la técnica y las ciencias contemporáneas que son la metafísica moderna. La metafísica tradicional continúa presente, según Heidegger, en toda ontología trascendente o cristiana, en las ideologías, en las filosofías de la vida, en la técnica y la ciencia. Las críticas de los maestros de la sospecha no eran definitivas o insuperables. Los grandes maestros de la sospecha no han eliminado a UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 24 Dios sino sus conceptualizaciones históricas y cristalizadas en términos de una época o cultura. Han ayudado a purificar la idea de Dios más que a certificar su muerte. Dios no ha muerto sino los conceptos sobre Dios que han elaborado las culturas. Lógicamente, la muerte de los conceptos ha conllevado la crisis de los grandes relatos que se afincaban sobre ellos y de las instituciones que los encarnaban, especialmente en Occidente. Los maestros de la sospecha atacaron los conceptos para construir una nueva forma interpretativa más saludable. Se trata de una deconstrucción de lo existente para expresar en una "crítica de la resistencia" lo que no marchaba más y allí proponer algo nuevo. Las críticas de los Maestros de la sospecha son críticas hechas dentro de la misma cultura. Propiamente no se alcanza a negar la posibilidad de Dios, sea lo que éste sea, sino las concretizaciones culturales de la idea de Dios. Son los grandes iconoclastas en cuanto testigos de la idolización de las religiones por la solidificación de sus símbolos. Cuando la conciencia de la instrumentalidad e historicidad de los símbolos se pierde, se instala en las culturas la convicción de la existencia objetiva de ciertos conceptos o imágenes, que son así objetivados o sustancializados. Es como un integrismo simbólico en filosofía y teología. Las religiones pudieron haber convertido los símbolos en metafísica inmutable, el status quo en principio perenne y amarraron la hermenéutica a una clave conceptual anclada en una época histórica. Los maestros de la sospecha derribaron los ídolos pero no el sentido ni la profundidad. En este campo les faltó radicalidad; o la intuyeron y no sacaron todas las consecuencias. Tal vez, llegar a la contemplación les cortó el aliento, pues era muy peligroso afirmar la posibilidad del sentido en un mundo en que reinaba la modernidad y en el que cualquier atisbo místico era considerado un regreso a la inmadurez o a la minoría de edad. El papel de la metafísica, en palabras heideggerianas, ha sido el establecimiento y el mantenimiento de un fundamento de los seres (Arboleda 2010). El ser como presencia plena, representada y definida CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 25 conceptualmente que fundamentaba toda vida y toda afirmación de los entes es el proyecto histórico de la metafísica occidental, pero en ese proyecto histórico se confunde la universalidad del ente con su particularidad. Desconoce así la diferencia ontológica y se olvida del ser. La metafísica es la época del olvido del Ser, olvidar la diferencia entre el Ser y el ente. No se despliega la diferencia ontológica o se piensa esta diferencia desde el concepto de participación y representación. Esta representación es la presencia, no como presencia del Ser sino como presencia del ser del ente. El Ser es conceptualizado como ser del ente y se olvida el Ser. El destino del Ser es el olvido del Ser que es ser el ser de los entes, constituir los entes, unificar y diferenciar los entes y simultáneamente ocultarse tras los entes ya constituidos. El olvido del Ser, el olvido de la diferencia ónticoontológica, impide y olvida indagar por la verdadera esencia del Ser. Así los filósofos se olvidaron del Ser y hablaron de los entes. El mismo Dios queda reducido a un ente, considerado dentro del horizonte de aparición del ser de los entes. Un ser atemporal y ahistórico que se da de una vez y para siempre, negando la historicidad y la multiplicidad. Se entiende más como ousia fija que como physis desbordante que emerge o como aletheia que se descubre y desvela. Se olvida el sentido de emergencia y descubrimiento, y se da preeminencia a la presencia y a la permanencia, en el sentido de lo duradero (ousia) (Thomson 2005). ¿Hasta qué punto el Dios de la teología cristiana es el Dios de la metafísica fijista? Hay que hacer un análisis histórico crítico del uso de las categorías metafísicas en la teología. También hay que preguntarse si el Dios de la teología conceptual es el mismo de la Escritura. Aquí hay que investigar si las afirmaciones teológicas hechas bajo forma de conceptos corresponden a lo que expresa la Escritura. Es difícil armonizar el Dios de la Escritura con el simple, inmutable, actualizado, completamente existente Dios de la formulación conceptual dogmática. Se ve que mucho del contenido y las categorías teológicas conceptuales son más de la metafísica que del Dios de la Escritura y más fijadas en la ousia que en la manifestación o en el don. Así los teólogos se olvidaron de Dios y hablaron de él como ente. UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 26 2. La teología de la muerte de Dios. La teología de la muerte de Dios, aunque fue un movimiento sensacionalista y de corta duración, tuvo su importancia en la génesis del nuevo pensamiento sobre Dios. Sus antecedentes están en las críticas de Comte, Feuerbach y Nietzsche, pero lo que en ellos fue crítica profunda, en estos teólogos fue un movimiento situado en los marcos de la secularización, la filosofía analítica y una aceptación acrítica del racionalismo moderno. Sin embargo, tiene semillas que ayudan a la purificación del nombre y la imagen de Dios en un mundo culturalmente agnóstico. Se inicia con Gabriel Vahanian (1961) que acusa al cristianismo de confundir humanitarismo con Reino de Dios, reduciendo la vida cristiana a una convivencia cívica y a un desarrollo económico y social. Se ha olvidado a Dios y se quiere reducir el cristianismo a una búsqueda de vida en paz y desarrollo. La muerte de Dios se debe a que se ha reducido a un dato cultural, cuando en realidad, siguiendo a Barth y a Calvino, Dios es el totalmente Otro irreducible a una cultura. La solución está en negar las posibilidades racionales de encontrar a Dios y predicarlo en forma absoluta sin mezclas culturales o racionales. El aporte de Vahanian es interesante, pues indica que la vía racional moderna no es camino para llegar a Dios. John A. T. Robinson publicó un libro de amplia circulación Honest to God (1963). Él encuentra que hay un abismo entre la cultura modernasecular-científica y las formas expresivas del cristianismo. La causa está en el lenguaje metafísico usado que está lejos del lenguaje moderno. La solución está en una reinterpretación radical del cristianismo en términos de relaciones humanas y de amor mutuo donde se manifiesta la profundidad de Dios. Hay que hablar de relaciones humanas y no de un Dios muy por encima de los hombres. Importante en Robinson es su llamado a una praxis del amor aunque lo haga en términos de una metafísica tradicional (por eso fue atacado de antimetafísico y agnóstico) que le impide conocer y llegar hasta la fuente de ese amor. CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 27 Estos dos autores se sitúan en la línea menos radical de la teología de la muerte de Dios, que sería la continuación de dos teólogos, Friedrich Gogarten y Dietrich Bonhoeffer. El primero, con una teoría acerca de la secularización. Gogarten (1971) influye al aceptar teológicamente la secularización distinguiéndola del secularismo. La secularización no era negativa, pues era simplemente dejar al mundo ser mundo, siendo la expresión de la libertad del cristiano ante la modernidad, libertad que consiste en no dominar el mundo sino en servir al mundo desde la defensa de la humanidad frente a las pretensiones de los sistemas totalitarios. No hay que pelear con el mundo, sino servirlo desde una visión humanizante sin pretender dominarlo con posiciones políticas cristianas o con partidos confesionales. Hay que liberar al mundo del mito y de la mística, para dejarlo ser mundo. Esta posición, muy del agrado de una sociedad capitalista y en desarrollo, sin embargo, es una renuncia al papel de Dios en el mundo. De alguna manera, es rendirse antes de dar la batalla contra el agnosticismo y la clausura de la humanidad en una visión recortada de la razón. El segundo, Bonhoeffer, buscaba un cristianismo sin religión, no individualista, lejano del sobrenaturalismo metafísico, y buscando un cristianismo kenótico (el Crucificado como imagen central de Dios, Dios que se oculta en la cruz). Bonhoeffer se sitúa así en la génesis de la nueva forma de pensar, pues hace un rechazo del dios metafísico: Veo de nuevo con toda claridad que no debemos utilizar a Dios como tapaagujeros de nuestro conocimiento imperfecto. Porque entonces si los límites del conocimiento van retrocediendo cada vez más –lo cual objetivamente es inevitable-, Dios es desplazado continuamente junto con ellos y por consiguiente se halla en una constante retirada. Hemos de hallar a Dios en las cosas que conocemos y no en las que ignoramos. Dios quiere ser comprendido por nosotros en las cuestiones resueltas, y no en las que aún están por resolver. Esto es válido para la relación entre Dios y el conocimiento científico. Pero lo es asimismo para las cuestiones humanas de carácter general como la muerte, el sufrimiento y la culpa. Hoy hemos llegado a un punto en que, también para estas cuestiones, existen respuestas humanas que pueden prescindir por completo de Dios. En realidad –y así ha sido en todas las épocas-, el hombre llega a resolver estas cuestiones incluso sin Dios, y es pura falsedad que solamente el cristianismo ofrezca una solución para ellas. Por lo que al concepto de UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 28 "solución" se refiere, las respuestas cristianas son tan concluyentes (o tan poco concluyentes) como las demás soluciones posibles. Tampoco en esto es Dios un tapa-agujeros. Dios ha de ser reconocido en medio de nuestra vida, y no sólo en los límites de nuestras posibilidades. Dios quiere ser reconocido en la vida y no sólo en la muerte; en la salud y en la fuerza y no sólo en el sufrimiento; en la acción y no sólo en el pecado. La razón de ello se halla en la revelación de Dios en Jesucristo. Él es el centro de nuestra vida, y no ha "venido" en modo alguno para resolvernos cuestiones sin solución. A partir del centro de nuestra vida, determinadas cuestiones desaparecen, e igualmente las respuestas (estoy pensando en el juicio sobre los amigos de Job). En Cristo no existen "problemas cristianos". Pero basta ya; acaban de estorbarme de nuevo (1983 218). Pero luego vendrán los teólogos más radicales. Paul van Buren afirmará que no hay razones intelectuales para el cristianismo y que éste sólo es una actitud ética de preocupación por los demás. Más allá de lo que ha representado histórica y éticamente, el cristianismo no es nada más (1963). Heredero de la filosofía positivista del lenguaje, vió que el contenido de la teología no era experimentalmente verificable y por eso no podría ser un lenguaje verdadero y ontológico. La Biblia como lenguaje no tiene sentido ni su historicidad es verificable. Lo único verificable en Jesucristo era que: "era un hombre libre capaz de entregarse a los otros, allá donde estuvieran" (Id. 121). Los discípulos tuvieron una experiencia sicológica y "empezaron a poseer algo de la libertad de Jesús; y esa libertad comenzó a ser contagiosa..." (Id. 133-124). La tesis de van Buren se rinde totalmente ante la filosofía analítica, excluye cualquier tipo de metafísica y de trascendencia y ni siquiera abre el camino a otra reflexión. Para él, el cristianismo es una historia más dentro de las múltiples historias que hay en la humanidad. La Ciudad Secular de Harvey Cox (1965) es una aceptación de la llegada de la secularización. Con razón puede considerarse uno de los padres de la teoría de la secularización. Esta se caracteriza por la libertad del mundo frente a lo religioso, el pragmatismo filosófico y político y la profanidad como algo subsistente en sí mismo de tal modo que las cuestiones últimas no tengan ninguna interferencia en las soluciones políticas. El hombre ha tomado el mundo en sus propias manos y es el responsable de la historia sin relación a nada trascendente. El hombre "se ha liberado CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 29 de la tutela religiosa y metafísica, para apartar su atención de otros mundos y volverla hacia este". (Id. 17). Más importante que la metafísica es la política pragmática al estilo de Norteamérica. Es un prolegómeno al pragmatismo contemporáneo de los EE.UU. Es una rendición ya plena al pragmatismo estilo Richard Rorty. No hay metafísica sólo queda la acción política más o menos correcta. Pero el mismo Cox tuvo que reformar su posición cuando vio la crisis de la teoría de la secularización. En los últimos años del siglo XX, el resurgimiento religioso le obligó a repensar su posición. Su libro Fuego del cielo: el surgimiento de la espiritualidad pentecostal y la reconfiguración de la religión en el siglo XXI (2001) es una reconsideración del libro escrito treinta años antes. La observación del crecimiento del movimiento pentecostal que se convierte en el fenómeno religioso más importante del siglo XX, lo lleva a mirar el fracaso de la teoría de la secularización, el renacimiento de la religión y la aparición de un movimiento religioso que se convierte en una nueva Reforma para el siglo XXI. Importante, en este último libro, es su contribución a que se piense la religión como una experiencia mística que puede abrir el campo a una nueva reflexión filosófico-teológica que recupere el papel de la experiencia por encima de la teología y filosofía conceptuales. Luego llegarían los teólogos más incisivos de la teología de la muerte de Dios pero que se alejan más de una posición trascendente hasta el punto de que pueden ser llamados ateos. Simplemente aceptan la crítica de los siglos XIX y XX a la metafísica y a teología, la dan por cierta y comienzan a vivir en la sociedad posteísta, poscristiana y plenamente secular. El cristiano simplemente trabaja por un mundo más justo, sin más razones. William Hamilton (Altizer y Hamilton 1966) propone no ir más allá de la ética entendida como lucha por la justicia y por el orden. El hombre ha alcanzado su madurez y no necesita ya de la compañía de Dios y el hombre debe asumir su responsabilidad temporal. Realmente Dios ha muerto, es una pérdida verdadera y no se espera que vuelva el Dios cristiano, por tanto, la espiritualidad de la teología radical es la política. Altizer (1967), en cambio, opta por un misticismo secular. Comienza por aceptar las críticas a la ontoteología realizadas por los filósofos del siglo XIX pues ellos permiten descubrir el verdadero rostro del cristianismo. UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 30 En la perspectiva del destino histórico ateo de nuestro tiempo, un tiempo en el que la participación a la condición universal del hombre exige la asunción de una vida sin Dios, no está fuera de lugar plantear el problema de la necesidad de un ateísmo cristiano contemporáneo. Mi estudio acoge esa necesidad elaborando un análisis teológico basado sobre la visión del cristianismo de Blake, Hegel y Nietzsche. (Altizer y Hamilton 1966 23). La teología debe abandonar su forma religiosa, repudiando plena y coherentemente la búsqueda de un algo sacro primordial, y al mismo tiempo la negación religiosa y el rechazo de lo profano; porque, en la medida en que la teología permanece unida a un Verbo primordial y trascendente, permanecerá cerrada, fuera del presente y de la actualidad humana de la historia (Id. 77). En el pensamiento de Altizer Dios ha muerto para que viviera el hombre y ya no hay nada más que esperar. Se reduce a un humanismo interesante pero sin ningún aspecto de trascendencia o de posibilidades futuras de pensar a Dios. 3. Una nueva manera de pensar Hubo un momento en que se creó un clima de desesperanza en las posibilidades de la filosofía, y se cayó en una actitud pragmatista que llevó a la filosofía farandulera y al repetirse de la imposibilidad de encontrar vías de salida a los desafíos de la modernidad. Pero el mismo análisis de Heidegger abre el camino de una búsqueda mística procedente de Dionisio Areopagita como se ve en sus obras del llamado segundo Heidegger especialmente en los Beitrage. La influencia de Dionisio Areopagita en Heidegger es mostrada por Derrida en Cómo no hablar. Denegaciones, donde "recordaría sin embargo lo que en el pensamiento de Heidegger podría asemejarse a la herencia más cuestionadora, la repetición a la vez más audaz y más libre de las tradiciones que acabo de evocar (Platón, neoplatonismos, Dionisio)" (Derrida 1997) y es que Heidegger, de alguna manera se basa en la teología negativa, en el no-ser, en el rayo luminoso, el problema de Dios y el ser. Muñoz Martínez (2006) sitúa los siguientes puntos de contacto entre Heidegger y Dionisio: CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 31 un nuevo pensar que aunque normalmente se había atribuído a Heidegger, Dionisio ya lo había intentado con la teología apofática (Id.). Heidegger asume la teología negativa que revela los límites y fronteras de la razón y la incapacidad del lenguaje racional para acceder al Principio de todas las cosas. Se trata de buscar una nueva manera de pensar fuera de la ontoteología. Abandonar las representaciones indica entrar en otro pensamiento fuera también de la representación y del concepto, como lo hizo Dionisio en sus obras. En lo que se puede llamar el segundo Heidegger (el de Besinnung, Beitrage...) se da la misma estructura de búsqueda: el Ser se da en el evento sin hacer ruido. La teología mística de Dionisio es una experiencia, no una técnica ni una lógica racional, que se expresa en símbolos que dicen algo y luego lo niegan, hay semejanza y desemejanza, logrando expresar algo el símbolo eminente (hyper). El pensar heideggeriano tiene mucho de experiencia con el Ser, o mejor, de experiencia del ser. Es una experiencia mística del Ser que se tiene si se está a la espera, si se está en el claro, si se está disponible en el momento del paso del Ser, y que se expresa de manera más clara en la poesía, no en el lenguaje científico. El poeta es el decidor del ser con símbolos que no agotan ni definen el Ser, sino que lo muestran. "Se podría decir que Heidegger piensa en muchas ocasiones a la manera de la teología negativa" (Id. 43). Gelassenheit) como despojo, renuncia y abandono, le llega a Heidegger a través del "desapego" de Eckhart, como la humildad fundada sobre la nada. La serenidad es el desapego del pensamiento representativo y renunciar al querer vinculado con el horizonte. En Heidegger no es una renuncia voluntaria al querer, como en Eckhart, sino permanecer totalmente ajeno al querer. La serenidad es el estado de permanecer abierto a la Apertura o consumación del UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 32 total abandono que permite la apertura del mundo a Dios en el fondo del alma y la prueba de que el mundo está abierto a Dios allí donde el hombre ya no es él mismo (Libera 2000). Eckart es influenciado por Dionisio Areopagita en este sentido. (Deja los sentidos y las operaciones del entendimiento; deja todos los objetos sensibles e inteligibles, y universalmente todas las cosas que son y que no son. M.T I, 1). Para Dionisio, Dios es una suprema nada sobre la cual no se puede decir algún concepto. Escoto Erígena confirma que Dios no es un ser, porque si es un ser quedaría limitado en una definición. Eckhart sobre este camino habla del desapego como la condición de la apertura a la nada de Dios. Ese desapego es la condición para que Dios se manifieste o, en Heidegger, para que el ser pueda ser visto en el Lichtung. quitando todo aquello que a modo de envoltura impide ver claramente la forma encubierta. Basta este simple despojo para que se manifieste la oculta y genuina belleza. M.T. II). Así mismo, en la misma línea de los antiguos griegos, Heidegger plantea la verdad como aletheia o progresivo desvelamiento o manifestación. Dionisio y el neoplatonismo serían la oportunidad de repensar la ontología, a través de la teología negativa y de una vía mística: Heidegger, al final de su trayectoria, en lo que se llama la vuelta (Kehre), llegó a ver el ser, la realidad, como un don, como un regalo. Incluso le quita ese nombre tan abstracto, por metafísico, que es el de ser, y lo veía como acontecimiento, como acontecer (Ereignis). El acontecer es lo más gratuito que hay, en el doble sentido de que se da porque sí, sin más, y en el de que es algo que hemos de aceptar e incluso agradecer. Esto suena a veces a resignación, y por eso se habla de esta etapa de Heidegger como una etapa mística. Y, al modo de muchos místicos, al menos de una corriente en la historia de la mística, Heidegger adopta una actitud de silencio ante lo indecible, lo inefable. Lo que se llamó teología negativa, o, quizá más propiamente, ontología negativa, pues también del ser puede haber una mística; la ontología ha estado vinculada a la mística (Beauchot 2010). CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 33 La filosofía neoplatónica, especialmente Plotino y Proclo, entra al cristianismo con Dionisio Areopagita y con éste llega hasta hoy después de haber tenido una gran influencia en Occidente, a través de Eckart y Dionisio el Cartujano. Heidegger recibe la influencia del Areopagita y de Eckart. Los posheideggerianos y la filosofía francesa actual adoptan, mutatis mutandis, la filosofía neoplatónica especialmente en dos puntos: su rechazo a la metafísica occidental moderna racional-conceptual y su tendencia mística de abrirse a la manifestación del ser más como bondad o caridad que como ente. Bergson, Brehier, Blondel, Trouillard, Festugiére, Saffrey, Hadot, Henry, Marion... son algunos de los que han buscado por esta línea (Hankey 1999). Marion, por ejemplo, encuentra en Blondel la conversión de la voluntad o caridad por la cual se iría a Dios sin caer en la ontoteología. Esta teología sin ontología, Marion primero la descubrió en una relectura del neoplatonismo de Dionisio Areopagita como lo muestra en su libro El ídolo y la distancia (1977). También Agustín influye en Marion con su búsqueda de Dios bajo el nombre de caridad y no bajo el concepto de ser. Así Marion hace una síntesis de Dionisio, Agustín, un santo Tomás neoplatonizado y un Heidegger releído para afrontar los problemas de una concepción de Dios metafísica ontoteológica. Jean-Luc Marion considera que hay que superar el horizonte del objeto y el del ser. Éste ve que la crítica de los Maestros de la sospecha, entendida como crítica a la Ontoteología, es una manera de acabar con los ídolos conceptuales de la razón y abrir el camino a la manifestación del fenómeno saturado. Marion trata esto en su libro Dios sin el ser (2010). Esta concepción de Dios sin el ser, la ha encontrado Marion en el neoplatonismo de Dionisio Areopagita. El ídolo es la comprensión de Dios bajo conceptos, sean éstos antropomórficos o metafísicos. Pensar a Dios como ente supremo o como ente fundamento de la ética es idolátrico. Pero aún pensar a Dios sobre el fondo del ser en su diferencia del ente es idolátrico. Dios sería pensado a partir de una precomprensión humana, la del ser. UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 34 ¿Retroceder de la metafísica a suponer que llega el pensamiento dado al ser en tanto que ser, basta para liberar a Dios de la idolatría... o al contrario, la idolatría de la causa sui no reenvía a otra idolatría... más discreta... y por tanto, más amenazante? [...]. Más allá de la idolatría propia de la metafísica, opera otra idolatría propia del pensamiento del Ser en cuanto tal. (Id 58-65). La solución, para Marion, es pensar a Dios con el término de amor (agape). El amor se da y se da sin condiciones. El donador se abandona completamente a la donación hasta coincidir donador y donación. Y darse completamente sin precomprensiones o comprensiones, es amar. El amor excluye al ídolo, pues en el movimiento del darse, el sujeto no cubre al otro con su conceptualidad sino que se abandona totalmente a él, hasta dejarse determinar en esta donación. Ya no se trata de pensar a Dios desde la conceptualización humana, sino desde el donarse: El amor no se da sino abandonándose, transgrediendo continuamente los límites del propio don, hasta trasplantarse fuera de sí. La consecuencia es que esta transferencia del amor fuera de sí mismo, sin fines ni límites, impide inmediatamente que se deje agarrar en una respuesta, en una representación, en un ídolo. Es típica de la esencia del amor –diffusivum sui– la capacidad de sumergir, así como una marea sumerge las murallas de un puerto extranjero, toda limitación, representativa o existencial del propio flujo; el amor excluye el ídolo, o mejor, lo incluye subvirtiéndolo. Puede también ser definido como el movimiento de una donación que, para avanzar sin condiciones, se impone una autocrítica permanente y sin reservas (Marion 2010). A partir de lo anterior se inicia el trabajo de "ampliar los límites de la razón" para superar la razón científica y dar cabida a una razón que incluya la donación de lo invisible. El neoplatonismo se ha convertido en un camino de búsqueda para superar las críticas a la ontoteología. Esto requiere una nueva manera de pensar. Y es lo que inaugura Heidegger. Un pensar abierto, casi místico. Pero que no se encierra en el concepto clásico, religioso y teológico, de mística. Un pensar místico que atraviesa las regiones de la poesía, el arte, el evento, para encontrarse con la CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 35 saturación de lo inconceptuable. Es el habitar poético del mundo. Desde Duméry, Trouillard y Stanislas Breton, en el reciente pasado francés, se busca una línea antimetafísica y quizás posmoderna. Luego Jean Luc Marion, tomando a Dionisio y releyendo el argumento ontológico de Anselmo, encuentra en la caridad el camino a un Dios sin el ser. Henry lo trata por el sendero de la inmanencia material de la vida y Lévinas por el rostro del otro. Se trata así de responder a las cuestiones levantadas por la Modernidad contra el Dios conceptual. Los franceses han tomado la delantera en esta reflexión. Posteriormente, los anglosajones se han introducido en el campo (por ejemplo, John Milbank, A. H. Amstrong, E.R. Dodds). Como se ve en la historia de la filosofía francesa de los dos últimos siglos, ha sido una fenomenología hecha por clérigos en su mayoría o por filósofos allegados a alguna confesión religiosa (Por ejemplo, Pierre Aubenqueprotestantey Jean Luc Marion –católico–). Esto ya hace plantear una pregunta. Será únicamente esta reflexión cuestión clerical de relacionar la fe con la teología, ¿o es el fenómeno saturado, el darse del fenómeno, una estructura universal de la reflexión filosófica? En este último sentido lo plantea Marion pero debe seguir la discusión (Arboleda 2007). 4. Del Dasein al DaGott. Para Marion, responder la cuestión ontológica (¿Qué es el ser?), transforma la reflexión en ontoteología por eso propone dejar que la manifestación sea la que indique el camino. La pregunta subyacente para Marion es: ¿Dios se ha revelado como Ser o como algo más? Asumir que se debe revelar como ser es ignorar la manifestación que se da del fenómeno saturado. Los seres particulares son tales porque son llamados y constituidos por el Otro. Es importante para Marion la respuesta a la manifestación, más que hacerse la pregunta que implica una respuesta del Otro como ser. Dios es sin el ser, es la proposición del francés. Actuando así, subvierte el sistema jerárquico de fundamento y fundado. UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 36 El problema de la muerte de Dios en Nietzsche es uno de los puntos de partida de Marion. Este cree que puede acabar con el ídolo conceptual que es el dios de la metafísica, abriendo el espacio a la verdadera manifestación. Dios debe ser pensado sin el ser. Y debe ser pensado con el único concepto que permanece posible fuera de la diferencia ontológica. El concepto de amor (ágape). Para lograr esta tarea, Marion esclarece fenomenológicamente el "ver". El ver permite desvelar la posibilidad de visibilidad de lo invisible (los fenómenos saturados, incluyendo la estética). El somete la objetividad y la cuestión del ser a la tarea de ser llevadas al extremo. Así radicaliza la reducción husserliana a partir del yo constituyente, pero también la heideggeriana a partir del Dasein. Busca una reducción pura a lo dado como tal, por un interlocutor originario, interpelado por la donación misma. Este es el cuarto principio de la fenomenología. Es el concepto de donación: el fenómeno es un don, un dado, un fenómeno saturado, hasta ahora no reconocido por la fenomenología pero sí presente en la mística, la estética, la historia, la poesía. Este fenómeno es aquel en el cual la intuición excede el concepto y la efectividad precede a la posibilidad. El sujeto (adonado) es el que se recibe a sí mismo cuando recibe el don, el dado. Si recibe el don como no ser, no será ya más Dasein sino Da-Gott o aún Da-Gegeben. Marion trata de refundar la fenomenología. Un nuevo comienzo de la filosofía. De acuerdo con Heidegger, hay dos comienzos históricos filosóficamente hablando. El primero es el descubrimiento (desvelamiento) del ser en la primera filosofía griega, rápidamente olvidado por la preocupación por el ser. Y el segundo, es el comienzo que se da con el trabajo de Nietzsche, aunque, dice Heidegger, éste no logró la plena emancipación de la metafísica (1999) Marion, de alguna manera, se presenta en la línea de este segundo comienzo, tratando de superar a Heidegger. La fenomenología no sería una escuela o doctrina filosófica sino un nuevo método para filosofar lleno de aperturas y posibilidades. Este nuevo método estaría representado, entre otros, por Paul Ricoeur, Michel Henry, Marc Richir, Marion, etc. También la filosofía de Lévinas participa en esta refundación. Su mirada del otro, entraña una redefinición radical de la intencionalidad, una emancipación CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 37 de la intencionalidad objetivante y del ver fenomenológico. Todos estos "herejes" de la fenomenología plantean una arquiética, una arquignosis, una fenomenología hiperbólica y metafórica, y un nuevo sujeto pasivo y adonado. Se apura la reducción hasta que es cancelada. La posibilidad de la fenomenología se lleva al exceso. Y se lleva al extremo a Heidegger. Es el uso extremo del Beiträge zur Philosophie heideggeriano. No es que el Ser o la Vida sean algo, con una esencia que se da, sino que el Ser (Heidegger está inspirado en Meister Eckhard y quizás Dionisio) "es" pura donación de sí. Supone una radicalidad total pues la iniciativa es del fenómeno saturado incondicionado e inabarcable y el sujeto es radicalmente pasivo. No hay conceptualización sino simbolización permanente de lo que se manifiesta siempre diferente. Heidegger ya había puesto en cuestión el problema del sujeto constitutivo kantiano. "¿En qué consiste esta puesta en cuestión? En una revolución radical: la subjeti(vi)dad no reconoce ya por objetivo la objetivación del objeto, porque el instrumento último de esta objetivación -la intencionalidad- no apunta ya, como para Husserl al llevar a término el proyecto kantiano, a la constitución de objetos, sino a la apertura de un mundo" (Marion 1993 440). El sujeto no está como espectador constituyente del mundo, sino que es arrebatado por el mundo que se abre y se abre en la medida en que el Dasein hace la apertura mediante su propio éxtasis. "El éxtasis del Dasein consiste en que, lejos de fundarse sobre su esencia o de fundar su esencia en sí mismo (según las dos postulaciones, kantiana y aristotélica, de la subjetividad), él es el ente a quien le va, en cada caso, nada menos que su ser; mejor aún: el ente para quien, cuando le va su ser, está también en juego el ser de todos los demás entes" (Id.). El Dasein es el sucesor y heredero del sujeto constituyente y se convierte en el ser propio que constituye la propia vida en la que está en juego el propio ser. Ese ser mío se da en la resolución. Ésta anticipa despejando el ser del Dasein como cuidado y permite buscar el sentido del ser por venir. La UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 38 resolución aparece y se prepara en la angustia, la duda y la muerte. Estas son experiencias fenomenológicas que abren extáticamente hacia la nada. Pero que según interpreta Marion, en Heidegger se da una reminiscencia del sujeto constituyente pues la autenticidad exige la conciencia del Dasein como constancia de sí mismo expuesto a la nada. El éxtasis del Dasein, aunque en un primer momento, suprime el yo kantiano o cartesiano, en un segundo momento, restablece la autarquía del Dasein, idéntico a sí mismo por sí mismo. Y esa autarquía imita, la autoconstitución y la permanencia en la subsistencia. "Sobre el Dasein sigue planeando la sombra del ego" (Id. 445). Heidegger no da el paso de la superación de la autoconstitución del sujeto aunque ha planteado la apertura del mundo por el éxtasis del sujeto. Está servida la aporía de quien llama y es llamado al mismo tiempo. Heidegger en La carta sobre el humanismo, parece cambiar cuando invoca la "apelación por la cual el ser reclama al hombre como la instancia fenomenológica de su manifestación. Al contrario que en Sein und Zeit, donde la apelación vuelve siempre a ser una apelación de sí mismo, aquí la apelación reclama, en nombre del Ser, al hombre, desde el exterior y de antemano" (Id. 448). Y el hombre instituido por la llamada del Ser, se constituye en el Reclamado. "¿Qué pasa con este sujeto así entendido? Es una revolución radical" (Id. 440). Lo que está en el mundo no son objetos constituidos por el sujeto, sino que el sujeto está como abrumado por lo que encuentra. El mundo no es la suma de los objetos constituidos por el yo, sino que es apertura a lo que se da. El Dasein no constituye al ser, sino que se arriesga al ser que se manifiesta y el ser para la muerte es el arriesgarse a ese aparecer que lo constituye y que no es constituido. La fenomenología recoge ese reto, qué sucede al sujeto? Al sujeto le sucede la interpelación. Esta instituye al interpelado. ¿Qué o quién interpela? Se dan varias respuestas: Dios (en la teología), el otro (Lévinas), la vida (Henry), el ser (el acontecimiento en Heidegger). Son respuestas posteriores simbólicas. Si en el momento de la reclamación se conociera al interpelante, se volvería a la plena intencionalidad y a CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 39 la construcción del que se da. Se estaría de nuevo en la ontoteología. Si no hay sorpresa en la interpelación es porque se conoce quién es el ser, el otro, Dios o la vida. Vuelvo a ser un yo constituyente. Pero el total anonimato del apelante y la facticidad humilde del interpelado garantizan la gratuidad del don (Id.). Gratuidad que resuena y se pierde, se pierde pero deja huella, huella que es símbolo pero no esencia. El apelante se manifiesta al interpelado, lo constituye, y de ahí, el interpelado puede responder. La subjetividad es una subjetividad finita, no constituyente sino recipiente de una fenomenalidad encarnada, afectada, inmanente. El ser es el aparecer al sujeto que recibe ese aparecer. Se afirma la irreductibilidad del ser del ego a la objetividad, pues desaparece la intencionalidad y se llena de intuición. Esta refundación de la fenomenología hace de la conciencia, no la condición de la manifestación, sino la manifestación originaria. Es la fenomenología de la esencia de la manifestación, fenomenología de la manifestación inmanente, fenomenología de la vida, el amor, la carne. Esta fenomenología relaciona el logos y las cosas en el fondo de la inmanencia. Entran allí a funcionar la sensibilidad y el pathos. El arte, la pintura, la poesía, el dolor y el sentimiento son lugares donde la experiencia tiene su propio sentido y su propia razón, pues es donde aparece el aparecer. En la obra de arte, por ejemplo, está el fenómeno que aparece y que está por y para aparecer, dándose simplemente en forma saturada. En el proceso de donación, se cuestiona que toda experiencia humana sea una interacción entre el sujeto y el objeto. Hay la experiencia de unidad que se podría llamar de apabullamiento del sujeto por la inmensidad del don. En el método fenomenológico tradicional, la intencionalidad es central y asume que el sujeto y el objeto de conciencia son distintos. La premisa básica, llamada intencionalidad, significa que el acto de pensar es un acto que afirma la unión que existe entre el sujeto pensante y el objeto del pensamiento. Hay un esfuerzo por parte del sujeto para poder conocer al objeto. En la experiencia del don, en cambio, no se actúa con UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 40 los métodos cualitativos o cuantitativos de la investigación científica, sino con la experiencia de lo dado profundamente. En ésta, se abandona lo externo (epojé), y hay un sentimiento de que el ego es trascendido. El yo queda abrumado, sin fronteras, como diluido en el universo, de tal manera que la dualidad entre sujeto y objeto queda superada. El sujeto es agobiado por la experiencia y como ésta no es una experiencia cognitiva, no se puede expresar en conceptos. No hay palabras para expresar en términos de reducción fenomenológica, lo vivido. Sólo se expresa en términos negativos: no tiempo, no espacio, no relación. La intencionalidad queda reemplazada por unas estructuras de experiencia que se pueden expresar como sin tiempo, ni espacio, ni conexión con algo. Es una experiencia total de pasividad, en la que no se piensa o se elaboran conceptos. El sujeto y el objeto son uno? Esa es la conceptualización general de la experiencia, pero va más allá de eso. Hay una inadecuación en el mismo método fenomenológico para dar razón de tal experiencia. La experiencia del fenómeno saturado hace posible entender el estado de un yo kenótico. La fenomenología trascendental tiene que llegar al exceso de la fenomenología radical. En ésta, la epojé fenomenológica coloca entre paréntesis toda preconcepción para poder reducir todo el material experiencial a su pura esencia. Reinterpretar la experiencia con base en las propias preconcepciones o teorías es un error lógico y metodológico. Esta epojé no es una premisa en el proceso de deducción, sino una actitud vital, una fenomenología práctica que lleva a la pura experiencia. Esta experiencia no es contraria o distinta a la razón, sino que es su plenitud. La razón, desde la modernidad, se quedó en los fenómenos pobres de intuición (y potenció la ciencia experimental), dejando para otro tipo de conocimiento como la fe, lo relativo a lo trascendente que no era construible por el Yo. La radicalización de la fenomenología abre de nuevo el campo a la potencia de la razón, aunque con un yo receptivo y no potente. San Juan de la Cruz indica el método fenomenológico de ese proceso y muestra el resultado. La dificultad con San Juan es que ha expresado su camino con un lenguaje que puede ser el de la ascética y la religiosidad, y así se ha entendido. Despojando a sus obras de la CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 41 intelección piadosa que se ha hecho de ellas, se encuentra un método que es completamente comparable al de los nuevos fenomenólogos franceses. La reducción fenomenológica, eidética, trascendental y egológica tiene allí su residencia aunque haya que hacer un trabajo de traducción del lenguaje ascético-virtuoso y de sus connotaciones culturales al filosófico. La experiencia transmitida por él, es profundamente racional, en sentido amplio, y presenta una epistemología del misticismo como recepción del don. En un contexto epistemológico, el estado de negatividad del alma puede considerarse como la condición de posibilidad de una directa intuición del fenómeno. La negación presupone la pasividad del sujeto y la actividad de quien se revela. Esta actividad es la divina infusión o sea la plena donación o plena intuición. Superando las dos analogías o símbolos principales utilizados por San Juan de la Cruz, el amante y el esposo, se puede ver el amor como expresión de esa relación entre el sujeto y el donador. Aunque se puede pensar que es una mística o una donación irracional, la mística de San Juan de la Cruz muestra la posibilidad real de la donación. Marion presenta la estructura fenomenológica de la donación y San Juan de la Cruz su realización. Es otra forma de presentar la razón, no ya como la que domina, sino como quien recibe. El ejercicio de la simbolización hace que la razón tenga un papel importante en la reflexión sobre la experiencia de la manifestación. La donación es una apelación que "me" constituye. El momento de la apelación me constituye en "me" o "a mí". Llamado, desaparecido todo yo, soy invadido por la interpelación. Hay un desastre del yo y se constituye el "a mí", el interpelado, el llamado. Este tiene cuatro características: convocación, sorpresa, interlocución, facticidad (Marion 1993). El interpelado siente una llamada de sometimiento. Sin ninguna intencionalidad o reflexión previa, se anula la subjetividad en aras de una llamada anónima. Es sorprendido por un éxtasis que no es cognoscitivo (pues el sujeto no despliega un objeto ya constituido o conocido) sino que es oscuro, éxtasis impuesto, soportado, subyugante. No hay conciencia UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 42 original constituyente sino sorpresa de una llamada que no se sabe de donde viene. No es una admiración metafísica dada en la subjetividad, sino una admiración inmanente dada al yo paciente. Esa apelación "me habla" sin conceptos, simplemente "se me da" constituyéndome en interlocutor que no contesta sino que "sufre" una interlocución, es la reducción fenomenológica a lo puramente dado. Esa interlocución produce o hace reconocer la facticidad. Todo humano es convocado, llamado, "interlocutado" desde antes de su nacimiento. El hablar del interpelado es oír pasivamente una palabra sin conceptos pero que crea alteridad y "me" constituye en "llamado". Es oír una llamada no conceptual que sólo es llamada, don, apertura al aparecer de la llamada gratuita. Se constituye el hombre como "dotadodonado" con capacidad de responder, lo que mantiene la "diferencia". El llamado no es el apelante, sino el receptor de la llamada que lo constituye "otro" distinto al apelante. La llamada no proviene del apelado pues sería clara y distinta, y, en verdad, es oscuramente clara o claramente oscura. La autenticidad radica en la pasividad de la recepción, la inautenticidad en la constitución del yo fuerte. La primera confirma la verdad de la constitución por el llamado, la segunda la limitación a lo que el yo pueda constituir. El interpelado difiere del apelante y, por tanto, difiere también de sí mismo, no es un yo sino un otro, el otro del interpelante y el otro de los interpelados. El retraso entre la percepción del llamado por parte de los interpelados y el llamado del interpelante, marca también la diferencia entre los dos. El interpelado es un retrasado ante el continuum del llamado. ¿Quién es el interpelante que "me" constituye? Aquí hay un problema con los autores tratados. De alguna manera, introducen la intencionalidad al decir que es el Ser (en el evento), Dios (en las religiones), el Otro (Lévinas), la Vida (Henry), el Amor (Marion), Cristo (Tillich). Hacen una aproximación simbólica al interpelante. Este es anónimo, oscuro, profundo, innominable... que no se puede colocar en una instancia regional como lo simbólico, aunque éste es la única manera de nombrarlo precariamente. Por eso, la propuesta apofática salvaguarda el anonimato del interpelante y permite que en el evento se manifieste el mismo en forma diferente cada CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 43 vez y no se pueda agotar su realidad ni entender su esencia. La filosofía permanece como tarea siempre antigua y siempre nueva en un proceso de hermenéutica de la llamada, indagando por el aparecer y por el don, sin agotarlos ni reducirlos. El anonimato del interpelado garantiza la labor sin tregua del filósofo: el darse y el perderse de la donación hace que no necesite fundación pues se cumple en el resonar y se cumple también en el perderse (irse sin dejar huella ni nombre). El recurso a lo simbólico, de manera inmediata en la filosofía, haría que estuviéramos fundando la apelación de nuevo en la metafísica, o reduciéndola a conciencia de la inmanencia. En verdad, se revela en la inmanencia como sorpresa de alteridad, pero no se confunde con ella y sólo sería, en este caso, un epifenómeno sicológico o patológico, y se conocería de antemano el quién de la interpelación. No es el resultado de una intuición obsesiva deseada o profundamente dirigida. Como dice Marion: "la reclamación no tiene que hacerse conocer para hacerse reconocer, ni identificarse para ejercerse" (Id. 455). Pero ahí está la labor del filósofo: buscar más allá del ser pero no con la razón que desembocaría en una teodicea, sino en el exceso de una extática erótica. El inicio de la filosofía no es la pregunta por el ser, sino la admiración o asombro por la realidad total que no se expresa en conceptos de ser. Este es un símbolo posterior a la experiencia del aparecer del fenómeno. La realidad es revelada, manifestada, donada. La filosofía racional luego trató de domeñarla a través del logos conceptual. Este hizo del ser algo único y unívoco, dejando al símbolo y a la metáfora el papel de simples expresiones retóricas, cuando en verdad acogen (imperfectamente) la totalidad de la realidad siempre nueva y reveladora, pero siempre oculta e indecible. La physis ama el ocultamiento y lo que se manifiesta son sus apariciones (Heráclito Frag. 123). La filosofía occidental ha pretendido su aprehensión intelectual y por eso le ha quedado únicamente el concepto preciso como solución descuidando el pensamiento simbólico. Este exige que en el fondo haya una pneumatología, una revelación. Así la nueva metafísica es una poesía, poesía erótica del aparecer y del aparecer como interpelado por la cuota mistérica de lo que da y se oculta. La filosofía es una mística, poiesis de UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 44 la experiencia extática de la presencia del fenómeno total. Poiesis siempre posterior a la experiencia de la facticidad y la sorpresa. La experiencia de la que se ha venido hablando es una dimensión humana. Siempre se da en la humanidad como vía de acceso a la realidad, pues la filosofía como aprehensión total y conceptual del ser es una tarea posterior de los filósofos. Primero han estado la mística (cerrar los ojos para ver) y los misterios (orgía y frenesíembriaguez ante el abandono de la razón). No es propiedad de una determinada religión ni es una experiencia únicamente religiosa, aunque las religiones se han apropiado de ella arrebatándosela al hombre. Esto era claro para los griegos órficos: la iniciación mística permitía a los filósofos comunicarse con el más allá. Esta comunión con el más allá es la vivencia extática misma, de naturaleza poética, que produce el entusiasmo filosófico para poder "ir más allá". "En una noche oscura, con ansias en amores inflamada, Oh dichosa ventura, salí sin ser notada, estando ya mi casa sosegada", expresará San Juan de la Cruz. Es el platónico "dar la espalda al mundo", dejar aparte el intelecto y sumergirse en lo báquico como denomina Marsilio Ficino la tarea de la teología mística en Dionisio Aeropagita (Ramos 1992). Este dejar aparte el intelecto no es rechazarlo pues la experiencia no lo anula sino que lo deslumbra. Es una iluminación del intelecto racional, pero no una iluminación racional del intelecto o un reemplazo del intelecto racional. El exceso es posible, la cultura podrá simbolizar la manifestación en un juego orgiástico de simbolizaciones que permitirán la hermenéutica remitiéndose al fenómeno que siempre se revela en forma diferente. Sean vida, libertad, amor, incondicionado, alteridad... el juego de los símbolos dirigirá la cultura que vive en el exceso de la manifestación, la posibilidad de la profundidad. La filosofía primera es la donación de la profundidad y la hermenéutica es la simbolización múltiple de su aparecer. Es un pensamiento difícil de comunicar pero hay que mantener la pasión por testimoniarlo: Dios es el que se manifiesta al hombre y por eso éste es "Dios ahí" (Da-gott). El ser ya no entendido como ser sino como donación de amor, es el propio manifestar o dación, y es su relación con el recipiente. El darse significa la esencia misma de la donación, pues el CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 45 amor es concederse. Heidegger lo entendía como darse del Ser (de ahí sus restos metafísicos), pero en Dionisio y Marion, es el darse del dar, darse del Hyper-ousia, darse del amor, darse de Dios. El hombre es el recipiente, la apertura que es llenada con el darse del amor, es el guardián del amor recibido. Esa es la humanidad del hombre: ser el ahí del amor, en términos creyentes, ser el ahí de Dios. El hombre no es pues un objeto biológico, ni siquiera un animal racional, sino que es el ahí de Dios (Da-gott) 5. Unas conclusiones para seguir pensando Dionisio Areopagita seria pues el nuevo medieval contemporáneo que permitiría el acceso a los fenómenos que no caben dentro de la razón científica y ayudaría a comprender la situación humana hoy. Hay unos puntos comunes de reflexión que quedan planteados con la relación Dionisiomística medievalHeideggerfenomenología francesa: La posibilidad filosófica y la efectividad teológica de una experiencia de Dios. Punto importante pues tiene muchas implicaciones en filosofía y en teología. Por una parte, se salvaguarda la posición filosófica de la fenomenología de seguir pensando la posibilidad de la manifestación del ser y se conserva la propiedad teológica de hablar de la efectiva revelación de Dios. Pero, por otra parte, abre una fuente de reflexión interesante: ¿hay una estructura ontológica originaria humana que permita hablar de la posibilidad de acceder a Dios por parte del hombre? En San Agustín y en Heidegger se dan las bases de esa estructura y de esa posibilidad. La estructura ontológica originaria, según Agustín, está fundamentada en la preocupación o inquietud1. La vida es preocupación por la "vita beata", es decir, por la autenticidad, en términos de Heidegger, que busca la salvación. La existenciariedad (anticipación de las posibilidades), UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 46 la facticidad (encontrarse arrojado en el mundo) y la caída (posibilidad de perderse en la inautenticidad debido a la delectatio (tentación) son tres elementos cooriginarios de la preocupación por la felicidad. En esa estructura originaria late y lucha por salir el deseo de Dios. La vida es movilidad vital fáctica y su esencia es la preocupación por lo que verdaderamente hace feliz al hombre. Hay un anhelo "esencial" por lo definitivo que da sentido a esa movilidad vital. En otros términos hay un anhelo que indica una apertura a otra cosa que no sea fáctica ni histórica ni finita. Podría ser lo que Heidegger llama la pregunta por el ser, tarea infinita y que sería la apertura a la manifestación del ser, o manifestación de Dios en otros filósofos. Una definición sencilla del hombre es que es una apertura que necesita ser llenada, un espacio a la espera del acontecimiento plenificador. El hombre es una esperanza abierta a una manifestación de algo más allá de él mismo. Si esto sea un existenciario ontológico, es tarea tanto de la filosofía como de la teología investigar su consistencia. La posibilidad de una crítica definitiva a la ontoteología desde la concepción autorrevelatoria del fenómeno saturado. La crisis actual de las religiones institucionalizadas radica en gran parte en la concepción ontoteológica del Ser supremo y en la esclerosis dogmática de sus creencias. Una vuelta a la comprensión de lo Ultimo como fenómeno saturado, a través de la mística, salvaría la absoluta transcendencia de Dios, la plenitud de su manifestación aunque inabarcable, y la historicidad dogmática de las religiones. Si definitivamente se ha enterrado la ontoteología, la tarea de la filosofía y la teología es volver a la experiencia. La experiencia de lo que puede llamarse el Incondicionado o el fenómeno saturado se da al hombre continuamente. Si es innombrable e indefinible en su esencia misma o en el instante de su manifestación, no lo es en el acto hermenéutico que sigue a la revelación o manifestación. La experiencia de la manifestación es universal y permanente, pero la interpretación de ella por parte del recipiente es histórica y cultural. El incondicionado se manifiesta siempre tal cual es, es decir, total y excedente, magnífico pero inagarrable, colma todas las intencionalidades del hombre y desborda todo horizonte de CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 47 comprensión. Así la experiencia siempre es total e incompleta al mismo tiempo. Se tiene la experiencia de la totalidad pero no se logra asimilar toda su magnitud. Dios se da en sí mismo, en lo que él es, pero el hombre no logra asimilar toda su manifestación. Por eso, sigue la interpretación que tiene dos etapas. Una primera etapa es poética. Se trata de expresar lo que es Dios en términos como unión, matrimonio, luz, vida, amor, belleza, claridad...En la segunda etapa se expresa en los términos de la cultura o sea en forma hermenéutica. La hermenéutica trae la experiencia a una forma comunicable dentro de una cultura. Se sitúa en una historia y en una tradición donde es significativa dicha experiencia por la semejanza o desemejanza con otras experiencias recordadas en la cultura. Esta tradición se convierte en forma autenticatoria de la experiencia tenida, y si lo es, se considera parte constitutiva de la misma tradición. Pero como situada también históricamente, tiene algo que decir al momento mismo de la comunidad donde se realiza. La experiencia se sitúa en la comunidad pero es novedosa para esa comunidad. De lo contrario, se estaría repitiendo la tradición o legitimando una coyuntura. Toda experiencia es novedosa pues está situada en la tradición y al mismo tiempo la confronta con nuevas adquisiciones. La solución que aporta Dionisio a Heidegger y a los fenomenólogos al hablar de la simultaneidad de la manifestación y el ocultamiento. Sólo una manera de pensar distinta a la de la metafísica tradicional, una manera de pensar encarnada en la razón mística, permitiría el acceso al misterio, misterio que se revela plenamente en cada manifestación, pero que se oculta de nuevo en su darse. Queda así salvaguardada la nueva metafísica de toda idolatría conceptual, histórica e integrista. El testigo de la manifestación, sujeto pasivo, elabora su experiencia con los símbolos que incluyen lenguaje, cultura, historia, pero que son siempre y constantemente hermenéutica del don. La dinámica de la manifestación y del ocultamiento siempre salvaguardan la "distancia" de Dios que se revela pero sigue siendo oculto. En términos sencillos, sólo "pedazos" o "rasguños" de Dios se captan en la experiencia mística y esos pedazos UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 48 o rasguños alimentan la historia de las comunidades, obligándolas a vivir siempre en la esperanza. El ya y el todavía no, indican la libertad de Dios y alimentan los esfuerzos humanos. En cada revelación Dios se da pero todavía no es el momento de su dación definitiva. Así se asegura la vida en la tierra, vida alimentada por la posibilidad siempre presente y siempre futura de la salvación. Esto cambia el sentido del tiempo, como lo muestra Heidegger en su análisis de las cartas paulinas. El cristiano primitivo no vive en el tiempo cronológico de lo que pasó y lo que vendrá. El cristiano vive en la tensión dialéctica entre lo que ya está dado sin estar completo, y lo que vendrá aunque ya está aquí. La esperanza se convierte en la seguridad de que la promesa ya está realizada aunque todavía no se ve claramente su cumplimiento. Así todo momento es ya el segundo advenimiento a la vez que impulsa a que se haga presente su plenitud. No se sienta el creyente a esperar lo que se espera, sino que siente que lo esperado ya está aquí en medio de las luchas y dificultades del presente. El carácter de la ética originaria que surge en el acto de revelación. Uno de los problemas graves hoy es el de la fundamentación de la ética. La manifestación del don, revelación del fenómeno saturado, continuo trato con el misterio del ser o de Dios, apertura al acontecimiento o Evento, fundamentaría una ética humana integral, sea que la hermenéutica entienda lo manifestado como Ser, vida, amor, el otro, luz, u otro símbolo histórico-cultural. Pero sólo una experiencia de Absoluto fundamenta una ética originaria. Bibliografía Altizer, Thomas. The Gospel of Christian Atheism. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966. _____. Toward A New Christianity: Readings in the Death of God . New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967. CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA e 49 Altizer, T. y William Hamilton. Radical Theology and the Death of God. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966. Arboleda Mora, Carlos. Profundidad y cultura. Del concepto de Dios a la experiencia de Dios. Medellín: Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, 2007. _____. "Dionisio Areopagita y el giro teológico de la fenomenología". Pensamiento y Cultura. 13,2, (2010): 181-193. Beuchot, Mauricio. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas de la Universidad Autónoma de México. 2010 <http://www.filosoficas. unam.mx/~afmbib/mayteAFM/Ponencias/19001.pdf>. Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. Resistencia y sumisión. Cartas desde la prisión. Salamanca: Sígueme, 1983. Caputo, John D. Philosophy and Theology. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2006. Cox, Harvey. The Secular City. New York, MacMillan, 1965. _____. Fire from heaven: the rise of pentecostal spirituality and the reshaping of religion in the twenty-first century. Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2001. Derrida, Jacques. "Cómo no hablar. Denegaciones". Derrida, J., Cómo no hablar y otros textos, Proyecto A, 1997, pp. 13-58. Edición digital de Derrida en castellano. http://www.jacquesderrida.com.ar/textos/ como_no_hablar.htm (consulta enero 10 de 2011). Gogarten, Friedrich. Destino y esperanza del mundo moderno, La secularización como problema teológico. Madrid: Marova, 1971. UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT 50 Hankey, Wayne John. "French Neoplatonism In The 20th Century". Animus. 204. 4 (1999): 135-167 Heidegger, Martin. Estudios sobre la mística medieval. México: FCE, 1997. _____. Contributions to philosophy (from enowning). Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999. Libera, Alain de. Patxi Lanceros y José María Ortega. Pensar en la Edad Media. Barcelona: Anthropos, 2000. Marion, Jean-Luc. L'idole et la distance, Cinq etudes. Paris: Grasset et Fasquelle, 1977 _____. "El sujeto en última instancia". Revista de Filosofía. 6. 10 (1993): 439-458. _____. Dios sin el ser. Castellón de la Plana: Ellago, 2010. _____. "La conversion de la volonté selon 'L'Action'". Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger, 177.1 (1987): 33-46. Muñoz Martínez, Rubén. Tratamiento ontológico del silencio en Heidegger. Sevilla: Fénix Editora, 2006. Pagallo, Giulio F. "¿Para qué Presocráticos?". Apuntes Filosóficos. 14. 27 (2005): 217-218. Ramos, Jorge. "Un acceso filosófico a la noción mística de gracia en san Juan de la Cruz." Estudios 28 (1992): 15 Ene. 2011 < http:// biblioteca.itam.mx/estudios/estudio/letras28/toc.html > CARLOS ARBOLEDA MORA 51 Robinson, John. Honest to God. Philadelphia: Westminster John Knox, 1963. Thomson, Ian. Heidegger on ontotheology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Vahanian, Gabriel. The Death of God: The Culture of Our Post-Christian Era. New York: George Braziller, 1961. Van Buren, Paul. The secular meaning of the Gospel. New York: Macmillan Co., 1963. UN NUEVO PENSAR SOBRE DIOS: DEL DASEIN AL DAGOTT

I s M o r a l i t y R e l a t i v e ? Michae l Garnet t Birkbeck College, University of London 1. Confessions I used to be a moral relativist-I used to think that moral judgements could be true or false only relative to a culture. Not just that: I used to think that moral relativism was obviously true. I struggled to understand how anyone could not be a moral relativist. Denying moral relativism, I thought, meant thinking that you were in possession of the one, true, universal, objective morality-and who could be so arrogant as to think they had that? I mean, maybe if you were religious you might think you had that. But even then, there are many different religions, and religious teachings require interpretation; and so who could be so arrogant as to think that they, out of everyone in the world, had hit on the one true interpretation of the one true religion? My mother is a social anthropologist, someone whose job it is to study different cultures, and growing up I was keenly aware of the huge differences in moral ideas and outlooks between different human societies. As a kid I'd sit through dinner parties listening to my mum and her anthropology friends swapping stories about the distant peoples with whom they'd lived: the things they'd had to eat (live grasshoppers and stewed goat's placenta were particular standouts), the different kinds of family structures they'd been welcomed into, and the different ideas about ethics and the cosmos that they'd learned about. For as long as I can remember, then, I've known that the ideas I happen to have about things like property, marriage, suicide, homicide, incest, cannibalism, the natural world, and so on, are mostly just local to me and to my little corner of the world. So how could I not have been a relativist? Perhaps I could have believed in a universal, objective morality if I'd been ignorant of the extent of these 2 cultural differences-if I'd somehow thought that everyone in the world shared more or less the same moral ideas as me and the other white, middleclass Londoners in my neighbourhood. But I wasn't ignorant: I had a front row seat at the theatre of human cultural diversity. So to believe in a single true morality I would have had to believe, arrogantly, that somehow I (along with the rest of my 'tribe') had some special access to the moral truth, a special access denied to everyone else on the face of the planet. What could possibly justify this? After all, it's simply an accident of birth that I grew up to have the moral ideas that I have. Had I instead grown up on a Fijian island, or deep in the Amazon basin, or in rural China, I would have had an utterly different moral outlook. Clearly, I had no better claim to the moral truth than anyone else. And that's why I thought moral relativism was obviously true. But I'm not a moral relativist any more. So what happened? What happened is I studied philosophy. Philosophy showed me that I was muddled about what exactly did and didn't follow from these facts about cultural diversity and disagreement, and it helped me to see everything more clearly. I eventually came to understand that, of the various things I thought about this topic, some of them were correct, but weren't moral relativism; and some of them were moral relativism, but weren't correct. It took me a few years to get this all straightened out in my head. What you're reading now is my attempt to pass some of this on, to give you a shortcut through the thicket. This is the essay that I wish I'd been able to read after sitting through those anthropology dinners, my head spinning vertiginously at exotic tales of cultural difference. 2. Nobody's Perfect So what did I learn? One of the most important things was this: that believing in a single objective true morality doesn't mean that you must also think that you're the final authority on what it contains. Morality needn't be any different from anything else on this score. We all make mistakes, we all get things wrong (sometimes badly wrong), everyone is fallible, and no one can speak with final, absolute certainty about anything, morality included. To think that there's an objective morality, you needn't think that you can never 3 be wrong about it. (In fact, to think that you can be wrong about it, you maybe have to think that there's an objective morality-or otherwise there isn't anything to be wrong about. I'll come back to this later.) All of this flows from a basic distinction that's enormously important not just for ethics but also for philosophy as a whole. It's the distinction between, on the one hand, the nature of reality itself and, on the other hand, our knowledge of that reality; or, more briefly, between metaphysics and epistemology. Let me first try to illustrate this with a non-moral example: the existence of God. Here's one question: Does God exist? This is a metaphysical question. It's a question about the nature of reality itself. Now, here's another question: Can we know whether God exists? That's an epistemological question. It's a question about the nature or possible extent of our knowledge. And these are very different questions. They have independent answers. If God exists, then he exists whether we know it or not. And if he doesn't, then he doesn't exist even if people think they know that he does. The existence of God is an objective matter-either God's up there in the heavens or he isn't-and it doesn't depend on what we think or what we know. God's existence (or nonexistence) is the objective state of the world that we're trying to discover. The same applies to morality. One question is: Is there a single objective morality? That's a metaphysical question, a question about the nature of reality itself. Another question is: What can we know about this objective morality? That's an epistemological question, a question about what we can know. Just because you think there's a single objective morality doesn't mean you think you know everything, or even anything, about it. Of course, if you believe in a single objective morality then you've probably got some ideas about what you think it involves. But you needn't be very sure about this, and you certainly needn't think you can never be wrong. This is a view that philosophers call fallibilism: the view that our ideas and beliefs might be mistaken. You can be a fallibilist about all kinds of things. For instance, you could be a fallibilist about science: you could think that even our best scientific theories might be mistaken. (Nearly everyone, and 4 definitely all scientists, are fallibilists about science.) Similarly, you could be a fallibilist about morality: you could think that even our best moral theories might be mistaken. The crucial point is that being a fallibilist about morality needn't make you an anti-objectivist or a relativist. It's possible to think both that there's one true objective morality and that we're often mistaken about what it consists in. To be an objectivist about morality, you don't have to arrogantly assume that you know all the moral truths. In fact, it's pretty difficult to be a fallibilist about morality without being an objectivist. Suppose that I, an objectivist, say: 'I think that abortion is morally permissible; but I might be wrong'. What do I mean? What I mean is this: first, that there's an objective morality; second, that my best guess is that this objective morality tells us that abortion is morally permissible; and, third, that it might not-that for all I know it might, in fact, tell us that abortion is morally wrong. Now suppose that you, a moral relativist, say: 'I think that abortion is morally permissible; but I might be wrong'. What do you mean? Well, you can't mean that you think that objective morality might in fact tell us that abortion is morally wrong-because you don't think there is an objective morality! So what then? Maybe you mean that you think most people in your culture think that abortion is morally permissible, and that you might be wrong about what they think. But then you're not really admitting to the possibility of a moral mistake after all. You're just admitting to the possibility of a sociological mistake. The problem is that if there's no objective moral standard to test your moral claim against, then there's nothing that it can really mean for that claim to be right or wrong. This is, of course, part of the moral relativist's whole point: that there's no such thing as 'objectively right' and 'objectively wrong'. But, if so, then not only can you not say 'I'm objectively right'; you also can't say 'I might be objectively wrong'. Each is as meaningless as the other. In order to be wrong, there must be something to be wrong about-and that means (perhaps) that there must be some kind of objective morality. 3. Toleration and Respect So rejecting relativism doesn't mean thinking yourself morally infallible. Nor, I also came to understand, does it mean thinking that you're justified in 5 imposing your own moral views on others against their will. Moral relativism doesn't have a monopoly on toleration and respect for other cultures. In fact, counterintuitively, moral relativism often gets in the way of toleration. This is the second thing philosophy taught me to see more clearly about this topic. Let's take an example. Suppose that I think that polygamy (that is, the practice of having two or more husbands or wives at the same time) is morally wrong. Suppose that someone else (let's call her Beth) lives in a place where people practice polygamy and, like the majority of people in this place, doesn't think there's anything wrong with it. Suppose further that I believe in a single, objective moral truth. So, presumably, I think that it's an objective fact that polygamy is morally wrong, and I think that Beth is just in error about this. That seems disrespectful of her and her culture. Even more worryingly, it seems that I would therefore be justified in intervening in her culture and trying to stop the polygamy, possibly by force. (After all, didn't I just say (for the purposes of this example) that I think polygamy is objectively morally wrong?) By contrast, a moral relativist could be able to argue that Beth and I are both right: that polygamy is morally wrong for me (relative to my culture) but morally permissible for Beth (relative to hers). Moral relativism therefore seems to offer a more tolerant, 'live and let live' approach to these kinds of disagreements. Indeed, moral relativism arose in Europe partly as a reaction to an earlier colonial perspective, according to which the moral codes of other cultures were considered inferior to the supposedly correct moral attitudes of the Europeans, and therefore in need of changing (if necessary, at gunpoint). In this context, moral relativism played an important antiImperialist role by denying that any one culture was inherently better than any other. But you don't need to be a moral relativist to be able to challenge these sorts of racist colonial attitudes. I can think that I'm correct about polygamy, and that Beth is wrong, without thinking that I therefore have any right to impose my views on her against her will. For instance, I might think that in addition to telling us that polygamy is morally wrong, objective morality also tells us 6 that we must tolerate and respect other people and their cultures. Put differently: the problem with the forcible imposition of European values on other cultures might be that it is intolerant and disrespectful and coercive and unjust-where these are objective moral facts about colonialism. What's more, moral relativism can actually make it more difficult to criticise these sorts of colonial attitudes. That's because most 19th Century Europeans believed that they were justified in imposing their 'superior' values onto their 'backward' colonial subjects. So, relative to their culture, it was right for them to do this. Far from helping to show what's wrong with forcibly imposing your views on someone else, therefore, moral relativism can end up justifying it. This suggests that in order to condemn 19th Century European colonial attitudes, we need to do so from outside 19th Century European culture-and that, in turn, suggests again that we may need some kind of objective moral standard. 4. Context Is Everything If morality isn't relative, it must be universal: instead of applying only to certain people in certain places at certain times, moral truths must apply to all people in all places at all times. But, the relativist might ask, what moral truths could possibly have this kind of universal application? This problem is especially serious if we think of morality as a collection of simple rules, such as 'Do not steal', 'Do not kill', and so on. It just doesn't seem credible that rules like this could really apply to all people at all times. Indeed, we can all think of contexts or circumstances in which rules like this have exceptions. Take 'Do not steal', for instance. This seems like a pretty good moral rule as applied to you or I standing in a clothes shop thinking about shoplifting. But if someone were lost and starving in the wilderness, and she came across an empty and deserted cabin, would it really be wrong for her to go inside and take a tin of beans from the cupboard, if this would save her life? We might say: the moral rule 'Do not steal' doesn't apply to a starving person out in the wilderness, even though it does apply to us in a clothes shop. Or that it's true for us, but not true for her. And that, presumably, is moral relativism. 7 Here's another example of the same kind of thing. Suppose that you visit a distant culture, and you find out that they practice cannibalism. Not just that: you find out that they eat their own parents. (They don't kill their parents; they just eat them once they're already dead.) Pretty horrifying, right? If you asked around in our culture, I'd expect that almost everyone would agree that eating your own dead parents is morally wrong. But suppose that, as you get to know these people better, you also come to understand more about this practice. You learn that, for them, eating someone is a sign of enormous respect. You find out that they believe that by eating someone, by literally taking their flesh into your body, you enable them to live on through you, and you give them further life. You see that this is something they do as part of their funeral ceremonies, and that it has great cultural and emotional significance for them. Eventually, you're not quite so horrified by it. (I don't mean it's something you'd think about doing yourself-just that you can start to understand a bit why they do it.) Now, consider the following abstract moral question: 'Is it morally permissible to eat your own dead parents?' Well, it depends. In the context of our cultural beliefs and ideas, it almost certainly is wrong (if someone did that here, we'd be in Silence of the Lambs territory). In the context of these other cultural beliefs and ideas, though, it maybe isn't wrong. So the answer to this question depends on your culture. And that's just moral relativism, right? Well, no. Not in the way that term is normally understood. Specifically, accepting this needn't require anyone to give up the idea that there is one true objective universal morality. All it requires us to give up is the idea that morality consists in simple rules. And that's something we should give up anyway. Morality isn't simple; it's highly complex. The morality of an action depends on all sorts of subtle factors, including the motivations and beliefs of the person acting, the circumstances in which they act, the likely further effects of their action, and so on. All of this and more has to be taken into account when making moral judgements. But that doesn't mean that the standards we use to make such judgements, and the judgements themselves, aren't objective. It just means that they're complicated, and sensitive to context. 8 Once we accept that morality is complex, we'll no longer expect it to give us simple, universal rules like 'It's wrong to steal'. We'll expect it to give us more nuanced, particular judgements like 'It's wrong to steal clothes from a shop when you already have plenty of clothes' and 'It's permissible to steal unwanted food to save yourself from starvation'. (Even these still aren't nuanced and particular enough-they themselves are open to exceptions- but you get the idea.) And there's no reason to think that these more specific judgements can't be utterly objective and universal. These judgements (or more specific versions of them) might apply to all people in all places at all times: for instance, to anyone lost in the wilderness, regardless of time and place. So this isn't yet moral relativism. To distinguish it from relativism, philosophers call it contextualism. It's the idea that moral judgements must always take into account the particular context of their subject matter. Looking back, many of the anthropologists I grew up listening to over dinner weren't really relativists, but contextualists. Their main worry was about people blundering into foreign cultures, taking one look at the local practices, and forming strong moral judgements about them based only on simple rules derived from their own unexamined cultural ideas and beliefs. But you don't need the idea that there's no objective moral truth or that morality is relative in order to explain what's wrong with this. You only need the ideas that moral judgement must be sensitive to context, and that it normally takes a lot of time and effort to understand a foreign culture. 5. It 's Personal So here, at its most basic, is what philosophy taught me about relativism: that the reason I thought moral relativism was obviously true was that I didn't actually understand the alternatives. I thought that if you weren't a moral relativist, then necessarily you believed in some kind of universal objective ethics; and that if you believed in a universal objective ethics, then necessarily (1) you thought you knew all the answers, (2) you thought you were entitled to impose your beliefs on others, and (3) you thought that moral rules just applied everywhere regardless of local context. I now know that none of this is true. Moral objectivism doesn't commit you to any of these 9 things. You can believe that morality is objective without thinking that you're the final authority on all moral questions (just as you can believe that science is objective without thinking that you're the final authority on all scientific questions). You can believe that one of morality's objective requirements is toleration and respect for others. And you can believe that morality yields judgements that depend on the particular circumstances of a given case, and that they are no less objective for that. Here's another thing I learned. When I was younger, I assumed more or less that all reasonably intelligent, worldly people were moral relativists. (How could they not be?) But I then discovered that at least out of philosophers- the very people whose job it is to think carefully about these questions- virtually no one is a moral relativist. Moreover, this isn't because every philosopher believes in an objective morality. Far from it. It's because moral relativism isn't the only theoretical option, even for those who reject objectivism. Indeed, there are plenty of philosophers who completely reject the idea that moral judgements can be objective, but almost none of them are relativists. How so? Well, it's all very well rejecting the idea that morality is objective. But this just leads to another issue, which is what people are up to when they make moral claims and act on the basis of moral judgements. If there's no objective morality, then what on earth are they doing? Relativists have an answer to this, which is that people are talking about and acting on moral ideas that are true (or false) relative to their own cultures. But that's not the only possible answer. Some philosophers think that people aren't really talking about anything, but are instead just expressing their own personal subjective feelings. This view is called expressivism. Others think that people are talking about objective morality-there just isn't any objective morality actually out there, so they're making a mistake, like when people used to talk about witches or dragons. This is the error theory. (There are other theories too.) All of these theories-relativism, expressivism, error theory-share the idea that there's no objective morality, but they disagree over what, in that case, 10 people are actually doing when they engage in moral practices. And relativism isn't a popular option, even among anti-objectivists. Why not? Let's look a bit more carefully at the moral relativist's distinctive idea. This is that moral claims can be true and false, but only relative to different cultures. So, for example, 'stealing is wrong' might be true relative to modern English culture, but false relative to some other culture. This means that, if I'm a member of the one culture-if I'm a modern Englishman-then 'stealing is wrong' is true for me, whereas if you're a member of the other culture then it's false for you. But what is a culture? Where does one culture end, and another one begin? For example, are England and Scotland different cultures, or are they parts of the same culture? (Or London and Yorkshire? Or East London and West London?) Relatedly, how do you know which culture you belong to, and so which moral claims are true for you? I'm English and Cuban and Russian and American. When these conflict, who decides which morality applies to me? And what about disagreement within cultures? Not everyone in England (or in rural China or in the Amazon basin) shares the same moral code. So what then does it mean exactly to say that some moral judgement is 'true relative to English (or Chinese or Amazonian) culture'? Who decides what is true relative to a given culture? The root problem here is that cultures aren't always discrete, homogenous, easily categorisable entities. (In fact, many anthropologists nowadays don't even use the term 'culture'.) What's more, cultures aren't the only determinants of our moral identities. Our moral outlooks are shaped not only by our cultures but also by our positions within them, like our class, gender, race, sexual orientation, disability status, and so on. Indeed, not all moral relativists are cultural relativists. For example, some Marxists think that moral claims are true and false relative to different social classes, and others have thought the same about a wide range of other factors. All of this leads to the thought that morality isn't relative only to culture, but to all of these things (after all, picking out just one category over the others would be pretty arbitrary). But what happens then, as we go down this road of pulling more and more demographic categories into our relativist theory, is that we 11 gradually move away from the idea that moral claims are true and false relative to different groups, and towards the idea that moral claims are true and false relative to different individuals. At that point, 'this is true for me' stops meaning anything very different from just 'this is what I think'. And so we seem to lose sight of the distinctive, central idea of relativism-that moral judgements are true and false relative to different groups-and end up just with the idea that different people have different moral beliefs, something we already knew. In short, while moral relativism seems to lead to all sorts of problems about how exactly to define the relevant groups, and how to decide which moral claims are true relative to which groups, other kinds of anti-objectivism don't. And that's one of the main reasons why even anti-objectivist philosophers tend not to be relativists. (Or course, both expressivism and error theory have problems of their own-but that's a story for another time.) 6. Concluding Thoughts If I were to go back in time and give philosophical advice to my past self, it would be this. First, take very seriously the idea that there might be a single, universal, objective morality-that idea's not nearly as ridiculous as you think. Second, if after careful reflection you conclude that morality really isn't objective, then consider adopting some other kind of anti-objectivism in place of relativism. It may save you a lot of trouble. Unfortunately, I'll never be able to give this advice to its intended recipient. But I hope, at least, some of it has been useful for you.

François Laruelle. A Biography of Ordinary Man: On Authorities and Minorities. Ed. Jessie Hock and Alex Dubilet. Cambridge: Polity Books, 2018. 331 pp. ISBN 978-1-509-509-959. Reviewed by Ekin Erkan Columbia University To think minorities as 'difference' is to reduce them to their fusion with...their difference from the State, conceiving of them as statominoritarian mixtures, as modes or projections of power relations, profits and losses of an indefatigable grind – history. The other thought, properly minoritarian and no longer statominoritarian, radicalizes the conditions of the problem. It asks what would minorities be who would not form an additional universal – the intersection of the great authoritarian universals, Language, Sex, Culture, Desire, Power? Who would be par excellence real or formed of individuals as they are? (33) François Laruelle has rightfully earned the title of contemporary French philosophy's archetypical heretic, having fostered the "non-standard" method of univocal genericity and spurred an altogether radical praxis, inciting a new generation of loyal followers that include Jason Barker and Ray Brassier. Laruelle's method, often referred to as "non-philosophy" (though "non-philosophy" is an abbreviation of "non-standard philosophy"), withdraws from the metaphysical precept of separating the world into binarisms, perhaps epitomized by the formative division between "universals" and "particulars" in Kant's Transcendental Deduction. Laruelle's method also rejects the "evental" nature of Being described by Heiddegger as the foundation for philosophy's "standard model," which Heidegger termed Ereignis (often translated as "the event of Appropriation"). In its immanence, Laruelle's "One" is understood as generic identity an identity/commonality that reverses the classical metaphysics found in philosophy's bastion thinkers (a lineage that runs from Plato to Badiou), where the transcendental is upheld as a necessary precondition for grounding reality. Instead, Laruelle asserts the "One" as the immanent real: generic, non-philosophical and axiomatic. Drawing on The Minority Principle (1981) and Struggle and Utopia: At the End Times of Philosophy (2012), Laruelle further cultivates his project on generic ethics and axiomatic principles with his latest text, A Biography of an Ordinary Man: On Authorities and Minorities REVIEWED BY EKIN ERKAN Cincinnati Romance Review 46 (Spring 2019): 119-23 120 (2018). From the very beginning of the book, Laruelle stakes a "revolt against philosophers" (1) and, in particular, against philosophy's historical hostage of the "ethical Other" – staking a cause against philosophy's "warp and weft of games of power," which all too often reduce marginalized individuals and collectives to terms of "difference" (32). Laruelle, with great detailed prowess, surveys the excesses shoring the discipline of philosophy. Captivated with "revealing" and "reflection," Laruelle charges philosophy with increasingly moving towards a dominion stilted on dialectics, metaphysics, and Derridian différance at the expense of the Real. Where immanence does transpire in philosophical discourse, it is almost always tied to the Deleuzian plane of multiplicitous immanence. For Laruelle, this is far too weak. With the exception of speculative realism and object-oriented ontology, a quick canvas of contemporary philosophy evinces the terms of Laruelle's polemics: Slavoj Žižek's dialectic approach is indebted to Hegelian synthesis; Catherine Malabou's work on plasticity is contingent on Kantian "correlationism"; Michel Serres and Bernard Stiegler both rely on the aperture of transcendence. Thus, not only is Kant's transcendental deduction looming in Laruelle's foreground but so, too, is Deleuze's ethics (of "becoming-minor"). In A Biography of Ordinary Man, Laruelle tasks "non-ethics" with devolving "individual causality," the sole content of the "Real essence" (225). With one swift move, Laruelle's univocal immanence superimposes the (Kantian) analytic a priori as the Real before moving on to confront the true subject of this book – to poise a more precise and rigid means of working with science within the interior of philosophy. Laruelle proposes a terrain whereby science ceases to be a "techno-political fantasy" and becomes "a real science," whereby "man must be irreducible in his multiplicity if he is no longer to be this anthropological fetish" (2). Consequentially, Laruellean ethics is radically de-anthropocentrized, fundamentally directed towards a universalized, auto-effective set of generic conditions. Laruelle takes up the responsibility of describing socio-political relations between minority and the state via causality and politico-logical terms, rather than traditional ontological terms of Foucauldian power. For those initiated within the structuralist discourse of Foucault and Althusser, Laruelle's theses on "Authority" and "the State" are riveting reversals that upend post-structuralist proclivities: Laruelle transfigures Foucault's "conditions of possibility for knowledge" by directing them towards the generic conditions of the a priori. Rather than the hackneyed platitude "we are (configured by) the State," Laruelle offers that "We are minorities, they are us.... Thinking is beginning with real individuals in order to go towards the State.... It is necessary to 'invert' or rather unilateralize the World and the State...so that thought finds its real basis" (40-41). For Laruelle, "Authorities" are the aprioristic structures predicating experience in the "World, History, and State" via "Games of power," which pose "real essences" and "onto-logical" content. A generic world – a truly Laruellean world – is conditioned by immanence of identity rather than ontological difference. A BIOGRAPHY OF ORDINARY MAN: ON AUTHORITIES AND MINORITIES Cincinnati Romance Review 46 (Spring 2019): 119-23 121 Laruelle's use of "science" is unconventional and possibly perplexing for readers devoid of a primer. For Laruelle, the domain of "Absolute science" belongs to "ordinary man rather than to the philosopher" (151), where "minority" or "ordinary" indexes that which pervades the world and individual (the fold of the general condition). Laruelle's text is undoubtedly political but, for those readers expecting the utilitarian Marxism of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, they will not find "the Revolution" here; rather, A Biography of Ordinary Man prefigures resistance it is, as Laruelle notes, essentially a "prerevolutionary, pre-activist, anterior to struggles" (25). This is not to insinuate that Laruelle's book is composed of nebulous postulates – non-philosophy's foes are taken up in full. In addition to Deleuze and Kant, Laruelle complicates "being-in-the-world" as described in Heidegger's "phenomenologicoexistential sense" (127), which privileges the methodologies of hermeneutics and interpretation. Laruelle's principle of "the One," rather than some decision or identity, is a postural withdrawal from the philosophical "auto-position" of distance between the Real and Being – instead, the two are interminably folded over one-another. Laruelle's "One" is diametrically opposed to Heidegger's "world of authentic presence" and "unconcealement," where truth is stilted on exchange. What uniquely colors A Biography of Ordinary Man from Laruelle's prolific output over the last few decades is that this project is framed not only in epistemic terms but, primarily, through the ethical lens that invigorates the "non" in "non-philosophy." Laruelle's unilateral "One" resists any concentration of power by affect, genealogy, or history; unlike Foucault's project, which in the structuralist-archaeological tradition opposes and exchanges animal madness (folie) with human madness (déraison), Laruelle pitches the "nonstandard human" to underscore the quantum nature of a generic primary of pure immanence. Such radical immanence is "no longer exactly a relation, that is, a reciprocity or a reversibility, or even a relativity" (17) – in fact, it could be said that Laruelle opposes what we conceive of as "the political" with "the purely ethical" as, for Laruelle, that which is ethical is not a system of laws but, rather, axiomatic genericity. Thus, Laruelle refuses to revitalize the minority discourse proffered by the State, in favor of a transspecies generic category (hence, Laruelle's penchant for lifting algebraic principles and plucking quantum mechanics). By problematizing what he terms "The Statist Ideal," or the "Unitary Illusion" be it negative (Hegel) or positive (Nietzsche) Laruelle interrogates the "scission" of the minority subject, which he contends is a "symptom" of the Western dialectic practice (64). In opposition to the Kantian first principles upon which both Continental and Analytic philosophy rest, Laruelle attempts to sketch a "real Critique of Reason" that is determined in itself and through itself; insofar as this involves Laruellean "non-ethics," this involves breaking from the long-situated practice of studying the State from the paralogism of the State view, itself. Laruelle's A Biography of Ordinary Man is systematically split into four subsections: "Who Are Minorities?," "Who are Authorities?," "Ordinary Mysticism," and, lastly, REVIEWED BY EKIN ERKAN Cincinnati Romance Review 46 (Spring 2019): 119-23 122 "Ordinary Pragmatics." Throughout, Laruelle proposes a unique system of "non-ethics," as philosophical ethics has undermined the negotiation of morality by insisting on a preliminary a priori recognition of "philosophical positioning," authoritatively rendering ethics under history, world, or state. For Laruelle, ethics is (improperly) philosophically founded in "Greek ontological prejudices" (6), "mystico-religious" dualisms, and Christian "gnoses," which orient "experience as a quasispatial insertion into the World and as a topography" (80). What alternative, then, does Laruelle pose? A Biography of Ordinary Man furthers Laruelle's post-Althusserian Marxism and, consequently, his long-spanning literature on the "determination in the last instance" (DLI), Laruelle's uniquely unidirectional and rigorously irreversible causality, which he also terms "cloning." Thus, before further explaining Laruelle's idiosyncratic verbiage, I ought to note that A Biography of Ordinary Man is a book that unforgivingly makes use of the terms Laruelle has collectively accumulated throughout his philosophical career. To those approaching Laruelle for the first time, I advise beginning elsewhere, such as with Principles of Non-Philosophy (1996) and Future Christ (2002), while complementing these preliminary readings with those of secondary commentators including Alexander Galloway's brilliant monogram, Laruelle: Beyond the Digital (2014), and John Ó Maoilearca's non-philosophy primer All Thoughts Are Equal (2015). Otherwise, the neophyte reader will not only be weighed by seemingly obscure Laruellean language but also risk glossing over otherwise truly exhilarating minutiae. Categorizing Laruelle as a Marxist may, also, seem folly after all, Laruelle's project is to unmoor the "fully accounted" capture of history from the "bastard sciences" (4) of mytho-philosophical ambition, as exemplified by ethnology, linguistics, biology, Greco-Christian anthropology, psychoanalysis and even Marx's "science of history" (1). For Laruelle, identifying with any genealogy of the "Sciences of Man" evinces that they stem from the same archaic, metaphysical presuppositions. Laruelle seeks to establish a rigorous "science of man" that no longer borrows from other sciences, refuting the "purely passive and static genesis" of Marxist structuralism (112). Nonetheless, Laruelle is a Marxist, despite what one may glean from any surface-level review; in A Biography of Ordinary Man, his anticapitalist project appropriates Althusserian "determination in the last instance" so as to prohibit the necessity of "relations of exchange" (136). Laruelle's tactical use of Althusser's DLI is perhaps best elaborated in his "Theorem 2. Minorities determine Authorities in the last instance, who do not determine them in return." While Laruelle's book makes liberal use of such edicts and theorems, this is quite possibly the most important, for it preconfigures Laruelle's "Minority Principle," which requires that the "authentic minority, that is individuality, be laid bare and decide to think through itself" (33). Thus, unlike Deleuze who has traditionally appointed cinema and the arts with the responsibility to facilitate the representation of a "missing people," Laruelle's ethical position posits "The ordinary individual experiences his reality and thinks for himself, in the radical finitude of his essence as inherent (to) himself: he is A BIOGRAPHY OF ORDINARY MAN: ON AUTHORITIES AND MINORITIES Cincinnati Romance Review 46 (Spring 2019): 119-23 123 for himself an immediate given" (76). Laruelle advocates for creative and inventive autoimpression, devoid of mediation, be it interpersonal or intertextual. While Laruelle's "non-philosophy" (and, in this book, "non-ethics") certainly commits to a mutiny of past methodology, it would be blindsided to claim that Laruelle's book is unrelated to the late Michel Henry's notion of "auto-affective Life" and to the Nietzschean sensibility of "active forces." However, Laruelle radicalizes Henry by elbowing auto-affection towards the non-human terrain, effectively universalizing it and reconfiguring the concept from the transcendental by transubstantiating it as constant mutation. Laruelle's past approaches materialized science via the aporetics of "antiphilosophy" with utopic vigor his newest book is no exception. Whereas ethics traditionally disorients itself from the real and philosophy is based on spatial distance, Laruelle's "non-ethics" is confrontational in its compressive tactility, unwrenching these tenets from their histories. For those interested in animal ethics, cyborg theory, and the anthropocene, I highly recommend this text as Laruelle deftly displaces any notion of a "Humanity Principle," equating it with the "Power Principle, the Language Principle, the Pleasure Principle" (10). For Laruelle, all philosophy is performance and, consequently, under philosophy the domain of political ethics is derived from a point of extension and the Other, within the scope of "Pragmatic Reason" (184). One could say that, as Althusser once professed that Reading Capital could be best understood by those precariat workers in the factory, thereby expanding theory's "knowledge effects," Laruelle's non-ethics in its polemic proposition seeks to broaden philosophy by mutating ethics in the hands of the generic. It is mirthless to seek a revolutionary ethos in Laruelle – his critique solely provides us with the appropriate tools and, in this case, the ethics with which to problematize philosophy. Laruelle's contemporaries, such as his anarcho-Maoist student, Gilles Grelet, have weaponized Laruelle to radicalize non-philosophy and pose an antiphenomenological practice. A Biography of Ordinary Man furthers the conversation towards an ethical terrain, allotting a unique admixture of non-humanist interventions – how to apply these "non-ethics" is now within the reader's sphere.

Herding QATs: Quality Assessment Tools for Evidence in Medicine Jacob Stegenga Forthcoming in Classification, Disease and Evidence: New Essays in Philosophy of Medicine (Huneman, Silberstein, Lambert, eds.), Springer Abstract Medical scientists employ 'quality assessment tools' (QATs) to measure the quality of evidence from clinical studies, especially randomized controlled trials (RCTs). These tools are designed to take into account various methodological details of clinical studies, including randomization, blinding, and other features of studies deemed relevant to minimizing bias and error. There are now dozens available. The various QATs on offer differ widely from each other, and second-order empirical studies show that QATs have low inter-rater reliability and low inter-tool reliability. This is an instance of a more general problem I call the underdetermination of evidential significance. Disagreements about the strength of a particular piece of evidence can be due to different-but in principle equally good-weightings of the fine-grained methodological features which constitute QATs. 1. Introduction 2. Quality Assessment Tools 3. Inter-Rater Reliability 4. Inter-Tool Reliability 5. Underdetermination of Evidential Significance 6. QATs and Hierarchies 7. Conclusion 2 Jacob Stegenga Banting Postdoctoral Fellow Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology University of Toronto 91 Charles Street West Toronto, Ontario Canada M5S 1K7 and Assistant Professor Department of Philosophy University of Utah 215 South Central Campus Drive Carolyn Tanner Irish Humanities Building 4th Floor Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 [email protected] http://individual.utoronto.ca/jstegenga Acknowledgements This paper has benefited from discussion with Nancy Cartwright, Eran Tal, Jonah Schupbach, and audiences at the University of Utah, University of Toronto, and the Canadian Society for the History and Philosophy of Science. Medical scientists Ken Bond and David Moher provided detailed written commentary, as did Philippe Huneman and Gérard Lambert. For the title I thank Frédéric Bouchard. I am grateful for financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 3 1 Introduction The diversity of evidence in modern medicine is amazing. Many causal hypotheses in medicine, for instance, have evidence generated from experiments on cell and tissue cultures, experiments on laboratory animals (alive at first, then dead, dissected, and analyzed), results of mathematical models, data from epidemiological studies of human populations, data from controlled clinical trials, and meta-level summaries from systematic reviews based on techniques such as meta-analysis and social processes such as consensus conferences. Moreover, each of these kinds of evidence has many variations. Epidemiological studies on humans, for instance, include casecontrol studies, retrospective cohort studies, and prospective cohort studies. Evidence from each of these diverse kinds of methods has varying degrees of credibility and relevance for a hypothesis of interest. It is crucial, in order to determine how compelling the available kinds of evidence are, and to make a wellinformed assessment of a causal hypothesis, that one take into account substantive details of the methods that generated the available evidence for that hypothesis. Methodological quality, in medical research at least, is typically defined as the extent to which the design, conduct, analysis, and report of a medical trial minimizes potential bias and error. Medical scientists attempt to account for the various dimensions of quality of evidence in a number of ways. Methodological quality is a complex multi-dimensional property that one cannot simply intuit, and so formalized tools have been developed to aid in the assessment of the quality of medical evidence. Medical evidence is often assessed rather crudely by rank-ordering the types of methods according to an 'evidence hierarchy'. Systematic reviews and specifically meta-analyses are typically at the top of such hierarchies, randomized controlled trials are near the top, non-randomized cohort and case-control studies are lower, and near the bottom are laboratory studies and anecdotal case reports.1 Evidence from methods at the top of this hierarchy, especially evidence from clinical trials, is often assessed with more fine-grained tools that I call quality assessment tools (QATs). There are many such tools now on 1 I discuss evidence hierarchies in more detail in §6. Such evidence hierarchies are commonly employed in evidence-based medicine. Examples include those of the Oxford Centre for EvidenceBased Medicine, the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN), and The Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) Working Group. These evidence hierarchies have recently received much criticism. See, for example, Bluhm (2005), Upshur (2005), Borgerson (2008), and La Caze (2011), and for a specific critique of placing meta-analysis at the top of such hierarchies, see Stegenga (2011). In footnote 4 below I cite several recent criticisms of the assumption that RCTs ought to be necessarily near the top of such hierarchies. 4 offer-QATs are quickly becoming an important tool of epidemiologists and other medical scientists. QATs are used to assess the primary-level evidence amalgamated by a systematic review, and since most causal hypotheses in medicine are assessed by evidence generated from systematic reviews, much of what we think we know about causal hypotheses in medicine is influenced by QATs. A widely accepted norm holds that when determining the plausibility of a hypothesis one should take into account all of the available evidence. For hypotheses about medical interventions this principle stipulates that one ought to take into account the range of diverse kinds of evidence which are available for that hypothesis.2 A similar norm states that when determining the plausibility of a hypothesis one should take into account how compelling the various kinds of evidence available for that hypothesis are, by considering detailed qualitative features of the methods used to generate that evidence. The purpose of using a QAT is to evaluate the quality of evidence from medical trials and observational studies in such a fine-grained way. Their domain of application is relatively focused, therefore, since they do not apply to other kinds of evidence that is typically available for causal hypotheses in medicine (such as mechanistic evidence generated by basic science research, or results from experiments on animals), but for better or worse it is usually only RCTs, meta-analyses of RCTs, and sometimes observational studies that are considered when assessing causal hypotheses in medicine, and it is these types of methods that QATs are designed for. A burgeoning literature has investigated the strategies that scientists employ when generating and assessing evidence. In what follows I examine the use of QATs as codified tools for assessing evidence in medical research. Although there has been some criticism of QATs in the medical literature, they have received little philosophical critique.3 I begin by describing general properties of QATs, including the methodological features that many QATs share and how QATs are typically employed (§2). I then turn to a discussion of empirical studies which test the inter- 2 The general norm is usually called the principle of total evidence, associated with Carnap (1947). See also Good (1967). Howick (2011) invokes the principle of total evidence for systematic reviews of evidence related to medical hypotheses. A presently unpublished paper by Bert Leuridan contains a good discussion of the principle of total evidence as it applies to medicine. 3 Although one only needs to consider the prominence of randomization in QATs to see that QATs have, in fact, been indirectly criticized by the recent literature criticizing the assumed 'gold standard' status of RCTs (see footnote 4). In the present paper I do not attempt a thorough normative evaluation of any particular QAT. Considering the role of randomization suggests what a large task a thorough normative evaluation of a particular QAT would be. But for a systematic survey of the most prominent QATs, see West et al. (2002). See also Olivo et al. (2007) for an empirical critique of QATs. 5 rater reliability (§3) and inter-tool reliability (§4) of QATs: most QATs are not very good at constraining intersubjective assessments of hypotheses, and more worrying, the use of different QATs to assess the same primary evidence leads to widely divergent quality assessments of that evidence. This is an instance of a more general problem I call the underdetermination of evidential significance, which holds that in a rich enough empirical situation, the strength of the evidence is underdetermined (§5). Despite this problem, I defend the use of QATs in medical research. I end by comparing QATs to the widely employed evidence hierarchies, and argue that despite the problems with QATs, they are better than evidence hierarchies for assessing evidence in medicine (§6). 2 Quality Assessment Tools A quality assessment tool (QAT) for medical evidence can be either a scale with elements that receive a quantitative score representing the degree to which each element is satisfied by a medical trial, or else a QAT can be simply a checklist with elements that are marked as either present or absent in a medical trial. Given the emphasis on randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in medical research, most QATs are designed for the evaluation of RCTs, although there are several for observational studies and systematic reviews.4 Most QATs share several elements, including questions about how subjects were assigned to experimental groups in a trial, whether or not the subjects and experimenters were concealed to the subjects' treatment protocol, whether or not there was a sufficient description of subject withdrawal from the trial groups, whether or not particular statistical analyses were performed, and whether or not a report of a trial disclosed financial relationships between investigators and companies.5 Most QATs provide instructions on how to 4 The view that RCTs are the 'gold standard' of evidence has recently been subjected to much philosophical criticism. See, for example, Worrall (2002), Worrall (2007), Cartwright (2007), and Cartwright (2010); for an assessment of the arguments for and against the gold standard status of RCTs, see Howick (2011). Observational studies also have QATs, such as QATSO (Quality Assessment Checklist for Observational Studies) and NOQAT (Newcastle-Ottawa Quality Assessment Scale – Case Control Studies). 5 A note about terminology: sometimes the term 'trial' in the medical literature refers specifically to an experimental design (such as a randomized controlled trial) while the term 'study' refers to an observational design (such as a case control study), but this use is inconsistent. I will use both terms freely to refer to any method of generating 'human level' evidence in biomedical research, including both experimental and observational designs. 6 score the individual components of the QAT and how to determine an overall quality score of a trial. A comprehensive list of QATs developed by the mid-1990s was described by Moher et al. (1995). The first scale type to be developed, known as the Chalmers scale, was published in 1981. By the mid-1990s there were over two dozen QATs, and by 2002 West et al. were able to identify 68 for RCTs or observational studies. Some are designed for the evaluation of any medical trial, while others are designed to assess specific trials, or trials from a particular medical sub-discipline. Some are designed to assess the quality of a trial itself, while others are designed to assess the quality of a report of a trial, but most assess both. QATs are now widely used for several purposes. When performing a systematic review of the available evidence for a particular hypothesis, QATs help reviewers take the quality of medical studies into account. This is typically done in one of two ways. First, QAT scores can be used to generate a weighting factor for the technique known as meta-analysis. Meta-analysis usually involves calculating a weighted average of so-called effect sizes from individual medical studies, and the weighting of effect sizes can be determined by the score of the respective trial on a QAT.6 Second, QAT scores can be used as an inclusion criterion for a systematic review, in which any primary-level trial that achieves a QAT score above a certain threshold would be included in the systematic review (and conversely, any trial that achieves a QAT score below such a threshold would be excluded). This application of QATs is perhaps the most common use to which they are put. Finally, QATs can be used for purposes not directly associated with a particular systematic review or meta-analysis, but rather to investigate relationships between QAT scores and other properties of medical trials. For instance, several findings suggest that there is an inverse correlation between QAT score and effect size (in other words, higher quality trials tend to have lower estimates of the efficacy of medical interventions).7 Why should medical scientists bother using QATs to assess evidence? Consider the following argument, similar to an argument for following the principle of total evidence, based on a concern to take into account any 'defeating' properties of one's evidence. Suppose your evidence seems to provide definitive support for some 6 There are several commonly employed measures of effect size, including mean difference (for continuous variables), or odds ratio, risk ratio, or risk difference (for dichotomous variables). The weighting factor is sometimes determined by the QAT score, but a common method of determining the weight of a trial is simply based on the size of the trial (Egger, Smith, and Phillips, 1997), often by using the inverse variability of the data from a trial to measure that trial's weight (because inverse variability is correlated with trial size). 7 See, for example, Moher et al. (1998), Balk et al. (2002), and Hempel et al. (2011). 7 hypothesis, H1. But then you learn that there is a systematic error in the method which generated your evidence. Taking into account this systematic error, the evidence no longer supports H1 (perhaps instead the evidence supports a competitor hypothesis, H2). Had you not taken into account the fine-grained methodological information regarding the systematic error, you would have unwarranted belief in H1. You do not want to have unwarranted belief in a hypothesis, so you ought to take into account fine-grained methodological information. Here is a related argument: if one does not take into account all of one's evidence, including one's old evidence, then one is liable to commit the base-rate fallacy. In terms of Bayes' Theorem-p(H|e) = p(e|H)p(H)/p(e)-one commits the base-rate fallacy if one attempts to determine p(H|e) without taking into account p(H). Similarly, if one wants to determine p(H|e) then one ought to take into account the detailed methodological features which determine p(e|H) and p(e). One need not be a Bayesian to see the importance of assessing evidence at a fine-grain with QATs. For instance, Mayo's notion of 'severe testing', broadly based on aspects of frequentist statistics, also requires taking into account fine-grained methodological details. The Severity Principle, to use Mayo's term, claims that "passing a test T (with e) counts as a good test of or good evidence for H just to the extent that H fits e and T is a severe test of H" (Mayo 1996). Attending to finegrained methodological details to ensure that one has minimized the probability of committing an error is central to ensuring that the test in question is severe, and thus that the Severity Principle is satisfied. So, regardless of one's doctrinal commitment to Bayesianism or frequentism, the employment of tools like QATs to take into account detailed information about the methods used to generate the available evidence ought to seem reasonable. One of the simplest QATs is the Jadad scale, first developed in the 1990s to assess clinical studies in pain research. Here it is, in full: 1. Was the study described as randomized? 2. Was the study described as double blind? 3. Was there a description of withdrawals and dropouts? A 'yes' to question 1 and question 2 is given one point each. A 'yes' to question 3, in addition to a description of the number of withdrawals and dropouts in each of the trial sub-groups, and an explanation for the withdrawals or dropouts, receives one point. An additional point is given if the method of randomization is described in the paper, and the method is deemed appropriate. A final point is awarded if the method of blinding is described, and the method is deemed appropriate. Thus, a trial can receive between zero and five points on the Jadad scale. 8 The Jadad scale has been praised by some as being easy to use-it takes about ten minutes to complete for each study-which is an obvious virtue when a reviewer must assess hundreds of studies for a particular hypothesis. On the other hand, others complain that it is too simple, and that it has low inter-rater reliability (discussed in §3). I describe the tool here not to assess it but merely to provide an example of a QAT for illustration. In contrast to the simplicity of the Jadad scale, the Chalmers scale has 30 questions in several categories, which include the trial protocol, the statistical analysis, and the presentation of results. Similarly, the QAT developed by Cho and Bero (1994) has 24 questions. At a coarse grain some of the features on the Chalmers QAT and the Cho and Bero QAT are similar to the basic elements of the Jadad QAT: these scales both include questions about randomization, blinding, and subject withdrawal. (In §5 I briefly describe how Cho and Bero developed their QAT, as an illustration of the no-best-weighting argument). In addition, these more detailed QATs include questions about statistical analyses, control subjects, and other methodological features deemed relevant to minimizing systematic error. These QATs usually take around 30 to 40 minutes to complete for each study. Despite the added complexity of these more detailed QATs, their scoring systems are kept as simple as possible. For instance, most of the questions on the Cho and Bero QAT allow only the following answers: 'yes' (2 points), 'partial' (1 point), 'no' (0 points), and 'not applicable' (0 points). This is meant to constrain the amount of subjective judgment required when generating a QAT score. Although most QATs share at least several similar features, the relative weight of the overall score given to the various features differs widely between QATs. Table 1 lists the relative weight of three central methodological features-subject randomization, subject allocation concealment (or 'blinding'), and description of subject withdrawal-for the above QATs, in addition to three other QATs. 9 Table 1. Number of methodological features used in six QATs, and weight assigned to three widely shared methodological features (adapted from Jüni et al. 1999). Scale Number of Items Weight of Randomization Weight of Blinding Weight of Withdrawal Chalmers et al. (1981) 30 13.0 26.0 7.0 Jadad et al. (1996) 3 40.0 40.0 20.0 Cho & Bero (1994) 24 14.3 8.2 8.2 Reisch et al. (1989) 34 5.9 5.9 2.9 Spitzer et al. (1990) 32 3.1 3.1 9.4 Linde et al. (1997) 7 28.6 28.6 28.6 Note two aspects of Table 1. First, the number of items on a QAT is highly variable, from 3 to 34. Second, the weight given to particular methodological features is also highly variable. Randomization, for instance, constitutes 3.1% of the overall score on the QAT designed by Spitzer et al. (1990), whereas it constitutes 40% of the overall score on the QAT designed by Jadad et al. (1996). The differences between QATs explains the low inter-tool reliability, which I describe in §4. But first I describe the low inter-rater reliability of QATs. 3 Inter-Rater Reliability The extent to which multiple users of the same rating system achieve similar ratings is usually referred to as 'inter-rater reliability'. Empirical evaluations of the interrater reliability of QATs have shown a wide disparity in the outcomes of a QAT when applied to the same primary-level study by multiple reviewers; that is, the inter-rater reliability of QATs is, usually, poor. The typical set-up of evaluations of inter-rater reliability of a QAT is simple: give a set of manuscripts to multiple reviewers who have been trained to use the QAT, and compare the quality scores assigned by these reviewers to each other. A statistic called kappa (κ) is typically computed which provides a measure of agreement between the quality scores produced by the QAT from the multiple reviewers (although other statistics measuring agreement are also used, such as 10 Kendall's coefficient of concordance and the intraclass correlation coefficient).8 Sometimes the manuscripts are blinded as to who the authors were and what journals the manuscripts were published in, but sometimes the manuscripts are not blinded, and sometimes both blinded and non-blinded manuscripts are assessed to evaluate the effect of blinding. In some cases the manuscripts all pertain to the same hypothesis, while in other cases the manuscripts pertain to various subjects within a particular medical sub-discipline. For example, Clark et al. (1999) assessed the inter-rater reliability of the Jadad scale, using four reviewers to evaluate the quality of 76 manuscripts of RCTs. Interrater reliability was found to be "poor", but it increased substantially when the third item of the scale (explanation of withdrawal from study) was removed and only the remaining two questions were employed. A QAT known as the 'risk of bias tool' was devised by the Cochrane Collaboration (a prominent organization in the so-called evidence-based medicine movement) to assess the degree to which the results of a study "should be believed." A group of medical scientists subsequently assessed the inter-rater reliability of the risk of bias tool. They distributed 163 manuscripts of RCTs among five reviewers, who assessed the RCTs with this tool, and they found the inter-rater reliability of the quality assessments to be very low (Hartling et al. 2009). Similarly, Hartling et al. (2011) used three QATs (Risk of Bias tool, Jadad scale, Schulz allocation concealment) to assess 107 studies on a medical intervention (the use of inhaled corticosteriods for adults with persistent asthma). This group employed two independent reviewers who scored the 107 studies using the three QATs. They found that inter-rater reliability was 'moderate'. However, the claim that inter-rater reliability was moderate was based on a standard scale in which a κ measure between 0.41 0.6 is deemed moderate. The κ measure in this paper was 0.41, so it was just barely within the range deemed moderate. The next lower category, with a κ measure between 0.21 0.4, is deemed 'fair' by this standard scale. But at least in the context of measuring inter-rater reliability of QATs, a κ of 0.4 represents wide disagreement between reviewers. 8 For simplicity I will describe Cohen's Kappa, which measures the agreement of two reviewers who classify items into discrete categories, and is computed as follows: κ = [p(a) – p(e)]/[1 – p(e)] where p(a) is the probability of agreement (based on the observed frequency of agreement) and p(e) is the probability of chance agreement (also calculated using observed frequency data). Kappa was first introduced as a statistical measure by Cohen (1960). For more than two reviewers, a measure called Fleiss' Kappa can be used. I give an example of a calculation of κ below. 11 Here is a toy example to illustrate the disagreement that a κ measure of 0.4 represents. Suppose two teaching assistants, Beth and Sara, are grading the same class of 100 students, and must decide whether or not each student passes or fails. Their joint distribution of grades is: Sara Pass Fail Beth Pass 40 10 Fail 20 30 Of the 100 students, they agree on passing 40 students and failing 30 others, thus their frequency of agreement is 0.7. But the probability of random agreement is 0.5, because Beth passes 50% of the students and Sara passes 60% of the students, so the probability that Beth and Sara would agree on passing a randomly chosen student is 0.5 × 0.6 (= 0.3), and similarly the probability that Beth and Sara would agree on failing a randomly chosen student is 0.5 × 0.4 (= 0.2) (and so the overall probability of agreeing on passing or failing a randomly chosen student is 0.3 + 0.2 = 0.5). Applying the kappa formula gives: (0.7 0.5)/(1 0.5) = 0.4 Importantly, Beth and Sara disagree about 30 students regarding a relatively simple property (passing). It is natural to suppose that they disagree most about 'borderline' students, and their disagreement is made stark because Beth and Sara have a blunt evaluative tool (pass/fail grades rather than, say, letter grades). But a finer-grained evaluative tool would not necessarily mitigate such disagreement, since there would be more categories about which they could disagree for each student; a finer-grained evaluative tool would increase, rather than decrease, the number of borderline cases (because there are borderline cases between each letter grade). This example is meant to illustrate that a κ measure of 0.4 represents poor agreement between two reviewers.9 A κ score is fundamentally an arbitrary measure of disagreement, and the significance of the disagreement that a particular κ score represents presumably varies with context. This example, I nevertheless hope, helps to illustrate the extent of disagreement found in empirical assessments of the inter-rater reliability of QATs. 9 I owe Jonah Schupbach thanks for noting that a κ measure can not only seem inappropriately low, as in the above cases of poor inter-rater reliability, but can seem inappropriately high as well. If a κ measure approaches 1, this might suggest agreement which is 'too good to be true'. Returning to my toy example, if Beth and Sara had a very high a κ measure, then one might wonder if they colluded in their grading. Thus when using a κ statistic to assess inter-rater reliability, we should hope for a κ measure above some minimal threshold (below which indicates too much disagreement) but below some maximum threshold (above which indicates too much agreement). What exactly these thresholds should be are beyond the scope of this paper (and are, I suppose, context sensitive). 12 In short, different users of the same QAT, when assessing the same evidence, generate diverging assessments of the strength of that evidence. In most tests of the inter-rater reliability of QATs, the evidence being assessed comes from a narrow range of study designs (usually all the studies are RCTs), and the evidence is about a narrow range of subject matter (usually all the studies are about the same causal hypothesis regarding a particular medical intervention). The poor inter-rater reliability is even more striking considering the narrow range of study designs and subject matter from which the evidence is generated. 4 Inter-Tool Reliability The extent to which multiple instruments have correlated measurements when applied to the same property being measured is referred to as inter-tool reliability. One QAT has inter-tool reliability with respect to another if its measurement of the quality of medical studies correlates with the measurement of the quality of the same studies by the other QAT. A QAT score is a measure on a relatively arbitrary scale, and the scales between multiple QATs are incommensurable, so constructs such as 'high quality' and 'low quality' are developed for each QAT which allow the results from different QATs to be compared. That is, when testing the inter-tool reliability of multiple QATs, what is usually being compared is the extent of their agreement regarding the categorization of particular medical trials into pre-defined bins of quality. Similar to assessments of inter-rater reliability, empirical evaluations of the inter-tool reliability have shown a wide disparity in the outcomes of multiple QATs when applied to the same primary-level studies; that is, the inter-tool reliability of QATs is poor. I should note, however, that there are few such assessments available, and those published thus far have varied with respect to the particular QATs assessed, the design of the reliability assessment, and the statistical analyses employed.10 An extensive investigation of inter-tool reliability was performed by Jüni and colleagues (1999). They amalgamated data from 17 studies which had tested a 10 For this latter reason I refrain from describing or illustrating the particular statistical analyses employed in tests of the inter-tool reliability of QATs, as I did in §3 on tests of the inter-rater reliability of QATs. Nearly every published test of inter-rater reliability uses a different statistic to measure agreement of quality assessment between tools. Analyses include Kendall's rank correlation coefficient (τ), Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W), and Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (ρ). 13 particular medical intervention (the use of low molecular weight heparin to prevent post-operative thrombosis), and they used 25 QATs to assess the quality of these 17 studies (thereby effectively performing 25 meta-analyses). The QATs that this group used were the same that Moher et al. (1995) had earlier described, which varied in the number of assessed study attributes, from a low of three attributes to a high of 34, and varied in the weight given to the various study attributes. Jüni and his colleagues noted that "most of these scoring systems lack a focused theoretical basis." Their results were troubling: the amalgamated effect sizes between these 25 meta-analyses differed by up to 117%-using exactly the same primary evidence. They found that medical trials deemed high quality according to one QAT could be deemed low quality according to another. The authors concluded that "the type of scale used to assess trial quality can dramatically influence the interpretation of meta-analytic studies." Perhaps the most recent evaluation of inter-tool reliability is Hartling et al. (2011), discussed above in §3. Recall that this group used three QATs (Risk of Bias tool, Jadad scale, Schulz allocation concealment) to assess 107 trials on a particular medical intervention. They also found that the inter-tool reliability was very low. Yet another example of a test of inter-tool reliability of QATs was reported by Moher et al. (1996). This group used six QATs to evaluate 12 trials of a medical intervention. Again, the inter-tool reliability was found to be low. Low inter-tool reliability of QATs is troubling: it is a quantitative empirical demonstration that the determination of the quality of a medical trial depends on the choice of QAT. Moreover, in §2 I noted that there are many QATs available, and between them there are substantial differences in their design. Thus the best tools that medical scientists have to determine the strength of evidence generated by what are typically deemed the best study designs (RCTs) are relatively unconstraining and liable to produce conflicting assessments. Such low inter-tool reliability of QATs has important practical consequences. Elsewhere I show that multiple meta-analyses of the same primary evidence can reach contradictory conclusions regarding particular causal hypotheses, and one of the conditions which permits such malleability of meta-analysis is the choice of QAT (Stegenga 2011).11 The discordant results from the 25 meta-analyses performed by Moher et al. (1995) are a case in point. 11 Low inter-tool reliability of QATs is only one of several problems with meta-analysis. Other parameters of meta-analysis that render this method malleable include the choice of primary-level studies to include in the analysis, the choice of outcome measure to employ, the choice of kind of data to amalgamated (patient-level or study-level), and the choice of averaging technique to employ. See Stegenga (2011) for a critical account of meta-analysis. 14 Moreover, this low inter-tool reliability has philosophical consequences, which I explore in §5. Such low inter-tool reliability might be less troubling if the various QATs had distinct domains of application. The many biases present in medical research are pertinent to varying degrees depending on the details of the particular circumstances at hand, and so one might think that it is a mistake to expect that one QAT ought to apply to all circumstances. For some causal hypotheses, for instance, it is difficult or impossible to conceal the treatment from the experimental subjects and/or the investigators (that is, 'blinding' is sometimes impossible)-hypotheses regarding chiropractic spinal manipulation are a case in point. Thus, no study relevant to such a hypothesis will score well on a QAT that gives a large weight to allocation concealment. Such a QAT would be less sensitive to the presence or absence of sources of bias other than lack of allocation concealment, relative to QATs that give little or no weight to allocation concealment. In such a case one might argue that since the absence of allocation concealment is fixed among the relevant studies, an appropriate QAT to use in this case should not give any weight to allocation concealment, and would only ask about the presence of those properties of a study that might vary among the relevant studies. On the other hand, one might argue that since we have principled reasons for thinking that the absence of allocation concealment can bias the results of a study, even among those studies that cannot possibly conceal subject allocation, an appropriate QAT to use in this case should evaluate the presence of allocation concealment (in which case all of the relevant studies would simply receive a zero score on allocation concealment), just as a QAT ought to evaluate the presence of allocation concealment in a scenario in which the studies in fact can conceal subject allocation. The former consideration is an appeal to determining the relative quality between studies, and the latter consideration is an appeal to determining the absolute quality of studies. The latter consideration should be more compelling in most cases, since, as discussed above, the typical use of QATs is to help estimate the true efficacy of a medical intervention, and such estimates ought to take into account the full extent of the potential for biases in the relevant evidence, regardless of whether or not it was possible for the respective studies to avoid such biases. There are scenarios, though, in which we might have reasons to think that a property of a study that causes bias in other scenarios does not cause bias (or perhaps causes less bias) in these scenarios. For example, the placebo effect might be stronger in studies that are designed to assess the benefits of pharmaceuticals compared with studies that are designed to assess the harms of pharmaceuticals. 15 Such a difference could be independently and empirically tested. If this were true, then the different scenarios would indeed warrant different QATs, suitable for the particularities of the scenario at hand. If the low inter-tool reliability of QATs were merely the result of employing multiple QATs to different kinds of empirical scenarios (different kinds of studies, say, or studies of different kinds of hypotheses, such as benefits versus harms of pharmaceuticals), then such low inter-tool reliability would hardly be troubling. Indiscriminate use of QATs might lead to low inter-tool reliability, such thinking would go, but discriminate use would not. Similarly, low inter-tool reliability of QATs would be less troubling if one could show that in principle there is only one good QAT for a given domain, or at least a small set of good ones which are similar to each other in important respects, because then one could dismiss the observed low inter-tool reliability as an artefact caused by the inclusion of poor QATs in addition to the good ones. Unfortunately, on the whole, these considerations do not mitigate the problem of low inter-tool reliability of QATs. There are, in fact, a plurality of equally fine QATs, designed for the same kinds of scenarios (typically: assessing RCTs of the efficacy of pharmaceuticals). A systematic review by medical scientists concluded that there were numerous QATs that "represent acceptable approaches that could be used today without major modifications" (West et al. 2002). Moreover, all of the empirical demonstrations of their low inter-tool reliability involve the assessment of the quality of studies from a very narrow domain: for instance, the low inter-tool reliability of QATs shown in Jüni et al. (1999) involved assessing studies of a single design (RCTs) about a single causal hypothesis, and these QATs had been developed with the purpose of assessing the quality of that very study design. Although there are some QATs which are arguably inferior to others, at least among the reasonably good ones I argue below that we lack a theoretical basis for distinguishing among them, and so we are stuck with a panoply of acceptable QATs which disagree widely about the quality of particular medical studies and thus the strength of the evidence generated from those studies. One might agree with the view that there is no uniquely best QAT, but be tempted to think that this is due only to the fact that the quality of a study depends on particularities of the context (e.g. the particular kind of study in question and the form of the hypothesis being tested by that study). Different QATs might, according to this thought, be optimally suited to different contexts. While this latter point is no doubt true-above I noted that some QATs are designed for assessing particular kinds of studies, and others are designed for assessing studies in particular domains of medicine-it does not explain the low inter-tool reliability of QATs. That is 16 because, as above, the low inter-tool reliability of QATs is demonstrated in narrowly specified contexts. Moreover, the research groups that design QATs usually claim (explicitly) that their QATs are meant to be applicable to a given study design (usually RCTs) in almost any domain of medical research. In short, QATs are intended to apply to a broad range of contexts, but regardless, the empirical demonstrations of their low inter-tool reliability are almost always constrained to a single particular context. Despite their widespread and growing use, among medical scientists there is some debate about whether or not QATs ought to be employed at all (see, for example, Herbison et al. (2006)). Their low inter-rater and inter-tool reliability might suggest that resistance to their use is warranted. There are three reasons, however, that justify the continuing improvement and application of QATs to assessing the quality of medical evidence. First, when performing a meta-analysis, a decision to not use an instrument to differentially weight the quality of the primary-level studies is equivalent to weighting all the primary-level studies to an equal degree. So whether one wishes to or not, when performing a meta-analysis one is forced, in principle, to weight the primary-level studies, and the remaining question then is simply how arbitrary one's method of weighting is. Assigning equal weights regardless of methodological quality is maximally arbitrary. The use of QATs to differentially weight primary-level studies is an attempt to minimize such arbitrariness. Second, as argued in §2 above, one must account for fine-grained methodological features in order to guarantee that one avoids potential defeating properties of evidence, and QATs can help with this. Third-but closely related to the second point-there is some empirical evidence which suggests that studies of lower quality have a tendency to over-estimate the efficacy of medical interventions (see footnote 7), and thus the use of QATs helps to accurately estimate the efficacy of medical interventions. In short, despite their low inter-rater and inter-tool reliability, QATs are an important component of medical research, and should be employed when performing a systematic review or meta-analysis. 5 Underdetermination of Evidential Significance The primary use of QATs is to estimate the quality of evidence from particular medical studies, and the primary use of such evidence is to estimate the strength (if any) of causal relations in relevant domains. The relata in these purported causal relations are, of course, the medical intervention under investigation and the change 17 in value of one or more parameters of a group of subjects. The best available QATs appropriate to a given domain differ substantially in the weight assigned to various methodological properties (§2), and thus generate discordant estimates of evidential quality when applied to the same evidence (§4). The differences between the best available QATs are fundamentally arbitrary. Although I assume that there must be a unique value (if at all) to the strength of purported causal relations in the domains in which these tools are employed, the low inter-tool reliability of QATs-together with the fundamentally arbitrary differences of their content-suggests that, in such domains and for such relations, there is no uniquely correct estimate of the quality of evidence. This is an instance of the general problem I call the underdetermination of evidential significance. Disagreement regarding the strength of evidence in particular scientific domains has been frequently documented with historical case studies. One virtue of examining the disagreement generated by the use of QATs is that such disagreements occur in highly controlled settings, are quantifiable using measures such as the κ statistic, and are about subjects of great importance. Such disagreements do not necessarily represent shortcoming on the part of the disagreeing scientists, and nor do such disagreements necessarily suggest a crude relativism. Two scientists who disagree about the strength of a particular piece of evidence can both be rational because their differing assessments of the strength of the same evidence can be due to their different weightings of fine-grained features of the methods which generated the evidence. This explains (at least in part) the low inter-rater and inter-tool reliability of QATs. Concluding that there is no uniquely correct determination of the epistemic significance of some piece of evidence by appealing to the poor inter-rater and intertool reliability of QATs is not merely an argument from disagreement. If it were, then the standard objection would simply note that the mere fact of disagreement about a particular subject does not imply that there is no correct or uniquely best view on the subject. Although different QATs disagree about the strength of evidence from a particular trial, this does not imply that there is no true or best view regarding the strength of evidence from this particular trial-goes the standard objection-since the best QATs might agree with each other about the evidence from this trial, and even more ambitiously, agreement or disagreement among QATs would be irrelevant if we just took into account the quality assessment of this particular trial by the uniquely best QAT. The burden that this objection faces is the identification of the single best QAT or at least the set of good ones (and then hope that multiple users of the best QAT will have high inter-rater reliability, or that the 18 set of good QATs will have high inter-tool reliability). As noted in §4, medical scientists involved in the development and assessment of QATs claim that there are simply a plurality of decent QATs that differ from one another in arbitrary respects. More fundamentally, we lack a theory of scientific inference that would allow us to referee between the most sophisticated QATs. Recall the different weightings of the particular methodological features assessed in QATs, noted in Table 1. Another way to state the burden of the 'mere argument by disagreement' objection is that to identify the best QATs, one would have to possess a principled method of determining the optimal weights for the methodological features included on a QAT. That we do not presently have such a principled method is an understatement. Consider this compelling illustration of the arbitrariness involved in the assignment of weights to methodological features in QATs. Cho and Bero (1994) employed three different algorithms for weighting the methodological features of their QAT (discussed in §2). Then they tested the three weighting algorithms for their effect on quality scores of medical trials, and their effect on the inter-rater reliability of such scores. They selected for further use-with no principled basis- the weighting algorithm that had the highest inter-rater reliability. Cho and Bero explicitly admitted that nothing beyond the higher inter-rater reliability warranted the choice of this weighting algorithm, and they rightfully claimed that such arbitrariness was justified because "there is little empiric [sic] evidence on the relative importance of the individual quality criteria to the control of systematic bias."12 Medical scientists have no principled foundation for developing a uniquely good QAT, and so resort to a relatively arbitrary basis for their development. One could press the standard objection by noting that while it is true that we presently lack an inductive theory that could provide warrant for a unique system for weighting the various methodological features, it is overly pessimistic to think that we will never have a principled basis for identifying a uniquely best weighting system. It is plausible, this objection goes, to think that someday we will have a uniquely best QAT, or perhaps uniquely best QATs for particular kinds of epistemic scenarios, and we could thereby achieve agreement regarding the strength of evidence from medical studies. To this one would have to forgive those medical scientists, dissatisfied with this response, who are concerned with assessing evidence today. But there is another, deeper reason why such a response is not compelling. 12 There is a tendency among medical scientists to suppose that the relative importance of various methodological features is merely an empirical matter. One need not entirely sympathize with such methodological naturalism to agree with the point expressed by Cho and Bero here: we lack reasons to prefer one weighting of methodological features over another, regardless of whether one thinks of these reasons as empirical or principled. 19 It is not a mere argument from present disagreement-I reiterate-to claim that the poor inter-tool reliability of QATs implies that the strength of evidence from particular medical studies is underdetermined. That is because, as the example of the Cho and Bero QAT suggests, the disagreements between QATs are due to arbitrary differences in how the particular methodological features are weighed in the various QATs. There are, to be sure, better and worse QATs. But that is about as good as one can do when it comes to distinguishing between QATs. Of those that account for the majority of relevant methodological features, some weight those features in a slightly different manner than others, and we have no principled grounds for preferring one weighting over another. We do not possess a theory of scientific inference that could help determine the weights of the methodological features in QATs. If one really wanted to, one could sustain the objection by claiming that it is possible that in the future we will develop a theory of inference which would allow us to identify a uniquely best QAT. There is a point at which one can no longer argue against philosophical optimism. The underdetermination of evidential significance is a hard problem; like other hard philosophical problems, it does not preclude optimism. One could put aside the aim of finding a principled basis for selecting among the available QATs, and instead perform a selection based on their historical performance. Call this a 'naturalist' selection of QATs.13 Since QATs are employed to estimate the quality of evidence from medical studies, and such evidence is used to estimate the strength of causal relations, the naturalist approach would involve selecting QATs based on a parameter determined by the 'fit' between (i) the strength of presently known causal relations and (ii) the quality of the evidence for such causal relations available at a particular time, as determined in retrospect by currently available QATs. The best QAT would be the one with the best average fit between (i) and (ii). Such an assessment of QATs would be of some value. It would be fundamentally limited, though, given an epistemic circularity. In the domains in which QATs are employed, the best epistemic access to the strength of causal relations is the total evidence from all the available medical studies, summarized by a careful systematic review (which, in this domain, usually takes the form of a metaanalysis), appropriately weighted to take into account relevant methodological features of those studies. But of course, those very weightings are generated by QATs. The naturalist approach to assessing QATs, then, itself requires the employment of QATs. 13 Such an approach was first suggested to me by Jim Tabery. 20 The underdetermination of evidential significance is not the same problem that is often associated with Duhem and Quine. One formulation of the standard underdetermination problem-underdetermination of theory by evidence-holds that there are multiple theories compatible with a given body of evidence. The underdetermination of evidential significance is the prior problem of settling on the strength of a given piece of evidence in the first place. Indeed, one may wish to say that an appropriate name for the present problem is just the inverse of the Quinean locution: underdetermination of evidence by theory. Our best theories of inference underdetermine the strength of evidence, exemplified by tools such as QATs. 6 QATs and Hierarchies The most frequently used tools for assessing the quality of medical studies are not QATs, but rather evidence hierarchies. An evidence hierarchy is a rank-ordering of kinds of methods according to the potential for bias in that kind of method. The potential for bias is usually based on one or very few parameters of study designs, most prominently randomization. QATs and evidence hierarchies are not mutually exclusive, since an evidence hierarchy can be employed to generate a rank-ordering of types of methods, and then QATs can be employed to evaluate the quality of tokens of those methods. However, judicious use of QATs should replace evidence hierarchies altogether. The best defense of evidence hierarchies that I know of is given by Howick (2011), who promotes a sophisticated version of hierarchies in which the rank-ordering of a particular study can increase or decrease depending on parameters distinct from the parameter first used to generate the ranking. Howick's suggestion, and any evidence hierarchy consistent with his suggestion (such as that of GRADE), ultimately amounts to an outright abandonment of evidence hierarchies. Howick gives conditions for when mechanistic evidence and evidence from nonrandomized studies should be considered, and also suggests that sometimes evidence from RCTs should be doubted. If one takes into account methodological nuances of medical research, in the ways that Howick suggests or otherwise, then the metaphor of a hierarchy of evidence and its utility in assessing quality of evidence seem less compelling than more quantitative tools like QATs. For instance, the GRADE evidence hierarchy employs more than one property to rank methods. GRADE starts with a quality assignment based on one property and takes other properties into account by subsequent modifications of the quality 21 assignment (shifting the assignment up or down). Formally, the use of n properties to rank methods is equivalent to a scoring system based on n properties which discards any information that exceeds what is required to generate a ranking. QATs generate scores that are measured on scales more informative than ordinal scales (such as interval, ratio, or absolute scales). From any measure on one of these supra-ordinal scales, a ranking can be inferred on an ordinal scale, but not vice versa (from a ranking on an ordinal scale it is impossible to infer measures on supra-ordinal scales). Thus hierarchies (including the more sophisticated ones such as GRADE) provide evaluations of evidence which are necessarily less informative than evaluations provided by QATs. Moreover, because these sophisticated hierarchies begin with a quality assignment based on one methodological property and then shift the quality assignment by taking other properties into account, the weights that can be assigned to various methodological properties are constrained. With QATs, on the other hand, the weight assigned to any methodological property is completely open, and can be determined based on rational arguments regarding the respective importance of the various properties, without arbitrary constraints imposed by the structure of the scoring system. In short, despite the widespread use of evidence hierarchies and the defense of such use by Howick (2011), and despite the problems that I raise for QATs above, QATs are superior to evidence hierarchies for assessing the great volume of evidence in contemporary medical research. 7 Conclusion An examination of QATs suggests that coarse-grained features of evidence in medicine, like freedom from systematic error, are themselves amalgams of a complex set of considerations; that is why QATs take into account a plurality of methodological features such as randomization and blinding. The various aspects of a specific empirical situation which can influence an assessment of a coarse-grained evidential feature are numerous, often difficult to identify and articulate, and if they can be identified and articulated (as one attempts to do with QATs), they can be evaluated by different scientists to varying degrees and by different quality assessment tools to various degrees. In short, there are a variety of features of evidence that must be considered when assessing evidence, and there are numerous and potentially contradictory ways to do so. Our best theories of scientific inference 22 provide little guidance on how to weigh the relevant methodological features included in tools like QATs. A group of medical scientists prominent in the literature on QATs notes that "the quality of controlled trials is of obvious relevance to systematic reviews" but that "the methodology for both the assessment of quality and its incorporation into systematic reviews are a matter of ongoing debate" (Jüni, Altman, and Egger, 2001). I have argued that the use of QATs are important to minimize arbitrariness when assessing medical evidence and to accurately estimate probabilities associated with measures of confirmation. However, available QATs vary in their constitutions, and when medical evidence is assessed using QATs their inter-rater reliability and intertool reliability is low. This, in turn, is a compelling illustration of a more general problem: the underdetermination of evidential significance. Disagreements about the strength of evidence are, of course, ubiquitous in science. Such disagreement is especially striking, however, when it results from the employment of carefully codified tools designed to quantitatively assess the strength of evidence. QATs are currently the best instruments available to medical scientists to assess the strength of evidence, yet when applied to what is purported to be the best quality evidence in medicine (namely, evidence from RCTs), different users of the same QAT, and different QATs applied to the same evidence, lead to widely discordant assessments of the strength of evidence. References Balk EM, Bonis PA, Moskowitz H, Schmid CH, Ioannidis JP, Wang C, Lau J. 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(2006) "Adjustment of Meta-Analyses on the Basis of Quality Scores Should be Abandoned" J Clin Epidemiol 59: 1249-56. 24 Howick, J. (2011) The Philosophy of Evidence-Based Medicine. Wiley-Blackwell. Jadad AR, Moore RA, Carroll D, et al. (1996) "Assessing the Quality of Reports of Randomized Clinical Trials: Is Blinding Necessary?" Control Clin Trials 17: 112. Jüni, P., Altman, D.G., Egger, M. (2001) "Assessing the Quality of Randomised Controlled Trials" in Systematic Reviews in Health Care: Meta-Analysis in Context (Egger, Smith, and Altman, eds.). London: BMJ Publishing Group. Jüni, P., Witschi, A., Bloch, R., Egger, M. (1999) "The Hazards of Scoring the Quality of Clinical Trials for Meta-Analysis" The Journal of the American Medical Association 282(11): 1054-60. La Caze, A. (2011) "The Role of Basic Science in Evidence-Based Medicine" Biology and Philosophy 26(1): 81-98. Linde K, Clausius N, Ramirez G, et al. (1997) "Are the Clinical Effects of Homoeopathy Placebo Effects?" 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(2002) "Systems to Rate the Strength of Scientific Evidence" Evidence Report/Technology Assessment Number 47, AHRQ Publication No. 02-E016. Worrall, J. (2002) "What Evidence in Evidence-Based Medicine?" Philosophy of Science 69: S316-30. Worrall, J. (2007) "Why There's No Cause to Randomize" The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58: 451-88.

A reprodução deste artigo é autorizada desde que citada a fonte. Caso não citada a fonte, os infratores estarão sujeitos às penalidades cabíveis, conforme o Artigo 184 do Código Penal e Lei 9.610/98. Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva © 2019. UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO DEPARTAMENTO DE ZOOTECNIA UFRPE EMANUEL ISAQUE CORDEIRO DA SILVA A NOVA PECUÁRIA LEITEIRA MUNDIAL – PRODUÇÃO MUNDIAL A NOVA PECUÁRIA LEITEIRA – PRODUÇÃO MUNDIAL DE LEITE EM 2018 NEW DAIRY LIVESTOCK WORLD PRODUCTION OF MILK IN 2018 Apoio: Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva1 Departamento de Zootecnia da UFRPE E-mail: [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 Produção mundial de Leite em 2018: análise sobre o crescente aumento da produção e da produtividade No mundo foram produzidos aproximadamente 843 milhões de toneladas de leite, isso corresponde à 843 bilhões de litros de leite produzidos em 2018, e comparado ao ano de 2017 que a produção foi de 812 bilhões de litros a variação média percentual foi de 2,2% crescente (FAO, 2019), em 2015 foram produzidos 656 bilhões de litros, entre 2015 e 2019, a produção mundial leiteira aumentou em 28,5% aproximadamente, e isso deve-se à implementação de tecnologias, manejos nutricionais, sanitários e outras técnicas que fazem a produção leiteira ser cada vez mais promíscua todos os anos mesmo com variações e quedas produtivas em determinados países como o próprio Brasil. Vale salientar, também, que o crescimento médio anual é variável mediante alguns países produtores, todavia, essa variação média anual é crescente e gira em torno de 3 à 4% nos últimos 5 anos de dados obtidos (FAO, 2018). Os gráficos abaixo, tratam da produção leiteira mundial no ano de 2017 e 2018 por continentes; observe com atenção os dados obtidos pela FAO e atente às conclusões que se seguem: 1 Bacharelando em Zootecnia pela Universidade Federal Rural de Pernambuco (2019-). É tecnólogo em agropecuária pelo Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia de Pernambuco Campus Belo Jardim (2016-2018). Normalista pelo Frei Cassiano Comacchio (2014-2017). E-mails: [email protected], [email protected] e [email protected]. WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399. Reprodução proibida. Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva 1 Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva [email protected] (82)98143-8399 Os dados obtidos e expressos supra são da FAO2 dos Estados Unidos, ele nos mostra uma ascendente produção leiteira dos continentes e a participação de ambos nesse mercado promissor. A Ásia, em 2017, foi responsável por mais de 40% da produção mundial de leite, foram mais de 320 bilhões de litros produzidos e um aumento percentual de 1,9% comparado ao ano de 2016; esse aumento aconteceu mesmo com o segundo declínio seguido da China na produção leiteira. Os países da União Europeia estão em segundo lugar com uma produção de mais de 224 bilhões de litros produzidos em 2017, um aumento percentual de 1,3% comparado ao ano de 2016, e com participação de quase 28% de toda produção global; todo esse aumento da produção e da produtividade europeia deve-se ao incremento de novas tecnologias aplicadas ao manejo das vacas, incluindo a atenção dobrada à sanidade e ao bem-estar dos animais. A América do Norte veio em terceiro lugar na produção e na participação mundial. Com uma participação de 13% e uma produção de 106 bilhões de litros em 2017, o continente conseguiu um acréscimo de 1,7% comparado ao ano de 2016. Os EUA é o responsável por esse grande acréscimo; produzindo em 2017 90% de todo total produzido e detendo um rebanho promissor de 9,3 milhões de cabeças leiteiras. A América do Sul, ao qual o Brasil está localizado, deteve a quarta colocação na participação e na produção mundial, participando com quase 8% de toda a produção mundial e produzindo 62 bilhões de litros de leite em 2017, uma acréscimo de 2,7% comparado ao ano de 2 Traduzido e gráficos construídos pelo autor em questão, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva do DZ da UFRPE. gráfico 1: participação dos continentes na produção leiteira em 2017. FONTE: FAO. Gráfico 2: produção mundial leiteira em bilhões de litros em 2017. FONTE: FAO. Reprodução proibida. Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva 2 Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva [email protected] (82)98143-8399 2016. Os maiores produtores do continente foram o Brasil que dos 62 bilhões produziu mais de 50%, em torno de 35 bilhões de litros, mesmo com declínio relativo, o país ainda é um dos maiores produtores mundiais; o Peru e a Colômbia. A Argentina também é uma grande produtora, todavia, passou por uma crise leiteira, sendo o mesmo "marginalizado", isto é, impróprio para o consumo. A África produziu em média 46 bilhões de litros de leite em 2017, ficando em quinto lugar na participação mundial, com quase 6% de toda produção global, não havendo variação positiva ou negativa significativa comparado com 2016. O continente oceânico (Oceania) produziu em torno de 31 bilhões de litros em 2017, um declínio de 2,9% comparado ao ano de 2016; participando de 3,8 da produção global. Esse declínio provém da Nova Zelândia, basicamente, que deteve um défice de 1,1% em sua produção, que chegou a 21,3 bilhões de litros; porém, o país continua sendo o maior produtor de leite do continente. A América Central produziu no ano de 2017, aproximadamente 18 bilhões de litros, participando de 2,2% da produção global; deteve um aumento de 1,1% comparado ao ano de 2016. Os dados supra, foram obtidos pela FAO que é a Organização das Nações Unidas para a Alimentação e a Agricultura. Com ele, podemos concluir que a cada ano que se passa, o mercado leiteiro têm variações positivas e negativas, todavia as negativas subjazem as positivas e, sendo assim, cada ano a produção e a produtividade nos países e nos continentes ascendem em proporções significativas; e esse aumento demonstra uma junção de fatores entre eles a implementação de novas tecnologias, a atenção com a sanidade e o bem-estar das vacas e do manejo nutricional e geral das fazendas e propriedades leiteiras espalhadas pelo mundo. A partir de toda essa análise supracitada, podemos apresentar o panorama do leite mundial em 2018, obtido através da FAO, e analisar as ascensões e possíveis declínios dos continentes e enfatizar os países que obtiveram pontos positivos ou negativos nessa participação leiteira de 2018. Observe os gráficos 3 e 4 abaixo e, posteriormente, e atente às análises: Reprodução proibida. Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva 3 Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva [email protected] (82)98143-8399 Em 2018, a produção leiteira mundial foi de 843 bilhões de litros, um aumento de 2,2% comparado ao ano de 2017. O gráfico 3 apresenta os continentes e a participação de ambos na produção leiteira mundial. O gráfico 4 apresenta os continentes e a produção de ambos expressas em bilhões de litros. Com esses dados, atualizados pelo autor em questão, apresentam mais uma vez um crescente mercado que gera empregos e emprega tecnologia de ponta para aumentar a produtividade dos animais e, consequentemente, a produção anual das fazendas e propriedades leiteiras. O continente asiático, em 2018, produziu 347 bilhões de litros de leite, a ascensão de 4% comparado ao ano de 2017. Ainda continua detendo a maior participação na produção mundial, passando de 40,3% em 2017 para quase 41% em 2018. A ênfase aos países produtores serão à Índia e ao Paquistão. A Índia teve um aumento de 5,6% de sua produção comparada ao ano de 2017; toda essa expansão é proveniente de uma equipe de veterinários, criadores, zootecnistas e outros especialistas que empregam mão-de-obra qualificada, tecnologias contemporâneas para obtenção do leite, manejo, sanidade, bem-estar às vacas, genética de qualidade e manejo nutricional concentrado na alta produção e produtividade dos animais. O Paquistão, mesmo com dificuldades nos processos de coleta do leite e em demais processos, obteve um acréscimo de 3% de sua produção em 2018 comparada a produção de 2017. A China, por sua vez, obteve o terceiro declínio em 4 anos, o declínio da produção em 2018 foi de 1,1% comparado ao ano de 2017; juntos, a China perdeu 15% de sua produção em apenas 5 anos. Note que o mercado produtor do leite tem suas variáveis extremas e difíceis de compreender, pois, à medida em que um país como o Paquistão tem toda uma dificuldade de obtenção do leite, nos processos de exportação e de industrialização do mesmo, consegue alavancar sua produção em 3% em um único ano; um país como a China, que é ainda um dos grandes produtores leiteiros, consegue uma perda inaceitável em sua produção de incríveis 15% em menos de 5 anos; daí a importância e a necessidade de uma equipe que consiga conciliar todos os fatores supracitados como emprego de mão-de-obra qualificada para manejar os animais e elencar a produção. Os países da União Europeia conseguiram uma participação de 27,1% na produção mundial de 2018, obtendo uma produção de 230 bilhões de litros no ano em questão, um acréscimo de 0,8% comparado ao ano de 2017. A ênfase é a Rússia que conseguiu um acréscimo de 1,1% comparado ao ano de 2017 e uma produção de 32 bilhões de litros em 2018. A junção da produção da Rússia e demais países europeus supriram o declínio da Ucrânia que passou por uma crise entre a desvalorização dos produtos agrícolas e a baixa no preço do leite. Reprodução proibida. Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva 4 Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva [email protected] (82)98143-8399 A América do Norte produziu, em 2018, 109 bilhões de litros de leite tendo uma participação mundial de 13% em toda produção global e com um acréscimo de 1,1% comparado ao ano de 2017. Os Estados Unidos continua sendo o maior produtor do continente, sendo responsável por mais de 90% de toda essa produção, produzindo no ano em questão, 98,6 bilhões de litros. Vale ressaltar que os EUA, com suas altas tecnologias e o emprego de alta genética nos animais, conseguiu aumentar a produtividade das vacas por ano, passando de 10.525 kg/ano/vaca em 2017 para 10.632kg/ano/vaca em 2018. A América do Sul foi responsável por 7,7% da produção mundial, produzindo 65 bilhões de litros, um aumento de 1,6% comparado ao ano de 2017. O Brasil, por sua vez, reduziu seu aumento, passando de 1% em 2017 para 0,8% em 2018, um aumento no ano comparado à produção de 2017 mas um declínio comparado ao aumento percentual de 2017. O continente africano aumentou sua produção em 1,1% comparada ao ano de 2017, chegando à 46,6 bilhões de litros produzidos em 2018; obtendo uma participação de 5,5% na produção global. A Oceania, depois de passar por dois anos de declínios seguidos na produção leiteira, conseguiu um acréscimo de 1% comparado ao ano de 2017. Produzindo 31,5 bilhões de litros em 2018, a maior responsável por esse aumento foi a Nova Zelândia, responsável pelos declínios, a mesma expandiu sua produção em 4,4%, todavia, o aumento do continente não foi maior por causa do declínio australiano que foi de 3,8% comparado ao ano de 2017. A participação global da Oceania foi de 3,7% em 2018. A América Central produziu 18,2 bilhões de litros em 2018, comparado com a produção de 2017 o aumento foi de 1,1%. O México é o maior produtor da região e aumentou sua produção em 1,6% no ano de 2018. A região ainda participou com 2,2% na produção mundial sem alterações comparadas ao ano de 2017. Os dados supra, obtidos pela FAO, traduzidos e atualizados pelo autor em questão, demonstram que o mercado do leite continua sendo promissor e empregador de milhares e milhões de empregos por todo o planeta. Como citado anteriormente, a junção de profissionais, potencial genético dos animais, sanidade, medicina preventiva, medidas profiláticas, bem-estar dos animais entre outros fatores tiveram impacto direto na alta produção e produtividade dos animais e na lucratividade dos países produtores que industrializam o leite ou mantém um mercado exportador do mesmo ou do leite in natura. Os países desenvolvidos responsáveis por 2/3 (dois terços) da produção mundial, isto é, produtores de 570 bilhões de litros, apresentam taxa de crescimento variável conforme as Reprodução proibida. Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva 5 Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva [email protected] (82)98143-8399 implicações nas propriedades e no mercado, porém essa taxa de variação de crescimento gira em torno de 0,5 à 1% ao ano e produtividade média entre 6.000-7000 litros/vaca/ano. Esses países, principalmente os europeus e os EUA, contam com elevados subsídios, que vêm apresentando tendência declinante nos últimos anos conforme apontam especialistas (FAO, 2019). Nos países subdesenvolvidos, em desenvolvimento, a produção em 2018 foi de 270 bilhões de litros e a taxa de crescimento é de 3-5% ao ano muito superior aos países já desenvolvidos. A produtividade, de 1500-2500 litros/vaca/ano, também vem se elevando nos países em desenvolvimento, em média 3-4% ao ano, contribuindo com major volume para a oferta mundial de leite. Observe a tabela construída a partir dos dados da FAO da produção mundial de países desenvolvidos e subdesenvolvidos de 2007 a 2018: Tabela 1: Produção mundial de leite em países desenvolvidos e subdesenvolvidos, 2007-2018. FONTE: FAO. Os dados da tabela atribuem ao avanço da produção de leite, bem como a análise sobre a crescente produção leiteira dos países em desenvolvimento. Especialistas apontam que a crescente produção dos países subdesenvolvidos e a implementação de técnicas mais especializadas e qualificadas terá uma consequência, essa será a equidade da produção com os países desenvolvidos e, futuramente, a produção leiteira dos países subdesenvolvidos ultrapassará a produção dos países já desenvolvidos. Nos países desenvolvidos, a produção leiteira passou de 334 bilhões para 504 bilhões de litros, ou seja, um aumento de 50% em média, já nos países subdesenvolvidos o aumento Reprodução proibida. Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva 6 Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva [email protected] (82)98143-8399 passou de 227 bilhões em 2007 para 336 bilhões de litros em 2018, um acréscimo de 48% na produção. Esses dados nos mostram que o aumento da produção nos países desenvolvidos já é alcançado na mesma escala pelos países em desenvolvimento; sendo assim, ambos estão empregando técnicas para facilitar a obtenção do leite e para ascender a produtividade de cada vaca leiteira de sua região. O aumento do volume de leite produzido nos países em desenvolvimento deve-se principalmente ao crescimento da Índia (5,6%) e Paquistão (3%) na Ásia, do Quênia na África e do Brasil (0,8%) na América do Sul. Os países considerados desenvolvidos apresentaram um crescimento grande e pouco superior aos subdesenvolvidos, e os maiores responsáveis por esse crescimento nos últimos anos foram a Rússia com 32 bilhões de litros, os EUA com quase 100 bilhões de litros produzidos ou 1/5 da produção dos países desenvolvidos, a Alemanha com acréscimo em sua produção, bem como a França, a Inglaterra e o aumento de 4,4% da Nova Zelândia. A redução da produção de leite em alguns países da União Europeia como a Ucrânia e da China na Ásia pode ser parcialmente atribuída às reformas políticas que culminaram em diminuição gradativa de subsídios a desvalorização de produtos agrícolas e, consequentemente a baixa no preço do leite, e também por serem países com menor competitividade em custo de produção. Além disso, os países europeus estão entre os que apresentam maiores níveis de produtividade média do rebanho, indicando alto grau de incorporação de tecnologia e dificuldade de expansão da produção. A Rússia foi um país que mais contribuiu negativamente para a redução da participação europeia, com quedas de dois bilhões de litros em 5 anos como aconteceu entre 2002-2007, porém, a mesma está investindo potencialmente em seu rebanho e em mão-de-obra qualificada para transformar seu rebanho em altos potenciais genéticos para a produção leiteira e é o que visa aos dias de hoje quanto a participação do pais na produção leiteira atual. Sobre essa queda da produção russa, com o fim da URSS, o setor lácteo na Rússia passou por um processo de reorganização e competição capitalista primordialmente com os EUA. Todas as ineficiências anteriormente mascaradas pelo regime comunista apareceram, exigindo do setor privado melhorias de qualidade, investimento em máquinas, equipamentos e qualificação de mão-de-obra. O reflexo imediato foi a redução significativa do rebanho e queda da produção de leite. O mesmo movimento ocorreu na Ucrânia, que também contribuiu para a perda da participação europeia na oferta global desde os anos 2000 até os dias atuais. Reprodução proibida. Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva 7 Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva [email protected] (82)98143-8399 A produção de leite ocorre em todos os países do mundo, porém a heterogeneidade do processo produtivo e volume de produção entre os diferentes países é marcante. Na tabela 2, observam-se os dez principais países produtores de leite em 2017. Tabela 2: Dez principais países produtores de leite em 2017. FONTE: Farmnews. A produção mundial em 2017 foi de 812 bilhões de litros e esses países corresponderam a 45% do volume mundial, quase a metade de toda produção. O Brasil, em 2017, ocupou a quarta colocação, com uma produção aproximada de 34,3 bilhões de litros anuais, que reapresentou 4,5% da produção total no mundo; em 2018 essa produção foi de mais de 36 bilhões de litros e uma queda na participação mundial, passando para 4,25%. Como conclusão, são infinitas as mudanças geográficas da produção de leite no mundo, o que ocasiona grandes diferenças nos sistemas produtivos e no volume produzido nos diversos países; consequentemente essas transformações causam mudanças na oferta do produto e o surgimento de países produtores de leite com maior competitividade, possibilidades de incorporação de tecnologia e estratégias definidas de inserção no mercado internacional. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – Departamento de Zootecnia da UFRPE Recife, 2019. Reprodução proibida. Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva 8 Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva [email protected] (82)98143-8399 REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS EMBRAPA. Base de dados. Embrapa gado de leite. Disponível em: <www.cnpgl.embrapa.br>. Acesso em: 23 de outubro de 2019. FAO – FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS. FAOSTAT database, 2017. Disponível em: <www.faostat.fao.org>. Acesso em: 22 de outubro de 2019. Idem. FAOSTAT database, 2018. Disponível em: <www.faostat.fao.org>. Acesso em: 22 de outubro de 2019. FORMIGONI, I. Quais são os principais países produtores de leite?. Farmnews.com. Disponível em: <http://www.farmnews.com.br/dados/paises-produtores-de-leite/>. Acesso em: 23 de outubro de 2019. ZOCCAL, R. et al. A Nova Pecuária Leiteira Brasileira – Produção mundial. In: BARBOSA, S. B. P.; BATISTA, A. M. V.; MONARDES, H. (Orgs.). Anais do 3° Congresso Brasileiro de Qualidade do Leite. Recife: CCS, 2008. pps. 85-87. Realização Apoio EMANUEL ISAQUE CORDEIRO DA SILVA Técnico em Agropecuária – IFPE Bacharelando em Zootecnia – UFRPE Aos professores: Luís Eduardo Pereira de Andrade Ferreira – graduado em Medicina Veterinária – UFRPE/UAG. Mestre em Sanidade e Reprodução de Ruminantes – UFRPE/UAG. Doutor em Ciência Animal Tropical – UFRPE/UAG. Professor do IFPE Campus Belo Jardim. Wellington Samay de Melo – graduado em Zootecnia – UFRPE. Licenciado em Ciências Agrárias – UFRPE. Mestre em Produção de Ruminantes – UFRPE e UFV. Doutor em Produção de Ruminantes – UFRPE, UFPB e UFC. Pós-doutor em Zootecnia – UFPB. Professor do IFPE Campus Belo Jardim.

_______________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________ Report Information from ProQuest May 10 2017 22:59 _______________________________________________________________ 10 May 2017 ProQuest Table of contents 1. Show me how to do like you: Co-mentoring as feminist pedagogy.............................................................. 1 10 May 2017 ii ProQuest Document 1 of 1 Show me how to do like you: Co-mentoring as feminist pedagogy Author: Bona, Mary Jo; Rinehart, Jane; Volbrecht, Rose Mary Publication info: Feminist Teacher ; Champaign 9.3 (1995): 116. ProQuest document link Abstract (Abstract): The reflection of three teachers on the experience of creating a learning community with 22 students during the spring of 1993 is presented. Their project demonstrates practical strategies for incorporating feminist scholarship and pedagogy into the core curriculum and for integrating core courses originating within diverse disciplines. Links: Check at Evergreen Full text: Show Me How to Do Like You: Co-Mentoring as Feminist Pedagogy Show me how to do like you Show me how to do it Structuring the curriculum The three authors of this article are all experienced university teachers. We have been drawn to teaching for many reasons, perhaps the most important of which is that we share an attraction to the continual renewal and surprise that teaching offers. It is predictable or fully subject to our control; teaching can take us to places we did not expect to go. We want to share our recent journey to a new place. This article presents our reflection on the experience of creating a learning community with twenty-two students during the spring of 1993. This project' demonstrates practical strategies for incorporating feminist scholarship and pedagogy into the core curriculum and for integrating core courses originating within diverse disciplines. The structure for this curriculum innovation consisted of the following elements: *Two courses, one in the English department and the other in philosophy, were linked; that is, students had to register to take two particular sections of these classes in the same semester. The two courses shared the title "Ethics and Fiction." Linked courses overcome one budgetary impediment to constructing learning communities in that each teacher may then carry the community as part of her/his regular teaching load. This does not address the additional faculty time required for performing the work of coordinating the linked courses, both in terms of planning and executing the connections. The attendance of almost all of the classes by all three teachers involved in this project was an overload, in the sense that it was not something for which any of us received release time or financial compensation. This is an important factor that all of us believe must be addressed. Engagement in a project such as this one is a vital part of faculty development, and it should receive institutional support that conveys a strong message about its importance. *The classes were scheduled so that the English literature course, "Studies in Fiction," met on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, and the "Ethics" class met on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Mary Jo was the instructor in the fiction component of the course and Rose Mary in the ethics section. *The instructors for the classes chose their reading material and organized their syllabi so that themes and questions would overlap. As part of an effort within the university's women's studies program to encourage the integration of this work into the core curriculum of required courses taken by all undergraduates, both teachers made a commitment to using feminist scholarship. *Other aspects of the courses were also designed to encourage students to connect their work in the two disciplines, for example, in writing assignments and class discussions. 10 May 2017 Page 1 of 14 ProQuest *The two instructors were present for almost all of the classes in both courses (exam days were an exception). The third member of the team (Jane) acted as a participant observer and attended two thirds of the classes. *The two classes were also related in terms of pedagogy. Both teachers stressed that collaborative learning strategies would be practiced in the classroom. Collaborative learning is an umbrella term for a variety of classroom practices designed to foster shared inquiring and responsibility for a course. All three faculty members involved in this project spent the year before the courses began meeting among themselves, sometimes with two other colleagues interested in eventually teaching in a similar format, to discuss possible course reading and how these might be taught with a variety of methods. In addition, all had attended conferences and/or discussion groups on alternative pedagogies and were members of the core faculty group that wrote the proposal for a women's studies program that was eventually accepted and established. It can be said, then, that the authors of this article have had considerable experience in reading, thinking, and talking about curriculum change. We have learned that changing what we teach and learn is changing the way we live; that is, the relationships we have and want to have are continually transformed as we read different texts and talk about new ideas. Telling what we knew and had done before embarking on our learning community adventure is important for the story we are about to tell because it is a story about many things we did not anticipate and our efforts to make sense of them through the image of comentoring. Although we planned conscientiously for our learning community, "Ethics and Fiction," we were also inventing it as we went along. This was a new course for all of us, and we had never worked as a teaching team' before. We did not know most of the students in the class. So, in the beginning, we had syllabi, high hopes, and lots of enthusiasm. We still had all of these at the end of the semester, but also much more, because we discovered how a learning community might work and that its work depends upon the development of a particular kind of relationship. The students sharpened our sense of this relationship, and the story of how they named what they were doing as "comentoring" seems the best place to describe what we learned. Unexpected insights By midsemester we were reading Alice Walker's The Color Purple. Mary Jo passed out four questions for students to discuss in small groups, including the three teachers. In order to provide a thorough and persuasive response to these questions, students were encouraged to accompany each other into the text, locating important scenes, analyzing recurring imagery, and organizing an approach that would allow them to articulate the ideas raised by the group. The students were given nearly fifty minutes to grapple with their questions. At the end of the period, each group was required to offer an extensive analysis of the novel in terms of the question they were given. Each group was helping to prepare the entire class for an eventual written response on a subsequent essay exam. The group that worked on the question regarding The Color Purple as a Kunstlerroman" offered important insights on the nature of creativity. They said that while creativity often is fueled by pain and anger, it cannot be sustained by it. When Celie discovers that Mister has been stowing away all the letters her sister Nettle has sent to her throughout the years of their separation, she wants to kill him. Celie's accumulated years of anger and resentment against her husband have silenced her; her pain prevents her from healing. Shug rescues Celie from self-imposed silence. Celie has already been down the road of deprivation and has used writing less as an act of revenge and more as an act of survival. Her present voicelessness is a form of self-punishment. At this point in the novel, Shug actively participates in Celie's healing. She prevents Celie from killing her husband, she shares private information about her own damaged relationship to her mother, and she encourages Celie to make herself pants to wear while she is working on the farm. These activities result in the development of Celie's own pants-making business. The business frees her from being financially dependent on Albert, and it also liberates her from being imprisoned by her dress while she works outside. Celie comes to understand the motivation behind Shug's encouragement by uttering: "A needle and not a razor in my hand, I think." The students realized that Celie's artistry is fostered by the nurturance she receives from other women in the 10 May 2017 Page 2 of 14 ProQuest text, especially Shug and Sofia. Throughout The Color Purple, the women were engaged in artistic acts: quilting, letter writing, and blues singing. Each of these activities was fostered by more than one woman. Each of the women working in these areas needed help from other women to inspire her creativity. They gave and received from each other the kind of assistance called "mentoring"; that is, individuals modeled desirable ways of acting and supported the capacity of others to engage in them. The kind of mentoring that goes on in the novel is not hierarchical and one-sided, but shared and mutual. No single character is locked into the role of mentee or mentor. The students also suggested that Walker was expanding the traditional meaning of "artist" to accommodate less appreciated and often undervalued forms of creativity: quilting and sewing. They noted what Mae Henderson points out in her article, "The Color Purple: Revisions and Redefinitions," that the art of quilting and sewing more than decorative and utilitarian, it is an activity shared with men, not only in the African-American world of the novel but also in the Olinka tribes of Africa. Nettle writes to Celie about the Olinka tribes, explaining that the men are known for their beautiful quilt-making. The students realized that Walker was compelling us to reconsider traditional and rigid dichotomies of female and male activity, popular modes of expression and "high" art, artistry as collective and collaborative enterprise, and artistry as individual and solitary work. Celie eventually teaches Albert, her former oppressor, to sew shirts to match the pants. As she teaches him to sew, Celie also informs him about African culture, thus helping him to grow out of his misconceptions about appropriate male and female behavior. Celie's artistry is liberating to Albert; it allows him to heal from his own suffering. The quilts and sewing in Walker's text ultimately become an outward symbol of the bonding between women and the potential mending of relations between men and women. Ultimately, Walker expends the meanings of artist and artistry to include an African/American female aesthetic, one that focuses on collaboration and reciprocity. Tutelage occurs mutually between learners at different times during their lives. Thus, the mentor is sometimes the neophyte, though these terms are not quite exact enough to accommodate the concept of co-mentoring. As Walker's text demonstrates, the activity of co-mentoring involves a context of companionship in which learners and teachers participate in a collaborative effort, that is, they labor together to produce something beautiful. The small group reported these fruits of their shared labor to the whole class with satisfaction and pride: they knew their work was good. When their report was almost completed, one of the members of the group declared, "We are co-mentors here." Many others in the class nodded immediately, recognizing the truth of the connection between our classroom experiences and the experiences of Celie with Shug and Sofia. This connection became a recurrent theme throughout the rest of the semester, as the students sought ways of relating the ideas expressed in course readings, about how relationships shape our choices and actions, to their experiences in shaping ties with each other through their shared work. The students in this learning community were a mix of different ages, personalities, and experiences. Some were married, many were not. Some were parents, most were not. Some were lesbians, most were heterosexuals. Most were female. We were companions on a remarkable learning journey. We co-mentored one another, and we supported one another's learning experience. The care that students took to support each other's learning did not rest, for most of them, upon personal friendships or even upon affection. They did come to know each other quite well. They were in class together every day where they interacted frequently in small discussion groups, as well as in the larger full class discussions which were often conducted with students facing one another in a large circle. Although they were not intimate with one another, they did develop a degree of trust that allowed them (in varying degrees) to discuss the course material in terms of their own experiences. The care that students demonstrated toward one another was based on the relationships they developed as a community of learners. It emerged out of their shared experienced that learning can be transformative when students and teachers create a learning community in which intellectual, emotional, and moral growth are seen as interconnected. 10 May 2017 Page 3 of 14 ProQuest For the teachers involved in this experiment, there was never any doubt that we wanted to employ feminist, collaborative learning strategies and build a learning community. Each of us had used these teaching methods in our individual classes, and we were excited by the prospect of spending more time with each other and with a self-selected group of students. We began, then, with high hopes and what we thought was a clear sense of what could happen in the course. What actually happened took us by surprise. Our students claimed the course's learning projects of intellectual collaboration in literary analysis and ethical reflection as their own. They entered into co-mentoring relationships by making explicit choices about their relationships with one another and with us. They chose to become co-laborers with us in a common work. When the students named what was occurring in the class as comentoring, we were struck by the richness of this concept and its potential for deepening understanding of the dynamics that emerge while becoming a community that learns. We have been working since then to define for ourselves what co-mentoring means and to characterize its usefulness for understanding new models of teaching and learning. Mentoring and co-mentoring Mentoring is a word for two-person relationships in which one individual serves as a trusted counselor or teacher for the other. The word mentor refers to this wise guide and is derived from the name of Odysseus's friend who was entrusted with the education of his son and guardianship of his household while Odysseus was away at Troy. Its derivation and continued usage indicate a presumption of hierarchy in a mentoring relationship: one leads, the other follows; therefore, one is presumed to be more experienced and capable than the other. The mentor shows the way, and the mentee appreciates and heeds the example. Mentoring takes its purest form in the case of an elder guiding a younger. This may last for a relatively short time or be a lifelong process; typically, at some point the mentee also becomes able to mentor others. In a traditionally defined mentoring relationship, there is a clear boundary between the mentor and the mentee. They do not switch roles within their relationship. If the mentee is ready to become a mentor, this entails the development of a different relationship with someone else. There is an emphasis upon action in mentoring. Mentoring cannot be reduced to telling or talking. The mentoring relationship assumes that its participants are located in the same context, are acting within it, and that the actions of the mentor can serve as a model for the mentee. While the mentor may also talk about how to do this or that, talking is not enough. The mentor performs for the mentee, presents the mentee with a demonstration, rather than simply offering a commentary. Mentoring refers to a special type of relationship that can emerge when a neophyte is granted close access and attention by an established figure who is willing to provide support, encouragement, and guidance as the newcomer "learns the ropes" of a new endeavor. The image that is most clearly associated with mentoring is of two men Mentor and Telemachus, the professor and the graduate student, the senior executive and the up-and-coming manager. Placing women into these pictures, either in the mentor or mentee role, complicates our reading of the relationship. When we imagine teaching or counseling relationships, that involve women only, the context seems to shift away from mentoring and toward nurturing of family: mothers with their daughters, older sisters with younger, aunts with nieces. Traditionally, women's teaching and advising have taken place in the private world of home, or the homelike elementary school. Even now when women are more and more involved in the workplace and politics, often acting in positions of responsibility, it can be difficult to place us within a mentoring frame. This difficulty seems to have a deeper source than women's restricted access to the resources that mentors need, discrimination against women as potential mentees, or problems in defining nonromantic, cross-sex relationships. It seems that there is an incompatibility between how the "feminine role" has been understood and the kind of relationship that mentoring really is. Traditionally, femininity has not been associated with authority and power. Girls and women have been more encouraged to follow gender norms that orient them to seek the roles of follower or friend, except in their relationships with children. Women are more likely to be given authority as mothers or teachers of young children. It is less likely that women will have authority, or be viewed as experts and leaders, in areas that 10 May 2017 Page 4 of 14 ProQuest involve the more prestigious public world of adulthood: higher education, the workplace, politics. As children develop into adolescents and adults, they are expected to move into these spheres where men are usually the leaders as coaches, administrators, professors, supervisors, and office-holders. These roles may or may not be contexts in which mentoring happens. Bernice Sandler has suggested that mentoring among women may often be hidden or unacknowledged because supportive relationships that facilitate a woman's development may be regarded as "personal" (and thus undervalued) rather than as mentoring. This suggestion that personal relationships and mentoring relationships are distinct from each other points to the problems previously identified regarding the split between private and public and the differential in how prestige is allocated. We are inclined to reserve the term mentoring for relationships that are carefully circumscribed as "impersonal" and that take place "away from home." Sandler also identifies several dimensions of mentoring that constitute it as a hierarchical relationship: the mentor has superior knowledge and connections; the mentor sets the agenda; the mentor should be older; mentoring is initiated by the mentor; the benefits of mentoring run in a single direction from the mentor to the mentee. Sandler discusses how each of these characteristics may inhibit the fruitfulness of the mentoring bond, and render it less supportive of women's development than the assistance provided by a social network. Burke and McKeen's review of the literature on the mentoring process in organizations contains a question that converges with Sandler's emphasis on networks as supporting women's development: "Are peer relationships `better fit' for women?" (329). Burke and McKeen wonder if women, given the freedom to design ways of working rather than struggling to accommodate established organizational rules and practice, might create a different, nonhierarchical way of mentoring. The study by Wolf, in which 240 women aged 34 to 64 answered questions about their classroom experiences as adult learners, takes a step toward answering their question. Wolf's participants described a complex mentoring process marked by interactive; collaborative relationships with their teachers in which they felt both supported and challenged. Our experience shows that this process can be extended to include student-student relationships as well. We believe that the possibility co-mentoring presents for understanding classrooms and their occupants benefits differently both men and women. The insights generated by analyses that reveal the limitations for women of the traditional mentoring frame need not be interpreted as applying to women only. They may be interpreted as prompted by questions about women's experiences but also as leading to alternative understandings that can enlarge opportunities for both women and men. Our understanding of co-mentoring, while it is based upon an experience with a class composed almost completely of women, is not gender specific. Just as collaborative learning is not restricted to one gender but is presented as enhancing and empowering for both, co-mentoring is a human capacity and activity. Regarding mentoring as both restrictive and masculine and developing an alternative that lifts the constraints and encompasses experiences that have been categorized as feminine is not an effort on our part to establish a gender-based parallel. "Let men do mentoring and women co-mentoring" is definitely not our motto. The aim of our construction of mentoring and co-mentoring as reflecting some dimensions of the differences between men's and women's relationships is not to reinforce such differences but to indicate an escape route from their confines. If we're right that thinking about intellectual collaboration in terms of co-mentoring clarifies pedagogy in both its theoretical and practical aspects, then comentoring as done by women and men may serve as one strategy for moving beyond the rigid boundaries set by gender rules. Co-mentoring gives a name to supportive assistance provided by several connected individuals." Placing the prefix "co" before "mentoring" reconstructs the relationship as nonhierarchical; "co" makes mentoring reciprocal and mutual. This reciprocity means that over time the mentee and mentor roles may shift; no one is stuck in one or the other for the duration of the relationship. It does not, however, remove the elements of counseling, modeling, and teaching preserved in the term mentoring. Co-mentoring names a dynamic that may evolve within collaborative learning. Both co-mentoring and collaborative learning are social, active, and appreciative of 10 May 2017 Page 5 of 14 ProQuest differences among individuals in terms of their backgrounds, talents, and learning styles. Co-mentoring is a specific way of being together that adds to companionship the elements of sharing work in a manner that invites the participants to act as teachers, demonstrators, and counselors for each other. These participants may include more than two because co-mentoring allows for the sharing of the mentor/mentee responsibilities by several individuals. Co-mentoring is not a method, but a relationship. Co-mentoring assumes that everyone has something to teach and something to learn. Rather than constructing teacher and learner as static positions, co-mentoring formulates these as tasks that may be performed at different times by individuals who are not strictly defined in terms of either. Go-mentors are collaborators they labor together. They need not be friends in the sense of having deep affection for and intimate ties with each other. They are better termed "companions"-individuals who share an association and a common activity. To do their work, co-mentors discover ways of showing each other the way. The awkward quality of the term co-mentoring indicates how impoverished our traditional category system is. It shows how we lack words for relationships in a learning environment that are not hierarchical and dichotomous. Lacking such words, we may be hindered from developing such partnerships. The collaborative learning model's emphasis upon sharing the talks of teacher and student is concretely embodied in the activities of comentoring and the relationships these activities build. Co-mentoring extends our imaginations and invites us to trespass, to cross the lines that divide the experts from the ignorant, the masters from the apprentices, the fathers from the sons. As women have moved in greater numbers and with louder voices into work organizations and college classrooms, the difficulties of living within these visible lines have become all the more apparent. Perhaps many also have the desire to explore another way to work and learn. To summarize, working from our experience in a learning community where students employed the term comentoring to characterize their working relationships, we argue in this essay that this concept bridges insights being developed in various contexts about the need for different ways to understand the connections among learners and workers. The traditional conception of mentoring is androcentric, meaning that it is centered upon the experiences of men, and hierarchical, meaning that it accepts knowledge/power differences as necessary and stable. Some research that examines women's experiences in business organizations and college classrooms suggests that an alternative model is both possible and attractive. This model focuses upon mutuality, shifting exchanges of perspectives and talents, and dispersion of responsibilities and accountability. It provides a perspective on what communal work can mean, which avoids identifying community with in tense personal affection, and which links communal reflection among individuals who share a work with the development of virtuous character and ethical practices. Learning about co-mentoring from The Color Purple Among many other possibilities, Alice Walker's novel, The Color Purple, is about co-mentoring. The characters show one another how to do well in a world that has caused them to suffer relentlessly. By the time we read The Color Purple, the students had established feelings of trust and mutuality with each other, thus enabling a more explicit form of co-mentoring. During the analysis of Walker's novel, the students named what they were doing as comentoring and saw a parallel between their intellectual activity and what they saw happening in the novel between Shug and Celie, who nurtured each other's talents. Encouraged to offer solid, textual evidence for their interpretations of Walker's novel, the students not only offered lucid, often stimulating responses to the questions, but they also generated a care for each other's learning that we have never seen so dramatically and successfully effected in any other classroom environment. What had been implicitly understood to be the objectives of the linked course was then explicitly named and desired. By choosing to become co-mentors, the students assumed responsibilities to facilitate each other's intellectual journey as well as to cultivate their own. They acknowledged the duty of each participant to hold all others accountable in this work, to challenge and critique the work of others for the purpose of extending and improving it. We believe that the students fostered creativity among themselves. Both the collaborative classroom structure and Walker's novel brought this about. Before the students worked in groups, Mary Jo introduced Alice Walker as a writer who subscribes to the belief 10 May 2017 Page 6 of 14 ProQuest that mentoring fuels the creative act. Walker's novel begins with an epigraph by Stevie Wonder - "Show Me How to Do Like You/Show Me How to Do It" embracing the idea that the act of demonstrating an activity for another's enhancement is imperative to one's development. "Show me...Show me," Wonder writes, and Walker responds at the end of her novel with a tribute to the Spirit, "without whose assistance neither this book nor I would have been written." Upon first reading, Walker seems to be implying that as a writer she has been inscribed by the spirit, perhaps reinforcing the traditional belief that the writer is inspired by God; she is God's instrument and as such is speaking God's words. This implication, which constructs the relationship as one of subordination, is not supported by the novel's depiction of the evolution of Celie's theology. Celie moves from submission to mutuality, from sorrowful and passive acceptance to joyful responsibility for her own life. She questions and grows stronger, more able to have mutual relationships with others, and with the god who has made purple flowers. This change allows us to reinterpret Walker's thankful tribute to the Spirit not as an expression of gratitude for a hierarchical mentoring relationship but as an affirmation of the dynamic relationship between the writer and her spirituality. At the climax of the novel, when Celie verbally defends herself (for the first time) against Albert, she attributes her ability to speak to a kind of divine furor, come from nature itself: "`I'm pore, I'm black, I may be ugly and can't cook, a voice say to everything listening, but I'm here'...look like when I open my mouth the air rush in and shape words" (italics added; 214, 213). Celie knows that she, like her creator, is getting assistance. As readers, the students came to realize that such help was grounded in a context of mutuality already nurtured by the examples of Shug and Sofia. They showed her how to do it. Celie recalls and borrows her initial description of Shug's manner of speaking - "Her mouth just pack with claws" at this pivotal moment in the novel. Shug showed her how to do this.Walker's novel offers the teacher and the student a powerful model of co-mentorship in which success and personal fulfillment are based on interdependence and assistance from others. Implicitly, Walker tells us that being successful (in the classroom, in the kitchen, at the writing table) does not require competitive individualism and need not only emerge from a hierarchical relationship between a vessel of wisdom (the mentor) and his/her empty vessel (the initiate). This message is vitally important for the students to hear again and again because it validates the enterprise of collaborative learning. Although the students in our classroom may not have suffered as viciously and relentlessly as Celie, they have been socialized to be silent in the classroom, to depend solely on the teacher for the information, to believe that the teacher is the only person with valid ideas, and to see themselves in turn as diminished persons because of what they do not know. Similarly, teachers have traditionally dispensed information, functioning as the sole authorities of the subject, though they were taught by others and have read critical work on the subjects they teach. Students need to be encouraged to value their own thinking and the ideas of their peers. Group work with clearly conceived goals enables students to share in the process of making meaning. The students modeled the behaviors of co-mentors within the classroom small groups, within the large circle often used for full class discussions in the Ethics class, and during ongoing library sessions they set up to prepare for exams. The seminar group that some students had casually established in one of the library nooks turned into a place for all of the students to go, if only for an hour, to share their ideas and get help from the rest of their peers. It continued to function this way for the rest of the semester, becoming a continuous study place just before the final exams in the two linked courses. The students showed us that when collaboration works well, it teaches better than any other learning technique. Co-mentoring compels taking responsibility for one's own learning and the learning of others. One student gleefully mentioned that she felt like an artist, constructing the meaning(s) of Walker's text. Both students and teachers were participants in each other's creativity. Though as teachers we did not initially set out to facilitate co-mentoring, the students showed us that that was what we were doing: re-visioning authority, modeling collaborative learning, and relating to each other dialogically. When we began discussing The Color Purple, students readily claimed the language of co-mentoring as an 10 May 2017 Page 7 of 14 ProQuest interpretive lens." They excitedly identified several co-mentoring relations in the novel. Beyond this they experienced The Color Purple as an affirmation of the strength of relationships, especially in how certain qualities of relating may empower us to become different kinds of people. The novel also concretized the main theme of the Ethics course: that morality is not simply about resolving controversial moral dilemmas, but more profoundly it is about what kind of people we want to be. Learning to be ethical takes place in the context of relationships in which we continue to be apprentices while also becoming teachers. We become who we are and develop our ethical perspectives within a continuing set of examples and responses that we experience and reflect upon with others. Ethics and Fiction repeatedly challenged our students' view of their world, of gender, and, consequently, of themselves. As a result, students felt alternately unsettled, liberated, confused, illuminated. We worked hard at creating a classroom environment that would feel safe for students as they took the risks necessarily involved in consciousness-raising and in remaking themselves. These included the risks of conflict in the classroom, as well as with friends and family outside the classroom. Students talked about how taking and talking about these courses had created conflict with friends and classmates who felt threatened by the kinds of questions they were raising. As we read The Color Purple, our students recognized that they, like Celie, were being empowered through co-mentoring to become different people. One vivid expression of empowerment occurred after an exam in Studies in Fiction. Mary Jo returned the essay exams, and, as usual, she asked two or three students to read portions of their essays to the class. One student (H.) whom she asked to read had struggled in both classes with her writing, was very quiet, and was often not very articulate in class. The class was sitting in a horseshoe with H. next to the last person in the horseshoe. As H. read a very lucid and insightful essay, many of us sat listening with amazement to our most quiet student. The student sitting next to her was smiling with pleasure and satisfaction. After class, this student described to one of the teachers how three of them had studied together, helping each other to formulate their ideas for the essays. It was clear that all of the students in the class were especially proud of H.'s work and delighted that her work had been recognized; they applauded when she finished reading. We believe that the students were pleased not only with H.'s intellectual work, but also with how this public recognition would empower H. to become more self-confident in her intellectual abilities. They applauded because of the quality of H.'s essay and because they recognized the significant intellectual and emotional growth that it represented. They felt some investment in H.'s learning process because they saw that their individual and collective learning was enhanced by the respect and concern which they extended to one another. Near the end of our course, we offered a three-hour workshop for interested faculty during which four of our students discussed their experiences in the course. They emphasized how they came to feel accountable to one another for being prepared for class and for small group discussions. They also emphasized how their ideas and attitudes had been challenged and how they had grown through this course. They recognized that these changes in how they viewed their world would require them to reweave their own webs of connection. They credited the comentoring that they received from other students and the instructors with facilitating and supporting their journeys. Their relationships with one another in the classroom encouraged them to take risks there and to consider new choices they might make about their lives. One choice they all declared was the decision to remain active learners and to take responsibility for creating learning communities in other classes. Conditions for co-mentoring In retrospect, it seems that we designed Ethics and Fiction in ways that fostered co-mentoring: * We made a commitment to the continuing co-presence and interaction in the classroom of the teaching team of two instructors and one participant observer. This meant that on any given class day, usually one of the two instructors was at the front of the class or in the center of the large circle while the other instructor and participant observer sat among the students, usually in different parts of the room. In this way, we exposed the students to conversations among us in which we each clearly assumed the tasks of guiding and following at 10 May 2017 Page 8 of 14 ProQuest different times and in different ways. As students in each other's classes, we asked and answered questions and we worked along with other students in the small groups, refusing to take on the role of group leader. We allowed the students to see and hear conversations among faculty that distributed the authority any one of us might otherwise have had and revealed us as alternating responsibilities for leading and following in different situations. This is not to say that the two instructors relinquished their responsibilities to select readings, structure discussions, provide lectures, and evaluate student work. The students had many opportunities to see the teachers also doing nonauthoritative kinds of things, such as raising our hands to ask each other questions, being called upon by each other for certain kinds of input when we were not officially in charge, struggling within small groups with the students to cooperate in accomplishing the discussion tasks. All three of us often operated as co-learners, working alongside students to think about disciplines and questions that were not our own. We modeled role shifts. *We shared an investment in creating and facilitating group conversations that worked, both in terms of the relational dynamics and completion of assigned tasks. We were in an advantageous position for monitoring these because we had teachers in more places, and at least two of those present did not carry the responsibilities of the primary facilitator. It also helped that we met frequently before and after classes to share information and insights. Each instructor had a much fuller reading of what was happening in the classroom than she could have produced with only herself to rely upon. This also helped the instructors to feel more confident about whatever decisions they made, for example, in changing the composition of the small groups. We let our students know that we relied upon one another for advice, and we let them know that we gave and received criticism from one another. They saw how we changed our own teaching styles under the influence of one another's feedback and example. In short, we modeled co-mentormg in our teaching process, and we let our students know how inspirited we felt by this co-labor. We built opportunities for student criticism into the course and shared with the entire class our responses to their comments and the reasons for the adjustments we made. *Classes were spent working through the assigned readings. It was made clear from the beginning that everyone in the classroom would be held responsible for analyzing the texts. The readings were not delivered to the students as analyzed, nor was an analysis performed for them while they listened and watched. They were pushed to engage in analysis, to learn by doing. This was indeed hard work, and at the start, it often meant that the presiding teacher would "call on" others; later, this became unnecessary as a classroom culture developed of mutual responsibility. Everyone participating in the course seemed to recognize that each individual had to be prepared and willing to contribute in order to produce the understandings we needed. We had a shared project. This engendered anxieties in both teachers and student will we know how to read, will we stumble around, will we look foolish? It made a difference that classroom expectations minimized competition and made it okay to struggle out loud. *The reading materials chosen by the instructors also focused on relationships and experiences that encouraged the students to think about the ways that relationships between people can foster or inhibit the development of character and ethical behavior. Although this focus was constant throughout the semester, the fiction read during the last five weeks of the course was directly concerned with this theme, and the philosophy readings dealt with relationships as a context for moral development. While we have focused in this article on how The Color Purple brought forth an epiphany, it is important to acknowledge that the ground had been well prepared, although not with this specific revelation in mind. In addition, other dimensions were not an explicit part of the course design but were definitely important influences on our students. These included the ways that we made visible our connections with each other the frequency with which we were seen with each other outside the classroom, the proximity of the offices of two of us, and our references to each other as valued mentors. Implications 10 May 2017 Page 9 of 14 ProQuest Co-mentoring presents students with opportunities for growth. By acting as mentors to one another, students learn about their gifts and practice using them. As mentees, they learn how to receive criticism and suggestions from peers. This makes the teachers' judgments less definitive and encompassing. Co-mentoring distributes responsibility throughout the class. It is an alternative to classrooms in which all the authority and direction rests with the teacher. The teacher is no longer the only one who is charged with fostering commitment and improvement. The teacher is then free to shift roles openly and explicitly to both teach and learn. The teacher does not bear the whole burden of "creating" learning. What occurs in a course is co-created by all the members of a class. This co-creation is facilitated by structures of mutual accountability based on shared needs; that is, we mentor and are mentored because we recognize that these relationships give us resources and opportunities for learning more than we can accomplish alone. Individual learning is not replaced or discarded. We have to prepare ourselves to give and receive when we come together. Co-mentoring reveals that each of us needs to be responsible for our own work, that we can also rely on others to be similarly invested in the task, and that the work each individual produces is enhanced by sharing it. These revelations are the common-sense wisdom of "the whole is greater than its parts," an insight often neglected within an individualistic, competitive educational system. Within the model of separate, isolated students and teachers, it can seem unnecessary to be in the same room. Why not tape the teacher speaking to empty chairs and allow each student to check out the tape at a convenient time for a private viewing? Comentoring is a radical movement in a counterdirection, moving toward a different set of goals. Co-mentoring makes co-presence essential and meaningful. It assumes that we need to be shown how and to show how, again and again; it declares, this is the way we learn. As students and teachers co-mentor, they affirm for each other the value of each person's participation. They experience themselves as "citizen" teachers and learners, as people who make decisions together and shape understandings. Co-mentoring is not going through the motions of discussing topics. It is an active process of leading and following. It is not school-time, divorced from real-time. What makes school seem unreal is that we often act there in a manner that is remote from our usual activity. We do busy work, go through the motions, feign attention, jump through hoops all of these common phrases express the experience of school as a place where we pretend. Students pretend to learn, teachers pretend not to notice. Comentoring is a commitment to do something else: to be genuinely engaged in a common task that we take seriously. When co-mentoring occurs in a course, the roles of students and teachers are more fluid. Expertise is not denied but defined in various ways and distributed throughout the group. Empowerment happens as individuals recognize that their insights are important and necessary. Knowing becomes a public action. In this way, work done in university settings becomes part of our practice of public life, helping us to develop skills in communicating our ideas, negotiating conflicts, and reaching a consensus. Co-mentoring offers a way of identifying what can happen within collaborative, feminist learning environments that explicitly confronts the criticism of these pedagogies as replacing intellectual rigor with emoting, transforming classes into mushy support groups or forums for ideological indoctrination." Choosing to connect affect and intellect does not entail sacrificing scholarly discipline, and it does not require that everyone in the collaborative classroom become friends or convert to a cause. Instead, co-mentoring allows the focus to be on the shared work of learning together. When we name ourselves as co-mentors, we attend to our obligations to each other as partners in a task that requires our best efforts. Co-mentoring cannot happen if we surrender the labor and concentrate on developing personal relationships. Co-mentoring makes the shared work central and encourages patterns of relationship that facilitate it. Coming out of a class like this one is both exhilarating and dispiriting. The teachers and students were exhilarated by what transpired in the classroom: we were collaborators, being for each other together. We did not necessarily have deep affectional ties, but we knew that we were beautiful because we were learning. What is sometimes dispiriting is knowing that to keep alive such a classroom, an immense fund of energy and 10 May 2017 Page 10 of 14 ProQuest engagement is needed. This would not be dispiriting if we knew that we could count on the resources to sustain this kind of work and rewards for doing it. While we recognize that budgetary constraints are often used as an argument for why teaching like this is undersupported, we believe that these may be more flexible than is usually acknowledged. Compelling accounts of the benefits of curricular and pedagogical innovations may make the difference in helping decision-makers see how vital it is that colleges and universities find ways to encourage faculty and students to build learning communities in which co-mentoring can happen. We hope this account has made such a difference. Notes 1. We received a seed grant from the Washington Center for Improving the Quality of Undergraduate Education that supported the development of the learning community. This center is located at The Evergreen College in Olympia, Washington. It was established in 1985 as an inter-institutional consortium to support educational reform. The grant supported summer planning time for the teachers and the development of materials for a workshop attended by interested faculty members at the end of the course. 2. We formulated team-teaching in a specific way. Each instructor assumed primary responsibility for one of the linked courses, but both (as well as the participant observer faculty member) were actively involved in the design of syllabi, planning of class activities and assignments, development of class discussions, and so forth. 3. We have found that students must be provided with a strong motivation and clear task for small group work in the classroom. This enables students to regard the work they do in these groups as significant, rather than a time-filling exercise. 4. This was the question: a novel that recounts the youth and young adulthood of a sensitive protagonist who is attempting to learn the nature of the world, discover its meaning and pattern, and acquire a philosophy of life and the art of living has been traditionally termed the Bildungsroman (novel of development or apprenticeship). When such a novel focuses on the development of an artist or writer, it is called a Kunstlerroman. In what ways does the protagonist, Celie, develop into an artist? What kind of artist does she become? Some considerations include the following: the importance of mentors/models who aid in the artist's development; the utilitarian and aesthetic purpose of art; Walker's expansion and redefinition of art in American culture. How, then, does Walker revise traditional and/or exclusive definitions of the artist figure? 5. Mark Schwehn's analysis of constructions of the academic vocation following Max Weber's influential lectures distinguishing science from politics makes it clear that these connections may be problematic for many academicians today. Although more and more educators are shifting to an understanding of truth as a communal process, there is continuing uncertainty and argument about what inquiring communities require and what purposes they serve. While there is considerable agreement about the faculty's responsibility to share knowledge and to impart skills and information to students, the responsibility to build character and the notion that inquiring together depends upon the exercise of virtues is more controversial. Since we teach in a university whose mission statement explicitly links the acquisition of knowledge and skill with the promotion of social justice, the connections between intellectual achievement and character formation are matters for a different sort of debate not about whether we should tie these together but about how best to do this within different disciplines. 6. For additional background on these pedagogical approaches, see Finkel and Monk and Gabelnick, MacCregor, Matthews, and Smith. 7. This description follows the characterization of mentoring given by Levinson whose focus is men's development. Levinson asserts that mentoring has great developmental significance for men. 8. Parker and Kram discuss this difference in terms of how the mentoring relationship is often imaged in Fatherson terms and the difficulties of simply expanding this image to include the mother-daughter relationship. They maintain that women's authority is most often identified with motherhood, a role perceived as both comforting and powerful. The comfort and power of mothers, however, is problematic for adults within nonfamilial settings. 10 May 2017 Page 11 of 14 ProQuest It is also noteworthy how much of the criticism directed at Hillary Rodham Clinton has to do with seeing her as having too much authority over the government. The numerous, and often venomous, attacks indicate a discomfort with women in power. 9. Burke and McKeen relate their question to the research findings of Kram and Isabella and of Noe which suggest that "peer relationships may be as important to women as mentoring and may be preferable to women. This suggests that women should actively seek not only mentoring relationships but also a broadly based peer network in organizations" (Burke and McKeen: 328). 10. We are grateful to Eloise Buker for suggesting this term when Rose Mary was writing an essay in which she discussed the role played by colleagues and friends in the development of moral judgment (see Volbrecht "Careful Mutuality"). 11 Parker Palmer's work has been especially helpful to us in drawing a distinction between the virtue of charity required For learning communities to be successful and the more restrictive understanding of love as intense intimacy. We began our course with a discussion of an essay by Palmer. We asked students to prepare by thinking about how the structures of a traditional classroom shape the learning that takes place there and how these might be changed if we understood learning as a communal process of searching for truth, rather than as individual competition for knowledge that is detached from knowers. We think it is important to give students direct access to the foundations for pedagogical decisions, so that they can develop their own perspectives on what is at stake in these choices (Palmer To Know, "Community"). 12. See Volbrecht ("Friendship"). In this essay, which was part of the assigned reading in "Ethics," Rose Mary argues that duty ethics emphasizes law and distrusts the concrete, particular, and contingent. This marginalizes friendship, which Aristotle treats as central to ethics. Our understanding of learning in community is an extension of Volbrecht's analysis of friendship to incorporate the companionship of classroom collaborators as another context in which we learn the habits of critical reflection and its connection to living well. 13. It is important for the students to hear how Walker's novel came into being; how she modeled her book on her maternal and literary ancestors; how she sees herself in several contexts familial, literary, national, and transnational. This information radically challenges traditional beliefs in originality and creativity. Walker dispels the illusion that creativity is highly individualistic and divorced from the ordinary. In modeling Celie on her own slave grandmother, who was raped at age twelve by the slave owner, Walker writes, "I liberated her from her own history...I wanted her to be happy." Walker's liberatory strategy in The Color Purple offers the students an example of redemption through healing. Healing can only occur in the context of co-mentoring, epitomized by the Celie-Shug relationship throughout the book (Anello and Abramson). 14. Walker's message of co-mentoring is reinforced by the novel's framework its epigraph, its concluding gratitude to the Spirit, and its final thanks. Walker writes, "I thank everybody in this book for coming. A.W., author and medium." Defining herself as creator and medium suggests that Walker's purpose is twofold: to create and control literary images of African-American women and to give voice and representation to such women who have been silenced in life and literature. Walker functions as much as their instrument as she does the Spirit's; perhaps they are one and the same. Alice Walker ultimately functions as a medium who gives voice to the Philomelas of this world: those spirits whose self-expression has been cut off through intimidation, deprivation, and brutality. See KingKok Cheung's article, "'Don't Tell': Imposed Silences in The Color Purple and The Woman Warrior," for a superb analysis of the theme of silence and the ways the female protagonists proceed to "defend themselves with words...sound themselves out through articulation" (162). 15. Rose Mary used the term co-mentoring in the Ethics course to refer to the ways that sound moral judgment is developed and refined through contextual learning with good models and by ongoing communal critical reflection about values and practices. The Ethics course emphasized that morality is not simply about resolving controversial moral dilemmas, but more profoundly about what kind of people we want to be, individually and as communities. When reading The Color Purple later in the semester, the students were able independently to 10 May 2017 Page 12 of 14 ProQuest appropriate this theme. 16. By "safe" we do not mean that we avoided challenging ourselves and our students. We did not encourage students to emote for its own sake, and the learning community was not defined as a support group. In our view, this is another misleading and dangerous dichotomy; namely that classrooms can either be intellectually rigorous or safe havens for emotional expression. We do not accept that this kind of choice is necessary. Thinking and feeling can and should be connected within a model of reflection that holds to high standards for mutual critique. 17. In addition to the article by Volbrecht cited earlier students in this course also read Friedman, Gilligan, and Houston. 18. As examples, see the following for caricatures of women's studies classes: D'Souza and Lehrman. Alice Jardine responded to D'Souza's description of his visit to her feminist theory class at Harvard. Her response appears as part of a forum on the "political correctness" debates in The Women's Review of Books in 1992. Works Cited Anello, Ray, and Pamela Abramson. "Characters in Search of a Book." Newsweek 21 June 1982: 67. Burke, Ronald J., and Carol A. McKeen. "Mentoring in Organizations: Implications for Women." Journal of Business Ethics 9.4/5 (1990): 317-32. Cheung, King-Kok. "`Don't Tell:' Imposed Silences in The Color Purple and The Woman Warrior" PMLA 103.2 (1988): 162-74. D'Souza, Dinesh. Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus. New York: Random House, 1992. Finkel, Donald, and G. Stephen Monk. "Teachers and Learning Groups: Dissolution of the Atlas Complex." Learning in Groups. Ed. C. Bouton and R.Y Garth. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1983. Friedman, Marilyn. "Beyond Caring: The De-Moralization of Gender." Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary 13 (1987). Reprinted in An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. M.J. Larrabee. New York: Routledge, 1993. 256-73. Gabelnick, Faith, Jean MacGregor, R.S. Matthews, and Barbara Leigh Smith. Learning Communities: Creating Connections Among Disciplines, Faculty, and Students. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1990. Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1982. Henderson, Mae. "The Color Purple: Revisions and Redefinitions." Sage 2.1(1985): 14-18. Houston, Barbara. "Prolegomena to Future Caring." Who Cares? Theory, Research, and Ethical Implications of the Ethic of Care. Ed. Mary Brabeck. New York: Praeger, 1989 Jardine, Alice. Women's Review of Books 9.5 (1992): 127-29. Kram, Kathy E., and L. Isabella. "Mentoring Alternatives: The Role of Peer Relationships in Career Development." Academy of Management Journal 28 (1985): 110-13. Lehrman, Karen. "Off Course." Mother Jones September-October (1993): 45-51. Levinson, Daniel J. The Seasons of Man's Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978. Noe, R.A. "Women and Mentoring: A Review and Research Agenda." Academy ofManagement Review 13.1 (1988): 65-78. Palmer, Parker. To Know as We Are Known. New York: Harper and Row, 1983.- "Community, Conflict, and Ways of Knowing: Ways to Deepen Our Educational Agenda." Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning 19.5. (1987): 20-25. Parker, Victoria A., and Kathy E. Kram. "Women Mentoring Women: Creating Conditions for Connection." Business Horizons 36.2 (1993): 42-51. Sandler, Bernice. "Women as Mentors: Myths and Commandments." The Chronicle of Higher Education 10 March 1993: B3. Schwehn, Mark R. Exiles From Eden: Religion and the Academic Vocation in America. New York: Oxford UP, 10 May 2017 Page 13 of 14 ProQuest 1993. Volbrecht, Rose Mary. "Friendship: Mutual Apprenticeship in Moral Development." The Journal of Value Inquiry 24 (1990): 301-14. - "Careful Mutuality: Leadership and Friendship in the Workplace." Taking Parts: Ingredients for Leadership. Participation, and Empowerment. Ed. Eloise A. Buker, Michael A. Leiserson, and Jane A. Rinehart. Lanham, MD: UP of America, 1994. Walker, Alice. The Color Purple. New York: Pocket Books, 1982. Wolf, Mary Alice. "Mentoring Middle-Aged Women in the Classroom." Adult Learning 4.5 (1993): 8+. Subject: Mentors; Learning; Feminism; Curricula; African Americans; Black literature; Education; Essays; Literature; Publication title: Feminist Teacher; Champaign Volume: 9 Issue: 3 Pages: 116 Number of pages: 9 Publication year: 1995 Publication date: 1995 Publisher: Feminist Teacher Editorial Collective Place of publication: Champaign Country of publication: United States Publication subject: Education--Teaching Methods And Curriculum, Women's Interests ISSN: 08824843 Source type: Scholarly Journals Language of publication: English Document type: Feature Accession number: 02937623, SFLNSIFMT0797FTGW563000066 ProQuest document ID: 224986733 Document URL: https://evergreen.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/224986733?accountid=11199 Copyright: Copyright Feminist Teacher Editorial Collective 1995 Last updated: 2015-08-15 Database: GenderWatch _______________________________________________________________ Contact ProQuest Copyright © 2017 ProQuest LLC. 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The Years of Permanent Midnight: The Liberalist Construction of the Philippine Nation in Cinema Under the US-Aquino Administration Jeffrey Deyto Far Eastern University Manila, Philippines abstract This study seeks to define the role of cinema in the formation/construction of the nation amidst the acceleration of global capital and the heightened need for outsourced and remotely-managed workers (both were manifested to the fruition of the BPO industry) in the earlier part of 2010s – both of which are supported by the intensification of the liberal economics and politics of the then administration of Benigno Aquino, III. Cinema is not referred in this study as a general aspect of nationformation/construction, but rather a node from a wide network of apparatuses deployed to support and maintain the nation and subjects that were continually produced/reproduced. Jonathan Beller referred to this network of apparatuses as the 129 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) World-Media System which, for him, is also a "dominant network of abstractions that would organize all social processes in the service of capital." The study aims to arrive at the kind of nation formed/constructed by these setting through the subjects produced by the World-Media System. The nation, as Kojin Karatani would stress coming from Benedict Anderson, is imagined through a certain mode of exchange. Karatani, however, would like to think of another kind of exchange than commodity-exchange. This study would depart from that notion considering the differences of historical developments between the global north and south: between the historical developments of former colonizers and former colonies. It is concluded in this study that the kind of subjects produced / reproduced by the WorldMedia System in the Philippines in 20102016 reflects much of the liberalist economics and politics of the then administration. These subjects produced, which I would later identify as the modern cynic, constitute a wider aspect of the definition of the nation. Keywords: Liberalist Construction, Cinema, Media, Nation Formation, Government  MABINI REVIEW| VOLUME 7 (2018): 77-127 © 2018 J. DEYTO| ISSN 2012-2144 130 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) T The Liberalist Construction of the Nation he film Year of Permanent Midnight1 opened with a young man and a young woman talking about the conflict which caused the split of the progressive student organization at the University of the Philippines during the 90s, where the film was set. On a later scene, we see the two persons knocking at a condo unit. They are welcomed by another person who later introduced us to their activity. The third person is describing in detail the progress of their project: to hack into a financial institution and digitally steal money. In this instance, the student-movement conflict that was being discussed earlier no longer rings in our ears. Instead, the wired room flattened the conflict into a singularity: it becomes a film about exploiting the hole of the then early global financial market. What seems to be an imbalance in writing makes sense to me as a symptom of the times of early digital age: the time when globalization is gaining a heightened momentum. This study treats the Philippine nation in the logical sense of this momentum: the Philippines, being totally wired to the global market can only be imagined as 1 A short film directed by then film-student, Clare del Rosario, and written by Carlo Cielo. The film was shot as partial fulfillment for Del Rosario's Film Directing class. The film was first screened at the Annual Black Beret Competition at the UPFI Film Center in 2014. 131 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) such. Several factors are to be considered: the acceleration of global capital, the heightened need of the global community for outsourced workers (both as manifested to the fruition of the BPO industry) in the 2010s – both are supported by the intensification of the liberal culture and politics of the then administration. The Philippine nation is imagined in this essay in the same manner as the film mentioned above, only as one which has gained more maturity. With this, the manner of the nationformation which lead to the nation being imagined only through and by globalization, as mentioned above, was enabled by liberalism. The liberalist construction of the nation does not differ in imagination than that of a globalist one. The liberal thought is founded on the notion of "openness," much like globalism, which aims to "encompass ever greater numbers of world spaces" which would eventually lead to "integration and interconnectivity."2 This integration and interconnectivity is never going to be possible without liberal method of "everyday political negotiation, consisting of various civic and cultural referents."3 Lisandro Claudio, in his book-length defense of liberalism through an intellectual history of its deployment in post-war Philippines, would look into liberalism more as the backdrop (in his words, "blueprint") of the country's overall composition. While 2 George Ritzer, "Introduction." The Blackwell Companion to Globalization. Ed. George Ritzer. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 16-28. 3 Lisandro Claudio, Liberalism and the Postcolony: Thinking the State in 20th Century Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2017. 132 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) he keeps mentioning that his "liberal heroes" have had a hand with economic-policy making, he did not perceive liberalism's blueprint also working on the economic level. He viewed liberalism generally as a polity – moreover, a polity of possibility and openness.4 This openness manifested in Philippine cinema through a new variation of production popularly termed as "maindie". The release of CinemaOne Originals' commercial breakout film, That Thing Called Tadhana (2014), indicated its first full realization. In an earlier period, Rolando Tolentino identifies as the "mainstreaming of independent cinema" as a practice which has become prevalent on the latter part of 2000s.5 What was before in the periphery of cinematic market is now in the center of discursive and practical approaches of both the affirmative and critical sides of the film scene. The big studios banked into producing or distributing similar works – and most gaining same reception as That Thing Called Tadhana. For this study, I would like to look at "maindie" as the site of the liberalist construction of the Philippine 4 "...openness makes liberalism the product of governance... an openness to dissent and the willingness to compromise..." "Liberalism [is] a fleeting concept that operates more as a blueprint than as an ideology[...]"; "...liberalism does not have steady friends or foes, it is because it negotiates those categories through constant praxis." ibid, 2-3. 5 This was, for him, embodied by the existence of Cinemalaya Independent Film Festival and its emphasis on "narrative, continuity [and] suture," similar to the focus of Hollywood. See Rolando B. Tolentino, Indie Cinema at mga Sanaysay sa Topograpiya ng Pelikula sa Filipinas. (Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing House, 2016), 15. 133 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) nation in cinema. It would be argued, however, that this construction does not just take place politically or culturally, more so, economically. Kojin Karatani would consider nation-formation as something which can also be located in economics: "[...]the nation is an "imagined community," but it is not a mere fancy or fantasy; it functions as the imagination that mediates and synthesizes the state, [its apparatuses] and market society."6 He would further argue, however, that the existence of the nation economically differs from the general conception of the nation-state founded in commodity-exchange. He suggests looking at the nation as enacting reciprocal exchange.7 But I would argue, however, that what Karatani is suggesting here can only be possible on nations which did not go through a history of colonization. Being in a post-colony presupposes that we look into the uneven exchanges set out the current condition and disposition of one nation. Unlike Japan, which was founded more in the dominance of an internal warlord, postcolonial nations like the Philippines was dominated from the exterior, hence, the conditions by which a nation's economics, politics and conditions will differ since the source of hegemony came from somewhere else. What I'm agreeing with Karatani is how the nation is imagined through exchange, albeit, an uneven exchange on postcolonial nations. With this, I'm offering a hypothesis: the nation is imagined through the 6 Kojin Karatani, Nation and Aesthetics: On Kant and Freud, Trans. Jonathan E. Abel, Hiroki Yoshikuni, Darwin H. Tsen, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 11. 7 ibid, 4. 134 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) formation of a national-subject. Under conditions of dominance, like ours, I'm arguing that the nation is imagined by the ruling class through a projection of themselves on others. It is in this instance that the symbols of nationality become important such as the flags, the anthems, and all the other images and texts which most has referred to as icons of the nation. The national-subject is constructed through its interpellation with the use of the national symbol. But come 21st century, the dependence on national symbols has depleted. As instantiated with Heneral Luna's epilogue where we see a CGI Philippine Flag burning, with its conscious rejection to subject itself into any symbol, the imagination of the national subject becomes different. In a time when disbelief on national symbols or when the "framework" of the nation has been shaken, Karatani suggests that "empire" or world capitalism was being "referred to as an alternative principle to the nation."8 This is not to say that the nation is being dissolved in this sense, but as exclusive exchange within the geopolitical boundaries are becoming harder to imagine, the sense of having symbols of nation is being treated as too "closed", openness to globalization is a feasible alternative for the liberalist logic. The task then, for maindie cinema as the site of liberalist construction of the nation through its subjects, is the construction of subjects which would definitely see themselves as part of this globalized imagined community. The subject, then, of a nation constructed under liberalism must be someone who believes in tolerance and openness, effaces the need 8 Ibid, 22. 135 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) for symbolization (which includes identification of one's self in a contradiction, or in symbolization through labor,) and firmly believes that even though the system is not perfect, it is still the best one he can have and there is no alternative for it (this nihilism is also one which is needed to be tolerated). The subject of a nation constructed under liberalism must be one which absorbs all these negation of symbolization and still performing / contributing to its economy through its conscious participation to commodity exchange: the modern-day cynic. Faced with the challenge of taking-on globalization in the discourse of the liberalist construction of the Philippine nation in cinema, I see it fit to look into the work done by Jonathan Beller in his theorization of the world-media system as the basis of the economic base responsible for the reproduction of globalization in cinema. Beller here employs Guy Debord's concept of the "spectacle" on his theorization of the world-media system as a "higher articulation of "pseudo-community" of the commodity."9 For him, the world-media system "names the organizational protocols that simultaneously structure culture and economy."10 He further adds that these protocols engineer also the perception through machinations of what passes through both faces 9 Jonathan Beller, The Cinematic Mode of Production: Attention Economy and the Society of the Spectacle. (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2006), 22. Also, see See Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. (Cambridge, Mass.: Zone Books, 1995), 172. 10 Jonathan Beller, Acquiring Eyes: Philippine Visuality, Nationalist Struggle and the World-Media System. (Quezon City: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 2006), 6. 136 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) (repressive and ideological) of state apparatuses. The world-media system produces the "dominant network of abstractions that would organize all social processes in the service of capital."11 World-media system's mode of social organization takes from the appropriation of global capital of what he calls the cinematic mode of production: cinema, for Beller, reproduces social life and subjects through the deployment of cinematic techniques.12 Reflecting on Louis Althusser, Beller would posit the reciprocity of this mode of production into the political: the mechanisms of the cinematic mode of production reproduces the subject "not only through wage labor [and the alienation of it] and the necessities that can be purchased with wage, but, psychologically, as it were, through a process [Althusser] called as interpellation – the calling of worker-subject into being by ideological apparatuses."13 In this study, since we are considering cinema's deployment of nationalism in the light of the cinematic mode of production, we are assuming that nationalism is indeed, an ideology. In a way, as Althusser would put it, nationalism can never exist in any other form but through apparatuses.14 The national symbols as embodiments of the nation have legal origins and implications – the law as 11 Jonathan Beller, Acquiring Eyes., 7. 12 Jonathan Beller, The Cinematic Mode of Production, 38. 13 Ibid, 291. 14 The argument over the materiality of ideology through its "exist[ence] in an apparatus and the practice or practices of that apparatus" marks the radical break of Althusserian theory of ideology from the conception of Marx in The German Ideology. See Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus. (London: Verso, 2014), 184. 137 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) an ideological apparatus. Cinema, being the site of liberalist construction of the nation, is considered also as one of the apparatuses through which nationalism, being an ideology, exists. Reproduction of the Nation As discussed in the earlier section, this essay perceives the construction of the nation through the construction of the nation-subject via the exchanges they encounter. In this sense, the construction also of subjectivity becomes important. The source of this subjectivity in its origin, however, is impossible to trace, as this also became a product of exchanges throughout history of the formation of the subject. As Jacques Lacan would put it, subjects "relay with each other in the course of intersubjective repetition,"15 presupposing the formation of the subject has always been in a manner of exchange or, in Lacan's terms, of discourse. This is where I came to break with Karatani's model of nation being imagined through reciprocal exchange and came with a different model fit with our country's history of colonization and dominance. Intersecting with Lacan is Benedict Anderson's reframing of the formation of the collective subjectivities which has led to nationalism "with consideration of the material, institutional and discursive bases." The bases, as Anderson would like to 15 Jacques Lacan, Écrits. Trans. Bruce Fink. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 16. 138 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) suggest, generates two contrasting types of seriality: the unbound and the bound.16 It is on these dialectical model that we can perceive the nationalist subjectivity came to be through its exchanges via the serialities generated by the material, institutional and discursive bases. The challenge here, and what is being addressed on this section of the essay, will be to locate cinema's place on those bases. These bases that Anderson talks about are the various apparatuses in operation in the deployment of ideology. Its bound-ness, so to speak, can be considered as an effect of the operations of these apparatuses. On this complex network of apparatuses in operation, cinema can be found on one of its segments. Althusser identified a "number of realities which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized institutions."17 He called these the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA). Among these "realities" are the cultural ISAs where we can locate cinema functioning as apparatus. But, in the light of globalization, cinema in the 21st century, can no longer be considered as merely cultural (in the manner that Althusser considered cultural ISAs as institution 16 The unbound seriality is "is exemplified by such open-to-theworld plurals as nationalists, anarchists, bureaucrats and workers. It is the seriality which makes the United Nations a normal, wholly unparadoxical institution." Bound seriality, on the other hand, "is exemplified by finite series like Asian-Americans, heurs, and Tutsis. It is the seriality that makes a United Ethnicities and United Identities unthinkable." See Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons. London: Verso, 1998. 17 Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, 243. 139 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) separate from the trade and communication ISAs). Starting in the 20th century, under capitalism, culture is already being captured by the economic to function as economic mediation. Beller further expounded: Culture, then, has been recast and reprogrammed by the acculturated who, at every level of the socius, labor under the heliotropism of capital and its leveraged exchange. This capitalization of action, thought, the unconscious, and desire, among other biosocial functions, is otherwise known as commodification.18 It is in this sense that the break from Karatani is completed, as a reversal of his break from and consequently returning to Marx: of reconsidering the commodity exchange as a framework of rethinking the exchanges that happened in a nation which history of uneven development speaks a lot of its formation and construction. In the light of globalization, the repetition, distribution and the mimesis then of ideology – of nationalism – can never be but in the form of commodity exchange. Cinema as an apparatus, can be said to appear as a specific form of ideology, among the the many apparatuses ideology can take shape from. The appearance of ideology in cinema is specific due to its specific form: the ideology is in the formal quality of the films. This form, of course, is determined by the politicaleconomy which informs its content. Nationalism, being the content interrogated in this essay, also appears as such. But in the age when the nation's framework is being 18 Beller, Acquiring Eyes, 2. 140 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) shaken, nationalism in this sense, take an alternative principle, and that is of "Empire" or as Karatani would note it, of "world-capitalism".19 Negotiating with Empire Since the notion of the "nation" is being uncomfortable – that is, the nation in the traditional sense of a closed economy in the realm of geopolitics, the recourse of liberal economics is to open itself to the global market. In the process, the effacement of any symbolization that would refer to the old nationalism has become a necessity. And in the process of exchange, it expects to produce a subject which is also open to this. Cinema, in this sense, become paradoxical in its operation as apparatus: what is to be represented (since cinema mostly functions through representation and suggestion) if it aims for less symbolization? If it is the "traditional" notion of the nation that will be erased from representation, if not, "nationalism" itself, what then is to be done with cinema? It needs to have another object – another ideology – to represent. This was resolved by a new sub-genre in romantic comedy, which is hugot. The word literally means "to pull-out," which in this context, a hugot in literary sense is a recontextualization of a certain passage or sentence which is pulled-out of personal reference In an earlier study I made, I identified the way of which hugot films succeeds on reproducing ideology through the repetition of the dialogues uttered by the 19 Karatani, Nation and Aesthetics, 22. 141 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) characters into the films' visual plane.20 The hugot in the film do not remain exclusively dialogical (it's no more a compendium of "hugot lines"), but is being repeated as a spectacle. What this signify in the context of the nation is that, what replaces the symbolizations and significations referring to anything that has something to do with the nation and nationalism are being replaced in hugot films by seeming representations of characters' frustrations. For instance, in That Thing Called Tadhana's opening sequence, we see Mace (Angelica Panganiban) unloading her bag to clear her off the excess baggage weight at the exit terminal of an airport. Mace justified that it is heavy because it contains the totality of her life ("dala ko kasi buong buhay ko dito"). The things which are "the totality of her life" – what's she removing from her bag – are mostly things which suggest that reminds her of her former partner. In another scene, Anthony (JM De Guzman) tests Mace if she can still carry the bag while crossing a pedestrian over-pass. Mace said to Anthony that she still can and she doesn't need help ("kaya ko"). The bag which burdens her was suddenly left behind while they go for another trip to somewhere. The same film-language is applied in Ang Kwento Nating Dalawa, on one of its heightened confrontations. In a scene at a bar, Sam (Nicco Manalo) tried to talk things through with Isa (Emmanuelle Vera) on the state of their relationship. While Sam signaled with a hesitant silence, Isa tried to shift the topic over the script she's 20 The study is titled "Pick-up Lines and Hugot: pop-culture phenomena against the back drop of Philippine Base and Superstructure." This was written in partial fulfillment of Media Theory (Media 210) under Prof. Cecilia Ilagan. 142 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) writing for their screenwriting class. Isa, with an angry look on her face, read some lines from her script to Sam. The following is the exchange which took place between the characters, which highlights the displacement of their conditions towards another aspect of the film as a means of its repetition: Sam Sorry. Kanina, para pala akong bata. Ang dami ko lang kasing realizations lately. Ako. Ako lang naman yung may problema sa 'tin, eh. (Sorry if I was acting like a kid earlier. I've just had a lot of realizations lately. That it is me, and only me who has problems between us.) Isa Uy.. Gandang line nun ah. Salamat, pwede ko bang hiramin para doon sa character doon sa script ko, si Mark? Ok ba? Pa-consult nga pala. Baka gusto mong basahin yung script ko, kaka-print ko lang bago pumunta dito. Pwede? (Hey, that's a good line. Can I use it for the character I've been writing on my script? As Mark's dialogue? I wanted to consult it with you. I just printed out my script before coming here, is that fine with you?) (Sam looks at Isa in silence) Isa (cont'd) Tignan mo tong dialogue dito... Yung dialogue ng babae. Tignan mo kung sakto lang, kasi pakiramdam ko ang cheesy eh. Ito: "Parang ayoko na rin. Paulit-ulit na lang kasi tayong ganito since naging tayo. Kung nahihirapan ka, Mark, mas nahihirapan din ako. Kasi nagtitiis ako. At gawa ako ng gawa ng paraan." Cheesy, 'no? (Look at this dialogue here... The woman's. See if it's just right. I have a feeling that it's going to be cheesy. Here it goes: "Seems like I do not want to go on anymore. It's always 143 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) been like this ever since we get together. If you're having a hard time, Mark, I have it much harder. Because I've been keeping it in. But I am always finding ways to make us work." Cheesy, right? At the end of the film, it is revealed that Sam is actually Isa's instructor for the scriptwriting class. As Isa submitted her screenplay project, Sam browsed through the script until he reached the part where it says Wakas (End), immediately reached out to his pen and erased the word. What is happening on both instances cited above can be said to be a repetition of the frustration into another filmic element from the dialogue. This repetition – a hypersignification, in a sense – becomes in itself, an avoidance for anymore signification. The frustrations repeated in the scenes persist as the only significant part of the story: it begs to be taken as it is. The films "spea[k] to itself about itself, without discrepancy."21 What is to be expected then, if we are considering this repetition as avoidance of signification as a mechanism of cinemaapparatus to reproduce ideology, of the subjects that it forms? Such formations identify the subject who is one which external contradictions are no longer a pressing matter, but all that must be resolved are exclusively personal. Beller stresses on this kind of signification as a kind of "flattening" between depth and signification where "[a]ll of the would-be contradictions, yesterday's 21 Jean Louis Comolli, and Jean Narboni. "Appendix I: Cinema/Ideology/Criticism." In Jean-Louis Comolli, Cinema Against Spectacle. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 255. 144 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) contradictions, are on the surface, and since there is nothing but surface they are no longer contradictions."22 What does this overdetermination of signification do? This is really what Beller called "capitalized mediation" wherein all of the signification's spatial and metaphysical properties were "sublated by capital logic."23 Beller suggests that the images produced by these mediations, by highlighting its overloading of signification, are less of signs but are commodities. The filmic subjects (i.e. characters) disappear and become themselves bearers of exchange-value/use-value logic. This is exemplified by the way the characters relate to each other. Mace and Anthony met and mostly form their relationship on their trips (which are not for free). The same goes with the girls of Camp Sawi (Viva Films 2016) and I'm Drunk I Love You (TBA 2017). Camp Sawi itself is an actual getaway lodge and their relation to the Camp Master is basically just one of the services offered by the resort. Most of the interactions in I'm Drunk I Love You happened not just over alcohol, but also on places where hypercommodification happens (bar and the music festival). Isa and Sam, being student and teacher from De La Salle – Saint Benilde, inevitably has their relation placed on a hypercommodified environment: from their school cafeteria to the bar where they hang out. Complementing the elimination of depth is the "annihilation of laws and boundaries that have, in the past, delimited the movement of the signifier." This functions, in the films above, through the films' 22 Beller, The Cinematic Mode of Production, 219. 23 Ibid, 220. 145 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) elimination of the characters' identities as workers through setting the films in the time when work is at rest: vacation, trips, graduation. What the characters do for a living in those films are mostly being talked about inpassing, some in detail, but never really bear any significance to the progress of its narrative. We are left with nothing in the films but to trust whatever they say who they are. In That Thing Called Tadhana, the film is set at the time of the characters' arrival from a foreign country. They talked about careers, Mace told Anthony about a "career she gave up" so he can go to Italy and live with her former partner. Anthony talked about wanting to be an artist. But since the setting of the film was in their vacation, nothing can be seen which proves that Mace and Anthony are who they say they are. In Ang Kwento Nating Dalawa, most of the film is set on class-breaks and after-class. There's one sequence where Sam was seen sitting in a classroom, but eventually left. Their identities as workers - student and teacher - was only used as a plot-twist in the end. But the twist never helped forward this dynamics, but rather, pushed further the discourse of the affection (or the impossibility of it) between Sam and Isa. In I'm Drunk I Love You, it is mentioned through dialog that Carson (Maja Salvador) is a social welfare student and Dio (Paolo Avelino) is a film student. But since the film is set comfortably on their days before graduation, not to mention, their La Union vacation, so we can't see them doing any student-like activities. This leads us to the discussion of the subjects constructed through the characters of the films mentioned above. What kind of a subject can be 146 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) produced if we are to combine the removal of any form of collective identification, such as nationality, class, work-force into the mirroring signification? What can be produced from the negation of presence? To clarify, there are still representations in the film-image of the subject, only this representation is being determined by a negation of anything that can be said to be "traditionally" symbolic. The symbols relating to any collective identification are being replaced by a highly individualistic character on screen. One of which identification is still symbolic, but only in the form of commodities. The Liberal Nation-Subject: The Modern-day Cynic Looking at the end of I'm Drunk, I Love You made me reflect a lot on the idea of cynicism. In its final sequence, we see Carson and Dio drinking in front of a store. Dio is still wearing his graduation get-up, while Carson already has changed her clothes. The scene, taken into the context of the film, do not really close the film in such a manner that it is being resolved. The seemingly open-end does not quite have that tone. Instead, the film, even from its beginning, sets itself in a certain distance as such that it can only be taken "as it is."24 If so, it is an ending without an end. It is incapable of imagining such things: it does not resolve the loop that Carson is trapped in the shadows of Dio. It does not propose any 24 I've made a longer note on I'm Drunk, I Love You on my blog: https://missingcodec.wordpress.com/2017/08/23/two-ways-ofalienation/ 147 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) alternative for Carson. Rather, the film does not seem to believe that there will be any. While not being a perfect manifestation, the end sequence of I'm Drunk, I Love You can be seen as a symptom of what Mark Fisher identifies as Capitalist Realism. The concept of Capitalist Realism can be explained in summary using the idea of the actual resort in Camp Sawi: the camp participants all went with the hope of moving on, only to prepare them for another round of falling in love. Camp Sawi gridlocks its participants on the loop of moving-on and trying again. If not now, maybe, as the words Gwen (Arci Muñoz) and Bridgette (Bela Padilla) gave a toast to at the end of the film, "someday" (balang-araw). The notion of love – and the preparation, moving on from it – is what is being commodified by Camp Sawi. Like most of the relationships on the films mentioned on this section, this gridlock is nothing more than the gridlock to capitalism. What happens here is that the belief of love is being collapsed into a ritual/loop or symbolic elaboration that "all that is left is the consumer-spectator, trudging through the ruins and relics."25 A capitalist realism has a cynical tone to it. As Fisher would put it, "capitalist realism presents itself as a shield protecting us from the perils posed by belief itself."26 By belief, it means any more speculation outside of the capitalist logic. Capitalism, as Fisher would extend it, "brings with it a massive desacralization of culture"27 25 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Hants: Zer0 Books, 2009), 4. 26 Ibid, 5. 27 Ibid, 6. 148 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) which, in effect, actively and forcefully "deideologize[s] art and literature," which is, as Edel Garcellano would put it, "at the heart of liberalist hermeneutics."28 These desacralizations and deidologizations effectively brings the subject in a cynical distance between things, and should supposedly bring reason onto a new enlightenment through doubt towards "objectivity." Peter Sloterdijk referred to cynicism as an "enlightened false consciousness:" the term false consciousness used here is the same when Engels29 referred to it as the consciousness which is at operation in the process of ideology. Sloterdijk would insist, however, that cynicism is itself an heir to the enlightenment through its critical engagement with it: its critical engagement with enlightenment is precisely its fundamental nature. Cynicism constitutes "a consciousness afflicted with enlightenment that, having learned from historical experience, refutes cheap optimism." It "scarcely allow itself any hope, at most a little irony and pity."30 Sloterdijk's description of cynicism places the cynical subject in a position of awareness. Slavoj Žižek would expound more on Sloterdijk: The cynical subject is quite aware of the distance between the ideological mask and the social reality, but he none the 28 Edel Garcellano, Intertext, (Manila, Kalikasan Press, 1991), 58. 29 See Frederich Engels, "Engels to Franz Mehring," in Marx/Engels Collected Works Vol. 50. 1892-95 Letters. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2004) 163-167. 30 Peter Sloterdijk, The Critique of Cynical Reason. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 6. 149 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) less still insists upon the mask. The formula, as proposed by Sloterdijk, would then be: 'they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it'. Cynical reason is no longer naive, but is a paradox of an enlightened false consciousness: one knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular interest hidden behind an ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it.31 Capitalist realism, in this sense, can be seen in the light of cynicism that insists upon the mask of capitalism for its defense. If we refer back to I'm Drunk, I Love You, we see the same attitude if we perceive Carson and Dio's relationship as a metaphor for this. Carson know too well that it is the vagueness of her relationship to Dio that's making her miserable. Dio is quite aware too. But they both insist on supporting each other's enjoyment at a certain distance. Cynicism further empowers liberalist openness: since a cynic does what it does despite knowing what it is he's doing, he proceeds to but with a certain distance, which on most cases, leads to its own complicity with capital. Such is the case of a significant part of the independent film culture. Fisher would claim that the "establishment of settled 'alternative' or 'independent' cultural zones" such as the independent film scene, do not really "designate something outside mainstream 31 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. The Essential Zizek Series, (London: Verso, 2008), 25-26. 150 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) culture; rather, they are styles, in fact the dominant styles, within the mainstream."32 These zones and scenes may be considered as the cynical spaces of film production of which, if given a certain amount of time to mature, would be open to its cooptation to the mainstream. Maindie, being the site of liberalist construction of the national subject, is also the site of cooptation of the independent scene by the mainstream. And so retains itself parts of the cynical attitude it bears from its beginnings. For instance, in the film Apocalypse Child (TBA 2015), Ford (Sid Lucero) knows too well that what her mother said who his father was is ultimately false, her mother knows too well too, but they continue to live the made-up story. The maintenance of this false consciousness is important to have them all go on living out their desire. It is this false consciousness that became their standard for living. What for me cynicism opens ultimately is this negotiation with violence. Claudio's defense of liberalism only places its position to aver anything that is deemed extremist. In his own words, liberals "are willing to compromise." That being said, liberals have this "willingness to get hands dirty" which "lands liberals in the halls of power."33 But what of non-totalitarian violence? Claudio can only give "moderation" and "tolerance" as a response, since the greatest liberal pursuit is modus vivendi. Since for him, there is a necessity for a "politics of mediation."34 32 Fisher, Capitalist Realism, 9. 33 Claudio, Liberalism and the Postcolony, 151. 34 Ibid, 4. 151 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) This politics of mediation is apparent also in Apocalypse Child. The end sequence of the film is a mediation between the tyrannical father's legacy through Rich (RK Bagatsing) and the orphaned Oedipus, Ford. Instead of condemnation, a pragmatic response can be heard from Rich's resolve over the history of abuses from his father: after all, he's learned a lot from his father and his abuses ("marami akong natutunan sa kanya"). In another film, Hele sa Hiwagang Hapis (Epicmedia/Sine Olivia 2016), a postmodern reimagination of Jose Rizal's El Filibusterismo, one of the characters, Padre Florentino (Menggie Cobarrubias), is telling Basilio (John Lloyd Cruz) to forgive Simoun (Piolo Pascual) of his past mistakes: to forgive Simoun of his initial collaboration with the Spaniards since, as Florentino would see it, he's trying to make up for it. Basilio is insisting that he shouldn't at first. But after sometime of staying with Simoun at Florentino's hut, Basilio started to doubt his resolve. In the end, he asked Florentino that if he's forgiven, what would happen to the effects of his action to the revolution. Why do things need to end up the way it is? All fundamental questions pertaining to Simoun's actions' effects to history. Florentino left the answer to Basilio that only the young ones, in reference to the future, can answer his questions. ("kayong mga nakababata ang makakasagot niyan") There are two things that are being mediated here: first, is the actual violence done by Rich's father to him, defending it for its supposed pedagogical effect; second, is the violence done by Simoun for the liberation movement, which is being defended by incorporating Basilio with Florentino's appeal for forgiveness. Cynicism 152 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) here as a political mediation displaces violence from its systematic and institutional origins to a more pragmatic and personal approach: "it subverts the official proposition by confronting it with the situation of its enunciation; it proceeds ad hominem"35 Michael Neu noted that these moderation perceives such violence as just, and hence his collective concept for these kinds of violence as just liberal violence. "The liberal framework," according to Neu, "is obsessed with individuals [but are] blind to social hierarchies and interconnectedness." What is being forwarded as a replacement to systematic critique is an extreme moralization: "a fixat[ion to press] the complex material world into a binary moral structure of right and wrong."36 It isn't surprising, from this context that one of Maindie's most successful film in terms of box-office, Heneral Luna, wraps itself up in the notion of the assumption of individual agency as the largest perpetrator of the nation's demise and not its colonizers. On confronting the cabinet and the President, Antonio Luna (John Arcilla) remarked the following statement as a response to the sentiments of the businessmen at the meeting: "May mas malaking kaaway tayo maliban sa mga Amerikano: ang ating sarili." ("We have a greater enemy than the Americans: ourselves.") Preceding sequences suggest the justification of this statement to mean exactly what it means: there are no instances of American violence against the Filipinos, war is depicted as a dignified and highly coded activity. At the end of the film, 35 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 26. 36 Michael Neu, Just Liberal Violence. (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 100. 153 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) Luna was "executed" at the grounds of Aguinaldo's backyard. What sets the tone which supports the earlier quote isn't the execution itself, but the montage of subjective scenes which includes Americans laughing at the audience (addressing them as Filipinos) for "killing their finest war commander." In the very last instance, cynicism brings about a highly individualize look at formation of history, individual or collective. Since the cynical subject doubts any institutions to actually affect his or her life, the blame is placed onto the individual's agency alone. Neu places this reactive agency as the agency "to act rightly regardless of awful things can get."37 But the object here of "blame" isn't one's agency per se, but rather the individual subject himself. Mark Fisher would refer to this mechanism as "responsibilisation." It is the tactic wherein "[e]ach individual member of the subordinate class is encouraged into feeling that their poverty, lack of opportunities, or unemployment, is their fault and their fault alone."38 It has become a dead-end for the cynic, since he no longer believes on institutions, the statement of Luna in the film can act as an overdetermination of his being: that indeed, him and only himself is the enemy. The Nation under Permanent Midnight Nick Dunn would remind us, on his reflection of the Nocturnal City, that "despite of the increasing 37 Ibid, 99. 38 Mark Fisher, "Good for Nothing" in The Fisher-Function, (London: [egress], 2017), 40. 154 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) homogenization of different places, it is important to emphasize from the outset that cities are not neutral containers nor aspecial."39 We can look at our cynics on the same manner: despite of their seeming homogenized existence, they can never be considered as anyone neutral. If anything, their liberalist orientation of openness and negotiation made them complicit with whatever the liberalist construction of the nation is being complicit to, in this case, globalization. The third person in the short film Year of Permanent Midnight is the very manifestation of the cynical subject: he mediates between the global heist and the seeming unimportance of the conflict that the other two characters bear. He instead, due to his distrust over the two as representative of institutions, helped himself on getting most of the exploits of their heist. His reign over the two marked the start of their life under permanent midnight. The Permanent Midnight I'm referring to, which I lifted off the film's title, is the reign of the liberal thought over the country's political economy. The cynic as a product of the liberal-construction of the nation, is also a historical product of the country under liberalism. If as Claudio would like to claim, that we've had a long history of Liberalism – as old as the mid-19th Century – it is then that our production of the cynic as a subject is something that the country is historically determined to have. But this can only be made possible, and intensified, with the acceleration of global capital. The cynic is the product of 39 Nick Dunn, Dark Matters: A Manifesto for the Nocturnal City. London: Zero Books, 2016. 155 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) liberalist negotiation to globalization. The years of permanent midnight has finally realized itself in this era of global capital being mediated through everyday negotiation of liberal values with exploiting classes and capitalist practices. In a nation under permanent midnight, literally, everything becomes possible as long as it is within the bounds of negotiation. Even violence is somehow permissible, but the validation of it does not come from the subject. The 2016 documentary Sunday Beauty Queen is witness to this. In the film, the subjects are captured most of the time on their day-offs, either preparing for or participating at the beauty pageants organized by the Filipinos in Hong Kong as charity events. While the subjects themselves are revealing how is it hard to live as domestic worker in Hong Kong, even some of them getting rid of their employment but unable to get back, it would only take one statement from one employer, who happened to be a film producer in Hong Kong, to justify all these violence that the domestic workers experience: "without the domestic workers," according to the employer interviewed, "Hong Kong will not be as great as it is now." The nation under permanent midnight, being at the excess of darkness, shrouds the structures which takes root of its conditions. Cynicism, ironically, as a guiding light, is blind of the structures. He is entrapped by a global mode of mediation. Beller notes of the role of the world-media system: it constructs a subject whose humanity, "under globalization," is "enjoined to produce 156 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) its own nonexistence."40 The subject produced by the liberalist construction was abjected of his symbolic existence, and was left out as himself a mediation between commodities. The cynic, the subject produced by the liberalist construction of the nation, is also the perfect consumer of the global market. The production of the cynic as a national subject, as mentioned earlier, can only be possible on a specific time. This time is covered by the films read for this study. It is the time after all the trust in institutions are displaced towards technology. The mainstream-indie-liberal politics connection traces back to the perceived beginning of the so-called Philippine New Wave. While independent film production has always been historically a practice in Philippine cinema, commentators, as Tolentino would suggest, traces the roots of the "movement" at the beginning of Cinemalaya Independent Film Festival in 2005.41 What sets this movement against older independent film practices is their use of the digital technology as medium. Lav Diaz identifies the Digital Technology as "liberation theology".42 In earlier writings, 40 Beller, Acquiring Eyes, 5. 41 Tolentino, Indie Cinema, 4. 42 "Digital is liberation theology. Now we can have our own media . The internet is so free, the camera is so free. The issue is not anymore that you cannot shoot. You have a Southeast Independent Cinema now. We have been deprived for a long time, we have been neglected, we have been dismissed by the Western media. That was because of production logistics. We did not have money, we did not have cameras, all those things. Now, these questions have been answered. We are on equal terms now. Now there are new people who are doing these very diff erent things, such as Raya Martin, John Torres, or Khavn de la Cruz in the Philippines." Tilman Baumgärtel, "'Digital is Liberation 157 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) Khavn dela Cruz also sought the coming of digital technology as something which is positive for the artist and even assumes a "democratization of filmmaking" which enables the filmmaker to "shoot [his/her] opus in any [video] format."43 Technological determinism on the part of earlier practitioners of digital filmmaking is very telling of liberalism in a way that the coming of the digital technology also assumes that one is now free to do whatever he wants on whatever way he wants with the medium. For some time, the practice remained true to its political economy: dela Cruz and Diaz both have their own production outfits making their own films on their own time. Eduardo Dayao saw the movement back then as something similar to punk rock.44 But like punk and its offshoot, grunge, indies got easily coopted by the mainstream after some years. This is due to indies' failure to sustain a critique of the mainstream: but this failure is not because of it not being conscious of its position in relation to the mainstream, but as Tolentino would also Theology': an interview with Lav Diaz" in Tilman Baumgärtel (ed.), Southeast Asian Independent Cinema. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 177. 43 Khavn dela Cruz, "Four Manifestos" in Tilman Baumgärtel (ed.), Southeast Asian Independent Cinema. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 122. 44 "Roughly ten years ago, give or take, independent cinema was punk rock (or hip-hop) for filmmakers, with the same energy, the same sense of adventurism, the same love for new forms, the same fervor for cross-pollination, the same carte blanche, the same economic freedom, the same disregard for gatekeepers, who were eventually cast out as their counter parts around the world." Eduardo Dayao, "Sleeping with the Enemy." Kino Punch, (2015), 40. 158 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) contend, in his commentaries of the films Ang Babae sa Septic Tank (2011) and Ang mga Kidnapper ni Ronnie Lazaro (2012), that the indies are already aware that they are no longer in the age to assume any innocence of the practices (and excesses) that they appropriated from the mainstream, which is why a significant part of its earlier history were not dedicated to critique.45 But, since the limit of discourse of the then independent movement is technological-determinist in essence, it fails to sustain a running critique and resistance to the dominating practice of the ruling institutions. The arguments of digital liberation are left open to negotiation since it is mainly grounded on the celebration of technology. By 2012, all SM cinemas in the country have become fully digitized,46 which signaled a change, too, for mainstream studios to shift into digital filmmaking. From filmmaking in the periphery for friends and selected venues, practices of big studios trickled down for the independent scene to follow. As the great structures of power of the studio system managed to coopt the once-independent digital movement, it too has become the vessel of dominantstate agenda and ideology. It isn't an accident that 45 Tolentino, Indie Cinema, 5, Tolentino will also further stress that the major contributing factor for the mainstream appropriation of the digital medium is Cinemalaya's emphasis for the development of "mainstream look" for independent productions which stresses on "narrative, continuity and suture," similar to classical Hollywood narrative films. Ibid, 15. 46 "SM Cinema goes full digital." 27 August 2012. The Philippine Star. http://www.philstar.com/entertainment/2012/08/27/842405/sm -cinema-goes-full-digital. (accessed 05 November 2017). 159 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) mainstream-indie exchange, or maindie, zeniths in 2014, at the middle of the liberal administration of President Benigno Aquino III. It is then that the political-economic environment at the time is ripe and made possible to imagine this kind of openness as attuned with liberal values. The Aquino administration boasts of economic achievements as reflected by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) increase and revenue from IT-BPO industries.47 The then-administration' s Public-Private Partnership programs (PPPP) was also highlighted as signs of confidence of the public and private sectors. 48 PPPP has extended towards cinema through Quezon City's Local Government Unit's establishment of its own festival, QCinema International Film Festival, back in 2013, which give grants to filmmakers to produce films which will be premiered in the festival. The festival expands from just 47 FDIs increased from $11.77 B (2005-2010) to $20.42 B (20112015) while IT-BPO revenues increased to more than 200% as compared with its revenue before the Aquino administration. Achievements Under the Aquino Administration, (Manila: Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office, 2016), 4-5. 48 Elizabeth Marcelo: "Kayo na po ang magkumpara sa pagkakaiba. Dati walang nakikisama sa proyekto ngayon nag uunahan na ang mga pribadong kumpanya at nagbibigay ng premium," Aquino said. Aquino said that while before, the government has to offer numerous fiscal incentives to attract companies to enter into a PPP deal with the government, now, private firms are the ones offering premiums to the government in order to secure PPP projects Elizabeth Marcelo. "PNoy cites PPP projects as proof of confidence in his administration." GMA News Online. http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/529626/pnoycites-ppp-projects-as-proof-of-confidence-in-hisadministration/story/ (accessed 05 November 2017). 160 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) producing and exhibiting three films in 2013 to featuring 38 films from both commissioned works to invited films from international and local filmmakers. It isn't just the QCinema-filmmaker relationship which is reflective of PPPP, but also within QCinema. QCinema is being organized by a private studio, VPF Creative Productions, presented as a main partner. QCinema has opened a way for a budding studio, TBA,49 to have most of its production be co-produced in the festival. It should be noted, however, that despite of the achievements that the Aquino administration claims, the over-all economic condition has not changed throughout the country. The liberal and elitist policies of the Aquino administration have resulted to the intensification of what Amado Guerrero identified long before as "uneven and spasmodic development" in the different parts of the country.50 The Communist Party of the Philippines' Central Committee would add: "[t]he illusion of economic growth in 2013 and 2014 is due to the heavy inflow of portfolio investments to the Philippine financial markets from the US and other foreign hedge funds. This kind of financial flow amounted to more than 60 percent of total inflows. The remittances of overseas contract workers and net inflows from exports amounted to a 49 TBA is an abbreviation for three production companies it represents: Tuko Film Productions owned by real-estate comprador Fernando Ortigas, Buchi Boy Films owned by film producer and actor Eduardo A. Rocha, and Artikulo Uno, also owned by Ortigas. 50 Amado Guerrero. Philippine Society and Revolution. (Manila: Aklat ng Bayan, Inc., 2006), 64. 161 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) small part."51 Ibon Foundation's summation of their assessment of the Aquino administration would support this statement: "Even if FDIs increased and employment grew, jobs creation has fallen from 1.1 million in 2011 to just 638,000 in 2015. There has also been a 543,000 addition to the number of underemployed Filipinos in the same period, showing that there are now more temporary, low-paying and insecure jobs in the business-biased economy. Moreover, 63% of the total employed are nonregular, agency-hired, informal sector, or unpaid family workers. Wages have also been very insufficient: the P481 National Capital Region minimum wage, which is the highest across all regions, make less than half of the P1,093 family living wage or the amount needed by a family of six for subsistence. Aquino vetoed proposed increases in nurses' salaries and the elderly's pensions."52 In this complex history, the subject which is formed under these conditions is set into a field wherein institutions, due to it either being incomprehensible or just outright elitist, can no longer be trusted. It is as such that most films also depicted it that way: on most hugot films, while agency are being considered, the individuals' fate is being left into the care of commodities to accompany the effacement of institutionalized values and identities, at least in representations. Intensified by most maindie productions' call for responsibilisation, like in Heneral Luna, the individual has firmly wrapped himself 51 "Intensify the Offensives on a National Scale to Advance the People's Democratic Revolution." Ang Bayan 29 March 2015, 5. 52 "Elitist politics and economics: the real Aquino legacy." 01 July 2016. Ibon. http://ibon.org/2016/07/elitist-politics-andeconomics-the-real-aquino-legacy/. (accessed 05 November 2017) 162 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) into the web created for himself. The nation which the liberalist construction would like to have is a nation which subjects prolong his own displacement from the collective identities he formerly holds, towards a new imagination of perceived "borderlessness." The liberalist construction of the nation places its subject on an imaginary "independence" while being negotiated for the global market. References Books Althusser, Louis. On the Reproduction of Capitalism. London: Verso, 2014. Anderson, Benedict. The Spectre of Comparisons. London: Verso, 1998. Baumgärtel, Tilman, ed. Southeast Asian Independent Cinema. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012. Beller, Jonathan. Acquiring Eyes: Philippine Visuality, Nationalist Struggle and the World-Media System. Quezon City: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 2006. -. The Cinematic Mode of Production. Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2006. Claudio, Lisandro. Liberalism and the Postcolony. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2017. Comolli, Jean Louis. Cinema Against Spectacle. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015. Dunn, Nick. Dark Matters. London: Zero Books, 2016. Fisher, Mark. Capitalist Realism. London: Zero Books, 2009. 163 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) Fisher, Mark. "Good For Nothing." In The Fisher-Function, 33-42. London: [egress], 2017. Garcellano, Edel E. Intertext. Manila: Kalikasan Press, 1991. Guerrero, Amado. Philippine Society and Revolution. Manila: Aklat ng Bayan, Inc., 2006. Karatani, Kojin. Nation and Aesthetics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Translated by Bruce Fink. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006. Neu, Michael. Just Liberal Violence. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017. Ritzer, George. "Introduction." In The Blackwell Companion to Globalization, edited by George Ritzer, 16-28. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. Sloterdijk, Peter. The Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. Tolentino, Rolando B. Indie Cinema. Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing House, 2016. Žižek, Slavoj. The Sublime Object of Ideology. The Essential Zizek. London: Verso, 2008. Motion Pictures Ang Kwento Nating Dalawa. Directed by Nestor Jr. Abrogena. Produced by Dogtown Manila; Monoxide Works. 2015. Apocalypse Child. Directed by Mario Cornejo. Produced by TBA, Arkeo Films. 2015. Camp Sawi. Directed by Irene Villamor. Produced by Viva Films. 2016. Heneral Luna. Directed by Jerrold Tarog. Produced by Artikulo Uno. 2015. 164 THE YEARS OF PERMANENT MIDNIGHT MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) I'm Drunk, I Love You. Directed by J. P. Habac. Produced by TBA. 2017. Sunday Beauty Queen. Directed by Babyruth Guttierez Villarama. Produced by TBA, Voyage Studios. 2016. That Thing Called Tadhana. Directed by Antoinette Jadaone. Produced by Cinema One Originals. 2014. Year of Permanent Midnight. Directed by Clare Del Rosario. Produced by Jose Del Rosario, & Fe Del Rosario. 2014. Articles, Periodicals, Websites Achievements Under the Aquino Administration. Manila: Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office, 2016. Ang Bayan. "Intensify the Offensives on a National Scale to Advance the People's Democratic Revolution." March 29, 2015. Dayao, Eduardo. "Sleeping with the Enemy." Kino Punch, 2015: 38-41. Ibon Foundation. "Elitist politics and economics: the real Aquino legacy." Ibon. July 01, 2016. http://ibon.org/2016/07/elitist-politics-andeconomics-the-real-aquino-legacy/ (accessed November 05, 2017). Marcelo, Elizabeth. "PNoy cites PPP projects as proof of confidence in his administration." GMA News Online. June 28, 2015. http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/natio n/529626/pnoy-cites-ppp-projects-as-proof-of- 165 J. DEYTO MABINI REVIEW I VOLUME 7 (2018) confidence-in-his-administration/story/ (accessed November 05, 2017). The Philippine Star. "SM Cinema goes full digital." The Philippine Star. August 27, 2012. http://www.philstar.com/entertainment/2012/0 8/27/842405/sm-cinema-goes-full-digital (accessed November 05, 2017). About the Author JEFFREY DEYTO is a Lecturer at the Far Eastern University and a part-time instructor at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines where he also took his undergraduate degree in Clinical Psychology. He writes film-criticism for VCinema, a website dedicated for Asian Cinema. He was a fellow of the 2018 Yamagata International Documentary Film Festival and Film Festival Dokumenter – Jogja's Film Criticism Workshop. He is also a filmmaker and scholar currently taking his Masters in Media Studies (Film) at the University of the Philippines – Film Institute. As a filmmaker, his works have been screened at S-Express, Cinemanila International Film Festival, FACINE – Filipino Arts and Cine Festival, Gawad CCP Para sa Alternatibong Pelikula at Bidyo, and QCinema International Film Festival. His research interest includes the role of ideology in cinema and deployments of new moving image disciplines across mediums.

DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS B M LB What is Good and Why: the Ethics of Well-Being. B R K. (Harvard UP, . Pp. xi + . Price £..) Richard Kraut's What is Good and Why is his first full-length foray into ethical theory. Of course, he has done plenty of ethical theory in working on Plato and Aristotle. In the decades since its publication, his  paper 'Two Conceptions of Happiness' has been seminal in philosophical investigations into human well-being. But What is Good differs from Kraut's earlier work by attempting a full-scale development and defence of a central element in ethical theory, in just the way its title suggests. One way to construe this work is as a development or completion of the earlier paper. But to leave it at that would be an injustice; Kraut's ambitions extend much further – to the role of the good overall in practical thinking. Kraut carries out this larger project in his characteristically lucid style. He frames a distinctive view which offers original contributions across a wide variety of subdisciplines within ethics. In fact, his view is remarkable for the range of positions it disagrees with while maintaining a high degree of plausibility. A theme consistent with his earlier paper is his rejection of what are sometimes called 'subjectivist' accounts of well-being. Kraut now subsumes these under the heading 'conative theories', and mounts a vigorous repudiation of them. Often the contrast class for such theories is taken to be 'objective list' theories, but Kraut distances himself from the objective list approach too, as well as from the objective theory of welfare (as 'rational care') defended by Stephen Darwall. Is he then defending some version of eudaimonism, carried over from his work on Plato and Aristotle? No, not that either, and I shall return to this point. His view also is in some ways similar to what are sometimes called 'perfectionist' theories, but Kraut gives good reason for not accepting this classification either. Though his approach has similarities to Philippa Foot-style ethical naturalism, he repudiates her naturalism. In short, he has created a theoretical niche all his own. Kraut calls his approach developmentalism, and it has at its core the notion that there is a 'tight connection' between a living being's doing well and its developing and using its powers (p. ): 'when we consider the good of any living thing, we should look to the process of growth and development that best suits things of its The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. , No.  October  ISSN – doi: ./j.-...x ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly Published by Blackwell Publishing,  Garsington Road, Oxford  , UK, and  Main Street, Malden,  , USA kind' (p. n.). Kraut's developmentalism maintains that the good for a living being is the highest development of its natural powers. One great advantage of this approach is that it yields an account of good for which generalizes across species. At the same time, Kraut thinks developmentalism pays off in thinking about the good for human beings – our welfare or well-being or prudential good – in a plausible and attractive way. By attending to the way children develop and grow, and in particular to the common sense normative judgements we make about when they do so well or poorly, we can identify the natural capacities it is good for us to develop. These Kraut identifies as our cognitive, affective, sensory, social, and (to a lesser extent) physical powers. His argument for the view proceeds in stages. The first two chapters are pathbreakers for the full articulation of the theory in ch.  and its defence and application in ch. . The earlier chapters aim to distance developmentalism from a variety of views. The prime target is the 'conative' family of theories of well-being, which for some time now have dominated theories of well-being. Kraut's is the most developed critique of these approaches I have seen, and as elsewhere, his aim is to vindicate his claims by appeal to 'platitudes' about what is good for us. Kraut's critical work hardly ends there, however. Among the other theories he rejects are theories which make good somehow mind-dependent; views (such as those of Moore and Ross) which privilege goodness sans phrase over good-for; theories which make practical reasons depend on things other than considerations of goodness and in particular good-for (e.g., principles of right);1 hedonism; egoism; utilitarianism; views which distinguish agent-neutral from agent-relative values; and Foot-style naturalism. That is a lot of brush to clear, but Kraut's method is to draw on ordinary intuitions about conditions under which living things thrive (in particular, but not only, human beings), in order to show that all these fail. Readers with different predilections will doubtless form different judgements as to which of his arrows miss their marks. Still, Kraut's arguments in most cases will, I suspect, earn their way into rebuttals in a wide variety of venues. Ch.  is the heart of the positive account. Here Kraut lays out the shape which developmentalism takes in the human case, and explains in detail what are the kinds of power the proper development of which constitutes what is good for us. His argument features much sensible development of platitudes about what is good for us which are easily overlooked but ought to be staples of any adequate account of well-being. Many of the platitudes we accept about children and about what counts as good for them in their development carry more force and attract less controversy than vexed questions about what competent adults choose for themselves and the bearing of those choices on their good. Kraut drew attention to the significance of the process of growing up in his  paper, and brings home here the full force of what we believe is right for those becoming fully fledged human beings. Rosalind Hursthouse remarked that Aristotle never forgot that we were once children,2 and Kraut perhaps more than anyone else working in the area has taken this to heart.  MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 1 In this way Kraut's theory is welfarist in the sense identified by L.W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ), p. . 2 R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford UP, ), p. . Ch.  applies the insights of developmentalism, with the aim of showing the reach of the theory, in particular that we do not have to go beyond good-for considerations to account for the reasons we have for action. Kraut considers possible sources of demurral on this point – promising, punishment, desert, rights, consent – to argue that none needs to go beyond considerations of good-for to account for the proper sorts of reasons to act in each case. This is an all too brief survey of a plausible and attractive account of well-being; I cannot do justice here to all of its valuable lines of enquiry. In the remainder of this review I shall consider some issues which arise from the relationship between goodfor (which is central to Kraut's developmentalism) and reasons for action. Kraut touches on this subject repeatedly without making clear just what this relationship is. Partly as a result, I believe there are real puzzles in making sense of the import of developmentalism for ordinary practice. Kraut's developmentalism bears an uneasy relationship with the eudaimonism of the ancient Greeks, and I shall bring out my concerns about his approach by focusing on some crucial points of disagreement between them. It is striking to consider the contrasts between Kraut's developmentalism and ancient eudaimonism, for two reasons. First, Kraut has written extensively on ancient value theory, in particular the ethics and politics of Plato and Aristotle. It is therefore instructive that he does not toe the ancient line when it comes to an account of what is good for us. Secondly, though Kraut's view is not eudaimonist, it is obviously deeply influenced by his work on the ancient accounts. Moreover, his earlier landmark paper on happiness explicitly challenged contemporary 'conative' theories of happiness from a perspective grounded in ancient thinking about well-being. So his departure from eudaimonism is worth scrutinizing. Where does he part company with the ancients? For one thing, Kraut is interested in a general account of good-for which can apply not only to humans but to all living things. In general the ancients seemed simply not interested in this broader question, at least for purposes of ethical theorizing. More importantly, Kraut departs from the ancients in treating our capacities for engaging reasons as just one more suite of powers among many. On the developmental view, our capacity for rationality matters, but so does our capacity for social development, and our capacity to sense, and feel, and so on. All are equally important in the story of what is good for us, and each has its stake in the demands for development. Not so on ancient accounts, where rationality plays a distinctive role and stands in a special relationship with every other element of our nature. While the ancients agree that we have these other capacities, and that their development matters, they insist that our cognitive powers have a special place in the story of their proper development. This is partly because the complexity of human nature and the multiplicity of our capacities open up to us a range of developmental possibilities, so that the path to developing them in ways that are good for us is more complex than nature alone settles. There is a 'natural indeterminacy' to the course of proper development for us, but because we are by nature practical reasoners, an essential element in our developing properly is learning to cultivate our own capacities in response to reasons. The best path of development for each of us is in large part the DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS  ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly work of our own practical reason to sort out, and for this reason the development and exercise of practical wisdom occupies a special place in the story of what is good for us. It is not merely that practical wisdom is more important than other developed capacities. It orders and structures what counts as the proper development of our other capacities: it has what Daniel Russell has called a directive role in our good.3 On Kraut's view, there is no such recognition of a special significance for the development of our rational capacities – they need development in ways that are recognizably good for us, but in this respect they are on all fours with all our natural capacities. Because there is no recognition in Kraut's view that directing the living of a good human life is the work of practical wisdom, there is also no recognition of what I shall call the internal relationship between practical wisdom and a good human life. This internal relationship entails that each of us is uniquely positioned to contribute to our own living well in a way in which others simply cannot. A good human life is, on the ancient view, one with an appropriate rational structure in the choices and conduct which constitute it, and it is the agent's capacity for rational agency which provides this structure. This is what explains the internal relationship, and because Kraut fails to acknowledge that relationship, his account does not establish a clear linkage between what is good for us and what reasons we have for acting; the eudaimonist approach does. I now turn to two places where this loss is especially problematic. Whose good to seek, and why On the ancient views, it is the work of practical wisdom to recognize and respond to reasons for action, beginning with the reasons we have to live well. However, on Kraut's account, the good-for relation has no direct connection at all with reasons for action. Presumably we have reasons for action, and Kraut is explicit that these reasons must come from what is good for somebody or something. Yet there is no account at all of how this might be so. Kraut rejects utilitarianism, not only because he believes we should reject its maximizing commitments (§) but also because it does not give proper place to concerns for whose good we are to advance (pp. –). Impersonal regard for the good of all is, he says (p. ), no appropriate moral standard; so there is no connection with reasons for action from anything like a maximizing principle of rationality. But Kraut also rejects even a weak form of egoism which holds that among those goods which each of us has reason to advance is our own good – that we must have direct concern for our own well-being (p. ). He argues that we can endorse the strategy of someone who cares for his own good only instrumentally, as a necessary means to caring for the goods of others (p. ). This leaves a puzzle as to how exactly anybody's good becomes reason-giving for us, given that there is no immediate connection between reasons for action and either one's own good or everybody's good. Somehow, somebody's good must be  MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 3 D. Russell, Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford UP, ), ch. . Though the details vary from account to account, the ancient eudaimonists – Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics – are in unison on this point. Because eudaimonia is (on all these ancient accounts) something that is the product of practical wisdom, eudaimonism is not even a species of developmentalism: that is to say, it is not Kraut's general account as applied to the human case. reason-giving, but how? Kraut maintains (pp. , ) that there is no philosophical answer here: ... we do not need a formula that tells all people whatsoever, regardless of their circumstances, whose good they should promote. We can instead rely on common sense, and recognize that the world as it is already offers countless opportunities for doing what is good.... To act, one must answer the question 'Whose good should I be serving?' and not merely 'What is good?'. There are unlimited ways of properly answering the first of these questions, and so philosophy cannot help us here; it can only help with the second question. The answer to the 'who to serve?' question depends in each case on lots of contingent factors over which it is impossible to generalize. We stand in various social relationships – family member, doctor, promisor, teacher – which make certain responses salient, and beyond that there is nothing more for philosophy to say. But insisting, as Kraut does (pp. , ), that these 'social roles' answer the question leaves open the reasons we have for taking up and occupying such roles.4 What philosophy can and should say something about is how the goods of some people (or for that matter of some other living things), but not others, come to be reasongiving for us, and thus in part why we have reason to take on such roles with respect to some people but not others. We are awash in a sea of possibilities for promoting the development of living things. If the goods of some but not others are reasongiving, it is a philosophical question when and how this occurs. If such connections are beyond reason and rational scrutiny, then they are arbitrary, and we can hardly suppose that this is the case. Yet Kraut's account offers no clue as to the rational structure of our interest in the well-being of human beings. Our own good is not in itself necessarily reason-giving; neither is the maximum good. We are left without an account of when and how a being's good establishes reasons for action. This is a hole which some prescriptive story needs to fill, even if it is not one which can address the contingencies that spell out particular cases. Philosophy need not yield determinate solutions to these practical problems in order to offer insight into how to think about them. We might also wonder about the content of the attitudes available to those who would care for their own goods only instrumentally. Suppose Ally does not see her own good as reason-giving except instrumentally, but sees her father's good as something that is more than instrumentally reason-giving for her. It is not clear what form her concern for him might take. After all, Ally cannot share in his thinking that his good is something which by its very nature must be reason-giving for him. Ally must, it seems, see his concern for his own good as in a sense arbitrary, for the reasons I have just considered. What kind of attitude can that leave her, not only towards his well-being but towards him? In Aristotle, the love of self and the love of others are deeply connected. In commitments of the best sort, Aristotle says, I love my friend as a 'second self '.5 This DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS  ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 4 Kraut has re-emphasized in private communication his concern about social roles in answering this question. 5 NE a , b , b ; EE a ; MM a . is a way of extending the love I already have for myself (in particular for myself as rational agent) for my own sake.6 Aristotle thinks this connection between people who love their own goods first is possible because we recognize our own rational agency as essential to ourselves, and we do likewise with those we care about. We see their rational agency, their love for themselves, and their love for others as inextricably bound together, psychologically and normatively. But it is not clear that Ally can do this. She does not understand what it is like to be someone for the sake of whom people have reasons to act, since she has no sense of being a self whose own good gives her reasons for action. For this reason also, being the object of love for one's own sake is a notion alien to her. Better that her concern for her father's good is grounded in a concern for him – a concern which it is hard to see that she could have without regarding herself in that way first.7 What this points to, once again, is what is lost by abandoning the connection between what is good for us and our capacity for rational agency, as recognized in the ancient eudaimonist accounts. Proper concern for others – concern of the sort that is appropriate to psychologically complex human beings – is impossible without recognizing the internal connection between reasons for acting (and the work of practical wisdom) and living well. The absence of that connection seems to make real friendship and love impossible. But these are not the only important social relations that are affected. Development and respect I can best bring out a further dimension of loss by exploring the proposal that we should see ourselves and each other not merely as receptacles or locations of development (or even good-for), but as beings entitled to respect – as claimants on others. Kraut does insist that we have obligations not to harm others. Not only impediments but lots of other things (e.g., pain) can be bad for us, and in so far as some action is bad for something, in general this provides reason not to perform it. Developmentalism can thus account for many of the considerations bearing on (for example) promise-keeping, punishment, and other social practices. What it cannot account for is our status as entitled to demand or claim that others must keep their promises to us, or more generally our claim to be respected by others. Kraut (p. ) says of the harm done to relationships by breaking promises that Breaking certain promises is very wrong, because the damage their violation does to one's relationships, or the good that one promised but failed to deliver, is very great. This is certainly true, but a crucial part of why such harm is done to relationships cannot be explained by developmentalism. If you break a promise to me in a way that brings about more good for me than keeping it would have, I may yet have a  MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 6 NE IX , a ff.; cf. also IX , b . 7 For formidable versions of this argument, see J. Hampton, 'The Wisdom of the Egoist', Social Philosophy and Policy,  (), pp. –, and 'Feminist Contractarianism', in L. Antony and C. Witt (eds), A Mind of One's Own (Boulder: Westview, ), pp. –. complaint against you. The complaint is not simply that you have damaged our relationship. In fact, given that (by hypothesis) you have actually made me better off, an explanation is needed of why I should think you have damaged it. Simply looking at what is good for me cannot explain this. What does explain it is precisely the 'internal relation' to our own good which each of us has in virtue of our rational agency, and which your action ignores. Because developmentalism loses sight of the crucial role of rational agency in what is good for us, it is prone to get things wrong just when agency matters in ways which concern for good-for can mask. Similar problems arise about Kraut's treatment of the Millian notion that we are entitled to a moral 'wall' protecting us from interference. Kraut rejects what he calls 'pure anti-paternalism', the view that the consent of others is required for interfering in their lives or actions (§). This view is, he says (p. ), 'arbitrary' in holding that another's will should be respected when no good is performed by doing so. We bypass people's will[s] all the time, by preventing them from harming others and requiring them to contribute to the good of others, whether they want to or not. There is no merit in the general idea that we should all be allowed to do whatever we choose. On Kraut's view the only possible point of respecting the wills of others must be that they perform a crucial epistemic service, because they are generally better situated to know what is good for them than we are. This is, of course, very often true, but it fails to capture important intuitions about the respect others may claim from us by right. Those who think it an important feature of normative ethical theory that we are entitled, as rational agents in moral community with other rational agents, to make claims on other moral agents will not be satisfied that developmentalism can capture this. As Stephen Darwall has argued in recent work,8 it is hard to resist the proposal that this sort of standing is central to our moral and other practices in much of human social life – promising and anti-paternalism among them. But developmentalism neither makes a clear and central place for rational agency in understanding what is good for us, nor forges any clear connection between what is good for us and the ways we respond to reasons. Those who think our rational agency is what gives us our distinctive moral standing will feel that Kraut's account of the ways in which we can harm others – or for that matter the ways in which our relationships with them can be enriched and improved – simply falls short.9 Practical wisdom, good-for, and matching I conclude with a related puzzle arising from Kraut's venture into meta-ethics. Though Kraut distances himself from the 'naturalism' of the sort defended by Foot, he resembles her in denying adamantly that goodness is mind-dependent. What is DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS  ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 8 S. Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint (Harvard UP, ). 9 In a similar vein, Kraut offers a 'buck-passing' view of rightness (§) which many will find unsatisfactory, because his conception of goods and harms (and thus his conception of reasons) is too narrow. It does not, for example, recognize Darwall's 'second-person reasons', nor the good of second-person relations, in any systematic way. good or bad for living things is in no way dependent on human minds: it is 'not brought into being by, or dependent on, human attitudes, or minds in general'. It is 'already "out there" in the world, existing independently of any mind' (p. ). Kraut takes himself to be affirming what Christine Korsgaard calls 'substantive realism', in contrast with her 'constructivism' and with other mindor response-dependent views of the nature of goodness or good-for.10 Yet he gives no account of how he would meet standard objections to realism of this sort – how he might explain, for example, how such evaluative properties can fit into the natural world, or how we come to know about them. Presumably, claiming that (say) the growth of a healthy root system for a plant is good for it is doing something more than simply reporting on the botanical facts about the plant and its roots. It is ascribing a property that is not merely descriptive of the natural facts, but is an evaluation of those facts. But Kraut says nothing about the provenance of this extra-botanical property – how it comes to be, or how we might be in a position to detect it. However, Kraut does give us something of an analysis of the good-for relation without yet addressing those issues. One important reason he offers for privileging the notion of good-for as opposed to good simpliciter is that the 'for' in the former is, as Kraut puts it, a relation of a certain sort of suitability: 'the "for" in "g is good for S" is best taken to indicate that g has a certain kind of suitability to S : their properties are so matched to each other that g serves S well' (p. ; my italics). By way of example, Kraut offers a case in which one might think that a certain career – that of a physician, say – is good for some particular individual: 'if we say of someone that it is good for him that he is living the life of a doctor, there must be some suitability between him and that life, some match between them that makes it the case that such a life serves him well' (p. ). So the nature of good-for consists in these matching relations. I myself think Kraut is right in thinking about good-for in this way, but doubt that we can best understand these relations as mind-independent. In any event, if we are to respond to opportunities to realize good-for in the world around us, our doing so must depend upon our capacity to detect and respond to these relations. Given the varieties of things that can be good for us, there must be many different kinds of matching relations that matter for promoting our good. Many of these matches we no doubt can discern 'by nature' – without reflection or training. However, given the significance we ordinarily accord to wisdom in finer cases of discernment, it is odd that the development of a capacity to detect these matches reliably and accurately should receive no greater priority than Kraut gives it. Of course, it might just be that acting morally is only one of several arenas of human life and action, not in itself specially important. Kraut denies the priority of the right over the good (§), but says nothing about the priority of the good among the many possible exercises of our capacities. If, however, we think that morality – in particular, the promotion of good for ourselves and others – is especially important for living well, we again notice a sharp contrast with the ancients. It is because the capacity for discrimination is so crucial to living well that practical wisdom enjoys the pride of place in human development  MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 10 C. Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, ), Lecture I. See Kraut, n.  §. which it does on the ancient accounts. This also explains why, amid recognition of a broad and general need to develop as whole beings, the ancients emphasized the significance of moral education. This discriminatory capacity, among all our capacities, bears a special role in our living well, because it is essential for virtue, and virtue requires (inter alia) getting those matching relations right. Overall, it seems the central relationship between good-for and reasons for action is one that cannot rest in the indeterminate form in which Kraut has left it. Since recognizing and responding to reasons for action (perhaps including these matching relations) is so important for how we live, how we come to do this must be a crucial part of the developmental story as well. Moral philosophy can and should shed light on how the possible goods of the living things around us come to give us reasons for action. On the other hand, the key insights of Kraut's developmentalism are not only compatible with the overall thrust of ancient eudaimonism, which makes that relationship explicit, but are actually a welcome complement to it. Eudaimonist theories (in particular, neo-Aristotelian theories) often emphasize the differences between us and other living things in the light of our reflective rational capacities. This sometimes comes at the cost of inattention to the natural facts about our development from children into adult human beings. Kraut brings onto centre stage in thinking about our good these facts about ourselves as developing beings. Eudaimonists, like others thinking about what is good for us and why, can only benefit from taking these lessons seriously.11 University of North Carolina DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS  ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 11 I am most grateful to Richard Kraut for his comments, and to Nathaniel Goldberg and Daniel Russell for discussion.

Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 221 The emergence of the physical world from information processing Brian Whitworth Massey University, Albany, New Zealand email: [email protected] Not only is the universe stranger than we imagine, it is stranger than we can imagine Sir Arthur Eddington ABSTRACT This paper links the conjecture that the physical world is a virtual reality to the findings of modern physics. What is usually the subject of science fiction is here proposed as a scientific theory open to empirical evaluation. We know from physics how the world behaves, and from computing how information behaves, so whether the physical world arises from ongoing information processing is a question science can evaluate. A prima facie case for the virtual reality conjecture is presented. If a photon is a pixel on a multi-dimensional grid that gives rise to space, the speed of light could reflect its refresh rate. If mass, charge and energy all arise from processing, the many conservation laws of physics could reduce to a single law of dynamic information conservation. If the universe is a virtual reality, then its big bang creation could be simply when the system was booted up. Deriving core physics from information processing could reconcile relativity and quantum theory, with the former how processing creates the space-time operating system and the latter how it creates energy and matter applications. 1. Introduction We know that processing can create virtual worlds with their own time, space and objects1, but that the physical world arises this way is normally a topic of science fiction not physics. Yet the reader is asked to keep an open mind and not reject a theory before evaluating it. The virtual reality conjecture is quite simply that the physical world arises from quantum processing as images arise on a computer screen. A method to evaluate this conjecture is also proposed. 1 For example Second Life, http://secondlife.com/ Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 222 1.1 Strange physics The theories of modern physics often seem strange, e.g. in many-worlds theory each quantum choice divides the universe into alternate realities (Everett, 1957), so everything that can happen does happen somewhere in an inconceivable "multiverse' of parallel worlds. In Guth's inflationary model, our universe is just one of many possible "bubble universes" (Guth, 1998). In string theory the physical world has ten spatial dimensions, six of them "curled up" and hidden from view. M-theory puts our universe on a three dimensional "brane", floating in time on a fifth dimension we cannot see (Gribbin, 2000, p177-180). The cyclic-ekpyrotic model postulates that we are in one of two 3D worlds that collide and retreat in an eternal cycle along a hidden connecting dimension (J. Khoury, 2001). Yet the empirical findings of physics are even stranger, e.g. the sun's gravity bends light traveling past it by "curving" nearby space. Gravity also slows down time itself, so an atomic clock atop a tall building ticks faster than one on the ground. Yet a clock in a moving plane ticks slower than one on the ground and is also heavier, as movement increases mass. Despite this malleability of space and time, the speed of light is fixed, e.g. light shone from a spaceship going at nearly the speed of light still leaves it at the speed of light. None of this makes much common sense but the experiments have been done. In 1972 one of two synchronized atomic clocks was flown in an airplane for days and another kept stationary on the ground. Less time ticked by for the moving clock. Time really does slow down with high speed travel (Hafele & Keating, 1972). If cosmic events are strange, micro-cosmic events are even stranger. When quantum particles entangle what happens to one instantly affects the other, even if they are light years apart. The vacuum energy of "empty" space generates virtual particles with measurable effects. In Young's two slit experiment entities somehow manage to go through both slits at once, even when sent through one at a time. Quantum events like gamma radiation are entirely random, i.e. physical effects without a physical cause. Even Einstein never came to terms with quantum physics, perhaps because it makes even less common sense than relativity. In conclusion, it isn't the theories of physics that are strange but the world itself. Physics has polled our reality and the results are in: the physical world is stranger than it seems. 1.2 The semantic vacuum Modern physics began with Maxwell's wave equations in 1900, Einstein's special relativity in 1905, and general relativity in 1915. Despite scientific skepticism, these theories met every experimental and logical test their critics could devise. Their predictive success surprised even their advocates, e.g. in 1933 Fermi pre-discovered the neutrino before research verified it in 1953, and Dirac's equations similarly predicted anti-matter before it too was later confirmed. These and other stunning successes have made quantum mechanics and relativity theory the crown jewels of modern physics. They have quite simply never been Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 223 shown wrong. Yet, a century later, they still just don‟t make sense. As Ford says of quantum theory: "Its just that the theory lacks a rationale. "How come the quantum" John Wheeler likes to ask. "If your head doesn‟t swim when you think about the quantum," Niels Bohr reportedly said, "you haven‟t understood it." And Richard Feynman ... who understood quantum mechanics as deeply as anyone, wrote: "My physics students don‟t understand it either. That is because I don‟t understand it."" (Ford, 2004, p98) Similar statements apply to relativity theory. For perhaps the first time in the history of any science, scholars simply don't personally believe what the reigning theories of their discipline are saying. They accept them as mathematical statements that give correct answers, but not as reality descriptions of the world. This is, to say the least, an unusual state of affairs. Relativity theory and quantum mechanics contradict not only common sense but also each other. Each works perfectly in its domain, relativity for cosmic macro-events and quantum theory for atomic micro-events, but together they clash, e.g. in relativity nothing travels faster than light but one entangled quantum entity instantly affects the other anywhere in the universe. As Greene notes: "The problem ... is that when the equations of general relativity commingle with those of quantum mechanics, the result is disastrous." (Greene, 2004, p15) The problem isn't lack of use, as these theories permeate modern physics applications, from micro-computers to space exploration. By some estimates over 40% of US productivity derives from technologies based on quantum theory, including cell phones, transistors, lasers, CD players and computers. Physicists use quantum theory because it works, not because it makes sense: "... physicists who work with the theory every day don‟t really know quite what to make of it. They fill blackboards with quantum calculations and acknowledge that it is probably the most powerful, accurate, and predictive scientific theory ever developed. But ... the very suggestion that it may be literally true as a description of nature is still greeted with cynicism, incomprehension, and even anger." (Vacca, 2005, p. 116) We have precision, proofs and applications, but not understanding. We know the mathematics exactly, but can't connect it to our experience of the world, e.g. Feynman's "sum over histories" method calculates quantum outcomes by assuming electrons simultaneously take all possible paths between two points, but how can a basic physical entity like an electron travel all possible paths between two points at the same time? While most theories increase understanding, such theories seem to take it away. Despite a century of validation, neither relativity or quantum mechanics concepts are taught in high schools today, not because of their complexity, but because the emperor of modern physics has no semantic clothes. Who can teach the unbelievable? Physics has quarantined the problem behind a dense "fence" of mathematics: Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 224 "... we have locked up quantum physics in "black boxes", which we can handle and operate without knowing what is going on inside. (Audretsch, 2004) (Preface, p x). Physicists use these mathematical black boxes like magic wands, but why the "spells" work we don't really know. Like monkeys in a New York apartment, we know that pressing the switch turns on the light, but not why. Pragmatists say that if the formulae work we don't need to know why, but others feel that the formulae that describe ultimate reality warrant an explanation: "Many physicists believe that some reason for quantum mechanics awaits discovery." (Ford, 2004, p98) One cannot relegate quantum and relativity effects to the "odd" corner of physics, as in many ways these theories are modern physics. Quantum theory rules the microcosmic world, from which the world we see emerges, and relativity rules the cosmic world that surrounds us. These two poles encompass everything we see and know of the physical world. It is unacceptable that their prime theories, however mathematically precise, remain opaque to human understanding. Traditional objective reality concepts have had over a century to give meaning to relativity and quantum physics. That they have not yet done so suggests they never will. Hence let us now think the unthinkable alternative: that the physical world is not an objective reality but a virtual reality. 2. The virtual reality conjecture While never commonly held, the idea that physical reality isn't the ultimate reality has a long pedigree. In Buddhism, the discriminated world is just an effect created by a universal "essence of mind" that underlies all. In Hinduism the world of Maya or illusion is created by God's "play" or Lila. In western philosophy, Plato's cave analogy portrays the world we see as mere shadows on a cave wall that only reflect an external light2. The idea that the world is calculated has an equally long history. Over two thousand years ago Pythagoras considered numbers the nonmaterial essence behind the physical world. Plato felt that "God geometrizes" and Gauss believed that "God computes" (Svozil, 2005). Both derived nature's mathematics from the divine mind, as Blake shows Urizen, "The Ancient of Days", wielding a compass to calculate the world (Figure 1). Zuse expressed the idea in modern scientific terms by suggesting that space calculates (Zuse, 1969), and since then others have explored the concept (Fredkin, 2 In the analogy, people are tied up in a dark cave with their backs to its exit. Looking at the cave wall, they see only their shadows, created by sunlight from the outside, and take those shadows to be all of reality. Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 225 1990; Lloyd, 2006; Rhodes, 2001; Schmidhuber, 1997; Svozil, 2005; Tegmark, 2007; Wolfram, 2002). Some common responses to the idea are detailed in Appendix A. 2.1 Axioms of existence A virtual reality is a world created entirely by information processing, where information arises when a value is chosen from an available value set (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) and processing is the transformation of information values. As virtual worlds exist by processing, by definition nothing in them exists independently in or of itself. If the processing stops so does the virtual reality. In contrast, an objective reality simply is, and needs nothing else to sustain it. These two hypotheses are: 1. The objective reality hypothesis: That our reality is an objective reality that exists in and of itself and being self-contained needs nothing beside itself. 2. The virtual reality hypothesis: That our reality is a virtual reality that only exists by information processing beyond itself, upon which it depends. Whatever one's personal view, these hypotheses are mutually exclusive. An objective world can't be virtual, and a virtual world can't be objective. Each theory has implications, e.g. if the physical universe is a permanent objective reality, then it has nowhere to come from or go to. 3 From Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urizen Figure 1. The Ancient of Days 3 Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 226 To illustrate the contrast, consider what some call the prime axiom of physics: 1. There is nothing outside the physical universe (Smolin, 2001 p17). So for example, space is assumed to have no meaning except as the relationships between real objects in the world. Yet the virtual reality conjecture turns this axiom it on its logical head: 2. There is nothing inside the physical universe that exists of or by itself. This alternative axiom applies because every virtual reality must arise from processing outside itself, or its creation couldn't begin. These aren't the only statements possible about the world, but as mutually exclusive statements they provide a contrast that science can evaluate. Philosophers have long known that one can't prove reality assumptions (Esfeld, 2004), so claims that the virtual reality conjecture cannot be tested by science to the standard of objective reality are hollow (Mullins, 2008) as science has never proved the world is a objective reality, either by logic or experiment. It is hypocritical to call a new theory unprovable when the established theory is in the same boat. Science doesn't prove theories, nor test them in isolation. In practice, it merely picks the most probable of mutually exclusive hypotheses, here that the world is an objective reality or that it is a virtual reality. It is this contrast, not virtual reality theory alone, that can be tested by science. 2.2 The containing reality A corollary of the virtual reality conjecture is that every virtual world must have at least one dimension outside it, in its containing reality. An objective reality's extra dimensions must exist inside it, so string theory's invisible extra dimensions are assumed "curled up" so small we can't see them. However in a virtual reality, invisible extra dimensions can be very large, if they exist in the containing reality. If the "extra" dimensions of physics can be inside or outside the physical world, nothing in science favors either view, as the contrast between an unknowable "in-the-world" dimension and an unknowable "out-of-the-world" one is untestable. A common critique of the virtual reality conjecture is that it gives: "...no means of understanding the hardware upon which that software is running. So we have no way of understanding the real physics of reality." (Deutsch, 2003). That any containing reality must use "hardware" like ours, or that everything real must be understandable to us, are just assumptions. There is no reason per se why our reality has to be the only reality, or why all reality must be knowable to us. This conjecture is not nullified because it doesn't meet the convenient and habitual assumptions of the objective reality theory it denies. Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 227 Yet the virtual reality conjecture is still a theory about this world, not another unknowable one. It states that this world is a virtual reality created by processing, not an objective reality that exists inherently by itself alone. Unprovable speculations about other virtual universes (Tegmark, 1997), or that the universe could be "saved" and "restored" (Schmidhuber, 1997), or that one virtual reality could create another (Bostrom, 2002) fall outside its scope. It certainly uses non-physical concepts, but only as other physics theories do, e.g. the quantum wave function has no counterpart in physical reality. 2.3 Science in a virtual reality Science, our way of finding the truth, needs physical data to work because that is all we can know. This is a limitation of ourselves, not of reality. Equally, science is a way to ask questions about reality, not a set of fixed assumptions about it (Whitworth, 2007). It limits not the questions we ask but how we answer them. So to question physical reality doesn't deny science, but engages its very spirit of inquiry. Science itself is not limited to physical "observables", as it includes mathematics, and non-observables like electrons and quarks are accepted if they are evaluated by observation, e.g. the big bang is by definition an unobservable event, but science accepts it as true by the observable evidence of cosmic background radiation. If data from the world can decide if an unobservable big bang occurred, it can also decide if the virtual reality conjecture is true. Conversely, could a virtual reality support science? Suppose one day the processing behind the virtual online world The Sims allowed some Sims to "think". To practice science, they would need information to test theories against. This a virtual reality could easily provide. If simulated beings in a simulated world acquired science, would they find a world like ours? Could they deduce that their world was virtual, or at least likely to be so? They couldn't perceive the processing creating them, but they could still conceive it, as we do now. Their science could then evaluate that conjecture by how their world behaved. Not only does science allow the virtual reality conjecture, a virtual reality could also allow science. 2.4 Local reality In the science-fiction movie The Matrix, people lived in a virtual reality that appeared real to them as long as they stayed within it, knowing their world only by the information they received from it, as we know ours. In the story, when a pill disconnects the hero from the matrix input he falls back into the real physical world, where machines are farming people's brains in vats, i.e. the physical world is the primary reality creating the simulation. The virtual reality conjecture is the opposite idea: that the physical world is the simulation, not what creates it. It implies a quantum containing reality behind physicality, but gives it no physical properties. Still, the usual straw man objective realists attack is Bishop Berkeley's solipsism, that the physical world is a hallucination, where a tree falling in a wood makes no sound if no-one is there to hear it. Dr Johnson is said to have reacted to the idea of the world as a dream by Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 228 stubbing his toe on a stone and saying "I disprove it thus". The virtual reality conjecture is again the opposite idea, as it accepts that there is indeed a real world that exists apart from us. It just adds that the world we see isn't it. That the physical world is a virtual reality doesn't make it an illusion, and that the physical world is not objectively real doesn't mean that nothing is. To clarify the difference, viewed from our physical world a simulated game world is "unreal", but to an avatar in that world its events are as real as it gets. Even if a virtual blow only creates virtual pain to a virtual avatar, toe stubbing will still hurt. Further, if a person is identified with a virtual game its events become real imagine the identification possible in a multi-media, multi-player game with the bandwidth of our reality. A virtual world that is real within itself but still externally created can be called a local reality. Local and objective realities differ is not how their inhabitants see them, but in whether they need anything outside themselves to exist. Even physical existence is relative to the observer, e.g. a table is only "solid" to us because we are made of the same atomic stuff as it is, but to an almost massless neutrino the table is a ghostly insubstantiality through which it flies, as indeed is the entire earth. Only things constituted the same way are substantial to each other. So in a local reality, pixels could register other pixels as "real", but still be just information patterns to the containing reality. Such a reality could look like an objective one, as Hawking says: "But maybe we are all linked in to a giant computer simulation that sends a signal of pain when we send a motor signal to swing an imaginary foot at an imaginary stone. Maybe we are characters in a computer game played by aliens." (Vacca, 2005, p131) Yet to give context, the next sentence was "Joking apart, ...". For some reason even to imagine the world is virtual can only be a joke with aliens. Yet if logically the world could be a local reality and if physically it behaves like one, shouldn't we at least consider the possibility? 2.5 The processing connection Physics could connect the physical world to information processing in three ways: 1. Calculable universe hypothesis: That processing could calculate physical reality. 2. Calculating universe hypothesis: That processing calculates some physical reality. 3. Calculated universe hypothesis: That processing calculate all physical reality. The calculable universe hypothesis states that information processing could simulate physical reality (Tegmark, 2007). Calculable here does not mean deterministic as processing can be probabilistic, nor mathematically definable as not all definable mathematics is calculable, e.g. an infinite series. Many scientists accept that the universe is calculable in theory, as the Church-Turing thesis states that for any specifiable output there is a finite program capable of simulating it. If our universe is lawfully specifiable, even probabilistically, then in theory a program could simulate it. This hypothesis doesn't say the universe is a computer but that it could be simulated by one, i.e. it does not contradict objective reality. Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 229 This "thin edge of the wedge" could be falsified by a non-computable law of physics, but so far none has been found. The calculating universe hypothesis states that the universe somehow uses information processing algorithms in its operations, e.g. quantum mechanical formulae. Supporters of this view include mainstream physicists like John Wheeler, whose phrase "It from Bit" suggests that objects ("it") somehow derive from information ("bit"). Now information processing doesn't just model the universe, it attempts to explain it (Piccinini, 2007). While a computer simulation compares its output to the physical world, now that processing creates reality is a theory about how the world actually works. The world isn't just like a computer, but to some degree at least, it is a computer. This option would be unlikely if computer simulations of physics gave no value, but they do. The calculated universe hypothesis goes a step further, stating that all physical reality arises from information processing outside itself. This is the virtual reality conjecture, that the physical world is nothing but processing output. Supporters of this "strong" virtual reality theory are few (Fredkin, 1990), with none in mainstream physics. Due to its existential cost, it will not even be considered unless it explains what nothing else can, as this paper argues it does. These then are the three options of information processing in physics. 2.6 The world is not a computer The above three statements cumulate, as each requires the previous to be true. If the universe is not calculable it cannot calculate its operations, and if its operations can't be calculated then it can't be a calculated reality. They are also a slippery slope, as if physical reality is calculable then it could be calculating, and if it is calculating then it could be calculated, i.e. virtual. Currently, the calculating universe hypothesis is presented as the best option, mid-way between the normalcy of an objective universe and the shock of a virtual one: "The universe is not a program running somewhere else. It is a universal computer, and there is nothing outside it." (Kelly, 2002) Some explicitly suggest a universal quantum computer embedded in our space-time: "Imagine the quantum computation embedded in space and time. Each logic gate now sites at a point in space and time, and the wires represent physical paths along which the quantum bits flow from one point to another." (Lloyd, 1999) p172. However processing embedded in space-time cannot create space-time, and in general no world cannot create itself (Whitworth, 2010), e.g. if the physical universe is a computer with by definition nothing beyond it, how could it begin? An entity creating itself must already exist before it does so. That the universe computes the universe is an impossible recursion (Hofstadter, 1999). A physical universe can no more output itself than a physical computer can print out itself. Biological properties can evolve by bootstrapping (autopoiesis), but existence itself Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 230 is not a "property" that can arise in the same way. No amount of "emergence" from nothing can create something. To argue that existence emerged from itself returns us to metaphysical mysticism. If the physical world is the processing, what is the output? Or if the physical world is the output, where is the processing? While the brain inputs, processes and outputs information like a computer, most of the world does not (Piccinini, 2007), e.g. what "input" does the sun process and what is its "output"? If one part of the universe outputs another, how did it all begin? Suppose string theory's hidden dimensions somehow produce the universe we see as output. If these curledup dimensions are "in the world", the big bang that created matter, energy, space and time must also have created them. If the processing that processes the world was itself produced at the beginning, the circular creation illogicality remains. Or if the big bang didn't create these extra dimensions, by what logic are they "in the world", as they existed before its creation? If the extra dimensions of string theory are "beyond the world", then something non-physical is creating the physical, exactly as the virtual reality conjecture proposes. The physical world can't be both processor and output because one can't have the virtual cake and eat it too. Either the physical world is not virtual and so not a processing output, or it is virtual and its processor is outside itself. If the physical world as a universal computer outputting itself is invalid, the three earlier options reduce to two that the physical world is an objective reality or that it is a virtual reality. 2.7 Duality vs. non-duality These considerations reflect a deep philosophical divide stretching back to the contrast between Plato's ideal forms and Aristotle's empirical pragmatism. Platonic idealism, that the visible physical world reflects a greater unseen world, is incompatible with Aristotelian physicalism, that the world we see is all there is. Logically, one of these world views has to be wrong. After centuries of conflict, protagonists of science and religion agreed to a compromise, that as well as this physical reality "below", another spiritual world somehow exists apart from it. In dualism, developed by Descartes, the realms of mind and body both exist side by side, equally and separately. This compromise allowed the physicality of science to coexist with the spirituality of religion. It divided scientists into atheists who believed only in the physical world, theists who also believed in a world beyond the physical, and agnostics who didn't know what to believe. Today, dualism seems increasingly an illogical kludge of two essentially contradictory ideas, a marriage of convenience rather than truth. How can two entirely different mind and body realities simultaneously exist, or if they do, how can independent realms of existence interact? Or if they interact, which came first causally? If conscious mind "emerges" from neuronal physics then isn't the mind created by the physical brain, and so superfluous? Or if the mind causes the body, as it does a dream, why is it constrained by the laws of physics? Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 231 Why can't I dream whatever I want, e.g. to fly anywhere, as occurs in out-of-body experiences? The dualist view of reality, as two independent worlds in one, is currently in retreat before the simpler non-dualist view that there is only one real world. The scientific audience of this ideological battle has generally concluded that if there is only one world, it better be the physical one science studies. So scientists increasingly accept as "self-evident" the physicalist canon that only the physical world exists. Yet, while rejected by both conventional science and religion, another non-dual player is still logically standing on the ideological field, namely virtualism (Raspanti, 2000). If physicalism is that only the physical world exists, and dualism is that another non-physical reality also exists, then virtualism is that only that other reality exists. It claims that the "ghostly" world of quantum physics is the actual world, and that the "solid" physical world we perceive is just an image thrown up. Virtualism is the non-dual converse of physicalism. It is non-dual because, like physicalism, it asserts that there is only one world. It is the converse of physicalism because it sees the physical world that instruments register as information patterns, like an image on a screen, rather than as "things" that are real in themselves. It avoids the illogical dualism of a quantum computer creating itself, and postulates no imaginary "hardware" in a metaphysical reality beyond ours. If the physical world is virtual, it makes no sense to make physicality the yardstick of reality. In this view, the physical world is not even a drop in the universal ocean of existence, but just the wave patterns on its surface. 3. A prima facie case that physicality is virtual What evidence is there that virtualism is even a possibility? 3.1 Initial requirements Any processing that simulated our world would have to be: 1. Finitely allocated. Information as a choice from a set of options doesn't permit infinite processing, nor can a universe that began expanding a finite time ago at a finite speed be infinite. The processing needed to simulate a universe as big as ours is enormous but not inconceivable, e.g. under 1036 calculations could simulate all human history and a planet sized physical computer could do 1042 operations per second, let alone a quantum one (Bostrom, 2002). 2. Autonomous. Once started, it must run with no further input. While human simulations need regular data input to run, in our world such input would constitute a "miracle". As these are at best rare, this simulation must generally work without miracles. 3. Conserved. A system that takes no input after it starts but loses the processing it has will "run down", which our universe hasn't done for billions of years of quantum events. If matter, energy, charge, momentum and spin are all information processing, their partial Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 232 conservation laws could reduce to one law of dynamic information conservation. Einstein's matter/energy equation is then just information going from one form to another. 4. Self-registering. System interactions must allow internal observation. While human computer simulations output to an outside viewer, we see our world from within. We register "reality" when light from the world interacts with our eyes, which are also in the world. This system must be able to consistently register itself, locally at least. 3.2 Twelve reasons to think the physical world is a virtual reality One of the mysteries of our world is how every photon, electron or quark seems to just "know" what to do at each moment. Super-computers running a million-million cycles per second currently take millions of seconds (months) to simulate not just what one photon does in a million-millionth of a second, but in a million-millionth of that (Wilczek, 2008) (p113). How do these tiniest bits of the universe, with no known structures or mechanisms, make the complex choices they do? How can one photon in effect do all that processing? A later paper attributes this to information copying. Other reasons the physical world could be a virtual reality include that: 1. It was created. In the big bang theory our universe began as a singularity arising from "nothing" at a particular space-time event. This makes no sense for an objective reality, but every virtual reality boots up from nothing (in itself). 2. It has a maximum speed. In our world nothing can exceed the speed of light. While odd for an objective reality, every virtual reality has a maximum pixel transfer speed, set by the refresh rate of its screen. The speed of light could simply be a processing limit of our system. 3. It has Planck limits. Not only energy but also space seems quantized at Plank limits, and loop quantum gravity theory uses discrete space to avoid mathematical infinities (Smolin, 2001). An objective space has no reason to be discrete, but a virtual space must be so, as it is built entirely from discrete numbers. 4. Tunneling occurs. In quantum tunneling an electron suddenly appears beyond a field barrier impenetrable to it, like a coin in a perfectly sealed glass bottle suddenly appearing outside it. This is explained if quantum events are just a series of probabilistic state transitions. So reality is like a movie of still frames run quickly together, where slowing the projector gives a series of discrete pictures. A world of objects that exist inherently and continuously can't allow tunneling, but a virtual reality built from discrete probability of existence frames can. 5. Non-local effects occur. Quantum entanglement and wave function collapse are non-local effects that instantly affect quantum entities anywhere in the universe. An objective reality can't do this, but all virtual reality processing is "equidistant" to the screen, and no pixel further from its program than any other. As code can run pixels anywhere onscreen, so entangled photons could just be information objects run by the same program. Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 233 6. Space-time is malleable. An objective reality's space-time should be as fixed as it is, but in our world dense mass and high speeds alter time and space. This is strange in an objective reality, but if mass, movement and space-time arise from processing, loading one could affect another, as online videos slow down if the local server is busy. If matter uses up processing, a massive body could both dilate time and curve space. If movement uses up processing, it could shorten space and increase mass. Relativity is then just a local processing load effect. 7. It has an uncaused cause. Einstein never accepted that quantum choice was really random, so invoked unknown "hidden variables" to explain it, but over fifty years later none have been found. If every physical event is predicted by others, that a radioactive atom decays to emit light by pure chance, when "it decides", regardless of all prior physical events, should be impossible. Yet in a virtual world, choices random to that world can be easily generated by a processor running outside it. Indeed, a virtual world needs randomness to evolve, as it is entirely predictable without it, i.e. has zero information. 8. Empty space is not empty. "Empty space" is the medium that limits the speed of light, and its vacuum energy spawns the "virtual particles" of the Casimir effect. In an objective reality space is "nothing at all" and from such a nothing, nothing can come. However in a virtual reality "nothing" could be null processing, which can host light and spawn temporary entities. 9. Existence can divide. In the classic "two slit experiment" a single electron goes through both slits at once to create an interference effect with itself. In Feynman's path model "particles" simultaneously travel all possible paths between two points to pick the best one. Such effects are only possible if quantum entities exist in many places at once, which they can't do in an objective reality. Yet a virtual existence can divide up like this, as it is just information. 10. Quantum entities are equivalent. Every electron or quark in our world is like every other. By the quantum indistinguishability principle it is in impossible to mark any electron apart from another. This is odd in an objective world of things that inherently exist, but in a virtual world "objects", like electrons, are just digital symbols. If every electron in the universe is from the same code, as every "a" on this page is, they all instantiate the same program class. 11. Complementarity. In quantum theory simple "object" properties like position and momentum have complementary uncertainty, so knowing one 100% makes the other entirely uncertain. This isn't measurement "noise" but a property of reality itself. If complementary properties use the same processing, one could trade-off against another (Rhodes, 2001). 12. It is algorithmically simple. The algorithmic simplicity of physics is far beyond what one might reasonably expect of an objective reality: Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 234 "The enormous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sciences is something bordering on the mysterious and there is no rational explanation for it." (Wigner, 1960) The laws of a virtual reality are expected to be simple if they are actually being calculated. Perhaps individually none of the above points convince, but together they cumulate into what the courts call circumstantial evidence. Two properties of our world that the virtual reality conjecture explains but objective reality theory cannot are now given in more detail. 3.3 Why did our universe begin? In the traditional view, the objective universe "just is", so while its parts may transform, its total is a steady state that always was and always will be. One doesn't expect such a universe, that is all there is, to be created in a big bang. Over the last century, steady state and big bang theory battled it out for supremacy on the stage of science. Steady-state proponents were respected physicists who found the idea that the entire physical universe just "popped up" out of nowhere highly unlikely. Yet since all the galaxies were expanding away from us at a known rate, one could calculate the expansion back to a source occurring about 15 billion years ago. The discovery of cosmic background radiation leftover from the big bang confirmed its reality for most physicists today. The failure of the steady state theory removed a cornerstone of support for the view that our universe exists in and of itself. If it does exist that way, there is by definition nowhere outside itself from where it could have come in the big bang. Big bang theory neatly sidesteps questions like "What existed before the big bang?" by saying that there was no time or space before the big bang, so the question is irrelevant, i.e. it "defines away" the problem. Yet even without our time or space, a universe that began is a dependent one, so what it depends on is a valid question. Conversely, if time and space suddenly "appeared" for no apparent reason at the big bang, could they equally suddenly disappear anytime today? If nothing in our universe comes from nothing, how can the entire universe have come from nothing? That our physical universe arose from nothing is not just incredible, it is inconceivable. One can state the problems simply: 1. What caused the big bang? 2. What caused space to start? 3. What caused time to start? 4. How could a "big bang" occur without time or space? 5. How could space "start" with no time flow for the starting to occur in? 6. How could time start somewhere if there is no "there" for it to flow in? That the physical world began implies that something began it. That it came from "nothing", or somehow emerged from itself, are both highly unsatisfactory answers. Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 235 In contrast, virtual reality theory requires a big bang. No virtual reality has existed forever and all virtual realities initiate at a specific moment with a sudden information influx. It is a virtual reality hallmark that a single event begins its existence and its space-time. Anyone who boots up a computer begins a "big bang" that also starts up its operating system. If the world is a self-sufficient objective reality, its space and time should be the same, i.e. exist independently of anything else. So that before the big bang there was a "no time" or a "no space" is inconceivable for an objective reality. Yet that a virtual world's time and space were started up is no surprise. Its creation was indeed from nothing in that virtual world, and before it there was indeed no time or space in that virtual world. To a virtual world observer, its origin would have all the properties of our big bang. In the virtual reality conjecture, the big bang was simply when our universe was "booted up". This approach is distinct from current attempts to attribute everything to the physical world, e.g. in Zizzi's Big Wow theory consciousness somehow emerged when the inflating physical universe reached the information potential of the human brain, taken as the yardstick of consciousness (Zizzi, 2003). That machine complexity can create consciousness (Kurzweil, 1999) or that voltage changes will somehow become conscious qualia, are just the imaginations of physicalism. Super-computers are no more conscious than ordinary computers because their processing architecture is the same (Whitworth, 2009). As piling many rocks together just gives a big rock, so piling many graphic boards together into a supercomputer just gives a big machine. In this model "consciousness arises" when virtual systems by self-awareness recognize their origin. As current computing design avoids the recursive processing necessary for self-awareness, computers will not become conscious any time soon. The big bang is now an accepted part of physics. It implies a universe created by something outside itself, a concept objective reality theory can't accommodate but virtual reality theory can. Science accepts the big bang based on data, even though we can't go back to witness it, i.e. a conjecture about an unknowable cause was resolved by knowable world data. If science can resolve the steady state vs. big bang hypothesis contrast, it can resolve the objective vs. virtual reality contrast. To do this we need only examine with an open mind a knowable world that: "... has some important and surprising things to say about itself." (Wilczek, 2008) (p3). 3.4 Why is there a maximum speed? My interest in this area began by asking why the universe had a maximum speed? Einstein deduced that nothing travels faster than light from how the world behaves, but gave no structural reason for it to be so. Why can't objects just go faster and faster? What actually stops them? Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 236 The medium of light If light is a wave it needs a medium to transmit it, as water waves use the medium of water. Its speed should then depend upon medium properties, like elasticity. If the medium is space, the speed of light should depend on the elasticity of space. If space is nothing it has no properties at all, let alone an elasticity, so scientists originally thought that everything must move in a luminiferous ether, as a fish swims in water. However if the earth orbits the sun at 108,000 km per hour, which turns even faster around the galaxy, we must be moving through the ether (Figure 2). The ether as the medium of light is a frame of reference for it, so if we are moving through the ether in some direction, light should have different speeds in different directions. However in 1887 Michelson and Morley found that the speed of light was the same in every direction, so there could not be a physical ether. Then Einstein showed logically that the speed of light, not the ether, was the real absolute. This left space, the medium of light, as "nothing". Some say the speed of light defines the elasticity of space, but this argues backwards, that a wave defines its medium, when really the medium must define the wave, i.e. the speed of light should conclude the argument not begin it. The nature of space should define the rate of transmission through it, but how can an empty space devoid of physical properties transmit light and limit its speed? The object context paradox An argument that physical objects need a non-physical context is as follows: 1. A world containing an inherent object must also contain something that is "not-thatobject", as a boundary context. 4 From Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:AetherWind.svg Figure 2. Luminiferous ether 4 Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 237 2. Unless objects entirely fill the world, the set of all objects implies a "not-any-object" context (space). 3. If space is "nothing at all", the world consists only of objects, so has no basis for movement. 4. If space exists in the world as an object, by the previous logic it also needs a context, which logic circle continues indefinitely. For example, fish are physical objects that exist in an ocean. If the ocean is also a physical, it too needs boundary context to surround it, say land or air. If the land is also physical, it too needs a context, and so on. This circularity, of physical objects requiring physical contexts, has to stop somewhere, and in this model space is it. Yet if space exists, it can't do so as the physical objects it contains do. Empty space exists The ether error was to assume that everything must exist as physical objects do, so objects must exist in space as a fish exists in water. A physical ether isn't justified by experimental science, or by logic, as an object cannot be an ultimate context. Equally space as nothing at all contradicts much modern physics, and a world entirely of objects has no logical base for movement. The inescapable conclusion is that empty space exists but not as physical objects do, i.e. the medium that transmits light doesn't exist physically. Einstein discredited the idea of a physical ether but retained the idea of physical objects. He traded Newton's old absolute space and absolute time for a new but equally absolute space-time: "...absolute space-time is as absolute for special relativity as absolute space and absolute time were for Newton ..." (Greene, 2004, p51) He shifted the problem of how light vibrates empty space to how it vibrates an equally empty space-time, whose mathematical properties of length, breadth, depth and sequence still give no basis for media properties like elasticity. Einstein felt as strongly as Newton that objects exist in and of themselves, which implies an ether-like context: "According to the general theory of relativity space without ether is unthinkable; for in such a space there would not only be no propagation of light, but also no possibility of existence for standards of space and time ..." (Einstein, 1920, in May 5th address at the University of Leyden) That an ether must exist but that it can't be physical led to a logical impasse he never resolved. An absolute physical reality can't have a non-physical ether around it, but a virtual reality can. If the physical world is virtual then the processing causing it is by definition nonphysical. Every virtual world exists in a processing "ether" that contains its existence. So null processing can host photon calculations, as the "medium" of information waves, but still manifest as "nothing" in the virtual reality. Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 238 While physical objects existing in a physical space is illogical, virtual objects existing in a virtual space-time is not, because processing "stacks", i.e. processing can run processing, e.g. an operating system running a word-processing application is processing inside processing. Virtual objects can run in a virtual space-time if both objects and their space-time context are processing outputs. Matter and energy are then just local applications in a spacetime operating system. That mass, time, space and movement all arise from processing explains not only how their object properties change, but also why they interrelate, e.g. at high speeds time dilates, space shrinks and mass increases because all involve processing. Information processing as the "quintessence" of the universe could reconcile the clash between relativity and quantum theory, with the former how processing creates space-time and the latter how it creates energy and matter. The speed of light is the rate of processing To understand this theory, an analogy with our computer processing can be useful. When a pixel moves across a computer screen, its maximum transfer rate depends on how fast the screen refreshes, e.g. a TV screen looks continuous because it refreshes faster than our eyes do5. In the virtual reality conjecture, a photon is just processing passed between the nodes of a universal screen that Wilczek calls The Grid (Wilczek, 2008). As a screen's frames per second limit how fast pixels move across it, so the grid refresh rate defines the maximum transfer rate we call the speed of light6. Indeed every virtual reality has a finite "speed of light" for local pixel transfers. The values we use, like 186,000 miles per second or 299,792,458 meters per second, just reflect our units. Actually, the speed of light in a virtual reality is always just one one grid node per processing cycle. In this analogy, physical matter is the pixels a screen creates. Empty space is then just a part of the screen that happens to be blank. It is "idle", as it creates no pixels, but is still "on", which null processing is the proposed vacuum energy of space. Only turning it off could show the screen (grid) itself, but that would also destroy the images on it (us). Distinguish the pixel patterns creating the virtual world, from the screen nodes processing its pixel values, and the program calculations that direct the processing. In this model, the physical world is the pixels, an unseen universal grid is the screen, and the equations of quantum mechanics are the programs running on it. If everything arises from an unseen quantum grid, can we "hack" into its processing? Scientists developing quantum computers may be doing just that (Lloyd, 1999). 5 Usually 60 or 70 Hertz, or cycles per second is enough to look continuous to us. 6 Given Planck time is 10-43 second, the rate would be a mind boggling 1043 hertz. Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 239 Figure 3. A virtual reality game So space is not the screen the virtual reality appears on, e.g. the Figure 3 avatars are just pixels, but so is their background. As an avatar moves through the forest, no fixed nodepixel mapping is required, as any screen node can process any pixel, whether of avatar or background. Programmers "move" an avatar image through a forest by shifting all its pixels equally relative to the background, but often prefer to "bit-shift" the background behind the image, leaving the avatar centre screen as he/she "moves" through the forest. A later paper attributes relativistic frames of reference to this. Only for each processing cycle instance does a space pixel "point" necessarily map to one screen grid node. Recall that the grid proposed is not space, time, or space-time, but what creates them. Processing as the ultimate context explains why transparent materials like glass slow light down, though it still goes at the maximum speed possible. If the grid that processes photon transfers also process the atoms of glass, their extra load reduces the transfer rate, making the light go more slowly. The fastest possible transfers occur when the grid has nothing else to do at all, i.e. empty space. If light passes through glass we say its medium is glass, and if it goes through water we say its medium is water, but this is just our physical bias. If water is the medium of light traveling through water, what is its medium in empty space? In this model, whether traveling in space, water or glass, the medium of light is always the unseen grid that processes everything. That our world has a maximum speed is another accepted fact about it that virtual reality theory explains but objective reality theory cannot. What then is the "tipping point" for this case? Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 240 4. Evaluating the virtual reality conjecture This prima facie case that the physical world is a virtual reality could be: 1. Spurious. One can satisfy any requirements by appropriate assumptions. A model can always be found to explain anything. This is less likely if the assumptions are few and reasonable. 2. Coincidence. The matches between virtual reality theory and modern physics are lucky coincidences. This is less likely if the matches found are many and detailed. 3. Useful. Seeing the world in information processing terms may open up new perspectives in physics. This response is more likely if virtual reality theory suggests new ideas. 4. Correct. Our world is in all likelihood a virtual reality. This is more likely if the virtual reality hypothesis explains and predicts what the objective reality alternative cannot. How can science decide the best response? 4.1 Method In science, one can't test a theory by selecting data to support it, as choosing data to fit a case is bias. So that selected computer programs (cellular automata) mimic selected world properties (Wolfram, 2002) is not evidence if the researcher chooses what is explained. Finding facts to fit a theory is not a new kind of science but an old kind of bias. Hence the method of this model is to derive all core physics from information first principles, i.e. begin with processing and derive space, time, energy and matter, explaining not just selected world events but its operational core. This method is the usual hypothesis testing of science assume a theory true then "follow the logic" to see if it fails, i.e. design then test. If the theory isn't true, assuming it is should soon give outcomes inconsistent with observation. If it is true, it should explain what other theories cannot. Valid theories should be falsifiable, e.g. virtual reality theory is falsifiable as any incomputable physics would disprove it: "... the hypothesis that our universe is a program running on a digital computer in another universe generates empirical predictions, and is therefore falsifiable" (McCabe, 2004) p1 If reality does what processing can't, then the world can't be virtual, but while incomputable algorithms exist, all known physics is computable. Objective reality theory is equally falsifiable and indeed has been falsified. Aspect and his colleagues showed decades ago that our world cannot be an objective reality (Aspect, Grangier, & Roger, 1982) in a well replicated experiment that challenges these assumptions of physical realism (Groblacher et al., 2007): Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 241 1. Object locality: That physical objects exist in a locality that limits their interactions. 2. Object realism: That physical objects have intrinsic properties that persist over time. Unless formal logic itself is flawed, one or both of these objective reality assumptions must be wrong (D'Espagnat, 1979). Yet the theory remains unchallenged today, not because it is right but because no theory exists to take its place. As Chaitin, following Gödel, showed, the irreducible axioms of physics aren't logically "proven" but exist by fruitfulness they explain more than they assume (Chaitin, 2006). Without such axioms, physics itself couldn't stand, so they are not dropped just because they are "disproved". Like house foundations, an axiom can only be removed if another can be put in to bear its load. Foundation axioms only change during paradigm shifts (Kuhn, 1970), when intellectual structures are renovated and expanded, e.g. removing Euclid's axiom that parallel lines can't converge allowed the development of hyper-geometries, where parallel lines on a curved surface like the earth do converge (at the poles). Euclid's geometry is now just the zero curvature flat surface case, i.e. what was once the only possible geometry is now just one of many. If the virtual reality conjecture is also a paradigm shift, it will be evaluated by its fruitfulness not the logic of the previous paradigm, which may remain as the special case of a local reality. 5. Discussion About a century ago Russell used Occam's razor7 to cut down the idea that life is a dream: "There is no logical impossibility in the supposition that the whole of life is a dream, in which we ourselves create all the objects that come before us. But although this is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that it is true; and it is, in fact, a less simple hypothesis, viewed as a means of accounting for the facts of our own life, than the common-sense hypothesis that there really are objects independent of us, whose action on us causes our sensations." (Russell, 1912) The virtual reality conjecture is not so easily dismissed, as in physics today it is the simpler statement. Given the big bang, is it simpler that an objectively real universe arose from nothing or that a virtual reality was booted up? Given that nothing goes faster than light, is it simpler that the "nothing" of empty space limits its speed or that a processing limit does? When information processing explains more physics than common-sense (Table 1), Occam's razor cuts the other way. 5.1 Egocentrism The equations of modern physics wouldn't change if the world were a virtual reality. Indeed, their status would rise, from convenient fictions to literal truths. That our physical 7 Occam's Razor is not to multiply causes unnecessarily, but prefer the simpler theory Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 242 bodies are pixilated avatars in a digital world challenge not mathematics but the human ego, as science has often done before: "Since our earliest ancestors admired the stars, our human egos have suffered a series of blows." (Tegmark, 2007) Copernicus challenged the paradigm that the Earth was the center of the universe. Science now knows that our little planet circles a mediocre star two-thirds of the way out of an average size galaxy of a million, million stars, in a universe of at least as many galaxies, i.e. we aren't the physical center of anything. Table 1. Physical outcomes and virtual causes Physical Outcome Virtual Cause The big bang. The universe was created from a "big bang" event that also made time and space Virtual reality creation. All virtual worlds arise when an information influx starts their space-time Quantization. Mass, energy, time and space all seem to be quantized at the Planck level Digitization. Anything that arises from digital processing must be discrete Maximum speed. Nothing in our universe can travel faster than light Maximum processing rate. A screen cannot transfer pixels faster than its refresh rate Wave function collapse. The quantum wave function collapse is a non-local effect Non-local effects. Processing is "non-local" with respect to pixels on a screen Gravity and speed effects. Near massive bodies and at high speeds space shortens and time dilates Processing load effects. Processing outputs like space and time reduce with network load Physical conservation. Physical properties like mass either conserve or equivalently transform Information conservation. A stable virtual reality must conserve dynamic information Physical law simplicity. Physical law formulae have a remarkable mathematical simplicity Algorithmic simplicity. A virtual universe works best if it is easy to calculate Quantum randomness. Quantum choice is random and unpredicted by any world event Choice creation. A processor outside a virtual reality can create randomness in it Complementarity. Quantum entities cant have an exact position and momentum at once Common processing. Complementary properties could just use the same processing Quantum equivalence. All quantum entities, like photons or electrons, are equivalent Digital equivalence. Every digital "object" created by the same code must be equivalent. Quantum transitions. In quantum mechanics an event is a series of state transitions Digital transitions. In digital movies events are a series of picture frames Darwin challenged the paradigm of humanity as the pinnacle of a biology built for us. Science now knows that we only evolved about three million years ago, and that over 99.9% of all species that ever lived are now extinct, e.g. 65 million years ago the entire dinosaur Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 243 class mostly died out after dominating the earth for two hundred million years, much as mammals do today. Insects and plants exceed us in biomass, are often more complex genetically, and are much more likely to survive say a nuclear disaster, i.e. we aren't the biological centre of anything either. Today even the paradigm of a unitary self is challenged, as a brain "split" at its highest level, into autonomous right and left cortical hemispheres, doesn't allow for an "I" (Sperry & Gazzaniga, 1967). We don't even have the psychological centre we imagine we do (Whitworth, 2009). The trend is clear: we repeatedly imagine ourselves at the centre of things then science repeatedly finds that we aren't. Every generation thinks it has the answers and every following one finds them wrong. Why then is now the end of the line of human fallacies? Is not taking our reality as the existential centre of everything just another egocentric assumption? And would yet another ego blow, that our physical reality is not actually "reality central", be so unexpected? In the virtual reality conjecture, physical reality is a processing product, not something that exists in itself. The evidence presented for this view is from science not religion, e.g. the physical matter we generally take as "reality" is only 4% of the universe, with dark matter (23%) and dark energy (73%) the rest (Ford, 2004, p246). If most of the universe isn't the world we see, why assume that what we see is all there is? Indeed, how can a finite physical world created by a "big bang", a finite time ago, conceivably be all there is? 5.2 The challenge of physics Fundamental physics is currently in a bind. On the one hand objective realism faces paradoxes it can't solve and probably never will. On the other hand the speculative mathematics of string theory is going nowhere, as it can't even manage to be wrong (Woit, 2007). In contrast, that processing creates physicality is a logical option not yet explored, as calculated entities can be started, stopped, re-started, copied and merged in ways that "objects" can't. This is not the "brain in a vat" idea of movies like The Matrix, where a real physical world creates a false virtual one, nor the hallucinatory dream of solipsism. Yet it is true that in a virtual world, views are only calculated as needed if an avatar looks left a left view is created and if they look right another is shown. Everywhere one looks in a virtual world, it exists, yet the views are still only created on demand. This cracks the quantum measurement problem8, as observing a virtual entity indeed creates (a view of) it, but raises a realism problem. Does virtualism deny realism, the idea of a real world "out there". As Einstein said, surely the moon still exists if no-one observes it? If brains in vats hallucinate reality from data input, 8 The quantum measurement problem is that observing a wave function makes it take a physical state, so in quantum mechanics our observation creates reality. Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 244 how can it all be so realistic? If no-one is looking to see if a tree falls in a forest, then no tree can fall, but what if someone looks later to see if it fell does the system calculate a consistent history to get the current view? Did it fabricate the billions of years before mankind arrived to observe? In some models our consciousness is critical to quantum operations, but in this model humanity has no such central role. In it, every quantum interaction creates a "view", so everything is always "viewing" everything else, and everything is everywhere always "being viewed". The observer of this virtual reality is not human existence, but all existence. No tree can fall in a forest unseen, as the very ground it hits "sees" it. As there are no "gaps" in this virtual reality, so there is no view history to recapitulate. 5.3 The physical world as an interface In this view, the world "out there" is a quantum one of probability waves processed by an unseen grid. The "solid" matter we see then arises from electrons and quarks, which physics knows are just quantum probabilities, i.e. information. If physical reality is just probability waves interfering, that it inherently and continuously exists in and of itself is an unnecessary belief. Yet if the world is a virtual reality, who is the player? In our single player games, virtual worlds respond consistently to one person according to how they were designed. The knower and the known are in separate realities, the one virtual and the other containing it. Players interact in the virtual world using an avatar, then log off to return to a containing world. Multiplayer games allow more realistic worlds, because their responses increasingly come from other players. This model takes that principle to the extreme, attributing physical realism to quantum "players" in the most massive multi-player simulation conceivable. Figure 4 gives the reality model options. The first is a simple objective reality that observes itself (Figure 4a). This gives the illogicality of a thing creating itself and doesn't explain the strangeness of modern physics, but it is accepted by most people. The second option argues that since all human perceptions arise from neural information signals, our reality could be a virtual one, which in fiction stories is created by gods, aliens or machines, for study, amusement or profit (Figure 4b). This is not in fact illogical and explains some inexplicable physics, but few people believe that the world is an illusion created by our minds. Rather they believe that there is a real world out there, that exists whether we see it or not. Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 245 The third option, of a reality that uses a virtual reality to know itself, is this model (Figure 4c). As this paper asserts and later papers expand, it is logically consistent, supports realism and fits the facts of modern physics. In it, the observer exists as a source of consciousness, the observed also exist as a source of realism, but the observer-observed interactions are equivalent to virtual images that are only locally real. This is not a virtuality created by a reality apart, but by a reality to and from itself. If the physical world is an interface to allow an existence to interact with itself, then it is like no information interface that we know. Appendix A. Common Responses Common responses to the virtual reality conjecture include that it: 1) Is just meta-physics. Meta-physical speculation is untestable ideas about unknowable entities outside the observed world, like the number of angels on a pinhead. In contrast, the virtual reality conjecture is a hypothesis about this world, albeit that meta-physics (outside the world) causes physics (the world). 2) Can't be proved. True, but objective reality theory isn't "proved" either. Science doesn't prove theories absolutely it just rejects improbable ones. In modern physics, it seems increasingly unlikely that the world is an objective reality. 3) Postulates the unseen. Being perceivable is not a demand of science or one could argue that since we can't see atoms they don't exist: 4) "Atomism began life as a philosophical idea that would fail virtually every contemporary test of what should be regarded as „scientific‟; yet, eventually, it became the cornerstone of physical science." [12] p3 5) Contradicts Occam‟s razor. Occam's razor is not to multiply causes unnecessarily, to take the simplest theory that fits the facts. A hundred years ago it favored a common sense view of a. A reality sees itself objectively Observer Reality b. A reality sees a virtuality Observer Virtual Reality c. A reality sees itself virtually Observer Observer Virtual Reality Figure 4. Reality models Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 246 the world as an objective reality. Today virtual particles seethe from empty space, quantum objects teleport past impassable barriers and space and time bend and dilate. Now virtual reality theory is the simpler explanation, i.e. Occam‟s razor cuts the other way. 6) Means the world is fake. A virtual world need not be a fake world. The virtual reality model contradicts physical realism but not philosophical realism: that there is a real world "out there" generating experiences. A virtual world can be real to its participants, i.e. locally real. 7) Contradicts common sense. Common sense one told us that the sun rose and set across the earth. The same senses that tell us the earth is flat also tell that it is objectively real, but common sense no longer mandates truth. 8) Equations are enough. Equations without understanding are not enough. Certainly they work, but what do they mean? Physics cannot just declare meaning to be meaningless. 9) Implies dual realities. This theory postulates no dualism. If physical reality is entirely virtual, then it is a derived reality, not a dual reality. There is only one world, but it isn't the world we see. 10) Is wrong because objective reality theory is true. This circular refutation goes like this: a) You propose that the physical world is created by processing b) But processing is always based on the physical world (assumption) c) So everything is physical reality anyway. A well known British physics journal dismissed these ideas as follows: "The author insists on the "virtual reality" analogy, but seems to fail to notice that virtual reality as practiced on computers deals with a physical reality based on the known laws of physics which govern electronic or other computers. ... Thus we are back to physics and asking ourselves which physical laws would be governing the computer that is supporting the virtual reality framework that the writer is proposing: back to first base as they say." The reviewer assumes that only the physical world exists, then by that assumption manages to falsify the conjecture. When it was pointed out that this was circular reasoning, "disproving" a hypothesis by assuming its antithesis, the editor's reply was that you write, we decide. Logic is no grounds for editorial appeal in academic publishing (Whitworth & Friedman, 2009). Questions The following questions highlight some of the issues covered: 1) Are quantum mechanics and general relativity true statements about reality? 2) Does science require an objectively real world? 3) Would a virtual reality allow science? 4) How does a local reality differ from an objective one? Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 247 5) What is the logical opposite of physicalism, that only the physical world exists? 6) Could the world be a universal computer that calculates and outputs itself? 7) In what ways does our world act like a virtual reality? 8) Could an objective reality arise from a "big bang"? 9) If light is a wave, what medium does it travel in? 10) Why cant anything ever go faster than light? 11) Is the virtual reality conjecture testable? Is it falsifiable? Is it provable? 12) If modern physics has falsified objective reality theory, why is it still the accepted? 13) How would the mathematics of physics change if the physical world was virtual? 14) If the world is a virtual reality, who is observing it? Acknowledgements Thanks to Onofrio Russo, NJIT, for arousing my interest, to Ken Hawick, Massey University, for listening to my ramblings, to Cris Calude, Auckland University, for a useful critique, and to Jonathan Dickau, Matthew Raspanti, Bruce Maier, Tom Cambell, Ross Rhodes, Bryan Warner, Andrew Eaglen and Andrew Thomas for comments. Especial thanks to my son Alex, who helped me think and express more clearly. Still, all the mistakes are mine alone. The chapter version is can be downloaded at http://brianwhitworth.com/BWVRT1.pdf References Aspect, A., Grangier, P., & Roger, G. (1982). Experimental Realization of Einstein-PodolskyRosen-Bohm Gedankenexperiment: A New Violation of Bell's Inequalities. Physical Review Letters, 49(2), 91-94. Audretsch, J. (Ed.). (2004). Entangled World: The fascination of quantum information and computation. Verlag: Wiley. Bostrom, N. (2002). Are you Living in a Computer Simulation? Philosophical Quarterly, 53(211), 243-255. Chaitin, G. (2006). The limits of reason. Scientific American, 294(3), 74-81. Davies, P. (2004). Emergent Biological Principles and the Computational Properties of the Universe. Complexity 10 (2), 11-15. D'Espagnat, B. (1979). The quantum theory and reality. Scientific American, 241(5), 158-182. Deutsch, D. (1997). The Fabric of Reality. Penguin Press: Allen lane. Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 248 Deutsch, D. (2003). Physics, Philosophy and Quantum Technology. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Quantum Communication, Measurement and Computing, Princeton, NJ. Esfeld, M. (2004). Quantum Theory: A Challenge for Philosophy! In J. Audretsch (Ed.), Entangled World (pp. 271-296). Weinheim: Wiley-VCH. Everett, H. (1957). 'Relative state' formulation of quantum mechanics. Rev. of Mod. Phys., 29, 454-462. Ford, K. W. (2004). The Quantum World: Quantum Physics for Everyone. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press. Fredkin, E. (1990). Digital Mechanics. Physica D, 254-270. Greene, B. (2004). The Fabric of the Cosmos. New York: Vintage Books. Gribbin, J. (2000). The Search for Superstrings, Symmetry, and the Theory of Everything: Little, Brown & Company. Groblacher, S., Paterek, T., Kaltenbaek, R., Brukner, C., Zukowski, M., Aspelmeyer, M., et al. (2007). An experimental test of non-local realism [Electronic Version]. arXiv:0704.2529v2 [quant-ph] 6 Aug 2007 from http://www.arxiv.org/pdf/0704.2529 Guth, A. (1998). The Inflationary Universe: The Quest for a New Theory of Cosmic Origins Perseus Books. Hafele, J. C., & Keating, R. E. (1972). Around-the-world atomic clocks: Observed relativistic time gains. Science, 177, 168-170. Hofstadter, D. R. (1999). Godel, Escher, Bach: An eternal golden braid. New York: Basic Books. J. Khoury, B. A. O., P.J. Steinhardt and N. Turok. (2001). Ekpyrotic universe: Colliding branes and the origin of the hot big bang. Phys. Rev. D64(12). Kelly, K. (2002). God is the Machine. Wired, 10(12). Kuhn, T. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Kurzweil, R. (1999). The Age of Spiritual Machines. Toronto: Penguin Books. Lloyd, S. (1999). Universe as Quantum Computer. arXiv:quant-ph/9912088v1 17 Dec. Lloyd, S. (2006). Programming the Universe. A Quantum Computer Scientist Takes On the Cosmos Alfred A. Knopf. Mullins, J. (2008). NZ scientist boosts "universe as virtual reality" theory. New Scientist, UK, 8 January. Piccinini, G. (2007). Computational modelling vs computational explanation: Is everything a Turing machine and does it matter to a philosophy of mind? The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85(1), 93 115. Raspanti, M. (2000). The Virtual Universe. Authorhouse. Rhodes, R. (2001). A Cybernetic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics [Electronic Version]. Ver. 2.0 July 11, 2001 from http://www.bottomlayer.com/bottom/Argument4.PDF. Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy. London: Williams and Norgate. Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 249 Schmidhuber, J. (1997). A Computer Scientist's View of Life, the Universe and Everything. In C. Freksa (Ed.), Foundations of Computer Science: Potential-Theory-Cognition Lecture Notes in Computer Science (pp. 201-208): Springer. Shannon, C. E., & Weaver, W. (1949). The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Smolin, L. (2001). Three Roads to Quantum Gravity. New York: Basic Books. Sperry, R. W., & Gazzaniga, M. S. (1967). Language following surgical disconnexion of the hemispheres. In C. H. Millikan & F. L. Darley (Eds.), Brain Mechanisms Underlying Speech and Language. USA: Grune & Stratton. Svozil, K. (2005). Computational Universes. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 25(4), 845-859. Tegmark, M. (1997). The interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: Many Worlds or Many Words [Electronic Version]. arXiv:quant-ph/9709032v1 15 Sep. Tegmark, M. (2007). The Mathematical Universe. In R. Chiao (Ed.), Visions of Discovery: Shedding New Light on Physics and Cosmology. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Vacca, J. (2005). The World's 20 Greatest Unsolved Problems. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Whitworth, B. (2007). A Research Publishing Checklist For New Authors. Paper presented at the 18th Australasian Conference on Information Systems (ACIS). See also: http://researchroadmap.org/content/ Whitworth, B., & Friedman, R. (2009). Reinventing academic publishing online Part I: Rigor, Relevance and Practice. First Monday, 14(8). Whitworth, B. (2009). A Comparison of Human and Computer Information Processing. In M. Pagani (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Multimedia Technology and Networking (pp. 230-239, http://brianwhitworth.com/braincomputer.pdf Hershey PA: Information Science Reference. Whitworth, B. (2010). Simulating space and time. Prespacetime Journal, http://prespacetime.com/index.php/pst/article/view/18, 1(2), 218-243. Wigner, E. (1960). The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. In Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics, vol. 13, No. I New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Wilczek, F. (2008). The Lightness of Being: Mass, Ether and the Unification of forces. New York: Basic Books. Woit, P. (2007). Not even wrong. London: Vintage. Wolfram, S. (2002). A New Kind of Science: Wolfram Media Zizzi, P. (2003). Emergent Consciousness; From the Early Universe to Our Mind, arXiv: grqc/0007006. NeuroQuantology, 3, 295-311. Zuse, K. (1969). Calculating Space. Cambridge Mass.: MIT.

PHILOSOPHY WITHIN ITS PROPER BOUNDS Full Title: Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds Author / Editor: Édouard Machery Publisher: Oxford University Press, 2017 BUY ON AMAZON Review © Metapsychology Vol. 22, No. 48 Reviewer: Jonathan Lewis Since around the turn of the twenty-first century, philosophers have become increasingly occupied with using experimental methods to answer philosophical questions. Specifically, experimental GENRES Art and Photography Fiction General Memoirs Philosophical Self Help SUBJECTS Addiction and Alcoholism Search ...  Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD philosophers have drawn upon the design, tools and findings of experimental psychology and the behavioural sciences in general in order to shed light on the phenomena that affect actual judgments about philosophical cases. Do folk think that George should shove the portly man onto the track in in order to save ten scrawny strangers? Do they think the farmer knew that his prized cow was in the field all along? Do they consider the hermetically-sealed symbol shifter to understand Chinese? Furthermore, do responses to such cases vary between different cultures, ages and genders or when presented in different ways? In his new book, Édouard Machery, a long-time proponent of the experimental philosophy ('XPhi') movement, claims that the cases with which many philosophers and non-philosophers are familiar have been deployed from the armchair in order to answer questions concerning the modal facts bearing on knowledge about what is necessary and what is possible. Is it the case that necessarily someone knows that p if and only if they have a justified true belief that p? Is it the case that necessarily the extension of natural kind terms is determined by empirical properties? Is it the case that necessarily descriptivism about the reference of proper names is false? Since the inception of X-Phi, experimental philosophers have provided evidence that judgments about cases are subject to demographic and presentational effects. On that basis, the so-called method of cases, which, according to Machery, aims to determine what facts hold and to distinguish competing philosophical theories, should be restricted. Machery's latest monograph is an innovative and substantial contribution to the project of 'negative X-Phi' in that it argues for a 'radical restriction' on the method of cases as the basis for modal claims. He starts by arguing that the judgments we make in philosophical cases are no different to the beliefs we hold in response to everyday situations. There is nothing special about the judgments Anxiety Childhood Disorders Children Depression Ethics Grief Medications Mental Health Personality Psychoanalysis Psychology Psychotherapy Relationships Religion Sexuality Wellness MEDIA TYPES Audio Books Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD elicited by philosophical cases; these judgments do not rely on irreducible intuitions or conceptual mastery or a priori judgment (chapter 1). Machery goes on to provide a systematic review of the literature in experimental philosophy in order to support the claim that judgments elicited in response to the most well-known philosophical cases vary according to demographic factors, the order in which cases are presented and the way in which questions about them are framed (chapter 2). The results of the literature review provide the inductive basis for two arguments that support his radical restrictionism. Firstly, because judgments elicited by philosophical cases are influenced to a large enough degree by demographic and presentation variables, these judgments are unreliable. Furthermore, since the method of cases aims to distinguish between competing philosophical theories, and since, according to Machery, philosophers from different camps tend to agree when responding to mundane situations, it is not an accident that philosophical cases feature 'disturbing characteristics'. For Machery, philosophical cases express unusual situations, adopt irrelevant and tendentious narrative elements and pull apart properties that go together in everyday life (physical violence from doing-more-harm-than-good; truth and justification from getting-things-right-by-luck, and so on). On the basis that the disturbing characteristics of philosophical cases elicit judgments that we would not be expected to make in everyday life, these judgments are fundamentally unreliable (chapter 3). The second argument is that since many proponents of the method of cases do not take seriously the variations in judgments about philosophical cases, the premises of their arguments should not be taken seriously. The point is that either there is a disagreement between philosophers and nonphilosophers or they talk about different things when making judgments in philosophical cases. In either case, Machery argues that the method of cases is more likely to enshrine philosophical Movies Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD prejudices than articulate modal facts (chapter 4). If peers are likely to disagree about a philosophical case or if judgments about a case are plausibly severely unreliable, then we ought to suspend judgment about answers elicited by a particular case. Indeed, according to Machery, the consequent of that conditional applies to all philosophical cases (unless certain cases are known to elicit either a reliable judgment or agreement amongst peers). Alternatively, if it is the case that peers do not disagree but refer to different properties (epistemic, moral, semantic, and so on) when they respond to philosophical cases, then, as Machery sees it, philosophers should abstain from the method of cases, 'reorient their philosophical interests and stop theorizing about the philosophically familiar' (p. 148). Machery articulates what a suitable 'reorientation' might look like. After responding to several common arguments for the method of cases (chapter 5), he sets out his own particular vision for 'positive X-Phi'. For Machery, the method of cases is part-and-parcel of the modal immodesty of contemporary analytic philosophy. Although the purported authority of modal claims involving metaphysical necessity or possibility allows philosophy to establish distinct research projects on which scientific practices cannot supervene, the fact that the main philosophical method for identifying modal facts cannot facilitate such knowledge means that we should adopt more modally skeptical positions. Machery's radical restrictionism concerning the method of cases undermines modally immodest philosophical enterprises, especially in less 'naturalistic' areas of philosophy. For Machery, standard philosophical issues, specifically, issues that preclude investigation by means of scientific methods, are beyond our epistemic reach (Chapter 6). Advocating philosophical modesty, he calls for a 'naturalised' approach to conceptual analysis (chapter 7). If the concepts actually possessed by folk are interpreted as psychological entities – subsets of people's belief-like states (which Machery calls 'bliefs' (p. 210)) – and thereby difficult Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD to access for those that possess them, then, according to Machery, we can make progress in analyzing concepts by using the designs, tools and findings of experimental psychology to make the implicit structures underpinning our belief-like states explicit. If the first goal of a naturalized conceptual analysis is descriptive, then, for Machery, the second goal is prescriptive. If we assume that concepts are psychological entities, then, as is the case with our beliefs, they can contain false information. According to Machery, naturalized conceptual analysis would not only assess the validity of inferences that concepts dispose us to draw by exposing the 'bliefs' that constitute them and the relation of those 'bliefs' to empirical knowledge about the world, it would set about revising those inferences that are in some way deficient. In response, the proponent of modally immodest philosophical enterprises might argue that in order to assess the validity of our inferences drawn from concepts like 'knowledge', 'justification' and 'truth', we would be required to gain knowledge about knowledge, justification and truth, whereby the processes for accessing such knowledge would be tantamount to the practice of making modal claims. This leads us to consider whether Machery's overarching modal scepticism is reasonably justified. One can accept his case against the method of cases and yet still remain open to the possibility that knowledge of metaphysical modality is not a fruitless non-naturalistic goal. Even though Machery considers some alternative routes to modal knowledge in chapter 6, it would be difficult to reasonably claim that he has justified the inductive leap from the modally-defunct method of cases to a totalizing modal skepticism. Indeed, there are other inferentialist, essentialist, explanationist and principle-based approaches to modal knowledge that do not rely on the method of cases and (when taken at face value) do not seem to fall neatly under the categories of alternative approaches discussed by Machery in chapter 6. I accede that this is only a minor contention. After all, neither the validity of Machery's case against the method of cases nor his Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD proposals for a naturalized conceptual analysis depend on him demonstrating that modal skepticism is true. Nevertheless, the case against the method of cases does depend on the reliability and validity of the experimental findings that Machery uses as the inductive basis for his arguments against philosophical dogmatism and parochialism as well as for his claims regarding the reliability of judgments in philosophical cases. It also depends on the reliability and validity of the inductive leap from the unreliability of judgments elicited by those cases that have been analyzed by experimental philosophers to the fundamental unreliability of judgments elicited by philosophical cases in general. Regarding the findings of experimental studies that Machery discusses in chapter 2, he acknowledges that the X-Phi movement has examined only a limited number of cases, of which few have been systematically studied, and many have not been subjected to repeated draws (p. 85). He also mentions deficiencies with the experimental design of these studies, though he does not go into detail about what these deficiencies are. Consequently, Machery claims that 'the arguments based on this empirical record...must assume that it is representative of the phenomena that characterize the judgments elicited by philosophical cases in general' (p, 85). This assumption may be too much of a 'leap of faith' for some experimental researchers, that is, without further details of the limitations of the experimental designs and without repeated trials. That said, repeated draws come with their own risks; primarily, an increase in the likelihood of reactive behavior on the part of the study participants. Consequently, as is commonly understood, an experimental design with repetition does not automatically guarantee or improve the validity of a study. Furthermore, what is important about experimental practice is not so much observational results and the products of experiments, but the design and implementation of experimental setups that reveal or produce causal relationships in a reliable manner. Consequently, even when Machery argues that 'judgments elicited by typical Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD philosophical cases are similar to experimental artefacts – outcomes of experimental manipulations that are not due to the phenomena experimentally investigated, but to the (often otherwise reliable) experimental tools used to investigate them' (p. 90), it will not take an experimentally-oriented researcher long to suggest that unless the implementation of the experimental design is successful, the same holds true for the judgments elicited by X-Phi surveys. As previously mentioned, Machery's inductive leap from the unreliability of some of the specific judgments of studied cases to the fundamental unreliability of judgments elicited by philosophical cases in general appeals to the similarity of philosophical cases in the sense that they exhibit disturbing characteristics (pp. 111-120). Firstly, it is not clear how the presence of such characteristics relates to the inductive leap. Secondly, Machery does not investigate whether demographic and presentation variables influence judgments in usual, everyday situations. He briefly considers this latter issue but quickly dismisses it (p.129-30), claiming, with no evidence, that 'people do actually agree about everyday situations eliciting the application of concepts of philosophical interest' (p. 130). Much rides on the distinction between unusual judgments elicited by philosophical cases and judgments in 'everyday life'. If it were found that people do not, in fact, agree in their philosophical judgments elicited by everyday situations, the case against the method of cases would lose some of its potency in the sense that one might have reason to suggest that the method of cases is not epistemically inferior to other philosophical methods employed to determine which facts hold in certain situations. Assuming that the principle aim of experimental methodologies is to make reliable causal inferences about the effects of some particular causal relationship, one way in which Machery could respond to these two interrelated problems is by explaining the causal factors that operate Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD between specific disturbing characteristics and (what are otherwise considered to be) reliable processes of judgment-making. Many philosophers of the social and behavioral sciences suggest that the causal inferences within an experiment are reliable if they are the results of causes that happen under the governance of a causal relationship, which, in turn, results from an underlying causal structure. To warrant the belief that a causal inference can be extrapolated from a particular experiment or small set of experiments to situations involving philosophical cases in general, proposed techniques of causal inference stress that what is required is knowledge of the nature and stability of the causal factors involved as well as knowledge of the background causal structures that operate in judgments elicited by philosophical cases. Such knowledge cannot be underwritten by any particular experiment or set of experiments. As result, both experimental and non-naturalistic philosophers may have reason to question whether the inductive leap has been established. Overall, it seems that what Machery presents is a manifesto – a tightly-and-powerfully-argued, eminently readable, innovative manifesto – for the X-Phi movement rather than a full-blown evidence-based policy. However, unlike the majority of contemporary political manifestos, it deserves to be taken seriously. By consolidating findings drawn from individual experimental studies, by incorporating various approaches to experimental philosophy and by advocating a particular picture of what the future of 'positive-X-Phi' could look like, this book serves not only as the foundations on which experimental philosophers can build, but as a provocative challenge to more common approaches to theorising in the tradition of analytic philosophy. © 2018 Jonathan Lewis Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD Jonathan Lewis, Dublin City University PREVIOUS REVIEW NEXT REVIEW Home About Metapsychology Terms and Privacy Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD Copyright © 2020 Metapsychology Online Reviews Built by Cranky Fox | Powered by Astra WordPress Theme Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD

Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 149 ( 2014 ) 261 – 268 Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect 1877-0428 © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of LUMEN 2014. doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.08.227 LUMEN 2014 Multimodality as a Premise for Inducing Online Flow on a Brand Website: a Social Semiotic Approach Oana Culachea,*, Daniel Rareș Obadăb a Faculty of Philosophy and Social-Political Sciences, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iași, 11 Carol I Avenue, Iași, 700506, Romania b Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iași, 11 Carol I Avenue, Iași, 700506, Romania Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a new approach in the form of multimodality as a semiotic method that can be used by marketers and semioticians to induce online flow, a psychological state, on a brand website. First, we refer to multimodality as a semiotic analysis that can be used for a better optimization of semiotic resource sets in meaning-making, and we distinguish it from another similar concept: multimedia. Second, after a critical literature review, we address the flow construct a state of mind sometimes experienced by people who are deeply involved and immersed in some event, object or activity. Previous quantitative studies show a correlation between online flow experience and other variables such as design, content, sound and layout that are suggested to be its antecedents. In our study, these flow antecedents are viewed as sets of signs or modes that can be orchestrated in order to create different levels of perceived challenge for brand website users. We consider that multimodality can be used for a better optimization of these various meanings as expressed by modes that are "essentially different in nature" (Bateman, 2008, p.54). Also, we refer to the online marketing outcomes of the online flow experience, in order to outline its importance and its implications in the online environment. The main conclusion of our paper is that multimodality can be used by scholars and practitioners as a premise to induce online flow on a brand website, by optimizing the sets of signs or modes. Originality – our contribution consists of an interdisciplinary approach. We use concepts from semiotics, positive psychology, and online marketing for a better understanding of how marketers and semioticians can positively influence online customer behaviour. © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of LUMEN 2014. Keywords: multimodality; flow state; brand website; social semiotics; marketing outcomes * Corresponding authors. E-mail addresses: [email protected]; [email protected] © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of LUMEN 2014. 262 Oana Culache and Daniel Rareș Obadă / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 149 ( 2014 ) 261 – 268 1. Introduction The expansion of the online environment has led to an increasing interest on the part of researchers and practitioners in investigating the personal experience of website users. According to the study World Internet Usage and Population Statistics (2012) retrieved from Internet World Stats, an international website that features up-to-date world Internet Usage, Population Statistics, Travel Stats and Internet Markets, the Internet penetration rate for June 30, 2012 was to 34.3% of the world's population, meaning 2,405,518,376 users. Considering the growth of online markets, it has become extremely important for brand managers to address their message to online customers, and to provide them with compelling experiences. The purpose of a brand website is to create a positive brand experience for customers. This type of site differs from e-commerce sites due to its main function which is to inform the customers and build the brand, rather than to facilitate online transactions. In this context, it is extremely important for marketers and semioticians to understand online customer behaviour and factors that influence a compelling experience when surfing a brand website. In the last few years, the flow construct proposed by Csikszentmihalyi (1975) and applied in computer mediated environments by Hoffman and Novak (1996) proved to be useful for marketing scholars and practitioners in order to understand the user's experience and behaviour in virtual worlds, so that they could create effective brand websites. In this paper, we argue that the online flow state can be affected by the semiotic resources website creators use, namely content, layout, sounds, and design. We build our argument on the social semiotic perspective, given that multiple semiotic resources are co-deployed in the brand website building process, and their interaction generates meaning. In this respect, we believe that these semiotic resources and their interaction create meaning, and they also create the conditions for inducing the online flow state, by means of capturing the visitors' attention and offering them an interesting, long-lasting online experience that would make them want to revisit a brand website. 2. Background According to the American semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce, the world consists of signs. There are various types of signs identified by Peirce, the most popular of which in the literature are icons, indexes, and symbols (CP 1.369). Signs operate in the context of a semiosis, defined as an action or influence involving three elements: sign, object, and interpretant (CP 5.484) whose cooperation is mandatory in order to ensure communication. In order to represent a semiosis' objects, social semioticians argue that there are a great deal of social semiotic systems that have a role in representation and meaning-making (Halliday, 1978). Each of these semiotic resources is socially developed, and impacts in a particular way during the representation and communication process, while their interaction defines the final meaning of a message. These sets of signs are commonly known as modes. 2.1. The role of multimodality in representation and communication Modes are sets of semiotic resources organized in such a manner as to create meaning, while their existence and way of employment are validated by a previous social and cultural acceptance (Bezemer & Jewitt, 2010). This perspective is also assumed by Kress (2010), who defines the mode as "...a socially shaped and culturally given semiotic resource for making meaning" (p. 79) and being represented by: image, writing, layout, music, gesture, speech, moving image, soundtrack, colours, and 3D objects. Each mode of representation offers a unique potential to create meaning, potential that proves to be different from that of other modes of representation. As a result, in order to better represent an object or entity, Kress noted that there are always several modes used together, in "modal ensembles" (2010), that are strategically designed so that each mode uses its own "affordances" (Gibson, 1977) a concept understood as referring to something that is "...possible to express and represent easily in a mode" (Bezemer & Jewitt, 2010, p.184), that is what a mode can contribute in a communication situation. This distinctiveness of each mode is paramount in selecting the mode that is used in a specific communication context (Kress, 2010). The method of combining several modes in a message in order to better express the intended meaning is referred to as multimodality. Multimodality is defined as "...the existence of multiple modes of communication, in order to manage meaning construction through the effective integration of a repertory of resources suited to the needs of different users" 263 Oana Culache and Daniel Rareș Obadă / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 149 ( 2014 ) 261 – 268 (Lόpez Rodríguez, Prieto Velasco, & Sánchez, 2013, p.49). Multimodality represents the case when, within a message, "...at least two input (senses) or output (medium/device) modes (or sub-modes) are involved" (Pauwels, 2012, p.250). Kress (2010) points out the difference between two similar concepts: multimedia and multimodality. While the former refers to the cultural technologies currently used for disseminating messages (such as television, radio, World Wide Web, etc.), the latter comprises the cultural technologies of representation, as we have already specified still and dynamic images, 3D objects, colours, writings, speeches, layouts, music, etc. We understand representation in conformity with the following definition: [A] process in which the makers of signs [...] seek to make a representation of some object or entity, whether physical or semiotic, and in which their interest in the object, at the point of making the representation, is a complex one, arising out of the cultural, social and psychological history of the sign-maker, and focused by the specific context in which the sign-maker produces the sign (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p.7). In order to better represent an object or entity, the various modes used by people should be strategically combined in a "semiotic harmony" (Kress, 2010). The modes do not act as duplicates. On the contrary, they complement each other. To explain this, Ravelli (2006) uses the concept of "intersemiosis", designating the unitary coordination of semiosis created across multiple sign systems so that they are not perceived to be isolated, but as having a unitary meaning. Thibault (2000) considers the meaning of a multimodal message as a composite product/process involving the way in which different resources are co-deployed. Consequently, it should not be divided into a number of separate "channels" or "codes". Also, Lemke (1998) introduces the concept of "multiplication of meaning", as an orchestrated combination of meanings, different from redundancy, which bring something new. This idea is supported by Schriver (1997), who explains that through rhetorical clusters we can ensure that users understand the proper way to interpret a text: We can think of a document as a field of interacting rhetorical clusters. If the document is well designed, the clusters orchestrate a web of converging meanings, which enable readers to form a coherent and consistent idea of the content (p.344). As we have previously discussed, multimodality does not comprise the addition of meanings, but a reunification of various meanings that are "essentially different in nature" (Bateman, 2008, p.54), according to the "resource integration principle" (Baldry & Thibault, 2006). The orchestration of different modes describes "...the process of selecting/assembling/designing the semiotic "materials" which seem essential to meet the rhetor's interests and which will be given shape as the semiotic entity of text as an ensemble, through the process of design" (Kress, 2010, p.162). In the next section, we briefly review flow theory and discuss the manner in which multimodality can be used to manage different sets of signs or modes, such as design, layout, sound and content, and influence a brand website visitor's experience by making it enjoyable, self-rewarding, and long-lasting. 2.2. Flow theory In the literature, flow is a term used by positive psychologists to describe a state of mind sometimes experienced by people who are deeply involved in some event, object, or activity to such an extent that they are completely and totally immersed in it (Csikszentmihalyi, 1977). According to Csikszentmihalyi (1977), flow is the holistic sensation that people feel when they act with total involvement. Flow experience, or "optimal experience", is a common feeling of deep immersion identified by Csikszentmihalyi (1975, 1990) while interviewing certain professional and amateur dancers, chess players, rock climbers and surgeons. Since 1975, scholars have used the flow construct in different fields such as education, sports, management and marketing. In 1996, Hoffman and Novak used the flow construct in online environments and defined it as the state 264 Oana Culache and Daniel Rareș Obadă / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 149 ( 2014 ) 261 – 268 occurring during network navigation which is: (1) characterized by a seamless sequence of responses facilitated by machine interactivity, (2) intrinsically enjoyable, (3) accompanied by a loss of self-consciousness, and (4) selfreinforcing. Hoffman and Novak (1996) argued that optimal experience, or flow, can have positive marketing outcomes, such as increased perceived behaviour control, positive subjective experience, increased learning and exploratory behaviour. Our literature review of flow studies in offline and online environments revealed that researchers share the same perspective on the conceptual definition of flow as presented by Csikszentmihalyi (1997). However, we identified different models of flow proposed by scholars containing different factors influencing optimal experience. In our study, we will refer to two flow models in order to establish the conceptual framework and to explain how multimodality can be used by marketers and semioticians in order to induce users' online flow, while they surf a brand website. As we have already stated, we consider it important to clarify the flow process stages and the nature of variables included in flow models. First, in order to clarify flow process stages, we invoke the flow model proposed by Chen (2000): Flow antecedents – or conditions of flow experience (e.g.: clear goals, immediate feedback, potential control, and merging of action and awareness); Flow experience – symptoms (e.g.: concentration, telepresence, time distortion, and loss of selfconsciousness); Flow consequences – flow outcomes (e.g.: positive affect and autotelic experience). Chen's model is important when it comes to clarifying the flow phenomenon and its stages, because there are some discrepancies in the literature regarding the variables proposed to be flow antecedents, flow experience symptoms, and flow consequences (Obadă, 2013). However, most researchers agree on the following three stages of the flow process as a flow framework: flow antecedents, flow experience, and flow consequences (Chen, 2000; Ghani, 1995; Ghani & Deshpande, 1994; Trevino & Webster, 1993). As stated before, in our paper we focus on flow antecedents, or flow conditions, by arguing that multimodality can be used by marketers and semioticians in order to induce flow experience on a brand website. As we can see in Chen's model, flow conditions are variables that can be classified into different types according to their nature. In this context, we refer to the Person-Artefact-Task (PAT) model proposed by Finneran and Zhang (2003), in order to clarify the nature of these components: Person. Csikszentmihalyi (1988) states that individuals are different in their skills and life attitudes, and these differences affect their propensity to achieve a flow experience. Csikszentmihalyi (1988) called this the "autotelic personality" trait. For a user to experience flow, it is important to have a clear goal, a sense of control, and a balance between perceived skills and perceived challenge. Artefact. Finneran and Zhang (2003) argue that artefact characteristics influence the user's flow experience. For example, website speed, content (i.e. sound, text, image, audio, video, layout, or a combination of any of these), and interactivity (or immediate feedback) represent an important part of a user's perceived challenge. Task. Task type (i.e. goal-oriented or experiential tasks) can influence flow occurrence (Finneran & Zhang, 2003). Whereas a goal-directed task such as searching for information on a brand website has utilitarian benefits, situational involvement, and instrumental orientation, an experiential task such as entertainment uses a non-directed search and has hedonic benefits, ritualistic involvement, and enduring involvement (Finneran & Zhang, 2003). The task nature and task complexity influence flow experience because, in some cases, they can determine an imbalance between the user's perceived challenge and his perceived skills (Finneran & Zhang, 2003), that are important antecedents of online flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988). Finneran and Zhang (2003) state that the components of the PAT model are interrelated, and they proposed it for a better conceptualization of online flow. In our study, based on Finneran and Zhang's PAT model, we argue that marketers and semioticians can manage the second component, artefact, using multimodality as a 265 Oana Culache and Daniel Rareș Obadă / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 149 ( 2014 ) 261 – 268 qualitative/semiotic method. As a result, in the next section, we will examine the way in which multimodality influences online flow on a brand website. 3. The multimodal nature of a brand website and its influence on the flow state Websites are communication instruments that allow their users to control their interaction with a brand in the virtual world. As studies have demonstrated, successful online marketing is strongly influenced by a website's ability to induce a flow state on the part of the visitor (Hoffman & Novak, 1996). Thus, brand owners invest resources in order to create an interesting interface and a relevant content. As we shall argue, these efforts should take into consideration the semiotic multimodality whose affordances may prove to generate the conditions that induce the flow state. As presented above, there are some particular factors that favour the appearance of a flow state. We believe that the multimodal method represented by modes and their organization influences a brand website's potential to generate a visitor's flow experience. In our view, marketers and semioticians can optimize the sets of signs or modes in order to create a compelling experience for brand website users. For example, by managing the sets of signs, marketers can use appealing images, a high quality content, an easy-to-read layout for an aesthetically pleasing brand website, suitable colours and music, moving images, soundtrack, and 3D objects. All these modes or sets of signs can be administered to create an artefact, in our case a brand website, that can induce online flow. First of all, website design has proven to be an important variable for successful brand websites. Huang (2003) considers that website attributes can be designed in order to induce flow. Huang (2003) argues that users see each website as a bundle of attributes with various capacities to satisfy their needs. This means that different modes can be managed to meet users' needs when they surf a brand website while searching for information (goal-oriented behaviour) or for entertainment. Second, ease of use has been proven to affect the visitor's experience (Skadberg & Kimmel, 2004) and refers to the navigational characteristics of a website. By using multimodality, marketers and semioticians can optimize the navigational characteristics of brand websites. From a broader perspective, websites are created using different codes or signs. This means that multimodality can be used to create a "semiotic harmony" (Kress, 2010), or a successful brand website. Third, the perceived characteristics of a brand website may engender the flow experience. For example, user's perceptions of a website's flexibility and modifiability may contribute to flow. Users may enjoy the idea that they can tailor softwares to their individual needs by varying commands, speeds, and difficulty levels, sounds, or colours (Malone & Lepper, 1987). In Ghani's (1991) survey, computer users who have developed their own applications and explored the capabilities of the software, spend more time in computer interactions, are more involved, and reported greater enjoyment. Fourth, in our opinion, it is extremely important for brand websites to contain optimized sets of signs, or modes, so that to ensure a balance between the user's perceived skills and the perceived challenge. 3.1. Meeting online visitors' needs via multimodal brand websites As a flow state requires the visitor's focused attention (Pace, 2004), the website must be able to get it by satisfying the visitor's needs, so as to be congruent with his interests. As a result, the website, which is an informative platform per se, should display relevant information. The multimodal nature of digital instruments allows message producers to use only two "(super-)modes": the visual and the auditory, ruling out all modes that address the other senses (Pauwels, 2012). Hence, in order to display relevant data for visitors, websites may employ textual features (including typography), layouts, shapes, colours, still and dynamic images, special effects, and hyperlinks. Regarding the auditory prompts, websites may contain sound effects or noises, soundtracks/music, and even recorded speech. The content must be codified and exposed by using several modes that best comply with their objects: rarity/originality may imply specific information/images; emotional impact may be generated by the content's subject, tropes, images, music, and soundtracks; the aesthetic appeal may be materialized in layout, colour interplay, typography, special effects, etc. 266 Oana Culache and Daniel Rareș Obadă / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 149 ( 2014 ) 261 – 268 3.2. Organizing modes for an easy-to-use brand website Website ease of use refers to the ease with which visitors can locate the relevant information which they are searching for (Skadberg & Kimmel, 2004). As Pace (2004) argues, a poorly designed interface may inhibit the flow state because of the excessive efforts required on the part of the visitor in order to achieve his informational goals. For example, we must consider that a website has two types of structures: (1) a logical one, which refers to the conceptual organization and the "reading path", and (2) a geometrical one, represented by its layout (Bateman, 2008). In order to ensure an optimal experience for their visitors, websites are organized in a particular manner that makes them intuitive and user-friendly, by anticipating needs and actions. In this respect, website designers imagine possible "reading paths" (Kress, 2005), that is "...the order by which the reader may process different episodes in a multimodal text" (Lim Fei, 2004, p.230), and they should generally coincide with a visitor's decisions during navigation. Like other visual texts, websites are usually designed so as to allow multiple "reading paths", but there are still some preferred ones, dictated by the most salient elements on a webpage, as Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) argue. Along with salience, information value and framing are very important factors in terms of a website's organization principle. While information value refers to centred or polarized compositions, the role of frames is to separate/disconnect elements, so as to make them easily identifiable in a quick scan of a webpage, by using white spaces and geometric shapes and also by alternating and contrasting colours (Bateman, 2008). 3.3. Creating challenging brand websites using modes We consider that visitors to a brand website are seeking information about a brand product or service. This means that they are ready to engage in a semiotic interaction with the brand. The visitors' challenge, after entering the website, implies scanning the page for relevant information and understanding the website's content and non-linear structure, as Pace (2004) concluded. Different modes may be more or less difficult to interpret, and their combination may complicate the meaning, being directly influenced by the "interpretative space" (Yuen, 2004). Depending on the type of signs icons, indexes, symbols decoding messages might be challenging, while some images require a "visual literacy" (Debes, 1968) in order to be deciphered. Also, tropes such as metaphors, metonymies and similes require special attention to give the right interpretation. Not last, the overall organization of salient elements on the website's pages impacts on its status as being challenging. 3.4. Managing perceived characteristics of brand websites by multimodal means Brand website characteristics are important antecedents of the flow experience. This argument is supported by many studies from the literature, and flow models include variables such as website design, speed, content quality, modifiability, or interactivity. As we have already explained, it is important for brand website users to tailor software to their individual needs by varying commands, speeds, and difficulty levels, sounds, or colours (Malone & Lepper, 1987). Customers may experience a flow state while they surf a brand website if the artefact offers them a level of perceived challenges in line with their perceived skills. Our idea is supported by Ghani's (1991) survey, in which computer users who developed their own applications and explored the capabilities of the software, spent more time in computer interactions, were more involved, and reported greater enjoyment. 4. Conclusion This paper argues that multimodality, as a semiotic method, can induce an online flow state while users surf a brand website. Multimodality combines multiple semiotic resources to generate integrated multisemiotic messages, and we assume that multimodality is important for creating an efficient artefact (in our case a brand website). The modes co-deployed on a brand website constitute website content, design, layout and sound. The interaction effect between modes has an impact on the user's experience that occurs while using the artefact. In this respect, we consider that multimodality represents a premise for inducing the user's optimal experience on a brand website. 267 Oana Culache and Daniel Rareș Obadă / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 149 ( 2014 ) 261 – 268 Our study also has limitations. First, our paper is purely conceptual and our main hypothesis should be tested in empirical studies and confirmed by practitioners. Second, due to the interdisciplinary approach we used and the concepts' origins, researchers may have difficulty in the operationalization of the concepts. However, it is important to note that future research is needed for a better understanding of the flow phenomenon. Optimal experience, also called flow, appears to be a critical and relevant issue for consumer behaviour theory and practice, because facilitating enjoyable online shopping experiences has been found to lead to positive marketing outcomes (Koufaris, 2005; Novak, Hoffman & Yung, 2000; Skadberg & Kimmel, 2004). Creating a compelling online experience for customers through brand websites could be a new research area for Internet scholars. 5. Implications In this section we refer to the implications of using multimodality as a qualitative method for inducing online flow on a brand website. First of all, it is important for marketing practitioners to create compelling brand websites by managing different modes. In our view, practitioners can optimize the sets of signs, or modes, such as dynamic images, 3D objects, colours, writings, speeches, layouts, music. Second, flow experience has proven itself to be extremely important for marketers to better understand online customers' behaviour. Flow studies showed a positive relationship between optimal experience and learning (Hoffman & Novak, 2009; Ho & Kuo, 2010), brand attitudes (Mathwick & Rigdon, 2004; Sanchez-Franco, 2006), attitude toward a website (Luna, Peracchio & de Juan, 2003), intention to use the Web (Agarwal & Karahanna, 2000; Sanchez-Franco, 2006), revisit intentions (Koufaris, 2002; Luna, Peracchio & de Juan, 2002, 2003), purchase intentions (Luna, Peracchio & de Juan, 2002, 2003; Richard & Chandra, 2005), an increased exploratory behaviour (Novak, Hoffman & Yung, 2000; Koorzan, 2003), and perceived control (Webster, Trevino & Ryan, 1993; Hoffman & Novak, 1996; Agarwal & Karahanna, 2000; Huang, 2006). Third, in our view, an interdisciplinary approach is needed. In this paper, we propose a new approach by using concepts from social semiotics, positive psychology and online marketing in order to achieve an integrative view. References Agarwal, R. & Karahanna, E. (2000). 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ANTICIPATION IN THE CONTEXT OF ALTERED STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS Doina-Elena Manolea & Aliodor Manole Independent researchers Bucharest, ROMANIA [email protected], [email protected] Abstract Starting from the paradigm of the material continuum we discuss the possibility to transcend the space-time reality (Here-and-Now) in the aim of investigating the energetic and informational reality, support of the continuous present. The altered states of consciousness, obtained by means of "psyche"-type techniques, allow the transformation of a future temporal nexus in an element of the present time. Through this "psyche anticipation" process, a sliding of the time reference takes place, since the future becomes present and the present an element of the past. In this way the initial anticipatory potential is enhanced and allows one more energetic and informational step. By such a step-by-step progression segments of the future could be investigated, thus building an anticipatory model. The "psyche anticipation" techniques can be successfully used in the healing process of some diseases. 1. PARADIGMS OF THE UNIVERSE 1.1. MATERIAL CONTINUUM PARADIGM Kybernetikos, as point of view of the formal analogy, with numerous and diversified applications in all domains: technical, economy, medicine, complementary science, etc. clarifies the different aspects of the subtle energy of the human being, especially the neutral aspect. Through the particular organization of the organic substance, the human being induces a specific energetic emergence, strongly related to the universal energetic emergence. The human body's energy, as well as any other living creature's energy, is deep connected to the universal energy from which appertains and which cannot be isolated. Albert Einstein proved by the well known Relativity Theory that space and time are not separate entities and that these are not connected only one to each other, but that are components of an unitary called spatially and temporally continuum. The English physicist William Bohm reveals that all that exists in the Universe is part of an enormous continuum and the visible Uni-verse and invisible verses are combining in order to furnish the illusion of this reality, and therefore to probate the aphorism which says "I am the Universe an the Universe contains me". Even though, Universe mustn't be considered as an undifferentiated mass, but in the same time, each piece is a part of the entire whole, maintaining the unique qualities that characterizes it. The oneness feelings experienced during the conscience's expansion seem to possess the holographic qualities of the whole. The spatially and temporally continuum defines the whole objective reality, underlining it's unitary character. It's organization and hierarchization, in information and entropy terms, is a determination aspect of the material continuum pattern. According to this pattern there are: 1. An informational and energetic reality, dominated by informational elements, implanted upon an energetic fundamental found. 2. A physical reality, dominated by substance and bioplasma, transphysic energies and physic energies, respectively by space and time. The two objective realities belong to the material continuum, dominated on one side by informational-energetic elements, and, on the other side, by substrate and energy in the spatial and temporal frame. The farthest of the distinct realities are representing, finally, superior limit of certain integration processes, respectively of variation, which defines and characterizes the manifestation of the substance inside the material continuum. As bioplasma or substance represents the substrate, and the energies are manifested on transphysic or physic appearance, on it's turn the physical reality is divided, in: • bioplasmatic subdivision, dominated by bioplasma and transphysic energies; • physic subdivision, dominated by substance and physic energies. Starting from the physic reality, with individual transforming elements, separated in space and time, defined as structure and shape, the antientropic integration process leads, when space and time are not defined, to the informational-energetic reality. Individual elements are appearing in this connection, parts of more and more general ensembles. Continuing the integration process, these ensembles become more and more general, until the individual disappears entirely, assimilated to the general absolute ensemble, the Undifferentiated Whole. This phase represents an ideal superior limit of the material continuum, the final point of an integration process, respectively the initial point of a differential process, corresponding to maximum information and order, respectively to minimum entropy. The inverse process, the entropic differentiation, begins from the upper limit of the informational and energetic reality. In this domain marked by the differentiation process, takes place the apparent individualization of certain elements, distinguished inside the informational and energetic ensemble found. The informational and energetic ensemble found comprises an informational and an energetic aspect. The informational aspect is probably assigned for structuration, determinateing the apparent individualization of certain elements. The differentiation process inside the informational and energetic reality is limited, because of the profound connection between the elements and the whole energetic found. The substance manifestation in the physical reality attains characteristic aspects: substrate, structure, defined form, etc., due to peculiar lows, reclaimed by the temporal and spatial support. The elements' individualization in time and space is increased, but being never saturated, because a total individualization will presume the disconnection form the material continuum. The differentiation process, information and order decrease continuously in the entropy and disorder benefit. The temporal and spatial support, which defines the physic reality, implies a clear separation from the energetic and informational reality, governed by own laws according to some of the characteristic forms of substance manifestation. In this manner is not possible to define an interface between the two objective realities, considering the real meaning of the word. While the informational and energetic reality's defined aspect is represented by the connection of the interdependent elements, physic reality is characterized by the time and space elements' individualization. If the energetic and informational reality can be compared to the implicit form of an equation, then physical reality represents the explicit form. The relation between the two realities is the same compared to the function and it's differential equation. The differentiation process determinates events, phenomena, and processes that produce individual elements interacting and transforming each other. Even if it is nonspatially and nontemporary, the informational and energetic reality cannot be considered beyond the existence and nonexistence. The potentiality attribute (objective existence as it is) creates the possibility to limit the objective manifested existence, that means nonspatially and nontemporally, in the informational and energetic reality, and certain events and phenomena which are not described in causal terms and temporal succeeding (continuum present). If the informational and energetic reality can be considered a potentiality domain, and is described by permanent present expression, physical reality represents a manifestation domain, which can be characterized by Here-and-Now expression. Figure 1. Material continuum model. In order to answer to the existentialist question relied to the true nature of the substance, if there is a hope to discover the fundamental substance constitutives, there have been bestowed a lot of theories. In 1910 the English physicist Ernest Rutherford presents the theory, according which, the atom is built by a central nucleus and electrons gravitating around it; in 1913 Niels Bohr quantifies this idea and now there were discovered about hundred elementary particles. Most recently, this problem of the fundamental brick is brought out shaped as a theory that sustains that fundamental particles could be variations, not from a unique particle, but from a subjacent wave. This ondulatory formula was called superchord because it behaves as a violin chord. The Superchord theory reveals that billions of invisible chords populate the Universe and that their different frequencies create all forms of substance and energies that change in time and space. The chords are positioned beyond our four dimensions' Universe. The English mathematician Roger Peronese proposes an alternative method based upon mathematics targets called by him twisters. According to him, the Universe is eight dimensioned, with four dimensions accessible to the five senses, and four belonging to the imaginary dimension. In this tremendous octosional Universe are attaining the twisters, making understandable a big part of this verse. 1.2. HOLONOMIC PARADIGM Dr. Carl Pribram realized the connection between the researches of Carl Lashley, neuropsychiatrist, which detected that the rats used in experiments remembered what they learned even if certain parts of the brain had been excised, and hologram; it was possible that each part of the brain to embody the necessary information needed to recall a whole recollection. Following researches revealed that, in order to see, hear and feel, the brain accomplishes complex calculations regarding the frequency of the received data. In this manner, a landscape, a person, are probably levels of frequencies received by our brain and decoded. The mathematician Denis Gabor, by using the Fourier series, succeeded to transform the image of an object in a range of frequencies registered on a holographic film and to transform these frequencies in the image of the original object. So, immediately after an image is inscribed on the retina, is converted in the range of frequencies called Fourier transformations along the nervous wire. In order to answer the question: if the brain reaches the understanding gathering holograms, transforming mathematically the frequencies received, who interprets inside the brain these holograms? Where is to be found Me? If the holographic brain is the exact from, then, the objective reality does not exist, or exists in the sense we believe it does. Is possible that the world to be a frequentional arrangement transformed in what we know as reality, and known by us after was penetrating our physical senses. The English physicist David Bohm, Albert Einstein's ex assistant in Pricetown University, New Jersey, describes the holonomic universe as if follows: What it seams to be a tangible, stable, visible world, is an illusion. If it is dynamic, kaleidoscopic, is not really there. What we are looking at is the explicit and displayed things order, which is unfolded as a film and we are the spectators; in the same time a subjacent order exists, implicit, replied, which is the father and the mother of this reality. The implicit order being the domain of the invisible things, hides from the exterior, visible universe, the explicit order. Bohm describes a replied universe towards itself, and another, opened, unfolded. These considerations had made Dr. Pribram to disclose that the mathematical process to which the brain is submitted, is possible to act as a camera releasing gear, shaping the object with it's characteristics: shape, color, smell... If this lentil would not exist, a world organized without space and time would be perceived, in which happen only events. Holonomic theory postulates that the brain perceives a concrete realty by interpreting the frequencies coming from a space and time transcending dimension. So, the brain would be a hologram that interprets a holonomic universe. Professor William Tiller from Stanford University, California, points out that all the things which seem to be stable and eternal, from physics' laws to the galactic substance had to be considered as impermanent reality fields, any reality being considered an illusion, only the conscience being endless. The universe began as subtle energy field (nonphysical) and densified little by little. Maybe, the physical universe emerged from a divine thought, which provides the model of this draft, influencing and creating subtle levels, more and more dense, from the universal field through a lot of holograms, until this thought is combined in a physical Universe hologram. Then, the physic body could be holonomic by nature that means a miniature size universe. In addition, our thoughts can generate the apparition of holographic imagines not only in our energy fields, but also to the reality's subtle energetic levels. That would explain the fact that human spirit is capable to get ill first in mind, then physical, but to heal in a second too. The human being carries inside the roots, which mount to heaven, but also which descend to hell. 1.3. THE DIAGRAM WILLIAM TILLER. SPACE-TIME, POSITIVE-NEGATIVE PATTERN Pursuing the diagram from Fig.2, in the first quadrangle (I) is described the evolution of the positive substance substance of our classic universe in which are validated the known physical laws depending on speed. The energy of the particle increases near infinity when speed is almost the light speed. Physic existence of the particle is not possible over the limit imposed by the light speed, therefore do not exist but only for speeds lower than light speed. The force associated to positive spatial and temporal substance is represented by electromagnetic radiation. In the second quadrangle (II) is described the evolution of the negative substance, nonphysical; it's existence begins form speeds superior to light speed, and it's energy increases jointly to the speed. According to Professor W.Tiller, the tachyonic particles, which characterize the negative substance (that exists only when speed overtops light speed) is the substrate of the magnetoelectric radiation, as an associated force to it. Figure 2. Tiller's diagram. By joining the two spaces, according to the neutral theory (see section 2) we can consider our universe to be characterized by positive mass particles moving with a speed close to light speed, and which, after overcoming this speed, move, inevitable, in the negative space and time universe, the subtle universe. The leading thread is the unity of the two spaces, positive and negative, the continuity and simultaneously coexistence. The laws ruling the second quadrangle are only presumed, so that time, which in the first quadrangle flows linearly, uniform, in the second quadrangle, the physical flow (not perception) of time is not uniform. According to the hereabove presented theories, the human energetic being is redefined as an energetic field, in which the positive substance, of electric nature, which contains particles characterized by speed lower than light speed, is combined to the nonphysical substance, subtle, negative, of magnetic nature, formed by nonphysical particles characterized by speed higher than light speed. Doctor Richard Gerber reveals that the negative particle properties disclose the subtle energy phenomena, and, in this context, the subtle body of the human being has to be considered a material body built of negative, over light speed particles, a holographic field selforganizing according to the influence of his creating mind. More, this negative substance is magnetic by nature. The determinations accomplished seem to prove that these particular magnetic fields, evidenced by healers, correspond to the criteria presented by professor Tiller. Magnetism might be, in this case, a negative spatial and temporal substance, o according to the terminology, a magnetoelectric substance. Crossing from the first quadrangle to the second quadrangle (Tiller diagram), or crossing from spatial and temporal reality to informational and energetic reality (material continuum) is realized by feedback using the neutral field. The metamorphose experiment of a system from quantal level, of the over light speed (quadrangle II), to the classic level physics, under light speed, (quadrangle I) have been accomplished in the Kastler-Brassel Laboratories, at the Normal Superior School from Paris. The practical viability of the theory of passing from a universe to another, from an existentially reality to another, phenomena known as dechoerence, was scientifically proved. 2. THE NEUTRAL THEORY In 2000 we have introduced the Neutral Theory concerning the Neutral Field and the Neutral Technique, used mainly for healing purposes. Through Neutral Technique is accomplished the feedback phenomena, on the archetypal level of the energetic and informational field; which is also the support of the spatial and temporal reality, called by us Neutral Field. The Neutral FieldTM manifests specific aspects such as: • maintains the functional and structural unity of the system, it's connection to all the vibrating energetic systems from all the verses; • permits slow reactions between the energetic predominant part and the minor energetic part from which results and which produce energy. • is a reaction's ponderer, a reaction milieu; • accomplishes the dynamic stabilization function of the system; • represents the part of the system which does not allow the mixture of the components; • is the part which maintain the components integrity, even during the most dynamic reactions; • neutral field is the life support, represents the vital side of life; • is the main skeleton in which takes place the motion and the energy's transformation. Figure 3. Neutral Field's diagram The practical applicability of Neutral Theory by Neutral Technique, using The Neutral Field is evidenced by reflection of the essential knowledge principle, manifested through the feedback principle. Therefore, through a specific action on the spatial and temporal reality level, the answer obtained is consonant. An act resulting form the energetic and informational reality that permits to the system upon which was exercised the action, as well as to the system which acts, to manifest a transformation. This allows the system the action of learning in order to improve the activity; consequently, the next activity will obtain a better effect. 3. TN MIND CONTROL DEEP ALPHATM AS MODALITY OF ACCESSING THE REALITY OF THE CONTINUOUS PRESENT It refers to the perceiving, connecting, implementing the modification and pursuing the result materialized through the modification of partial D type nexus, for a spiritual individuality or for spatial-temporal individualities, both in the Informational and Energy Reality, and/or in the Spatial-Temporal Reality. By working in the intuitive space, either the temporary equilibrium of the target entity is modified or future events can be anticipated. In the Spatial-Temporal Reality the existential development of an entity evolves from nexus to nexus (from a temporary knot to another), the differentiation between them being marked by noting seclusion in time and space, following a certain existential trajectory. On this trajectory the free will is applied only at the nexus level. Once the free will applied, the entity looses its right to choose, the way to be followed being compulsory up to the next nexus. Figure 4. The existential time flow. Each nexus has another location in time and space, another emotional, mental, action context. PAST PRESENT FUTURE The law of free will has the significance of the free choice, according to the inner convictions characteristic to each person, to a way to be crossed, no matter the respective person is or is not acquainted with the consequences of his/her actions. As a matter of fact, the anticipatory operator accesses, in a manner specific to the technique of TN MIND CONTROL DEEP ALPHA, the Existential Fundamental Field, the Neutral Field, for himself/herself or another entity, modifying it in order to get the transformation, the consonant answer from the energetic and informational reality, which will produce the modification at the spatial-temporal level. In each one of us there is the possibility to work with both cerebral hemispheres. The right hemisphere is the imaginative one, the intuitive one, and the left hemisphere is the analytic one, it anchors us in this spatial-temporal reality. Everyday we hardly cope with the existing social conditions, and our inner actually pines after the spiritual part and the feeling of unfulfilment appears. In this moment practically the choosing of the way of each one of us is made. At the β (beta) level of the brain activity one works heavily with the left hemisphere. In order to work in the intuitive space, which is governed by the right cerebral hemisphere, it is necessary to descend from the left cerebral hemisphere up to the deep alpha level. The essence of working in the intuitive space is to maintain the state of lucid consciousness, what gives the possibility of performing the planned activity. The efficiency of this activity is proportional to the belief in the accomplishment of the stated aim. LCH – left cerebral hemisphere RCH – right cerebral hemisphere Figure 5. The progressive diagram of the brain's functioning The belief is made up of: a. The wish, as motivational power, directed to the aim. It belongs to the Spatial-Temporal Reality, it belongs to Here-and-Now. b. The conviction is the one that supports us between wish and expectation (in the sense of aimed objective, objective to be fulfilled), between the motive power and the proposed aim. c. The expectation belongs to the alpha level, to the intuitive, subjective dimension, it represents the aim. If the wish is the power that stretches the bow spring, the expectation is the target we aim at, and the performance is similar to that inner conviction. The secret of the anticipative action is that, after establishing the aim and the modality to fulfill this one, the expectation has to manifest itself concurrently with the action for the fulfillment of the aim, against the background of firm inner conviction that the manifested wish will be fulfilled. The state of conscious lucidity in deep alpha can be achieved in 5 steps (levels): 5. is the conscious outer level; 4. is the level where tiredness appears, heavy eyelids and / subsequently the closing of eyes; 3. the body relaxation and established ideomotor signal are present; 2. consists in relaxation of the mind (the attention is focused to a limited number of subjects); 1. is the deep alpha level, both mental and physical; at this level the access to the intuitive space is accomplished. The sine-qua-non condition of the anticipative accessing is being aware of the real situation from the spatial-temporal reality. This allows the expressing of aims and the formation of the motivation for achieving them, while the entropy decreases. When one acts in order to achieve the deep alpha state, one thinks clearer, more lucid, there is a state of inner innocence due to the order-performance dualism. It is this inner state of noticing the fact that the performance of what is ordered is achieved. In deep alpha the access to the past and future reality is possible, as well as to the persons we have access to in order to get information. The access to information is directly proportional to and proportional to the personal entropy. LEVEL CONSCIENCE LEVEL Steps MIND S U P R I O R L E V E L S DIVINE CONSCIENCE IV OVERCONSCIOUS _3 _2 _1 EXTRA-MIND SOLAR CONSCIENCE III UNCONSCIOUS _7 _6 _5 _4 _3 _2 _1 INTUITIVE MIND PLANETARY CONSCIENCE II SUBCONSCIOUS _7 _6 _5 _4 _3 _2 _1 ENLIGHTENED MIND COSMIC CONSCIENCE I | | IMMATERIAL | CONSCIOUS |------------------ | | VITAL | _7 _6 _5 _4 _3 _2 _1 SUPERIOR MIND PHISICAL CONSCIENCE 0 | | PHISICAL 1 ORDINARY MIND (thoughtful) Progresive Subsoil PHISICAL SUBCONSCIENCE MATERIAL UNCONSCIOUS 1 VITAL MIND 2 PHISICAL MIND 3 CELLULAR MIND Figure 6. Conscience mind relation. The modified state of the conscience obtained through TN MIND CONTROL DEEP ALPHA is a way, a real possibility of transpersonal access in the Energetic and Informational Reality, which is the manifestation support of the Continuous Present. The events of the Continuous Present are liberated from the spatial-temporal constraint of the Reality Here-and-Now. In the Spatial-Temporal Reality the existential development takes place only in one sense, from the past, through the present to the future. Figure 7. Anticipative potenciality ANTICIPATIVE POTENTIALITY PAST PRESENT FUTURE The anticipative potentiality Past ► Present can be brought to the energyinformational values necessary for anticipation by using techniques of the type "Psyche". Figure 8. First step of the "Psyche Anticipation" Through "Psyche Anticipation" the inclusion in the Ψ 1 Potential allows the transformation of the immediately future temporal nexus in present time element. Control of the State of Conscious Relaxation (deep alpha) The complete relaxation, physically and mentally, in deep alpha reduces the state of inner excitement, the stress, and it strengthens the immunitary system (it reduces the entropy). When relaxation at different levels of depth, both mentally and physically, is achieved, we can say that a conscious control of this state is achieved, a state in which different stages of modification of the conscience are achieved (different modified states of the conscience). Through training, the control of the state of relaxation is achieved more and more elevated. A practical method of entering in deep alpha (conscious relaxation) is presented in figure 9. Conditional phrase Aim .... Return 5 5 4 4 3 – repeat aim 3 – repeat aim 2 2 1  1  deep alpha Conditional phrase deep alpha Maintenance Deepening Apply Techniques Figure 9. Practical method of using deep alpha technique. Using the conditional phrase and concentrating in the origin center, the mental state deepens at a more profound level of the mind, and in this state the personal conscience is more elevated, there is a higher sense of conscience. CONCLUSIONS Using an altered state of consciousness achieved by TN MIND CONTROL DEEP ALPHA, is becomes possible to anticipate existential trajectories by transcending the plans of the material continuum from the Spatial-Temporal Reality level to the Energetic and Informational Reality level. Thus, a gap in the intermediate interval of uncertitude placed at the separation border of the to realities is made. The sequentialy ordered fenomena in the Continuous Present where the entire information of the Universe, from beginning to end, INCLUSION POTENTIAL Ψ 1 PAST PRESENT FUTURE coexists, and, consequently the entire evolution of an entity are anticipated, using an arbitrary spatio-temporal sliding. References 1. PRIBRAM, CARL Free will: The brain as an anticipatory system, Computing Anticipatory Systems: CASYS'99 Third International Conference, AIP 517, pp.53-72 2. GABOR, D. Theory of communication, Journal of the Institute of Electrical Engineers 93, pp.429-441, 1946. 3. CAPRA, FRITJOF – The Tao of Physics An exploration of the parallels between modern physics mysticism, Flamingo, 1992. 4. 2. JITARIU, P. AND TEAM. The magnetic field's action upon animal organisms, Annals of Romanian Academy, 1987. 5. MALTZ, MAXWELLPsycho-cybernetics, Prentice Hall, Inc.,1960. 6. SRI AUROBINDO – The Syntesis of Yoga – The Yoga of Divine Works, Sri Aurobindo Ashram Trust, 1992. 7. DUMITRU, CONSTANTIN Substance's intelligence, Ed. Militara, Bucharest, 1981 8. MANOLEA, DOINA-ELENA & ALIODOR The subtle energetics of the human being, Ed. Aldomar Extrasenzorial, Bucharest, 1997. 9. MANOLEA, DOINA-ELENA & ALIODOR Manual for developing the personal magnetism, Ed. Aldomar Extrasenzorial, Bucharest, 1998. 10. MANOLEA, DOINA-ELENA & ALIODOR Feeling, Ed. Aldomar Extrasenzorial, Bucharest, 1998. 11. MANOLEA, DOINA-ELENA & ALIODOR Extrasensorial perceptions, Ed. Aldomar Extrasenzorial, Bucharest, 1998. 12. MANOLEA, DOINA-ELENA & ALIODOR Biomagnetism between science and empiricism. Communication presented to Scientific Communications Session of the Medical Academy -Craiova, Romania, 21-22 June 1996. 13. MANOLEA, DOINA-ELENA si ALIODOR Modulated course: Subtle energetics of the human being evaluation, recovering, conservation and increasing of the human performances through neutral technique Manolea-Aldomar Extrasenzorial F.A., 1996. 1. Plagiarism Detector Originality Report Plagiarism Detector Project: [ http://plagiarism-detector.com ] Application core verrsion: 600 Originality report details: Generation Time and Date: 03.07.2012 12:34:20 Document Name: ANTICIPATION IN THE CONTEXT OF ALTERED STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 2003 public 2004.doc Document Location: C:\Users\Aliodor\Documents\ANTICIPATION IN THE CONTEXT OF ALTERED STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 2003 public 2004.doc Document Words Count: 4343 Referenced 0% / Linked 0% Original 100% / 0% Plagiarism

A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S FOLIA G ERM ANICA 3, 2002 Tomasz Majewski INSCENIZACJE DRAMATÓW GERHARTA HAUPTMANNA NA SCENACH WROCŁAWIA W LATACH 1933-1944 Wrocławskie teatry dramatyczne pod rządami narodowych socjalistów w sposób planowy realizowały, podobnie jak sceny innych miast niemieckich tamtego okresu, powierzane im zadania o charakterze polityczno- -propagandowym. Ich polityka repertuarowa w znacznym stopniu kreowana centralnie za pośrednictwem skupionego w departamencie teatralnym ministerstwa propagandy aparatu kontroli stanowiła część ogólnokrajowego programu włączenia sztuki dramatycznej i teatralnej do budowy zjawisk kulturowych w służbie państwa totalitarnego. Staranna selekcja inscenizowanych po 1933 r. dram atów następowała według kryteriów, a raczej priorytetów, określanych na podstawie bieżących zadań politycznych partii nazistowskiej. Instrumentalne traktowanie dzieł scenicznych wielu twórców niemieckojęzycznych, którego genezy upatrywać należy w szczególnej roli przypisywanej sztuce dramatycznej przez ideologów III Rzeszy, nie ominęło autorów o niepodważalnym znaczeniu dla europejskiego dorobku literackiego. Jeśli na wykorzystanie w celach propagandowych narażone były utwory Schillera, Hebbla czy Kleista, to z podobnymi zagrożeniami musieli liczyć się dramatopisarze współcześni reżimowi, którym przyszło żyć pod jego rządami. W centralnym programie instrumentalizacji politycznej teatru niemieckiego po 1933 r. uczestniczyły praktycznie wszystkie placówki dramatyczne Niemiec, nie wyłączając scen funkcjonujących wtedy we Wrocławiu. Działające tam Lobei Gerhart Hauptmann-Theater oraz Schauspielhaus skupiono w jednej strukturze organizacyjnej i oddano do wyłącznej dyspozycji narodowosocjalistycznych władz Wrocławia1. Im również przyszło realizować nakreślone w Berlinie cele propagandowe, także w odniesieniu do Gerharta Hauptmanna, którego związki z tym miastem, jak i z całym Śląskiem miały charakter szczególny. Gerhart Hauptmann, laureat literackiej nagrody Nobla, był bez wątpienia najwybitniejszym niemieckim pisarzem, który podjął decyzję o pozostaniu w państwie narodowosocjalistycznym. Spotkało się to z niezwykle ostrą reakcją wielu przedstawicieli niemieckiego życia kulturalnego na uchodźstwie, nie wyłączając Thomasa M anna. Szczególnie ostro atakował go zawiedziony przyjaciel i krytyk literacki Alfred Kerr. Krytyka emigrantów, szczególnie ostra bezpośrednio po przejęciu władzy przez partię Hitlera, z czasem jednak osłabła. Postępowanie Gerharta Hauptmanna w latach 1933-1945 odbierano bowiem jako nieuchronne następstwo decyzji o nieopuszczaniu Niemiec, za którą przyszło mu notabene ponieść wszelkie konsekwencje. Spotkało go za to wiele upokorzeń ze strony reżimu. W tym czasie Hauptm ann mógł się w swoim postanowieniu czuć osamotniony; narażony na nieustanne zakusy zawłaszczenia jego osoby przez ideologów III Rzeszy i jednocześnie krytykowany, a nawet całkowicie odrzucany przez intelektualistów emigracyjnych. Należał jednak do grona pisarzy, których znaczenie wykraczało poza granice Niemiec, był noblistą którego znała i szanowała cała Europa. Jego osoba nie mogła zostać zignorowana przez władze kulturalne ani w prosty sposób wciągnięta w tryby machiny propagandowej. W kręgach ministerstwa kierowanego przez Goebbelsa nazywano Gerharta Hauptm anna „seniorem współczesnych dramaturgów niemieckich" (Senior der heutigen deutschen Dramatiker). Nie ufano mu, nie uważano go także za zwolennika narodowego socjalizmu, ale ze względu na jego dorobek literacki i niepodważalne znaczenie wśród twórców współczesnej literatury europejskiej traktowano Hauptmanna w sposób szczególny. Hubert Orłowski tak pisał o jego sytuacji i postawie: Szczególny „przypadek" stanowi Gerhart Hauptmann. Pisano u nas już o tym stosunkowo wiele (Wilhelm Szewczyk, Norbert Honsza). Większość znawców dzieła Hauptmanna zgodnie stwierdza, że nie sposób w jego twórczości zauważyć ukłonów w stronę III Rzeszy. Z drugiej jednak strony w swych prywatnych wypowiedziach zdradzał Hauptmann przynajmniej jeszcze w latach trzydziestych powściągliwe zainteresowanie rozwojem sytuacji w Niemczech. W III Rzeszy Hauptmann był już starcem, obnoszącym się ze swoją postawą olimpijczyka. Był tam czczony i zarazem obnoszony jako artystyczne i moralne alibi państwa nazistowskiego. Tyle Hauptmann powinien był wiedzieć2. 1 Lobetheater i Gerhart Hauptmann-Theater z przyczyn ekonomicznych zostały zamknięte w połowie lat trzydziestych (1935 i 1936). Wraz z rozpoczęciem sezonu teatralnego 1936/1937 praktycznie jedyną sceną dramatyczną Wrocławia stał się goszczący wcześniej inscenizacje muzyczne Schauspielhaus. 2 H. Orłowski, Literatura iv III Rzeszy, Poznań 1979, s. 258. Całą złożoność problematyki związanej z relacjami pomiędzy Gerhartem Hauptmannem a nazistowskim reżimem dostrzega Jan-Pieter Barbian3. Powołując się na zbiory korespondencji opracowanej przez Hansa von Bresciusa4 i zasoby archiwalne, przytacza szereg faktów z życia twórcy po 1933 r.: jego poparcie dla rewizjonistycznej polityki Hitlera zmierzającej do odrzucenia niekorzystnych dla Niemiec postanowień traktatu wersalskiego (Hitler deklarował początkowo pokojowe metody działania), lekturę (wprawdzie selektywną) Mein Kampf będącą rezultatem wrażenia, jakie uczyniły na pisarzu jego wystąpienia (Hauptmann nie mógł nie dostrzec zawartego tam chorobliwego antysemityzmu), wywieszenie nazistowskiej flagi, ale także akt niewątpliwej odwagi cywilnej, jakim był udział w pogrzebie żydowskich przyjaciół Маха Pinkusa oraz Samuela Fischera i zredagowanie poświęconego Fischerowi nekrologu opublikowanego na łamach prasy. „Delikatnej" sytuacji Gerharta Hauptmanna w III Rzeszy nie poprawiał także fakt, że ster rządów w dziedzinie polityki kulturalnej państwa dzierżyli jego zagorzali krytycy: Alfred Rosenberg, Rainer Schlösser, Hanns Johst czy Rudolf Erckmann. G erharta Hauptmanna próbowano zatem wykorzystać do budowy zewnętrznego wizerunku hitlerowskich Niemiec. Z jednej strony już sam fakt jego pozostania w kraju przemawiał na korzyść obrazu III Rzeszy, z drugiej zaś bezwzględnie wykorzystywano w celach propagandowych każde przyznane mu wyróżnienie, każdą jego „milczącą zgodę" uznawano zaś za publicznie „wypowiedzianą" akceptację istniejącego porządku. Hauptmann nie przyjął do wiadomości ani nie protestował przeciw publicznemu paleniu książek w maju 1933 r., ekscesom wymierzonym przeciw żydowskim studentom, ani przeciw bojkotowi sklepów będących w posiadaniu obywateli pochodzenia żydowskiego5. Dramaty G erharta Hauptmanna obecne od wielu lat na scenach teatrów niemieckich nie zniknęły z nich w chwili przejęcia władzy przez narodowych socjalistów, mimo wielu zastrzeżeń wysuwanych pod ich adresem przez część środowiska teatralnego związanego z NSDAP. W 1933 r. w repertuarach teatrów niemieckich znajdowały się jedynie trzy utwory: Die Goldene Harfe, Vor Sonnenuntergang i Die versunkene Glocke6, ale już w roku 1934 3 J. P. Barbian, ,,Fehlbesetzung": Zur Rolle von Gerhart Hauptmann im „Dritten Reich", [w:] E. Białek, E. Tomiczek, M. Zybura [red.], 1лЬеп Werk Lebenswerk. Ein Gerhart Hauptmann-Gedenkblatt, Legnica 1997, s. 251-286. 4 H. v. Brescius, Gerhart Hauptmann. Zeitgeschehen und Bewusstsein in unbekannten Selbstzeugnissen. Eine politisch-biographische Studie, Bonn 1976. 5 Рог. J. P. Barbian, op. cit., s. 257. 6 Wszystkie tytuły dramatów Gerharta Hauptmanna zostają przytoczone w niemieckiej wersji językowej. w 25 teatrach całych Niemiec grywano 13 spośród jego dram atów7. Jego twórczość sceniczna miała wielu zwolenników wśród znaczących osobowości teatralnych III Rzeszy dyrektorów teatrów, reżyserów i samych aktorów. Na scenach teatrów wrocławskich tuż przed przejęciem władzy przez partię Hitlera w 1932 r. także gościły trzy utwory: Vor Sonnenuntergang (kwiecień 1932 r. Lobetheater), Und Pippa tanzt (wrzesień 1932 r. Gerhart Hauptmann-Theatcr) i Die Ratten (listopad 1932 r. Gerhart HauptmannTheater )8. Był to rok jego siedemdziesiątych urodzin, stąd aż trzy sztuki gościły w tym czasie w repertuarze scen Wrocławia. Gerhart Hauptmann był pisarzem, który kontynuował swoją twórczość po 1933 r. Jeszcze w 1933 r. ukończył pracę nad dramatem Die Goldene Harfe, którego uroczysta prapremiera miała miejsce podczas Dnia Sztuki Niemieckiej (Tag der Deutschen Kunst) w ramach monachijskich Kammerspiele 9 października 1933 r.9 Dwa lata później gotowa była sztuka Hamlet in Wittenberg, a w 1937 r. powstał opublikowany po 1945 r. dramat Finsternisse poświęcony zmarłemu żydowskiemu przyjacielowi Hauptmanna Maxowi Pinkusowi. Także w 1937 r. autor zakończył pracę nad rymowanym utworem scenicznym Ulrich von Lichtenstein, który był w całości dedykowany niemieckim twórcom literatury średniowiecza. Motywy zaczerpnięte z tej epoki wykorzystał w Die Tochter der Kathedrale (1939). W latach II wojny światowej Gerhart Hauptmann pracował nad tetralogią Atrydów (sztuk o wymowie antywojennej), uciekając niejako przed nazistowską rzeczywistością w świat mitologii helleńskiej. Premiery tych dramatów odbywały się niejednokrotnie w niezwykle uroczystej oprawie i z doborową obsadą na scenach teatralnych Berlina, Wiednia, Hamburga i Monachium. Mimo oznak pozornego szacunku oraz uznania dla osoby i twórczości G erharta Hauptmanna, w III Rzeszy narażony był na nieustanne szykany. Kiedy w latach trzydziestych chciał on opublikować napisany w 1915 r. dram at Magnus Garbe, spotkał się ze stanowczą odmową. Sztuka była bowiem oskarżeniem inkwizycji i obawiano się, aby nie była odebrana jako krytyka stylu sprawowania rządów. Utwór ten wydrukowano dopiero w zbiorowym wydaniu dzieł Hauptmanna (wydanym w 1942 r.), przygotowanym z okazji osiemdziesiątych urodzin twórcy, a jego prapremiera odbyła się już po zakończeniu wojny. Całkowicie zakazano wystawiania dram atu Die Weber i niektórych innych sztuk naturalistycznych. Wątpliwości ministerstwa propagandy budził także dramat Elga. Wprawdzie Hauptmann zaczerpnął motywy do niego ze sztuki Grillparzera Das Kloster bei Sendomir, jednak rozgrywająca się w polskiej scenerii akcja i odwołujący się do 1 B. Drewniak, Das Theater im NS-Staat. Szenarium deutscher Zeitgeschichte 1933-1945, Düsseldorf 1983, s. 191. 8 „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten" 1932, nr 92, 244, 314. 9 B. Drewniak, op. cit., s. 191. polskiej historii utwór nie mógł znaleźć uznania wśród władz kulturalnych. Był on wprawdzie grywany po 1933 r. w Berlinie, ale już wrocławska inscenizacja z 1940 r. wywołała gromkie protesty nie tylko miejscowych środowisk partyjnych. Swoje oburzenie wyraził w liście z grudnia 1940 r. do Reichsdramaturga Hans Hinkel: Z relacji, którą przekazał mi szef policji bezpieczeństwa i SD , wynika, że wielu towarzyszy partyjnych i liczna publiczność teatralna protestuje przeciw dramatowi Gerharta Hauptmanna ..E lga" grywanemu obecnie we wrocławskim Schauspielhaus. Jest poważnym błędem, że właśnie ta sztuka Gerharta Hauptmanna, której akcja rozgrywa się w Polsce, jest obecnie wystawiana. Stawia się pytanie, co skłoniło dyrekcję teatru do inscenizacji tej sztuki, która przedstawia polskich rycerzy, polskie kobiety i polskich knechtów w ich słowiańskiej naturze, właśnie na byłym pograniczu z Polską. Ta kwestia została już nawet podniesiona w prasie. Dostrzega się w tym brak odpowiedzialności odpowiednich osób, aby właśnie dzisiaj umieszczać w repertuarze ten zakurzony, zresztą przelotny dramat z 1896 r10. Jednak Schlösser nie uznał zasadności tych zarzutów, odpowiadając na list Hinkela: Abstrahując od tego, że motywy zostały zaczerpnięte od samego Grillparzera i przez to noszą znamiona klasycyzmu, akcja rozgrywająca się wśród Polaków służy przecież jako przestroga i pouczenie. Jak dla niemieckich pojęć za bardzo bezgraniczne rozpętywanie się prywatnych namiętności, jakie ma miejsce u występujących rycerzy, powinno raczej budzić przerażenie publiczności niż jej sympatię11. W liście do samego Goebbelsa (także datowanym na grudzień 1940 r.) Schlösser pisał: W ostatnim czasie piętrzą się u mnie życzenia, aby powstrzymać utwory dramatyczne, co do których istnieją rzekome zastrzeżenia polityczne. Jeśli z tego powodu wykreślimy z repertuaru znany na całym świecie dramat Gerharta Hauptmanna, ponieważ przez nagłe pojawienie się Polaków Niemcy być może mogliby zostać zainfekowani, napawa mnie to niemałym strachem12. Jednakże kiedy w niespełna rok później, w październiku 1941 r., S tadttheater Zwickau ubiegał się o zgodę na włączenie do repertuaru Elgi, z ministerstwa propagandy nadeszła jasna, negatywna odpowiedź ówczesnego referenta sprawy, Frenzela: „Przedstawienie wyżej wymienionej sztuki uważam w obecnym czasie za niepożądane. Proszę pomyśleć o innym utworze tego samego autora" 13. Mimo więc pewnych ograniczeń dramaty Gerharta Hauptmanna znalazły się na scenach wielu teatrów niemieckich nieprzerwanie przez cały okres rządów hitlerowskich. Sceny dramatyczne Wrocławia nie stanowiły pod tym 10 Bundesarchiv Berlin, R55, akta nr 20 235 (wszystkie cytaty w tłumaczeniu autora artykułu). 11 Ibidem. 12 Ibidem. 13 Ibidem. względem wyjątku. Zastanawiający wydaje się być jednak fakt, że pierwsza inscenizacja sztuki Hauptmanna po przejęciu władzy przez partię Hitlera miała miejsce dopiero w 1935 r. W dostępnych materiałach źródłowych brak jednak jakiejkolwiek informacji o ewentualnych przyczynach jego krótkotrwałej zresztą nieobecności w repertuarze teatralnym. Wprawdzie Lucyna i Franciszek Biały piszą w swym artykule Z dziejów teatru niemieckiego w prowincjach śląskich w pierwszych latach rządów hitlerowskich o zakazie wystawiania dramatów Hauptmanna nałożonym przez samego Goebbelsa w listopadzie 1933 r., jednak teza ta nic znajduje potwierdzenia w faktach, choćby ze względu na przytoczone wcześniej inscenizacje z roku 193414. Nieobecność dzieł Hauptmanna wydaje się być spowodowana raczej radykalnymi zmianami w polityce repertuarowej i gwałtownym wprowadzaniem na sceny wrocławskie sztuk o wymowie otwarcie narodowosocjalistycznej. Dla związanego z Wrocławiem twórcy, którego dramaty wcześniej często gościły na jego scenach, w pierwszym okresie nowych rządów zabrakło miejsca w repertuarze. Spośród trzech utworów wystawionych w ostatnim roku istnienia republiki weimarskiej dwie inscenizacje zostały przygotowane z okazji siedemdziesiątych urodzin twórcy. Pierwszym dramatem Gerharta Hauptmanna wystawionym po 1933 r. we Wrocławiu była więc komedia Der Biberpelz w reżyserii Eugena Baumanna (w czerwcu 1935 r. na scenie działającego jeszcze wtedy Lobetheater). Inscenizacja ta nie ustrzegła się jednak zmiany pierwotnego charakteru dramatu. Recenzent przedstawienia podkreśla świadomą ingerencję reżysera, który inaczej (niż dotychczas) akcentuje poszczególne motywy sztuki. Komedię, która mogła być wcześniej odbierana przede wszystkim jako satyra na pewien typ urzędnika, Baumann przekształca w sztukę o charakterze ludowym opiewając „zdrowe" cechy narodu niemieckiego15. Dwa lata później, w listopadzie 1937 r., na scenie Schauspielhaus z okazji siedemdziesiątych piątych urodzin twórcy (obchodzonych o wiele skromniej niż choćby jubileusze wypadające w latach 1922 i 1932) wystawiono sztukę Michael Kramer, w której autor zwrócił się ku problematyce artystystycznej . Niezwykle pozytywna recenzja prasowa przedstawienia (w reżyserii ówczesnego dyrektora scen dramatycznych Wrocławia K urta Hoffmanna) zwraca uwagę na mistrzowskie i tym razem wierne oddanie idei utworu. Zachowano stanowiący o sile dramatu doskonały rysunek postaci, podkreślony dodatkowo dobrymi kreacjami aktorskimi. Scenografię do spektaklu przygotował Gustav Bargo16. Jubileuszowy spektakl doczekał się pięciu przed14 L. Biały, F. Biały, Z dziejów teatru niemieckiego w prowincjach śląskich w pierwszych latach rządów hitlerowskich, „ A c t a Universitatis Wratislaviensis" 1985, nr 725, s. 58. 15 „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten" 1935, nr 151, s. 2. 16 G. Bergmann, ,,M ichael Kramer" im Schauspielhaus. Neuinszenierung des Gerhart Hauptmann-Dramas, „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten" 1937, nr 314, s. 2. stawień i w sprawozdaniu z dzialaności scen wrocławskich w sezonie artystycznym 1937/1938 sporządzonym dla ministerstwa propagandy został pozytywnie oceniony przez władze teatralne m iasta17. W ramach obchodów siedemdziesiątych piątych urodzin Hauptmanna we Wrocławiu w grudniu 1937 r. odbyła się jeszcze jedna uroczystość, a mianowicie prapremiera filmu Der Biberpelz na podstawie komedii pod tym samym tytułem (w obecności licznych funkcjonariuszy partyjnych i w niezwykle odświętnej oprawie). Gerhart Hauptmann przyjął zaproszenie na projekcję. W styczniu 1938 r. na scenie Schauspielhaus gościł znany w całych Niemczech aktor, przybyły specjalnie z Berlina wraz ze swoim zespołem teatralnym, Paul Wegener, aby zagrać komedię Kollege Crampton. Wcielając się w postać profesora Cramptona, Wegener potrafił zręcznie oddać geniusz granego przez siebie artysty ze słabościami jego charakteru. Zaprezentowane dwukrotnie przedstawienie spotkało się z ciepłym przyjęciem publiczności1". Kolejną inscenizacją dramatu Gerharta Hauptmanna we Wrocławiu był wspomniany już wcześniej spektakl Elga, który ze względu na swą polską tematykę wywołał prawdziwą burzę. Warto przy tym wspomnieć, że nie licząc gościnnego występu Paula Wegenera w styczniu 1938 r., twórczość Gerharta Hauptm anna nie trafiła do repertuaru scen wrocławskich przez blisko trzy sezony teatralne. Rezenzent prasowy przedstawienia z września 1940 r. (nieświadomy późniejszej fali krytyki) pozytywnie ocenia nie tylko inscenizację, ale także chwali sam, w istocie pod względem artystycznym mało wartościowy utwór. Podkreśla, że należał on do nielicznych późniejszych dramatów Hauptmanna, który już od swojej prapremiery w 1905 r. w Berlinie cieszył się niesłabnącym powodzeniem. Za motyw przewodni sztuki uważa obraz „życia kochającego i ufającego mężczyzny rozbitego przez niewierność bezgranicznie zmysłowej kobiety" 10. Takie spojrzenie na przesłanie utworu rzeczywiście przystawało do argumentów przytaczanych później przez Reichsdram aturga Rainera Schlóssera w liście do Hinkela, jakoby sztuka H auptm anna miała być „przestrogą" i „pouczeniem", a ukazany w niej obraz Polski miał budzić niechęć u publiczności. Przedstawienie w reżyserii Stefana Dahlena ze względu na liczne protesty o podłożu politycznym zaprezentowano jedynie 10 razy20. W kwietniu 1941 r. w repertuarze Schauspielhaus znalazł się pochodzący z 1914 r. dramat Bogen des Odysseus. Uroczysta premiera sztuki w reżyserii 17 Bundesarchiv Berlin, R55, akta nr 20 327. 18 G. Bergmann, Paul Wegener a b ,,Kollege Crampton". Gastspiel m it eigenem Ensemble im Breslauer Schauspielhaus, „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten" 1938, nr 28, s. 2. 19 G. Bergmann, Hauptmanns ,,Elga". Neuinszenierung im Breslauer Schauspielhaus, „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten" 1940, nr 263, s. 2. 20 Bundesarchiv Berlin, R55, akta nr 20 327. ówczesnego dyrektora wrocławskiej sceny dramatycznej K urta Hoffmanna odbyła się w Niedzielę Wielkanocną. Autor zaczerpnął motywy do swego utworu ze świata antycznej Grecji, a i tym razem nie zawahano się tak rozłożyć akcenty inscenizacji (nie było to zresztą zbyt skomplikowane), aby można w niej było dostrzec treści bliskie obowiązującej ideologii. Powracający z wygnania do swojej ojczyzny Odyscusz (w tej roli Kurt Lieck) uosabiał przywiązanie do rodzinnej ziemi, jakie winno być udziałem każdego Niemca. Bogatą scenografię do spektaklu prócz od dawna związanego ze sceną wrocławską Lothara Baumgartena przygotowywał także przybyły specjalnie z Pragi Lübbert. Kostiumy do przedstawienia zaprojektowała Liselotte Erler21. W następnym sezonie teatralnym (marzec 1942 r.) w repertuarze scen dramatycznych Wrocławia znalazła się, przedstawiająca konflikt miłosny (morderczyni dziecka), Rose Bernd wyreżyserowana przez K urta Hoffmanna. W rolach głównych wystąpili Grete Kretschmer i Richard Täufel. Scenografię do spektaklu przygotował Lothar Baumgarten22. Specjalnego znaczenia w relacjach Gerharta Hauptmanna z panującym w Niemczech reżimem nabiera jubileusz jego osiemdziesiątych urodzin przypadający w listopadzie 1942 r. W końcu 1941 r. pamiętające o rocznicy ministerstwo propagandy z rozmachem przystąpiło więc do przygotowań jubileuszowych. Prace te obejmowały obchody planowane nie tylko w Niemczech, ale także w teatrach państw okupowanych, jak i neutralnych oraz sprzymierzonych z 111 Rzeszą. W obchody rocznicy urodzin G erharta Hauptm anna zaangażowało się liczne grono prominentnych funkcjonariuszy państwowych: Joseph Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg, Baldur von Schirach i przede wszystkim Gauleiter Dolnego Śląska Karl Hanke23. W niektóre zagadnienia włączano samego Hitlera, oczekując od niego rozstrzygania kwestii spornych powstałych w toku prac. W grupie tej znalazło się dwóch „sympatyków twórczości Gerharta Hauptmanna, których zamierzeniem 21 M. L. Metzner, Gerhart Hauptmanns „Bogen des Odysseus". Erstaufführung im Breslauer Schauspielhaus, „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten" 1941, nr 103, s. 2. 22 K. Wessel, ,,Rose Bernd": Triumph der Menschlichkeit. Betrachtungen zur Neuinszenierung, „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten" 1942, nr 75, s. 2. 23 Karl Hanke (1903-1945) polityk nimiecki, urodzony w Lubaniu na Śląsku. Od 1928 r. w partii nazistowskiej; w 1931 r. zwolniony z pracy w szkolnictwie ze względu na swe związki z NSDAP. W dziedzinie propagandy należał do najbliższych przyjaciół i współpracowników Goebbelsa. Po 1933 r. wyniesiony przez niego do godności referenta i sekretarza w ministerstwie propagandy. Od 1937 r. Reichskultursenator i wiceprezydent Izby Kulturalnej Rzeszy. Jego błyskotliwa kariera w dziedzinie polityki kulturalnej zakończyła się w 1941 r. z powodu różnic osobistych z Goebbelsem. Od tegoż roku pełnił funkcję Gauleitera Dolnego Śląska, w 1945 r. wsławił się fanatyczną obroną Festung Breslau. W swoim testamencie Hitler wskazał Hankego jako następcę Himmlera na stanowisku Reichsfuhrera SS. Po ucieczce z Wrocławia został pojmany przez czeskich partyzantów i zastrzelony jako anonimowy oficer SS podczas próby ucieczki. było nadanie obchodom jubileuszu jak największego wymiaru. Pierwszym z nich był Gauleiter Dolnego Śląska Karl Hanke, drugim Reichsleiter Wiednia Baldur von Schirach. Departament teatralny ministerstwa propagandy odpowiedzialny za kompleksowe przygotowanie uroczystości jubileuszowych postanowił główny ciężar obchodów przenieść do Wrocławia. Decyzja ta (notabene podjęta w porozumieniu z samym Hitlerem) miała zapobiec nadmiernemu rozgłosowi i powstaniu wrażenia, że twórczość Hauptmanna, ale także jego postawa, bliskie są narodowemu socjalizmowi. Wśród wewnętrznej korespondencji departamentu teatralnego ministerstwa propagandy znaleźć można list jednego z referentów przeznaczony dla Goebbelsa datowany na luty 1942 r., którego fragment dobitnie obrazuje niechętny stosunek aparatu władzy do Hauptmanna: Przesunięcie punktu ciężkości do Wrocławia uważam za celowe. Nie ma potrzeby, aby Berlin tak m ocno w sprawę Hauptmanna się zaangażował, co bądź co bądź po dekadzie napięć między nim i narodowym socjalizmem w latach 1923-33 byłoby właściwe24. Z drugiej zaś strony jubileuszu nie sposób było przemilczeć. Postanowiono więc główne obchody zredukować do uroczystości wrocławskich, nadając im jednak pewien umiarkowany wymiar propagandowy. Także w lutym 1942 r. Reichsdramaturg Schlösser w poufnej notatce pisał do Goebbelsa: Za niezwykle ważne i owocne uważam, aby w nadchodzących uroczystościach wykazać europejskie znaczenie Hauptmanna i w szczególnym wymiarze zaprosić zagranicznych dziennikarzy, a pod pewnymi warunkami także twórców scenicznych, aby m óc pokazać także na zewnątrz wspaniałomyślną postawę narodowego socjalizmu25. W początkowej fazie przygotowań zakładano, że wrocławskie obchody otworzy właśnie Schlösser, tak aby uniknąć wystąpienia Goebbelsa. W tym samym liście można odnaleźć następujący fragment: Poza tym wyraził on [Hanke przyp. tłum.] życzenie, ażeby planowane uroczystości zostały otwarte moim przemówieniem, co według mnie należałoby rozpatrzyć. Tego rodzaju uczestnictwo ministerstwa byłoby plastyczne i zapewniałoby kulturalno-politycznie ważne panowanie nad całością bez potTzeby publicznego występowania Pańskiej osoby, jeśli za słuszne uważa Pan zachowanie rezerwy26. Już w lutym 1942 r., tj. w początkowej fazie przygotowań, planowano we Wrocławiu przeprowadzenie tygodnia Gerharta Hauptm anna (Gerhart Ilauptmann-Woche) w dniach 15-22 listopada. Na liście dramatów, o których wystawienie ubiegały się sceny wrocławskie, znalazły się następujące tytuły: Florian Geyer, Und Pippa tanzt, Vor Sonnenuntergang, Der Bogen des 24 Bundesarchiv Berlin, R55, akta nr 20 235. 25 Ibidem. 26 Ibidem. Odysseus, Michael Kramer, Rose Bernd, Iphigenie i Die Weber. Ponadto zaplanowano otwarcie wystawy pod roboczym tytułem Udział Śląska w piśmiennictwie Wielkich Niemiec (Schlesiens Anteil an Schrifttum Grossdeutschlands). Częścią uroczystości miał być także wieczór poświęcony bratu Gerharta Hauptmanna Carlowi, a jej uwieńczeniem przygotowanie zbiorowego wydania dzieł autora. Większość tych propozycji spotkała się ze wstępną aprobatą ministerstwa propagandy. Stanowczy sprzeciw wyrażono jedynie wobec planowanej inscenizacji dramatu Die Weber, którą uznano za niepożądaną nawet w ramach jubileuszu. Ostateczny kształt publikacji wymagał zaś wcześniejszej akceptacji Goebbelsa. Przeprowadzenie centralnych uroczystości we Wrocławiu miejscowy Gauleiter Karl Hanke uważał za zbyt skromne i prowincjonalne. Porozumiał się z Baldurem von Schirachem co do zorganizowania obchodów jubileuszu H auptm anna w Wiedniu, co miało odpowiadać rzekomo „serdecznym życzeniom" samego twórcy. O zaangażowaniu Hankego niech świadczy notatka, jaką sporządził Reichsdramaturg Schlösser po telefonicznej rozmowie z nim w kwietniu 1942 r.: W Wielki Piątek zadzwonił do mnie do mieszkania Gauleiter Hanke i rozpoczął rozmowę na temat tygodnia Gerharta Hauptmanna. Hanke poinformował mnie, że porozumiał się z Schirachem w kwestii uroczystości we Wiedniu, ponieważ ograniczenie osiemdziesiątych urodzin na Wrocław byłoby przecież zbyt prowincjonalne. Jeśli nie wchodziłaby w rachubę osoba doktora [Goebbels przyp. tłum.], jako reprezentant narodowego socjalizmu we Wiedniu wystąpiłby przy tej okazji ktoś więcej niż tylko Gauleiter, a mianowicie Reichsleiter [Baldur von Schirach przyp. tłum.]21. Hanke był też gorącym orędownikiem nadania wrocławskim obchodom jubileuszu jak najbardziej uroczystej oprawy. W toku przygotowań zaproponował on przyznanie Gerhartowi Hauptmannowi nagrody Grillparzera oraz nazwanie jego imieniem od kilku lat nieczynnego wrocławskiego Lobetheater. Uważał, że osiemdziesiąte urodziny twórcy będą niepowtarzalną okazją do usunięcia od lat zadomowionej w świadomości wrocławian nazwy. Założyciel będącego wtedy w przebudowie teatru był bowiem z pochodzenia Żydem i ten właśnie fakt posłużył w tej sprawie za cenny argument. W tych dwóch ostatnich kwestiach Hanke nie mógł uzyskać zgody ministerstwa propagandy, gdyż negatywne stanowisko zajął także sam Hitler. Ani Goebbels, ani Schlösser nie byli zwolennikami zbyt hucznego jubileuszu, a na dotatek stale musieli liczyć się z protestami Alfreda Rosenberga, któremu nawet uroczystości w mocno okrojonej formie wydawały się zbyt rozbudowane. W zbiorach archiwalnych zachował się list Goebbelsa do Alfreda Rosenberga z 24 czerwca 1942 r., zawierający próbę odpowiedzi na postawione jego placówce zarzuty: Jestem zdania, że nie można milcząco przejść do porządku dziennego nad osiemdziesiątymi urodzinami Gerharta Hauptmanna, choćby ze względu na jego europejską sławę. Aby jednak zapobiec wrażeniu, że przewidziane na osiemdziesiąte urodziny Hauptmanna uroczystości są oficjalnym uhonorowaniem ze strony państwa czy też partii, poleciłem, aby sceny niemieckie przygotowały do końca roku nie więcej niż po jednej inscenizacji spośród jego utworów. Odrzuciłem także planowane przyznanie Hauptmannowi wiedeńskiej nagrody Grillparzera. Jedyne większe przedsięwzięcie dla uczczenia Gerharta Hauptmanna odbędzie się we Wrocławiu, a więc w jego rodzinnym regionie, w formie cyklu od 10 do 15 listopada2*. Mimo wyjaśnień ministra propagandy stanowisko Rosenberga pozostało negatywne. Fakt, że każdy większy teatr niemiecki przygotowywał jedno przedstawienie, uważał za „kulturalno-polityczną propagandę na rzecz twórczości G erharta H auptm anna" 29 i domagał się ograniczenia liczby inscenizacji. Przygotowania w wielu teatrach były już wtedy w pełnym toku, co posłużyło Goebbelsowi za cenny argument w polemice z Rosenbergiem. Nie zważając na liczne protesty Rosenberga i niechętne stanowisko urzędników ministerstwa propagandy, Hanke konsekwentnie wychodził z coraz to nowymi propozycjami. Kiedy Goebbels odrzucił przyznanie Gerhartowi Hauptmannowi nagrody Grillparzera, Gauleiter Dolnego Śląska zasugerował wręczenie jubilatowi sygnowanej przez NSDAP Nagrody Regionalnej (Gaupreis). Twórca miał być jej pierwszym laureatem, a przyznawanie tej nagrody planowano każdego roku. Jednak i ta propozyq'a dla decydentów w Berlinie była nie do przyjęcia. W aktach departam entu teatralnego ministerstwa propagandy znajduje się notatka datowana na 7 lipca 1942 r., w której czytamy m. in.: Po tym jak Rosenberg w tej kwestii nieustannie protestuje, minister ma zastrzeżenia co do przyznania Hauptmannowi na Śląsku z okazji jego osiemdziesiątych urodzin Nagrody Regionalnej (Gaupreis). Gaupreis oznaczałaby bowiem przecież nagrodę partii, a ta przy wyżej wspomnianej okazji nie powiną mieć miejsca, według życzenia i woli Światopoglądowego Wychowawcy N SD A P (der Weltanschauliche Erzieher der NSDAP). Byłoby celowe uzgodnić z Hankem, że G. Hauptmann zamiast Nagrody Regionalnej otrzyma Nagrodę M iasta W rocławia30. Ostatecznie postanowiono przekazać Gerhartowi Hauptmannowi Śląską Nagrodę Literacką {der Schlesiche Literaturpreis) w skromnej jednak jak na owe czasy wysokości 5000 RM. Jubileusz Gerharta Hauptmanna, a raczej zakres jego obchodów, do końca budził kontrowersje w kręgach osób zaangażowanych w jego organizację. W prost „genialnym posunięciem" było wykorzystanie faktu, że urodziny twórcy przypadały w tym samym dniu co jubileusz związanego z narodowym socjalizmem historyka literatury Adolfa Bartelsa. Nagłośnienie 28 Ibidem. 29 Ibidem. 30 Ibidem. weimarskich uroczystości poświęconych Bartelsowi miało przyćmić osobę G erharta Hauptmanna i stanowić swoiste zadośćuczynienie poniesionych w tej sprawie wysiłków. Jeden z referentów ministerstwa propagandy w sprawozdaniu przygotowanym dla Goebbelsa we wrześniu 1942 r. pisał: 15 listopada zarówno A dolf Bartels, jak i Gerhard (sic) Hauptmann obchodzą swoje osiemdziesiąte urodziny. Ten fakt daje nam możliwość, aby zapobiec nadmiernej publicznej obecności osoby Gerharda Hauptmanna. Oczy świata i Niemiec możemy zwrócić tego dnia przede wszystkim na wielkiego narodowego poetę Adolfa Bartelsa. Co stanowi o przewadze Adolfa Bartelsa nad Gerhardem Hauptmanncm, mianowicie jego jasna światopoglądowa i charakterologiczna postawa, która byłaby szczególnie podkreślona we wszystkich wystąpieniach. Przez to znaleźlibyśmy się w sytuacji, w której twórczość literacką Gerharda Hauptmanna potraktować można bez wyciągania na światło dzienne jego osobowości, co byłoby absolutnie fałszywe i niezasłużone. Przypadek Lala (sic) Andersen jest dowodem na to, że, jeśli chodzi 0 byłych przyjaciół Żydów, należy liczyć się zawsze z różnymi niespodziankami. Już choćby z tego powodu jest pożądane, aby w przypadku byłego przyjciela Żydów Gerharta Hauptmanna być ostrożnym i nie przedstawiać go na zewnątrz tak, jakbyśmy zgadzali się z jego postawą. Szczególnie akcentując wielką narodową twórczość i jasną światopoglądową postawę Adolfa Bartelsa, dokona się jasnego i wyraźnego rozdziału między nimi dwoma i nie musi się to dziać w sposób obraźliwy dla Gerharta Hauptmanna. Wiem, że także Reichsleiter Bormann osobiście wykazuje szczególnie wielkie zainteresowanie w niedopuszczeniu do nadmiernego wyeksponowania osobowości Gerharta Hauptmanna, 1 mam nadzieję, że tą sugestią wskazałem drogę, która daje możliwość przedstawienia Gerharta Hauptmanna za pomocą kilku jego utworów, bez powstania fałszywego wrażenia co do jego osoby31. Kiedy przeciwnicy Gerharta Hauptmanna w połowie 1942 r. nasilili swoje działania, z planowanego wcześniej osobistego udziału we wrocławskich uroczystościach wycofał się także Rainer Schlösser. Swą decyzję „o wyciągnięciu głowy z tej kulturalnopolitycznej pętli" 32 podjął pod wpływem przekazanej mu przez Goebbelsa sugestii z samej kwatery głównej Rzeszy. Próbując usprawiedliwić swą nieobecność, pisał w liście do Hankego: W nawiązaniu do naszego spotkania we Wiedniu jednoznacznie przemyślałem sobie pytanie, czy po decyzjach ostatnich tygodni jestem jeszcze odpowiednim m ówcą na 15 listopada we Wrocławiu. Jeśli teraz, choć wiem, że moja odwaga cywilna nie m oże być odtąd przez Pana wysoko ceniona, mimo to mam odwagę wziąć to na siebie, innymi słowy: jeśli chciałbym Pana poprosić, aby w moje miejsce wezwać według partii nie tak prowokującego mówcę na uroczystość 15 listopada, proszę zechcieć docenić, że naturalnie taktyczne przemówienie, którym nigdy nie naraziłbym się, m ogłoby zostać opracowane. N ie lubię jednak, i to musi mi Pan poczytać na moją korzyść, z takiej okazji jak ta, o którą właśnie idzie, mówić wydawałoby się oportunistycznie, a nie w zgodzie z własnymi przekonaniami. Ponieważ po wszystkich wydarzeniach nie jest to dla mnie już możliwe, lepiej będzie, jeśli ustąpię pola komuś, kto w przypadku Hauptmanna ma więcej niż ja bym miał wewnętrznej wolności33. 31 Ibidem. 32 Ibidem. 33 Ibidem. Przy planowaniu uroczystości jubileuszowych nie zapomniano również zadbać o należyte przekazywanie relacji poprzez prasę. Dzienniki centralne miały czerpać swe informacje z ogólnoniemieckiej agencji, a tylko niektóre najważniejsze tytuły mogły wysłać do Wrocławia swoich korespondentów. Na żądanie Rosenberga i Bormanna Goebbels polecił daleko idącą rezerwę w relacjonowaniu obchodów jubileuszu. Jedynie miejscowa prasa zachowała nieco więcej swobody. Niechętnie widziano także pisma okolicznościowe poświęcone Gerhartowi Hauptmannowi. Początkowo odrzucono projekt takiego wydawnictwa przygotowany przez uniwersytet we Wrocławiu i zaaprobowano jedynie wydany przez Reichspropagandaamt Breslau zbiór wypowiedzi o Hauptmannie. Zawierał on także utwory m. in. H ansa Niekrawietza, Friedricha Bischoffa, Arnolda Ulitza i G erharda Pohla. W antologii znalazł się także esej związanego z narodowym socjalizmem historyka literatury Josepha Nadlera zatytułowany Gerhart Hauptmann und das Theater. Gotowy był także pierwszy egzemplarz zbiorowego wydania dzieł, który został wręczony później Gerhartowi Hauptmannowi. Centralne uroczystości z okazji jubileuszu Hauptm anna odbyły się zatem we Wrocławiu w dniach od 10 do 15 listopada 1942 r. Cykl przygotowanych specjalnie na tę okazję inscenizacji otworzyło w Schauspielhaus przedstawienie dram atu Michael Kramer w reżyserii Fritza Schmiedela z Hermannem Menschelem w roli tytułowej. Sztukę tę wybrano na specjalne życzenie autora ze względu na jego związki z Wrocławiem34. Kolejnym spektaklem jubileuszowym była komedia Der Biberpelz, inscenizowana przez K urta Hoffmanna i ze scenografią Lothara Baumgartena, grana już od września 1942 r.3S Na przedstawieniu obecny był Gerhart Hauptmann wraz z m ałżonką36. 14 listopada, w wieczór poprzedzający urodziny pisarza, odbyło się przedstawienie długo nieobecnego we Wrocławiu bajkowego dram atu Und Pippa tanzt także w reżyserii Kurta Hoffmanna. Dzień później miała miejsce uroczysta premiera sztuki Die Tochter der Kathedrale wieńcząca całość uroczystości. Początkowo planowano w dniu urodzin twórcy zaprezentować Iphigenie in Delphi, ale odstąpiono od tego zamiaru, ponieważ dram at ten znalazł się w tym czasie w repertuarze wielu scen w całych Niemczech. Wybór padł na Die Tochter der Kathedrale (której prapremiera odbyła się w 1939 r. w berlińskim Staatstheater) inscenizowaną wcześniej jedynie w Hamburgu i Dreźnie. Wrocławski spektakl przygotował szef połączonych scen dramatycznej i operowej Hans Schlenck. W przedstawieniu wykorzystano muzykę Marca Lothara (tę samą, która towarzyszyła 34 „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten" 1942, nr 309, s. 2. 35 G. Bergmann, Breslauer Schauspielhaus: „Der Biberpelz". Gerhart Hauptmanns Komödie neu inszeniert, „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten" 1942, nr 257, s. 2. 36 „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten" 1942, nr 317, s. 2. berlińskiej prapremierze). Ta pełna poezji, ale i mądrości sztuka w 12 obrazach, nawiązująca w swej budowie i filozofii do Szekspirowskich komedii doczekała się jubileuszowej inscenizacji we Wrocławiu także na życzenie samego twórcy. W roli tytułowej wystąpiła Renate Densow, a scenografię zaprojektował Lothar Baumgarten37. Informacja Bogusława Drewniaka o przedstawieniu dram atu Bogen des Odysseus jest błędna38. Minister propagandy wyraził zgodę jedynie na cztery inscenizacje. Na podstawie stosunkowo bogatych relacji prasowych z obchodów jubileuszu można z całą pewnością stwierdzić, że inscenizacja tej sztuki nie odbyła się39. Cykl przedstawień na scenie Schauspielhaus tworzyły zatem: Michael Kramer, Der Biberpelz, Und Pippa tanzt i Die Tochter der Kathedrale. Inscenizacjom teatralnym w dniach 10-15 listopada towarzyszyły wymienione wcześniej uroczystości związane z osobą samego jubilata. Gerhart Hauptmann wraz z żoną przyjechał z Jagniątkowa (Agnetendorf) do W rocławia w towarzystwie Gauleitera Dolnego Śląska Karla Hankego. Jako honorowy obywatel miasta był gościem jego władz. 15 listopada w Sali Błękitnej prezydium (nie była ona siedzibą Gauleitera) odbyło się uroczyste wręczenie jubilatowi Śląskiej Nagrody Literackiej (Schlesischer Literaturpreis). Z rąk Karla Hankego Gerhart Hauptmann otrzymał także Pierścień Sillinga (Silling-Ring). Nieobecny na wrocławskich uroczystościach Rainer Schlösser wysłał ostatecznie telegram, którego treść zostaje przytoczona w języku niemieckim: Zu Ihrem 80. Geburtstag bitte ich Sie, der Sie als dramatischer Dichter mehr als fünf Jahrzehnte über die Geschichte des deutschen Theaters entscheidend mitbestimmten, dessen urschöpferisches gestalterisches Vermögen den Reichtum unseres Spielplans um Werke und Werte von unumstrittener Wirkung mehrte, die herzlichsten Glückwünsche des Reichsdramaturgen, die Sie auch als Zeichen persönlichen Dankens für unvergessliche Rindrücke aufnehmen wollen, entgegenzunehmen. M it den besten Wünschen für Ihr Schaffen und Ihr W ohlergehen, mit Heil Hitler Dr. Rainer Schlösser!40 31 G . Bergmann, ,,Die Tochter der Kathedrale". Erstaufführung am Geburtstage des Dichters im Schauspielhaus, „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten" 1942, nr 317, s. 5-6. 38 B. Drewniak, op. cit., s. 202. 39 Gerhart Hauptmann zu Ehren. Die Städtischen Bühnen zu seinem 80. Geburtstage, „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten" 1942, nr 309, s. 2-3; Gerhart Hauptmann in ,,Biberpelz", ibidem, nr 314, s. 2; G. Bergmann, ,,Die Tochter der Kathedrale". Erstaufführung am Geburtstage des Dichters im Schauspielhaus, ibidem, s. 2; Deutschland ehrte Gerhart Hauptmann, ibidem, s. 5; G. Bergmann, ,,Und Pippa tanzt". Neuinszenierung des Glashüt ten-Märchens, ibidem, s. 5-6. 40 Bundesarchiv Berlin, R55, akta nr 20 235. Reichsdramaturg Rainer Schlösser był także autorem służbowego telegramu, jaki 14 listopada został wysłany Gerhartowi Hauptmannowi w imieniu ministra propagandy Josepha Goebbelsa. Oto jego treść: Sehr geehrter Herr Doktor. Als dem Klassiker des Naturalismus, der über eine literarische Richtung hinaus stets die Dichtung wollte, dessen Liebe ebensosehr dem schlesischen Menschen in seiner ganzen Gefühlsweite wie allen Kindern der Phantasie, wie die Sage, Märchen und Epos kennen, gehörte, und dessen scharfe Beobachtung uns ein noch heute aufschlussreiches Bild der Rcichshauptstadt von vorgestern schenkte, bestätigen Ihnen am heutigen Tage fünfzig Jahre des Bühnenerfolgs Ihre in allem Wandel der Zeit unbestritten gebliebene Könnerschaft. Der Kampf, in dem wir stehen, und welcher nicht zuletzt der Rettung der Kultur schlechthin gilt, verbürgt auch Ihnen, dass, was Theater und Literaturgeschichte über die Leistung Ihres Lebens verbuchten, unverloren bleibt. In diesem Sinne beglückwünsche ich Sie herzlich zu Ihrem achtzigsten Geburtstag. Heil Hitler!41 Także Adolf Hitler czuł się w obowiązku telegraficznie przesłać życzenia Gerhartowi Hauptm annow i, dołączając do nich wykonaną w Berlinie porcelanową wazę z insygniami SS. Jubileusz osiemdziesiątych urodzin Gerharta Hauptm anna uczcili także germaniści wrocławskiego uniwersytetu (Das Deutsche Institut der Unversität Breslau). Ich stosunek do osoby i dzieł pisarza stanowi przedmiot badań Wojciecha Kunickiego42. Gerhart Hauptmann jako jeden z najwybitniejszych twórców literatury niemieckiej pozostawał bowiem w kręgu zainteresowań jej badaczy. Szczególne osobiste relacje łączyły go z prof. Paulem Merkerem, który od 1929 r. kierował katedrą literatury współczesnej wrocławskiej germanistyki. Hauptmann był jego długoletnim przyjacielem; obaj wielokrotnie spotykali się i wymieniali korespondencję. Merker zaangażował się już w jubileusz siedemdziesiątych urodzin pisarza, publikując na łamach „Schlesische Monatshefte" tekst pt. Gerhart Hauptmann und seine Z e iŕ 3. 10 lat później był jednym z pomysłodawców i inicjatorów (wraz z prorektorem Meissnerem) przyznania mu „honorowej profesury" uniwersytetu, co jednak nie doszło do skutku ze względu na sprzeciw ministerstwa propagandy44. Jubileusz Gerharta Hauptmanna został uczczony ostatecznie przez wrocławską germanistykę pracą zbiorową omawiającą różne aspekty jego twórczości pt. Gerhart Hauptmann. Studien zum Werk und Persönlichkeit. Dem Dichter zum 80. Geburtstage dargeboten vom Deutschen Institut der Universität Breslau (Breslau 1942), w ktorej prócz Paula Merkera (Gerhart Hauptmann. Versuch einer Wesendeutung) swój tekst umieścił m. in. Wolfgang Baumgart (Erlebnis und Gestaltung des Meeres bei Gerhart Hauptmann). Jego pisarstwu poświęcona 41 Ibidem. 42 W. Kunicki, Gerhart Hauptmann im Umkreis des Deutschen Instituts der Universität Breslau, [w:] E. Bialek, E. Tomiczek, M. Zybura [red.], Leben Werk Lebenswerk, s. 161-206. 43 Ibidem , s. 185. 44 Ibidem, s. 201. była również publikacja Gerhart Hauptmann (Breslau 1942) wydana przez Reichspropagandaamt Schlesien i broszura Felixa A. Voigta Gerhart Hauptmann. Der Schlesier4S. Zamiast „honorowej profesury" jubilat odebrał ostatecznie 14 listopada 1942 r. z rąk prorektora Meissnera „honorowe obywatelstwo" uniwersytetu46. Jubileusz osiemdziesiątych urodzin Gerharta Hauptm anna był ostatnią okrągłą rocznicą obchodzoną w III Rzeszy. Aparat propagandy państwa nazistowskiego do końca swojego istnienia próbował wykorzystywać osobę twórcy do celów politycznych. Kiedy w 1945 r., tuż przed nadejściem armii sowieckiej, Hauptmann opuścił Jagniątków i udał się do Drezna, pilnie oczekiwano wieści o jego domniemanej śmierci w gruzach bombardowanego miasta. Wtedy można by było obwieścić światu: alianci nie tylko zniszczyli miasto o niewątpliwym znaczeniu dla kultury całej Europy, ale na dodatek przyczynili się bezpośrednio do śmierci wybitnego niemieckiego twórcy. Gerhart Hauptmann nie zginął jednak w Dreźnie, ale powrócił do swej posiadłości w Jagniątkowie, gdzie zmarł 6 czerwca 1946 r. Jego zwłoki przewieziono pociągiem do Berlina, a następnie na Hiddensee, gdzie został pochowany. W ostatnim sezonie teatralnym (1943/1944), 5 grudnia 1943 r., we Wrocławiu jeszcze raz sięgnięto do repertuaru Gerharta Hauptmanna. Na scenie Schauspielhaus z okazji osiemdziesiątych pierwszych urodzin twórcy miała miejsce wrocławska premiera dramatu Iphigenie in Delphi (prapremiera odbyła się w Berlinie dwa lata wcześniej). Inscenizacja w reżyserii K urta Hoffmanna i ze scenografią Lothara Baumgartena zbiegła się z wiedeńską prapremierą kolejnej części tetralogii Atrydów zatytułowanej Iphigenie in Aulis47. Sztuka doczekała się jednak zaledwie dziewięciu przedstawień48. Były to ostatnie spektakle dram atu Gerharta Hauptmanna w niemieckim Wrocławiu. Twórczość dramatyczna Gerharta Hauptmanna, choć niemal stale obecna na deskach wrocławskich teatrów dramatycznych, zważywszy na rangę osoby i jej znaczenie dla dorobku literackiego Niemiec, wydaje się być przez narodowych socjalistów traktow ana co najmniej niechętnie. Liczba 12 inscenizacji, jakie miały miejsce w czasie trwania 11 sezonów teatralnych, nie jest w stanie oddać szczególnych związków pisarza z regionem, którego Wrocław pozostawał przecież stolicą, zważywszy na fakt, że 4 spośród nich zostały przygotowane na specjalną okazję jubileusz osiemdziesiątych urodzin twórcy. Chęć wykorzystania dramatów, ale także osoby ich autora do realizacji bieżących zamierzeń politycznych nie może jednak przesłonić faktu, że w praktyce, choćby pośrednio Hauptmann w tym procederze 45 Ibidem, s. 201, 204. 4Л Die Gerhart Hauptmann Tage in Breslau. Vom 11. bis 15. November 1942. Ein Buch der Erinnerung, Breslau 1943. 47 G. Bergmann, Breslauer Schauspielhaus. Hauptmanns „Iphigenie in Delphi", „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten" 1943, nr 337, s. 2. 48 Bundesarchiv Berlin, R55, akta nr 20 327. uczestniczył, akceptując de facto ten stan rzeczy i występując publicznie w przedsięwzięciach kulturalnych reżimu. Z pewnością nie był jego ideowym faworytem, wzbudzając co najmniej rezerwę jego prominentnych działaczy, ale nie należał również do jego otwartych przeciwników, czego najlepszym dowodem stał się jubileusz jego osiemdziesiątych urodzin. Obecność dramatów Hauptmanna w repertuarze scen wrocławskich we wspomnianej już liczbie zdaje się obrazować skomplikowane relacje jego osoby z panującym reżimem. Pod tym względem teatry Wrocławia, stolicy regionu o szczególnym znaczeniu dla pisarza, stanowiły swoistego rodzaju normę, charakterystyczną dla całych Niemiec. BIBLIOGRAFIA Zasoby archiwalne Bundcsarchiv Berlin R55 Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda. R55/ 20 235 Prüfungen und Beurteilungen von Werken. Okt. 1942-Dez. 1942. R55/ 20 326 20 327 Breslau Städtische Bühnen. Literatura przedmiotu J. P. Barbian, ,,F e h lh e s e tz u n g Zur Rolle von Gerhart Hauptmann im ,.Dritten Reich", [w:] E. Białek, E. Tomiczek, M. Zybura [red.], liehen Werk Lebenswerk. Ein Gerhart Hauptmann-Gedenkblatt, Legnica 1997, s. 251-286. L. Biały, F. Biały, Z dziejów teatru niemieckiego iv prowincjach śląskich w pierwszych latach rządów hitlerowskich, [w:] „Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis" 1985, nr 725. H. v. Brescius, Gerhart Hauptmann. Zeitgeschehen und Bewusstsein in unbekannten Selbstzeugnissen. Eine politisch-biographische Studie, Bonn 1976. B. Drewniak, D as Theater im N S-Staat. Szenarium deutscher Zeitgeschichte 1933-1945, Düsseldorf 1983. Die Gerhart Hauptmann-Tage in Breslau. Vom 11. bis 15. November 1942. Ein Buch der Erinnerung, Breslau 1943. W. Kunicki, Gerhart Hauptmann im Umkreis des Deutschen Instituts der Universität Breslau, [w:] E. Białek, E. Tomiczek, M. Zybura [red.], Leben Werk Lehenswerk. Ein Gerhart Hauptmann-Gedenkblatt, Legnica 1997, s. 161-206. H. Orłowski, Literatura w H I Rzeszy, Poznań 1979. Prasa „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten", Breslau 1932-1944. Tomasz Majewski DIE INSZENIERUNGEN DER DRAM KN VON GKRHART HAUPTM ANN AUF DEN BRESLAUER BÜH NEN IN DEN JAHREN 1933-1944 Die Breslauer Sprechbühnen wiesen in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus Tendenzen auf, die für das gesamte Theaterleben Deutschlands charakteristisch waren. D ie politische Instrumentalisierung der dramatischen Kunst, wie des ganzen literarischen Lebens, resultierte aus dem zentralen, von dem Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda postulierten Programm, das den Theatern ausscrästhetische Propagandaund F.rziehungsaufgabcn zuschrieb. Die Hauptfrage nach der Spielplangestaltung traf auch für die wichtigsten Verfasser der damaligen Literatur zu, zu denen sicher der eng mit der schlesischen Provinz verbundene Gerhart Hauptmann gehörte. Seine Stellung nach dem Jahre 1933 war keineswegs eideutig und sie bestätigte nur die komplizierten Verhältnisse zwischen ihm und dem Regime, das aus Propagandagründen sein Schaffen selektiv akzeptierte. In den ersten Jahren nach der Machtergreifung spielten deutsche Theater nur wenige Stückre Hauptmanns, in Breslau sogar keine. Erst 1935 brachte das Lobetheater die Aufführung der K om ödie Der Biberpelz. Zwei Jahre später (anlässlich Hauptmanns 75. Geburtstages) spielte man im Breslauer Schauspielhaus, das seit 1936 die einzige Sprechbühne war, das Drama Michael Kramer. In Anwesenheit des Dichters fand hier auch die Uraufführung des Filmes Der Biberpelz statt. 1938 gastierte mit einem eigenen Ensemble der Staatsschauspieler Paul Wegener mit der Inszenierung von Kollege Crampton in Breslau. Erst zwei Jahre später (Jan. 1940) nahm das Theater in Breslau Hauptmanns Werk wieder in das Repertoire auf. D ie Aufführung des Schauspiels Elga, dessen Motive aus Grillparzers Drama entnommen wurden, verursachte heftige Proteste mancher Regime-Ideologen (einschliesslich Alfred Rosenbergs) wegen der polnischen Thematik des Dramas. Im Jahre 1941 inszenierte das Breslauer Schauspielhaus das Stück Der Bogen des Odysseus (die erste Aufführung war am Osternsonntag), im M ärz 1942 die Tragödie Rose Bernd. Eine besondere Bedeutung kommt dem 80. Jubiläum des Dichters (Nov. 1942) zu. Die zentralen Feierlichkeiten dazu wurden von der Theaterabteilung des Goebbelschen Propagandaministeriums nach Breslau verlegt. Nach zahlreichen Kontroversen und Abstimmungen beschloss man im Schauspielhaus 4 Dramen zu spielen: Michael Kramer, Die Tochter der Kathedrale, Und Pippa tanzt und Der Biberpelz. Hauptmann verlieh man auch den Schliesischen Literaturpreis. Ausserdem wurde er zum Ersten Ehrenbürger der Friedrich-Wilhelm-Universität ernannt. Das Deutsche Institut der Breslauer Universität veröffentlichte aus diesem Anlass ein dem Jubilar gewidmetes Gedenkblatt, das verschiedene Aspekte seines Schaffens zum Thema hatte. Auch das Reichspropagandaamt Schlesien bereitete eine Broschüre vor, die das Interesse der Partei betonen sollte. Die Krönung des Jubiläums war die Gesamtausgabe von Hauptmanns Werken, deren erstes Exemplar dem Dichter überreicht wurde. Unter den zahlreichen Wünschen, die Gerhart Hauptmann zu seinem Geburtstage bekam, befanden sich auch Telegrammme von Hitler, Goebbels und Schlösser. D as letzte in Breslau inszenierte Drama Hauptmanns war Imphigenie in Delphi, dessen Erstaufführung am 5. Dez. 1943 im Schauspielhaus stattfand.

Promotion as Contrastive Increase in Expected Fit* Forthcoming, Philosophical Studies (please cite published version) Nathaniel Sharadin ([email protected]) Finnur Dellsén ([email protected]) Abstract​: What is required for an action to ​promote the satisfaction of a desire? We reject extant answers and propose an an alternative. Our account differs from competing answers in two ways: first, it is ​contrastive​, in that actions promote the satisfaction of desires only as contrasted with other possible actions. Second, it employs a notion of expected fit between desire and world, defined as the weighted sum of the fit between the desire and the world in all possible outcomes, where each weight is given by the probability of the agent's obtaining the relevant outcome. According to our proposal, then, an action promotes a desire when the expected fit for the desire given that the agent performs the action is greater than the expected fit of the desire given that the agent performs the contrasting action. We highlight this account's attractive features and explain how it improves on its competitors. Keywords: promotion, desire, rationality, Humeanism, probability 1. Introduction It's possible to satisfy desires. If you want $100, and you get $100, then your desire is satisfied. It's also possible to ​promote the satisfaction of desires. If you want $100, and you get a ticket to a fair lottery the prize for which is $100, then although your desire hasn't ​ipso facto ​been satisfied, the satisfaction of your desire has been promoted. According to one version of Humeanism about reasons, agents have reason to perform all and only those actions that promote the satisfaction of their desires. And even 1 among non-Humeans, it seems clear that at least ​some reasons, viz. the instrumental ones, involve promoting the satisfaction of desires. What, precisely, is required for an 2 1 See, for instance, Schroeder (2007) and Manne (2016). Though they are importantly different, both Schroeder and Manne's brands of Humeanism are put explicitly in terms of promoting agents' desires. See also Hubin (1999). 2 Examples abound. See, for just two instances, Korsgaard (1996) and Scanlon (2015). As Snedegar (2014) points out, even authors not explicitly interested in instrumental reasons -or even ​desires -seem to appeal to the idea of promotion in stating their views. (Compare Snedegar (2014, pp. 46-7).) Here we * Both authors contributed equally to the paper; we've adopted the convention of alternating the order in which our names appear on published work. action to promote the satisfaction of a desire? In this paper, we offer a new account, highlight its attractive features, and explain how it improves on its competitors. All of the most prominent accounts of promotion appeal to the notion of probability, so we begin (in section 2) by describing two recent probabilistic accounts -Pure Probabilism and Causal Probabilism. We'll argue that both accounts face serious problems, but that these can be solved by recognizing that promotion is contrastive (in a sense to be explicated). But that's not the end of the story, since even contrastive probabilistic accounts of promotion face a peculiar problem first identified by one of the present authors in previous work (Sharadin (2015)). Sharadin suggests solving this problem with a disjunctive account that introduces the notion of "fit" between desire and world. But we'll argue that Sharadin's prior account, even when modified to take account of the contrastive nature of promotion, is also problematic. In section 4, we describe two related problems with Sharadin's view. This completes the main negative argument of the paper: extant proposals regarding promotion are, we think, unacceptable. In sections 5 and 6, we describe our own account, and explain how it accommodates the virtues of Sharadin's earlier account while elegantly solving its problems. In the penultimate section (section 7) we'll explain how our view's neutrality on the question of what sort of probabilities are at issue is a ​feature ​rather than a ​bug of the view. We conclude by reflecting on where this leaves the debate over promotion. 2. Probabilism: Pure, Causal, and Contrastive 2.1. Pure Probabilism One recent proposal is that promoting the satisfaction of a desire -- ​promoting a desire​, for short -is simply a matter of its satisfaction being more probable given the action that it would otherwise be. According to the most general version of this view: Pure Probabilism​: Agent A's φ-ing promotes desire D iff pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) > pr(satisfaction of D|B)​. won't be concerned with the details of the relationship between promotion and instrumental reasons, or promotion and other possible objects of promotion (such as values, or objectives, or ends); instead, with others in the literature (e.g. Behrends and DiPaolo (2015), Lin (2016)), we'll take there to be some plausible relationship between reasons and promotion and we'll treat the promotion relation as independently interesting. We'll also focus our attention in what follows on promoting ​desires (rather than, say, ends or values), but nothing important hangs on this focus. For more on the relationship between reasons and promotion, see the discussion in Kolodny (forthcoming) and Maguire (2016). 2 Where B (for ​B​aseline) is filled in by the specific version of the purely probabilistic view on offer. For instance, Mark Schroeder says that the baseline is the agent performing no action whatsoever. Stephen Finlay claims the baseline is the agent not 3 performing the action in question (e.g., not-φ-ing). D. Justin Coates holds that the 4 baseline comprises whatever facts contribute to the "antecedent intrinsic likelihood" of D's being satisfied. 5 Pure Probabilism yields intuitively correct results in a wide range of cases. For instance, working for the moment with Schroeder's account of the baseline, we can explain why buying a ticket to the lottery might promote your desire for $100. If we suppose that the probability that you'll get $100 if you do nothing is quite low (you have no salary, and no one is likely to give you the money, say), that the lottery is fair, and that there will only be 100 tickets sold, then buying a ticket to the lottery would plausibly promote your desire. For instance, if the probability that you'll get $100 if you do nothing is .002, then buying a ticket promotes your desire, since the probability that you'll get $100 if you buy a single ticket is .01, and .01>.002. Similar remarks go for a range of other cases. Intuitively, Pure Probabilism captures something important about the connection between the (instrumental) reasons there are to perform actions and the likelihood that our desires will be satisfied if we perform those actions: when the satisfaction of our desires is ​more likely given some actions we might perform, i.e., when the actions do what purely probabilistic accounts of promotion say is necessary and sufficient to ​promote those desires, then we have (at least some) reason to perform those actions. However, Pure Probabilism faces a range of related counterexamples due to Jeffrey Behrends and Joshua DiPaolo. The details of the counterexamples depend, in part, on 6 what purely probabilistic account is being targeted. That is, the details of the counterexamples depend on what account of the ​baseline the relevant purely probabilistic account accepts. So, for instance, switching now to Finlay's account of the baseline as our target, we can construct a counterexample such as: 3 Schroeder (2007, p. 113). 4 Finlay (2006, p. 8). Finlay's view is complicated in his (2014): there, he offers a probabilistic account of the ​good for relation rather than the ​promotion relation. Here, we'll discuss his (2006) view. Thanks to [removed for blind review] for suggesting clarity on this point. 5 Coates (2014, p. 5). See Sharadin (2015, esp. fn. 21) for some worries regarding the notion of an "antecedent intrinsic likelihood." 6 C.f. their (2011, 2016). 3 Debbie​: Debbie has some desire. There are three buttons in front of her. If she pushes either Button A or Button B, her desire is guaranteed to be fulfilled. If she pushes button C, her desire will not be fulfilled. Debbie in fact pushes A. Had she not pushed A, she would have pushed B instead. 7 According to Finlay's purely probabilistic account of promotion, an action promotes the satisfaction of a desire only if the probability of that desire's being satisfied is greater than the probability that the desire will be satisfied ​given that the agent does not perform the relevant action​. If that's right, then Debbie ​doesn't ​promote the satisfaction of her desire even if she does something that directly leads to the satisfaction of her desire, viz. pressing button A. To see why, note that since Debbie would have pressed B had she not pressed A, the probability that she presses B given that she does not press A is 1. It follows that the probability of satisfying her desire given that she does not press A is equal to the probability of satisfying her desire given that she presses B. But since her desire is 8 equally likely to be satisfied if she presses B as it is if she presses A (i.e., since the probability is 1 in both cases), it follows that the probability of her desire's satisfaction given that she presses A is ​equal ​to its probability given that she doesn't press A. So, she can't perform any action such that the probability of her desire's being satisfied would be higher than it is given the baseline of 'not pressing A.' So, on Finlay's view, this means she can't promote her desire by pressing A. Intuitively, however, Debbie ​can promote her desire by pressing A: after all, pressing A ​immediately results in her desire's being satisfied​! And this is so even if it's ​also true that ​pressing B would promote the satisfaction of her desire. If you're not convinced, consider the corresponding reasonable claims about what Debbie has ​reason to do. Presumably, since pressing A guarantees the satisfaction of her desire, Debbie has (instrumental) reason to press A. But if Finlay's account is correct, then we are barred from saying this: for, since pressing A doesn't promote the satisfaction of Debbie's desire, there's no 7 Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, p. 2). In order for this counterexample to work, the counterfactual statement at the end of the example must be understood as implying that Debbie's probability of pushing B given that she doesn't push A is 1. 8 Let S​D​ be the proposition that Debbie's desire is satisfied, and let P​A​ and P​B​ be the propositions that Debbie presses A and B respectively. Now, it is theorem of the probability calculus that pr(S​D​|¬​P​A​) = pr(S​D​|​P​B​) pr(P​B​|¬​P​A​) + pr(S​D​|¬​P​B​) pr(​¬​P​B​|¬​P​A​)​. In Buttons, it is meant to be stipulated that pr(P​B​|¬​P​A​) = 1 (see the previous footnote), and thus that pr(​¬​P​B​|¬​P​A​) = 0. It follows from the theorem that pr(S​D​|¬​P​A​) = pr(S​D​|​P​B​). 4 (promotive, instrumental) reason for Debbie to press A. It might seem as if this counterexample depends on Finlay's idiosyncratic view of what the ​baseline is. There's something right about this suspicion. As we mentioned above, the details of the counterexamples to purely probabilistic accounts of promotion do depend on the particular purely probabilistic account of promotion being targeted: such counterexamples exploit the purely probabilistic nature of those accounts ​together with the particular account's view of what the baseline is. For instance, returning to Schroeder's account of the baseline (viz., the agent's ​doing nothing​), we can generate a counterexample by imagining a case where the agent's desire will be satisfied ​iff she in fact ​does nothing​. In such a case, Schroeder's view will deliver the counterintuitive result that the agent's doing nothing does ​not promote her desire (despite guaranteeing it will be satisfied). This is because in this particular case the relevant action is identical to what Schroeder has chosen as the baseline; so, the satisfaction of the agent's desire is equally probable given the action as it is given the baseline. Structurally similar counterexamples arise for other purely probabilistic accounts. What these 9 counterexamples have in common is that they are cases where, intuitively, an agent's action promotes her desire, and the agent thereby has reason to perform that action, but where the probability of the desire's satisfaction is incapable of rising, due to the details of the case, relative to the baseline. 10 2.2. Causal Probabilism In a recent article, Eden Lin has suggested that the availability of counterexamples to Pure Probabilism is rooted in those views' failure to require a ​causal connection between an agent's action and the uptick in probability sufficient for promotion. By contrast, then, Lin thinks an action promotes the satisfaction of a desire when (and only when) it ​makes or ​causes the probability of the desire's satisfaction to increase in the 9 For an extended discussion of this counterexample to Schroeder's account, see Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, pp. 4) and Sharadin (2015, pp. 1373-5). For one targeting Coates's view, a version of which we'll discuss in more detail below (section 3.1), see Sharadin (2015) and Behrends and DiPaolo (2016). 10 Some, for instance Lin (2016) and Fischer (2017), think that when one's desire is certain to be satisfied no matter what one does (e.g., in Debbie's case), nothing one can do ​promotes the satisfaction of that desire. Hence these philosophers think that purely probabilistic accounts are not subject to Debbie-style counterexamples. We think this intuition too firmly (indeed, in Fischer's case, explicitly) ties one's view about promotion to one's view about reasons. In any case, below we'll argue that probabilistic accounts face other difficulties too; so, for the sake of argument, we can admit that these counterexamples are not decisive. 5 actual world, where the causal increase in probability is best understood as a change in probability over time -from the time ​prior to the agent's action to a time ​after the action. Hence Lin argues for what he calls "Simple Probabilistic Promotion," and what 11 we'll call ​Causal​ ​Probabilism​: Causal Probabilism​: For time t​1 prior to an agent A's φ-ing and later time t​2 after A's φ-ing, φ-ing promotes the satisfaction of D iff φ-ing ​causes pr​t2​(satisfaction of D) > pr​t1​(satisfaction of D). , 12 13 Lin's idea, then, is that promotion is a matter of ​causing ​something to be more likely than it was before: when an agent's action promotes the satisfaction of one of her desires, the action causes the desire to be more likely to be satisfied than it was prior to the action. Just like ​Pure Probabilism, ​Causal ​Probabilism gets the right results in a range of cases: Why does buying a lottery ticket promote one's desire to have $100? Because buying the lottery ticket ​causes the probability of having $100 to be higher after buying the ticket than it was prior to buying it. Causal probabilism still has a potential problem with cases like Debbie, since the probability of Debbie's desire being satisfied was already 1 before she pressed the button. However, Lin (2016, p. 6-11) has argued that 11 While Lin himself doesn't include one, we think it's natural to suppose that Lin's view should include a restriction on the relevant times prior to (t​1​) and after (t​2​) the agent's action. Such a restriction would, we think, naturally involve the ​existence ​of the desire at t​1. To see why, suppose we do ​not ​require that t​1 be a time when the agent's desire already exists -or, if you think desires can be satisfied despite no longer existing, ​has already existed​. Now suppose I do not now (at t​1​) desire a fig newton, but that, unless I'm informed of my serious allergy to figs, I will desire a fig newton in six days. Finally, suppose that, no matter what happens, I will be given a fig newton in seven days. Then it turns out that, given Causal Probabilism (without some restriction on t​1​), actions I might perform in the next several days that make it less likely that I'll be informed of my serious allergy to figs -for instance, locking myself in a room -- promote the satisfaction of my (future) desire for a fig newton. This is because such actions make it more likely that my desire for a fig newton will ​come into being (on day six), and hence subsequently be satisfied (on day seven). But, intuitively, what locking myself in my room causally affects is something about ​which desires I'll have​, not ​which desires of mine are promoted​. The counterintuitiveness of this result appears even greater if we invoke the standard connection between reasons and desire-promotion, since that would seem to imply that I have a reason, at t​1​, to lock myself in my room (since doing so would promote the satisfaction of my future desire). In any case, nothing in what follows depends on this issue. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging clarity on this point.) 12 Lin (2016, p. 4). Here we precisify Lin's account slightly. Lin's official version is: S's doing A promotes p iff it makes p more likely to obtain than it was prior to the occurrence of A. Here we are focused on the case of ​desire promotion. We also make explicit that Lin's talk of "making more likely" should be understood in causal terms. In personal correspondence Lin has confirmed that the version of his account we give here is faithful to his intentions with respect to the account. 13 Here, pr​t1​(-) and pr​t2​(-) are the relevant probability functions at t​1​ and t​2​ respectively. 6 Debbie is not a genuine counterexample to Causal Probabilism, since the intuition that Debbie's desire is promoted is mistaken in his view. We will not critically discuss Lin's argument for that claim here; instead, we will argue that Causal Probabilism is subject to a range of ​other counterexamples. (We will shortly argue that the way to avoid these counterexamples is to go ​contrastive​ about promotion.) Consider Bertie, who desires to run (and finish) a marathon. For simplicity, suppose that the following are the only relevant actions available to Bertie at t​1​: Regular (R): ​Begin a regular training program Sporadic (S):​ Begin a sporadic training program No Training (N):​ Begin no training program Since Bertie is conscientious, there's a good chance he'll engage in a ​r​egular training program, a much smaller chance he'll be ​s​poradic in his training, and some non-negligible chance that he'll ​n​eglect his training altogether. Specifically, suppose that the following probabilities hold at t​1 with respect to Bertie's likelihood of embarking on these various training programs: pr​t1​(R) = .88 pr​t1​(S) = .1 pr​t1​(N) = .02 Suppose further that the following conditional probabilities hold with respect to the chances of Bertie's finishing the marathon (F), given that he embarks on one of the training programs: pr​t1​(F|R) = .95 pr​t1​(F|S) = .2 pr​t1​(F|N) = .001 These probabilities reflect the facts that runners who train regularly tend to finish marathons at a (much) higher rate than runners who train sporadically, and that those who train sporadically in turn tend to finish marathons at a (much) higher rather than those who don't train at all. Now consider what Causal Probabilism says about which of the actions available to Bertie at t​1 promotes his desire to finish a marathon. In order for Causal Probabilism to deliver a verdict, we need to know the probability, at t​1​, that Bertie will finish the marathon, since it is only if that probability increases as a causal result of an action that that action promotes Bertie's desire. On the assumption that the 7 courses of action listed above exhaust Bertie's options with regard to embarking on different training programs, we can calculate the probability of Bertie's finishing the marathon prior to beginning a training program (at t​1​) as follows: pr​t1​(F) ​= ​pr​t1​(R) * pr​t1​(F|R) + pr​t1​(S) * pr​t1​(F|S) + pr​t1​(N) * pr​t1​(F|N) = .88 * .95 + .1 * .2 + .02 * .001 ≈ .856 But then, according to Causal Probabilism, the only available action that Bertie could perform at t​1 that would promote his desire to finish the marathon is to begin a regular training program (R). In particular, if Bertie engages in a sporadic training program (S), his probability of finishing the marathon will be equal to his prior conditional probability of finishing the marathon provided that he started a sporadic training program. That is: pr​t2​(F) = pr​t1​(F|S) = .2 Notice that Bertie's beginning a sporadic training program thus causes a ​decrease rather than an ​increase ​in the probability of his finishing the marathon. So Causal Probabilism entails that beginning a sporadic training program not only does not ​promote Bertie's desire, but in fact significantly ​dispromotes​ his desire. 14 But this is a very awkward result! There is a clear sense in which Bertie's beginning a sporadic training program promotes his desire to finish a marathon -and, correspondingly, a clear sense in which Bertie's desire gives him a reason to begin such a training program. Any adequate view of promotion should account for that. It is of course true that what would ​best promote Bertie's desire to finish -and what Bertie's desire plausibly gives him ​most reason to do -is to train regularly. He obviously has less reason to train sporadically, since this would less effectively promote his desire to finish the marathon. But it doesn't follow that he has ​no reason whatsoever to train sporadically, and, most importantly for our purposes here, it certainly doesn't follow that training sporadically would dispromote his desire to finish the marathon. Bertie's case isn't isolated. Here's the recipe for generating other counterexamples: Take an agent who is antecedently very likely to perform one action that will make it very likely that her desire is satisfied (e.g., R), and who is antecedently very unlikely to do something that will make it somewhat less likely that her desire is satisfied (e.g., S). It will follow, according to Causal Probabilism, that only the thing the agent is 14 Here, and in what follows, we use 'dispromote' as the opposite of 'promote.' 8 antecedently very likely to perform (e.g., R) will promote the satisfaction of her desire, since only the action that makes it very likely that the desire is satisfied will generate the inequalities Causal Probabilism requires. However, in these cases, this is simply the wrong result. Although performing the antecedently likely action is what ​best promotes her desire in these cases, there is a clear sense in which other actions the agent might perform may also promote her desire (though not quite to the same degree). 15 2.3. Contrastive Probabilism So, like Pure Probabilism, Causal Probabilism appears to be subject to counterexamples. What to do? We think both sorts of counterexamples can be avoided by adopting a ​contrastive account of promotion -one that mimics and complements a contrastive account of reasons such as Justin Snedegar's. Rather than taking 16 promotion to be a non-contrastive affair, according to which an action either promotes, or fails to promote, the satisfaction of a desire ​simpliciter​, we should take promotion to be a ​contrastive notion, according to which an action either promotes, or fails to promote, the satisfaction of a desire ​as compared to other actions​. This basic idea can 17 be spelled out in a probabilistic framework as follows: Contrastive Pure Probabilism​: Agent A's φ-ing ​rather than ψ-ing promotes desire D iff pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) > pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs)​. 18 15 Lin appears to be aware that his view generates these sorts of results, and is aware that they appear problematic (see especially Lin 2016, pp. 18-19). Although he's aware of these problems, he doesn't offer a solution to them, saying instead that accepting Causal Probabilism would amount to "biting a bullet" (p. 19) on these points. Below, we offer a solution on his behalf (see footnote 18). 16 Snedegar (2014). Here we follow Snedegar's proposal about how to understand the structure of contrastivism, though note that our interest in contrastivism concerns the promotion relation rather than the reason-for relation, which is that target of Snedegar's analysis. While we find Snedegar's proposal regarding contrastivism about reasons ​compelling, our account of promotion here is strictly speaking neutral on the nature of the reason-for relation. With that said, we do note that our contrastivism about promotion fits nicely into Snedegar's contrastivism about reasons, given a very modest assumption about how the two should be linked. Snedegar analyses what it takes for there to be a reason for an agent to φ rather than ψ in terms of whether φ-ing or ψ-ing ​better promotes one of the agent's desires. But what is it for φ-ing to promote a desire better than ψ-ing does? We submit that this is (at least extensionally equivalent to) its being the case that φ-ing ​rather than ψ-ing ​promotes the desire. If so, our account here in effect is an account of the promotion comparisons that Snedegar appeals to in his contrastivism about reasons. 17 C.f. Snedegar (2014, esp. p. 52 and following). 18 Causal Probabilism can also be given a contrastivist spin, roughly by contrasting how much two (or 9 Note the two differences between Contrastive Pure Probabilism and its non-contrastive counterpart. First, an agent's action promotes the satisfaction of a desire only ​as contrasted with ​another action. Second, the ​baseline against which an agent's action is 19 compared in terms of the probability of satisfying the desire is replaced with the contrasting action; hence, we now compare the probabilities of satisfying a desire given two different actions, as opposed to comparing the probabilities of satisfying that desire given an action and a baseline. How does this modification to Pure Probabilism resolve the two problems discussed above? Let's start by examining Debbie's case, which seemed to cause problems for Finlay's account. The problem, in short, was the account's inability to say that Debbie's pressing A promotes her desire. But given a contrastive understanding of promotion, we are now in a position to identify the way in which Debbie's pressing A ​does promote her desire. Given the details of Debbie's case and Contrastive Pure Probabilism, we have the following: (1) Debbie's pressing button A rather than C promotes the satisfaction of her desire. (2) Debbie's pressing button B rather than C promotes the satisfaction of her desire. (3) Debbie's pressing button A rather than B ​does not promote the satisfaction of her desire. Given (1), there is a sense in which Debbie's pressing A promotes her desire, in that Debbie's pressing A ​rather than C promotes the satisfaction of her desire. By the same more) actions cause the probability of satisfying a desire to increase. Somewhat more precisely: Contrastive Causal Probabilism​: For time t​1 prior to an agent A's φ-ing or ψ-ing, and a later time t​2 after A's φ-ing or ψ-ing, φ-ing rather than ψ-ing ​promotes the satisfaction of D iff I​φ > I​ψ​, where I​φ is the increase in probability of satisfying D between t​1 and t​2 that is (or would be) caused by φ-ing and I​ψ is the increase in probability of satisfying D between t​1 and t​2 that is (or would be) caused by ψ-ing. However, it is worth noting that this account involves a comparison between different worlds (viz. worlds in which A φs and worlds in which A ψs), and thus arguably betrays Lin's (2016, pp. 4-5) central idea that promotion should only be based on a comparison of probabilities at different times in the same world. Partly for that reason, we will not be exploring the plausibility of Contrastive Causal Probabilism in what follows (though we invite others to do so). 19 Or: ​set of multiple actions. Since this complication won't be important in the arguments to come, we ignore it in what follows. 10 token, given (2), there is a sense in which Debbie's pressing B promotes her desire, in that Debbie's pressing B rather than C promotes the satisfaction of her desire. Furthermore, it is intuitive that pressing A is just as good at promoting her desire as pressing B would be (since pressing either button satisfies her desire). That too is captured by Contrastive Pure Probabilism: (3) says that pressing A ​rather than B doesn't promote the satisfaction of her desire. So, assuming as we are here some connection between promoting a desire and the existence of instrumental reasons, there is a reason for Debbie to press A rather than C, a reason for her to press B rather than C, but no reason to press A rather than B. And all of these claims seem like exactly the 20 right results.​, 21 Next recall Bertie's case, which constituted our counterexample to Causal Probabilism. The problem with Causal Probabilism was its inability to say that Bertie's embarking on a sporadic training program promotes his desire to finish a marathon. But given a contrastive understanding of promotion, we are now in a position to identify the way in which Bertie's sporadic training ​does promote his desire. Given the details of Bertie's case and Contrastive Pure Probabilism, we have the following: (4) Bertie's sporadic training rather than no training promotes the satisfaction of his desire. (5) Bertie's regular training rather than no training promotes the satisfaction of his desire. (6) Bertie's sporadic training rather than regular training ​does not promote the satisfaction of his desire. Given (4), there is a sense in which Bertie's sporadic training promotes his desire, in that Bertie's sporadic training ​rather than no training ​does promote the satisfaction of his desire to run a marathon. By the same token, given (5), there is a sense in which 20 For more on contrastive reasons, see Snedegar (2014, esp. p. 53 and following; 2013). 21 It is perhaps worth noting that Contrastive Pure Probabilism also entails the following about Debbie: (3*) Debbie's pressing button A rather than not pressing button A ​does not promote the satisfaction of her desire. This might initially seem like a puzzling or even counterintuitive result. However, this reaction is based on a confusion. Recall that it is stipulated in this case that Debbie would press button B if she does not press A. So, in this case, pressing B and not pressing A are just two different descriptions for the very same course of action. It follows, then, that there is no difference in this case between pressing A rather than B, on the one hand, and pressing A rather than not pressing A, on the other hand. Thus (3) and (3*) stand and fall together. Since (3) is clearly true, the same goes for (3*). 11 Bertie's regular training also promotes his desire, in that his training regularly rather than not at all certainly promotes his desire. Furthermore, it is intuitively plausible that Bertie's training sporadically rather than regularly does not promote the satisfaction of his desires, which is captured by (6). So, assuming as we are here the connection between promoting a desire and the existence of instrumental reasons, there's a reason for Bertie to train sporadically rather than not at all, regularly rather than not at all, and no reason to train sporadically rather than regularly. And again, all of these claims seem like exactly the right results. 22 Before proceeding, it's worth briefly mentioning a complication, and an attendant possible worry. There certainly ​appear ​to be cases of promotion that are cases of promotion ​simpliciter​, i.e., cases where an action promotes a desire ​not as contrasted to some other action's promoting that desire, but simply promotes the desire ​full stop​. For instance, it's natural to say, as we said above, that buying a ticket to a fair lottery promotes an agent's desire to win (and to ​leave it at that​). How can such apparently non-contrastive cases of promotion be analyzed within the contrastivist framework we are proposing? Although there might be more than one plausible analysis on offer, we favor one along the following lines. Claims of promotion ​simpliciter are, we suggest, ​shorthand for contrastive promotion claims, where the contrasting action is determined by familiar conversational maxims. In particular, the contrasting action will be determined in part by Grice's maxim of quantity, which says to provide as much information is needed ​and no more​. Accordingly, at least in ordinary conversational contexts, the conversationally salient contrasting action when one says that some action φ-ing promotes a desire (simpliciter) is simply the action of ​not performing the action in question​, i.e., not-φ-ing. Hence in those contexts obeying the maxim of quantity would require making a promotion-simpliciter claim as opposed to a contrastive promotion claim, since it will be pragmatically determined that the contrasting action amounts to not performing the action. 23 22 There is a range of interesting features of contrastivism about promotion that we won't have the space to address here, e.g. ​how the contrast class is to be specified in a given case. Happily, the use to which we're putting contrastivism here doesn't depend on any particular answer to such questions. So, for reasons of space and ease of exposition, we put off discussion of them to another time, and, again, point the interested reader to Snedegar's (2013, 2014) work on how to deal with issues of this kind. 23 Interestingly, this helps explain why the ​non-​contrastive probabilistic accounts discussed above, such as Finlay's, take the baseline to be not-φ-ing. It helps explain, too, why there might be disagreement among probabilistic accounts over that baseline: Schroeder's account of the baseline (the agent's not doing anything at all) might be thought to be an alternative, equally good candidate for what is (sometimes, at least) a conversationally salient contrast class. 12 So, we have shown how a simple contrastivist version of Pure Probabilism provides an elegant and intuitive way of dealing with well-known counterexamples to other purely probabilistic accounts, as well as our own counterexamples to Lin's more recent Causal Probabilism. Going forward, then, we're going to assume that the correct account of promotion will be a ​contrastive one, i.e., one that embraces the idea that actions promote -or fail to promote -the satisfaction of desires ​as contrasted with other possible actions​. As we'll see in the next section, however, even a contrastive probabilistic account faces problems. 3. Promotion as Involving Fit Between Desire and World In recent work, one of the authors of this present essay -Nathaniel Sharadin (2015, 2016) -has argued that all probabilistic accounts of promotion face a problem in accounting for certain cases of promotion. Sharadin's focus there is on non-contrastive 24 purely probabilistic accounts of promotion. However, as we'll see, those arguments work against contrastive purely probabilistic accounts too. Since we've already argued that we have good reason to be interested in a contrastive probabilistic account of promotion (because such an account can avoid the counterexamples just adduced) here we'll focus our attention on showing how Sharadin's argument applies to ​contrastive probabilistic accounts of promotion. As we will see, Sharadin's argument motivates introducing the notion of ​fit ​between one's desire and the world as a central component in any account of promotion (including contrastive probabilistic accounts). 3.1. Desires that Cannot Be Fully Satisfied Briefly, the problem Sharadin introduced is that it is sometimes possible to promote a desire but, given the desire's content, impossible to raise the probability of its satisfaction. For instance, consider one of his examples of a desire: Extreme Ascetic (EA)​: The desire that none of your desires are satisfied. 25 The probability of EA's satisfaction is always 0. But then, no matter what the relevant 26 24 ​In what follows, although Sharadin is one of the authors of this present essay, we continue to refer to Sharadin in the third person, in order to avoid confusion between the previous and the present work. 25 Sharadin (2016, p. 1). 26 Either EA is satisfied, or EA is not satisfied. If EA is satisfied, then EA is not satisfied; if EA is not 13 contrasting actions are supposed to be, Contrastive Pure Probabilism entails that it is impossible to promote EA. However, Sharadin argues that it ​is possible to promote EA. Suppose you have the desire EA and are offered the opportunity to frustrate the satisfaction of a large percentage of your desires – by taking a desire-frustration pill, say. Intuitively, you have a reason to take the pill rather than, say, to take a placebo. This, in turn, is because by taking the pill rather than the placebo you promote the satisfaction of your desire that none of your desires are satisfied (EA). After all, Sharadin reasons, ​fewer of your desires will be satisfied if you take the pill than if you take the placebo and you desire that ​none of your desires are satisfied. If ​fewer of your desires will be satisfied if you take the pill than if you take the placebo, then by taking the pill you'll in some sense ​move closer (though, of course, not ​all the way​) ​to satisfying your desire that ​none of your desires are satisfied.. However, since you 27 cannot move closer to satisfying EA ​probabilistically​, Sharadin argues that we need to revise our account of promotion. 28 Sharadin's argument has recently been criticized by Lin (2016). To explain Lin's objection, suppose Artie has an arbitrary set of desires S, among which is EA, and among which some subset S* (not including EA!) is ​very likely to be satisfied in the course of the next week. Suppose also that Artie is offered a desire-frustration pill that will frustrate the satisfaction of all members of S*. Artie clearly has an (instrumental) reason to take the pill -a point on which Lin and Sharadin agree. However, Lin 29 disagrees with Sharadin's claim that the most natural explanation of this fact is that Artie's taking the pill will promote EA. Instead, Lin thinks that on the "most natural way of interpreting the case" Artie "has a number of ​related desires -such as the desire to have fewer [of his] desires [satisfied]". In other words, Artie has something like: 30 EA*​: The desire that as few of his desires as possible are satisfied. According to Lin, it is EA*, not EA, that explains why Artie has a reason to take the satisfied, then EA is not satisfied. So, no matter what, EA is not satisfied. If some desire is not satisfied no matter what, then the probability that it is satisfied is (always) 0. 27 Sharadin (2015, p. 1380). DiPaolo and Behrends (2015) criticize this sort of "reason to promotion" inference. But see Sharadin (2016) for a reply. 28 Note that Sharadin's worry is not just a worry for Contrastive Pure Probabilism. It's also a worry for Contrastive Causal Probabilism. Since, by hypothesis, the probability of EA cannot increase, nothing can, by hypothesis, be a ​cause​ of that probability increasing. 29 C.f. Lin (2016, p. 16): "I agree that on the most natural way of filling in the details of the case, there is intuitively a reason for the agent" to take the pill. 30 Lin (2016, p. 15). 14 pill. In a recent note, responding to the same point made by Jeffrey Behrends and Joshua DiPaolo, Sharadin offers a reply to this "neighboring desire" worry. In brief, 31 Sharadin's claim is that the rationality of EA* is now in need of explanation, and the best explanation of why there is a reason for Artie have EA* is that doing so promotes EA: and then we're back off to the races. We lack the space to consider Sharadin's 32 reply in detail here; but in any case, Lin goes further: Suppose that, besides [EA], our agent truly has ​no other desires [such as EA*] whose satisfaction might be promoted by [taking the pill]. Moreover, suppose that our agent has some reason ​against [taking the pill] (e.g., it would [...] be mildly unpleasant). Intuitively, however weak this reason is, he has more reason against [taking the pill] than he does in favor of [taking it]. This can only be because he has no reason of any weight to [take the pill]. This means that [EA] does ​not give him a reason to [take the pill], and thus that [taking it] would ​not promote the satisfaction of this desire. 33 We reject Lin's intuitive judgment in this case as probative on three grounds. First: we do not find it intuitive that, supposing Artie really does have EA, that however weak some countervailing reason is, that reason will always outweigh the reason provided by EA. Indeed, any proponent of the idea that impossible desires can be promoted would plausibly have a countervailing intuition: given a sufficiently weak reason against taking the pill, the reason Artie has in favor of taking the pill will win out. Since Lin offers no argumentative support for the claim that it will always lose out (other than the report of his own intuition about the case) a proponent of the idea that impossible desires can be promoted has no reason to accept that the agent's reason against taking the pill is necessarily stronger than any reason provided by EA in favor of taking it. Second: Lin's judgment about the case, if accurate, seems to itself deliver 31 For DiPaolo and Behrends's argument see their (2015). For Sharadin's reply, see his (2016). 32 Sharadin (2016, esp. p. 4 and following). As an anonymous referee points out, Sharadin's reply relies on two related contentious assumptions, viz. that (1) there must be a reason for the agent to have EA* and (2) the reason there is for the agent to have EA* is explained in the same way as the reasons there are for the agent to perform various actions. Again, we lack the space to adequately address these issues here; moreover, as we explain, even if we stipulate that there are no neighboring desires, there are issues with Lin's account. 33 Lin (2016, p. 15-16). 15 counterintuitive results. Suppose Artie has EA (and no further desire EA*) and is offered the choice between ​two pills, P1 and P2, one of which -P1 -will frustrate all the members of S*, and one of which -P2 -will frustrate all the members of S* ​plus one other desire of his. Lin's judgment about this case will be that since there is no reason to take P1 and no reason to take P2, there is equal reason to take both. But we find this result bewildering. There is, intuitively, a stronger reason to take P2 than P1; and this, in turn, is because taking P2 ​better promotes EA. Of course, it doesn't better probabilistically promote EA (since it's impossible to probabilistically promote EA in any case). But that only blocks us from saying what it is natural to say about the case if we tie ourselves, as Lin's own account does, to a probabilistic understanding of promotion. 34 Third, and finally: Even if it were true, as Lin claims, that the agent always has more reason ​against ​taking the pill than in favor of taking it, this would not show, as Lin claims it does, that the agent has no reason of any weight in favor of taking the pill. For it could be that, as a result of the correct account of reasons' weights, reasons agents have for taking actions that would promote the desires they have that are ​impossible to satisfy are, as a matter of principle, always everywhere outweighed by the reasons agents have for taking actions that would promote the desires they have that it is possible to satisfy. Indeed, such an account of the weight of reasons has some attractive features: if it's truly impossible to satisfy a desire, then, intuitively, it should be the ​very last thing one tries to do among one's options, if one is trying to do what one has (most) reason to do. Since Lin doesn't offer us any reason for thinking such a view about the weight of reasons is somehow unacceptable or, more importantly, precluded by an alternative account of promotion, a proponent of the idea that impossible desires can provide reasons of some (perhaps lexically minimal) weight might well, for all Lin has said, accept such a view about the weight of reasons. 3.2. The Disjunctive Alternative (in a Contrastivist Framework) Assuming, then, that we accept Sharadin's argument that desires such as EA can be promoted, what kind of account of promotion should we move towards? Sharadin's 34 These two replies to Lin rely on competing intuitive judgments about cases. Of course, the usual caveats that apply to such arguments apply to this one: intuitions will vary, and readers are free to disagree with ours. But since Lin makes free use of his own intuitions in the argument, we think it's fair to appeal to our own -and, importantly, to the intuitions of the proponent of the idea that desires it is impossible to satisfy can be promoted -in reply. 16 solution is to introduce the notion of ​fit between a desire and the world. In effect, the idea of fit is meant to flesh out what "moving closer" to the satisfaction of a desire amounts to, when it is not possible to do so probabilistically. Intuitively, fit between a world and a desire is a matter of match between the desire's content and the way the world is. According to Sharadin, we can formally model the intuitive idea of ​fit between a particular desire ​D and the set of possible worlds ​W by an order ≿​D on ​W so that, for some ​D and for any two worlds w​1 and w​2​, w​1 ≿​D w​2 just in case w​1 fits D at least as well as w​2​. We say that w​1 is a strictly better fit for D than w​2​, w​1 ≻​D w​2​, just in case w​1 ≿​D w​2 but not w​2 ≿​D w​1​; and that w​1 and w​2 fit d equally well, w​1 ∼​D w​2​, just in case w​1 ≿​D w​2 and w​2​ ≿​D​ w​1​. With this model in hand, we can formulate a contrastivist version of Sharadin's sufficient condition for promotion. The most straightforward way of doing so contrasts 35 the fit between desire and world in the closest possible worlds in which the agent performs the contrasted actions φ and ψ respectively. Thus, where w​φ stands for the 36 (closest) world that would be realized were the agent to φ and w​ψ stands for the (closest) world that would be realized were the agent to perform some contrasted action ψ, we have: Contrastive Fit​: Agent A's φ-ing rather than ψ-ing promotes the satisfaction of D if w​φ​ ≻​D​ w​ψ​. Contrastive Fit yields the intuitively correct verdict in cases such as the one involving desire EA above. For notice that, on the plausible assumption that a world where less of your desires are satisfied (w​φ​) exhibits a higher degree of fit with the desire to have none ​of your desires satisfied than the world where more of your desires are satisfied (w​ψ​), taking the desire-frustration pill (φ-ing) rather than taking the placebo (ψ-ing) promotes the satisfaction of your desire to have none of your desires satisfied (EA). But Contrastive Fit, if taken as a necessary condition on promotion as well as a sufficient condition, yields the ​incorrect results in cases like the simple lottery case. For notice that, on the plausible assumption that the closest world where you still have the 35 I.e. a contrastivist modification of what Sharadin calls "Fit-Promote" (Sharadin 2015, p. 1381). 36 This is the most straightforward way of doing it, but it is not entirely unproblematic. For notice that there might not be a single closest possible world in which the agent either φs or ψs. In that case, we would presumably have to compare the ​average ​fit of all the closest worlds in which the agent φs and ψs respectively (when there is a single closest world, the average of the fit reduces to the fit, since the average of a single number is that number itself). Since this complication is irrelevant to our objections to the disjunctive alternative that is currently under consideration, and since the issue does not arise within our own account of promotion below, we will ignore it in what follows. 17 $1 you are considering spending on the lottery ticket exhibits a higher degree of fit with the desire to have $100 than the closest world where you spend the $1 on the lottery ticket (assuming this is not a world in which you turn out to win the lottery), buying the lottery ticket rather than not buying it ​dispromotes rather than ​promotes the satisfaction of your desire for $100. In other words, you move ​farther away from the $100 world in terms of fit while at the same time moving ​closer to the $100 world in terms of probability. Hence, according to Sharadin, the correct story about when an agent's action promotes her desire involves more than simply Contrastive Fit: the correct story is ​disjunctive​. As we saw, just as there appear to be cases of promotion that do not involve an increase in probability​, there appear to be cases of promotion that do not involve an increase in ​fit​. Hence we must pair Contrastive Fit with a probabilistic account of promotion in order to get the ​disjunctive​ account of promotion Sharadin favors: Contrastive Fit-Probabilism​: An agent A's φ-ing rather than ψ-ing promotes D iff w​φ ≻​d w​ψ ​or pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) > pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs). 37 According to Sharadin, the disjunctive account represented by Contrastive Fit-Probabilism has "all the virtues" of a fit-based analysis (such as Contrastive Fit) "plus the virtues of a probabilistic analysis" such as those offered by contrastive ​pure probabilists (and, we can add, causal probabilists) while "avoiding the difficulties" faced by those accounts. 38 While we think Contrastive Fit-Probabilism is superior to Contrastive Pure Probabilism (and other accounts discussed so far), it also faces serious problems. Having described two such problems in the next section, we'll proceed to offer a new account of promotion -one that respects the motivations in favor of Contrastive Fit-Probabilism and yet solves our two problems with that view. In effect, then, the upshot will be twofold: Contrastive Fit-Probabilism is incorrect as it stands; but there's an attractive alternative proposal available that respects the motivations in favor of that view and improves on previously proposed accounts of promotion. 37 Sharadin (2015, p. 1382). Although recall that Sharadin did not conceive of promotion in a contrastive manner in that paper. 38 Sharadin (2015, pp. 1382-3). 18 4. Problems for Contrastive Fit-Probabilism Here we'll describe two problems for Contrastive Fit-Probabilism. The first problem we call the ​Degree Problem​; it concerns the difficulties faced by Contrastive Fit-Probabilism in accounting for the fact that a desire can be promoted to a greater and lesser extent. The second problem we'll call the ​Problem of Mixed Cases​; it concerns the difficulties faced by Contrastive Fit-Probabilism in accounting for cases in which probability increases but fit decreases, or, conversely, in which probability decreases but fit increases. 39 4.1. The Degree Problem The Degree Problem is easiest to see by reminding ourselves of the connection there is supposed to be between an action's promoting a desire and there being a reason to perform that action. Recall that Humeans and non-Humeans disagree about whether instrumental reasons to perform an action, conceived as reasons agents have in virtue of facts about how an action promotes the agent's desires, exhaust all the reasons there are. Here we are not interested in arbitrating this dispute between the Humean and the non-Humean. Instead, we note that proponents of both views presumably think that the strength of the reason there is for an agent to perform an action, when that reason is grounded in facts about promoting the satisfaction of one of the agent's desires, depends in part on the ​degree​ to which that action promotes the relevant desire. 40 The upshot of this is that there are important theoretical reasons for Humeans and non-Humeans alike to think that promoting a desire is something that should be, at least in part, a matter of degree. However, Contrastive Fit-Probabilism provides a purely binary account of promoting a desire -it offers no verdict at all about the degree to which a particular desire is promoted. To illustrate, notice that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism lacks the resources to distinguish between, on the one hand, a chocolate-desiring agent who is given a bar of chocolate rather than nothing at all, and, on the other hand, a chocolate-desiring agent who is given one out of 1 million tickets 39 Although we present these problems as targeted at ​Contrastive Fit-Probabilism it is worth noting that they apply with equal force to Sharadin's non-contrastive Fit-Probability Promote. 40 But see Schroeder (2007, esp. Ch 7) for disagreement. Schroeder's rejection of this idea, what he calls "proportionalism" has not been widely adopted. For criticism, see Shackel (2013), Rieder (2016), and Evers (2013). For one recent attempt to articulate a proportionalist Humean view, see Manne (2016). Here, we assume some version of proportionalism is true. 19 to a (fair) chocolate bar lottery rather than nothing at all. Contrastive Fit-Probabilism does deliver the result that both agents' desires are promoted. But, intuitively, there is an important distinction to be made in cases such as this between the (presumably lesser) degree to which receiving the lottery ticket promotes the agent's desire for a chocolate bar as compared to the (presumably higher) degree to which receiving the chocolate bar promotes that desire. An account of desire promotion that cannot draw such an intuitive and elementary distinction in cases such as these is severely impoverished. One might object that this is not a special problem for Contrastive Fit-Probabilism since Contrastive Pure Probabilism is a binary account of promotion in precisely the same way. While this is strictly speaking true, Contrastive Pure Probabilism can easily be extended to account for degrees of promotion by claiming that an agent's φ-ing rather than ψ-ing promotes the satisfaction of a desire D to the extent that pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) is larger than pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs). While there are many ways of spelling this out more precisely, the most straightforward approach simply exploits the difference ​between the two probabilities: 41 Contrastive Pure Probabilism*​: Agent A's φ-ing rather than ψ-ing promotes the satisfaction of desire D in proportion to [pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs)]. We are not endorsing this proposal to extend Contrastive Pure Probabilism into an account of degrees of promotion – indeed, we will present our own proposal below. However, this proposal illustrates how effortlessly any purely probabilistic account of promotion can be extended into an account of degrees of promotion, as any account of promotion arguably should be. By contrast, it should be clear that due to the disjunctive nature of Contrastive Fit-Probabilism, no similar extension can be as effortlessly provided for that account. According to Contrastive Fit-Probabilism a desire can be promoted in two quite distinct ways, so an extension of the account to degrees of promotion would need to provide some way of weighting the contribution each way of promoting the desire makes to the degree of promotion. The problem here is not merely that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism is 41 Other ways of spelling this out might exploit the ​ratio between pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) and pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs), or the ​log of the ratio between these two probabilities. These ways of measuring the degree of promotion mirror some different Bayesian measures of incremental confirmation (see, e.g., Fitelson 1999). For a somewhat different proposal regarding degree of promotion, see Manne (2016). 20 so far incomplete since no such weighting is provided by the account. The more serious problem is that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism fails to provide any guidance as to how we should choose between the infinitely many ways of providing such a weighting in a principled manner. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that it is highly doubtful that our intuitions will by themselves deliver anything close to reliable verdicts about which weightings accord better with our sense of what it is for a desire to be promoted to a greater or lesser extent. 4.2. The Problem of Mixed Cases A related problem with disjunctive accounts of promotion such as Contrastive Fit-Probabilism concerns how such accounts deal with cases in which a desire is promoted along one dimension while being dispromoted along the other dimension. There are two types of cases that fall into this category of 'mixed' cases. In the first, the probability that a desire is satisfied increases while the fit between the desire and the world decreases. In the second, the probability that a desire is satisfied decreases while the fit between desire and the world increases. The problem for Contrastive Fit-Probabilism – indeed for ​any disjunctive account of promotion – is that it entails that the desire is necessarily promoted in any such case. This is an absurd consequence since we can let the decrease along one of the two promotion-dimensions be arbitrarily large and the increase along the other dimension be arbitrarily small. And in such cases, Contrastive Fit-Probabilism will nonetheless deliver the wildly counterintuitive result that the desire is promoted. To see this clearly, consider one case of each type: i. Annie desires to have 100 chocolate bars, and she currently has 49. She 42 is offered the opportunity to trade all of her 49 bars for a ticket to the chocolate lottery, which pays the winner 100 chocolate bars. Since there are 100 tickets in the lottery, and since the lottery is a fair one with only one winner, her chance of winning would be 1%. If we suppose Annie has no other prospects of obtaining 100 bars, then, since the probability of Annie's obtaining 100 chocolate bars would increase by her making the 42 In this case, we could obviously have been more generous towards our protagonist, e.g. by giving her 99 chocolate bars rather than merely 49. However, we have chosen this particular number to get symmetry between the current example and the next one. In the next example, stipulating that our protagonist currently only has a 49% chance of winning the chocolate lottery preempts the response that Annie will win the chocolate lottery in the closest possible world in which Annie refuses the trade. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern with the second example.) 21 trade as compared with refusing to make the trade, Contrastive Fit-Probabilism entails that making the trade rather than refusing to do so would promote her desire for 100 chocolate bars. (For simplicity, we assume that Annie has no other means of acquiring chocolate bars.) ii. Annie desires to have 100 chocolate bars, and she currently has 0. However, Annie has 49 of the 100 tickets to the chocolate lottery, which pays the sole winner 100 bars, and so her current chance of obtaining 100 bars is 49%. Annie is offered the opportunity to trade all of her lottery tickets for a single chocolate bar. Since the fit between Annie's desires and the world would thereby increase, Contrastive Fit-Probabilism entails that making the trade rather than refusing to do so would promote her desire for 100 chocolate bars. (Again we assume, for simplicity, that Annie cannot acquire chocolate in any other way.) In each case, we submit that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism clearly delivers the wrong verdict. In the first case, it would not promote Annie's desire for 100 chocolate bars were she to give up her 49 bars for a 1% chance at 100 bars as compared to keeping the 49 bars. In the second case, it would not promote Annie's desire for 100 chocolate bars were she to give up her 49% chance at 100 bars for 1 bar as compared to keeping her 49% chance at 100 bars. We thus conclude that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism, at least in its current form, is flawed. 5. A Unified Alternative Account We have just argued against Contrastive Fit-Probabilism on the basis of two problems – the Degree Problem and the Problem of Mixed Cases – both of which exploit the disjunctive nature of the account. Yet we believe that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism is fundamentally correct in holding that there are two distinct ways for a desire to be promoted, i.e. by increasing the probability of its being satisfied and by increasing fit between the world and the desire. What we want, then, is a unified, i.e., non-disjunctive, account of promotion that accommodates both ways in which a desire can be promoted. In this section we present such an account (5.1) and show how it accommodates the virtues of Contrastive Fit-Probabilism (5.2) while avoiding the difficulties faced by that account (5.3). 5.1. Contrastive Expected Fit 22 We start by constructing a notion of ​expected fit analogous to the standard decision-theoretic notion of ​expected utility​, essentially just replacing an agent's utility in a given outcome with the fit between the desire in question and the worlds in which the outcome holds. In this context, an ​outcome can be defined as a set of possible worlds with equal fit with respect to the desire in question (i.e. a set of possible worlds W such that w​i ∼​D w​j ​for all w​i​,w​j in W, where D is the relevant desire.) To define a 43 notion of expected fit, we also need a numerical measure of how well the worlds in a given outcome fit the desire relative to complete frustration and satisfaction of that desire. So, we construct a function F(o​i​,D) from a outcome o​i and a desire D to a number on the unit interval [0,1] such that an outcome that completely frustrates a desire maps onto 0; an outcome that completely satisfies the desire maps onto 1; and any pair of outcomes for which the worlds in the first outcome have a strictly better fit than the worlds in the second outcome is such that the first outcome maps onto a higher value on the unit interval than the second. Intuitively, this function can be thought of as measuring how large a proportion of a desire is satisfied in a given world, on a scale from 0 to 1. With this function in hand, we define the expected fit of an agent A's action φ relative to some desire D as the weighted sum of the fit between D and the world in each possible outcome, where each weight is given by the probability of the agent's obtaining the relevant outcome. More formally: EF(A φs,D) = pr(o​i​|A φs) F(o​i​,D)∑ o ∈Oi where EF(A φs,D) is the ​expected fit of a desire D given that A performs an action φ, pr(o​i​|A φs) is the probability of outcome o​i given that A φs, F(o​i​,D) is the aforementioned measure of fit between D and and the world in o​i​, and O is a partition of all possible outcomes of A's φ-ing. 44 43 Since an outcome is just a set of possible world with equal fit with respect to some desire, we will henceforth talk about fit between the desire and an outcome as a less cumbersome way of referring to the fit between the desire and each of the worlds in the outcome. 44 Readers familiar with the distinction between Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and Causal Decision Theory (CDT) will notice that our definition of expected fit corresponds more closely to the 'evidential' definition of expected utility than the competing 'causal' definition. However, a definition of expected fit that corresponds to the latter can easily be provided by simply replacing the ​conditional probability pr(o​i​|A φs) with the ​counterfactual probability that if A were to φ, o​i would obtain, pr(A φs > o​i​). Presumably, a choice between these two slightly different ways of defining expected fit will be made on the basis of the same kind of considerations that are appealed to in the choice between EDT and CDT, including notably one's reaction to the infamous Newcomb's Problem -- 'one boxers' will use the definition of expected fit given the main text, while 'two boxers' will want to modify the definition in the way we have suggested here. Here we do not wish to take an official stand on this issue, but we will for 23 Our account of promotion then simply says that a desire is promoted when the expected fit for the desire in question given that the agent performs the action in question is greater than the expected fit of the desire given the contrasting action. More precisely: Contrastive Expected Fit​: An agent A's φ-ing rather than ψ-ing promotes D iff EF(A φs,D) > EF(A ψs,D). Why ​contrastive expected fit? That is, why not say that an agent's action promotes a desire when it increases the expected fit for her desire ​relative to some baseline ​(rather than ​as contrasted with some alternative action​). Briefly, the answer is that although it's possible to construct a non-contrastive account of promotion around the notion of expected fit, such an account will face exactly the same sorts of trouble faced by non-contrastive ​probabilistic accounts of promotion such as those canvassed above. Hence here, and in what follows, we 45 work with a contrastive version of the view. 46 5.2. Accommodating the Virtues of Contrastive Fit-Probabilism Contrastive Expected Fit accounts for the considerations that favor Contrastive Fit-Probabilism because it incorporates both considerations of fit and considerations of increased probability into a single measure. To see this clearly, consider first the following example: Bart has a desire D​100-bars to have 100 chocolate bars, but has only $1 to spend on chocolate. Each chocolate bar costs $1, and Bart could therefore buy a single bar. (We assume, for simplicity, that there is no other way for Bart to obtain chocolate with his $1.) According to Contrastive Fit-Probabilism, Bart would promote his desire by purchasing one chocolate bar rather than, say, purchasing nothing, since the fit for D​100-bars in an outcome where Bart has one chocolate bar is clearly greater than simplicity operate with the 'evidentialist' definition given in the main text in our discussion of examples below. 45 For example, consider an account on which promotion consists in causing an uptick in expected fit -a view analogous to Lin's Causal Probabilism, with probability of satisfaction replaced by expected fit. Although we did not specify the details about the degrees of fit of different outcomes in the original Bertie case, it is not hard to see that a version of the case can be constructed in which Bertie's beginning a sporadic training program would decrease the expected fit of his desire. Roughly, we need only assume that Bertie's expected fit for this desire was very high to begin with, due to his being very likely to begin a regular training program and there being a high degree of fit for the most probable outcomes of beginning such a training program. 46 For more on this, see the discussion at the end of section 2. 24 the fit in an outcome where Bart has no chocolate bar. We agree with this verdict and thus hope to reproduce it in our own account, so consider the situation from the perspective of ​expected ​fit. If Bart buys a chocolate bar he will, with probability 1, end up with an outcome in which he has one chocolate bar, and hence the ​expected ​fit will simply be the actual fit in that outcome. That is, since P(o​1-bar​|Bart buys 1 bar) = 1, we have EF(Bart buys 1 bar,D​100-bars​) = F(o​1-bar​,D​100-bars​). By the same token, if Bart purchases nothing with his $1, he will, with probability 1, end up having zero chocolate bars, so the expected ​fit will simply be the actual fit in ​that outcome. That is, since P(o​0-bar​|Bart buys nothing) = 1, we have EF(Bart buys nothing,D​100-bars​) = F(o​0-bars​,D​100-bars​). Since the fit in a 1-bar outcome is clearly greater than the fit in the 0-bar outcome Bart would end up in if he bought nothing, F(o​1-bar​,D​100-bars​) is clearly greater than F(o​0-bars​,D​100-bars​). So φ-ing promotes D​100-bars according to Contrastive Expected Fit, as desired. Consider next a modification of this case in which Bart is contemplating buying a ticket to a fair 100-ticket chocolate lottery, which conveniently pays the winner 100 chocolate bars and would thus satisfy Bart's desire for 100 chocolate bars (D​100-bars​). (Again we assume for simplicity that there is no other way for Bart to obtain chocolate with his $1.) According to Contrastive Fit-Probabilism, Bart would promote his desire by purchasing a ticket rather than, say, purchasing nothing, since the probability of satisfying D​100-bars​ is clearly greater if he purchases the ticket than if he does not. Again we agree with this verdict and hope to reproduce it in our own account, so consider the expected fit of each course of action. If Bart buys the chocolate lottery ticket, the probability is 1/100 that he will end up with perfect fit between D​100-bars and the outcome (i.e., that he will end up with a fully satisfied desire D​100-bars​) and 99/100 that he will end up with ​no​ fit between D​100-bars​ and the outcome. Thus, EF(Bart buys ticket,D​100-bars​) = 0.01 x F(o​100-bars​,D​100-bars​) + 0.99 x F(o​0-bars​,D​100-bars​). Contrast this with the expected fit of Bart purchasing nothing. In that case, Bart is certain to end up with an outcome in which he has zero chocolate bars, so the expected fit will simply be the actual fit in a zero-bar outcome. That is, since P(o​0-bar​|Bart buys nothing) = 1, we have EF(Bart buys nothing,D​100-bars​) = F(o​0-bars​,D​100-bars​). Given that F(o​100-bars​,D​100-bars​) is clearly greater than F(o​0-bars​,D​100-bars​), it follows that: EF(Bart buys ticket,D​100-bars​) > EF(Bart buys nothing,D​100-bars​). 25 So Bart buying the ticket rather than nothing promotes D​100-bars according to Contrastive Expected Fit, as desired. 5.3. Improving on Contrastive Fit-Probabilism We've just seen that Contrastive Expected Fit has the same advantages as Contrastive Fit-Probabilism. Recall, above, that we argued Contrastive Fit-Probabilism faced two problems: the Degree Problem and the Problem of Mixed Cases. In this section we'll explain how Contrastive Expected Fit solves both these problems and hence should be preferred over Contrastive Fit-Probabilism. Let us consider each problem in turn. The Degree Problem for Contrastive Fit-Probabilism arose because of its disjunctive nature: unlike purely probabilistic accounts of promotion, there was no natural way of extending the account to make sense of the ​degree ​of promotion. The problem, as we saw, was not just that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism as it stands provides no way of weighting the two (disjunctive) ways in which a desire can be promoted; the more serious problem was that, given that there are infinitely many ways of providing such a weighting, and given that it's completely implausible to suppose that our intuitions can be trusted to deliver reliable, precise verdicts regarding which method of weighting is superior to all others, Contrastive Fit-Probabilism appears to be at a loss for how to proceed. By contrast, Contrastive Expected Fit, like purely probabilistic accounts of promotion, can easily be extended to provide a natural account of the degree of promotion. Indeed, such an extension can be modelled on our earlier suggestion for how purely probabilistic accounts might be extended in this way: Contrastive Expected Fit*​: Agent A's φ-ing rather than ψ-ing promotes the satisfaction of desire D in proportion to [EF(A φs,D) EF(A ψs,D)]. In other words, the degree to which an agent's action promotes her desire by doing one thing rather than another is a function of how much greater the expected fit would be if one did the first thing as compared with the second. This provides for a simple and 47 47 To see this proposal in action, consider a version of Bart's case where he is offered the chance to to buy 10 chocolate bars at the greatly discounted price of $1. Intuitively, doing this this rather than buying nothing should promote his desire D​100-bars to a much greater extent than buying only 1 bar at the original price of $1 rather than buying nothing. This result is easily obtained: Since the fit between Bart's desire and the outcome is clearly greater when Bart has 10 bars rather than merely 1, we have that F(o​10-bars​,D​100-bars​) > F(o​1-bar​,D​100-bars​). 26 intuitive way of measuring the degree of promotion while at the same time taking the fit into account. 48 The second problem with Fit-Probabilism was that it delivered the wrong verdicts on what we called ​mixed cases​, i.e., cases either where a single action increased the degree of fit between a desire and the outcome while simultaneously decreasing the probability of that desire's satisfaction or ​vice versa​. To see how Contrastive Expected Fit solves this problem, consider the two variations on Annie's case again (4.2 above). In both variations Annie, like Bart, desires to have 100 chocolate bars. In the first variation, Annie is offered the opportunity to trade the 49 chocolate bars she currently has for a 1% chance at winning 100 bars. Contrastive Fit-Probabilism says that, because the probability of Annie satisfying her desire for 100 bars goes up were she to trade her 49 bars rather than reject the trade, doing so promotes her desire. In the second variation, Annie is offered the opportunity to trade the 49 out of 100 tickets to the 100 chocolate bar lottery she currently has for a single chocolate bar. Contrastive Fit-Probabilism says that, because the fit between Annie's desire and the outcome goes up were she to trade her tickets for the single chocolate bar, accepting rather than rejecting the trade promotes her desire. Both results are, as we said, incorrect. Intuitively, in the first variation Annie's desire is ​not promoted by trading her bars for the single ticket. And in the second variation, Annie's desire is ​not promoted by trading her tickets for the single bar. Let us consider how Contrastive Expected Fit deals with these cases. In the first variation of the case, refusing to make the trade guarantees that Annie will continue to have 49 chocolate bars. Thus the expected fit for refusing the trade is simply: EF(Annie refuses 1st trade,D​100-bars​) = F(o​49-bars​|D​100-bars​). As before (see section 5.2), we have that EF(Bart buys 1 bar,D​100-bars​) = F(o​1-bar​,D​100-bars​). By the same reasoning, EF(Bart buys 10 bars,D​100-bars​) = F(o​10-bars​,D​100-bars​). We thus get: EF(Bart buys 10 bars,D​100-bars​) > EF(Bart buys 1 bar,D​100-bars​) We now subtract by EF(Bart buys nothing,D​100-bars​) on both sides of the inequality to obtain EF(Bart buys 10 bars,D​100-bars​) EF(Bart buys nothing,D​100-bars​) > EF(Bart buys 1 bar,D​100-bars​) EF(Bart buys nothing,D​100-bars​) as desired. 48 Again, as in the case of probabilistic accounts, there are other possible ways of spelling out the degree of promotion that exploit the ​ratio between the two expected fits, or perhaps the ​log ​of the ratio between these two values. Here we don't take a stand on whether one of these is preferable to the others, since we don't yet see any theoretical reason to prefer one to the others. We think investigating the question of whether there are reasons to opt for one or the other measure would be worth pursuing, but it's not something we have the space to do here. 27 By contrast, the expected fit for making the trade is: EF(Annie makes 1st trade,D​100-bars​) = 0.01 x F(o​100-bars​,D​100-bars​) + 0.99 x F(o​0-bars​,D​100-bars​). Now, of course, the expected fit for each action will depend on how well Annie's desire for 100 chocolate bars fits the three outcomes at play here, i.e. o​0-bars​, o​49-bars​, and o​100-bars​. However, it is clear that any plausible measure of fit -i.e. any plausible function F -- will result in a higher expected fit for refusing the trade than for making it. To see this, note that D​100-bars is ​fully unsatisfied in o​0-bars -it could not possibly have a lesser fit -- and so, whatever else is true of our measure of fit, it will assign a value of ​zero to F(o​0-bars​,D​100-bars​). It follows from this minimal assumption that EF(Annie refuses 1st trade,D​100-bars​) is larger than EF(Annie makes 1st trade,D​100-bars​) if and only if F(o​49-bars​|D​100-bars​) > 0.01 x F(o​100-bars​,D​100-bars​). This means that the fit for Annie's desire D​100-bars would have to be ​at least 100 times less in an outcome in which she has 49 chocolate bars (o​49-bars​) than in an outcome in which she has 100 bars (o​100-bars​) in order for Annie's desire to be promoted by making the trade rather than refusing it. Thus we get the intuitively correct result that Annie's measure of fit for D​100-bars would have to exhibit a truly extreme preference for 100 bars as opposed to 49 in order for the desire to be promoted by making the trade rather than refusing it. In putting the point this way, we assume that measures of fit are relative to agents. So, for instance, we assume that it's possible for two agents to have a desire with the same content, e.g., for 100 chocolate bars, for both agents to be in an outcome the content of which matches the content of that desire to the same degree, e.g., an outcome in which each agent has 49 chocolate bars, and yet for the ​fit between each agent's desire and the outcome to differ. We find this way of thinking of things attractive, as it allows for variation in how well outcomes match desires not just in terms of the explicit match between the content of an outcome and the content of a desire, but also between the content of an outcome and the ​non-contentful character of a desire, for instance, how important fully satisfying that desire is to the agent. Hence it allows, for instance, that our two agents might each want 100 chocolate bars, each have 49, but that one agent cares a ​great deal about getting those last 51 bars, and the other cares substantially less. (That is, in effect, what we just saw in Annie's case, above.) 28 Importantly, however, this assumption isn't necessary to make the point. (Indeed, it's worth pointing out that Sharadin's (2015) description of the measure of fit between outcomes and desires leaves open whether he intends it to be agent-relative or non-agent-relative.) Suppose instead that measures of fit are not relative to agents, so that two agents symmetrically situated both in terms of the content of their desires and the content of the outcomes they are in are also always symmetrically situated in terms of the fit between their desires and the outcomes. Then, our argument amounts to an argument for a restriction on any plausible measure of (non-agent-relative) fit, viz., that increasing match in content sometimes generates diminishing (but plausibly non-zero) returns in terms of fit. Going forward, we'll continue to assume the agent-relative measure of fit, but note that the arguments can also be read in this alternative way. In the second variation of Annie's case, refusing to make the trade guarantees that Annie will continue to have a 49% probability of having 100 chocolate bars. Thus the expected fit for refusing the trade is: EF(Annie refuses 2nd trade,D​100-bars​) = 0.49 x F(o​100-bars​|D​100-bars​) + 0.51 x F(o​0-bars​,D​100-bars​). By contrast, making the trade guarantees Annie a single chocolate bar but also prevents her from getting any further chocolate bars. Thus the expected fit for making the trade in this variation of the case is simply: EF(Annie makes 2nd trade,D​100-bars​) = F(o​1-bar​,D​100-bars​) Again, the expected fit for each action will depend on how well Annie's desire for 100 chocolate bars fits the three outcomes at play here, i.e. o​0-bars​, o​1-bar​, and o​100-bars​. By the same token as before, however, we have that EF(Annie refuses 2nd trade,D​100-bars​) is larger than EF(Annie makes 2nd trade,D​100-bars​) if and only if 0.49 x F(o​100-bars​|D​100-bars​) > F(o​1-bar​,D​100-bars​). This means that the fit for Annie's desire D​100-bars in an outcome in which she only has a single bar would have to be roughly half (49%) of that in which she has all 100 of the chocolate bars in order for Annie's desire to be promoted by making the trade rather than refusing it. So we again get the intuitively correct result that Annie's measure of fit for D​100-bars would have to be extremely peculiar in order for the desire to be promoted by making the trade rather than refusing it. Of course, without specifying more about Annie, her measure of fit might still have such a structure, but its peculiarity explains 29 why our intuitions balk at the suggestion that trading in all those lottery tickets for a single chocolate bar would promote her desires. 7. ​What Kind of Probability? Before concluding, it's worth mentioning one final aspect of our account that might appear to be a lacuna at first glance, but we think is in fact an advantage of the view. Contrastive Expected Fit, like its competitors, appeals to ​probability in analyzing the promotion relation. In particular, it appeals to the probability that one action would result in a world that more closely fits an agent's desire than some contrasting action. But what kind of probability is being employed in this analysis? There are two 49 plausible possibilities: either the kind of probabilities appealed to are ​objective chances, or they are ​subjective probabilities ​of some sort or other. Which do we endorse? Both. To explain, we think that strictly speaking there are two equally good interpretations of Contrastive Expected Fit corresponding to the two kinds of probability. On the ​objective interpretation, the probabilities appealed to in Contrastive Expected Fit should be read as objective chances, and the view yields verdicts regarding what actions ​as a matter of fact promote what desires. That is, it yields objective truths about what actions stand in the promotion relation to what desires. On the subjective interpretation, the probabilities appealed to in Contrastive Expected Fit should be read as subjective probabilities, and the view yields verdicts regarding what actions promote what desires ​according to some subject. ​That is, it yields verdicts about what actions stand in the promotion relation to what desires in the opinion of that agent. Why opt for a view of this sort? Recall from the introduction that the promotion relation is thought to have something to do with agents' reasons: for certain Humean views, ​all reasons are reasons in virtue of facts about promotion, and for non-Humeans, at least some reasons (intuitively the ​instrumental ​reasons) are reasons in virtue of facts about promotion. Now notice that there is a distinction among reasons that corresponds quite nicely to the two plausible interpretations of Contrastive Expected Fit, viz. the distinction between ​objective and ​subjective ​reasons​, where the difference between these two kinds of reasons is understood as a difference between considerations that in fact count in favor of an action and considerations that, from the point of view of some subject, count in favor of an action. So, corresponding to the ​objective interpretation 50 49 This is a question faced by ​any account of promotion that appeals to probabilistic facts. See Behrends & DiPaolo (2016) for a discussion. 50 In the literature, the terms 'subjective reason' and 'objective reason' are used to refer to a range of differences among reasons. For instance, some use 'subjective reason' to refer to the subset of objective 30 of Contrastive Expected Fit, we have what we might call the ​objective promotion relation that delivers results regarding ​objective reasons​, understood as above. And similarly, corresponding to the ​subjective ​interpretation of Contrastive Expected Fit, we have what we might call the ​subjective ​promotion relation that delivers results regarding subjective reasons​, again understood as above. Now, there are serious disagreements among philosophers about which of these kinds of reasons corresponding to the different promotion relations are ​genuine normative reasons -all views in logical space are occupied. Here, we don't take any stand on which of these views is correct. For all we say here, it could turn out that only objective reasons are genuine, and that subjective reasons aren't reasons at all. It could turn out, in other words, that the fact that from the point of view of some subject one action has a higher expected fit than an alternative action is neither here nor there with respect to what action there is reason for the subject to do. Anyone inclined toward such a view should then insist on the objective interpretation of Contrastive Expected Fit. (The reverse is true for those who think think there are only subjective reasons and no genuine objective reasons..) Since it's not our aim here to decide these difficult questions, we think it's an advantage of our view that it both remains silent on them and allows for a range of possible answers. 8. Conclusion Let's recap. Probabilistic accounts of promotion -Pure Probabilism and Causal Probabilism -are liable to counterexamples that militate in favor of a contrastive understanding of promotion. Unfortunately, even going contrastive won't save those accounts: they're liable to their own set of counterexamples that exploit their purely probabilistic nature. Contrastive Fit-Probabilism solves the problems with those views, but its disjunctive nature makes it subject to its own problems: the Degree Problem and the Problem of Mixed Cases. Our alternative -Contrastive Expected Fit -represents a unified, non-disjunctive alternative that solves these problems. Where does this leave us? Our account of promotion, if correct, reveals that the theory of what it is for an action to promote a desire appeals to a notion of ​expected fit which is interestingly analogous to the decision-theoretic notion of ​expected utility employed in reasons to which an agent has epistemic access, so that something cannot be a subjective reason without also being an objective reason. By contrast, our use of the terms here allows for this possibility. We don't care to die on this particular terminological hill. Instead, we're interested in highlighting the parallel between ​these two senses of a reason -whatever, in the end, it's correct to call them -and the two possible interpretations of Contrastive Expected Fit. 31 expected utility theory. On reflection, we think this structural similarity shouldn't be too surprising. After all, expected utility theory can naturally be described as an account of rational action according to which actions should be compared with regard to how well they ​promote ​overall utility. A similarly sophisticated account of promoting desires thus plausibly employs the same formal machinery for explicating the notion of promoting a desire. Indeed, looking ahead, it's worth exploring whether there are other fruitful connections between these two areas. More generally, there are a number of interesting issues we haven't addressed here that are worthy of attention, e.g. about whether the correct measure of fit is agent-relative or non-agent-relative, about how to spell out a gradable notion of promotion (see footnotes 40 and 46), about whether expected fit should be given an 'evidential' or 'causal' definition (see footnote 43), and, of course, on the correct view to take about the connection between promotion and reasons. We leave these issues to another time. References Behrends, J., & DiPaolo, J. (2011). "Finlay and Schroeder on Promoting a Desire," Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy​, 6: 1-6. Behrends, J., & DiPaolo, J. (2016). "Probabilistic Promotion Revisited," ​Philosophical Studies​ 173: 1735-1754. Coates, D. J. (2014) "An Actual Sequence Theory of Promotion," ​Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy​: 1-7. DiPaolo, J. and Behrends, J. (2015) "Reason to Promotion Inferences," ​Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy​: 1-9. 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VASIL PENCHEV WHY ANYTHING RATHER THAN NOTHING? THE ANSWER OF QUANTUM MECHANICS Abstract: Many researchers determine the question "Why anything rather than nothing?" to be the most ancient and fundamental philosophical problem. It is closely related to the idea of Creation shared by religion, science, and philosophy, for example in the shape of the "Big Bang", the doctrine of first cause or causa sui, the Creation in six days in the Bible, etc. Thus, the solution of quantum mechanics, being scientific in essence, can also be interpreted philosophically, and even religiously. This paper will only discuss the philosophical interpretation. The essence of the answer of quantum mechanics is: 1.) Creation is necessary in a rigorously mathematical sense. Thus, it does not need any choice, free will, subject, God, etc. to appear. The world exists by virtue of mathematical necessity, e.g. as any mathematical truth such as 2+2=4; and 2.) Being is less than nothing rather than more than nothing. Thus creation is not an increase of nothing, but the decrease of nothing: it is a deficiency in relation to nothing. Time and its "arrow" form the road from that diminishment or incompleteness to nothing. Keywords: creation, quantum mechanics, being, anything, nothing Why Anything Rather than Nothing? Many researchers determine the question "Why anything rather than nothing?" as the most ancient and fundamental philosophical problem (Wippel 2011). Some believe that this problem should be questioned first, before any other problem is tackled (Hoffman, Rosenkrantz 2010). 151Why anything rather than nothing? It should underlie what the primary substance of the world is: spirit or matter. The pathway from being to time was traced by Heidegger in his famous Sein und Zeit (1927), where he insisted on the "question of the meaning of the Being" as the beginning of philosophy. We will try to answer it, too, by means of science rather than strictly by means of philosophy. Nevertheless, we will find, as Heidegger, that time inherently links to being once the question "Why being rather than nothing?" is asked. Three of the most fundamental domains of human culture – religion, physics and mathematics – have offered three quite different versions of the Creation. Our problem is very closely related to the idea of Creation shared by religion, science and philosophy (e.g. the "Big Bang", the doctrine of first cause or causa sui, the Creation in six days in the Bible, etc). In mathematics the "empty set", the mathematical equivalent to "nothing", is what is there in the beginning. From this starting point, it generates natural numbers, choice, sets, and all mathematical objects, complex or not. Mathematics, then, provides an example of how its world can be rigorously constructed on the grounds of "nothing". The concept of Creation generates big issues in physics, due to the following: the most fundamental postulate of physics – energy conservation – can be called a "no creation" axiom. Energy must conserve at all times, and thus anything physical, having by definition nonzero energy, cannot appear from nothing possessing zero energy for this would violate the rules of energy conservation. Furthermore, in different physics theories, time is conceived in two opposite ways inconsistent with each other: either reversibly (classical mechanics, relativity, etc.) or irreversibly (thermodynamics, etc.). The solution of statistical thermodynamics for time is very interesting and successful. It manages to resolve the contradiction of reversible time in mechanics and irreversible time in thermodynamics. According to statistical thermodynamics, the thermodynamic irreversibility is a result of the statistical averaging of mechanical reversibility. A huge part of information is lost after averaging and it is precisely that loss which generates irreversibility in thermodynamics. The loss of information in thermodynamics can be generalized by the notion of "hidden variables", which are hidden after averaging. Quantum mechanics appeared as the domain of physics which generated new fundamental questions about the relevant way to reconcile reversible and irreversible time as a single consistent scientific theory. Quantum mechanics was forced to introduce the Planck constant, which is thermodynamic in essence, as fundamental to mechanical 152 Vasil Penchev motion. Thus, its aim was to reconcile the reversible time of mechanics with the irreversible time of thermodynamics already present at its core. Many scientists, even Einstein, expected that its solution should be similar to that of statistical thermodynamics. However, that conjecture turned out to be fundamentally wrong: "No hidden variables in quantum mechanics!" might have been the "slogan" of the solution for the reversible and irreversible time in quantum mechanics. Yet, the solution of quantum mechanics is partly analogical to that of statistical thermodynamics. In any single measurement 1, a great deal (exactly 50%) of information is lost. However, that loss is not due to averaging, or a result of human ignorance. It is a fundamental law of nature due to the limitations imposed by the Planck constant. That fundamental loss is caused by the passing of time in the final analysis. All rejected counterfactual alternatives might represent that necessary loss of information. * * * In physics, two different, and possibly even two inconsistent conjectures exist about the "creation". The Big Bang is the most popular one. It postulates a special point in the creation (the "singularity" in t = 0), in which physical laws do not yet hold. However, these physical laws (both energy conservation and the reversible time of relativity) hold at any time thereafter. The viewpoint of quantum mechanics is different and rather similar to that of Descartes, mainly in his Third 1 In fact, any quantum leap is determined unambiguously by both an initial and a final state. Thus, the number of necessary variables is exactly the same as in the classical case of smooth motion, and only as types of variables are there half of them, each occurring twice: once for the leap initial state, and once more for the leap final state. However, and unlike in the classical case, that exhausting number of variables is not accessible in any single measurement, but in two separate events. Thus, a new problem appears as far as Heraclitus' "No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's not the same river and he's not the same man" holds. Continuing the metaphor of Heraclitus' "river", quantum mechanics is forced to describe all states of both "river" (i.e. the investigated quantum entity) and "man" (i.e. the apparatus together with the experimenter), which might happen in the future. This description is the wave function of the entity at hand. The wave function refers to only half of the variables in comparison to the classical case, but the information attributed to them is doubled for the wave function is complex rather than real. From that viewpoint, hidden variables in quantum mechanics cannot exist since the information is exactly the same as in the classical case. Half of the information is lost only after measurement and then secondarily restorable as a probability distribution of all states of both "man" and "river" in a series of measurements. 153Why anything rather than nothing? Meditation (Descartes 1641; Husserl 1931; Мамардашвили 981; Secada 1990; Gorham 2007, 2008): creation is permanent at any time and it is due to the irreversibility of time. If one projects all irreversibility of time into a single point of the beginning, the well-known picture of the Big Bang will appear. One can search for empirical confirmations regarding the Big Bang. If the Big Bang were real, it would be impossible for any physical objects in the universe older than the universe itself to exist. However, if the Big Bang is not real, but only a hypothetical projection of the irreversibility of time into a single zero point, it may be an averaging of the course of time in all points in the universe. Arbitrary deviations from that average quantity would exist in various spots of the universe. Most objects may be younger than the universe, but at least a few ones should be older than it. The existence of objects older than the universe has been partly 2 confirmed through experiments (Chamberlain, Aller 1951; Spite, Spite 1982; Molaro 1987; Bond et al. 2013). Various interpretations of the solution of quantum mechanics might exist analogically. Thus, the solution of quantum mechanics, being scientific in fact, can also be interpreted philosophically, and even religiously. Indeed, the opposite conjecture of the Big Bang was elaborated by the Belgian Catholic priest Georges Lemaître (1927; 1931; 1946) as early as 1927. It was able to reconcile science (from the Big Bang onwards) with religion (the Big Bang itself as God's Creation). Analogically, the solution of quantum mechanics admits religious interpretations. However, only the philosophical and mathematical interpretations are discussed here. Its essence is: creation is permanent and due to the irreversibility of time; it is mathematically necessary. Thus, it is not due to one's free will (e.g. God's, the observer's, etc.). It is not an addition, but rather takes away due to the rejection of the reverse "half" of time. Being is less than nothing. The viewpoint of quantum mechanics on the creation reveals the following. The essence of the answer of quantum mechanics (in physical terms rather than in philosophical notions) is: the CPT-theorem is fundamental (Bell 1955; Pauli 1955; Luders 1954) because it manages the 2 The contemporary accuracy of measurements does not allow for any unambiguous statements: they may or may not really be older than the universe. However, the dominating paradigm of the "real Big Bang" has a very strong influence on the formulation. Therefore, all publications emphasize that those objects appeared very soon after the Big Bang, rather than right before it, though the experimental accuracy allows for both kinds of interpretation. 154 Vasil Penchev transformation of the discrete charge (electric and color charge, weak isospin) into a space-time position. Thus, it manages how the discrete transformation of elementary particles is equivalent to a continuous space-time trajectory. Weak (or the unified electro-weak) interaction manages the mechanism of how discrete charges can be transformed into space-time trajectories. Weak interaction implies that the Higgs mechanism (Englert, Brout 1964; Higgs 1964; Higgs 1964a; Guralnik, Hagen, and Kibble 1964; Glashow 1961; Anderson 1963; Gilbert 1964; Streater 1965; Higgs 1966) generates mass (energy) at rest by cutting the opposite direction of time 3. Therefore, mass (energy) at rest represents the total probability of all cut alternatives after the unavoidable choice in the course of time. The antiparticles (with opposite charges) represent the "difference" of the particles compared to the physical "nothing" (which is not a vacuum, but the result of their physical annihilation). Thus, particles identical to their antiparticles (such as photons, Z0 bosons, π0 mesons) represent the physical nothing from the viewpoint of the physical being (which may be defined as possessing any nonzero mass at rest) 4. What the Higgs mechanism moving within the pole of "first philosophy" means is very simple, but hardly obvious: the nothing is unstable. It breaks down "spontaneously", i.e. by itself. All being is due to that fundamental instability of the nothing, and thus that instability should underlie the concept of creation. The answer to our initial question "Why anything rather than nothing" is: because the nothing is unstable. However, there is one even more fundamental question: "Why is the nothing unstable?" The question seems not to allow a direct physical answer. It needs a mathematical reason that could be revealed in the foundation of mathematics – in set theory – and will be discussed 3 A complex relation between "choice" (the axiom of choice) and the imaginary and real domains of Minkowski space utilized by special relativity on the one hand, and the complex separable Hilbert space utilized by quantum mechanics on the other hand, is available. Namely: by means of the axiom of choice, the imaginary domain may be mapped isomorphically into that Hilbert space, thereby cutting the real domain equivalent to the opposite direction of time, or in other words, choosing the imaginary domain of Minkowski space. 4 The "boundary" of the physical nothing between particles and antiparticles is, in a sense, conventional. Theoretically, this could be any state. In fact, this state is determined unambiguously by the three most fundamental physical constants: the Planck constant, the light speed in vacuum, and the gravitational constant. It may be considered as "zero" only ontologically, for those constants imply nonzero physical parameters for it. 155Why anything rather than nothing? as the mathematical necessity of creation later in the article. What the Higgs mechanism discusses immediately is how the elementary particles corresponding to the weak and strong fields, unlike those of the electromagnetic field, acquire their nonzero mass at rest – something that all experiments confirm. Furthermore, it discusses the way for all possessing nonzero mass at rest to acquire it. Consequently, the Higgs mechanism elucidates how matter in a physical sense always appears. It follows that the pole of ontology can be represented as follows: time and its "arrow" are what break down the symmetry by rejecting the opposite direction of time 5. Everything that is rejected as belonging to the opposite direction of time is represented in the actual course of time as that mass at rest, and this is the way for it to appear from the nothing, i.e. as if it is a "byproduct" of time. Quantum mechanics can be considered as a cognitive "microscope" for investigating the correct genesis for that asymmetry of time. Indeed, it is a theory of how irreversible time appears physically from the coherent and reversible quantum state. Both electromagnetic and strong interactions as well as gravity in a sense share CT-symmetry implying P-symmetry as a separate and independent symmetry for the total CPT-symmetry. In that particular framework, only the antiparticles represent the opposite direction of time in the coherent "primordial soup" of being, just as in the process of how the "arrow of time" appears. The weak interaction complicates the above picture adding P-asymmetry to C-asymmetry to represent the appearing T-asymmetry in the still coherent "primordial soup" of being. Where is the room for gravity in breaking down the symmetry? Indeed, there are two different conceptions about mass of rest: the first, according to the Higgs mechanism following how it appears; the other, according to general relativity, as it interacts. Both "kinds" of mass at rest should be equal to each other in a generalization of the "equality of inertial and gravitational mass": the former in the Higgs mechanism, and the latter in 5 The physical meaning of that ontological viewpoint is the following: The violation of symmetry is forced by the different physical dimensionality of Minkowski space corresponding to the light speed in vacuum, and thus to "speed", and of the utilized Hilbert space corresponding to the Planck constant, and thus to "action". The gravitational constant is what adds a second equation to the relation of their dimensionality, therefore determining that violation of symmetry unambiguously. As far as the real domain of Minkowski space, equivalent to the opposite direction of time, is cut for the transformation of the former into the latter space, one may say that the cut direction of time is represented implicitly in the gravitational constant and then, by any mass involved in gravitational interaction. 156 Vasil Penchev general relativity. The following is an approach to both Higgs and gravitational mass at rest (and their eventual unification), which discusses the way for the opposite (rejected) direction of time to be represented in general relativity. One has to start from special relativity, in which the "normal" direction of time is represented by the subliminal (or "imaginary") domain in Minkowski space, and the "opposite" direction, by the superluminal (or "real") one. The change in direction of time means the exchange between the two domains as well as the T-symmetry. If one utilizes the conjecture that general relativity can be considered as the generalization of special relativity in relation to the superluminal domain (Penchev 2013), the change to the opposite direction of time means involving the subluminal domain of pseudo-Riemannian space in the superluminal domain of Minkowski space. In the pole of ontological reflection, this means that all information lost due to rejecting the opposite direction of time is represented anyway in the "normal" course of time. However, this occurs in the total form of mass (energy) generated by the transformation of Minkowski space into pseudo-Riemannian space and results in gravitational interaction. The transition from the forward (for us) to the opposite direction of time, as well as the reverse transition from the opposite to the forward (for us) direction of time, results in one and the same pseudo-Riemannian space, one and the same general relativity. Mass and energy in general relativity are only positive and only generate attraction: the change in direction of time does not imply antigravity: it seems not to exist. Following CT-symmetry, one may notice that the mass of all antiparticles is identical to that of the corresponding particles, their counterparts. Thus, general relativity discusses the ultimate result after the direction of time is established as what is conceived to be forward for us. On the contrary, quantum mechanics means the "primordial soup" of a partly, in general coherent state, in which both directions of time co-exist, and the asymmetry of time, the "arrow of time", is still in the process of its constitution and obeys CPT-invariance. Thus, the viewpoint of general relativity is disjunctively alternative to that of quantum mechanics, as well as, in a sense, equivalent to it. However, the choice of the opposite direction of time leads to a universe identical to ours. All antiparticles exist only in the "primordial soup" of quantum coherent states. All of them result in the total mass (energy) in the normal course of the ultimate "arrow" of time. The C-symmetry, T-symmetry, and 157Why anything rather than nothing? P-symmetry are decomposed from the "primordial" total CPT-symmetry and each of those three symmetries is reduced to idempotency: the "antiparticles" coincide with the particles; the opposite direction of time coincides with the normal one, and space is isotropic. Electromagnetism can visualize that transition if one admits both electric charges situated just "before the boundary" of the ultimate "arrow" of time, and the single magnetic charge as the result of the identification of both electric charges just "after the same boundary". That illustration can serve as a metaphor of how the Higgs mechanism in the "primordial soup" of time is transformed into the mass (energy) of general relativity after the ultimate constitution of the "arrow" of time. The "dark"problems However, there exist two huge "dark" problems concerning the equality or equivalence of the Higgs mechanism to the mass (energy) of general relativity: "dark matter" and "dark energy". "Dark matter" (Trimble 1987: 451-452) consists of the experimentally very well corroborated fact (Ade 2016) that the angular speed of rotation of huge celestial objects such as our galaxy, the Milky Way, exceeds many times the speed allowed according to the total mass of the visible matter in the object at issue (e.g. the Milky Way). In other words, almost all huge celestial objects such as galaxies, star clusters, nebulae, etc. should break down and flush in all directions due to the centrifugal forces of their rotations. However, nothing of this sort has been observed. The only possible, or at least the most probable explanation according to contemporary science, is the presence of hidden or "dark" mass and matter, which has not been visible until now, not even in principle. Furthermore, this hidden matter should possess about 5.47 times more mass than the usual, visible mass. Of course, this conclusion is shocking since it means that our physical cognition refers only to a relatively insignificant part (about 18.3%) of the universe. Nevertheless, all experimental observations confirm this fact. All mass due to the Higgs mechanism, as well as all elementary particles, are observable. Unlike all this, dark matter can be revealed only by its gravitational effect preventing the action of centrifugal forces. "Dark energy" (Riess et al. 1998: 1009) consists of the very well confirmed fact 6 that the expansion of the universe is accelerated: the 6 The Dark Energy Survey: https://www.darkenergysurvey.org/the-des-project/ 158 Vasil Penchev speed of its expansion increases permanently. According to the level of contemporary physical cognition, this means that a large, unknown amount of energy is pouring into the universe at any given moment in time. This is "dark energy". Both dark energy and dark mass are "dark": this means that their existence is established only indirectly by means of their effect, but they seem not to be directly observable, at least up till now. However, dark matter is a static "dark" effect, while dark energy is a dynamic one. The total amount of dark energy in the universe is a few times more than dark matter and more than ten times more than visible matter and energy. The experimentally confirmed proportions are: visible matter and energy comprise 4.9%; dark matter, 26.8%; dark energy, 68.3%. So, the existence of dark energy is even more striking than that of dark matter. The metaphor that the "shore of our knowledge" is much less than the "ocean of our ignorance" is very appropriate when speaking about dark matter and dark energy. The attempts to explain those "dark" phenomena might be distributed into two basic groups: "standard", by means of the Standard model; or "non-standard", by means of theories or experimentally observed phenomena from the framework of the Standard model. Confinement or "color confinement" is one of the main conjectures among the standard explanations of the dark phenomena. It means a mysterious, hypothetical force which holds on to the quarks linked very strongly to each other, preventing them from being observed on their own. The hypothesis is that it increases proportionally (even exponentially) at a distance, unlike all known and observable forces in nature decreasing at a distance. This is how the confinement might explain dark energy. The expansion of the universe is a process of positive feedback since the expansion itself generates energy by means of the mechanism of confinement. In other words, the dark energy is equivalent to the expansion of the universe and thus, it is self-accelerating in and of itself. In turn, dark matter might be a static phenomenon of dark energy, due to the current amount of energy in any huge rotating celestial object such as our Milky Way. The main objection is that the degree of tension due to color confinement has an upper limit, after which the color interaction breaks, just as an over-extended elastic spring breaks, and therefore a "colorless jet" of hadrons appears: the so-called hadronization of quarks or gluons. That "jet" tends to expand further and further in time because the color interaction in any new colorless hadron has been extending overview/ 159Why anything rather than nothing? in turn until it "breaks", too, and generates more new quarks or gluons, which are hadronized again immediately and unobservably 7. Our key question should be what happens with energy conservation during the process of hadronization: the energy of the "broken over-extension" passes into the mass-energy of the generated ("from the vacuum") anti-counterparts for any quark or a pair of quarks and antiquark for any gluon. This can explain how the space extension itself can generate energy by itself by means of color elementary particles such as quarks or gluons and the extraordinary property of color confinement transforming the extension of the universe into a kind of "perpetuum mobile". The process of hadronization may further illuminate the intimate mechanism of how time appears from space over the upper limit of its allowed extension. The space extension generates energy for color confinement. That space extension breaks over a certain energetic bound and a hadron jet appears. Any element of the hadron jet turns out to be doubled by a pair of quark and antiquark, and hadronization obeys the first of all strong, and electromagnetic interaction. Both are CT-invariant, and P-symmetric because of CPT-invariance. As all the Standard models, they are Lorentz-invariant, which is very closely linked to the CPT-invariance. Thus, any pair of quark-antiquark can be considered equivalent to a single particle doubled in both directions of time 8. Those "two directions of time" appear to exceed 7 The only exception is the top quark, whose time of decay is supposed to be less than the time necessary for its hadronization, so the products of its decay can be observed and thus indirectly, the top quark itself is as if "bare" (Abachi et al. 1995; Abe et al. 1995). 8 One can consider motion at a velocity as the elastic extension of space. Then, the speed of light is the upper bound: a limit, after which the space is "ruptured" into parts, e.g. into particles such as an electron and a positron. On the contrary, the Planck constant is the minimal possible action between two or many parts, in which those "parts" (ostensibly) are necessarily a single whole. So, both the speed of light in vacuum and the Planck constant are boundaries between discreteness and continuity in a physical and thus experimental sense. Nonetheless, they are absolutely independent from each other; even their physical dimensionalities are different. One may further imagine the special case where the one criterion for discreteness is satisfied, but the other one is not. The quark's inability to exist alone seems to fit right into that intermediate or "conflict" area between the two different boundaries separating discreteness and continuity. As far as they interact with each other and can interact with other elementary particles both by strong and by electromagnetic interaction, the Planck constant seems to be exceeded, but in the special case of quarks, the speed of light is not. This seems to be the essence of confinement from the present viewpoint. 160 Vasil Penchev the upper limit of allowed space extension: time seems to appear for the limitation of spatial "elastic" extension 9. There are at least a few objections against color confinement as a possible source of dark matter and energy. It is still only an ad hoc empirical hypothesis explaining a series of phenomena studied by quantum chromodynamics very well, but it cannot be deduced mathematically from the formalism of quantum mechanics and quantum chromodynamics. It is corollary from one of the seven "Millennium Prize Problems", namely the "Yang–Mills and Mass Gap" problem 10. "Color confinement" is not yet described well enough quantitatively and theoretically, but rather qualitatively. Thus, the origin of the energy transformed into hadrons after hadronization is not elucidated: that kind of energy is instead only postulated ad hoc for the abundance of corroborating experimental data. Furthermore, there exist essential problems about untarity or the Lorentz invariance of hadronization. The main "nonstandard" conjecture about dark matter or dark energy is the phenomenon of entanglement. Entanglement is a phenomenon suggested by Einstein (together with Podolsky and Rosen) in 1935, in a famous article (Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 1935) as the refutation of the completeness of quantum mechanics, and independently by Schrődinger in the same year (Schrődinger 1935). Today, entanglement is very well corroborated experimentally 11. In Einstein's words, it is a "spooky action at a distance" meaning that it should be neither Lorentz invariant nor unitary. Roughly speaking, one may say that it transfers only "pure" information about a certain quantum state (called "quantum information") at any distance instantly without any carrier possessing a certain nonzero amount of mass or energy. Even more mysterious: any other elementary particle such as an electron or a photon changes its state after it has obtained that "secret message" from its entangled counterpart(s). This makes it seem as if an electron or a photon, or any other elementary particle, has a "free will" in making a decision about how to change its state after the quantum message has been obtained 9 The pair of a quark and an antiquark may be interpreted as rupturing the space by exceeding the "second" barrier, namely that of light speed, and thus rupturing the intimate link of the two directions of time, by which time appears properly. As far as all quarks in definition (or in virtue of confinement) cannot exceed that second barrier, they vanish instantly either by hardronization (most often) or by decay (only the top quark). 10 http://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems 11 The number of confirming experiments is huge (a brief overview e.g. in: Wiseman 2015). 161Why anything rather than nothing? by it. There even exist two "free will theorems" in quantum mechanics (Conway, Kochen 2006; 2009) stating that if the experimenter, a human being, possesses that "valuable commodity" of free will, this implies that any electron or any quantum entity with which the experimenter deals necessarily possesses the same "valuable commodity". It is this very same idea (about the "free will of an electron") that made Einstein declare, in a letter to Max Born, that he would prefer to be a "croupier" or a "shoemaker" rather than a physicist if this were to be true (Born 1969: 118). The cited theorems correctly and expressively state the "free will of an electron". Therefore, it is possible that Einstein did not possess "free will" when deciding what would be his profession (this being a not less paradoxical solution of the problem). However, a much more ordinary interpretation of entanglement, without any curious, pictorial, or even ridiculous presentations as presented above, is possible. Entanglement is a new form of physical interaction which is both non-unitary and Lorentz non-invariant, and generalizes the concept of physical interaction to certain physical instantaneous actions at any distance (i.e. in a zero time, or in other words, as if out of time), and (quantum) information is equivalent to physical action as far as the Planck constant exists. So, the electron does not "decide" how to change its state after having obtained the corresponding (quantum) information, but this information changes its state both directly and instantaneously by being itself equivalent to physical action . What seems to be "free will" is the direct physical action of information, for the information comprises the quantity of choices (and indeed, measured in units of elementary choices, what the bits are), and therefore information can in a sense be considered as the "quantity of free will". * * * All three interactions (electromagnetic, weak, and strong) in the Standard model are both unitary (energy conservation) and Lorentz invariant (not exceeding the speed of light in vacuum). On the contrary, entanglement, if one considers it as a new physical interaction, is neither unitary (its energy is indefinite) nor Lorentz invariant (it is instantaneous, therefore exceeding the speed of light in vacuum). The only other known physical interaction, which is neither unitary nor Lorentz invariant, is gravity according to general relativity, which is the best confirmed theory of gravity, even without any "anomaly". Indeed, it is not unitary for energy does not conserve (what is conserved according to general 162 Vasil Penchev relativity is energy-momentum, and therefore the energy itself is indefinite in general). It is not Lorentz invariant because the pseudo-Riemannian space of general relativity is arbitrarily (and even differently at any point in general) "curved" to the Minkowski space of special relativity. Perhaps Bronstein (Бронштейн 1936) was the first who demonstrated that gravity can be only locally quantizable since it is only locally unitary and Lorentz invariant, due to its continuity and smoothness, but generally not globally. According to him, only weak gravitational fields are approximately quantizable, and any gravitational field from all singularities is locally "weak". At last, one may build a one-to-one mapping, possessing a clear physical meaning, of the superluminal ("real") domain of Minkowski space into the subluminal ("imaginary") domain of pseudo-Riemannian space (Penchev 2013). The sense of that mapping is the interpretation of gravity as entanglement and vice versa 12. Both dark matter and dark energy are revealed by gravitational phenomena for very huge celestial objects, the behavior of which is described by general relativity. So, if one may equate entanglement to gravity, entanglement turns out to be a possible source of dark matter or energy, e.g. as the corresponding equivalent mass at rest and gravitational energy. Indeed, entanglement satisfies the condition of being "dark" for it falls outside of the Standard model describing all as "visible". The explanation of dark energy by means of entanglement can be the following: The process of decoherence of any entangled state would mean the disappearance of entanglement and its degree of non-unitarity (or Lorentz non-invariance) equivalent to a certain mass (energy) in terms of general relativity. That energy can be called "energy of decoherence" therefore specific for any entangled object and "emitted" in space at any time in virtue of the decoherence itself. That energy is "pure" without 12 The usual interpretation of entanglement in terms of general relativity (e.g. Jensen, Karch 2013) is as, or by means of, a "wormhole" in space-time (Einstein, Rosen 1935). For if one means that kind of usual interpretation, any quantum leap in space-time corresponds to a certain, "straight" wormhole "through" space-time. From our viewpoint, this wormhole is equivalent to a certain curvature in spacetime (representable by a space-time tensor) and thus to a certain mass-energy (representable by an energy-momentum tensor equated to the former by the Einstein field equation) generating that space-time curvature. A certain common measure of both straight wormhole and curvature (and very roughly speaking, their length) has to be the same for that equivalence to hold. The concept, for example, of "holographic duality" means something similar in the framework encountered the interpretation of entanglement as a wormhole. 163Why anything rather than nothing? any source in the framework of the Standard model for entanglement is out of it, and therefore "dark". More than that, it is "dark" in principle as well, for it does not have any carrier in definition, originating directly from quantum information equated to a physical action by means of the Planck constant. The equivalence of gravity and entanglement by general relativity is the necessary condition for that explanation of dark energy. If this were accepted as true, dark matter would correspond to the current degree of entanglement as an equivalent amount of mass at rest which also falls outside of the Standard model, unlike the Higgs mechanism 13, and directly (non-unitarily and Lorentz non-invariantly) originates from quantum information. This means that the process of decoherence transforms dark matter into dark energy as matter and energy are equated to each other by either special or general relativity: the amount of dark mass should decrease by the same amount, by which the amount of dark energy increases. All physical interactions are able to generate entanglement 14, and 13 The Higgs mechanism seems to correspond to the gravitational constant and thus to the unambiguous determination of the relation of Minkowski space and Hilbert space at issue. On the other hand, their relation (or difference) consists mathematically in two members: (a) the real domain of Minkowski space; (b) the axiom of choice for the discretization of Minkowski space to the separable complex Hilbert space as an equivalent. To be "equated" those two members, three physical members known until now and possibly partly or thoroughly overlapping each other should appear: gravitational constant & general relativity as well as entanglement. If one grants dark matter & energy to entanglement (as us), it is logically necessary either the Higgs mechanism to allow for a "dark part" (out of the Standard model) or it to be complemented by an additional, yet unknown part to the difference between Minkowski and Hilbert space in question. The problem seems to be directly linked to that of the "cosmological constant" (Einstein 1918) or "Mach's principle" (Einstein 1918: 241) in general relativity, and thus to the expansion of the universe, the "Big Bang" and (ostensibly) "Einstein's biggest blunt" (Gamov 1970: 44). If one admits (as us) that (quantum) information is able to cause physical action out of time (space-time) by entanglement, "Mach's principle" is rejected. Then, the cosmological constant is not necessary, but anyway both possible and consistent as well as the expansion of the universe and even eventually the "Big Bang" as a real event. 14 Indeed, any interaction implies a force acting to any entity participating in the interaction, and thus causes a certain acceleration according to its mass (energy). That acceleration is able to be transformed partly as (or in other words, represented by) different degrees of entanglement between entities in the interaction. In a sense, the entanglement of the interaction is transformed equivalently into the acceleration of the entity at issue, and vice versa. The essence of entanglement and acceleration is one and the same from the viewpoint of quantum information, to which the option 164 Vasil Penchev it is still unclear how the balance between ordinary and dark matter and dark energy over the course of time might change. For this, a special theory of mutual transformation between them is needed, as well as many observations and experiments. What one might say unambiguously is that dark matter decreases by transforming into dark energy, which increases. However, the amount of new dark matter for new entanglement due to the "visible" interactions remains absolutely unknown, and therefore the same goes for the general balance and change. Perhaps color confinement will take an essential place in that general balance 15. The creation due to mathematical necessity One can approach the mathematical necessity of creation as follows: the creation is necessary in a rigorous sense after one has mathematically represented the physical creation by "taking away". The operation A → {A} (i.e. the generation of a set from a class) means "taking away", and it is always possible, including the application to ∅ (the empty set) or to another set: {A} →{{A}}. However, choice from the empty set is not allowed. Thus, choice turns out to be secondary to the natural numbers. They are implied directly and thus, necessarily, from the nothing for choice is implied only indirectly by means of them and by the axiom of choice, which does not include the choice of the empty set. That secondarity of choice is just that which implies the necessity of creation, for the creation comes "before" the choice appears. The choice appears together with time, however creation is outside of time, for the creation creates the time along with all the rest. The creation underlain by set theory seems to be leap-like, generating all natural numbers as the result of that necessary leap from nothing into being. On the contrary, physics describes the same equivalently, but alternatively: as a continuous process of the being to appear, which is observed as the expansion of their mutual transformation is due. 15 Confinement and entanglement seem to be similar to each other in a sense. Unlike the usual physical interactions between objects separate in both Minkowski and Hilbert space, the objects interacting either by entanglement or confinement are absolutely separate only in the one of them correspondingly. Entanglement is possible both by violating Bell's equation (over the light barrier) or not (below it). The criterion for the partial inseparability of quarks in Minkowski space is their fractional electric charge. At last, one may admit that a phenomenon (e.g. Lewkowycz, Maldacena 2014) as the entanglement of quarks (color entanglement) might exist to complement that scheme of partial separability and inseparability in different senses. That color entanglement might be linked to dark energy, too (e.g. Banerjee et al. 2005). 165Why anything rather than nothing? of the universe. In other words, the expansion of the universe is right in its appearance as the appearance of the being. However, the result of that process (the natural numbers) is given (or "granted") in advance. The creation (and quite particularly: the corresponding "principle of least action" in mechanics) suggests teleology as a certain aim, which is predefined in virtue of its necessity and embodied in the necessary appearance of the natural numbers from the empty set as an equivalent of the "nothing" to mathematics. In other words, the visibility of teleology can be understood as a "by-product" of the secondarity of the choice. The operation, which is the generation of a set from the "nothing", implies all natural numbers by the construction described in the "axiom of infinity" in set theory. The set of all natural numbers is infinite, though all natural numbers are finite according to the axiom of induction in Peano arithmetic. That last circumstance needs elucidation. First, we must understand how the axiom of induction implies that all natural numbers are finite. The unit is finite. By adding a unit to any finite number, another finite number is obtained. If both premises are true, the axiom of induction implies that all natural numbers will be finite. Furthermore, the set of all natural numbers is infinite though all natural numbers are finite. One could argue that the wholeness of all natural numbers, which is what is meant by the concept of a set, implies a new different, "emergent" property, namely to be infinite. This is in contrast to the natural numbers, constituting that wholeness, which are finite. However, as above, that wholeness, perhaps as any wholeness, is obtained by taking away from rather than by adding to the natural numbers: finiteness turns out to be more than infinity, just as finiteness turned out to be less than the "nothing", as described in the empty set earlier. One can say the following about the secondarity of choice: any set may be enumerated (the well-ordering principle), which means that it may be mapped one-to-one into some subset of the set of all natural numbers. The empty set can be enumerated by the special natural number "zero". The well-ordering principle implies the axiom of choice: this is meant as the secondarity of choice. Thus, the being does not need any choice, free will, subject, God, observer, etc. to appear for it appears in virtue of mathematical necessity. The creation can be considered as a mathematical truth. The world exists in virtue of mathematical necessity, e.g. as any mathematical truth such as "2+2=4". However, that fact requires the completeness of the being, which is not demonstrated yet, e.g. as follows: the operation A → {A} can be interpreted as a "primary choice", and thus a vicious circle appears. The vicious circle being equivalent to 166 Vasil Penchev a contradiction generates an empty set, to which it is a characteristic property. That empty set can underlie the successive genesis: "A → {A}" as a choice means an alternative "A → {B}" exists, e.g. {B}=∅: that choice would be necessary only if {A}={B}=∅, i.e. "nothing → ∅" is necessary. In a sense, the being is less than nothing. The being is less than nothing, rather than more than nothing. The creation does not add, but takes away. This seems to be paradoxical to common sense. It may be visualized particularly by an example. Any contradiction (such as A ∧ ¬A) as a characteristic property defines the empty set. If one removes either A or ¬A, an non-empty set can in general be defined by means of either ¬A or A correspondingly as two separated characteristic properties. Furthermore, the mathematical necessity of the being is also consistent with the conception of the Big Bang. We discuss the gradual physical creation at any time, due to the irreversibility of time as mathematically necessary. However, the mathematical necessity of the being underlies the "Big Bang" too. Time implies energy in virtue of Emmy Noether's theorems (1918). The well ordering generates the axiom of choice and thus choice itself. The Big Bang might also occur in virtue of mathematical reasons. Now, everything is ready for the Big Bang. There are time and energy, though they are not "activated" physically yet. This will be done by choice, which exists, too. The choice means zero entropy and thus infinite temperature at any finite energy, and even possibly at zero energy. The infinite temperature generates symmetry breakings (such as the Higgs mechanism), and particularly breaks the symmetry of the two directions of time. The latter symmetry breaking starts time at the moment: t=0. The nothing explodes (or "Nothing explodes") by itself by taking away, as the History of Being. The creation might be a decrease rather than an increase. The common point of view surrounding the creation or the being is the opposite. Creation should add rather than take away. The being should ostensibly be more than nothing. On the contrary, the creation is not an increase of nothing, but the decrease of nothing: it is a deficiency in relation to nothing. An image of this could be a sculptor who takes away from the stone with his chisel. Time and its "arrow" take away, for the other direction of time is removed. Time and its "arrow" are the way from that diminishing or incompleteness to nothing. One may represent the nothing as the unification of both directions of time. However, only the one, forward in time, is real. The other one, backward in time, is taken away from the nothing. After the one direction of time has been taken away from that 167Why anything rather than nothing? nothing, what remains is the being. If one could add the reverse direction of time to the being, only the nothing would be obtained. The concept of transformation into nothing exists in physics as that of "annihilation". "Annihilation" in physics means the fusion of a particle and its antiparticle into light. So, the light (electromagnetic radiation) is the way for us to see the nothing from our viewpoint of the being (i.e. less than nothing). This is the reason for the nothing to be regarded as something: namely as light, but only from our point of view, which is that of "less than nothing". One might try to interpret some ideas about the "Creation", borrowed from the Bible (Genesis 1: 3-4), from a physics point of view: "And God said, "Let there be light," and there was light. And God saw that the light was good. And God separated the light from the darkness" 16. Our reading of the "light" in both Bible and the theory of relativity is the following: we see the nothing as light because we ourselves are less than nothing. Indeed, the light is an absolute upper border or limit for all being, just as the theory of relativity states. To be nothing, to be an upper border, is only another way of saying that the being is "negative", i.e. less than nothing. According to the Bible (John 1:1-4): "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him was not any thing made that was made" 17. Our reading of the "Word" in both the Bible and the theory of quantum information is: the "Word" is information, particularly quantum information. Ontologically, information, being measured by units of bits, is the quantity of "taking away" from the nothing for the being to be created. Indeed, a bit is the elementary choice between two equally probable alternatives, and thus "taking away" one of them: the other is the chosen one. Time and information are linked to each other intimately. Information is the quantity of choices measured in units of elementary choices, i.e. bits. Time in turn is the result of choices: the successive series of all chosen alternatives. The first crucial and mathematically necessary choice is the choice of time itself, or in other words, the choice of the direction of time, or the "arrow of time". Information (the quantity of choices), and time (the series of all the results of those choices) are closely linked. 16 Cited according to the King James Version: https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis+1%3A3-4&version=KJV 17 Cited according to the King James Version: https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John+1&version=KJV 168 Vasil Penchev Conclusions: Conclusions as negations: The state of "nothing" is not stable. The physical nothing is not a general vacuum. The being is less than nothing. The creation is taking away from the nothing. Time is the destruction of symmetry. The creation does not need any (external) cause. Conclusions as statements: The state of nothing passes spontaneously (by itself) into the state of being. This represents the "creation". The transition of nothing into being is mathematically necessary. The choice (which can be interpreted philosophically as "free will") appears necessarily because of mathematical reasons. The choice generates asymmetry, which is the beginning of time and therefore of the physical word. Information is the quantity of choices, and is intimately linked to time. References: Abachi, S. et al. (D0 Collaboration) (1995) Search for High Mass Top Quark Production in pp Collisions at √s = 1.8 TeV. Physical Review Letters 74(13), 2422–2426. Abe, F. et al. (CDF Collaboration) (1995) Observation of Top Quark Production in pp Collisions with the Collider Detector at Fermilab. Physical Review Letters 74(14), 2626–2631. Ade, P. A. R. et al. (Planck Collaboration) (2016) Planck 2015 results. XIII. Cosmological parameters. Astronomy and Astrophysics 594, A13(63). Anderson, P. W. (1963) Plasmons, Gauge Invariance, and Mass. Physical Review 130(1), 439 – 442. Banerjee, S. et al. (2005) Cosmological dark energy from the cosmic QCD phase transition and colour entanglement. Physics Letters B 611(1-2), 27-33. Bell, J. S. (1955) Time reversal in field theory. 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La controverse Newton-Hooke dans l'opinion des scientifiques contemporains Nicolae Sfetcu 31.05.2019 Sfetcu, Nicolae, « La controverse Newton-Hooke dans l'opinion des scientifiques contemporains », SetThings (31 mai 2019), URL = https://www.setthings.com/fr/la-controverse-newton-hookedans-lopinion-des-scientifiques-contemporains/ Email: [email protected] Cet article est sous licence Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International. Pour voir une copie de cette licence, visitez http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/. Une traduction partielle de : Sfetcu, Nicolae, Controversa dintre Isaac Newton și Robert Hooke despre prioritatea în legea gravitației", SetThings (29 noiembrie 2017), MultiMedia Publishing (ed.), DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.24577.97122, ISBN: 978-606-033-133-9, URL = https://www.setthings.com/ro/e-books/controversa-dintre-isaac-newton-si-robert-hooke-despreprioritatea-legea-gravitatiei/ La controverse Newton-Hooke dans l'opinion des scientifiques contemporains Une présentation de la monographie de 1674 de Hooke présentant l'idée de la gravitation universelle est apparue dans Philosophical Transactions de 1674, (Hooke 1674) et puis plusieurs lettres contenant des observations, dont celle de Huygens. Mais évidemment, après la publication du Principia en 1687, (Newton 1687) la priorité de Hooke dans la proposition de la gravitation universelle a été oubliée. Après avoir entendu parler de la demande de Hooke de reconnaître sa priorité, Newton a supprimé les nombreuses références à Hooke dans Principia. Dans une lettre à Halley, Newton a déclaré : « ... [Hooke] ne savait pas comment procéder. N'est-ce pas si bon maintenant ? Les mathématiciens qui apprennent, établissent et font tout le travail doivent se contenter d'être de simples calculatrices, et ceux qui prétendent simplement tout comprendre doivent supprimer toute invention, ainsi que ceux qui voudraient la suivre et les précurseurs. » (Newton 1960) Selon David Gregory, qui a visité Newton à Cambridge en 1694, « j'ai vu un manuscrit écrit avant 1669 ... dans lequel tous les principes fondamentaux de sa philosophie sont établis : la gravitation de la lune sur la terre et les planètes sur le soleil. Et, en fait, tout cela était même calculé alors ... » (Herivel 1965) Ce manuscrit montre que Newton est allé plus loin que Hooke, redécouvrant la relation mathématique découverte par Huygens mais non publiée avant 1673. Dans sa correspondance de 1686 avec Halley, dans laquelle il nia les allégations selon lesquelles il aurait appris l'existence des carrés inverses de Hooke, Newton nota que « M. Hook, ne sachant pas ce que j'ai trouvé dans ses lettres, ne peut pas en savoir plus que la proportion était dupliquée quam proxime [avec approximation] à de grandes distances du centre, et il l'a deviné seulement pour être si précise, et il a mal interprété en étendant cette proportion au centre même ... » (Newton 1960) Newton a utilisé à plusieurs reprises le mot « deviner » pour indiquer que Hooke n'a fourni aucune preuve mathématique de son hypothèse selon laquelle « l'attraction est toujours en double proportion de la distance qui les sépare du centre l'une de l'autre », comme avait écrit Hooke. Dans une lettre à Halley, Newton a souligné qu'en ce sens « La théorie était claire pour moi avant M. Hook. Environ un an après [1673], dans sa tentative de prouver le mouvement de la Terre, il a déclaré expressément que les degrés de la décroissance de la gravité n'avaient pas été vérifiés expérimentalement, c'est-à-dire qu'il ne savait pas comment l'obtenir des phénomènes, c'est pourquoi il recommande que d'autres continuent. » (Newton 1960) Ce que disaient les supporters d'Isaac Newton Les scientifiques du dix-septième siècle ont raisonnablement rejeté la prétention de Hooke, mais les historiens de la science n'ont pas oublié cette controverse, poursuivant ainsi le débat. L'argumentation cité par Lohne avec l'approbation de Vavilov indique que seulement Newton, au dix-septième siècle, pouvait écrire Principia; cependant, Hooke a esquissé son premier programme, (Lohne 1960) mais Hooke en a reçu plus que nécessaire. (Westfall 1967) En raison du manque de démonstrations, les historiens étaient enclins à interpréter ses paroles à la lumière des démonstrations de Newton. (Koyré 1851) Hooke a été attaqué sur des sujets faisant partie de l'idéologie de la Royal Society et défendus par des personnalités telles que Boyle, Joseph Glanvill et Thomas Sprat. Ce que disaient les partisans de Robert Hooke Le journaliste John Aubrey, un ami de Hooke, a plaidé en faveur de Hooke et a écrit désespérément à l'antiquaire Anthony à Wood, qui a ensuite qui élaborait sa théorie sur Athenae Oxonies. Des articles plus récents de P. E. B. Jourdain, A. Koyré, J. Lohne, F. F. Centore, R. S. Westfall, H. Erlichson, O. Gal, J. Bennett et d'autres soulignent les contributions importantes de Hooke à la gravitation et à la théorie planétaire. Hooke, considéré comme un « mécanicien de génie » plutôt que comme un scientifique, (Gal 2002) était souvent désavantagé socialement par Newton, le noble théoricien (Vickers) ou par Huygens. Le statut social inférieur de Hooke ne lui permettait pas de s'identifier à des « hommes libres et sans contrainte », tels que Boyle1, par exemple. 1 Les paroles de Thomas Sprat citées dans « Introduction » de Michael Hunter et Simon Schaffer dans Robert Hooke, New Studies. (Hunter, Hunter, and Schaffer 1989) Le mathématicien et philosophe Newton semblait aux nombreux collègues ce que Glanvill a appelé un « dogmatiste » qui « trahit la pauvreté et un rétrécissement de l'esprit », et étant « trop confiant dans ses opinions », montrait « des manières mauvaises et immortalité ». Grâce aux travaux de Pugliese et aux interprétations proposées par Michael Nauenberg, Hooke a maintenant été réévalué en bon mathématicien. (Pugliese 1989) (Nauenberg 2005) Comme l'a souligné Gal, Hooke ne peut être compris qu'en plaçant son travail sur la théorie planétaire dans le contexte plus large de ses intérêts multiples. (Bennett 1986) Dans la Biographie universelle de Michaud, (Michaud 1843) qui comprend une centaine de volumes, l'article « Newton » semble être une traduction du Biographia Britannica à laquelle il se réfère. Il contient la représentation de l'univers conformément à la loi de la gravitation, littéralement et in extenso, selon une tentative de démonstration du mouvement de la terre à partir d'observations de Robert Hooke, Londres, 1674. L'article ajoute que le point principal, à savoir que la gravité s'étend sur tous les corps célestes, a déjà été exprimé dans Theoria motus planetarum e causis physicis deducta de Borelli, Florence, 1666. Schopenhauer reconnaît la contribution de Hooke à la conception gravitationnelle et laisse à Newton seulement la vérification au moyen de calculs. Selon ce point de vue, Hooke a évolué aussi mal que Columbus : le continent s'appelle « l'Amérique » et la gravité s'appelle « la théorie de Newton ». (Schopenhauer 2013) Bibliographie Bennett, J. A. 1986. The Mechanics' Philosophy and the Mechanical Philosophy. Gal. 2002. Meanest Foundations. Herivel, John. 1965. The Background to Newton's Principia. Hooke, Robert. 1674. "An Attempt to Prove the Motion of the Earth from Observations." http://echo.mpiwgberlin.mpg.de/ECHOdocuView/ECHOzogiLib?mode=imagepath&url=/mpiwg/online/pe rmanent/library/XXTBUC3U/pageimg. Hunter, Michael Cyril William, Reader in History Michael Hunter, and Simon Schaffer. 1989. Robert Hooke: New Studies. Boydell Press. Koyré. 1851. "Gravitația Universală de La Kepler La Newton." Arhivele Internationale de Istorie a Științelor, 638–53. Lohne, Johs. 1960. "Hooke versus Newton." Centaurus, 42–42. Michaud, M. 1843. Biographie Universelle Ancienne et Moderne : Histoire Par Ordre Alphabétique de La Vie Publique et Privée de Tous Les Hommes.... 34. Pomaré-Quix / Publ. Sous La Dir. de M. Michaud ; Ouvrage Réd. Par Une Société de Gens de Lettres et de Savants. https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k51674f. Nauenberg, Michael. 2005. "Robert Hooke's Seminal Contribution to Orbital Dynamics." Physics in Perspective 7 (1): 4–34. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00016-004-0226-y. Newton, Isaac. 1687. "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, I Ed." The British Library. 1687. https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/newtons-principia-mathematica. ---. 1960. "Correspondence of Isaac Newton, Vol 2" 2: 431–48. Pugliese, P.J. 1989. Robert Hooke and the Dynamics of Motion in a Curved Path. Schopenhauer. 2013. "Schopenhauer on Newton and Hooke." The Monist 23: 439–45. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27900444. Westfall, Richard S. 1967. "Hooke and the Law of Universal Gravitation: A Reappraisal of a Reappraisal." The British Journal for the History of Science 3: 245-261-245-261. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4025050.

Ilustrasi: Tiara Lipcasani Ekofeminisme dalam Antroposen: Relevankah? Kritik terhadap Gagasan Ekofeminisme Ni Nyoman Oktaria Asmarani PUSPARAGAM KEILMUAN BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 128 Abstrak Sikap kritis terhadap krisis ekologi yang berdampak buruk pada perempuan telah dimulai oleh Francoise d'Eaubonne dalam bukunya La Feminsme au la Mort (1974). Inilah awal terminologi ekofeminisme diperkenalkan. d'Eaubonne mengungkapkan adanya keterkaitan yang erat antara penindasan terhadap perempuan dan penindasan terhadap alam yang berakar pada kultur patriarki. Dalam sistem ini, perempuan menempati konstruksi posisi yang sama dengan alam yaitu sebagai objek, bukan subjek. Ekofeminisme kemudian lahir untuk memecahkan masalah kehidupan manusia dengan alam yang berangkat dari pengalaman perempuan dan menjadikannya sebagai salah satu sumber belajar dalam pengelolaan dan pelestarian alam. Dalam artikel ini, saya akan mencoba melakukan kritik terhadap beberapa gagasan ekofeminisme. Kritik dalam gagasan ekofeminisme yang akan dilayangkan adalah terkait: relasi antara perempuan dan alam, sifat ideal perempuan, etika kepedulian, gagasan "Ibu Bumi", dan gagasan menyembuhkan Bumi. Dengan metode studi pustaka, saya akan membedah gagasan dan solusi yang ditawarkan oleh ekofeminisme dalam menghadapi alam saat ini dan melihat apakah ekofeminisme masih relevan dalam epos Antroposen. Kata kunci: ekofeminisme, Antroposen, relasi perempuan dan alam, Ibu Bumi, Bumi feminin "We often cause ourselves suffering by wanting only to live in a world of valleys, a world without struggle and difficulty, a world that is flat, plain, consistent." bell hooks (2004) Pendahuluan Pada tahun 1975, Rosemary Radford Ruether menulis bahwa perempuan harus menyadari tidak akan ada pembebasan bagi mereka. Tidak akan ada pula solusi terhadap krisis ekologi di dalam masyarakat yang hubungan dasarnya adalah dominasi. Sehingga, mereka harus menyatukan tuntutan gerakan perempuan dengan gerakan ekologi untuk mencapai pembebasan perempuan dan juga membenahi krisis ekologi itu sendiri.1 Kaum feminis dan 1. Rosemary Radford Ruether. New Woman, New Earth: Sexist Ideologies and Human Liberation. New York: Seabury Press, 1975, hal 204. BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 129 para perempuan ahli ekologi kemudian mulai melihat hubungan paralel antara kekerasan dan eksploitasi terhadap perempuan oleh sistem patriarki dengan eksploitasi terhadap Bumi oleh sistem ekonomi kapitalisme. Kesadaran ini timbul karena dalam sistem patriarki, perempuan dan Bumi adalah objek dan properti yang layak dieksploitasi.2 Melihat latar belakang tersebut maka lahirlah gerakan sekaligus teori yang disebut Ekofeminisme. Bagi salah satu tokoh ekofe minis awal, Karen J. Warren, eko feminisme adalah istilah umum untuk berbagai posisi berbeda yang terkait dengan hubungan ini, yakni interkoneksi "perempuan-other human Others-alam" [sic]. "Others" ("Yang lain") merujuk kepada isu dominasi, eksploitasi, dan kolonisasi kelom pok tertentu yang memiliki sta tus yang tersubordinasi.3 Term ekofeminisme sendiri di cetuskan pertama kali-sebagai ecofeminisme-oleh Françoise d'Eaubonne dalam karyanya, Le Féminisme ou La Mort (1974) yang merujuk pada gerakan pe rem puan yang bertujuan untuk menyelamatkan Bumi. Warren berpendapat bahwa ka um ekofeminis mengklaim ada nya hubungan penting antara do minasi laki-laki terhadap pe rem puan, anak-anak, orang-orang kulit berwarna (people of color), dan orang miskin-disebut "human Others", serta dominasi manusia terhadap binatang, hutan, tanah, air, dan sebagainya ("earth Others"). Dengan demikian, kaum ekofeminis menempatkan diri mereka di persimpangan 2. Ynestra King. "Healing the Wounds: Feminism, Ecology, and the Nature/Culture Dualism" dalam Irene Diamond, Gloria Feman Orenstein. Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism. San Francisco: Sierra Book Club, 1990, hal 106-121. 3. Karen J. Warren. Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It Is and Why It Matters. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, hal XIV. Interkoneksi perempuan-other human Others-alam (terjemahan dari women-other human Others-nature interconnections) adalah term yang dirancang oleh Warren untuk mendefinisikan ekofeminisme. 4. Chris J. Cuomo. Feminism and Ecological Communities. London: Routledge, 1998, hal 24. 5. Ibid., hal 1. 6. Ibid., hal 8. gerakan feminis, anti-rasis, dan gerakan lingkungan, serta kritik terhadap kapitalisme, heteroseksisme, homofobia, dan bentuk penindasan lainnya.4 "Alam adalah isu feminis" dapat disebut sebagai slogan kaum ekofeminis. Slogan ini menerangkan bahwa pohon, air, produksi makanan, hewan, tumbuhan, racun, dan dominasi terhadap alam non-manusia adalah isu feminis. Dengan memahami persoalanpersoalan tersebut, kaum ekofeminis dapat memahami interkoneksi antara dominasi perempuan dan juga kelompok manusia lain yang tersubordinasi ("Other human Others"), serta dominasi terhadap alam non-manusia.5 Kerusakan alam adalah isu perempuan sebab perempuan dan anak-anak adalah kaum yang terkena dampak terbesar. Ini disebabkan oleh faktor-faktor yang saling berkaitan, salah satunya yang terbesar adalah kemiskinan. Anders Wijkman dan Lloyd Timberlake, seperti dikutip Warren, mengatakan bahwa bagian terbesar populasi kaum miskin adalah perempuan dan anak-anak yang semakin lama jumlahnya semakin meningkat. Kemiskinan ini semakin diperparah dengan faktor ras, etnisitas, dan usia.6 Kesehatan perempuan dan anakanak, terutama di komunitas kaum kulit berwarna yang miskin, sangat dipengaruhi dan dirugikan oleh praktik lingkungan yang berbahaya. Misalnya di beberapa wilayah pedesaan yang masyarakatnya mengandalkan hidup dari alam, kelangkaan air mengakibatkan perempuan semakin BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 130 sulit untuk bisa mengakses air bersih dan menjaga ketahanan pangan untuk memenuhi kebutuhan hidupnya sehari-hari.7 Tak hanya di negara berkembang, di negara maju seperti Amerika Serikat dan Kanada, literatur tentang kepekaan kimia (chemical sensitivity) menunjukkan bahwa kepekaan manusia terhadap zat formaldehida sangat terkait gender (jumlah kasus perempuan dua sampai tiga kali lebih banyak daripada laki-laki) dan bergantung usia (anak-anak dan perempuan yang lebih tua adalah yang paling rentan). Di Great Lakes Basin, Amerika Serikat, kandungan pestisida, logam berat, PCB (polychlorinated biphenyls), dan dioksin tidak hanya menghasilkan gangguan reproduksi, kanker, tumor pada ikan dan mamalia, serta kelainan bentuk pada larva serangga, tetapi juga pada jaringan manusia. PCB telah berkontribusi terhadap hasil reproduksi yang merugikan (termasuk penurunan jumlah sperma pada laki-laki), rendahnya berat badan bayi yang lahir, bayi yang lahir dengan lingkar kepala yang lebih kecil, tingkat kanker yang meningkat, penyakit peredaran darah, dan penyakit terkait sistem kekebalan tubuh.8 Di sisi lain, ketika perhatian mengenai perubahan alam mulai meningkat, Paul Crutzen dan Eugene Stoermer menyatakan bahwa kita sudah tidak berada pada epos Holosen, tapi dalam Antroposen Bagi mereka, kita sudah seharusnya menitikberatkan peran sentral manusia dalam geologi dan ekologi dengan menggunakan term Antroposen sebagai epos geologi saat ini.9 7. Dewi Candraningrum, et al. Ekofeminisme dalam Tafsir Agama, Pendirikan, Ekonomi, dan Budaya. Yogyakarta: Jalasutra, 2013, hal x. 8. Tom Muir dan Anne Sudar, "Toxic Chemicals in the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem: Some Observations" (Burlington, Ont.: Environment Canada, 1988; tidak diterbitkan) dalam Karen J. Warren. Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It Is and Why It Matters. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, hal 11. 9. Paul Crutzen & Eugene Stoermer. "The 'Anthropocene'" dalam Global Change Newsletter Vol. 41, hal 17-18. 10. Will Steffen, et al. "The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature?" dalam AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment, 36(8), 2007, hal 614-621. 11. Jeremy Davies. The Birth of Anthropocene. Oakland: University of California Press, 2016, hal 5. Peralihan ini besar dipengaruhi oleh aktivitas manusia yang telah merasuk sangat dalam sehingga mengalahkan kekuatan besar Alam itu sendiri.10 Hal tersebut menandakan bahwa kini manusia telah mengubah tatanan Bumi pada Holosen dan karenanya telah menjadi faktor geologis utama penentu gerak alam. Perubahan akibat aktivitas manusia pada sistem Bumi sangat besar sehingga sistem Bumi itu berubah secara fundamental. Perubahan ini terlihat pada daratan, atmosfer, perairan, laut, keragaman hayati, perubahan karbon, nitrogen, fosfor, dan sulfur. Antroposen kemudian menjadi suatu tantangan baru bagi asumsi-asumsi kaum ekofeminis. Salah satu fungsi ekofeminisme yang bertujuan untuk menjaga dan menyembuhkan alam dengan cara sebisa mungkin mengembalikannya ke keadaan yang semula-yang dianggap kaum ekofeminis adalah keadaan yang lebih baik daripada saat ini-kemudian patut untuk dipertanyakan kembali. Hal ini disebabkan karena ketika Bumi berpindah dari satu epos geologi ke epos geologi yang lain, Bumi tidak dapat kembali ke epos geologi sebelumnya.11 Ketika Bumi sudah memasuki epos geologi yang baru, itu menandakan bahwa Bumi telah berubah secara fundamental dan oleh karenanya tidak dapat "dikembalikan" seperti semula. Selain itu, epos Antroposen sendiri berbeda dengan Holosen, sebab Bumi dianggap tidak memiliki karakteristik yang statis-seperti karakteristik yang diandaikan pada Holosen. Oleh karena itu, perlu adanya kritik terhadap gagasan-gagasan ekofeminisme BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 131 dan juga melihat relevansinya pada era Antroposen ini. Dalam beberapa kritik yang akan saya sampaikan, dapat dilihat pula betapa ekofeminisme adalah gagasan yang saling tumpang tindih dan seringkali tidak mendukung satu sama lain untuk menjadikannya sebuah bentuk teori yang utuh. Perlu untuk digarisbawahi bahwa apa yang saya lakukan di sini bukanlah untuk sepenuhnya menentang gagasan ekofeminisme. Saya hanya mencoba untuk melihatnya secara lebih kritis. Tentang Hubungan Perempuan dan Alam Ekofeminisme hadir sebagai suatu bentuk teori dan gerakan karena adanya hubungan kuat antara perempuan dan alam. Ketika perempuan melihat adanya kerusakan pada alam, mereka menyadari adanya hubungan yang sangat kuat antara represi patriarki terhadap perempuan dan dominasi manusia terhadap alam. Bagi Ynestra King, dengan menentang patriarki yang tak hanya merusak perempuan namun juga alam ini, perempuan dapat merasa bertanggung jawab terhadap Bumi dan generasi yang akan datang. "Kami memiliki pemahaman mendalam dan khusus tentang hal ini baik melalui sifat, maupun pengalaman kami sebagai perempuan."12 Bagi kaum ekofeminis, korporasikorporasi melakukan represi terhadap alam. Represi ini kemudian mereka anggap sebagai sesuatu yang mirip dengan represi patriarki terhadap perempuan. Maka dari itu, kaum ekofeminis semakin yakin bahwa ada hubungan yang kuat antara perempuan dan alam. Pertanyaannya 12. Ynestra King. "The Eco-Feminist Perspective" dalam Maria Mies, Vandana Shiva. Ecofeminism. London: Zed Books, 2014, hal 14. 13. Janet Biehl. "Women and Nature: A Recurring Mystique," dalam Le Monde Diplomatique. 2011. sekarang adalah, dari mana kesadaran seperti ini berasal? Apakah memang benar ada hubungan antara perempuan dan alam? Apakah itu menjadikan perempuan lebih "hijau" dibanding laki-laki? Apakah persoalan alam sebaiknya memang diatasi oleh perempuan karena merekalah yang memiliki ikatan spesial tersebut? Saya akan mencoba membedahnya di sini. Menurut Janet Biehl, terdapat sebuah kesalahan mendasar dari apa yang kita sebut sebagai ekofeminisme saat ini, dan apa yang sebenarnya dirumuskan oleh d'Eaubonne di tahun 1974. Hal ini bermula dalam karya Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (1968). Dalam buku tersebut, disebutkan bahwa apa yang merusak planet Bumi adalah populasi manusia yang berlebihan. Ehrilch menyarankan bahwa hal terbaik yang bisa dilakukan manusia untuk Bumi adalah dengan menolak bereproduksi. Beberapa tahun kemudian, dalam Le Féminisme ou La Mort, d'Eaubonne melihat bahwa separuh populasi manusia di Bumi yakni perempuan, tidak memiliki kekuatan untuk membuat pilihan itu sebab mereka tidak mengendalikan reproduksi mereka sendiri. Sistem patriarki lah yang menginginkan perempuan untuk terus menerus bereproduksi.13 Akan tetapi, perempuan bisa dan harus melawan, kata Eaubonne, dengan menuntut kebebasan reproduksi: yakni akses mudah untuk aborsi dan kontrasepsi. Kebebasan itu kemudian dapat mengemansipasi perempuan dan menyelamatkan planet ini dari kelebihan populasi. "Hubungan pertama antara ekologi dan pembebasan perempuan adalah pembaharuan oleh perempuan dalam pertumbuhan penduduk, yang akan BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 132 mendefiniskan ulang kepemilikan tubuh mereka sendiri."14 Beberapa ahli lingkungan Amerika kemudian mengambil term ekofeminisme tapi menerapkan arti yang berbeda untuk itu. Mereka ingat bahwa penulis buku tentang lingkungan, Silent Spring (1963), adalah seorang perempuan, yakni Rachel Carson. Mereka juga melihat bahwa perempuan banyak memimpin demonstrasi untuk menentang pembangkit listrik tenaga nuklir, seperti Lois Gibbs di Love Canal, New York, dan melawan keracunan kimia di lingkungan mereka. Salah satu penulis berpengaruh yang menulis laporan Limits to Growth (1972) juga merupakan seorang perempuan, yakni Donella Meadows. Salah satu anggota partai German Greens di Jerman juga seorang perempuan, Petra Kelly. Di Inggris, sebuah kelompok yang disebut Women for Life on Earth membentuk "kamp perdamaian" di pangkalan udara Greenham Common untuk memprotes penyebaran rudal jelajah NATO. Saat itu, banyak peserta yang berkemah mengidentifikasi diri mereka sebagai ekofeminis. Akan tetapi, bagi Biehl, itu bukan bagian dari perjuangan untuk kebebasan reproduksi. Kemudian, entah bagaimana kemudian mulai muncul pandangan bahwa perempuan dan alam memiliki ikatan khusus. Mereka bisa melihatnya dalam bahasa itu sendiri, di mana "alam" dan "Bumi" bersifat feminin; hutan "perawan"; Alam adalah "ibu" dan ia "tahu yang terbaik." Perempuan kemudian bisa menjadi "Ibu Bumi" atau "penyihir liar"; ia adalah entitas yang sangat kuat. Sebaliknya, kekuatan yang mencoba untuk "menjinakkan alam" dan "memperkosa tanah" adalah sains, teknologi, dan akal-proyek maskulin.15 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Maria Mies, Vandana Shiva. Ecofeminism. London: Zed Books, 2014, hal 280. Maka tidak heran bila kemudian para ekofeminis mulai memiliki arah yang berbeda dari apa yang dirumuskan pada awalnya. Hal ini terlihat dalam Ecofeminism (2014), karya Maria Mies dan Vandana Shiva. Dua ekofeminis tersebut menganggap bila perempuan mulai 'tercerahkan' dengan pendidikan terkait reproduksi, berarti perempuan semakin diduduki oleh paradigma Utara-mereka tidak menggunakan dikotomi Barat-Timur tetapi Utara-Selatan-yang merepresi perempuan dan masyarakat negara dunia ketiga. Ini tentu jelas bertentangan dengan apa yang diharapkan oleh d'Eaubonne sebagai salah satu tujuan dari ekofeminisme itu sendiri. "Perempuan yang berpen didikan lebih baik diasumsikan akan mempraktikkan keluarga berencana. Namun, pendidikan biasanya terlihat memisahkan hubungan perempuan dengan kelasnya dan latar belakang pedesaan atau perkotaannya. Pendidikan saja belum meme cahkan masalah kemiskinan bagi banyak perempuan, juga masalah asuransi di hari tua, yang merupakan salah satu alasan mengapa masyarakat di Selatan terus memiliki keluarga besar. Dengan tidak adanya sistem jaminan sosial, anakanak adalah satu-satunya asuransi usia tua. Kebijakan keluarga berencana selalu diperbanyak dengan argumen bahwa keluarga kecil adalah keluarga yang bahagia. Tapi UNFPA atau agen pengendali populasi lainnya tidak pernah bertanya apakah sebenarnya mengurangi jumlah anak dalam keluarga telah membuat mereka lebih bahagia atau lebih makmur. Kita hanya bisa membaca kesenjangan antara orang kaya dan miskin Selatan semakin melebar."16 BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 133 Saya tidak menuliskan ku tipan ini dengan bermaksud me ng atakan bahwa semua yang di lakukan secara tradisional sesuai nilai-nilai di tiap negara dunia ketiga adalah sesuatu yang salah. Akan tetapi, ketika Mies dan Shiva mengatakan bahwa kontrol kelahiran adalah sesuatu yang tidak cocok dilakukan ketika memang Bumi sedang mengalami overpopulasi, hal itu sudah tidak sejalan dengan apa yang diharapkan oleh d'Eaubonne. Keinginan perempuan untuk bereproduksi secara terus menerus adalah salah satu tanda bahwa ia sudah menjalani apa yang sistem patriarki inginkan: perempuan yang berada dalam domestikasi keluarga. Hal ini, bagi saya, juga menjadi salah satu dilema dari perempuan di negara dunia ketiga: tetap berpaku pada tradisinya yang bisa jadi ikut membantu dalam merusak alam, atau mulai menerima sesuatu yang datang dari negara dunia pertama-misalnya pendidikan-yang bisa jadi membuat mereka hidup dalam kehidupan yang lebih baik. Selain itu, pertentangan dua argumen besar antara d'Eaubonne dengan Mies dan Shiva ini menjadi salah satu contoh tidak adanya persamaan paradigma dan teori antara ekofeminis satu dengan lainnya. Akan tetapi, untuk saat ini, mari kembali pada persoalan hubungan perempuan dengan alam itu sendiri. Menurut Carolyn Merchant (1995), salah satu dari perumus awal teori ekofeminisme, ekologi memiliki kaitan erat dengan perempuan sebab, "Kata ekologi berasal dari kata Yunani 'oikos', yang berarti rumah. Ekologi, kemudian, adalah ilmu tentang rumah tangga-rumah tangga Bumi. Hubungan antara Bumi dan 17. Carolyn Merchant (1995) dalam Catriona Sandilands, The Good-Natured Feminist: Ecofeminism and the Quest for Democracy. Minnesota: Univerity of Minnesota Press, 1999, hal 4. 18. Ibid. rumah secara historis telah dimediasi oleh perempuan."17 Hal ini kemudian juga menjadi salah satu penguat bagi para ekofeminis bahwa ada kaitan yang kuat antara perempuan dan alam. Merupakan hal yang sangat lazim dan dapat diterima bahwa perempuan patut merawat alam dengan baik, karena alam juga memiliki karakteristik yang sama dengan mereka. Akan tetapi, hal ini menjadi sangat problematis apabila kita menilik kembali siapa dan apa yang disebut perempuan dan alam dalam diskursus ekofeminisme. Pernyataan tersebut bisa membawa para pembaca ke ranah berpikir yang sangat reduksionis; seolah menyatakan hanya ada satu alam dan satu jenis perempuan di Bumi yang sangat luas ini. Hal ini juga sempat diungkapkan oleh Catriona Sandilands bahwa, "Ekologi menjadi ekonomi rumah tangga, planet Bumi menjadi rumah tangga, dan hubungan kompleks perempuan dengan kedua hal di atas menjadi 'mediasi'. Perempuan mana yang melakukan mediasi, sifat apa yang terlibat dalam mediasi, dan yang disebut oleh 'perempuan' dan 'alam' adalah pertanyaan yang tidak ditanyakan, dan Merchant (seperti banyak ahli ekofeminisme lainnya) sepertinya tidak merasa perlu untuk menginterogasi halhal tersebut; identitas solid 'perempuan' menjadi penting melalui hubungan spesifik dengan metafora tertentu dari 'alam'."18 Bahkan sejak ekofeminisme pertama kali dirumuskan, tidak ada pandangan kritis terhadap apa yang dimaksud dengan alam dan perempuan. Konsep alam dan BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 134 perempuan diterima begitu saja sehingga melahirkan gagasan bahwa represi terhadap perempuan adalah setara dengan represi terhadap alam. Terkait apa dan siapa perempuan itu, apa dan bagaimana alam itu, adalah sesuatu yang tidak dibahas secara mendalam oleh kaum ekofeminis. Padahal, Sherry Ortner, seorang ekofeminis, secara eksplisit menyatakan bahwa kategori 'alam' dan 'kultur' (manusia), merupakan hasil kategorisasi dari manusia. Baginya, tidak ada tempat di dunia nyata di mana seseorang dapat menemukan batas sebenarnya antara kedua keadaan atau sifat itu.19 Bahkan dengan landasan seperti ini, sebagian besar teoretikus ekofeminisme tetap menggunakan term alam dan manusia (atau perempuan) tanpa membedahnya lebih dalam. Maka tidak mengherankan bila gagasan-gagasan dalam teori ekofeminisme tampak tidak seirama satu sama lainnya. Akan tetapi, untuk melanjutkan tulisan ini, mari kita andaikan bahwa kita sudah menerima bahwa ekofeminisme adalah soal perempuan dan alam, serta keterkaitannya terhadap kerusakan satu sama lain. Mari kita kesampingkan terlebih dahulu siapa yang dimaksud perempuan dan alam itu. Namun, ketika kita mencoba untuk mulai percaya bahwa perempuan dan alam memiliki hubungan erat, Ortner datang dengan membawa pemahaman yang berbeda. Bagi Ortner, perempuan didefinisikan atau disimbolkan sebagai sesuatu yang nilainya didegradasi di setiap kultur. Perempuan memiliki tingkatan yang lebih rendah daripada kultur itu sendiri. Oleh karenanya, hal yang dapat dipadankan dengan sesuatu yang lebih rendah daripada kultur tersebut adalah natur (alam). 19. Sherry B. Ortner, "Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?" dalam Feminist Studies Vol.1 No.2 (Musim Gugur, 1972), hal 10. 20. Ibid., hal 28. Ortner tidak menjelaskan lebih lanjut apa yang ia maksud sebagai proyek "kreativitas dan transendensi". 21. Françoise d'Eaubonne (1974) dalam Catriona Sandilands, The Good-Natured Feminist: Ecofeminism and the Quest for Democracy. Minnesota: Univerity of Minnesota Press, 1999, hal 7. Agenda politik Ortner terlihat jelas karena pada akhirnya ia menginginkan baik laki-laki maupun perempuan mampu dan harus terlibat bersamasama dalam apa yang ia sebut sebagai proyek "kreativitas dan transendensi". Baru pada saat itulah perempuan dilihat selaras dengan budaya, dalam dialektika yang terus berlanjut dengan alam.20 Namun, ternyata apa yang Ortner katakan justru tidak sesuai dengan agenda dari d'Eaubonne. Sebab, d'Eaubonne merayakan hubungan antara perempuan dan alam sebagai sarana untuk memberikan kembali nilai pada aspekaspek kehidupan yang telah terdegradasi dan terdistorsi oleh sistem patriarki: "Oleh karena itu, akan terbukti bahwa tidak ada kelompok manusia lain yang dapat membawa revolusi ekologis selain perempuan; sebab tidak ada manusia lain yang secara langsung peduli terhadap alam di semua tingkatan." 21 Dengan begini, kembali terjadi ketidakseragaman antara satu ekofeminis dan lainnya. Hal tersebut terlihat dalam gagasan bahwa memang perempuan lah yang lebih mampu untuk memperbaiki, merehabilitasi alam. Mari kita bedah satu per satu bagaimana sesungguhnya hal itu tidak bisa dengan mudah diterima. Diskusi kaum ekofeminis tentang hubungan erat antara perempuan dan alam mengambil dua bentuk besar. Pendukung "argumen berbasis tubuh" meng klaim bahwa perempuan, melalui pengalaman tubuh mereka yang unik yakni ovulasi, menstruasi, kehamilan, persalinan, dan menyusui, BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 135 mendekati dan dapat lebih mudah terhubung dengan alam. Sedangkan pendukung "argumen penindasan" mendasarkan keyakinannya pada pembagian kerja seksual dan penindasan terhadap perempuan sebagai penyebab kaum perempuan mengembangkan wawasan dan hubungan khusus dengan alam.22 Para ahli ekofeminisme, menurut Karen J. Warren, biasanya juga memperoleh dasar-dasar etika berdasarkan nilai feminin misalnya dari "perawatan, cinta, pertemanan, kepercayaan, dan timbal balik yang sesuai"23, yang dimaksudkan untuk mengatasi segala bentuk dominasi. Kita mesti sangat berhati-hati jika ikut mendukung argumen bahwa pengalaman-pengalaman tubuh perempuan membuatnya menjadi lebih superior-tidak lagi hanya sekadar berbeda-daripada lakilaki dalam hubungannya dengan alam. Ketika pengalaman perempuan dalam bermenstruasi, melahirkan, menyusui, dan merawat anak-anaknya dapat disebut sebagai sesuatu yang identik dengan kerjakerja 'ibu Bumi' yang selalu memberi, menumbuhsuburkan makhluk hidup dan memberikannya tempat berlindung, bersedia untuk berkorban demi kebutuhan mereka; bereproduksi, bagaimana dengan pengalaman hidup laki-laki? Bukankah lakilaki dan perempuan sama-sama mengalami proses biologis seperti makan, tidur, ekskresi, sakit, dan mati, layaknya semua makhluk hidup lainnya, tak hanya perempuan? Bahkan, menurut Catherine Roach, melalui ejakulasi air mani, laki-laki memiliki pengalaman tentang reproduksi kehidupan.24 Robyn Eckersley menyarankan bahwa "walaupun terdapat perbedaan pengalaman tubuh antara laki-laki dan perempuan, tidak 22. Anne Archambault, "A Critique to Ecofeminism". Canadian Woman Studies, Vol. 13 No. 3, 1993. 23. Karen J. Warren. "The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism." Dalam Environmental Ethics. 12 (1990): 125-146. 24. Roach, Catherine. "Loving Your Mother: On the Woman-Nature Relation." dalam Hypatia. 6 (1991): 46-57. 25. Robyn Eckersley (1992) dalam Anne Archambault, "A Critique to Ecofeminism". Canadian Woman Studies, Vol. 13 No. 3, 1993. ada alasan mengapa seseorang harus diangkat secara sosial lebih tinggi dari yang lain". Sehingga masih perlu dipertanyakan kembali apakah "perumpamaan tubuh" perempuan lebih "alami" daripada laki-laki. Kita merendahkan status laki-laki kepada status "Yang lain" hanya karena mereka tidak secara aktif berpartisipasi dalam kesadaran tubuh yang menjadikan perempuan menjadi lebih dekat dengan alam. Jika itu terjadi, secara tidak langsung kita hanya membalikkan dualisme hierarkis antara perempuan dan laki-laki, yang sesungguhnya ingin dihapus oleh kaum ekofeminis itu sendiri.25 Identifikasi berlebihan terhadap perspektif perempuan dalam memandang alam sehingga menerimanya secara tidak kritis adalah suatu hal yang sangat gegabah untuk dilakukan oleh kaum ekofeminis. Eckersley menunjukkan tiga sisi di mana pengalaman perempuan yang dianggap "istimewa" dapat menghambat proses emansipatoris dalam menghadapi alam saat ini. Pertama, analisis semacam itu bisa mengabaikan sejauh mana peran perempuan dalam proses kehancuran ekologis di masa lalu. Adanya identifikasi berlebihan terhadap pengalaman perempuan membuat imaji bahwa perempuan adalah makhluk yang paling tidak berdosa. Bahkan, dalam kata lain, perempuan jauh lebih tidak berdosa dibanding laki-laki dalam kaitannya dengan kehancuran alam; kehancuran alam hanyalah disebabkan oleh perbuatan lakilaki semata. Kedua, hal tersebut gagal untuk mengidentifikasi berbagai cara di mana lakilaki sendiri menderita stereotip "maskulin". Dengan begitu, laki-laki dianggap memiliki kedudukan yang sama: hanya sebagai perusak alam dan itu disebabkan oleh identifikasinya BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 136 dengan sifat maskulin. Ketiga, tidak responsif terhadap dampak dari dinamika sosial lainnya dan menaruh prasangka yang tidak terkait dengan masalah gender.26 Dengan begitu, kedua argumen dalam diskursus besar ekofeminisme, argumen berbasis tubuh dan berbasis pengalaman, sangatlah reduksionis dan tidak dapat dibenarkan sepenuhnya. Sifat Ideal Perempuan, Apa dan yang Mana? Kaum ekofeminis sepertinya tetap mengakui bahwa karakteristik perempuan seperti selalu "merawat" dan "memelihara" mesti menjadi bagian dari etika lingkungan ekofeminis. Terlepas dari apakah perempuan telah mengembangkan hubungan khusus dengan alam melalui argumen tubuh atau argumen penindasan historis mereka. Hal yang mudah ditangkap dari argumen kaum ekofeminis adalah, mengganti karakteristik manusia bermodel maskulin dengan model yang lebih feminin. Val Plumwood juga menyebut ihwal logika dari kaum ekofeminis terkait karakteristik ideal. Menurutnya, jika strategi maskulinisasi menolak karakter feminin ideal dan menggunakan karakter maskulin ideal untuk semua orang, maka sebaliknya, strategi feminisasi menolak karakter maskulin dan menyetujui karakter feminin untuk semua orang. Ada dua cara yang dapat digunakan dalam strategi feminisasi: pertama, melengkapi model maskulin dengan cara menggunakan sifat-sifat yang tidak digunakan oleh model maskulin; kedua, merayakan perbedaan antara karakter perempuan dan karakter maskulin yang ideal.27 Feminisasi karakter perempuan ideal berkisar pada konsep ideal perempuan. 26. Ibid. 27. Val Plumwood. "Women, Humanity and Nature" dalam Radical Philosophy 48 (Musim Semi 1988), hal 20. 28. Ibid, hal 21. Namun pertama-tama, kita mesti mencari tahu, apa yang disebut dengan konsep ideal perempuan? Apa saja ciri-cirinya? Apakah memang ada karakteristik bawaan perempuan, atau karakteristik itu hanya merupakan konstruksi saja? Menurut Plumwood, karakter feminin yang sebenarnya bahkan tidak diketahui atau belum diketahui untuk bereksistensi. "Karena tidak ada perempuan yang karakternya membentuk basis ideal, posisi ini memicu pencarian semacam esensi feminin yang mengabaikan ekspresi dalam masyarakat saat ini, namun muncul sebagai potensi yang belum terealisasi, sangat tidak terealisasi yang dalam beberapa versi bahkan secara esensi hampir tidak dapat diekspresikan."28 Karakteristik feminin yang dianggap dimiliki oleh perempuan sebenarnya tidaklah diketahui. Oleh karena itu, kaum ekofeminis perlu memikirkan kembali konsep etika ekofeminis yang berdasarkan pengetahuan dan kepedulian yang spesial dari perempuan terhadap alam. Tentang Etika Kepedulian Salah satu hal yang menjadi landasan dari ekofeminisme adalah etika kepedulian. Etika ini dapat hadir karena berhubungan dengan adanya karakteristik ideal perempuan, seperti yang sudah saya jelaskan di atas. Jika karakteristik ideal perempuan, lebih tepatnya karakteristik feminin ideal masih sangat problematis untuk diajukan sebagai landasan etika ekofeminisme, maka kita juga harus mempermasalahkan produk dari karakter tersebut, yakni etika kepedulian itu sendiri. BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 137 Etika kepedulian digagas Carol Gilligan, seorang ahli psikologi, melalui studinya terkait perkembangan gender dan moral di tahun 1980-an. Dalam studi psikologis tersebut, terlihat bahwa perempuan memiliki nilai kepedulian, pemeliharaan, dan penjagaan hubungan yang baik-yang secara kebetulan memiliki asosiasi yang sama dengan perempuan dalam budaya patriarki Barat. Dalam usaha untuk membawa pengalaman perempuan dalam pengembangan teori etika feminis, teoretikus feminisme dan ekofeminisme telah menerapkan etika kepedulian berdasarkan tiga hal: (1) Perempuan dan anak perempuan dalam studi Gilligan menampilkan ketertarikan yang lebih pada kepedulian dan hubungan baik daripada hak dan tanggung jawab institusional abstrak. (2) Dalam budaya di mana kebanyakan teoretikus feminisme berada, perempuan dianggap lebih mampu mengasuh dan merawat daripada laki-laki, baik untuk alasan alami atau sosial. (3) Pertimbangan etis tentang kepedulian dan keintiman jauh kurang menonjol dalam sejarah filsafat dan sejarah institusi politik, terutama di Barat, daripada pertimbangan tindakan benar dan salah.29 Tidak mengherankan, "perempuan pada dasarnya lebih dekat dengan alam" adalah klaim yang paling umum dikritik oleh kritikus ekofeminisme. Klaim tersebut bersifat regresif sebab secara tidak langsung memperkuat dominasi patriarki itu sendiri. Hal itu hanya akan mengabadikan gagasan bahwa asumsi biologi menentukan ketidaksetaraan sosial antara laki-laki dan perempuan. Pandangan bahwa "biologi adalah takdir" telah secara aktif dikritik oleh feminis selama hampir setengah abad. 29. Chris J. Cuomo. Feminism and Ecological Communities. London: Routledge, 1998, hal. 127. 30. Janet Biehl. Rethinking Ecofemhist Politics. Boston: South End Press, 1991, hal 26. 31. Ibid, hal 148. Kini, ekofeminisme seolah-olah merayakannya dan menggunakannya sebagai basis dari etikanya. Hal ini akhirnya memicu Biehl yang beranggapan bahwa etika yang didasarkan pada sifat perempuan yang konstan seperti itu sangat membatasi karena tidak memberi ruang bagi evolusi "kesadaran, akal dan kebebasan" bagi perempuan. Oleh karena itu, perempuan dibatasi pada peran mereka dalam mengasuh dan tidak memiliki harapan untuk melampaui itu.30 Biehl berpendapat bahwa bahkan orang yang paling 'peduli' pun tidak dapat memperluas perhatian mereka kepada semua manusia lainnya. Mereka tentu saja tidak dapat memperpanjang perawatan mereka seperti seorang ibu akan merawat anakanaknya atau keluarganya kepada setiap orang di dunia ini. Dia menyatakan, "Sebagai emosi, 'peduli' tidak dapat diuniversalisasi sebagai dasar untuk organisasi sosial di luar kelompok kecil seseorang-terlepas dari apakah ia berbasis kekerabatan atau tidak. Tidak pula ada jenis kepedulian yang dirasakan seorang ibu (atau ayah) bagi seorang anak yang dapat diuniversalisasikan. Untuk merawat semua orang hanya akan meremehkan konsep kepedulian dan menjadikannya tidak berarti dan tidak fokus."31 Pada akhirnya, di sini jelas terlihat bahwa etika kepedulian bukanlah suatu pandangan etika yang tepat untuk digunakan dalam ekofeminisme. Etika ini juga tidak tepat digunakan dalam memandang dinamika alam yang saat ini dianggap sedang membawa kita ke suatu "kiamat". BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 138 Tentang Ibu Bumi Dunia kita yang hilang itu adalah dunia organik. Setidaknya, itu yang dikatakan oleh Carolyn Merchant (1990). Baginya, manusia telah hidup dalam hubungan yang organik sejak waktu yang dia tidak ketahui hingga tahun 1500-an. Saat itu, interaksi dengan alam masih sangat terstruktur secara kooperatif dan organik untuk kebanyakan masyarakat Eropa dan negara-negara lain. Dengan demikian, tidaklah mengherankan bahwa bagi masyarakat Eropa abad XVI, metafora organismelah yang mengikat diri, masyarakat, dan kosmos. Sebagai proyeksi dari cara orang mengalami kehidupan sehari-hari, teori organismik menekankan hubungan saling ketergantungan antara bagian-bagian tubuh manusia, subordinasi individu terhadap tujuan komunal dalam keluarga, masyarakat, dan negara, dan kehidupan vital yang menyerap kosmos ke tingkat yang paling rendah.32 Inti dari teori organik adalah identifikasi alam, terutama Bumi, dengan ibu yang memelihara. Ibu Bumi dicitrakan sebagai perempuan dermawan penyedia kebutuhan umat manusia di alam semesta yang terencana dan tertata. Tapi ada pula citra lain alam sebagai perempuan ini, yakni liar dan tak terkendali, dapat membuat beragam kekerasan, badai, kekeringan, dan kekacauan. Keduanya diidentifikasi dengan jenis kelamin perempuan dan merupakan proyeksi persepsi manusia terhadap dunia luar.33 Bagi Merchant, metafora Bumi sebagai ibu secara bertahap lenyap sebagai citra dominan saat Revolusi Ilmiah mulai melakukan mekanisasi untuk merasionalisasi pandangan dunia. Seiring semakin 32. Carolyn Merchant. The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and Scientific Revolution. Manhattan: Harper & Row, 1990, hal 1. 33. Ibid, hal 2. 34. Ibid, hal 2. mekanisnya budaya Barat di tahun 1600an, semangat Bumi dan semangat "Bumi yang perawan" ditundukkan oleh mesin. Mentalitas yang berorientasi organik di mana asas-asas perempuan memainkan peran penting dirongrong dan digantikan oleh mentalitas yang berorientasi mekanis sehingga menghilangkan prinsip-prinsip perempuan.34 Bagi Merchant, narasi tentang Ibu Bumi sangat berpengaruh dalam kehidupan manusia sehari-hari. Sebab, manusia selalu berhubungan dan membutuhkan alam. Baginya, "Citra Bumi sebagai makhluk hidup dan ibu pengasuh telah berfungsi sebagai kendala yang membatasi tindakan manusia. Seseorang tidak mudah membunuh seorang ibu, menggali isi perutnya untuk emas atau memutilasi tubuhnya, meskipun pertambangan komersial akan segera membutuhkannya. Selama Bumi dianggap masih hidup dan sensitif, perlakuan destruktif manusia terhadapnya bisa dianggap sebagai pelanggaran etis. Bagi kebanyakan budaya tradisional, mineral dan logam matang di rahim Ibu Bumi, tambang disamakan dengan vaginanya, dan metalurgi adalah kelahiran manusia dari kelahiran logam hidup di dalam rahim. Penambang menawarkan perdamaian kepada dewa-dewa tanah dan dunia bawah tanah, melakukan pengorbanan seremonial, mengamati kebersihan, pantangan seksual, dan puasa yang ketat sebelum melanggar kesucian Bumi yang hidup dengan menenggelamkan sebuah tambang. Pandai besi mengambil tanggung jawab yang mengagumkan dalam BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 139 mempercepat kelahiran logam melalui peleburan, penggabungan, dan pemukulan dengan palu dan landasan; mereka sering diberi status dukun dalam ritual kesukuan dan alat mereka dianggap memiliki kekuatan khusus."35 Metafora Ibu Bumi kemudian menjadi problematis ketika dilihat dari segi yang berbeda. Sebab, pada kenyataannya, alam adalah dirinya sendiri. Dia bukanlah manusia laki-laki atau manusia perempuan. Ia tidak bisa dengan mudah direduksi sebagai entitas yang dapat disamakan dengan manusia. Jika memang ekofeminisme sangat menentang adanya dominasi manusia terhadap alam, termasuk pandangan antroposentrisme, narasi Ibu Bumi kemudian menjadi sangat tidak relevan sejak awal. Elizabeth Dodson Gray menyatakan bahwa "tanah yang kita pijaki bukanlah Ibu Bumi; melainkan tanah yang memiliki unsur kimiawi dan biologis tersendiri yang kita sendiri pun juga harus pahami dan hormati."36 Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa jika memang kita mesti menghormati alam, hal itu dilakukan sebagai penghormatan atas dirinya sebagai dirinya sendiri; bukan karena ia memiliki sifat-sifat yang sama dengan manusia. Metafora Ibu Bumi kemudian juga bisa dijadikan sebuah asumsi yang keliru terhadap alam. Sebab, Ibu identik dengan sesuatu yang menyayangi dan selalu mengasuh anakanaknya, sehingga sudah seharusnya pula ia tidak akan tega untuk membunuh anakanaknya sendiri. Akan tetapi, apa yang kita lihat pada alam adalah tentang satu hal: ia tidak dapat diprediksi dengan tepat oleh manusia, apalagi direduksi untuk memiliki sifat-sifat yang sama seperti manusia. Oleh karena itu, akan menjadi tidak masuk akal apabila kita menganggapnya sebagai suatu entitas yang dapat disebut "Ibu". 35. Ibid, hal 4. 36. Elizabeth Dodson Gray. "Nature as an Act of Imagination" dalam Women of Power, 9 (Musim Semi 1988), hal 18-21. Tentang Menyembuhkan Ibu Bumi yang Lara Ibu Bumi kini sedang menderita. Ia menangis tersedu sebab seluruh tubuhnya terkoyak-koyak oleh anak-anaknya- manusia-yang tega memperalatnya. Anakanaknya hanya ingin menyejahterakan dirinya saja dan semakin lama semakin lupa, bahwa ia dilahirkan oleh rahim tak kasat mata yakni Ibu Bumi itu sendiri. Sang ibu tak lagi ingin dirawatnya, ia dicampakkan begitu saja setelah kelenjar-kelenjar payudaranya tak lagi mengalirkan air susu yang tak mereka sadari telah menghidupinya. Kini anak-anak itu ingin membangun sesuatu dari jasad Ibu Bumi yang sudah sekarat; peradaban semakin megah dengan bantuan teknologi canggih yang kepandaiannya hampir-hampir melampaui miliknya. Apa yang harus kita lakukan sebagai anak-anak Ibu Bumi? Ternyata, yang bisa menyembuhkan Ibu Bumi yang merana itu adalah anakanak perempuannya. Pasalnya, sang anak laki-laki yang sangat rasional itu justru membuat sang ibu sakit hingga separah ini. Anak-anak perempuan tersebut, juga ikut tersakiti! Mereka ikut menanggung derita sang ibu dengan perlahan namun pasti melalui kelaparan, kekeringan, kekurangan air bersih, penyakit-penyakit berbahaya, dan masih banyak lainnya. Bumi saat ini bukanlah membutuhkan rasionalitas yang merusak, tapi perempuanperempuan yang memiliki sifat lebih peka terhadap apa yang dihadapi Bumi. Perempuan mempunyai perasaan terhubung dengan ritme alam sehingga mereka secara intuitif lebih memahami keterkaitan manusia dan alam. Justru, solusi untuk kehancuran ekologi adalah ikatan khusus antara perempuan dan alam. Karena ikatan BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 140 itu, perempuan bisa memberikan solusisolusi terbaik untuk ibu sekaligus rekannya dalam hidup, yaitu Ibu Bumi. Setidaknya, hal-hal inilah yang menjadi gagasan utama dari teori sekaligus gerakan ekofeminisme. Di daerah rural di Afrika, Asia, dan Amerika Latin, Vandana Shiva dan kaum ekofeminis lain berpendapat bahwa perempuan adalah tukang kebun dan ahli hortikultura, dengan pengetahuan ahli tentang alam. Ketika maldevelopment- term dari kaum ekofeminis untuk menyebut kapitalisme internasional eksploitatif yang merajalela-yang maskulin hanya menghargai sumber daya alam sebagai komoditas potensial untuk ekonomi pasar, perempuan memahami bahwa sumber daya ini harus dihormati untuk memastikan ketersediaannya bagi generasi mendatang. Oleh karena itu, secara naluriah perempuan memberi prioritas lebih besar untuk melindungi lingkungan alam. Namun, bagaimana dengan perempuan yang memiliki aspirasi modern, berpendidikan, berkehidupan profesional, dan hidup dengan sejahtera? Bagi Biehl, kaum ekofeminis tampaknya lebih menyukai mereka bertahan dalam peran lama mereka untuk menyembuhkan Bumi: bertelanjang kaki dan berkebun.37 Biehl melanjutkan bahwa, "Baru-baru ini di Amerika Serikat, romantisasi hubungan perempuan-alam membuat sebuah tren yang bisa disebut sebagai kemunduran. 'Perempuan bersandar pada hubungan dan strategi jangka panjang yang memprioritaskan generasi masa depan,' kata Shannon Hayes, penulis The Radical Homemaker. Inkarnasi dari ibu Bumi mengantarkan perempuan dengan pendidikan tinggi dan karir profesional 37. Janet Biehl. "Women and Nature: A Recurring Mystique," dalam Le Monde Diplomatique. 2011. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. ke sebuah kehidupan yang "berbeda". Dia memilih tinggal di rumah untuk membesarkan keluarganya, memberi makan makanan lezat bagi anak-anaknya dari hasil panen yang dia kembangkan di halaman belakang rumahnya. Dia merawat beragam jenis hubungan, dia menghargai kesederhanaan dan keaslian- sehingga pada saat bersamaan mengurangi jejak karbonnya. Jejak karbonnya sangat kecil. Dengan demikian dia mencapai pemenuhan pribadi dan kehidupan yang berarti,atau begitulah tampaknya."38 Di dalam rumah, perempuan memiliki peran yang sangat vital dalam urusan membina hubungan antaranggota keluarga sekaligus hubungan dengan alam. Akan tetapi, di tingkat nasional, sebagian besar pemimpin dalam organisasi lingkungan adalah laki-laki. Berbeda dengan di tingkat lokal yang mana sebagian besar pemimpin dan anggotanya adalah perempuan.39 Apa yang bisa kita tangkap dari semua itu? Fakta-fakta tersebut menunjukkan bahwa pembedaan antara karakteristik, kepekaan, kerja-kerja, bahkan solusisolusi antara laki-laki dan perempuan pada akhirnya bersifat regresif bagi kedua belah pihak. Ekofeminisme bisa berarti regresif. Jika laki-laki mendominasi kepemimpinan lingkungan nasional, harusnya dominasi tersebut diperebutkan, tidak diterima dengan menjadi ibu rumah tangga yang baik. Jika perempuan memiliki jejak karbon yang lebih kecil, maka laki-laki harus mengurangi miliknya. Jika perempuan lebih peduli dengan koneksi, maka laki-laki perlu mencari cara untuk melakukan hal yang sama pula. Jika tidak begitu, pada akhirnya, kita akan kembali ke bidang-bidang yang terpisah. BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 141 Selain itu, ada hal yang juga lebih penting untuk dikritisi: apakah bisa kita menyembuhkan alam? Apakah kita bisa mengembalikannya ke masa lampau, ke masa dimana segalanya terasa lebih baik? Jawabannya adalah tidak. Pasalnya, saat ini kita sedang berada dalam masa transisi antara Holosen dan Antroposen. Kondisi iklim Bumi pada epos Holosen yang kurang lebih dimulai sejak 11.700 tahun yang lalu memang relatif stabil. Holosen adalah sebuah epos dimana peradaban manusia hadir; epoch of civilization. Hal ini disebabkan oleh temperatur global yang relatif stabil dibandingkan era Senozoikum secara keseluruhan. Sebelum tahun 9700 SM-awal epos Holosen-tidak ada kebudayaan yang mengembangkan tulisan atau pertanian dan hampir semua manusia hanya pernah hidup dalam model berburu dan meramu yang nomaden; hanya sedikit saja yang mampu membentuk pedesaan kecil yang tetap.40 Adalah sebuah keniscayaan bahwa apa yang disebut sebagai Ibu Bumi oleh kaum ekofeminis adalah Bumi pada masa Holosen. Di epos ini, manusia memang mengalami perkembangan yang membuat manusia bisa mencapai apa yang bisa mereka capai saat ini, dan itu semua karena dukungan dari alam yang hidup bersamanya. Kondisi iklim Bumi relatif stabil sehingga layak untuk ditinggali oleh manusia dan makhluk hidup lainnya. Bumi memberikan apa yang dibutuhkan oleh anak-anaknya. Akan tetapi, ketika kita telah memasuki atau sedang berada dalam masa transisi menuju Antroposen, kita harus mengucapkan selamat tinggal kepada Holosen sebab kita tidak bisa kembali ke masa itu. Seradikal 40. Jeremy Davies. The Birth of Anthropocene. Oakland: University of California Press, 2016, hal 146-147. 41. Ibid., hal 2. 42. Françoise d'Eaubonne (1974) dalam Catriona Sandilands, The Good-Natured Feminist: Ecofeminism and the Quest for Democracy. Minnesota: Univerity of Minnesota Press, 1999, hal 7. apapun kita melakukan agenda-agenda untuk menyelamatkan alam, kita tidak akan kembali. Maka secara otomatis, narasi Ibu Bumi yang hanya mungkin bisa digunakan di Holosen, tidak lagi relevan dalam Antroposen. Hal ini dikarenakan pergantian satu epos ke epos lain bukanlah suatu hal yang kecil. Ia menandai sebuah perubahan yang sangat besar dan mendasar dari Bumi itu sendiri. Atmosfer Bumi, samudera, batuan, tumbuh-tumbuhan, dan hewan, semuanya mengalami perubahan besar. Jadi, sekali lagi, kita tidak bisa kembali ke era Holosen.41 Kita tidak bisa kembali ke Holosen, atau ke epos manapun yang memberikan kita sebuah kestabilan dan segala hal-hal baik yang diberikan oleh "Ibu Bumi". Maka, dengan begitu tujuan d'Eaubonne untuk mencapai "planet bergender feminin yang menjadi hijau kembali untuk semuanya"42-yang saya asumsikan sebagai tujuan dari kaum ekofeminis-sudah dipastikan gugur. Sebab dalam Antroposen, kita tidak bisa melihat sesuatu yang pasti, baik apa yang kita hadapi saat ini, atau yang ada di masa depan. Tidak ada Ibu Bumi lagi. Tidak ada Bumi yang feminin lagi. Tidak ada yang bisa mengidentifikasi seperti apa sifat Bumi saat ini. Kesimpulan Ketergantungan hidup manusia di Bumi adalah sesuatu yang bebas gender. Kita semua menghadapi sebuah perubahan radikal yang terjadi di masa transisi menuju Antroposen. Pada saat bersamaan, kita harus menyadari bahwa orang-orang yang sudah mengalami ketidakadilan sosial paling rentan mengalami BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 142 risiko degradasi lingkungan. Namun, kita bisa mengenali fakta itu tanpa menghidupkan kembali stereotip patriarkal tentang perempuan yang "dekat dengan alam" atau beralih ke mistik ekofeminis. Hal paling penting untuk diingat adalah bahwa apa yang kita bersama hadapi saat ini-epos Antroposen-adalah problem yang dimiliki semua makhluk hidup. Epos ini harusnya menyadarkan kita bahwa persoalan alam bukanlah semata-mata milik manusia, tapi ada persoalan lainnya yang dialami oleh makhluk di luar manusia yang bisa jadi jauh lebih besar. Sangatlah egois dan sia-sia apabila kita masih terus berdebat apakah perempuan ataukah laki-laki yang lebih pantas untuk merawat alam. Kita pun tidak akan membuat alam "memperpanjang usianya" atau "membuat keadaannya lebih baik" hanya dengan membebankan kepada satu jenis kelamin saja. Lebih dari itu, ini bukan persoalan gender ataupun manusia. Ini adalah persoalan yang dihadapi oleh setiap entitas di Bumi. Hal yang bisa kita lakukan saat ini bukanlah lari dari krisis Holosen menuju sebuah dunia yang berkelanjutan.Kita harusnya mulai memikirkan cara untuk hidup di tengah krisis. Jadi, menurut saya, ekofeminisme belum mampu menjadi solusi terbaik dalam menghadapi krisis yang kita hadapi dalam masa transisi ini. Persoalan represi patriarki terhadap perempuan dan dominasi manusia terhadap alam memang masih relevan untuk dibicarakam di epos Antroposen ini. Akan tetapi, ekofeminisme belum bisa digunakan untuk menyelesaikan persoalan tersebut, apalagi secara bersamaan Walaupun begitu, ekofeminisme mungkin masih bisa digunakan tapi tidak bisa menjadi sarana atau tujuan universal untuk seluruh manusia-dan makhluk hidup lainnya-karena fungsinya untuk menyembuhkan alam sudah tidak relevan lagi untuk digunakan di epos Antroposen. Ekofeminisme memiliki nilai-nilai yang juga dapat mengeratkan perempuan-perempuan yang tertindas, terutama di negara-negara dunia ketiga. Saya rasa kita patut untuk menghargai itu. Pun, Ibu Bumi sendiri adalah nama yang selalu disebutkan dalam setiap perjuangan perempuan-perempuan tersebut untuk alam yang mereka hidupi. Akan tetapi, akan sangat disayangkan bila kita harus menjadikan Bumi sebuah alam yang feminin untuk kelangsungan kehidupan kita bersama. Manusia seharusnya mampu untuk selalu beradaptasi bersama alam. Tidak seharusnya kita dengan naif berharap agar alam menjadi suatu tempat yang harmonis dan selalu memberi kebahagiaan untuk semua makhluknya. Hidup tidak semanis itu, bahkan dalam dongeng sekalipun.[] BALAIRUNG: Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Indonesia Vol. 1 No. 1 Tahun 2018 143 Daftar Pustaka Buku Biehl, Janet. Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics. Boston: South End Press, 1991. Candraningrum, Dewi, dkk. Ekofeminisme dalam Tafsir Agama, Pendidikan, Ekonomi, dan Budaya. Yogyakarta: Jalasutra, 2013. Cuomo, Chris J. Feminism and Ecological Communities. London: Routledge, 1998. Davies, Jeremy. The Birth of Anthropocene. Oakland: University of California Press, 2016. Diamond, Irene and Gloria Feman Orenstein. Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism. San Francisco: Sierra Book Club, 1990. Merchant, Carolyn. The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and Scientific Revolution. Manhattan: Harper & Row, 1990. Mies, Maria and Vandana Shiva. Ecofeminism. London: Zed Books, 2014. Ruether, Rosemary Radford. New Woman, New Earth: Sexist Ideologies and Human Liberation. New York: Seabury Press, 1975. Sandilands, Catriona. The Good-Natured Feminist: Ecofeminism and the Quest for Democracy. Minnesota: Univerity of Minnesota Press, 1999. Warren, Karen J. Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It Is and Why It Matters. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000. Artikel Jurnal Archambault, Anne. "A Critique to Ecofeminism",." Canadian Woman Studies Vol. 13 (1993). Biehl, Janet. "Women and Nature: A Recurring Mystique." Le Monde Diplomatique (2011). Crutzen, Paul and Eugene Stoermer. "The Anthropocene" Global Change Newsletter Vol. 41 (2000). Gray, Elizabeth Dodson. "Nature as an Act of Imagination." Women of Power Vol. 9 (1988). Ortner, Sherry B. "Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?" Feminist Studies Vol. 1 No. 2 (1972). Plumwood, Val. "Women, Humanity and Nature." Radical Philosophy Vol. 48 (1988). Roach, Catherine. "Loving Your Mother: On the Woman-Nature Relation." Hypatia Vol. 6 (1991). Steffen, Will. "The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature." AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment Vol. 36 No. 8 (2007). Warren, Karen J. "The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism." Environmental Ethics Vol. 12 (1990).

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Lemable∗ Résumé Nous vivons une crise écologique qui semble être provoquée par l'humain. Elle est la conséquence de la modernité, fondée sur la prééminence d'une humanité rationnelle en opposition à une nature qui serait extérieure à celle-ci. Pour se sortir de ladite crise, le discours sur l'anthropocène propose deux solutions : d'un côté, un techno-optimisme qui propose d'investir davantage dans les sciences et les technologies ; de l'autre, un cynisme éco-apocalyptique qui n'incite pas à l'action, mais paralyse l'être humain. Ces solutions perpétuent l'opposition entre nature et culture qui est à l'origine de la crise. Le présent article décrit une nouvelle ontologie posthumaniste et néomatérialiste qui permet de concevoir des alternatives en soulignant l'interdépendance entre nature et culture. Haraway propose le Chthulucène pour remplacer l'anthropocène : l'opposition entre nature et culture sera effacée et la (sur)vie humaine et non humaine deviendra possible. Introduction Nous vivons une crise écologique qui semble être provoquée par l'humain. Elle est la conséquence directe de la modernité, fondée sur la prééminence d'une humanité rationnelle en opposition à une nature qui serait extérieure à celle-ci et qui servirait de ressource à la croissance économique, au développement social et au progrès. À l'origine de cette crise planétaire, qui caractérise ce que l'on nomme ______________ ∗ L'auteure est étudiante à la maîtrise en philosophie à l'Université de Bruxelles, présentement en échange à l'UQAM. Sari
Lemable 156 dorénavant l'anthropocène, se trouve ainsi une opposition entre culture et nature. Le sujet humain se conçoit comme un agent actif qui domine la nature, cette dernière étant généralement représentée comme passive et dépourvue de toute agentivité. De ce point de vue, il existe deux types de réponses possibles à l'anthropocène : d'un côté, un technooptimisme qui propose d'investir davantage dans les sciences et les technologies pour surmonter la crise ; de l'autre, un cynisme écoapocalyptique qui n'incite pas à l'action, mais paralyse l'être humain. Cependant, ce que démontre bien l'ère critique actuelle, c'est que la nature n'est pas externe au monde humain : toutes les actions humaines ont un impact sur l'environnement et sur la nature et les réactions naturelles ont également un effet sur le monde humain, d'une manière pouvant mettre en péril la (sur)vie humaine et non humaine. Afin de bien conceptualiser la crise contemporaine, il faut donc renoncer à la dichotomie entre nature et culture. Le présent article décrit une nouvelle ontologie posthumaniste et néomatérialiste qui remplace l'ontologie cartésienne de la modernité. Cette nouvelle ontologie souligne l'interdépendance entre sujet et objet, entre culture et nature, et dote le monde matériel d'agentivité. Pour rendre ceci plus concret, nous détaillerons la proposition de Haraway (2016) qui propose de penser notre situation présente dans les termes de ce qu'elle appelle le Chthulucène, période qui est censée remplacer l'anthropocène au plus vite. C'est une ère dans laquelle l'opposition entre nature et culture est effacée et la (sur)vie humaine et non humaine devient possible. Nous commencerons par remonter à l'origine de ladite opposition en présentant les différentes perspectives modernes à propos de la nature. Nous passerons ensuite en revue les différentes perspectives à partir desquelles la distinction entre nature et culture peut être mise en jeu. Nous proposerons alors d'adopter une nouvelle ontologie posthumaniste et néomatérialiste. Nous finirons par exposer la proposition de Haraway concernant le Chthulucène. De
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? 157 1. Origine philosophique de la distinction entre nature et culture La séparation moderne entre nature et culture trouve ses origines dans le dualisme cartésien, qu'on pourrait faire remonter à Platon et au christianisme1. La scission cartésienne entre corps et esprit était formatrice pour l'idée d'un sujet conscient, autonome, indépendant, rationnel, objectif et universel2. La distinction a ainsi créé une opposition ontologique entre sujet et objet, et entre culture et nature. En soulignant la rationalité humaine, elle a renforcé l'idée d'un contrôle sur la nature par la raison ou la science. Dans la philosophie occidentale, le sujet se constitue donc en s'opposant à l'autre, à ce qu'il n'est pas. Pour opérer cette distinction entre un moi rationnel et l'autre, le sujet se fonde sur les binarités qui ont structuré toute la pensée moderne et qui se retrouvent à presque tous les niveaux de la réalité : culture/nature, esprit/corps, homme/femme, raison/émotion, actif/passif, etc. Ce sont des catégories qu'on tient pour nettement distinctes, clairement définies et radicalement séparées. Ces binarités créent ainsi une distance ontologique entre les deux pôles et renforcent l'idée de leur autonomie et indépendance3. Afin de mieux comprendre la problématique proposée dans le présent article, il conviendra d'aborder les sens pertinents et modernes du concept de la « nature ». Bien évidemment, il n'existe pas de définition claire qui contienne toute la complexité à laquelle cette notion peut faire référence. Habituellement, la nature est opposée à la culture et considérée comme « autre » : elle est ce qui n'est pas humain et n'appartient pas à l'habitat humain, ce monde artificiel théorisé par Arendt qui consiste en des choses et objets fabriqués par l'être humain pour créer ainsi un environnement durable et stable4. La vision instrumentale de la nature se fonde sur cette opposition entre nature et culture et retient l'idée de la nature comme autre, à ______________ 1 Murris, K. (2018), « Posthuman Child and the Diffractive Teacher », p. 4. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 7. 4 Arendt, H. (1958), The Human Condition, p. 9. Sari
Lemable 158 l'extérieur du monde humain. Elle est la vision dominante dans le système économique capitaliste actuel. Même si la sphère humaine et la sphère naturelle s'impactent mutuellement, l'idée de deux catégories nettement distinctes persiste dans cette conception. Elle est née de la vision judéo-chrétienne qui considère que le monde matériel est un don divin dont l'être humain est à la fois le gardien et le maître5. Cette conviction a connu une évolution pendant les révolutions scientifiques et industrielles, qui a abouti à l'idée de la nature comme ressource, un simple moyen pour une fin6. La représentation romantique de la nature va à l'encontre de cette vision instrumentaliste et perçoit la nature ou bien comme une étendue sauvage, voire pure et innocente, ou bien comme indomptée et violente7. Elle peut être refuge ou menace. Cronon8 conceptualise la nature sauvage comme un lieu sans civilisation, non touché ou contaminé par la modernité et la culture. Le point de vue romantique, tout comme le point de vue instrumental, oppose donc l'humain à la nature. Une dernière représentation pertinente et moderne de la nature est épistémologique : la nature est vue comme quelque chose qu'on peut connaître, elle est donc dotée d'une valeur épistémologique. La modernité soutient la possibilité d'objectivité et de découverte de la vérité dans la nature par le biais de la science, comme si les objets naturels n'étaient que des objets attendant d'être dévoilés et desquels l'humain pourrait extraire la vérité. Partant de ces différentes perspectives, comment l'humain pourrait-il répondre à la crise planétaire actuelle ? Les visions instrumentaliste et épistémologique ont recours au discours du développement durable : grâce aux investissements dans les sciences et les technologies et au bon fonctionnement du marché et de l'économie, l'humanité sera capable de faire face aux défis environnementaux9. La vision romantique propose elle au contraire un retour à la nature : la société et la culture sont incriminées de tous ______________ 5 Uggla, Y. (2010), « What is this thing called "natural"? », p. 80. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., p. 79. 8 Cronon, W. (1996), « The trouble with wilderness; or, getting back to the wrong nature », p. 69-70. 9 Uggla, Y. (2010), « What is this thing called "natural"? », p. 80. De
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? 159 les maux qui affligent la nature et l'être humain est la cause de la dégradation de cette dernière. Il faudra donc protéger la nature et la biodiversité pour leur valeur intrinsèque et investir davantage dans la protection environnementale10. La première réponse aboutirait à une artificialisation complète de la nature, la seconde à une éradication totale de la culture. Dans les deux cas, l'opposition entre nature et culture serait effectuée, au sens hégélien du terme, par l'abolition d'un de ses pôles11. Les différentes visions et leurs réponses décrites ici perpétuent donc l'opposition entre nature et culture. Aucune des deux réponses ne nous permet de considérer correctement les défis auxquels nous nous trouvons confrontés ; au contraire, elles ne font qu'entretenir le problème. Pour faire face à la crise planétaire actuelle, il faudra considérer une réponse alternative qui ne transcende pas l'opposition entre culture et nature en insistant sur un des deux pôles, mais qui les place plutôt sur un continuum et qui met l'accent sur l'interdépendance des deux éléments. 2. La mise en cause de la distinction entre nature et culture Avant d'approfondir la réponse alternative au problème de l'opposition entre nature et culture – qui est une réponse posthumaniste et néomatérialiste et qui considère l'interaction entre ces deux réalités –, nous problématiserons ladite opposition. Nous aborderons plusieurs perspectives à partir desquelles elle peut être questionnée : épistémologique, instrumentale, morale et à partir du concept même de l'anthropocène. Ainsi, nous voulons démontrer que l'abolition de l'opposition peut ouvrir la voie à de nouvelles possibilités pour penser l'anthropocène et la crise planétaire actuelle. Une nouvelle façon de conceptualiser la (sur)vie humaine et non humaine à l'ère critique actuelle est possible. ______________ 10 Uggla, Y. (2010), « What is this thing called "natural"? », p. 79-80. 11 Maybee, J. E. (2019), « Hegel's Dialectics ». Sari
Lemable 160 2.1. Vision épistémologique Les études sociales sur les sciences (social studies of science) problématisent la conception moderniste de la nature. Selon Latour12, la vie publique consiste en deux domaines : le monde humain ou culturel et le monde des objets et des non humains, c'est-à-dire, le monde naturel. C'est dans ce dernier que – selon la conception moderniste – la science peut aboutir à des faits scientifiques « indiscutables13 » de façon neutre et objective. Elle est alors capable de percer la nature de l'objet lui-même. Le domaine de la science se voit attribuer ainsi la responsabilité de la représentation des objets et des non humains, donc de la nature14. Or, l'être humain n'a pas d'accès à une nature pure et externe qui existerait au-dehors de lui-même puisque « la nature n'est pas un domaine particulier de la réalité15 ». Elle naît de la conception moderniste de la réalité qui sépare sujet et objet et qui crée ces deux mondes opposés16. Selon Latour, une telle distinction nette entre nature et culture n'existe pas. La « Science » prétend avoir accès au monde naturel ; or ce sont les « sciences » comme savoir-faire pratique qui constituent le monde commun17. Dans cette optique, les sciences sont un artefact qui incite à une certaine interprétation et à une construction des faits dits « naturels »18. Selon Latour, la crise écologique actuelle est indissolublement une crise épistémologique et une crise de l'objectivité19 : les objets considérés comme étant naturels « n'ont pas de bords nets, pas d'essences bien définies, pas de séparation tranchée entre un noyau ______________ 12 Latour, B. (1999), Politiques de la nature. Comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie, p. 23 et 27. 13 Ibid., p. 23. 14 Ibid., p. 28. 15 Ibid., p. 375. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid., p. 361. 18 François, K. (2008), « Hoofdstuk 1 : Latour als inspiratie », p. 22. 19 Latour, B. (1999), Politiques de la nature. Comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie, p. 35. De
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? 161 dur et leur environnement20 ». Ils ne répondent donc plus à l'interprétation moderniste d'un objet naturel. De plus, ils donnent lieu à des conséquences inattendues, parfois à long terme, qui ont un impact non seulement dans le monde naturel, mais également dans le monde humain. De ceci, il suit que nature et culture sont intimement liées. Pour dépasser la distinction entre nature et culture, Latour propose d'élaborer une « écologie politique21 » d'un nouveau genre : les intérêts des humains et des non humains sont entremêlés et doivent être considérés ainsi22. Nature et culture ne sont pas deux domaines nettement distincts ; ils sont interdépendants. Selon Latour, humains et non humains forment des associations : dans la pratique des sciences par exemple, non humains, professionnels, instruments et protocoles se lient23. D'un point de vue épistémologique, le clivage entre nature et culture n'est donc plus tenable : les connaissances se construisent dans un réseau social et ne sont jamais pures, détachées et objectives, mais toujours partielles et situées comme l'a théorisé Haraway24. La seule approche épistémologique qui est encore possible est empirique et prend acte de la partialité des connaissances et des savoirs qui dépendent d'un sujet incarné et situé25. De plus, la pensée néomatérialiste ajoute l'idée que la matière est dotée d'agentivité – qui n'implique pas nécessairement de l'intentionnalité – et qu'elle produit des effets et des conséquences réelles et concrètes tant dans le monde humain et culturel que non humain26. ______________ 20 Latour, B. (1999), Politiques de la nature. Comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie, p. 40. 21 Ibid., p. 98. 22 François, K. (2008), « Hoofdstuk 1 : Latour als inspiratie », p. 34. 23 Latour, B. (1999), Politiques de la nature. Comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie, p. 114. 24 Haraway, D. (1988), « Situated Knowledges ». 25 François, K. (2008), « Hoofdstuk 1 : Latour als inspiratie », p. 44 ; Haraway, D. (1988), « Situated Knowledges ». 26 Alaimo, S. et S. Hekman (dir.) (2008), Material Feminisms, p. 5. Sari
Lemable 162 Dans cette conception néomatérialiste, l'agentivité n'a rien à voir avec une intentionnalité ou une subjectivité humaine, mais se limite à l'action, c'est-à-dire à l'agir : le sujet ou l'objet se trouve en interaction avec d'autres unités27. Son agentivité est dynamique et crée un monde qui est en devenir constant et où les limites entre les différentes unités se trouvent en flux continu et sont établies à travers l'action28. En droite ligne avec les études sociales sur les sciences, le néomatérialisme avance ainsi l'idée d'un enchevêtrement de facteurs humains et non humains tels que des technologies, des appareils et des hypothèses dans la coconstruction des connaissances. La crise planétaire actuelle nous pose des défis complexes formés par des agents et des enjeux différents et multiples qui ne peuvent plus être séparés entre nature et culture. Ils demandent une nouvelle approche qui pourrait nous permettre de sortir de la crise. 2.2 Vision instrumentale D'un point de vue instrumental, la séparation entre nature et culture existe parce que le système capitaliste a besoin d'une telle nature externe pour garantir sa propre existence29. Le capitalisme est conçu comme une façon d'organiser la nature et de la soumettre à la croissance économique, au développement social ou au progrès30. Elle est une ressource à exploiter sans répit par l'humain pour rendre possible l'accumulation du capital. À cette vision de la nature comme une catégorie nettement distincte de la culture, Moore oppose l'idée de la « toile du vivant ». Celle-ci contient la nature toute entière qui n'est plus un simple arrière-plan, mais qui devient historique : l'humanité, les organisations humaines, les flux de pouvoir, de capital et d'énergie, et les conditions géologiques et biologiques ne sont pas des éléments séparés comme ils le sont dans une vision moderniste, mais forment un ensemble31. Culture et nature ne sont pas deux entités distinctes, mais elles sont ______________ 27 Barad, K. (2008), « Posthumanist performativity », p. 144. 28 Ibid., p. 135-136. 29 Moore, J. W. (2015), Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital, p. 2. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., p. 2-3 et 12. De
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? 163 des coproductions dont les limites varient d'une époque historique et géographique à l'autre32. L'argument de Moore est dialectique : l'humanité façonne des environnements et les environnements façonnent l'humanité. Nature et culture sont interdépendantes. Moore pense, comme Haraway33, que l'idée de la nature comme domaine externe et séparé du monde social aboutit à un faux dilemme : soit la crise planétaire actuelle est résolue par le biais des sciences et de la technologie, soit la crise mène à l'effondrement34. Aucune de ces deux croyances ne peut être satisfaisante selon Moore et, tout comme Haraway et les penseurs posthumanistes, il propose une conception qui permet de dépasser la binarité entre nature et culture pour trouver de meilleures réponses. 2.3 Vision morale L'ontologie qui domine à une certaine époque décide de ce qui existe et de ce qui a par conséquent une identité, une voix et une agentivité35. Elle a aussi un impact direct sur l'épistémologie et sur ce que l'humain peut savoir et connaître. L'ontologie substantialiste de la philosophie occidentale traditionnelle érige « l'Homme » comme signifiant universel et exclut les savoirs, connaissances et voix de groupes entiers parce qu'ils ne répondent pas à la norme36. La pensée binaire peut fonctionner de façon essentialiste et déterministe, ce qui peut fournir la base d'une justification pour la discrimination et l'oppression, comme le soutiennent les philosophies féministes. Elle peut limiter la liberté des groupes qui n'appartiennent pas à la norme et peut confirmer la domination d'un seul pôle de la binarité au détriment de l'autre. La division entre nature et culture a ______________ 32 Moore, J. W. (2015), Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital, p. 12 et 18. 33 Haraway, D. (2016), Staying with the Trouble. 34 Moore, J. W. (2015), Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital, p. 19. 35 Murris, K. (2018), « Posthuman Child and the Diffractive Teacher », p. 6. 36 Braidotti, R. (2019), « A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities », p. 36 ; Murris, K. (2018), « Posthuman Child and the Diffractive Teacher », p. 6. Sari
Lemable 164 ainsi été utilisée pour essentialiser les femmes, les populations autochtones, les personnes racisées et d'autres groupes marginalisés en les enfermant dans la catégorie de « naturel37 ». Cette action discursive les a figés dans une biologie déterministe et leur a confisqué la capacité d'agir38. Bon nombre des catégories dites « naturelles » proviennent du discours et ont donc été déterminées par la culture. Le genre et la race sont des catégories artificielles dont on affirme pourtant qu'elles ont un fondement biologique. En incluant certains types de personnes dans ces catégories immuables et essentialistes, leur agentivité est mutilée et ils sont soumis à des puissances supposément naturelles. En inscrivant certaines caractéristiques dans le domaine de la nature, l'oppression et la discrimination peuvent se reproduire et les idées anthropocentriques, misogynes, racistes, classistes et spécistes peuvent persister. C'est ainsi que les dichotomies peuvent opérer de façon violente et produire des catégorisations hiérarchiques et discriminatoires. La pensée moderniste et l'ontologie cartésienne ont fait avancer la rationalité, les sciences et la technologie, mais ont également rendu possible le colonialisme et les relations de pouvoir asymétriques, non seulement entre humains, mais également entre l'humain et le non humain39. En créant une distance ontologique entre le sujet et l'autre, les binarités peuvent imposer une norme et l'opposer à ce qui est l'autre, ce qui ouvre la voie à la discrimination. Les philosophies féministes et posthumanistes essaient de dépasser l'androcentrisme, l'anthropocentrisme et les binarités pour éviter ces violences ontologiques et épistémiques. Dans A Manifesto for Cyborgs40, Haraway lutte pour une reconstruction des catégories et elle théorise la décomposition des limites entre l'humain et la machine, et entre l'humain et l'animal. La moralité exige du respect pour la diversité et, par conséquent, des alternatives à la pensée par catégories ______________ 37 Barad, K. (2008), « Posthumanist performativity », p. 4. 38 Kirby, V. (2008), « Natural convers(at)ions », p. 218. 39 Braidotti, R. (2019), « A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities » ; Murris, K. (2018), « Posthuman Child and the Diffractive Teacher », p. 1. 40 Haraway, D. (1985), « A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s ». De
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? 165 essentialistes, tout en acceptant la recherche d'une identité unifiante qui rend possible la lutte politique en faveur de cette demande morale. 2.4 Le concept d'anthropocène Une dernière perspective capable de remettre en cause la distinction entre nature et culture réside dans le concept même d'anthropocène qui fait de l'humanité une force géologique et bouleverse ainsi la distinction. L'être humain dispose d'une identité double : il a une réalité naturelle qu'il essaie de saisir par le biais de la culture, et une réalité culturelle dont Kirby41 avance qu'elle se retrouve peut-être dans sa biologie. Le concept d'anthropocène démontre que l'humain rivalise maintenant avec les grandes forces de la nature de par sa capacité culturelle. De ce point de vue, l'humanité elle-même est conçue comme une force naturelle. Crutzen et Stoermer42 ont proposé le terme d'« anthropocène » en 2000 pour mettre l'accent sur ce qu'ils considèrent le rôle central de l'être humain dans les changements géologiques et écologiques. Ils datent les débuts de l'anthropocène à la fin du XVIIIe siècle puisque c'est à partir de cette période que les données démontrent une concentration atmosphérique croissante des gaz à effet de serre43. De plus, ils ont choisi cette datation parce qu'elle coïncide avec l'invention du moteur à vapeur en 1784. Ils désignent donc la révolution industrielle anglaise comme signal de départ de la crise planétaire actuelle. Néanmoins, les théories posthumanistes s'opposent à ce discours sur l'anthropocène parce qu'il ne permet pas de dépasser la distinction entre nature et culture et reste figé dans un cadre binaire et anthropocentrique. Elles dénoncent le terme d'anthropocène parce qu'il reprend la vision instrumentale qui place l'humain dominant d'un côté et la nature, comme réceptacle inerte prêt à être exploité, de ______________ 41 Kirby, V. (2008), « Natural convers(at)ions », p. 221. 42 Crutzen, P. et E. Stoermer (2000), « The "Anthropocene" ». 43 Ibid. Sari
Lemable 166 l'autre44. De plus, il désigne l'humain comme seul acteur responsable du changement planétaire. Selon les théories posthumanistes, il s'agit bien d'une vision anthropocentrique qui tient pour acquis l'exceptionnalisme humain. De plus, le discours sur l'anthropocène donne lieu à des récits techno-optimistes qui proposent d'investir davantage dans les sciences et les technologies, comme l'affirment par exemple les auteurs du Manifeste éco-moderniste45. Or, cela implique qu'il n'y aura pas de fin à la domination et au contrôle de la nature par l'humain et que celui-ci poursuit et approfondit l'opposition entre nature et culture. Poussé à l'extrême, ceci aboutirait à une artificialisation totale de la nature. Haraway s'oppose à cette vision restreinte de l'anthropocène qui considère l'humain comme le seul véritable acteur. Elle propose de remonter plus loin dans le passé, jusqu'au XVIe et XVIIe siècles, en se demandant pourquoi on a pu inventer le moteur à vapeur46. Cette invention a seulement été possible après que le système économique eut déjà profondément changé suite à l'avènement du colonialisme, des déplacements globaux des personnes réduites en esclavage et des marchandises provenant du Nouveau Monde, l'apparition du système des plantations, les génocides autochtones et l'impact sur la faune et la flore locales47. D'après Haraway, il faut retracer toutes ces histoires pour saisir comment la crise actuelle a pu se produire. L'idée que les origines de la crise planétaire actuelle remontent à l'avènement du colonialisme est d'ailleurs aussi soutenue par Lewis et Maslin48. Cette vision avancée par Haraway est posthumaniste et considère l'interaction entre des entités très différentes telles que les systèmes économiques, les humains, les non humains et l'interdépendance de la nature et de la culture. Or, une telle conception de l'anthropocène semble affaiblir l'agentivité humaine, et par conséquent, sa responsabilité. C'est aussi ce qu'Hamilton49 reproche aux ontologies ______________ 44 Moore, J. W. (2015), Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital ; Haraway, D. (2016), Staying with the Trouble. 45 Haraway, D. (2016), Staying with the Trouble. 46 Ibid., p. 48. 47 Ibid. 48 Lewis, S. L. et M. A. Maslin (2015), « Defining the Anthropocene ». 49 Hamilton, C. (2017), Defiant Earth. The Fate of Humans in the Anthropocene. De
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Lemable 168 Bien que les théories posthumanistes de Stengers et Haraway proposent l'abandon d'un cadre dualiste et se veuillent antianthropocentriques, leurs théories s'approchent de la proposition avancée ici par Hamilton : elles donnent des noms spécifiques (Gaïa, Terra) à ce système terre et le dotent d'une agentivité qui lui est propre et qui menace l'existence des humains et d'autres espèces dans la crise planétaire actuelle. Pour conclure, le discours sur l'anthropocène montre que l'humain se trouve dans la nature, qu'il dépend des écosystèmes pour sa propre (sur)vie, et que ses actions ont un impact sur la nature dans laquelle il vit. Celle-ci n'est pas un arrière-plan inerte et distinct de lui et elle n'est pas un domaine extérieur à celui de la culture : l'humain se trouve toujours déjà dans la nature et en interaction avec elle. Les travaux d'Anna Tsing55 illustrent parfaitement cette interdépendance de la nature et de la culture, du non humain et de l'humain. Tsing56 évoque l'histoire du matsutake, un champignon sauvage aromatique qui est particulièrement apprécié au Japon, mais qui y est devenu rare après la catastrophe nucléaire de Tchernobyl. Celle-ci a contaminé les terres où il poussait. Maintenant, il pousse surtout aux États-Unis dans des forêts ravagées par l'industrialisation où il est cueilli par des réfugiés venus du Laos et du Cambodge qui vivent dans la précarité. Par la suite, le matsutake est expédié au Japon où il est vendu à des prix élevés. Le matsutake émerge rapidement dans des paysages ravagés : c'était la première créature vivante à émerger après la bombe d'Hiroshima57. Il s'accommode des dégâts environnementaux provoqués par l'humain et constitue un plaisir raffiné de gourmet58. En suivant le matsutake, Tsing tisse une histoire qui démontre les possibilités de coexistence entre l'humain et le non humain et qui lie capitalisme, précarité et crise écologique, nous permettant ainsi de comprendre l'enchevêtrement de l'humain et de la nature. ______________ 55 Tsing, A. (2017), Le champignon de la fin du monde. Sur la possibilité de vivre dans les ruines du capitalisme. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid., p. 33. 58 Ibid., p. 34. De
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Lemable 170 Les pensées postmoderniste et poststructuraliste proposent d'accepter que l'humain soit enfermé dans le domaine de la culture : la condition humaine est celle d'un être artificiel, d'un être qui n'est pas naturel. Le langage, l'intelligence et la créativité sont des capacités abstraites sans inscription dans la matérialité du monde64. Elles proposent un constructivisme social qui conçoit la science comme une construction culturelle qui fournit des concepts qui représentent et construisent ainsi le monde naturel65. L'humain n'a donc pas directement accès au monde naturel, mais y accède par l'intermédiaire de la culture. Comme par ironie, cette vision postmoderniste finit par renforcer la binarité entre nature et culture, remarque Kirby : elle retombe dans l'idée que l'être humain n'a pas d'accès à une nature qui lui est extérieure et met l'accent sur le langage66. L'être humain serait comme piégé dans un réseau d'interprétations discursives qui lui rendraient impossibles toute expérience et toute connaissance directes de la nature67. Alaimo et Hekman68 insistent sur cette conséquence paradoxale du tournant linguistique : les philosophies postmodernistes, bien qu'elles s'opposent aux binarités, se sont fait piéger par la dichotomie dominante entre langage et réalité. En soulignant l'importance du langage et du discours, les philosophies postmodernistes se sont ainsi éloignées de la matérialité. Ces théories ne permettent donc pas de dépasser les binarités problématiques comme celle entre nature et culture. 3.2 Tournant matériel Les études sociales sur les sciences et les critiques féministes des sciences ont essayé de combiner l'idée postmoderne de constructivisme social avec l'idée d'agentivité du monde matériel69. La nature devrait donc être reconceptualisée. Dans cette nouvelle ______________ 64 Kirby, V. (2008), « Natural convers(at)ions », p. 220. 65 Alaimo, S. et S. Hekman (dir.) (2008), Material Feminisms, p. 5. 66 Kirby, V. (2008), « Natural convers(at)ions », p. 220. 67 Ibid., p. 218. 68 Alaimo, S. et S. Hekman (dir.) (2008), Material Feminisms, p. 2. 69 Ibid., p. 5. De
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? 171 optique, elle est dotée d'agentivité. La matière devient une force active qui participe à la création du monde. Les actions ne se limitent plus à la représentation – c'est-à-dire au langage – mais peuvent être « material, discursive, human, more-than-human, corporeal and technological70 » et produisent des effets qui ont des conséquences réelles et concrètes dans le monde humain et non humain71. Ce tournant matériel dans les théories posthumanistes et féministes est né des études sociales sur les sciences, des enjeux féministes relatifs à la corporéité et de l'environnementalisme féministe qui soulignent l'importance de l'agentivité des objets, des corps et des organismes non humains respectivement72. Les philosophies qui s'inscrivent dans ce courant cherchent à problématiser les catégories de l'humain et du non humain, du culturel et du naturel. Elles mettent l'accent sur l'interdépendance de domaines divers tels que l'environnement, la biologie, la technologie, l'histoire et la culture73. Les unités, leurs caractéristiques et leurs limites sont en changement perpétuel par le biais des interactions. Des catégories fixes n'existent donc plus, mais sont déstabilisées74. Il s'agit d'une ontologie processuelle et relationnelle. Les philosophies posthumanistes et néomaterialistes essaient ainsi de théoriser la « toile du vivant », pour reprendre les termes de Moore75, et de s'imaginer de nouvelles possibilités de vie et de survie dans une planète troublée76. L'oeuvre de Haraway, qui aborde aussi bien les primates, les cyborgs que les espèces de compagnie, illustre bien ce projet posthumaniste. Les sujets qu'elle propose transcendent les catégories et rendent floues les limites77. Ainsi, le cyborg de A Manifesto for ______________ 70 Alaimo, S. et S. Hekman (dir.) (2008), Material Feminisms. 71 Barad, K. (2008), « Posthumanist performativity », p. 128. 72 Alaimo, S. et S. Hekman (dir.) (2008), Material Feminisms, p. 6. 73 Ibid., p. 7. 74 Barad, K. (2008), « Posthumanist performativity », p. 136. 75 Moore, J. W. (2015), Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital. 76 Haraway, D. (2016), Staying with the Trouble. 77 Braidotti, R. (2019), « A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities », p. 34. Sari
Lemable 172 Cyborgs78 est à la fois matériel – concret, situé dans un espace et un temps spécifiques – et discursif – un symbole qui permet de théoriser la possibilité de résistance dans un système d'oppression. Le cyborg démontre l'effacement des limites fixes entre les catégories de l'humain et de la machine, mais également entre l'humain et l'animal. Haraway théorise également le statut des « espèces compagnes79 », telles que le chien de Haraway, qui rapprochent le monde humain et non humain. Dans The Companion Species Manifesto80, elle démontre que l'espèce compagne n'est pas un simple sujet naturel et innocent, mais qu'il est formé par les évènements du passé et par son interaction avec le monde humain. Les figures qui apparaissent dans l'oeuvre de Haraway sont des sujets « natureculturels81 » : ils incarnent le continuum entre nature et culture. Selon Haraway, les sujets ne préexistent pas à leurs relations, mais se créent seulement par le biais de ces relations. Les sujets sont interdépendants et entremêlés, ce qui les dote d'obligations éthiques réciproques. Hamilton82 critique les ontologies posthumanistes et néomatérialistes parce qu'elles diminueraient l'agentivité de l'être humain en voulant dépasser l'anthropocentrisme. L'être humain deviendrait alors déterminé par ses relations interespécifiques et son intentionnalité se dissoudrait « dans une soupe de forces et objets naturels83 ». Il reproche à la fois au posthumanisme et au néomatérialisme de diminuer le pouvoir et le contrôle humains et d'exagérer l'agentivité non humaine84. Le problème est que cela libère l'humain de toute responsabilité envers la situation actuelle, puisque celui-ci ne serait alors plus qu'un pion dans le jeu. ______________ 78 Haraway, D. (1985), « A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s ». 79 Haraway, D. et C. Wolfe (2016), « The Companion Species Manifesto », notre traduction. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid., p. 93, notre traduction. 82 Hamilton, C. (2017), Defiant Earth. The Fate of Humans in the Anthropocene, p. 91. 83 Ibid., p. 91 et 93, notre traduction. 84 Ibid., p. 94. De
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? 173 Hamilton85 propose donc de différencier trois types d'agentivité : les objets non vivants ont des conséquences ; les entités vivantes non humaines ont des objectifs ; les humains ont des intentions. Seul l'être humain aurait ainsi la capacité de faire des choix délibérés et d'influencer la course du système terre. Alors que le posthumanisme et le néomatérialisme dissolvent l'intentionnalité humaine dans des réseaux, Hamilton confirme le statut central et unique de l'humain et son obligation de responsabilité puisqu'il dispose de la capacité de délibération. Cependant, Haraway met également l'accent sur cette responsabilité humaine, qu'elle nomme « réponse-abilité86 ». Tout comme Hamilton, elle insiste sur la capacité humaine de délibération quand elle souligne l'importance de développer la capacité de penser, de rester présent et de prendre pleinement conscience de la situation de crise dans laquelle l'humain vit87. Elle n'abolit donc pas sa responsabilité, mais elle étend son champ de vision en y incluant d'autres agents importants : « human beings are not the only important actors [...] However, the doings of situated, actual human beings matter88 ». 3.3 Propositions posthumanistes et néomatérialistes pour se sortir de la crise écologique L'ontologie de Haraway est posthumaniste et processuelle : elle dirige son attention tant vers le monde humain que non humain et elle essaie de transcender les catégories binaires en démontrant la faiblesse des limites considérées comme étant fixes. Elle avance que les sujets ne se constituent pas en isolation, mais qu'ils « deviennent ensemble89 ». Ainsi, elle met l'accent sur l'interdépendance. De plus, elle donne de l'agentivité aux organismes non humains et aux forces biotiques et abiotiques telles que les araignées, l'eau, la ______________ 85 Hamilton, C. (2017), Defiant Earth. The Fate of Humans in the Anthropocene, en s'inspirant de Hornborg, p. 100. 86 Haraway, D. (2016), Staying with the Trouble, p. 34 87 Ibid., p. 35. 88 Ibid., p. 55. 89 Ibid., p. 12, notre traduction. Sari
Lemable 174 température et la radiation : « human beings are with and of the earth, and the biotic and abiotic powers of this earth are the main story90 ». C'est pourquoi son ontologie est aussi néomatérialiste. Elle avance un exemple qui témoigne de cette interdépendance : les récifs de corail, les organismes qui y vivent et les humains dépendent l'un de l'autre pour leur propre (sur)vie91. La prospérité doit par conséquent être vue comme une responsabilité partagée entre espèces, qui met de côté l'anthropocentrisme et l'individualisme, écrit Haraway92. Cependant, la manière dont elle s'imagine concrètement cette responsabilité interespèces est loin d'être claire. Dans Staying with the trouble93, Haraway constate que la (sur)vie humaine et non humaine sur la planète est devenue précaire. L'être humain et une multitude d'autres espèces se retrouvent dans l'anthropocène et la question que se pose Haraway est celle du comment s'en sortir. Sa pensée est anti-anthropocentrique ; elle n'accorde nul crédit à l'idée que nous pourrions être sauvés par le biais des sciences et des technologies, c'est-à-dire au technooptimisme, tout comme elle refuse le piège du désespoir et du cynisme éco-apocalyptique94. Elle s'oppose à ces solutions qui découlent directement d'une conception moderniste de la nature et du discours sur l'anthropocène. Haraway propose une nouvelle conceptualisation de la crise planétaire actuelle : la seule façon de s'en sortir est de reconnaître la situation critique et de « demeurer dans le trouble » - comme le suggère le titre de son livre - tout en assumant la responsabilité de « bien » vivre et de « bien » mourir avec les organismes tant humains que non humains avec qui nous partageons la planète95. Haraway demande que l'humain accepte son interdépendance et sa connexion avec le monde non humain. C'est ainsi qu'elle rend floues les limites entre les domaines de la nature et de la culture. Pour ce faire, elle met en oeuvre une méthodologie spécifique qui lui permet de s'attaquer à l'anthropocène et de proposer une nouvelle ______________ 90 Haraway, D. (2016), Staying with the Trouble, p. 55. 91 Ibid., p. 56. 92 Ibid., p. 56-57. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid., p. 37-38 et 50. 95 Ibid., p. 38. De
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? 175 ère, le Chthulucène, période dans laquelle la (sur)vie multiespèces après l'anthropocène devient possible. Haraway désigne cette méthodologie comme une « fabulation spéculative96 » : elle fait usage d'histoires, de science-fiction et de science pour ouvrir l'imagination et l'éventail des possibilités. Pour Haraway, il est important de s'imaginer d'autres futurs possibles en esquivant tant le discours apocalyptique que techno-optimiste. Son Chthulucène – mot dérivé du grec khtôn signifiant « terre » et faisant référence aux organismes terriens et souterrains97 – est un concept générateur d'idées et de possibilités. C'est une ère qui échappe à tout essai de datation et de définition et qui accepte une multitude de noms différents : elle peut s'appeler Gaïa, Terra, Pachamama, etc.98 Le Chthulucène est une idée permettant à l'humain d'inventer de nouvelles histoires qui ne se limitent pas à un temps ou à un endroit spécifique, mais qui peuvent contenir des oppositions, des contradictions et une multitude d'assemblages entre l'humain et le non humain99. C'est une idée qui mélange narrations, fictions et faits, et qui transcende les limites entre l'humain et le non humain, c'est-àdire entre culture et nature, en plus de reconnaître l'agentivité d'entités très diverses. De plus, ce sont les connexions entre les organismes qui l'intéressent : la sympoïèse, le « devenir-ensemble », les entrelacements et l'interdépendance mutuelle. Concept provenant de la biologie, la sympoïèse fait référence aux systèmes qui coopèrent avec d'autres systèmes en distribuant l'information et le contrôle sur les différents composants100. De plus, ils n'ont pas de limites spatiales ou temporelles : les limites ne sont pas fixes, mais dynamiques et susceptibles au changement pendant l'interaction. Les systèmes et les organismes ne préexistent donc pas à l'interaction : « [N]atures, cultures, subjects, and objects do not preexist their intertwined ______________ 96 Haraway, D. (2016), Staying with the Trouble, p. 10. 97 Ibid., p. 31 et 173. 98 Ibid., p. 51. 99 Ibid., p. 101. 100 Ibid., p. 33. Sari
Lemable 176 worldings101 ». C'est par le biais de l'interaction que l'organisme et son monde se forment. Pour cette raison, les figures clés du Chthulucène sont une araignée – le Pimoa cthulhu – et les pieuvres, « les araignées de la mer102 ». Les pattes et les tentacules symbolisent l'ouverture vers d'autres possibilités, la connexion et la capacité de s'entremêler103. Le jeu de ficelles est un autre symbole du Chthulucène : les partenaires au jeu ne préexistent pas à leurs interactions, ils se constituent en s'entrelaçant104. Ce jeu se joue seul ou à plusieurs et le joueur avec les ficelles dans les mains crée une figure et l'offre ensuite à l'autre – les mains ouvertes et tendues vers l'autre – qui peut continuer ou non sur ce qui lui a été offert et en faire une nouvelle figure ou une figure différente. Le jeu constitue ainsi une métaphore pour les interactions entre l'humain et le non humain et démontre l'importance d'être présent, d'observer et d'être attentif, et de ce que Haraway appelle la « réponse-abilité105 ». Cependant, cette création d'une nouvelle mythologie pour quelque chose qui doit encore survenir, pour le futur, demeure du domaine du suggestif et du poétique. Concrètement, comment est-ce que Haraway envisage les interdépendances, le « devenir-ensemble » et la « réponseabilité » entre espèces multiples ? Ce sont des idées clés qui reviennent à plusieurs reprises dans Staying with the trouble106, mais dont il est difficile de s'imaginer ce qu'elles impliquent concrètement. Par exemple, il est vrai qu'actuellement l'humain se rend compte de plus en plus de sa responsabilité envers les animaux domestiques, les grands singes, les animaux d'élevage industriel et les animaux de laboratoire. Cependant, cette conscience de responsabilité semble se limiter aux mammifères ou, du moins, aux animaux avec qui l'humain entre en contact direct. Or, comment doit-il assumer sa responsabilité envers les « forces biotiques et abiotiques » mentionnées par Haraway, telles que les bactéries, les araignées et les coraux ? ______________ 101 Haraway, D. (2016), Staying with the Trouble, p. 13. 102 Ibid., p. 31 et 55, notre traduction. 103 Ibid., p. 31. 104 Ibid., p. 13. 105 Ibid., p. 12, notre traduction. 106 Ibid. De
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? 177 Haraway donne quelques exemples concrets d'interconnexions entre espèces différentes. Elle décrit plusieurs types de relations possibles entre humains et pigeons : ceux-ci collaborent ou sont utilisés dans les sports, la science et en tant que messagers107. Haraway cite le cas du « Project Sea Hunt » mené aux États-Unis dans les années 1970 et 1980, dans le cadre duquel la garde côtière a fait usage de pigeons pour retrouver des humains et du matériel perdus à la mer, les pigeons ayant un taux de réussite plus élevé que les humains pour ces tâches108. Néanmoins, pour réussir dans un tel projet, humains et pigeons ont dû apprendre à communiquer, à s'apprendre ce qui est pertinent, et à se comprendre. Haraway cite aussi le projet nommé « PigeonBlog » qui combine art et activisme, et efface les limites entre humains, pigeons et machines109. C'est un exemple qui démontre bien la disparition des limites fixes entre ces catégories, comme elle l'avait déjà théorisé dans A Manifesto for Cyborgs110. Les pigeons du projet « PigeonBlog » sont équipés de technologies et collectionnent des données sur la qualité d'air dans plusieurs villes californiennes. Ce projet mélange science, technologie, art et environnement tout en démontrant l'interdépendance entre l'humain et le non humain. Ce type de projets met en évidence, d'après Haraway, que nature et culture ne sont pas deux catégories nettement distinctes, mais qu'au contraire, elles sont interdépendantes. Pour se sortir de l'anthropocène au plus vite – époque qui ne fait que perpétuer l'anthropocentrisme et l'opposition non justifiée entre nature et culture – Haraway propose d'entrer dans l'ère du Chthulucène. C'est là que la (sur)vie humaine et non humaine devient possible, attestant de l'interdépendance de l'humain et du non humain, de la culture et de la nature. ______________ 107 Haraway, D. (2016), Staying with the Trouble, p. 18. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid., p. 20. 110 Haraway, D. (1985), « A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s ». Sari
Lemable 178 Conclusion Nous vivons une crise planétaire écologique qui semble être provoquée par l'être humain. Cette crise est la conséquence directe de la modernité qui se fonde sur la prééminence d'une humanité rationnelle en opposition avec une nature extérieure soumise au progrès. Du moins, c'est ce que le discours sur l'anthropocène propose. Ce type de discours ne permet que deux réponses à la crise planétaire, dont aucune n'est adéquate, selon les philosophies posthumanistes et néomatérialistes. Tant le techno-optimisme que le cynisme éco-apocalyptique perpétuent l'opposition entre nature et culture et ne permettent pas à l'humanité de dépasser la crise. Pour bien conceptualiser la crise contemporaine et se donner les moyens de s'en sortir au plus vite, il faut donc renoncer à cette opposition. Nous avons présenté une nouvelle ontologie posthumaniste et néomatérialiste qui remplace l'ontologie cartésienne de la modernité et souligne l'interdépendance des sujets et des objets, de la culture et de la nature. De plus, elle dote le monde matériel d'agentivité ce qui permet de concevoir comment les objets, perçus jusqu'à présent comme passifs, aident activement à la construction du monde dans lequel nous vivons. Nous avons ensuite présenté la proposition posthumaniste et néomatérialiste de Haraway, qui veut nous faire réfléchir dans les termes du Chthulucène : succédant à l'anthropocène, lui seul nous permettrait de penser la (sur)vie humaine et non humaine. Bibliographie Alaimo, S. et S. Hekman (dir.) (2008a), Material Feminisms, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 448 p. Alaimo, S. et S. Hekman (2008b), « Introduction: Emerging models of materiality in feminist theory », dans Alaimo, S. et S. Hekman (dir.), Material Feminisms, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, p. 1-20. Arendt, H. (1958), The Human Condition, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 332 p. Barad, K. (2008), « Posthumanist performativity. Toward an understanding of how matter comes to matter », dans Alaimo, S. De
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? 179 et S. Hekman (dir.), Material Feminisms, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, p. 120-154. Braidotti, R. (2019), « A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities », Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 36, n° 6, p. 31-61. Cronon, W. (1996), « The trouble with wilderness; or, getting back to the wrong nature », dans Cronon, W. (dir.), Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, New York, Norton, p. 69-90. Crutzen, P. et E. Stoermer (2000), « The "Anthropocene" », Global Change Newsletter, n° 41, p. 17-18. François, K. (2008), « Hoofdstuk 1: Latour als inspiratie », dans Politiek van de wiskunde, Brussel, A.S.P. Editions. Hamilton, C. (2017), Defiant Earth. The Fate of Humans in the Anthropocene, Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA, USA, Polity Press, 200 p. Haraway, D. (1985), « A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s », Socialist Review, vol. 2, n° 15, p. 65-107. Haraway, D. (1988), « Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective », Feminist Studies, vol. 14, n° 3, p. 575. Haraway, D. et C. Wolfe (2016), « The Companion Species Manifesto », dans Manifestly Haraway, University of Minnesota Press. Haraway, D. (2016), Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene, Durham, Duke University Press, 296 p. Kenney, M. (2017), « Donna Haraway (2016) Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene. Durham: Duke University Press. 312 pages. IBSN: 978-0822362241 », Science & Technology Studies, p. 73. Kirby, V. (2008), « Natural convers(at)ions: Or, what if culture was really nature all along? », dans Alaimo, S. et S. Hekman (dir.), Material Feminisms, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, p. 214-236. Latour, B. (1999), Politiques de la nature. Comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie, Paris, La Découverte, 382 p. Lewis, S. L. et M. A. Maslin (2015), « Defining the Anthropocene », Nature, vol. 519, n° 7542, p. 171-180. Sari
Lemable 180 Maybee, J. E. (2019), « Hegel's Dialectics », The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/hegeldialectics/>, consulté le 22 janvier 2020. Moore, J. W. (2015), Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital, London, Verso, 336 p. Murris, K. (2018), « Posthuman Child and the Diffractive Teacher: Decolonizing the Nature/Culture Binary », dans Latiner Raby, R. et E. J. Valeau (dir.), Handbook of Comparative Studies on Community Colleges and Global Counterparts, Cham, Springer International Publishing, p. 1-25. Stengers, I. (2009), Au temps des catastrophes: Résister à la barbarie qui vient, Paris, Éditions La Découverte, 204 p. The Breakthrough Institute (2015), « Un manifesto éco-moderniste », An Ecomodernist Manifesto, <http://www.ecomodernism.org/francais>, consulté le 22 janvier 2020. Tsing, A. (2017), Le champignon de la fin du monde. Sur la possibilité de vivre dans les ruines du capitalisme, Paris, La Découverte, 416 p. Uggla, Y. (2010), « What is this thing called "natural"? The natureculture divide in climate change and biodiversity policy », Journal of Political Ecology, vol. 17, n° 1, p. 79.

(Old Dominion Univ.) Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy Lawrence J. Hatab FROM EARLY IN HIS THINKING Heidegger subordinated the question of ethics to the question of Being. Like other ontical matters, ethics could not be addressed adequately until the ontological question of Dasein's general mode of Being was given priority. I Heidegger often indicated that this should not be taken to mean a rejection of, or indifference toward, ethics; rather, ethics, again like other ontic regions, has concealed within its mode of thinking a primordial dimension that can open up the way in which Dasein is in the world. My reading of this ontic-ontological differentiation is as follows. Ethics is rich in its analysis of normative topics but poor in attention to our being-ethical-in-the-world, in the fullest sense that Heidegger would give to such a phrase. This coordination of ethics and ontology suggests the possibility of taking up ethics anew once we have clarified the overall existential constitution of Dasein. Although Heidegger often gives the impression of segregating ontology from "practical" disciplines like ethics, I am convinced that this was an analytical division and not a substantive one. 2 Much in the early Heidegger has seemed promising for an investigation of ethics. 3 But there is also a good deal of suspicion about the ethical possibilities in Heidegger (notably in the work of Habermas and Levinas). Given the Olympian distance of Heidegger's later thought (e.g., the claim that Denken has "no result" and "no effect"4) and given his fascist politics together with the deceit and galling silence of the postwar years, the segregation of ethics from ontology can be interpreted as a more heinous division-that Heidegger's thought was or became indifferent to ethics, or worse, inseparable from something dark and barbaric. I am not entirely swayed by this suspicion. I am one of those who believes that we can distinguish Heidegger the human being from his thought in some way. We 'See Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 37. 2See ibid., pp. 340-41 and 332. 'See, e.g., The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1982), section 13, where Heidegger gives a very positive analysis of Kant's notions of moral personhood and respect, followed by a typical critique in section 14 that Kant's analysis does not go far enough ontologically. For an extended discussion of the possibilities for ethics drawn from Heidegger's response to Kant, see Frank Schalow, Imagination and Existence: Heidegger's Retrieval of the Kantian Ethic (Lanham: Univ. Press of America, 1986) and The Renewal of the HeideggerKant Dialogue: Action, Thought, and Responsibility (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992). 4Letter on Humanism, in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 236. INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Vol. XXXV, No.4 Issue No. 140 (December 1995) 404 HATAB can even distinguish Heidegger's extant thought from the potential for ethical thinking contained therein (in all periods of his thought, but especially in the early writings). Moreover, I also think it is possible to show in some measure that Heidegger's political commitments were not consistent with certain basic elements of his thought and its ethical implications. This is not to deny that Heidegger himself affirmed an idealized version of National Socialism that followed his thought in essential ways. My motive is not to rehabilitate Heidegger but to explore the ways in which his thinking can make an important contribution to ethics, and I aim to do this in terms offamiliar intellectual concerns and social applications, not through some arcane circulation of Heideggerian terminology. This is my project, then, and one that I will not shy away from calling moral philosophy; but most of my inspiration has come from Heidegger's way of thinking. 5 Moral philosophy must give up the model of ethical "theory," the insistence on rational justification, and the privileging of abstract principles over concrete situations. Ethics should be understood as the heuristic engagement of basic practical questions: How should human beings live? How should we live together? What are better and worse ways of conducting our lives? Moreover, ethics must acknowledge a prephilosophical, traditional heritage that presents us with a degree of consensus ahead of time regarding better and worse ways of living (this is an Aristotelian point reaffirmed by Heidegger). Taking our own society, we tend to agree already in a rough fashion and to a certain extent that lying, stealing, and killing are undesirable actions, that injustice, violence, cruelty, and indifference are worse than fairness, kindness, and concern. I dare say that such values are not unique to our culture or time either. 6 The task of philosophy would not be to put our entire moral outlook into question or to discover some brand new system of values (nothing so radical has ever happened in history). Rather, moral philosophy should engage a fivefold task: (1) analyze moral values as cultural phenomena; (2) clarify the meaning of the values and norms we inherit; (3) ask the question: Why should people be ethical in this way? This question is not a call for demonstration or proof to banish doubt or disagreement but rather an existential and pedagogical question to address the developments, conflicts, 'Some other studies that take up the issue of Heidegger and ethics and related topics in the Continental tradition include two works by Werner Marx. Is There a Measure on Earth": Foundations for a Nonmetaphysical Ethics, trans. Thomas J. Nenon and Reginald Lilly (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987) and Towards a Phenomenological Ethics: Ethics and the Life-World, trans. Stefaan Heyvaert (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992); Charles E. Scott, The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1990); Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought, ed. Arleen B. Dallery and Charles E. Scott with P. Holley Roberts (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992); and Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation: The EthicalPolitical Horizons of ModernitylPostmodernity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). A recent study that came to my attention too late to work into this essay is Lawrence Vogel, The Fragile "We": Ethical Implications of Heidegger's Being and Time (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press. 1994). 6Although there is certainly much disagreement and controversy in ethical matters, students are misled when we concentrate primarily on dilemmas and disputes in moral considerations or on the shortcomings of moral paradigms. We should at least start with areas of agreement (for example, all students agree that they should be graded fairly) before we take up controversies, to avoid the impression (very common among students) that moral values are completely undecidable. Stressing "lifeboat" scenarios, for example. is like beginning physics instruction with the uncertainty principle or the wave-particle paradox. ETHICS AND FINITUDE 405 and tensions in the ethical life. In other words, moral philosophy should be inseparable from moral education. It should (4) ask the related questions: How do people become ethical or unethical? What conditions or attributes or developments are involved in actualizing or blocking ethical potential? And moral philosophy should (5) submit the tradition to critique in order to uncover internal inconsistencies, conflicts, or failures and to discover innovations needed to revise or alter tradition. Given the difficulties that moral philosophy has faced so far in meeting this task, I think that ethics could benefit from Heidegger's thought in a way comparable to his revision of traditional ontology. Heidegger never claimed that rational or metaphysical models of thought are false or dispensable,7 only that they are not primordial enough, that something is concealed in their disclosures-the radical finitude of Being-that needs drawing out to renovate our thinking about the world. Heidegger also never denied the importance of ethics or the need for it in our critical time of history.8 I would propose an analogy between Heidegger's approach to traditional ontology and a possible approach to ethics. Traditional ethical theories are not false or dispensable; they all show us something important about morality. But they have missed or covered over the radical finitude of human existence and the preconceptual lived world, attention to which can renovate our thinking about ethics. So the ethics that is put in question would be the traditional philosophical and metaphysical presumptions about moral values and not the matter (die Sache) of how we should live our lives. If we attend in a Heideggerian manner to the existential environment (being-in-the-world) in which and out of which the ethical life arises, such a "pre-ethical" analysis should give us clues for a more adequate ethics in regard to its fivefold task described above. In the light of Heidegger's thought ethics can be seen as a finite, existential, ungrounded world dynamic, a configuration that I think can significantly improve upon traditional models in moral philosophy. The task for ethics should not be the search for a theory or principle that can survive rational scrutiny, that can satisfy the objective cognitive standards inherited from traditional logic and the sciences, that can give us clear and certain criteria to guide adjudication. We already are shaped by ethics, before we reflect on it. We must attend to this prereflective ethical world to understand better how values function in our experience, to open up the ethical life, its conditions, demands, and difficulties. In this way ethics is not simply a philosophical specialty but a social project that keeps the existential claim of morality alive as an issue that people must continually engage. And I think that Heidegger's constellation of being-in-the-world can be effectively translated to prepare such an approach. I. BEING-ETHICAL-IN-THE-WORLD Many ethical theories have searched for an objective, rational standard that can be as decisive in morality as in the domains of mathematics, logic, and the sciences (e.g., Platonic forms, the Kantian categorical imperative, the utilitarian 7See, e.g., Letter on Humanism, p. 210. *See ibid., pp. 231-32, and Nietzsche, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, vol. 4 (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), p. 245. 406 HATAB happiness calculus). One way or another the hope is that we can discover a measure to legislate the affective conflicts and empirical contingencies of the ethical field. From a Heideggerian perspective the futility of such a search is forcefully shown in the fact that even the most objective ontologies are dec onstructed into the dynamics of an existential lived world. Since no form of knowledge can claim a purely objective, fixed warrant, it is short work to show that objective certainty is a chimera in ethics. Being-ethical-in-the-world can be specifically drawn along the same lines as Heidegger's general ontological configuration. Everyday normative involvement gives us access to a non-cognitive environment that opens up the following conditions. The radical finitude of beingtoward-death is the existential thrust of care, the urgency of concern for our possibilities in the world that can bear us in, and in which we can bear, our finitude. Human norms are fully intelligible in such a setting as various modes of "shelter" for beings that are continually subjected to conditions of finitude: death, loss, pain, failure, etc. But norms as such are no less finite than the world in which they arise, so "having norms" must be understood in terms of the conditions uncovered in an existential analysis: temporality, historicality, unconcealment, facticity, particularity, plurality-none of which can support the search for an objective standard. One insight that a Heideggerian analysis can give to ethics is this: we are not first or finally ethical in an objective manner, by way of some theory or rational demonstration, which operates by reflectively standing back from world involvement. We are first introduced to values by way of training, habits, and institutional influences, i.e., by way of a tradition already in place that gives us our ethical orientation in a prereflective immersion and transmission. Values become part of our nature before we reflect on them, and there is no reason to think that such a prereflective dimension ever can be or should be dissociated from the moral life. Even after maturation and reflection, being ethical will not be free of traditional influences, will not be detachable from our particular existential concerns, and will always require the moments of decision where reflection leaves off and action begins. Being and Time gives us a model for orchestrating this range of non-cognitive elements: Dasein is first molded by a traditional heritage, in a self-world immersional whole that precedes subject-object differentiation; Dasein's concern for its existential possibilities, which concern is "mine" (cf. Jemeinigkeit), is never absent in its deliberations; and each Dasein is faced with the possibility of authentically taking up its traditional heritage in a unique way, in terms of decisions that will open up individual pathways in the course of life. All of this-precognitive training, existential concern, and decision-shows the shortcomings in purely objective. rational moral theories. In some respects there is historical precedent for the kind of ethical analysis I am trying to draw from Being and Time, namely, the ethics of Aristotle. The recent publication of an early lecture course, Phiinomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles,9 gives us some fascinating material regarding both the relationship between Heidegger's and Aristotle's thought and the possibilities for ethics "Gesamlau.l/?ahe, Band 61 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985). ETHICS AND FINITUDE 407 in Heidegger's early ontology.1O In this text Heidegger mentions the problems in absolutistic, transcendental moral systems owing to their detachment from a more worldly, finite, lived morality.l1 It is Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, particularly its critique of Platonic moral philosophy, that gives Heidegger a historical focus for another beginning, both in ontology and in ethics. Aristotle presents a phenomenology of ethics in that he does not bracket tradition or experience; he examines what "appears" (phainesthai) in culture and then submits it to analysis, clarification, and puzzle resolution (l14Sb3-7). What is shown are a number of elements that disrupt the Platonic tendency toward rationalistic, universalistic, and perfectionistic conceptions of goodness. The good will be a human good (109Sb3, 1178aS-lS) reflecting the finite conditions of a desiring being, not to be measured against divine perfection; the good first requires habituation (l103b24-2S), then mature deliberation in the complex choices of life; the good is pluralized, not uniform (1096a24-2S), particular, not universal, inexact, not precise (1094b20-2S), difficult, not easy (l106b30-3S). In a similar manner Heidegger suggests an ethics that will accord more with the human world, that will renounce the comfortable, undisturbed, lofty distances of moral theories that in their insulation foreclose any realization of ethical possibilities in the actual experience of finite conditions. 12 One interesting connection in this regard is that between Verstehen (Heidegger's notion of prereflective understanding) and Aristotle's phronesis or practical wisdom. Phronesis is an inexact, deliberative finesse that guides our actions regarding a desired end (telos) , that for the sake of which (hou heneka) we act. Here the human good involves natural potentialities that we strive to actualize through deliberative choices. This fits Heidegger's sense of Verstehen, which is connected with Seinkonnen (Dasein's potentiality-for-being), and das Umwillen (the for-thesake-of that animates Dasein's actions). Ethics, for Aristotle, involves human potentials and the means and conditions needed to actualize these ends. A similar kind of ethical developmentalism can be read out of Being and Time, although there we notice a radicalization of Aristotle's formulations. The Kierkegaardian influences in Being and Time show an even more dynamic, open, and contingent atmosphere than Aristotle would allow. For Heidegger, Dasein's potentiality is never filled up in any way or even compensated for by the comfort taken in a metaphysics of divine actuality. Dasein is potentiality, and so full actuality is ruled out in principle. Moreover, despite the acceptance of tradition in Heidegger's analysis, the notion of authenticity opens up issues relating to the tension between individuation and conformity, which goes far beyond the gesture toward particularity in Aristotle and which presents a more contemporary range of ethical topics regarding how we should engage social norms and controls. The focus on potentiality in Being and Time permits two basic applications that pertain to ethics. First, so many of our values address the supports for and obstacles to human development (e.g., homelife, child rearing, meaningful work, !OSee John van Buren, "The Young Heidegger, AIistotle, Ethics," in Ethics and Danger, pp. 169-85. See also Robert Bernasconi, "Heidegger's Destruction of Phronesis," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 28, supplement (1990),127-47, which includes a survey of the literature on this topic. llGesamtausgabe, 61, p. 64. l2See ibid., pp. 164-65. 408 HATAB social relationships, cultural pursuits). On a political level certain social programs should be seen to stem from asking basic ethical questions: What are the desirable ends of human activity? What are the ways in which a human life can flourish and tum out well? What are the material, environmental, and educational needs that make such flourishing more likely? Second, ethics itself is a human potential, the possibility of becoming a person who can live well with others. Attention to the human condition in all its facets would be an essential ingredient in moral education. The kind of analysis Heidegger offers in Being and Time is useful because it helps us understand what becoming ethical involves or requires-not simply moral education but knowing how values constitute our very being-in-the-world and what it takes to be able to enact our values. Attention to our sense of self and to the existential demands and difficulties of the ethical life have usually not been the focus of moral philosophy. I will develop some examples that address this problem shortly. II. BEING-ETHICAL-IN-THE-WORLD: THE PROBLEM OF SUBJECTIVITY It seems that ethics must involve something of a "call," something having a claim on us, something that draws us and motivates a commitment in the midst of counter-impulses. Such a call need not reflect the traditional force of a "command," but since normative matters always imply the human potential to alter one's behavior in the face of other (and likely more ready) inclinations, then some sense of a "self-transcendence" is needed to capture the tone of "obligation" that seems so indigenous to ethics. In this regard I think that Heidegger's ontological critique of subjectivity can also bear fruit in moral philosophy. 13 Many problems in ethical theory can be traced to the modernist tendency to ground values in a "subject," variously conceived in individual, collective, or cognitive terms. One way or another, Hume's division of fact and value retains its force as long as values are restricted to a subjective realm when measured against, and not measuring up to, the strict conditions of scientific objectivity. But since Heidegger's thought permits a deconstruction of objectivity, this opens up the possibility of reconciling the fact-value divorce that has made ethics so problematic since the Modem period. Consider emotivism, the notion that moral values are merely an expression of affective preferences that have no cognitive status. A phenomenology of values would, I think, call into question the idea that my objections to torture, for example, are nothing more than personal preferences (and what could I say about those whose preferences support torture?). And is the objection to fraud in scientific research nothing more than a preference? Consider also moral egoism, which in my view amounts to an oxymoron. In effect it says that the right thing to do is whatever an individual wants to do-when it is this very condition of individuals pursuing any and every desire that generates normative thinking in the first place. Individual subjectivity, then, is somewhat incoherent as an ethical reference, and it certainly seems to lack any sense of a "call" (what would it mean to say that I am obligated to follow my desires?). Utilitarianism is somewhat of an improvement in asking individuals to adjust 13See, e.g., Werner Marx, Is There a Measure on Earth? ch. 2. ETHICS AND FINITUDE 409 their actions to the general well-being of the community. But the community in this case is simply an aggregate of individual subjectivities, which does not therefore supercede the assumption that the good is nothing more than an internal affection having no external claim. Moreover, the criterion of collectivity contains the danger of majoritarian tyranny that has often plagued this theory, and the emphasis on instrumental reason seems to leave no room for the dignity of persons. The one modern approach that most satisfies the need for an ethical call is the kind of de ontological theory inspired by Kant. Here the subject is the rational subject that discovers universal ethical principles solely through the exercise of reason by way of the categorical imperative, principles that are completely independent of personal or collective inclinations and empirical conditions, and that should command our thinking in the same way that other rational truths claim the mind's assent. But we can notice in Kant's detached, abstract route to universal consistency something analogous to metaphysical subjectivism, as critiqued by Heidegger, particularly technicity's totalistic oblivion of Being and finite dwelling. The strict segregation of the good from personal concerns and from the contingencies of experience makes possible a kind of tyrannical formalism that becomes blind to the actual conditions of existence and thereby not only inapplicable but dangerously inflexible (the good at any cost). In different ways, then, the orientation toward the subject in modern moral theory can be implicated in various problems that have continued to frustrate ethical discourse. Without claiming that Heidegger's thought can solve all these problems, I think his critique of subjectivity can give us a good start in addressing the underlying assumptions that foster these difficulties. First, we can see that Heidegger would object to "grounding" values in the subject no less than he would object to the "grounding" of any region of Being. But this does not annul values; it opens the realm of values to the overall configuration of finite being-inthe-world. As with other concerns of Dasein, values can be understood as uncovered in Dasein's world and not simply in some inner subjective zone. As part of the world, values can be seen to have as much a "claim" on Dasei.Jl's understanding as other factical conditions into which it is "thrown." Notions such as facticity, thrownness, historicality (and, as we will see, Mitsein) that operate in Being and Time can give relief from individualistic and subjectivistic conceptions of values, as well as from a hyperbolic conception of existential freedom that in the end sees values as arbitrary choices. And regarding the difficulties indicated in utilitarianism and Kantian theory, I think that the phenomenological analysis of being-in that subverts the subject-object bifurcation initiated by Cartesian ontology can likewise open our understanding of values to a dimension "ecstatically" situated in world involvement, rather than simply the rational calculation of human preferences or the pure abstraction of universal consistency. Perhaps now we can better understand Heidegger's notorious objections to the term "value." We know that much of this came from his obsession with protecting Being from a reduction to human interests. Beyond ontological considerations, I am convinced that the same can be said for the moral domain, that renouncing the value paradigm is not a rejection of ethical concerns but a protection of 410 HATAB their authentic meaning from the distortion of reducing them to merely human, subjective estimations. 14 In general terms here we run up against the perennial problem of moral knowledge, of whether morality can have any cognitive status comparable to other modes of knowing. Much of modern philosophy has challenged the possibility of truth in ethics (especially positivism's inheritance of Hume's classic critique). But here again is the beauty of Heidegger's phenomenology. Ethics is indeed not a form of knowledge if truth is presumed to be the objective warrant of scientific rationality; values inhabit a realm of affectivity, uncertainty, contingency, and disagreement. For Heidegger, however, all knowledge must be deconstructed into the lived environment of the care structure, which amounts to a revision of what "knowledge" and "truth" mean. The aforementioned conditions of existential finitude are implicated in any form of knowing. In Being and Time traditional assumptions about strict objectivity are demolished but not in the direction of a radical skepticism or anti-realism. 15 The difference between supposedly objective and non-objective disciplines can be understood now as the degree to which existential concerns are implicated in their disclosures. Consequently, the so-called exact sciences are simply less existentially operational than history, art, or ethics. 16 Given this continuum, ethics, in being simply more animated by existential concerns, cannot on that account alone be deemed any less "real," any less "knowable," or, especially, any less "true" -if we employ Heidegger's interpretation of truth as aletheia, as a finite, ungrounded, process of unconcealment that can work for any form of disclosure. Heidegger should be read as a phenomenological realist, or, if you like, a radical realist, in that Being is disclosed through Dasein, not produced by Dasein (confusion and ambiguity on this point was part of the reason for the Kehre). But the disclosure of Being is a finite, dynamic, and pluralized process that subverts traditional philosophical confidences. The irony is, and this is a major contribution to moral philosophy, that the features of ethics that had often weakened its claims to knowledge and truth in traditional discourse can now be seen to strengthen those claims as long as knowledge and truth are given proper postmetaphysical alterations. 1lI. ETHICS AND DWELLING Dwelling (Wohnen) is a word that occupied Heidegger's later thinking. But it is completely consistent with, and expressive of, the non-objective/non-subjective configuration of being-in-the-world delineated in the early writings.17 The word "dwelling" captures both "subjective" and "objective" tones (human meaning 14Joseph Kockelmans makes this point in On the Truth of Being (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. 1984), pp. 258 and 261. A passage from Letter on Humanism lends credence to this interpretation: "To think against 'values' is not to maintain that everything ... is valueless .... through the characterization of something as a 'value' what is so valued is robbed of its worth .... what is valued is admitted only as an object for man's estimation" (p. 228). 15See Being and Time, p. 195, where Heidegger speaks against randomness and bias-laden obstacles to knowledge, and p. 251, where he offers a partially favorable gesture toward philosophical realism. 16Such a demarcation is suggested in Being and Time, p. 195. I7See Being and Time, p. 80, for the connection between dwelling, being, being-in, and being-inthe-world. Also, in Letter on Humanism: "dwelling is the essence of being-in-the-world" (p. 236). ETHICS AND FINITUDE 411 and the environment which we inhabit) but in a single, indivisible, existential term. The word in all its resonances becomes Heidegger's replacement for traditional subject-object ontologies. In Letter on Humanism Heidegger takes up the Greek word ethos in its sense of abode and dwelling place 18 and concludes that his ontological investigations might then be called an "original ethics" (p. 235). Although this answer is a typically unsatisfying "end run" around the specific question regarding the possibility of ethics in Heidegger's thinking, I believe that we can go beyond Heidegger's ontological fixation, that a normative ethics can benefit from attention to ethos-as-dwelling, that we can ask questions about how we dwell ethically, and how we should dwell in the world. Heidegger's notion of dwelling offers two main contributions to moral philosophy; the first points back to and summarizes preceding sections of my text, the second points forward to the rest of my essay: (1) values cannot be understood as either objective or subjective conditions-they are modes of being-in-the-world; (2) being-ethical-in-the-world must be understood as radically finite. For Heidegger, from beginning to end, from being-in-the-world to the fourfold (Geviert), dwelling means being at home in the finitude of Being, in its mixture of presence and absence, especially in terms of human mortality and the limit conditions of unconcealment. Dwelling is contrasted with the "flight" from Being indicated in the closure of metaphysical systems and the quest for certainty and control. Dwelling names something like what the poet John Keats called "negative capability," the capacity to live with conditions of uncertainty, 19 or as I would put it, a reconciliation with finitude. Although dwelling has a positive content suggesting a sense of placement in the world to counter radical versions of skepticism, phenomenalism, or anarchism, it also presents a deep challenge in that we must exist in a world without foundations, guarantees, or ultimate resolution of existential difficulties. The same radical finitude can be shown in our ethical dwelling. In fact, this finitude has always been acknowledged in moral philosophy, but it was deemed a deficiency that either needed correcting or prevented ethics from achieving intellectual legitimation. The moral life is always faced with cognitive, psychological, empirical, and practical limits, which are effectively expressed in the mixture of presence and absence that rings in Heidegger's favorite word, aletheia, unconcealment: values are not grounded in proof or demonstration; the moral arena is marked by disagreement and conflict; moral situations are often complex and ambiguous, where outcomes are uncertain, where goods conflict with each other, where a balance of differing interests is hard to gauge-but we have to decide and sometimes all we are left with is an abyssal moment of choice; we sometimes fail in our aim for the good, or in doing good we sometimes instigate harmful effects; extreme or degraded environments can ruin ethical potential; ethical commitments often require risk and sacrifice, which makes anxiety and mixed dispositions inevitable. The value of Heidegger's notion of dwelling is that we are forced to give up the idea that such conditions of finitude are "deficiencies." This is the ethical world, and the myth of pure "presence" must be surrendered in moral philosophy no less than in ontology. The problem with '*See Charles Scott's evocative reading in The Question of Ethics, pp. 142-47. I9"Letter to George and Thomas Keats," December 1817. 412 HATAB ethical beliefs that insulate the good from limit conditions is not simply a philosophical flaw. There is an irony that history has demonstrated all too often: the "purer" the concept of the good, the greater the capacity to do evil on its behalf. With a definitized ideal the world now appears "fallen" and in need of reform; when elements in the world continue to resist or fall short, there arises a potential to commit terror in the name of "salvation." IV. HUMAN NATURE AND FINITUDE Heidegger's thought challenges traditional essentialist assumptions about human nature that have played an important role in moral philosophy. Do we not need to discover or posit something essential, universal, and unified in human nature to shape the idea of a "common good" that can overcome the divisive strife that plagues us? Is not the denial of a metaphysics of humanity a significant threat to ethics? This is an important question that faces postmodern thought, but I believe that a non-essentialist description of human existence can speak to many important problems in ethics. In the early Heidegger Dasein's radical finitude is indicated in its "transcendence," which means-as is made clear in What Is Metaphysics? and in the notion of being-toward-death-being held out into the Nothing. The core of Dasein is not a definable essence but an abyss that is not reducible to any state of being. But the abyssal dimension of human existence makes questioning and disclosure (from concealment to unconcealment) possible. It is also, for Heidegger, the origin of freedom, which addresses the need for decision and choice in ethics; radical finitude is also radical openness, the antithesis of deterministic closure. In addition, abyssal transcendence leaves us with a non-essentialist version of personhood that can, I think, intercept a number of morally problematic beliefs and practices. Many human abuses can be traced to reductionistic pictures of human nature, where the self is traced to some positive property or condition, be it individual, group, or universal reductions (e.g., egoism, tribalism, or Enlightenment universalism). The trouble starts when an "other" is encountered (when the egoist encounters another ego, when the tribalist encounters another tribe, or when the universalist encounters differences or resistance to the presumed definition of "human nature"). To see the human person in non-essentialist terms is to refuse all reductions, to weigh potentiality more than actuality, concealment more than full disclosure, process more than finished states, uniqueness more than universality. What humans ultimately have in common, then, is the negativity of finitude, i.e., the fact that we do not have a definable "nature." But this negativity can help disrupt all the definitional references with which we frequently promote ourselves and demote others. Since human persons cannot ultimately be fixed by any designation, then all the abstract categories of race, gender, ethnicity, class, and the like that fuel so much trouble can be intercepted by a negative correction. Such categories do have a use but not as substantive designations. The "other" becomes a mystery (in relation to our presumptions), which can cash out in ethics as a warning against fixed beliefs that are implicated in hatred, discrimination, exploitation, and abuse. 20 Although the negativity of radical 2°John D. Caputo gives suggestions for ethics in this regard in Radical Hermeneutics (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1987), chs. 9-10. ETHICS AND FINITUDE 413 finitude might be unsettling, we should attend to the ways in which "positive" ascriptions are implicated in injustice. Renouncing such ascriptions can have an important consequence in ethics by gathering a Heideggerian word that has much moral resonance: Seinlassen. In letting-be there are tones of non-interference, openness, recognition, respect, and release. 21 V. MITSEIN AND MITLEID The negative tone of the preceding analysis can be balanced somewhat by attention to the world configuration in Being and Time. The world in which Dasein dwells is the rich array of meanings and concerns that, though finite, give positive content to existence. One of the features of the world structure that is most pertinent to ethics is the phenomenon of Mitsein. "Dasein is essentially Being-with. "22 Being-with-other-Daseins is equiprimordial with being-in-theworld. Mitsein is the basis of Dasein's everyday sense of self, which is not strictly speaking an "I" but das Man, the "they-self." Even authenticity is not a departure from Mitsein or even from das Man. 23 Here Heidegger is continuing a tradition (inspired by Hegel) that sees human existence as essentially social; the human self is primarily a "social self." We are not first and foremost isolated egoatoms that relate to other selves only secondarily. Everything from mutual dependence to child rearing to education to the phenomenon of recognition lends support to the idea that we become individuals only in and out of social relations. This is the sense in which Heidegger describes Mitsein as a world-phenomenon, as something in which we find our being. 24 One of the consequences of Mitsein for ethics is that we are liberated from the philosophical problematic of "arguing" for a social context to challenge egoistic or individualistic paradigms. In various ways the individual is others; relationships come first. Being-in-a-with-world suggests the following. Like other conditions that Dasein is in, that are there, in which Dasein ec-statically dwells, the individual self and other selves are not separate or even merely in a "relation." We are co-constituted by each other, we "exist" in each other in certain ways (being "in" love is a significant example). Such a structure provides an effective 2tDerrida addresses the ethical possibilities of letting-be in "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978). 22Being and Time, p. 156. See primarily sections 25-27. 23Authenticity is called a "modification" of das Man (Being and Time, p. 312). 24Much of the analysis of das Man in Being and Time is influenced by Kierkegaard's critique of bourgeois conformity, which gives the impression that authenticity would involve the liberation of the unique individual from ordinary social patterns. But then we are told that authenticity is not a departure from da.l' Man but its modification, even that da.\* Man "is an existentiale; and, as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution" (p. 167). This can make sense if we interpret das Man in a less pejorative way as socialization, as the necessarily "common" ways in which a person is incorporated into a cultural setting. Authenticity, then, would involve the tension between socialization and individuation, something that would never have to mean an asocial break but rather the particular, creative ways in which individuals cut their path within a social world. In this way authenticity would not mean isolated individuation; in fact it would remain essentially Mitsein. See the connection between death, individuation, and Mitsein (p. 309); see also the essential connection between authenticity, resolution, and being-with-others in Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 287-88. 414 HATAB challenge to the hegemony of liberal individualism and its effect on moral discourse since the Modern period. Consider the following passages from Basic Problems: "Self and world belong together in a single entity, the Dasein" (p. 297). Since other selves are part of the world, a unitary constellation of selves is implied: "Dasein is determined from the very outset by being-with-others" (p. 296). Even the I-thou relation is something made possible by a more primordial world correlation: "The basic condition for this possibility of the self's being a possible thou in being-with others is based on the circumstance that the Dasein as the self that it is, is such that it exists as being-in-the-world. For 'thou' means 'you who are with me in the world' " (pp. 297-98). Such a structure opens up the topology of ethical relations. Since "self" is not ontologically individuated in the strict sense, even the "mineness" of Dasein does not suggest a confinement to individual self-interest but rather an openness to the interests of others. The forthe-sake-of-itself of Dasein "does not assert ontically that the factual purpose of the facti cal Dasein is to care exclusively and primarily for itself and to use others as instruments (Werkzeug) toward this end" (p. 296). In fact selfhood as a world phenomenon is "the ontological presupposition for the selflessness in which every Dasein comports itself toward the other in the existent I-thou relationships" (p. 298). The idea that Dasein dwells with and in others helps us illuminate a phenomenon that is often addressed in ethics, namely, compassion. Some moral philosophers have made compassion the centerpiece of their ethics (e.g., Hume and Schopenhauer), and I think the notion of finite being-in-the-world can go a long way toward strengthening such reflections and opening up important possibilities for moral philosophy. Many of our values prescribe that we help others in need and refrain from abusing each other. The presence of compassion can be an effective force in living out these values (and its absence can account for not living them out). As shown in the words com-passion, sym-pathy. and Mit-leid, here we encounter an experience that "suffers-with," i.e., we share the pain of others. Compassion occurs when someone's misfortune actually touches us and alters our experience toward their pain and "calls" us in a visceral way to do something about it. The marvel of compassion is that the pain arises in us even when we ourselves are not directly undergoing the misfortune. How is something like this possible? I think that the notions of Mitsein and being-in help to show how compassion is possible, and indeed the phenomenon of compassion is a perfect illustration of the existential validity of Heidegger's configuration of being-in-the-world. In compassion we are decentered, desubjectivized, our experience dwells in the other, and so it cannot be understood as a subjective or objective condition but rather as a curious, compelling. ecstatic being-with-the-other. Compassion, then, may be the deepest indication of Mitsein. 25 There are a number of studies 25In Being and Time Heidegger speaks to this point by saying "only on the basis of Being-with does 'empathy' become possible" (p. 162). The German word here is Einfuhlung, not Mitleid. These two words are not exactly synonymous in German, but they overlap enough in the matter of sharing the experiences of others to make this passage fit my point well enough. In fact, Einfuhlung is the stronger, more heartfelt experience, and the "ein" captures an ecstatic sense of dwelling more sharply than "mit" does; moreover, "fuhlen" can apply to more positive ecstases and not simply to the sensitivity to misfortune. ETHICS AND FINITUDE 415 suggesting that compassion is something natural in humans, even in very young children, that it is not simply a matter of social conditioning. 26 If this is right, then moral theories like egoism or utilitarianism that focus exclusively on self-interest are seriously flawed. But indifference might be no less natural, either. Nevertheless the issue of compassion and indifference can be given more force if we see them as basic existential conditions; this would deepen ethical discourse to the heart of our being. Might it be, for example, that compassion is a basic ethical disposition (Befindlichkeit) or mood (Stimmung) that attunes us to the moral life in a way that mere knowledge, theories, or rules cannot? And might there be ways to cultivate this attunement or prevent its eclipse by other factors in the social environment? One thing is clear (and this is a thoroughly Heideggerian insight): attention to our finitude can open up the world in new ways; there is a fundamental connection between limit conditions and the disclosure of meaning. Specifically, our own sufferings can open us to noticing and feeling the sufferings of others. As in the relationship between being-toward-death and care, our experience of limits and loss can not only illuminate the urgency of our own concerns and vulnerability; it might be the best teacher in coming to care for others as well. Although human beings and cultures might differ in their forms of life, there is, I think, a common human understanding of finitude, of what it means to lose one's interests. Compassion in the face of pain, loss, and death can be the starting point for a cross-cultural ethics. It should also be clear that compassion cannot be sufficient for an ethics. It is not possible for human beings to experience compassion universally or continually. There will always be a limit to our experiential concern; some people will always count more to us than others, and heightened compassion whenever it occurs will not last indefinitely. But ethics can still draw on compassion as a familiar and esteemed phenomenon that helps articulate the ethical field, that serves as a reference for many of our values, and that therefore can function as a kind of "measure" (this is Werner Marx's term) for our ethical thinking and our allegiance to moral formulations that are cast in the non-affective, abstract form of rules, principles, obligations, etc. It would be naive to think that ethics and moral education can do without principles or the duty-inclination dynamic. But compassion can still serve as an effective focus for public discourse about regulations, maxims, laws, and government, all of which can in a way be called the ethical "lieutenants" of compassion; that is to say, laws and principles "stand in" for compassion, direct our behavior in its absence in accordance with its "measure," and in so doing ensure a more ethical world when its existential fuel is empty or low. 27 VI. COURAGE Aristotle's ethics focuses on virtues, or character traits and capacities, that are needed to lead a good life and to decide and act in the proper manner in ethical 'oSee Alvin I. Goldman, "Empathy, Mind, and Morals," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66, no. 3 (1992), 17-41. 27See Werner Marx, Towards a Phenomenological Ethics, pp. 56-67. For another perspective that considers justice in terms of the tension between universals and singularities, see John D. Caputo, "Hyperbolic Justice: Deconstruction, Myth, and Politics," Research in Phenomenology 21 (1991), 3-20. 416 HATAB situations. Virtue ethics has made something of a comeback recently,28 focusing less on rules and principles and more on the kind of person it takes to act ethically. Much in my analysis relates to such an approach, and I want to focus briefly on the virtue of courage with respect to an ethics of finitude. Aristotle defines courage in relation to pain. The courageous person is one who can stand fast in pursuit of a good in the midst of pain or the risk of pain. A coward is someone who cannot or does not act for the good because of pain or fear of pain. 29 Although Aristotle's discussion generally focuses on the obvious example of courage in battle, I think we can add in all sorts of pains, losses, and risks and consequently greatly expand the meaning of courage and cowardice in the ethical domain. In fact to a large extent I think that courage could be called the primary virtue in the moral life, and our analysis of finitude can help articulate why this might be so. I have said that Heidegger's analysis of being-in-the-world involves a reconciliation with finitude, with the limit conditions of existence. One way of understanding the notion of fallenness (Verfallen) is that it is a hyperimmersion in beings as a refuge from radical finitude. Part of authenticity, then, involves a release from this fixation and a capacity to dwell finitely, to accept the movements of presence and absence more readily. It seems to me that such a capacity is exactly what courage means in our being-ethical-in-world. So much of our possessive and abusive behavior that is morally problematical can be understood as stemming from the fear of finitude, of the pain of lacks and losses. A good deal of greed, anger, and violence can be traced to the "fallenness" of self-absorption as a refuge from losses or the threat of losses (which losses can be material, psychological, social, ideological, etc.). Even moderation and self-control can involve courage in that the person who indulges appetites at the expense of himself or others is cowardly in the sense of not being able to withstand the "pain" of an unfulfilled desire (experienced as a "lack"). Moreover, courage and cowardice help explain how and why we often fail to live up to an ethic we affirm in principle and want to enact. In many respects acting according to moral values involves risks, sacrifices, and uncertainties, which makes such enactment difficult and challenging. Honesty, for example, is not something that is risk-free or cost-free. The honest person is courageous in the sense of accepting such conditions, and the liar is in this respect a coward. So we could conclude that liars are not really affirming deceit as a "good" as much as they are fearing the consequences of telling the truth. If we recall a previous point about the role of tradition, we can say that a key task in ethics is not a radical challenge to our values (who would want to propose the abandonment of truth-telling?) but a recognition of how much courage it takes to lead a moral life. 30 It might even be possible to extend this virtue to the question of compassion and say that compassion takes courage and that indifference is a subtle form of cowardice, a psychological strategy to ward off the pain of real attention to 280ne work responsible for this is Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Univ. of Notre Dame Press. 1981). 29See Nicomachean Ethics III, 6-9. 30Sometimes the risks come from social pressures against being ethical. This is why it is wrong to assume that everydayness is the realm of ethics and that authenticity is a non-ethical sphere. Sometimes das Man is a strong anti-ethical force, as in the case of honesty. ETHICS AND FINITUDE 417 human suffering. This analysis of the virtue of courage augments a central conviction of my essay, that an authentic ethical existence can be seen to mirror Heidegger's broader conception of authenticity, in being able to dwell in the finitude of ethical situations and decisions. VII. DECISION Given limit conditions and uncertamtIes in ethical dwelling, we must still decide. And often we must decide to rebel against an established convention, to disrupt it in our resolve. And even if we are clear about the good, ethics is finally action, which means that we must decide to enact the good in the midst of counter-possibilities, which makes being ethical in the end spontaneous, without cognitive or social support. The openness of Dasein's temporal futurity is an ineradicable condition of moral engagement. Ethics at bottom is groundless, but we must accept its finitude and still decide how to act. The problem with traditional moral theories is that they want to "definitize" ethics by grounding the good in some fixed scheme; and they bypass the abyssal element of existential decision by modeling ethical deliberation along the lines of demonstrative and calculative techniques that in a sense decide things "for" us (I do not "decide," for example, that 2 plus 2 is 4 or that "Socrates is mortal," in the classic syllogism). Demonstrative "decidability," in fact, would erase the sense of responsibility for choices that also animates ethicsY As I have said, it is not that these theories are mistaken. The familiar models in moral philosophy all show us something important in ethics but fail in their reductive groundings and exclusions. The ongoing and unsettled debates between egoism, utilitarianism, deontology, libertarianism, communitarianism, and so on, deconstruct into the elements of finitude sketched in this essay. Ethics, like any other form of unconcealment, is a mixture and oscillation of presence and absence. When we focus, for example, on group interests, we conceal individuality, and vice versa; when we focus on principles, we conceal empirical contingencies, and vice versa; when we focus on obligation, we conceal inclination, and vice versa. The point is that ethical situations usually involve a complicated interplay and tension of these concerns-this is the difficulty of ethical life. Authentic decisions do not have to mean "correct" decisions but something like the attentive ethical finesse of Aristotle's phronesis, a deliberative capacity for responsive and responsible choice. But as radically finite, an existential finesse would hold more of a tremble than Aristotle's comfortable tone would suggest. To balance this discomfort we should keep in mind the non-subjective features of Heidegger's world configuration so that ethics is not taken to be so radically finite as to seem arbitrary. Moral commitment, though uncertain, has its truth. 31Derrida develops this point in terms of the connection between ethical decisions and undecidability in the Afterword of Limited Inc., ed. Gerald Graf (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, \988).

Instrumental reasoning* John Broome For: Rationality, Rules and Structure, edited by Julian Nida-Rümelin and Wolfgang Spohn, Kluwer. * This paper was written while I was a visiting fellow at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences. I am extremely grateful to the Collegium for its generous support and hospitality. In the long course of my work on this subject, I have learnt a great deal from discussions with, or some cases just passing comments from, Jeremy Butterfield, Jonathan Dancy, Sven Danielsson, Stephen Darwall, Jane Heal, Tito Magri, Adam Morton, Jan Odelstad, Derek Parfit, Ingmar Persson, Christian Piller, John Skorupski and Howard Sobel. 1 1. Intention reasoning Here is an example of practical reasoning: I am going to St Andrews (A1) and To go to St Andrews, a necessary means is to get off at Leuchars, (A2) so I shall get off at Leuchars. (A3) I mean (A1) to express an intention of yours to go to St Andrews rather than a belief that you are going to St Andrews. I mean (A2) to express a belief of yours, and I mean (A3) to express a decision you make. Think of this as a process of reasoning you might actually run through. You might do so when you come to buy your ticket. You approach the ticket office intending to go to St Andrews; you form the belief that a necessary means is to get off at Leuchars when the ticket clerk tells you so; and then you go through the reasoning (A). It takes you from two of your existing states of mind, an intention and a belief, to a new state of mind, an intention to get off at Leuchars. To form an intention, at least as a result of reasoning like this, is to make a decision. So this reasoning concludes in a decision. Making the states explicit by writing 'I' for 'you intend' and 'B' for 'you believe', we can describe your reasoning like this: I(I am going to St Andrews) (B1) and B(To go to St Andrews, a necessary means is to get off at Leuchars) (B2) leads to I(I shall get off at Leuchars). (B3) This is a description of your reasoning from the outside. It is not an inference. From the fact that you intend to go to St Andrews, and the fact that you believe a necessary means of doing so is to get off at Leuchars, we cannot infer that you intend to get off at Leuchars. You may not have that intention, for instance if you are irrational. On the other hand, your reasoning seen from the inside is an operation on the contents of the states, and it is an inference. It is represented in (A). I shall call reasoning that concludes in the forming of an intention 'intention reasoning'. Since it leads to a decision, it is practical reasoning. Reasoning could not be more practical than this; it could not get closer to action. It certainly could not conclude in a physical act itself, because it takes more than reasoning ability to bring about a physical act. It takes physical ability too. So intention reasoning is the paradigm of practical reasoning. The reasoning process (B) can be categorized in another way. It is instrumental reasoning, which means it is concerned with taking an appropriate means to an end. If we want to understand practical reasoning, it is a good idea to start with instrumental reasoning, because it is generally held to be more straightforward than other sorts. Kant (1948, p. 80) says it 'requires no special discussion', though I hope this paper proves him wrong. It considers instrumental reasoning only. Furthermore, it considers only a special case of instrumental reasoning: the case of reasoning to a necessary means. In another paper (Broome, 1998), I have extended the argument to means that are not necessary. I have been begging the question of whether intention reasoning is truly reasoning at all. If it is to be the paradigm of practical reasoning, it must be reasoning. Indeed it must be correct reasoning. (I shall keep the term 'valid' for the content of reasoning, and use 'correct' for the reasoning process.) We could call almost any process of thought 'reasoning', but I shall generally use this term only for correct reasoning. Intuitively, (B) describes correct reasoning, but we need an explanation of why. 2. Kant and the correctness of intention reasoning 2 Kant (1948, p. 80) asks 'how we can conceive the necessitation of the will expressed by the imperative in setting us a task'. In the context of instrumental reasoning, I think he means, for instance: how does my intention of going to St Andrews make it necessary for me to intend to get off at Leuchars? (I read 'will' as 'intend'.) I have just said this has the necessity of correct reasoning. Intuitively at least, intention reasoning of a form like (B) is correct, and that is why I must intend a necessary means if I intend an end. So an explanation of how intention reasoning is correct will answer Kant's question, and an answer to Kant's question will explain how intention reasoning is correct. In answering his question, Kant (1948, pp. 80–1) says, first: Who wills the end, wills (so far as reason has a decisive influence on his actions) also the means which are indispensably necessary and in his power. This remark needs a small correction: Kant should have said '. . . wills also what he believes to be the means which are indispensably necessary . . .' Once corrected, the remark is no doubt true. If you are rational, you cannot intend to go to St Andrews, and believe that getting off at Leuchars is a necessary means of getting there, without intending to get off at Leuchars. But this merely states what has to be explained. Why is it so? If (B) describes correct reasoning, then a rational person who intends to go to St Andrews, and believes that getting off at Leuchars is a necessary means of doing so, will be brought by this reasoning to intend to get off at Leuchars. Then Kant's remark will be true of her. But it does not help us understand why the reasoning is correct. Kant (1948, p. 81) next says his remark is analytic, but again that does not take us far forward. If intention reasoning is correct, then it is part of the meaning of 'rational' that a rational person will be guided by it. 'Rational' means, in part, guided by correct reasoning. So Kant's remark will be true in virtue of the meaning of 'rational'. But we still need an explanation of how intention reasoning can be correct in the first place. Kant (1948, p, 81) finally says, in explanation: For in my willing of an object as an effect, there is already conceived the causality of myself as an acting cause – that is, the use of means; and from the concept of willing an end the imperative merely extracts the concept of actions necessary to this end. If you conceive of yourself as doing something, you must conceive of yourself as doing it somehow – that may be true. But when you conceive of yourself as doing something, you need not have any specific means in mind. So when you conceive of yourself as doing something, it cannot be part of your conception that you conceive of yourself as taking some specific means to do it. You could conceive of yourself as going to St Andrews without conceiving of yourself as getting off the train at Leuchars. Kant acknowledges this, but he thinks it is not possible if you are rational and if you believe getting off at Leuchars is a necessary means of going to St Andrews. No doubt this is true. But it cannot be true just in virtue of the meaning of 'willing the end', as Kant suggests. It must also involve the meaning of 'rational'. It is true because, as a rational person, you are guided by correct intention reasoning. So we still need an explanation of how intention reasoning can be correct. But at this point Kant's explanation gives out. I shall offer an explanation in the next section. 3. The correctness of intention reasoning and belief reasoning To see why intention reasoning is correct, it will be helpful to compare it with a sort of reasoning that is better understood in philosophy. I mean theoretical reasoning or, as I shall call it 'belief reasoning'. All reasoning, conceived as a process, starts from existing states of mind and concludes in a new state of mind. By 'belief reasoning', I mean reasoning that 3 concludes in a belief. An example is: B(I am going to St Andrews) (C1) and B(To go to St Andrews, a necessary means is to get off at Leuchars) (C2) leads to B(I shall get off at Leuchars). (C3) Like (B), (C) describes a process of reasoning from the outside. It is not an inference. From (C1) and (C2), we cannot infer (C3). If you are irrational you might not. Seen from the inside, the reasoning operates on the contents of your beliefs, like this: I am going to St Andrews and To go to St Andrews, a necessary means is to get off at Leuchars, so I shall get off at Leuchars. These three statements represent the contents of beliefs, and together they represent the content of the reasoning described in (C). I shall take the individual contents to be propositions. They constitute a valid inference. These three propositions stand in a particular relation to each other, a relation such that, if the first two are true, so is the third. This makes the inference valid, which in turn makes the process of reasoning correct. The reasoning is correct because its content is valid. The validity of this content plays a part in other sorts of reasoning besides (C), because propositions do not need to be believed for them to play a part in reasoning. For example, the same content might feature in hypothetical reasoning, where you do not believe (C1) or (C2), but are working out what would be true if they were true. The same validity also plays a part in intention reasoning. The content of belief reasoning (C) is in fact exactly the same as (A), the content of intention reasoning (B). This content (A) is a valid inference. It turns out that this fact makes (B) correct just as it makes (C) correct. The difference between (B) and (C) is not in their content but in the stance you take towards their content. In (C), your stance towards (A1), that you are going to St Andrews, is to take it as true. In (B) your stance is to set yourself to make it true. Because (A) is valid, if (A1) and (A2) are true, (A3) must be true. This is what makes belief reasoning (C) correct. Also because (A) is valid, if (A2) is true, then if you are to make (A1) true you must make (A3) true. This is what makes intention reasoning (B) correct. Both (B) and (C) appropriately track the transmission of truth through the valid inference (A). (B) tracks it in a truth-making way and (C) in a truth-taking way. If David Hume (1978, Book 2, Part 3, Section 3) was right that reason is concerned only with truth, he should still have recognized that reasoning can transmit the truth-making stance as well as the truth-taking stance. It can transmit intention as well as belief. So reasoning can be practical. Intention reasoning is parallel to belief reasoning in the way I have described, and both depend on the validity of the same content. Consequently, one might be tempted to think intention reasoning somehow has belief reasoning embedded in it. If you intend to go to St Andrews, you normally believe you are going there. So you are normally in a position to run through the belief reasoning (C), which will bring you to believe you will get off at Leuchars. One might be tempted to think this is part of the process of forming your intention to get off at Leuchars. But my explanation of intention reasoning shows that belief reasoning is actually not involved in this process; it merely has the same content. In any case, a belief that you will get off at Leuchars cannot by any rational process bring you to form the intention of doing so. Belief reasoning is parallel to intention reasoning, but not a part of it. The validity of the content plays its part in intention reasoning directly, and not by giving you a belief. 4. Restrictions on the notion of intention 4 If you believe the premises of a valid inference, then correct reasoning will bring you to take the conclusion as true; you will believe it. Similarly, if you intend some of the premises of a valid inference, and believe the others, then correct reasoning will bring you to set yourself to make the conclusion true. However, it does not always follow that you will intend the conclusion. Setting yourself to make something true is not necessarily intending it. Our notion of intention does not include all instances of setting to make true. Take this putative case of intention reasoning, for example: I(I am going to St Andrews) and B(If I am going to St Andrews, I shall be kept awake by seagulls) leads to I(I shall be kept awake by seagulls). The content of this reasoning is valid, but the reasoning itself is not an intuitively correct piece of intention reasoning. Intuitively, it seems you need not intend to be kept awake by seagulls, even though you recognize this will be a consequence of what you do intend. True enough, because you intend to go to St Andrews, you must adopt the stance of truth-making towards the proposition that you will be kept awake by seagulls. To fulfil your intention, you must make this proposition true. But we would not say you intend to be kept awake by seagulls. This is partly because of a conventional restriction we normally impose on our use of 'intend': we normally only say you intend something if it is an act of yours. Since being kept awake is not an act, we would not normally say you intend it. If this feature of normal usage was all there was to it, the restriction would be unimportant from the point of view of practical reason, because from that point of view we are only interested in acts. Furthermore, our normal usage might be dispensable and have no philosophical significance. Indeed, we do sometimes dispense with it: we would indeed say you intend to be kept awake by seagulls if that was your purpose in going to St Andrews. But there may also be a restriction that applies even to acts. According to the 'doctrine of double effect', you may intend to do some act, and believe that some other act of yours will be a consequence of doing it, yet not intend to do the other act. For instance, according to the doctrine of double effect, the following is not correct intention reasoning, even though its content is valid: I(I shall save the woman) and B(If I save the woman, I shall kill her unborn child) leads to I(I shall kill her unborn child). According to the doctrine, you need not intend to kill the child even though you recognize you will do so as a consequence of what you intend to do. You must intend to do it only if you believe it is a means to what you intend to do. If the doctrine of double effect is right, it is a further restriction on the correctness of intention reasoning: intention reasoning is correct only if it is premised on a belief of the particular form that one act is a necessary means to another. We could not dismiss this restriction as merely a dispensable feature of our normal usage, because if the doctrine is right, it is morally significant. I do not wish to argue about the doctrine of double effect. That is why I made my example satisfy its special restriction. (A2) contains the strong modality 'necessary means', rather than a simple material implication. Consequently, there should be no doubts about the correctness of (B). It might also be correct with a weaker conditional statement in place of (A2), but I do not wish to argue about that. In summary, not all putative intention reasoning that has a valid content is correct. To make the reasoning correct, some further constraints must be satisfied. But when these constraints are satisfied, intention reasoning is genuinely correct reasoning, and it provides a 5 clear paradigm of practical reasoning. 5. Reasoning is not reason-giving Because intention reasoning is reasoning, we may say it is normatively guided; it is an application of reason. Reason guides you from intending an end to intending a necessary means. But intention reasoning is normative in no other way. For one thing, its premises are not normative and nor is its conclusion; neither is about what you ought to do or have a reason to do. (By 'a reason' I mean a pro tanto ought. If you have a reason to do something, that means you ought to do it unless you also have a contrary reason not to.) Furthermore intention reasoning is not ought-giving nor even reason-giving; that is what I shall argue in this section and the next two. What do I mean? In my example, intention reasoning takes your from your intention to go to St Andrews to an intention to get off at Leuchars. But it does not determine that you ought to get off at Leuchars, or even that you have a reason to get off at Leuchars. I could equally well say that the intention on which the reasoning is premised is not reason-giving. Your intention to go to St Andrews gives you no reason to get off at Leuchars. That is what I shall argue. Reasoning in general is not ought-giving or reason-giving. (I shall mention an exception later.) Once again, it is easiest to see this by looking at the more familiar example of belief reasoning. Suppose you believe some proposition P from which Q follows by a valid inference. It does not follow that you ought to believe Q, nor that you have a reason to believe Q. (This is so even if the inference is immediate; it has nothing to do with the complexity of the inference.) This section and the next defend this claim. Section 7 returns to intention reasoning. From one point of view, a defence scarcely seems needed because the conclusion is obvious. For instance, suppose you ought not to believe P, though you do. Then it is surely obvious that it may not be the case that you ought to believe Q or that you have a reason to believe Q. Still, here is a simple defence in case it helps. P itself follows from P by a valid inference. But obviously, from the fact that you believe P it cannot follow that you ought to believe P, or have a reason to believe P. Beliefs do not automatically justify themselves. So it cannot be a general principle that if you believe P you ought to believe its consequences, or that you have a reason to do so. However, I need to respond to a plausible contrary thought: if you believe P, then surely in some sense or other that gives you a reason to believe its consequence Q, when Q is different from P itself. No doubt, we would not say believing P gives you a reason to believe P itself, because you do not need a reason for that; you already believe it. But if you are going to believe a consequence of P that is distinct from P, you do need a reason for that, and surely believing P gives you one, in some sense or other. Perhaps this thought does not apply to every consequence of P that is distinct from P. For instance, suppose you believe the earth is flat. Perhaps this gives you no reason to believe that either the earth is flat or the moon is made of green cheese, even though this disjunction is a consequence of your belief and distinct from it. But perhaps this is because, once again, you do not need a reason to believe the disjunction, since perhaps in some way you already believe it by believing one of the disjuncts. However, if you believe the earth is flat, then surely in some sense that gives you a reason to believe the very distinct consequence that there is no horizon. In response to this contrary thought, I am willing to agree that in some sense or other your belief that the earth is flat gives you a reason to believe there is no horizon. In general, if you 6 believe P, in some sense or other this gives you a reason to believe the consequence Q, if Q is significantly different from P itself. But this sense is an unsatisfactory one. Expressed more precisely, the position is that a particular relation holds between your believing P and your believing Q: one rationally requires the other, as I shall put it. In symbols: B(P) O6 B(Q), (D) where O6 is this relation of rationally requiring. The formula (D) attaches rationality to the relation between the beliefs. In belief reasoning, the relation of rationally requiring mirrors the relation of entailment that holds between propositions. If one proposition entails another, believing the first rationally requires believing the second. 6. Rational requirement If we needed to formalize a rational requirement, we could adopt the notion of a 'conditional obligation' from deontic logic. (See the survey in Åqvist (1984).) The analysis of conditional obligations is by no means settled. (For a recent analysis, see Makinson (1998).) It might turn out, for instance, that (D) is best understood as: O(B(P) 6 B(Q)) where 'O' stands for 'ought' and '6' is the material conditional. But the important question for our purposes is whether (D) implies B(P) 6 R(B(Q)), (E) where '6' is the material conditional, and 'R' stands for 'have a reason to'. In (E), the rationality is attached to the consequent rather than the connective, as it is in (D). This means the consequent can be detached by modus ponens. From B(P) and (E), we can infer R(B(P)). If you believe P, then (E) says you have a reason to believe Q. As it stands, (D) does not allow detachment of that sort. It says that believing P gives you a reason to believe Q in a sense, but not in a sense that allows us to say, literally, that if you believe P you have a reason to believe Q. The reason is always relative to your belief in P. Unless it can be detached, it does not determine what you actually have a reason to believe. So unless the reason can be detached, the sense in which believing P gives you a reason to believe Q is decidedly misleading. Detachment requires (E), so we must know whether (E) follows from (D). The following argument shows it does not. Suppose you believe both P and ¬Q. These are inconsistent beliefs, since Q follows from P, but of course you might have inconsistent beliefs. Parallel to (D), we have that B(¬Q) O6 B(¬P) Your belief in P requires you to believe Q, and your belief in ¬Q requires you to believe ¬P. These relative requirements make good sense; it is part of your inconsistent condition that some of your beliefs require you to have beliefs that contradict others of your beliefs. But suppose it was possible to infer (E) from (D). Then we would be able to infer that you have a reason to believe Q and similarly that you have a reason to believe ¬P, both nonrelatively. If you have a reason to believe ¬P, evidently you have a reason not to believe P. So you are supposed to have a reason to believe Q, but this reason is supposed to be derived from your belief in P, which you are supposed to have a reason not to have. This is incredible. If you do not find it immediately incredible, imagine that, apart from their connection with each other, you have no reason to believe P or ¬P, or Q or ¬Q. Then if your belief in P gives you a nonrelative reason to believe Q, you ought to believe Q, because there is no contrary reason. Likewise, if your belief in ¬Q gives you a reason not to believe P, you ought not to believe P. So the claim is that you ought to believe Q, solely because of a belief you ought 7 not to have. This really is incredible. A possible reply is to say that a belief only generates a nonrelative reason if it is consistent with your other beliefs. That is to say, there is no direct inference from (D) to (E), but there is an inference if we add the premise that your belief in P is consistent with your other beliefs. I can see no reason why we should accept this qualification: if a consistent belief generates a nonrelative reason, why does not an inconsistent belief? But in any case, a different version of the same argument works against this reply too. Suppose you believe P and you do not believe Q, and suppose your belief in P is consistent with all your other beliefs. Plainly, not believing Q rationally requires you not to believe P: ¬B(Q) O6 ¬B(P). (I am not suggesting that the relation of rational requirement always permits contraposition, but it does in this case.) Then exactly the same argument will go through, but this time your belief in P is consistent with your other beliefs. There is one special sort of belief reasoning that is genuinely reason-giving, indeed oughtgiving, in a nonrelative way. Some reasoning concludes in a tautology, which rests on no premises; the premises are discharged along the way. You ought nonrelatively to believe a tautology. This is an exception to my general claim that reasoning is not reason-giving or ought-giving. However, there is no parallel exception for intention reasoning, since intention reasoning has to have an intention as a premise. The strict notion of 'ought' can be weakened in two different ways. A reason is a weakened sort of ought; it is a pro tanto ought. A rational requirement of the sort expressed in (D) is also a weakened sort of ought; it is weakened by being made relative. It is easy to muddle the two types of weakening, and slide between a relative ought and a nonrelative pro tanto ought – between a rational requirement and a reason. But they are different. What difference does it make? Suppose you believe P and have no reason not to believe Q. Then, if your belief in P gave you a reason to believe Q, in the sense of a pro tanto ought, you actually ought to believe Q, because this reason would not be opposed by a contrary reason. But in fact it is not necessarily the case that you ought to believe Q. That may well depend on whether you ought to believe P in the first case. Your belief in P merely requires you, in the sense of a relative ought, to believe Q. To state this rational requirement is merely to repeat the assumption I made at the start, that Q follows from P. It restates this assumption at the level of mental states – of beliefs. Because Q follows from P, correct reasoning will take you from a belief in P to a belief in Q. That is to say, a belief in P rationally requires a belief in Q. At the beginning of Section 5, I said that reasoning is normatively guided. In recognizing the notion of a rational requirement, I have done nothing but make this more explicit. Some states of mind rationally require others. Reasoning is not ought-giving or reason-giving in anything but a misleading sense. Nor are the states of mind it is premised on. 7. Intentions are not reason-giving Everything I have said about belief reasoning applies to intention reasoning too. If you intend an end, and believe some act is a necessary means to it, your intention and belief rationally require you to intend the means. Reasoning will bring you to intend it. This is simply to restate the correctness of intention reasoning such at (B). It does not follow that you ought to intend the means, nor that you have a reason to intend it. For example, if you intend to go to St Andrews, and believe that getting off at Leuchars is a necessary means of getting there, it does not follow that you ought to get off at Leuchars or have a reason to do so. From one point of view, this is obvious. It might be, for instance, that 8 you ought not to be going to St Andrews in the first place. In Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason, Michael Bratman (1987, pp. 23–7) points out that a theory of practical reason must not imply 'bootstrapping', as he calls it. Just because you intend to go to St Andrews, that intention cannot possibly create a reason for you to go there if you have none already. An intention cannot justify itself, by providing itself with a reason. Still, your intention must play a role in your reasoning and lead you to other intentions, including the intention of getting off at St Andrews. The purpose of Bratman's book is to elucidate the vital role of intentions in the reasoned planning of our lives. It creates a puzzle. If your intention leads to other intentions by reasoning, does it not create a reason for those other intentions? That would still be a sort of bootstrapping; a reason is being pulled into existence out of nothing. Now we have a solution to this puzzle. There is no bootstrapping. One intention gives rise to another by means of reasoning, but no reasons are involved. There is only the relation of rational requirement, which is given us by the correctness of the reasoning. There is something normative about the process, but the normativity attaches to the reasoning and not to the intention that emerges from it. When we acquire beliefs or intentions by reasoning, we may hope we ought to have them or have reason to have them, but we cannot be sure of it. It is often thought that, to justify our beliefs and intentions, we must give reasons for them. But we cannot do that, and it is the wrong idea of justification. The correct way to justify beliefs and intentions is to cite the reasoning that led to them, with its premises. If you are asked to give reasons for your beliefs and intentions, you should interpret this as a request to cite your reasoning. 8. Summary Like all reasoning, practical reasoning is a process that takes you from some of your existing mental states to a new mental state. Theoretical reasoning concludes in a belief; practical reasoning in an intention. If a piece of reasoning is correct, it concludes in a state that is rationally required by the states it is derived from. But it does not follow that you ought to be in the concluding state, or have a reason to be in it, even if you are in the states it is derived from. This paper considered only one sort of practical reasoning: instrumental reasoning. If you intend an end, from this intention together with an appropriate belief, instrumental reasoning leads you to intend some means to the end. The simplest cases of instrumental reasoning are where you believe a particular means is necessary to the end. In those cases, the correctness of the reasoning is ensured by the logical validity of its content. References Åqvist, Lennart: 1984, 'Deontic logic', in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume II, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 605–714. Bratman, Michael E.: 1987, Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Broome, John: 1998, 'Practical reasoning', typescript. Hume, David: 1978, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Kant, Immanuel: 1948, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H. J. Paton, in The Moral Law, Hutchinson, London. Makinson, David: 1998, 'On a fundamental problem in deontic logic', in Deon '98: Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science, 9 pp. 3–42. University of St Andrews Department of Moral Philosophy Fife KY16 9AL Scotland 10 Symbols 6 (Right arrow) ¬ (Logical negation sign) O6 (Letter 'O' followed immediately by right arrow)

4 gilles deleuze Daniel W. Smith Gilles Deleuze1 was one of the most infl uential and prolifi c French philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century. "I consider him to be the greatest contemporary French philosopher," Michel Foucault once said, adding famously that "perhaps one day this century will be known as Deleuzian."2 Despite such accolades, Deleuze remains diffi cult to classify as a thinker. Th e labels most frequently used to interpret contemporary French philosophy are inapplicable to Deleuze, since he was neither a phenomenologist, a structuralist, a hermeneutician, a Heideggerian, nor even a "postmodernist." Whereas many French philosophers (Levinas, Ricoeur, Derrida, Lyotard) began their careers with studies of Husserl, Deleuze wrote his fi rst book on Hume, and always considered himself an empiricist. Most dauntingly perhaps, his published oeuvre at fi rst sight seems to be marked by a rather bewildering eclecticism, including constructive works such as Diff erence and Repetition and Logic of Sense, numerous monographs in the history of philosophy (on Hume, Nietzsche, Bergson, Kant, Spinoza, and 1. Gilles Deleuze (January 18, 1925–November 4, 1995; born and died in Paris, France) was educated at the Sorbonne (1944–48), and received a doctorat d'état there in 1968. His infl uences included Bergson, Heidegger, Hume, Kant, Lautmann, Leibniz, Maimon, Nietzsche, Sartre, Simondon, and Spinoza, and he held appointments at the Lycée d'Amiens (1948–53), Lycée d'Orleans (1953–55), Lycée LouisleGrand (1955–57), Sorbonne (1957–60), Centre National de Recherche Scientifi que (1960–64), University of Lyon (1964–69), and University of Paris VIII–VincennesSt. Denis (1969–87). 2. Th e fi rst quote is from Foucault, "La Scène de la philosophie" (1978 interview with Moriaki Watanabe), in Dits et écrits 1954–1988, tomes 1–4, Daniel Defert and François Ewald (eds) (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), vol. 3, 589; the second is from Foucault, "Th eatrum Philosophicum," in Th e Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984. Volume 2: Aesthetics, Method, Epistemology, James D. Faubion (ed.) (New York: New Press, 1998), 343. Volume 6 daniel w. smith 92 Leibniz), as well as works dealing with clinical psychiatry, psychoanalysis, politics, the cinema, literature, and art. Although a number of these works have become classics in their respective fi elds, the unity of Deleuze's oeuvre is not always apparent, even to serious readers of his work. It is no doubt the singular nature of his work that is the most characteristic feature of Deleuze's philosophy. "Th ose who really brought something new [to contemporary philosophy]," Michel Serres has commented: did not take the superhighways – for example, Gilles Deleuze. He disengaged himself from the traditional history of philosophy, from the human sciences, from epistemology – an excellent example of the dynamic movement of a free and inventive thought. ... Th e greatest praise I can give to him is to say that philosophical thinking made him truly happy, profoundly serene.3 Deleuze was born in Paris, near the Arc de Triomphe, and lived there, except for a few interludes elsewhere, for the rest of his life. He was the second son of a conservative, middleclass engineer, and received his elementary education in the French public school system. When the Germans invaded France in 1940, Deleuze's family was on vacation in Normandy, and he spent a year being schooled there. Deleuze traced his own initiation into literature, at age fourteen, to a curious encounter on the beaches at Deauville with a teacher named Pierre Halbwachs (son of the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs), who introduced him to writers such as André Gide and Charles Baudelaire. He completed his baccalauréat in 1943 at his neighborhood school in Paris, the Lycée Carnot, and began to read philosophy during the "términale" year, under the infl uence of his professor, M. Vial. Early on, he recalled, philosophical concepts struck him with the same force as literary characters, having their own autonomy and style. He soon began to read philosophical works with the same animation and engagement as literary texts, and decided that philosophy would be his vocation. During the Occupation, Deleuze's older brother Georges, then a student at the military school St. Cyr, was arrested by the Nazis for resistance activities and deported; he died on the train to a concentration camp.4 3. Michel Serres, Éclaircissements: Entretiens avec Bruno Latour (Paris: François Bourin, 1992), 61–2, 66; published in English as Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, Roxanne Lapidus (trans.) (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 39–40, translation modifi ed. 4. Deleuze never referred to his brother's death in any of his writings, and it does not seem to have had a great infl uence on his later political views. François Dosse, in Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari: Biographie croisée (Paris: La Découverte, 2007) discusses Deleuze's complex personal reaction to Georges' death. On the one hand, Deleuze felt his brother's loss deeply: Volume 6 gilles deleuze 93 Aft er the Liberation, Deleuze immersed himself in his university studies. He undertook his khâgne (an intensive year of preparatory studies) at the prestigious Lycée HenriIV, and then studied the history of philosophy at the Sorbonne under the tutelage of Jean Hyppolite and Ferdinand Alquié ("two professors I loved and admired enormously"5), as well as Georges Canguilheim and Maurice de Gandillac. He was immediately recognized by both his teachers and peers to be an exceptional student, and easily excelled in his studies.6 In 1947, he received his diplôme d'études supérieures from the Sorbonne with a thesis on Hume, directed by Hyppolite and Canguilhem. In an era dominated by phenomenology and "the three H's" (Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger), Deleuze's decision to write on empiricism and Hume was already a provocation, early evidence of the heterodox tendencies of his thought. A revised version of the Hume thesis would be published in 1953, as Deleuze's fi rst book, under the title Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Th eory of Human Nature. In 1948, Deleuze passed the agrégation examination in philosophy, along with Louis Althusser and François Châtelet, and was assigned to a teaching position at the Lycée d'Amiens.7 At the time, like many of his peers, he was as infl uenced by the writings of JeanPaul Sartre as he was by his academic mentors; he devoured Being and Nothingness when it appeared in 1948. When Sartre refused JeanPierre Faye, a childhood friend, recalled seeing Deleuze at the burial of another young man who had died in a concentration camp, "his face convulsed in pain, overwhelmed" (ibid., 113). On the other hand, Deleuze's parents idolized Georges for his heroic act, and aft erwards treated Gilles as a secondary and relatively insignifi cant sibling, which only hastened Deleuze's break from his familial milieu. Michel Tournier later recalled, "His parents devoted a veritable cult to his older brother and Gilles did not forgive his parents for their exclusive admiration for Georges. He was the second child, the mediocre one, whereas Georges was a hero" (ibid., 112). 5. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (trans.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 12. 6. François Châtelet, in his autobiographical text, Chronique des idées perdues, relates the following story about Deleuze's audacity as a student: "I preserve the memory of a reading by Gilles Deleuze, who had to treat I don't know what classic theme of Nicholas Malebranche's doctrine before one of our most profound and most meticulous historians of philosophy and who had constructed his demonstration, solid and supported with peremptory references, around the sole principle of the irreducibility of Adam's rib. At the expression of this adopted principle, the master turned pale, and obviously had to keep himself from intervening. As the exposition unfolded, the indignation was changed into incredulity, and then, at the moment of peroration, into admiring surprise. And he justly concluded by making us all return the next week with our own analysis of the same theme" (Chronique des idées perdues [Paris: Éditions Stock, 1977], 46). Th e teacher Châtelet is referring to was probably Henri Gouhier (I would like to thank Alan Schrift for this identifi cation). 7. Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, Betsy Wing (trans.) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 33. Volume 6 daniel w. smith 94 the Nobel Prize in 1964, Deleuze would pen a moving tribute to him entitled "He Was My Teacher."8 Deleuze, however, quickly rebelled against the academic training he was receiving in the French university system, with its emphasis on close readings of classical canonical texts.9 "I belong to a generation," he later recalled: one of the last generations, that was more or less assassinated by the history of philosophy. Th e history of philosophy plays an obvious repressive role in philosophy, it is a properly philosophical Oedipal complex: "All the same, you dare not speak in your own name until you have read this and that, and that on this, and this on that." Many members of my generation never broke free of this; others did by inventing their own particular methods and new rules, a new approach.10 Deleuze's own way of breaking free took a variety of forms. He tended to seek out and retrieve forgotten fi gures, such as Bergson, who had faded into obscurity and disrespect by the postwar period.11 He read and championed lesserknown fi gures, including both contemporaries (Lautmann, Simondon, Ruyer12) and historical 8. Gilles Deleuze, "He Was My Teacher," in Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953–1974), David Lapoujade (ed.), Michael Taormina (trans.) (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004). Th is text originally appeared in the French journal Arts (November 28, 1964), one month aft er Sartre refused the Nobel Prize in Literature. 9. For an analysis of the institutional context of French philosophy, see Alan D. Schrift , TwentiethCentury French Philosophy: Key Th emes and Th inkers (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), especially Appendix 1, "Understanding French Academic Culture," 188–208. 10. Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972–1990, Martin Joughin (trans.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 5, translation modifi ed. 11. Claude LéviStrauss gave voice to a widespread opinion when he joked that Bergson had "'reduced being and things to a state of mush in order to bring out their ineff ability,'" and Deleuze said that even friends laughed at him for writing on Bergson. (Th e quote from LéviStrauss appears in Richard Rorty's review of Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy "Unsoundness in Perspective," Times Literary Supplement.) Deleuze lamented that "they have no idea how much hatred Bergson managed to stir up in the French university system at the outset, and how he became a focus for all sorts of crazy and marginal people" (Deleuze, Negotiations, 6, translation modifi ed). Deleuze's 1964 book Bergsonism is now credited with having almost singlehandedly brought about a revival of interest in Bergson's work. 12. Gilbert Simondon (1924–89), a French philosopher whose work focused primarily on the issues of individuation and technology, was the author of L'Individu et sa genèse physicobiologique (Th e individual and its physicalbiological genesis). Albert Lautmann (1908–44), a French philosopher of mathematics, shot by the German authorities in Toulouse as an escaped prisoner of war, was the author of Essai sur les Notions de Structure et d'Existence en Mathématiques (Essay on the notions of structure and existence in mathematics). Raymond Ruyer (1902–87), a prolifi c French philosopher, known for his work in the philosophy of Volume 6 gilles deleuze 95 fi gures (BordasDemoulin, HoënéWronski, Maimon, among many others13). He created novel sequences in the history of philosophy, reading Stoic logic in conjunction with Lewis Carroll's work, for example, or linking Duns Scotus's concept of univocity with the work of Spinoza and Nietzsche. Most importantly, perhaps, he read even the major fi gures of the tradition in new ways. "I suppose the main way I coped with things at the time," he explained in an oft cited text: was to see the history of philosophy as a kind of buggery or (it amounts to the same thing) an immaculate conception: I saw myself as taking an author from behind, and giving him a child that would be his own, yet monstrous. It was very important that the child was his own, because the author had to say everything I was making him say. But it was also necessary for the child to be monstrous, because it had to pass through all sorts of decenterings, slidings, dislocations, and secret emissions that gave me much pleasure.14 Yet this seemingly fl ippant remark should not obscure the respect and admiration Deleuze had for all the authors he worked on. "My ideal, when I write about an author," he later added, "would be to write nothing that would cause him sadness, or if he is dead, that might make him weep in his grave."15 In order to write and think, Deleuze explained, he needed to work with "intercessors" with whom he could enter into a kind of becoming (past philosophers were intercessors of this type, as was Félix Guattari, in the present).16 When biology and information theory, was the author of Néofi nalisme (Neofi nalism) and La Genèse des formes vivantes (Th e genesis of living forms). 13. Salomon Maimon (1752–54?–1800), a German philosopher, born of Jewish parentage in Poland, was one of the earliest and most profound critics of Kant's critical philosophy and the author of the Versuch über die Transcendentalphilosophie (Essay on transcendental philosophy), which attempted to ground postKantian philosophy on a Leibnizian reinterpretation of the calculus. Józef Maria HoënéWronski (1778 –1853), a prolifi c Polish mathematician who developed a messianic and mystical system of philosophy, is best remembered for his theory of infi nite series as developed in works such as Philosophie de l'infi ni (Philosophy of the infi nite) and Philosophie de la technie algorithmique (Philosophy of the algorithmic technique). Jean Baptiste BordasDemoulin (1798–1859), a French philosopher who attempted to reconcile Christianity with modern civilization, was the author of Le Cartésianisme ou la véritable rénovation des sciences (Cartesianism, or the true rejuvenation of the sciences), in the context of which he off ered a Platonic interpretation of the calculus. [*] For a discussion of Salomon Maimon and his critique of Kant, see the essay by Richard Fincham in History of Continental Philosophy: Volume 1. 14. Deleuze, Negotiations, 6, translation modifi ed. 15. Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 119. 16. See Deleuze, Negotiations, 121–34. Th e French term "Intercesseurs" in the title is translated into English as "Mediators." Volume 6 daniel w. smith 96 reading Deleuze's monographs, one literally enters a "zone of indiscernibility" between Deleuze's thought and the philosopher he is writing on (free indirect discourse): there is a becomingDeleuze of Leibniz, for instance, as much as there is a becomingLeibniz on Deleuze's part. Th is accounts for the complexities one encounters in reading Deleuze's texts: one moves from a fairly straightforward explication of the thinker at hand, to a more specifi cally Deleuzian interpretation, which oft en makes use of concepts incorporated from the outside (for instance, Deleuze interprets Spinoza in terms of Duns Scotus's concept of "univocity," and Leibniz in terms of the mathematical concept of "singularities," even though neither of these terms appears in Spinoza's or Leibniz's texts); and fi nally, one reaches a creative point where Deleuze pushes the thought of the thinker at hand to its diff erential or immanent limit. Despite his occasional use of such language, it is impossible to categorize fi gures in the history of philosophy simply as Deleuze's "friends" or "enemies": he was as indebted to Kant (a supposed enemy) as he was critical of Bergson (a supposed friend). It is sometimes joked that "continental" philosophers pretend they have read everything, whereas "analytic" philosophers pretend they have read nothing. In Deleuze's case, this caricature comes close to the truth: JeanFrançois Lyotard once called him "the library of Babel."17 His writings are not only strongly grounded in the history of philosophy, but are also dotted with references to numerous nonphilosophical domains, including diff erential calculus, thermodynamics, geology, molecular biology, population genetics, ethology, embryology, anthropology, psychoanalysis, economics, linguistics, and even esoteric thought. But this erudition was never in the service of a mere acquisition of knowledge or the mastery of a discipline, but rather a kind of passage to the limit: the conditions of thought, Deleuze liked to say, must always be drawn, not from the model of knowledge, but from the process of learning. We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms the one into the other .... To satisfy ignorance is to put off writing until tomorrow – or rather, to make it impossible ...18 One always speaks from the depths of what one does not know.19 Deleuze and Guattari would almost elevate this link between erudition and ignorance into a principle of their writing: "We claim the right to a radical laxity, 17. JeanFrançois Lyotard, "Il était la bibliothèque de babel," Liberation (November 9, 1995). 18. Gilles Deleuze, "Preface," in Diff erence and Repetition, Paul Patton (trans.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), xxi. 19. Deleuze, Negotiations, 7, translation modifi ed. Volume 6 gilles deleuze 97 a radical incompetence."20 "We would like to speak in the name of an absolute incompetence."21 Th e novelist Michel Tournier, who studied with Deleuze at the Sorbonne, recalled in his memoir that, even as a student, Deleuze already manifested this ability to transmute the thoughts he incorporated from others: "He possessed extraordinary powers of translation and rearrangement: all the tired philosophy of the curriculum passed through him and emerged unrecognizable but rejuvenated, with an air of freshness, undigestedness, and raw newness, utterly startling and discomfi ting our weakness and laziness."22 During the decade between 1953 and 1962, Deleuze published little, and moved among various teaching positions in Paris and the provinces. He later referred to this period, somewhat glibly, as "a hole in my life," but in fact it was a period of intense study and activity, during which Deleuze was quietly pursuing his own unique path in philosophy. During the 1956–57 academic year, for instance, he gave a hypokhâgne course at the Lycée LouisleGrand entitled "Qu'estce que fonder?" (What is grounding?), which already included much of the material that would later appear in Diff erence and Repetition.23 In August 1956 he married Denise Paul Grandjouan ("Fanny"), who became the French translator of D. H. Lawrence, and with whom Deleuze would have two children, Julien (b. 1960) and Emilie (b. 1964). In 1962 his groundbreaking study Nietzsche and Philosophy – an antiHegelian polemic that reads Nietzsche in the context of the postKantian tradition – was published to considerable acclaim, cementing Deleuze's reputation in academic circles.24 During the remaining years of the 1960s, Deleuze published a book a year, each of them devoted to the work of a particular philosopher or literary fi gure: Kant (1963), Proust (1964), Nietzsche (1965), Bergson (1966), Sade and Masoch (1967), and Spinoza (1968). Deleuze later considered these to be years of apprenticeship: the books were preparatory sketches for the great canvases of Diff erence and Repetition and Logic of Sense. In 1962, shortly aft er the publication of Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze met Foucault in ClermontFerrand, at the home of Jules Vuillemin, who had just been elected to the Collège de France. Foucault had suggested that Deleuze might replace Vuillemin at the University of ClermontFerrand; Deleuze instead 20. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, AntiOedipus, Robert Hurley et al. (trans.) (New York: Viking, 1977), 334. 21. Ibid., 380. 22. Michel Tournier, Th e Wind Spirit: An Autobiography, Arthur Goldhammer (trans.) (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1988), 127–8. 23. Notes from this course have been preserved by one of Deleuze's students, Pierre Lefebvre, at www.webdeleuze.com (accessed August 2010). *24. For a discussion of Deleuze's work on Nietzsche, see the essay by Alan D. Schrift on "French Nietzscheanism" in this volume. Volume 6 daniel w. smith 98 received an assignment at the University of Lyon, where he taught from 1964 to 1969. But the meeting marked the beginning of a long and respectful intellectual friendship.25 In 1970, Foucault wrote an infl uential article on Deleuze, entitled "Th eatricum Philosophicum," which was instrumental in introducing Deleuze's work to a broader public;26 Deleuze would later declare Foucault to be "the greatest thinker of our time."27 When Foucault's life was cut short in 1984, Deleuze devoted a year of his seminar to Foucault's writings, and the resulting book, he said, was written "out of necessity for me, out of admiration for him, out of my emotion at his death, at this interrupted work."28 Th e years 1968 and 1969 were pivotal in Deleuze's life. In 1968, Deleuze presented and defended his thèse de doctorat d'état: his principal thesis was Diff erence and Repetition, directed by Gandillac, considered by many to be Deleuze's magnum opus; his secondary thesis was Spinoza and the Problem of Expression, directed by Alquié. Th ese were followed, in 1969, by Logic of Sense, an analysis of the concept of sense oriented around a reading of Lewis Carroll and Stoicism. Some time during this period, Deleuze contracted a recurring respiratory ailment that would plague him for the rest of his life; he underwent a major lung operation for the condition in 1969, and although he said that the disease never seriously aff ected his ability to work, he was frequently absent from his courses in later years because of his illness.29 In the same year, he met Félix Guattari, a militant psychoanalyst, with whom he would write his most famous and wellread books, the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972, 1980). Th e fi rst volume, AntiOedipus, was an overtly political text written in the wake of the ferment of May 1968; it became a bestseller in France, and thrust Deleuze and Guattari into the limelight as public intellectuals. Deleuze was teaching in Lyon when the events of May 1968 erupted, and he was an immediate and unrelenting supporter of the student movement. "For my part," he later recalled, "I made a kind of passage into politics around May '68, as I 25. See Eribon, Michel Foucault, 136–8, for a brief account of the Foucault–Deleuze relationship. Deleuze and Foucault did not see each other aft er 1977, for reasons that were circumstantial (Foucault was teaching in Berkeley) as well as political. James Miller discusses the reasons for the supposed "break" in his biography, Th e Passion of Michel Foucault (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 297–8; both Foucault and Deleuze were protesting Germany's request that France extradite Klaus Croissant, a lawyer for the BaaderMeinhof gang, but whereas Foucault "couched his own position in terms of right," Deleuze went much further, and wanted "to protest what he regarded as Germany's 'state terrorism,' implicitly endorsing the image of the government held by the BaaderMeinhof gang itself " (ibid., 297). 26. Michel Foucault, "Th eatrum Philosophicum," Critique 282 (1970). 27. Deleuze, Negotiations, 102. 28. Ibid. 29. Hugh Tomlinson, personal correspondence with the author, August 14, 1987. Volume 6 gilles deleuze 99 came into contact with specifi c problems, through Guattari, through Foucault, through Elie Sambar [founder of the Revue d'études palestiniennes]."30 During the 1970s, Deleuze would become politically active in a number of causes, including the Groupe d'information sur les prisons (formed by Foucault, among others), and he had an engaged concern with homosexual rights and the Palestinian liberation movement. Late in 1969, he took up a position at the University of Paris VIII–Vincennes, which was created as an "experimental" campus aft er the events of May 1968. Foucault, Châtelet, Serres, Étienne Balibar, Jacques Rancière, and Alain Badiou were all teaching there, although Foucault was named to the Collège de France the following year, and Serres left for the Sorbonne soon aft erwards. JeanFrançois Lyotard joined the faculty in 1972, and he and Deleuze would collaborate on several projects (including writing a public letter condemning the dismissal of Luce Irigaray in 1974 from the Department of Psychoanalysis31). Th e Vincennes facilities were razed by the government in 1978, and the faculty was transferred to a campus at SaintDenis, a suburb north of Paris, where Deleuze remained until his retirement in 1987, holding weekly seminars every Tuesday morning. He never took up a joint appointment at an American university, as many of his contemporaries did, and he tended to shun academic conferences and colloquia, insisting that the activity of thought took place primarily in writing, and not in dialogue and discussion. Like Kant, he traveled little: France was his Prussia, and Paris his Königsberg. Th e only trip that ever counted for him, he said, was a trip to Florence, "perhaps";32 his sole trip to the United States took place in 1972, when he participated in a conference at Columbia University, organized by Sylvère Lotringer, on AntiOedipus. "If I don't travel," he explained, "I've taken motionless trips just like everyone else .... Some voyages take place in situ, they are trips in intensity."33 In 1980, the second volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia appeared, entitled A Th ousand Plateaus, a highly experimental text, organized in a series of "plateaus" rather than chapters, which pushed Deleuze and Guattari's production of concepts (rhizome, becoming, the refrain, the war machine) to an entirely new level. In the 1980s, Deleuze and Guattari pursued their writing careers separately, with Deleuze's attention increasingly turned toward the arts: he published a book on painting (Francis Bacon: Th e Logic of Sensation; 1980), a twovolume study of the cinema (Th e MovementImage; 1983; and Th e TimeImage; 1985), 30. Deleuze, Negotiations, 170, translation modifi ed. 31. First published in December 1974 in Les Temps modernes, Deleuze and Lyotard's letter "Sur le Département de psychanalyse de Vincennes" appears in JeanFrançois Lyotard, Political Writings, Bill Readings and Kevin Paul Geiman (trans.) (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 68–9. 32. Philippe Mengue, Gilles Deleuze ou le système du multiple (Paris: Éditions Kimé, 1994), 297–8. 33. Deleuze, Negotiations, 11, translation modifi ed. Volume 6 daniel w. smith 100 an analysis of the Baroque (Th e Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque; 1988), and a collection of essays on literature (Essays Critical and Clinical; 1993). Deleuze's fi nal collaboration with Guattari, What is Philosophy? was published in 1991. Guattari died of a heart attack in 1992; by 1993, Deleuze's pulmonary illness had confi ned him severely, making it increasingly diffi cult to read or write; he took his own life by defenestration, on the night of November 4, 1995. Since then, additional material from Deleuze's corpus has come to light. Two volumes of Deleuze's occasional texts and interviews were collected and edited by David Lapoujade, a former student, and published as Desert Islands (2002) and Two Regimes of Madness (2003). Richard Pinhas, another former student, is in the process of making transcriptions of Deleuze's seminars available at webdeleuze. com, which is an invaluable resource for those interested in the development of Deleuze's philosophy. *** In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari famously defi ne philosophy as "the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts," although this creation of concepts always takes place under the constraint of changing problematics that are as much historical and social as they are philosophical.34 For Deleuze, concepts are the medium within which philosophers work – just as painters work with lines and colors, fi lmmakers work with images, and musicians work with sounds – and his work was marked throughout by an extraordinary conceptual inventiveness. Deleuze rejected the Heideggerian theme of the end of metaphysics, and much of his own conceptual production was aimed at developing a metaphysics adequate to contemporary mathematics and science: a metaphysics in which the concept of multiplicity replaces that of substance, event replaces essence, virtuality replaces possibility, and so on. "I feel myself to be a pure metaphysician," he noted, "Bergson says that modern science hasn't found its metaphysics, the metaphysics it would need. It is this metaphysics that interests me."35 But Deleuze's metaphysics is a resolutely postKantian metaphysics in that it refuses to admit the three "transcendent illusions" criticized by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason: God, the World, and the Self. Although Deleuze's early work is oft en read as a reaction against Hegel, Deleuze's more general project can be seen as a reassessment of the thendominant postKantian tradition in philosophy. Kant's genius, for Deleuze, was to have conceived a 34. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (trans.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 2. 35. Gilles Deleuze, "Réponses à une série de questions," interview with Arnaud Villani, which appears as an appendix to Arnaud Villani, La Guêpe et l'orchidée: Essai sur Gilles Deleuze (Paris: Belin, 1999), 129–31, esp. 130. An English translation, under the title "Responses to a Series of Questions," can be found in the journal Collapse 3 (2007), 39–43. Volume 6 gilles deleuze 101 purely immanent critique of rea son: a critique that did not seek, within reason, "errors" pro duced by external causes, but rather "illu sions" that arise internally from within reason itself by the illegitimate (transcendent) uses of the syntheses of consciousness. Deleuze characterized his own work as a philosophy of immanence, but argued that Kant himself had failed to fully realize the immanent ambitions of his critique, for at least two reasons. First, Kant made the immanent fi eld immanent to a transcendental subject, thereby reintroducing an element of transcendence, and reserving all power of synthesis to the activity of the subject. Deleuze's fi rst book, on Hume, had pointed to an empiricist reversal of this relation: whereas Kant's question had been "How can the given be given to a subject?" Hume's question had been "How is the subject (human nature) constituted within the given?" Deleuze would later characterize his own position as a "transcendental empiricism": the determination of an impersonal and preindividual transcendental fi eld in which the subject is itself the result or product of passive syntheses (of the body, habit, desire, the unconscious). Just as there is no universal reason but only historically variable processes of "rationalization" (Max Weber), so there is no universal or transcendental subject, but only diverse and historically variable processes of "subjectivation." Deleuze summarized his empiricism in terms of two characteristics: (i) the abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained; (ii) the aim of philosophy is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to fi nd the singular conditions under which something new is produced (creativity). Second, Kant had simply presumed the existence of certain "facts" (knowledge, morality) and then sought their conditions of possibility in the transcendental. But already in 1789, Salomon Maimon, whose early critiques of Kant helped generate the postKantian tradition, had argued that Kant's critical project required a method of genesis – and not merely a method of conditioning – that would account for the production of knowledge, morality, and indeed reason itself – a method, in other words, that would be able to reach the conditions of real and not merely possible experience. Maimon found a solution to this problem in a principle of diff erence: whereas identity is the condition of possibility of thought in general, it is diff erence that constitutes the genetic and productive principle of real thought. Th ese two Maimonian exigencies – the search for the genetic conditions of real experience and the positing of a principle of diff erence – reappear like a leitmotif in almost every one of Deleuze's early monographs. Nietzsche and Philosophy, for instance, suggests that Nietzsche completed and inverted Kantianism by bringing critique to bear, not simply on false claims to knowledge or morality, but on true knowledge and true morality, and indeed on truth itself: "genealogy" constituted Nietzsche's genetic method, and the will to power was his principle of diff erence. In Bergsonism, on the other hand, Deleuze argues that Bergson's concepts of duration, memory, and Volume 6 daniel w. smith 102 élan vital constitute the diff erential and genetic dimensions of the multiplicities of the real. Against the "major" postKantian tradition of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, Deleuze in eff ect posited his own "minor" postKantian trio of Maimon, Nietzsche, and Bergson. In rethinking the postKantian heritage, Deleuze would also retrieve the work of a wellknown trio of preKantian philosophers – Hume, Spinoza, and Leibniz – although from a decidedly postKantian viewpoint. Deleuze's historical monographs were, in this sense, preliminary sketches for the great canvas of Diff erence and Repetition, which marshaled these resources from the history of philosophy in an ambitious project to construct a metaphysics of diff erence. Normally, diff erence is conceived of as an empirical relation between two terms each of which have a prior identity of their own ("x is diff erent from y"). In Deleuze, this primacy is inverted: identity persists, but it is now a secondary principle produced by a prior relation between diff erentials (dx rather than notx). Diff erence is no longer an empirical relation but becomes a transcendental principle that constitutes the suffi cient reason of empirical diversity as such (for example, it is the diff erence of potential in a cloud that constitutes the suffi cient reason of the phenomenon of lightning). In Deleuze's ontology, the diff erent is related to the diff erent through diff erence itself, without any mediation. Although he was indebted to metaphysical thinkers such as Spinoza, Leibniz, and Bergson, Deleuze appropriated their respective systems of thought only by pushing them to their "diff erential" limit, purging them of the three great terminal points of traditional metaphysics (God, World, Self). Deleuze's subsequent work was, to some degree, a further working out of the metaphysics developed in Diff erence and Repetition. "I believe in philosophy as a system," Deleuze once wrote, "For me, the system must not only be in perpetual heterogeneity, it must be a heterogenesis, which, it seems to me, has never been attempted."36 Heterogenesis: this means that the system itself must entail the genesis of the heterogeneous, or the production of the new (a dynamic and open system), which in turn means that the concepts themselves are dynamic and open. "It is not a question of bringing things together under a single concept, but rather of relating each concept to the variables that explain its mutations."37 Consider, for example, the notion of intensity: in Diff erence and Repetition, it is linked to a notion of depth; in Logic of Sense, it is linked to the concept of surface; in AntiOedipus, it is what takes place on a body without organs; in What is Philosophy? it marks the nature of the components of a concept.38 Th e 36. "Preface," in JeanClet Martin, Variations: La Philosophie de Gilles Deleuze (Paris: Payot, 1993), 7. 37. Deleuze, Negotiations, 31, translation modifi ed. 38. Deleuze himself points out the mutation of the concept of intensity in his "Author's Note for the Italian Edition of Logic of Sense," in Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975– 1995, Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (trans.) (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), 65–6. Volume 6 gilles deleuze 103 consistency of a concept, in other words, has as its necessary correlate the variability of the concept. For these reasons, it is impossible to summarize Deleuze's system, but we can at least give a sense of the problems that generate it by considering fi ve philosophical domains that more or less parallel those laid out in the architectonic of Kant's Critiques: dialectics, aesthetics, ethics, politics, analytics. 1. Dialectics (Th eory of the Idea). Diff erence and Repetition attempts to formulate a theory of Ideas (dialectics) based on neither an essential model of identity (Plato), nor a regulative model of unity (Kant), nor a dialectical model of contradiction (Hegel), but rather on a problematic and genetic model of diff erence. Ideas are what defi ne the "essence" of a thing, but one cannot attain an Idea through the Socratic question "What is ...?" (which posits Ideas as transcendent and eternal), but rather through "minor" questions such as "Which one?" "Where?" "When?" "How?" "How many?" "In which case?" "From which viewpoint?" – all of which allow one to defi ne the spatiotemporal coordinates of Ideas that are immanent and diff erential. Kant posited Ideas as "regulative" notions that serve to unify and systematize the operations of the understanding: concepts fi nd the ground of their maximal experimental use only insofar as they are related to Ideas, which Kant defi nes as foci or horizons that lie outside the bounds of experience. But an object outside experience can be represented only in a problematic form: it can neither be given nor known, but must be represented without being able to be directly determined. Th is undetermined object of the Idea marks neither an imperfection in our knowledge nor a lack in the object: it is a perfectly positive and objective structure that allows us to represent other objects (those of experience) which it endows with a maximum of systematic unity. In Kant, then, Ideas present three aspects: they are undetermined with regard to their object, but nonetheless determinable with regard to the objects of experience, and bear the ideal of a complete determination with regards to the concepts of the understanding. Because he held fast to the point of view of conditioning, however, two of these three moments remain as extrinsic characteristics in Kant. In Diff erence and Repetition, Deleuze aims to develop a theory of problematic Ideas that is genetic and not merely conditioning, following Maimon's contention that the duality between concepts and intuitions can be bridged only by positing ideas of diff erence within sensibility itself. Th e formal criteria Deleuze uses to defi ne Ideas are largely derived from Leibniz and the model of the diff erential calculus, which provides a mathematical symbolism for the exploration of the real: things or beings are virtual and problematic multiplicities composed of singularitiesevents , which are prolonged in converging and diverging series, forming zones of indiscernibility where the multiplicities enter into perpetual becomings. Drawing on the work of Jules Vuillemin and Albert Lautman, among others, in Volume 6 daniel w. smith 104 the philosophy of mathematics, Deleuze defi nes the three moments of the Idea in a purely intrinsic and diff erential manner: (i) it implies elements that in themselves are completely undetermined (dx, dy); (ii) these elements are nonetheless determinable reciprocally in the diff erential relation (dy/dx), which (iii) defi nes their complete determination as a singular point (values of dy and dx). For Lautman, the conditions of a problem are constituted by the nomadic and virtual distribution of these singular points, and the solution appears only with the integral curves that constitute the actualization of certain singularities. Deleuze thus defi nes the problematic structure of an Idea as an internal multiplicity, a system of multiple, nonlocalizable connections between diff erential elements, in which diff erence is related to diff erence through diff erence. Th e genesis takes place in time, not between one actual term and another, but between the virtual and its actualization, that is, it goes from the condition of the problem to cases of solution, from the diff erential elements and their ideal connections to the actual terms and diverse real relations that constitute the actuality of time. Whereas Kantian Ideas are unifying and conditioning, Deleuzian Ideas are diff erential and genetic. Perhaps Deleuze's most famous – and most misunderstood – concept is that of the virtual, which has nothing to do with an alternate or transcendent reality (as in the notion of "virtual reality"). Rather, it is a concept Deleuze utilizes in order to designate the modal status of problematic Ideas, and which he systematically contrasts with the concept of the possible: an Idea is not a locus of possibilities, but a fi eld of virtualities. We tend to think of the possible as somehow "preexisting" the real, and we think of the real as something more than the possible, that is, as the possible with existence added to it. But the drawback of this conception of the possible is that the identity of a thing is already given in the concept, and simply has existence added to it when it is "instantiated" or "realized." Th is process of realization, Deleuze suggests, is subject to two rules: resemblance (the real resembles the possibility that it realizes) and limitation (in the process of realization, some possibilities are repulsed or thwarted, while others "pass" into the real). But this is where the sleight of hand becomes obvious: if the real is supposed to resemble the possible, is it not because we have retrospectively "projected" a fi ctitious image of the real back into the possible? In fact, it is not the real that resembles the possible, but the possible that resembles the real. For this reason, the concept of the possible can never grasp the production of the new, or the genesis of diff erence. Deleuze's proposal, therefore, is to replace the possible–real couple with the virtual–actual couple. Th e reality of the virtual is the reality of the problematic, that is, the reality of the Idea, while the rules of actualization are not resemblance and limitation, but diff erenciation or divergence (creation). Th e concept of the virtual is synonymous with the Deleuzian notion of diff erent/ciation: a problematic is completely diff erentiated (by its Volume 6 gilles deleuze 105 diff erential relations and singularities), while every actualization of a problem is a movement of diff erenciation, that is, the production of a new diff erence. As such, the concept of the virtual fulfi lls the demands of a philosophy of diff erence: diff erence is related to diff erence through diff erence itself. 2. Aesthetics (Th eory of Sensation). What are the implications of a principle of diff erence for aesthetics? Kant had dissociated aesthetics into two halves: the theory of sensibility as the form of possible experience (the "Transcendental Aesthetic"), and the theory of art as a refl ection on real experience (the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"). In Deleuze's work, these two halves of aesthetics are reunited: if the most general aim of art is to "produce a sensation," then the genetic principles of sensation are at the same time the principles of composition for works of art; conversely, it is works of art that are best capable of revealing these conditions of sensibility. Deleuze's writings on the various arts – including the cinema (Cinema I, Cinema II), literature (Essays Critical and Clinical), and painting (Francis Bacon: Th e Logic of Sensation) – must be read not as works of criticism, but rather as philosophical explorations of this transcendental domain of sensibility. Deleuze locates the conditions of sensibility in an intensive conception of space and a virtual conception of time, which are necessarily actualized in a plurality of spaces and a complex rhythm of times (for instance, in the nonextended spaces and nonlinear times of modern mathematics and physics). Deleuze's interpretation of Leibniz's famous theory of perception provides a useful example of his method. Leibniz argued that a conscious perception must be related not to objects situated in space and time, but to the minute perceptions of which it is composed. I apprehend the noise of the sea or the murmur of a crowd, but not the sound of each wave or each voice of which it is composed. Th ese unconscious perceptions are related to conscious perceptions, not as parts to a whole, but as what is ordinary to what is remarkable or singular: a conscious perception is produced when at least two of these elements enter into a diff erential relation that determines a singularity. Or consider the color green: yellow and blue can be perceived, but if they reach a point where they become indiscernible, they enter into a diff erential relation that determines the color green (db∕dy = G); in turn, yellow or blue, each on its own account, may be determined by the diff erential relation of two colors we cannot detect (dx∕dy = Y). Th ese unconscious perceptions constitute the "ideal genetic elements" of perception, or what Maimon called the "diff erentials of consciousness." It is such a virtual multiplicity of genetic elements, and the system of connections established between them, that constitutes an Idea: the relations are actualized in diverse spatiotemporal relationships, just as the elements are actualized in diverse perceptions and forms. Rather than perception presupposing an object capable of aff ecting us, it is the reciprocal determination of diff erentials (dx∕dy) Volume 6 daniel w. smith 106 that entails both the complete determination of the object as perception and the determinability of spacetime as conditions. Spacetime ceases to be a given in order to become the totality or nexus of diff erential relations in the subject, and the object ceases to be an empirical given in order to become the product of these relations in conscious perception. 3. Ethics (Th eory of Aff ectivity). Deleuze has similarly developed a purely immanent conception of ethics, an "ethics without morality." If morality implies an appeal to transcendent values as criteria of judgment (as in Kant's moral law), ethics evaluates actions and intentions according to the immanent mode of existence they imply. One says or does this, thinks or feels that: What mode of existence does it imply? Th is is the link Deleuze establishes between Spinoza and Nietzsche, his two great precursors as philosophers of immanence: each of them argued, in his own manner, that there are things one cannot do or think except on the condition of being base or enslaved, unless one harbors a ressentiment against life (Nietzsche), unless one remains the slave of passive aff ections (Spinoza); and there are other things one cannot do or say except on the condition of being noble or free, unless one affi rms life or attains active aff ections. Th e transcendent moral opposition (Good/Evil) is in this way replaced by an immanent ethical diff erence (good/bad). A bad or sickly life is an exhausted and degenerating mode of existence, one that judges life from the perspective of its sickness, that devalues life in the name of higher values. A good or healthy life, by contrast, is an overfl owing or ascending mode of existence, capable of transforming itself depending on the forces it encounters, always opening up new possibilities of life, new becomings. For Deleuze, modes of existence can be evaluated according to the purely immanent criteria of aff ectivity, that is, by their capacity to aff ect and to be aff ected – a capacity that is not a simple logical possibility but is necessarily actualized at every moment, thus fulfi lling the demand for a genetic principle of the real. If the greatness of Nietzsche's theory of nihilism was to have analyzed the process of becomingreactive, the aim of Spinoza's Ethics was to outline the process of becomingactive. Th ese two processes, however, necessarily coexist in any mode of existence, and for Deleuze the aim of ethical theory is to determine, not universal grounds or normative foundations, but rather the conditions under which the attainment of active aff ections is possible – or more precisely, the conditions under which the production of new modes of existence is possible, since the "activity" of a mode is defi ned by its ability to aff ect or transform itself. In his later work, Foucault, under a Deleuzian inspiration, coined the term "subjectivation" ("subjectivation") to defi ne the means through which modes of existence are produced. In the later volumes of Th e History of Sexuality, Foucault analyzed the variable forms these aff ective processes took in the Greek Volume 6 gilles deleuze 107 ("know yourself "), Roman ("master yourself "), and Christian ("renounce yourself ") periods. It may be that the creators of new modes of existence are the "nobles" (Nietzsche), or the aestheticized "free man" (Foucault); under diff erent conditions, however, they may also be the excluded, the minorized, the marginalized (Deleuze). Th e study of variations in the process of subjectivation is one of the fundamental positive tasks posed by an immanent conception of ethics. 4. Politics (SocioPolitical Th eory). Th is immanent conception of ethics leads directly into Deleuze's political philosophy, which he developed most fully in the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, coauthored with Guattari. AntiOedipus , under the guise of a critique of psychoanalysis, is in eff ect an immanent reworking of Kant's theory of desire in the Critique of Practical Reason. For Deleuze, the link between ethics and politics is redefi ned as the link between desire and power: desire (the diff erence between active and reactive forces in a given mode of existence) never exists in a spontaneous or natural state, but is always "assembled" (agencé) in variable but determinable manners in concrete social formations, and what assembles desire are relations of power. Deleuze remains a "Marxist" in that his social theory is necessarily tied to an analysis of capitalism, which he defi nes by the conjunction or diff erential relation between the virtual quantities of labor and capital. What he calls "schizophrenia" is an absolute limit that would cause these quantities to travel in a free and unbound state on a desocialized body: this is the "Idea" of society, a limit that is never reached as such, but constitutes the ideal "problematic" to which every social formation constitutes a concrete solution. For Deleuze, the central political question concerns the means by which the singularities and states of diff erence of the transcendental fi eld are assembled in a given socius. Capitalism and Schizophrenia consequently outlines a typology of four abstract social formations – "primitive" or segmentary societies, states, nomadic "war machines," and capitalism itself – that aims to provide the conceptual tools for analyzing the diverse dimensions of concrete social structures: How are its mechanisms of power organized? What are the "lines of fl ight" that escape its integration? What new modes of existence does it make possible? Th ese types of social formations are not to be understood as stages in a progressive evolution or development; rather, they sketch out a topological fi eld in which each type functions as a variable of coexistence that enters into complex relations with the other types. 5. Analytics (Th eory of the Concept). Finally, Deleuze's dialectic (the constitution of problems) leads directly into his analytic (concepts as cases of solution), which he presented in his late book What is Philosophy? Deleuze defi nes philosophy as the creation of concepts, as knowledge through pure concepts. But for Deleuze, the highest concepts are not a priori universals applicable to objects of Volume 6 daniel w. smith 108 possible experience (categories), but singularities that correspond to the structures of real experience. What Is Philosophy? defi nes philosophical concepts in terms of three components: (i) Endoconsistency. A concept is composed of a fi nite number of heterogenous and singular components that it renders consistent in itself; concepts have no extension, but only what Deleuze terms "intensive ordinates." For example, the Cartesian concept of the cogito presents three components – doubting, thinking, and being – each of which has certain phases (perceptual, scientifi c, obsessional doubt) and between which there are zones of neighborhood (myself who doubts, I cannot doubt that I think). (ii) Exoconsistency. Concepts enter into determinable relations of consistency with other concepts, both internally (a concept's components can be considered as concepts in their own right) and externally (concepts create their own bridges or links with other concepts). In Descartes, the idea of infi nity provides an external bridge leading from the concept of the cogito to the concept of God, a new concept having three components that form the "proofs" for the existence of God. (iii) Selfreferentiality. Finally, concepts have no reference, but posit both themselves and their object in being created. When Kant "criticized" Descartes by introducing time as a component of the cogito, he eff ectively created a new concept with a new object. More than most of his contemporaries, Deleuze insisted on the autonomy of philosophy as a discipline, arguing forcefully for the irreducibility of philosophical concepts to scientifi c functions or logical propositions. Deleuze contrasts the reference of functions with the consistency of concepts: what Deleuze calls a "function" is always defi ned in relation to an actualized virtual (which fi nds its reference in a state of things, an object, or lived experience), whereas philosophical concepts are defi ned by the consistency they give to the virtual as such. Consequently, philosophical concepts are not propositional, and do not form a discursive whole; they are rather fragmentary totalities with irregular contours that "freely enter into relationships of nondiscursive resonance."39 Taken together, these fi ve rubrics, although certainly not exhaustive, nonetheless serve to present the broad outlines of a systematic philosophy of diff erence as it appears in Deleuze's work. Critics have posed objections in each of these domains: How can a diff erential "logic of sensation" imply a theory of art without fi rst addressing the conceptual question "What is art?" – a question Duchamp's 39. Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 23. Volume 6 gilles deleuze 109 works threw down like a gauntlet to the twentieth century? According to what criteria can one assess the validity of a philosophical concept if it creates its object simply by being posited, and has no "referent"? Does not a diff erential ethics amount to a kind of moral nihilism in which all diff erences are in turn affi rmed as equally valid (as Jürgen Habermas has charged), or an aestheticism in which ethics is reduced to a private search for autonomy or selfinvention (as Richard Rorty claimed)? Such criticisms, and others like them, can be summed up in the reproach that a philosophy of diff erence seems unable (or unwilling) to put forward normative criteria of judgment in any domain, and in this sense it fails in the "critical" task that Kant himself assigned to philosophy. In response, Deleuze insisted that one of the signifi cant consequences of a philosophy of diff erence is its shift in emphasis away from the universal toward the singular and the new: only a principle of diff erence is capable of providing a rigorous response to the question of heterogenesis: "What are the conditions for the production of the new?" (artistic creation, conceptual innovation, social change).40 major works Empirisme et subjectivité. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953. Published in English as Empiricism and Subjectivity, translated by Constantin Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. Nietzsche et la philosophie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962. Published in English as Nietzsche and Philosophy, translated by Hugh Tomlinson. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. La Philosophie critique de Kant. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963. Published in English as Th e Critical Philosophy of Kant, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984. Proust et les signes. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964, 1970, 1976. Published in English as Proust and Signs. Th e Complete Text, translated by Richard Howard. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. Le Bergsonisme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966. Published in English as Bergsonism, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Zone Books, 1988. Présentation de SacherMasoch. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1967. Published in English as Masochism: An Interpretation of Coldness and Cruelty, translated by Jean McNeil. New York: G. Braziller, 1971. Diff érence et répétition. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968. Published in English as Diff erence and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Spinoza et le problème de l'expression. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1968. Published in English as Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, translated by Martin Joughin. New York: Zone Books, 1990. 40. Th is essay is dedicated to the memory of François Zourabichvili, who was both a great friend and a great philosopher, and whose writings on Deleuze set such a high standard of rigor and insight that those of us who follow in his wake can only vainly hope to emulate it. Volume 6 daniel w. smith 110 Logique du sens. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1969. Published in English as Th e Logic of Sense, translated by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Spinoza: Philosophie pratique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970. 2nd ed. 1981. Published in English as Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, translated by Robert Hurley. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988. L'AntiOedipe (with Félix Guattari). Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1972. Published in English as AntiOedipus , translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. New York: Viking, 1977. Kafk a: pour une littérature mineure (with Félix Guattari). Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1975. Published in English as Kafk a: Toward a Minor Literature, translated by Dana Polan. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. Dialogues (with Claire Parnet). Paris: Flammarion, 1977. Published in English as Dialogues, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. Mille plateaux (with Félix Guattari). Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1980. Published in English as A Th ousand Plateaus, translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation. Paris: Editions de la diff érence, 1981. Published in English as Francis Bacon: Logic of Sensation, translated by Daniel W. Smith. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. Cinéma I: L'ImageMouvement. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1983. Published in English as Cinema I: Th e MovementImage, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. Cinéma II: L'Imagetemps. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1985. Published in English as Cinema II: Th e TimeImage, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. Foucault. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1986. Published in English as Foucault, translated by Seán Hand. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1988. Le Pli: Leibniz et le Baroque. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1988. Published in English as Th e Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, translated by Tom Conley. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993. Pourparlers. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1990. Published in English as Negotiations, 1972–1990, translated by Martin Joughin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. Qu'estce que la philosophie? (with Félix Guattari). Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1991. Published in English as What is Philosophy?, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Critique et clinique. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1993. Published in English as Essays Critical and Clinical, translated by Daniel W. Smith and Michael Greco. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. ĽÎle déserte et autres textes: Textes et entretiens 1953–1974. Edited by David Lapoujade. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 2002. Published in English as Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953–1974), translated by Mike Taormina. New York: Semiotext(e), 2003. Deux régimes de fous: Textes et entretiens 1975–1995. Edited by David Lapoujade. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 2003. Published in English as Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995, translated by Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina. New York: Semiotext(e), 2006. Volume

RAFFAELLI, T., Filosofia sociale e metodo della scienza economica, Introduzione di TAGLIAGAMBA, S., De Donato, Bari 1980. Un volume di pp. 184. Questo saggio si presenta da un lato come una rassegna dei dibattiti metodologici sorti fra gli economisti negli ultimi decenni e delle interpretazioni della scienza economica che sono state proposte ana luce della filosofia della scienza contemporanea, e dall'altro come un tentativo di sintesi che vuole suggerire una soluzione ai problemi sollevati da questi dibattiti. Il genere letterario al quale il saggio appartiene non è cosa nuova per la tradizione anglosassone. Un libro di questo genere è invece un prodotto relativamente originale nel mondo di lingua italiana: è frutto della ripresa, avvenuta negli anni Settanta. del dialogo fra economisti e filosofi, della quale il convegno di Modena del '78 sulla teoria del valore-lavoro è stato il momento più significativo. La tesi centrale, intorno alla quale il lavoro è costruito, è la seguente: il «metodo» ipostatizzato, terra di nessuno fra filosofia e scienza economica, è il frutto di un'operazione mistificatrice: «i presupposti di filosofia sociale, morale e politica, vengono travestiti da asserti metodologici che pretendono per sé un grado di accettabilità maggiore dei primi». In tal modo si tenta di «ritagliare il campo di una teoria economica pura, ornata della rispettabilità che la denominazione sotto il concetto generico di scienza comporta» (p. 25). Invece il "metodo» è considerato proprio come il terreno di uno scontro ideologico e politico sul quale si danno battaglia diverse filosofie sociali, diverse concezioni della natura, dell'uomo e della sua attività sociale «tradotte in proposizioni sul metodo ed il modello della scienza economica» (p. 25). L'autore prende in considerazione la scienza economica «accademica» o «dominante» in Occidente, che coesistono due filoni con lei poco comunicanti: quello marxista e quello istituzionalista. Questa tradizione "dominante» è il risultato della giustapposizione della tradizione neoclassica alla tradizione keynesiana, Questa tradizione nasce anzi come risposta alla crisi apertasi con l'opera di Keynes. opera che ha dato un salutare scrollone al formalismo e alle pretese di universalità della teoria economica. La sintesi fra Keynes e il marginalismo che si è affermata in seguito ha in realtà eliminato il nocciolo essenziale della teoria keynesiana. I dibattiti sulla metodologia economica" degli ultimi decenni, .ispirati dalla filosofia della. scienza di impostazione neopositivistica e popperiana, sono da leggere essenzialmente come un tentativo di legittimazione di questa sintesi arbitraria. L'economia postkeynesiana «ha di nuovo espulso dalla teoria la storia e il tempo»; il modello di scientificità di stampo neopositivistico, con il suo «mito della matematica» ha prestato una apparente dignità a questa operazione. Per suffragare questa sua diagnosi, l'autore parte da un excursus sul pensiero economico dai classici al nostro secolo, excursus (che in realtà è una delle cose più deboli del libro) per giungere ad affrontare alcuni nodi dei dibattiti metodologici più recenti: l'individualismo metodologico, l'universalità delle leggi economiche, l'avalutatività. Illustriamo quello che può essere considerato il punto centrale della ricostruzione operata. dall'autore: le interpretazioni metodologico* epistemologiche ~ egli sostiene si sono sviluppate in parallelo con i dibattiti interni alla scienza economica, Nel nostro secolo è caduta la soluzione neokantiana che aveva legittimato l'approccio neoclassico facendo. con Menger, della scienza economica una scienza sociale esatta e certa perché fondata su verità evidenti riguardanti la natura umana. La caduta di questa soluzione è legata al rifiuto del giudizio sintetico. a priori fatto proprio dalla filosofia della scienza di stampo neopositivistico, Si era con ciò giunti vicino a due esiti pericolosi per motivi opposti: o fare della scienza economica un discorso solo formale, che non parla della realtà, o costringerla, con Keynes, a partire da un quadro realistico di una realtà sociale storicamente data. Milton Friedman sarebbe giunto ad evitare entrambe gli esiti grazie a una mossa di difesa: questa mossa di difesa consiste nella teorizzazione della irrilevanza delle assunzioni nel pensiero economico. Le assunzioni. secondo Milton Friedman, dovrebbero essere messe alla prova solo attraverso le conseguenze che ne discendono. Ma questa secondo l'autore l'ultima versione del tentativo di rendere impermeabile la teoria economica al confronto con l'esperienza e in ultima istanza di renderlo un discorso dogmatico, una cattiva metafisica, e quindi inevitabilmente una ideologia al servizio di interessi costituiti. Il punto di partenza per una ripresa di una teoria economica che sappia fare oggi ciò che ha fatto in passato il pensiero economico nei suoi momenti più creativi, è rappresentato dall'eredità di Keynes. Gli studi di MyrdaI sul problema del sottosviluppo rappresentano un esempio in questa direzione. La contestazione fatta da MyrdaI della stessa distinzione fra «fattori economici» e «fattori non economici>. è fatta propria dall'autore: in realtà bisogna decidere volta per volta quali fattori siano rilevanti data una certa situazione sociale e bisogna sapere quali fini la società persegue, per poter costruire uno fra i molti possibili modelli di razionalità. economica. La necessità di rimettersi a «pensare. la realtà economica – sottolinea l'autore – è tanto più urgente di fronte a problemi «irresolubili». Come i problemi "del sottosviluppo, del deterioramento delle condizioni di vita nelle grandi metropoli urbane, degli sprechi» (p. 118). Di fronte al. problema di che cosa e come produrre. «quale senso ha affidare allo Stato il compito di mantenere elevato il livello complessivo del prodotto nazionale lordo? Che senso ha considerare il livello della produzione come misura principale per giudicare il successo di un sistema economico senza badare alle conseguenze sociali? La neutralità del criterio di razionalità economica nasconde qui una assuefazione all'ingiustizia e alla barbarie (p. 178). Dalla breve esposizione della tesi centrale dell'autore che abbiamo fatto risulterà chiaro come il saggio sia sufficientemente provocatorio per essere una lettura da consigliare a tutti gli economisti. Le direzioni di ricerca portanti del saggio sono ampiamente condivisibili e condivise. D.P. Levine, in Economic Studies, aveva seguito, alcuni anni prima. la stessa pista di ricerca. In uno spirito assai simile si muove il libro di L. Ruggiu, La genesi dello spazio economico. che è in corso di stampa presso Guida. Ciò che divide il Raffaelli da questi e da altri contributi sono due posizioni peculiari: una posizione induttivista e realista in filosofia della scienza, che si può rare risalire in senso lato alla eredità di Geymonat, e una posizione che vuole difendere l'attualità, non solo dell'ispirazione ma anche della impostazione generale dell'opera di Mao: in una misura che a parere di chi scrive si spinge molto oltre al necessario. Pur ammettendo che lo storicismo marxiano, con la visione unidirezionale dello sviluppo storico che ne deriva, non è più difendibile. l'autore nega contro MyrdaI l'economicismo di Marx (pp. 129 ss., p, 178). Non adducendo però particolari argomenti contro Myrdal, questa difesa è quanto meno carente. E soprattutto, lascia perplessi il suggerimento secondo il quale l'alternativa si porrebbe oggi fra un «marxismo non fossilizzato» e l'impostazione «aulica» dominante. Proprio Keynes, Myrdal e Wright Mills, ai quali l'autore si richiama, non sembrano rientrare in questa alternativa. L'immagine che del marxismo si fa Raffaelli e la sua filosofia della scienza generale sembrano, tutto sommato, superflue: i due testi che abbiamo ricordato difendono tesi simili nella sostanza pur partendo da prospettive divergenti su questi terreni, Su questi punti, e su alcuni altri più occasionali, come la valutazione della classe operaia come salarialista, «integrata» ai valori e ai rapporti sociali borghesi, che introduce l'esortazione rivolta alla classe operaia stessa a diventare «protagonista delle scelte economiche e sociali» lasciando perdere la mania per la contrattazione salariale (p. 113), il saggio si rivela come una sintesi non del tutto matura. Tuttavia, questo tentativo di sintesi rimane un contributo prezioso per una ripresa di un dialogo fra i filosofi, gli economisti e gli altri scienziati. sociali che è appena ricominciato e che ha davanti a sé una lunga strada. S. CREMASCHI Milano, Università Cattolica

Early modern political philosophies and the shaping of political economy Sergio Cremaschi Former Professor of Moral Philosophy Department of Humanities, Amedeo Avogadro University (Alessandria, Novara, Vercelli) This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Heinz Kurz (ed.), Routledge Historical Resources. History of Economic Thought (2017), available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.4324/9781138201521-HET5-1 Please quote from the published version. Abstract In the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the paradigm of a new science, political economy, was established. It was a science distinct from the Aristotelian sub-disciplines of practical philosophy named oikonomía and politiké, and emphasis on its character of science not unlike the natural sciences – still called 'natural philosophy' – mirrored precisely a willingness to stress its autonomy from two other subdisciplines of practical philosophy, that is, ethics and politics. However, the new science resulted from a transformation of part of traditional practical philosophy, allowing the inclusion of bodies of knowledge accumulated by experts of commerce and public finance. Such bodies of knowledge were unified by the (true or alleged) discovery of regularities, mechanisms, causal connections making for a new partial order within the overall social order. How far this paved the way to a science similar to mathematics or rather left a normative discipline as alive as ever was a recurrent question for at least a century, until the marginalist revolution opened the way for a sharp division, leaving 'economics' as a science of causes and effects facing 'economic policy' as a discourse on ends. Introduction The emergence of an autonomous economic discourse in the modern age has been interpreted in various ways either as a stage in the progression from traditional or metaphysical ways of thinking to a scientific approach to the study of both nature and society or as a losing sight of objective values with a drift toward relativism. Needless to say, the actual story is much more complex. In the traditional Aristotelian view of practical philosophy, the latter was divided into three parts: monastic – that is, ethics in so far as it deals 2 with the individual; oeconomica – that is, the art of administering the household (oikos); and politica, the discussion of justice and the government of the city or the state (polis). In the Oeconomica, a treatise compiled by the Aristotelian school, the phrase oikonomía he politiké occurred once, indicating the management of state's finances. At the dawn of the modern age, economic discourse was developed within various bodies of literature. One was that of natural law doctrines worked out by scholastic philosophers or by followers of the 'new science of natural law' founded by Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf. Another was casuistry, literature dealing with 'cases of conscience'. A section in both kinds of treatise was dedicated to property, commerce, the just price, loans and usury. Somewhat later, another body of literature appeared with a secular and practical character, later on named mercantilism, consisting of pamphlets discussing issues related to matters of commercial policy and embodying piecemeal social theorizing occasionally yielding some fruitful insight into commercial and monetary mechanism. A German tradition, cameralism, yielded writings on commercial and fiscal policies (Foucault 1966: 166–200; Tribe 1978: 80–109). Another genre was the postRenaissance literature carrying a revival of Aristotelian Politica. This is discussed in more detail in the following section. Political discourse on commerce and corruption Humanism on wealth and virtue In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Niccolò Machiavelli, Francesco Guicciardini and Leon Battista Alberti were authors of treatises giving advice on the best ways to preserve the state and promote civic virtue, a virtue different from the virtues taught by Christianity. This tradition was continued in the following centuries in Northern Europe and among the United States' founding fathers. One obvious example is Utopia (More 1516); a later one is Oceana (Harrington 1656). Both develop a sustained argument against commerce and in favour of agriculture, seen as providing the economic conditions for equality and martial spirit among citizens (Pocock 1975). Mandeville on vice as public virtue Bernard de Mandeville's Fable of the Bees is a short satiric poem, with extended commentaries, telling the story of a rich, civilized and powerful hive which, as an unforeseen effect of the abolition of vice among the bees, becomes suddenly miserable and depopulated. Mandeville drew inspiration from Galilean experimental science and seventeenth-century programmes to reform moral philosophy by applying the method of natural philosophy to moral studies. The iatro-political analogy with which Mandeville starts views society as an organism whose basic function, namely making man a sociable animal, is entrusted to 3 the latter's vilest qualities, just as the most important organs in animals are made up of thin membranes and small channels that an uneducated eye would not observe. In human society, nothing is good or bad in itself, but only with respect to its function, and 'what we call evil [...] is the great principle which makes us sociable creatures' (Mandeville 1729, 1: 369). Hence the paradox, in a 'small society' with a small population living on agriculture – like Harrington's Commonwealth of Oceana – 'virtuous' behaviour is possible and private virtue is likely to serve the public interest in while in a 'great society' such as English society of the time, with a large population, a powerful army, trade, growing towns, manufactures, arts and sciences, the public good may coexist with kinds of behaviour that common morality condemns, such as theft, alcoholism and prostitution 'virtue' is rarely productive of public good and vice is inseparable from its greatness. The serious question asked by Mandeville may be said to be, what are the costs and benefits – once we take the fact of social cooperation as a datum – carried by the choice for either the neo-classical utopia or the great society. The importance of Mandeville's paradox may be understood when one realizes that the question asked by both Montesquieu and Rousseau was how to assess such costs and benefits. Montesquieu on passions Charles-Louis de Montesquieu was one more author who wanted to follow the model provided by Galilean science in order to study states 'as they really are' rather than as they should be and examine interactions between various political systems and human nature 'as it really is'. Drawing inspiration from classical authors, he believed he had discovered a scientific proof of the truth of one of their claims – namely, that republican governments promote virtue while monarchical ones promote passion. The virtue at stake is love of one's homeland and of equality. It is not Christian virtue but 'political virtue'. Elaborating on Mandeville's paradox, he contends, in book 19 of The Spirit of Laws, that 'not all political vices are moral vices, and that not all moral vices are political vices' (Montesquieu 1748: 314). In modern Europe, the development of trade fosters republican governments or 'civilized monarchies', i.e. those where the sovereign's power is limited by division of powers; these, in turn, by countering unruly passions, foster political virtue, civilized manners and peace among nations (Hirschman 1977). In book 21 he declares that, in such societies, interest acts as a lieutenant of virtue, and 'happily, men are in a situation such that, though their passions inspire in them the thought of being wicked, they nevertheless have an interest in not being so' (Montesquieu 1748: 389–90). And yet, despite his optimism, Montesquieu sees clearly the price to be paid. He is aware that commerce establishes bonds between nations but causes division among individuals; and he admits also that, while it carries 'a certain exact sense of justice', the opposite of 'robbery', it weakens those moral virtues that prompt people to care not only for their own interests but also, on occasion, for those of others. 4 Rousseau on corruption and cooperation Jean-Jacques Rousseau formulated a new version of civic humanism based on an evolutionary account of human history. In his account, the genesis of morality goes along with the emergence of political power and private property and the ensuing corruption of humankind. The savage lives in a condition that requires no conscience because compassion is enough to inspire cooperation with fellow beings (Rousseau 1755). It is with technical progress – namely, developments in metallurgy and agriculture – that a split is produced within the individual and between the latter and his fellow beings. This is the gap between desire and fulfilment, which provides both the spring of individual improvement and that of destructive passions. The structure of all societies up to this point has been deeply unjust. Justified kinds of inequality would have been those associated with natural ones – that is, greater physical or intellectual capacity. Political institutions of every nation and time have instead been a trick enabling the rich to turn the poor from potential aggressors into their own gaolers. Such radical illegitimacy tends to become worse in modern societies where the corrupting powers of money and opinion are bringing about New Barbarism or a new state of nature (Rousseau 1755). The remedy suggested is a new social contract by which human beings would reach a true moral state – not a return to a state of nature – and become masters of themselves, with no sovereign other than their own (collective) will (Rousseau 1762). The price to be paid would be a renunciation of economic growth and an option for the state Mandeville had described as 'small society' `– that is, a political community with limited territory and population, without big towns or international trade. Political economy between Galilean science and political discourse The phrase 'political economy' was rescued in the seventeenth century as a title for a book, Traicté de l'Oeconomie politique (Montchrestien 1615), treating four subjects, namely manufacture, commerce, navigation and the sovereign's revenue, and outlining a number of proposals for regulation of these matters. One particular claim is that 'interest' is the key idea for the politician and politics is the art of designing a 'machine' channelling divergent interests in the right direction, thus creating a harmony of interest, a surrogate for 'virtue'. The phrase économie politique and its translations became increasingly popular a century later, when Richard Cantillon (1755), François Quesnay (1758), Pierre-Paul Le Mercier de la Rivière (1767), AnneRobert-Jacques Turgot (1776), Pietro Verri (1771), James Steuart (1767), Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1776), Adam Smith (1776) and others published treatises which brought together topics that had been previously ascribed to separate disciplines such as politics, casuistry and commerce. The phrase had not yet become the name of a discipline and it did not necessarily occur in the titles of these authors' works, which included Essai de la nature du commerce en général, Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution des 5 richesses and Le commerce et le gouvernment. The new genre implied a syllabus, standards for admissible arguments, and a shared agenda. In fact, it resulted from an osmotic process involving different traditions of discourse: piecemeal theorizing from cameralism, the so-called mercantilist literature exemplified by Thomas Mun, as well as from the older tradition of casuistical literature on Mercatura, and theorizing about societal laws from the natural law tradition (Brown 1984: 25–48). Standard topics were the nature of wealth, the market, money, price and value, agriculture, domestic and international trade, credit and taxation. Nothing was completely new, and treatment, sometimes quite sophisticated, of some of the topics may be found in works from previous genres. At some point the discipline started being taught as an independent subject, albeit still under the label 'commerce', first at the University of Naples and then at the East India College at Haileybury. In the first years of the nineteenth century, 'political economy' became the name of a discipline. The novelty was that the topics clustered together above were now considered in relation to each other and in comparative isolation from ethics, theology and politics. This is a decisive point. Newborn political economy was never understood as a pure science of facts independent of values, even less as a building founded 'on the bedrock of self-interest'. It was a critical theory of society making room for a normative dimension. But there were two contrasting approaches to justification of such normative dimension, a deductive one adopted by the Physiocrats and an 'inductive' and minimalist one adopted by Smith (Cremaschi 1989: 98–9). Physiocracy The physiocrats were among the founders of the new science but, nonetheless, the main pillar supporting their own theory was a quite traditional notion of natural law. More precisely, they adopted the thesis of the existence of a 'natural order' that is both expedient and morally good. From Nicolas Malebranche, Quesnay inherited the idea that God acts through general laws and causes each particular event by means of these laws. A physical law is the course of every physical event of the natural order, while a moral law is the rule of every human action conforming to the physical order most advantageous for mankind, with enlightened interest prompting individuals to desire the application of such order since it serves both their own and the sovereign's interest (Quesnay 1765; 1767). In a word, the physiocrats addressed the same problem as Montesquieu but contributed to the solution their own idea of physical/moral laws. Like him, they wanted to channel passions in a useful direction. The alleged discovery of a natural order provided the way to make the expedient coincide with the right just as it brought together distinct self-interests (Mercier de la Rivière 1767). The philosopher's task is, first, to discover such an order and, second, to persuade the sovereign that following it is in his own interest. An undesirable implication is that the natural order cannot establish itself spontaneously and requires substantial social engineering. Thus, economic science is proclaimed by Nicolas Baudeau to be the heir of both ethics and politics. He writes that the moral and political sciences are the most useful parts of philosophy and economic science deserves to be placed 6 above all others, for 'Social order just needs to be understood in order to be able to carry out the function of criterion and standard of liberty, of self-interest; and it is mainly ignorance that turns desire of enjoyment into a greedy, exclusive, oppressive and tyrannical attitude' (Baudeau 1768: 28; see Steiner 1998; Cremaschi 2002). Adam Smith Smith declares, in book 7 of his Theory of Moral Sentiments, that there are two 'useful' parts of moral philosophy, namely ethics and jurisprudence (Smith 1759: 340). The latter 'investigates the general principles which ought be the foundation of the laws of all nations' (Smith 1978: 397). Both disciplines should follow a third way between Stoic or Platonic rationalism and Mandevillian relativism (Forbes 1982). Smith's third way entrusts moral standards to the impartial spectator, the source of an open-ended standard that may only be applied to the raw materials represented by historical laws and customs. It is this character that makes room for psychological, sociological and economic reconstructions. The philosopher needs causal explanations of facts in order to appraise the propriety of sympathetic responses in different situations (Haakonnsen 1982: 206–7). The methodological background is anti-Cartesian, ruling out topdown approaches and making room for auxiliary disciplines that are, in turn, not so much deductive Cartesian sciences as conjectural reconstructions of social processes. These take place mainly as unintended results of actions that obey laws independent of the essential qualities of the entities at stake but 'superimposed' on them. This reflects, in the social world, the 'metaphysics' of modern natural science, with its refusal of Aristotelian essences. Smith wanted to develop a science of man and society and within this an economic science – some kind of systematic reconstruction of economic systems, more comprehensive than cameralist or mercantilist piecemeal theorizing and more empirical than physiocratic natural order. This yielded a division into two parts – a 'mitosis' – of the traditional notion of natural law, making room for two different fields: a normative discourse based on judgments formulated by the impartial spectator and a descriptive reconstruction of social phenomena discovering some kind of order in social phenomena. Thus, political economy is understood as value-free science but in a peculiar sense. Causal explanation is a preliminary step for any value judgment since, in order to account for and eventually criticize the judgments of real spectators, the philosopher needs to first reconstruct cause-effect relationships. He needs to show, for example, that the manual labourer is the one who nourishes the whole society in order to make it obvious that the one who maintains the whole society should be well nourished and well fed, or show that gold and silver are not the essence of a nation's wealth in order to unmask the merchant's fallacious arguments in favour of aggressive commercial policies. But, nevertheless, social science still needs some substitute for the 'law of nature' – for example, the impartial spectator – as a standard against which to assess the appropriateness of custom and laws. 7 Let us now see how this strategy works in The Wealth of Nations. The work is both an example – perhaps the best – of those treatises on 'commerce' I have mentioned and a sustained political argument for legislative change that would bring about a more equitable and humane society. Smith endorses Montesquieu's idea that commerce is less obnoxious than war – that is, that wealth-seeking activities provide channels into which passions may be directed towards goals that are less destructive than several other goals. In addition, he declares that the 'desire of bettering our condition' (Smith 1776: 341) is a ubiquitous calm passion providing a spring of action generally beneficial to both the individual and the community, and even more disorderly passions such as 'ambition' or dreams of wealth and luxury (Smith 1759: 50, 149, 181–3) can have unintended beneficial effects such as promoting the growth of the wealth of the nation and improving the condition of the worst off (Smith 1759: 183–5). The 'system of natural liberty' he advocates is not a top-down programme but rather a non-artificial set of regulations justified by widely shared judgments (Smith 1776: 687) which, once 'natural liberty' is recognized for manual labourers no less than for merchants (Smith 1776: 99), will gradually bring about redistributive effects close enough to those an impartial spectator would desire to see. All this depends on a more sophisticated framework than most commentators suspected. As argued above, political economy was understood as an auxiliary discipline of natural jurisprudence and thus a kind of indirectly normative discourse. According to this view, a system of moral and legal rules – emerging through a non-artificial process – is one side of any social system, whose other side is a system of causal chains leading to the emergence of some kind of social order. In the jargon of twentieth-century social science, society is a system regulated by two subsystems, the former being the total sum of individual noncoordinated actions yielding unintended results such as the division of labour and market mechanisms, and the latter being the joint effect of numberless cases of 'change of situation' yielded by the human mind's innate tendency to mirror itself in others, causing the emergence of systems of moral and legal rules. The separation of political economy from politics The anti-Jacobine reaction and the opposition between Freedom and Liberty I already mentioned that, in the last decades of the eighteenth century, the phrase which had been adopted by Montchrestien as a title, 'political economy', gradually won currency as the name of a selfcontained discipline. It was used in this sense by James Steaurt and Jean-Baptiste Say. In the 1790s in Britain, at the peak of anti-Jacobin repression, it became fashionable to separate political economy from politics in order to protect its practitioners from accusations of political radicalism while stressing its character of objective science, in contrast to both prejudices shared by so-called 'practical men' and traditional views on property, trade, poverty and population. One obvious political implication of the 8 campaign for science against prejudice was the defence of 'freedom' or, better, 'free trade'. The alternative key word, liberty, tiptoed out of public discourse. It had been one element of Smith's system of natural liberty, but now it echoed too much of Jacobinism. After the 1819 Peterloo Massacre, 'Liberty' became a dangerous word while 'Freedom' – meaning primarily 'Free Trade' – remained respectable. Smith started being cited in parliament by both Tories and Whigs in connection to his defence of property and vindication of free enterprise, but his moral and political theories were forgotten (Rashid 1998: 135–81; Rothschild 2002: 55–60). Up to 1815 radicals continued to refer to him as an authority in favour of the rights of the labouring poor, and the movement of ideas from the mid-nineteenth century going under the label 'Ricardian Socialism' was still mainly based on Smithian arguments, but his economic work started to be read in isolation from his moral work and his political arguments for natural liberty were overlooked. Political economy, as understood by the first generation of self-appointed 'political economists', was not part of politics, but a 'science' separated from the 'science of legislation' and more theoretical than practical (Rothschild 2002: 52–86; Winch and Collini 1983: 349–88). There was some confusion about both aspects. While Malthus and Ricardo were allied in the defence of 'the science' against 'practical men', at some point they started discussing the method, scope and function of political economy. Ricardo defended the abstract nature of the science on the basis that there are so many causes at play in real-world economies that it is safer to examine simplified models illustrating simple cause-effect relationships (Ricardo 1820: 5–7; see Cremaschi and Dascal 1996: 498–505). Malthus argued instead, from the same starting point, that one should try to explain real-world processes by taking multiple causes into account, paying the price of a loss in rigour but gaining greater realism and relevance, since political economy loses all value when reduced to an abstract science instead of being part of 'moral and political science' (Malthus 1820, 1: 203; see Cremaschi 2010). In the 1820s and 1830s, Malthus's views were adopted and expanded by the school of 'Christian political economy', which included John Sumner (1816), Thomas Chalmers (1832) and Richard Whately (1831). They viewed political economy as a theoretical toolbox, to be used in order to implement policies designed by a more encompassing moral and political discourse. This was essentially moral discourse, grounded in strong assumptions, according to which self-interest could not be assumed to be the main spring of action, wealth should be defined as including such entities as culture and morality, and there were higher goals for economic policies than the growth of material wealth of a nation (Waterman 1991; Cremaschi 2014: 127– 56). The opposite camp was a somewhat odd alignment of ultra-orthodox Ricardian political economists such as John R. McCulloch with the tiny sect of 'philosophical radicals' founded by Jeremy Bentham. James Mill, both political philosopher and political economist, was the missing link between the economic school and the political lobby. Despite an old myth, there was no trace of Benthamite philosophy in Ricardian economics, and Bentham's own writings on economic subjects predated Ricardo's contributions and 9 provided a rather traditional kind of economic argument, with little relation to Bentham's own epistemology, ethics and politics. The fact is that Ricardo was recruited by Mill for tactical reasons in order to add to the philosophical radical war machine such powerful weaponry as a prestigious economic doctrine would afford. Part of this strategy was an attempt to make Ricardian economics appear more distant from both Smith and Bentham than it actually was – that is, that it provided a set of deterministic economic laws surrounded by the same scientific aura that radiated from Bentham's science of morals and legislation. In fact, Ricardo, like several other 'friends of mankind', was just a fellow traveller of the philosophical radicals: his moral and epistemological ideas were different from Bentham's programme of reduction of ethics and politics to calculus, and his approach to political economy was inspired by intellectual modesty, i.e. awareness of ubiquitous multi-causality and the consequent limits of theories in terms of explanatory power (Cremaschi 2004), an attitude quite different to Mill's search for iron laws. The latter's shocked reaction to the third edition of Ricardo's Principia, with its well-known chapter on machinery that questioned the benefits of technical innovation for the working class, is proof of the distance of his views from those of Ricardo. Political economy among the 'sciences morales' The physiocratic tradition did not survive the shock of the French Revolution. In the two following decades Smith's work was introduced to France and what was believed to be Smith's labour-value theory was received with particular enthusiasm. His approach was thought to present a view of political economy as a 'moral science', unlike the physiocratic view of it as a 'natural science' because of the central role assigned by the latter to land. At the time it was said, 'once we look at it from Smith's point of view, this science is classified among the other moral sciences, whose aim is to improve their subject matter and bring it to the highest degree of perfection to which it may be brought' (Garnier 1802, xviii–xix). Thus, Smith's lesson was interpreted as a decisive argument against physiocracy and favouring a return to Turgot's utility-based value theory, in turn grounded in 'sensism', the theory of knowledge whose main proponent was Étienne Bonnot de Condillac. Jean-Baptiste Say and Antoine-Louis-Claude Destutt de Tracy are the two best-known figures among the new economists giving birth to what is generally classified as the French classical political economy, which amounted to a body of Smithian doctrines combined with Turgot's ideas. A somewhat odd example is the notion of law, a term Smith was careful to avoid, preferring to stick to the Newtonian term 'principle'. However, the term is given pride of place by the French economists, who believe that 'moral and political laws' have an objective character, that – as Say states in the 'Discours préliminaire' to his Traité – 'they derive from the nature of things with the same degree of certainty as all the laws of the physical world; they are not imagined, they are discovered [...] one never can violate them with impunity' (Say 1803: 17). Another innovation is the place given to utility as a basis of value. Value – Say declares in the first chapter 10 of Book 1 – depends on utility, in so far as it is recognized by partners of social interaction: 'exchange value is arbitrary and ill-determined until it is not recognized' (Say 1803: 79; 1819: 66), and this is why it is 'social wealth', rather than 'natural wealth', that 'may be taken as a subject matter of scientific study' (Say 599; see Arena 1998: 125–26). No less than Smith, Say and Destutt de Tracy believe that political economy is far from an a-moral science grounded in self-interest and their agenda rescues some fundamental questions from French eighteenth-century moral and political discourse – namely, how to improve national morality and how to counter self-love's destructive effects by transforming it into enlightened self-love (Destutt de Tracy 1798; Say 1800). Say claims that it is enlightened self-interest that 'moral man' pursues, and political economy, being a part of 'moral science' rather than the natural sciences, does provide a justification for such self-interest. This in turn is related to the fact that 'utility' is a social phenomenon, i.e. that the subject matter of study is the utility which is recognized to be such by 'man in society' in so far as he is ready to give something in exchange for things embodying utility. In nineteenth-century France there was consensus around the idea that science, economic progress and the improvement of morality go hand in hand. The ethical element embedded in the physiocratic notion of natural order had been dropped, and the most individualistic and hedonistic elements that Bentham's followers believed could be extracted from classical political economy were domesticated by Say's utility value theory, while a social and moral dimension was incorporated into the economic agent's motives. The Historical School and the ethical element in economic theory Germany in the eighteenth century had no literature that could be classified as political economy due to the survival of an Aristotelian understanding of practical philosophy making room for a sub-discipline known as oeconomica, still understood as literature for the pater familias, as well as of the particular German genre of cameralism. At the end of the century, first James Steuart, then Smith, and later on Say and Ricardo were translated into German. After Kant manifested his appreciation of Smith as a moral philosopher and political economist, his followers made room for political economy in the Kantian tree of knowledge, placing it in the pigeonhole 'empirical moral philosophy', a sub-discipline which Kant saw as an auxiliary to 'pure moral philosophy'. Hegel, in paragraph 189 of his Elements of the Philosophy of Right, revealed his own admiration for Smith, Say and Ricardo, whose contributions he believed provided dazzling examples 'of the ways in which the mind [...] detects within the subject matter examined simple principles laying behind the infinite variety of disjoined facts it faces in a former phase' (Hegel 1828: 227). In the first decades of the nineteenth century a German classical school came into being, inspired mainly by Say, Sismondi and Malthus. Smith and Ricardo were often criticized for alleged mistakes, namely their defence of laissez faire, their labour-value theory and their characterization of unproductive labour (Kurz 1998: 128–30). Within fifty years, however, the classical school was replaced by a rather assorted company called the 'German Historical School', whose main proponents were Friedrich List (1841), Carl Knies (1853), 11 Wilhelm Roscher (1854–94) and later on Gustav Schmoller (1893). This was essentially a reaction against what was seen as a deductive and amoral approach to social studies. Against 'rationalism', the School fostered the 'inductive method', and against 'utilitarianism' it promoted the 'ethical' approach, which implicitly rejected the existence of unchanging economic laws and spurned laissez faire in favour of state intervention (Tribe 1995). In Roscher's words, The naturalistic approach to the economy, as founded by the Physiocrats and Adam Smith, was based on ideas drawn from natural science and natural law doctrines. It considers the economy to be a naturally harmonious system of individual forces whose spring is selfishness, even though their Deistic optimism granted that from interaction of such forces only positive consequences would follow. It was a theory which preached the ideals of individualism and liberalism, declared the state almost superfluous and every statesman a villain. (Schmoller 1983: 27–8) Marx and the critique of political economy In the 1870s, a century after political economy's putative birth, the discipline's passing away was celebrated in several quarters. Obituaries were of two kinds. The first was redacted by Karl Marx, a German philosopher and revolutionary leader living in London, in two instalments, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859) and Capital (1867–1910). Marx believed his discoveries to be: 1) the twofold character of value incorporated in commodities, depending in turn on the distinction between use value and exchange value; and 2) the existence of surplus value, the new value created by workers in addition to the cost of labour, which engenders profit. An implication is that political economy is on the one hand an important intellectual achievement, the discovery of the anatomy of modern society, and on the other a subtle unconscious mystification representing a historically given structure of social relations as natural and ahistorical. Far from requiring an overarching political philosophy – say, utilitarianism or Comtian positivism – the discipline needed a radical critique from inside that would turn its findings upside down. Detection of policy goals and strategies, in turn, did not require an overall philosophical view – least of all the proletarian Weltanschauung, which was deduced from materialistic philosophical assumptions announced later on by self-appointed Marxists – but had to be entrusted to the reflective practice of the workers' movement. Conclusion: the dissolution of classical political economy and the expulsion of the political element from economic theory 12 A different obituary came from Stanley Jevons, Leon Walras and Karl Menger, the authors of the marginalist revolution. This was a typical example of 'multiple discovery', taking place during the 1870s across three different linguistic areas and involving the rejection of typical classical labour-value theory and its substitution by a utility-based theory. The key in the new approach is the idea of decreasing marginal utility by which the rate of exchange between commodities is accounted for on the basis of decreasing satisfaction produced by acquisition of further units of one commodity. Thus they carried out, even though with different results, the combination of political economy and utilitarianism that James Mill had actively promoted in the beginning of the century. Jevons overtly adopts the 'calculus' of pleasure and pain, the core of Bentham's philosophy, as a basis for value theory. He notes that Mill once asserted 'that there was nothing in the Laws of Value which remained for himself or any future writer to clear up' (Jevons 1871: v), but he adds that, in his view, a new start is possible in attempting 'to treat Economy as a Calculus of Pleasure and Pain' (Jevons 1871: vi). The ethical and political implications of this attempt were that 'economics', understood now as a purely theoretical science, was in a position to provide the economic agent – the administrator of a charity no less than a shark of finance – with a clear view of means-ends relations while leaving the choice of ends to a different discipline or discourse: ethics for the individual and economic policy for the nation. 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An Abductive Theory of Constitution∗ Michael Baumgartner†and Lorenzo Casini‡ Abstract The first part of this paper finds Craver's (2007) mutual manipulability theory (MM) of constitution inadequate, as it definitionally ties constitution to the feasibility of idealized experiments, which, however, are unrealizable in principle. As an alternative, the second part develops an abductive theory of constitution (NDC), which exploits the fact that phenomena and their constituents are unbreakably coupled via common causes. The best explanation for this common-cause coupling is the existence of an additional dependence relation, viz. constitution. Apart from adequately capturing the essential characteristics of constitution missed by MM, NDC has important ramifications for constitutional discovery-most notably, that there is no experimentum crucis for constitution, not even under ideal discovery circumstances. 1 Introduction According to mechanistic theories of explanation, the upper (macro) level behavior Ψ of a system S is explained by carving out the lower (micro) level mechanism constituting that behavior (Glennan 1996; Machamer et al. 2000; Craver 2007). Hence, a theory of mechanistic explanation presupposes a theory of constitution providing criteria that identify those of S's spatiotemporal parts whose activities are constitutively relevant to S's Ψ-ing. The most popular theory of constitution, due to Craver (2007), purports to furnish such criteria by drawing on conceptual and methodological resources that have proven valuable in analyzing and discovering causation-notwithstanding the fact that constitution and causation are very different relations (Craver and Bechtel 2007). Since the time of Mill (1843), one of the dominant approaches to uncovering causation consists in intervening on causes (in controlled environments) to test whether they make a difference to their purported effects. As is well-known, Woodward (2003) has built his influential interventionist theory of causation on the fundament of this experimental protocol. While causation is a unidirectional difference-making relation-i.e. causes change their effects, but not vice versa- and holds among mereologically independent entities, Craver (2007) argues that constitution is a bidirectional or mutual difference-making relation among wholes and some of their spatiotemporal parts. Correspondingly, he proposes a theory of constitution that adds a parthood and a mutuality tweak to Woodward's interventionist theory of causation. Subject to Craver's (2007, 153) mutual manipulability theory (MM), the behavior Φ of a spatiotemporal partX of S constitutes S's Ψ-ing ∗Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science. †Dept. of Philosophy, University of Geneva. Email: [email protected] ‡Dept. of Philosophy, University of Geneva. Email: [email protected] 1 2 Michael Baumgartner and Lorenzo Casini iff it is possible to (ideally) intervene (from the bottom up) on X's Φ-ing such that S's Ψ-ing changes, and (from the top down) on S's Ψ-ing such that X's Φ-ing changes. Craver claims that MM provides an adequate analysis of constitution and that it furnishes a solid foundation for evidence-based constitutional discovery. The first part of this paper takes issue with both of these claims (§2). MM is far from providing an adequate analysis of constitution, as it is in fact inapplicable to the very structures it is designed to account for. MM definitionally ties constitution to the feasibility of idealized experiments. Such experiments are, however, unrealizable in principle. Macro-level phenomena and their constituents are so tightly intertwined that they can only be manipulated via common causes (cf. Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015). Furthermore, less rigorous but feasible experimental setups inevitably generate confounded data that systematically underdetermine the inference to constitutive relations. Hence, MM cannot possibly ground a viable methodology for constitutional discovery. Since constitution is a non-causal form of dependence-as commonly assumed in mechanistic theorizing-one cannot simply tweak a successful account of causation to obtain a successful account of constitution. Rather, constitution must be defined within a theoretical framework that reflects its distinctly non-causal nature. Furthermore, the inference to constitution can neither in theory nor in practice proceed along the lines of the inference to causation. The main reason is that, while there exist ideal experimental designs allowing for the generation of unconfounded data that conclusively establish the existence of causal relations, no such experimental designs exist for the inference to constitution. Even data generated under ideal discovery circumstances can always equivalently be accounted for in terms of a model that features constitutive dependencies and a model without any such dependencies. Hence, the inference to constitution is inherently underdetermined by experimental evidence (§3). As an alternative to MM, the second part of the paper then develops an abductive theory of constitution, which exploits the fact that phenomena and their constituents are unbreakably coupled via common causes (§4). The existence of an additional dependence relation, viz. constitution, is the best explanation for this unbreakable common-cause coupling. Hence, pace Craver, the defining feature of constitution is not the possibility of top-down and bottom-up interventions on a mechanism and the existence of corresponding (mutual) difference-making scenarios, but the impossibility of such interventions and the nonexistence of such difference-making scenarios. Our abductive theory has important ramifications for the inference to constitution that any viable method of constitutional discovery has to take into account (§5). In particular, to establish constitutive dependencies, it does not suffice to wiggle the macro level of a mechanistic system such that the micro level changes and vice versa-as stipulated by MM. Rather, an extended series of experiments is needed that explore the whole space of possible ways of breaking the coupling of macro and micro levels. Only if all of these tests are unsuccessful, an inference to constitution is warranted. Moreover, in light of its inherent empirical underdeAn Abductive Theory of Constitution 3 termination, such an inference is ultimately grounded in pragmatic considerations concerning explanatory power, and is not forced upon the modeler by the evidence. 2 Inadequacy of MM Before reviewing Craver's MM, we must render transparent two crucial background assumptions of our argument and introduce our notation. According to the first assumption, which is compellingly substantiated by Craver and Bechtel (2007), constitution must be sharply distinguished from causation. Causation holds among mereologically independent entities such that causes temporally precede their effects, and it is a unidirectional form of dependence in the sense that effects depend on their causes but not vice versa. By contrast, constitution holds among wholes and their parts,1 that is, among spatiotemporally overlapping entities, and it is bidirectional in the sense that parts depend on the wholes and vice versa. Although some authors are skeptical of the distinction between causation and constitution (e.g. Ross and Ladyman 2010; Leuridan 2012), the distinction is standardly accepted by representatives of theories of mechanistic explanation. As this is the theoretical context of our paper, we shall subsequently assume that constitution is a distinctly non-causal form of dependence. The second assumption likewise belongs to the canon of mechanistic theorizing; it states that the relation between a mechanism's upper and lower level is to be analyzed in terms of non-reductive supervenience (Glennan 1996, 61-62; Eronen 2011, ch. 11). More specifically, relative to a given a mechanistic organization of the constituents, phenomena supervene on their constituents, meaning that every change in a phenomenon is necessarily accompanied by a change in its constituents (Craver 2007, 153). Moreover, phenomena are not reducible-in particular, not identical-to their constituents. Phenomena and their constituents are types of behavior exhibited by specific entities on macro and micro levels, respectively. To represent such behaviors, we adopt the following notational conventions. Entities on macro levels are represented by individual constants S, S1, S2, etc., and macro behaviors by variables Ψ, Ψ1, Ψ2, etc. Micro-level entities are symbolized by X , X1, X2, etc., and micro behaviors by variables Φ, Φ1, Φ2, etc. (Craver 2007, 153-60). Moreover, we refer to the behaviors of specific entities-S's Ψ-ing or X's Φ-ing-by means of specific variables-Ψ(S) and Φ(X). Contrary to generic variables, which represent behaviors as exhibited by any entities, specific variables represent behaviors of specific entities (Spohn 2006). For instance, Φ(X) = φi means that entity X exhibits the behavior φi. As we-like Craver-are only concerned with behaviors 1Although the relation of parthood raises numerous metaphysical questions, authors working on mechanistic explanation typically sidestep the topic (Harbecke 2010 is a commendable exception), as they employ a metaphysically "thin" notion of parthood. This notion-which we shall employ, too-is the notion of containment in a phenomenon's spatiotemporal extension, a notion formally defined by the axioms of Ground Mereology (Casati and Varzi 1999, ch. 3). 4 Michael Baumgartner and Lorenzo Casini Ψ Φ Φ Φ2 3 Φ4 2 31 5 7Φ1 Φ Φ 6 Ψ Ψ Figure 1: An example of a phenomenon Ψ2 with three constituents, Φ2, Φ3 and Φ6, and two non-constituting parts, Φ4 and Φ5. Dashed lines represent constitution, directed edges symbolize causation, and the dotted lines stand for spatiotemporal overlap. of specific entities, we can dispense with generic behavioral variables altogether, which, in turn, allows us to treat the specificity of specific variables implicitly, and to abbreviate our notation by simply writing Ψ for Ψ(S) and Φ for Φ(X). Phenomena typically have a multitude of spatiotemporal parts, only a proper subset of which are constitutively relevant to them. Likewise, they tend to be involved in manifold causal interactions with non-constituents. Figure 1 provides an illustration: the phenomenon Ψ2 in the macro-level ellipse has five parts in the micro-level ellipse; only three of them, viz. Φ2, Φ3, and Φ6, are constituents of Ψ2; both the phenomenon and its constituents are involved in numerous interand intralevel causal relationships. That abstract structure can, for instance, be interpreted in terms of the mechanism underlying a cruising car, such that Ψ2 represents the phenomenon of the cruise, Φ2 the running engine, Φ3 the transmission of momentum to the axle, and Φ6 the turning wheels. Moreover, the car has two parts that are not constitutively relevant to its movement, viz. the air conditioning, Φ4, which is also operated by the engine, and the ashtray, Φ5, which is causally detached from the causal mechanism constituting the car's cruise. The purpose of a theory of constitution is to provide criteria that distinguish constituents from non-constituting parts and from their causes and effects. According to Craver's (2007) MM, constitution is a difference-making relation that is adequately analyzed by suitably supplementing the resources of the currently most popular difference-making theory of causation: Woodward's (2003) interventionism. In a nutshell, interventionism stipulates that a variable X is a cause of another variable Y iff it is possible to (ideally) intervene on X in such a way that Y changes, when all off-path causes of Y are fixed (cf. Woodward 2003, 59).2 As constitution, contrary to causation, is a bidirectional dependence relation among parts and wholes, unidirectional manipulability as in interventionism does not suffice to establish constitutive relevance. Therefore, Craver adds a parthood and a mutuality constraint: constituents are spatiotemporal parts of phenomena and both are mutual difference-makers of each other. More explicitly: [. . . ] to establish that X's Φ-ing is relevant to S's Ψ-ing [where X is a spatiotemporal part of S] it is sufficient that one be able to manipulate S's Ψ-ing 2We slightly adapt Woodward's notation to avoid confusion with our own notation. An Abductive Theory of Constitution 5 by intervening to change X's Φ-ing (by stimulating or inhibiting) and that one be able to manipulate X's Φ-ing by manipulating S's Ψ-ing. To establish that a component is irrelevant, it is sufficient to show that one cannot manipulate S's Ψ-ing by intervening to change X's Φ-ing and that one cannot manipulate X's Φ-ing by manipulating S's Ψ-ing. (Craver 2007, 159) MM provides a sufficient condition for constitutive relevance and a sufficient condition for constitutive irrelevance, which jointly amount to a sufficient and necessary condition for constitutive relevance-that is, to a complete definition of constitution.3 The core notion in its definiens is the modal notion of manipulability, which Craver (2007, §4.8.3) cashes out in terms of the existence of a possible ideal intervention as defined by Woodward (2003, 98). An ideal intervention on Ψ with respect to Φ is a variable IΨ taking one of its values, IΨ = in, and thereby surgically fixing the value of Ψ without having an impact on Φ that is not mediated via Ψ and without being correlated with any other (off-path) causes of Φ. In sum, MM amounts to the following (where the specificity of the variables is made explicit): (MM) Φ(X) is constitutively relevant to Ψ(S) iff (i) X (resp. X's Φ-ing) is a spatiotemporal part of S (resp. S's Ψ-ing); (ii) there exists a possible ideal intervention IΦ = im on Φ(X) w.r.t. Ψ(S) that is associated with a change in Ψ(S); (iii) there exists a possible ideal intervention IΨ = in on Ψ(S) w.r.t. Φ(X) that is associated with a change in Φ(X). One of the main selling points of MM is that it is directly operationalizable experimentally. The most straightforward way of establishing the possibility of mutually intervening on Φ and Ψ is to furnish actual bottom-up and top-down interventions of types IΦ = im and IΨ = in. If, and only if, such experiments reveal mutual difference-making among wholes and parts, the latter are proven to be constituents of the former. To use Figure 1 as an illustration, Φ2 (the car's engine) is conclusively shown to be a constituent of Ψ2 (the car's movement) by performing one intervention on Φ2 (e.g., taking one's foot off the accelerator) that is associated with a change in Ψ2 (the car's deceleration) as well as one intervention on Ψ2 (e.g., adding external friction) that is associated with a change in Φ2 (the engine working harder). By contrast, if it is established (inductively or otherwise) that there are no such mutual difference-making interventions on parts Φ4 (the air conditioning) and Φ5 (the ashtray) or on causes (Φ1,Ψ1) and effects (Φ7,Ψ3) of the mechanism, MM identifies these variables as non-constituents of Ψ2. Although MM has considerable intuitive appeal, the remainder of this section will show that MM does not amount to an adequate theory of constitution-not because it merely fails in some intricate cases but because it fails in all cases. In short, the reason is that MM is unsatisfiable in principle, for there cannot exist ideal interventions on upper and lower levels of a mechanism that are associated with changes on the other level. 3Some authors (e.g. Couch 2011, 382; Kaplan 2012, 560) misread MM as only providing a sufficient condition for constitutive relevance. Textual evidence clearly contradicts that assessment. 6 Michael Baumgartner and Lorenzo Casini Ψ Φ Φ Φ2 31 Ψ Φ1 Φ2 Φ3 (a) Ψ Φ Φ Φ2 31 Ψ Ψ Ψ , ,, (b) Figure 2: Model (a) depicts the impossible surgical interventions required by MM; model (b), by contrast, features the possible fat-handed interventions. To see this, consider the simple mechanism in Figure 2a: Ψ has the three constituents Φ1, Φ2, Φ3, which we assemble in what we subsequently call a constituting set Φ = {Φ1,Φ2,Φ3}. MM entails that, for the elements of Φ to be constituents of Ψ, it is necessary that there exist intervention variables IΨ, IΦ1 , IΦ2 , IΦ3 as depicted in Figure 2a that can induce changes on the system's other level. Thus, assume (for reductio) that IΨ is an intervention variable for Ψ w.r.t. Φ1 such that changing Ψ via IΨ is associated with a change in Φ1 (when all off-path causes of Φ1 are held fixed). In that case, Woodward's interventionism, which constitutes the theoretical background of MM, entails that IΨ is a cause of both Ψ and Φ1. This can be realized in one of two ways: either IΨ causes Ψ and Φ1 along one causal path, say, IΨ −→ Ψ −→ Φ1, or along two paths, Ψ ←− IΨ −→ Φ1. The former option is excluded since the instances of Ψ and Φ1 spatiotemporally overlap (i.e. the corresponding values of the variables represent spatiotemporally overlapping behaviors), which entails that their relationship is non-causal. Hence, IΨ causes Ψ and Φ1 along two different paths, meaning that IΨ is a common cause of Ψ and Φ1.4 That, in turn, entails that IΨ does not surgically cause Ψ and is, therefore, not an intervention variable for Ψ w.r.t. Φ1, which contradicts our initial assumption, thereby reducing it to absurdity.5 4Note that by a common cause we simply mean a cause with two (or more) parallel effects- independently of whether there is an additional dependence relation between these effects. A common cause is standardly represented by two (or more) exiting arrows (but see Woodward 2015, 331, for an alternative representation). 5An anonymous reviewer suggested that the consequence that IΨ is a common cause of Ψ and Φ1-and thus a non-surgical cause of Ψ-could be avoided on the basis of a theory of causation requiring that causally analyzed variable sets exclusively contain causally distinct variables, which Ψ and Φ1, arguably, are not. Clearly though, interventionism as developed in Woodward (2003, 2015) and as implemented by Craver (2007) does not impose such a restriction-and with good reasons, in our view. Whether IΨ is an intervention variable for Ψ w.r.t. Φ1 does not depend on whether IΨ surgically causes Ψ relative to some suitably chosen variable set, but on whether what is represented by IΨ surgically causes Ψ in the world-which is not the case under the non-reductive physicalist assumption that Ψ and Φ1 are non-identical. Moreover, a theory of causation explicitly imposing that variables be causally distinct would not be applicable to variable sets relevant for mechanistic explanations, and worse even, it would run an obvious circularity risk. An Abductive Theory of Constitution 7 This result can easily be generalized. Due to the non-causal nature of the relationship between phenomena and their parts, every cause of a mechanism's upper or lower level that is associated with a change on the other level is a common cause of the corresponding occurrences on the two levels. In other words, whatever makes a difference on both levels of a mechanism does so along different causal paths and, hence, is not a surgical intervention. Furthermore, as the constituents Φ of Ψ realize Ψ on the micro level, they form the supervenience base of Ψ in the mechanistic context of Figure 2a, which entails that every change in Ψ (occurring in some spatiotemporal region) is necessarily accompanied by a change in Φ (i.e. in some Φi in Φ, occurring in the same spatiotemporal region). Every cause inducing a change in Ψ necessarily also brings about a change in at least one Φi in Φ and is, thus, a common cause of Ψ and Φi. More concretely, every cause of Ψ has the structural properties of either IΨ, I ′Ψ, or I ′′Ψ in Figure 2b. And more generally, every cause of a mechanism's macro level is necessarily a common cause of the phenomenon and at least one of its constituents. Phenomena and their constituents can only be manipulated with a fat hand (cf. Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015).6 Overall, the types of interventions required by MM cannot possibly exist for any mechanistic system. MM is hence unsatisfiable, which means that constitutive relations as defined by MM are inexistent, which again entails that friends of mechanistic explanations who rely on MM chase a chimera. This result reduces MM to absurdity. 3 Underdetermination of constitutional inference The source of this fatal deficiency of MM is easily pinpointed: MM definitionally ties the notion of constitution to the possibility of surgical top-down and bottomup interventions that target one level of a mechanism and thereby change the other level, where in fact it is only possible to induce changes on upper and lower levels of a mechanism by fat-handedly targeting both levels on separate causal paths. Contrapositively put, whenever surgical interventions that target a first variable and induce changes in a second one are possible, these variables are not linked in terms of constitution but in terms of causation-as is duly entailed by the interventionist theory of causation (Woodward 2003). An obvious conclusion to draw is that constitution should not be analyzed in terms of surgical (or ideal) mutual manipulability. If the mutual manipulability idea is to get off the ground at all, it must be cashed out in terms of non-surgical interventions of some sort. Indeed, prompted by problems of the original version of interventionism with macro-to-micro causation, Woodward (2015) has recently offered a modified variant of his theory, interventionism∗, which comes with a correspondingly modified 6A fat-handed intervention is an intervention that causes its effects along two (or more) different paths (Scheines 2005, 931-32). Similarly to us, Romero (2015) and Eronen and Brooks (2014, 194) have recently argued that it follows from non-reductive physicalism and interventionism that interventions on phenomena are necessarily fat-handed (or common causes). 8 Michael Baumgartner and Lorenzo Casini Ψ Φ Φ Φ2 31 Ψ Φ (a) Ψ Φ Φ Φ2 31 Ψ Φ (b) Figure 3: Two empirically indistinguishable mechanistic models. notion of an intervention.7 He (2015, 334) now defines an intervention on Ψ w.r.t. Φ to be a variable IΨ taking one of its values, IΨ = in, and thereby fixing the value of Ψ without having an impact on Φ that is not mediated via Ψ or via a variable Γ, which is related in terms of supervenience to Ψ or Φ, and without being correlated with any other (off-path) cause Γ of Φ such that Γ is not related in terms of supervenience to Ψ or Φ. Against that background, IΨ can pass as an intervention variable for Ψ w.r.t. Φ even if IΨ is connected to Φ along causal paths that do not go through Ψ but through variables related to Ψ by supervenience. That is, according to interventionism∗, common causes of macro and micro levels of mechanisms as in Figure 2b count as interventions, because the macro level supervenes on the micro level. If such interventions are moreover associated with changes on both levels, which in light of the fat-handedness of these interventions will consistently be the case, MM turns out to be applicable to mechanistic systems and to entail that different levels of such systems are related in terms of constitution. That is, giving up the surgicality requirement for interventions allows the mutual manipulability framework to steer clear of the reductio argument of the previous section. Nonetheless, the fact remains that all of the non-surgical interventions on one level of a mechanism that are associated with changes on the other level are fat-handed, which, as this section will show, has far-reaching consequences for the inference to constitution and-a fortiori-for theories that analyze constitution in terms of the existence of (possible) manipulations of mechanisms. Fat-handed interventions generate confounded data, which, in turn, greatly diminishes the inferential leverage delivered by them (cf. e.g. Scheines 2005). Data produced by a common cause of two target variables are uninformative as regards the relationship between these variables. To see this, consider the fat-handed interventions depicted in Figure 3a. If such interventions bring about correlations between the upper and lower levels, these correlations can be fully accounted for by the mere fact that the two levels are wiggled with a fat hand. Hence, there is no need at all to stipulate the existence of additional constitutive dependencies. Model 7Woodward himself sees no discontinuity between (2015) and the theory in (2003). However, as core definitions of the theory change between (2003) and (2015), we do not consider it inappropriate to refer to the latter as modifying the former. An Abductive Theory of Constitution 9 3a, which features constitutive dependencies, and model 3b, which does not, imply the very same correlations under manipulations via IΨ and IΦ. As all manipulations that induce changes on both levels of a mechanistic system are fat-handed, this finding, again, can be generalized: relaxing the constraints imposed on interventions along the lines of interventionism∗ entails that the mutual manipulability of macro and micro levels can always be accounted for by the mere fat-handed nature of corresponding manipulations. Mutual manipulability via common causes does not provide a rationale for inferring constitutive relations.8 For every model featuring constitution there exists a pure common-cause model that entails the very same correlations under manipulations and, hence, cannot be distinguished from the former model empirically. Nonetheless, if two common causes of Ψ and Φ1 (such as IΨ and IΦ in Figure 3) that count as interventions by the standards of interventionism∗ yield changes on both levels of the system, MM-interpreted against the background of interventionism∗-infers that Φ1 is constitutively relevant to Ψ. And Craver is not alone in contending that a few suitable experiments (in a controlled laboratory context) can afford conclusive experimental evidence for constitution. Harbecke (2015), for instance, proposes a variant of Mill's (1843) method of difference that he claims to be apt for evidence-based constitutional discovery. In a nutshell, the idea is that if in one of two test situations, which are homogeneous with respect to instantiations of unmeasured constituents of a scrutinized phenomenon Ψ, a change is induced on a mereological part Φ of Ψ such that Ψ changes its value while both Φ and Ψ remain unchanged in the other of the two test situations, it can be inferred that Φ is a constituent of Ψ. However, the fat-handedness of all experimental manipulations of different levels of mechanistic systems inevitably yields that attempts at generating conclusive evidence for constitutive relations are bound to fail. Even in laboratory contexts that are perfectly homogeneous with respect to unmeasured factors that (causally or constitutively) determine a phenomenon Ψ, it is impossible to generate unconfounded data on constitutive relations. As a result, the inference to constitution is systematically underdetermined by evidence. What is more, empirical underdetermination affecting constitutional inference differs from empirical underdetermination as is known from causal inference. Empirical data can often be accounted for in terms of different causal models that fare equally well with respect to all parameters of model fit (cf. e.g. Spirtes et al. 2000, 59-72; Eberhardt 2013). Such underdetermination ultimately stems from the complexity of causal structures in the world we live in and from our limited capacities for controlling background influences in ordinary discovery contexts. The resulting noise in typical real-life data yields that the latter, ever so often, do not unambiguously reflect underlying causal structures. But this common form of empirical underdetermination can be resolved in ideal discovery contexts. Causes and 8Harinen (2014), who also points out that MM imposes unsatisfiable requirements on interventions, fails to see that relaxing the requirements in the vein of interventionism∗ deprives interventions on mechanisms of their inferential value. 10 Michael Baumgartner and Lorenzo Casini effects are mereologically independent entities. It is possible to surgically intervene on a cause with respect to its effect. Moreover, since it takes time for causal influence to be transmitted from the cause to the effect, an effect can be suppressed via suitable interventions even after the cause has occurred, that is, causal interactions can be broken. As a result, cause-effect pairs can, at least in principle, be isolated from confounding background influences. It follows that contexts of causal discovery can be idealized to such a degree that crucial experiments become possible that produce unconfounded data providing conclusive evidence for causal dependencies. The paradigm example of such an ideal discovery context is the experimental setting envisaged in Mill's method of difference, which also underlies interventionist approaches to causal inference. If a variable X is associated with changes in a (mereologically independent) variable Y , when all other causes of Y are fixed and all further required background assumptions are warranted (e.g. that Y does not change in an uncaused manner, i.e. miraculously), it conclusively follows that X is causally relevant to Y (Hofmann and Baumgartner 2011). That is, there exist ideal discovery circumstances in which causal relations can receive unambiguous empirical support. Such ideal discovery circumstances cannot possibly exist for constitutive relations. Since constituents realize phenomena on the micro level, manipulating phenomena is tantamount to manipulating their constituents. It is impossible to surgically intervene on phenomena, break constitutive dependencies, and isolate phenomenon-constituent pairs. As a result, even in ideal discovery contexts in which all unmeasured relevant factors for a scrutinized phenomenon Ψ are (assumed to be) fixed and all further required background assumptions are warranted (e.g. that the spatiotemporal parts of Ψ have been correctly identified), it is impossible to produce unconfounded data furnishing conclusive evidence for constitutive relations. The reason is that in constitutional discovery-as opposed to causal discovery-data confounding is introduced by the very experimental manipulations intended to uncover constitution. Therefore, even data generated under ideal constitutional discovery circumstances can always be accounted for both by a model featuring constitutive dependencies and by a model without such dependencies. Or differently, even if the hypothesis "Φ is a constituent of Ψ" is experimentally tested in isolation (i.e. such that the whole theoretical background is taken to be beyond doubt), no evidence can be produced demonstrating that this hypothesis is true and its negation false. Contrary to the case of causation, there cannot exist an experimentum crucis for constitution. Being experimentally underdetermined is an inherent feature of constitutive relations. This shows that analyses of constitution in terms of the existence of suitable experimental manipulations of mechanistic systems-be it of the surgical or nonsurgical type-are beyond repair. In particular, the basic idea behind Craver's MM, viz. to account for constitution by supplementing the resources of the most popular difference-making theory of causation, interventionism, by a parthood and a mutuality tweak, is not just misguided because of unrealistic surgicality requirements but because phenomena and their constituents simply are not difference-makers of An Abductive Theory of Constitution 11 one another. Rather, they share common difference-makers in their mutual causal past, that is, they are unbreakably coupled via common causes. The fundamental differences between causation and constitution yield that these two relations must be theoretically accounted for in fundamentally different terms and uncovered by following fundamentally different methodological protocols. 4 An abductive alternative In this section, we propose an alternative theory of constitutive relevance, which avoids MM's problems by further developing the main finding of the previous sections: the characteristic feature of constitution is not the possibility of surgical topdown and bottom-up interventions on mechanisms, but the impossibility of such interventions. Whatever makes a difference on both levels of a mechanism necessarily does so along different causal paths, because constituents are spatiotemporal parts of phenomena and, hence, not themselves causally related to the latter. Therefore, while causal dependencies can be broken by means of suitable surgical interventions, there do not exist surgical interventions that could break constitutive dependencies. Rather, constitution relates macro and micro levels in such a way that they are unbreakably coupled via common causes. To render this idea precise, it must first be emphasized that the common-cause coupling that marks constitution is characterized by an asymmetry between macro and micro levels, which stems from the fact that a phenomenon Ψ of a given mechanism supervenes on its constituents in a constituting set Φ = {Φ1, . . . ,Φn}, but not vice versa. In consequence, every cause of Ψ is necessarily associated with a change in at least one element of Φ and, thus, it causes the latter change on a path that does not go through Ψ. That is, every cause of Ψ necessarily is a common cause of Ψ and at least one element of Φ. The same, however, does not hold for causes of the constituents in Φ. Supervenience does not exclude the possibility of causing changes in the supervenience base that are not associated with a change in the supervening property. For instance, if two values φn and φm of Φ1 realize the same value ψk of Ψ, causes that induce a change from Φ1 = φn to Φ1 = φm (or vice versa) are invariably associated with Ψ = ψk. Such causes can count as surgical and, hence, the micro level may be surgically manipulated. But since surgical micro-level causes are not associated with changes on the macro level, they are non-revealing with respect to constitutive relations-and thus irrelevant for an analysis of constitution. The micro-level causes that are of relevance to account for constitution are the ones that are associated with changes on the macro level, and it does hold that these causes are common causes of the micro and macro level. The condition of common-cause coupling needs further refining, for, as stated, it may also be satisfied by variable sets containing parts of a phenomenon that do not constitute it. To illustrate, reconsider the mechanism in Figure 1. The variable Φ4, which represents a car's AC, is an effect of the constituent Φ2, the car's running engine, but not itself a constituent of the phenomenon Ψ2, the car's cruise. 12 Michael Baumgartner and Lorenzo Casini In Craver's (2007, 143) jargon, the AC is a "sterile effect" of the mechanism, that is, a constitutively irrelevant downstream effect of a constituent. Many common causes affect both the AC and the moving car. For instance, starting the engine initiates both the AC and the car's movement, and, conversely, stopping the engine terminates both the AC and the movement. And yet, the AC is not a constituent, for an obvious reason: the influence of the common causes of the cruising car and its AC is always mediated via another spatiotemporal part of the car, namely its engine, which is a constituent of the cruise. Or consider the causally and constitutionally isolated variable Φ5, which represents the behavior of the car's ashtray. Many causes of Ψ2 will also cause changes in Φ5. For example, an accident can both warp the ashtray and stop the car. But that an accident can be a common cause of a deformed ashtray and a terminated cruise does not show that the ashtray is a constituent of the car's movement. The reason is, again, obvious: the accident not only warps the ashtray but also the engine, which is a constituent of the car's movement. To ensure that a constituting set Φ exclusively contains constituents, and in particular that it excludes non-constituents such as sterile effects and isolated parts, we require that Φ be redundancy-free in the sense that no proper subset of Φ is common-cause coupled with the phenomenon. That is, for every proper subset Φ′ of Φ, some cause of the phenomenon exists that fails to be associated with a change in Φ′ and, instead, is associated with a change in an element of Φ outside of Φ′. Non-constituents such as sterile effects or isolated parts can be eliminated from a set of parts of the phenomenon without breaking the common-cause coupling of the phenomenon and the remaining parts: any change in the phenomenon still is associated with a change in some element of the resulting subset. More concretely, Φ4 and Φ5 are not part of a constituting set Φ of the phenomenon Ψ2 in Figure 1 because the set Φ′′ = {Φ1,Φ2,Φ3,Φ4,Φ5} is not redundancy-free: it contains a proper subset, Φ = {Φ1,Φ2,Φ3}, that is common-cause coupled to Ψ2, meaning that every cause of Ψ2 is a common cause of Ψ2 and at least one element of Φ. Overall, we contend that a first defining feature of a constituting set Φ of a phenomenon Ψ is that it is common-cause coupled with Ψ in a redundancy-free manner, meaning that both of the following two conditions are satisfied. First, every cause of Ψ is a common cause of Ψ and at least one Φi in Φ. Second, no proper subset Φ\{Φi} is common-cause coupled with Ψ-more precisely, for any Φi in Φ, there exists at least one cause of Ψ, which is not a common cause of Ψ and any Φj in Φ \ {Φi}. However, many variable sets Vi including only causally related variables may comprise a variable V1 and a subset V′i of Vi, which does not include V1, such that V1 and V′i are common-cause coupled (i.e. such that every cause of V1 in Vi is a common cause of V1 and some element of V′i) and V ′ i is redundancy-free. Hence, the criterion of common-cause coupling needs to be supplemented by a further criterion, which discriminates between constitutional and non-constitutional (i.e. coincidental) common-cause couplings. We contend that the identifying feature of constitutional common-cause couplings is their unbreakability. That is, if the set An Abductive Theory of Constitution 13 of analyzed variables is expanded, coincidental common-cause couplings may be broken whereas constitutional common-cause couplings will persist across all variable set expansions. More concretely, if a variable V1 and a set V′i coincidentally happen to be common-cause coupled within a set Vi, expansions of Vi by further causes of V1 are bound to unveil, say, surgical causes of V1 that do not induce changes in V′i-to the effect that the common-cause coupling disappears. This is excluded in cases of constitution. The common-cause coupling of a phenomenon Ψ and a constituting set Φ is not a mere contingency of a modeled set V, which contains Ψ and Φ along with a given number of their common causes; rather, it is a structural necessity of the relationship between Ψ and Φ, which not only holds relative to V but also relative to every expansion of V. That means that, even though the constitutional model 3a and the pure causal model 3b in Figure 3 are indistinguishable relative to data on the variables in the set V3 = {IΨ, IΦ,Ψ,Φ1,Φ2,Φ3}, they are not equivalent in their implications for what happens under expansions of V3. Model 3a with its constitutive dependencies entails that the common-cause coupling of Ψ and its constituents cannot be broken by expanding V3, whereas model 3b does not have any such implications. Rather, according to model 3b it is to be expected that, sooner or later, surgical causes of Ψ and Φ1 to Φ3 will be found that break their coupling. These different implications render it possible to choose between constitutional and pure common-cause models. Gradually expanding V3 (in a series of follow-up studies) will yield one of two outcomes: (I) the common-cause coupling of Ψ and Φ = {Φ1,Φ2,Φ3} is broken or (II) it is not broken. In case of outcome (I), the attempt to model the relationship between Ψ and Φ constitutionally is empirically rejected. If, say, a follow-up study reveals a surgical cause of Ψ, Φ is shown not to be a constituting set of Ψ, meaning that the common-cause model prevails. By contrast, outcome (II) gives preference to modeling Φ as a constituting set of Ψ, notwithstanding the fact that the correlations in every expansion of V3 can likewise be reproduced by a mere common-cause model. The reason is that a constitutional model not only reproduces the empirical correlations but also explains why the common-cause coupling of Ψ and Φ is not broken. That is, in case of outcome (II), a constitutional model is preferable over a pure common-cause model because it exceeds the latter in explanatory power. While it is a structural necessity of the constitutional model 3a that Ψ and Φ remain common-cause coupled in all expansions of V3, viz. that outcome (II) obtains, the common-cause model 3b provides no reason whatsoever why surgical causes of Ψ cannot be found. The inference to constitution is thus inherently abductive: constitutional models are preferable over pure causal models because they explain both the highly correlated behavior of phenomena and their constituents as well as the impossibility to de-couple them.9 9Our proposal on how to model the coupling of phenomena and constituents bears certain similarities to Causey's proposal on how to interpret biconditional dependencies used as bridge laws in theory reductions. For Causey (1977, chs. 2, 5), those dependencies express attribute identities if all attempts at causally explaining them have failed-for identity then is the only explanation left standing (Causey 1977, 98-99). (We thank an anonymous reviewer for indicating this parallel to us.) 14 Michael Baumgartner and Lorenzo Casini By letting a complex instance of a variable set Φ designate the occurrence or process (in a particular spatiotemporal region) represented by a complex value assignment Φ1 = φ1, . . . ,Φn = φn to all elements of Φ, we can now introduce the definitional details of our proposed No De-Coupling (NDC) theory of constitutive relevance (where the specificity of the variables is again made explicit): (NDC) Φ1(X1) is constitutively relevant to Ψ(S) if, and only if, there exists a variable set V containing Ψ(S) and a proper subset Φ(X) = {Φ1(X1), . . . ,Φn(Xn)}, such that: (1) Parthood. For every complex instance of Φ(X), there is an instance of Ψ(S) such that the former is part of the latter. (2) Coupling. (i) Every cause of Ψ(S) in V is a common cause of Ψ(S) and at least one Φi(Xi) in Φ(X); (ii) for no Φi(Xi) in Φ(X) does Φ(X) \ {Φi(Xi)} comply with (2.i). (3) No De-Coupling. The Coupling of Φ(X) and Ψ(S) cannot be broken (invalidated) by expanding V. NDC differs in a number of crucial ways from MM. First, it replaces MM's mutual manipulability conditions by Coupling and No De-Coupling. This replacement ensures that NDC avoids the problems of MM: while MM defines constitution in terms of the possibility of top-down and bottom-up interventions, Coupling and No De-Coupling essentially define it in terms of the impossibility of such interventions. Coupling and No De-Coupling capture what we take to be the characteristic feature of constituents, viz. that they are unbreakably linked to their phenomenon via common causes. Second, on a related note, while MM cashes out constitution broadly on a par with causation, NDC defines it in stark opposition to causation. More concretely, according to difference-making theories of causation, of which interventionism and interventionism∗ are popular instances, a causal relation among X and Y is analyzed in terms of the existence of (possible) probabilistic or counterfactual difference-making scenarios. As §2 has shown, MM likewise renders constitution dependent on the existence of (possible) mutual difference-making scenarios. That is, both causation and constitution are rendered as existentially defined relations. In consequence, that some entities are related in terms of causation or constitution promises to be conclusively verifiable by exhibiting the existence of required difference-making scenarios. By contrast, NDC defines constitution in terms of the nonexistence of (possible) surgical causes. As a negative existential is the same as a universal negation, NDC renders constitution as a universally defined relation. According to NDC, it thus holds that a constitutive relation cannot be conclusively verified; rather, it can only be inductively corroborated. In that light, NDC-defined constitution is much closer to non-causation or causal irrelevance than to causation. To establish that X is causally irrelevant to An Abductive Theory of Constitution 15 Y , according to difference-making theories, requires establishing the nonexistence of a (possible) scenario where X makes a difference to Y . No (finite) data sample could ever conclusively establish this. Due to the fact that it is a universally defined relation, causal irrelevance-just as NDC-defined constitution-can only be inductively corroborated. Of course, NDC does not yield a notion of constitution that is co-extensional with causal irrelevance. After all, constitution is a robust dependence relation, whereas the extension of causal irrelevance encompasses many independent entities. Still, the extension of the notion of NDC-constitution is a proper subset of the extension of the notion of causal irrelevance (as defined by difference-making theories). This squares nicely with our initial background assumption-taken from the canon of mechanistic theorizing-that constitution is a distinctly non-causal form of dependence (Craver and Bechtel 2007). A third manifest difference between NDC and MM is that the former defines constitutive relevance of Φi to Ψ with recourse to sets of variables, whereas, according to the latter, that relation is defined in terms of the pair 〈Φi,Ψ〉 alone. That is, while MM renders constitutive relevance as intrinsic property of the pair 〈Φi,Ψ〉, NDC renders it as extrinsic property of that pair, which depends on whether Φi is contained in a constituting set of Ψ. This does justice to the fact that, contrary to causal dependencies, pairwise constitutive dependencies cannot be isolated from their context; rather, a constituent Φi is an indispensable element of a system that figures as supervenience base realizing Ψ in a given mechanistic context-to the effect that the phenomenon cannot exist without the constituents. At the same time, the set-relativity of NDC-defined constitution does not turn it into a relativized notion. Whether Φi is a constituent of Ψ does not depend on the existence of a particular constituting set but on the existence of any such set. Moreover, No De-Coupling ensures that constitutive relations are constant across variable set expansions. They either hold relative to all expansions of a set that is common-cause coupled to a scrutinized phenomenon or they do not hold at all. 5 Constitutional discovery in a new light As indicated in §2, one of the most attractive features of MM is that it is straightforwardly operationalizable methodologically: to establish that a spatiotemporal part is a constituent of a phenomenon, it is sufficient to produce one successful topdown and one bottom-up intervention each. We have seen, however, that MM does not ground a viable method of constitutional discovery. For reasons of space, we must postpone a methodological operationalization of NDC to another occasion. Still, we want to emphasize that, against the background of NDC, constitutional discovery appears in a very different light than against the background of MM. The role NDC attributes to experimental manipulations of mechanisms differs fundamentally from the role attributed to them by MM. MM calls for top-down and bottom-up manipulations whose intended purpose is to reveal mutual differencemaking. By contrast, NDC-being formulated in terms of common-cause coupling 16 Michael Baumgartner and Lorenzo Casini instead of mutual difference-making-does justice to the fact that there cannot exist top-down and bottom-up manipulations in the first place, that is, manipulations that indirectly induce changes on one level of a mechanism by virtue of directly changing the other level. Rather than for mutual difference-making, NDC requires testing for unbreakable common-cause coupling, which is considerably more challenging than the simple test designs demanded by MM. Whereas, according to MM, one successful top-down and one bottom-up manipulation warrant an inference to constitution, corroborating the unrestricted universal quantifiers in Coupling and the impossibility operator in No De-Coupling calls for a whole battery of severe tests. In a nutshell, the ways of manipulating a phenomenon Ψ and the elements of a candidate constituting set Φ must be systematically altered while the baseline set of modeled variables V is gradually expanded, in order to check whether, outside of V, there exist surgical causes that break the common-cause coupling of Φ and Ψ. That is, testing for the unbreakability of a common-cause coupling calls for maximally diverse manipulations in maximally diverse background conditions. Of course, it will often be infeasible to conduct experiments on the whole space of common causes of a systems's levels, and all variable set expansions are bound to be finite. Therefore, after a finite number of expansions and severe but unsuccessful attempts at breaking recovered common-cause couplings, the satisfaction of Coupling and No De-Coupling by Φ and Ψ must be inductively inferred. This, in turn, licenses an abductive inference to the constitutive relevance of every Φi in Φ.10 By contrast, if variable set expansions reveal a surgical cause of Ψ that does not target any element of Φ, the common-cause coupling of Φ and Ψ is falsified. Note, however, that this does not also falsify the constitutive relevance of a particular Φi in Φ for Ψ. Even if Φ is not a constituting set, Φi might still be contained in another set Φ′, which is unbreakably common-cause coupled to Ψ. That is, while the common-cause coupling of Φ and Ψ is conclusively falsifiable, constitutive relevance of one particular Φi in Φ is not; rather, that Φi fails to be constitutively relevant to Φ can only be inductively corroborated by means of an extended unsuccessful search for a constituting set comprising Φi. Overall, as to NDC, every constitutional inference-be it to constitution or to non-constitution-inevitably involves an inductive leap. Independently of how exactly a viable method of constitutional discovery will eventually look like, we contend that the following methodological consequence of NDC must be respected by any such method. Even under ideal discovery circumstances, no finite number of experimental manipulations can be sufficient for conclusively warranting a constitutional inference. In particular, there does not exist a design for an experimentum crucis for constitution. Rather, establishing constitutive relations requires an extended test series exploring the whole space of 10There is no universal rule determining how much a variable set needs expanding before an inference to constitution as defined by NDC is justified. Rather, the justification depends on the particularities of a given research context (e.g., the size of the original baseline set, the nature of the mechanism under scrutiny, or the amount of available prior knowledge about that mechanism). An Abductive Theory of Constitution 17 possible ways of breaking the coupling of macro and micro levels. Only if these tests are unsuccessful, an inference to constitution is warranted. And since the evidence for the unbreakability of common-cause couplings is never conclusive, constitution can only be inductively corroborated. 6 Conclusion If, as is standardly assumed in mechanistic theorizing, constitution is a non-causal form of dependence, and phenomena are non-reductively supervening on their constituents, constitution cannot be adequately accounted for in terms of mutual difference-making relations, along the lines of Craver's (2007) mutual manipulability theory (MM)-which likewise invalidates all accounts of mechanistic explanation based on MM. The reason is that different levels of a mechanism can only be manipulated simultaneously, on different causal paths. In other words, the top-down and bottom-up interventions required by MM are impossible, because phenomena and their constituents can only be manipulated with a fat hand. In light of the inevitable fat-handedness of interventions on mechanisms the inference to constitution is inherently underdetermined by evidence: for every constitutional model there exists an empirically equivalent pure common-cause model. In that light, this paper developed an abductive theory of constitution (NDC), according to which constitution is a dependence relation that best explains why phenomena and some of their spatiotemporal parts are unbreakably coupled via common causes. Rather than in terms of the possibility of mutual differencemaking scenarios, NDC spells out constitution in terms of the impossibility of such scenarios. Against that background, constitutional inference and discovery appear in a new light. Subject to NDC, establishing that Φ is a constituent of Ψ amounts to establishing that Φ is contained in a set Φ that is unbreakably common-cause coupled to Ψ; this, in turn, calls for a whole battery of experiments exploring the space of possible manipulations of the scrutinized system. The abductive inference to constitution is warranted only if all attempts to de-couple Φ and Ψ have failed. An obvious question remains: is it possible to faithfully reconstruct constitutional reasoning in science in terms of NDC? Craver (2007) contends that MM provides a faithful reconstruction of scientific practice, and he has undertaken considerable efforts to interpret real-life studies on the basis of MM. We have done none of that sort for NDC here. Still, our results demonstrate that MM cannot ground a viable method of constitutional discovery. Hence, if we grant practicing scientists that they uncover constitutive relations based on some viable method- whichever this may be-MM cannot faithfully reconstruct their practice. How well NDC fares in this respect is thus the crucial follow-up question to be answered in future work. Acknowledgements We thank the audiences of the annual conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, Manchester, 2–3 July 2015, and of the European Soci18 Michael Baumgartner and Lorenzo Casini ety for the Philosophy of Science, Düsseldorf, 23–26 September 2015. We are especially grateful to Beate Krickel for very helpful comments and discussions, and to three anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier versions of the paper. This research was generously supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation, grant no. PP00P1 144736/1 for MB and grant no. CRSII 1 147685/1 for LC. References Baumgartner, M. and A. Gebharter (2015). 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A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S FOLIA GERMANICA 6, 2010 Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska∗ ÜBERLEGUNGEN ZUR ISOCHRONIE-HYPOTHESE UND RHYTHMUSTYPOLOGISCHEN KLASSIFIZIERUNG VON SPRACHEN (SILBENVS. AKZENTZÄHLEND) AM BEISPIEL DES POLNISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN 1. Vorbemerkungen In der phonetisch-phonologischen Fachliteratur begegnet man in den letzten Jahrzehnten einer Reihe von Publikationen, die u.a. der rhythmustypologischen Klassifizierung von Sprachen gewidmet sind. So sind an dieser Stelle folgende Arbeiten zu nennen: Die Pilotstudie von Kaltenbacher (1998) mit amerikanischen, russischen und japanischen Muttersprachlern als Versuchspersonen, die kontrastive Gegenüberstellung des Sprechrhythmus im Russischen und Deutschen von Stock und Veličkova (2002a, b; vgl. auch Schurova 1999; Malachova 1999), des Weiteren kontrastive Untersuchungen zum Rhythmus des Deutschen und des britischen Englisch von Benkwitz (2004) und zuletzt eine Fehleranalyse in Bezug auf den Rhythmuserwerb mit L1 Polnisch und L2 Deutsch von Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska (2005; 2009). Aus sprechwissenschaftlicher Sicht ist die rhythmusbezogene Klassifikation von Sprachen hauptsächlich im Hinblick auf die didaktisch-methodischen Ansätze des Fremdsprachenlehrens und -lernens von Interesse (vgl. Benkwitz 2003, S. 24). In dem vorliegenden Beitrag werden einige grundlegende Fragen zur herkömmlichen Klassifizierung der Weltsprachen nach zwei Rhythmustypen (akzentvs. silbenzählend) erörtert werden: Zunächst werden die Grundlagen der (umstrittenen) Isochronie-These skizziert, anschliessend daran einige phonetische Untersuchungen vorgestellt sowie der phonetisch-phonologische Rettungsversuch der Sprachtypologie im Hinblick auf den Rhythmus problematisiert. ∗ Dr. Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska, Lehrstuhl für deutsche und angewandte Sprachwissenschaft, Universität Łódź. [135] Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska 136 2. Zur Genese der Isochronie1-Hypothese Die Debatte um den Rhythmus in der gesprochenen Sprache begann mit dem ersten systematischen Werk über die Prosodie des Englischen unter dem Titel: An Essay towards Establishing the Melody and Measure of Speech to be Expressed and Perceptuated by Peculiar Symbols des ersten englischen Prosodisten Joshua Steele (1775). Nach ihm setzt die rhythmische Organisation als Bezugsgrösse immer (nicht nur in der Musik) ein festes Taktmuster, d.h. eine Folge gleicher (isochroner) Zeitintervalle voraus: It is the office of RHYTHMUS, aided by the influence of this instinctive POIZE, to regulate the whole duration of any melody or movement by an exactly equal and periodical pulsation, until it is thought proper to change the measure, for some other uniform pulsation, either quicker or slower (Steele 1775, S. 117). Den für den Rhythmus typischen Wechsel zwischen schweren und leichten – oder emphatischen und unemphatischen – Silben sah Steele also im Zusammenhang mit dem rhythmischen Pulsieren, das natürlicherweise den (steigenden und fallenden) Bewegungen der menschlichen Füsse beim Gehen entspringt.2 Eine klassische Isochronie-Definition für die Linguistik formulierte, ausgehend von der rhythmischen Einheit (rhythm-units),3 Kenneth L. Pike (1945). Seine These besagte u.a. Folgendes: This units tend to follow one another in such a way that the lapse of time between the beginning of their prominent syllables is somewhat uniform. [...] the recurrent stress timing is perhaps even more important than the number syllables [...]. Because its length [von ,single rythm unit'] la largely dependent upon the presence of one strong stress, rather than upon the specific number of its syllables, it may conveniently be labeled STRESS-TIMED rhythm unit (a phonemic type in contrast to syllable-timed units) (Pike 1945, S. 34ff.). 1 Isochronie (gr. ísos – gleich, chrónos – Zeit) als eine zeitlich gleichmässige Abfolge von Elementen (vgl. Duden „Ethymologie" 1989, S. 112 und 311). 2 Sein erster Nachfolger war Daniel Jones (1918), der die Isochronie der menschlichen Sprache auch als elementares Merkmal des Rhythmus betrachtete. 3 Die Bausteine von rhythmischen Einheiten – rhythmischen Gruppen bzw. Akzentgruppen (vgl. Stock 1996, S. 70) – sind Silben, wobei sich (mehrere) unbetonte Silben um eine betonte gruppieren. Im Englischen werden solche Einheiten herkömmlich als feet bezeichnet (vgl. Hall 1995, S. 115); im Deutschen auch als Takte, Füsse (vgl. Stock 2000, S. 4) und im Polnischen als jednostka akcentowa, grupa akcentowa, zestrój akcentowy (vgl. Dukiewicz, Sawicka 1995, S. 79). Zur Unterscheidung zwischen rhythmischer Gruppe, Fuss und Takt vgl. auch Grzeszczakowska- -Pawlikowska (2009, S. 21). Überlegungen zur Isochronie-Hypothese und rhythmustypologischen Klassifizierung... 137 Somit stellte Pike – ohne jegliche Evidenz – die akzentzählende rhythmische Einheit (stress-timed unit) einer silbenzählenden Einheit (syllable-timed unit), in der Silben, und nicht Akzente, in gleichen Zeitabständen aufeinander folgen, gegenüber: Many non-English languages (Spanish, for instance) tend to use a rhythm which is more closely related to the syllable than the regular stress-time of English; in this case, it is the syllables, instead of stresses, which tend to come at more-or-less evenly recurrent intervals [...]. The type may be called a SYLLABLE-TIMED rhythm unit [...] (Pike 1945, S. 34ff.). Dabei sprach er lediglich von einer Tendenz zur regelmässigen Akzentbzw. Silbenabfolge (vgl. auch Dauer 1983, S. 51), im Gegensatz zu Abercrombie (1967), der das Isochronie-Prinzip als grundlegend für die gesprochene Sprache auffasste. Somit gilt er bis heute als strengster Befürworter der These. Ausgehend von Stetsons (1928) Silbentheorie4 brachte er die Silbenproduktion (den sog. chest-pulse, der an der Hervorbringung von Silben beteiligt ist, und den sog. stress-pulse, der die Erzeugung betonter Silben begleitet) und den sprechsprachlichen Rhythmus in einen engen Zusammenhang: These two processes – the syllable process and the stress process – together make up the pulmonic mechanism, and they are the basis on which the whole of the rest of speech is built. Different languages co-ordinate the two processes in different ways, and the manner in which they are combined, that is to say the manner in which stressed and unstressed syllables succeed each other, is what produces the rhythm of a language (Abercrombie 1967, S. 36). Abercrombie zufolge können die oben beschriebenen Prozesse auf zweifache Weise miteinander kombiniert werden, so dass dementsprechend zwischen zwei Rhythmusarten zu unterscheiden ist:5 As far as is known, every language in the world is spoken with one kind of rhythm or with the other. In the one kind, known as a syllable-timed rhythm, the periodic recurrence of movement is supplied by the syllable-producing process: the chestpulses, and hence the syllables, recur at equal intervals of time – they are isochronous. French, Telugu, Yoruba [...] are syllable-timed languages. In the other kind, known as a stressed-timed rhythm, the periodic recurrence of movement is supplied by the stress-producing process: the stress-pulses, and hence the stressed syllables, 4 Im Rahmen der Silbentheorie wurde Silbe als „a movement of the speech organs" (Stetson 1928) bezeichnet. 5 Inzwischen wurde die Silbentheorie von Stetson (1928) sowohl aus medizinischer als auch linguistischer Sicht kritisiert (vgl. u.a. Völtz 1990, S. 15). Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska 138 are isochronous. English, Russian, Arabic [...] are stressed-timed languages (Abercrombie 1967, S. 97). Pike (1945) und Abercrombie (1967) gemeinsam war ihr Streben nach einer rhythmustypologischen Spracheinteilung mit Isochronie als entscheidendem Kriterium. Dies bedeutete allerdings eine strenge Dichotomie, die auf zwei Interpretationsweisen dieses Phänomens fusste: der Akzent-Isochronie in den sog. akzentzählenden Sprachen (stress-timed languages), in denen die betonten Silben isochron – in gleichen Zeitabständen – aufeinander folgen sollten, und der Silben-Isochronie in den sog. silbenzählenden Sprachen (syllable-timed languages), in denen alle Silben isochron (gleich) sein sollten. Die rhythmustypologische Unterscheidung von Sprachen mit dieser Isochronie-Auffasung im Vordergrund implizierte zugleich unterschiedliche phonetische Behandlung von unbetonten Silben: Während in den akzentzählenden Sprachen die rhythmische Komprimierung der Silben auf Grund der regelmässigen Zeitabstände von Akzenten in den mehrsilbigen Einheiten zu allerart Reduktionen der unbetonten Silben (Dauerreduktionen, Verwischung der Vokalqualität) oder in einigen Fällen sogar zu einem Silbenausfall führt, wachsen in den silbenzählenden Sprachen die Abstände zwischen zwei Akzenten in Abhängigkeit mit der zunehmenden Silbenzahl proportional an, wobei die Dauer betroffener rhythmischer Einheiten nicht konstant bleibt. Einerseits liegt also die verschiedene Silbenlänge vor, die nicht nur von charakteristischen phonetischen Parametern einzelner Laute abhängt, sondern auch von der Silbenzahl in der jeweiligen rhythmischen Einheit, andererseits sind die Ausgleichstendenzen innerhalb von Silben zu erwarten (vgl. Auer, Uhmann 1988, S. 217ff.): If the unstressed syllables are each made abrupt, the unit becomes somewhat STACCATO.6 If the unstressed syllables are more or less equally timed, and some what prominent, but glided or smoothed together, the general impression is that of a SPOKEN CHANT (Pike 1945, S. 35). Die beiden Rhythmuskategorien wurden seit Pike und Abercrombie um weitere Sprachen erweitert. Zu den akzentzählenden Sprachen gehören z.B. nach der Übersicht von Dauer (1983, S. 56) Thai, das Brasilianische Portugiesisch, auch Newari, Chepang, Gurung, Tamang (Indianersprachen) und germanische 6 Die Begriffe staccato vs. legato bezeichnen in der phonetischen Fachliteratur ebenfalls zwei Rhythmusarten. So spricht Hakkarainen (1995, S. 151) von einem Staccato-Hörseindruck in den germanischen Sprachen. Diese Bezeichnungen sind allerdings ziemlich irreführend und entsprechen nicht in jedem Fall den etablierten Termini akzentvs. silbenzählend. Man bezeichnet z.B. den Rhythmus des Russischen als legato (vgl. Stock 1996, S. 69). Zugleich wird diese Sprache als akzentzählend anerkannt (vgl. Stock 1998, S. 3; Couper-Kuhlen 1986, S. 55). Überlegungen zur Isochronie-Hypothese und rhythmustypologischen Klassifizierung... 139 Sprachen: Deutsch, Schwedisch und Dänisch (vgl. Auer, Uhmann 1988, S. 218). Zu den silbenzählenden Sprachen werden demgegenüber auch gezählt: Hindi, Tamil, Indonesisch, Japanisch (vgl. Dauer 1983), Finnisch (vgl. Hakkarainen 1995, S. 151), Italienisch,7 Türkisch, die gesamte Munda-Sprachenfamilie (vgl. Auer, Uhmann 1988), das Ungarische (Bussmann 1990, S. 64) und das Tschechische (Metzler Lexikon Sprache 1993, S. 513). Die herkömmliche rhythmustypologische Sprachklassifizierung etablierte sich weitgehend in der Linguistik, auch wenn sie inzwischen als solche auf Grund einer Reihe von experimentellen phonetischen Untersuchungen auf ihre Haltbarkeit hin verifiziert, und sogar abgelehnt wurde. Darauf wird im Folgenden eingegangen. 3. Untersuchungen zur Isochronie-Hypothese Schon bei Classe (1939, S. 90) erwies sich die Isochronie-Hypothese, zum ersten Mal im Labor experimentell untersucht, wenigstens in ihrer strengen Version als Hauptkriterium für die dichotomische Unterscheidung von Weltsprachen in zwei Rhythmusgruppen als nicht nachweisbar: [...] isochronism often means nothing more than a sort of ideal which may be frequently realized, but more is not. Dennoch ist das (Akzent)-Isochronie-Phänomen laut Classe ein spürbares Merkmal, das immer vorhanden zu sein scheint – zumindest als grundlegende Tendenz unter folgenden Voraussetzungen: [...] the groups concerned must not contain very different numbers of syllables; the phonetic structure of the component syllables must not differ too widely; the grammatical connexion between the groups and the grammatical structure of these groups must be similar (Classe 1939, S. 85). 3.1. Untersuchungen zur Isochronie-Hypothese in der Domäne der Sprachproduktion Seit der Etablierung der herkömmlichen Sprachklassifikation im Sinne von Pike (1945) und Abercrombie (1967) in Bezug auf ihren akzentvs. silbenzählenden Rhythmus löste die Isochronie-Hypothese zahlreiche experimentelle Versuche aus. Anfangs wurde sie zunächst in der Domäne der Sprachproduktion 7 Italienisch bleibt wird bei Dauer (1983, S. 56) neben dem Griechischen unklassifiziert. Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska 140 untersucht, wobei das Untersuchungsziel von der Zugehörigkeit der gegebenen Sprache zu einer der Rhythmusgruppen abhing. Um isochrone Abstände zwischen den Akzentsilben bzw. die Isochronie aller erzeugten Silben nachweisen zu können, wurde die gesprochene Sprache nach bestimmten Kriterien zunächst akustischen Messungen unterzogen: Man analysierte entweder die Fussdauer in Abhängigkeit von der Silbenzahl im Fuss in den akzentzählenden Sprachen oder die Silbenlänge bzw. die zeitlichen Abstände zwischen den einzelnen Silben in den silbenzählenden Sprachen. 3.1.1. Einzelsprachlich angelegte Untersuchungen Die ersten Experimente wurden vor allem einzelsprachlich (mit Englisch als Untersuchungsgegenstand) angelegt. Es konnten zwar keine Befunde für die Isochronie der Akzentstellen geliefert werden (vgl. Shen, Peterson 1962; O'Connor 1965, 1968), es wurden allerdings jeweils bestimmte Faktoren (die Silbenstruktur bzw. ein durchschnittlich schnelles Tempo des Nachrichtenstils) genannt, die von einer determinierten Tendenz zur Isochronie sprechen liessen (vgl. Bollinger 1965; Uldall 1971, 1972). Darüber hinaus verweist Lehiste (1977, S. 253) auf die weitgehend detaillierten Studien von Lea (1974), der eine lineare Zunahme der Fussdauer bei steigender Anzahl der unbetonten Silben feststellte, womit der zentrale Teil der Pikeschen Definition von den regelmässigen Zeitabständen zwischen den Akzentstellen bei einem geringen bzw. keinem Einfluss der Zahl von unbetonten Silben auf den Zeitintervall zwischen den betonten Silben widerlegt wurde (vgl. auch Uldall 1978). Im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchungen von Lehiste, die der Überprüfung der Annahme von Classe (1939, S. 85) von der Tendenz zur Isochronie unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen (siehe Kap. 1) dienten, stand nicht nur die interne Struktur der Füsse unter ausschliesslicher Berücksichtigung der Silbenzahl (die Fussdauer), sondern auch die Position der Füsse in den intonatorischen Phrasen. Das Resultat der Messungen sprach einerseits für die Isochronie, andererseits – dagegen: The same foot types – like monosyllabic metric feet or disyllabic long-short feet – had remarkably similar durations, especially in position 2 and 3 (the sentences consisted of four metric feet). [...] there were clear differences between the average durations of different foot type in the same position (Lehiste 1977, S. 253ff.). Daraus konnte Folgendes geschlussfolgert werden: Sowohl die Platzierung der Füsse als auch ihre interne Struktur haben einen entscheidenden Einfluss auf ihre Dauer. Laut Auer und Uhmann (1988, S. 224ff.) sind allerdings Lehistes Untersuchungsergebnisse für die Isochronie-Hypothese nicht ausschlaggebend, Überlegungen zur Isochronie-Hypothese und rhythmustypologischen Klassifizierung... 141 da von ihr weitgehend nur Gleiches mit Gleichem verglichen wurde. Bei der Messung variierender Fussgrössen sollten den beiden Autoren zufolge die Abweichungen erwartungsgemäss noch weiter ansteigen. Zu negativen Ergebnissen bezüglich der Isochronie in der Sprachproduktion führten ebenfalls messphonetische Experimente an anderen Sprachen. So konnte im Hinblick auf die Fussund Silbendauer im Brasilianischen Portugiesisch u.a. festgestellt werden, dass die Dauer der Intervalle zwischen den Akzenten nicht proportional zur Anzahl intervenierender unakzentuierter Silben anwächst und dass die Silbendauer nicht konstant, sondern umgekehrt proportional zur Anzahl der Silben im Fuss ist. Die Gesamtfussdauer ist jedoch nicht nur von der Anzahl der Silben abhängig, sondern auch von der Iktusposition (vgl. Majors 1981, 1985). Auch sehr undeutlich waren die Versuchsresultate zur Dauer von betonten und unbetonten Silben im Spanischen, einer nach Pike (1945) prototypisch silbenzählenden Sprache. Auer, Uhmann (1988, S. 226) führen eine Übersicht von Messdaten verschiedener Autoren (vgl. Olson 1972; Delattre 1966; Gili Y Gaya 1940) an, aus denen sich ergibt, neben der phonetischen Hervorhebung habe auch die Silbenstruktur und -position einen bedeutenden Einfluss auf ihre Länge. Ausserdem spielt hier der Faktor Inhaltsvs. Funktionswörter ebenfalls eine entscheidende Rolle. Darüber hinaus sind an Dehnungserscheinungen sowohl Vokale als auch Konsonanten beteiligt (vgl. Borzone de Manrique, Signorini 1983). Im Allgemeinen sind jedoch im Spanischen die Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Silbentypen geringer als z.B. im Englischen, obwohl eine absolute Isochronie auf der Silbenebene nicht gegeben ist (vgl. Auer, Uhmann 1988, S. 227). Ebenso wenig konnte eine messphonetische Evidenz für die Zuordnung des Französischen (vgl. Wenk, Wioland 1982, S. 194) sowie des Italienischen (vgl. Auer, Uhmann 1988) zu silbenzählenden Sprachen geliefert werden. Mit dem kurzen Überblick über die einzelsprachlichen Untersuchungen konnte also Folgendes gezeigt werden: Weder in Bezug auf die Fussdauer noch hinsichtlich der Silbendauer lässt sich die „absolute" Isochronie in der Sprachproduktion finden. Auch die Komprimierungseffekte, die von einer Reihe von Faktoren abhängen, treten in unterschiedlichem Grad in Erscheinung. Daraus wurde geschlussfolgert, dass die Isochronie in ihrer strengen Version im Sinne von Abercrombie (1967) tatsächlich nicht vorhanden ist. 3.1.2. Sprachvergleichende Untersuchungen Angesichts der fehlenden experimentalphonetischen Nachweise für die Akzentbzw. Silben-Isochronie in der Sprachproduktion wollten Auer und Uhmann (1988, S. 230) die Isochronie-Hypothese – zumindest als Tendenz – erst in der Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska 142 Unterscheidung zwischen akzentund silbenzählenden Sprachen als Kontinuum gelten lassen, in dem „akzentzählende Sprachen mehr als silbenzählende die Dauerverhältnisse innerhalb des Fusses ausgleichen, während die silbenzählenden Sprachen mehr als die akzentzählenden die Dauerverhältnisse innerhalb der Silbe ausgleichen." Solche These von einem rhythmustypologischen Kontinuum wurde u.a. von Delattre (1969, S. 295ff.) mit seinen Untersuchungen zu Vokalreduktionen (wahrgenommen als Verdunkelung der Vokalqualität) an unbetonten Silben unterstützt. Aus einer statistischen Analyse der Formanten- -Frequenzen resultierte folgender Reduktionsprozentsatz: im Englischen: 17,78%, im Französischen: 8,69%, im Deutschen: 6,39% und im Spanischen: 3,65%. Die erhobenen Daten sind allerdings laut Auer und Uhmann (1988, S. 235) nur z.T. valid, da infolge der fast ausschliesslichen Verwendung nicht- -germanischer Wörter in Bezug auf das Deutsche der für seine Phonologie typische Schwalaut sowie der Tiefschwa aus |r| gar nicht berücksichtigt wurden. Demgegenüber ergaben sich jedoch aus den sprachvergleichenden Messungen der Fussund Silbendauer an Abercrombies (1967) prototypisch akzentund silbenzählenden Sprachen keine systematischen Unterschiede (vgl. Roach 1982). Die Resultate von Roaches Analysen waren, sogar beim Ausschliessen der Tempoveränderungen sowie bei geringer Sprecherzahl (vgl. Benkwitz 2003, S. 26), ein Gegenargument gegen die angestrebte schwächere Version der Isochronie-Hypothese (vgl. auch Brown 1977) – umso mehr, weil in den bei Abercrombie (1967) akzentzählenden Sprachen (Englisch, Russisch und Arabisch) die Silbenlängen durchschnittlich viel stärker variierten als in den dort zu den silbenzählenden Sprachen gerechneten (Französich, Telugu und Yoruba). Mit sprachvergleichenden Analysen von Englisch und Thai (akzentzählende Sprache), Spanisch (eine silbenzählende Sprache) und Griechisch sowie Italienisch (im rhythmustypologischen Sinne unklassifzierte Sprachen) erhoffte sich auch Dauer (1983, S. 51ff.) positive Befunde für das Aufrechterhalten der Isochronie -Hypothese zu gewinnen. Aus den (schon z.T. auditiv)-messphonetischen Untersuchungen zu Abständen zwischen den betonten Silben zeigte sich dennoch u.a., dass die Unterschiede in der Dauer der Zeitintervalle zwischen den betonten Silben aller untersuchten Sprachen sehr gering waren, und dass die Zunahme der Durchschnittsdauer mit steigender Anzahl von unbetonten Silben ebenfalls sehr ähnlich war (zu erwähnen ist dabei die Ähnlichkeit zwischen dem Englischen, Spanischen und Griechischen), wobei die Abstände zwischen den Akzentsilben mit der wachsenden Zahl der unbetonten Silben selbstverständlich direkt proportional grösser wurden. Nachweisbar war lediglich der Einfluss der individuellen Sprechstile. Dazu konstatierte Dauer Folgendes: we can conclude that difference between English, a stressed-timed language, and Spanish, a syllable-timed language, has nothing to do with the duration of interstress intervals. Furthermore, stresses recur no more regularly in English than they do in Überlegungen zur Isochronie-Hypothese und rhythmustypologischen Klassifizierung... 143 any other languages with clearly definable stress. Rather, what these data reflect appears to be universal properties of temporal organization of language. [...] The regularity in rate across languages is clearly shown by the recurrence of interstress intervals, whereas the rate in terms of syllables per second varies greatly. Es gäbe also keine Erklärung dafür, das Englische als weniger silbenzählend zu bezeichnen als z.B. Italienisch. Im Hinblick auf alle bisher erhobenen Daten halten Auer und Uhmann (1988, S. 236) fest, die Isochronie-Hypothese lasse sich auch in ihrer abgeschwächten Version durch phonetische Messungen zumindest in ihrer zentralen Komponente (in Bezug auf die Fussund Silbendauer) nicht eindeutig bestätigen. In Anbetracht dessen wurde jedoch der Versuch unternommen, diese umstrittene These von isochronen Abständen in der menschlichen Sprache zu „retten", indem die bisher gewonnenen Ergebnisse auf Grund der Kritik der verwendeten Untersuchungsmethoden einigermassen entkräftet wurden (vgl. Auer, Uhmann 1988, S. 237ff.). Einer der Einwände betrifft z.B. die Domäne der Isochronie. So ist die Isochronie-(Tendenz), Auer und Uhmann (1988) zufolge, „keine Eigenschaft fortlaufender Texte, sondern kleinerer Einheiten; der Bereich der Isochronie muss genauer definiert werden, bevor man misst." Sie verweisen dabei auf Lehiste (1973), die auf die Rolle der Syntax bezüglich der Isochronie- -Muster hindeutete, und auf Rees (1975), der in der Tongruppe bzw. der intonatorischen Phrase, begrenzt von zwei (phonetischen Pausen) einen für die Isochronie entscheidenden Faktor sah. Dennoch gab es im Hinblick auf die Messresultate ebenfalls viele Widersprüche, so dass man „nicht unbedingt mit einem eindeutigen messphonetischen Nachweis rechnen" kann, auch „wenn man die Geltung der Isochronie-Hypothese auf intonatorische Phrasen einschränkt" (vgl. Auer, Uhmann 1988, S. 240). Somit bewährte sich dieser „Rettungsversuch" der Isochronie-Hypothese auch nicht. Zugleich tauchte allerdings die Frage nach der Validität akustischer Messungen auf. 3.2. Untersuchungen zur Isochronie-Hypothese in der Domäne der Sprachperzeption Im Hinblick auf die Unzulänglichkeit intstrumenteller Untersuchungen, Befunde für die Unterstützung der Isochronie-Hypothese in der Domäne der Sprachproduktion zu liefern, sieht Dauer (1983, S. 52) die Ursache dafür in der Dateninterpretation: The problem is how to interpret the data: two intervals of 50 cs and 57 cs are objectively unequal, but are they to be considered the 'same' in production, or at least in perception? Just how large of an objective difference does there need to be for the intervals to be counted as 'different'? (vgl. auch Lehiste 1977, S. 256). Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska 144 Angesichts der Streuung bezüglich der erhobenen Daten ist es tatsächlich danach zu fragen, inwiefern der Mensch in der Lage ist, solche Dauerunterschiede überhaupt wahrzunehmen bzw. wo die Grenzen der menschlichen Sprachperzeption bzw. -produktion liegen. So weist Lehiste (1977, S. 259) auf die Unfähigkeit des Menschen, isochrone Muster zu produzieren, hin (vgl. auch O'Connor 1965) und macht aufmerksam auf Allens (1972, 1973, 1975) Studienserie, laut der die zeitliche Variabilität in der Produktion von Sprachsignalen der Variabilität von anderen rhythmischen Aktivitäten, wie z.B. mit dem Finger klopfen, entspricht. Für kurze sprachliche Segmente sei dabei eine Zeitdauer-Variabilität von ca. 10% charakteristisch,8 für lange Sequenzen – von ungefähr 4%, während die durchschnittliche Rate für die Fehler bei motorischen Rhythmen zwischen 3% und 11% der Länge eines bestimmten Zeitintervalls liege. So variiert die wirkliche Dauer eines Fusses zwischen 488 und 566 msec., auch wenn man sich bemüht, die Fusslänge konstant zu halten (vgl. Couper-Kuhlen 1986, S. 54). Darüber hinaus verifizierte Lehiste (1977, S. 256ff.) die bisherigen Versuchsresultate,9 indem sie vier Stimuli sowohl im nicht-sprachlichen als auch im sprachlichen Signal an ihre Untersuchungen heranzog. Die Aufgabe der Hörer war jeweils zu entscheiden, welcher von diesen vier Intervallen das kürzeste und das längste war. So hatten die Testpersonen im Fall der gesprochenen Sprache erhebliche Schwierigkeiten, richtige Urteile abzugeben, im Gegensatz zu den nicht-sprachlichen Zeitintervallen, die sie meistens ohne Fehler einordneten. Daraus schlussfolgerte Lehiste (1977, S. 256) Folgendes: if listeners cannot identify the actually longest or shortest measures in spoken English sentences, the measures must seem to them to have equal duration; [...] Isochrony would then be a perceptual phenomenon. Auf Grund der Tatsache, dass die Hörer besser mit dem nicht-sprachlichen Material umgingen, konnte zudem festgestellt werden, „that phenomenon is language-bound: isochrony would then characterize spoken language [...], rather than being a general feature of the perception of the rhythm" (Lehiste 1977, S. 256). Im Zusammenhang damit ergab ein anderes Experiment am nichtsprachlichen Material, dass die Hörschwelle für das Erkennen des kürzesten sowie auch des längsten Intervalls für Geräuschblocksequenzen zwischen 30 bis 100 msec. liegt, wobei auch die Position des Intervalls in der Sequenz eine Rolle spielen sollte. Die kleineren als 30 msec. Unterschiede werden überhört (vgl. Lehiste 1975). Infolge dessen konstatierte Lehiste (1977, S. 257), dass sogar 8 Die von Shen, Peterson (1962) oder Lea (1974) festgestellte Zeitdauer-Variabilität für sprachliche Sequenzen war allerdings viel grösser als 10%. 9 Durchgeführt fast ausschliesslich am nicht-sprachlichen Material und nur mit zwei Stimuli, vgl. Lehiste (1973). Überlegungen zur Isochronie-Hypothese und rhythmustypologischen Klassifizierung... 145 ganz grosse Dauerunterschiede in der natürlichen Sprache nicht wahrnehmbar sind und dass die meisten bisher gemessenen Dauerunterschiede in der Sprachproduktion schlechthin nicht wahrgenommen werden: Thus sentences that are not produced with absolutely isochronous intervals between stresses may still be perceived as if the interstress intervals were identical (vgl. auch Völtz 1990, S. 32ff.). Die Schwankungen in diesem Bereich sind also für die Sprachwahrnehmung und -verarbeitung unwesentlich (vgl. auch O'Connor 1965; Uldall 1971).10 Gerade in der Sprachperzeption sahen auch Auer, Uhmann (1988, S. 240ff.) die zweite „Rettungschance" für die Haltbarkeit der These von isochronen Abläufen in der menschlichen Sprache. Wohl nicht ohne Grund wird der (sprechsprachliche) Rhythmus als Wahrnehmungsphänomen bezeichnet, das vom Rezipienten sehr subjektiv empfunden wird, so dass z.B. die Sprecher einer akzentzählenden Sprache eine silbenzählende deutlicher als silbenzählend wahrnehmen als deren Muttersprachler, die wiederum die andere mehr als dessen „native speakers" als akzentzählend einschätzen (vgl. Auer, Uhmann 1988). Laut Auer und Uhmann (1988, S. 242) bekräftigen die von Lehiste gewonnenen Ergebnisse nun die Tatsache, dass das Differenzierungsvermögen des Ohrs, das zwar subtile Tonhöhenunterschiede wahrnehme, nicht aber kleine Unterschiede der Dauer, oft überschätzt werde (vgl. auch Hoequist, Kohler, Schäfer-Vincent 1986). Diese Tatsache bringt Pompino-Marschall (1990, S. 9) mit dem Effekt der dauerbezogenen Überschätzung kürzerer sowie der Unterschätzung längerer Intervalle in Zusammenhang (vgl. auch Woodrow 1951; Fraisse 1963). Demgegenüber werden aber physikalisch isochrone sprachliche Stimuli in Abhängigkeit von ihrer phonologischen Struktur unter Umständen als unrhythmisch interpretiert, was im Rahmen jüngerer Forschung herausgefunden wurde (vgl. Auer, Couper-Kuhlen 1994, S. 82ff.). Andererseits weist Stock (1998, S. 3) darauf hin, dass nicht jede Form der akustischen Anisochronie eine perzeptive Isochronie hervorruft. Deshalb setzt er sich mit dem Begriff perzeptuelle Illusion11 auseinander. Eine experimentelle Unterstützung für die Isochronie in der Sprachperzeption wurde allerdings in einer Reihe von Mitklopfexperimenten gefunden, in 10 Völtz (1990, S. 32ff.) betont allerdings die Abstraktheit der Beweisführung, denn über die Unterschiede in der Perzeption könne nur anhand der subjektiven Bewertung des Hörers entschieden werden. 11 Damit wird von Völtz (1990, S. 36) ein Perzeptionsvorgang gemeint, mit dem Störungen bei der Erzeugung von isochronen Betonungsmustern korrigiert werden. So wird die zugrunde liegende Isochronie wieder hergestellt. Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska 146 denen die Versuchspersonen gebeten wurden, den Rhythmus einer vorgelesenen Passage des Englischen mitzuklopfen. Das Resultat war Folgendes: Es wurde mehr Rhythmus wahrgenommen als es ihn im physikalisch untersuchten Signal gab. Der Effekt sollte wiederum bei nicht-sprachlichen Vorbild-Geräuschen verschwinden, was noch ein weiterer Beweis dafür war, dass er offensichtlich an die Wahrnehmung von Sprache gebunden ist (vgl. Auer, Uhmann 1988, S. 240ff.). Zuletzt sollte noch auf ein wichtiges Phänomen der Rhythmuswahrnehmung, auf das der perzeptuellen Gliederung, eingegangen werden. Laut den Erkenntnissen der Gestaltpsychologie sind rhythmische Strukturen nicht als solche im Signal vorhanden, sondern die Wahrnehmung rhythmischer Gestalten ist ein aktiver Prozess der zeitlichen Gestaltgebung. Folglich sollten sprachliche Rhythmen subjektive Rhythmen sein, wobei die subjektive Rhythmisierung auch Folgen von physikalisch identischen Stimuli (meist in Zweier-, seltener in Dreiergruppen) gliedert und zugleich einen Stimulus (meist den ersten) zum Akzent erhebt (vgl. Auer, Couper-Kuhlen 1994, S. 82): the listener imposes a rhythmic structure on sequences of interstress intervals in spite of the fact that their durational differences are above the perceptual threshold (Lehiste 1977, S. 258). Dabei werde einer der identischen Elemente als stärker wahrgenommen. In Bezug auf die Gliederung tritt laut Lehiste (1977) ebenfalls das oben schon erwähnte Phänomen der Überbzw. Unterschätzung der Dauer von Intervallen in Erscheinung, infolge dessen die nur ungefähr gleiche Dauer von Sequenzen gleicher als in Wirklichkeit empfunden wird. Ausserdem tendieren die Hörer im Allgemeinen dazu, ihre Wahrnehmung von Zeitintervallen einer durchschnittlichen Dauer anzupassen. Die beiden Effekte tragen nach Lehiste zur Perzeption eines regulären Rhythmus in den Sprachen mit einem stress/accent bei. Somit wäre die Isochronie als perzeptuelles Phänomen wohl unbezweifelt. Dennoch ist abschliessend die Frage aufzuwerfen, ob die Isochronie in der Sprachperzeption als ein „sicheres" rhythmustypologisches Kriterium bei der strengen Dichotomie akzentzählend vs. silbenzählend überhaupt gelten kann oder ob sie wenigstens die Sprachen auf einer Skala zu einer der Rhythmusgruppen zuordnen lässt, nachdem die messphonetischen Experimente keine aussagekräftigen Resultate liefern konnten. Dies überprüfte Miller (1984, S. 76). Ausgehend von der These, die starke Version der Isochronie-Hypothese sei möglicherweise irreführend, konzipierte er ein Perzeptionsexperiment. Zugleich nahm er an, die Zuordnung von Sprachen zu einer der Rhythmusgruppen könne von verschiedenen Faktoren beeinflusst werden, wie z.B. unterschiedliches Sprechtempo, unterschiedliche Stilebenen, verschiedene Hörer, verschiedene Überlegungen zur Isochronie-Hypothese und rhythmustypologischen Klassifizierung... 147 Muttersprachen der Hörer bzw. ihre Erfahrung mit Fremdsprachen, usw. Im Hinblick auf die Isochronie in der Sprachperzeption hielt er für glaubwürdiger, „to consider each language as occupying a certain range on a scale varying from strongly syllable-timed to strongly stress-timed" (Miller 1984). Millers Ziel war, „to determine the degree of consensus, if any, on the perception of syllable/stress-timing in seven languages" (Japanisch, Yoruba, Finnisch, Arabisch, Indonesisch, das Argentinische Spanisch und Polnisch). Vier Gruppen von Testpersonen (englische Phonetiker, englische Nicht-Phonetiker, französische Phonetiker und französische Nicht-Phonetiker) wurden gebeten, die jeweils untersuchte Sprache als akzentoder silbenzählend einzustufen. Das Resultat des Experiments war an manchen Stellen unerwartet bzw. sogar widersprüchlich. Nur Arabisch wurde von allen eindeutig als eine akzentzählende Sprache bezeichnet. Daraus schlussfolgerte Miller (1984, S. 82), dass sich die Weltsprachen (oder wenigstens die von ihm untersuchten) nicht in dichotomische Rhythmusgruppen unterscheiden lassen, dass aber jede Sprache im bestimmten Masse durch verschiedene Eigenschaften gekennzeichnet ist, die entweder für den akzentoder den silbenzählenden Rhythmus charakteristisch sind. Folglich kann Isochronie (als perzeptuelles Phänomen) keinesfalls als entscheidendes sprachtypologisches Kriterium in Bezug auf den sprechsprachlichen Rhythmus anerkannt werden (vgl. Auer, Uhmann 1988, S. 253ff.). 4. Rhythmustypologische Klassifizierung des Polnischen und Deutschen 4.1. Phonetische Untersuchungen zur Isochronie im Polnischen Auf die Tendenz zur (Akzent)-Isochronie in den slawischen Sprachen12 machte schon Broch (1911, S. 309) aufmerksam: Bei gewöhnlichem rascheren Lesen [...] habe ich auch eine unverkennbare Neigung beobachtet, den in dieser Weise gebildeten Abschnitten des Satzes gleiche Länge zu geben. Meine Beobachtungen über slavische Aussprache haben mir nirgends so deutliche Ansätze zu <Sprechtakten>, von gleicher Länge, gezeigt. [...] wo ein <Takt> mehrere unbetonte Silben umfasst, wird jede derselben kürzer als dort, wo der Takt nur eine unbetonte Silbe hat. Doch nahm mein Ohr dieses Verhältnis nur beim L e s e n deutlich wahr. 12 Polnisch gehört zur westslawischen Sprachfamilie (vgl. Bussmann 1990, S. 591). Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska 148 Von der Tendenz des Polnischen, annähernd gleiche Zeitabstände zwischen den betonten Silben, unabhängig von der Anzahl der unbetonten, einzuhalten, ist ebenfalls in den gegenwärtigen phonetisch-phonologischen Fachpublikationen die Rede. Diese Erscheinung, die eine kürzere Lautdauer in den aus mehreren unbetonten Silben bestehenden Akzenteinheiten impliziert, wird dort Isochronie der Akzenteinheiten (der Takte) (izochronizm zestrojowy) genannt. Als Erste machte darauf Koneczna (1934) aufmerksam (vgl. auch Dłuska 1946, S. 27; Wierzchowska 1971, S. 211, 217ff.;13 Dukiewicz, Sawicka 1995, S. 80ff., 180) und aus den ersten detaillierten Untersuchungen zur Isochronie der Akzenteinheiten von Richter (1983) ging u.a. hervor, dass infolge dieser Erscheinung im Polnischen ausschliesslich Vokale in bestimmten Positionen komprimiert werden. So betrifft das die Akzentund Nachakzentsilben – konsequent bei verschiedenen Sprechern des Polnischen (vgl. Richter 1983, S. 11). Dadurch erfolgt die Redestruktuierung regelmässiger, obwohl es keine arytmetische Regularität ist (vgl. Dłuska 1946). In der polnischen Sprache überwiegen die zwei-, dreibzw. viersilbigen Füsse, wobei die Zahl von Silben in einem Fuss nicht direkt mit ihrer Dauer14 korreliert (vgl. Dukiewicz, Sawicka 1995, S. 180; mit Verweis auf Biedrzycki 1980, 1985). In längeren komplizierten Füssen bzw. bei schnellem Tempo, emotional gefärbter oder individuell geprägter Sprechweise unterliegt diese Tendenz teilweise einer Störung. In der gegenwärtigen sprachwissenschaftlichen Fachliteratur sind die Angaben über die Zugehörigkeit des Polnischen zu einem der prototypischen Rhythmustypen nicht übereinstimmend. Bei Kohler (1995, S. 117) werden die slawischen Sprachen zu den akzentzählenden Sprachen gezählt. Demgegenüber wird das Polnische in Encyklopedia językoznawstwa ogólnego (Polański 1999, S. 463) (Enzyklopädie für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft), neben dem Französischen und Italienischen, als silbenzählend bezeichnet. Auf Grund der messphonetischen Versuche zu Silbenbzw. Fussdauer an acht Sprachen wollen Ramus, Nespor und Mehler (1999, S. 275) dafür Polnisch (neben: Englisch, Niederländisch, Französisch, Spanisch, Katalanisch, Italienisch und Japanisch) weder als silbennoch als akzentzählend klassifizieren. In Bezug auf die vokalischen Abschnitte weist die polnische Sprache mit 41% (nach Englisch mit 40,1%) den zweigeringsten Prozentsatz auf – gefolgt von Niederländisch und von den vier prototypisch silbenzählenden Sprachen (Französisch, Spanisch, Italienisch und Katalanisch). Hinsichtlich der Standardabweichung von vokalischen Intervallen bezogen auf ihre Dauer befindet sich das Polnische auf der Skala von allen untersuchten Sprachen ziemlich abseits. 13 Dłuska und Wierzchowska beziehen diese Erscheinung nicht auf die Takte (Füsse), sondern auf die Akzentgruppen als rhythmische Gruppe (vgl. Stock 1996, S. 70). 14 Die durchschnittliche Dauer des Fusses beträgt im Polnischen laut Biedrzycki (1980, 1985) 55cs. Überlegungen zur Isochronie-Hypothese und rhythmustypologischen Klassifizierung... 149 Die polnische Sprache wurde auf die Isochronie-Hypothese auch in der Domäne der Sprachperzeption hin untersucht (vgl. Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska 2005; 2009). Ausgehend von der Klassifizierung des Polnischen zu silbenzählenden Sprachen von Polański (1999, S. 463) stellte die Autorin die Annahme auf, dass die zeitlichen Intervalle zwischen betonten Silben von polnischen Hörpersonen – mit (Gruppe A) und ohne Deutschkenntnisse (Gruppe B) – und deutschen Hörern (ohne Polnischkenntnisse) als unregelmässig wahrgenommen werden, wobei diese Tendenz von deutschen Hörern als stärker ausgeprägt bezeichnet wird. Um diese Hypothese zu überprüfen wurden die Probanden jeweils gebeten, die Abstände zwischen den betonten Silben auf der Skala von 1 (als nie gleichmässig) bis 7 (als immer gleichmässig) in dem abgehörten (gelesenen) Testmaterial (ein sachlicher Text vs. eine Anekdote mit Dialogpassagen) zu bewerten. Die Versuchsresultate erwiesen sich zwar als hörerspezifisch, die Annahme konnte aber – anders als erwartet – von deutschen Hörpersonen nicht bestätigt werden, d.h. die polnische Sprache weist laut dieser Hörergruppe eine geringe Tendenz zur Gleichheit von untersuchten Zeitintervallen auf (vgl. Polański 1999, S. 171). Demgegenüber wurden die zeitlichen Intervalle zwischen betonten Silben von polnischen Hörern (Gruppe A und B) insgesamt als unregelmässig bezeichnet (vgl. Polański 1999, S. 172). Keine eindeutige Zuordnung des Polnischen zu einer der prototypischen Rhythmusgruppen (akzentvs. silbenzählend) auf einer Skala von Sprachen (als Kontinuum) ergab sich ebenfalls aus den oben zitierten (siehe Kap. 2.2), auditiven Untersuchungen zur Isochronie-Tendenz von Miller (1984, S. 82). Je nach der Textsorte (gelesener vs. frei gesprochener Text) und je nach Hörern (englische Phonetiker vs. englische Nicht-Phonetiker) wurde Polnisch als Sprache mit einer starken Tendenz sowohl zum Akzent-Timing als auch zum Silben-Timing klassifiziert bzw. es wurde von anderen Hörern (französische Phonetiker vs. französische Nicht-Phonetiker) keiner der Rhythmusgruppen zugeordnet. 4.2. Phonetische Untersuchungen zur Isochronie im Deutschen In der einschlägigen Literatur wird das Deutsche übereinstimmend zu den akzentzählenden Sprachen gezählt (Bussmann 1990, S. 64; Stock 1996, S. 69; Hakkarainen 1995, S. 151; Kohler 1995, S. 117; Völtz 1994, S. 110; Linke, Nussbaumer, Portmann 1996, S. 424; Bose 1999, S. 226; Hirschfeld 1996, S. 46; Kaltenbacher 1998, S. 21; Hall 1995, S. 116).15 15 Vgl. auch Pheby, Eras (1969, S. 51ff.) und Pompino-Marschall (1995, S. 236), die die deutsche Sprache entsprechend als taktzählend und betonungszählend bezeichnen. Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska 150 Auf Grund einer Reihe von Versuchen am Sprachmaterial im Deutschen sowie an Nonsens-Takten konnte Kohler (1982, S. 102)16 zur Realität der Pikeschen (1945) Charakterisierung von stress-timing für das Deutsche letzten Endes feststellen, „dass die Tendenz zur Isochronie eindeutig existiert, dass sich diese Tendenz nicht nur in artikulatorischen Verschleifungen in schwachen Formen manifestiert, sondern auch generell in Dauerkompressionen, dass diese aber durch Silbenzahl und -komplexität sowie durch Betonungsmuster modifiziert werden." Das Deutsche hat allerdings ihm zufolge keine Akzent- -Isochronie: Diese Tendenz lässt sich in seiner strengsten Form infolge artikulatorischer Grenzen bei zunehmender Komplexität und Silbenzahl nicht durchziehen (Kohler 1982, S. 103). Insgesamt begründete Kohler (1991, S. 258) die Pikesche Annahme in ihrer schwächeren Version folgendermassen: There is a tendency to compress as the number of syllables within the same frames increases, but this compression quickly approaches a ceiling when the number of syllables exceeds two. On the other hand, there is also the tendency to vary the durations of reduced unstressed vowels in opposition to the preceding stressed vowel, being a complementary aspect of a tendency to foot isochrony (vgl. auch Untersuchungen zur Vokalund Silbenkompression im Deutschen von Pompino- -Marschall, Grosser, Hubmayer, Wieden 1987). Kohlers (1982) Isochronie-Auffassung für das Deutsche stellt Stock (1998, S. 8) jedoch in Frage. Seiner Meinung nach sind die Dauerkompressionen und artikulatorische Verschleifungen vielmehr auf die phonetische Realisierungsart der Betonung zurückzuführen, bei der „eine Konzentration der Artikulationsenergie auf die Akzentsilben" auf Kosten der „Schwächung der akzentlosen Silben [...] und deren temporaler Raffung, ohne das ein höheres rhythmisches Prinzip dafür verantwortlich gemacht werden müsste", geschieht. Darüber hinaus bezweifeln Stock, Veličkova (2002a, S. 34), ob solche (wie in der Untersuchung) vorgenommene Bestimmung der Takte und damit die der 16 In Bezug auf die früheren Untersuchungen (siehe Kap. 2.1) wendete Kohler (1982, S. 91ff.) allerdings ein, dass beim Ausmessen von Takten das Problem der Silbengrenzen ausser Acht gelassen wurde, infolge dessen die Ergebnisse nicht einheitlich sein konnten. Demgegenüber setzte die von ihm angewandte Untersuchungsmethode einerseits die Berücksichtigung von Silbengrenzen und andererseits einen äusseren Zeitgeber voraus. Die Strategie der Datenerhebung sollte gegenüber früheren Versuchen gerade umgekehrt sein, d.h. es wurde zuerst ein gleich bleibendes Zeitmass vorgegeben und dann untersucht, ob eine vollständige Kompression innerhalb dieses Masses auch tatsächlich möglich ist (vgl. Kohler 1982, S. 92). Überlegungen zur Isochronie-Hypothese und rhythmustypologischen Klassifizierung... 151 Hebungen und Äusserungsakzente in der Kommunikation überhaupt real ist. Ihnen zufolge ist solche Akzentdichte „zwar generativistisch ableitbar, kommt beim Sprechen aber nur durch inhaltsentleerte Skansion zustande. Alltagsversionen ebenso wie rezitatorische Sprechfassungen würden dagegen weniger auditiv erfassbare Akzente aufweisen. Im Ergebnis steigt in unregelmässigen Abständen die Zahl der akzentlosen Silben zwischen den Akzenten und damit die Tendenz zu deren Anisochronie." Im Hinblick auf die Erforschung des Rhythmus im Deutschen ergab sich aus den Messungen der Taktlänge von Pheby und Eras (1969, S. 47ff., 56, 58) ein engeres Verhältnis zwischen der Zeitdauer der verschiedenen Takte als zwischen ihren Silbenzahlen, so dass das untersuchte Material – trotz einer Streuung in den Einzelwerten, jedoch „angesichts der auffallenden Ähnlichkeit der Verhältnisse der Taktdauern bei den verschiedenen Sprechern" – „für eine linguistische Aussage als ausreichend betrachtet" wurde. Somit konnte die Annahme, das Deutsche sei eine „taktzählende" (akzentzählende) Sprache, laut den beiden Autoren bestätigt werden. Pheby (1984, S. 851) zufolge hat dabei die Silbenzahl nur einen sehr geringen Einfluss auf die Taktdauer, d.h.: Im fliessenden Redestrom erfolgt die Artikulation von starken Silben in zeitlichen Abständen, die so regelmässig sind, dass sie phonologisch als gleich gelten, und zwar unabhängig von der Zahl [...] der dazwischen liegenden schwachen Silben. Laut Pheby (1984) ist die Isochronie (diese relative Gleichabständigkeit der Akzentsilben) eine „integrierte Eigenschaft der gesprochenen Sprache", sie bestimmt den Sprechrhythmus im Deutschen. Die im Experiment angewandte Untersuchungsmethode wurde allerdings von Stock und Veličkova (2002a, S. 28ff.) ebenfalls einer Kritik unterzogen. Zwar beginnt für Pheby (1984) jeder Takt mit einer Hebung, die ihm zufolge durch eine akzentuierte Silbe realisiert wird. Laut Stock und Veličkova (2002a) sind solche „sprecherisch realisierten und auditiv erfassbaren Akzentsilben" im Versuch nicht ermittelt worden. Sie ergaben sich den beiden Autoren zufolge „durch Interpretation, indem nach der generativistischen Akzenttheorie bzw. der generativen Metrik [...] die Wortakzentsilben aller Autosemantika [...] und aller deiktisch fungierenden Wörter als derartige Silben bewertet werden." Dabei unterstreichen Stock und Veličkova (2002a, S. 28ff.) Folgendes: Die Produktion und Perzeption rhythmischer Strukturen beruht aber allein auf den auditiv sicher erfassbaren Äusserungs-(Satz-)akzenten, durch die textbzw. situationsangemessen einzelne Wörter (genauer: deren Akzentsilben) im fliessenden Sprechen herausgehoben werden. Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska 152 Darüber hinaus wird von den beiden Autoren auch die andere Auffassung von Pheby und Eras (1969, S. 52), die rhythmische Struktur der deutschen Sprache sei von der Stilschicht unabhängig, bezweifelt (Stock, Veličkova 2002a, S. 31). So konnten die Vorleser (geübte Rundfunkund Fernsehrsprecher) das Versuchsmaterial (einen faktenreichen, emotionsarmen Text) „nur informationsorientiert und mit der Präsentation aller Details, also mit mässiger Sprechgeschwindigkeit und häufigen Akzenten realisieren." Stock und Veličkova (2002a, S. 45) unterstreichen darüber hinaus im Hinblick auf das Abhören des Testmaterials die Zweckmässigkeit der Unterscheidung „zwischen (haupt)akzentuierten, nebenakzentuierten und akzentlosen Elementen." Den beiden Autoren zufolge wird aber in vielen Fällen (wie z.B. bei Kohler 1982) in auditiven Versuchen vor allem auf „Äusserungsoder Phrasenakzente" abgezielt, „auf denen allein das Rhythmuserlebnis basiert. Sie entstehen, indem einige der Wortakzente, keineswegs alle, durch zusätzliche Hervorhebungsmittel auf die Ebene von Äusserungsakzenten gehoben werden. Für Nebenbzw. Sekundärakzente im Wort kommt dies nur sehr selten in Frage. Ohne die Beachtung von Wort-Nebenakzenten sind jedoch die Isochronie- -Interpretationen von Pheby und Eras und Kohler hinfällig." Die zeitliche Platzierung der Akzente im Deutschen (im Vergleich zum Englischen) untersuchte am gelesenen und gesprochenen Testmaterial (drei Textsorten: einem Prosatext, gebundener Sprache und Spontansprache) auditiv ebenfalls Benkwitz (2004, S. 103ff.). Die Frage: „Setzt der/die Sprecher(in) Akzente in zeitlich gleichen Intervallen?" wurde mit Hilfe einer Skala von 1 („trifft sehr selten zu") bis 6 („trifft sehr oft zu") und subjektiver Einschätzung der deutschen Hörer beantwortet. Laut ihnen setzten sowohl die deutschen als auch die englischen Sprecher die Akzente durchschnittlich in gleichmässigeren Abständen im Falle des Prosatextes sowie der metrisch gebundenen Rede, anders als im frei Gesprochenen. Es konnte allerdings nicht eindeutig nachgewiesen werden, wie die Autorin in einer der Hypothesen vermutete, dass die englischen Sprecher „Akzente in perzeptuell gleichmässigeren zeitlichen Abständen als die deutschen MuttersprachlerInnen" (vgl. Benkwitz 2004, S. 84) setzen. Neben den deutlichen Differenzen zwischen den untersuchten Textsorten konnte dennoch gezeigt werden, dass die isochronen Abständen zwischen den akzentuierten Silben „hauptsächlich durch eine flüssige Sprechweise mit gleichmässigem Sprechtempo sowie durch viele Akzente erreicht werden" (Benkwitz 2003, S. 30). Insgesamt konnte eine Tendenz zur Akzent- -Isochronie im Deutschen von Benkwitz, zumindest in bestimmten Textsorten, bestätigt werden. Überlegungen zur Isochronie-Hypothese und rhythmustypologischen Klassifizierung... 153 5. Rhythmustypologische Klassifizierung von Sprachen: akzentvs. silbenzählend. Frage nach einer „entsprechenden" Terminologie Die rhythmustypologische Sprachklassifzierung von Pike (1945) und Abercrombie (1967) mit Akzentvs. Silben-Isochronie als grundlegendem Kriterium – erwies sich letzten Endes – wie oben gezeigt – als starre der sprachlichen Wirklichkeit fernliegende Dichotomie und kann als solche nicht angenommen werden: Auf Grund instrumenteller messphonetischer objektiver Messungen am akustischen Signal wurde kein aussagekräftiger Aufschluss über die Zugehörigkeit einer bestimmten Sprache zu einer der prototypischen Rhythmusgruppen (akzentvs. silbenzählend) vermittelt. Laut Auer und Couper-Kuhlen (1994, S. 83) ist allerdings die Frage nach der Priorität zwischen gemessenen und gehörten Rhythmen auch nicht prinzipiel zu beantworten. Dafür seien komplizierte Theorien notwendig, „um die Beziehung zwischen wahrgenommenen und ‚objektiven' Rhythmen erfassen zu können" (Auer, Couper-Kuhlen 1994). Dennoch konnte in dem vorliegenden Aufsatz gezeigt werden, dass der sprechsprachliche Rhythmus (als mehr oder weniger regelmässige Abfolge von Akzentstellen) vor allem ein subjektives Phänomen in der Domäne der Sprachperzeption ist, indem jeder Menschen – je nach seiner Muttersprache, der Sprache des untersuchten Testmaterials bzw. der gegebenen Textsorte – den vorhandenen Rhythmen jeweils anders wahrnimmt. So kann erklärt werden, warum germanische Sprachen einen Staccato-Gehörseindruck hervorrufen, während romanische wiederum plastischer sind (vgl. Hakkarainen 1995, S. 151). Die Akzentbzw. Silben-Isochronie allein bildet jedoch keine linguistische Grundlage für ein einwandfreies Beschreibungsmodell im Sinne einer Sprachtypologie. Die herkömmliche (ausschliesslich phonetische) Sprachunterscheidung wurde in der einschlägigen Literatur wegen der Übergeneralisierung (d.h. einer eindeutigen Einstufung der Sprachen in eine der beiden Kategorien) sowie wegen der Verallgemeinerung, da die sich voneinander sehr stark unterscheidenden Sprachen wie z.B. Englisch oder Arabisch nebeneinander gesetzt wurden, stark kritisiert (vgl. Dauer 1987, S. 447). Im Hinblick auf den Rhythmus mag es also fraglich sein, ob eine solche typologische prinzipiell festgelegte Differenzierung in akzentvs. silbenzählende Sprachen überhaupt legitim ist, zumal dabei noch zusätzlich viele wichtige Problembereiche, wie z.B. Spracherwerb, Sprachwandel oder zuletzt Sprachvarianten schlechthin ausser Acht gelassen werden (vgl. Dauer 1983, S. 59; Völtz 1990, S. 76ff.). Laut Benkwitz (2003, S. 31) z.B. kann solche „globale Zuordnung von Sprachen zu einem Rhythmustyp nicht aufrecht erhalten werden. Vielmehr wurde auf Grund der Versuchsresultate gezeigt, „dass zwischen Gelesenem und spontan Gesprochenen und auch zwischen gebundener und ungebundener Rede innerhalb einer Sprache unterschieden werden muss." Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska 154 Gerade für die methodisch-didaktischen Zwecke ist jedoch m.E. jeder Versuch, Sprachen rhythmustypologisch zu benennen und somit auch zu beschreiben, gerechtfertigt. Es sollte allerdings eine solche Sprachtypologie angestrebt werden, mit der Kriterien für die Ausprägung eines bestimmten sprechsprachlichen Rhythmus festgelegt werden: Das Ziel einer Typologie sollte [also] [...] nicht die einfache und absolute Etikettierung einer Sprache sein, sondern die relative Einordnung im Vergleich mit anderen Sprachen (Völtz 1990, 76). In dem Sinne wird in dem vorliegenden Aufsatz für eine phonetisch- -phonologische Rhythmusbeschreibung plädiert: The particular rhythm of a language is the result of the interaction of a number of components, including phonetic components, such as the relative length, pitch, and segmental quality of accented and unaccented syllables, and phonological components, such as syllable structure and the function of accent (Dauer 1987, S. 447; vgl. auch 1983, S. 55ff.). In der Phonologisierung der Rhythmustypologie sehen wohl eine Chance für das Aufrechterhalten der prototypischen Rhythmuskategorien ebenfalls Klimov (1987, S. 463) und Strangert (1987, S. 150). So können einzelne Sprachen anhand eines Kriterienkataloges (vgl. u.a. Dauer 1987, S. 448ff.; Auer, Uhmann 1988, S. 253; Völtz 1991, S. 287ff.; Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska 2009, S. 54) jeweils auf ihre (phonetisch-phonologischen) Rhythmusmerkmale hin charakterisiert werden: Tabelle 1. Merkmale des sprechsprachlichen Rhythmus Kriterienkatalog nach Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska (2009, S. 54) Rhythmusmerkmale Prototypisch akzentzählend Prototypisch silbenzählend 1 2 3 Akzentuierung Funktion Akzentregeln Akzent hat einen freien Charakter, ist grammatisch distinktiv. Es gibt komplexe Akzentregeln; typisch sind auch Euphonieregeln. Akzent ist i.d.R. grammatisch nicht distinktiv, hat einen festen Charakter; er kann auch fehlen. Auf Grund eines festen Charakters des Akzents sind die Akzentregeln überschaubar. Überlegungen zur Isochronie-Hypothese und rhythmustypologischen Klassifizierung... 155 Tabelle 1 1 2 3 Phonetische Realisierung der betonten und unbetonten Silben (Kontrast), Vokalreduktionen Es gibt stark ausgeprägte Unterschiede in der Realisierung von betonten und unbetonten Silben; jede unbetonte Silbe wird sowohl qualitativ als auch quantitativ reduziert. Die Unterschiede zwischen den betonten und unbetonten Silben im Hinblick auf ihre phonetische Realisierung sind gering; jede Silbe wird sowohl qualitativ als auch quantitativ vollständig realisiert, Vokalreduktionen kommen nicht vor. Vokalquantität Die Quantität ist ein distinktives Merkmal, kommt nur in betonten Silben vor. Die Vokalquantität tritt neben anderen phonetischen Korrelaten der Akzentuierung in betonten Silben in Erscheinung, hat aber keinen distinktiven Charakter. Struktur und Distribution von Silben (offene vs. geschlossene Silben). Silbengrenzen Offene und geschlossene Silben bleiben in einem nahezu ausgewogenen Verhältnis. Die Silbengrenzen sind schlecht definiert (Ambisilbizität) und oft tempoabhängig variabel. Offene Silben überwiegen an der Gesamtsilbenzahl. Die Silbengrenzen sind konstant und gut definierbar. Der sprachspezifische Rhythmus kann dabei durch die Adition der Teilausprägungen auf einer Skala platziert werden: Je häufiger die Merkmale nahezu vollständig realisiert werden, desto ausgeprägter ist der Rhythmus, während eher ausgewogene Realisierungen auf einen Mischtyp hindeuten (vgl. Völtz 1991, S. 287ff.). Im Falle solch begriffener Rhythmustypologie handelt es sich keinesfalls um eine mathematische Exaktheit, sondern um eine Vorstellung vom Sprachrhythmus überhaupt, die erst in Bezug auf das jeweilige Ziel der Sprachbeschreibung, wie z.B. der Fremdsprachenunterricht, zu präzisieren wäre. In solchem Sinne sind auch die prototypischen Termini akzentvs. silbenzählend17 zu betrachten, d.h. nicht als „absolute Grössen", sondern als „tendenzielle Annäherungen an einen Idealtyp" (Völtz 1991, S. 287). Danach wäre der Rhythmus im Polnischen mit seinem relativ festen Akzent ohne distinktive Funktion, mit fast keinen Unterschieden hinsichtlich der phonetischen Realisierung der betonten und unbetonten Silben, mit überwiegend offenen Silben und mit Vokalquantität ohne distinktiven Charakter – trotz der in der Fachliteratur angegebenen Tendenz zur Akzent-Isochronie und der komplizierten Silbenstrukturen mit Konsonantencluster – eine eher silbenzählende Sprache, im Gegensatz 17 Zur Frage nach der Terminologie stressvs. syllable-timed vgl. Dauer (1983, S. 59). Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska 156 zum akzentzählenden Deutschen mit freiem Akzent vom distinktiven Charakter, phonetisch stark ausgeprägtem Kontrast zwischen den betonten und unbetonten Silben, mit Reduktionserscheinungen, distinktiver Vokalquantität, überwiegend geschlossenen relativ komplexen Silbenstrukturen und schwer festzulegenden Silbengrenzen. 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In: Stevens S. S. (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Psychology, New York, S. 1224−1236. Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska 160 Beata Grzeszczakowska-Pawlikowska ROZWAŻANIA NA TEMAT HIPOTEZY IZOCHRONIZMU I TYPOLOGICZNEJ KLASYFIKACJI JĘZYKÓW WZGLĘDEM RYTMU (SYLLABLE-TIMED VS. STRESS-TIMED) NA PRZYKŁADZIE JĘZYKA POLSKIEGO I NIEMIECKIEGO (Streszczenie) Już w 1775 r. Joshua Steele sformułował tezę o występowaniu równych pod względem czasowym interwałów – nie tylko w muzyce, ale również w mowie ludzkiej. Tak zwana teoria izochronizmu stała się w późniejszym okresie wyjściowym kryterium dla typologicznego podziału języków świata pod względem zjawisk rytmicznych. Na podstawie badań akustyczno-audytywnych niemożliwe było jednak znalezienie empirycznych dowodów co do równości odstępów pomiędzy sylabami akcentowanymi w językach grupy stress-timed ani co do równego czasu trwania poszczególnych sylab w językach typu syllable-timed. Tak więc pierwotny typologiczny podział języków według dwóch typów rytmicznych okazał się nieuzasadniony. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest ukazanie innych kryteriów typologicznego opisu języków pod względem rytmu (tu na przykładzie języków polskiego i niemieckiego), który ma duże znaczenie w dziedzinie językoznawstwa kontrastywnego oraz nauczania języków obcych.

Bayesian Confirmation: A Means With No End Peter Brössel Franz Huber Department of Philosophy Department of Philosophy Ruhr-University Bochum University of Toronto Germany Canada [email protected] [email protected] Penultimate version: please cite the paper that is forthcoming in the BJPS! – Franz Huber, 01/01/2014 Abstract Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry? In this paper we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be saying how worthy of belief various hypotheses are. Then we consider a different use Bayesian confirmation might be put to, namely to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out. Interestingly Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that confirmation be used for this purpose. We conclude that Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end. 1 Contents 1 Introduction 2 2 Bayesian Confirmation Theory 4 3 Bayesian Confirmation and Belief 5 4 Confirmation and the Value of Experiments 12 5 Conclusion 16 1 Introduction Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry, broadly construed? In this paper we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for guiding or prescribing epistemic states, or for guiding or prescribing experimental actions. First we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. Then we consider a different use confirmation might be put to, namely to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out. Interestingly, however, Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that confirmation be used for this purpose. We conclude that there is no need to supplement the general Bayesian framework with Bayesian confirmation theory. Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end.1 1In this paper we focus on showing that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can serve the purpose of guiding or prescribing epistemic states or experimental actions. In other words, we focus on showing that Bayesian confirmation theory, qua normative theory, is a means with no end. An anonymous referee for this journal has raised the point that the 2 We argue as follows. Bayesian confirmation theory defines confirmation as a relation between evidence, hypothesis, background assumptions, and some probability measure. The probability measure is interpreted as an agent's degree of belief function. Since the agent's degrees of belief are used to determine whether the evidence confirms the hypothesis, confirmation cannot be used to determine the agent's degrees of belief, that is, how worthy of belief the hypothesis is. Next we consider a popular measure of incremental confirmation and show that it can be used to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes. Standard decision theory then allows us to form the expected epistemic value of an experiment, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out. Finally we look at the notion of confirmation Bayesian confirmation theorists want to explicate. We find that one particular criterion they impose on their explicans, viz. that old evidence should be able to provide confirmation, explicitly rules out that it be used to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes. This implies our negative conclusion. We proceed as follows. In section 2 we present the tenets of Bayesian confirmation theory. In section 3 we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used to say how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. In section 4 we find that there is a Bayesian conception of confirmation that can be used to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes. However, we also show that this possible use is ruled out – in some cases exBayesian conception of confirmation might serve the purpose of explaining or describing the epistemic relationship between hypotheses and evidence. Even if that were the case, our conclusion – that Bayesian confirmation theory, qua normative theory, is a means with no end – would not be affected. Furthermore, in light of work by psychologists such as Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky [1973], Tversky and Kahneman [1983]) we are skeptical that Bayesianism is a descriptively adequate theory. Since it is not clear to us to what extent a descriptively inadequate theory can be explanatory, we are skeptical of the prospects for an explanatory version of Bayesian confirmation theory. 3 plicitly, in others implicitly – by proponents of Bayesian confirmation theory. We conclude in section 5. 2 Bayesian Confirmation Theory Bayesian confirmation theory is defined within the general Bayesian framework. The latter consists of the synchronic norm that an agent's degrees of belief should obey the probability calculus and the diachronic norm that, depending on the format of the new information received, the agent's degrees of belief should be updated by strict conditionalization or Jeffrey conditionalization (Jeffrey [1983a]) or Field conditionalization (Field [1978]). Bayesian confirmation theory adds two notions of confirmation to this general Bayesian framework: absolute confirmation and incremental confirmation. According to both notions confirmation is a relation between evidence E, hypothesis H, background assumptions B, and some probability measure Pr (and some formal language of sentences or algebra of propositions, which may be ignored for present purposes). Evidence E is said to absolutely confirm hypothesis H relative to background assumptions B and probability function Pr if and only if the conditional probability of the hypothesis given the evidence and the background assumptions is sufficiently high, Pr(H | E ∩B) > r, where r is a number not smaller than 1/2, but smaller than 1. The degree of absolute confirmation of hypothesis H by evidence E relative to background assumptions B is defined as the conditional probability of the hypothesis given the evidence and the background assumptions, Pr(H | E ∩B). Evidence E is said to incrementally confirm hypothesis H relative to background assumptions B and probability function Pr if and only if the conditional probability of the hypothesis given the evidence and the background assumptions is greater than the probability of the hypothesis given 4 merely the background assumptions, Pr(H | E ∩ B) > Pr(H | B). The degree of incremental confirmation of hypothesis H by evidence E relative to background assumptions B is defined as the distance between the conditional probability of the hypothesis given the evidence and the background assumptions, Pr (H | E ∩B), and the probability of the hypothesis given merely the background assumptions, Pr (H | B). There are several ways to measure distance (Earman [1992], ch. 5), and there are other quantities the distance between which can be measured (Joyce [2003]). The way distance is measured, and the quantities between which it is measured, affect the validity of various arguments in Bayesian confirmation theory (Brössel [2013]; Fitelson [1999]). However, these differences do not matter for present purposes. The probability measure figuring in these definitions of confirmation is typically interpreted as an agent's actual or rational degree of belief function. Subjective Bayesians hold that the probability function is interpreted as the agent's actual degree of belief function, properly idealized. Objective Bayesians hold that the probability function is interpreted as the degree of belief function the agent objectively ought to have (Williamson [2010]), or as the degree of belief function the agent is rationally justified to (Maher [2004]). 3 Bayesian Confirmation and Belief Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry, broadly construed? In this section we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. Intuitively, we should believe or accept those hypotheses that are well confirmed. For example, suppose the NASA announces that the analysis of 5 data from a moon probe confirms the existence of H2O. This is generally taken to provide reason to believe or accept the hypothesis that there exists H2O on the moon. Hence, pre-theoretically the information that a hypothesis has been confirmed provides reason to believe or accept this hypothesis. Saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are is also the purpose the founding father of confirmation theory intends for confirmation. In his seminal "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation", Hempel writes: It is now clear that an analysis of confirmation is of fundamental importance also for the study of the central problem of what is customarily called epistemology; this problem may be characterized as the elaboration of "standards of rational belief" or of criteria of warranted assertibility. (Hempel [1945], p. 7) We claim that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for this purpose. The reason for this is purely conceptual and consists in the fact that Bayesian confirmation theory presupposes that this question is already answered. Recall that, according to Bayesian confirmation theory, confirmation is a relation between evidence, hypothesis, background assumptions, and some probability measure. The probability measure is typically interpreted as an agent's (subjective or objective) degree of belief function. This means that confirmation is itself defined in terms of (subjective or objective) degrees of belief. Therefore it cannot be used to say how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are without presupposing that this question is already answered. This is so even if we grant, as we do, that the complete probability function (the complete probability space, if we include the language or algebra) as well as the evidence and background assumptions are transparent to the agent. The reason is simply that Bayesian confirmation theory interprets the probabilities as the agent's (subjective or objective) degrees of belief. 6 Let us go through this argument in more detail. In order to say whether evidence E confirms hypothesis H relative to background assumptions B and probability measure Pr we must specify the probability measure Pr. First consider subjective Bayesians. They interpret the probability measure Pr as the agent's actual degree of belief function, properly idealized. Hence we must specify the agent's actual degrees of belief before we can say whether the evidence confirms the hypothesis. Therefore we cannot use the information that the evidence confirms the hypothesis in order to specify the agent's actual degrees of belief. Next consider objective Bayesians. They interpret the probability measure as the degree of belief function the agent objectively ought to have, or as the degree of belief function she is rationally justified to. Hence we must specify the degrees of belief the agent objectively ought to have, or the degrees of belief she is rationally justified to, before we can say whether the evidence confirms the hypothesis. Therefore we cannot use the information that the evidence confirms the hypothesis to say which degrees of belief the agent objectively ought to have, or which degrees of belief she is rationally justified to. Our argument works as long as the probability measure in terms of which confirmation is defined is interpreted as the agent's (subjective or objective) degree of belief function in the sense of which confirmation should say how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. There are two options to escape the negative conclusion of our argument that Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end. The first option is to say that the probability measure in terms of which confirmation is defined – call it the confirmation function – is different from the agent's (subjective or objective) degree of belief function. The second option is to say that confirmation is a means to some end other than saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. Let us consider the prospects of the first option according to which the 7 confirmation function is interpreted in terms of something other than the agent's degrees of belief. An attempt along these lines, motivated by the problem of old evidence (see the next section) and championed by Howson and Urbach ([1993], [2006]), is to identify the confirmation function with the agent's counterfactual degree of belief function. The proposal is that the support of H by E is gauged according to the effect which one believes a knowledge of E would now have on one's degree of belief in H, on the (counterfactual) supposition that one does not yet know E. (Howson and Urbach [1993], pp. 404–405, notation adapted; see also Howson and Urbach [2006], pp. 297–301) The counterfactual strategy as developed by Howson and Urbach ([1993], [2006]) is generally considered unsuccessful as a solution to the problem of old evidence (Hawthorne [2005]; Williamson [2000], ch. 10). Among others, this is so because it is not clear how to determine the degree of belief an agent would have in H given the "(counterfactual) supposition that [she] does not yet know E." That is, it is not clear how to determine the agent's counterfactual degree of belief function from her actual degree of belief function. However, even if the counterfactual strategy were successful as a solution to the problem of old evidence, it would still not help in escaping the negative conclusion of our argument. The reason is that we need to know the agent's actual degree of belief function before we can determine her counterfactual degree of belief function. Otherwise one cannot determine "the effect which one believes a knowledge of E would now have on one's degree of belief in H." In order to escape the negative conclusion of our argument one must interpret the confirmation function as something that is not merely different from, but also sufficiently independent of the agent's degree of belief function. One way of doing so is to simply stipulate that there exists a confirmation function that is sufficiently independent of, but nevertheless appropriately 8 linked to, the agent's degree of belief function. We call this strategy of solving philosophical problems by simply postulating solutions to them the deus ex machina strategy. The deus ex machina strategy is, of course, an unacceptable move in philosophical theorizing. Presumably no philosopher will ever seriously propose to solve a philosophical problem by it. However, a bad strategy need not be a worst strategy. While there may not be a sharp border separating good strategies from bad ones, other things being equal, strategies are worse the closer they are to the extreme of the deus ex machina strategy. The deus ex machina strategy must not be confused with the indispensable move in philosophical theorizing of postulating that a notion of philosophical interest is primitive. For instance, Williamson ([2000]) argues that knowledge should, or at least may, be taken as primitive, among other things, because attempts to reduce it to notions other than knowledge have failed. He then proceeds to show that other notions of philosophical interest such as assertibility and belief and evidence can be illuminated by, or even reduced to, knowledge. Another example is Woodward ([2003]) who shows that one can say many illuminating things about direct causal relevance in terms of other causal notions in a circular, but not viciously circular way. In these two cases the existence and intelligibility of knowledge and causality (that differs from direct causal relevance), respectively, are taken for granted. While one generally has to argue for the existence and intelligibility of the things one postulates, there are clearer cases such as those of knowledge and causality where this is not so urgent, and less clear cases such as that of the confirmation function where this is urgent. Williamson's work on knowledge and Woodward's work on causality belong to the very best of contemporary philosophy, even though their work bears some resemblance to the deus ex machina strategy. It does so by giving up on attempts to reductive analysis, and by stipulating that there exist such things as knowledge and causality 9 and that they have the properties intuition says they have. Therefore it may not be possible to completely do without elements of the deus ex machina strategy. However, we clearly should try to work with as few of those elements as possible. An account that stipulates that there exists a "degrees-of-support function" that is sufficiently independent of and appropriately linked to the agent's degree of belief function to play the role of the confirmation function is presented in Hawthorne ([2005]). Hawthorne's degrees-of-support function is supposed to be a logical or quasi-logical conception of probability that represents objective or public likelihoods (Hawthorne [2005], pp. 298ff). While Hawthorne ([2005]) states a link between his degrees-of-support function and the agent's degree of belief function, he does not say why we are entitled to assume that there exists a degrees-of-support function. Nor does he tell us how we could possibly determine the quasi-logical or logical degree-of-support of a sentence or proposition. Therefore Hawthorne violates the criterion of ascertainability that has been suggested by Salmon ([1966]) as a condition of adequacy on interpretations of probability (the criterion is also favorably discussed in Hájek [2012], sect. 2). "This criterion requires that there be some method by which, in principle at least, we can ascertain values of probabilities. It merely expresses the fact that a concept of probability will be useless if it is impossible in principle to find out what the probabilities are" (Salmon [1966], p. 64). Indeed, the only reason Hawthorne provides for the existence of the degrees-of-support function is that it solves the problem of old evidence. We think that this account bears too much resemblance to the deus ex machina strategy. A similar account is presented in Williamson ([2000], ch. 10), who stipulates that there exists an "evidential probability" measure that plays the role of the confirmation function. Having in mind the betting interpretation of an agent's degrees of belief Williamson explicitly rejects the demand for 10 an operational definition of evidential probability and merely says that it satisfies the axioms of the probability calculus. The only reason he provides for the existence of the evidential probability measure is his dissatisfaction with the notion of an agent's rational degrees of belief. We agree that there is no need for an operational definition of evidential probability. However, we think that the agent's betting behavior is merely used to measure, not to define, the agent's degrees of belief. In accordance with the above criterion of ascertainability we think that a theory of measurement is something highly desirable. Without such a theory more has to be said about why we are entitled to assume that there exists an evidential probability measure. As with Hawthorne's account of degrees-of-support, but in stark contrast to Williamson's account of knowledge, we think that Williamson's account of evidential probability bears too much resemblance to the deus ex machina strategy. Hawthorne ([2005]) and Williamson ([2000], ch. 10) stipulate the existence of a degrees-of-support function and an evidential probability measure, respectively. Taken as the confirmation function each would be sufficiently independent of, but appropriately linked to, the agent's degree of belief function in order for confirmation to be a means to the end of saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. However, we do not think these authors provide sufficient reason for us to be entitled to assume the existence of these functions. Their accounts bear too much resemblance to the deus ex machina strategy. We both think that the only notion whose existence and intelligibility may be safely assumed and which is sufficiently independent of, but appropriately linked to, the agent's degree of belief function, is the agent's initial or a priori degree of belief function. We both also think that this conclusively establishes that there is no need for confirmation as a means to the end of saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. The general Bayesian framework 11 answers this question satisfactorily and without reference to its supplement Bayesian confirmation theory: Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end. (We disagree about what, if anything, one should do about this, though. See Brössel [ms]; Huber [2005a], [2005b], [2008a], [2008b].) Therefore let us turn to the prospects of the second option according to which confirmation is a means to some end other than saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. 4 Confirmation and the Value of Experiments No Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used to say how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. However, this still leaves open the possibility that confirmation is put to some other use. In this section we consider a popular measure of incremental confirmation and show that it can be used to measure the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out by forming their expected epistemic values. However, we also show that Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out – in some cases explicitly, in others implicitly – that confirmation be used for this purpose, and so defend our negative conclusion from the previous section. One might argue that the epistemic value of an experimental outcome in a test of a hypothesis for an agent consists in the difference the experimental outcome would make to the agent's degree of belief in the hypothesis. In the literature this is referred to as "the potential further support" (Christensen [1999]) or "the additional evidence provided by" (Milne [ms]) an experimental outcome for a hypothesis for an agent. Suppose an agent with actual degree of belief function Pr is testing the hypothesis H by an experiment with possible experimental outcomes E and ¬E against background assumptions B. The difference the experimental outcome E would make to the agent's degree of belief in the hypothesis given the 12 background assumptions can be measured by the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure of factual support F (Kemeny and Oppenheim [1952]; Fitelson [2001], Good [1983], and Pearl [1988] endorse F or measures ordinally equivalent to it): F (H,E,B) = [ Pr (E | H ∩B)− Pr (E | ¬H ∩B) Pr (E | H ∩B) + Pr (E | ¬H ∩B) ] The difference the experimental outcome ¬E would make to the agent's degree of belief in the hypothesis given the background assumptions is measured by F (H,¬E,B) = [ Pr (¬E | H ∩B)− Pr (¬E | ¬H ∩B) Pr (¬E | H ∩B) + Pr (¬E | ¬H ∩B) ] For an agent with degree of belief function Pr the expected epistemic value of an experiment E with possible experimental outcomes E and ¬E for hypothesis H relative to background assumptions B can then be defined in the standard decision-theoretic way as F (H, E , B) = F (H,E,B) Pr (E | B) + F (H,¬E,B) Pr (¬E | B) There are other measures of incremental confirmation besides F , and it is an interesting question which one is best suited for measuring an agent's epistemic value of an experimental outcome for a hypothesis relative to some background assumptions. Importantly, though, Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that any measure of incremental confirmation be used for this purpose. For instance, Christensen ([1999]) wants to capture the support an agent's confidence in H already receives from E (in contrast to the potential further support that might be gotten from raising Pr(E)). (Christensen [1999], p. 449, notation adapted) He thus explicitly rules out that confirmation be used to measure the epistemic value of experimental outcomes. 13 Other philosophers follow Christensen in aiming at an explication of "actualized support" (Christensen [1999], p. 449) as opposed to potential further support. More specifically, many Bayesian confirmation theorists are committed to denying that a measure of confirmation quantifies potential further support, even if they do not deny this explicitly. This can be seen from the fact that they take the following to be a problem for their accounts of incremental confirmation. Recall that evidence E incrementally confirms hypothesis H relative to background assumption B and probability measure Pr just in case Pr (H | E ∩B) > Pr (H | B). On this account, evidence E which receives probability one relative to background assumptions B cannot confirm or disconfirm any hypothesis H. The reason is that the conditional probability of the hypothesis given the evidence and the background assumptions, Pr (H | E ∩B), equals the probability of the hypothesis given merely the background assumptions, Pr (H | B), if the probability of the evidence given the background assumptions equals one, Pr (E | B) = 1. Evidence may receive probability one because it is trivial in the sense that it is highly unspecific or even tautologous. However, on a Bayesian interpretation of probability, evidence may also receive probability one because it is old in the sense that it has been established beyond doubt. This strips the confirmatory potential from highly non-trivial evidence that is maximally believed to be true. Glymour ([1980]) cites the fact that the pre-existing evidence of Mercury's 43′′ arc advance of its perihelion was considered by most physicists as compelling evidence for Einstein's general theory of relativity as one historical instance of this problem, which since is known as the problem of old evidence. Numerous attempts have been made to solve the problem of old evidence. They range from claiming that Pr (E | B) is never one (Rosenkrantz [1983]) to counterfactually reassigning the probability of old evidence (Howson and Urbach [1993], [2006]) to relocating the source of the problem in logical learn14 ing (Garber [1983]; Jeffrey [1983b]; Niiniluoto [1983]). All these philosophers apparently hold that old evidence is, or should be, able to provide confirmation. More specifically, these philosophers apparently hold that if c is a measure of confirmation, then it is, or should be, possible that there is a piece of evidence E and a hypothesis H such that E is old given the background assumptions B, Pr (E | B) = 1, and E confirms H relative to B in the sense of c. However, if c is a measure of potential further support, then c is a measure of incremental confirmation. In this case it is not possible that there is a piece of evidence E and a hypothesis H such that E is old given background assumptions B, Pr (E | B) = 1, and E confirms H relative to B in the sense of c. Put differently, for potential further support, the inability of old evidence to raise or lower the probability of some hypothesis is a precondition rather than a problem. A measure of potential further support cannot account for old evidence, nor should it. It cannot and should not do so for the most general reason that old evidence has, by definition, no potential to further support a hypothesis. Old evidence is, by definition, unable to provide additional evidence for any hypothesis. To sum up: old evidence cannot provide incremental confirmation, and since potential further support is a form of incremental confirmation, old evidence cannot provide potential further support. Therefore all philosophers who take the problem of old evidence seriously cannot want to capture potential further support with their notions of confirmation. This in turn implies that they implicitly rule out that confirmation be used to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out. 15 5 Conclusion In this paper we have argued that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for guiding or prescribing epistemic states or experimental actions. In particular, we have argued that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. We have considered a different use confirmation might be put to, namely to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and so to decide which experiments to carry out. We have seen that Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that confirmation be used for this purpose, either explicitly, or implicitly by taking the problem of old evidence to be serious. We conclude that Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end. Acknowledgements Peter Brössel is especially thankful to his co-author and PhD-supervisor Franz Huber for many valuable and challenging discussions on the topic of this paper and Bayesian epistemology in general. He is also grateful to Hannes Leitgeb for helpful comments on various drafts of the paper. In addition, he would like to thank the participants of the 2012 European Epistemology Networking Meeting and of the Research Networking Programme The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective: New directions in the philosophy of science for feedback on an early version of the paper. Franz Huber is very grateful to Peter Brössel for many helpful and stimulating discussions on Bayesian confirmation theory. Part of Huber's research was supported by the German Research Foundation through its Emmy Noether Program. Both authors are grateful to four anonymous referees for this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions. 16 References [1] Brössel, P. [ms]: 'Rethinking Bayesian Confirmation Theory – Steps Towards a New Theory of Confirmation', unpublished manuscript. [2] Brössel, P. [2013]: 'The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux', Philosophy of Science, 80, pp. 378–97. [3] Christensen, D. [1999]: 'Measuring Confirmation', Journal of Philosophy, 96, pp. 437–61. [4] Earman, J. 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"Knowledge as Credit for True Belief," in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). JOHN GRECO KNOWLEDGE AS CREDIT FOR TRUE BELIEF I begin by reviewing two kinds of problem for fallibilism about knowledge. The first is the lottery problem, or the problem of explaining why fallible evidence, though otherwise excellent, is not enough to know that one will lose the lottery. The second kind of problem is Gettier problems. I will argue that both kinds of problem can be resolved if we note an important illocutionary force of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give the person credit for getting things right. Put another way, we imply that the person is responsible for getting things right. The key idea here is not that knowledge requires responsibility in one's conduct, although that might also be the case, but that knowledge requires responsibility for true belief. Again, to say that someone knows is to say that his believing the truth can be credited to him. It is to say that the person got things right due to his own abilities, efforts and actions, rather than due to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else.i 1. The lottery problem. The lottery problem for fallibilism is stated nicely by Stewart Cohen.ii On the one hand, fallibilists want to say that there can be knowledge by inductive reasoning. Thus fallibilists define themselves against rationalists, who hold that only deductive grounds can give rise to knowledge. On the other hand, it seems that a ticket holder does not know that she will lose the lottery, even if the odds are heavily in favor of her losing. So here is the problem for fallibilism: how is it that in general one can know through inductive grounds, but in the lottery case one fails to know, though one's inductive grounds are excellent? To sharpen the problem, consider two cases of inductive reasoning. Case 1. On the way to the elevator S drops a trash bag down the garbage chute of her apartment building. A few minutes later, reasoning on the basis of past experience and relevant background knowledge, S forms the true belief that the bag is in the basement garbage room. Of course her grounds for so believing are merely inductive: it is possible that the trash bag somehow gets hung up in the chute, although this is extremely 2 unlikely.iii Case 2. S buys a ticket for a lottery in which the chances of winning are ten million to one. A few minutes later, reasoning on the basis of past experience and relevant background knowledge, S forms the true belief that she will lose the lottery. Of course her grounds for so believing are merely inductive: it is possible that she buys the winning ticket, although this is extremely unlikely. Many will have the intuition that S knows in Case 1 but not in Case 2. But how so, given that her reasons are excellent in both cases? This is what the fallibilist needs to explain. a. Nozick's tracking account. The difficulty of the problem is illustrated by some accounts that fail to solve it. According to Robert Nozick, S knows p just in case S's believing p tracks the truth.iv Complications aside, this amounts to the following: S knows p just in case 1. p is true 2. if p were true then S would believe p 3. if p were false then S would not believe p. Nozick's account does a good job explaining why S does not know in the lottery case: if S were going to win the lottery, she would still believe that she is going to lose. However, the tracking account rules incorrectly in the garbage chute case. This is because it is possible, although an extremely unlikely occurrence, that the trash bag gets hung up in the chute. But if the bag did get hung up, S would still believe that the bag is in the basement, and so S fails to satisfy clause (3) of Nozick's account. In fact, the garbage chute case and one's like it were originally formulated as counterexamples to Nozick's account.v b. Sosa's safety account. Let us say that one's belief is sensitive to the truth just in case it satisfies Nozick's clause (3). Ernest Sosa suggests that a belief is better safe than sensitive, where a belief is safe just in case one would have it only if it were true.vi Complications aside, Sosa's suggestion amounts to the following: S knows p just in case 1. p is true 2. S believes p 3 3. S would believe p only if p were true. Alternatively, S would not believe p unless p were true. Sosa's clause (3) is ambiguous between the following two interpretations: Strong Safety: In close worlds, always if S believes p then p is true. Alternatively, in close worlds never does S believe p and p is false. Weak Safety: In close worlds, usually if S believes p then p is true. Alternatively, in close worlds, almost never does S believe p and p is false. But now there is a problem. If Sosa means to endorse strong safety as a condition on knowledge, then his account does no better than Nozick's with Case 1: S would believe that the bag is in the basement even if it were hung up in the chute, and so S fails to satisfy a strong safety condition on knowledge.vii This suggests that Sosa means his safety condition to be interpreted as weak safety. But now his account rules incorrectly that there is knowledge in Case 2: It is true that in close worlds, usually if S believes she will lose the lottery then it is true that she will lose, and so in the lottery case S satisfies a weak safety condition. That is how Sosa's account rules on the lottery case when complications are aside. When complications are not aside, Sosa adds that there are other conditions required for knowledge, or at least for full-blooded, reflective knowledge. For example, in one place Sosa says that a belief's safety "must be fundamentally through the exercise of an intellectual virtue," where an intellectual virtue is a reliable or trustworthy source of truth.viii In another place he says: "For reflective knowledge one not only must believe out of virtue. One must also be aware of doing so"ix But it seems clear that these added requirements do not make a difference in the lottery case, for there S does believe through reliable inductive reasoning, and might even be aware that she does. c. Cohen's contextualism. Finally, consider Cohen's own solution to the lottery problem. According to Cohen, the problem is solved by recognizing that attributions of knowledge are sensitive to context, and, more specifically, that the standards for knowledge are sensitive to context. We have knowledge in cases of ordinary 4 inductive reasoning, such as that employed in the garbage chute case, because the standards that are operative in ordinary contexts are low enough to admit such cases as counting for knowledge. We do not have knowledge in the lottery case, however, because in that context the standards for knowledge are raised-the possibility of winning the lottery becomes salient, and our inductive evidence, as good as it is, does not rule out this possibility. x I do not wish to deny Cohen's general point that the standards for knowledge are sensitive to context-it seems to me that they are. What is less clear is how this is supposed to solve the lottery problem for fallibilism. The problem is that Cohen gives us no explanation why the standards for knowledge should get raised so high in the lottery case. More specifically: he gives no explanation why the standards should be raised beyond S's capacities to meet them. Cohen is quite explicit that he means to remain within the framework of fallibilism. Moreover, in the lottery case it is stipulated that S has excellent (although fallible) reasons for believing that she will lose. So why, on a fallibilist account of knowledge, does S fail to know that she will lose? To be clear, I am not claiming that S does know in the lottery case-I agree that she does not. My complaint is that nothing in Cohen's account explains why S does not know. The same problem can be viewed from a different angle. Cohen says that when S reasons about the odds, the very form of her reasoning makes the possibility that S wins salient. And once made salient, Cohen says, that possibility cannot be ruled out. But again, why can't it be? Why isn't S's reasoning about the odds good enough to rule out the possibility of winning, even once made salient? It has been stipulated that S has excellent reasons for thinking she will not win the lottery, so why doesn't she know that she will not win? In sum, Cohen's contextualism does not explain what it was supposed to explain: given that we are fallibilists about knowledge, and given that we think inductive grounds are good enough to know in other cases, why are S's grounds not good enough to know in the lottery case?xi 2. Gettier problems. It has long been understood that fallibilist accounts of justification give rise to Gettier problems. For 5 example, consider the following. Case 3. On the basis of excellent (although fallible) reasons, S believes that her co-worker Mr. Nogot owns a Ford: Nogot testifies that he owns a Ford, and this is confirmed by S's own relevant observations. From this S infers that someone in her office owns a Ford. As it turns out, S's evidence is misleading and Nogot does not in fact own a Ford. However, another person in S's office, Mr. Havit, does own a Ford, although S has no reason for believing this.xii Clearly S does not know that someone in her office owns a Ford. The problem for the fallibilist is to explain why this is so, given that S has excellent evidence for this true proposition. 3. A proposal for resolving the two problems for fallibilism. We may distinguish two questions one might try to answer when giving an account of knowledge. The first is the "What is knowledge?" question. This question asks what conditions a person must satisfy to count as knowing. The second is the "What are we doing?" question. This question asks what illocutionary act is being performed when we say that someone knows. I will have more to say about the "What is knowledge?" question below. But I think that the key to solving our two problems for fallibilism lies in the "What are we doing?" question. So what are we doing when we attribute knowledge to someone? Clearly, we might be doing any number of things. But one of the central functions of knowledge attributions is to give credit for true belief. When we say that S knows p, we imply that it is not just an accident that S believes the truth with respect to p. On the contrary, we mean to say that S gets things right with respect to p because S has reasoned in an appropriate way, or perceived things accurately, or remembered things well, etc. We mean to say that getting it right can be put down to S's own abilities, rather than to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else. But then this gives us a resource for solving the two problems for fallibilism reviewed above. For in the lottery case, it does seem to be just a matter of chance that S gets it right when S believes that she will lose the lottery. And in Case 3 (the Gettier case), it seems just a matter of luck that S gets it right that someone in her office owns a Ford. In the garbage chute case, however, we think that it is due to S's good reasoning that she gets 6 things right-we give S credit for arriving at the truth in this case, and we are therefore willing to say that she knows. This is the main idea that I want to pursue.xiii The idea needs to be developed, however. For one, my treatment of the two problems remains largely intuitive so far. More importantly, the main idea I am proposing is faced with the following problem. First, I have said that we are willing to give S credit for her true belief in cases of knowledge, but not in the lottery case or in Gettier cases. Second, I have said that this is because in the former, but not in the latter, S's arriving at the truth is due to her own efforts and actions, or more exactly, to her own abilities. But it is not clear why the various cases can be distinguished in this way. Consider that in the lottery case, S uses excellent reasons to draw the conclusion that she will lose. And in the Gettier case, S reasons flawlessly to the conclusion that someone in her office owns a Ford. But then it seems that S arrives at the truth because of her abilities in all of the cases above, and not only in the cases where we judge that S has knowledge. Clearly, more needs to be said. By way of saying more, I will draw on some important work in moral theory. Specifically, I want to look at Joel Feinberg's fascinating discussion of attributions of moral blame.xiv From this it will be easy enough to construct a general theory of credit attribution, and a theory of intellectual credit attribution in particular. With this groundwork in place, it will be possible to explain why it is appropriate to give S credit for her true belief in cases of knowledge, and appropriate to withhold such credit in the lottery case and Gettier cases. More specifically, it will be possible to explain why, in cases of knowledge, it is appropriate to say that S gets things right because of her own abilities, whereas in the lottery case and Gettier cases, it is appropriate to deny this. a. Feinberg on blaming. Feinberg's account of moral blaming takes off from the following central idea: When we attribute blame to a person for some occurrence, part of what we are doing is assigning causal responsibility to that person for the occurrence. Put another way, when we blame S for X's occurring, we imply that S figures importantly into a correct causal explanation of why X occurred. To get further 7 insight into our practices of blaming, therefore, Feinberg makes some observations about the pragmatics of causal explanations in general. One important aspect of causal explanation language is this: In general, when we say that Y occurs because X occurs, or that Y's occurring is due to X's occurring, we mark out X's occurring as a particularly important or salient part of the causal story behind Y's occurring. For example, to say that the fire occurred because of the explosion is not to say that the explosion caused the fire all by itself. Rather, it is to say that the explosion is a particularly important part, perhaps the most important part, of the whole story. Or to change the example: to say that the fire occurred because of S's negligence is not to say that S's negligence caused the fire all by itself. Rather, it is to say that S's negligence is a particularly salient part, perhaps the most salient part, of the set of relevant factors that caused the fire.xv What determines salience? Any number of things might, but Feinberg cites two kinds of consideration as particularly important. First, among the various necessary parts of a complete causal process, an explanation will often pick out what is abnormal in the case, or what is contrary to expectations. For example, we will say that sparks caused the fire if the presence of sparks in the area is not normal. That explanation would misfire, however, if we were trying to explain the cause of a fire in a welding shop, where sparks are flying all the time. Or suppose that a white elephant walks into a room and causes a panic. Of course the white elephant entering the room is not sufficient all by itself to cause the panic-it would not if the room were part of a zoo and the people inside were animal trainers. But if the room is a place where white elephants are not expected to be, and if the people inside are as we would expect them to be, we have no trouble picking out the elephant as "the" cause of the commotion. Another major factor governing salience is our interests and purposes. For example, often when we are looking for something's cause we are looking for something that we can manipulate to good effect. If the thing to be explained is smoke coming from the engine, for example, we will look for a part that needs to be replaced. Here it is perfectly appropriate to say that the cause of the smoke is the malfunctioning carburetor, although clearly a faulty carburetor cannot cause smoke all by itself. Or witness the various explanations of New York City's plunging crime rate. The police attribute it 8 to good policing, the Mayor attributes it to broader social policy, and opposing politicians attribute it to things over which the Mayor has no control, such as an upturn in the national economy. Of course any honest person would admit that the crime rate is influenced by all of these things. But different people have different interests, and so highlight different parts, of the causal conditions that were together sufficient for the drop in crime. None of this need be insincere, nor is salience something that is merely subjective. The argument over "the" cause of the drop in crime is an argument over which of many causal factors should be deemed most important, given our collective interests and given what we know about human behavior, how we want to spend limited resources, what policies have what costs, etc. Likewise, a correct explanation of what caused a panic focuses on what is in fact abnormal about the situation. As was noted above, if the presence of elephants in the room were not in fact abnormal, then a correct explanation would have to focus elsewhere. In sum, correct causal explanations pick out some salient necessary part of a total set of causal factors, where salience is determined by a number of factors, including what is in fact normal and what are our actual interests. xvi We may now revisit Feinberg's point that attributions of blame imply causal explanations. This is most obvious in cases where the thing for which the person is blamed is a consequence of the person's actions. For example, to blame someone for the fire is to imply that her actions caused it: she is the one who struck the match, or who did not pay attention, or who did pay the arsonist. Alternatively, we can blame a person for the action itself, implying that she herself was the action's cause, or perhaps that her choice was or her efforts were. As Feinberg notes, the distinction between blaming someone for her action and blaming someone for a consequence of her action is often merely verbal. For example, we can say either "She caused the fire by striking the match," or "She started the fire." Likewise, "She caused his death by poisoning his food," substitutes for "She killed him." Finally, Feinberg argues that when we blame someone for an action we imply that the action reveals something important about the person himself: "In general, I should think, a person's faulty act is registerable only if it reveals what sort of person he is in some respect about which others have 9 a practical interest in being informed."xvii Feinberg's position is perhaps too strong on this point; it would seem that people can be rightfully blamed for actions that are out of character. Nevertheless, there does seem to be a kind of blame that Feinberg is right about. In other words, even if not all blaming implies that the person's action reveals a faulty character, there is a strong sort of blame, which is common enough, that does. Moreover, this strong sort of blame has a counterpart in a strong sort of credit. Often enough, credit for an action implies a judgement about the person as well, implying not only that the person is responsible for doing something good, but that this is a manifestation of virtuous character. Putting all this together, Feinberg's account of blame for an action can be summed up as follows. A person S is morally to blame for action A only if a. A is a morally faulty action, b. A can be ascribed to S, and c. A reveals S's faulty moral character. Feinberg concludes that attributions of blame share the same pragmatics as causal explanations. His argument for this emphasizes clause (b) of the above account: attributing blame involves ascribing action, and ascribing action involves causal citation. What I want to emphasize, however, is that clause (c) acts the same way. Clause (c) also insures that attributions of blame involve causal citation, for what does it mean to say that an action reveals character, other than that the action results from character? In other words, clause (c) can be read: c'. S did A because S has a faulty moral character. This might seem too strong, and it is if we read (c') as saying that S's character was sufficient all by itself to cause S's action. Similarly, it is too strong if we read (c') as saying that, given S's character, S had to do A. But it is not too strong if we remember the pragmatics of causal explanation language reviewed above. For according to that account, to say that S's action is a result of her character is to say that S's character is an important part, perhaps the most important part, of 10 the story. Taken this way, (c') is not too strong at all, but rather reflects our common sense attitudes about the sources of human action. The fact is, we cite character in explanations of human behavior all the time, as when we say that he made the remark because he is insensitive (as opposed to having a bad day), or that she failed to spend the money because she is cheap (as opposed to hard up for cash at the moment).xviii Feinberg's analysis reveals that such explanations are implied in attributions of blame, or at least in attributions of a certain sort of blame. And this implies that attributions of blame (of that special sort) will inherit the pragmatics of causal explanations. Clearly, any action will be the result of a number of factors, including a person's character. But sometimes we want to say that character is particularly salient-that it is an important part, perhaps the most important part, of the story behind why the person acted as he did. b. A general theory of credit attribution. Feinberg's account of moral blaming can easily be broadened in two ways. First, I have already noted that the counterpart of blame for an action is credit for an action. In fact, we can use credit as the general term, and talk about positive credit (i.e. praise) and negative credit (i.e. blame) for an action. Second, there are kinds of credit other than moral.xix For example, we credit athletes for athletic feats and thinkers for intellectual ones. Accordingly, I propose the following as a general theory of credit. A person S deserves credit of kind K for action A only if a. A has value of kind K, b. A can be ascribed to S, and c. A reveals S's K-relevant character. Alternatively: S's K-relevant character is an important necessary part of the total set of causal factors that give rise to S's doing A. Two examples will illustrate this account. Case 4. Ken Griffey Jr. runs full speed toward the center field wall, leaps with outstretched glove, and catches the ball while diving to the ground. The home team crowd, just robbed of a game winning double, shakes their respective heads in admiration of Griffey's 11 spectacular catch. Case 5. Griffey Jr. runs full speed toward the center field wall, trips, and falls face down on the ground. The ball bounces off his head, goes straight in the air, and comes down in his glove. The home team crowd, just robbed of a game winning double, shakes their respective heads in disgust. In both cases, the action in question has clear athletic value-catching the ball before it hits the ground is essential to winning baseball games. Moreover, in both cases the catch is ascribable to Griffey-we can be sure that a broadcaster announcing the game will be yelling, "Griffey caught the ball! Griffey caught the ball!" But only in Case 4 will Griffey be given credit for catching the ball, and that is because in Case 4 Griffey's catching the ball is the result of his relevant character; i.e. his great athletic abilities. In Case 5 Griffey's catching the ball was just dumb luck, and so the home team crowd is not just a bunch of sore losers. They are right to be disgusted. A similar phenomenon occurs when a poor fielder makes a spectacular catch. In this case he will be given credit of a sort-he will get pats on the back from his teammates and applause from the crowd. But it won't be the same kind of credit that Griffey gets. Griffey makes spectacular catches all the time-his catches manifest his great skills. Not so when Albert Belle makes such a catch. If the catch is difficult, it is almost just good luck that he makes it. And opposing fans will treat it that way, withholding the credit they would readily give to Griffey. Or consider Bucky Dent's infamous home run to knock the Red Sox out of the play-offs. To this day Boston fans do not give Dent credit for the home run or the Yankees credit for the win. Dent was just a singles hitter, and his fly ball would have been a routine out in any park but Fenway. The home run was just bad luck, Boston fans think, having little to do with Dent's abilities as a hitter. Finally, it is interesting that the case can be viewed in more than one way. Yankee fans do give Dent credit for the home run-to them, he will always be considered a great hero. This is because Yankee fans don't think that Dent's home run was just a matter of luck. Their thinking emphasizes the idea that some luck is always involved in sports, but Dent got his bat on the ball, he was strong enough to muscle it out there, he was able to take advantage of Fenway's short left field. In other words, their account of the home run downplays luck and emphasizes Dent's abilities. This is a 12 common enough phenomenon in sports: Losers try to deny credit by emphasizing the role of luck, and winners try to take credit by putting the emphasis back on ability. Hence the attractive but dubious claims that "Good teams make their own luck" and "It all comes out even in the end." c. A theory of intellectual credit attribution. When we attribute knowledge to someone we imply that it is to his credit that he got things right. It is not because the person is lucky that he believes the truth-it is because of his own cognitive abilities. He figured it out, or remembered it correctly, or perceived that it was so. Applying the account of credit attribution above, we have: S deserves intellectual credit for believing the truth regarding p only if a. believing the truth regarding p has intellectual value, b. believing the truth regarding p can be ascribed to S, and c. believing the truth regarding p reveals S's reliable cognitive character. Alternatively: S's reliable cognitive character is an important necessary part of the total set of causal factors that give rise to S's believing the truth regarding p. And hence: S knows p only if believing the truth regarding p reveals S's reliable cognitive character. Alternatively: only if S's reliable cognitive character is an important necessary part of the total set of causal factors that give rise to S's believing the truth regarding p. We are now in a position to apply these results to the two problems for fallibilism. 4. The lottery problem solved: Chance undermines credit. The application to the lottery problem is initially straightforward: knowledge attributions imply attributions of intellectual credit for true belief, and intellectual credit implies that the true belief is the result of S's own intellectual abilities. But here as in other cases, salient chance undermines credit. In the lottery case, but not in the garbage chute case, it seems just a matter of chance that S believes the truth. In the garbage chute case, but not in the lottery case, S's true belief is appropriately credited to her, i.e. to her intellectual abilities. This was our initial treatment of the case. But this initial treatment gave rise to the following problem: S employs admirable inductive reasoning no less in the lottery case than in the garbage 13 chute case. In both cases, therefore, S's abilities make up a necessary part, but only a part, of the whole story regarding S's believing the truth. The present account of credit solves this problem. For it is only in the garbage chute case that S's abilities are a salient part of the story. In the lottery case, what is most salient is the element of chance. Why does the element of chance become salient in the lottery case? I would suggest that the very idea of a lottery has the idea of chance built right into it. Here is the way we think of the lottery case: First, S reasons on the basis of excellent grounds that she will lose the lottery. Second, the lottery is held and reality either does or does not match up with S's belief-it's just a matter of chance. Notice that things are different if S believes that she lost the lottery because she reads the results in the newspaper.xx Here again her evidence is merely inductive, but now the role of chance does not play an important part in the story. Here is the most natural way to think of the newspaper case: First the lottery is held and the facts are fixed. Second, S infers from a reliable source that she has lost the lottery. Now it is not just a matter of chance that she believes the truth-she believes the truth because she has the good sense to believe what she reads about the results. Two more cases help to explore the implications of the present account. Case 6. On the basis of excellent evidence, S believes that her friend will meet her in New York City for lunch. However, S's friend has bought a ticket in the lottery, and if he were to win then he would be in New Jersey to collect his winnings. In fact, the friend loses the lottery and meets S for lunch.xxi Intuitively, people can know things about their friends even when, unknown to them, their friends have bought tickets in the lottery and would behave differently if they won. On the other hand, there is some intuitive pull toward thinking that S does not know in Case 6, since if her friend were to win the lottery then he would not meet her for lunch. The present account explains these conflicting intuitions by distinguishing contexts of attribution. In contexts where considerations about the lottery are not important, the salience of chance is low and so attributions of knowledge can still be appropriate. However, in contexts where considerations about the lottery are important, the salience of chance rises and therefore knowledge attributions are undermined. Handling Case 6 14 this way allows us to say that knowledge is closed under known entailment. Taking a page from the book of standards contextualists, we may note that there is no single context relative to which a) S knows that her friend will meet her for lunch, b) S knows that her friend will meet her for lunch only if he loses the lottery, and c) S does not know that her friend will lose the lottery. If the context does not make chance salient, then relative to that context S can know that her friend will meet her for lunch. But if the context does make chance salient, then relative to that context S knows neither that her friend will meet her for lunch nor that he will lose the lottery.xxii Now consider another case. Case 7. S is visiting from another culture and knows nothing about lotteries. However, over a long period of time S observes many people exchanging dollar bills for small slips of paper, which they invariably discard after a brief examination. On the basis of excellent inductive reasoning, S concludes that the next person in line will soon discard his slip of paper. And in fact S's belief is true.xxiii This case threatens a counterintuitive result: that relative to S's context, S knows that the next person in line will discard his ticket. Put another way, if S were to express a knowledge claim, then, relative to S's own context of attribution, his claim would be true. This result threatens because S understands nothing about the workings of lotteries. And therefore, it seems, chance could not be a salient factor in S's context. However, this way of interpreting the case assumes that salience is a psychological phenomenon-that salience is a function of where someone's attention is, or how he is thinking about things. This is admittedly one meaning of the term, but it is not the one that we want here. On the contrary, I have argued that salience is a function of a) what is in fact normal or abnormal in the case, and b) what interests and purposes are in fact operative in the context of attribution. Therefore, whether something is salient relative to a context of attribution, in the sense intended here, is not a question about how anyone is thinking. What we are looking for is not psychological salience but explanatory salience. The way to identify what is salient in this sense is to ask where a correct explanation would have to focus. As noted above, a correct explanation of a car fire might properly focus on sparks coming from the engine, whereas a correct explanation of a fire in a welding shop must focus somewhere else. But 15 this has nothing to do with how people are thinking about the cases. Rather, it has to do with what is in fact normal and abnormal in cars and welding shops. Likewise, if a drunk driver runs a light and is involved in a collision, then almost always a correct explanation will focus on the driver's impaired condition. Given the interests and purposes that are usually in place, other explanations of the collision are almost always inappropriate. These considerations explain why it is correct to say that S does not have knowledge in Case 7, even relative to S's own context of attribution. For although the role of chance has no psychological salience for S, it does have explanatory salience; that is, any correct explanation of why S believes the truth would have to refer to the lottery. This is because playing the lottery is pretty much the only thing going on here. Relative to almost any context we can imagine, including S's own, an explanation that did not refer to the lottery would leave the most important thing out. This is in contrast to Case 6. In that case any number of factors contribute to S's believing the truth regarding her friend meeting her for lunch. And relative to most contexts that we can imagine, the fact that her friend loses the lottery will play no important part in a correct explanation of why she believes the truth. Finally, it will be helpful to compare the present account with standards contextualism. First, both accounts are contextualist; that is, they both make the truth conditions of knowledge claims relative to the context of attribution. But the way this works in the two accounts is different. According to standards contextualism, the context of attribution determines the standards for knowledge, so that standards are higher or lower relative to different contexts. On the present account, however, the context of attribution determines the salience of various contributing causal factors, thus determining responsibility for true belief. Standards are not raised or lowered according context; rather, responsibility for a complex event (someone's believing the truth) is creditable or not creditable to the believer according to context. Second, I argued above that familiar versions of standards contextualism do not explain why S's inductive reasoning does not allow her to know that she will lose the lottery. The standards contextualist says that in the lottery case the standards for knowing get raised because the possibility 16 of winning becomes salient. But this does not tell us why S's reasoning fails to meet those standards, even if raised. The present account does better in this respect. The very idea of a lottery involves the idea of chance, and so we have an explanation why chance is salient in cases where the lottery is salient. We can then apply a familiar general principle of credit attribution: that salient chance undermines credit. 5. Gettier problems solved: abnormality trumps interest. Recently I have argued that the following conditions are necessary for knowledge.xxiv S knows p only if 1. S's believing p is subjectively justified is the following sense: S's believing p is the result of dispositions that S manifests when S is trying to believe the truth, and 2. S's believing p is objectively justified is the following sense: The dispositions that result in S's believing p make S reliable in believing p. Alternatively, the dispositions that result in S's believing p constitute intellectual abilities, or powers, or virtues. The thinking behind the subjective justification condition is that knowledge requires that belief be appropriate from the knower's point of view. More specifically, the knower must have some awareness that a belief so formed has a good likelihood of being true. Some authors have required that the knower believe that this is so, but I have resisted this way of understanding the kind of awareness in question. It seems that people rarely have beliefs about the genesis of their beliefs, and so it would be too strong to require that they always have one in cases of knowledge. Accordingly, I have stated the subjective justification condition in terms of dispositions to believe rather than actual beliefs, or even dispositional beliefs. People manifest highly specific, finely tuned dispositions to form beliefs in some ways rather than others. And this fact, I take it, amounts to an implicit awareness of the reliability of those dispositions. The objective justification condition can be interpreted along the lines of Sosa's weak safety condition above: to say that S is reliable in believing p is to say that, at least in relevantly close worlds, usually if S believes p then p is true. Notice that clause (2) makes the knower the seat of reliability: it says that S is reliable, not that some process is, or that S's method is, or that S's evidence 17 is. The thinking here is that knowledge must be grounded in the knower. That is, it must be grounded in the knower's own abilities, rather than in a process or method that might be engaged in accidentally, or on evidence that might be trusted on a whim. I now want to add a third condition on knowledge, understanding knowledge attributions to imply attributions of intellectual credit, and understanding intellectual credit along the lines above. I propose that adding this third condition makes the three sufficient as well as necessary for knowledge. 3. S believes the truth regarding p because S is reliable in believing p. Alternatively: The intellectual abilities (i.e. powers or virtues) that result in S's believing the truth regarding p are an important necessary part of the total set of causal factors that give rise to S's believing the truth regarding p. I claimed above that clause (3) allows us to handle a range of Gettier cases. Intuitively, in cases of knowledge S's reliable character has salience in an explanation of how S comes to get things right. In Gettier cases, S's reliable character loses its salience in favor of something else. What we want now is an account of why this is so. Hence we have two questions before us: First, why is it that S's cognitive abilities have salience in cases of knowledge. Second, why is it that they do not have salience in Gettier cases.xxv To answer the first question we may turn to a point that has been emphasized by Sosa. He writes, All kinds of justification involve the cognitive or intellectual virtues, faculties, or aptitudes of the subject. We care about justification because it tends to indicate a state of the subject that is important and of interest to his community, a state of great interest and importance to an information-sharing social species. What sort of state? Presumably, the state of being a dependable source of information over a certain field in certain circumstances.xxvi For present purposes Sosa's point may be glossed this way: For beings like us, dependability (or reliability) of cognitive character is of fundamental social importance. But this implies that cognitive character will have a kind of default salience in the explanation of true belief. Unless something else is present that trumps the salience of S's cognitive abilities, those will be the most important part of 18 the story, or at least a very important part of the story. We may now turn to the second question: Why is it that S's cognitive abilites are not salient in Gettier cases? Gettier cases seem to fall into three categories in this respect. First, there are cases where S's abilities are not salient in an explanation of true belief because S's abilities are not involved at all. Here is one such case. Case 8. Charlie has excellent reasons to believe that he will make his connection in Chicago. However, Charlie does not recognize these reasons for what they are, nor does he base his belief on them. Rather, he believes that he will make his connection because he is overcome with wishful thinking at the prospects of seeing his fiancée. As it turns out, his belief is true. Here it is straightforward that Charlie does not believe the truth because of his intellectual abilities, since his abilities are not involved at all in the production or maintenance of his belief. As I have described the case, he believes the truth entirely out of wishful thinking. Second, there are cases where S's belief is produced by faculties that would normally be considered abilities, but where S is not reliable in the environement where those faculties are used. Here are two. Case 9. Henry is driving in the countryside and sees a barn ahead in clear view. On this basis he believes that the object he sees is a barn. Unknown to Henry, however, the area is dotted with barn facades that are indistinguishable from real barns from the road. However, Henry happens to be looking at the one real barn in the area.xxvii Case 10. Rene is the victim of an evil demon who causes him to be systematically deceived. Despite admirable intellectual care and responsibility, almost all of Rene's beliefs are false. However, his belief that he is sitting by the fire, which is based on appropriate sensations and background beliefs, happens to be true.xxviii In Case 9 S's belief is the result of perception, and normally S's perception would constitute a cognitive virtue, i.e. a reliable ability or power. However, reliability is relative to an environment, and S's perception is not reliable relative to the environment in the example. Similar things can be said about Case 10-Rene's beliefs are caused by his cognitive faculties and in a normal 19 environment these faculties would constitute abilities or powers. But in Rene's actual environment his faculties are unreliable. Finally, there are Gettier cases where S does use reliable abilities or powers to arrive at her belief, but where this is not the most salient aspect of the case. Case 3 regarding the Ford is one. Here are two others. Case 11. A man takes there to be a sheep in the field and does so under conditions which are such that, when a man does thus take there to be a sheep in the field, then it is evident to him that there is a sheep in the field. The man, however, has mistaken a dog for a sheep and so what he sees is not a sheep at all. Nevertheless, unsuspected by the man, there is a sheep in another part of the field.xxix Case 12. Smith looks at his watch and forms the belief that it is 3 o'clock. In fact, Smith's watch is broken. But by a remarkable coincidence, it has stopped running exactly twelve hours earlier, and so shows the correct time when Smith looks at it.xxx In all three of these cases, reliable cognitive character gives rise to the belief in question – Lehrer's office worker reasons from her evidence, Chisholm's sheep watcher trusts his vision, and Russell's time teller trusts his watch. But in none of these cases does the person believe the truth because of reliable character. On the contrary, an explanation of how the person comes to get things right would have to focus somewhere else. In Case 3, S believes the truth because someone else in her office owns a Ford. Chisholm's sheep watcher believes the truth because there is a sheep in another part of the field. Russell's time teller believes the truth because his watch has stopped running exactly twelve hours before he looked at it. In each of the cases, there is something else that is more salient than S's cognitive abilities in the explanation of how S came to get things right. Why is that so in this third category of Gettier cases? I propose that, in at least many such cases, there is something odd or unexpected about the way that S comes to believe the truth, and that the salience of the abnormality trumps the default salience of S's cognitive abilities. We have already seen that the salience of abnormalities is a general phenomenon. When a white elephant enters the room, all bets are off for other explanations regarding why the room emptied out. The odd or the unexpected undermines the salience of other factors involved in the event. In fact, Gettier cases are 20 often told so as to increase this effect. Typically, there is a first part of the case where an entirely normal scene is described. Then comes the "big surprise" part of the case, where we get the odd twist: what S sees is actually a dog, but there happens to be a sheep in another part of the field; S's evidence is misleading, but someone else in the office owns a Ford. Not all abnormalities undermine the salience of cognitive character, however. For example, an unlikely coincidence reminds the detective of evidence he has neglected, and this missing piece of the puzzle allows him to solve the crime. Less dramatically, an unusual noise causes someone to turn her head, and something else comes into plain view. We would like an account of which abnormalities undermine the salience of character in the explanation of true belief and which do not. Here is a suggestion that seems to handle the above cases well: abnormalities in the way one gets one's evidence do not undermine credit, whereas abnormalities regarding the way one gets a true belief, given that one has the evidence that one does, do undermine credit. Put another way, in cases where something unusual does take away the salience of character, it seems just a matter of good luck that S ends up with a true belief, even given that she has the evidence that she does.xxxi We may understand this point in a way that generalizes to other kinds of credit: we may say that, in general, situational luck does not undermine credit. In other words, luck in the way that one gets into one's situation does not undermine credit for what one does once in that situation. This, I take it, is one of the lessons of the literature on moral luck. A general prohibition on luck shrinks the sphere of moral responsibility to nothing, and hence an adequate theory of moral responsibility must allow for the influence of some kinds of luck but not others.xxxii In sum, the present account goes some way toward explicating the content and pragmatics of knowledge attributions, although we must recognize that it does not go all the way. It goes some way because it analyzes knowledge in terms of credit attribution and credit attribution in terms of the content and pragmatics of causal explanations. It does not go all the way, however, because the pragmatics of causal explanations, and especially those concerning the salience of partial causes, are not fully understood. For example, the account given above in this regard is clearly only a partial account.xxxiii Nevertheless, our intuitions about knowledge seem to follow our intuitions about 21 causal explanation: In cases of knowledge, we think that S believes the truth because she is reliable, whereas in Gettier cases we think that S's believing the truth must be explained in some other way. 6. Concluding remarks. I would like to end with two considerations that lend further support to the account of knowledge that has been offered here. First, the account predicts certain phenomena that do in fact take place. Second, the account suggests a solution to the value problem for knowledge. a. Conflicting knowledge attributions. If the preceding account of knowledge is correct, then there should be arguments over knowledge attribution that mirror arguments over other kinds of credit attribution. More specifically, there should be cases where disagreements over whether someone has knowledge reflect different emphases on the relative importance of S's contribution to arriving at the truth. This is in fact the case. For example, consider the following conversation between a gambler and his wife. Gambler: I told you so, Honey! I knew that horse would win! Wife: You knew no such thing, you idiot! That horse could have lost-you nearly threw away our rent money again! Gambler: No-I knew she would win! I've been watching that horse for months now, and I knew that she would run great in these conditions. Wife: You son-of-a-bitch. The conversation lends itself to the following interpretation: The gambler is trying to take credit for his true belief that the horse would win, and his wife is trying to deny him credit. In doing so, he tries to emphasize his ability to pick winning horses, and she tries to emphasize the role of luck. In the context set by the above example I would tend to agree with the wife. But perhaps there are other contexts relative to which the gambler's claim to know is correct. Consider a conversation that might take place among gambling buddies. First Gambler: How did you know that horse was going to win? Second Gambler: Are you kidding? I've seen her run in mud before, and the only horse in 22 the race that could touch her was pulled just before post time. When I saw that, I ran to the betting window. First Gambler: You son-of-a-bitch. In this context the claim to know is accepted by all involved. Perhaps this is because gamblers are deluded about the relative importance of luck and ability in picking horses. Alternatively, in the present context the role of luck is taken for granted, and so all emphasis is rightly put on the relative abilities among the gamblers. If the "amateur" in the next row also picked the winner, he wouldn't be given credit for his true belief. b. The value problem. Recently, Linda Zagzebski has called attention to the value problem for knowledge.xxxiv An adequate account of knowledge, she points out, ought to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. In closing, I will suggest how the present account solves that problem. In Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes a distinction between a) morally virtuous action and b) action that is merely as if morally virtuous. One important difference, says Aristotle, is that morally virtuous actions "proceed from a firm and unchangeable character." [II.4] Moreover, it is morally virtuous action, as opposed to action that is as if virtuous, that is both intrinsically valuable and constitutive of the good life: "human good turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting excellence." [I.7] The same point holds for intellectually virtuous action, where the distinction between "virtuous action" and "action as if virtuous" translates to a distinction between knowledge and mere true belief. Following Aristotle, therefore, we get an answer to the value problem: As is the case regarding moral goods, getting the truth as a result of one's virtues is more valuable than getting it on the cheap. xxxv,xxxvi i The idea that knowledge entails credit for true belief can be found in Ernest Sosa, "Beyond Skepticism, to the Best of our Knowledge," Mind 97 (1988): 153-89 , and Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and in Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and "What is Knowledge?" in John Greco and Ernest Sosa, eds. The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999). More explicitly, Wayne Riggs argues that in cases of knowledge "we deserve credit for arriving at true belief non-accidentally." See his "Reliability and the Value of Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming. 23 ii Stewart Cohen, "How to Be a Fallibilist," Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 91-123, and "Contextualist Solutions to Epistemic Problems: Skepticism, Gettier and the Lottery," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming. iii The example is from Ernest Sosa, "Skepticism and Contextualism," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 1-18. We can imagine that the bag's getting hung up is extremely unlikely because everything would have to go just right for that to occur, including the trajectory of the bag, its contents, the distribution of its weight, etc. iv See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). v Here is another counterexample to Nozick's account, due to Jonathan Vogel: "Suppose two policemen confront a mugger, who is standing some distance away with a drawn gun. One of the officers, a rookie, attempts to disarm the mugger by shooting a bullet down the barrel of the mugger's gun. (I assume that the chances of doing this are virtually nil.) Imagine that the rookie's veteran partner knows what the rookie is trying to do. The veteran sees him fire, but is screened from seeing the result. Aware that his partner is trying something that is all but impossible, the veteran thinks (correctly as it turns out) [that the] rookie missed." From "Tracking, Closure, and Deductive Knowledge," in Steven Luper-Foy, ed., The Possibility of Knowledge (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987). vi See Ernest Sosa, "Skepticism and Contextualism"; "How Must Knowledge be Modally Related to What is Known," Philosophical Topics 26 (1999): 373-384; and "How to Defeat Opposition to Moore," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 141-155. vii Here I am assuming that there is a close world in which the bag gets hung up in the chute. If that seems wrong, we can invoke Vogel's rookie cop example from note 5. There it seems uncontroversial that there is a close world where the rookie's bullet enters the mugger's barrel. viii "How Must Knowledge be Modally Related to What is Known?", p. 383, note 7. ix Knowledge in Perspective, p. 278. x "How to Be a Fallibilist," pp. 106-7. xi My claim is not that standards contextualism cannot explain the lottery case in principle. Rather, I restrict myself to the weaker claim that Cohen's contextualism does not in fact explain it. What are the prospects for other versions of standards contextualism? The trick, of course, is for the standards contextualist to explain why S does not have knowledge in the lottery case, while at the same time preserving the intuition that S does have knowledge in other cases of inductive reasoning. But this will be hard to do. For example, Keith DeRose argues that S has knowledge if her belief matches the truth out to the nearest world where a salient alternative possibility is actual. However, the matching requirement insures that DeRose's account rules incorrectly in the garbage chute case and in the rookie cop case from note 5. This is because these cases are designed so that not-p worlds are very, very close, and so no matter how weak the 24 standards for knowledge are being set, S's belief will not match the truth far enough out into alternative possible worlds. In other words, no matter how close the nearest world where a salient possibility is actual, S's belief will not match the truth out to that world. See Keith DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem," Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 1-52. xii The example is from Keith Lehrer, "Knowledge, Truth and Evidence," Analysis 25 (1965): 168-75. xiii I first suggested a solution to Gettier problems along these line in my review of Jonathan Kvanvig's The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol LIV, no 4 (December 1994), pp. 973-976. Linda Zagzebski develops the idea in a different direction in Virtues of the Mind and in "What is Knowledge?", and Keith Lehrer develops a similar idea in Theory of Knowledge, 2 nd edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000). Earlier than any of this, Sosa writes that in cases of knowledge one's belief must "non-accidentally reflect the truth of P through the exercise of . . . a virtue." However, he does not suggest that this idea can be used to address Gettier problems. See his "Beyond Skepticism, to the Best of our Knowledge," p. 184. See also Knowledge in Perspective, p. 277. xiv Feinberg's discussion takes place over three papers, all of which are collected in Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). The papers are "Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals," "Action and Responsibility," and "Causing Voluntary Actions." Page numbers that follow correspond to Doing and Deserving. My account of Feinberg's account of blaming is a reconstruction-I have taken parts of what he says from each of his three papers and put them together in a way that suits my present purposes. xv It is tempting to follow Feinberg and to put things this way: When we say that Y occurs because X occurs, or that Y's occurring is due to X's occurring, we mark out X's occurring as a particularly important or salient part of a sufficient condition for Y's occurring. (177) This assumes, however, that all causes can be understood as sufficient conditions. Since I do not want to deny either a) the possibility of agent causation or b) the possibility of indeterminate causation, I employ the looser language above. xvi Another example: Sports fans will argue endlessly over why we lost the big game. Was it because we gave up too many points or because we didn't score enough? Obviously, the outcome of a game is a function of both points allowed and points scored. The real argument here is over what was the most important factor in the loss. And that is a function of what one can normally expect, what could have been done differently, etc. xvii Feinberg, p. 126. xviii Some recent work in social psychology suggests that common sense is flawed in this respect. For example, see Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett, The Person and the Situation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991). For a persuasive argument against such a conclusion, see Michael DePaul, "Character Traits, Virtues and Vices: Are there None?", Proceedings of the Twentieth World 25 Congress of Philosophy, Volume IX: Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Psychology, forthcoming. xix Feinberg's own discussion is at times aimed at other kinds of blame. xx This point is made by Cohen in "How to Be a Fallibilist." xxi This kind of case is discussed by Cohen in "How to Be a Fallibilist," and by Gilbert Harman in Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). xxii Cohen and DeRose have both argued that contextualists need not run into closure problems. See Cohen, "How to Be a Fallibilist" and DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem." For an early discussion of relevant issues, see Gail Stine, "Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure," Philosophical Studies 29 (1976) 249-261. xxiii This sort of case was raised by Phillip Quinn in discussion. xxiv See my Putting Skeptics in Their Place (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and "Agent Reliabilism," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 273-296. xxv What is a Gettier case? Zagzebski has argued that all Gettier cases are ones where bad epistemic luck is cancelled out by good epistemic luck. For example, in Case 3 S's evidence is deceptive (bad luck), but someone else in S's office owns a Ford (good luck). This analysis suggests that we can treat Gettier cases in the same way that we treated the lottery problem above-we can say that Gettier cases involve salient luck, and salient luck undermines credit. In my opinion this assessment is correct, but it is not as informative as we would like. This is because in Gettier cases, to say that S believes the truth because of good luck is very close to saying that S believes the truth for some reason other than her own abilities. And although that seems true, it is not more informative than what we already have-which is that clause (3) is violated. (In the lottery case, we said that the clause is violated due to the role of salient chance. That explanation is informative, however, because we have an independent grasp of what we mean by chance in a lottery.) xxvi Knowledge in Perspective, pp. 281-2. xxvii The example is from Alvin Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 771-791. Reprinted in Goldman, Alvin, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992). xxviii The example is from Sosa, "Perspectives in Virtue Epistemology: A Response to Dancy and BonJour," Philosophical Studies 78 (1995): 221-235. xxix The example is quoted from Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2 nd edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 105. 26 xxx The watch example is due to Bertrand Russell in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948). The example is cited by Chisholm in Theory of Knowledge, where he points out that it is a Gettier case. xxxi The distinction employed here is similar to Mylan Engel's distinction between verific and evidential luck, in Mylan Engel, Jr., "Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge?," The Southern Journal of Philosophy XXX, 2 (1992): 59-75. I thank Michael Bergmann for pointing out to me that Engel's distinction is helpful in the present context. xxxii In this regard, see Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck" in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Margaret Walker, "Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency," Metaphilosophy 22 (1991): 14-27; and John Greco, "A Second Paradox Concerning Responsibility and Luck," Metaphilosophy 26 (1995): 81-96. xxxiii We can imagine Gettier-type cases, for example, where the problem is not abnormality in the way that S comes to believe the truth, but the interference of another agent, such as a "helpful demon." Here, as in other cases, credit for true belief and hence knowledge is undermined. And, here again, this seems to be a general phenomenon regarding credit. So, for example, the influence of a helpful demon would undermine moral credit as well. I thank Daniel Nolan and Tamar Gendler for raising this kind of concern. xxxiv Zagzebski raises the problem in Virtues of the Mind, pp. 300-2, and in a more extended way in "From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume V: Epistemology (1999): 173-179. Reprinted in expanded form in Axtell, ed., Knowledge, Belief and Character : Readings in Virtue Epistemology (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000). See also Zagzebski's contribution to this volume. xxxv Riggs takes a similar approach to the value problem. He writes, "When a true belief is achieved non-accidentally, the person derives epistemic credit for this that she would not be due had she only accidentally happened upon a true belief. . . . The difference that makes a value difference here is the variation in the degree to which a person's abilities, powers, and skills are causally responsible for the outcome, believing truly that p." See "Reliability and the Value of Knowledge." xxxvi I would like to thank Robert Audi, Heather Battaly, Michael Bergmann, Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose, Tamar Gendler, Stephen Grimm, Daniel Nolan, Philip Quinn, Wayne Riggs, Ted Sider, Eleonore Stump, Ernest Sosa, Fritz Warfield, and Linda Zagzebski for their helpful comments in discussion and on earlier versions of the paper.

Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes Author(s): Charlie Kurth Source: Ethics, Vol. 124, No. 2 (January 2014), pp. 370-383 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/673435 . Accessed: 13/12/2013 11:00 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Ethics. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes*Charlie Kurth Allan Gibbard maintains that his plan-based expressivism allows for a particular type of innocent mistake: I can agree that your plan to F makes sense ðsay, because it was based on advice from someone you trustÞ, while nonetheless insisting that it is incorrect ðe.g., because you chose a bad advisorÞ. However, Steve Daskal has recently argued that there are significant limitations in Gibbard's account of how we can be mistaken about the normative judgment we make. This essay refines Gibbard's account in order to show-contra Daskal-that expressivists can deliver a surprisingly robust form of normativity objectivity. I can judge your plan to vacation at the shore to be innocently mistaken for a variety of reasons. First, I can judge it to be innocently mistaken on epistemic grounds. Perhaps this is because I know that your plan is based on your false but warranted belief that last year's hurricane damage has been cleaned up. Alternatively, I can think your vacation plan is mistaken, not because of some deficiency in your epistemic situation but rather because I think you have confused tastes about what is enjoyable. Your preferences to the contrary, Daytona Beach during spring break is no place for a middle-aged academic like you. Part of what makes innocent mistakes like these normatively interesting is that they allow for a form of partial endorsement: while I deem your vacation plan to be mistaken, I can nonetheless acknowledge that there is a sense in which it makes sense-it is an unfortunate product of your false beliefs or your odd preferences. But understanding innocent mistakes also draws out the richness and complexity of our normative lives, thereby helping us understand what a plausible account of normative objectivity must be able to explain.* Thanks to Steve Daskal and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay. 370 Ethics 124 ( January 2014): 370–383 © 2014 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/2014/12402-0008$10.00 This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Against this backdrop, SteveDaskal has developed an important pair of objections to Allan Gibbard's recent expressivist account of normaKurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 371tive objectivity.1 Daskal argues that Gibbard's expressivism is unable to accommodate two types of non-epistemic innocent mistakes. The first kind of innocent mistake-what Daskal calls "pure planning innocent mistakes" ðPPIMsÞ-are, roughly, those that result from the choice of a poor planning strategy. The second kind-what he calls "innocent mistakes of mental constitution" ðIMMCsÞ-result not so much from deficiencies in our planning strategies but rather deficiencies in our underlying preferences. As Daskal sees it, Gibbard's expressivism forces him to understand planning in a very particular way, but given these self-imposed constraints, Gibbard is left without the resources that he needs to make sense of either PPIMs or IMMCs. These objections to Gibbard's expressivist proposal are interesting for two reasons. First, rather than a vague complaint about Gibbard's inability to provide a plausible account of normative objectivity, they identify specific deficiencies in Gibbard's proposal. Second, they also provide an internal critique of Gibbard's expressivism. That is, they maintain that Gibbard's account of normative objectivity fails on its own terms. So unlike other objections to expressivist objectivity, Daskal's arguments seem to avoid the common charge that they beg the question against the expressivist.2 However, in what follows, I argue that both of Daskal's criticisms fall short. Gibbard's expressivism does allow for PPIMs, and it can explain why IMMCs count as mistakes. I conclude by pointing to some implications that my argument has for our thinking about both the viability of the expressivist project and normative objectivity more generally. I. GIBBARD'S ACCOUNT OF PPIMs AND DASKAL'S FIRST OBJECTION A. Gibbard on Innocent Mistakes At a gloss, Gibbard's expressivist proposal in Thinking How to Live takes planning to be best understood in terms of a noncognitive mental state. To plan to X, or in Gibbard's words, to judge X-ing 'the thing to do' is to endorse X-ing-to see it as choiceworthy. His account of innocent mistakes builds from this foundation. But in order to understand it, we need1. Steve Daskal, "Plan-Based Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes," Ethics 119 ð2009Þ: 310–35. Daskal focuses on the expressivist proposal of Allan Gibbard's Thinking How to Live ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003Þ. 2. For a discussion of the claim that ðmostÞ challenges to expressivist accounts beg the question, seeMark Timmons,Morality without Foundations ðOxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1999Þ, chap. 3. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions to take a closer look at two features of his general account of planning.3 First, Gibbard endorses a conception of planning that is liberal in its scope. 372 Ethics January 2014Not only can I plan for actual situations ðe.g., what to teach in class tomorrowÞ and contingent ones ðe.g., what to do if I win the lottoÞ but I can also plan for the hypothetical situation of being in someone else's shoes. For instance, I can plan for the situation of being you as you contemplate what to do on vacation. Second, for a given planning situation, Gibbard's account allows us to ask a rich set of planning questions. In particular, I can think about both what I plan to do in F and what I plan to plan to do in F. In the former, I directly take up the question of what to do inF. In the latter, I am concerned with the ðhigher-orderÞ question of how to address the ðfirst-orderÞ question of what to do in F. When I consider this higher-order question, I develop ðor draw onÞ my plans for how to plan-I think through issues like whether and when I should trust my ability to plan for F and what to do if I come to doubt this ability. For instance, I might conclude that I should directly take up the question of what to do in F only when I am not nervous; I might also conclude that, when nervous, I should follow the advice of someone I trust ðe.g., an idealized version of myself or my spiritual guruÞ. Moreover, in coming to a conclusion about these higher-order planning questions, I indirectly come to a conclusion to the first-order question about what to plan to do inF: if the higher-order plan I settle on tells me to approach the first-order question in a particular way, then by taking this approach, I will come a conclusion about what to do in F. These features of Gibbard's account, when combined with the psychological fact that different people can have different preferences about what to do and how to plan, allow him to make sense of a distinctive form of innocent mistake-pure planning innocent mistakes. To draw this out, consider how I could approach planning for the hypothetical situation V: being you contemplating what to do on vacation. When I directly ask 'what to plan to do in V?', say I come to the conclusion, ð1Þ If in V, go to the mountains. But 3 32, 24 4 now suppose that either I come to doubt the legitimacy of ð1Þ or, gh confident in ð1Þ, I want to give further thought to my answer.4thou Since these doubts and curiosities raise questions about how to plan to plan, they move me from the first-order question 'what to plan to do in V?' to the higher-order question 'what to plan to plan to do in V?'. Now, in considering this new question, suppose that I reason like this: I think. What follows is based on Gibbard's discussion in Thinking How to Live, 48–53, 231– 0–43. . As will become apparent in Sec. II, the difference between these two options matters. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions about whom you would trust and conclude that you would trust the idealized version of yourself, You1. I then think about how You1 would Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 373plan and conclude: ð2Þ If in V, go to the shore. The Butresult is that my thinking about what to plan to do, and my thinking t what to plan to plan to do, have led to different conclusions aboutabou what to do. When this happens-when I come to different conclusions about what to do-Gibbard maintains that we have a PPIM. Gibbard's ability to accommodate innocent mistakes of this sort is significant because it allows him to capture the richness and complexity of our normative assessments. It allows him to explain, for instance, how I can grant that your plan to go to the shore was well-formed ðbecause it was based on advice from someone you trust-You1Þ while maintaining that it was incorrect nonetheless ðbecause You1 is a bad advisorÞ. B. Daskal's First Objection Daskal maintains that PPIMs are not actually possible within Gibbard's framework. His argument for this starts from the observation that Gibbard's account of PPIMs requires it to be possible to approach hypothetical planning from two different perspectives-for example, the perspective that leads to ð1Þ and the perspective that leads to ð2Þ. But Daskal denies that planning in this way would ever make sense. To see why, let's return to situation V. Daskal notes that it is perfectly plausible to see reasoning like that which led to ð2Þ going differently. For instance, rather than asking whom you would trust, I can ask whom I would trust. Moreover, I can pick a different advisor ðMe1Þ and come to a different conclusion: ð2*Þ If in V, go to the mountains. now we have two distinct routes to an answer to the higher-order tion 'what to plan to plan to do in V?'. Moreover, these routes lead toques conflicting conclusions. So which should we to go with-the reasoning that leads to ð2Þ or the reasoning that leads to ð2*Þ? But once we acknowledge this question, Daskal thinks we learn that PPIMs are not really possible. Here he gives two arguments. First, he argues that because the first-order question 'what to plan to do in V?' and the higher-order question 'what to plan to plan to do in V?' are so similar, the reasons that support using a particular strategy ðor advisorÞ for answering one question should carry over with equal force to support doing the same for the other question. So, for example, whatever reason I have for going with You1 for the higher-order question would seem to lead me to also go with You1 for the first-order question. And whatever reason I have for going with Me1 for the higher-order question wouldThis content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions seem to lead me to also go with Me1 for the first-order question.5 The second argument builds from Gibbard's account of what planning is. To 374 Ethics January 2014plan to X is to endorse or commit to X-ing. But if this is what planning is, then PPIMs seem incoherent. After all, in my planning for V, my higher-order reasoning commits me to planning to go to the shore, and my first-order reasoning commits me to planning to go to themountains. Not only are these plans incompatible but, since we are dealing with an innocent mistake, neither is supposed to repudiate the other. But how can this be?6 Together, we can see these arguments as presenting Gibbard with a threefold challenge. First, he must explain how it is possible to use different strategies ðor advisorsÞ to come to incompatible decisions about what to do and what to plan to do. Second, he needs to explain why it makes sense to see these diverging plans as involving an innocent mistake. Finally, we need an explanation of how it is that both of these decisions nonetheless carry the endorsement that is characteristic of genuine plans. II. HOW TO MAKE A PURE PLANNING INNOCENT MISTAKE To see why Daskal is wrong to think that Gibbard's proposal does not allow for PPIMs, we need to note an important feature of Gibbard's account of planning, one that Daskal appears to overlook. According to Gibbard, we can plan under two kinds of circumstances: ðaÞ cases where we are confident about our "powers of direct judgment" and ðbÞ cases where we have doubts about these powers.7 Now while it is true that PPIMs are not possible in cases where we have doubts, they are possible in cases where we are confident. But because Daskal considers only cases of the former sort, he fails to see that PPIMs are possible within Gibbard's system. To draw this out, let's start by considering a case where I doubt my powers of direct judgment. Suppose I doubt my ability to plan for V in the following sense: I recognize that I need to think about vacationing from your perspective, but I have lost confidence in my ability to do this. In this situation, my doubts about my powers of direct judgment lead me to seek guidance frommy plans for how to plan. As we have seen ðSec. IÞ, these plans not only tell me when to distrust my powers of direct judgment but they also tell me whom to trust when this happens. So suppose my plan for planning tells me to trust You1 when I come to doubt my powers of direct judgment. If I use the perspective of You1 when 5. Daskal, "Plan-Based Expressivism," 318. 6. Ibid., 321–24. 7. Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, 242–43. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions considering what to plan to plan to do in V, then-as Daskal notes- coherence demands that I use similar reasoning when considering what Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 375to plan to do in V. Similarly, suppose my plan for planning tells me to trust Me1 when I come to doubt my powers of direct judgment. If I use this perspective when considering what to plan to plan to do in V, then, likewise, coherence demands that I endorse similar reasoning when considering what to plan to do in V. Here Daskal is right: my conclusions to the planning questions cannot come apart-so PPIMs are not possible. But things are different when we look at a case where I am confident about my powers of direct judgment.8 For starters, even if I am confident in my answer to the first-order question 'what to plan to do in V?', I can still consider the higher-order question 'what to plan to plan to do in V?'. But, importantly, unlike the case of planning with doubts, I can consider this higher-order question from a different perspective. This is because when I take up this higher-order question, I am operating on the contrary-to-fact assumption that I have come to doubt my ability to plan. Though I am confident in my plans andmy plans for planning, I can "bracket" my conclusions and "abstract away from" my reasoning with regard to the first-order question.9 This bracketing and abstracting allows me to take up the higher-order question as an independent piece of planning. It allows me to think through that question at a different level, and from a different perspective-say, the perspective of You1. But this means that I can coherently come to a conclusion ðif in V, go to the shoreÞ that is different than the one I am confident in ðif in V, go to the mountainsÞ. With these observations in hand, we can return to Daskal's threefold challenge in order to see how PPIMs are possible within Gibbard's system. First, cases where I bracket my conclusion to a first-order question in order to consider, at a different level and from a different perspective, the associated higher-order question are cases where I can coherently come to divergent conclusions about what to do. Second, because my conclusion to the higher-order question is based on the contrary-tofact assumption that I doubt my powers of direct reasoning, it is ultimately trumped by the ðinitial but temporarily bracketedÞ conclusion that I came to when directly considering the first-order question. So it makes sense to say that the conclusion of my contrary-to-fact planning is ðinnocentlyÞ mistaken.10 Finally, because I take up the first-order and higher-order questions as independent pieces of planning, in both cases my answers carry the endorsement that is characteristic of genuine plans. 8. What follows draws from ibid. 9. Ibid., 243. 10. There are interesting questions about when ðif everÞ one should allow one's thinking about higher-order questions to affect one's confidence about one's powers of direct judgment. But even if we allow that one's thinking about higher-order questions can ðor This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions This last step might seem suspect. Onemight argue that because my planning with regard to the higher-order question is based on the contrary376 Ethics January 2014to-fact assumption that I have come to doubt my powers of direct reasoning, my plan has a conditional structure: ð3Þ Were I to doubt my powers of direct reasoning, then go to the shore if in V.11One But 1 awkw ð3*ÞW do if thinkmight then argue that a plan with a conditional structure of this sort ot carry the endorsement that is distinctive of planning. But thiscann objection fails. To see why, notice that the conditional structure that we have here is no different than what we find-and have no problem accepting-in the case of the contingency plans discussed above ðSec. IÞ. Contingency plans, recall, are plans that we make because we are unsure about the future or because we want to prepare for certain contingencies-for example, what to do were I to win the lotto. So they result in conditional plans, plans like this: ð4Þ Were I to win the lotto, then head to Vegas. this means the two plans-ð3Þ and ð4Þ-have the same general connal structure: were I to F, then Ψ. Moreover, given that we are com-ditio fortable that ð4Þ carries the endorsement that is distinctive of plans, we should be comfortable that ð3Þ does too. With this objection set aside, we can see that the three parts of Daskal's challenge can be met. But this means that PPIMs are possible within Gibbard's system. III. MAKING SENSE OF INNOCENT MISTAKES OF MENTAL CONSTITUTION Even if we have succeeded in defusing Daskal's first objection, there is still the charge that Gibbard's system cannot explain why IMMCs count as mistakes. As we have just seen, PPIMs are possible because we are able to plan for a situation like V from different perspectives. IMMCs represent a distinct challenge because they suggest that there are planning situations where a similar sort of flexibility in perspective is not possible. To see this, let's consider Daskal's example. Daskal considers the hypothetical planning situation M: being Mortis, a psychopath who prefers to murder and who trusts the planning adsometimes shouldÞ influence one's thinking about first-order questions, there is no reason to1. Granted, the conditional plan in ð3Þ is somewhat awkward. But notice that this ardness goes away when we restate ð3Þ using Gibbard's 'is the thing to do' language: ere I to doubt my powers of direct reasoning, then going to the shore is the thing to in V. this will always be the case. So there is no reason to think that PPIMs are not possible. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions vice only of the idealized murder-happy version of himself, Mortis1.12 He then asks us to consider the first-order question 'what to plan to do in Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 377M?'. As we have seen, when we take up this question, we step into Mortis's shoes and plan for the situation of being him. Here we conclude if Mortis in M, murder. As Daskal explains, "it would be unreasonable to deny this, given that Mortis's mental constitution is such that he has no possible access to a perspective from which he could recognize what is wrong with murdering."13 But these facts about Mortis's mental constitution also make it the case that when we take up the higher-order question 'what to plan to plan to do in M?', we have no flexibility when choosing an advisor-we must choose Mortis1.14 The result, says Daskal, is trouble. For starters, it reveals that on Gibbard's account we are forced to conclude that, if Mortis in M, murdering is both the thing to do and the thing to plan to do. But this in turn entails that there is no way for Gibbard to say what is obvious-namely, that given the unfortunate way that Mortis is wired up, he is ðinnocentlyÞmistaken about the appropriateness of murdering. Thus, Gibbard's account of normative objectivity is seriously deficient-it does not have the resources to explain IMMCs as mistakes.15 However, while Daskal is right that Mortis's preferences commit us to concluding that, if Mortis in M, murder is both the thing to do and the thing to plan to do, he is wrong that this prevents us from concluding that Mortis is mistaken. This is because Gibbard's account of how we go 12. Daskal, "Plan-Based Expressivism," 325–27. 13. Ibid., 325. 14. It is this lack of flexibility that makes the Mortis case importantly different from the earlier discussion of PPIMs. 15. One might worry that Daskal's objection rests on a confused account of how Gibbard must assess situation M. In particular, one might argue that the first-order question 'what to plan to do in M?' is ambiguous between two options, neither of which delivers what is needed for Daskal's objection to work. On the one hand, this question might be understood as ðiÞ the descriptive counterfactual question 'what would we plan to do if Mortis in M?'. But while "murder!" is a plausible answer here, it is a descriptive claim, not a plan-not an endorsement-of what to do if Mortis in M. So it causes no trouble for Gibbard. On the other hand, the question might be understood as ðiiÞ the hypothetical planning question 'what to plan to do if Mortis in M?'. An answer here would carry the endorsement of a plan. However, it does not seem true that murdering is something that we would plan to do if, hypothetically, we were in Mortis's shoes. So, again, there is no trouble for Gibbard. If this worry is correct, thenGibbard can quickly dismiss theDaskal objection presented in the text. However, I am not sure whether the worry is correct. In particular, I am not sure that it is true that the answer to ðiiÞ cannot be "murder!" This is because Gibbard says very little to explain how we are to make sense of hypothetical planning for extreme cases like M-cases where, to plan, we step into the shoes of someone like Mortis who not only has monstrous preferences but is incapable of seeing how confused his preferences are. Given my uncertainty, I will proceed ðin the textÞ on the assumption that Daskal's presentation of the Mortis example does not fall to this worry. As we will see, even after granting this, Gibbard can still make an effective reply. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to address this aspect of Daskal's objection. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions about planning makes room for an additional layer of assessment. As we will see, Gibbard's system gives us the ability to assess not just plans but 378 Ethics January 2014planners. So it allows us to judge that though Mortis's plans make sense, he is ðinnocentlyÞ mistaken. To draw this out, we need a better understanding of Gibbard's take on how we plan. According to Gibbard, we are social creatures-wemake plans together, and we look to each other for insight and guidance about what to do and whom to trust. Recognizing this is significant because it reveals that our plans for planning must have certain features. First, since planning is something that we do together, we must, in our plans for planning, accept the authority of other individuals with regard to questions about what to do-at least to the extent that we deem those individuals to be trustworthy judges. But, second, the fact that our trust in others is qualified in this way means that our plans for planning must include a ðroughÞ account of what makes someone a trustworthy judge. Gibbard notes that such an account will point to certain "formal" features as indicative of trustworthiness-for example, awareness of the relevant facts or a dispassionate frame of mind. But he also notes that this will not be enough. After all, "formal" constraints alone cannot guarantee that we will get results that mesh with our intuitions about what to do and whom to trust-the ideally coherent Caligula violates no formal constraints.16 Thus, Gibbard concludes that our plans for planning hold that an individual is trustworthy only to the extent that he both meets our formal constraints and has a ðstatisticallyÞ normal mental constitution.17 In light of the above, we see that our plans for planning commit us to reducing-even revoking-another's authority if we come to see that his advice is not trustworthy. While there are a variety of ways that our trust in others can be called into question, this generally happens when their decisions about what to do fail to mesh with the conclusions that we have reached and that we are confident in. If we are confident that ðsayÞ murder is wrong, or that a life of contemplation is good, then we should tend to doubt the trustworthiness of those who judge otherwise. Moreover, as Gibbard notes, there are a variety of ways that we can respond to those whose advice we come to doubt. We might just give their advice less weight in our deliberations. But, more significantly, we might also adopt a "parochial stance" toward them-wemight carve themout of16. Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990Þ, 196–97. 17. Gibbard, Thinking How to Live , 234–35. Gibbard's discussion leaves open whether "normal mental constitution" functions to rigidly designate what is normal in this world. While this question raises interesting issues ðe.g., if there is no rigid designation, what are we to make of cases where the Caligulas of the world outnumber the non-Caligulas?Þ, I must set discussion of it aside. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions our normative lives, giving their judgments no weight in our planning.18 Though extreme, this is something we might feel we need to do in order Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 379to keep from having to grant authority to those whose judgments we deem monstrous. In Gibbard's words, it is something we do "in order to keep our normative moorings."19 With this broader understanding of how we go about planning in hand, we can see that Gibbard has the resources to explain IMMCs as mistakes. To draw this out, let's return to our thinking about situationM. In planning for M, we step into Mortis's shoes and operate under the contrary-to-fact assumption that we are Mortis. From this perspective, we conclude that, if Mortis in M, murdering is both the thing to do and the thing to plan to do. But when we set this contrary-to-fact planning aside and think more generally about how to live, we can reflect on the confidence that we have in the wrongness of murder. That we can do this is important, for it allows us to call into question Mortis's trustworthiness as a judge. Moreover, given how monstrous we deem his judgments to be, we see that he is not just an untrustworthy judge of how to live but also someone whom we must carve out of our normative lives. So, though we acknowledge that, if Mortis in M, murder is the thing to do and the thing to plan to do, we are not committed to giving our full endorsement to these plans. Rather, we can give them the partial endorsement that is distinctive of attributing an innocent mistake. That is, we can judge that while murdering is both the thing to do and the thing for him to plan to do, if Mortis in M, these judgments are nonetheless mistaken. They are mistaken because they are the upshot of Mortis's deviant, and thus untrustworthy, mental constitution. But this means that Gibbard's system has the resources to explain why someone like Mortis is ðinnocentlyÞ mistaken. It is worth emphasizing that this account of why IMMCs count as mistakes is one that fits within Gibbard's expressivist proposal. For starters, because our plans for planning presume a distinction between normal and deviant mental constitutions, we can address a situation like M from two different perspectives-our perspective and the perspective of the person whose shoes we are stepping into. It is this feature of Gibbard's account that allows us to assess Mortis from our own perspective even though we are forced to use his preferences when considering what to plan to do and what to plan to plan to do, if Mortis in M. Second, our plans for planning commit us to voiding another's authority if we deem them to have a sufficiently deviant mental constitution. This feature of Gibbard's account allows us to explain why Mortis is innocently mistaken: because Mortis's mental constitution leads him to plan 18. Ibid., 246–48, 252, 280–83; Gibbard,Wise Choices, 208. 19. Gibbard,Wise Choices, 218; see also 196–97. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions in ways we find monstrous, we conclude that he is not a trustworthy judge. Moreover, we can also explain what he is mistaken about: Mortis 380 Ethics January 2014is mistaken about what to do and whom to trust; his assessments of these matters are so monstrous that they can have no weight in our planning. Granted, these explanations are not ones that Mortis himself would accept. But since we have adopted a parochial stance toward him, we can insist ðwhen in normative discussion among ourselvesÞ that he is mistaken, and we can point to his deviant mental constitution to explain why this is.20 IV. A DEEPER ISSUE: HOW TO UNDERSTAND NORMATIVE OBJECTIVITY One might maintain that the above victory is cold comfort to Gibbard. After all, he must acknowledge that individuals-you and Mortis, for instance-can have incompatible normative perspectives. But it seems that allowing for incompatible normative perspectives just is to grant that there are unacceptable limitations on the forms of error and disagreement that characterize expressivist accounts of normative objectivity. In a slightly different context, Daskal offers a further set of arguments that we can see as pressing this line. If successful, these arguments would allow him to blunt the force of the conclusion from the above account of IMMCs. In the first argument, Daskal considers the possibility that Gibbard's system allows us to say that Mortis is mistaken about murdering. But he then argues that while this might buy Gibbard some objective distance, his reliance on the move to these parochial perspectives commits him to the implausible conclusion that, for Mortis, murdering is the thing to do. But Daskal maintains that this is implausible. Intuitively, planning to murder is amistake even for someonewithMortis'smental constitution.21 The second argument maintains that, if making sense of innocent mistakes requires maintaining that you and Mortis have incompatible normative perspectives ðor mental constitutionsÞ, then we get the implausible result that you and Mortis are not actually disagreeing with each other. The content of your judgments makes reference to what to do given your mental constitution, and the content of Mortis's judgments makes reference to what to do given his mental constitution. Thus, you can agree with Mortis that, given his mental constitution, he plans correctly, andMortis can agree with you that, given yourmental constitution,20. For more on the normative assessments one can make from a parochial stance, see ibid., chap. 11. 21. Daskal, "Plan-Based Expressivism," 328–29. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions your planning is correct. So there is nothing that the two of you actually disagree about.22 Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 381The trouble with these arguments is that they beg the question against Gibbard. For one, Gibbard explicitly acknowledges that his account of normative error and disagreement will be modest in the way that Daskal observes. For instance, he notes that his account of error is perspective dependent: "Unless one has the right kind of mental constitution . . . all the epistemic virtues in the world won't lead to judgments that are correct. There is, moreover, no satisfactory way to specify what makes for the right kind of mental constitution that doesn't, in effect, settle by fiat basic controversies over how to plan."23 He also notes that his account allows for genuine disagreement only when there is sufficient overlap in the perspective of the disagreeing parties: "The practice of thinking and discussing how to live will be hostage to our having sufficiently congruent reactions to issues that arise. Our reactions may be congruent enough in some areas and not in others. In that case, . . . 1⁄2a particular question about how to live, as a topic for agreement and disagreement, may have sufficient point in some areas and not in others."24 So the "limitations" that Daskal notes are things that Gibbard actually embraces. But this should not be surprising. After all, if normative objectivity is to be explained, at bottom, in terms of the noncognitive mental state of planning, then it should be possible for two individuals to accept perfectly consistent but incompatible plans. That just is what expressivist normative objectivity amounts to. Moreover, an expressivist like Gibbard can provide an independently well-motivated argument for why normative objectivity should be understood in this way. It is a familiar story that draws on, among other things, a methodological commitment to naturalism, an endorsement of an internalist understanding of normative motivation, and skepticism about the possibility of substantive analyses of normative terms and properties. The upshot, then, is that Gibbard can plausibly maintain that the "limitations" in his account are not really limitations. Rather, his expressivism captures the very forms of error and disagreement that we actually find in our normative discourse. Granted, those with realist intuitions will maintain that Gibbard's account leaves out important dimensions of objectivity. For instance, Daskal might protest that if we accept the thin understanding of error and disagreement that comes with the move to parochialism, we lose22. Ibid., 330. Daskal maintains that this result is particularly troubling since one of the central motivations driving Gibbard's move to plan-based expressivism is its ability capture genuine disagreement ð329–30Þ. But, as we will see, Daskal's conclusion here is based on a dubious claim about the sort of disagreement that Gibbard must explain. 23. Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, 251. 24. Ibid., 281. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions the ability to say ðfor exampleÞ that we are right and Mortis is wrong. But, as we have seen ðSec. IIIÞ, this is not the case. While it is true that taking 382 Ethics January 2014a parochial stance toward Mortis entails that we cannot, when speaking to him, say that he is wrong and we are right ðthat would be an unacceptable form of browbeatingÞ, we can make these normative assessments when we are in discussion among ourselves.25 Moreover, the reply that this is still not a sufficiently robust account of error would have force only if it could be presented in a non-question-begging manner-something expressivists and their sympathizers deny is possible.26 These observation indicate that the charge that Gibbard's account of normative objectivity leaves something out is not so much an objection as a statement of what is at issue between expressivists and their opponents in these debates. It indicates that the question of whether expressivism can make sense of IMMCs is really a deeper question about what normative objectivity looks like. V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER IMPLICATIONS At the beginning of his essay, Daskal notes that expressivists face two hurdles: they must provide a viable account of objectivity and they need to explain how their revisionary semantics can avoid the Frege-Geach problem. While Daskal thinks Gibbard has succeeded in dealing with the semantic worries, he maintains that his innocent mistake objections show that making sense of objectivity remains a significant problem.27 Against this backdrop, I close with two observations. First, showing that Daskal's concerns about objectivity are mistaken does not vindicate the expressivist project-for there is good reason to think that his optimism about expressivists' ability to address their semantic problems is misplaced.28 Second, expressivists are not the only irrealists 25. Gibbard,Wise Choices, 205–8. Also see his "How Much Realism? Evolved Thinkers and Normative Concepts," in Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6, ed. R. Shafer-Landau ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2011Þ, 33–51. 26. The literature on this debate is significant. For a representative sample of the realists' worries, see Nicholas Sturgeon, "What Difference Does It Make Whether Moral Realism Is True?" Southern Journal of Philosophy 24, supp. ð1986Þ: 115–42; Paul Bloomfield, Moral Reality ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2001Þ, chap. 1; and Andy Egan, "QuasiRealism and FundamentalMoral Error," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 ð2010Þ: 205–19. For replies from irrealists, see, for instance, Timmons,Morality without Foundations, chap. 3; Simon Blackburn, "Truth and A Priori Possibility,"Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 ð2011Þ: 201–13; and Charlie Kurth, "What Do Our Critical Practices Say about the Nature of Morality?"Philosophical Studies ðforthcomingÞ. 27. Daskal, "Plan-Based Expressivism," 310–11. 28. For concerns with expressivist solutions to the Frege-Geach problem, see Mark Schroeder, Being For ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2008Þ. For more general worries This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions for whom IMMCs are thought to be a problem. The possibility of Mortislike characters also brings trouble for ðfor exampleÞHumean constructivKurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 383ists and speaker relativists.29 But given the similarities between expressivism and these other varieties of irrealism, my argument suggests that these non-expressivist irrealists may have more resources for dealing with such cases than they realize. For instance, Sharon Street acknowledges that it is problematic that a Humean constructivist like herself must allow that the ideally coherent Caligula "is not making a mistake."30 But the argument here suggests she may be wrong about this. Given that her constructivism hasmuch in commonwithGibbard's expressivism, it seems that she can say that-like Mortis-Caligula's mental constitution leaves him innocently mistaken about what to do. If this is correct ðand more would need to be saidÞ, then Street's account of objectivity proves to be more robust than she realizes. Moreover, it also suggests that the real insight of expressivism lies in what it might tell us about the nature of normative objectivity.29. See, e.g., Sharon Street, "Constructivism about Reasons," inOxford Studies in Metaethics 3, ed. R. Shafer-Landau ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2008Þ, 207–45; and Jamie Dreier, "Internalism and Speaker Relativism," Ethics 101 ð1990Þ: 6–26. 30. Street, "What Is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?" Philosophy Compass 5 ð2010Þ: 363–84, 371. While Street does not believe that she can say that Caligula is mistaken, she does believe that her account allows her to express other forms of normative criticism-e.g., that Caligula is despicable. See Street, "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Rethink It" ðunpublished manuscript, https://files.nyu.edu/ss194/public/sharonstreet /Writing.html 1⁄2accessed September 13, 2013Þ, for details. about the expressivist's ability to provide a plausible alternative account of logic and inference, see Charlie Kurth, "Logic for Morals, Morals from Logic," Philosophical Studies 155 ð2011Þ: 161–80. It is worth noting that Daskal's optimism about the expressivists' ability to solve their semantic problems may not sit well with some of the arguments that he makes in his essay. In particular, Daskal explores the possibility that an appeal to moral emotions might help Gibbard make sense of IMMCs. But his response ð"Plan-Based Expressivism," at 332–33Þ attributes to Gibbard a difficulty-roughly, that his planning language does not have enough structure to accommodate the various ways in which one judgment can override another-that is strikingly similar to the 'negation problem' Schroeder develops in Being For. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Paul Ricoeur, Linguaggio e filosofia, a cura di Domenico Jervolino, Guerini, Milano,1994, un volume di 232 pp. Ricoeur, uno dei più noti esponenti dell'ermeneutica del Novecento, ha compiuto un tragitto complesso che lo ha portato, dalla originale prossimità alla filosofia riflessiva di Jean Nabert attraverso un confronto con la fenomenologia e poi con l'ermeneutica biblica e la linguistica, a confrontarsi con la filosofia del linguaggio angloamericana, scoprendo un'affinità con una delle sue due tradizioni: quella della filosofia del linguaggio ordinario. In quanto l'ermeneutica come viene intesa dal Ricoeur della maturità, si basa su una semantica delle espressioni multivoche, essa "si oppone alle teorie del metalinguaggio, che vorrebbero riformulare i linguaggi esistenti in funzione di modelli ideali". In compenso essa entra in un dialogo fruttuoso con le dottrine nate dalle Ricerche filosofiche di Wittgenstein e dall'analisi del linguaggio ordinario nei paesi anglosassoni". Nel saggio "Husserl e Wittgenstein sul linguaggio" del 1967, con cui questa raccolta si apre, l'autore propone un confronto fra Husserl e Wittgenstein seguendo l'idea-guida di un parallelismo nell'evoluzione del pensiero dei due: da una posizione in cui il linguaggio ordinario è misurato sul metro di un linguaggio ideale a una posizione in cui il linguaggio è fatto oggetto di indagine nel suo essere linguaggio vissuto, il linguaggio del "mondo della vita" husserliano o quello dei "giochi linguistici" wittgensteiniani. A Ricoeur la definizione del linguaggio come uso, pro-pria di Wittgenstein, sembra "dialettica", gli sembra impedire quella presa di distanza dalla vita che è richiesta per rendere possibile l'atteggiamento riflessivo della filosofia, ma che gli sembra tanto più innegabile in quanto è la stessa presa di distanza che permette anche la genesi del linguaggio stesso. Questo saggio, come si è detto, può essere letto anche come documento di una tappa dell'evoluzione del pensiero di Ricoeur: documenta il suo incontro con la filosofia analitica a partire da una sorta di sua personale svolta linguistica, maturata entro l'ambito dell'ermeneutica. Come conseguenza di questi incontri le opere di Ricoeur degli anni Settanta-Novanta sono caratterizzate da quella che egli chiama una capacità di ibridare fra fenomenologia, linguistica, filosofia analitica (si veda quanto Ricoeur dice sul suo tragitto intellettuale in La reflexion faite, Seuil, Paris 1995). Il volume comprende altri saggi come "Filosofie del linguaggio", "Parola e simbolo", "Retorica, poetica, ermeneutica" che documentano un percorso pluridecennale di confronto con la linguistica, l'ermeneutica, e la filosofia analitica con quella tipica attitudine di Ricoeur che egli stesso chiama "capacità di ibridare". Nella storia umana il meticciato è sempre stata la caratteristica delle culture capaci di innovare, e quindi non di sopravvivere (cioè clonare eternamente se stesse), ma di dare vita ad altro. La melior pars della filosofica tedesca e (un po' meno) di quella francese hanno saputo rispondere alla sfida che si è posta a partire dagli anni Sessanta, e i saggi qui raccolti ne sono una testimonianza. Sergio Cremaschi

„AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) SPOŁECZEŃSTWO I POLITYKA KRZYSZTOF TRZCIŃSKI CO ŁĄCZY I DZIELI COMMUNAL CONFLICT ORAZ „KONFLIKT ETNICZNY"? ANALIZA ZNACZENIOWA OBU TERMINÓW I ICH NIGERYJSKA EGZEMPLIFIKACJA1 Streszczenie Artykuł traktuje o sensie terminów communal confl ict oraz „konfl ikt etniczny". Jego celami są: wyjaśnienie, jak najczęściej rozumiane są w literaturze przedmiotu terminy communal confl ict i „konfl ikt etniczny" oraz zidentyfi kowanie ich cech wspólnych i dzielących je różnic. Realizacji wskazanych celów służy nigeryjska egzemplifi kacja obu rodzajów konfl iktów. W poszczególnych częściach artykułu dokonano analizy znaczeniowej terminów „konfl ikt etniczny" i communal confl ict, omówiono przykład wojny biafrańskiej (lata 1967–70) uznawanej często za konfl ikt etniczny i kazus communal confl ict w mieście Sagamu w 1999 r., oraz zaprezentowano wnioski wskazujące istniejące podobieństwa i różnice znaczeniowe między oboma przedmiotowymi pojęciami, a także zaproponowano polskie tłumaczenie terminu communal confl ict. Słowa kluczowe: communal confl ict, konfl ikt etniczny, przemoc etniczna, inter-communal confl ict, Nigeria, Biafra, Sagamu Wstęp Stosowany coraz częściej w anglojęzycznym, a zatem dominującym, piśmiennictwie naukowym dotyczącym problemów politycznych Nigerii i innych państw Afryki Subsaharyjskiej termin communal confl ict nie doczekał się jeszcze pol1 Autor dziękuje studentom afrykanistyki Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego za zadawane w trakcie wykładów ważkie pytania dotyczące sensu pojęć. Stały się one inspiracją dla podjęcia analizy znaczeniowej, której owocem jest ten artykuł. 12 „AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Krzysztof Trzciński skiego odpowiednika, co zapewne w jakimś stopniu związane jest z trudnościami translatorskimi. Jak pisze nigeryjski fi lozof Damian U. Opata2, „coś, co jest tłumaczone już samo przez się jest lokowane (positioned) jako obce, jako coś, z czym trzeba się pogodzić w sensie tłumaczenia na miejscowy język". Istotniejsze jest jednak to, że znaczenie terminu communal confl ict nie jest jeszcze ugruntowane, podobnie jak sens pojęcia „konfl ikt etniczny". Oba terminy, w mniejszym lub większym stopniu, są zatem nadal w stadium pojęć przed-teoretycznych (ang. notions) niż na poziomie pojęć steoretyzowanych (ang. concepts). Termin communal confl ict bywa jednak często stosowany w zastępstwie coraz bardziej niechętnie używanego terminu „konfl ikt etniczny", który, choć semantycznie wydaje się doń podobny, bynajmniej nie ma charakteru jego synonimu. Sytuacja ta zachęca do głębszego przyjrzenia się istocie obu pojęć. Celami tego artykułu są: wyjaśnienie, jak najczęściej rozumiane są w literaturze przedmiotu terminy communal confl ict i „konfl ikt etniczny" oraz zidentyfi kowanie ich cech wspólnych i dzielących je różnic. W realizacji wskazanych celów ma pomóc nigeryjska egzemplifi kacja obu rodzajów konfl iktów. W artykule dokonano analizy znaczeniowej terminów „konfl ikt etniczny" i communal confl ict, omówiono przykład wojny biafrańskiej (lata 1967–70) uznawanej często za konfl ikt etniczny i kazus communal confl ict w mieście Sagamu w 1999 r., oraz zaprezentowano wnioski wskazujące istniejące podobieństwa i różnice znaczeniowe między oboma rozpatrywanymi pojęciami, a także zaproponowano polskie tłumaczenie terminu communal confl ict. Czym jest konfl ikt etniczny? Ponieważ nowszy termin communal confl ict zastępuje często starsze pojęcie „konfl ikt etniczny", analizę tę warto rozpocząć od wyjaśnienia, czym jest konfl ikt etniczny czy też jak to pojęcie jest najczęściej defi niowane. W najprostszym rozumieniu konfl ikt etniczny oznacza silne napięcia, zwykle z użyciem przemocy, które występują w relacjach między członkami odmiennych grup etnicznych w danym państwie. Szczególne warunki do powstawania takich napięć istnieją w Nigerii. To najludniejsze państwo Afryki, zamieszkałe w 2015 r. przez ok. 185 mln ludzi3, jest wieloetniczne i zarazem wielokulturowe. Szacuje się, że około 50% mieszkańców Nigerii to muzułmanie, 40% to chrześcijanie, a około 10% to wyznawcy wierzeń rodzimych4. Choć w Nigerii językiem urzędowym jest język angielski, 2 Damian U. Opata, The beautiful interpreters are not yet here: The poverty of metaphysics of state and civil society in Africa, "Quest. An International African Journal of Philosophy", 12, 1, 1998, s. 137. 3 Worldometers, Population, http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population [dostęp z: 2015-12-18]. 4 Index Mundi, Nigeria demographics profi le 2014, http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/demographics_profi le.html [dostęp z: 2015-12-18]. 13„AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Co łączy i dzieli communal confl ict oraz „konfl ikt etniczny"... to w użyciu jest ponad 500 języków lokalnych5. Nigeryjskie społeczeństwo składa się z członków około 250 grup etnicznych6, wśród których największe to Hausa-Fulani (ok. 29% mieszkańców Nigerii), Joruba (ok. 21%), Ibo (ok. 18%) i Ijaw (10%)7. W opinii Arenda Lijpharta8 „grupa etniczna" to „grupa ludzi, którzy postrzegają siebie jako odrębną wspólnotę kulturową, których często łączą wspólne: język, religia, pokrewieństwo, i/lub cechy fi zyczne (takie jak na przykład kolor skóry); i którzy mają skłonność do żywienia negatywnych oraz wrogich uczuć wobec członków innych grup etnicznych". Według Timothy'ego D. Siska9, pojęcie „grupa etniczna" oznacza grupę zorganizowaną na fundamencie wspólnej tożsamości czy też charakteryzującej jej członków „wspólnej percepcji pochodzenia", włączając w to również grupę sformowaną na bazie wspólnej „religii, kultury, języka, rasy i kasty". Natomiast pojęcie „konfl ikt etniczny" Sisk10 defi niuje szeroko jako „konfrontację o charakterze politycznym, społecznym lub militarnym, zawierającą lub nie zawierającą w sobie użycie przemocy, której uczestnicy określają się w kategoriach rasy, języka, religii, kultury lub narodowości bądź jakiegoś połączenia kilku kryteriów askryptywnych", tj. przypisanych. Z kolei Errol A. Henderson11 w węższy sposób określa znaczenie pojęcia „konfl ikt etniczny" lub wymiennie stosowanego przezeń terminu „konfl ikt międzyetniczny" (interethnic confl ict) jako spory między rywalizującymi ze sobą grupami, które identyfi kują siebie głównie w oparciu o kryterium etniczne, i które wysuwają grupowe roszczenia do jakichś zasobów na podstawie swoich praw grupowych. Stuart J. Kaufman12 przypominając, że większość państw świata jest etnicznie zróżnicowana, a stosunki między zamieszkującymi je grupami etnicznymi zwykle generują jakieś konfl ikty, wskazuje, że konkretny konfl ikt można nazwać etnicznym wówczas, gdy jego strony mogą być wyróżnione przede wszystkim z powodu ich odmiennej etniczności (tożsamości etnicznej), zaś podstawą zaangażowania ludzi w konfl ikt jest ich grupowa przynależność, a nie jakiś inny czynnik. Dodaje 5 Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Nigeria, http://www.ethnologue.com/country/NG [dostęp z: 2015-12-19]. 6 Encyclopedia of the Nations, Nigeria, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Nigeria.html [dostęp z: 2015-12-19]. 7 Index Mundi, Nigeria Demographics Profi le 2014, op. cit. 8 Arend Lijphart, Multiethnic democracy, [w:] The Encyclopedia of democracy, red. Seymour M. Lipset, tom III, London 1995, s. 853. 9 Timothy D. Sisk, Power sharing and international mediation in ethnic confl icts, Washington DC 1996, s. 119. 10 Ibidem. 11 Errol A. Henderson, Ethnic confl ict and cooperation, [w:] Encyclopedia of violence, peace, and confl ict, red. Lester Kurtz, tom I, San Diego 1999, s. 751. 12 Stuart J. Kaufman, Ethnicity as a generator of confl ict, [w:] Routledge handbook of ethnic confl ict, red. Karl Cordell, Stefan Wolff, London 2011, s. 93–94. 14 „AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Krzysztof Trzciński zarazem, że każda lub któraś ze stron konfl iktu może równie dobrze być koalicjami dwóch lub więcej grup etnicznych. Defi niując konfl ikt etniczny w taki sposób, Kaufman zdaje sobie sprawę z faktu, że zasadność stosowania pojęcia „konfl ikt etniczny" jest podważana i że są tego istotne podstawy. Mianowicie część badaczy, określanych mianem instrumentalistów, uważa, że tożsamości etniczne są zwykle po prostu wykorzystywane przez klasę polityczną lub jej część w rywalizacji zwłaszcza o dostęp do dóbr ekonomicznych. Grupy etniczne nie wchodzą zatem ze sobą w konfl ikt z powodu swojej odmienności13. W konsekwencji samo współistnienie w danym państwie różnych grup etnicznych nie może być uznane za przyczynę konfl iktów, a tożsamości etniczne nie mogą generować konfl iktów etnicznych, gdyż takowe nie istnieją14. Kaufman zauważa również, że z kolei dla wielu innych badaczy pojęcie konfl iktu etnicznego jest po prostu dalece nieprecyzyjne. Stan ten skutkuje często brakiem zgody co do tego, czy dany konfl ikt można nazwać etnicznym. Sam jednak stoi na stanowisku, że o konfl ikcie etnicznym można już mówić w sytuacji, gdy dochodzi do rywalizacji jakichś interesów kojarzonych z konkretnymi grupami etnicznymi i identyfi kuje trzy najważniejsze, w jego opinii, typy tych interesów: językowe, religijne i ekonomiczne15. Dla konfl iktu etnicznego symptomatyczna jest zarazem sytuacja, w której to nie konkretne interesy prowadzą do jego rozwoju, lecz sprawy z pozoru o znaczeniu symbolicznym (na przykład chęć używania własnej fl agi), które jednak mogą mieć dla danej grupy istotny sens z punktu widzenia poczucia własnej wartości16 jej członków17. Konfl ikt etniczny może przebiegać w rozmaity sposób. W opinii Robina M. Williamsa18, należy wyróżnić jego cztery podstawowe formy: niepokoje (turmoil), wojnę wewnątrz państwa (internal war), masowy mord za przyzwoleniem władz państwowych (democide) i ludobójstwo (genocide). Rodzajami niepokojów są strajki, demonstracje, bunty, akty sabotażu, zamieszki i terroryzm. Woj13 Ghański fi lozof Kwame Gyekye, Tradition and modernity: Philosophical refl ections on the African experience, Oxford 1997, s. 99 i n., uważa zaś wręcz, że idea etniczności wiąże się z mityczną wspólnotą pochodzenia i jest bardziej „wynalazkiem" niż czymś naturalnym i rzeczywistym, a jakiekolwiek grupowanie czy klasyfi kowanie ludzi na podstawie ich rzekomo wspólnego pochodzenia jest błędne. W konsekwencji Gyekye prezentuje opinię, że w afrykańskiej rzeczywistości nie tyle istnieją grupy etniczne, ile grupy wspólnoto-kulturowe (communocultural groups), będące wspólnotami celów, wartości, ideałów, bądź aspiracji swoich członków, którzy razem zamieszkują jakieś określone terytorium. 14 Stuart J. Kaufman, Ethnicity as a generator of confl ict, op. cit., s. 91, 94. 15 Ibidem, s. 91, 94–95 16 Szerzej na temat znaczenia tej wartości w kontekście etniczności zob. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Ethnic identity as a political resource, [w:] red. Teodros Kiros, Explorations in African political thought: Identity, community, ethics, New York–London 2001, s. 50 i n. 17 Stuart J. Kaufman, Ethnicity as a generator of confl ict, op. cit., s. 96. 18 Robin M. Williams Jr., Ethnic confl icts, [w:] International encyclopedia of the social and behavioral sciences, red. Neil J. Smelser, Paul B. Balties, tom VII, Oxford 2001, s. 4807 15„AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Co łączy i dzieli communal confl ict oraz „konfl ikt etniczny"... na wewnątrz państwa może przybrać postać zbrojnej przemocy towarzyszącej zamachom stanu, separatystycznej rebelii, wojny domowej, wojny partyzanckiej i rewolucji. Masowy mord politycznych oponentów może być zorganizowany przez władze państwowe lub te mogą do niego podżegać. Ludobójstwo ma charakter celowego wyniszczania całych lub części grup etnicznych (narodowych, plemiennych), jak i religijnych (wyznaniowych) bądź rasowych. Każda z wymienionych form ma inny stopień złożoności postrzeganej z perspektywy zasięgu masowej mobilizacji, poziomu scentralizowanej organizacji i kontroli, oraz rodzaju, stopnia i zasięgu stosowanej przemocy. Niektóre z wymienionych postaci konfl iktu etnicznego mogą występować jednocześnie lub być trudne do klarownego rozróżnienia. Wojna biafrańska jako konfl ikt etniczny Za historyczną już egzemplifi kację konfl iktu etnicznego w Nigerii uważany jest często kazus wojny wewnątrz państwa, tzw. wojny biafrańskiej, która toczyła się w latach 1967–1970 oraz wydarzeń, które ją poprzedziły. W opinii Jamesa Cimenta19, „wojna biafrańska była pierwszym wielkim konfl iktem etnicznym pokolonialnej Afryki, tragicznym zwiastunem tego, co nastąpi" w innych częściach tego kontynentu20. Wojna wybuchła w siedem lat po uzyskaniu przez Nigerię niepodległości w granicach ustanowionych jeszcze w czasach kolonialnych przez Europejczyków. Granice te nie respektowały podziałów etnicznych, językowych i religijnych. Nowe wieloetniczne i zarazem wielokulturowe państwo niemal natychmiast stało się areną międzyetnicznych napięć, podsycanych przez elity polityczne występujące w charakterze reprezentantów interesów poszczególnych grup etnicznych, zorganizowane w tzw. partie etniczne21. U podłoża tych napięć leżały między innymi: wyraźne różnice kulturowe (dzielące Nigeryjczyków z muzułmańskiej, w przeważającym stopniu, Północy i głównie chrześcijańskiej pozostałej części państwa); ekonomiczna kwestia podziału przychodów budżetowych (w znacznym stopniu pochodzących z podatków i opłat uiszczanych przez podmioty wydobywające ropę naftową w Delcie Nigru); jak również problemy związane z charakteryzującymi główne grupy etniczne odmiennymi tradycjami politycznymi i trudnościami w ich pogodzeniu w sytuacji konieczności wspólnego rządzenia niepodległym państwem. Co więcej, jak obrazowo ujęła to nigeryjska pisarka Chimamandra Ngozi Adichie22, ledwie co niepodległa Nigeria stanowiła 19 James Ciment, Nigeria: Biafra War, 1967–1970, [w:] Encyclopedia of confl icts since World War II, red. idem, London–New York 2015, s. 245. 20 Zgodnie z przywołanym wcześniej stanowiskiem instrumentalistów, wojna biafrańska nie mogła oczywiście być konfl iktem etnicznym. 21 Zob. szerzej np. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic groups in confl ict, Berkeley 1985, s. 609 i n. 22 Chimamandra Ngozi Adichie, Połówka żółtego słońca, tłum. Witold Kurylak, Katowice 2009, s. 190. 16 „AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Krzysztof Trzciński przed wybuchem wojny biafrańskiej „zbiór fragmentów utrzymywanych razem przez bardzo wątłą dłoń". Genezy wojny biafrańskiej jej badacze doszukują się w wojskowym zamachu stanu z 15 stycznia 1966 r., który postrzegany był zwłaszcza przez część elit Hausa-Fulanich i Jorubów jako przygotowany i przeprowadzony głównie przez ofi cerów wywodzących się z grupy etnicznej Ibo. Na czele puczu stał major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, który choć urodził się na muzułmańskiej Północy Nigerii, to pochodził z chrześcijańskiej rodziny Ibów, emigrantów z obszaru Delty Nigru. Zamach miał być próbą zapobieżenia dezintegracji terytorialnej Nigerii w obliczu tendencji separatystycznych występujących wśród części elit Północy, ale w konsekwencji do niej ostatecznie doprowadził, choć na Wschodzie tego państwa. Mimo, że się nie powiódł, w jego trakcie zginęła znaczna część czołowych nigeryjskich polityków, funkcjonariuszy państwowych, a także wysokiej rangi ofi cerów wywodzących się z ówczesnych regionów: Północnego (zdominowanego przez Hausa-Fulanich) i Zachodniego (kontrolowanego przez Jorubów). Zamachowcy oszczędzili natomiast członków nigeryjskich elit politycznych i wojskowych, którzy pochodzili z grupy Ibo, dominującej w obfi tującym w ropę naftową Regionie Wschodnim. Po zamachu, na około pół roku nieformalną funkcję głowy państwa zdołał objąć generał dywizji Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, Ibo, który w pierwszym zamachu stanu nie brał udziału i nie popierał go. Aguiyi-Ironsi zawiesił działanie części przepisów nigeryjskiej ustawy zasadniczej, a majora Nzeogwu i innych spiskowców potraktował pobłażliwie, co spotkało się z niezadowoleniem zwłaszcza hausańskiej i jorubskiej części korpusu ofi cerskiego. W konsekwencji, 29 lipca 1966 r. grupa głównie hausańskich ofi cerów z Północy dokonała nowego puczu, w którym zginęli czołowi ofi cerowie wywodzący się z grupy Ibo, w tym i Aguiyi-Ironsi. Na czele rządu tymczasowego stanął generał Yakubu Gowon, pochodzący z relatywnie niewielkiej grupy etnicznej Angas, chrześcijanin wychowany w północnej Nigerii. W miastach Regionu Północnego już od czerwca 1966 r. dochodziło do pogromów mieszkających tam Ibów, którzy między innymi ze względu na swój wysoki status materialny i edukacyjny nie cieszyli się popularnością wśród Hausa-Fulanich i innych rodzimych grup etnicznych. Trwająca do października 1966 r. przemoc, której siły rządowe nie zdołały lub nie chciały zapobiec, przyniosła dziesiątki tysięcy ofi ar i spowodowała wielką falę uchodźstwa Ibów do Regionu Wschodniego23. Organizatorzy i sprawcy masakr nie zostali aresztowani ani ukarani. 31 marca 1967 r. regionalny rząd podpułkownika Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, Ibo, który po zamachu stanu ze stycznia 1966 r. został gubernatorem wojskowym Regionu Wschodniego, zadekretował, że w związku z brakiem nale23 Chinua Achebe, There was a country: A memoir, New York 2012, zwłaszcza s. 80–83. 17„AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Co łączy i dzieli communal confl ict oraz „konfl ikt etniczny"... żytej reakcji ze strony tymczasowych władz Nigerii na pogromy Ibów, przejmuje w tym regionie pełnię kompetencji władzy państwowej. Elity polityczne Ibów były już wówczas bardzo zaniepokojone ich postępującą marginalizacją w państwie rządzonym głównie przez wojskowych wywodzących się z Regionu Północnego. Były również niezadowolone z wysokości środków, jakie wpływają do Regionu Wschodniego w ramach prowadzonej przez rząd centralny redystrybucji przychodów budżetowych, których lwia część pochodziła z dochodów uzyskiwanych dzięki eksploatacji ropy naftowej w Delcie Nigru, a zatem na obszarze kontrolowanym przez Ibów. Ibowie żądali również od rządu w Lagos formalnego zagwarantowania im prawa do secesji, co być może było kartą przetargową mającą pomóc w uzyskaniu większej części pieniędzy z budżetu federalnego. Nigeryjski rząd wojskowy uznał posunięcie władz Regionu Wschodniego za próbę pozbawienia przez Ibów reszty Nigerii wpływów z eksploatacji ropy naftowej w Delcie Nigru i w odpowiedzi wysunął 27 maja 1967 r. propozycję nowego podziału terytorialnego Nigerii na dwanaście stanów24 w miejsce istniejących wówczas czterech regionów25. Region Wschodni miał zostać rozbity na trzy mniejsze stany, czego efektem byłoby zmniejszenie dominacji Ibów w Delcie Nigru. Reakcją na te zamierzenia było ogłoszenie 30 maja 1967 r. przez podpułkownika Ojukwu secesji Regionu Wschodniego i utworzenie na jego obszarze niepodległej Republiki Biafry26, co stało się bezpośrednią przyczyną wybuchu wojny. 6 lipca 1967 r. Biafra została zaatakowana przez siły federalne. Tak wyglądała geneza nigeryjskiej wojny domowej, w której – jak podaje większość źródeł – zginęło, głównie z powodu głodu, ponad milion ludzi27. W trakcie wojny rząd centralny prowadził bowiem blokadę żywnościową terenów kontrolowanych przez władze Biafry, co Ibowie uznali za próbę ich eksterminacji poprzez zagłodzenie. Również po zakończeniu trwającej blisko trzy lata wojny Ibowie byli w rozmaity sposób dyskryminowani przez władze Nigerii28. Z kilku powodów wojna biafrańska często klasyfi kowana jest jako konfl ikt etniczny. Przede wszystkim jej główni uczestnicy wyróżniani są ze względu na swą 24 Plan ten został wcielony w życie już po wybuchu wojny biafrańskiej, w 1968 r. 25 W latach 1960 –1968 istniał w Nigerii prosty podział terytorialny na kilka regionów, wpierw na trzy (Północny, Zachodni i Wschodni), a od 1963 r. (po wydzieleniu Regionu Środkowozachodniego z Regionu Zachodniego) na cztery. 26 Republika Biafry ze stolicą w Enugu uzyskała później uznanie międzynarodowe jedynie pięciu państw i formalnie istniała do 15 stycznia 1970 r. 27 Według badacza wojny biafrańskiej, Herberta Ekwe-Ekwe, Igbo genocide and its aftermath – The tragedy of Africa's unlearned lesson,http://www.genocidescholars.org/sites/default/fi les/document%09%5Bcurrent-page%3A1%5D/documents/IAGS%202011%20Herbert%20Ekwe-Ekwe.pdf [dostęp z: 2015-12-18], w konfl ikcie tym i w wyniku przemocy go poprzedzającej zginęło ponad 3 miliony ludzi. 28 Paul O. Obi-Ani, Nigeria: Biafran secession and civil war, 1967–1970, [w:] Encyclopedia of African history, red. Kevin Shillington, tom II, New York–London 2005, s. 1115. 18 „AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Krzysztof Trzciński odmienną etniczność. Po jednej stronie walczyli bowiem głównie Ibowie, zaś po drugiej – koalicja dwóch wielkich grup etnicznych: Hausa Fulanich i Jorubów. Ibowie stali się w trakcie wojny ofi arami celowego wyniszczania poprzez głodzenie, zaplanowanego i konsekwentnie przeprowadzanego przez siły rządu centralnego kontrolowanego przez członków innych grup etnicznych29. Ponadto, jeszcze przed wybuchem wojny biafrańskiej oraz w jej trakcie doszło do rywalizacji interesów ekonomicznych kojarzonych z konkretnymi grupami etnicznymi, których członkowie walczyli w wojnie po przeciwnych stronach. I tak Ibowie w imieniu swoim i mniejszych grup etnicznych zamieszkujących Deltę Nigru kontestowali reguły redystrybucji między różne regiony Nigerii jej dochodów budżetowych, które pochodziły głównie z eksploatacji ropy naftowej w Regionie Wschodnim. Ibowie wysuwali roszczenia do zasobów naturalnych Delty Nigru m.in. na podstawie obrony swoich praw grupowych, w tym natury egzystencjalnej, które zostały zagrożone masakrami dokonywanymi na nich w przeddzień wojny głównie przez Hausa-Fulanich oraz planami wprowadzeniem nowego podziału terytorialnego Nigerii, de facto likwidującego władzę Ibów w Delcie Nigru. Z kolei Hausa-Fulani i Jorubowie nie mogli pozwolić sobie na odcięcie reszty Nigerii od dochodów płynących z eksploatacji zasobów naturalnych znajdujących się na terenach kontrolowanych przez Ibów. Od czasów wojny biafrańskiej nie doszło w Nigerii do erupcji konfl iktu etnicznego na tak dużą skalę. Jednakże w państwie tym wielokrotnie miały i nadal mają miejsce tzw. communal confl icts, które posiadają cechy wspólne z konfl iktami etnicznymi. Czym jest communal confl ict? Termin communal confl ict niejednokrotnie używany jest w piśmiennictwie naukowym w zastępstwie terminu „konfl ikt etniczny". Nie jest to bezzasadne. Errol A. Henderson30 wskazuje bowiem, że pojęcie „grupa etniczna" stosuje się zwykle wymiennie z pojęciem communal group. Również Lijphart31 zauważa, że termin communal group stał się niemal synonimiczny z pojęciem „grupa etniczna". Termin communal group nie doczekał się przekładu na język polski. Mimo bliskości znaczeniowej pojęć „grupa etniczna" i communal group, terminy „konfl ikt etniczny" i communal confl ict odnoszące się do konfl iktów, w których biorą udział członkowie wskazanych społeczności, nie zawsze jednak mogą być stosowane wymiennie. Badacze z Institute for Policy Analysis of Confl ict (IPAC) tłumaczą, że termin communal confl ict odnosi się bowiem zarówno do konfronta29 Część badaczy uznaje ten proceder za ludobójstwo. Zob. np. Lasse Heerten, A. Dirk Moses, The Nigeria–Biafra war: Postcolonial confl ict and the question of genocide, "Journal of Genocide Research", 16, 2–3, 2014, s. 169–203; Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, Igbo genocide and its aftermath..., op. cit. 30 Errol A. Henderson, Ethnic confl ict and cooperation, op. cit., s. 751. 31 Arend Lijphart, Multiethnic democracy, op. cit., s. 854. 19„AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Co łączy i dzieli communal confl ict oraz „konfl ikt etniczny"... cji między członkami różnych grup etnicznych lub wspólnot religijnych, jaki i do „utarczek (clashes) pomiędzy wioskami, których strony defi niowane są przez węższe tożsamości"32. Według IPAC, u podłoża communal confl ict często leżą czynniki polityczne lub ekonomiczne, w tym kwestia własności ziemi. Niejednokrotnie communal confl icts wybuchają w następstwie długo narastających wzajemnych pretensji członków różnych grup tożsamościowych. Dwójka skandynawskich badaczy konfl iktów, Johan Brosché i Emma Elverson33 pod pojęciem communal confl ict rozumie „konfl ikt z użyciem przemocy, który zachodzi pomiędzy grupami o charakterze niepaństwowym (nonstate groups), zorganizowanymi wokół łączącej ich członków tożsamości wspólnotowej". Wyjaśniają oni, że wyrażenie „grupy o charakterze niepaństwowym" oznacza grupy, które nie kontrolują całego państwa i jego sił zbrojnych, choć jacyś aktorzy państwowi mogą być zaangażowani w communal confl ict w charakterze „ważnych aktorów wspomagających" którąś z jego stron. Z kolei zorganizowanie grup „wokół łączącej ich członków tożsamości wspólnotowej" polega na tym, że konfrontacja między nimi ma miejsce „wzdłuż linii tożsamości grupowych". Takie pojmowanie znaczenia terminu communal confl ict z pozoru nie różni się w zasadniczym stopniu od rozumienia pojęcia „konfl ikt etniczny". Brosché i Elverson zauważają jednak, że choć pojęcie tożsamości wspólnotowej (communal identity) bywa traktowane jako tożsame z pojęciem tożsamości etnicznej, to, w ich opinii, jest one szersze, gdyż może być konceptualizowane jako subiektywna identyfi kacja grupowa oparta na przykład na wspólnej historii bądź jakichś zasadniczych, wyznawanych wspólnie przez członków grupy wartościach. Podejście to oznacza, że pojęcie tożsamości etnicznej jest za mało elastyczne, bowiem opiera się przede wszystkim na przekonaniu członków danej grupy etnicznej o ich pokrewieństwie i odczuwaniu wspólnoty pochodzenia. Brosché i Elverson próbują egzemplifi kować ową różnicę odwołując się do kazusów występujących na przykład w Afryce Zachodniej lokalnych konfl iktów o jakieś dobra, w tym zwłaszcza o ziemię, między grupami mającymi na jakimś obszarze charakter autochtoniczny a grupami, które zasiedliły go w czasie późniejszym, i których członków można określić mianem przybyszów. Przykład ten nie wskazuje jednak na jakieś kluczowe różnice między pojęciami konfl iktu etnicznego i communal confl ict, a raczej skupia się na kwestii przedmiotu konfl iktu. Za klarowniejszą można uznać inną, teoretyczną sytuację przywołaną przez Brosché i Elverson34, której sedno skupia się na odczuwaniu tożsamości wspól32 Institute for Policy Analysis of Confl ict, Communal Confl ict, http://www.understandingconfl ict.org/en/confl ict/index/1/Communal-Confl ict [dostęp z: 2015-12-12]. 33 Johan Brosché, Emma Elverson, Communal confl ict, civil war, and the state: Complexities, connections, and the case of Sudan, "African Journal on Confl ict Resolution", 12, 1, 2012, s. 35 34 Ibidem, s. 36. 20 „AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Krzysztof Trzciński notowej przez mieszkańców wioski etnicznie heterogenicznej. Ich konfl ikt np. z jakąś grupą przybyszów nie byłby konfl iktem etnicznym, gdyż podstawą odczuwania tożsamości wspólnotowej nie jest tożsama etniczność. Kazus ten wskazuje na zachodzącą niekiedy rzeczywistą różnicę między terminami „konfl ikt etniczny" i communal confl ict, choć należy zauważyć, że etnicznie heterogeniczne wioski nie są czymś typowym czy też częstym dla Afryki Subsaharyjskiej. Niemniej jednak communal confl ict należy uznać za pojęcie nieco szersze od terminu „konfl ikt etniczny" w tym sensie, że można go swobodniej używać wobec konfl iktów, których poszczególne strony są zorganizowane wokół tożsamości również innych niż opartych stricte na etniczności, na przykład religijnych, wyznaniowych lub rasowych bądź wobec konfl iktów, których strony mogą być wyróżnione według więcej niż jednego grupowego kryterium tożsamościowego, np. etnicznego i religijnego zarazem. Z drugiej jednak strony, jak wskazuje przywołana, szeroka defi nicja pojęcia „konfl ikt etniczny" autorstwa Siska35, konfrontacja między stronami określającymi się w kategoriach religii lub rasy również może zostać zaliczona do konfl iktu etnicznego. Niemniej jednak, dzięki obu przykładom przytoczonym przez Brosché i Elverson, należy wnioskować, iż pojęcie communal confl ict w przypadku Afryki Subsaharyjskiej odnoszone jest przede wszystkim do konfl iktów o charakterze lokalnym, i z tego punktu widzenia oznacza pojęcie znaczeniowo istotnie węższe od pojęcia konfl iktu etnicznego36. O lokalności communal confl ict świadczy również defi nicja autorstwa IPAC. Nie znaczy to jednak bynajmniej, że zidentyfi kowana granica między communal confl ict a konfl iktem etnicznym jest klarowna. Problem leży bowiem w tym, że pojęcie „konfl ikt etniczny" również bywa stosowane wobec tych konfl iktów pomiędzy grupami etnicznymi, które rozgrywają się w mikroskali. Należy jednak założyć, że mianem communal confl ict powinno się określać wyłącznie konfl ikt o zasięgu lokalnym między aktorami tworzącymi tę samą wspólnotę terytorialną, choć przynależącymi do innych grup etnicznych bądź wspólnot religijnych. Warto w tym miejscu zwrócić uwagę na fakt, że leżący u podstaw terminu communal confl ict termin „wspólnota" (ang. community) jest wieloznaczny czy też różnie rozumiany w zależności od kontekstu. Ponieważ termin communal confl ict ma zdecydowanie konotacje lokalne, wspólnota, w której się on rozgrywa jest de facto wspólnotą lokalną (ang. local community). Termin „wspólnota lokalna" również nie jest jednak prosty do zdefi niowania, zwłaszcza w rzeczywistości Afryki Subsaharyjskiej. I tak np. nigeryjski fi lozof 35 Timothy D. Sisk, Power sharing and international mediation in ethnic confl icts, op. cit., s. 119. 36 Por. Ted Robert Gurr, Communal confl icts and global security, "Current History", 94, 592, 1995, s. 212–217. 21„AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Co łączy i dzieli communal confl ict oraz „konfl ikt etniczny"... Ifeanyi A. Menkiti określa mianem wspólnot lokalnych mniejsze zbiorowości istniejące w ramach grup etnicznych. Intelektualista ten nie precyzuje jednak, czy pod pojęciem wspólnoty lokalnej rozumie konkretnie rodzinę, lineaż, klan bądź wieś jako jednostkę organizacyjną, terytorialną i społeczną. W jednej ze swoich prac stosuje jednak w podobnym kontekście takie terminy jak „społeczność wiejska" (village society) oraz „świat wioskowy" (village world)37. Z kolei ghański fi lozof Kwasi Wiredu defi niuje wspólnotę lokalną jako ogół lineaży zamieszkujących niewielki obszar. Termin „lineaż" stosuje zaś w odniesieniu do wszystkich jednostek żyjących na przykład w jakiejś miejscowości lub wsi, które pochodzą od jednego przodka lub antenatki, w zależności od tego, czy w danej kulturze lineaże mają charakter patrylinearny czy matrylinearny38. Wiredu wskazuje, że afrykańskie wspólnoty lokalne są „społeczeństwami typu wspólnotowego (communalistic societies), a zatem takimi, w których rozbudowane więzi pokrewieństwa odgrywają dominującą rolę w stosunkach społecznych"39. Przedstawione próby defi nicyjne zdają się jednak być nieadekwatne na potrzeby przeprowadzanej tu analizy, albowiem communal confl ict toczy się między członkami różnych grup tożsamościowych. Rozgrywa się zatem w warunkach wspólnoty lokalnej heterogenicznej zwłaszcza pod względem etnicznym lub religijnym czy też wyznaniowym. Takie rozumienie wspólnoty lokalnej wychodzi znacznie ponad więzi pokrewieństwa i homogeniczną pod względem etnicznym jednostkę terytorialną, które charakteryzują afrykańskie wspólnoty lokalne w rozumieniu przywołanych afrykańskich fi lozofów. Co więcej, jest ono również inne od wspólnoty lokalnej pojmowanej przez badaczy zachodnich, w tym Roberta Putnama40, w znaczeniu społeczności zamieszkującej ten sam niewielki obszar, której członków łączą zwykle pewne wspólne wartości oraz cele, i którzy współdziałają ze sobą na rzecz ich realizacji. Tak ujmowana wspólnota lokalna tworzy bezcenny kapitał społeczny i nastawiona jest na rozwiązywanie sporów, a nie ich zaognianie. Tego zachodniego rozumienia koncepcji wspólnoty lokalnej nie sposób jednak odnieść bezpośrednio do lokalnych społeczności silnie podzielonych wzdłuż linii 37 Zob. Ifeanyi A. Menkiti, Physical and metaphysical understanding: Nature, agency, and causation in African traditional thought, [w:] red. Lee M. Brown, African philosophy: New and traditional perspectives, Oxford 2004, s. 124 i 133. Por. Ryszard Vorbrich, Plemienna i postplemienna Afryka. Koncepcje i postaci wspólnoty w dawnej i współczesnej Afryce, Poznań 2012, s. 78, 128, 154. 38 Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural universals and particulars: An African perspective, Bloomington IN 1996, s. 161 i n. Por. Ryszard Vorbrich, Plemienna i postplemienna Afryka..., op. cit., s. 130–132, 136, 138. 39 Kwasi Wiredu, The state, civil society and democracy in Africa, "Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy", 12, 1, 1998, s. 241. 40 Zob. np. Robert D. Putnam, Demokracja w działaniu. Tradycje obywatelskie we współczesnych Włoszech, tłum. Jakub Szacki, Kraków 1995; idem, Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community, New York 2000. 22 „AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Krzysztof Trzciński tożsamościowych, które występują zwłaszcza w miastach Afryki Subsaharyjskiej. Skoro podstawową cechą communal confl ict jest lokalność, a konfl ikt tego rodzaju często zachodzi w relacjach między członkami różnych grup etnicznych, warto wskazać jego typową nigeryjską egzemplifi kację. Przykład communal confl ict w mieście Sagamu Ważnym przykładem communal confl ict w Nigerii jest konfrontacja między członkami grup Joruba i Hausa-Fulani, której krwawy przebieg miał miejsce w lipcu 1999 r. w mieście Sagamu (Shagamu) w stanie Ogun, w południowo- -zachodniej części Nigerii, położonym między Lagos i Ibadanem. Choć Sagamu zlokalizowane jest na obszarze zamieszkałym głównie przez Jorubów, w mieście tym od dawna żyło wielu Hausa-Fulanich, którzy przybyli doń kiedyś między innymi w celu handlu bydłem i orzechami kola. Problemem spornym w Sagamu był, w mniemaniu Jorubów, brak należytego poszanowania przez Hausa-Fulanich ich zwyczajów w trakcie obchodzonego corocznie kilkudniowego, tradycyjnego święta boga Oro. Jorubowie żywią przekonanie, że podczas tej uroczystości nieJorubowie powinni pozostawać wewnątrz swych domostw. Dotyczy to zwłaszcza kobiet, które „nigdy nie powinny zobaczyć Oro". Erupcja konfl iktu w 1999 r. nastąpiła po tym, jak jeden z Jorubów zabił hausańską kobietę, którą dostrzegł na otwartej przestrzeni w czasie obchodów święta, co uznał za brak szacunku dla zasad kultywowanych przez wyznawców Oro. Zapoczątkowana tym zabójstwem spirala przemocy przyniosła śmierć kilkudziesięciu osób, wywodzących się z obu grup i duże zniszczenia mienia41. Konfl ikt w Sagamu zdaje się jednak potwierdzać powszechne wśród badaczy konfl iktów przekonanie, że u podstaw erupcji przemocy w międzyetnicznych stosunkach leży zwykle więcej niż jednej czynnik. Bamgbose J. Adele i Amos Oloruntele42 wskazują bowiem, że nieporozumienia na tle szacunku dla tradycyjnych zwyczajów w Sagamu stanowiły jedynie część szerszego konfl iktu, który miał też wymiar polityczny w postaci rywalizacji między miejskimi elitami Jorubów i Hausa-Fulanich, jak również wiązał się z roszczeniami Jorubów do ziemi, na której zamieszkiwali w Sagamu Hausa-Fulani. Wybuch przemocy w Sagamu w 1999 r. był zatem najpewniej wynikiem długo narastających antagonizmów43. 41 UNHCR, Nigeria: Oro festival including the role of the Oro priest and whether, or not, he or she is masked; whether there are any penalties invoked against those who observe the priest performing his rituals, 2000-09-16, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4be794.html [dostęp z: 2015-12-12]. 42 Bamgbose J. Adele, Amos Oloruntele, Ethnic agitation and confl icts in Nigeria, 1999–2000, "Development Policy Management Network Bulletin" 13, 3, 2001, s. 36. 43 Na temat innych communal confl icts we współczesnej Nigerii w ujęciu syntetycznym zob. np. Tokunbo S. Osinubi, Oladipupo S. Osinubi, Ethnic confl icts in contemporary Africa: The Nigerian experience, "Journal of Social Sciences", 12, 6, 2006, s. 108–110. 23„AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Co łączy i dzieli communal confl ict oraz „konfl ikt etniczny"... Konfl ikt w Sagamu w 1999 r. jest wzorcowym przykładem ilustrującym istotę communal confl ict. Był to bowiem konfl ikt o ograniczonej skali, który toczył się w mieście, a zatem na poziomie lokalnym, między członkami różnych grup tożsamościowych, etnicznych i jednocześnie religijnych, którzy tworzyli jedną wspólnotę terytorialną, wewnątrz której rozwijały się waśnie i nieporozumienia. Wydarzenia w Sagamu spowodowały jednak wybuch przemocy między członkami różnych grup etnicznych i zarazem wspólnot religijnych w Kano, największym mieście zdominowanej przez Hausa-Fulanich Północy Nigerii. Po przybyciu uchodźców hausańskich z Sagamu do Kano, część mieszkańców miasta zaczęła bowiem mordować członków lokalnej mniejszości jorubskiej i niszczyć ich dobytek. Przykład konfl iktu w Sagamu dowodzi, że mimo swego pozornie lokalnego tylko charakteru, erupcja communal confl ict w jednym miejscu Nigerii może spowodować wybuch przemocy etnicznej nawet na obszarze oddalonym o setki kilometrów, a zatem przenieść konfl ikt w nowe miejsce. Podobnie było w przypadku omówionej wcześniej genezy wojny biafrańskiej. W kontekście takich wydarzeń jak wskazane w Sagamu i Kano, do których dochodzi w Nigerii na poziomie lokalnym, w literaturze przedmiotu coraz częściej używa się terminu ethnic violence44 który można tłumaczyć na język polski jako „przemoc etniczna" czy też, bardziej precyzyjnie, jako „przemoc między członkami różnych grup etnicznych". Termin ten może być uznany za szerszy od pierwszej z wymienionych form konfl iktu etnicznego (tj. niepokojów) w tym sensie, że dotyczy on wybuchu takiego rodzaju nieporozumień między członkami różnych grup etnicznych, które ex defi nitione zawierają w sobie użycie przemocy. Z drugiej jednak strony, przemoc etniczna może mieć charakter nagły, krótkotrwały, pozbawiony organizacji i wówczas mieć węższe znaczenie, zwłaszcza od pozostałych wskazanych trzech form konfl iktu etnicznego (tj. wojny wewnątrz państwa, masowego mordu za przyzwoleniem władz państwowych oraz ludobójstwa), które zdają się zawierać w sobie element planowania i przewlekłości oraz występują w skali ponadlokalnej. Niemniej jednak termin ethnic violence de facto używany bywa w zastępstwie terminu communal confl ict w sytuacji, gdy dany konfl ikt ma charakter lokalny i konkretnie toczy się między członkami różnych grup etnicznych, a nie innych grup tożsamościowych. Termin ethnic violence wydaje się zatem nieco porządkować problem braku klarownego rozróżnienia między communal confl ict a konfl iktem etnicznym, choć, patrząc na to z innej perspektywy, może być uznany za dalszą komplikację terminologiczną. 44 Pojęcie to niekiedy używane jest w towarzystwie terminu sectarian violence (np. ethnic and sectarian violence), który można tłumaczyć jako przemoc na tle religijnym czy też przemoc zachodząca w stosunkach między członkami odmiennych grup religijnych lub wyznaniowych. 24 „AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Krzysztof Trzciński Wnioski Communal confl icts i konfl ikty etniczne mają wiele cech wspólnych. Najważniejsza jest oczywiście ta, że oba rodzaje konfl iktów mogą rozgrywać się między członkami różnych grup etnicznych. W przypadku konfl iktu etnicznego, jak wskazuje sama nazwa, powinno być tak zawsze; w przypadku communal confl icts jest tak bardzo często. Problemy z klarownym rozróżnieniem obu rodzajów konfl iktów przynajmniej po części wiążą są z faktem, że powstają one w zbliżonym, jeśli nie tożsamym kontekście. Jak zauważa Sisk45, konfl ikty między różnymi grupami tożsamościowymi, w tym etnicznymi, mają najczęściej miejsce w tzw. społeczeństwach głęboko podzielonych (ang. deeply divided societies). Termin ten należy, jego zdaniem, stosować na określenie takich pluralnych społeczeństw (zwłaszcza: wieloetnicznych, wieloreligijnych, wielowyznaniowych), w których relacje między odmiennymi grupami tożsamościowymi są tak napięte, że przynajmniej od czasu do czasu dochodziło lub dochodzi w nich do krwawych walk, a nawet „wymuszanej asymilacji, 'czystek etnicznych' lub przymusowych wypędzeń oraz ludobójstwa". Również czynniki prowadzące do powstawania i rozwoju communal confl icts i konfl iktów etnicznych są podobne, jeśli nie identyczne. Badacze źródeł konfl iktów Herbert C. Kelman i Ronald J. Fisher46 podkreślają, że u podstaw każdego konfl iktu między grupami tożsamościowymi, w tym etnicznymi, w społeczeństwach pluralnych mogą leżeć zarówno czynniki racjonalne, jak i nieracjonalne, a nadto czynniki subiektywne i obiektywne. Badacze ci formułują kilka ważnych społeczno-psychologicznych twierdzeń dotyczących uwarunkowań rozwoju konfl iktów. Zgodnie z pierwszym z nich, konfl ikt jest „procesem napędzanym zbiorowymi potrzebami i obawami"47. I tak na przykład grupy etniczne reprezentują potrzeby swych członków, u których w warunkach wieloetniczności strach przed wyginięciem grupy połączony jest z obawą przed osobistym unicestwieniem. Potrzeby te mogą być zupełnie podstawowe (pożywienie, mieszkanie, bezpieczeństwo fi zyczne), jak i bardziej rozbudowane (ochrona tożsamości, poczucie własnej wartości, autonomia, poczucie sprawiedliwości, uznanie). Konieczność zaspokajania potrzeb danej grupy etnicznej defi niuje jej interesy. Konfl ikt pojawia się wówczas, gdy interesy jednej grupy zostają pogwałcone lub są lekceważone przez inną grupę lub grupy, a zatem gdy zaspokajanie potrzeb tej pierwszej jest niemożliwe lub możliwe jedynie w ograniczonym stopniu. 45 Timothy D. Sisk, Power sharing and international mediation in ethnic confl icts, op. cit., s. 3. 46 Herbert C. Kelman i Ronald J. Fisher, Analiza konfl iktów i ich rozwiązywanie, [w:] red. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, Robert Jervis, Psychologia polityczna, tłum. Robert Andruszko, Kraków 2008, s. 288–293. 47 Ibidem, s. 289. 25„AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Co łączy i dzieli communal confl ict oraz „konfl ikt etniczny"... W myśl kolejnego twierdzenia Kelmana i Fishera, konfl ikt jest „wieloaspektowym procesem wzajemnego wywierania wpływu"48, w którym każda strona dąży do „ochrony i wspierania swoich interesów", wpływając na zachowania innych stron. Konfl ikt rozwija się wówczas, gdy interesy poszczególnych stron ze sobą kolidują, w tym zwłaszcza gdy realizacja interesów którejś ze stron zagraża interesom innej lub jest postrzegana jako potencjalnie zagrażająca. Wywieranie przez jedną stronę wpływu poprzez groźby lub zachęty bądź na oba sposoby jednocześnie ma skłonić drugą stronę do podjęcia pożądanych przez pierwszą stronę działań. Ostatnie ważne w kontekście analizowanej problematyki twierdzenie stanowi, że konfl ikt jest „procesem interakcyjnym o eskalacyjnej, samonapędzającej się dynamice"49. Twierdzenie to oznacza, że interakcje między stronami konfl iktu zwykle prowadzą do jego wzmocnienia, a nie osłabienia. Prawidłowość ta wiąże się w dużym stopniu z faktem, że strony konfl iktu odmiennie postrzegają i interpretują dostępne informacje. Stan ten oznacza, że w miarę rozwoju nieporozumień strony wzmacniają wiarę w swoje racje, a ich „zdolność postawienia się w sytuacji drugiego jest poważnie upośledzona", co utrudnia rozwiązanie konfl iktu. Wskazane cechy wspólne z pewnością nie ułatwiają klarownego odróżnienia communal confl icts od konfl iktów etnicznych. Do takiego można się zbliżyć dopiero po zwróceniu uwagi na zasięg terytorialny obu rodzajów konfl iktów. Konfl ikty etniczne rozgrywają się bowiem w wymiarze dużej części państwa, np. regionu lub kilku stanów (jak w przypadku wojny biafrańskiej w latach 1967–70), bądź całego terytorium państwa, zwłaszcza o niewielkiej powierzchni (na co wskazuje np. kazus konfl iktu w Rwandzie w 1994 r.). Z kolei teatrem communal confl ict w Afryce Subsaharyjskiej jest relatywnie niewielki, mniejszy od regionu lub innej podstawowej jednostki podziału terytorialnego, obszar zamieszkany przez członków zwłaszcza różnych grup etnicznych lub wspólnot religijnych (bądź jednych i drugich jednocześnie, jak w przypadku konfl iktu w Sagamu w 1999 r.), w tym szczególnie miejscowość lub miasto. Communal confl ict zachodzi zatem w ramach wspólnoty lokalnej tworzonej przez ludzi, którzy przynależą zwłaszcza do różnych grup etnicznych lub, a niekiedy także, wspólnot religijnych. Jeżeli communal confl ict toczy się między członkami odmiennych grup etnicznych, wówczas można go uznać za konfl ikt etniczny w mikroskali czy też, innymi słowy, za lokalny konfl ikt etniczny. Oczywiście taki konfl ikt może rozprzestrzeniać się na inne części państwa i objawiać w postaci nowych ognisk ethnic violence (o czym świadczy przykład wydarzeń w Kano w 1999 r.) lub ewoluować w konfl ikt etniczny na ponadlokalną skalę (jak np. miało to miejsce w Nigerii w latach 1966–67 r.). 48 Ibidem, s. 290. 49 Ibidem, s. 292. 26 „AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Krzysztof Trzciński Z zasięgiem terytorialnym bezpośrednio związana jest skala tragedii ludzkiej. Konfl ikt etniczny jako toczący się na większej powierzchni państwa ma również większą liczbę uczestników i przynosi większe straty w ludziach, communal confl ict – odwrotnie. Warto teraz skupić się na kolejnej istotnej kwestii, która pozostaje w bezpośrednim związku z zagadnieniem cech wspólnych oraz różnic między communal confl ict oraz konfl iktem etnicznym. Mianowicie w politologicznej literaturze przedmiotu odnoszącej się do problemów Afryki Subsaharyjskiej coraz rzadziej stosowany jest termin „konfl ikt etniczny". Można nawet zaryzykować stwierdzenie, że jest on wypierany przez termin communal confl ict. Prawidłowość ta, jak można wnioskować, wiąże się co najmniej z trzema przyczynami. Po pierwsze, znaczna część badaczy podziela przywołane wcześniej stanowisko instrumentalistów, zgodnie z którym, krótko rzecz ujmując, nie ma czegoś takiego jak konfl ikt etniczny50. Istnieją jednak antagonizmy i zatargi między grupami etnicznymi, które częstokroć objawiają się w erupcji przemocy. Wówczas w sukurs przychodzi termin communal confl ict, który może być uznany za bardziej elastyczny, gdyż pozbawiony jest w nazwie pierwiastka wskazującego na etniczne źródła konfl iktu. Warto jednak pamiętać, o ograniczającej cesze tego rodzaju konfl iktu, jakim jest jego lokalny charakter. W konsekwencji, konfl ikt na ponadlokalną skalę między członkami różnych grup etnicznych, którzy bronią jakichś partykularnych interesów grupowych, nazywany bywa przez instrumentalistów w ogóle bez odwołań do kwestii odmienności etnicznych wyróżniających jego strony, a przy zastosowaniu jakiejś innej kategorii. I tak np. wojna biafrańska może być po prostu określana jako konfl ikt separatystyczny czy też wojna secesyjna, albo po prostu jako wojna domowa51. Po drugie, na kontynencie afrykańskim na początku XXI w. coraz rzadziej dochodzi do wybuchów konfl iktów na dużą skalę, a więc istnieje mniejsza potrzeba stosowania do wyjaśniania współczesnej rzeczywistości terminu „konfl ikt etniczny" w znaczeniu konfl iktu, który rozgrywa się między członkami różnych grup etnicznych, związany jest z rywalizacją interesów grupowych i nosi inne cechy go defi niujące. Z drugiej strony, konfl ikty takie od czasu do czasu wybuchają na poziomie lokalnym i wówczas można je określić mianem communal confl icts. Communal confl icts, co warto przypomnieć, nie zawsze jednak występują w relacjach międzyetnicznych i wówczas nie mają charakteru konfl iktów etnicznych 50 Z drugiej jednak strony, wbrew zdobywającemu coraz większy posłuch stanowisku instrumentalistów, w Encyclopedia of confl icts since World War II, red. James Ciment, London–New York 2015, s. 47–54 w części ogólnej zatytuowanej „Źródła wojny" (Roots of war) wyróżniane są w charakterze odrębnej sekcji „Konfl ikty etniczne i religijne" (Ethnic and religious confl icts), a konkretne konfl ikty klasyfi kowane są następnie jako etniczne, religijne lub mieszane. 51 Np. w piśmiennictwie anglojęzycznym wojna biafrańska występuje często jako Nigerian Civil War. 27„AFRYKA" 42 (2015 r.) Co łączy i dzieli communal confl ict oraz „konfl ikt etniczny"... w mikroskali. Niemniej jednak, co też warto powtórzyć, lokalne konfl ikty między członkami odmiennych wspólnot religijnych często są zarazem konfl iktami między członkami różnych grup etnicznych. Po trzecie, również strony afrykańskich konfl iktów na ponadlokalną skalę często wyróżniane są zarówno wzdłuż linii odmiennych tożsamości etnicznych, jak i religijnych. Innymi słowy, jedną stronę konfl iktu może tworzyć konkretna grupa etniczna (lub koalicja grup), której członkowie są głównie wyznawcami np. chrześcijaństwa, podczas gdy drugą – inna grupa etniczna (bądź koalicja grup), której członkowie to przede wszystkim wyznawcy np. islamu. Gdyby konfl ikt taki miał charakter li tylko lokalny, wówczas właściwe byłoby jego nazwanie mianem communal confl ict (tak jak ma to miejsce np. w przypadku konfl iktu w Sagamu w 1999 r.). Jednakże w sytuacji, gdy obejmuje on swym zasięgiem znaczną część danego państwa lub całe jego terytorium, to wówczas nieadekwatne staje się zastosowanie zarówno terminu communal confl ict, jak i pojęcia „konfl ikt etniczny". Wtenczas z pomocą przychodzi inny, nadal mało popularny anglojęzyczny termin: inter-communal confl ict, który na przykład stosowany bywa wobec konfl iktu toczącego się w XXI w. w Republice Środkowoafrykańskiej (zwłaszcza w latach 2013–14)52. Celem tego artykułu nie była ocena zasadności stosowania terminów communal confl ict oraz „konfl ikt etniczny", a jedynie wyjaśnienie, w jakim znaczeniu terminy te są najczęściej rozumiane, oraz zidentyfi kowanie ich cech wspólnych i dzielących je różnic. Przeprowadzona analiza znaczeniowa dowodzi, jak trudno jest w praktyce klarownie odróżnić od siebie oba terminy. Główną podstawą rozróżnienia wydaje się zasięg terytorialny konfl iktów określanych przedmiotowymi pojęciami. Warto zatem powtórzyć, że termin communal confl ict odnosi się do konfl iktów lokalnych, często, choć nie jedynie, wybuchających między członkami różnych grup etnicznych, podczas gdy pojęcie „konfl ikt etniczny" używane jest w stosunku do konfl iktów rozgrywających się głównie między członkami odmiennych grup etnicznych zwłaszcza na ponadlokalnym obszarze. Na koniec warto jeszcze zaproponować, by termin communal confl ict tłumaczony był na język polski po prostu jako „konfl ikt wspólnotowy", albowiem zachodzi on w ramach danej lokalnej wspólnoty terytorialnej, której członkowie wywodzą się zwłaszcza z różnych grup etnicznych i/lub wspólnot religijnych. Analogicznie, można by w polskim piśmiennictwie stosować termin „konfl ikt międzywspólnotowy" jako tłumaczenie angielskiego terminu inter-communal confl ict, który rozgrywa się w wymiarze ponadlokalnym między członkami odmiennych grup tożsamościowych, w tym etnicznych i religijnych. 52 Zob. np. 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EL PERIPLO DE LA RAZÓN El racionalismo Musulmán en la Edad Media .....Autor Sevilla A mis padres © ................ ISBN: pte Depósito Legal: Edita: Fénix Editora www.fenixeditora.com Imprime: Fénix Editora Diseño y maquetación: Performance SL. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 5 In di ce In di ce El PEriPlo dE la razón " 7 INTRODUCCIÓN Una buena parte de la historiografía europea ha considerado que el pensamiento racional era un fenómeno esencialmente suyo. Con un giro mental cuyo etnocentrismo es ocioso subrayar, los europeos han desdeñado sistemáticamente las creaciones intelectuales de los otros pueblos, asiáticos, africanos o americanos. Algunos sabios guardianes del espíritu filosófico en las universidades alemanas, llegaron incluso a insinuar que el pensamiento creador es un don repartido entre griegos y germanos1. La belleza de la dicción en los autores de esa escuela historicista, su enorme erudición en el manejo de los datos y la profundidad conceptual de sus estudios, no nos pueden ocultar el sentido de las ideas, que buscan definir una esencia de la filosofía buceando en las cualidades espirituales de un pueblo inspirado por la genialidad. El mito de la superioridad indoeuropea subyace a esa comprensión de la 1. No resis to la tentación de transcribir el siguiente párrafo que Jaeger pone al comien zo de su Paideia como justificación de su trabajo: Precisa mente, en un momento histórico en que por razón misma de su carácter postrimero, la vida humana se ha recluido en la rigidez de una costra, en que el complicado mecanismo de la cultura deviene hostil a las cualidades heroicas del hombre, es preciso, por una necesidad histórica profunda, volver la mirada anhelante a las fuentes donde brota el impulso creador de nuestro pueblo, penetrar en las capas profundas del ser histórico en que el espíritu del pueblo griego, estrechamente vinculado al nuestro, dio forma a la vida palpitante que se conserva hasta nuestros días y eternizó el instante creador de su irrupción. Jaeger, W., Paideia: los ideales de la cultura griega, México, F.C.E., 1957. 8 " nombrE autor o autorEs historia, pero es evidente que sus intereses no caminan en pos de la razón. Esa forma de explicar la historia está extendida en el pensamiento europeo desde sus mismas raíces medievales y viene acompañada por la construcción de una ortodoxia en las ideas, que nos llega asociada a un imperialismo gestado ya en aquella época y que todavía sobrevive en nuestras manías culturales. La lucha de la Iglesia Católica para controlar la cultura europea durante los siglos finales del feudalismo, se manifestó en la represión de aquellas corrientes de pensamiento que habían nacido del contacto con la civilización islámica desarrollada al sur del Mediterráneo. Previamente habían sido destruidos los restos de un pensamiento no católico en la Europa medieval, mediante el exterminio de otras religiones: expulsiones de judíos en los principales países europeos, liquidación de los herejes albigenses y cátaros, destrucción de la cultura musulmana andalusí. Y si bien la Iglesia Católica fue incapaz de detener ese desarrollo del pensamiento que culminó en el Renacimiento, sí consiguió que los europeos olvidáramos la verdadera cuna de nuestros saberes y tendencias racionalistas. Por eso, aunque la intolerancia religiosa terminaría naufragando en la modernidad gracias a la reforma protestante y la revolución burguesa, una forma debilitada de esa misma intolerancia continuó existiendo en el pensamiento europeo bajo la forma de etnocentrismo cultural, acompañando al expansionismo colonial y presente en ciertas corrientes ilustradas que se apoyaron en la idea de Progreso. Cierto que el orgullo ilustrado tiene motivos poderosos en el espectacular desarrollo científico de occidente. Pero eso no puede ser excusa para querer vivir de una mentira, cuyas consecuencias siempre serán nefastas. La labor dogmática de erradicar la memoria de los que quedaron marginados por su oposición a la ortodoxia, se extiende también a la desconsideración de aquellos pensadores que por no haber sido cristianos y europeos, no El PEriPlo dE la razón " 9 merecen que se les tenga en cuenta en las historias oficiales de la filosofía 'occidental'. Incluso los mejores herederos actuales de aquellas corrientes filosóficas –que como veremos es el materialismo dialéctico–, ignoran la verdadera dimensión de la tragedia, pues los muñidores del mito del Renacimiento ya se encargaron de ocultar el verdadero proceso histórico. No es que el Renacimiento no haya sido valioso, muy valioso. Pero se entiende a menudo que el esplendor cultural de los siglos XV y XVI aparece como una vuelta a las fuentes del saber tras siglos de oscuridad medieval; lo que no es sino otra variante del mismo prejuicio etnocéntrico, que ha producido una auténtica insensibilidad hacia la verdad histórica. Gracias al redescubrimiento de la sabiduría griega por los europeos del siglo XV, la Razón habría sido rescatada del olvido para volver a brillar con todo esplendor ante la humanidad redimida de su ignorancia. Nada más lejos de la verdad; la continuidad del pensamiento racional no puede entenderse sin los siglos en que fue conservado y desarrollado entre los musulmanes de Siria, Irak, Persia o al-Ándalus, para ser luego traspasado a los europeos de la Baja Edad Media que prepararon el Renacimiento. No puede darse una explicación satisfactoria de la Escolástica cristiana sin la lectura de los sabios musulmanes y judíos de la Edad Media; tampoco puede comprenderse la revolución científica del siglo XVI, sin las aportaciones de la ciencia islámica entre los siglos VII y XII de nuestra era. Los hechos sucedieron de modo muy contrario a como se explican tantas veces en las cátedras de la Universidad europea. Una bendita superstición occidental ha hecho descender el pensamiento moderno de un reencuentro de Europa consigo misma tras los oscuros siglos medievales, el descubrimiento del pensamiento clásico griego tras casi dos milenios de olvido. Por eso el nombre de Renacimiento, que damos a esa época histórica que comienza la modernidad, nos oculta el periplo asiático y 10 " nombrE autor o autorEs africano de la racionalidad. Esto es ya en sí mismo un prejuicio. A deshacer esa superstición está destinado este ensayo. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 11 I PRIMERA PARTE: LOS ANTECEDENTES La filosofía islámica que se desarrolla entre los siglos IX y XII de nuestra era, desde la península ibérica hasta la India, bebe de fuentes muy antiguas, y especialmente de la antigua sabiduría griega, que incluye a los filósofos Platón y Aristóteles, tanto como a los científicos posteriores, Euclides, Arquímedes, Ptolomeo, etc. Una segunda fuente de los estudios musulmanes es la filosofía neoplatónica, elaborada en Egipto y Siria, cuyos conceptos metafísicos sirven para espiritualizar la religión monoteísta y darle un contenido racional. En tercer lugar, los sabios musulmanes elaboran un sistema de pensamiento que debe justificar el orden social feudal y el papel esencial que la religión juega en ese contexto histórico. Por tanto, la tradición racionalista del pensamiento filosófico era ya milenaria, cuando fue adoptada por las élites políticas de la civilización islámica, para constituir el fundamento de su actividad cultural. En esta primera parte, una sucinta idea del desarrollo filosófico de la Antigüedad nos mostrará las raíces intelectuales de los pensadores musulmanes. 1. ORígENES DEL PENSAMIENTO RACIONAL El razonamiento argumentativo nació en la Grecia clásica. El arte de demostrar y convencer mediante el diálogo racional fue un instrumento principal, utilizado por los ciudadanos griegos para el desarrollo social.2 En aquellas ciudades del siglo VI a.n.e. dedicadas 2. Esa idea viene desarrollada por un clásico sobre el tema, Jean Pierre Vernet en Los orígenes del pensamiento griego, así como en Mito y pensamiento en la Grecia antigua. 12 " nombrE autor o autorEs al comercio y la artesanía, sus habitantes se organizaron dentro de un nuevo sistema de relaciones sociales, bajo un orden democrático que establecía la igualdad ante la ley, isonomía, y la igualdad de palabra en la asamblea, isegoría. De ese modo se garantizaba la participación en las decisiones políticas para todos los ciudadanos en pie de igualdad. La ciudad griega se fundó en el debate público, la exposición de intereses y puntos de vista contrapuestos, como método para alcanzar el consenso colectivo sobre las leyes que regulan las costumbres y las conductas. Esa racionalidad del orden social fue volcada luego sobre la explicación de los fenómenos naturales y así nació la filosofía.3 El concepto de una ley natural, que determina el devenir armonioso de los acontecimientos cósmicos, proviene de la constitución de la sociedad dentro de un orden político fundado en la universalidad de la ley, idéntica para todos los ciudadanos varones y libres. Por eso –a pesar de la discriminación de las mujeres y de la institución de la esclavitud por deudas–, la constitución de la polis democrática consigue abolir las castas y los estamentos, las particularidades étnicas o religiosas dentro de una sociedad igualitaria; y al hacerlo puso las bases para la constitución del sentido común ciudadano en la sociedad griega antigua, como suma de las experiencias de todos y cada uno de los participantes en la vida social.4 La multiplicidad de interpretaciones que nos ofrece el 3. Un célebre fragmento que nos ha llegado de Anaximandro (filósofo de Mileto en el s.VI a.n.e.), dice así: 'según la necesidad, pues, se pagan pena y mutua retribución por su injusticia según la disposición del tiempo', –lo que nos muestra cómo el lenguaje jurídico ha sido apropiado por los filósofos para explicar los fenómenos de la naturaleza–. 4. Se puede objetar que la sociedad griega tenía una estructura esclavista. Efectivamente existía la esclavitud por deudas, lo que hoy en día consideramos un atentado contra los derechos humanos. En Atenas, por ejemplo, los esclavos trabajaban en las minas de plata de Laurium; eran personas arruinadas que recibían de ese modo una manera de ganarse la El PEriPlo dE la razón " 13 universo sensible, no son sino los distintos aspectos de la realidad, que tienen que dar lugar a una síntesis, a una descripción única y adecuada de los fenómenos naturales que es una suma de las experiencias particulares de los individuos, en la composición de los diferentes puntos de vista –del mismo modo que la multiplicidad de intereses en la polis debe dar lugar a un acuerdo común de convivencia–. Así las repúblicas helenas de los siglos VI al IV a.n.e. fueron la cuna de una nueva forma de pensar, que sustituía las alegorías religiosas y los mitos fundacionales por conceptos y principios racionales, en la construcción de la sociedad y en la explicación del universo que habitan los humanos. 1.1. RasGos básicos de La RacionaLidad huMana Una característica del pensamiento humano es por tanto la búsqueda constante de coherencia en muchos sentidos diferentes. Lo primero que descubrimos ahora es que los conceptos básicos del pensamiento humano son formales; eso significa que ciertas ideas pueden aplicarse a muchos aspectos diferentes de la experiencia. Los conceptos abstractos, las formas del pensamiento, vienen dados por los códigos de los lenguajes con que comunicamos nuestra experiencia. Así tenemos el concepto de ley con sus dos aspectos significativos: su vertiente normativa, como condición para las acciones futuras de los ciudadanos, y su versión descriptiva, que explica las tendencias permanentes de los fenómenos naturales. Eso sucede por una maravillosa vida. De ahí deriva la opinión de Aristóteles de que 'esclavo es quien no sabe manejar su propia vida'. Pero en la Ciudad Estado la mayor parte de la población estaba constituida por trabajadores libres. Para la dinámica política de las clases en la sociedad griega ver Arthur Ronsenberg, democracia y lucha de clases en la antigüedad. 14 " nombrE autor o autorEs capacidad metafórica y metonímica, poética en definitiva, que tiene la mente humana, asociando de forma multívoca sus imágenes mentales; pero también por la capacidad abstractiva, que consiste en asignar muchos objetos diferentes a un mismo signo referencial. En definitiva, 'ley' significa universalidad, y se requiere una buena capacidad de elevarse mentalmente por encima de la experiencia cotidiana inmediata y concreta para poder concebirla. Pero esto no nos explica todavía a la razón. Ya el sicoanálisis lacaniano ha definido el deseo como una función de coherencia de la psique humana; ésta es una unidad funcional que se vive como persona dentro del medio social –el cual constituye a su vez una integración funcional de numerosas personalidades diferentes–. En ese rasgo del ser social, que busca la coherencia para poder realizarse en los dos niveles, individual y colectivo, es donde radica la racionalidad humana, que tiene un claro carácter intencional. Es decir, conseguir la coherencia es un proyecto personal –como diría Kant, la libertad del alma es un postulado de la Razón práctica–. La idea moderna de Progreso tiende a identificar esa racionalidad con la expansión de la especie humana en el dominio de la naturaleza a través del desarrollo de los productos culturales; pero debemos tener en cuenta –en los tiempos de caos civilizatorio en que vivimos–, que la conservación de la especie es también racional. Por tanto, aunque nuestro estudio se haga desde la noción tradicional de una racionalidad expansiva –sin duda discutible y discutida, pero que pertenece a la propia naturaleza humana como especie biológica–, será necesario hacer una interpretación de las ideas conservadoras, o mejor conservacionistas, como parte de la racionalidad global de la humanidad, para obtener una idea de Razón que supere los condicionamientos de la civilización capitalista y su estrecha idea de Progreso. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 15 La historia de la filosofía es una crónica del desarrollo de la razón humana, entendida como diálogo entre puntos de vista contrapuestos –esto es lo que se ha denominado dialéctica desde la antigüedad–. La razón es por tanto una capacidad para sumar las experiencias individuales en una experiencia colectiva, capacidad que se nos da a través del lenguaje y que hace posible el desarrollo científico y artístico de la humanidad. Por eso, incluso desde el punto de vista de la conservación de la especie, la razón es expansiva, una conquista de nuevas posibilidades de vida. El proyecto humano en la naturaleza. Esa racionalidad teleológica es el fundamento para construir una historia de la filosofía, que desentrañe las claves del pensamiento de cada época, su orientación fundamental y los conceptos básicos que interpretando diferentes aspectos de la realidad han condicionado el progreso o la decadencia a lo largo de los siglos. Y por eso la filosofía es una historia que puede arrojar luz sobre el presente, mostrándonos lo que somos como humanidad. 1.2. La Razón coMo foRMa deL PensaMiento en eL Modo de PRoducción de La ciudad estado En el mundo griego, el descubrimiento de la razón estuvo relacionado con la democracia como forma de la organización social. Las actividades propias de la ciudad, la artesanía y el comercio, también contribuyeron a ello, pero en sus orígenes la razón humana está asociada a las condiciones democráticas del orden social, pues sólo éstas permiten la libertad de expresión y la igualdad de palabra que son necesarias para el debate público, el contraste de pareceres y la libre circulación de la información. Y un elemento de esa democracia fue el laicismo, la ausencia de una religión dogmática. Aunque los tribunales de la polis condenaron 16 " nombrE autor o autorEs a varios filósofos por sus enseñanzas impías contra las creencias religiosas establecidas, no es difícil descubrir los motivos políticos que subyacían a esos juicios. El desarrollo de la democracia no se dio sin tensiones y conflictos políticos, y en la turbulenta historia de las luchas intestinas dentro la polis, hubo varios filósofos entre los condenados a la pena capital –es decir, la condena al suicidio–, como Anaxágoras y Protágoras –amigos de Pericles–, Sócrates –acusado de conspirar contra la democracia–, y el propio Aristóteles –por connivencia con el poder macedónico–, todos ellos sólo en Atenas. Únicamente Sócrates llegó suicidarse, los demás prefirieron el exilio, puesto que además no eran atenienses.5 A pesar de esas condenas por motivos religiosos, la ausencia de religión dogmática con una casta sacerdotal que vela por la pureza de la fe, dio a la cultura griega una libertad de pensamiento que hizo posible el empuje inicial del pensamiento racional. La educación de las jóvenes generaciones jugó un papel fundamental en el desarrollo del orden democrático. Incluso los proletarios y las clases menos pudientes procuraban a sus hijos los elementos fundamentales de su formación intelectual, como preparación y garantía para la participación acertada en los asuntos públicos. Además el arte griego –junto con las religiones de salvación que proponían la reencarnación de las almas–, jugaba un importante papel en la formación de la conciencia moral. Dentro del arte debemos considerar especialmente la tragedia, que alcanza una enorme efectividad a la hora de plantear problemas fundamentales del alma humana. El éxito de la República 5. Sin duda, es un rasgo de elevación cultural y sensibilidad humana, el que las ciudades griegas no mataran a los condenados a muerte, sino que les invitaran al suicidio. Circunstancia que era aprovechada por los reos para escapar. Que Sócrates no hiciera lo que era usual y se bebiera la cicuta que lo llevó a la tumba, ha sido siempre uno de los tópicos más queridos de la filosofía. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 17 democrática depende de una ciudadanía culta, moralizada por el arte y capaz de tomar decisiones acertadas a través del diálogo colectivo, lo que exige una conciencia personal bien formada. Además como las actividades propias de la polis democrática, la artesanía y el comercio, conllevan una exploración del mundo natural y social. El artesano necesita conocer la physis, los procesos naturales, para poderla dominar mediante su técnica, téchne; el comerciante ha reconocido la variedad de las costumbres y las instituciones humanas, y aprende a relativizar las creencias particulares. Esas formas urbanas de vida permiten incrementar el caudal de experiencias y conocimientos, que se poseen en común gracias a la libertad de expresión y comunicación. La filosofía nace en el foro de Mileto, entre viajeros y mercaderes, empresarios y trabajadores manuales, gentes curiosas e inquietas, ávidas de novedades y experiencias. 1.3. La RacionaLidad coMo oRden sociaL exPansivo Dos siglos y medio después del nacimiento del modo de pensar conceptual, las victorias militares de Alejandro Magno y la consiguiente expansión cultural del helenismo por todo el mundo antiguo, llevaron la filosofía –el amor a la sabiduría–, a todas las civilizaciones mediterráneas, Egipto, Siria, Asia Menor, Chipre, Cirene, Roma,... De ese modo, el arte de razonar descubierto por los ciudadanos griegos se convirtió en el modo de pensar de las clases dominantes de los Estados antiguos. Las geniales ideas de los griegos convencieron a los intelectuales antiguos en todas partes, en aquellas naciones que fueron derrotadas por las armas tanto como en las que triunfaron militarmente. La filosofía se convirtió en aliada del Estado imperial para la construcción de un sistema económico a gran escala: un modo de producción 18 " nombrE autor o autorEs que explotaba grandes haciendas agrícolas y desarrollaba enormes factorías donde trabajaban millones de esclavos. Unos cincuenta años antes de que Alejandro cruzara el estrecho de Dardanelos con diez mil hombres para conquistar Asia, en la Academia de Atenas Platón (428/27-348 a.n.e.) ponía las bases del método científico de conocimiento, y un discípulo suyo, Eudoxo de Cnido (408-355 a.n.e.), proponía la primera hipótesis contrastable empíricamente –la teoría geocéntrica que explicaba el movimiento de los cuerpos celestes–, dando origen a la astronomía. Se trata de un salto fabuloso del pensamiento, desde las leyendas mitológicas a los conceptos explicativos. Doscientos años de tradición filosófica habían permitido esa conquista de la mente humana. Se ponía así en marcha el primer programa de investigación de la naturaleza, que habría de ser continuado por los siglos y los milenios, soportando periodos de estancamiento y cambios revolucionarios, hasta la extraordinaria astronomía de nuestros días. El preceptor de Alejandro en la corte Macedonia, Aristóteles (384/83-322 a.n.e.) –discípulo de Platón–, consiguió junto con sus seguidores impulsar importantes avances científicos en la Antigüedad: biología, lógica, metafísica, política, ética y estética, fueron algunas de las materias que se desarrollaron en su escuela. En ella se perfeccionó la teoría geocéntrica, ajustando el modelo y añadiendo explicaciones físicas, que consideraban un universo esférico de éter rodeando a la Tierra. Las esferas celestes giraban alrededor del centro cósmico, que se encontraba en la Tierra, y en su movimiento arrastraban los astros observables en el cielo: las estrellas, el sol, la luna y los cinco planetas conocidos entonces: Mercurio, Venus, Marte, Júpiter y Saturno. El éter que componía esas esferas celestes era un material sutil y elástico, capaz de soportar las enormes presiones centrífugas que se producían por el veloz movimiento circular de las esferas celestes. Y más allá de lo observable se encontraba el Primer Motor Inmóvil, causa El PEriPlo dE la razón " 19 última de todo el movimiento cósmico, hipótesis necesaria para una mentalidad que no podía explicarse el incesante cambio del mundo material, porque necesitaba postular la eternidad de las ideas y del alma. También era evidente para estos sabios antiguos que las cosas no pueden moverse porque sí, al azar, sin sentido, pues el universo se muestra con un orden y una armonía que sólo una Inteligencia Suprema podría hacer posible. Aristóteles y su escuela –llamada peripatética por su costumbre de pasear mientras daban las lecciones– desarrollaron la biología, comenzando una extensa investigación empírica, que se ayudó con la clasificación y la ordenación de las especies vivas. Una significativa anécdota cuenta que Alejandro Magno enviaba a su maestro animales exóticos de los países que iba conquistando, lo que nos indica la importancia que dieron los griegos a la expansión de su cultura y sus conocimientos. Por lo demás, en plena Ilustración Kant afirmaría, con evidente exageración, que la lógica fundada por Aristóteles no había avanzado un paso desde su creación –con ignorancia de la lógica estoica, o de las discusiones medievales sobre el silogismo, por ejemplo–. Ese interés por la ciencia, que llegó incluso a iniciar la exploración experimental del mundo natural, marcó una rápida evolución de la filosofía hacia el materialismo entre los peripatéticos. Cierto que las principales escuelas de la época antigua eran materialistas: entre los filósofos que las fundaron, Epicuro (341– 270 a.n.e.) fue el más sabio, el estoico Zenón de Citio (335–264 a.n.e.) el más logrado, el cínico Diógenes (413-327 a.n.e.) el más admirado. Entre sus seguidores se discutió la ciencia y se hizo avanzar el saber; gracias a ellas la filosofía penetró en el mundo romano. Para ese materialismo antiguo, la naturaleza de las cosas era la ley cósmica que definía su desarrollo –como lo es hoy en día para nuestra forma científica de pensar–. Pero el éxito de esos sistemas de pensamiento se agotó con el hundimiento del mundo antiguo. En el siglo III de nuestra era, la estrella de Platón volvió 20 " nombrE autor o autorEs a brillar con fuerza, y su idealismo construyó el puente de tránsito para la razón hacia el mundo medieval teológico. En Europa comenzó a penetrar la luminosidad de la enseñanza platónica, confundida ahora con el mensaje religioso de la salvación de la humanidad por la divinidad. En el Oriente Medio y el norte de África las cosas trascurrieron de otro modo: allí se perpetuó el espíritu científico de Aristóteles; y esto es lo que Occidente ignora: la ciencia aristotélica fue practicada por la escuelas helenistas y después fue conocida y desarrollada por los sabios de cultura musulmana, en lengua árabe o persa, y por los sabios judíos –o bien cristianos y también sabeos–, que convivieron con ellos en paz durante siglos. En las centurias centrales del medioevo, el árabe sustituyó al griego como lengua de cultura, ya fuera en literatura, ya en ciencia y filosofía. Astronomía, geografía, medicina, biología, lógica, matemáticas, política, etc., fueron cultivadas por los sabios de aquella civilización; y con estas ciencias, la filosofía asociada a la investigación empírica, así como la metafísica, la política y la ética, instrumentos conceptuales para racionalizar la religión, el gobierno y la moral. No se puede olvidar que Aristóteles y su escuela, con Teofrasto (372-288 a.n.e.) y Estratón (muerto en el 266 a.n.e.), hicieron aportaciones importantísimas en biología y la lógica –ciencias fundadas por ellos–; que la astronomía estaba ya madura y desarrollada en el mundo antiguo, hasta el punto de haberse propuesto la teoría heliocéntrica –que fue desestimada por considerarse poco plausible–; que la ingeniería había dado importantes pasos con Arquímedes (287-212 a.n.e.) y otros sabios egipcios y griegos; que Euclides (330-275 a.n.e.) había establecido con sus elementos de geometría el modelo de una ciencia deductiva. En Alejandría el Museo y la Biblioteca se constituyeron como centros de saber y Ptolomeo (100-170) propuso la forma definitiva que el modelo geocéntrico iba a mantener durante los siglos medievales. Ese legado fue adquirido y desarrollado por sabios de la civilización musulmana en la Edad Media, El PEriPlo dE la razón " 21 que continuaron la tradición de pensamiento que daría origen a la ciencia moderna. No se trata de entender esa continuidad como un puente entre dos épocas, sino de darle a la Edad Media la entidad que se merece en la historia y comprender que el desarrollo del pensamiento racional no es una patente europea. Lo que algunos europeos poco ilustrados lamentaban es que todo eso se perdiera durante los mil años de feudalismo y predominio religioso. Pero esos lamentos yerran en la causa de su dolor: esos conocimientos no se perdieron..., la verdad es que nunca habían pertenecido a la cultura europea. Continuaron creciendo en el Mediterráneo oriental, donde estaban extendidos desde antiguo. Es cierto que en el siglo IV, al final del mundo Antiguo, y después de lo que voy a llamar la 'revolución cristiana', se produjo una reacción antirracionalista que cortó de raíz el desarrollo del pensamiento conceptual, –y una película reciente de Amenábar, ágora, nos lo ha vuelto a recordar–. El ascenso del cristianismo como religión oficial del Imperio Romano, fue una revolución pasiva,6 que se caracterizó por una actitud de intolerancia y fanatismo que estaban en continuidad con la decadencia del modo de producción esclavista. Es decir, permitió a las élites de ese sistema imperialista continuar con su dominación, cambiando la forma de dominio. Se sustituyó el modo de producción esclavista por el feudal sin cuestionar el orden clasista, y fueron solo las invasiones bárbaras las que impusieron una renovación de las clases dominantes. Y ahí se acaba la historia de la filosofía medieval para nuestros eruditos europeos. En aquellos siglos Europa era una región atrasada, cultural y económicamente, y esa parece ser la causa del desinterés por lo que pasó entonces. Pero lo que no se cuenta 6. Utilizo este concepto de Antonio Gramsci: revolución pasiva es cuando las clases dirigentes pueden cambiar la forma de su dominación, sin dejar de ser dominantes. 22 " nombrE autor o autorEs –lo que no se quiere saber, según parece–, es que un par de siglos después, del cristianismo nació una herejía tolerante y amante del conocimiento, el Islam, que fue adoptada con júbilo por los sufridos cristianos sometidos a la dictadura dogmática de las Iglesias oficiales, y que avivó los rescoldos de la sabiduría antigua para crear la gran hoguera del saber medieval. *** 2. LAS RAíCES DE LA fILOSOfíA MUSULMANA: EL PERIODO TEOLÓgICO DE LA fILOSOfíA gRIEgA La organización de la sociedad en grandes Estados imperiales exigía una visión coherente e integrada de la totalidad a través de un conjunto ordenado de ideas racionales. En eso consistieron los grandes sistemas de pensamiento en el mundo antiguo, y especialmente el estoicismo jugó el papel de hacer inteligible la acción política de las élites dominantes en el Imperio Romano. Pero en su evolución a través de los primeros siglos de nuestra era, esos sistemas de ideas abandonaron la forma filosófica para constituirse en la matriz teológica de las religiones monoteístas, que caracterizaron la visión del mundo de las clases dominantes del feudalismo. Los condicionantes de esa evolución son varios. Primero, la difusión de la filosofía racional entre las culturas antiguas, dio origen al sincretismo que caracterizó a la cultura del Helenismo: la variedad cultural se unifica a través de una moralidad pública común, revestida de simbología religiosa. Además, la necesidad política de unificar la cultura de las clases populares y la ideología de las dominantes en un sistema único de ideas, para evitar la ruptura del orden interno de la sociedad. Y en tercer lugar, todo ello dentro de una organización económica que potencia el comercio y la industria a gran escala, superando el El PEriPlo dE la razón " 23 esclavismo nacido a partir de la expansión de la Ciudad Estado antigua. Veamos más en detalle esa evolución. La civilización griega se caracterizó por supeditar el manejo del mundo material a una concepción de los fines humanos, individuales y sociales, que perseguía la felicidad personal a través de la armonía en las relaciones sociales. La investigación sobre la naturaleza, sobre el conocimiento humano o la vida social, estaba supeditada al objetivo político de conseguir una ciudadanía virtuosa en un Estado justo. La filosofía es propiamente eso: la visión de los fines superiores de la acción humana, como parte de la vida social. Durante su periodo de formación en las pequeñas repúblicas independientes, el método del conocimiento era un arte de la argumentación, crítico con las ideas establecidas tanto como con las aportaciones de los diferentes pensadores, un permanente debate entre sabios: Heráclito contra Pitágoras, Parménides contra Heráclito, Demócrito contra Parménides, Platón contra Demócrito, Epicuro contra Platón, etc. Se delimitaba así el ámbito del error y la tradición de pensamiento iba creciendo en agudeza y seguridad. Pero cuando el helenismo se expandió por todo el Mediterráneo, para constituirse en la cultura superior de las clases dominantes del mundo antiguo, la filosofía se convirtió en un instrumento de la organización del Estado. No quiere decir esto que se perdiera el talante crítico, pero el pensamiento se hizo escolástico para poder ser útil a las necesidades de la burocracia estatal. El estoicismo –y parcialmente también el epicureísmo o el platonismo– fue adoptado por los administradores imperiales, como ideología racionalizadora de la vida política y social. Los Estados imperiales del helenismo, y posteriormente el Imperio Romano, basaron su sistema productivo en el trabajo de millones de esclavos, dentro de enormes factorías o grandes latifundios de cultivo extensivo. Justificando ese orden económico hay una ideología que considera natural la institución de la esclavitud –Aristóteles fue uno de sus muñidores–. Por eso, la 24 " nombrE autor o autorEs idea estoica de un orden cósmico justo, armonioso y racional, tenía mucho de argumentación justificativa de una realidad social cruel; y por eso la actitud básica del sabio estoico ante la vida social es un idealismo ético que se aísla del mundo, aun cuando su doctrina fuera oficialmente materialista. Ese idealismo tiene su justificación en haberse constituido como el núcleo del pensamiento racional entre los señores del mundo mediterráneo antiguo: las clases superiores están convencidas de la legitimidad de su dominación, porque tienen acceso a una concepción racional de la naturaleza cósmica tanto como de la personalidad humana: los señores lo son, sobre todo porque conocen y practican las técnicas para dominar las pasiones anímicas. Y al mismo tiempo que esas técnicas de autocontrol les cualificaron para ejercer su función dominante de dirigir el orden social, también sirvieron para aminorar y hacer más tolerable la opresión de la clase subalterna esclava. El derecho, como instrumento para construir una administración consistente de los bienes privados y públicos, fue la gran aportación romana a la civilización; pero posiblemente Roma no habría llegado a ser la capital del Imperio sin el estoicismo de sus gobernantes, que dotaba de racionalidad a su acción política personal adecuándola a los requerimientos legítimos. Y sin unos funcionarios educados en la moralidad estoica, la administración romana no habría sido nunca el sistema relativamente estable que duró más de trescientos años, para dar origen a la teocracia cristiana después. El poder político nace de las relaciones económicas, pero las funciones de dirección social requieren determinadas capacidades intelectuales –y también morales–, sin las cuales la decadencia del orden social se vuelve intolerable. El estoicismo proveía al funcionario estatal romano de una ética fundada en la virtud, que le hacía indiferente frente a las tentaciones del poder y la corrupción por la riqueza. Pero esa moral para élites El PEriPlo dE la razón " 25 se distanciaba radicalmente de las clases subalternas a las que se ofrecía una religión oficial basada en el culto al emperador. Quizás porque las clases subalternas estaban sometidas a esclavitud, la distancia del esclavo con respecto a su amo hacía imposible una identidad de ideas entre ambos; a pesar de que el estoicismo se esforzó por dar un trato de dignidad humana a los esclavos, no se puede minimizar la enorme explotación que el sistema introduce. El sistema era inviable a largo plazo y acabó hundiéndose en medio de sus contradicciones. En ese proceso secular, el idealismo ético estoico fue necesitando reforzarse cada vez más intensamente, conforme el Estado imperial se desgastaba y se desorganizaba, y esa necesidad dio origen a una evolución intelectual que llevó a recuperar el platonismo y que desembocó finalmente en el cristianismo. El agotamiento del esclavismo y la disminución de la productividad de la tierra, plantearon problemas que hicieron inviable ese orden social. Y comenzó la transición al feudalismo; eso sucedió en el siglo III y se hizo necesaria la adopción de una nueva ideología para la clase dominante. La renovación ideológica provino de la religión prevaleciente entre las clases populares, puesto que la moral es el conjunto de las instituciones, las costumbres y las virtudes del pueblo. En cierto modo, el desarrollo y la adopción de la religión cristiana en el Bajo Imperio fue una consecuencia de las necesidades organizativas de la administración imperial romana en el cambio del modo de producción esclavista hacia el feudalismo. Y la consagración del cristianismo como religión oficial por la élite romana fue una revolución controlada, que le permitió continuar con su dominación al tiempo que liquidaba los restos del pensamiento libre e independiente todavía existentes en la cultura imperial. Sin embargo, quedaron las herejías como testimonios de una actividad intelectual autónoma por parte de las clases subalternas, y esas herejías dieron origen finalmente al Islam. Fue 26 " nombrE autor o autorEs entonces cuando se produjo una segunda 'revolución religiosa' monoteísta en Oriente Medio, que provocó unas segundas 'invasiones bárbaras' en el sur del ámbito mediterráneo: la expansión musulmana. Con la diferencia de que el Islam asimiló la cultura filosófica y científica que existía en Oriente, al mismo tiempo que se expandía hacia el este, constituyendo así un desarrollo civilizatorio de importantes consecuencias. Tenemos que ver con más detalle ese proceso, que tiene dos secuencias: en primer lugar, el camino de la filosofía antigua hacia la religión; y en segundo lugar, el significado del triunfo del cristianismo, como prólogo a la expansión del Islam. 2.1. La foRMación de La conciencia ReLiGiosa La constitución de la filosofía de la naturaleza entre los presocráticos se muestra paralela a la formación ética de la subjetividad personal; con la filosofía aparece un sujeto consciente que toma decisiones racionales y dirige su conducta en orden a lograr sus fines naturales. Para ciertos sectores –los pitagóricos y los platónicos–, en ese proceso han jugado un papel importante las creencias en la reencarnación del alma, que fueron difundidas en la cultura griega durante su época de formación –tal vez por maestros orientales provenientes de la India–. Pero el cauce principal de la filosofía griega permanece ajena al influjo religioso durante siglos: será el arte en sus diversas variantes –plástico, dramático, musical–, el encargado de transmitir los ideales y las formas de valorar a la conciencia individual. No obstante, durante los primeros siglos de nuestra era, paulatinamente la conciencia religiosa va a penetrar cada vez más profundamente en esa mentalidad antigua. Hay varios problemas que necesitan ser resueltos por las personas y por la sociedad de forma coherente y racional. Quizá El PEriPlo dE la razón " 27 el más decisivo desde el punto de vista ético-político que estamos tratando es el desarrollo armonioso de la personalidad individual dentro del orden social justo. La buena socialización de la persona dentro de su medio social es un factor decisivo para su bienestar psíquico y el desarrollo de sus potencialidades, para su felicidad en definitiva. Ese deseo de socialización aparece a través de la conciencia personal, y se manifiesta por una intencionalidad subjetiva, como deseo de felicidad que se funda en el bien moral y se plasma en la ética como dirección racional de la conducta. Pero esa coherencia se debe realizar en el marco necesario de las relaciones de producción dentro de la sociedad, relaciones que organizan la producción económica de forma más o menos consistente a través de la división del trabajo, y constituyen el fundamento del orden político. La justicia se produce cuando los ciudadanos pueden acceder a la plenitud de su vida moral en libertad. Pero el medio social no es transparente: en la cooperación social aparecen situaciones de explotación y opresión que permanecen más o menos ocultas por los velos de la ideología. Por eso, al participar del proceso social la persona pierde la noción de su verdadero papel en ese orden económico y realiza su acción de forma coactiva; cuando la persona se integra de ese modo en el orden social, se produce su alienación, deja de ser dueña de sus actos; al mismo tiempo, los trabajadores producen la riqueza para que otros la disfruten. Esa alienación de los trabajadores se corresponde con otra alienación simétrica en la inhumanidad de las clases dominantes, animalizadas por los vicios derivados de la riqueza y brutalizadas por la crueldad necesaria para explotar a los subalternos. Esa situación de opresión social es la causa de las confusiones de la conciencia. Podemos comprobar en el desarrollo del pensamiento a través de la historia, que la finalidad subjetiva de felicidad 28 " nombrE autor o autorEs y justicia, se vuelve progresivamente autónoma del sujeto que la produce, de modo que acaba proyectándose fuera de la persona como una realidad trascendente; hasta el punto de ser concebida como más real que las percepciones del mundo sensible.7 El ego trascendental de los valores e ideales de la conciencia, se proyecta fuera de la subjetividad, en un ente supremo que constituye la esencia de la realidad: el mundo espiritual del pensamiento se infla en detrimento de la experiencia del mundo sensible, acentuando la importancia de las relaciones con la divinidad, para reforzar la vida interior de la persona que lucha por dominar su propia realidad moral. En buena medida esa evolución consiste en la creación de instrumentos de control de la subjetividad por la colectividad, a través de la moral definida por la autoridad. El uso de esos instrumentos de control por la Iglesia –sacramentos, ritos, ceremonias, etc.–, está justificado por la idea de transcendencia en sus diversas variantes. La operación de la trascendencia ya está planteada por Platón: las ideas eternas, que el alma racional debe alcanzar, están más allá del espacio y el tiempo e informan el mundo de la materia para constituir los objetos, son el modelo a partir del cual están diseñadas las realidades naturales. El sabio que conoce las ideas está capacitado para ejercer el gobierno de la sociedad. Las virtualidades contenidas en esa idea platónica sólo se dieron a conocer con el paso del tiempo y atraviesan toda la historia de la filosofía. Aunque la escuela fundada por Platón, la Academia de Atenas, evolucionó hacia el escepticismo con Carnéades (214-129 a.n.e.), la influencia del idealismo platónico se extendió mucho más allá de sus herederos directos. 7. Platón en el conocido mito de la caverna expresa esta idea de manera metafórica, afirmando que la Idea de Bien preside el mundo de las ideas. La República, libro VII. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 29 El platonismo se transformó en religión del Estado ptolemaico de Egipto, donde existía desde antiguo la creencia en el alma. En ese sincretismo podemos ver el origen de esa tendencia hacia la espiritualidad de la vida religiosa, que se refuerza con el neoplatonismo hasta convertirse en una religión filosófica; ésta pretendió ser la alternativa al cristianismo durante una centuria hasta desaparecer absorbida por las religiones monoteístas –si bien su influencia se mantuvo en las zonas orientales hasta el siglo VII, para después renacer en la filosofía islámica–. La enorme influencia que el platonismo ejerció como factor de racionalización de los contenidos de la fe religiosa en el judaísmo, primero, y luego en el cristianismo y el Islam, hizo posible la pervivencia de la filosofía como tal, y por eso el neoplatonismo filosófico del siglo III representa el paso desde el modo antiguo de pensar hasta el medieval. La evolución en el Mediterráneo occidental fue ligeramente diferente; aquí se hizo más hincapié en los mecanismos legales de control social, en el derecho y la administración garantizados por el poder represivo del Estado. Mientras el platonismo y la ciencia aristotélica se desarrollaban en el Mediterráneo oriental, el estoicismo –y en menor medida el epicureísmo– fueron intensamente adoptados como ideología por las clases dominantes romanas con el objetivo de racionalizar el gobierno imperial. El estoicismo suponía que el Logos, la sabiduría, es una realidad cósmica inmanente al mundo material –fuego eterno que se enciende y se apaga según medida, según la sentencia de Heráclito–; y de ahí que el ser humano extraiga su sabiduría del propio cosmos, como parte de la naturaleza gobernada por el Logos. El sabio aprende a vivir según la naturaleza. Pero el ataque escéptico de los académicos de Atenas, consistía precisamente en señalar que no hay garantía alguna de que podamos conocer las leyes que rigen el orden universal –en caso de que éstas existieran–; pues no hay garantía de que aquellos prin30 " nombrE autor o autorEs cipios racionales que descubrimos con la mente sean también los principios de organización de un universo material, independiente del alma espiritual humana. En consonancia con esto, se dice que Carnéades, el escéptico director de la Academia platónica en el 155 a.n.e., afirmaba cínicamente el poder romano como fruto de una voluntad de poder que corresponde a las naturalezas fuertes y bien constituidas, en un sentido muy cercano al de los sofistas combatidos por Sócrates en los diálogos platónicos. Ese irracionalismo no fue aceptado, y el estoicismo superó la crítica cuando los filósofos de esta escuela, Panecio (185-110 a.n.e.) y Posidonio (135-50 a.n.e.), reforzaron sus teorías con ideas provenientes de la tradición platónica y aristotélica, para apoyar la organización del Imperio Romano introduciendo ciertos elementos de trascendencia. Quedaba claro que –salvo abandonándose a la irresponsabilidad–, el ejercicio del poder exigía fe en la racionalidad, el orden y la armonía constitutivos del cosmos, lo cual resulta comprensible para la inteligencia humana.8 La fe filosófica de los patricios romanos no tenía las mismas dimensiones que la fe religiosa de los plebeyos romanos en su Estado, manifestada en el culto al emperador. Pero de todos modos esa fe ambivalente se impuso como norma en todo el Imperio Romano y sólo entró en crisis al cabo de los siglos, con el agotamiento del modo de producción esclavista. Cuando esa vía entre en vía muerta ante los fracasos de la administración imperial romana, la necesidad de reforzar el poder político mediante su sacralización, así como el deseo de preservar un ámbito moral para la sociedad 8. Esa clarividencia de los patricios romanos, al rechazar el irracionalismo de Carnéades, es un síntoma más de su inteligencia práctica. Por el contrario, la adopción de una ideología similar por la aristocracia ateniense –los sofistas Gorgias y Calicles– llevó al desastre de los Treinta Tiranos: el escepticismo de Carnéades era un regalo envenenado para los patricios romanos. El viejo republicano Catón supo ver el engaño. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 31 clasista, sustrayéndolo a las críticas escépticas, son las causas históricas que conducen a la trasformación de la filosofía en religión monoteísta. 2.2. La evoLución de La fiLosofía antiGua hacia La ReLiGión La filosofía en el mundo antiguo era una concepción de la realidad natural, que se fundaba en el desarrollo de la conciencia personal a través de la meditación y el conocimiento de sí mismo: conócete a ti mismo, era el lema inscrito en el frontón del oráculo de Delfos, una de las instituciones religiosas más importantes del mundo griego antiguo. Ese conocimiento de sí mismo se traduce en técnicas de meditación y exploración de la vida interior, que permiten el autocontrol racional de la conducta. Esa herencia ética explica el éxito de la filosofía entre los antiguos: el conocimiento de las técnicas del alma permiten al funcionario del Estado esclavista actuar conforme al deber definido por las leyes, evitando que la pasión por el poder desborde su comportamiento, que se deslizaría de ese modo hacia la irracionalidad. En medio de una corte corrupta por la riqueza y el vicio, el funcionario de la administración imperial está éticamente adiestrado para ejercer su cargo con ecuanimidad y justicia. Para alcanzar la sabiduría y la felicidad, Epicuro recomienda huir de los placeres artificiales y buscar la amistad de todos, también los esclavos y las mujeres. Séneca (4-65), alto funcionario romano, recomienda a su amigo y discípulo Lucilio que posea las riquezas sin dejarse poseer por ellas, como si no las tuviera, pues sólo gozamos los bienes que estamos dispuestos a perder. Reclama el trato humano hacia los esclavos y una vida apartada del vulgo y sus placeres groseros. El filósofo Epicteto es un esclavo liberto, educado en el amor al saber con Musonio Rufo por deseo de su patrón. El 32 " nombrE autor o autorEs emperador Marco Aurelio (121-180), filósofo estoico, promueve la virtud, la ética del deber y el amor a la humanidad en medio de las guerras y las ocupaciones políticas –entre las que contaba la represión del cristianismo, como religión que no aceptaba el culto al emperador y rechazaba los dioses, una religión atea en su opinión–. Por eso, en cierto modo la filosofía clásica es tan incomprensible para la mentalidad moderna occidental; pertenece a un mundo tan extraño para nosotros como la filosofía budista que se ha desarrollado en el Lejano Oriente. Hoy se carece de experiencias de la vida interior, se desconoce la virtud, indiferentes ante la felicidad de estar en paz con uno mismo. Igual que un monje budista o taoísta, el sabio estoico se ocupa de manejar su vida emocional y pasional, busca planificar su propia personalidad conforme a un designio racional. Su filosofía consiste en un saber sobre sí mismo, basándose en una epistemología materialista que define tres momentos del conocer a partir de la experiencia: la sensación, la percepción y la razón. La razón puede intervenir sobre la percepción para definir la realidad, impidiendo que el mundo externo afecte la paz de espíritu del sabio; y la ética consiste en el ejercicio voluntario y consciente de esa capacidad. La indiferencia ante las pasiones es garantía de un cumplimiento estricto y justo del deber, definido por la ley del Estado al que sirve. Su idealismo consiste en pensar que esa ley imperial es justa, como el orden cósmico es perfecto y racional, incluso cuando en casos particulares perjudica al ser humano; pues ese mal es inevitable consecuencia de las leyes que dirigen el devenir natural. El sabio estoico alcanza así la apatía, la indiferencia ante las pasiones. Sin embargo, no se le puede ocultar la injusticia y la maldad del orden social esclavista, no puede ser ciego voluntariamente sin grave engaño; y así necesita reforzar su fe en la El PEriPlo dE la razón " 33 racionalidad constitutiva del universo. Probablemente esa sea la causa de que en el desarrollo de la doctrina, el funcionario estoico requiera cada vez más fuerzas psíquicas para mantener su voluntad erguida ante los contratiempos y heroicamente íntegra ante las pasiones; de modo que se vuelve hacia la trascendencia para apoyarse en su lucha por el autodominio: es la creencia en un mundo del espíritu, autónomo e independiente del mundo material sensible, que contiene el modelo perfecto y puro sobre el que está construido éste otro de la fortuna veleidosa y corruptible. Platón no habría definido con claridad la realidad trascendente de su mundo de ideas; una interpretación inmanente de las ideas platónicas, como formas constitutivas de la realidad, es posible –así lo hizo Aristóteles–. El neoplatonismo desarrolla esa comprensión inmanente, si bien la escuela neoplatónica de Roma rechaza el materialismo aristotélico y adopta el punto de vista de que la realidad es espiritual; elimina la trascendencia del mundo de las ideas como realidad extra-sensible, pero convierte su espiritualidad en la esencia universal. No obstante, una intuición de la trascendencia, como radical separación entre el mundo ideal y el material, también es posible a partir de Platón, y ese es el camino que lleva al cristianismo y la postulación de la absoluta trascendencia divina, en consonancia con el Dios de la Biblia hebrea. Las fuerzas históricas que han conducido ese proceso son materiales, en el sentido de encontrarse inscritas en las relaciones sociales necesarias para la producción material de la vida humana. La debilidad de la conciencia humana y la escasa racionalidad del orden social, preñado de contradicciones entre las clases sociales, incitan al filósofo a salvaguardar una esfera de los valores situándola más allá del mundo social: Dios eterno y todopoderoso, espíritu puro, garantiza la verdad de los ideales humanos. 34 " nombrE autor o autorEs La trascendencia ofrece la esperanza de una vida eterna, como compensación por los padecimientos en esta vida presente. Al mismo tiempo, crea una esfera propia para los valores e ideales, independiente del mundo material, de modo que éstos queden protegidos de las veleidades caprichosas del individuo irracional y la caótica historia humana. En el epicureísmo –Lucrecio (96-55), por ejemplo– encontramos una visión materialista que se resiste a rendirse ante la trascendencia divina, y observa el proceso histórico en toda su problematicidad, donde el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas viene acompañado por las profundas alienaciones evidentes en la acción humana; ante esa problemática, nos invita a desentendernos de esa realidad, refugiándonos en nuestra vida privada. Pero los estoicos no tienen esa posibilidad, porque forman parte de la vida pública romana; necesitan reforzar la creencia en la razón constitutiva del mundo, para continuar en el fiel servicio del deber administrativo prescrito por las leyes. De aquí que en el estoicismo final está expedito el camino para la adopción del monoteísmo cristiano, aunque para eso será necesaria una transformación doctrinal de la filosofía hacia el neoplatonismo. Eso va a significar también que la racionalidad se separa del debate público sobre los fines sociales y se convierte en instrumento del poder; los ideales que expresan los objetivos de la acción humana se constituyen como dogmas sagrados: en un proceso cada vez más acentuado, la filosofía viene a ser sustituida por la religión. Ya el estoico Panecio recomendaba a los gobernantes romanos crear una religión popular para imbuir los valores cívicos en los ciudadanos, reservándose la filosofía para los gobernantes. Ese consejo puede haber sido el origen del posterior culto al emperador. En todo caso refuerza el dominio de las élites gobernantes sobre la sociedad, quienes utilizan todos los recursos para crear consenso sobre su dominación política El PEriPlo dE la razón " 35 y poder así definir las orientaciones de la práctica humana según las necesidades del orden social vigente. En ese desarrollo de la filosofía, los ideales y los valores que constituyen la razón son reforzados mediante la operación metafísica de declararlos trascendentes al mundo material en el que transcurre la vida humana. De ese modo la filosofía se convirtió en religión a través de un proceso que duró alrededor de 300 años y que dio origen a la civilización cristiana. 2.3. La síntesis ecLéctica deL PLatonisMo Medio en eL caMino hacia La ReLiGión Monoteísta En el área oriental del Mediterráneo, el eclecticismo del platonismo medio prepara ese camino de espiritualidad. Es una filosofía sincrética: los principales pensadores de este momento, Antíoco de Ascalona (s.I a.n.e.), Eudoro de Alejandría (s.I), Plutarco de Queronea (45-125) y Albino (s.II), nos muestran una inclinación a beber de todas las fuentes de la filosofía clásica griega: se toma la lógica y la ciencia aristotélicas para combinarlas con la cosmología del platonismo popular y las aspiraciones religiosas del neopitagorismo, todo ello dentro de un marco estoico de pensamiento. Las matemáticas se toman como el modelo de la razón humana y se considera que la constitución del mundo sensible contiene una estructura racional; esa racionalidad matemática es vivida mística, espiritualmente, como transfiguración del Uno en la pluralidad de las percepciones. Se trata de una filosofía que permite sostener la investigación científica, combinándola con la introspección y el trabajo interior para una vida ética. En ese desafío el sabio tiene que equilibrar la interpretación racional de la naturaleza con el conocimiento y desarrollo de su propia subjetividad ética. Y tras la crítica escéptica, es muy fuerte la tentación de unificar ambos campos de la experiencia en una 36 " nombrE autor o autorEs identidad mística y religiosa. Si no queremos caer en una creencia ciega, ¿cómo podemos demostrar la racionalidad matemática del universo? Y si no lo podemos demostrar, ¿cómo evitar caer en una creencia sin fundamento racional? Platón resuelve este problema declarando irreal el mundo de los fenómenos sensibles: sólo el mundo de las ideas eternas contiene la verdad auténtica, la estructura esencial del universo. La cuestión se reduce a la investigación de la racionalidad del mundo de las ideas por parte del sabio, lo que exige una filosofía de la mente que establezca los principios eternos del universo, puesto que éste es una manifestación del espíritu. Pero esa solución conduce al dogma. La filosofía se orienta cada vez más hacia la religión: se descubren los inteligibles puros –la Verdad, el Bien, la Belleza, etc.– y se alcanza el concepto de Uno como principio constitutivo de las ideas matemáticas; entonces los inteligibles se personifican y son objeto de veneración, configurando un nuevo panteón religioso. El Intelecto, el Alma del Mundo, el Bien, el Uno, conceptos de la metafísica platónica, toman el camino de la divinización: es la hipóstasis divina de las ideas abstractas. El concepto de causalidad es sustituido por el de generación: esa explicación mítica contiene, no obstante, una racionalidad alternativa aun no desarrollada: la explicación genética de la realidad procesual del universo. Para superar la crítica escéptica se cae en el dogma: aparece la necesidad de reconocer la existencia de una divinidad trascendente y suprema, que es la fuente de todo ser e informa los principios constitutivos de la realidad material a través de la creación. Y para salvar el abismo entre la realidad trascendente ideal y los seres de la naturaleza física, el mundo se puebla de seres intermedios que van transmitiendo la existencia, como los peldaños de una escalera que descendiesen desde lo alto hasta el nivel más bajo, desde el Ser Supremo hasta los seres materiales, El PEriPlo dE la razón " 37 desde la espiritualidad del Uno, el Intelecto, el Alma del Mundo –las ideas supremas que la religión monoteísta transformará en personas divinas, ángeles o inteligencias cósmicas–, hasta los seres materiales, el ser humano, los animales y vegetales, el ser inerte... Ya Posidonio habló del ser humano como lazo entre la divinidad y la naturaleza, el elemento más elevado de la jerarquía material, un gozne en la escala del ser. Con él se produjo la fusión de las ideas platónicas con el estoicismo dando paso a una nueva espiritualidad que acentuaba la importancia del alma personal. Esa tendencia al sincretismo filosófico se intensifica en el s. I a.n.e., al tiempo que Dios se identifica con el demiurgo del mito platónico de la creación. Antíoco estableció que las Ideas platónicas eran el pensamiento de Dios y considera idénticas la filosofía platónica y peripatética. Plutarco en sobre isis y osiris comenzó la interpretación alegórica de los mitos de la religión egipcia, subrayando los aspectos metafísicos y religiosos del platonismo. Albino en didaskalikos profundizó en la jerarquía metafísica, situando a Dios por encima de la Inteligencia, estableciendo el Primer Principio inefable que no puede ser conocido ni explicado. La filosofía helenista se transforma progresivamente en una religión de la Razón bajo el Imperio Romano. En esa andadura el platonismo juega un papel principal, desarrollando una tendencia que ya había aparecido en los últimos escritos de Platón. Un segundo factor viene dado por la fusión de la cultura helenista con la religión judía entre los hebreos helenizados de Egipto, Siria y Palestina. Finalmente la influencia de las religiones de la luz iranias y el maniqueísmo de Zarathustra que se habían extendido con la dominación persa en los siglos anteriores a las conquistas de Alejandro. 38 " nombrE autor o autorEs 2.4. eL judaísMo heLenizado coMo ReLiGión fiLosófica Un importante paso en esa evolución se produce cuando los hebreos asimilen la filosofía griega; una corriente influyente en ese momento es la filosofía judeo-helenística de Alejandría. La asimilación del racionalismo entre los hebreos se manifiesta en el movimiento esenio dentro de la propia Palestina, pero especialmente entre los judíos emigrados en Egipto y otras ciudades helenísticas. La Ley hebrea, la torá, se había quedado anticuada en ese contexto histórico; por tanto había que adaptarla a lo nuevos tiempos o bien abolirla y declararla caduca. El segundo camino, la abolición de la Ley mosaica, será seguido por Pablo de Tarso para dar origen al cristianismo (5/10 a.n.e.-67); el primero es la vía de Filón de Alejandría (25 a.n.e.– 50), quien mantiene la ley pero la reinterpreta de modo alegórico. Su objetivo es la vida espiritual humana universalmente considerada, para lo cual parangona la Ley de Moisés con la ley natural del estoicismo; de ese modo hay una equivalencia entre los preceptos de la torá y las normas morales racionales, inteligibles para el ser humano. La función de la torá, como la paideia griega, es la educación de la persona; por lo tanto debe ser superada con la madurez del conocimiento, aunque la mayoría no alcanza ese estado y permanece en el sometimiento a la ley. Filón de Alejandría, el principal filósofo de la comunidad hebrea y la culminación de esa tradición en el helenismo, tiene el mérito de seleccionar los elementos más universales de la filosofía griega, en su intento de adaptarla a una cultura tan diferente como era la suya. Combinó la teoría platónica de las ideas con la doctrina estoica del Logos y con ideas del pensamiento oriental, como la existencia de seres intermedios y la gnosis, derivación del maniqueísmo iranio del Zend-Avesta. Se inspiró en el platonismo El PEriPlo dE la razón " 39 para establecer la naturaleza de Dios como Bien Supremo, Idea de las ideas, Modelo de las Leyes. Su teología afirmó la absoluta trascendencia y espiritualidad de Dios: único, absolutamente simple, infinito y eterno; es también inefable –nada positivo podemos decir de Dios, pues su realidad es inalcanzable para nuestro entendimiento–. De ese modo, importantes corrientes del pensamiento posterior beben de las fuentes filonianas: la teología negativa del cristianismo, que va desde Clemente de Alejandría (150-215) hasta Juan Escoto Eriúgena (810-877), y que es la fuente de la mística, así como la importante filosofía musulmana, los místicos sufíes y la teología del Islam. Un ejemplo de esto se nos muestra en el tema de la soledad del sabio que fue desarrollado por el zaragozano Avempace en el s.XII y que es objeto de la reflexión de Filón: los que buscan a Dios aman la soledad, que es la auténtica vida del espíritu. Y esa actitud manifiesta la crisis del hombre helenístico bajo el Imperio Romano: el desgarro íntimo y la ruptura con el mundo, la desconfianza hacia las relaciones sociales, el hundimiento de una imagen del mundo segura e inquebrantable, son los síntomas de una enfermedad espiritual, cuyo único tratamiento conocido es la creencia religiosa en la existencia trascendental del bien. La síntesis de judaísmo y helenismo que dará origen al cristianismo, tiene una importante referencia en la escuela alejandrina sistematizada por Filón y su influencia sobre los Padres de la Iglesia es enorme; también sobre los pensadores judíos e islámicos medievales. Interpreta la filosofía griega como una variante de la sabiduría oriental y afirma que los antiguos filósofos griegos plagiaron a los autores bíblicos –lo que se conoce como la 'teoría del latrocinio'–. Según ésta, los filósofos habrían tomado sus ideas de la Biblia sin citar la fuente, de tal modo que el pensamiento racional había tenido su origen en la religión judía, y su desarrollo era perfectamente compatible con ella, siempre que se expurgase de sus 40 " nombrE autor o autorEs desviaciones y errores. Esa compatibilidad quedaba establecida por la afirmación de la existencia de un solo Dios, conclusión a la que habían llegado el pensamiento griego tras la crítica de la religión politeísta; el Dios de Filón corresponde al Intelecto del platonismo medio, inefable, incomprensible e innombrable. Con la diferencia de que la especulación filosófica había deducido la existencia de un solo dios con mucho esfuerzo y tras siglos de crítica intelectual; en cambio, la religión hebrea se fundaba en esa intuición desde mucho tiempo atrás. De ahí que Filón considerase que los filósofos copiaban sus ideas más importantes de los profetas hebreos. Pero debe quedar claro que, para poder compatibilizar ambas tradiciones de pensamiento, se tiene que hacer una traducción de los mitos bíblicos al lenguaje racional, del mismo modo como diversos filósofos antiguos habían realizado una interpretación racional de los mitos griegos en su crítica de la religión; de ahí la afirmación de que Filón es más un filósofo racionalista que un religioso ecléctico. Comienza así una tradición de interpretación alegórica de la Biblia que será enormemente fecunda entre los pensadores neoplatónicos y los teólogos judíos medievales con Avicebrón (1020-1059) y Maimónides (1135-1204) como figuras señeras. Y comienza también así la disputa para situar la teología y la Revelación por encima del pensamiento racional –o a la inversa, construir una fe compatible con la razón–, la que será tan importante a lo largo de la Edad Media y para el pensamiento religioso posterior. Pero Filón también se sitúa en el origen del neoplatonismo por su teoría metafísica, que puede ser clasificada como emanatista por su doctrina de los seres intermedios. Dios es el Ser único, simple y trascendente, que produce toda la realidad por sobreabundancia de Bien. Se trata de una trascendencia inmanente, una producción del cosmos desde dentro y no desde fuera como propone la teología cristiana. El cosmos emana de la El PEriPlo dE la razón " 41 esencia divina, por pura bondad. Primero, se produce el Logos, que contiene las ideas del mundo –y que es probablemente el antecedente de la concepción del Logos en el evangelio de San Juan–. Luego otros seres intermedios como la Sabiduría, el Espíritu y los ángeles. Aquí se manifiesta una creciente influencia del pensamiento oriental en la filosofía grecolatina, que culminará con el triunfo del cristianismo. A través de Filón de Alejandría la filosofía intensifica su acercamiento a la religión y esa evolución culmina en el neoplatonismo, que es ya propiamente una filosofía religiosa. 2.5. La evoLución hacia eL MonoteísMo: eL neoPLatonisMo Fundado, según algunas fuentes, por Amonio de Saccas (175-242) en Egipto, sus principales figuras en el mundo romano son Plotino (205-270) y Porfirio (232-304), donde desapareció absorbido por el cristianismo. En el Mediterráneo oriental se mantuvo con fuerza –incluso dentro de los ambientes religiosos–, hasta el punto de constituir la columna vertebral de la filosofía medieval musulmana. Según algunos autores, no fue Amonio Sacas el que creó el neoplatonismo, sino Numenio de Apamea, filósofo sirio del siglo II de quien aprendiera Plotino sus ideas. Él habría sido el responsable de esa síntesis de platonismo, pitagorismo y judaísmo, que constituyó la principal corriente de pensamiento a finales del Imperio Romano. Sin embargo, Amelio (s.III), discípulo de Plotino, se encargó de refutar esa afirmación mostrando las diferencias entre ambas doctrinas. La enseñanza de Numenio transcurrió en Antioquía, capital de Siria, y acusa influencias griegas, persas y judías; se trata de un monoteísmo panteísta que utiliza la idea de emanación: el dios Uno es la esencia misma, espiritual e inteligible, del universo. Las ideas que Plotino desarrolló en Roma con plena madurez 42 " nombrE autor o autorEs y coherencia, aparecen en Numenio en un estado más primario, y orientadas hacia la teología. Su filosofía es una metafísica del ser incorporal que sigue la exposición cosmológica de Platón en el timeo. Este texto establece la existencia de un Ser Supremo, el Uno, que es forma de formas, la esencia formal de las ideas; pues las ideas, en efecto, están compuestas con un contenido, mientras que el Uno es simple. Del Uno se engendra el Intelecto que contiene los inteligibles y éste a su vez engendra el Alma del Mundo, la cual produce la realidad natural. Esa tríada esencial del neoplatonismo –el Uno, el Intelecto y el Alma del Mundo– va a pasar íntegra a la filosofía musulmana medieval, la cual recibe y desarrolla la herencia del pensamiento tricotómico –que piensa las categorías asociadas de tres en tres, de tal modo que de cada una de ellas se puede pasar a las otras–. Por otra parte, también la trinidad cristiana –Padre, Hijo y Espíritu Santo– se construye a imitación de las tríadas filosóficas, y Agustín de Hipona (354430), al aplicar el racionalismo neoplatónico a la teología cristiana, construye tríadas para interpretar la naturaleza creada. Del mismo modo, la fijación de los atributos del Dios único ha comenzado entre estos filósofos. Siguiendo las indicaciones platónicas, Numenio establece que hay un único principio supremo que es perfectamente simple: el dios Primero, al existir en sí mismo, es simple... no es en modo alguno divisible. Este ser eterno es conocido mediante la intelección, pues siendo incorporal en su simplicidad es también inteligible; del mismo modo, el conocimiento del Bien es un movimiento que lleva de lo sensible a lo inteligible. En ese Dios Primero se identifican el Bien y el Uno como pura forma sin contenido material alguno; de él nacen los dioses Segundo y Tercero, ya asociados a la materia –en cuanto que la materia indica posibilidad y devenir–; éstos unifican la materia y son escindidos por ella en un proceso dialéctico. La misma materia emana del Uno en su Primera Hipóstasis, formando parte del nous o Intelecto, y esa idea de una El PEriPlo dE la razón " 43 composición universal de los seres por la materia, incluso en los entes más cercanos a la divinidad, forma parte del legado neoplatónico de Numenio en la teología medieval de la civilización musulmana. El pensamiento descubre un ser permanente más allá de la mutación constante que acaece en los fenómenos sensibles; pero cuando profundiza en ese ámbito metafísico del ser eterno, llega a la conclusión de que éste es doble para salvar la absoluta inmutabilidad y perfección del primer principio. Aparece entonces una duplicidad: el Demiurgo imita el Bien y el Devenir imita al Demiurgo. A su vez el Demiurgo es doble con una parte de sí volcada en la inteligibilidad del Bien y la otra en la relación con el mundo sensible del Devenir. El mundo natural es por tanto un simulacro, el reflejo de un reflejo, la copia de una copia, lo que explica su imperfección e inestabilidad. Por otra parte, esa metafísica viene a ser explicada mediante una alegoría que concede una mayor realidad al mundo sensible material. El Primer Dios, el modelo inteligible platónico, es el propietario de un campo –símbolo de la materia universal– y de las semillas de las plantas –símbolo de los inteligibles o formas de los objetos que están en la mente divina–; el Segundo Dios o Demiurgo ejecuta la plantación –lleva las formas al mundo material y las distribuye ordenadamente–; el Tercer Dios o Alma del Mundo representa la fructificación del campo, que es el devenir de los seres en el universo material. El símil biológico concede a la materia un valor de realidad y de hecho la materia ocupa lugares muy altos en la escala del ser, pues forma parte de la Segunda y Tercera divinidad. El Primer Dios, en cambio, está más allá de cualquier definición, siendo puramente inteligible. Este esquema metafísico resurgirá entre los filósofos medievales de la civilización islámica, que preferirán dar una explicación racional a los misterios de la fe. 44 " nombrE autor o autorEs El misticismo neoplatónico es también una herencia que será recibida en el ámbito cultural islámico; esta filosofía llama a hombres y mujeres a la vida espiritual, mediante la purificación, la contemplación y la visión estática. El alma se purifica de sus errores y pecados, para poder contemplar el mundo natural como un pálido reflejo de las ideas eternas, y acostumbrándose poco a poco a la luz, llegar hasta la visión de la belleza en sí. Platón en el banquete describe ese proceso como una ascensión del alma, impulsada por el amor a la belleza. El pecado es el olvido de su origen primero, en que cae el alma encerrada en el cuerpo material; se hace necesaria una conversión hacia el mundo superior, de modo que el alma se ponga en camino desde la multiforme experiencia sensible hacia los grados más altos de la comprensión de la realidad. Se trata de promover una ética centrada en los valores intelectuales del ser humano, elevándose hasta los conceptos más universales para entrar en comunidad con la existencia eterna. El fundamento de esa ética es una metafísica que subraya la trascendentalidad de la realidad divina, sin eliminar su inmanencia al mundo creado. De aquí surge la teoría emanatista, como una línea intermedia entre el panteísmo materialista estoico y la realización teísta de la filosofía en el cristianismo. Si bien el neoplatonismo ejerce una influencia nada desdeñable sobre los filósofos cristianos, la teología cristiana rechazará toda explicación de la realidad que sea incompatible con el dogma y perseguirá cualquier desviación sospechosa. Orígenes (185/86-254), siendo el pensador más agudo entre los primeros cristianos, ha sido sospechoso de bordear el dogma teológico y sus escritos fueron expurgados –la mayor parte destruidos– por la ortodoxia a causa de sus tendencias neoplatónicas. Numenio impresionó a Orígenes, quien elaboró la teología dogmática especialmente en la doctrina de la Trinidad a partir de los conceptos triádicos de los neoplatónicos. A pesar de que la teología El PEriPlo dE la razón " 45 cristiana procede a una simplificación de la metafísica emanatista, pues la creación del mundo por Dios a partir de la nada garantiza suficientemente su trascendencia frente al mundo material, en Orígenes hay una tendencia racionalista que le acerca a los postulados neoplatónicos. Así afirmará que toda la realidad creada –incluidos en ella los pecadores y los demonios–, vuelve al seno divino tras grandes sufrimientos por la lejanía respecto del Bien. Esa tendencia será fuertemente combatida por Agustín de Hipona y la ortodoxia católica, pues le priva al clero de uno de sus instrumentos favoritos de control de las conciencias, el miedo al castigo eterno. Dios es el principio de toda la realidad; no hay un estadio pre–eterno en el cual él no sea principio. Hay una relación directa entre Dios y sus criaturas, por lo que se puede alcanzar una cierta comprensión de Dios a través del mundo visible y de las operaciones del intelecto humano: dios es participado por quienes tienen espíritu de dios. La función cosmológica de la metafísica es subordinada a la explicación de la salvación, la función soteriológica; en la explicación de la Trinidad, Orígenes sustituye la metafísica matemática de Platón por el esquema soteriológico de la salvación: el Padre es la Primera Hipóstasis o Persona de la Trinidad, creador del mundo; el Hijo, Segunda Persona, con funciones cosmológicas e intermediarias; el Espíritu Santo, la Tercera Persona, ejerce su acción sobre aquellos que se vuelven hacia los seres superiores y siguen los caminos de Jesucristo. La cosmología platónica se convierte en la sustentación metafísica de los dogmas cristianos, de modo que éstos alcanzan algún tipo de explicación racional. La adopción de ese esquema conceptual para la explicación de las verdades teológicas, comienza una labor intelectual que fue continuada por los filósofos musulmanes, requiriendo un esfuerzo importante por encontrar una formulación metafísica compatible con la enseñanza coránica; pero durante los primeros 46 " nombrE autor o autorEs siglos del Islam, éstos jugaran con la ventaja de no tener que estas sometidos a una Iglesia dogmática, ni al integrismo religioso, y utilizarán el criterio de que la doctrina religiosa utiliza alegorías para enseñar la verdad al pueblo, verdad que se alcanza por la reflexión racional. La filosofía de Numenio ejerció una auténtica influencia en Oriente Medio; su enseñanza habría dejado una tradición neoplatónica independiente que se desarrolló en los límites de la civilización romana y fue continuada por la filosofía islámica. Esa corriente estableció en Harrán al norte de Siria una escuela que perduró hasta la conquista árabe, y que fue el único centro de estudios filosóficos que no se cristianizó al final del helenismo. Por eso recibió a la Academia platónica de Atenas cuando el emperador Justiniano la cerró en el 529; ésta permaneció al menos medio siglo entre los harranitas, antes de continuar su emigración hacia Persia. Ya bajo el Islam, los seguidores de la filosofía neoplatónica oriental fueron admitidos como una religión del libro bajo el nombre de "sabeos", y sus enseñanzas constituyeron una de las vías por las que entró la filosofía en la civilización musulmana. 2.6. una fiLosofía ReLiGiosa El neoplatonismo jugó un papel primordial en la formación de la doctrina católica, así como en el desarrollo de las corrientes místicas durante la Edad Media cristiana. La idea de la inmanencia divina en los seres naturales conduce a un deseo de introspección para encontrar el mensaje divino que habita en el interior de la humanidad e interpretarlo mediante la conciencia personal. Agustín de Hipona, influido por el neoplatonismo, hablará del deus absconditus, el Dios escondido en el alma humana, luz que ilumina su conocimiento de la realidad. La propuesta neoplatónica es presentar la contemplación de la esencia divina como el objetivo del ser humano, un camino místico de El PEriPlo dE la razón " 47 carácter intelectualista, que tendrá una enorme influencia en la religiosidad de la Edad Media. Pero debemos diferenciar la propuesta cristiana, influida por la metafísica de Plotino y limitada a las verdades del dogma, del racionalismo filosófico musulmán proveniente del neoplatonismo oriental. La vía mística pretende alcanzar un conocimiento directo de la esencia divina a través de la introspección de la vida interior por la conciencia. En términos neoplatónicos se entiende que a través de la vía mística, el Uno es cognoscible intuitivamente para el alma humana, pues es inmanente a ella. El Uno no es el resultado de una abstracción, como lo puede ser la unidad: no es así como se le puede conocer, pues está más allá de la intelección. En el sentido de que, del mismo modo que se puede contemplar lo inteligible cuando se ha eliminado lo sensible –lo que es propiamente la abstracción–, también se puede contemplar lo que es más esencial que lo inteligible, al eliminar a éste –lo que es una operación que está más allá de la abstracción, es una intuición–. Es una intuición que aparece cuando eliminamos lo inteligible, después de haber eliminado lo sensible por la abstracción. De ese modo, alcanzamos la visión de que todas las cosas pertenecen a una comunidad esencial de los seres en la existencia; pero al mismo tiempo eleva ese lazo de unión esencial al rango de realidad suprema, estableciendo una distancia eminente con las cosas mundanas particulares. Acceder a ella es alcanzar una visión esencial, trasfigurando la materialidad natural en un efecto de la perfección y la belleza divinas. La ética se convierte en una mística de la ascensión del alma humana hasta la comprensión de la unidad esencial y su reintegración en ese medio divino. En el camino se ejercitan las virtudes cívicas y la purificación mediante ciertas prácticas ascéticas para romper el lazo que nos ata al mundo sensible de la materia. El ser humano debe huir del mundo material y asemejarse a Dios espiritual. El amor es el camino hacia el Uno, 48 " nombrE autor o autorEs pero el Uno no es amor, pues no es una voluntad; el amor nace de todo lo creado que tiende hacia su creador. El amor consiste en la búsqueda de lo Bello en sí, y ese amor al Bien conduce al misticismo. Es un misticismo intelectual y no psicológico, es decir, no tiene ritual; para alcanzar la comprensión de Dios utiliza las vías de la negación –el Uno no tiene los defectos observables en el mundo sensible–, de la analogía –el Uno es causa de las perfecciones visibles en los seres– y de la eminencia –el Uno posee en sumo grado esas perfecciones–. Ese conocimiento debe procurar el éxtasis que es una visión de la luz del Uno dentro de uno mismo, en el alma, y una contemplación del mundo natural desde el Principio. En esa situación extática desaparece la relación entre sujeto y objeto que caracteriza el conocimiento cotidiano de la realidad natural –podríamos compararla al sentimiento oceánico que permite al ser humano identificarse con la naturaleza suspendiendo las barreras del yo–. De esa manera el neoplatonismo se convierte en el antecedente de la exploración mística del alma humana, que tanta importancia tendrá en la cultura religiosa, cristiana e islámica; en ésta a través de los sufíes, los Hermanos de la Pureza y otras comunidades monacales y espirituales, como la escuela masarrí en al-Ándalus. El Uno es un principio necesario que consiste en la tranquila autocontención y crea el mundo por la sobreabundancia de su ser. Esa creación no es voluntaria ni consciente; es un rebosar de la existencia, un desbordamiento de la potencia inmensa de la divinidad, una relación eterna del Uno divino consigo mismo, que determina la aparición de la realidad creada. No obstante esa afirmación radical de la trascendentalidad divina, los filósofos neoplatónicos se mantendrán en el paganismo, pues no renuncian a la inmanencia –no renuncian a la razón para abrazar la fe–, y su filosofar es un hacer compatibles dialécticamente esas dos interpretaciones del principio Absoluto, una trascendencia en la inmanencia. Su tríada platónica no es la Trinidad cristiaEl PEriPlo dE la razón " 49 na, pues no es una comunidad de personas, sino una jerarquía de niveles conceptuales en el mundo del espíritu; la existencia divina, la suprema razón no es una personalidad dotada de entendimiento y voluntad, como el Dios cristiano antropomorfo. Está más allá de esa imagen popular de la divinidad. Y esto lo rechaza el cristianismo, cuyo objetivo es una tarea imposible de mantener la unidad de creencias entre el pueblo y las élites, restañando las fisuras producidas en la sociedad por las diferencias de clase o estamento, las diferencias inducidas por la división del trabajo. Pero el racionalismo filosófico musulmán defenderá una visión intelectualista de la divinidad, mientras estuvo en su mano confrontar el integrismo religioso incrustado en la administración burocrática del Estado. Si es verdad que la deformación dogmática es propia de una burocracia rígida e inflexible en el ejercicio del poder estatal, esto no sucederá en el mundo islámico hasta el siglo XII, cinco siglos después de su fundación, y ocho siglos después que la Iglesia Católica fijara con dogmas los contenidos de la fe. Según esa doctrina neoplatónica, la Primera Hipóstasis, el Uno, transciende el concepto de ser que nos formamos a partir de los objetos, su característica es la simplicidad absoluta, pura existencia sin esencia inteligible; a partir del Uno que rebosa de realidad, se produce la Segunda Hipóstasis como una dualidad de Ser e Intelecto: del reposo del Uno se origina el Ser; de la contemplación del Uno, el Intelecto o nous. Del mismo modo, se crea la Tercera Hipóstasis como Alma del Mundo, con dos partes, una superior orientada hacia arriba, hacia el Intelecto, y otra orientada hacia abajo, la naturaleza. La Naturaleza puede considerarse como una cuarta Hipóstasis, si bien se identifica con la parte inferior del Alma del Mundo. El Uno es puro sujeto al que no se le pueden asignar los predicados, el Uno se conoce a sí mismo y se identifica con el Bien, de modo que se produzca la emanación del Intelecto y del 50 " nombrE autor o autorEs Ser; por tanto se le atribuyen esas perfecciones por analogía. La primera emanación, el Intelecto, es el Pensamiento o Espíritu, el nous, nace como intuición o aprehensión inmediata del Uno por sí mismo; pero es una dualidad, pues es también Ser que emana del Uno, Ser que viene identificado con la materia, sustrato de la percepción sensible. La dualidad aparece también en la autocontemplación del Uno, como proceso en el que éste se desdobla, en sujeto contemplador y objeto contemplado; todo conocimiento requiere un objeto conocido por un sujeto. De la contemplación del Uno por el nous se produce la multiplicidad, de ese modo el nous contiene las ideas de clases e individuos y equivale al mundo de las ideas de la metafísica platónica; es imagen del Uno como la luna lo es del sol. Si el Uno es luz pura y divina que se expande por el universo, el nous es el diamante que difracta la luz en los colores del arco iris. Con el nous aparece la multiplicidad, aun siendo eterno e intemporal, y el nous es como un foco que expande la luz originada en el Uno; esa luz que se va perdiendo en la oscuridad de la materia, llegando hasta lo más ínfimo del Universo, es el Alma del Mundo. Como en un juego de espejos que reflejan la luz recibida de otro espejo, el Alma del Mundo es una imagen del nous y a su vez reproduce una imagen suya en la Naturaleza. En cierto sentido, el nous también equivale al Demiurgo que en el timeo platónico modela la materia fijándose en las ideas para crear el mundo; pero más precisamente, Demiurgo es el Alma del Mundo que plasma los objetos en la Naturaleza. Al constituir el Alma del Mundo, las significaciones inteligibles del nous se hacen temporales y aparece la infinidad de almas particulares. Ese Alma tiene una doble naturaleza, una superior intelectiva y otra inferior sensitiva, de ese modo, produce el mundo corpóreo y ordena el universo. Los niveles inferiores se producen por contemplación de los superiores y no implican una caída desde el mundo superior al inferior, sino un debilitarse El PEriPlo dE la razón " 51 la existencia, un difuminarse la realidad, un disolverse la luz en el infinito. Esa metáfora de la luz utilizada por Plotino tiene el objetivo muy preciso de quitarle realidad a la materia, y será recogida por Agustín de Hipona y la teología católica posterior. La materia es identificada con el mal, pero no es más que una ilusión humana. El mal no existe como tal, ni por tanto la materia, puesto que el mundo es espíritu. El mal es la pérdida de realidad que se produce en la expansión del ser en la naturaleza; es por tanto no existencia, carencia de ser, lejanía respecto la fuente productora de realidad, ausencia respecto del Bien. Pero todo ser hasta el más ínfimo y perdido en la materialidad, es decir en la nada, participa del Uno. El argumento pasará a la teología católica para salvar el problema de la teodicea, es decir, la explicación del mal en el mundo. Dios es Bueno, perfección infinita, y omnipotente, creador de toda la realidad; esa esencia divina es contradictoria con la existencia del mal en el mundo: un Dios bueno no puede haber creado el mal; por tanto el mal no existe. El mismo argumento será utilizado de forma invertida por los ilustrados del siglo XVIII para mostrar la inconsistencia del concepto cristiano de Dios, cuando la crítica racional haga imposible ocultar la existencia del mal en el mundo. Y aquí encontramos la principal diferencia entre Plotino y Numenio, pues éste último hacía nacer la materia de la Segunda Hipóstasis, y si bien eso podría interpretarse como la imperfección o carencia de ser que comenzaría ya aquí, en la primera separación con respecto del Uno, no fue esa la idea que tuvieron los racionalistas musulmanes o judíos, que elaboraron sus doctrinas en el mundo islámico. En el neoplatonismo oriental no se produce la identificación de la materia con el mal, sino que por influencia del aristotelismo se considera la materia como realidad universal y eterna, sustrato y posibilidad del ser, lo que dará pie 52 " nombrE autor o autorEs a una mejor consideración de los problemas del conocimiento natural. La materia es un nombre para designar el movimiento eterno de la realidad sensible, afirmando su realidad infinita e indeleble. Un concepto para subrayar el carácter procesual de los acontecimientos cósmicos, regulados por leyes inexorables y perfectamente racionales. El problema que debe resolver esa metafísica consiste en la relación entre esa trascendencia del Uno y la multiplicidad de los seres finitos; para ello necesita establecer una serie de mediadores que hacen posible el tránsito desde la simplicidad absoluta de Dios hasta la complejidad del mundo sensible. Esa mediación viene dada en las religiones monoteístas por la creencia en los ángeles, identificados bien con las inteligencias puras sin mezcla de materia de la metafísica cristiana, bien con las inteligencias cósmicas de la filosofía árabe. En Oriente la metafísica neoplatónica se fusionó con la concepción cosmológica de Aristóteles y la teoría geocéntrica de la astronomía científica, para constituir la visión del mundo de las élites del mundo islámico. Como se ha señalado ya, esta cosmología pasará íntegra a los filósofos musulmanes y se verá reproducida por la filosofía de al-Farabi (872-950) o Avicena (980-1037) en su elaboración de los conceptos fundamentales de la física medieval. Es en ese sentido que los filósofos musulmanes abrazan el racionalismo, frente al irracionalismo de fondo que subyace a la teología cristiana. El análisis racional afirma la eternidad de la materia y del mundo creado, pues no se admite que pueda venir algo a partir de la nada: de la nada, nada se hace.9 De ahí nace la necesi9. Por eso Ernst Bloch ha podido afirmar que la metafísica medieval musulmana es el antecedente del materialismo dialéctico, es decir, un materialismo que sirve de fundamento a la exploración científica de la naturaleza sin perder el horizonte de los ideales racionales que constituyen la esencia del ser humano. Cf. avicena y la izquierda aristotélica, Madrid, Ciencia Nueva, 1964. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 53 dad de explicar la realidad por emanación: la realidad cósmica se origina en la sobreabundancia de la existencia divina, que rebosa realidad para formar el mundo; la razón defiende la inmanencia: el Uno es una interpretación intelectual de la realidad: la unidad de todo el cosmos en el ser constitutivo de toda existencia, la esencia de toda realidad no está en el más allá, sino en todas las cosas. La eternidad de la divinidad hace eterna la materia que nace de ella. Pero antes de meternos de lleno en esa comprensión cosmológica, veamos cómo se produjo el cambio en el modo de producción que trajo el feudalismo como orden social de la Edad Media. *** 3. LAS RAíCES POLíTICO-SOCIALES DEL ISLAM: EL ORDEN SOCIAL DEL fEUDALISMO El neoplatonismo fue una síntesis de todas las escuelas del helenismo: platonismo, aristotelismo, estoicismo, neopitagorismo, gnosis, hermetismo más misterios y doctrinas soteriológicas. Esa síntesis acompaña a una crisis profunda del Imperio Romano, que dará origen a la instauración del cristianismo. En el orden económico, la solución de la crisis fue una transformación de las relaciones de producción entre las clases sociales, que instauró el feudalismo sustituyendo la fuerza de trabajo esclava por los siervos. Al mismo tiempo, en el terreno cultural se sustituyó la filosofía –como sistema de ideas dominante del sistema de clases esclavista en la Antigüedad– por la teología –ideología dominante del feudalismo–. La nueva forma de pensar, que acompañó a la instauración y desarrollo del sistema feudal, tuvo un carácter religioso: consistió en establecer un sistema de control sobre la conciencia de los fieles, fundándose en los ritos religiosos –que reúnen al pueblo en torno a la fe–, en los sacramentos –que mo54 " nombrE autor o autorEs delan la personalidad individual–, y una escatología –que refuerza la ansiedad por la salvación a través de la creencia en la vida futura del alma–. De ese modo, a través de la religión católica, la conciencia personal queda prisionera de las intenciones del clero eclesiástico, y en última instancia de las directrices del poder político que homogeneizan la sociedad y trazan su destino político. Esa 'revolución cristiana' conlleva una transformación de la conciencia personal, que viene prefigurada por la utopía platónica de la república gobernada por los sabios. Para hacer efectiva esa utopía se requiere una conciencia cuya máxima aspiración consista en alcanzar un comportamiento moral adecuado a la función que debe desempeñar en el orden social. El fracaso de Platón a la hora de realizar sus ideas en la práctica, planteó la necesidad de una preparación de las masas que fue madurando a lo largo de los siglos. Al final del mundo antiguo, el cristianismo proporcionó la ideología y las instituciones para la continuidad del proyecto de organización clasista de la sociedad. Eso quiere decir también que la transcendencia del mundo espiritual constituye el eje en el sistema de ideas que acompaña a esa solución política que se apoya en la fe religiosa. Sustentar el poder estatal en la formulación religiosa de las cuestiones ideológicas, exigía dar un carácter sagrado a los ideales y los valores que fundan el orden social; o dicho de otro modo, asentar el dominio de la clase superior a través de orientar las intenciones de las clases populares hacia los valores espirituales –moralidad, intelectualismo, armonía–, consiguiendo el consenso acerca del orden social establecido. Los dos parámetros que producen la cohesión social son la coacción política del Estado, que corrige las conductas desviadas, y el consenso moral conseguido por la Iglesia, cuya misión es promover las conductas adecuadas para sostener el orden social. Dicho en términos religiosos, el culto de dulía, que establece el miedo –el temor a Dios y al castigo eterno– como El PEriPlo dE la razón " 55 principio rector de la conciencia, y el culto de latría, que mueve la conducta por el amor al Bien Supremo, a Dios. Agustín de Hipona (354-430), en su exposición de la ciudad de dios, presentó esos dos estadios de la formación social como dos sociedades distintas conviviendo en el mismo mundo terrenal, la Ciudad del Hombre y la Ciudad de Dios. Cuanto mayor sea el éxito de la Iglesia en su función moralizadora, menos será necesario recurrir a la imposición política del orden social. De ese modo, se asegura la coordinación entre las instancias sociales a partir de la conciencia moral de los sujetos que las forman, y la sociedad puede funcionar sin especiales conflictos internos. Pero esa forma de dominación exige una completa aceptación de la fe dogmática que la Iglesia Católica defiende; esto es muy evidente en la filosofía de Agustín y los problemas que necesita resolver. En primer lugar, esa fe dogmática no es racional, no sólo porque exige una creencia injustificada que da una voltereta mortal por encima del raciocinio lógico, sino sobre todo porque, como se ha señalado, la razón es desde su mismo origen duda, discrepancia, debate, dialéctica. Por mucho que se empeñe Agustín en demostrar la plausibilidad racional de los contenidos de la fe, carece de pruebas para sus afirmaciones. En segundo lugar, porque esa fe no basta para sujetar las ambiciones de los hombres, que entrarán en conflicto permanentemente a lo largo de la historia del cristianismo. Tanto los conflictos de clase, como la búsqueda de una mayor racionalidad en el orden social y espiritual, se manifestarán a través de las herejías, permanentemente renacidas y duramente reprimidas por el poder eclesial a lo largo de la Edad Media. Para resolver los problemas fundamentales de la filosofía, el cristianismo no necesita elaborar una metafísica complicada; no la necesita, ya que para convencer utiliza el poder estatal y la represión violenta de la herejía. Combina con más o menos habilidad el consenso y la coacción, la buena fe y la represión. 56 " nombrE autor o autorEs Gracias a ello, puede justificar la trascendencia divina sin recurrir a intrincadas especulaciones metafísicas: Dios crea el mundo de la nada y lo dirige con su sabiduría, es la Causa de toda realidad, que no se confunde con su efecto, es Suprema Sabiduría que se revela al ser humano a través de su Iglesia. Dicho de otro modo: el cristianismo no necesita convencer mediante largas y tediosas demostraciones filosóficas: se vale de la fe, crea la confianza de la gente en el sistema social que representa, o amenaza con el castigo eterno a quien no cree –y con el castigo corporal también–. De ese modo, aparece un nuevo consenso, un nuevo pacto entre el poder político de las élites dominantes, a cuyo servicio se encuentra la religión, y el pueblo llano trabajador que forma la clase subalterna. El objetivo de la Iglesia Católica será mantener una homogeneidad de pensamiento entre las distintas clases a través del dogma. Y ese dogma, interpretado y controlado por la jerarquía eclesiástica, estará protegido mediante la represión violenta. La trascendencia metafísica, como símbolo del orden social, implica jerarquía y poder político, el mensaje divino interpretado por la jerarquía e impuesto por la represión estatal al servicio del dogma. El cristianismo en su expansión por el mundo antiguo realizará una función de divulgación del platonismo entre las masas del Bajo Imperio Romano, y esa será una meritoria labor de elevación espiritual del pueblo llano. Pero cuando en el siglo IV se convierte en una religión estatal –y en el Imperio de Occidente la jerarquía eclesiástica se constituye en el Estado mismo–, su papel histórico cambia radicalmente, imponiendo violentamente su doctrina. Para evitar las discrepancias internas entre los súbditos de ese Estado, la Iglesia Cristiana recurre al dogma, como creencia compartida por toda la cristiandad que unifica las diferentes clases sociales. La fe sustituye a la razón, la trascendencia a la inmanencia. De ese modo, a través de los símbolos cristianos se vulgarizan los contenidos platónicos de forma sesgada, se difunEl PEriPlo dE la razón " 57 den los valores espirituales entre las masas como algo inalcanzable, y se preparan los espíritus para una educación moral de carácter servil. La simbología cristiana tiene como objetivo modelar los sentimientos de las gentes, constituidos como motivaciones fundamentales de su acción moral por encima de la razón. Por otra parte, Gramsci ha subrayado que el objetivo fundamental de la Iglesia cristiana es mantener la unidad de culto dentro de la sociedad, evitando que la ideología de la clase dominante se distancie de los sentimientos de la clase subalterna. En cierto modo, la estrategia cristiana es plausible, y ha tenido un éxito notable en ciertos aspectos; pero no es posible equiparar las creencias y la conciencia de la clase subalterna a las de la clase dominante sin algún grado de falsificación de los ideales y los valores. Ahí radica la enorme ambigüedad del mensaje cristiano: ¿qué igualdad o fraternidad puede haber dentro de una sociedad escindida en clases? Inmediatamente, desde el mismo momento en que la Iglesia accedió al poder estatal, nacieron dos cristianismos, el de la jerarquía y el de la plebe –y comenzaron las persecuciones de las herejías–. La revolución cristiana quiso unificar a todo el género humano en una fraternidad universal, pero para ello tenía que haber acabado con las clases sociales. El mayor mérito del cristianismo es haber llevado la civilización al norte de Europa, pues el pensamiento racional todavía no había penetrado en Europa aparte de Grecia y el sur de Italia, y apenas había arañado la cultura de las élites gobernantes romanas. Un nivel más atrasado del desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, explica el éxito europeo del catolicismo romano o la ortodoxia griega. Pero difícilmente podía resultar aceptable la actitud cristiana en Oriente y norte de África, y ese el secreto del triunfo del Islam. La solución que dio el Islam a ese problema –el del estatus de la filosofía racionalista y la investigación científica dentro de la cultura de una sociedad unida por lazos de religión–, en el medio cultural de Oriente Medio desarrollado y 58 " nombrE autor o autorEs científico, se parece a la propuesta estoica de Panecio a las élites del Imperio Romano: la filosofía como ideología de la clase dominante, que promueve la religión para el pueblo con el objetivo de facilitar el gobierno. Esto sirvió para continuar el pensamiento racional en la Edad Media durante cinco siglos, hasta que los problemas internos de la civilización musulmana hicieron estallar esa posibilidad. Fue entonces, y no antes, cuando la antorcha del saber pasó a la cultura europea. 3.1. eL tRasfondo econóMico deL tRiunfo deL cRistianisMo Según una tesis defendida por Max Weber, la decadencia del modo de producción antiguo, se debió al agotamiento paulatino de las riquezas naturales, la pérdida de fertilidad del suelo, los cada vez más bajos rendimientos en las extracciones minerales, el agotamiento de recursos pesqueros y forestales, etc.; pero especialmente el modo de producción esclavista entró en crisis cuando se agotaron los esclavos, que eran producto de las guerras de conquista romana. Los miembros de la clase explotada no se reproducían porque su estado de degradación se lo impedía, y era necesario mantener la población de trabajo esclavo a base de guerras y ataques punitivos. Pero el Imperio comenzó a estancarse y retroceder desde el siglo tercero por el empuje de los pueblos bárbaros no sometidos al poder imperial. De ahí que la producción basada en la fuerza de trabajo esclava tuviera que ser sustituida por nuevas relaciones de producción. La desaparición de la esclavitud fue, pues, un elemento necesario del nuevo orden social feudal; los esclavos fueron sustituidos por los siervos de la gleba en la transición hacia el nuevo modo de producción. Y fue ese un factor que favoreció el auge y la victoria del cristianismo, pues supuso una remodelación de las costumbres y las El PEriPlo dE la razón " 59 instituciones, para adecuarlas a la nueva situación económica que dio origen al feudalismo –lo que exigía una nueva forma de pensar–.10 Ya desde los siglos II y III se introducen formas de propiedad de la tierra que sustituían el esclavismo. Se refuerza la función económica de las grandes haciendas, que arriendan las tierras a los colonos y que se hacen autosuficientes con artesanos que producen lo necesario para la vida diaria. Sustituyendo a los esclavos de los latifundios, esos colonos darán origen a los siervos de la gleba del sistema feudal. Con el final de la economía esclavista se hunde la vida de las ciudades –se ha descrito las ciudades del Imperio Romano como 'colonias de zánganos' que parasitaban el trabajo esclavo–. La crisis del endeudamiento privado deprime la actividad económica, las asociaciones gremiales se burocratizan y son asimiladas por la administración, se rompe la autonomía municipal y las ciudades son supervisadas por funcionarios del Estado –se ha dicho también que el Imperio Romano fue una federación de ciudades autónomas y su hundimiento está relacionado con la pérdida de ese carácter urbano–. En el siglo III el ejército deja de ser fiable y se producen las primeras oleadas de invasiones germánicas, las ciudades se despueblan y el centro de gravedad de la vida social se desplaza al campo. En una larga transición de dos siglos Europa queda sometida al nuevo orden feudal. 10. Max Weber, en AA.VV., La transición del esclavismo al feudalismo, Madrid, Akal, 1980, 3a edición revisada. Dentro de este mismo volumen, E.M. Staerman, "La caída del régimen esclavista", ha señalado que la clase subalterna mantenía una lucha sorda que hacía ineficiente el esclavismo, lo que constituye un factor añadido a las causas señaladas. 60 " nombrE autor o autorEs 3.2. eL iMPeRio se hace cRistiano El cristianismo en su adaptación al helenismo moderó el ímpetu revolucionario del judaísmo mesiánico que profesó Jesús, por lo que un sector decisivo del movimiento cristiano funcionó en la práctica como un partido reformista.11 Precisamente por eso, el cristianismo fue una religión ampliamente extendida de la que participaban al lado de los proletarios romanos, una parte significativa de las clases medias, especialmente en las regiones subordinadas a la dominación romana, y seguramente también numerosos grupos de esclavos. En el siglo III importantes sectores de la administración y la aristocracia romana se convirtieron al cristianismo12, lo que muestra toda la ambigüedad de esta religión como instrumento para la reconciliación entre las clases sociales. Los Padres de la Iglesia recomendaban obediencia y resignación a los esclavos, lo cual no es la mejor receta para llevar a cabo una lucha necesaria para la emancipación de la clase subalterna. Pero la dignificación la persona humana –incluso en las situaciones más degradadas de existencia como la esclavitud: Cristo murió en la cruz–, era un mensaje del Evangelio que debió ser atractivo para las clases más desfavorecidas. Y eso hizo del cristianismo una ideología revolucionaria por su mensaje ético y moral, si bien pacifista y moderada desde el punto de vista político; su triunfo en el IV acompañó la organización de un nuevo de producción económica: el feudalismo. Esa coincidencia temporal no puede ser fruto de un mero azar. El cristianismo primitivo se desarrolló entre las capas urbanas de la sociedad romana. Fue durante la crisis del siglo III 11. Gonzalo Puente Ojea, ideología e historia. La formación del cristianismo como fenómeno ideológico, Madrid, siglo XXI, 1984. 12. J.M. Blázquez, en AA.VV. cristianismo primitivo y religiones mistéricas, cap.XIV, Madrid, Cátedra, 1995. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 61 cuando se convirtió en religión masiva entre los campesinos de Oriente, a causa de los movimientos de anacoretas y monjes que proliferaron en Egipto y Siria. El monacato es un movimiento de rechazo a la Iglesia oficial vinculada al poder político; se trata de un fenómeno de masas en el mundo rural, que representa la protesta social transformada en un movimiento religioso. Los anacoretas son individuos solitarios que se enfrentan al diablo en el desierto, como hizo Jesús según el Evangelio, ganando así la santidad. En muchos casos se trata de individuos huidos o en rebeldía social, que intentan escapar del servicio militar o no quieren pagar impuestos, incluso gente que ha cometido crímenes. Pero en la imaginación popular la aparición de ese hombre santo que vive por fuera del templo sagrado, significó el final de la religión clásica. Posteriormente, Pacomio (287-346), Antonio (251-356) y Basilio (329-379), reunieron a esos hombres en comunidades de trabajo y oración bajo reglas de convivencia comunitaria, y los monasterios adquirieron grandes propiedades transformándose en unidades de producción económica ya propiamente feudal. En Occidente el monacato comenzó con Prisciliano (340-385) en Hispania y Martín de Tours (316-397) en la Galia, jugando el papel de conversión de las masas campesinas en el IV, y más tarde se desarrolló como institución feudal en el momento de la descomposición de la sociedad romana por las invasiones bárbaras. Al mismo tiempo que se desarrolla la crisis de la economía esclavista y la decadencia política del imperialismo romano a lo largo del IV, se crean las fuerzas que harán posible el cambio en el modo de producción y la organización de nuevas relaciones sociales. La administración romana es sustituida por la organización eclesiástica y el Estado imperial cede su lugar a la Iglesia Católica. Más tarde en el V, las invasiones de los pueblos germánicos acabaron definitivamente con la organización imperial en 62 " nombrE autor o autorEs Europa y aceleraron un proceso de feudalización que ya había comenzado en los siglos anteriores. La crisis económica y social llevará al retroceso de las ciudades, a la pérdida del comercio y la industria, y a una fractura del Estado burocrático que se quiere evitar mediante la nueva religión. En el 313 Constantino legaliza las instituciones cristianas; el mismo emperador desarrolló una labor legislativa que habría de dejar fuera de juego al modo de producción esclavista; sus decretos fueron decisivos para el desarrollo de la nueva economía fundada en el latifundio autosuficiente, que eliminaba la preeminencia de la vida urbana.13 Al mismo tiempo, Eusebio de Cesarea (265-339) desarrolla una nueva filosofía política –o más bien una teología política: el césaro-papismo-, de modo que la religión pasa a ser un instrumento de legitimación del poder estatal. Constantino funda una monarquía cuya legitimidad reside en el derecho divino, es el representante de Dios en la tierra; el cristianismo se convierte en el soporte del poder imperial y la Iglesia en un instrumento de la política estatal. A partir de ese momento, comienzan las persecuciones de los paganos y los herejes; la estructura de la dominación se mantiene, aunque cambia la ideología de los dominadores. En realidad, el principal beneficiado de esa trasmutación no fue el cristianismo, sino el Estado que se vio reforzado tanto en Roma como en Constantinopla –la ciudad fundada por Constantino que luego tomó el nombre de Bizancio–. A través de los acontecimientos de los siglos IV y V la estructura institucional de la Iglesia sustituyó a la administración imperial en la organización de las relaciones sociales dentro del ámbito mediterráneo. Los obispos, como jefes de las comunida13. E.M. Staerman, "La caída del régimen esclavista", en AA.VV., La transición del esclavismo al feudalismo, Madrid, Akal, 1980, 3a edición revisada. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 63 des cristianas, pasan a constituir la dirección de las ciudades: un personaje polivalente, a la vez sacerdote, político, retórico, jurista y juez. Son reclutados entre las antiguas clases aristocráticas urbanas, que consiguen gracias al cristianismo reforzar su papel político y su influencia en el nuevo orden social –Juan Crisóstomo (347-407), Gregorio Nacianceno (329-389) y Basilio de Nisa (330.379), los Padres Capadocios son un buen ejemplo de ello-. Son la guía de la clase dirigente local y defensores de las clases subalternas; independientes unos de otros, son mediadores entre el poder central de la administración imperial y el poder local de la ciudad autónoma; la elección se hace mediante un proceso democrático en el que participa el pueblo y los clérigos. Pero en el proceso de construcción de esa estructura institucional las comunidades cristianas se jerarquizaron, perdiendo sus rasgos más democráticos, y acumularon riqueza que quedó en manos de los obispos, eliminando los aspectos comunistas del mensaje primitivo. En los siglos siguientes la Iglesia Católica convertirá Europa occidental en una civilización teocrática, donde el papa detentará la autoridad suprema. 3.3. eL cRistianisMo coMo factoR ideoLóGico deL caMbio sociaL El cristianismo pudo aliarse al poder político por su ambigüedad constitutiva: por un lado, se trataba de un movimiento pacifista que acepta el orden social, y en los escritos de los primeros cristianos encontramos llamamientos a la obediencia y la resignación; los Padres de la Iglesia sacralizan el poder político en sus escritos. Por otro, es una religión popular destinada a los más pobres, donde la predicación de la mansedumbre aparece junto a la crítica de la riqueza y el poder político. Esa ambivalencia sirve para contemporizar con el orden social injusto esclavista de 64 " nombrE autor o autorEs la civilización mediterránea y más tarde para construir un orden clasista feudal; frente al sufrimiento y los dolores de este mundo ofrece un consuelo espiritual: la vida eterna en Dios. Se debe desenmascarar esa ambigüedad: la función social de la religión como ideología al servicio de la clase dominante; especialmente notable es el papel ideológico de la Iglesia Cristiana –Católica u Ortodoxa– en el feudalismo, al justificar la dominación clasista; y posteriormente una papel extremadamente reaccionario desde finales de la época feudal. Esa ambivalencia ideológica del cristianismo está reconocida expresamente: se trata de la doble legalidad que rige los destinos humanos. Según Clemente de Alejandría, la ley que organiza el orden social justifica la propiedad y la distribución desigual de la riqueza; el que se atiene a ella es justo, sin pertenecer a la comunidad de los santos; pero la ley de Cristo promueve la desposesión de los bienes de este mundo y la donación de las riquezas por amor a Dios y al prójimo. Hay por tanto dos formas de ser cristiano y cada cual debe elegir la que le corresponde, una imperfecta, los que se atienen a la ley humana y están apegados a las cosas de este mundo, y otra perfecta, los que siguen la ley divina y buscan la vida espiritual en la unión con Dios. De ese modo, al mismo tiempo que el cristianismo se identifica con las aspiraciones y formas de vida de la clase subalterna mediante la glorificación de la pobreza, da validez al orden social vigente fundado en una distribución de la riqueza en función del mérito social; sólo aspira a iniciar un camino de educación de la clase dominante en los valores de la solidaridad social, la caridad fraterna, de modo que aprenda a valorar negativamente las riquezas. La insuficiencia de la revolución cristiana consistió en no abolir las relaciones de dominación entre las clases. Los Padres de la Iglesia se acomodaron al Estado y hacia el año 300 Lactancio prepara el acceso de los cristianos al poder político, El PEriPlo dE la razón " 65 reinterpretando en clave cristiana la moral racional inscrita en la naturaleza humana según los estoicos. El Decálogo hebreo es el equivalente al derecho natural estoico que orla las leyes romanas con una retórica de la igualdad y la libertad naturales del ser humano. El papel ideológico del estoicismo será ahora asumido por la teología cristiana, en un proceso que conducirá a la organización teocrática de la sociedad. Como ejemplo de adaptación de la moral cristiana a las tareas políticas, encontramos la aceptación del servicio militar. Los primeros fieles rechazaron la milicia por violar los mandamientos morales que prohíben el homicidio, haciendo objeción de conciencia; a partir de la inserción de la estructuras eclesiales en el Estado imperial, el ejercicio de la guerra será reconocido como una ocupación legítima de defensa de la comunidad creyente. Sin embargo, otra corriente dentro de los cristianos rechaza como falsa esa justificación de Clemente: no puede haber una doble ética y una doble ley –se trata de un dualismo que embota la fuerza revolucionaria del mensaje cristiano–; el uso de los bienes ha de ser común a todos, la posesión de bienes privados es un delito. Basilio de Cesarea, seguido por Gregorio Nacianceno y Juan Crisóstomo, dentro del grupo de intelectuales de Antioquía y Constantinopla, resalta la carga social del mensaje evangélico. Los bienes pertenecen a todos, pues todos tenemos la misma naturaleza, y la riqueza es una apropiación de bienes públicos, un culto a lo inútil y al engaño, produce insatisfacción, tristeza e infelicidad. Hay una sola ley inscrita por Dios en la naturaleza humana, que es el goce colectivo de los bienes naturales; el ataque a la propiedad privada es directo: Juan Crisóstomo llega a afirmar que la riqueza es fruto del robo, origen de la guerra, no es buena para nada; la riqueza sólo es un bien cuando lleva en sí el mecanismo de la donación. Bajo esa inspiración el feudalismo reconocerá un doble derecho de propiedad: el derecho campesino de uso de la tierra para obtener los frutos de su trabajo, y 66 " nombrE autor o autorEs el derecho de usufructo del señor feudal, que es un servidor de la comunidad en su papel de administrador y guerrero con las retribuciones correspondientes. Además el sistema multiplicará los bienes comunales de apropiación colectiva con titularidad pública. Pero esa revolución tiene un carácter eminentemente moral: consiste en el control de la conciencia por las instituciones religiosas. En el terreno político sostiene una ingenuidad engañosa: si bien acompaña al final de la esclavitud como modo de producción del mundo antiguo, fía la consecución de sus objetivos utópicos a la buena voluntad de las gentes, dejando intactas las estructuras de clases en la división funcional del trabajo; se trata de una revolución a medias, una revolución pasiva. Pero no puede dejar de observarse, que en la interpretación de la historia como desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, el feudalismo es una etapa en esa evolución. El cristianismo y posteriormente el islamismo, como ideologías religiosas del modo de producción feudal, han jugado un papel clave en la socialización de la humanidad moderna, instaurando entre las masas importantes principios morales. En la predicación monoteísta, y a través de los símbolos e instituciones de las Iglesias Cristianas y el Islam, se ha hecho popular la ética platónica: 'es más infeliz el que comete una injusticia que el que la padece'. A lo que se debe añadir que la radicalidad del mensaje utópico de los primeros creyentes no ha sido olvidada entre sus continuadores a lo largo de los siglos. En el siglo IV, Basilio cita a Platón: 'si cada uno tomase sólo lo que le sirve para sus necesidades y dejase lo restante para el que lo necesita, ninguno se haría rico, ninguno se haría pobre, nadie estaría en la miseria'. Tal vez por haber sido causa coadyuvante de la formación del feudalismo, se pueda hablar de la expansión del cristianismo primitivo como un modelo de transformación social, en el que una moral revolucionaria eleva a la clase subalterna hasta constituirse en el sujeto de la historia. La afinidad del cristianismo El PEriPlo dE la razón " 67 con las clases subalternas del Imperio Romano es indudable, y se manifiesta especialmente en su mensaje comunista y dignificador de la persona humana, frente a las relaciones sociales degradantes, como la esclavitud y las costumbres licenciosas. Los valores comunistas –rechazo de la riqueza y la propiedad privada, democracia de base participativa e igualitarismo radical entre los hombres, sociedad fundada en la personalidad moral consciente y crítica del Estado como organización de la violencia, etc.– están hondamente enraizados en el cristianismo, como se manifiesta en el evangelio y en la organización de las comunidades cristianas primitivas, de la que ya hemos hablado; lo mismo puede comprobarse con una lectura de la utopía de Tomas Moro, santo mártir de la Iglesia Católica en el siglo XVI. Además después del Renacimiento las sectas protestantes en ruptura con la Iglesia de Roma serán el fermento de la revolución burguesa. Lo más asombroso es que esos valores se truequen en sus contrarios en la práctica de las Iglesias Cristianas y de tantos individuos que se llaman nominalmente cristianos. En esa falsa conciencia podemos descubrir el significado de la palabra 'ideología'. La discusión del carácter del cristianismo que hemos seguido aquí, puede rendirnos un balance ambiguo: como movimiento político sólo fue revolucionario en su etapa nacionalista israelita de confrontación con la dominación romana, como aspiración utópica al Reino de Dios. Destruida la Comunidad de Jerusalén constituyó un movimiento religioso con una nueva moral, fundada en el amor al prójimo, pero incapaz de transformar las estructuras sociales injustas. Por eso pasó a jugar un papel cada vez más conservador de aceptación del orden social clasista, lo cual se hizo evidente cuando la Iglesia Católica se fusionó con el Estado romano. Sin duda, al ofrecer una satisfacción vicaria en el otro mundo, la moral cristiana y los símbolos religiosos del cristianismo tienden a hacer más llevadera la opresión social y excluyen la resistencia ante la dominación. En ese sentido es el 68 " nombrE autor o autorEs 'opio del pueblo, las flores que disimulan las cadenas' –en expresión de Karl Marx–. Al mismo tiempo, en el núcleo de la doctrina siguen presentes los valores comunistas y democráticos, aunque en un mundo espiritual de ideales; por eso, el cristianismo ha supuesto un avance moral y una toma de conciencia para las clases subalternas, pues insiste en la sociabilidad humana y en la cooperación entre los seres humanos. Es cierto, que propone una vida ilusoria en el más allá que confunde a los creyentes; pero también es cierto que un cristianismo auténtico puede proporcionar una conciencia ética al ser humano, convencido del amor al prójimo, y haciendo suya la tesis clásica de la ética racional: 'quien es tirano consigo mismo es tirano también con los demás'. Y en ese sentido su moral es revolucionaria en el sentido de la tesis de Marx que afirma que 'el resultado de la historia es la humanidad socializada'; el movimiento cristiano ha supuesto un paso importante en esa dirección. Sólo que ese cristianismo auténtico será necesariamente herético. El Islam bebe de las fuentes cristianas y de su moral revolucionaria –Juan Damasceno lo calificará de herejía del cristianismo–. Por eso, puede entenderse como una expansión de esa revolución cristiana hacia Oriente, que jugará un papel importante en el desarrollo científico y cultural durante el Medievo. Será esa herejía que rompiendo el poder de la Iglesia sobre las conciencias de las gentes, proporcione una moral superior a la cristiana, más tolerante y adecuada a las necesidades culturales de las zonas orientales del Mediterráneo, más desarrolladas que las europeas. Al menos en sus primeros siglos de existencia y hasta la reacción integrista del siglo XII, el Islam será la civilización científica y filosófica más avanzada de la época. Por eso, a menos que pensemos que la humanidad se reduce a Europa, o que el desarrollo filosófico se limite a lo que pensaron gentes europeas, la Edad Media no puede ser vista como una etapa oscurantista, según nos ha querido mostrar la historiografía moderna, sino El PEriPlo dE la razón " 69 como una fase en la que se producen importantes innovaciones y desarrollos culturales. Y gran parte del ámbito mediterráneo se vinculará a la cultura musulmana, como medio para mantenerse en contacto con la civilización más avanzada de su tiempo, la que se desarrolló en Oriente Medio. 3.4. La constRucción de un estado teocRático contRa Las heRejías La civilización cristiana se funda en el refuerzo de la conciencia personal a través de la educación en los valores sociales y el apoyo moral de la institución religiosa. El objetivo de los sacramentos y las ceremonias litúrgicas es, primero, la formación de una personalidad capaz de tomar decisiones morales adecuadas para la vida social; pero además, el seguimiento y el control de la conciencia por la Iglesia y sus ministros, sirve para armonizar las relaciones personales con la comunidad, evitando desviaciones que puedan generar conflictos y rupturas de la convivencia. En la interiorización de una personalidad divina y trascendente, el individuo es puesto delante de los valores e ideales sociales, a los que tiene que responder de manera positiva, aceptándolos y practicándolos; mediante el llamado a la oración, es interpelado a realizar un diálogo interior por el que su conciencia se identifica con los principios morales vigentes en su medio social; en la revisión periódica de su conducta mediante el examen de conciencia, el cristiano aprende a conocerse para adecuar su conducta a los valores morales; la codificación de los preceptos y las normas morales por las instituciones eclesiásticas, facilita a los fieles la respuesta a la pregunta ¿qué debo hacer? Por otra parte la burocratización de la jerarquía eclesiástica y la administración de la gracia divina a los fieles, que permite la salvación mediante los sacramentos, tiene por objetivo evitar incoherencias y contradicciones para facilitar la construcción de un orden 70 " nombrE autor o autorEs social racional y armonioso, fundado en la conciencia moral de los ciudadanos. El objetivo del magisterio de la Iglesia consiste, por principio, en establecer una sociedad fundada en el consenso y la cooperación voluntaria entre los ciudadanos, conseguida mediante la persuasión; se quiere eliminar así la coacción política, el conflicto y la explotación entre los seres humanos. La máxima que rige la moral del cristiano exige la cooperación voluntaria y altruista de los creyentes, al afirmar 'amarás a dios sobre todas las cosas y al prójimo como a ti mismo'. La moral del amor al prójimo, fundada en el amor de Dios, Padre bondadoso de la humanidad, debía ser suficiente para conseguir esos objetivos a partir del consenso de los fieles. De hecho sirvió para aglutinar a las clases subalternas del Imperio Romano, haciendo posible de ese modo una profunda transformación de la organización social. Todo sería perfecto si la naturaleza humana no fuera material y corruptible; y como no dejaron de denunciar los cristianos críticos desde el mismo momento de la conquista del poder, la institución eclesiástica se corrompe por efecto del poder y la riqueza. Al asumir las tareas propias de la dirección política en el nuevo contexto creado por la revolución social que habían impulsado, los cristianos se encontraron con una serie de problemas típicos que provienen de la organización del poder. Cuando Teodosio declaró la catolicidad del Imperio Romano, la legislación imperial determinó acabar con el paganismo, cerrar los templos, destruir los ídolos y anular los privilegios de los sacerdotes paganos. Tras la promulgación de esas leyes y en el proceso de aplicación surgieron tumultos y se cometieron abusos por parte del pueblo exaltado, y encabezado en ocasiones por las autoridades eclesiásticas. En uno de esos tumultos fue asesinada la filósofa neoplatónica Hipatia de Alejandría; fue el golpe de gracia a la antigua religión: las masas que asesinaban próceres cristianos en los primeros siglos del Imperio El PEriPlo dE la razón " 71 Romano, ahora se volvían contra los filósofos paganos; hasta tal punto la estructura social se había mantenido intacta. En la perpetración de ese crimen puede verse simbolizado el aspecto más siniestro de la Iglesia y el cristianismo fanático, su intolerancia hacia la libertad de pensamiento y el consecuente rechazo de la investigación científica. Además la misoginia propia de una religión que hereda y desarrolla el orden patriarcal. Pero la dificultad más importante consistió en adaptar la organización eclesial a la nueva situación de poder. Es en ese contexto que debemos entender las palabras de Ambrosio, obispo de Milán: "la pobreza, que para nosotros es un honor, es considerada por los paganos como un ultraje. nosotros creemos que los emperadores nos ayudaban mejor cuando nos perseguían que ahora cuando nos protegen". Es la intuición de que el acceso a las tareas de control social por parte de los ministros de la Iglesia pervertía el mensaje cristiano. La función social que desempeña el gobernante determina sus actitudes y sentimientos. Los problemas de la integración de la Iglesia y el Estado fueron numerosos y produjeron importantes disidencias, que se manifestaron como herejías en ese ambiente cultural de predominio de la religión y la fe sobre el debate racional. A través de las herejías podemos entender las fuerzas sociales que modelaron el dogma ortodoxo, para alcanzar un máximo de coherencia interna, y cómo determinados aspectos del cristianismo primitivo fueron marginados por considerarse utópicos. Por otra parte, en la época de máximo esplendor de la Edad Media, entre los siglos VII y XII la civilización cristiana fue inferior a la islámica, desde el punto de vista económico, político y cultural; de modo que las soluciones que se dieron al problema de las relaciones entre Iglesia y Estado, tanto en el catolicismo romano como en la ortodoxia oriental, no fueron las más exitosas para aquella época. Ni después: para entrar en la modernidad fue necesaria la Reforma Protestante que cambió esencialmente 72 " nombrE autor o autorEs las relaciones entre la religión y el Estado. Esa superioridad del mundo musulmán medieval tiene que ver con la ausencia de dogma y su tolerancia hacia las otras religiones, lo que permitió un notable desarrollo científico-técnico, así como la importante expansión comercial que puso en conexión el Extremo Oriente con las regiones más occidentales del mundo entonces conocido. Entre las tensiones manifiestas dentro del mundo cristiano al acceder al poder, una típica fue creada por aquellos disidentes que rechazaban la fusión de las antiguas estructuras estatales imperiales con el esquema cristiano de la organización social, lo que dio origen herejías como la de Donato, obispo del norte de África, que podía tener un trasfondo nacionalista, buscando la independencia con respecto el poder centralizado en Roma. Una segunda fue la contestación al carácter represivo del Estado y a la tendencia al abuso del poder político, que se mostró en el juicio y ejecución del obispo español Prisciliano. La tercera, el tratamiento de la libertad de opinión y las variantes religiosas aceptables dentro de la ortodoxia, que se puso de manifiesto en las discusiones con aquellos disidentes que ponían en peligro la estructura clasista y el sistema de control social establecido, como fueron Arrio por un lado y Pelagio por otro. En definitiva, cuando el poder romano adoptó la religión cristiana como oficial, interpretó que la discrepancia en materia religiosa era peligrosa para sus intereses de control social y puso así de manifiesto que el ideal cristiano de comunidad moral universal era una utopía irrealizable a gran escala, porque los intereses políticos y las pasiones humanas interferían en su consecución. La revolución cristiana, simbolizada por la Comunidad de Jerusalén, se quedó a medias; tendía a la extinción del Estado esclavista y la abolición de la propiedad privada, sustituido por una sociedad regida por el principio comunista de distribución de los bienes, 'a cada cual según su necesidad, de cada cual según su posibilidad', tal como El PEriPlo dE la razón " 73 aparece explicado en los hechos de los apóstoles. Una sociedad civil donde la cooperación se conseguía gracias al desarrollo de la conciencia moral sin necesidad de coacción política. Esa forma utópica de vida social quedó relegada a la vida espiritual, al Reino de los Cielos y a la Comunión de los Santos, la comunidad mística de los fieles.14 Podemos establecer cuatro criterios para comprender la discriminación entre ortodoxia y herejía, que funcionaron como condicionantes históricos en la definición del dogma católico. El primero es la posición de subordinación de las mujeres en la sociedad, la Iglesia Católica adoptó los criterios patriarcales para definir la ortodoxia –es el caso de los maniqueos–. El segundo es la congruencia entre las élites y la plebe, evitando la quiebra interna de la sociedad y disimulando las diferencias y antagonismos de clase bajo la fraternidad universal de los cristianos –el caso de los gnósticos–. El tercero es el mantenimiento de las estructuras jerárquicas de la sociedad y la continuidad de las élites sociales del antiguo Imperio Romano –el caso de los priscilianos y arrianos–. El cuarto criterio es la subordinación de la conciencia individual a la moral social controlada por la Iglesia –el caso de los pelagianos–. A esos criterios se puede añadir uno que manifiesta la diferencia entre el catolicismo de la Iglesia Romana y la ortodoxia de la Iglesia Ortodoxa Oriental, que es la forma adecuada de organizar las relaciones entre Iglesia y Estado, afirmando la preeminencia de la autoridad moral del Papa, obispo de Roma, en el catolicismo, o bien la superioridad del Emperador como autoridad civil entre las Iglesias de Oriente 14. Se puede observar que la organización comunista de la Comunidad de Jerusalén era inviable económicamente, pues sus miembros vivían en la espera de Jesús resucitado despreciando el trabajo; de ese modo tenían que sobrevivir con las aportaciones económicas de las demás comunidades cristianas. 74 " nombrE autor o autorEs que mantienen una mayor independencia entre sí y una mayor libertad de conciencia. A lo largo de toda la Edad Media surgirán herejías, cuyo objetivo es abolir las clases sociales y establecer un orden social equitativo y fraterno. Y al comienzo de la modernidad será necesaria una herejía protestante para abrir el camino de un nuevo modo de producción. Pero desde la época de las Cruzadas podemos observar la aparición de un nuevo criterio de ortodoxia: la confesión cristiana debe ser compatible con la expansión imperialista de los Estados europeos –el caso de los albigenses o cátaros de carácter pacifista–. Una disidencia surgió entre aquéllos que no querían aceptar la nueva situación de complementariedad entre los cuadros dirigentes cristianos y la administración imperial. Los donatistas rechazaron el orden social que se estaba gestando con el entendimiento entre la Iglesia católica y Estado romano. Agustín de Hipona fue el encargado de suministrar la doctrina que pusiera fin a la querella: el poder político debe estar sometido a la institución religiosa como un instrumento para alcanzar sus fines temporales. Los enemigos de la Iglesia, condenados por herejía, son entregados al brazo secular para recibir el castigo correspondiente; dicho de otro modo, el poder político se ve justificado en su acción represiva por la bendición del Clero. Con eso no hizo más que sancionar filosóficamente lo que ya había sido la práctica con el emperador Teodosio, quien admitió humillarse frente a las autoridades eclesiásticas, ante Ambrosio obispo de Milán (340-397), y hacer penitencia por sus pecados y errores de gobierno –había ordenado acuchillar a los ciudadanos de Tesalónica por un motín contra su autoridad–. La conciencia de los cristianos puede estar tranquila: la Iglesia en su misión del salvar a la humanidad, controla los excesos del poder estatal que representa la ciudad terrena del pecado. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 75 También el emperador Máximo, colega de Teodosio, fue amonestado por las autoridades eclesiásticas debido a su trato hacia Prisciliano, torturado y ejecutado bajo la acusación de herejía, además de prácticas litúrgicas poco ortodoxas. Pero no queda claro en que consistió su herejía –que perduró en la península Ibérica durante siglos–. Por el tipo de acusaciones de las que fueron reos, parece que fueran un antecedente de los 'alumbrados' o 'iluminados', herejes del siglo XVI que consideraban la sexualidad una forma de oración. Sus acusadores convencieron al tribunal que los juzgaba de que practicaban brujería y ese fue el motivo de que fueran decapitados los principales dirigentes de la secta herética. Las acusaciones de obscenidad y de prácticas criminales habían sido típicas contra los cristianos en los primeros siglos y uno de los motivos por los que se azuzaban las persecuciones contra ellos. En numerosas ocasiones los escritores cristianos, los Padres apologistas, tuvieron que refutar esas calumnias en cartas públicas al emperador. Quizás fuera el motivo por el que la ejecución de Prisciliano, sus compañeros y compañeras, fuera vista por los principales teólogos del momento –Ambrosio de Milán, Martín de Tours y el papa Siricio– como una equivocación que retrotraía al pasado, continuando con un tipo de represión que hubiera debido desaparecer en la nueva situación. En realidad, Prisciliano representaba la mentalidad tradicional del cristianismo revolucionario, frente a la adaptación de la Iglesia a las estructuras sociales de la sociedad clasista. Pide romper con los valores del dinero, el poder, la fama y el placer, que crean una sociedad corrompida basada en el engaño, el poder y la avaricia. Propugna una sociedad fundada en los valores evangélicos de la fraternidad libre entre iguales, un sistema social basado en el amor y el compartir. Afirma la pobreza voluntaria como fuente de felicidad. Fustiga a los obispos corruptos, que 76 " nombrE autor o autorEs consiguen llevarlo ante los tribunales que firman su sentencia de muerte. Ejemplo de lo poco que habían cambiado las estructuras clasistas de la sociedad mediterránea con la conversión del imperio esclavista al cristianismo feudal. La idea clásica que afirma la autonomía moral del ser humano, reapareció en el siglo IV como la herejía pelagiana, que afirmaba que la persona puede salvarse con sus propias fuerzas. Pelagio (354-420/40) era un monje inglés que afirmaba que el pecado original no se trasmitía de padres a hijos; con ello establecía la capacidad del cristiano para llevar una vida moral y alcanzar la felicidad a través de la virtud y el dominio del carácter, sin el auxilio de la Iglesia. Parece evidente que esa opinión suscitaba el peligro de que los creyentes quedaran fuera del control de las instituciones. Además según éste, la Gracia divina es natural, se encuentra infusa en la naturaleza entera y por tanto reside también en el hombre como uno de sus atributos. Con lo cual defendía la libertad humana, que es su creatividad permanente para modificar la realidad, y que debe entenderse como elemento determinante del proceso histórico. La historia contiene la posibilidad revolucionaria de realizar la justicia en un mundo nuevo sin opresión. Esa interpretación de la figura de Cristo suscitó enorme interés y también muchas dudas. La Iglesia era una institución que se estaba transformando en una burocracia episcopal al servicio del despotismo; de modo que triunfó la versión más conservadora frente a las aventuras teologales de Pelagio. Sus ideas eran más propias de ciertos filósofos estoicos o epicúreos que de los teólogos cristianos y, condenado en el Concilio de Éfeso (431), no se le permitió continuar con sus enseñanzas. El pelagianismo fue otra de las herejías que Agustín de Hipona combatió para establecer la ortodoxia de la Iglesia Romana, eliminando el viejo espíritu revolucionario del cristianismo, y para ello se inventó una teoría extraña, el traducianismo, según El PEriPlo dE la razón " 77 la cual el pecado original se trasmitía a través del acto sexual en la concepción humana. Y es que Agustín optó por la ambición política, renunciando a un tiempo al uso autónomo de su razón y a la sexualidad, lo que le llevo al repudio de su compañera; para ello fue convencido por su madre santa Mónica y el obispo de Milán, san Ambrosio. El arrianismo, una herejía condenada por el concilio de Nicea en el 325, afirmaba que sólo había un Dios, y por tanto el Hijo no era una persona divina, sino que había sido creado por Dios, siendo a su vez el creador del Espíritu Santo, primero, y de todas las demás cosas, después. Esta visión de la Trinidad cristiana –difundida por Arrio, un presbítero de Alejandría–, está emparentada con la filosofía neoplatónica, que tuvo una enorme influencia en la Iglesia Oriental. Frente a la racionalización del dogma que proponían los heréticos, la Iglesia Católica opuso el misterio incomprensible de la Trinidad: un solo Dios con tres personas divinas. En la teología de Arrio latían las esperanzas mesiánicas de una revolución popular ayudada por la Providencia divina, tal como se simbolizan en el libro del apocalipsis; esas esperanzas de liberación se reflejan con fuerza en la lucha de los santos dirigidos por el Mesías contra la ciudad terrenal corrompida por el pecado. Después de la condena Arrio fue expulsado de la Iglesia oficial, pero su herejía pasó a las tribus godas que invadieron el Imperio Romano, y pervivió en el reino visigodo de la península Ibérica hasta la conversión al catolicismo ortodoxo en el siglo VI. Además la Iglesia Oriental adoptó una versión diferente del dogma trinitario que la Iglesia de Roma, según la cual el Hijo es de 'semejante naturaleza' que el Padre, pero no de la 'misma naturaleza', como reza el dogma católico. Frente a esas herejías, la jerarquía eclesiástica defiende la sociedad de clases del Imperio Romano, pues ya en ese momento coinciden los intereses del clero sacerdotal con el orden impe78 " nombrE autor o autorEs rial; Agustín de Hipona defiende una organización autoritaria de la Iglesia, modelada sobre la organización estatal jerarquizada. Tras algunas vacilaciones primeras, la doctrina de la institución eclesial establecida por Agustín aceptó la violencia del Estado para combatir a los herejes: admitió torturas y ejecuciones, para someter a los herejes como habían hecho los emperadores romanos con los primitivos cristianos. El éxito de las medidas represivas aplicadas a los donatistas, le llevó a formular una curiosa teoría según la cual el amor divino se manifestaba a través de la coacción violenta contra los disidentes para obligarles a volver al redil de la comunidad. ¿Qué es lo que se está dilucidando en esos matices de apreciación acerca de la naturaleza divina, para que la ortodoxia haya visto la necesidad de depurar la doctrina y expulsar a los que no aceptan el dogma? En la cuestión de las herejías yace el problema de la organización social, tal como lo concibe la mentalidad cristiana; en definitiva es una cuestión de coherencia institucional. Las normas morales, provenientes de Dios e inscritas en la naturaleza humana, deben bastar para establecer las relaciones sociales justas; pero en una sociedad multicultural y cosmopolita es necesario que esas normas sean desarrolladas por la autoridad, ante la dificultad de establecer consensos dialogados entre personas muy alejadas entre sí. En la desconfianza acerca de la naturaleza humana podemos ver problemas reales de la organización social, problemas de comunicación y cooperación, que son resueltos de forma simplista y al modo jerárquico y autoritario de la tradición. En la disputa teológica se establecen las normas morales e institucionales que organizan la sociedad; entonces el hereje es el vencido, sus propuestas son desechadas y con suerte escapa con vida; el ortodoxo es el vencedor, sus propuestas son asumidas y el poder se le rinde. No hay una ortodoxia antes de establecer el dogma; eso es una ficción. Ahora bien, es verdad que el El PEriPlo dE la razón " 79 cristianismo, una vez alcanzado el poder, optó por las versiones más conservadoras, limitando severamente las posibilidades revolucionarias que están en el núcleo duro del cristianismo, por cuanto la predicación de Jesús de Nazareth puede entenderse como la de un revolucionario anti-imperialista. El caso del Islam, como variante del monoteísmo que genera una civilización más avanzada al menos durante un periodo de cinco siglos, nos indica que las opciones adoptadas por la jerarquía eclesiástica cristiana no siempre fueron las mejores. Por otra parte, la necesidad de depurar el dogma deriva de la exigencia de mantener una sociedad unida, bien organizada y coordinada; esta exigencia provenía más bien de los planteamientos propios del poder político, en cuanto le corresponde la responsabilidad de mantener una sociedad bien ordenada, y utiliza la religión como instrumento para desempeñar su función mediante el consenso, ahorrándose medios represivos. A partir del IV las instituciones religiosas se incrustarán durante un milenio en el Estado y el poder político en Europa oriental y occidental. Como veremos ese modelo será rechazado por las élites del Mediterráneo oriental, que acabarán adoptando la religión musulmana a partir del VII. Con la fusión de la Iglesia y el Estado, la institución religiosa acepta jugar una función ideológica para conservar las estructuras sociales de dominación; entonces viene a ser utilizada para justificar la coacción de la que se sirve el estado en la organización de las relaciones sociales. Los pensadores cristianos se habían preparado para desempeñar ese papel ideológico desde los primeros momentos, pidiendo la obediencia al poder político y sacralizando las relaciones sociales de dominación. El cristianismo se convierte así en el opio del pueblo, porque ayuda a los creyentes a soportar mejor su situación de opresión ofreciéndoles la redención en otro mundo. La simbiosis entre Iglesia y Estado fortalece a ambos. La Iglesia Católica, representante de Dios 80 " nombrE autor o autorEs en la Tierra, se arroga el derecho de dictar la vida moral y las normas de convivencia que deben ser obedecidas sin apelación posible con lo que crea el consenso social necesario. El Estado se encarga de eliminar los elementos más díscolos para sostener las relaciones jerárquicas y proteger a la sociedad frente a las invasiones extranjeras. 3.5. La difeRencia oRientaL Quizás convenga terminar con una evaluación de lo que hemos llamado la revolución cristiana. ¿Fue una revolución pasiva, en el sentido que permitió a las clases dominantes mantener su hegemonía social? ¿O fue un significativo avance histórico para las masas explotadas del mundo mediterráneo? En primer lugar, si bien los miembros de las clases subalternas fueron mayoritarios en las primeras comunidades cristianas, éstas fueron asimilando cada vez más a miembros de las clases medias y altas. El carácter de clase del movimiento cristiano fue cambiando a medida que se desarrollaba y con ello la ideología del mismo. De ese modo, la Iglesia aportó nuevas formas de ejercer el poder para la clase dominante, cuando se institucionalizó en el siglo IV: la organización eclesial. Pero tanto en Oriente como en Occidente, es dudoso que apareciera un nuevo grupo de poder y una nueva clase dominante entre los ciudadanos de la sociedad mediterránea; puede que hubiera oportunidades para el ascenso social, durante el proceso de cambio, pero los nuevos dirigentes compartieron su autoridad con la vieja aristocracia. En ese sentido fue una revolución pasiva, incluso aunque hubiese supuesto una mejora en la condición de los miembros de las clases subalternas. La aparición de un nuevo grupo de poder en Europa occidental estuvo relacionado con la llegada de los bárbaros; cuando la administración romana se desplomó y la antigua clase El PEriPlo dE la razón " 81 dominante fue desplazada de su hegemonía por las invasiones bárbaras que establecieron los nuevos Estados medievales y reorganizaron el poder político y económico en Europa. Entonces la Iglesia Católica pasó a ser la única autoridad en Occidente y el Papa la máxima expresión de esa autoridad: la sociedad se organizó como una teocracia. En cambio la Iglesia Oriental no tuvo que soportar esas invasiones y evolucionó de otra manera. Más arriba se ha hablado de pequeños matices metafísicos en la interpretación del dogma trinitario, que tenían un significado político y organizativo. Entre los orientales no hay una asamblea cristiana cuyo representante sea superior a las demás, como sucede con el obispo de Roma en Occidente. Las Iglesias de Alejandría, Antioquía y Bizancio, no reconocieron la autoridad superior del Papa y se acogieron a la protección del Emperador, que mantuvo el control de la situación. Se produjo así el Cisma de la Iglesia Oriental, donde las disputas teológicas apenas disimulaban el trasfondo político. Pequeños matices en cuestiones filosóficas pueden tener importantes consecuencias en la forma de la organización social. Mientras que en Occidente la versión romana del catolicismo podía ser adecuada para el progreso de los europeos, por su situación de atraso en el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, en Oriente el Estado resultaba más necesario por la mayor evolución económica y cultural. Para la Iglesia Oriental el Emperador es el Sumo Sacerdote, lo que significa que la Iglesia está subordinada al Estado. Eso redunda en una mayor libertad de conciencia, donde el orden político del Estado retiene los mecanismos de organización social. Y ése será el modelo que adopte la civilización musulmana, cuando los pueblos orientales se sacudan el yugo cristiano. Tal vez por esa peculiaridad oriental, la autoridad represiva del Estado cristiano no pudo sostenerse. La persecución de la libertad religiosa y de conciencia en la época de Justiniano (527565) acabó con la Academia de Atenas y llevó a la expulsión 82 " nombrE autor o autorEs de nestorianos y herejes. En ese hecho debemos ver el prólogo de una nueva herejía que se extendería rápidamente por todo el mundo desarrollado, hasta el punto de configurarse como una nueva religión más avanzada: el Islam. La decadencia de la civilización esclavista era insoportable para los propios romanos, y su final previsto por sus mejores intelectuales desde mucho tiempo antes. De alguna manera el cristianismo contribuyó a ello con su ideología milenarista revolucionaria, aunque nunca se expresó el propósito deliberado de transformar políticamente la sociedad. Pronto al mensaje cristiano del amor y la pobreza le sucedió lo que le había sucedido al derecho natural estoico: sirvió de retórica para adornar los discursos oficiales, mientras la práctica oficial se alejaba cada vez más de los planteamientos revolucionarios iniciales. Por otro lado, la reconstrucción de las estructuras de represión del Estado Romano por los emperadores cristianos en contra de la opinión de muchos creyentes, nos manifiesta las enormes tensiones que la nueva ideología suscitó en los ámbitos del poder. Finalmente el hecho de que el cristianismo haya supuesto una vida espiritual para millones de gentes a lo largo de dos mil años y que todavía pueda jugar un papel revolucionario en algunos lugares como ideología de las clases subalternas, es una prueba la profundidad histórica de sus ideas y sus símbolos, y manifiesta también la enorme ambigüedad de su mensaje. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 83 II EL ESPLENDOR CULTURAL DE LA EDAD MEDIA 1. LA ECLOSIÓN DEL hUMANISMO RACIONALISTA MEDIEvAL El racionalismo filosófico estaba extendido por todo Oriente Medio cuando los árabes conquistaron la zona predicando el Islam. En Siria la filosofía griega era bien conocida ya desde la época del helenismo –casi mil años antes–, pues los griegos se establecieron allí fundando la ciudad de Apamea, de donde provenía el estoico Posidonio. En Antioquía estuvo la capital de uno de los principales reinos helenísticos con una importante escuela neoplatónica, cuya influencia se hizo sentir en Oriente a través de las derivaciones establecidas en Harrán, mezclándose con los antiguos cultos astrales de los babilónicos. Más tarde, dos hechos hicieron que la filosofía viajara hacia oriente en los siglos V y VI: la expulsión de los monjes nestorianos que se refugiaron en Persia y el cierre de la Academia platónica por Justiniano en el 529, que hizo peregrinar a los intelectuales griegos hacia Mesopotamia y Persia. Estos filósofos difundían un neoplatonismo que adquirió fuertes rasgos orientales, judíos, caldeos y persas. Esos territorios se encontraban bajo el Imperio Bizantino, cuyas características organizativas se diferenciaban del occidente europeo, en el sentido de que aquí el emperador era a la vez sumo sacerdote; lo cual viene a indicar una cierta continuidad con la estructura de la administración romana, enlazando incluso con la forma del poder político en los antiguos reinos helenísticos. 84 " nombrE autor o autorEs De ese modo, la religión se convierte en instrumento del orden social dirigido por el Estado bizantino, y no a la inversa como pretendía la Iglesia romana medieval. Pero la libertad de cultos que existió bajo la dominación imperial, iba a desaparecer con el cristianismo. La influencia de éste se hizo notar en Oriente –tanto como en el área occidental del Mediterráneo–, por la persecución de diversas herejías del momento: monofisitas, nestorianos, arrianos, etc. La intolerancia de la nueva religión se manifestó también contra la libertad de pensamiento y de manera especial en el asesinato de Hipatia y la quema de la Biblioteca de Alejandría. Sin embargo, el predominio cristiano duró apenas tres siglos en estas regiones, pues pronto sus pueblos se convirtieron a la religión musulmana. ¿Por qué tantas naciones abrazaron el Islam en unas pocas décadas, abandonando el cristianismo y la protección de Bizancio? Creo que se puede responder a esa pregunta apelando a dos causas principales, una de carácter superestructural o ideológico, y otra económica. Podemos hacer aquí la observación de que los factores culturales también tienen un papel determinante en la historia, si bien ese papel no es decisivo, pues éste corresponde a los factores económicos; eso es especialmente cierto en el modo de producción feudal propio del Medievo. La primera causa del éxito musulmán en el momento de su expansión, fue su mayor tolerancia acerca de los fundamentos de la fe y demás cuestiones ideológicas. Esa apertura, que también era un deseo de aprender y experimentar, permitió una mayor libertad de conciencia, lo que viene a reforzar el carácter semilaico del Estado en su papel de coordinar la actividad social; se trata de un Estado confesional que permite una amplia divergencia de opiniones en materia religiosa y apenas interviene en las disputas acerca de las diferencias sectarias, salvo caída en la ilegalidad manifiesta. Siendo un Estado que se reconoce en el Islam, tiene obligación de proteger las diversas religiones que El PEriPlo dE la razón " 85 caen bajo su jurisdicción. Esa tolerancia vigente durante siglos en el mundo islámico dará a los musulmanes la oportunidad de proseguir la investigación científica iniciada en el mundo antiguo, y desemboca en un racionalismo filosófico que pondera el valor de la razón sin menospreciar la importancia del sentimiento. La verdadera religión –nos dirán los pensadores musulmanes– es el amor a la humanidad y, por tanto, sus fundamentos universales descansan en la naturaleza humana más allá de las religiones particulares; esa afirmación de racionalismo filosófico es ya por sí sola un rasgo de la superioridad del primer Islam sobre el cristianismo medieval. Un punto de vista que en muy breve tiempo se extendió por Oriente, el Norte de África y el sur europeo, entre aquellas poblaciones que habían sufrido la intolerancia dogmática del cristianismo institucional. Las características religiosas del Islam, donde no hay dogmas ni jerarquías eclesiásticas, crearon una cultura que favoreció la libertad de pensamiento y la investigación científica durante los primeros siglos de su existencia –al menos, hasta la aparición del integrismo religioso, como consecuencia de las alteraciones que sufrió el Islam en los siglos XI y XII, tras los ataques promovidos por las cruzadas cristianas en Palestina y la península Ibérica–. A eso debe añadírsele una religión sencilla, sin las complicaciones teológicas del cristianismo, con mandatos simples y claros, al tiempo que con un profundo significado social y personal: la higiene –expresión del cuidado del cuerpo–, la peregrinación a la Meca –necesidad de permanecer culturalmente abierto a otras formas de existencia humana–, la oración colectiva e individual –reconocimiento de la vida espiritual personal y la vida comunitaria–, el ayuno –control de los deseos carnales–, la limosna –generosidad en la solidaridad social y la redistribución de los bienes entre los miembros de la comunidad de los creyentes–, y como resumen de todo ello, la yihad o lucha moral por alcanzar el bien. Esas normas morales serán interpretadas 86 " nombrE autor o autorEs de forma racionalista por los sabios musulmanes: así, el ayuno y la higiene de los preceptos alcoránicos servirán de fundamento para una medicina de carácter preventivo, basada en la dieta y la alimentación controlada. El mandato moral de la peregrinación a la Meca pone en contacto civilizaciones distantes, sirve de apoyo al comercio y fue aprovechado por los andalusíes, por ejemplo, para formarse intelectualmente en las escuelas de pensamiento de Oriente Medio. Éste fue uno de los caminos por el que la filosofía penetró en Europa. Por otra parte, la enorme actividad comercial que desarrollaron los árabes, exige una apertura de mentalidad hacia las otras culturas y formas de pensamiento, de modo que los musulmanes reconocen la validez relativa de las normas morales provenientes de las religiones anteriores; de ese modo, el Islam es capaz de adaptarse a circunstancias culturales tan diversas como las que se produjeron en los desiertos y sabanas de África hasta las estepas del centro de Asia y las selvas del sudeste asiático, pasando por una enorme variedad de culturas, lenguas y paisajes. La segunda causa, con seguridad la más determinante del éxito del Islam, fue el desarrollo económico que los árabes aportaron al mundo civilizado, y que consistió por una parte en abrir las rutas comerciales desde el lejano Oriente hasta la punta más Occidental del mundo Antiguo. Recordemos que China e India se convirtieron en potencias manufactureras durante la Edad Media y que en los primeros siglos de la Edad Moderna eran el centro de la producción industrial del mundo –más o menos como está sucediendo de nuevo en nuestros días–. A lo largo de las rutas comerciales, desde al-Ándalus hasta Indonesia, por todo el cinturón del trópico de Cáncer, los Estados fundados por los árabes establecieron organizaciones administrativas que hicieron posible el comercio a larga distancia y el florecimiento de la industria y la artesanía, regulando pesos y medidas, acuñando una El PEriPlo dE la razón " 87 moneda única –el dinar de oro– que facilitó la equivalencia en los intercambios, asegurando las rutas comerciales frente al robo y el crimen, facilitando la igualdad en los intercambios comerciales mediante precios regulados por la administración, promoviendo la convivencia pacífica y la resolución razonable de los conflictos. Por otra parte, los musulmanes realizaron una revolución agrícola que aplicó a la producción de alimentos los conocimientos científicos en biología, en medicina y en física, generando un incremento de productividad que permitió el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas durante el medioevo en una ancha franja de países. De ese modo la civilización humana continuó avanzando durante el medievo –y no retrocedió como nos quieren hacer creer los historiadores etnocéntricos–. Por poner un ejemplo que es nuestro, recordaremos el extraordinario florecimiento agrícola y artesanal de la península ibérica en la Edad Media bajo el califato andalusí. El Estado musulmán imita el modelo bizantino, donde el Califa es al mismo tiempo el jefe religioso de la comunidad, con la ventaja de una mayor libertad de pensamiento y de expresión de las creencias. Se trata de un orden social donde los lugares preeminentes están ocupados por la élite árabe guerrera y una aristocracia comercial: al lado de un feudalismo agrario, fuertemente tradicionalista y religioso, se desarrolla un capitalismo comercial, racionalista y laico, que se apoya en la administración del Estado. En Oriente Medio las ciudades reciben un nuevo impulso para su desarrollo, bajo los gobiernos progresistas de califas y emires musulmanes. Esa composición de la clase dominante explica las tensiones vividas por la cultura islámica, a lo largo de su historia. El Estado absoluto centralizado organiza una importante actividad mercantil y artesana en la economía musulmana. Al tiempo, coexiste con las clases feudales y campesinas que todavía forman la mayoría de la sociedad. 88 " nombrE autor o autorEs La economía musulmana utiliza la fuerza de trabajo esclava, pero al-corán contiene normas respecto de la esclavitud que tienden a suavizar la servidumbre y garantizar los derechos personales del esclavo: puede ganar su sustento y conseguir su emancipación con el trabajo; en caso contrario el amo estaba obligado a mantener al esclavo y no se le puede obligar a ganar dinero para sus amos –la explotación directa está prohibida por la moral religiosa–. También al-corán afirma la igualdad de todas las etnias humanas, no hay razas superiores ni inferiores; sin embargo, la influencia de Aristóteles introdujo la teoría del carácter natural de la esclavitud. Por esas condiciones impuestas a la práctica de la esclavitud, a pesar de que el comercio de esclavos se mantuvo en el mundo musulmán hasta bien entrado el siglo XIX, podemos considerar que la religión islámica intentó mejorar la situación de éstos mediante preceptos morales que limitaban las prerrogativas del amo. En los primeros momentos de expansión del Islam, predomina la racionalización económica y el progreso cultural y social, la religión se subordina a la organización política de los intereses públicos. La religión es concebida por los gobernantes como un medio de elevar el nivel moral y cultural de su pueblo, y como instrumento para manejar el orden social, lo que vendrá a ser expresado entre los grandes pensadores de la civilización musulmana como el predominio de la razón sobre la fe: la verdadera religión es aquella que está de acuerdo con la filosofía racional. La razón viene dada por el Estado en la creación de un orden social justo, donde la religión puede colaborar inculcando sentimientos sociables y buenos en las personas, pero que fundamentalmente viene establecido por la administración equitativa de los bienes públicos. A mitad camino entre los factores superestructurales de carácter ideológico y los factores económicos determinantes, se encuentra la ciencia, que si bien es un modo de pensar, también El PEriPlo dE la razón " 89 es una fuerza productiva cuando el conocimiento se aplica en las técnicas de producción y a la mejora del rendimiento de la fuerza de trabajo. La cultura musulmana heredó la ciencia antigua que se había desarrollado en las grandes ciudades del Medio Oriente durante la época helenista y romana, especialmente en Alejandría; gracias a la libertad de pensamiento que permitía la nueva religión, los sabios orientales conservaron y aumentaron los conocimientos astronómicos, físicos, químicos, médicos y sociales de la Antigüedad, mediante la observación empírica y la experimentación controlada, y extendieron la cultura científica hacia oriente y occidente, al tiempo que promovían la educación de amplias capas sociales y establecían una moral de la solidaridad entre todos los seres humanos. El desarrollo cultural y económico de la civilización islámica se tradujo en un conocimiento científico en el dominio de lo social, que fue compendiado por Ibn Jaldún (1332-1406) en su libro sobre la historia universal, donde los conocimientos sobre la dinámica económica, se unen a la investigación sociológica y a la sistematización de la historia. El racionalismo musulmán alcanza aquí una madurez que sobrepasa el ámbito especulativo, religioso y filosófico, para pasar a la construcción de una ciencia práctica para uso de los gobernantes en la organización del Estado. Ibn Jaldún –un científico social cuya familia de origen andalusí había emigrado al norte de África–, se convierte en el 'padre' del concepto moderno de historia, gracias a estar formado dentro de una tradición racionalista; sus teorías explican cómo la reflexión fundada en la experiencia permite al hombre situarse por encima de los animales. En su descripción del mundo islámico, Ibn Jaldún establece cómo los nómadas árabes, violentos y depredadores, se transforman en un pueblo capaz de fundar un imperio por la unificación religiosa. La consolidación del feudalismo en el Mediterráneo oriental, Oriente Medio y norte de África, necesitó de la domi90 " nombrE autor o autorEs nación de las tribus árabes, en un proceso similar y paralelo a la dominación de las tribus germánicas sobre la Europa meridional, bajo la égida de la Iglesia de Roma. Pero las favorables circunstancias en las que se desarrolla el Islam, promovieron la eclosión de una cultura humanista entre los musulmanes durante la Edad Media, construyendo una civilización que alcanzó altos niveles de organización y desarrollo cultural. Los intelectuales islámicos fueron conscientes de la importancia del esplendor cultural de su civilización; por eso damos fe de las palabras de al-Biruni cuando afirma: "Las ciencias de todo el mundo se han traducido a la lengua de los árabes y han penetrado en el corazón de este nuevo mundo, para seguir latiendo desde ahora como corazón universal de todo el gran organismo de la civilización".15 Durante quinientos años a lo largo del Medievo nadie pudo hablar así con todo derecho y verdad, sino los musulmanes. Lejos de creer en el mito del Renacimiento, como una vuelta a las fuentes clásicas después del enorme hueco vacío de la Edad Media –mito que ha sido cultivado con fruición entre los historiadores europeos–, tenemos que mostrar cómo el surgimiento del racionalismo en la edad moderna es heredero directo de la cultura islámica. A menos que se crea en los milagros, no se puede entender el Renacimiento sin esa influencia que los sabios musulmanes y judíos de al-Ándalus ejercieron sobre la filosofía de la Baja Edad Media. Y naturalmente hemos de entender la cultura andalusí como parte de la civilización que se extendía hasta el Extremo Oriente más allá de la India, llegando hasta Filipinas. 15. Científico y filósofo persa, al-Biruni (973-1048), estudioso de la cultura india, vivió en Afganistán tras el dominio turco de Bagdad. La cita esta tomada de la tesis doctoral de Simón Haik, Las traducciones medievales y su influencia, Edición facsímil de la Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 1981, 203. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 91 El Islam fue el receptáculo del desarrollo científico y cultural en los siglos centrales de la Edad Media. En sus primeros siglos de existencia, la religión islámica permitió una organización social capaz de admitir y expandir una cultura humanista, y ése es el factor que hizo posible la continuidad y el desarrollo del pensamiento racional en Oriente Medio. A través de esos filósofos y científicos que transportaron la antorcha de la razón, que iluminaba en Oriente desde la Antigüedad helenista, la filosofía volvió a ocupar un papel preponderante en la cultura medieval, para llegar a Europa al final de la Edad Media y permitir el nacimiento de la Edad Moderna. 1.1. La exPansión de La nueva ReLiGión Tras su fundación por Mahoma en la península arábiga, como religión monoteísta continuadora del judaísmo y el cristianismo, el Islam se expandió rápidamente por la zonas tropicales, desde Filipinas en el lejano Oriente hasta la península Ibérica y el Magreb en la parte más occidental del mundo por entonces conocido; por el sur penetró en África hasta alcanzar los límites de la selva ecuatorial y por el norte penetró en las culturas esteparias del centro de Asia. Es posible que su penetración entre los cristianos se viera favorecida por la persistencia de las herejías arriana y donatista en el Mediterráneo oriental, en el norte de África y en la península Ibérica, así como por los intelectuales monofisistas y nestorianos refugiados en Oriente tras su expulsión del Imperio bizantino; en cierto modo, el Islam es una herejía del cristianismo que se expande con rapidez por su mayor liberalidad y sencillez –o si se prefiere una versión más auténtica de la revolución cristiana–. Su triunfo tuvo un carácter político entre gentes de aquellas regiones que desde hacía tiempo querían emanciparse de la tutela dogmática de la Iglesia católica. Por eso pudo favorecer su expansión el hecho de que el Islam fuera una religión 92 " nombrE autor o autorEs más tolerante que el cristianismo en varios aspectos: primero, en la ausencia de dogmas establecidos, pues en lo que respecta a las creencias de los fieles se limita a algunas afirmaciones generales; segundo, en la admisión de la licitud de las otras creencias monoteístas y sus respectivos cultos, pues admite y protege a las religiones del libro, cristianismo, judaísmo, zoroastrismo y sabeos; tercero, en su adaptación a otras realidades culturales y en su aceptación de la actividad intelectual y científica humana. En el Islam no hay una Iglesia que controle las creencias de los fieles y la organización social depende de un Estado que en muchos casos asume funciones religiosas. La tolerancia que preside los primeros siglos de expansión religiosa del Islam y que se encuentra entre las intenciones más profundas de los creyentes, se transparenta en los hermosos versos de uno de sus más insignes filósofos, Ibn Arabí (1192-1270) –quien, no obstante la belleza de sus ideas, fue a veces tachado de heterodoxo y de hereje por teólogos de la ortodoxia musulmana–: Mi corazón es prado ¡ay! de las gacelas. Mi corazón acoge todas las creencias. Refugio para el monje, templo para el ídolo, Kaaba del peregrino. es tabla de la torá y libro al-corán. La religión del amor sólo sigo. Esa búsqueda de un sentido religioso universal es un rasgo propio del racionalismo cultural que se desarrolla entre los intelectuales musulmanes. El filósofo piensa que todas las religiones contienen una parte de la verdad, pero escoge aquella que le acerca más al conocimiento racional; así dice Averroes (11261198): el hombre sabio debe escoger la mejor de las religiones de El PEriPlo dE la razón " 93 su tiempo, aun cuando cree que todas son verdaderas. La convivencia entre musulmanes, judíos y cristianos, es una realidad a lo largo de la historia del Islam, que sólo recientemente ha sido incorporada en Europa, tras siglos de luchas políticas por la tolerancia y la libertad de conciencia. Los filósofos ilustrados y los revolucionarios de la Edad Moderna, no dirán otra cosa que lo que había sido costumbre entre los musulmanes del Medievo. Ese irenismo universalista, que se funda en el amor a la humanidad, conduce a una segunda característica de los intelectuales del Islam: la religión se encuentra al servicio del orden social, como instrumento para el desarrollo cultural del pueblo y como fundamento de la moral pública, que establece el consenso acerca de la dominación del Estado. Si bien religión y política aparecen fusionadas en el Estado musulmán, la propia aceptación de las diferencias religiosas conlleva la prioridad del poder político como factor de unidad social; el Estado musulmán no es laico, sino confesional, pero está obligado a atender las necesidades sociales de todas las confesiones de los súbditos. La decadencia del Islam comenzará el día que el integrismo quiera imponer el monolitismo religioso en la cultura musulmana, tal vez como consecuencia de las Cruzadas cristianas, pero seguramente por una involución burocrática del Estado islámico. Hacia el siglo XII parece agotado el impulso expansivo del fenómeno islámico, y en los sistemas políticos de cultura musulmana el autoritarismo religioso se hace con las riendas del poder al tiempo que se produce la burocratización del Estado.16 Hasta ese momento, la organización social que proponen los árabes en su predicación del Islam es un factor de progreso, en aquellos contextos históricos donde los gobernantes promueven el desarrollo 16. Valga aquí como explicación la observación de Manuel Sacristán en su comentario al pensamiento de Labriola: la raíz última de la escolástica es el autoritarismo (en Sobre Marx y marxismo. Panfletos y materiales i, Icaria, Barcelona 1982, 130). 94 " nombrE autor o autorEs científico y la filosofía racional, permitiendo una amplia libertad de pensamiento entre sus súbditos. Pero cuando la ortodoxia religiosa consiga controlar los resortes del poder político prohibiendo la libre circulación de ideas, y persiguiendo a los filósofos racionalistas y las instituciones civiles dedicadas a desarrollar la cultura humanista y la investigación científica, se produce una decadencia cultural que acompaña al declinar del imperio de los árabes –la expresión es de Ibn Jaldún– y su sustitución por el Imperio turco. Al principio el Islam pretendió mantener la unidad política, entre tantas culturas diferentes que aceptaron su unificación religiosa, bajo la dirección de una capa dirigente de origen árabe; pero pronto se fraccionó en innumerables Estados independientes entre sí, reinos y califatos en frecuentes guerras intestinas. Esos Estados con rasgos teocráticos y organización feudal, estaban gobernados por jefes religiosos y políticos a la vez. Pero a pesar de las divisiones se afianzó una civilización universalista con la lengua árabe como lengua culta y la religión islámica como forma unitaria de la moral colectiva. En su momento de apogeo alcanzó un notable desarrollo, tanto económica como intelectualmente, y su prestigio cultural contaminó a occidente con sus ideas científicas y su método racional. Esa superioridad cultural del mundo islámico en la Edad Media, estaba fundada también en un nivel más avanzado de las fuerzas productivas. El Imperio Romano en su zona oriental había sufrido menos la crisis del modo de producción en el siglo III que en occidente, porque el esclavismo nunca alcanzó allí la importancia que adquirió en Europa occidental y en el norte de África; la actividad económica hundía sus raíces en el pasado remoto de la ciudad estado, más antiguo que el sistema esclavista propio de los Imperios helenistas, y especialmente desarrollado por Roma. De ahí que continuara la vida urbana fundada en la artesanía y el comercio, lo que había desaparecido en las regioEl PEriPlo dE la razón " 95 nes más occidentales. Los conquistadores árabes heredaron una civilización que se había feudalizado sin destruir completamente ciertos aspectos del antiguo modo de producción. Se mantuvo la importancia del capital mercantil, y el propio Mahoma pertenecía a una familia de comerciantes en La Meca; los mercaderes musulmanes pusieron en contacto a las antiguas civilizaciones asiáticas con el resto del mundo, desde la China hasta Andalucía, y desde las estepas del centro de Asia hasta las selvas africanas, pasando por la India, Persia, Mesopotamia, Palestina, Siria, Egipto,... Al tiempo que se creaba una economía internacionalizada por los intercambios comerciales a larga distancia, la expansión del Islam produjo la revolución agrícola musulmana, también llamada la 'revolución verde de la edad Media', que consistió en la difusión de los cultivos, como el sorgo africano, los cítricos chinos, el algodón, la caña de azúcar y el arroz de la India, los árboles frutales, etc. Se trata de una agricultura para el mercado y la exportación, con rotación de cultivos y varias cosechas al año, que estaba planificada sobre el conocimiento científico de las plantas y su rendimiento; como ejemplo, el andalusí Ibn al-Baytar (1190-1248), botánico jefe del sultán de Egipto, estudioso de las plantas y de sus propiedades farmacéuticas, llegó a describir más de 1400 especies. Además los conocimientos físicos aplicados a la producción dieron lugar a sofisticadas técnicas de regadío –que incluían el manejo del agua sobre la base de los principios hidráulicos: noria, molinos, etc.–. Todo lo cual que condujo a un importante incremento de la producción agrícola, lo que tuvo consecuencias en toda la economía y la organización social: aumentó la población, crecieron las ciudades, se desarrolló la industria agrícola, se mejoró el vestido, etc. Por eso los califatos musulmanes fueron las principales potencias económicas de la Edad Media. 96 " nombrE autor o autorEs Si esa revolución económica en la agricultura explica el éxito del Islam, no puede olvidarse que ella no hubiera sido posible sin una nueva visión del mundo fundada en el racionalismo y la atención al conocimiento práctico. Los árabes recibieron la importancia del libro a través de la influencia greco-siria donde había pervivido; a través de ese reconocimiento alcanzaron la pasión por el estudio y la transmitieron junto a la predicación de la nueva religión. El amor al saber está presente en el libro de la revelación, al-corán; una necesidad sentida por el propio Mahoma, que recoge así una aspiración de su pueblo: 'al principio allah creó la inteligencia', dice el libro sagrado como un eco neoplatónico repetido de siglo en siglo. También la tradición del profeta nos lo muestra con un interés especial por la medicina y numerosas anécdotas sagradas se refieren a ella: para cada enfermedad, allah ha dado una cura, dice Mahoma incitando a la investigación médica; una tanta importancia le concedió, que muchos musulmanes religiosos practicaron la medicina, lo que nos ofrece una visión de una religión centrada en los intereses prácticos por mejorar la vida material de los creyentes. Finalmente el estudio del lenguaje se encuentra anclado también en las preocupaciones religiosas. Según la fe musulmana el texto sagrado es una estructura sempiterna ajena a la historia, pero la verdad es que la tarea de fijación y conservación de las palabras del profeta, exigió un trabajo científico de primer orden en el terreno lingüístico: la preservación de la lengua árabe como idioma de la Revelación produjo una investigación que permitiera normalizar su uso, abarcando aspectos fonéticos, gramaticales y lexicales. Así que mientras que las caravanas comerciales y las expediciones navales conectaban vastas regiones geográficas, los sabios musulmanes elaboraban notables conocimientos científicos en medicina, matemática, astronomía, geografía, química, lingüística, etc., heredando la tradición griega de investigación El PEriPlo dE la razón " 97 natural, cuando el estudio de esas materias era muy precario todavía, o ni siquiera había comenzado en Europa occidental. Los viajes y los descubrimientos geográficos, la avidez de conocimientos y experiencias, las relaciones con civilizaciones diferentes y costumbres diversas, el intercambio de cosmovisiones y vivencias espirituales, todo ello se combina para enriquecer la cultura de los musulmanes, ampliar sus horizontes intelectuales y vitales. La literatura árabe alcanzó una calidad notable con Las mil y una noches, donde Simbad el Marino es el prototipo del mercader árabe que descubre mundos nuevos e insospechados. La reflexión conceptual se fundó en esa riquísima experiencia del mundo y sus sabios se apoyaron en la vieja tradición racionalista filosófica, de modo que dieron a conocer a Aristóteles y al pensamiento de la Antigüedad de una forma original, que tuvo una enorme influencia en los siglos posteriores. A pesar de que su filosofía ha sido ninguneada en occidente por prejuicios culturales y por la persecución de teólogos reaccionarios, sin temor a equivocarnos podemos afirmar que el auténtico periodo clásico de la filosofía medieval se dio en la civilización musulmana. Una falsa perspectiva y una visión etnocéntrica de la cultura han hecho de la Edad Media en la historiografía europea, una época oscurantista en la que el conocimiento sufrió un serio retroceso. Nada más lejos de la realidad. En esta época hubo un importante desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas en Oriente y un avance importante en el conocimiento del mundo natural por los científicos musulmanes que continuaron la tradición racionalista griega. El desarrollo filosófico pasó de Grecia a Oriente, especialmente Mesopotamia y Persia, y de ahí a la península Ibérica y luego al norte de Europa. Y quizás el momento más brillante del pensamiento medieval debamos situarlo en al-Ándalus en los siglos XI y XII, donde se dio una libertad y una altura del pensamiento que no se igualó en Europa del norte hasta varios 98 " nombrE autor o autorEs siglos después. Sólo para los ignorantes de esas realidades puede la filosofía medieval considerarse retrógrada. 1.2. aL-ándaLus coMo ejeMPLo Tomemos como modelo de las trasformaciones que la religión musulmana introduce en la sociedad a su llegada, alÁndalus, donde se desarrolló la cultura europea más brillante de su época. La llegada del Islam al sur de la Península fue una auténtica revolución económica y política, que apoyándose en la nueva religión transformó completamente la organización de la sociedad y la administración estatal en siete años. Se introdujeron técnicas agrícolas provenientes del norte de África y se establecieron relaciones comerciales y culturales con una vasta extensión de territorios comunicados por la nueva civilización. Aparte de los productos mediterráneos, cereales, vid y olivo, se estableció una importante horticultura de regadío mediante un sistema de acequias que todavía estaba en funcionamiento más de mil años después: arroz, azúcar, granados, agrios, algodón, verduras, almendros, higueras, manzanos,... Y ese desarrollo agrícola vino acompañado de una mejoría de las condiciones de vida de los campesinos: el sistema de aparcería, contrato entre dos hombres libres, el propietario y el cultivador, en la cual el primero tenía derecho a una parte del producto, que no podía exceder la mitad del mismo; es una mejora notable respecto al colonato feudal europeo, heredado del Imperio Romano. Las exenciones a las que tenía derecho el señor fueron aliviadas en el nuevo orden social. Cierto que la esclavitud continuó, con atenuantes por las medias legales de protección y las prohibiciones de los malos tratos a esclavos; el esclavo se convierte en una persona con derechos y obligaciones, que puede comprar su libertad. Cierto El PEriPlo dE la razón " 99 también que las mujeres continuaron en situación de dependencia y subordinación, tratadas como menores de edad; y aunque mejoraron en algo sus condiciones legales, el enclaustramiento al que se les somete es un síntoma de su inferioridad social. Sin embargo, conocemos textos jurídicos de Averroes, la bidaya, donde el filósofo expone una visión emancipadora de las mujeres: pueden ser funcionarios, tienen derecho a la herencia, está permitido salir a la calle sin velo, etc. Por eso, aunque de forma algo restrictiva, se puede afirmar que el Islam se presentó en la península Ibérica como una religión emancipadora, ya sea en el aspecto económico al permitir a los campesinos mejorar su situación, ya sea en el aspecto cultural atendiendo a la tolerancia respecto de las opiniones y las ideas; pero seguramente en esa limitada mejora podemos ver una parte del éxito musulmán. Se dice que la ciudad de Córdoba llegó a tener medio millón de habitantes, 300 baños públicos, 28 arrabales,..., lo que nos da una idea de la riqueza urbana del mundo andalusí. Al lado de esa economía artesanal y mercantil se hizo necesaria la existencia de un Estado, que regulara la competencia y garantizase la seguridad comercial, y que al mismo tiempo fuera capaz de producir bienes públicos como el sistema de justicia, el desarrollo cultural, la atención médica, la seguridad y la defensa del territorio. En esos aspectos el Califato andalusí (755-1031) logró brillantes resultados prácticos durante casi tres siglos. Salvando las diferencias con el Estado semi-burgués del siglo XVIII, cuya administración mucho más desarrollada se cohesiona alrededor de la monarquía absoluta, se trata de un 'despotismo ilustrado', donde los regentes del Estado son conscientes de su misión al servicio de la sociedad y mantienen a su lado un grupo de sabios consejeros y visires que orientan la acción de gobierno. Si bien son característicos del feudalismo los conflictos intestinos y las rivalidades entre los nobles y las distintas facciones de la clase 100 " nombrE autor o autorEs dominante de guerreros, el orden social andalusí en sus diferentes etapas se nos muestra como un anticipo de lo que será el Estado moderno. Una clase de funcionarios cultos, con amplios conocimientos en las tareas que les competen y una visión filosófica de la humanidad, harán posible la administración pública y el desarrollo cultural en el sur peninsular musulmán durante la época medieval. La convivencia cultural entre religiones diferentes –entre musulmanes, judíos y cristianos–, en la sociedad andalusí se manifestó como un extraordinario fermento para la vida cultural. Así mientras que los judíos eran perseguidos y expulsados de las sociedades europeas de la Baja Edad Media, pudieron mantenerse en al-Ándalus durante más tiempo, hasta su expulsión por los Reyes Católicos en 1492, inmediatamente después de la conquista de Granada, el último reducto musulmán en la península ibérica. Es cierto que, como veremos que sucedió con Maimónides, en algún momento los judíos llegaron a tener dificultades; pero no menos cierto es que formaron parte de la cultura andalusí con pleno derecho y asimilaron las ideas filosóficas que aquí se desarrollaron, hasta el punto de que podemos identificarlos dentro de la misma corriente de pensamiento. Maimónides emigró a Egipto, donde ejerció como médico del Califa, siendo al tiempo jefe de la comunidad judía y uno de los más altos funcionarios del Estado. Sobre la base de un campesinado que había mejorado sus condiciones económicas y un Estado que redujo su presión sobre la libertad de pensamiento o incluso promovió el desarrollo cultural, se levantó el edificio de la filosofía islámica, acompañando el despliegue de conocimientos empíricos que acompaña a las actividades urbanas. La importancia de esa burguesía intelectual es lo que explica el auge cultural del mundo islámico; y sobre esa base cultural trabajó la investigación filosófica, no sólo como una reflexión complementaria para el desarrollo científico, sino también como el intento de comprender la totalidad social para El PEriPlo dE la razón " 101 poder encauzar y planificar su desarrollo. Los andalusíes aprovecharon la obligación religiosa de viajar a la Meca al menos una vez en al vida, para estudiar la avanzada ciencia y la refinada filosofía oriental, importando al mismo tiempo libros e ideas; vemos dos señalados ejemplos de este hecho con Ibn Masarra (883931) y al-Kirmani (970-1066). Como explica el cadí toledano de origen andalusí, Said al-Andalusí (1029-1070) en su historia de las ciencias, los pueblos hispanos abrazaron el Islam y la cultura árabe para poder desarrollarse intelectualmente en contacto con las civilizaciones más avanzadas de la época; el progreso científico y cultural en la península Ibérica se debió a la arabización que permitió entrar en contacto con las culturas orientales. De ahí que estos filósofos funcionarios puedan ser comparados con los estoicos del Imperio romano, en su papel de elaborar la ideología del Estado. La posición de esa élite de la administración estatal respecto de la religión es comparable a la de Panecio, cuando recomendaba establecer una religión popular como instrumento para la construcción de la cultura civil. Con la diferencia importante de que el estoicismo fue una filosofía elitista, mientras que la expansión de la religión monoteísta unificó las capas sociales alrededor de las creencias compartidas, y elevó el nivel cultural de las masas. El filósofo musulmán es un creyente convencido, y si bien tiene una visión intelectualista de los asuntos de la fe, se siente en comunión con su pueblo a través del sentimiento religioso. Y estos filósofos se nos muestran más libres y confiados en la razón humana, sobre todo en las grandes formulaciones de al-Farabi (872-950), Avicena (980-1037) y Averroes, seguramente por las mejoras sociales que introdujo el Islam en su momento de expansión. A través de la perspectiva que se ha mostrado más arriba sobre su contexto histórico, se puede apreciar cuál es la importancia que se debe conceder a los sabios musulmanes en la historia de la filosofía y en la sociedad de su tiempo. Pero ¿cómo se articuló 102 " nombrE autor o autorEs el racionalismo filosófico con las estructuras del poder político?, ¿cuál fue su contenido de clase?, ¿cuál su horizonte utópico? Esos sabios, altos funcionarios de los Estados feudales con predominio de la aristocracia árabe y religión musulmana, son consejeros encargados del gobierno político: médicos, juristas, musicólogos, científicos,... Se trata de un feudalismo con características particulares frente al ruralismo europeo medieval, pues aquí se mantuvo la actividad de las ciudades con su economía mercantil y artesana, hasta el punto de que un observador de primera fila, como fue Averroes, afirme que el régimen político musulmán era una timocracia –literalmente el poder de los ricos–; es decir, que el poder político estaba en manos de una aristocracia mercantil, cuya forma política es el Estado califal absoluto. Averroes en su explicación a la 'República' de Platón utiliza los términos técnicos de la filosofía política que elaboraron los griegos clásicos, Platón y Aristóteles, para describirnos una sociedad urbanizada con predominio del capital mercantil y una importante población dedicada a los oficios artesanos. Eso no impide que la mayor parte de la actividad económica girase alrededor de la agricultura; incluso es en ese aspecto donde la organización económica alcanzó sus mejores resultados. De ahí una permanente lucha política en el Estado musulmán entre dos clases oligárquicas, la aristocracia urbana y comercial frente a la aristocracia rural y agrícola. Y ese conflicto político se manifiesta como las tendencias centralizadoras de la élite comercial urbana y la búsqueda de la autonomía de los señores feudales del agro. Complementariamente también se nos muestra en la oposición cultural e ideológica entre las corrientes racionalizadoras de la vida social en sentido filosófico y las corrientes tradicionalistas agrupadas alrededor de la religión. El fracaso y decadencia de esa brillante civilización a partir del siglo XIII, se produce tras varios siglos de luchas políticas, en las que los musulmanes intentan sin conseguirlo, construir un El PEriPlo dE la razón " 103 orden político adecuado al desarrollo cultural y económico de su sociedad. Primero el califato omeya se hunde al desarticularse los mecanismos de control de los poderes públicos, fundados en las relaciones entre los grandes clanes familiares: el Estado careció de instituciones sociales bien consolidadas y a lo largo del califato la aristocracia árabe se transformó en oligarquía. Sólo esa falla del sistema político explica la política militarista de Almanzor, que destruyó los reinos cristianos, pero también fue un desastre para los musulmanes, pues desarticuló aún más los fundamentos del Estado califal y a largo plazo le costó a la cultura andalusí la soberanía política. Resulta una paradoja que la campaña militar victoriosa de Almanzor diera comienzo a la descomposición del califato cordobés, pero la propia política de guerra era una salida desesperada ante la descomposición del Estado islámico en al-Ándalus. Tras ésta se hizo imposible la reconstrucción de una administración centralizada independiente, por la incapacidad para encontrar un mecanismo eficaz de control del poder político. Los dos ensayos principales de unificar el sur de la Península con el norte de África, los almorávides y los almohades, resultaron fallidos. De esas experiencias, Averroes sacaría la conclusión de que no es bueno que los militares gobiernen el Estado. Su testimonio nos muestra el desastre de al-Ándalus como consecuencia de la inestabilidad política, que llega incluso a recalar en la tiranía. Se trata de sociedades en constante evolución para adaptarse a los avatares de la historia, así que los sistemas políticos también cambian; durante las taifas o estados independientes andalusíes, nos dice Averroes que el régimen político se convirtió en demagogia –el poder de los pobres cuando oprime a la minoría rica–; lo que seguramente quiere decir que el poder político llegó a pasar en algunas situaciones a las manos de la pequeña burguesía urbana. La sociedad política andalusí se dividió en veintiséis Estados y ello le dio a los reinos cristianos la oportunidad para la revancha. 104 " nombrE autor o autorEs Algunos arabistas consideran la etapa de taifas como una de las más ricas en el desarrollo de la cultura andalusí, por la completa libertad de pensamiento sin los límites del Estado centralizado. Baste pensar en la riqueza cultural de la taifa de Zaragoza durante el siglo XI y los primeros años del XII, cuyos filósofos y poetas tuvieron que emigrar tras la conquista cristiana; y el igualmente notable caso de Toledo con científicos de primera talla, cuyo legado fue transmitido a Europa en los siglos siguientes a su conquista. Las taifas –veintiséis regiones agrupadas cada una de ellas alrededor de una ciudad importante–, hubieran podido dar lugar a un desarrollo social similar al de la ciudad-estado griega, lo que no fue posible por la presión de los reinos cristianos que impusieron fuertes contribuciones que dislocaron su economía y acabaron sometiéndolas. Las pequeñas repúblicas urbanas independientes existieron también en la Italia medieval –especialmente Pisa y Venecia–, con la diferencia de que estas capitales soberanas andalusíes no llegaron a perdurar como tales, en buena medida por la presión militar de los reinos cristianos. Una ciudad-estado, una república, sólo tiene sentido si es plenamente soberana y necesita la paz para conseguirlo, pues al ser un Estado pequeño no puede sobrevivir a la presión de los vecinos más fuertes; lo que no fue posible en las condiciones medievales de la península Ibérica. Y no siendo posible el sistema de pequeños estados independientes, se intentó construir un Estado fuerte con los almorávides. Los reinos y repúblicas de taifas alternaron con los intentos de reconstruir un Estado unificado con los almorávides y los almohades a lo largo de los siglos XI y XII y marcaron la decadencia y el final de al-Ándalus. La incapacidad para organizar el orden social magrebí e imponerse a los reinos cristianos en la península ibérica, es el síntoma más evidente de una civilización que ha alcanzado ya el máximo de su desarrollo y comienza su retroceso. El Islam, en efecto, es una civilización feudal y los El PEriPlo dE la razón " 105 tiempos históricos señalaron su final exigiendo un nuevo modo de producción que tardaría todavía siglos en establecerse en el norte de Europa. Es, sin embargo, en esa etapa de decadencia política cuando se produce el mayor esplendor cultural y filosófico entre los andalusíes, lo que puede ser tal vez entendido bajo esa intuición hegeliana que dice que la lechuza de Minerva levanta el vuelo al atardecer –la conciencia filosófica llega tardíamente a la humanidad, una vez realizados lo hechos históricos que marcan el apogeo de una cultura–. Para contrarrestar esa presión cristiana, los almorávides construyeron un imperio acabando con la independencia de las ciudades andalusíes. Pero, si bien contaron con un filósofo de primera talla con Avempace (1082-1138), hicieron una interpretación rigorista de al-corán. Fue en aquellos años cuando se produjo la reacción antirracionalista de Algazel (1058-1111) en la teología islámica, que sirvió para impulsar una cultura integrista y conservadora entre los musulmanes. Es reconocido el enorme impacto que tuvo sobre la cultura musulmana, la crítica escéptica de este filósofo persa contra las capacidades racionales de la humanidad, hasta el punto de que Averroes consideró necesario hacer una crítica de esa crítica para recuperar el racionalismo filosófico. Entretanto el integrismo desarticuló todavía más la sociedad andalusí, al perseguir a judíos y mozárabes cristianos. Derrotados los almorávides en el Magreb durante el siglo XII, se producen las segundas taifas; ahora el sistema político se convirtió en tiranía, explica Averroes con una opinión que puede sonar a interesada, para justificar la dominación almohade, pero que tiene su justificación en los reyezuelos militares que dominaron algunas taifas. El desorden político y la presión de los reinos cristianos del norte peninsular, condujeron a la 'revolución almohade', que intentó reconstruir la administración unificada de la época califal, apoyándose en el saber de una granada élite de 106 " nombrE autor o autorEs sabios y científicos, entre los que cuentan los andalusíes Abentofail (1110-1185) y Averroes, como más destacados. El imperio almohade fue el resultado de una reforma religiosa, llevada a cabo por Muhammad ibn Tûmart (1080-1130), como un intento de volver a los orígenes del Islam, a través de una concepción teológica de carácter racionalista, que quedó recogida en su Profesión de fe, donde –como señala Andrés Martínez Lorca– demuestra un importante dominio de la lógica y el razonamiento silogístico.17 Se trata de una reforma religiosa con raíces populares, que quiere volver a las fuentes del Islam para revitalizar a la sociedad musulmana. Los dirigentes bereberes de ese movimiento son personajes cultos que reconstruyen la administración estatal basándose en un sistema fuertemente jerarquizado, y organizado en círculos concéntricos de funcionarios instruidos en las escuelas o madrasas musulmanas. Ese racionalismo religioso se transformó en un impulso reformista de la organización social, fundándose en la vida moral y la austeridad en la vida pública, que movió a las masas musulmanas del Magreb y el sur peninsular. También fue incapaz el Imperio almohade de contener el avance cristiano, y en buena medida ello se debió a la desarticulación cada vez más profunda de la sociedad andalusí. La persecución de judíos y mozárabes se hizo intolerable. La burocratización y militarización del Estado erosionó las bases de la 17. En esa Profesión de fe, estaría recogido también el argumento del motor inmóvil para demostrar la existencia de Dios, que proviene de la metafísica aristotélica y sería posteriormente recogido por Tomás de Aquino como la via manifiestor, la demostración más evidente de la existencia de Dios. También utiliza la prueba de Dios como Ser Necesario, fundándose en la contingencia de los seres creados, usada por Avicena, y que posteriormente será tercera vía tomista. Martínez Lorca, Andrés, espacio, tiempo y forma, Revista de la Facultad de Geografía e Historia de la UNED, Serie III, t. 17, 2004, 399-413. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 107 convivencia. Las cortapisas y censuras al racionalismo filosófico se cebaron con personas tan cercanas al califa como el propio Averroes. En el siglo XIII al-Ándalus cayó bajo la dominación cristiana, excepto el pequeño reino nazarí de Granada. Los continuos cambios de formas de gobierno, que no son sino formas experimentales de organización social y que no lograron mantener un orden eficaz permanente, no fueron un obstáculo para el desarrollo de una cultura avanzada en los terrenos científico y literario. Fue la conquista cristiana a partir del siglo XIII, la que terminó con ella; y seguramente fue también la presión cristiana desde el XI lo que constituyó un obstáculo poderoso para la reorganización del mundo musulmán andalusí. Siendo la cultura más avanzada de su tiempo, estaba al mismo tiempo expuesta a la agresión de sus vecinos del norte. La situación de al-Ándalus era ciertamente singular por la permanente presión de los reinos cristianos y la Reconquista en la península Ibérica; singular, pero no única, pues otro frente de guerra se abrirá a partir del XI en el Próximo Oriente con las cruzadas, y en el XII, a consecuencia de esa presión militar, el mundo islámico sufrirá una crisis profunda que puede explicar, al menos parcialmente, el brusco final de su espléndido desarrollo cultural. Por tanto, los cuatro factores más fundamentales que en mi opinión condujeron al estancamiento de la civilización musulmana, son: a) agotamiento del impulso religioso revolucionario que dio origen al Islam; b) la burocratización del Estado y la creación de una capa de funcionarios con intereses específicos de clase; c) el giro intelectual característicamente antirracionalista que se produce en la teología musulmana, cuando la escuela asariya de Basora pasa a representar la ortodoxia islámica con Algazel, frente a la escuela mutazilí del califato abasí de Bagdad; d) el ataque cristiano organizado en las Cruzadas, la guerra de civilizaciones. El modelo que persigue el Estado andalusí depende de las aspiraciones de las diferentes clases sociales. El predominio de 108 " nombrE autor o autorEs los grandes propietarios agrícolas y comerciales en la época del califato y en los sistemas imperiales, se corresponde con el absolutismo monárquico, que dado el carácter racionalista de la cultura islámica medieval se manifiesta como un despotismo ilustrado, tomando la República de Platón como ideal utópico, según refieren los análisis políticos de filósofos como Averroes en al-Ándalus y al-Farabi en Bagdad: una sociedad gobernada por los sabios, considerando al profeta Mahoma como el mayor de ellos. El hecho de que en esa sociedad convivan comunidades de diferentes creencias religiosas, otorga al Estado un carácter laico de intermediación entre los diferentes intereses políticos y permite una importante libertad de pensamiento. En ese ambiente de libertad intelectual se produjo el último florecimiento filosófico en al-Ándalus; pero la suerte ya estaba echada: el imperio almohade se debilitó en el siglo XIII por la actividad de los sectores religiosos conservadores, y la conquista cristiana puso punto final al esplendor cultural, científico y filosófico, de la cultura musulmana en el sur de la península Ibérica. Al caer los territorios musulmanes de la península ibérica bajo la dominación cristiana, la población del sur peninsular se convirtió en masa al cristianismo y el pensamiento racional y la investigación científica languideció aquí por los siglos dentro del Estado integrista católico. Hasta ese momento, las ciudades andalusíes constituyeron la base política y económica de un brillante desarrollo intelectual durante los siglos XII y XIII, cuyo esplendor irradió por Europa durante los siglos finales de la Edad Media e hizo posible el paso a la modernidad. 1.3. La fiLosofía coMo PRoyecto PoLítico El horizonte utópico que animaba esa intención emancipadora, que se ha mencionado en el primer Islam y en la filosofía islámica, es la umma –la comunidad de los creyentes, unida por El PEriPlo dE la razón " 109 la solidaridad y las relaciones fraternales–. Es decir, unas relaciones sociales que se fundamentan en la vida moral de las personas conscientes, con un sentido religioso parecido al cristiano. Pero en comparación con el cristianismo y su ideología centrada en la construcción de una conciencia personal dependiente del clero, el Islam ha subrayado la participación colectiva en la vida social y comunitaria. Sin instituciones eclesiásticas de control sobre la subjetividad, el Islam deja que la comunidad realice el juicio moral sobre el comportamiento de los creyentes; la garantía de una conducta moral no está en el clero, sino en la presión social colectiva. Frente al individualismo que es perceptible en el cristianismo, y que dará origen al desarrollo del liberalismo moderno, el Islam es comunitario y centra en el bien público el objetivo de la acción colectiva. Por poner un ejemplo, el mandato moral de la limosna tiende a la redistribución de la riqueza entre los miembros de la comunidad, corrigiendo los desequilibrios sociales evidentes que se crean en una sociedad de mercado; pero no es una institución política sino un mandato moral. El carácter racionalista del pensamiento musulmán medieval, tendía a construir un orden social justo y equilibrado –aunque incapaz de superar su carácter clasista–, que tuvo sus mejores resultados en el crecimiento económico y el desarrollo cultural. Es pertinente desde el punto de vista de la filosofía, que ese carácter social y racional de la vida humana se traduzca metafísicamente en un pensamiento que subraya la inmanencia del mundo del espíritu al de la materia. Pues si por un lado la idea de inmanencia entre esos filósofos musulmanes está emparentada con el materialismo científico y el racionalismo en el orden social, por el otro, viene a ser la intuición de que el mundo de las ideas se desarrolla a partir de la base material de la vida social; o dicho en términos más sociológicos, la idea de que los valores con que juzgamos el mundo y las ideas con que comprendemos la realidad, brotan de las relaciones sociales y tienen en ellas 110 " nombrE autor o autorEs su verdad y su realidad práctica. Esa comprensión no explícitamente formulada por los filósofos musulmanes, está claramente intuida en sus exposiciones, que utilizan un lenguaje aristotélico modificado para pensar un materialismo no mecanicista ni vulgar. Si a ello añadimos el impulso que la nueva religión dio a la investigación científica en todos sus aspectos, entonces se nos aparece con claridad el papel de continuadora y transmisora de la cultura científica que tuvo la civilización islámica. El resultado de esas orientaciones fue que el concepto de materia adquirió en la metafísica un relieve que no había tenido desde los filósofos presocráticos. Como señaló Ernst Bloch, lo importante de estos filósofos fue su construcción de la idea de materia, a través de la cual se abrió el camino de la ciencia moderna.18 El prototipo del sabio musulmán es un miembro de la corte del Califa, que domina numerosos saberes –derecho, medicina, astronomía, física, lógica, matemáticas, metafísica y teología–, y a quien se le pide consejo en diversas materias a la hora de tomar decisiones. Es un personaje radicalmente distinto del sabio medieval cristiano, generalmente un monje retirado de la vida pública o, como mucho, profesor de la universidad, dedicado esencialmente a la teología y la defensa e interpretación del dogma. El musulmán es un hombre dedicado a los intereses prácticos de la sociedad, interesado por el funcionamiento del mundo natural, amante de la buena vida y cumplidor de sus deberes religiosos.19 Esas características de su posición social y de su forma de vivir, determinan un modo de hacer filosofía y un punto de 18. La filosofía musulmana es un miembro ilustre del linaje filosófico que condujo hasta el materialismo dialéctico del siglo XIX: Ernst Bloch, avicena y la izquierda aristotélica, Madrid, Ciencia Nueva, 1964. En este sentido, también es interesante que la sociología y la historia modernas puedan encontrar en Ibn Jaldún un importante precedente. 19. Una anécdota de la vida de Avicena cuenta que tuvo problemas con la guardia del Califa persa por su afición a las mujeres y al vino. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 111 vista en el que predomina la reflexión sobre el mundo terrestre y la vida humana, más que la visión del mundo espiritual. El pensamiento político de esos sabios reconoce que los instrumentos del gobierno son dos: la coacción y el consenso, y que la mejor forma de construir las relaciones sociales consiste en establecer la cooperación entre los miembros de la sociedad, intentando reducir el empleo de la violencia. El poder político se basa en el acuerdo entre los musulmanes, de modo que la religión es considerada un instrumento para la educación del pueblo, al tiempo que para la formación de consenso entre los ciudadanos. La comunidad religiosa perfecta, umma, es el ideal de sociedad fundada exclusivamente en la justicia y la fraternidad, donde no es necesario el empleo de la coacción para hacer cumplir las leyes, y por tanto los jueces están de más. La existencia de jueces es una prueba de la imperfección de la sociedad, dirá Averroes, quien fue juez y descendiente de una familia de jueces de la ciudad de Córdoba. En cambio, una sociedad justa estará gobernada por filósofos y sabios, que conocen en qué consiste la justicia gracias a su visión filosófica de la armonía universal. En el aspecto político, el Estado islámico no careció de un sistema de poderes diferenciados en busca del equilibrio. No sólo porque la existencia de una capa de sabios funcionarios que rodea al califa y se encarga de dirigir la administración; sino especialmente por el eminente papel que los jueces o cadíes juegan en la sociedad islámica a la hora de administrar justicia y aplicar la ley. En efecto, un importante aspecto cultural que impulsó la investigación racional fue el Derecho. Desde el comienzo de la revolución cultural islámica se investiga la ley y se desarrolla una ciencia jurídica basada en la verdad revelada y la tradición, pero también en principios racionales que establecen la unicidad y la consistencia en el sistema legal como garantía de su eficacia. Además los califas abasíes de Bagdad, que sustituyeron a los omeyas de Damasco, vieron la necesidad de construir un Estado 112 " nombrE autor o autorEs que administrara de forma justa la vida social de los creyentes musulmanes, tanto como las demás profesiones religiosas. El califato abasí en el siglo IX es un Estado modernizador que se funda sobre la tradición religiosa del Islam, recién acabada de surgir en forma revolucionaria desde las entrañas del desierto, y que al mismo tiempo recoge la actividad científica y filosófica del helenismo que todavía perduraba en el Mediterráneo oriental. La religión sirve para elevación moral del pueblo, mientras que la filosofía permite mejorar la acción de gobierno, sistematizando la estructura social y buscando la coherencia jurídica para evitar las arbitrariedades y las injusticias. Al mismo tiempo se encomienda a los filósofos un programa cultural que mejore la educación de la población y con ella la calidad vital de las masas. La filosofía es, por eso, también un movimiento social, que penetra en los estratos sociales a través de la educación y la formación intelectual del pueblo llano. Entre el sabio encumbrado en la cúspide del Estado y el campesino analfabeto de la aldea más remota, hay una estratificación de los conocimientos que dan sentido al mundo natural y hacen posible la cohesión social. Entre el visir filósofo y el maestro de escuela coránica hay un sin fin de grados de cultura y numerosos intelectuales, doctores y científicos, que hacen posible la creación de una rica civilización ilustrada. A lo largo de esta exposición citaremos a los Hermanos de la Pureza, como una asociación de sabios educadores en contacto con el pueblo llano, que, siendo profundamente religiosos, al mismo tiempo se convirtieron en investigadores científicos y propagadores del conocimiento entre las gentes sencillas. En regiones de civilización antiquísima y largas tradiciones de estudio e investigación que se remontan a 2000 o 3000 años antes de nuestra era, como Egipto y Mesopotamia, una de las primeras preocupaciones de los nuevos Estados surgidos con el Islam será el desarrollo intelectual del pueblo, elevando los niveles cultuEl PEriPlo dE la razón " 113 rales de la población. La tarea de la filosofía será la de construir una síntesis coherente de los conocimientos, ayudando a una expansión del saber entre los ciudadanos. En ese sentido, los siglos de esplendor de la cultura musulmana son también una época de Ilustración. 1.4. La Mística isLáMica Hay cuatro problemas importantes en la teología musulmana: la relación entre la unidad divina y la pluralidad de sus atributos; el problema de la libertad humana en relación con la ciencia universal de Allah; el premio y castigo en la vida eterna; y la legitimidad del poder político. Los filósofos resuelven el primero de esos problemas mediante la doctrina emanatista por influencia neoplatónica, solución que es rechazada por los teólogos ortodoxos por caer en el panteísmo. En cuanto al segundo, el emanatismo neoplatónico que constituye la base doctrinal del racionalismo filosófico, conduce a una concepción determinista de la realidad, y como consecuencia a la idea de predestinación; es ésta una de las principales disputas teológicas entre los musulmanes. El tercer problema nos remite a la escatología musulmana sobre la vida eterna, que es muy rica y también tema de debate. Finalmente, la legitimidad del poder político proviene del consenso de los musulmanes, que le conceden sus prerrogativas para organizar la vida social –es decir, que el poder reside en la comunidad de los musulmanes–. Las coincidencias entre la teología musulmana y la cristiana son tan amplias que San Juan Damasceno afirmaba que el Islam es una herejía cristiana que niega la Trinidad y la divinidad de Cristo. Aunque esa opinión no estuviera fundamentada por la realidad, el parecido entre ambas se manifiesta especialmente –aunque no sólo– en el dogma escatológico, la idea de una vida 114 " nombrE autor o autorEs futura en el más allá para el alma; ambas religiones establecen cuatro estados después de la muerte: el cielo, el infierno, el purgatorio y el limbo –este último recibió el nombre de Seno de Abraham entre los primeros cristianos y hasta el siglo XV no se generalizó el nombre de limbo, proveniente de la divina comedia de Dante Alighieri quien lo inventó a partir de fuentes islámicas–. El murciano Ibn Arabí o Abenarabi, quien emigró a Palestina y murió en Damasco, escribirá extensamente sobre ello y será la fuente de inspiración de la divina comedia.20 Un viaje místico por esos lugares escatológicos es narrado en el futuhat de Ibn Arabí, como una alegoría de la redención moral de la humanidad; después de conocer el limbo, el infierno y el purgatorio, Ibn Arabí llega al cielo donde contempla la visión beatífica de las almas, prendidas en el rayo de luz divina que les aporta la suprema felicidad. La vida gloriosa consiste en la epifanía de la divinidad, representada como un foco luminoso; esa luz perfecciona la aptitud del entendimiento humano para ser capaz de elevarse a la visión beatífica. Esa visión engendra un gozo o deleite que produce éxtasis en el alma, la pérdida de la memoria y un sopor o cuasi inconsciencia que adormece el alma. Los elegidos gozan de grados diversos de percepción según el grado de conocimiento alcanzado y según la intensidad de su amor, pero esas diferencias no producen tristeza o envidia. Esa concepción de la vida de ultratumba será recogida por Santo Tomás y retratada por Dante, y más tarde pasará a formar parte de la dogmática cristiana. 20. Miguel Asín Palacios ha demostrado que la inspiración del Dante proviene de fuentes árabes y su libro repite incluso literalmente pasajes de las narraciones de Ibn Arabí sobre los viajes de ultratumba. dante y el islam, Madrid, Voluntad, 1927. Esta observación es un dato relevante para justificar la tesis que aquí se defiende: el Renacimiento europeo es una continuación de la cultura musulmana andalusí. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 115 La mística es una técnica psicológica que promete al iniciado alcanzar los estados beatíficos del alma en la contemplación de la divinidad, cuando todavía se encuentra formando parte del cuerpo en la personalidad terrestre. Para ello exige el cumplimiento de una moral ascética muy estricta y la renuncia a cualquier interés por las realidades mundanas. El ascenso hasta las realidades divinas se realiza mediante la meditación y la oración; en el caso de eremitas, monjes y derviches, eso se consigue apartándose del mundo y sus tentaciones, pero en el Islam hay un movimiento místico que se inserta en las experiencias de la vida cotidiana ordinaria: son los sufíes. Es a causa de este movimiento sufí que la mística juega un papel importante en la cultura islámica, exhortando a los musulmanes a una vida de santidad. Como religión, el Islam es sobre todo un movimiento espiritual, que persigue la unión con la divinidad presentida a través de la naturaleza, más que interesar a las gentes en las realidades políticas y económicas en las que se ve envuelta toda la realidad humana; la personalidad humana tiene un aspecto moral e intelectual que es lo que el Islam propone desarrollar a sus fieles, con una actitud muy sensible hacia la dimensión comunitaria del ser humano. Desde ese punto de vista, hay tres elementos básicos del Islam: a) los datos de la Revelación, que configuran la tradición y la ley; b) la verdad espiritual como realización personal; y c) la vía mística que sirve de lazo de unión entre ambas. El sufismo, como materialización de esa vía mística, constituye un fenómeno de capital importancia en el Islam que hace fructificar el mensaje espiritual del profeta. Su objetivo es la contemplación de la divinidad en todo lo que hay, consiguiendo modelar la conducta personal sobre el modelo de al-corán, para conseguir un estado de oración perpetua y alcanzar la presencia infinita de Alláh. Entre los sufíes orientales se menciona al-Basri (muerto en el 728) que propone la unificación del ser divino con lo humano en un acto trascendente de amor. También, al-Hallay quien pretendía supe116 " nombrE autor o autorEs rar el esoterismo propio de la enseñanzas místicas, para darlas a conocer al pueblo, ganándose con eso la animadversión de los sufíes, tanto como de los teólogos ortodoxos y la corte califal. Se le acusó de panteísmo, por confundir lo humano y lo divino en su concepto de unión mística con Allah. Fue procesado, encarcelado y martirizado en Bagdad en el año 922. Finalmente, otro mártir sufí, al-Suhrawardi (1155-1191) fue condenado a muerte por afirmar que Allah puede enviar nuevos profetas. De origen persa y confesión shií, tuvo una enorme influencia al resucitar la antigua religión de Zaratustra, identificándola con la filosofía de Platón y la sabiduría hermética, también muy extendida en el mundo islámico a partir de Egipto. Expone el sistema peripatético a través de la lógica, la física y la metafísica, pero el objetivo fundamental es dar a conocer la filosofía de la luz. Después de Algazel o al-Gazali, teólogo y místico con una enorme influencia en el mundo islámico, el murciano Ibn Arabí es el más conocido entre los filósofos islámicos que escribieron sobre mística; pero en realidad es el último continuador de una serie de místicos importantes que vivieron en al-Ándalus medieval: Abenmasarra, Abenhazem, Abenalsid, Abenalarif, Abentofail. El primero de ellos, Ibn Masarra o Abenmasarra (Córdoba 883-931), fundador de la escuela masarrí extendida en toda la cultura andalusí. Después de exponer sus primeras doctrinas, tuvo que exiliarse al ser acusado de heterodoxo por criticar la doctrina del libre albedrío y negar la realidad física de los castigos del infierno –se trata de una recuperación de las doctrinas neoplatónicas defendidas también entre los teólogos cristianos, como es el caso de Orígenes–. En su viaje a Oriente –para realizar la peregrinación a la Meca-, entró en contacto con los círculos esotéricos y se inició en las ideas del sistema neoplatónico islámico, que afirma la concordancia entre el conocimiento especulativo y la tradición religiosa. Por tanto, recibe las influencias de la filosofía oriental, Filón, el gnosticismo El PEriPlo dE la razón " 117 y el neoplatonismo, que introduce en al-Ándalus. Allah crea el mundo por emanación: es luz, verdad y bien, que se difunde por la realidad, y el objeto del ser humano es alcanzar la unión espiritual con el elemento divino. A la vuelta a Córdoba fundó un cenobio o comunidad de vida monacal, pero explica su filosofía de modo secreto y alegórico, para evitar tener problemas de nuevo con los ortodoxos. Su doctrina negaba que pudiera haber una ciencia teológica de la divinidad, fiando el conocimiento de Allah a la intuición directa, lo que se alcanza mediante la vida moral, las prácticas de introspección y la catarsis personal. La intención es el aspecto decisivo de nuestros actos a la hora de juzgarlos moralmente, y pueden ser meritorios, pecaminosos o indiferentes; se debe evitar el pecado y hacer las buenas obras. De ese modo la persona puede ascender hacia lo divino, pues el alma está manchada por su contacto con el cuerpo y la materia, necesita purificarse para ascender a su elemento propio, la vida del espíritu. La felicidad consiste en liberarse de todo lazo material, lo que se consigue mediante la vida ascética y el desprecio de los placeres del mundo sensible. El examen de conciencia y la confianza en el ser divino, junto con las prácticas de mortificación, ayuno, pobreza, humildad, oración, etc., son el camino del reencuentro con la divinidad. El alma purificada mediante la práctica del autoexamen y las reglas de conducta moral, refleja la sabiduría divina como un espejo pulimentado refleja la luz. Otro importante pensador relacionado con los masarríes, al-Kirmani (970-1066), viajó a Oriente para realizar estudios matemáticos y médicos, tras lo cual importó a la península ibérica la filosofía neoplatónica de los hermanos de la Pureza, asentándose en Zaragoza donde ejerció como primer funcionario o gran visir de la corte taifa independiente. Entre los seguidores andalusíes de la Hermandad de la Pureza durante el siglo XI, se encontraban también intelectuales judíos como Ibn Paquda y Avicebrón 118 " nombrE autor o autorEs (1021-1059), lo que muestra el grado de integración alcanzado entre ambas comunidades. Los masarríes fueron condenados por los califas omeyas y se organizaron como secta esotérica con dos escuelas, una en Córdoba y otra en Pechina (Almería) donde más tarde destacaría el sufí Abenalarif (1088-1141). Eran sospechosos de heterodoxia, por sus tendencias comunistas pidiendo la abolición de la propiedad privada. El cisma de Ismail al Ruyani radicalizó las tendencias comunistas afirmando que todas las cosas que se poseen en este mundo son ilícitas, la propiedad es el producto de un robo a la humanidad. Negó la vida futura, la resurrección de los muertos y el juicio final; por el contrario, el mundo de la creación es un conjunto perfecto y eterno que perdurará para siempre. Mientras la mística consista en un camino de perfección moral, nada se le puede objetar desde el punto de vista del pensamiento racional; los místicos islámicos no han expresado menosprecio hacia el conocimiento conseguido mediante la observación empírica sistematizada por la ciencia. La filosofía neoplatónica, que es el sustrato de la metafísica islámica, contempla la complementariedad entre el conocimiento científico y la vía espiritual de la introspección apoyada por símbolos y alegorías de carácter religioso. Pero el problema surgirá cuando la mística sea utilizada como instrumento para el ataque contra la razón y éste será el camino seguido por Algazel, con el objetivo de situar a la teología por encima de la metafísica y el pensamiento racional; para ello busca la alianza de los sufíes. De ese modo construirá una reorientación del pensamiento islámico, el cual desde los siglos XII y XIII abandonará el importante interés por la ciencia que había distinguido su primera época, para centrarse en la especulación religiosa. Lo que vendrá unido a una mayor intolerancia religiosa, y actos públicos de carácter inquisitorial como la quema de libros. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 119 1.5. eL desaRRoLLo científico entRe Los MusuLManes La filosofía islámica es un discurso comprometido con la ciencia, el desarrollo y el progreso, cuyo principal objetivo es conciliar la razón con la fe, hacer compatible el desarrollo científico con los principios de la religión. Puede esquematizarse someramente la dialéctica que la reflexión musulmana atravesó en su desarrollo: las primeras formulaciones desarrollan la pasión intelectual de Mahoma; posteriormente, la acentuación del racionalismo en al-Farabi y Avicena, la reacción ortodoxa en Algazel y la respuesta final de Averroes, como el canto del cisne de esa época dorada de la ciencia islámica –un final que resonó con fuerza en la cultura europea y fue el comienzo de un nuevo impulso intelectual en sus universidades–. Esa dialéctica manifiesta una tensión fundamental en el plano social entre tradición y progreso, que no fue siempre fácil de conjugar para los protagonistas. Pero tuvo también consecuencias en el desarrollo del conocimiento y las orientaciones de la investigación científica. Además de un brillante escéptico cuyas argumentaciones repetiría David Hume siete siglos y medio después, Algazel fue un místico que se encerró en una torre para poder disfrutar de sus visiones divinas, y su influencia sobre los intelectuales musulmanes les apartaría del camino del saber empírico y la filosofía racionalista. Algazel afirmaba que los sentidos no nos muestran la verdad; ni tampoco los entes de razón. La auténtica verdad está dentro de nosotros y es un rayo de luz divina que nos ilumina por dentro. Esa teología es una invitación a nuestro conocimiento interior y a la remodelación de nuestra personalidad para ponernos en relación con la divinidad. En cambio Avicena y Averroes construyeron su reflexión filosófica sobre un amplio conocimiento empírico de la realidad, que sistematizaron en formulaciones metafísicas. Esa labor tuvo 120 " nombrE autor o autorEs un amplio eco entre los científicos medievales y perduró hasta bien entrada la Edad Moderna. Los investigadores musulmanes tenían a su favor la inquietud intelectual de Mahoma, recogida en al-corán. Se dice aquí en efecto: la tinta del sabio es más preciosa que la sangre de los mártires; y eso debía ser, sin duda, un importante estímulo para la investigación y una garantía de su reconocimiento social. El esfuerzo para conocer la verdad no es sólo fruto de la curiosidad por saber, es también en sí mismo una actividad bendecida por el Profeta como un modo de acercarse a Allah. La escuela teológica predominante en los primeros siglos del Islam –y especialmente durante el califato abasí de Bagdad– son los mutazilíes, cuya reflexión filosófica consiste en el intento de hacer inteligibles los contenidos de la fe, con el convencimiento de que a través de la razón se puede llegar a conocer las verdades religiosas reveladas. Para ello adoptan los principios racionales de la filosofía heredada de la civilización helénica, y utilizan una técnica dialéctica para la discusión teológica, que se llama kalam. Esa especulación afirma la absoluta unicidad divina, hasta el punto de no poder adscribirle ningún atributo –lo que parece una herencia del neoplatonismo–; de ese modo se elimina el antropomorfismo de la representación popular de la divinidad, y por lo tanto se afirma el carácter simbólico y metafórico del lenguaje sagrado de al-corán. Otra afirmación de un importante calado racionalista es que la salvación humana depende de la razón, lo que hace obligatorios el estudio y la adquisición de conocimiento para el ser humano. La verdad es accesible al ser humano antes de la Revelación divina y ésta no tiene otro objeto que facilitar el conocimiento a todos los seres humanos. La expresión de esa forma de pensar es claramente perceptible en los grandes pensadores del siglo XII andalusí, como en la novela filosófica de Abentofail y en la reflexión de Averroes: en nuestra religión es cosa obligatoria el estudio de los filósofos antiguos. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 121 Sobre esa base teológica se desarrolla la investigación naturalista y su aplicación tecnológica en la revolución económica medieval. El método de la ciencia islámica es la analogía y buena parte del pensamiento filosófico tratará de sus condiciones de validez. La analogía es un tema que aparece ya en el pensamiento platónico con su uso frecuente de alegorías poéticas de enorme éxito en la tradición filosófica; recordemos la comparación que el mito de la caverna establece entre la luz y la sabiduría: el sol productor de la luz en el mundo visible es una metáfora de la idea de Bien que orienta o ilumina el conocimiento intelectual humano. También Aristóteles trata el tema, pero ya desde el punto de vista del análisis lingüístico que forma parte de su metafísica: la analogía es el empleo de una misma palabra para dos realidades distintas, pero que tienen algún punto de semejanza o que poseen caracteres o funciones similares; es el caso del uso de la palabra 'ser': el ser se utiliza propiamente para la substancia y derivadamente para los accidentes. Más tarde la analogía fue estudiada por los neoplatónicos y pasó a la primera filosofía cristiana como instrumento para el conocimiento de la esencia divina. Entre los musulmanes además de su aplicación lingüística y teológica, el uso de la analogía en el derecho sirvió para racionalizar el sistema jurídico y mejorar los códigos legales fundados en la tradición. Gracias a ese método de trabajo sistemático Averroes pudo, por ejemplo, establecer en plena Edad Media normas favorables a la libertad de las mujeres. Según la definición de Ábed Yabri, "una analogía es válida de un término ausente por otro presente, cuando ambos comparten en su naturaleza común un elemento que represente de manera intrínseca uno de sus caracteres constitutivos fundamentales".21 Por tanto el científico tiene que descubrir un elemento cons21. Mahomed Ábed Yabri, El legado filosófico árabe, Madrid, Trotta, 2001. 122 " nombrE autor o autorEs titutivo que sea compartido por los objetos análogos, lo que consigue mediante el análisis y la clasificación. El análisis es el procedimiento racional: la enumeración de las características y peculiaridades de los objetos investigados. La clasificación es el estudio pormenorizado de esas características descubiertas por el análisis racional, lo que para los científicos musulmanes consistía en la experimentación. Es decir, esos científicos mediante el análisis teórico y la práctica de la experimentación poseían ya en la Edad Media la clave de la investigación científica moderna, y fueron ellos quienes se la legaron a los científicos europeos, como en su momento reconocerá el científico inglés del siglo XIII Roger Bacon. En ciencias naturales, el análisis racional distinguía entre aquellas características de la realidad que son investigables por el método científico y las que no lo son: sólo son científicas las materias cuantitativas, es decir, aquéllas a las que se les aplica los números –una idea que proviene de los antiguos pitagóricos y que fue recogida por Platón en su explicación de la ciencia–. La idea de Galileo de que 'el libro de la naturaleza está escrito en caracteres matemáticos', estaba ya perfectamente formulada en la reflexión de Maimónides y expuesta en su carta a los rabinos de Marsella: la verdadera ciencia astronómica trata de las magnitudes cuantificables de los astros: movimientos, distancias, figuras, número, tamaño, etc.; en cambio la astrología no es más que una creencia religiosa, ridícula desde el punto de vista de monoteísmo judío. La distinción entre ciencia y religión, y el criterio de demarcación entre ambas, es uno de los problemas fundamentales de la filosofía judía y musulmana, el que realmente subyace al problema de las 'dos verdades' –la verdad de la razón y la de la fe–, que ha sido desfigurado por la Escolástica católica medieval en Europa, para acusar a estos pensadores de falsedad incoherente. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 123 Los musulmanes utilizaron el sistema ptolemaico para las explicar los fenómenos celestes y consiguieron catálogos de estrellas que superaron a los griegos en el número y la precisión de las observaciones. Ya los Omeya fundaron en el año 700 un observatorio astronómico en Damasco, reuniendo allí a un grupo de científicos. También los Abasíes de Bagdad llevaron científicos a su corte que se dedicaron a la traducción de las obras griegas al árabe en la 'Casa de la sabiduría' fundada en el 828 y a la observación de los astros en un observatorio fundado en el 829. El almagesto de Ptolomeo fue traducido aquí al árabe durante el siglo IX, junto con las obras de medicina de Hipócrates y de Dioscórides. Los sabeos –astrólogos cuyas creencias fueron admitidas como religión lícita por sus conocimientos científicos– trabajaron es el observatorio de Bagdad, bajo la teoría de Ptolomeo fusionada con la metafísica neoplatónica de la emanación, y una creencia en la divinidad los cielos regidos por las inteligencias astrales, que fueron interpretadas como los ángeles para hacerlas compatibles con el monoteísmo islámico. El principal entre ellos fue al-Battani (858-929), descubridor de los cambios en la excentricidad de la trayectoria del sol, lo que traducido en términos modernos significa que la órbita terrestre es una elipse variable; gracias a ello logró una determinación precisa del año solar (365 días, 5 horas, 46 minutos y 24 segundos). La ciencia penetró en Europa a través de la península Ibérica cuando los castellanos ocuparon Toledo y más tarde el valle del Guadalquivir. El almagesto de Ptolomeo fue traducido del árabe al latín en Toledo hacia 1175 por Gerardo de Cremona, siendo esta versión más fiable que la traducción directa del griego al latín realizada en Sicilia en 1160. En esta ciudad existió una escuela de investigación científica y filosófica desde el XI, gracias al cadí Said al-Andalusí y al astrónomo Azarquiel (1029-1087). Said alAndalusí, historiador de la ciencia antigua y musulmana a la vez 124 " nombrE autor o autorEs que astrónomo, se preocupó de reunir el grupo de científicos a los que facilitó los medios para su investigación. Azarquiel, por su parte, perfeccionó el astrolabio introduciendo la azalea, que permitía usar este instrumento de observación en cualquier punto terrestre y facilitaba de ese modo la navegación. Bajo su dirección se elaboraron las tablas astronómicas que fueron conocidas por los europeos como el modelo de investigación sobre los fenómenos celestes; los astrónomos musulmanes consiguieron un importante grado de precisión en el cálculo de las posiciones de los astros, hasta el punto de que se dice que todavía Laplace en el siglo XVIII seguía utilizando sus observaciones. En el siglo XII y en los siguientes se tradujeron las obras de los astrónomos musulmanes, las enciclopedias médicas, los libros de geografía y los conocimientos matemáticos. Entre los científicos de al-Ándalus, Azarquiel, Avempace, Averroes, Abentofail o Abubacer y Alpetragius, criticaron la teoría ptolemaica de los epiciclos, arguyendo que un planeta no puede girar sobre un punto, sino que debe hacerlo sobre un objeto sólido –intuición de la existencia de gravedad–. Fue esa pléyade de científicos la que transmitió la tradición de conocimiento racional a los europeos durante la época medieval y su influjo se hizo sentir en profundidad hasta el punto de originar la corriente de pensamiento que daría origen al Renacimiento y posteriormente a toda la modernidad. La medicina árabe tuvo un auge extraordinario. Rhazes (865-925) escribe el Libro completo, donde se abarca toda la medicina griega, india y del oriente medio entonces conocida. Avicena por su parte expuso sus conocimientos médicos en el canon de medicina a partir de los estudios de Galeno, que tanto éxito tuvo durante siglos; en el XVII todavía se estudiaba en las facultades de medicina de Montpellier y Lovaina. Avicena conocía las causas geológicas que modifican el paisaje terrestre, el plutoEl PEriPlo dE la razón " 125 nismo o acción de los volcanes y terremotos, y el neptunismo, la erosión por el agua y el viento. A partir de las observaciones de los fósiles marinos en las montañas, concluye que esa parte de la tierra ha estado sumergida bajo las aguas antiguamente. Otro importante médico Ibn al-Nafis (1213-1288) es el descubridor de la circulación menor de la sangre, que hace posible su oxigenación a través de los pulmones, aunque su descubrimiento no se publicitó y quedó desconocido. Entre los numerosos conocimientos que desarrolló Averroes cuenta también la medicina, pues fue discípulo y amigo del médico andalusí Avenzoar (†1162) y atendió al califa almohade como médico de cabecera. Avenzoar escribió un famoso libro que denominó Kitab al-taisir (Libro de particularidades), que fue motivo para que Averroes escribiera su Kitab al-Kulyat (Libro de generalidades), un compendio de medicina teórica conocido como colliget entre los europeos con enorme repercusión y fama durante siglos. Avicena aparece relacionado con una secta sufí, los Hermanos de la Pureza, que afirmaban la igualdad de todos los hombres y bajo ese principio desarrollaron la educación y expandieron la cultura, preparando enciclopedias con todo el saber acumulado. Los Hermanos de la Pureza escribieron el corpus fundamental de la alquimia islámica, cuyas ideas elaboraron en conexión con una mística religiosa, según la cual el hombre es un microcosmos que reproduce en pequeña dimensión la estructura de todo el universo. En lugar del razonamiento deductivo y geométrico se dedicaban a la investigación empírica, estudiando cuantitativamente los fenómenos. Finalmente la secta fue prohibida y su enciclopedia filosófica fue quemada públicamente. Esta obra es una de las aportaciones más importantes de la ciencia musulmana de la época; constaba de 52 epístolas, de las cuales 14 estaban dedicadas a matemáticas y lógica, 17 a ciencias de la naturaleza y psicología, 10 versaban sobre metafísica y 11 sobre mística, 126 " nombrE autor o autorEs astrología y magia. La doctrina adoptaba un punto de vista ecléctico, recogiendo la influencia de aristotelismo neoplatonizante, además del gnosticismo cristiano y hebreo, combinados con ideas sufíes, ismailíes y mutazilíes. En este terreno de la alquimia, los científicos musulmanes hicieron grandes progresos en la preparación de sustancias y en los procesos químicos, con métodos perfeccionados para evaporación, filtración, destilación, etc. Y gracias a la experimentación consiguieron importantes conocimientos prácticos sobre farmacia y toxicología que fueron utilizados en principalmente en la medicina. Uno de los desarrollos de la industria musulmana, relacionada con la alquimia, fue la fabricación del papel, una técnica que llegó desde China, primero a Samarcanda en el siglo VIII y de ahí al resto de la civilización islámica, que la llevó a Europa a través de la península Ibérica. Cuando Bagdad cayó en manos de los turcos, muchos científicos emigraron a Egipto donde se fundó una Casa del Saber en el Cairo. Allí trabajaron Alhazén (965-1038) especialista en óptica, el astrónomo Ibn Yunus (†1150) quien preparó las tablas astronómicas hakimíes –llamadas así por el califa al-Hakim–, y los médicos Maimónides, que llegó de al-Ándalus, y al-Nafis, quien conoció la circulación de la sangre pasando por los pulmones. También en el Cairo existió una excelente escuela de matemáticas. Algunos de los progresos más importantes de las matemáticas se deben a los sabios árabes, como el uso del álgebra y la trasmisión de las cifras decimales que provienen de la India. El sabio musulmán al-Juwarizmi (780-850) adoptó el álgebra y la matemática india, junto con el sistema numérico decimal basado en los guarismos del uno al nueve más el cero, que hoy utilizamos. El uso de esas figuras se generalizó entre los matemáticos islámicos y a partir de ellos se difundió entre los cristianos. La primera aparición conocida de las cifras modernas en Europa se produce en el monasterio de Ripoll durante el siglo X, bajo la influencia de la cultura andalusí. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 127 2. LOS fILÓSOfOS fUNCIONARIOS: EL DESARROLLO DEL RACIONALISMO fILOSÓfICO EN ORIENTE El pensamiento musulmán tiene como fundamento la fe religiosa monoteísta, que afirma la unidad del género humano por referencia a la divinidad creadora de la realidad. Esa creencia se hace plenamente consecuente cuando admite la pluralidad humana dentro de su unidad fundamental: la unidad del género humano está producida por sus capacidades racionales para elaborar un pensamiento coherente y dominar la materia gracias al conocimiento científico de la realidad. La fortaleza de la especie humana consiste en sumar las experiencias individuales en una experiencia colectiva, que está a disposición de cada uno de los seres humanos a través de la comunicación y el lenguaje, dentro de la sistematización científica del conocimiento. Por eso el símbolo monoteísta de una sola divinidad para una sola humanidad, no es más que un punto de apoyo que viene a ser superado por la reflexión consciente. La convicción más importante de estos filósofos es que la razón está por encima de la fe en el descubrimiento de la verdad; la razón es razonabilidad y actividad práctica, convencimiento y cooperación. La religión enseña lo mismo que la filosofía, pero con símbolos que todos pueden entender, incluida la gente iletrada del pueblo llano; es una forma de sabiduría sencilla para la gente ocupada con sus quehaceres cotidianos, trabajadores manuales, comerciantes, campesinos, guerreros,... La creencia religiosa no es más que una comprensión elemental de los valores morales, reconocidos con más extensión y profundidad por la sabiduría. Los religiosos hablan mediante mitos y parábolas para las gentes simples, exponiendo así las enseñanzas de las verdades fundamentales que el pensamiento racional construye y desarrolla de forma más compleja. Recogiendo una tradición de interpretación alegórica que se remonta a la Antigüedad griega y que fue elabo128 " nombrE autor o autorEs rada por los judíos helenistas y los neoplatónicos, musulmanes y judíos medievales desarrollan una hermenéutica de la fe: los símbolos religiosos deben comprenderse como verdades metafóricas a la luz de un análisis racional. Una alegoría religiosa es como un jeroglífico o un sueño, que hay que descifrar mediante un código particular. El núcleo racional de ese simbolismo es la moral popular que los hombres practican mediante sus costumbres sociables. La religión es una máscara de la moral colectiva, una envoltura alegórica que encierra las verdades fundamentales de la vida cotidiana, y sus contenidos pueden y deben verterse en conceptos filosóficos racionales. Así, por ejemplo, Avicena interpreta la sura 36 de al-corán, donde se establece la creencia en la resurrección de los muertos, negando que deba entenderse en un sentido literal. En los filósofos islámicos la demostración sustituye a la inspiración. Dos elementos principales constituyen la base de la filosofía musulmana. Por un lado, un factor especialmente importante para el desarrollo científico fue la difusión del pensamiento aristotélico, como marco de comprensión y compendio de conocimientos empíricos de la ciencia antigua. Si bien el pensamiento de Aristóteles era una filosofía de la polis que no jugó un papel central en el helenismo, la escuela peripatética fundada por éste se especializó en la investigación empírica y parte de sus teorías fueron asumidas por los pensadores de otras escuelas más cosmopolitas. Por eso, una tradición científica y lógica que bebía de las fuentes aristotélicas continuó desarrollándose en el mundo antiguo, y todavía estaba en activo cuando los árabes se expandieron en el siglo VII y fundaron el califato de Damasco. Muchas obras clásicas de la filosofía y la ciencia griegas fueron traducidas a lenguas siríacas, para pasar desde éstas al árabe; muchas otras pasaron directamente a través de los griegos emigrados por problemas religiosos. Las obras de Aristóteles fueron vertidas a la El PEriPlo dE la razón " 129 lengua árabe por cristianos de Bagdad y por los filósofos de la escuela de Harrán –apelados 'sabeos' entre los musulmanes–, de modo que sus ideas se difundieron por toda la cultura islámica. Por otra parte, en Antioquía y en otras ciudades sirias que fueron lugares de desarrollo intelectual en el helenismo tardío, se cultivó la filosofía neoplatónica que fue adoptada por los filósofos musulmanes para establecer una interpretación racionalista de la religión monoteísta. De ese modo, mientras las prácticas religiosas musulmanas daban origen a una racionalización de la moral, la filosofía islámica realiza una síntesis de la metafísica neoplatónica de carácter estético y místico, y el aristotelismo más científico. La lógica y la metafísica aristotélicas enmarcaron la investigación empírica, mientras las categorías neoplatónicas daban cuenta racional de las creencias religiosas islámicas; y esa triple síntesis pasó a formar el núcleo del pensamiento especulativo de los intelectuales musulmanes, los cuales tuvieron que adaptar las categorías filosóficas a su cultura y situación histórica. Cuando esa brillante filosofía fue conocida en el Occidente cristiano, los intelectuales europeos quedaron deslumbrados durante varios siglos y esa luz iluminó un desarrollo intelectual que desembocaría en el Renacimiento y la revolución científica. Gracias a ese periplo la tradición filosófica no se interrumpió. Primero se expandió por Oriente llegando hasta Persia y Mesopotamia desde Siria, y luego de ahí a al-Ándalus en los esplendorosos siglos de la civilización musulmana en la península Ibérica, para finalmente entrar en el mundo cristiano desde el siglo XII, en la labor continuada de la Escuela de Traductores de Toledo que floreció en la corte de Alfonso X el Sabio; las ideas filosóficas de la Antigüedad llegaron hasta Europa desde el sur de la península Ibérica, para hacer germinar el pensamiento racional, gozando de la enorme importancia de la que disfrutaron al final de la Edad Media. De la mayor importancia es que las 130 " nombrE autor o autorEs ideas aristotélicas, recibieron especial atención por los filósofos orientales, de modo que sobrevivieron a su eclipse de la época helenística. Ese aristotelismo estaba unido al interés por el conocimiento empírico de la naturaleza y en su metafísica aparece el concepto de materia que tan importante resulta como categoría fundamental para la investigación científica. En sus primeros pasos, la filosofía islámica intenta conciliar la concepción racionalista sobre el hombre y el universo con los principios de la fe y la tradición. La escuela teológica de los mutazilíes, fundada en el siglo VIII, adoptó un fuerte racionalismo para justificar la fe islámica y fue elevada a enseñanza oficial bajo el califa abasí al-Mamum a principios del siglo IX. La conciliación racional entre las creencias religiosas particulares en el bien común colectivo, favoreciendo el desarrollo cultural y científico, es sentida como una necesidad derivada de la organización social a partir del Estado. De ahí que los califas financien la traducción de los textos griegos, impulsando la investigación científica, y que los filósofos sean en su mayoría funcionarios de la corte y se encuentren muy implicados en la vida política de su presente histórico –reproduciendo en la administración pública un esquema orgánico que se dio ya en el Imperio romano con la filosofía estoica–. Así el primer filósofo del mundo islámico, también importante matemático, al-Kindi (800-872), a pesar de que a veces descrito como un Rousseau oriental por su forma de vida apartada en el campo, se encuentra plenamente imbuido de los problemas de su tiempo.22 Su objetivo es alcanzar la verdad mediante un equilibrio entre la religión y la filosofía, criticando al clero religioso por sus inconsecuencias e ignorancias. Esa síntesis entre la filosofía y el Islam, entre el pensamiento racional y el monoteísmo de origen semita, que reproduce la sín22. Mahomed Ábed Yabri, op.cit. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 131 tesis cristiana, tiene delante de sí un obstáculo: el racionalismo filosófico no se aviene con la exigencia de la fe de renunciar al uso de la crítica y la duda para examinar todas las verdades. Los filósofos musulmanes intentaron quitarle importancia y restarle fuerza a esa contradicción, y en general estuvieron inclinados a reconocer la superioridad de la razón sobre la fe; establecieron la prioridad de la demostración argumentativa sobre la creencia subjetiva, la cual es considerada como un instrumento para la instrucción del pueblo a través de símbolos y parábolas. Se trata de un programa humanista que pretende unir a una sociedad compuesta de numerosas etnias y lenguas, por medio de la cultura fundada en la capacidad racional de la humanidad para llegar a una convivencia pacífica, en la complementariedad de las experiencias sobre la naturaleza que permite multiplicar los conocimientos, en la variedad de aptitudes y habilidades humanas que permiten aumentar la riqueza colectiva. La superioridad de la razón se demuestra además porque la propia religión islámica, demostrando su nulidad para el objetivo que se había propuesto de unir a los creyentes, estaba dividida en multitud de sectas y confesiones que dificultaban establecer el orden social e introducen la confusión en los espíritus. En esas circunstancias la razón viene a ser el árbitro de las numerosas creencias en disputa y así lo entendieron los gobernantes árabes que dieron a los filósofos un lugar de honor en su Estado. 2.1. aL-faRabi (tuRquestán, 872 daMasco, 950): eL sisteMa de La fiLosofía MusuLMana Después de al-Kindi, al-Farabi fue un importante científico y musicólogo, además de filósofo; de familia persa –o según otros autores turca– y profesión religiosa chií, vivió la mayor parte de su vida en Bagdad, en la corte abásida, donde estudió la filo132 " nombrE autor o autorEs sofía antigua, ocupó importantes cargos políticos y se dedicó a la investigación, aportando numerosas contribuciones en varios campos científicos; también escribió un tratado clásico sobre la música, basado en las matemáticas y en principios racionales, que nos lo muestra como un importante pensador con variados intereses y capacidades. Su método quiere combinar la estrategia religiosa, retórica y dialéctica, con la estrategia filosófica demostrativa, como instrumentos complementarios en el descubrimiento de la verdad. Al-Farabi, llamado el 'segundo Maestro' por la tradición musulmana, es considerado aquí como el mayor filósofo después de Aristóteles; participó en la traducción de las obras aristotélicas y tomó de ahí su noción de entendimiento y de método científico, para construir una síntesis con la idea neoplatónica de emanación y con el sistema de creencias islámicas, asignándolas de ese modo un nuevo contenido. La filosofía racional y el sufismo místico se sintetizaron de ese modo en los pensadores orientales, para inspirar las direcciones del desarrollo cultural durante la Edad Media. 2.1.1. La superioridad de la razón sobre la fe El concepto de emanación del mundo a partir del Uno aparece en el neoplatonismo del siglo III, de modo que la conciliación entre la filosofía y la religión monoteísta era un camino allanado durante siglos. Esa metafísica religiosa, que piensa la naturaleza como una emanación del ser divino, se fusiona con la visión geocéntrica del mundo y la teoría astronómica de Ptolomeo –es decir, el sistema científico de la época–; la visión integrada y coherente del universo que ofrece la ciencia, se combina con el sentimiento natural de la divinidad modelado por la religión monoteísta, para elaborar un sistema completo del universo, en el cual las esferas celestes eran la residencia de las inteligenEl PEriPlo dE la razón " 133 cias emanadas del Uno divino, los ángeles de la teología y las creencias populares de raíz oriental. Esa exposición contenía, sin embargo, sus contradicciones: la religión monoteísta contiene la creencia en una creación del mundo a partir de la nada y no puede prescindir de ella, siendo así que entre los principios de la razón, no es el menos importante la idea de que 'nada se produce a partir de nada' y como consecuencia la materia es eterna. Los filósofos islámicos y judíos medievales intentaron eliminar esa contradicción afirmando una creación desde la eternidad; algunos además afirmaron que la materia también forma parte de la divinidad, pues se encuentra presente en toda la realidad. Pero en todo caso, para ellos la razón era una capacidad humana más importante que la fe, y subordinaron ésta a aquélla. Esa es la posición de al-Farabi, quien utiliza un argumento basado en la génesis histórica para negar la contradicción entre la filosofía y la religión: el Islam es la religión cristiana enmendada y transferida a los árabes –reconocido por el profeta en al-corán–; a su vez el cristianismo es una derivación de la filosofía griega, con el objetivo de instruir al vulgo; por tanto, la filosofía griega también es el origen del Islam. En realidad los contenidos de la religión son símbolos de las ideas racionales de la filosofía, por lo que no puede haber conflicto entre ellas, aunque los hombres de religión no se percaten de ello. Por tanto, hay una prioridad histórica de la filosofía sobre la religión; pero además hay también una prioridad racional, basada en el método argumentativo, cuya exposición demuestra el profundo intelectualismo de alFarabi. Ese método se aplica ahora al terreno moral: la religión es virtuosa cuando se parece a la filosofía, en cambio una religión extraviada se aparta de la verdad racional. Pues todas las leyes de la religión virtuosa caen bajo los universales de la filosofía práctica; y esta última tiene la ventaja de que da demostraciones de sus leyes, de ahí su superioridad. 134 " nombrE autor o autorEs El significado de esa filosofía es claramente político: alFarabi representa las fuerzas avanzadas y aperturistas del mundo islámico medieval. Su objetivo es la unificación de la sociedad bajo un Estado centralizado, pero considera que eso debe hacerse a través de la administración racionalizada de la corte califal y una cultura científica y racional que comparta toda la humanidad civilizada. El acuerdo entre los seres humanos es posible: la conciliación entre fe y razón, entre la religión y la ciencia, tiene un modelo en su libro sobre la conciliación entre el divino Platón y el sabio aristóteles. No puede haber contradicción entre ambas, pues la Inteligencia de todos los seres humanos es una sola y la misma: el entendimiento agente colectivo produce las ideas y las infunde en el entendimiento pasivo individual –aparece aquí la doctrina, que proviene de Alejandro de Afrodisia (ss. II-III), de una capacidad colectiva de la humanidad para producir las ideas, que está separada de las personalidades individuales y es eterna–. El entendimiento personal o memoria es pasivo, se limita a recibir y guardar las ideas elaboradas por el entendimiento agente o Inteligencia; ese entendimiento activo o agente es como el sol que con su luz permite al ojo ver las imágenes de las cosas, una Inteligencia cósmica emanada del Ser Divino, a través de la cual el ser humano se pone en contacto con Allah. Esa idea será una de las principales características del pensamiento medieval en el ámbito musulmán, y seguramente una manera acrítica o simbólica y pre-científica, de entender el papel que el lenguaje juega en la formación de las capacidades intelectuales humanas; de ahí se desprende la existencia de una razón común a toda la humanidad, propia de la naturaleza humana –lo que el racionalismo contemporáneo ha determinado como la existencia de universales lingüísticos, que subyacen a la gramática de todas las lenguas–. Esa forma de entender el conocimiento también puede asimilarse a la mística sufí –en el sentido de que lo divino es interior a la humanidad e ilumina el alma de las personas El PEriPlo dE la razón " 135 puras–, sin perder el mayor empeño en la investigación científica racional y empírica. Un Estado fundado en la racionalidad legal para una sociedad culta y emancipada, es el objetivo de la reflexión de al-Farabi; y propone una utopía de sociedad perfecta en su libro La ciudad ideal, apoyándose en la República de Platón, pero introduciendo las modificaciones que adaptaban el modelo a la religión musulmana. Las dos fuentes de inspiración son la utopía platónica y la comunidad religiosa del profeta: el modelo de organización es platónico pero la ley es islámica, la sharía; las ideas de Platón vertidas en el molde de Mahoma. El gobernante es un sabio que dirige colegiadamente el orden social, rodeado de ayudantes con grandes conocimientos prácticos, cuyo objetivo es concertar la doctrina religiosa con las normas establecidas; la sabiduría va unida al gobierno para garantizar el orden racional de la sociedad. Por lo tanto, la ciudad ideal es la ciudad de la verdad y el conocimiento, que se contrapone a la ciudad de la ignorancia, y entre ambos extremos está la gradación de ciudades reales existentes, errantes y perversas, en un mundo a mitad camino entre el ideal y la nada. La ciudad en la que se desarrolla la vida humana, parece alejada del modelo diseñado. La teoría política busca unificar la sociedad que empezaba a resquebrajarse por la falta de control religioso y la diversidad cultural. La diversidad étnica y religiosa, la proliferación de sectas y la indisciplina de las regiones, amenazan la unidad política del mundo islámico. La integración de la religión en la filosofía es el medio para erigir el Estado califal sobre los cimientos del consenso universal. Al-Farabi busca la cohesión en el ámbito intelectual a partir de la tradición y la razón; esas dos fuentes de pensamiento representan los dos elementos fundamentales de la sociedad islámica de la época: las estructuras feudales agrarias y las organizaciones urbanas comerciales. Por eso cuando se afirma que la religión es un símil de la filosofía para el pue136 " nombrE autor o autorEs blo iletrado, lo que se pretende es dar mayor relevancia a las actividades urbanas, comercio e industria, y al Estado creado a partir de ellas, como unificación de sociedades diversas en una civilización cosmopolita. Su programa político busca el desarrollo de una economía mercantil, apoyándose en el Estado como instrumento de la racionalización legal de las relaciones sociales y en la difusión de una cultura científica, que domine la variedad de opiniones religiosas. En definitiva, el programa político de al-Farabi propone reconstruir el poder central, regenerando la sociedad y el Estado a partir de la sabiduría política, y su confianza en la razón tiene rasgos utópicos, que le hacen pensar en la posibilidad de traer el reino de Allah a la tierra mediante el dominio humano de la naturaleza y la organización racional de la sociedad humana. Se trata de elevar el orden social en la tierra para emular el orden cósmico universal: la sociedad perfecta es inalcanzable, pero la ciudad terrena se puede acercar al modelo en un grado determinable, y puede ser mejorada o empeorada según las costumbres ciudadanas. El tipo de sociedad que se alcanza, no es por tanto, indiferente a las directrices políticas y al desarrollo cultural, así como la felicidad depende de la vida moral de hombres y mujeres. Una sociedad puede apartarse de ese ideal, produciendo una enorme infelicidad entre los seres humanos. La metafísica de al-Farabi es un modelo abstracto de ese orden social: el significado de la emanación es pensar la realidad como un reflejo del mundo ideal, participando de su esencia perfecta en una determinada medida. Es claro que los numerosos disturbios políticos –con asesinato del califa incluido–, así como los abusos de los poderosos y los militares, muestran una realidad muy apartada del ideal armonioso de una sociedad justa y reconciliada. Pero el concepto contenido en la metafísica es más un modelo funcional de la organización social y una propuesta de acción, que una descripción de la realidad El PEriPlo dE la razón " 137 histórica. Hay una triple simetría que viene a ser justificada por la metafísica: el orden físico del universo entre lo contingente y lo necesario, que va desde las esferas eternas de los astros hasta la vida efímera de los seres minúsculos; el orden moral de la perfección humana entre el alma y el cuerpo, desde la eternidad de los modelos ideales hasta la corrupción material; y el orden social que constituye una unidad totalizada y funcional, constituido a partir de instituciones y actividades que se complementan y se componen de organismos y funciones más simples; éstas a su vez pueden entenderse en su composición, y así hasta alcanzar la individualidad de las personalidades singulares. De ese modo, nos encontramos ante una metafísica funcionalista, y todas las actividades de los seres existentes y sus partes, hasta la más minúscula, son necesarias en cuanto que ocupan un lugar imprescindible en la economía cósmica. Tal vez se me permita ahora comentar la diferencia con la metafísica trascendental cristiana, con el objeto de comprender mejor de qué se está hablando. También esa metafísica cristiana de la trascendencia divina es metáfora de la realidad social: el orden social jerárquicamente establecido por las funciones políticas y la división social del trabajo. Es la sociología que parece subyacer a una teología como la tomista, que constituye en núcleo de la doctrina cristiana moderna. El modelo metafísico de la divinidad, los espíritus puros sin mezcla de materia, el ser humano y los seres terrestres, animales y plantas, es el modelo mismo que debe seguir la realidad social, con el monarca en la cúspide de la organización y las sucesivas clases, capas y grupos sociales; que acaban en los desheredados. Es el orden feudal, traspuesto al mundo abstracto de los esquemas conceptuales, los estamentos sociales, nobleza, clero, artesanos y siervos, pensados como trasposición material y sociológica de la realidad eterna del mundo ideal. 138 " nombrE autor o autorEs Diferente es la interpretación inmanente de la filosofía neoplatónica, donde la procesión de seres emanados del creador y su jerarquía que va desde el Uno hasta la poquedad de la materialidad sensible, representa niveles de existencia distinguibles por sus modos de acción y sus producciones: el ser social como organización funcional de las instituciones, compuesto de personalidades conscientes que asumen activamente su participación en el todo. La prioridad ontológica del Uno, traduce la intuición aristotélica de la unidad de las estructuras funcionales, como los seres vivos o las sociedades, que se piensan como modelos del Cosmos. Ese holismo de Aristóteles dice que el todo es superior a las partes, es decir, que las propiedades de la totalidad constituida no pueden darse por separado en los elementos que la componen. Esta metafísica afirma la creación necesaria de la realidad por el Uno. Si bien el Uno resulta desconocido desde nuestro punto de vista humano, necesariamente limitado por la contingencia, es un supuesto indispensable del pensamiento racional. La necesidad de la creación es un postulado para una comprensión racional de los acontecimientos cósmicos: la existencia de leyes universales por las que se rige el devenir cósmico, que pueden ser conocidas por el ser humano. Así que los seres contingentes lo son de forma necesaria –de modo que la lógica que subyace a la realidad tiene una formulación especial, que tenemos que examinar–. En primer lugar, desde el punto de vista moral y psicológico, se puede señalar que la creación necesaria del cosmos por el Uno divino, elimina el problema del libre albedrío; en realidad, éste se hace irrelevante, porque se transforma en un problema del conocimiento: no la cuestión de si podemos elegir entre hacer el bien u obrar mal, sino el problema de saber en qué consiste el bien. Se trata del reconocimiento de las constricciones de la conciencia a la hora de tomar decisiones, el hecho de que el ejercicio de la libertad está en dependencia de los condicionamientos que constituyen la vida de cada personaEl PEriPlo dE la razón " 139 lidad humana. La ética de al-Farabi es intelectualista, en la mejor tradición del racionalismo filosófico: el mal es la ignorancia, para obrar el bien, hay que conocer la verdad. Como les sucede a los demás pensadores de la filosofía islámica, la situación de al-Farabi es ambigua. Por un lado, representa los intereses de la clase dominante islámica y ofrece argumentos ideológicos para su justificación y sostenimiento. Por otra parte, representa fuerzas dinámicas y progresistas de esa sociedad que buscan un orden racional y justo, a través de la expansión de la cultura hacia todas las capas sociales; de ahí que interprete la religión como el primer acceso de las gentes sencillas en su camino hacia el conocimiento. Quizás se pueda criticar ese programa reformista como insuficiente porque no elimina las relaciones de explotación que se producen en la situación dependiente del campesinado y a través del capitalismo comercial. Pero estos filósofos fueron un síntoma del progreso social producido por la revolución islámica, e inspiraron una práctica de la fraternidad universal que rindió notables frutos culturales a lo largo de varios siglos. 2.1.2. La distinción entre esencia y existencia; la lógica trivalente Para mejorar la descripción de la realidad y construir el conocimiento de forma rigurosa, la ciencia requiere un lenguaje perfeccionado mediante la formalización, de tal modo que se defina con precisión semántica los términos utilizados y las relaciones sintácticas que éstos mantienen entre sí. La construcción científica requiere una serie de operaciones propedéuticas, que establezcan los conceptos fundamentales, los métodos de investigación, los límites y los objetivos del conocimiento. Aristóteles encomendó esa tarea a la metafísica y la lógica, de modo que la 140 " nombrE autor o autorEs metafísica establece los principios generales de la experiencia, dentro de los que se enmarca la investigación, mientras que la lógica consiste en la definición sintáctica precisa de los términos que empleamos en nuestro lenguaje y sus relaciones internas. La metafísica antigua de carácter aristotélico tenía como misión establecer los rasgos fundamentales de toda realidad, que podamos conocer a través de nuestra experiencia del mundo; esos rasgos se expresan como categorías, y sobre ellas se asienta la investigación científica de los hechos empíricos. Para establecerlas, Aristóteles investiga la lengua hablada, de modo que las categorías son descubiertas a partir del lenguaje común, considerando que el lenguaje contiene una descripción verdadera y correcta de la realidad, y que por tanto esas categorías representa los rasgos característicos de la realidad –como dice metafóricamente Aristóteles: el alma es de alguna manera todas las cosas–. La investigación metafísica de Aristóteles versa sobre las propiedades del ser, porque la palabra 'ser' se aplica a todas las cosas, es máximamente universal, dando como resultado que el ser se puede pensar como sustancia –que se corresponde con el sustantivo o nombre gramatical, el sujeto de la oración–, o como accidentes –todas las demás categorías gramaticales como cualidad, cantidad, modo, relación, lugar, tiempo, acción, pasión–. El ser se dice propiamente de la sustancia y derivadamente de los accidentes. A su vez las sustancias están compuestas de materia y forma: la materia es su posibilidad de existir como objeto para nuestra percepción sensible; la forma es el estado actual de la sustancia, tal como es captada por el entendimiento humano a través de sus capacidades para la abstracción –es decir, la definición y la clasificación de los objetos según su forma–. Al-Farabi –y con él la filosofía musulmana– recogió la enseñanza aristotélica, subrayando el papel de la materia, es decir, prestando atención a la realidad empírica como fundamento de la investigación científica. Pero introdujo una importante innovación El PEriPlo dE la razón " 141 conceptual que tendría profundas consecuencias en la filosofía medieval: la distinción entre esencia y existencia. Esa innovación aparece cuando se traducen los libros de Aristóteles al árabe: por ser ésta una lengua semítica no posee un equivalente al verbo 'ser'. La metafísica aristotélica consiste en una investigación del ser –'einai', sustantivizado en 'to on' el ser o el ente en griego, de donde viene 'ontología', ciencia del ser–, porque pretende descubrir los principios de todas las cosas, es decir, de todas las ciencias; y esos principios deben poderse distinguir en las propiedades del ser. Pero el verbo 'ser' con sus múltiples funciones gramaticales es propio de las lenguas indoeuropeas, las lenguas semitas carecen de él. Ello obliga a una traducción compleja de la metafísica aristotélica: la función gramatical del verbo 'ser' se traduce según las circunstancias por dos palabras árabes que cubren aproximadamente su campo semántico, y que luego serían vertidas al latín medieval como 'esencia' y 'existencia'. El vocablo 'esencia' se utiliza para designar las características definitorias de un objeto o naturaleza, tal como pueden ser descubiertas por el entendimiento; el vocablo designa 'existencia' su presencia actual en el tiempo, así que pueda ser percibido de algún modo entre los objetos que componen el universo. De esa manera es cómo apareció una nueva lectura 'existencialista' de Aristóteles entre los árabes, que luego será heredada por la Escolástica cristiana. Al-Farabi aprovecha esa circunstancia lingüística con el objetivo de distinguir entre Allah y las criaturas. Pues la esencia de Allah coincide con su existencia; la existencia pertenece a la esencia de Allah, que es por eso el Ser Necesario; en cambio en los seres creados la existencia es como un accidente que se añade a su esencia por la actividad divina, son los seres contingentes. Ese argumento ha tenido enorme éxito entre los teólogos monoteístas y constituyó uno de los ejes para la reflexión medieval, tanto islámica, como hebrea, y más adelante también para la escolástica cristiana. Pero a diferencia con los teólogos cristianos, 142 " nombrE autor o autorEs al-Farabi –influido por la teoría neoplatónica según la cual Allah crea necesariamente la realidad–, afirma que la existencia no es puramente accidental en las criaturas, sino necesaria al mismo tiempo que creada y contingente. Es una formulación metafísica, pre-científica, de un principio de economía fundamental para el pensamiento científico: la naturaleza no hace nada en vano. Ya he señalado las implicaciones morales y políticas de esa idea determinista sobre la conducta humana. Se trata un punto de vista característico en el periodo clásico de la filosofía musulmana, a través del cual se ofrece una perspectiva sobre la realidad que inspira confianza en las capacidades de la razón humana, tanto como en los designios de Allah. Al mismo tiempo, se subrayan las determinaciones que condicionan el devenir natural en forma de leyes cósmicas, las cuales pueden ser comprendidas por la razón humana y adecuadamente representadas por el lenguaje. Para entender bien esta cuestión, y en general todo este capítulo dedicado a la filosofía islámica, hay que saber cómo al-Farabi y los filósofos musulmanes enfocaron la lógica a partir de su estudio en Aristóteles. Pues esa metafísica se traduce en una construcción lógica del lenguaje, que es utilizado para la descripción científica del cosmos. Es decir, la lógica consiste en una depuración sistemática del lenguaje para hacer posible la conceptualización científica. La metafísica, como análisis previo de las categorías lingüísticas, contiene los rasgos básicos de la realidad que podemos conocer a través de los sentidos; y a través de su plasmación lógica, los principios de la metafísica hacen posible la construcción de una ciencia racional. La ciencia aristotélica se construye sobre una lógica bivalente, que asigna dos valores de verdad a los enunciados: una oración puede ser verdadera o falsa, según se adecue a la realidad observada empíricamente, o no. Una proposición descriptiva representa un hecho contingente, que puede suceder o no suceder, y por tanto puede representarse por esos dos valores. Para hablar El PEriPlo dE la razón " 143 de cosas del pasado que conocemos por experiencia, resulta útil una lógica con sólo dos valores de verdad: algo es verdadero o falso –según sea un suceso observable o no–, no hay una tercera posibilidad. Eso se conoce también como el principio del tercero excluido. Y así se descubren los tres axiomas fundamentales de una lógica bivalente: identidad –una cosa es idéntica a sí misma–, no contradicción –no puede ser y no ser al mismo tiempo– y tercero excluido –es o no es–.23 El requisito para poder construir una lógica de ese tipo es la definición precisa de los nombres involucrados en el razonamiento, evitando la ambigüedad y polivocidad del lenguaje cotidiano; y ése es el camino por medio del cual se ha desarrollado la moderna ciencia lógica formal, cuyo objetivo es construir un lenguaje científico como instrumento de transmisión de conocimientos empíricos. La ciencia busca leyes universales que son equivalentes en el pasado y en el futuro, trata de los hechos que no cambian en el tiempo, sino que se mantienen permanente idénticos, considerados en un plano abstracto. Se trata de una lógica basada en el discurso informativo, que nos sirve para describir la realidad conocida –llamado 'apofántico' por Aristóteles–, y que se distingue del expresivo con el que damos a conocer nuestros estados internos o el apelativo con el que queremos modificar las conductas de los otros. Cuando dejamos de lado la descripción científica de la realidad, lograda mediante el análisis del lenguaje y de sus relaciones con la experiencia sensible, y buscamos un discurso prescriptivo, para orientar las acciones humanas hacia finalidades deseables por su bondad intrínseca, se utiliza un lenguaje expresivo que no puede someterse a los principios de la lógica bivalente. Dado que las acciones humanas se desenvuelven en el plano de la 23. El descubrimiento de tales axiomas está expuesto en el Poema alegórico de Parménides en el siglo V a.n.e.: 'el ser es..., no es posible que sea y no sea..., es o no es'. 144 " nombrE autor o autorEs libertad consciente –por contraposición de lo que Aristóteles llama 'actos del hombre' que tienen un carácter necesario–, se hace necesario distinguir entre lo que se mantiene igual en la naturaleza y puede ser explicado por la legalidad científica, y lo que puede ser modificado por la acción humana. En este caso, la categoría de 'posibilidad' viene a sustituir a la categoría de 'contingencia', como lo que está inducido por la acción humana –donde la acción humana se convierte en un agente causal–. Por eso, el propio Aristóteles explorando las posibilidades del lenguaje, señalaba que hay varios tipos de lógica: al lado de la lógica formal silogística que él emplea en la descripción científica, establece una lógica modal con tres valores de verdad: lo posible, lo necesario y lo imposible –al que se le puede añadir lo contingente como un cuarto valor–. Si queremos establecer una lógica que dé cuenta de estadios futuros, y no sólo de situaciones conocidas en el pasado, necesitamos una lógica trivalente en sus diferentes versiones: modal, deóntica, temporal, etc., –puesto que el futuro tiene siempre un margen de incertidumbre–. Para que una lógica de estas características tenga sentido, es necesaria una voluntad moral de racionalizar la conducta humana, esto es, la voluntad de dirigir la conducta personal y social hacia fines racionales, y el deseo de explorar las posibilidades de racionalidad humana hacia el futuro incierto y desconocido, que se considera esencialmente diferente del pasado. En tales circunstancias se debe hacer valer un principio de prudencia –del que carece la civilización actual, por ejemplo–. O bien, dicho de otro modo, el problema de la decisión racional es distinguir qué es lo que permanece inmutable en lo acontecimientos, y podemos predecir en el futuro gracias a la experiencia pasada sistemática organizada por la ciencia, y qué es lo que puede ser cambiado por voluntad propia humana; aquí es donde entra el concepto de 'necesariamente contingente', que acuña al-Farabi. Esto es, El PEriPlo dE la razón " 145 ni más ni menos lo que algunos filósofos contemporáneos han llamado dialéctica.24 Una lógica trivalente tiene tres valores: verdadero, falso, e indeterminado o intermedio. Todo depende de las definiciones que están en la base del sistema científico y lo que con él se quiera representar; hoy en día, por ejemplo, se ha construido una lógica llamada intuicionista, que prescinde del principio de tercero excluido. Pues bien, la lógica que vemos aparecer en los textos que los filósofos musulmanes dedicaron a la metafísica, tiene la característica de ser una lógica trivalente o lógica modal.25 Lo cual es útil, si se quiere distinguir la metafísica como explicación de la racionalidad de los valores y los ideales –por tanto, garante de la racionalidad futura de la acción humana–, frente a la ciencia cuyo objetivo es hacer inteligible la experiencia y acumular conocimientos que provienen siempre del pasado.26 Hay una lógica trivalente que proviene de Aristóteles y fue desarrollada por la tradición filosófica europea, a través de los estoicos y la escolástica. La teología cristiana utilizó esas categorías para oponer el Ser Necesario identificado con Dios, con el ser contingente o ser creado. Sin embargo, la metafísica judeomusulmana medieval, heredera del determinismo neoplatónico, no opone lo necesario a lo contingente al modo de los teólogos cristianos, sino que establece tres categorías de seres: el ser necesario, cuya existencia no puede no darse, Allah o Yavéh; el ser sólo posible accidentalmente –para lo que se utiliza el término 24. Por eso Ernst Bloch argumenta que esta metafísica medieval judeomusulmana es el antecedente del materialismo dialéctico, op.cit. 25. Mahomed Ábed Yabri, op.cit. 26. Se puede observar aquí la profunda irracionalidad de la civilización industrial moderna, que prescinde de cualquier proyección futura de las actuales tendencias destructivas de la naturaleza viva del planeta Tierra, y que deriva del reduccionismo científico-técnico de la realidad. 146 " nombrE autor o autorEs técnico de 'contingente'–; y el ser que pertenece a las dos categorías a la vez, posible y necesario, necesariamente posible. Y la realidad que percibimos sensiblemente pertenece a esta tercera categoría, porque la emanación no es un acto libre de la voluntad divina, sino una creación necesaria y completamente determinista del universo material. El uso de esta lógica trivalente no se dirige a describir la experiencia pasada, sino a comprender nuestra conducta futura como una acción a la vez necesaria –determinada por los acontecimientos causales del pasado– y posible –determinada por nuestras decisiones personales–. Es decir, se trata de un uso moral de la metafísica, bajo la idea de que nuestra conducta está determinada por los acontecimientos sin dejar de ser libre y consciente –tal como propugna la ética intelectualista de al-Farabi, en línea con la tradición de la ética clásica griega–. Esa sutil distinción tiene, por tanto, importantes consecuencias de tipo moral. Frente a la concepción cristiana de la libertad como 'libre arbitrio de indiferencia', que entiende la elección personal como una decisión desligada de condicionantes efectivos, y que explica el mal moral como consecuencia de un acto deliberado de la voluntad humana en pecado original, la metafísica musulmana tiende a explicar la decisión personal como consecuencia de un proceso causalmente determinado, entendiendo los condicionantes biográficos e históricos que pesan en las acciones humanas y explicando el mal moral como un resultado de la ignorancia. Así se hace evidente el mandato moral del conocimiento, la interpretación simbólica de la religión como instrumento de elevación cultural del pueblo, la obligación de explicar esos símbolos al pueblo, etc. En cierto modo, esa lógica trivalente se corresponde con la dialéctica como modo de pensar la realidad natural: la realidad como síntesis de opuestos, tal como aparece en Heráclito o LaoTsé, por poner dos ejemplos paradigmáticos. En la Escolástica la veremos reaparecer en la metafísica de Duns Escoto, en el ReEl PEriPlo dE la razón " 147 nacimiento alemán viene de la mano del místico Jakob Boehme y finalmente toma forma moderna idealista con Hegel. En todos ellos la inmanencia y la dialéctica aparecen como conceptos complementarios del sistema de pensamiento. Si Hegel siguiendo a Heráclito, une los conceptos del ser y la nada para entender la realidad como devenir, los sabios islámicos y judíos medievales, en dependencia de la religión revelada y de las características estructurales de la lengua semita, unen la necesidad y la contingencia, para producir el concepto de lo 'contingentemente necesario' o 'necesariamente contingente': la emanación como creación necesaria, el universo como un desarrollo determinado por leyes universales y necesarias provenientes de la actividad divina inmanente a la naturaleza. Se trata de una forma de pensamiento con una honda raigambre naturalista y racional, que ha estado presente en todas las épocas de la filosofía. Su objetivo es pensar las cosas concretas en su dimensión temporal y en su cualidad individual, evitando las abstracciones propias del entendimiento humano que obstaculizan la decisión racional, las generalizaciones que pierden los detalles cualitativos de la realidad presente que tan importantes son para la vida moral. Pero es claro que esa descripción metafísica está en dependencia del lenguaje que se utiliza como referencia. Tal vez el redescubrimiento de la filosofía por los europeos del Renacimiento, su deslumbramiento por los sabios griegos que de alguna manera condujo a la ciencia moderna, se debió al hecho de que la lengua de los clásicos griegos era tan indoeuropea como el latín que fue la lengua científica en aquella época. En cambio la lengua árabe introducía categorías extrañas a la mentalidad europea, modelada sobre el latín, que generaron no pocas confusiones, y quizás hasta conflictos internos entre los intelectuales y el poder político y religioso. 148 " nombrE autor o autorEs 2.2. avicena (ibn sina; afsana, 980 – haMadán 1037), La MaduRez LoGRada Cuando Tomás de Aquino escriba su importante opúsculo de ens et essencia, citará a dos filósofos musulmanes como las máximas autoridades de la sabiduría; además del Filósofo (Aristóteles) y el Comentador (Averroes), el tercero es Avicena, quien creó el sistema filosófico mejor estructurado de la cultura islámica. Ese dato bibliográfico nos debe dar una idea de la importancia de los filósofos musulmanes como vehículos y continuadores de la tradición racional en el pensamiento. Pero debemos tener en cuenta que la reflexión de Tomás de Aquino es reactiva, se hace en contra las doctrinas de los filósofos materialistas para salvaguardar la primacía del dogma católico y tratar de combatir esas doctrinas, que se expandían entre los estudiosos europeos minando la autoridad de la Iglesia. Que una doctrina filosófica sea peligrosa para el orden establecido no es de extrañar, como se puede observar con el problema de las herejías. Pero ¿cuáles son los principios metafísicos de Avicena que lo hacen tan subversivo para el orden trascendental establecido? Hay tres doctrinas de su filosofía que son incompatibles con la teología cristiana dogmática: a) la eternidad y sustancialidad de la materia y el mundo constituido por ella, frente a la desvalorización de la realidad sensible por el espiritualismo clerical; b) la inexorabilidad de las leyes causales como fundamento para el conocimiento científico de la realidad, frente a las creencias en la magia y los milagros: la trascendencia no interviene en la realidad material –o sólo lo hace a través de la acción humana en cuanto realidad interna a lo humano–; c) la subordinación de la fe, a la razón: la creencia subjetiva religiosa está por debajo de la verdad objetiva de la ciencia; por tanto, se afirma la validez del método científico de investigación frente al predominio de la verdad establecida por El PEriPlo dE la razón " 149 la autoridad religiosa. En conjunto, la sabiduría de Avicena es un materialismo racionalista que le creó no pocos problemas con los poderes de este mundo. Nació en una región perteneciente al antiguo imperio persa, hijo del gobernador de la provincia. Avicena fue un niño prodigio con una extraordinaria memoria e inteligencia, que recibió una esmerada educación y quien, según escribió en su autobiografía, no había nada que no hubiera aprendido a la edad de 18 años. Más tarde ocupó diversos cargos en diversas ciudades, como médico y visir, teniendo que padecer las alternativas de la agitada vida política de su país, sin dejar de investigar y trabajar en sus libros. Es considerado como uno de los más grandes pensadores de la historia y uno de los científicos más importantes en medicina. Escribió 99 textos, entre los que cuenta su importantísimo canon de Medicina, que fue traducido e impreso 8 veces en Venecia en el siglo XVI y que todavía era usado en los estudios universitarios europeos en el XIX. 2.2.1. La concepción materialista de la inmanencia Muchos textos de Avicena se han perdido, como la importante filosofía oriental, donde afirmaba su fe panteísta, inspirándose en el neoplatonismo: allah es el alma del cosmos, que penetra como un fluido la naturaleza, para mantener su unidad y cohesión. El universo es visto por el médico Avicena como un cuerpo orgánico, como una unidad funcional: el modelo de la realidad es el organismo vivo. No hay una trascendencia sobrenatural más allá del universo material, pues el cuerpo celeste es el propio Allah, que con su giro eterno mueve y dirige toda la realidad. Es la teoría aristotélica del Primer Motor, depurada de sus tentaciones espiritualistas; la propia materia es la fuente de su 150 " nombrE autor o autorEs movimiento y contiene los principios de su autoorganización.27 Su metafísica defiende así un materialismo no mecanicista, que intuye la emergencia de realidades ontológicas complejas a partir de la simplicidad mecánica de la materia inerte. Pues el médico Avicena necesita explicarse la vida para poder conservarla, trata con problemas prácticos urgentes como son la enfermedad y la salud, y busca una teoría funcionalista de la realidad para ser eficaz; no puede inventarse fuerzas mágicas o demoníacas como causa de los fenómenos, ni reducir su práctica a una interpretación mecánica de las fuerzas naturales. De esa visión certera de los problemas vitales se deriva el enorme éxito de sus escritos médicos de Avicena, el canon de Medicina y el Libro de la curación, que iluminaron durante siglos la práctica de la medicina. Como estudioso de la medicina, Avicena unió la tradición greco-romana de Hipócrates y Galeno, con la medicina islámica y los conocimientos de las escuelas indias sushruta y charaka. La teoría resultante, llamada unani, se basa en la idea de que hay cuatro humores principales en el cuerpo, bilis, bilis negra, sangre y flema, de modo que la salud depende del adecuado equilibrio entre ellos. Estableció que la práctica del ejercicio físico es fundamental para la salud; recomendó los baños de agua fría, los masajes y la higiene corporal; respecto de la dieta aseguró que nuestra salud depende de que la nutrición sea apropiada para nosotros y la regulemos en cantidad y cualidad. Investigó enfermedades infecciosas y contagiosas y explicó sus causas y remedios. También describió diversas alteraciones psíquicas, alucinaciones, insomnio, vértigo, pesadillas, epilepsia, etc., y estudió enfermedades mentales como la melancolía y las fobias. 27. Seguimos la interpretación de Ernst Bloch, en el libro citado. Sin embargo, Yabri (en op.cit.) ha hecho una evaluación radicalmente diferente del pensamiento de Avicena que no comparto, y que me parece ideológicamente vinculada a las rivalidades entre sunníes y chiíes. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 151 Avicena fue funcionario de los emiratos persas y practicó la medicina tanto en la corte, como entre el pueblo; es fama que atendía a los pacientes pobres sin cobrarles nada. Por eso, la reflexión de Avicena está directamente ligada al surgimiento y desarrollo de un Estado persa independiente, aunque toma como modelo el impulso cultural que se desarrolló en Bagdad a favor de una racionalización de la cultura. La mayor parte de sus libros están escritos en lengua árabe, que era la lengua científica de su época; un pequeño número en cambio fue escrito también en persa. El nacionalismo de Avicena parece relacionado con su filosofía oriental, cuya inspiración parece situarse en el simbolismo y las expresiones místico religiosas de la secta ismailí, una rama de la variante chií del Islam. Sus familiares, padre y hermano, pertenecieron a los Hermanos de la Pureza, aquellos científicos empiristas con un programa de educación popular, que al mismo tiempo defendían la igualdad radical de todos los seres humanos y apoyaban posiciones independentistas frente al califato abasí de Bagdad –donde más tarde se quemaría la enciclopedia de este movimiento humanista–. Por eso, el aspecto místico de Avicena tal vez pueda relacionarse con sus pasiones nacionalistas, como hace Bloch, pero sabemos por otra parte que es una característica esencial del pensamiento islámico. Ese misticismo no puede equivocarnos acerca del auténtico significado de la filosofía de Avicena, como un esfuerzo de interpretación racional de la realidad en un sentido científico y humanista. Toma sus ideas de al-Farabi para desarrollarlas más ampliamente, construyendo un sistema de pensamiento que despertó admiración en los filósofos medievales. A partir de la distinción entre esencia y existencia de aquél, fue el primero en desarrollar un importante razonamiento para la demostración de la existencia de la divinidad, el argumento ontológico: basta pensar la esencia de la divinidad como no contradictoria para que de 152 " nombrE autor o autorEs ello se derive necesariamente su existencia. La esencia de Allah es existir y todos los demás seres existen por Él. De ahí deduce Avicena que la materia es eterna, pues a una causa eterna, el Ser Divino, le corresponde un efecto eterno, el universo material. Como al-Farabi, pensaba que Allah crea necesariamente la realidad, lo cual tiene una lectura determinista: todo es necesario por la existencia de Allah, –que es la interpretación teológica del pensamiento de Avicena–; pero también tiene una lectura panteísta: como todas las cosas son necesarias, por sí mismas emerge a partir de la realidad de Allah, quien constituye su unidad orgánica, integrada y coherente.28 Por lo tanto el mundo ha sido creado desde toda la eternidad, 'el mundo es eterno en esencia y creado en su existencia'. Veámoslo con más detalle. 2.2.2. La metafísica organicista de avicena El sistema filosófico se divide en tres partes: a) los estudios propedéuticos que son la lógica y las matemáticas, ejercitan la mente en el método científico y preparan para el conocimiento racional de la realidad; b) la enciclopedia, el compendio científico natural donde se describen los resultados alcanzados en todo tipo de investigaciones; y c) la metafísica que contiene los principios de la explicación del mundo, obtenidos a partir de la reflexión sobre los conocimientos empíricos. La coherencia del pensamiento de Avicena consistió en proyectar su práctica médica sobre una ontología que dibujaba su método conceptual. Así aparece la Metafísica, obra admirada en su tiempo por 28. Una concepción teológica que podría ser interpretada desde una ontología emergentista contemporánea, tal como Teilhard de Chardin ha defendido la aparición de Dios como un resultado de la evolución cósmica, una emergencia de la realidad espiritual a partir de la historia humana. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 153 constituir un modelo de sistema filosófico, cuando los escritos de los grandes clásicos griegos todavía andaban perdidos. Ese sistema metafísico es un resumen sintético de sus conocimientos empíricos y de su método de trabajo científico, y por serlo sirve de fundamento a la ulterior investigación científica, especialmente en el terreno médico. Tanto como en él se contiene el sistema de valores que inspira la acción humanista del filósofo: una actividad que tiene como fundamento un empirismo naturalista fundado en principios racionales, la confianza acerca de la capacidad del entendimiento humano para descubrir la verdad mediante la investigación. La Metafísica comienza con una introducción en la que se va exponer el carácter racional del conocimiento. Avicena se pregunta qué le pasaría a un hombre que no tuviera ninguna relación con el mundo por habérsele privado de cualquier tipo de sensaciones. Ese hombre pensaría, y al pensar descubriría ciertas ideas: el ser, la causa, lo necesario, lo uno. En la intuición del ser descubriría su propia existencia; de las otras nociones se desprende la existencia de Allah, el Uno, Ser Necesario y Causa Eficiente. No es difícil reconocer en esa narración el principio mismo del racionalismo: existen ideas que son independientes de la percepción sensible, mero producto de nuestro intelecto, las ideas innatas evidentes para la intuición intelectual de todo ser humano. Es la misma deducción que hará Descartes seis siglos más tarde para poner el fundamento del racionalismo europeo, con la diferencia de que Avicena no pone tanto énfasis en la subjetividad personal. Pues esas ideas que la conciencia posee no provienen de sí misma: el entendimiento agente que produce las ideas, es colectivo y eterno; sólo el entendimiento pasivo, que retiene las ideas en la memoria, es individual. Y si ahora traducimos esa epistemología de Avicena a nuestra fraseología moderna, diríamos que el pensamiento humano no es sólo el resultado de los procesos del cerebro individual, que produce esa 154 " nombrE autor o autorEs excrecencia a causa de su volumen especial o de las circunvalaciones de la materia gris; el pensamiento racional se hace posible por el lenguaje como instancia colectiva de la humanidad. Las ideas que tomamos como nuestras son un producto de la vida social; la conciencia tiene una realidad propia en la medida en que participa de una realidad más amplia de carácter colectivo. Esta es la causa de que el ser humano descubra inmediatamente a la divinidad que lleva dentro de sí, al reconocer que sus ideas le han sido proporcionadas por una inteligencia colectiva que trasciende su individualidad y que es la condición misma de su subjetividad. Una deducción mucho más natural en la metafísica de Avicena que en el juego conceptual del discurso del método cartesiano, donde la aparición de Dios resulta un tanto forzada, con el objetivo de resolver los problemas del solipsismo cristiano, que considera de una manera un tanto artificiosa –y en última instancia irracional–, al alma individual en relación directa con su creador. Ese entendimiento agente es una Inteligencia cósmica que ilumina el alma de toda la humanidad proporcionándole el conocimiento intelectual de la realidad. Es universal, por tanto; ninguna secta, religiosa o no, tiene su monopolio. En su adaptación de la metafísica aristotélica, Avicena establece la distinción propia de la teoría hylemórfica: la composición dual de la realidad. Los dos principios metafísicos de la realidad natural son materia y forma. La materia es pensada como una realidad independiente, en donde reside la potencia para existir: la materia absoluta es su propio receptáculo sin tener composición. Las formas necesitan un receptáculo para existir, por eso el receptáculo es la posibilidad de su existencia. Ese receptáculo, materia prima o absoluta, está antes que la forma, puesto que la forma es en acto y, para ser, necesita haber sido antes posible. La posibilidad de existir de la forma se da en la materia. De ahí se desprende la eternidad de la materia que es la substancia bajo el aspecto de la potencia. Esa materia prima es El PEriPlo dE la razón " 155 como arcilla fresca que puede adoptar miles de formas diferentes en manos del alfarero que fabrica los cacharros de la cocina, o como madera nueva que el carpintero modela para hacer sus muebles. Otro argumento para establecer la eternidad de la materia es que Allah crea necesariamente el mundo, por lo que su existencia necesaria se trasmite también a la realidad material existente, como necesariamente creada. Siguiendo la lógica trivalente que es propia del pensamiento islámico, los seres se clasifican según Avicena en tres categorías modales: el Ser necesario, el ser contingente y el 'ser posible por sí, pero necesario por otro'. La creación es necesaria, según los presupuestos neoplatónicos heredados por la filosofía islámica, así que el estatus de la realidad sensible que conocemos, es la posibilidad que se realiza necesariamente. Es una terminología que tiende a la introducción de la causa final en la explicación de los fenómenos; esa finalidad es necesaria, como lo son las funciones corporales en los seres vivos. Se trata de conceptualizar el concepto de función y su correspondiente concepto de estructura funcional, que da origen a una totalidad integrada con propiedades emergentes, según la explicación aristotélica del ser vivo como sistema holista. Esa explicación funcionalista es propia de las ciencias biológicas. Otro concepto elaborado según esa lógica trivalente es el que nos habla del ser 'temporalmente eterno y esencialmente temporal', que es la propia materia prima: la materia existe por siempre, pero cambia permanentemente, de modo que el tiempo existe por la materia y viceversa; la materia es tiempo y el tiempo es materia. En la física, según al-Farabi, el estado de los cuerpos puede ser el de 'movimiento' –que cae bajo la categoría del tiempo–, el de 'reposo' –nos da el espacio–, y el 'movimiento de apoyo o reposo variable' –la existencia de la cosa en el espacio en dos momentos diferentes que es la propia realidad del mundo sensible–. Más tarde, Averroes se apoyará en esa concepción del 156 " nombrE autor o autorEs tiempo como resultante del movimiento, para demostrar su eternidad, pues si suponemos un tiempo creado, podemos preguntarnos qué había antes de su creación; pero al preguntarlo estamos hablando ya en términos temporales, por lo que el tiempo es un a priori de nuestro conocimiento sensible del universo natural. En definitiva, la lógica trivalente nos dice que las abstracciones analíticas, que nos sirven para interpretar la experiencia sensible separando sus diversos aspectos, deben volver a unirse en un concepto que represente una síntesis adecuada para la descripción del mundo real. Se trata de las primeras aproximaciones al método de análisis y síntesis, que con su desarrollo histórico culminará en la revolución científica del Renacimiento. Por tanto, el Ser Necesario es espiritual, como sistema de relaciones de los cuerpos materiales –en cuanto 'alma del mundo' que emerge de la totalidad cósmica para sostenerla en su unidad integrada y coherente–; y aunque la materia es meramente posible, la realidad es la creación necesaria del mundo por Allah –el principio espiritual–, y tanto la materia como los seres materiales participan de Su necesidad. Esa lógica trivalente tiende a evitar el dualismo de los seres espirituales y los seres materiales, entendiendo el cosmos como una realidad unitaria e indescomponible, donde lo espiritual no es más que el orden de las relaciones sistemáticas entre los elementos simples que componen la complejidad real. Más que una realidad intermedia entre los dos opuestos de materia y espíritu, el cosmos es la realidad unitaria de materia y espíritu. De ese modo la materia, como posibilidad que se realiza necesariamente y receptáculo de las formas, deja de ser el elemento meramente pasivo de la realidad: todas las cosas tienden al ser por su deseo natural y su amor innato, este amor es la causa de su existencia. De lo que se deduce que Allah, como Causa Eficiente de toda la realidad, es el amor a la existencia de los seres de este mundo, y como Causa Final de todos los seres, es la existencia misma que éstos anhelan El PEriPlo dE la razón " 157 en comunión cósmica; pero también que la Causa Cósmica es ese amor que reside en la materia como posibilidad de existir, la cual de ese modo adquiere rasgos divinos. Hay una tensión, una energía en los seres de este mundo que buscan su realización en la existencia. Lo que existe es la 'forma material', la forma que existe en un receptáculo material y que no puede prescindir de ese receptáculo para existir, como tampoco la materia no puede existir sin forma alguna. De ahí la necesidad mutua que lleva a la unión de ambas. Hay una energía que lleva a la existencia de los seres y esa energía, amor a la existencia, es intrínseca a ellos mismos, producida por la necesidad de la forma por la materia y de la materia por la forma. Pero ese deseo puede frustrarse: el mal se da cuando algo que está en potencia, se ve privado de la perfección al realizarse; el mal es la materia en la medida que no alcanza el pleno desarrollo de la forma. Si la materia es la morada del no-ser, lo es solo como posibilidad no realizada. De ese modo, el mal es relativo a lo particular o individual en la medida en que éste no alcanza la existencia; puesto que en la materia y en la forma hay un amor innato por la unión de ambas, que puede quedar insatisfecho cuando la fuerza poderosa que lleva a la producción de lo real selecciona lo que es apto para existir. Pues los verdaderos seres son aptos para la perfección extrema y toda la realidad se encamina hacia ella: la materia desea ardientemente la forma ausente y se abraza estrechamente a aquélla por la cual existe. Como el Tao de Lao-Tsé, la energía que construye la realidad mundana es una fuerza material que late en el abismo más profundo del cosmos, aspirando a configurarse en la riqueza de las formas materiales, eclosionando en la miríada de los seres, en la felicidad de una pasión por existir por fin materializada. Es índice de una profunda penetración psicológica por parte de Avicena, el haber situado el origen del mal en la frustración de las potencialidades existenciales; es decir, no en la incapacidad o la insuficiencia 158 " nombrE autor o autorEs para ser que residiría en la materia, sino en la sobreabundancia de la potencia y en la lucha por existir dentro de la comunión eterna del cosmos. Se trata de un pensamiento fuertemente inmanentista, que no niega la trascendencia divina y la espiritualidad de las formas separadas, pero que las subordina a la unidad profunda de toda la realidad. Pues hay también formas separadas, que están completamente libres de materia como el alma y la inteligencia, y éstas constituyen el segundo estrato de lo real. Esas formas espirituales aparecen relacionadas con ciertas formas que son materiales, pero que pueden abandonar la materia en ciertas condiciones. Así el alma humana que se reúne con otras almas en el cielo después de la muerte, según una antropología similar a la platónica reelaborada por el estoico Posidonio. Pero también hay otras almas e inteligencias que habitan en las esferas celestes y se encargan de su movimiento; en la cúspide del sistema, el Alma del Mundo es Allah, de donde proviene la Inteligencia Suprema como su primera emanación y luego en sucesivas emanaciones todas las demás sustancias separadas. Así aunque Avicena admite el ser espiritual separado de la materia, éste siempre está en relación con algún aspecto material del universo, incluido el propio Allah al que se identifica como el alma del mundo. Pues lo espiritual es propiamente la relación entre objetos complementarios, la unión de funciones que se fusionan en la unidad, el amor por la existencia. 2.2.3. El problema de la finalidad en la explicación del orden cósmico y en la naturaleza humana Por tanto, el ser puede mostrarse de tres maneras: a) en los seres concretos que constituyen el mundo sensible, b) en el espíritu de las formas separadas, y c) como ser intencional, que es el factor común de los dos anteriores. El ser humano es el El PEriPlo dE la razón " 159 gozne entre dos mundos, el espíritu y la materia, y esa cualidad de vivir entre dos mundos se nos muestra como síntesis procesual en el tiempo: la experiencia sensible, que nos ofrece el mundo de los cuerpos materiales y concretos, está dirigida hacia una finalidad ideal por un proyecto personal y consciente, esto es lo que constituye la intención. Es éste un tema fundamental en toda la filosofía medieval. La intencionalidad es propia de la subjetividad humana, que busca la realización de sus ideales a través de la práctica material. El ser intencional constituye el lazo de unión entre el espíritu y la materia, lo que podría tener una consecuencia muy importante: el espíritu actúa en la materia a través de la intencionalidad humana para alcanzar sus finalidades. Eso es puro idealismo, porque el sabio islámico no renuncia a los ideales, al tiempo que realiza su investigación científica fundándose en una ontología materialista. Ese idealismo viene acentuado por la visión del mundo como una entidad ordenada, armoniosa y total –holista en sentido aristotélico–, establecida por la realidad divina inmanente. Esa finalidad objetiva y necesaria del proceso cósmico, que se autoproduce en la creación natural, se corresponde con la finalidad subjetiva de la conciencia intencional humana. Pero ¿no estamos vistiendo de modernidad a Avicena? Le hemos visto asignar una finalidad de existencia a la materia, 'un amor innato' por las formas que le confieren el existir. Por tanto, ¿no hay aquí una visión antropomórfica del mundo, o al menos un uso alegórico de la personalidad humana proyectada sobre el cosmos? Quizás debemos ver aquí la analogía del microcosmos con el macrocosmos, propia de los alquimistas medievales entre los que se encontraban sus familiares de los Hermanos de la Pureza. Podemos pensar en la materia como una energía dirigida a su realización, en ciertas formas prescritas en el devenir determinista del cosmos, una realización preformada y necesariamente producida por Allah, Alma del Mundo. 160 " nombrE autor o autorEs En la intención, la finalidad precede a la realidad existente, es el motor y causa de la realidad, como cuando se dice que las esencias aman la existencia; antes de que existan los seres concretos son puestos por la intencionalidad, esto es por el deseo y la voluntad –por utilizar un lenguaje que aparecerá en Avicebrón como un eco occidental del pensamiento avicénico–; aunque en el tiempo real del universo material el fin sea posterior, la preeminencia metafísica de la finalidad es anterior. De ese modo, Avicena sigue la teoría de las cuatro causas aristotélicas: el agente o principio del movimiento, la materia o posibilidad, la forma inteligible y el fin o causa final a la que tiende todas y cada una de las realidades de este mundo. Al subrayar la importancia de la causa final puede verse un rasgo de idealismo en Avicena, como en los filósofos de la Grecia clásica. Y del mismo modo que en Aristóteles la finalidad es comprendida a través de la observación de la vida con la agudeza propia del científico, esa visión de Avicena también puede interpretarse como un resultado de su práctica médica, en donde los organismos vivos son comprendidos como estructuras en equilibrio funcional cuyo objetivo definido consiste en mantenerse con vida; es decir, que en las ciencias de la vida predomina el concepto de función, la actividad dirigida al fin de la sobrevivencia, y por tanto el modelo metafísico de los conceptos biológicos necesita plasmar la idea de un sistema funcional. Pero tanto en el filósofo griego como en el persa, el equívoco aparece al confundir en una sola, dos formas diferentes de teleología –actividad dirigida a una finalidad–, que hoy sabemos distinguir una: la funcionalidad propia de las funciones vitales, cuya finalidad envuelve necesidad –y puede denominarse 'teleonomía'–29, 29. Así lo hace Jacques Monod en su libro el azar y la necesidad, sobre los principios de la biología. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 161 con la intencionalidad de los sujetos humanos; y otra que toman decisiones para dirigir su acción hacia la consecución de ciertos objetivos que se han reconocido como buenos. La construcción de fines a través de ideales y valores es un elemento esencial de la práctica humana, que Avicena puede estar aquí intuyendo sin la necesaria claridad analítica; y confunde esa propiedad de los sujetos conscientes con la funcionalidad de las estructuras holistas. No hay distinción entre los fines decididos por la conciencia subjetiva y los fines necesarios puestos por la naturaleza. Pero hay una explicación para esa indiferencia. El equilibrio es la clave de la vida, y todo cuerpo biológico se esfuerza por mantenerse dentro de las constantes vitales; es lo que podemos llamar una finalidad necesaria o teleología objetiva. Diferente es la finalidad que aparece en la persona que toma decisiones, para alcanzar unos objetivos conscientes; llamamos sujeto a una persona que establece sus fines autónomamente. Lo que falta en los filósofos medievales –como por otra parte en Aristóteles– es la noción de persona autónoma como sujeto de su propia trayectoria moral. Para ellos los fines humanos son naturales y objetivos, independientes de su voluntad; la persona debe alcanzarlos con su actividad moral, para ser feliz el sujeto necesita lograr su plenitud a través de sus fines naturales. Por tanto, esa confusión no resulta extraña, si tenemos en cuenta que para el racionalismo islámico, la intencionalidad humana establece sus fines de forma necesaria, por el determinismo cósmico que rige toda acción. Tal vez podamos situar en este punto el debate filosófico entre los musulmanes deterministas, que defienden la predestinación, y los que niegan ésta afirmando en consecuencia la existencia de un margen de libertad humana para la decisión. Éstos últimos abogan por una subjetividad que elige los fines de su acción de forma autónoma. Por lo demás en el pensamiento científico social, tendremos que esperar hasta la dialéctica marxista para encontrar claridad suficiente en estos temas. 162 " nombrE autor o autorEs 2.2.4. Materia, vida, espíritu La materia es movimiento, posee la energía para el cambio permanente y eterno. No necesita de otro para existir: es increada y a partir de ella se puede crear todo. Lo que necesita es una Causa Final, la forma, un principio de equilibrio, armonía y perfección, que orienta su movimiento hacia el orden cósmico; va de ese modo de la unidad informe del caos que no puede existir, hacia unidad sistemática de las formas diferenciadas en el cosmos orgánico universal. Puesto que posee el amor por la existencia, encierra la capacidad de engendrar la realidad. En esa tensión febril se prefigura la natura naturans de Spinoza, la naturaleza creadora que vendrá a ocupar el lugar vacante del dios monoteísta trascendente. Es una materia, que –como indica Bloch– en ciertos aspectos está muy por encima del concepto de materia mecánica que predomina en la ciencia 'occidental'. La importancia de ese concepto es la comprensión de que el movimiento de la materia no es puramente mecánico, ya sometido a las leyes deterministas de la causalidad física o a los azares de los choques atómicos; por el contrario está orientado hacia la plenitud de una naturaleza ya incoada en su mismo principio, desde la eternidad de su aparición. Como Leibniz señalará para el racionalismo moderno, el determinismo proviene de la finalidad de perfección a la que está destinado el universo entero; con la salvedad de que Avicena contempla cómo esa perfección que puede frustrarse, incluso considerando que constituye el anhelo más poderoso de la realidad existente. El universo en toda su extensión es visto como un sistema orgánico en el que todas las partes se corresponden, para alcanzar su máximo de potencialidad, su máximo de existencia. Allah es el principio motor de esa cosmología, la energía que despliega las partes, la perfección lograda de su movimiento, la unidad profunda de todo lo que existe. Es el propio universo en toda su extensión. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 163 Un nuevo concepto de materia empieza a germinar en Avicena: la materia es potencia como posibilidad, puede adoptar cualquier forma que esté predeterminada en la creación divina; pero es también potencia en sentido de capacidad activa para constituir el mundo formado. De ese modo, Allah puede verse como un mero inductor de un proceso cósmico ya predispuesto en la materia eterna. La potencia divina queda absorbida por la materia activa, como el semen que hace fructificar el vientre materno y se desarrolla en un cuerpo vivo. Es ésta una materia viva, pues posee una finalidad inscrita; su movimiento no es meramente mecánico, está ordenado en el sistema cósmico por una finalidad que viene a darle forma; su actividad es un desarrollo predispuesto para adoptar ciertas formas esenciales, que ya estaban inscritas en su origen seminal; es una materia informada por un código interno, ordenada por leyes funcionales que rigen su evolución y orientada hacia un futuro determinado de antemano. Y es así como la visión organicista del médico Avicena se proyecta en la realidad cósmica. El cuerpo vivo es el modelo de la realidad. Lo cual no está reñido con el respeto escrupuloso por la causalidad descubierta mediante la observación empírica, convenientemente interpretada por la razón. Pues del mismo modo que los movimientos y las afecciones del ser vivo tienen una explicación causal físico-química de tipo mecánico y otra explicación funcional basada en las necesidades orgánicas, esas correlaciones de hechos que llamamos causas y efectos son puestas al servicio de una realidad superior, la totalidad orgánica del universo que constituye un ser animado, habitado por Allah, Alma del Mundo. Y contra las leyendas de la religión revelada, el cuerpo no resucita. Lo que sucede es que hay una forma del alma racional que es imperecedera: se trata de la razón común a todos los seres humanos que debe distinguirse del entendimiento individual de cada uno. En la vida colectiva de la humanidad aparece una emergencia del ser espiritual, que no muere con el cuerpo. Pero 164 " nombrE autor o autorEs ese espíritu es la comunidad de todos los seres humanos por la razón colectiva. De ese modo, Avicena desarrolla la doctrina del entendimiento agente de Aristóteles, que era oscura e indefinida en ese autor, y que fue precisada por Alejandro de Afrodisia. El entendimiento pasivo o paciente, es individual y permanece ligado a la materia, su función es recoger las elaboraciones del entendimiento agente y guardarlas en la memoria. En cambio, el entendimiento agente es la razón común, activa y capaz de extraer los conceptos e ideas a partir de la experiencia sensible; por eso es único y representa así la unidad de la humanidad. Eso es entender el espíritu: el alma individual es apenas un grado de la organización de la materia, pero la unidad de las conciencias en el ente social es ya una realidad espiritual. Es la razón colectiva, el lenguaje que abstrae las formas inteligibles contenidas en las sensaciones que captamos mediante los sentidos. Una interpretación sencilla y moderna de esa idea sería identificar el entendimiento agente con el lenguaje, verdadero artífice del conocimiento de los seres humanos, puesto que les permite desarrollar una experiencia compartida de la realidad sensible. El lenguaje es inmortal, pues permanece en la vida colectiva; aunque no se puede pretender que sea eterno –o esa pretensión es interpretable–. En cambio, el entendimiento pasivo no es más que la memoria personal que muere con el cuerpo. De ese modo en la filosofía de Avicena está delineada la teoría emergentista que será fundamental en la filosofía del siglo XX, aunque en este filósofo todavía aparezca mezclada con ideas mítico-religiosas. La materia es capaz de producir la vida, porque contiene una potencialidad activa y creadora. La vida produce el espíritu, porque se hace humanidad como actividad colectiva realizada unitariamente a través del proceso de conocimiento. La razón activa o fuerza eficiente del conocimiento, ilumina nuestro entendimiento haciendo surgir la imagen del cosmos, y es el órEl PEriPlo dE la razón " 165 gano rector de lo humano mediante la abstracción de las formas inteligibles por las que conocemos la realidad. Esa interpretación del conocimiento se inserta en una mitología astral derivada del emanatismo neoplatónico, y también adoptada por la Cábala judía: el entendimiento agente es un elemento del espíritu divino, es el término inferior de una serie de inteligencias cósmicas que van desde el Ser Supremo hasta el ser humano, pasando por los espíritus planetarios. Así, mediante la unidad de su intelecto, la humanidad participa de la esencia divina. El Intelecto Agente está en contacto permanente con las almas de todos los seres humanos, ilumina el entendimiento individual y pasivo para llevarlo a la comprensión de la realidad. Esa teoría del conocimiento constituye, al mismo tiempo que una alternativa al profetismo, un peligro para las instituciones clericales y los poderes establecidos, pues se basa en la idea de la racionalidad de todos los seres humanos y su capacidad para conocer la realidad. La doctrina contiene una creencia en la unidad del género humano frente al sectarismo de las religiones; de ese modo promueve la tolerancia y el entendimiento entre todos los seres humanos, puesto que la verdad es la totalización común de la entera experiencia humana. A través del entendimiento agente se crea una comunión entre las conciencias de todos los hombres, regidas por los mismos valores e ideales más allá de las creencias particulares. La razón colectiva nos provee así de una ley moral natural en la que la justicia es el valor central. La moral universal es el contenido auténtico de las religiones particulares y está muy por encima de sus símbolos y sus ceremonias, de los cuales tiene que desprenderse para encontrar su verdad práctica: la convivencia humana. Esa ley natural establece la igualdad natural de todos los seres humanos como miembros de la comunidad racional. Y esa igualdad sitúa a la justicia en el eje central de sus exigencias morales, como equilibrio de las relaciones humanas y como razón común activa del género humano. 166 " nombrE autor o autorEs 2.3. La Reacción antiRRacionaLista: La fe PoR enciMa de La Razón A pesar de su esfuerzo por conciliar la razón con la fe y de la sinceridad de sus convicciones religiosas –matizadas por la voluntad de pensar racionalmente la fe–, la convivencia entre los filósofos musulmanes y las instituciones políticas aconsejadas por el clero religioso no fue siempre pacífica. En el siglo XII se produce una crisis religiosa de enorme calado histórico que deja su impronta en el fecundo desarrollo económico y cultural del mundo árabe. Es posible que el origen de esa crisis religiosa tuviera su origen en factores económicos y políticos de la época. Por un lado, el agotamiento de la impronta progresista de la revolución islámica, en cuanto instauración de un modo de producción feudal que desarrollaba las fuerzas productivas, a través de la revolución agrícola y la expansión del comercio. También la burocratización del Estado, acompañada de autoritarismo y la sobreexplotación de las clases subalternas trabajadoras, campesinos y esclavos –lo cual se muestra como insatisfacción social que conlleva la inestabilidad política y los conflictos políticos–. Además, la agresión que sufrió el Islam por parte de los países europeos cristianos a través de las cruzadas, en un doble frente: la conquista de Tierra Santa y el avance de los reinos cristianos en la península Ibérica. El humanismo universalista de al-Farabi recibe una refutación inapelable con las invasiones cristianas. Tal vez fuera éste un motivo añadido para que, en esos momentos de gran tensión religiosa por causa de las guerras que se producen con la civilización cristiana, los gobernantes musulmanes se apoyaran en corrientes integristas que establecieron actitudes de fanatismo e intolerancia moral en la vida cultural –en al-Ándalus, por ejemplo, éste parece haber sido un importante motivo de inestabilidad política–. Así podemos encontrar a místicos ortodoxos como Algazel, quien escribe Incoherencia de los filósoEl PEriPlo dE la razón " 167 fos, donde se declara a favor del conocimiento intuitivo de la divinidad, menospreciando la investigación científica, y donde defiende la trascendencia, buscando eliminar el panteísmo que asomaba sus orejas en los textos de los sabios musulmanes. donde luce el sol no se ven las estrellas, decía, queriendo indicar que el sol es al-corán y las estrellas los pensamientos filosóficos. Las imágenes que nos presenta la metafísica son un espejo del orden social; la metafísica expone el modelo de sociedad que habrá de seguir el intelectual orgánico a la clase dominante. De ese modo, la postulación de una radical trascendencia divina ha jugado un papel conservador en Oriente como en Occidente; en ese sentido lo mismo se podría afirmar de la idea de inmanencia, o de cualquier otra, siempre que sirva para justificar la división social del trabajo. Sin embargo, no es así, y del mismo modo que se puede distinguir entre unos modelos de sociedad que son más racionales que otros, también podemos suponer que las ideas metafísicas correspondientes serán más o menos adecuadas para la racionalidad humana. Hemos visto cómo la utopía alfarabiana cumplía con esa función evaluativa de las sociedades humanas. El irracionalismo, en cambio, negará cualquier posibilidad de organizar coherentemente la sociedad; y ni siquiera permite establecer esa función evaluativa de forma racional. La crítica de la razón comienza cuando se afirma la imposibilidad de un acuerdo entre los distintos puntos de vista presentes en la vida social humana: teniendo en cuenta que un rasgo de la razón es la existencia de perspectivas alternativas –en debate sobre la explicación de la realidad y los objetivos de la acción humana–, la irracionalidad consistirá precisamente en negar la posibilidad del diálogo racional –como hicieron los sofistas aristocráticos en la Atenas del siglo V a.n.e.–. Eso ya no es un punto de vista, sino la negativa a sumar las experiencias de todos en el conocimiento de la realidad, la voluntad de permanecer irreductiblemente individual frente a una humanidad que 168 " nombrE autor o autorEs se encamina hacia su plenitud. El irracionalista no necesita a los demás hombres para comunicarse con la divinidad: su vida personal está integrada por la transcendencia. Ese solipsismo busca encontrar la verdad en la relación directa con la divinidad, la iluminación del entendimiento personal por la luz que viene de lo alto. Es el 'asalto a la razón' que tantas veces se repite en la historia humana.30 Dos son las cuestiones que ese 'asalto' plantea: primero, si existen causas históricas que lo expliquen; y segundo, cuáles son las causas que obraron en la historia de la civilización musulmana. Empezando por la segunda, más arriba se ha hablado de aquella guerra de civilizaciones que fueron las Cruzadas cristianas en la Baja Edad Media, como una posible explicación inicial. Pero sin duda obraron causas más profundas que pueden observarse en el desorden político y la inestabilidad de los Estados musulmanes, las continuas luchas intestinas por el poder, las rivalidades y guerras entre Estados vecinos, las disputas religiosas y el fraccionamiento de la comunidad musulmana en sectas divergentes. A ello se añade la incapacidad de los califas para dirigir una administración de funcionarios, los cuales adquieren una relativa autonomía para imponer sus intereses a las decisiones políticas de los gobernantes. Esa autonomía se traduce en la corrupción del Estado, cuando la recaudación de impuestos va a parar a las manos privadas de los funcionarios venales, y como consecuencia se incrementa la explotación del campesi30. Pues, en efecto, no otra cosa es la posición de los sofistas aristocráticos en los diálogos platónicos, la misma que puede verse en Cleantes frente a los estoicos, y que reaparecerá más tarde en la crítica escéptica de Hume como justificación del conservadurismo burgués. el asalto a la razón es el título de una obra del filósofo húngaro, Georg Lukács, donde analiza el irracionalismo en la Europa moderna, con sus terribles consecuencias. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 169 nado y los trabajadores. En definitiva, todo parece indicar que el impulso renovador y progresista de la revolución islámica se había agotado casi completamente hacia el siglo XI, y desde ese momento comienza una larga decadencia que coincide con el final del modo de producción feudal. En cuanto a la primera cuestión, tal vez podría indicarse que el giro escéptico en la cultura filosófica se produce en momentos de agotamiento histórico, al acabarse los procesos de avance progresista en el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas y el orden social. Sin pretender demostrar esta tesis, se pueden señalar como ejemplos de ella, primero, el escepticismo que Cleantes ofrece a los dirigentes romanos en el siglo II a.n.e. –que no fue aceptado por éstos, pero es sintomático del estado de ánimo entre los atenienses–; además, el escepticismo que David Hume acuña en el siglo XVIII para dar fe del final de la revolución liberal democrática una vez que la burguesía se ha asentado en el poder. En cambio, el escepticismo sofista que aparece en los diálogos de Platón, es refutado ampliamente por éste –o por su maestro Sócrates, tanto da–, como consecuencia del fracasado intento de hacerse con el poder en el golpe de Estado de los Treinta Tiranos, por parte de los representantes políticos de la aristocracia ateniense que había alentado esa sofística. Es evidente que la solución dada al problema del agotamiento del desarrollo progresista de una forma cultural, varía en cada ocasión y para cada civilización. En el caso del Islam, el refuerzo de la religión y la intensificación de la piedad sufí, parece haber sido el camino elegido para conseguir una relativa estabilización de los logros alcanzados. En el orden político, corresponde con el ascenso del Imperio turco. Y en el plano metafísico ese cambio de época civilizatoria se manifiesta por la crítica del racionalismo filosófico, el abandono de la idea de inmanencia de la divinidad en la naturaleza y la postulación de 170 " nombrE autor o autorEs la trascendencia de la divinidad espiritual inconmensurable con el mundo material. ¿Por qué la idea de inmanencia acompaña las épocas de progreso, mientras que la transcendencia es una típica metafísica conservadora para una sociedad decadente? En primer lugar, por una cuestión de confianza en la ciencia: ese concepto de transcendencia absoluta de la divinidad, que aparece como explicación de las religiones monoteístas, está al servicio de una defensa de la libertad divina, que no está atada ni tan siquiera a sus propias leyes; lo que trae como colofón la negación de una racionalidad en las leyes rectoras del universo, que fuera accesible al entendimiento humano. La creación del universo se hace en cada momento, y eso explica la existencia de milagros: el orden cósmico cambia según los designios divinos que son inescrutables y solo pueden ser conocidos por la revelación; la verdad es transmitida por Allah directamente a sus elegidos y eso explica la profecía. No hay lugar para una ciencia rigurosa; a lo sumo para un empirismo titubeante e inseguro, pues únicamente se reconocen dos fuentes de conocimiento: la intuición sensible y la intuición mística. Y si bien esa actitud puede dar lugar a descubrimientos importantes, deja a los científicos sin dirección y sus hallazgos pueden ser objeto de usos inaceptables moralmente. En segundo lugar, el orden jerárquico de la transcendencia rompe los lazos que atan a la divinidad con sus criaturas, suspendiendo el orden racional de las obligaciones y los derechos, para sustituirlo por el designio divino y la acción de una providencia, que si no es arbitraria, sí incomprensible: la trascendencia explica las excepciones de la legalidad universal. Se trata evidentemente una metáfora del orden social absolutista: quien controla las excepciones mantiene el poder real, puede evadir la ley universal. Esa interpretación de la metafísica, que subraya El PEriPlo dE la razón " 171 las limitaciones de la razón humana, tiene como objetivo poner a los pueblos a merced de las disposiciones de la autoridad, que queda con las manos libres para actuar del modo que le parezca más conveniente. La visión inmanentista de Avicena establecía las relaciones multívocas de los elementos que forman tanto el sistema cósmico, como el orden social o el funcionamiento corporal; en su metafísica, el todo es la unidad del sistema, depende de la integración de las partes, de su adecuado funcionamiento y su coherencia interna. En cambio en la contemplación trascendental de la divinidad aparece la independencia de Allah, su omnipotencia y libertad absolutas, como un espejo del orden social donde el gobernante elude su responsabilidad con respecto a la ciudadanía y reclama un poder absoluto sin límites. Es cierto que el sistema racionalista tiene sus debilidades; con toda su coherencia y su integración, Avicena confunde la funcionalidad de las estructuras sociales con la capacidad moral humana para fijar los fines de la acción personal por medio de una decisión consciente; la subjetividad humana desaparece en ese esquema, absorbida por el determinismo de la leyes inmanentes –algo similar a lo que sucede en la filosofía de Hegel–. La libertad y autonomía del individuo que establece sus propios fines no cabe en el orden sistemático establecido. Tal vez, ese defecto sea suficiente para desmontar el sistema y volver a comenzar desde el principio, y la lección que podemos extraer de toda esta historia, es que para dar ese paso adelante, primero la reflexión tiene que retroceder hacia atrás. La concepción racionalista de la realidad es heterodoxa, y el racionalismo teológico de los mutazilíes es en cierto modo sorprendente, cuando realizan la hazaña intelectual de casar los principios racionales con los religiosos, siendo que éstos requieren una fe sin fisuras por parte de los fieles. Ahora frente a la visión racionalista se opone la idea monoteísta de la radical trascendencia de Allah, cuyo objetivo implícito es la construcción 172 " nombrE autor o autorEs de un régimen teocrático; por eso entre ambos conceptos de la divinidad se entabla una lucha nada banal, puesto que por detrás de las ideas se libra una batalla por el poder político y la forma de organización social. El poder clerical se funda en la noción de transcendencia, y ésta se impone por el consenso como por la represión, de modo que la evolución de la comunidad religiosa lleva a la construcción de un poder jerárquico que monopoliza las relaciones entre los fieles y la divinidad. Las premisas autoritarias e irracionalistas de la afirmación teológica de la transcendencia pueden estudiarse en la historia de la institución eclesiástica, pues al establecer la absoluta omnipotencia divina –y a través de la constelación de ideas que acompañan a ese concepto–, da plena libertad de acción al poder religioso en la dirección de la vida social. En sus orígenes y su primera expansión, al retomar la senda racionalista neoplatónica, el Islam aparece como una rebelión contra ese poder monolítico de la Iglesia cristiana asentado sobre las conciencias de los fieles; sin embargo, a partir del siglo XII la situación se modifica con la consolidación de las instituciones políticas y religiosas en el movimiento islámico; los dirigentes de la comunidad apelan de nuevo al concepto de la transcendencia divina para aferrar las riendas políticas del Estado autoritario. Esa concepción aparecerá en el mundo musulmán durante el siglo XII, con la adopción de la ortodoxia religiosa elaborada por el filósofo Algazel, a partir de la escuela teológica asariya de Basora. Hasta ese momento, la filosofía islámica había transcurrido por los caminos del racionalismo heredado del neoplatonismo oriental y la filosofía judía, en la construcción de un poder político independiente de la religión. Pero ese poder político se había visto prisionero de una burocracia estatal, que acababa imponiendo sus intereses de clase social y determinando la dinámica política en función de ellos. Finalmente esa administración pública se volvió tradicionalista y conservadora, por lo que en el plano de las ideas se produjo el amanecer del integrismo religioso. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 173 2.3.1. el criticismo de algazel o al-Ghazali (Gazala, Khorasán 1058-1111): la razón en contra de sí misma Algazel es el tercer filósofo persa del gran periodo clásico del pensamiento islámico; es el mayor teólogo musulmán y el fundador de la ortodoxia. Profesor de la escuela de Bagdad y profundo conocedor de la filosofía griega, desarrolló la duda metódica y el escepticismo, cambiando el curso de la filosofía islámica, que abandonó la metafísica racionalista por la idea de una intervención directa de Allah en el universo –lo que en occidente se ha denominado 'ocasionalismo'–. Escribió una abundante producción que podría haber superado los cien títulos; fue místico sufí y, según parece, se encerró durante años en una torre para disfrutar de la visión beatífica. Su labor filosófica puede compararse a la de Agustín de Hipona para la Iglesia romana, por su importancia clásica para el mundo islámico; una semejanza que aparece también en el principio que orienta su reflexión: el escepticismo sobre las capacidades de la razón humana, con el objetivo de afianzar la creencia religiosa y fundamentar la fe en las limitaciones del conocimiento humano. Incluso escribió sus 'confesiones' en un libro titulado La liberación del error, donde expone que la superación de su escepticismo epistemológico fue debida a 'una luz que proyectó en mi pecho la altísima Providencia'. La razón es ineficaz para conocer a Allah y comunicarse con Él, lo que podemos conseguir sólo a través de un conocimiento intuitivo de la divinidad que proviene de la fe. Consecuentemente en su libro sobre la Incoherencia de los filósofos, ataca el racionalismo y defiende la superioridad de la fe sobre la razón y la subordinación de la filosofía a la teología. La influencia de Algazel en la cultura musulmana ha sido enorme, y por eso algunos comentaristas tendenciosos han afirmado que la verdadera filosofía islámica fue realizada por los 174 " nombrE autor o autorEs teólogos, ignorando la ingente labor de otros clásicos. Y si bien es cierto que la operación filosófica de Algazel parece plenamente moderna en cierto sentido, puesto que se funda en la crítica, no menos cierto es que su reflexión apunta al retroceso de la civilización islámica, en cuanto cultura progresista que desarrolla las fuerzas productivas dentro de un orden social más o menos racional. La filosofía de Algazel es así la expresión en el mundo de las ideas de la decadencia del modo de producción feudal. Agotado el impulso regenerador de la revolución islámica, habiendo realizado su función de desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas en la época de ascenso progresista del feudalismo oriental, comienza una época de languidez cuya tonalidad dominante vendrá dada por una mística resignación, una vuelta hacia el interior personal propiciada por la religión. En el Islam no hay dogmas, así que la única manera que tenía a su disposición Algazel para atacar a los filósofos, era criticar la confianza en la razón, oponiendo a la filosofía de al-Farabi, y sobre todo de Avicena, argumentos escépticos que dejaban como sola opción la creencia en la fe revelada. De ese modo, como contrapunto –puesto que el escepticismo es siempre un momento fundamental del desarrollo del pensamiento–, la teología islámica se convierte en una fuente de la racionalización del pensamiento islámico –y en este sentido se puede comparar con la labor que hizo Hume respecto de la racionalidad ilustrada–. Algazel niega las ideas racionalistas: el principio de causalidad, la eternidad del universo creado, la razón como fuente de verdad superior a la fe, etc., obligando con ello a los filósofos a aguzar el ingenio para defender sus posiciones. Se ha subrayado también que Algazel adelanta fórmulas que aparecen en el pensamiento de Pascal, como el argumento de la apuesta infinita, que nos remite al paso del evangelio donde se pregunta '¿de que le sirve al hombre ganar el mundo si pierde el alma?'. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 175 En esa crítica contaba también la rivalidad política entre las distintas opciones que convivían en la sociedad musulmana, a) la tensiones entre el califato de Bagdad y los emiratos persas, pues Avicena es un típico representante del nacionalismo persa y un funcionario de los emiratos iraníes –Algazel también es persa, pero aparece vinculado al califato de Bagdad–; b) las diferencias entre las confesiones del Islam, pues tanto al-Farabi como Avicena eran chiítas y Algazel sunnita; c) las tensiones entre los diversos grupos de la clase dominante, la aristocracia rural de temperamento religioso y tradicionalista frente a la aristocracia comercial de talante racionalista; d) y seguramente también la necesidad de confrontar la agresión militar cristiana aunando fuerzas alrededor de la convicción religiosa. Todos esos factores se conjuraron para acabar con la tradición racionalista en la cultura musulmana durante el siglo XII. En continuidad con la tradición teológica de al-Asari (Basora, 874-936), defiende una metafísica ocasionalista: la Causa Primera y Final de toda realidad es Allah, que interviene permanentemente en la creación para ordenar los acontecimientos. De ahí que se niegue la existencia de una relación de causa y efecto entre fenómenos naturales; lo que el científico considera como causa es tan solo una causa eficiente secundaria, pues toda realidad es producida directamente por Allah. Las correlaciones de hechos que establecemos mediante la observación no son sino costumbres y hábitos adquiridos por la experiencia; esas correlaciones mutarían, si estuviera en la voluntad de Allah cambiar la serie de los acontecimientos. Lo que significa que hay en el mundo un determinismo estricto de carácter teológico y que la libertad del ser humano se ve reducida a la aceptación de los hechos y el mero consentimiento ante los designios de la Providencia; desaparece toda la intrincación de la metafísica elaborada por racionalistas musulmanes, para justificar la complejidad de la acción humana de carácter racional. Es claro que 176 " nombrE autor o autorEs esa metafísica está conceptualizando el final de las expectativas despertadas por la revolución islámica medieval y sus tendencias racionalistas. Podemos advertir en esta exposición que dado que el mundo de la metafísica es una representación esquemática de las relaciones sociales, el papel de una idea determinada está en función del sistema entero de relaciones sociales del que forma parte el filósofo que la enuncia. El resultado de la crítica de Algazel al racionalismo filosófico fue un cambio de dirección en los intereses intelectuales de los musulmanes, que dejaban constancia del agotamiento de la revolución económica y cultural y se encerraba en posiciones conservadoras. Lo que importa ahora es una razón al servicio de la teología, como justificación del orden social autoritario, y absorbida por la vida interior para la elevación moral de la personalidad. Se trata de una moral conservadora para una civilización en retroceso. Dicho con palabras de Algazel, 'el ser humano está a mitad camino entre el ángel y el animal, y lo que le distingue es el conocimiento... con la ayuda del conocimiento puede elevarse hasta los ángeles, pero si se deja llevar por la ira y el deseo caerá al nivel de los animales'. Por muy verdaderas que sean esas palabras, no deja de percibirse en ellas una adusta advertencia sobre el carácter dual de la personalidad humana; de ahí la necesidad de vigilancia sobre las tendencias naturales de la humanidad. Es de todos modos extraordinario, que este irracionalismo apele al conocimiento en contra de los instintos. Es la vieja sospecha sobre la naturaleza material, que pide al hombre volcarse en la vida del espíritu. La palabra conocimiento en Algazel se está refiriendo a la introspección, la exploración de la personalidad a través de los símbolos religiosos, lo decisivo es que la libertad se centra en la subjetividad individual que explora los mecanismos de su vida mental. Esta filosofía, pues, manifiesta una preocupación por la vida personal, que se manifiesta en el plano religioso y se El PEriPlo dE la razón " 177 vuelve contra la metafísica racionalista como una vana gloria del entendimiento humano. Mientras que el determinismo racionalista explora las leyes de la creación, basándose en la confianza en las capacidades humanas, ahora la crítica nos revela que esas leyes son inaccesibles para el entendimiento humano, porque los designios divinos son inescrutables. 2.3.2. La influencia de Algazel y el asalto medieval a la razón Después del éxito del ataque de Algazel al racionalismo, el pensamiento musulmán cambia de dirección. Los estadistas musulmanes prefirieron apoyarse en la ortodoxia religiosa para dirigir la vida social, antes que en la crítica racional y el debate público, porque ésta garantiza la fidelidad de los súbditos y evita la crítica social. La historia de al-Ándalus muestra que ese remedio fue peor que la enfermedad. Pues el peligro que se quería conjurar era la fragmentación de la sociedad islámica en pequeños Estados y Repúblicas –como de hecho llegó a suceder en algún momento por todas partes–, organizando una administración centralizada que garantizase el adecuado funcionamiento de la economía comercial mediante un Estado unificado y poderoso. Se anuncia la creación del Imperio turco. Como se ha señalado, la necesidad de ese Estado fuerte nace de la presión militar cristiana que se puso en marcha con las cruzadas, y que también tenía un aspecto económico de rivalidad comercial e industrial. La agresión conduce a un fuerte sentimiento de dependencia del individuo frente a la colectividad, lo que se manifiesta simbólicamente en la trascendencia divina: la acentuación en la radical contingencia del mundo creado y su dependencia respecto del Ser Necesario, expresa metafóricamente la subordinación de la gente del pueblo respecto del Estado. El proyecto de al-Farabi 178 " nombrE autor o autorEs incluía un humanismo universalista que quedó caducado con el desarrollo de una guerra secular entre el Islam y el cristianismo. Los sabios musulmanes tuvieron que sufrir persecuciones e incomprensiones por parte de los gobernantes influidos por religiosos intolerantes. Un siglo después de la muerte de Avicena, sus obras hubieron de sufrir las críticas de los musulmanes ortodoxos y la Enciclopedia filosófica de los Hermanos de la Pureza fue mandada quemar por el califa de Bagdad en el año 1150. La misma situación se reproduce en al-Ándalus: el filósofo Averroes, jurista y funcionario de la corte califal cordobesa, amigo de los califas gobernantes, se verá condenado en su vejez por su actividad intelectual, exilado primero en Lucena durante dos años y luego en Fez donde murió. Sus escritos fueron quemados en vida del filósofo, en el 1196, al mismo tiempo que se extendía la prohibición de estudiarlo. El edicto de córdoba condenaba a la pena del infierno a quien enseñara que la verdad se puede alcanzar por la mera razón sin ayuda de la fe. Al mismo tiempo, se persiguió a judíos y mozárabes, tanto durante el imperio almorávide como el almohade, alterando profundamente los equilibrios sociales del Estado andalusí. Esa situación también afectó a Maimónides, el importante filósofo judío nacido en Córdoba, quien emigró con su familia a Egipto por problemas de confesión religiosa; sin embargo, en Egipto ejerció la medicina y la filosofía llegando a ser médico del Califa, además de un reformador religioso de primera importancia, aunque considerado heterodoxo por los judíos. Esa persecución del pensamiento racional fue el prólogo de la conquista cristiana del sur Peninsular. Aunque el período clásico de la filosofía islámica prolongara su recorrido en al-Ándalus, donde hubo una pléyade de importantes pensadores, éstos constituyeron el final de la grandiosa civilización construida por los árabes. El siglo XI fue un auténtico 'siglo de oro' de la poesía El PEriPlo dE la razón " 179 peninsular en árabe y hebreo, y el siglo XII lo fue en filosofía y ciencia. Sin embargo, la sociedad musulmana acabó sucumbiendo ante las presiones que hemos descrito y su cultura científica y filosófica fue destruida con la anexión a los reinos cristianos del norte peninsular. Después de haber sido anexionada sucesivamente por los imperios norteafricanos, almorávide y almohade, que llegaron para combatir y refrenar el avance cristiano hacia el sur, la cultura andalusí sufrirá un colapso ante el avance cristiano. Y como sucede a menudo con la filosofía, la culminación de la reflexión árabe llegó al final, tras un brillante período de esplendor cultural que estaba agonizando. Sin embargo, esas persecuciones no ahogaron el pensamiento de sus autores. Es cierto que limitaron la libertad de pensamiento en el ámbito islámico, pero la sabiduría de los filósofos musulmanes pasó a Europa y fructificó en la multitud de investigadores y pensadores europeos de la Baja Edad Media, que abrió a las puertas a la revolución científica del Renacimiento. La actividad filosófica andalusí continuó todavía, entre los numerosos discípulos y continuadores de Averroes; pero quizás el aspecto más destacable en el siglo XIII fueran las traducciones que se hicieron en Toledo para el rey cristiano Alfonso X y que dieron a conocer la filosofía musulmana en el mundo cristiano. Por otra parte, importantes pensadores andalusíes abandonaron la península: el historiador ibn Amira y el literato al-Qartajanní pasaron al norte de África, el pensador de origen murciano ibn Arabí (1164-1240), uno de los más prolíficos y de los más leídos entre los musulmanes, emigró a Palestina; un descendiente de musulmanes andalusíes, Ibn Jaldún (1332-1406) realizó en Túnez una notable labor sobre historiografía y sociología que pasó casi desapercibida hasta nuestros días. Pero el pensamiento languideció con el final del dominio árabe, sustituido por el poder turco. En Irán la tradición filosófica persa que bebe de las 180 " nombrE autor o autorEs ideas de Avicena no ha desaparecido nunca, pero esas aportaciones han quedado en una situación marginal con respecto a la corriente principal de la filosofía y desconectadas del debate intelectual en el pensamiento moderno. Después de Averroes el mayor avance intelectual y teórico se desarrollará en las universidades europeas, como una continuación de esta filosofía. 3. EL RACIONALISMO EN LA EUROPA MEDIEvAL: LOS PENSADORES jUDíOS ANDALUSíES La tradición de pensamiento filosófico judío se remonta a la época helenista, y la aportación a la historia del pensamiento no es pequeña, si tenemos en cuenta que una de las raíces del neoplatonismo se encuentra en el pensamiento hebreo de la unicidad de Yahvé. De nuevo en la Edad Media andalusí volvemos a encontrar importantes filósofos de religión judía, que renuevan la tradición de Filón de Alejandría en un sentido racionalista y con una orientación panteísta. Los judíos participaron del esplendor cultural de la civilización islámica aportando su esfuerzo intelectual con resultados notables; además de tomar parte en el proceso de traducción que se desarrolló en los reinos peninsulares e hizo posible llevar la filosofía hacia Europa, la elaboración metafísica alcanzó una indiscutible altura con los pensadores andalusíes de credo judío. En especial merece destacarse la línea de pensamiento ateo-panteísta de raíz neoplatónica, que naciendo en Avicebrón y pasando por Giordano Bruno y luego Spinoza, fructificará entre los intelectuales alemanes del XIX. Estos filósofos forman parte de una fracción especial de la pequeña burguesía urbana independiente, dedicada al comercio y la artesanía, y también de la gran burguesía en ocasiones a las finanzas –que es papel atribuido tradicionalmente a las gentes de religión judía, puesto que en el cristianismo está condenada El PEriPlo dE la razón " 181 la usura como pecado mortal–. En muchos casos los sabios judíos son altos funcionarios del Estado islámico, desempeñando importantes cargos políticos, y su papel es equivalente al jugado por los sabios musulmanes. Ese grado de integración de la comunidad judía en la sociedad andalusí permite un importante desarrollo cultural que se manifiesta en especialmente en la poesía, pero también en la filosofía y la ciencia. Por eso, es artificial separar la filosofía judía andalusí de la musulmana: un pensador judío como Avicebrón se encuentra cercano al musulmán Abenhazem en su exposición de la filosofía –pues ambos siguen la estela neoplatónica tradicional entre los musulmanes, lo que se explica en parte por la coincidencia temporal–; en cambio, la reflexión de otro judío, como es Maimónides quien fue discípulo de Averroes, se realiza en plena crisis del racionalismo medieval, pues conoce la crítica de Algazel al racionalismo neoplatónico, así como la respuesta averroísta al mismo. Baste esta advertencia en la lectura de lo que sigue, donde he mantenido una división en atención a las afinidades religiosas, por motivos de comodidad expositiva. Se ha hablado del siglo XI en al-Ándalus como un Siglo de Oro de la cultura sefardí, con poetas como el zaragozano Ibn Paquda –que escribió en 1040 una ética con el título Guía para las dudas del corazón–, y científicos como el tudelano Ibn Ezra (1089-1164) –quien también fue poeta y teólogo–. Su situación como miembros del Estado musulmán tiene consecuencias filosóficas: el pensamiento judío aspira al conocimiento racional de la verdad, confiando en el poder de la razón como la posibilidad de un acuerdo colectivo entre puntos de vista religiosos que son alternativos en la organización de la convivencia social. El objetivo de su reflexión es interpretar las creencias, los conceptos y las prácticas religiosas particulares del judaísmo, de modo que sean compatibles con las exigencias de la vida en común con 182 " nombrE autor o autorEs otras culturas y religiones. De ahí que una buena parte de sus ideas filosóficas consistan en la interpretación alegórica de las escrituras y su método de trabajo sea la hermenéutica bíblica. La aspiración de ese trabajo intelectual consiste en integrarse en una identidad humana universal a través de una metafísica racionalista, que recoja las particularidades de cada religión sin perderlas ni difuminarlas. 3.1. La Poesía Metafísica de avicebRón (ibn GabiRoL, MáLaGa, 1021 – vaLencia, 1059) Murió muy joven, a los treinta y ocho años; pero fue el poeta más grande entre los judíos medievales de Sepharad, imitando en hebreo la importantísima y bellísima poesía árabe de la época. Huérfano de padre y madre, y en discordia con la comunidad judía, tuvo que sobrevivir ganándose la vida con sus grandes dotes literarias. Uno de sus poemas religiosos, la famosa corona de hierro, es todavía utilizado como oración en el culto judío. Además cultivó la poesía erótica, elaborando artísticamente la pasión y el deseo propios de la vida sensual amorosa, dentro de una sociedad donde la libertad de costumbres en el terreno sexual parece haber sido corriente. Esa experiencia tiene su expresión en las ideas filosóficas, en el sentido de haber dado un importante lugar al concepto de materia dentro del esquema interpretativo de la realidad. Avicebrón fue un extraordinario metafísico, que trasmitió a Europa la filosofía neoplatónica oriental y es la fuente de la que beben directamente Duns Scoto y otros escolásticos; su influencia alcanza al pensamiento moderno a través de Giordano Bruno y Spinoza, y no es exagerado decir que éstos se limitaron a ampliar y desarrollar las intuiciones asombrosas de sus meditaciones sobre el mundo. Si bien su filosofía fue combatida El PEriPlo dE la razón " 183 por los judíos ortodoxos, su vida meteórica ha iluminado a la humanidad durante siglos. Su libro sobre metafísica se llama en latín fons vitae, la fuente de la vida –también recibió el título de Materia et forma, o incluso de Materia universali–. Es un diálogo entre un maestro y un discípulo, lo que subraya la enorme influencia neoplatónica que recibió su pensamiento.31 Una obra falsamente adjudicada a Aristóteles, la llamada teología de aristóteles, que es en realidad una paráfrasis de las enéadas de Plotino, y otra de parecidas circunstancias, el Liber de causis compendio de una obra de Proclo, parecen ser sus fuentes de inspiración. También inspirado por la enciclopedia de los Hermanos de la Pureza –introducida en Zaragoza por el matemático y médico al-Kirmani, visir de los reyes de la taifa zaragozana–, pues la filosofía oriental emparentada con Avicena tuvo acogida en al-Ándalus, cuando los omeyas se hicieron independientes. Es decir, que Avicebrón bebe de las fuentes orientales y eso se manifiesta en su idea de que la materia es una emanación del Alma del mundo, cuyas implicaciones metafísicas ya había estudiado Avicena. Pero los conceptos de Avicebrón acentúan el materialismo implícito en el panteísmo tradicional de la filosofía judeo-musulmana medieval: la materia participa de todos los seres creados menos del Ser Esencial –puesto que éste no sabemos en qué consiste–, y por tanto la materia no responde al principio de individuación, sino al de posibilidad; en cambio, el principio de individuación viene a ser un nuevo concepto: la 'forma sensible' –que puede 31. Otro libro medieval escrito como diálogo entre maestro y discípulo es sobre la división de la naturaleza de Juan Scoto Eriúgena (810-877), influido por el neoplatonismo oriental del Pseudo-Dionisio, pues tradujo sus obras del griego al latín, y cuya metafísica rozaba el panteísmo inmanentista, por lo que fue condenada por herética muchos años después de su muerte. 184 " nombrE autor o autorEs entenderse como equivalente al de esencia individual de los nominalistas–. Complementariamente, Avicebrón establece el concepto de 'materia universal' –como hipótesis básica para la investigación racional del mundo sensible–. Todo lo contrario será lo que afirme la Escolástica tomista, siguiendo una interpretación de Aristóteles que está en función de la teología de la trascendencia divina. Tomás de Aquino critica la filosofía de Avicebrón, por haber confundido la distinción de género y especie con la de materia y forma; pero en realidad no reconoce que Avicebrón está interesado en exponer problemas que son ignorados por la metafísica del ser transcendental. Deshaciendo las identidades de forma y espíritu por un lado, y de materia y cuerpo por el otro, el pensamiento de Avicebrón se nos muestra como un importante intento de superar la jerarquía que pone a las realidades del espíritu por encima de la realidad material, combinando la interpretación racionalista del mundo con una concepción del universo fundada en la experiencia sensible. La fuente de la vida fue escrita en árabe, como lengua de cultura; pero también porque la filosofía es considerada como un terreno neutral, donde los creyentes de toda fe pueden debatir sus ideas sin renunciar a sus confesiones particulares. La filosofía es un espacio para el humanismo, para el encuentro entre las culturas en una sociedad multiétnica y multiconfesional. Precisamente por eso mereció el reproche de los teólogos ortodoxos judíos, que lo consideraban un libro ajeno a la Toráh, la Revelación. Sin embargo, Avicebrón no se despreocupó de las cuestiones religiosas, e incluso aplicó a las Escrituras el método de interpretación alegórica que se venía empleando entre los judíos desde Filón de Alejandría. Así lo hizo, por ejemplo, con el mito del Paraíso, explicando que el Edén representa el mundo superior, donde habitan Yahvé y los ángeles; el río que lo envuelve la materia universal, madre de todos los cuerpos, y los El PEriPlo dE la razón " 185 cuatro brazos en los que éste está dividido, los cuatro elementos de Empédocles o bien las cuatro causas aristotélicas. El hombre es el alma racional; la mujer, el alma animal; la serpiente, el alma vegetativa o concupiscible; el árbol del conocimiento es el placer sexual, y el árbol de la vida, el conocimiento del mundo superior. Como en el mito platónico del alma, el hombre está desterrado del mundo superior y debe volver a él; el camino de regreso es la búsqueda del conocimiento, entendiendo la sabiduría como conocimiento de Yahvé, la plena felicidad. La perfección del alma es el conocimiento, su imperfección la ignorancia. El hombre debe partir de la oscuridad de su ignorancia para alcanzar la luz del conocimiento. Ese camino consiste para el alma en pasar de la potencia al acto de saber. La metafísica que nos explica Avicebrón se apoya en conceptos emanatistas, pero los supera ampliamente. En todo su trabajo de reelaboración de los conceptos advertimos un talante creador que nos da como resultado una nueva concepción de la realidad. La verdadera esencia de Yahvé nos es desconocida e inalcanzable con los medios que poseemos en nuestra vida terrenal. Pues la Esencia Primera o Ser Esencial no es semejante al alma, porque Aquélla es infinita y ésta finita; nos es imposible conocer el infinito. Sólo podemos conocer al ser divino a través de sus obras, porque estamos en contacto con la Inteligencia que es semejante al alma y establece una mediación entre el alma y Yahvé. La Inteligencia se relaciona con el alma y hace posible el conocimiento de la verdad. Por lo tanto debemos aplicarnos al conocimiento de las cosas que están al alcance de nuestro entendimiento, lo que nos permitirá la comunicación con el mundo en el que mora la Esencia Primera. Como se ve, esta manera de exponer la tarea filosófica es perfectamente paralela al planteamiento del racionalismo musulmán que se ha explicado más arriba. 186 " nombrE autor o autorEs Tres son las partes de la ciencia: la ciencia de la materia y la forma, la ciencia de la Voluntad y la ciencia de la Esencia Primera. No hay más raíces de la sabiduría, pues todo lo creado necesita una causa y algún medio entre ellos. Lo creado es la materia y la forma, la causa es la Esencia Primera y el intermedio la Voluntad: esa imagen metafísica del cosmos es también la estructura de cada elemento que compone la realidad cósmica, en la identidad del microcosmos con el macrocosmos. Así en el ser humano la materia y la forma son el cuerpo, su voluntad es el alma y su esencia primera es la Inteligencia. Toda realidad está compuesta de materia y forma. El mundo está creado con una simetría perfecta entre materia y forma, que recuerda la teoría de los modos de la substancia en Spinoza. Aunque en cierto aspecto Avicebrón mantiene la superioridad de la forma sobre la materia, en otros lugares reconoce la superioridad de la materia sobre la forma –subvirtiendo las categorías metafísicas tradicionales–. La materia universal tiene una serie de propiedades inseparables que hacen de ella una realidad ontológica principal: existe por sí misma, tiene una sola esencia, sostiene la diversidad y da a las cosas esencia y nombre. La materia prima, pura posibilidad, es la forma que precede a todas las formas: esa materia universal es ya una forma, creada al mismo nivel que la forma universal; ésta, la forma universal, es el fondo común a todas las formas, la máxima abstracción siempre presente en el acto de conocer. Materia y forma universales son principios de la realidad, y como tales son conceptos espirituales, abstractos y complementarios, que se necesitan mutuamente. La forma universal subsiste, por otro la materia prima, y puede perfeccionar su esencia en lo que es, dándole el ser; así expuesta la cuestión, la materia aparece como ontológicamente superior, por tenr la posibilidad de existencia. Pero por otro, la materia es sólo potencia y en sí no tiene el ser, necesita unirse a la forma y en ese sentido depende de ella. En esa unión aparece la El PEriPlo dE la razón " 187 realidad cósmica, cuyo término inferior es la forma sensible –un concepto que parece una innovación de Avicebrón en el pensamiento medieval–. Justamente lo contrario de lo que la doctrina clásica había enseñado, sobre la forma inteligible superior y la materia sensible inferior, la forma sensible es un intermedio entre ambos en el que no se distingue una relación jerárquica. A través de ese concepto, Avicebrón ha adoptado la lógica trivalente que es moneda corriente entre los clásicos de la filosofía medieval, y subvierte con ella los conceptos de la metafísica, para revalorizar la naturaleza material. Además de afirmar filosofemas más convencionales en el neoplatonismo, como la idea de que el cielo y todo lo que hay en él está sostenido por la substancia espiritual, –en realidad hay muy pocos de éstos que no aparezcan transmutados en la operación intelectual de Avicebrón–, establece una gradación simétrica de la materia y la forma a partir de lo universal espiritual; ésta quiere comprender la realidad cósmica como un proceso que se encuentra en permanente cambio determinado por legalidades universales. De modo que todo lo que existe está formado por una materia universal espiritual –en consecuencia con su idea de que todo participa de la materia, pues todo cambia a través de una posibilidad que precede a su actualidad–; ésa mantiene la simetría en igualdad de rango con la forma universal espiritual. Lo que se designa aquí con el término 'espiritual' puede tal vez entenderse como la existencia conceptual de la materia universal; es una exigencia del pensamiento racional que interpreta la experiencia sensible como una producción continua del cosmos natural según leyes inteligibles. Por tanto, a la forma sensible, concreta e individualizada, que junto con la materia sensible determina la existencia de esencias individuales, se corresponde una materia universal, que necesitamos suponer conceptualmente y por ello es designada como una realidad espiritual paralela a la forma universal. Por eso su metafísica no es un dualismo, de tipo platónico 188 " nombrE autor o autorEs convencional o cristiano, una jerarquía en el que lo espiritual es superior y lo material inferior, sino un monismo substancial en el que lo material y lo formal son dos modos de manifestarse el Ser Divino Necesario como productividad infinita: lo posible y lo actual. El sistema emanatista comienza en el Uno desconocido que constituye la totalidad cósmica, a partir del cual la materia y la forma del espíritu universal son el inicio de un movimiento de despliegue que produce todas las restantes materias y formas de los seres, descendiendo hasta la última conexión de ambas –la individualizada forma sensible–, en las manifestaciones más concretas y elementales del ser. Esa legalidad evidente en el cosmos, viene determinada por la Voluntad procedente del Primer Origen, la fuerza divina creadora de materia y forma, que las une para producir las realidades existentes. Es una fuerza del espíritu que está difundida de arriba abajo en el universo como el alma en el cuerpo, como la luz en el aire o la inteligencia en el alma. Mueve toda forma subsistente en la materia, todo lo penetra y todo lo contiene, y la forma le sigue y le obedece, por lo que las diferentes especies se realizan conforme a la Voluntad –con ese concepto Avicebrón retoma una explicación de la realidad por la causa final, que es convencional en el racionalismo filosófico desde el mundo griego–. Las formas están impresas en la materia formando las substancias compuestas del universo, de modo que las formas son el intermediario entre la Voluntad y la materia. La Voluntad como intermediario entre Yahvé y el Universo compuesto de materia y forma, equivale al Alma del mundo y manifiesta la potencia creadora de la divinidad. Manifiesta también que la realidad está orientada por los designios inescrutables de la divinidad, a la que podemos suponer una finalidad de orden eterno e infinito. Avicebrón nos ha transmitido el concepto de materia que fue elaborado en Oriente, contribuyendo con ello al materialismo contemporáneo; pero la diferencia de esta filosofía con el El PEriPlo dE la razón " 189 cientificismo moderno consiste en el mecanicismo dominante desde la revolución científica del Renacimiento: en éste aparece la tendencia a eliminar la finalidad como causa explicativa del universo material. Así sucede en Spinoza y en el ateísmo contemporáneo; pero un concepto de materia no mecánico, puede resolver algunas aporías del pensamiento moderno –como ha señalado Ernst Bloch en su obra sobre el racionalismo medieval–. Por tanto, al haber atribuido la dinámica cósmica a la Voluntad nacida de la Esencia Divina, el filosofar de Avicebrón pertenece al medievo, a la tradición avicenista que postula la unidad del cosmos como entidad real de la que emerge el espíritu. Sin embargo, en sus conceptos falta muy poco para que Yahvé sea identificado con la naturaleza –en sentido spinozista–, y su potencia creadora sea transferida a la misma realidad del mundo sensible en paralelo con el inteligible. 3.2. La Razón coMo inteRPRetación aLeGóRica de Los contenidos ReLiGiosos, seGún MaiMónides (Rabbi Mose ben MaiMon; cóRdoba, 1135 – eL caiRo, 1204) Maimónides nació en Córdoba, pero tras padecer en su juventud junto con su familia los inconvenientes de la persecución de los judíos por motivos religiosos, emigró a El Cairo, donde llegó a ser médico del Califa, al tiempo que el miembro más respetado de la comunidad judía y dirigente de la misma. Sus escritos, influidos por el neoplatonismo y el aristotelismo, son considerados heterodoxos. Como todos los filósofos medievales, el problema fundamental que intenta dilucidar Maimónides, trata de las relaciones entre la fe y la razón. La Revelación manifestada en el libro sagrado proporciona los contenidos esenciales de la fe, pero 190 " nombrE autor o autorEs sus afirmaciones y exigencias pueden ser contrarias o aparecer como opuestas a los razonamientos humanos. Y es aquí donde se plantea el problema entre ambos. Las personas de temperamento religioso mantendrán las exigencias de la fe por encima de la razón humana, considerada como algo caduco y limitado. Otras de talante más racionalista preferirán interpretar las Escrituras a la luz de la razón, pensando que no puede haber contradicciones entre ambas; pero en caso de haberlas, la razón está por encima. Entre estas últimas se encuentra Maimónides, quien llegó a formular una teoría de la falsedad necesaria, refiriéndose a los textos sagrados, tanto se equivocaban éstos a la luz de su razón. Guía de perplejos es un análisis de las Escrituras a la luz de los principios racionales. La persona perpleja es aquélla que se enfrenta a los textos sagrados descubriendo en ellos contradicciones imposibles de aceptar. Por ejemplo, la maldad de Yahvé, su intención de hacer mal a las criaturas; o su corporeidad, voz, oído, vista, brazo, cabeza, corazón, etc., el antropomorfismo propio de la mentalidad arcaica. Se le atribuyen a Yahvé cualidades materiales y pasiones propias de la realidad humana. Ello es inadmisible desde el punto de vista de la racionalidad, desarrollada por las investigaciones de los filósofos clásicos. Por tanto, hay que admitir que los textos sagrados utilizan un lenguaje metafórico, cuyo significado hay que desvelar mediante el análisis racional. De ese modo, Maimónides descubre un sentido oculto bajo el significado aparente de las alegorías bíblicas, que es lo que resulta realmente valioso. La narración es como un envoltorio del sentido auténtico, que descubrimos a través del análisis racional cuando se destapa el contenido que lleva dentro. Maimónides afirma que el verdadero motivo para escribir la Guía de perplejos consiste en la exégesis de ciertos pasajes oscuros de la Escritura. Las alegorías de los profetas expresan una sabiduría de múltiple utilidad para aleccionar al vulgo, pero que a veces entran en contradicción con la razón humana. La toráh El PEriPlo dE la razón " 191 es divina cuando concuerda con la especulación filosófica, pero no lo es cuando se acomoda a la masa para inculcar enseñanzas no racionales. La razón sirve de criterio a la fe. Cuando Yahvé dice en el Génesis: 'hagamos al hombre a nuestra imagen y semejanza', no está hablando en sentido literal. El texto no nos dice que Yahvé tenga un cuerpo material; lo que se debe interpretar es que esa frase alude a la inteligencia del ser humano, la semejanza con Yahvé es respecto a la idea, la capacidad humana de participar en el mundo de las ideas. O en el mito del pecado original se dice que el conocimiento del bien y del mal se origina por el pecado; pero el conocimiento es un bien, de donde se deduce que el castigo por la falta cometida es un premio más que un daño. Maimónides explica que en realidad lo que sucedió es que nuestros primeros padres al prevaricar cedieron ante las apetencias imaginativas y los deleites corporales de los sentidos. ¿Por qué los profetas utilizan ese lenguaje infantil para manifestar la revelación? Porque sus visiones se dirigen a un público iletrado con un desarrollo intelectual muy pobre, al que se le debe inculcar ciertas normas morales útiles para la convivencia social. Ese público religioso es como un niño pequeño al que se le debe alimentar con leche y alimentos triturados, y no con vino y carne. Una descripción del entendimiento humano nos lo muestra falible e inadecuado para la comprensión intuitiva de la verdad; sólo se consigue alcanzar las verdades fundamentales a través de un gran esfuerzo. El hombre que desea conocer tiene que realizar una larga tarea intelectual de captación e investigación de la realidad, descubre después de mucho trabajo los principios de la demostración, aprende a reconocer lo verdadero mediante el uso prolongado de su raciocinio. Pero entre la gente corriente hay quien no se deja convencer por las demostraciones, hay que tener una predisposición natural para los estudios intelectuales y muchas personas de temperamento fogoso o sen192 " nombrE autor o autorEs sual no pueden seguirlos. Las virtudes morales son la base de las racionales. La perfecta racionalidad y la adquisición de la verdad sólo son factibles para el hombre respetuoso con la moral. Los mismos desacuerdos entre los hombres de ciencia nos muestran que la plena demostración de la verdad rebasa las capacidades del entendimiento humano. Maimónides hace una investigación del entendimiento humano con objeto de establecer sus capacidades tanto como sus límites. Nuestra inteligencia puede comprender por naturaleza ciertas cosas perceptibles, pero hay otros aspectos del ente que no son perceptibles, como cuando se habla de los átomos; además hay entes y cosas que nuestro entendimiento es absolutamente incapaz de aprehender. La inteligencia humana tiene un límite que es absolutamente incapaz de franquear. Por tanto, el primer deber de una persona que se dedica a las tareas intelectuales es no engañarse: no se puede probar lo indemostrable; no se puede rechazar lo que no está probado como rechazable mediante la reducción al absurdo; no se puede penetrar lo que es imposible de conocer. Bajo estos principios de una perfecta honestidad intelectual, Maimónides realiza una interpretación hermenéutica de los textos bíblicos. Se basa en una tradición que proviene de Filón de Alejandría, recogida y trasmitida por los neoplatónicos y por los árabes después. Aunque Yahvé es inefable y su conocimiento está más allá de los límites del entendimiento humano, el concepto de la divinidad que proviene de un análisis racional de su concepto, contradice completamente la imagen que nos muestran las Escrituras. Yahvé es intemporal, por ser eterno su existencia es un presente continuo, todo lo que hace, lo hace simultáneamente. No tiene pasiones, ni movimiento, ni pasividad. Es simple, omnisciente, omnipotente. Esa filosofía afirma que el mundo es una emanación del Uno divino, cuya esencia consiste en existir. La esencia de la divinidad coincide con su existencia. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 193 El mundo está completamente determinado a ser lo que es desde toda la eternidad, no puede ser de otro modo. Todo evento que sucede en el tiempo tiene necesariamente una causa próxima, que procede a su vez de otra y ésta también de otra, hasta que la serie llega a la Causa Primera de todas las cosas, es decir, la libre voluntad de Yahvé. Un argumento tomado de la tradición clásica que luego será utilizado por Tomás de Aquino en su demostración de la existencia de Dios, con la diferencia de que para la teología católica esa serie no implica determinismo cuando se admite la trascendencia divina. La teoría emanatista en cambio afirma la creación necesaria del mundo por una sobreabundancia de la naturaleza divina; por lo que se puede deducir que la creación no tiene ninguna finalidad intencional y que la divinidad no escoge entre alternativas. Las cosas del mundo son posibles en cuanto que no tienen necesidad de existir; ésta sólo se da en el caso de Yahvé, Ser Necesario. Pero las cosas son posibles de forma necesaria, porque Yahvé crea necesariamente la realidad. Eso significa que el curso del mundo no puede ser de otro modo. Por tanto, la creencia en el libre arbitrio no es verdadera, y sin embargo es necesaria para que los hombres adquieran el sentido de la responsabilidad. Según Maimónides hay que mantener ciertas creencias falsas según el criterio de la razón, pero que son necesarias para la educación de los ciudadanos. Tal vez esto parezca una formulación de la 'teoría de la doble verdad' atribuida a Averroes;32 éste, en efecto, señalaba que los legisladores utilizan historias ficticias por resultar necesarias para el vulgo en su búsqueda de tranquilidad. Ese 32. Parece que la teoría de la doble verdad –según la cual existen dos verdades, la religiosa y la racional– es del averroísta latino Siger de Brabante, quien interpretó de ese modo el esfuerzo de los filósofos racionalistas andalusíes para no chocar con la religión. Es claro que la importación de la filosofía al medio dogmático de la cultura medieval cristiana debía producir algunas distorsiones. 194 " nombrE autor o autorEs principio de doble verdad habría sido utilizado por Maimónides para disfrazar la auténtica naturaleza de su pensamiento, la tendencia racionalista y neoplatónica, que emerge en su discurso como la verdad simple y natural de las cosas. Pues además de ser claro y explicativo, Maimónides debía evitar que el ataque de los ortodoxos contra sus ideas fuera demasiado duro; éstos criticaron el racionalismo de su discurso por atender más a los principios filosóficos que a las exigencias de la fe. La doctrina determinista es esotérica, sólo aparece en la Guía de perplejos; en todos los demás textos que nos quedan, Maimónides nos habla de la responsabilidad personal por nuestras acciones. La explicación de que el mal en el mundo tiene su origen en la libertad humana, proviene de la doctrina teológica ortodoxa. Pero esa manera de entender la acción humana, que sirve para cargar la existencia del mal en el debe de la conciencia, tiene dificultades para una plena y satisfactoria aclaración de dicha existencia del mal desde el punto de vista racionalista. Pues olvida los numerosos condicionamientos que limitan la acción humana y deben hacerla inteligible; por eso, según qué circunstancias tal vez sólo sirva para provocar más males que los que resuelve. Por el contrario, la manera neoplatónica de entender de manera determinista la creación –ese determinismo que ya hemos examinado como una consecuencia de la visión organicista del cosmos–, reduciendo la omnipotencia divina, sortea algunos graves problemas esenciales de la teodicea trascendental, como éste de la existencia del mal en el mundo, cuya causa primera sería Yahvé. El inconveniente de ese racionalismo moral consiste en que su forma de ver elimina la responsabilidad moral, por eso sólo es recomendable para el sabio que tiene un perfecto dominio de su conducta. Por otra parte, tal vez se pueda observar aquí lo que ya se dijo más arriba de Avicena: ese determinismo nace de una confusión entre la finalidad necesaria de las funciones sistémiEl PEriPlo dE la razón " 195 cas y las decisiones de la voluntad humana que tienen carácter finalista y derivan del mundo de ideales y valores creados por la subjetividad humana. De ahí que la posición de Maimónides, a caballo entre las dos interpretaciones del devenir natural –la determinación legaliforme de la naturaleza, como concepto propio de la tradición racionalista, y la indeterminación de la libertad humana, como concepto de la tradición moral religiosa–, sea una forma ingenua de definir las dos formas de finalidad que hoy en día podemos reconocer en la investigación científica del mundo social. Y la forma prudente en que encara el problema, tiende a reconocer la complementariedad de ambas explicaciones. Lejos de entender la teoría de la doble verdad como una demostración de hipocresía –al modo de los teólogos católicos que pretenden manipular la conciencia de los fieles–, podemos entender el núcleo racional de su enseñanza, como una formulación intuitiva de conceptos complementarios. Para la teoría de la emanación el mal no existe, es simplemente carencia de bien. El ser es bueno y está en la esencia divina; todo ser existente procede de esa esencia a través de la emanación y es bueno por ser emanado y participar del Bien eterno. De esa forma se salva la esencia divina de las inconsistencias que nacen por reconocer al mismo tiempo la omnipotencia y bondad divinas –lo que será el blanco de las críticas ilustradas en el siglo XVIII europeo–.33 El mal no es más que la falta de ser, algún tipo de privación de bien y no tiene existencia como tal. Maimónides lo explica con su interpretación del Libro de Job: 33. Recordemos que éste será el problema que los ilustrados, y en especial Voltaire, le plantearán a la teología dogmática: dios es omnipotente o bueno, no puede ser las dos cosas a la vez, pues el mal en el mundo se contradice con esa imagen de la divinidad. El optimismo metafísico queda desacreditado por la existencia del mal. Naturalmente Voltaire afirmó, para rematar la crítica a la Iglesia, que en esa alternativa él prefería un dios bueno. 196 " nombrE autor o autorEs la queja de Job no es justa, no está padeciendo un mal, sino que se ha visto privado de cosas que no son más ilusiones materiales y placeres sensibles. Job está manifestando su apego a felicidades imaginarias y su ignorancia del único bien que es el conocimiento de Yahvé. La ignorancia del bien es lo que acarrea la infelicidad, pues la mayoría de los males que recaen en los seres humanos provienen de ellos mismos. La teoría de la emanación de Maimónides explica la trascendencia inmanente o la inmanencia trascendente; se sitúa a mitad camino del panteísmo de los filósofos y la trascendencia de los teólogos, busca la síntesis de ambos conceptos, es la equilibrada vía de en medio que pretende salvar la religión y la razón al mismo tiempo. Como los filósofos islámicos, Maimónides participa del esfuerzo por crear una cultura humanista fundada en las capacidades racionales del ser humano, para mejorar su situación en el mundo. Para ello hay que acomodarse a la naturaleza de las cosas, tanto como a los preceptos de la ley: los virtuosos y los sensatos conocen y penetran la sabiduría que resplandece en el universo. 4. EL PERIODO CLáSICO DE LA fILOSOfíA MEDIEvAL Como vemos en Maimónides, la filosofía que se desarrolla en al–Ándalus durante los siglos XI y XII no abandona la problemática de la conciliación entre razón y fe, a través de lo que los Escolásticos llamaron la teoría de la doble verdad; en ella se nos presenta, primero, el deslinde entre la verdad científica y la creencia religiosa, y segundo, la distinción entre la moral particular de cada religión y la moral racional universal propia de la naturaleza humana. Lo primero apunta a conceder la mayor libertad de pensamiento al investigador científico; lo segundo establece una naturaleza humana racional que es acreedora de la más alta consideración, por cuanto es portadora de un comportaEl PEriPlo dE la razón " 197 miento moral. Tal planteamiento es una reflexión especialmente importante para evitar confusiones de orden social y político, permitiendo así la convivencia entre comunidades de diferentes confesiones. Los problemas surgidos entre éstas durante el periodo almorávide y almohade, fueron el acicate para la profunda y extensa reflexión de Maimónides sobre la cuestión, y seguramente influyeron también en el planteamiento filosófico de los musulmanes. Observamos en éstos una defensa de las capacidades racionales del ser humano, cuyas intuiciones básicas se ven confirmadas por la Revelación divina a los profetas. Del mismo modo que en Avicebrón hemos descubierto una metafísica con ingredientes poéticos, que explica la experiencia estética de la vida humana fundándose en el platonismo, en el siglo XI encontramos con Ibn Hazm una reflexión sobre la belleza entre los musulmanes, que se complementa con un extenso conocimiento de la historia y el derecho. En segundo lugar, el esplendoroso desarrollo de las ciencias entre los andalusíes medievales, exige el planteamiento filosófico como reflexión sobre las ciencias tanto empíricas como formales, para establecer a través de la metafísica y la teoría del conocimiento, los fundamentos del método para el conocimiento racional. El siglo XII representará el máximo desarrollo filosófico andalusí con tres pensadores de primera talla, como fueron Avempace, Abentofail y Averroes. Especialmente Averroes explicó el aristotelismo, como la matriz del pensamiento científico en el mundo islámico, y tuvo una enorme influencia en los científicos europeos al final de la Edad Media y durante el primer Renacimiento. Es por eso que con ellos se alcanza el máximo desarrollo de la filosofía medieval, y pueden ser considerados como los clásicos medievales, a diferencia de una arraigada tradición eurocéntrica en historia de la filosofía que consideran la Escolástica cristiana como el paradigma de la reflexión medieval. La tradición filosófica en el occidente europeo es deudora de la sabiduría islámica y judía, ya 198 " nombrE autor o autorEs sea para continuarla aprovechando sus conocimientos, cuando ésta entró en crisis a partir del XIII, ya sea para refutarla como un pensamiento subversivo del orden social feudal europeo. Esa influencia es tan importante que se puede afirmar que el preRenacimiento fue consecuencia de la asimilación de la cultura y la filosofía islámica y judía por los cristianos católicos. 4.1. La sabiduRía deL aMoR de abenhazeM (ibn hazM, cóRdoba 994– MontíjaR 1064) La filosofía se extendió rápidamente en al-Ándalus, el occidente islámico, gracias a los viajes a la Meca y a través de la escuela masarrí, de modo que ya en el siglo XI encontramos un importante sabio, Ibn Hazm o Abenhazem; profundo conocedor de la enciclopedia científica, escribe numerosos libros históricos, jurídicos, sobre ética y un famoso compendio sobre el amor, el collar de la paloma, una descripción de las costumbres musulmanas andalusíes, escrito bajo la inspiración del platonismo islámico. Abenhazem asegura en su libro, que fue educado en el harén del califa Omeya por mujeres, y que fueron ellas las que le explicaron al-corán. Y a pesar de que en algún momento el autor critica el temperamento femenino, es seguro que el tono intelectual de su pensamiento está influido por sus intensas relaciones con el sexo opuesto desde la niñez. El libro contiene también elegantes poemas amorosos, y su sensualidad dulcifica el rigorismo moral de su ética, que recoge concepciones filosóficas tradicionales, clásicas, estoicas y cínicas: la virtud como término medio entre los excesos, la imperturbabilidad ante las pasiones, el recogimiento frente al mundo, consagrarse al trabajo, evitar placeres y riquezas buscando la vida humilde en la pobreza, etc. Perteneciendo a la clase más alta, habiendo vivido su niñez entre la opulencia del califato en el palacio de Medina Azahara de El PEriPlo dE la razón " 199 Córdoba –pero habiendo también sufrido persecución y cárcel por motivos políticos–, esa norma de conducta resulta aconsejable para fortalecer el carácter ante las vicisitudes mundanas, y proporciona un camino moral hacia el goce de la beatitud en la presencia de Allah, donde el alma encuentra la serenidad, el único y definitivo reposo frente a la agitación del mundo. En ese trasfondo moral, se sitúa su teoría sobre el amor y la belleza: el amor es la causa cósmica universal que atrae a los seres entre sí y en el terreno espiritual impulsa la fusión entre las almas divididas por este mundo material. Cuando el amor se funda en la afinidad entre las almas es irresistible y sólo desaparece con la muerte. Consiste en que lo semejante busca a lo semejante, de modo que las almas dispersas por el mundo buscan unirse mediante las facultades racionales, el bien, la verdad y la belleza. Su teoría recoge las ideas de Platón sobre la preexistencia de las almas y su fusión espiritual en el mundo superior de la belleza, 'el alma desea apasionadamente todo lo que es bello y se inclina hacia las imágenes perfectas' –lo que parece un eco de las enseñanzas de Diótima en el banquete platónico–. La causa segunda del amor es la belleza, que atrae al alma hacia sí, y de ese modo la impulsa para aspirar a la verdad de sí misma, superando su estado actual dentro del cuerpo terrenal como algo incompleto e insuficiente. Abenhazem conoce el sustrato sexual que acompaña siempre a la atracción amorosa y la influencia erótica en la vida afectiva: el amor empieza de burlas y acaba de veras. Se trata de un racionalismo que si bien aspira al conocimiento de la verdad intelectual y la práctica de los valores espirituales, no renuncia a la vida corporal y encuentra en ésta el motivo de la existencia, aceptando y superando sus inconvenientes. De ahí que un verso describa la belleza de una mujer como la sublime Razón verdadera. Es una razón erótica, que sabe encontrar el máximo de satisfacción en la vida, apreciando la belleza sensual dentro del equilibrio y la armonía de la naturaleza sensible, sin 200 " nombrE autor o autorEs caer en el vicio y la fealdad de querer arrebatarla por la posesión destructiva; así nos muestra la superioridad clásica de la cultura musulmana andalusí para potenciar el vitalismo humano. Y frente a los críticos responde: ¿cuándo vedó Mahoma el amor?, señalando que no hay pasaje alguno de al-corán que lo rechace. Sin perder un agudo sentido de la realidad carnal humana, abocada a la muerte y la desaparición, Abenhazem exploró las posibilidades de la espiritualidad y la participación de la vida personal en el mundo superior de las ideas. Escribió miles de páginas y fue un notable historiador de la religión, que escribió una historia crítica de las religiones, sectas y escuelas. Como teólogo influido por el aristotelismo, se funda en la razón para encontrar la divinidad; elaboró la teología natural, fundándose en la distinción entre esencia y existencia, ambas idénticas en Allah –su esencia consiste en existir, como había establecido al-Farabi–. Fiel seguidor del Califato omeya, que cayó cuando Abenhazem era joven, como jurista defendió las concepciones de la escuela zahirí, que postula la interpretación literal de los textos sagrados, rechazando la analogía que practicaron otras escuelas. Se trata de una concepción liberal de las normas jurídicas y morales, según la cual puede hacerse todo lo que no está prohibido por los textos sagrados. Tal vez podamos suponer que esa concepción está en consonancia con los intereses de las clases dominantes en una sociedad mercantil, que permite el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas mediante la innovación técnica, la división funcional del trabajo y la redistribución de los bienes producidos por el intercambio a través del mercado. Como sabemos hoy en día, los conocidos problemas a los que conduce una sociedad regida por los intercambios mercantiles, como la acumulación de la riqueza en pocas manos y la injusticia en la redistribución, requieren de un Estado capaz de reequilibrar los mecanismos sociales. De modo que la solución zahirí –que El PEriPlo dE la razón " 201 parece emparentada con el laissez faire moderno–, resulta insuficiente para resolver el problema planteado. 4.2. La fiLosofía Laica de aveMPace o ibn bayyah (zaRaGoza, 1082 – fez, 1138) El discurso que nos presenta Avempace es laico en el más pleno sentido de la palabra: sus ideas no pertenecen a ninguna confesión religiosa, sino a toda la humanidad. Tampoco se preocupa por explicar la fe ya sea de manera alegórica, exegética, o moralista; simplemente Avempace quiere establecer una forma de vida sabia y buena sobre principios puramente filosóficos. Su proyecto de una ética racional está en conjunción con la fundación del califato almorávide –del que fue un alto funcionario–, un Estado que pretendía reconstruir la vida social sobre los principios de la revolución islámica, de acuerdo a una interpretación de la religión basada en criterios racionales. Pero aunque Avempace anuncia el laicismo moderno con una anticipación de varios siglos, la inestabilidad social y política de al-Ándalus desembocó en la persecución de cristianos y judíos con graves consecuencias para la hegemonía islámica, que acabó desapareciendo en el siglo XIII bajo el empuje de la conquista cristiana –exceptuando el pequeño reino nazarí de Granada–. De nuevo la filosofía fracasó a la hora de hacer realidad sus principios racionales; tal vez por eso se nos muestra como una ideología al servicio del poder, justificando con las mejores intenciones la erección de un Estado represor. La reflexión de Avempace se nos aparece como ideología progresista y científica, abocada al fracaso por la falta de instrumentos racionales para comprender el orden social y la relativa inmadurez de las fuerzas productivas. Hombre muy ocupado en los asuntos públicos, Avempace era médico de profesión, al tiempo que botánico y farmacólo202 " nombrE autor o autorEs go pues utilizaba las plantas para la curación; fue maestro de Abentofail y amigo del califa almorávide, y sus obras abarcan setenta títulos de los cuales sólo unos pocos han llegado hasta nosotros. Además de algunos textos sueltos en los que comenta a Aristóteles, estudió la ciencia y la música, nos dejó un libro sobre la ética racional, el régimen del solitario, donde explica sus ideas sobre la conducta sabia y expone su concepción moral de la humanidad. La palabra 'régimen' quiere indicar 'la ordenación de unos actos con vistas a un fin propuesto': se trata de analizar la acción intencional del ser humano. El 'solitario' es el 'ser humano individual', cuyo objetivo es la felicidad, alcanzar la máxima perfección en su existencia. Establecer ese régimen requiere una investigación acerca de la naturaleza humana como parte del mundo físico y social en el que se encuentra. El sabio planifica su vida y ordena sus actos para su propia realización personal: el hombre que realiza sus actos, movido tan sólo por el dictamen de la razón y de lo justo, sin hacer caso alguno del alma bestial y de sus estímulos pasionales, merece que estos actos suyos sean más bien divinos que humanos. Se trata de una ética, fundada en la razón –como la de los clásicos– sin pedir ayuda a la fe; la personalidad humana fundada en la moral racional conduce a una divinización de la humanidad –y ése es el auténtico sentido de la vida espiritual–. Las acciones humanas son de varios tipos: el primero está formado por los actos somáticos involuntarios, que no dependen de la conciencia humana; el segundo son los actos animales, de carácter instintivo, que tampoco caen bajo la decisión consciente; y el tercero son los actos racionales. Éstos pueden ser de dos clases: en primer lugar, los que tienen origen en el espíritu humano por medio de las afecciones pasivas intelectuales: se trata del conocimiento por medio de las ideas que provienen del intelecto agente, conocimiento que se produce también de maEl PEriPlo dE la razón " 203 nera involuntaria por la permanente interacción entre el espíritu humano y la inteligencia cósmica. Baste recordar para entender esto, que al menos en cierto sentido, el entendimiento agente puede asimilarse al lenguaje y que el aprendizaje del mismo es automático para el individuo. Finalmente una segunda clase de acciones racionales son aquellas que nacen de la reflexión y la decisión, cuando interviene la voluntad y el libre albedrío humano. Y éstas son las que dependen de nosotros y sobre las que podemos actuar para conseguir la vida buena. La vida ética consiste en que el alma bestial obedezca al alma racional, lo que se consigue mediante la virtud. Avempace se funda en la psicología de Aristóteles, que está contenida en su teoría del alma, para establecer esa ética del carácter racional. El alma es entendida como la fuerza motriz del ser humano, porque contiene conceptos e ideas, que son formas o substancias inmutables que mueven al ser humano a la acción –Avempace está describiendo así el mundo espiritual de los valores y los ideales como fundamento de la subjetividad personal y motivación racional de la acción humana–. La ética se funda en la metafísica, la cual debe definir cuáles de esas ideas conducen al ser humano hacia su propio fin, alcanzando la perfección intelectual. Esa es la ciencia de las formas espirituales. Entre las ideas contenidas en el alma están aquellas que provienen de las sensaciones, y están en la imaginación y la memoria; éstas son particulares pues se refieren a objetos materiales concretos. Además están los inteligibles materiales de carácter universal, que son abstraídos de las sensaciones y que por tanto tienen también un carácter corporal. Finalmente están aquellas ideas que provienen del intelecto agente; éstas además de ser universales no requieren materia para existir. Son las formas espirituales, que no provienen de los sentidos ni de la naturaleza, sino que son producidas por el entendimiento agente o 'reflexión discurrida'. Es claro que esas ideas, que no dependen de la experiencia sensible, tienen que 204 " nombrE autor o autorEs estar inscritas en la naturaleza humana –en ese sentido serían innatas–, y derivan del ser social como emergencia de la historia –son producidas por el intelecto agente–. Podemos por tanto interpretar esas ideas de Avempace como una exposición de la filosofía racionalista, afirmando la existencia de los universales en cuanto producto de la naturaleza humana como ser racional, al mismo tiempo que residen en la conciencia subjetiva individual. La naturaleza del hombre parece ser como el término medio entre aquellos seres eternos y estos otros cuerpos generables y corruptibles. Como el ser humano es un ser intermedio, está compuesto de varias realidades; los fines del solitario dependen de esa composición: hay una forma corporal que nos exige guardar y cuidar el cuerpo material; además está el espíritu particular constituido por el alma bestial y está el espíritu universal con las facultades cognitivas. La satisfacción de las formas corporales nos produce placer, pero el placer no proporciona la felicidad, porque está conducido por un fin de la vida corporal y no es un fin en sí mismo. El fin del ser humano es la ascensión a la perfección intelectual, lo que se consigue mediante la unión con el intelecto agente a través de los inteligibles abstraídos de las sensaciones materiales. De ahí que en el temperamento filosófico las funciones primera y segunda están al servicio de la tercera, el conocimiento más completo de la realidad, que se consigue mediante el estudio de las ciencias especulativas. El objetivo del filósofo es el gobierno de su inteligencia para alcanzar la perfección, alzándose al nivel más alto de la vida intelectual. Para ello analiza el mundo a la luz de la razón, convirtiéndose él mismo en una parte del intelecto y consiguiendo la felicidad. Por eso el hombre es de las obras más maravillosas de la naturaleza, pues en él existe la potencia racional. El filósofo es solitario porque busca la salud del alma, que debe conseguir apartándose de la sociedad en la que no existe El PEriPlo dE la razón " 205 el conocimiento especulativo. Sin embargo, como esa búsqueda es el intento de alcanzar el intelecto universal, que es numéricamente uno, al mismo tiempo quiere alcanzar la ciudad perfecta integrándose en la vida social. Aquí aparece el ideal utópico de Al-Farabi, citado por Avempace; la ciudad perfecta es la ciudad de los sabios, y el propio filósofo, en la medida en que alcanza la perfección intelectual, es la causa de la ciudad perfecta. Puesto que en ella cada ser humano es justo y sabio, puede prescindir de jueces y médicos: la dieta es suficiente para mantener la salud y los sabios pueden entenderse sin disputar. Mientras las ciudades humanas son imperfectas y en ellas predomina la pluralidad y la diversidad, lo múltiple que se opone a la naturaleza del alma, la ciudad perfecta busca la unidad por medio de la razón; en ella todos tienen la misma opinión: no puede haber discrepancias o disputas entre los sabios, a lo sumo intercambios de perspectivas y opiniones complementarias. El intelecto agente produce el conocimiento y está en permanente comunicación con el ser humano, pero los seres vulgares no notan su existencia; es como el sol que ilumina el mundo del espíritu; pero ese sol puede haberse ocultado por diversas causas. Sólo los filósofos ven las ideas como son y ese conocimiento se produce de modo colectivo: ya que el intelecto agente es uno solo, los filósofos conforman una unidad en el conocimiento y son de ese modo uno sólo –como los miembros de una iglesia espiritual invisible que proponía Kant en el siglo XVIII–. Su objetivo es alcanzar la comunidad superando la multiplicidad; constituyen un solo intelecto y ahora todos unidos en un colectivo unitario no perecedero, alcanzan la eternidad en la ausencia del tiempo, puesto que lo anterior y lo posterior son uno sólo. La más perfecta forma de inteligencia es así la soledad del uno consigo mismo, la unidad de los filósofos en el conocimiento. 206 " nombrE autor o autorEs Todos los seres humanos que han participado en el desarrollo del conocimiento y alcanzado una inteligencia de los universales, constituyen de esa forma una comunidad de sabios que supera los condicionamientos naturales de la vida humana en el espacio y el tiempo. De ese modo participan de la esencia divina. Como la perfecta inteligencia del sistema universal del mundo es un atributo de Allah, los sabios buscan el máximo acercamiento a Él cuando estudian la ciencia universal. Mediante el conocimiento adquieren parte de su esencia y penetran en el mundo de la divinidad. Se trata de un ideal ilustrado de unidad del género humano por el desarrollo intelectual. Pero su defecto es no tener en cuenta la realidad social en la que se produce el conocimiento, realidad en la que el sabio vive compartiendo múltiples contradicciones con sus conciudadanos. El propio Avempace vive una situación histórica de persecución religiosa y no parece percibir que su discurso puede utilizarse en contra de sus propias ideas –por ejemplo, con la expulsión de Maimónides–. La incapacidad para reconocer esas contradicciones e intentar superarlas es el significado auténtico de el régimen del solitario, el apartamiento del mundo social en continuo conflicto civil, mediante un idealismo tan hermoso como inútil para las necesidades humanas. Sin embargo, Avempace acierta plenamente cuando afirma la necesidad de una personalidad humana ética y consciente, fundada en ideales racionales, como única garantía para la realización de una sociedad justa y equilibrada. 4.3. abucháfaR abentofaiL (Guadix 1110– MaRRuecos 1185): La Razón autosuficiente El andalusí Abentofail critica en Avicena y en al-Farabi el abandono de la escatología ortodoxa musulmana que establece el mundo de ultratumba, pero en muchos aspectos escribe bajo El PEriPlo dE la razón " 207 su inspiración y toma pie en sus ideas para escribir la novela filosófica, carta sobre los secretos de la sabiduría oriental, que traducida como El filósofo autodidacta, tuvo una importante influencia en el racionalismo europeo moderno. El objetivo del libro es establecer la perfecta conformidad entre los dictados de la razón y las enseñanzas de la tradición, partiendo de la base de que la inteligencia humana es capaz de descubrir la verdadera esencia de la realidad, la cual por otro lado viene mostrada por la revelación. Se narra en él la historia de un hombre, el viviente, hijo del despierto (Hay Benjocdán), que vive en una isla desierta desde su nacimiento y, sin embargo, es capaz de desarrollar el conocimiento de la naturaleza y la sabiduría racional por sus propios medios; de ese modo se concluye que todo saber humano es producto de la inteligencia natural que caracteriza a la especie. Gracias a una curiosidad innata y su aptitud para la observación de todas las cosas, unida al razonamiento que le permite clasificar y ordenar sus experiencias, y a un ingenio práctico para la aplicación de las técnicas que sirven para remediar la inferioridad humana desde el punto de vista biológico, el personaje es capaz de descubrir las leyes fundamentales de la realidad y desarrollar toda una metafísica, que le lleva al conocimiento de la existencia de Allah. Las ideas que aquí se desarrollan provienen de la tradición aristotélica, interpretada por los pensadores musulmanes: la extensión es la primera característica esencial de los cuerpos, que además poseen todos movimiento, bien hacia abajo, los pesados, o hacia arriba, los ligeros; ese movimiento da origen al tiempo. Todo cuerpo extenso se compone de materia y forma, lo que da respuesta a la perplejidad que surge de la contraposición entre la unidad y la multiplicidad en las cosas de este mundo. Los cuerpos terrestres son finitos, incluidos los astros, y los seres del mundo sublunar están sujetos a generación y corrupción. El mo208 " nombrE autor o autorEs vimiento y el cambio son propiedades en la materia. El mundo de los cielos permanece con un movimiento idéntico a lo largo del tiempo, acercándose al paradigma de la realidad eterna de dios. A partir de esa observación se plantea aquí una antinomia que la razón no puede resolver, según nos dice Abentofail: si el mundo es eterno o creado en el tiempo; pues ambas posibilidades son plausibles, pero frente a las dos se pueden encontrar objeciones importantes. El alma vital es también un cuerpo material, un vapor caliente contenido en el corazón; todas las almas de los seres vivos, vegetales o animales, forman una realidad única que está fragmentada en los distintos cuerpos. Pues todo el universo es una unidad: el orbe celeste en su totalidad, con lo que en él se contiene, es 'una sola cosa', unida y entrelazada en sus partes,... todo ello semeja en gran medida a un individuo del reino animal, siendo las estrellas que resplandecen como los sentidos de este animal. Esa metáfora del cosmos como gran cuerpo viviente, es propia de la metafísica musulmana medieval, como ya se ha comentado al explicar a Avicena. Y ese cuerpo requiere de un Alma del Mundo, un Agente capaz de moverlo, por lo que se alcanza la idea de dios, a la vez causa eficiente y final del universo sensible. Abentofail no menciona la doctrina del entendimiento agente separado, para construir su parábola sobre el conocimiento humano; el objetivo del filósofo es subrayar la autonomía y superioridad de la razón, hasta el punto de que al encontrarse el solitario con un hombre religioso, éste reconoce la superioridad del primero y decide seguir sus enseñanzas. También podemos observar que se nos propone la idea de una naturaleza bondadosa del ser humano, no corrompida por la sociedad. Pero lo que parece dudoso en esa interpretación del conocimiento humano, es que sin lenguaje ni comunicación interpersonal puedan existir capacidades abstractivas, como las que muestra el personaje de Abentofail; las observaciones que se han hecho posteriormente El PEriPlo dE la razón " 209 sobre niños abandonados demuestran que la inteligencia no se desarrolla fuera de la sociedad. Sólo si interpretamos el personaje de la novela como la propia humanidad, nacida de la naturaleza y abandonada a su destino en medio de ella, que partiendo de una completa ignorancia alcanza el saber y la verdad, nos damos cuenta de que la narración desenvuelve alegóricamente un punto de vista filosófico: la confianza en la razón humana, unida a la propuesta implícita de una metodología científica de carácter empirista, que funda el saber en la abstracción a partir de la comparación entre la igualdad formal y la diferencia material en los seres del mundo natural. Las inferencias que nos presenta Abentofail a partir de los datos naturales conducen a establecer una metafísica hylemórfica de tipo aristotélico, correspondiente a la idea de un cosmos geocéntrico, la cual sirve de fundamento para la observación naturalista y constituye la base conceptual de la investigación científica medieval. A partir de esos postulados metafísicos y extrapolando sus leyes fundamentales, el personaje alcanza la idea de dios y sus atributos esenciales, enlazando el tema científico con el religioso a través de la reflexión moral. El comportamiento humano debe estar orientado al cuidado del mundo natural, evitando los daños que se puedan producir a los seres vivos como consecuencia de los deseos humanos, mediante una satisfacción regulada de las necesidades y la contención de las pasiones. Se recomienda abstenerse de los alimentos en la medida de lo posible, con lo que aparece el tema de la dieta, tan importante en la medicina musulmana. Se propone también una activa intervención para eliminar el sufrimiento de los animales y las dificultades a las plantas. Además de eso la higiene, para mantenerse libre de impurezas, aparece como elemento fundamental de la ética personal –en consonancia con el mandato religioso de las abluciones diarias–. Se establece así que la ley moral natural está por encima de las religiones y puede conocerse por la mera razón; gracias a 210 " nombrE autor o autorEs ésta puede alcanzarse la sabiduría de la virtud sin otros apoyos externos, ni las muletas de la religión. Y aunque lo importante del precepto religioso es el núcleo moral que contiene, ese precepto debe someterse al escrutinio de la ley natural. Gracias a esa actitud soberana de la razón, la religión tiene muy poca influencia sobre la investigación científica. A la religión se le reconoce su propio campo de trabajo en la organización de las relaciones sociales, pero no debe interferir en la labor que realizan los sabios con el descubrimiento empírico del tesoro natural. Incluso las verdades morales contenidas en los símbolos religiosos pueden ser interpretadas y superadas racionalmente. No hay ningún misterio accesible sólo por la Revelación y que el entendimiento humano no pueda desvelar: el pensamiento humano puede alcanzar todas las verdades supremas. Esa investigación de la realidad que hace el solitario personaje de la novela culmina en el encuentro con dios; la última parte del libro está orientada a explicar la mística como contemplación del ser verdadero y preparación para la vida eterna. El descubrimiento del mundo espiritual, sin mezcla de materia, al que aspira el alma humana, es el inicio para un camino interior de elevación hacia el conocimiento del ser único, vivo y permanente. En ese proceso se descubren las esencias inmateriales de los cuerpos extensos, así como las esencias divinas, que subsisten por el poder del Ser único y verdadero. Todas esas realidades están al alcance del ser humano que ejercita su razonamiento y domina éticamente su carácter. 4.4. aveRRoes, ibn Rusd o Rochd (cóRdoba, 1126 – MaRRaquech, 1198): eL sisteMa deL sabeR Averroes, junto con Avicena y al-Farabi, debe ser considerado como la máxima figura de la filosofía islámica, aunque sólo El PEriPlo dE la razón " 211 fuera por la enorme influencia que ejerció en los siglos finales del Medievo europeo, dando aliento al primer desarrollo científico previo al Renacimiento. Forma parte de una familia de jueces de la ciudad de Córdoba de origen muladí o converso, y ya su abuelo fue un reconocido especialista en temas jurídicos, que dejó textos escritos sobre el tema. Su maestro fue Abú Yafar ibn Harún un médico de la ciudad de Trujillo, instalado en Sevilla, quien le introdujo en el interés por la filosofía. Más tarde, a través de la mediación de su amigo Abentofail fue protegido del Califa y participó de la revolución cultural almohade, cuyo lema 'volver a los principios' –es decir, refundar el esplendor de la revolución islámica del siglo VII–, exigía una lectura directa de Aristóteles tanto como de al-corán. El Califa encargó a Averroes la tarea filosófica de restaurar el pensamiento de Aristóteles en su pureza primitiva, como parte de su programa político y cultural, tarea que este filósofo realizó con una perfección reconocida unánimemente por los intelectuales de su tiempo, desde Maimónides a Tomás de Aquino. Y además con una agudeza plenamente moderna, que plantea los problemas esenciales del racionalismo, como se verá por la siguiente exposición. Por otro lado, la situación de al-Ándalus se encontraba cada día más comprometida por la inestabilidad política y la presión militar de la cristiandad, que había proclamado la cruzada contra el Islam. El programa político de Averroes es el 'despotismo ilustrado', siguiendo las pautas de la propuesta platónica: un gobierno absolutista fundado en la sabiduría de los dirigentes y en la legalidad jurídica, que difunde una cultura racional, mediante la educación, la ciencia y el arte. La refutación de Averroes no vendrá dada por una argumentación más brillante, como sugieren los seguidores del tomismo, sino por los hechos históricos mismos que hicieron inviable su propuesta para una cultura racional. El racionalismo moderno partirá del despotismo ilustrado, 212 " nombrE autor o autorEs pero acabará defendiendo la democracia como instrumento para el control del poder político. 4.4.1. La defensa del racionalismo La tarea cultural y política, que se había propuesto la revolución almohade, exigía restablecer la confianza en la razón, por lo que Averroes tuvo que entrar en la polémica interna de la filosofía islámica. En Oriente la crítica escéptica de Algazel a Al-Farabi y Avicena en su destrucción (incoherencia) de los filósofos, ridiculizó el pensamiento racional como una forma insuficiente para intentar alcanzar la verdad; además el racionalismo es inconsecuente dado que la verdad se encuentra ya en la Revelación coránica. Por tanto, Averroes tuvo que enfrentar esa crítica y demostrar a su vez su incongruencia, lo que hizo en su libro tahafut al-tahafut, que se puede traducir por la destrucción de la destrucción, o bien la incoherencia de la incoherencia. Y en ese proceso de reconstrucción de la razón encontró el medio para interpretar a Aristóteles en sus propios términos, dando lugar a una lectura de la obra aristotélica que predominaría en Europa del final del Medievo. En primer lugar, tuvo que superar la lógica trivalente –con tres valores: verdadero, falso e indeterminado–, que predomina en el pensamiento islámico oriental; puesto que además la lógica utilizada en la ciencia natural es bivalente –sólo reconoce dos valores: verdadero y falso–, y admite la validez del principio de tercero excluido. Eso significa también sustituir las cualidades de las cosas por magnitudes cuantitativas, para establecer una ciencia sobre un fundamento matemático. Por eso rechaza los conceptos intermedios de Avicena, como 'el ser posible por sí, pero necesario por otro', pues lo posible no puede transformarse en necesario, –y en general significa también eliminar lo que El PEriPlo dE la razón " 213 hoy se denomina 'conjuntos borrosos', cuyos límites no están bien definidos–. El resultado es una metafísica más apropiada a la investigación científica de la naturaleza, si bien se pierden los conceptos racionales que buscan interpretar científicamente la acción humana. La lógica islámica además se combina con la analogía, que según Algazel es la búsqueda del término medio en el silogismo, puesto que la conclusión del mismo ya viene dada por la fe, debe ser la verdad revelada y contenida en al-corán. La ciencia no puede descubrir ninguna verdad que no se encuentre establecida en la Revelación y lo máximo que puede hacer la investigación racional es intentar conciliarse con la fe. La respuesta de Averroes es la completa distinción entre dos niveles diferentes del conocimiento, la religión y la ciencia, que pueden dar origen a dos tipos de verdad distinta, la verdad de la fe y la verdad de la razón. La verdad religiosa está destinada a las multitudes que no son capaces de comprender los conceptos racionales y las demostraciones lógicas. La verdad filosófica es para aquellos que conocen la fuerza probatoria de las argumentaciones racionales. La verdad es universal, pero puede entenderse de varias formas –de ahí las técnicas de análisis racional basadas en la analogía y la interpretación–; cada de una de ellas es verdad en su propio nivel de validez, pero la autonomía de la razón en su propio campo es la garantía para evitar el dogma. Por eso el propio conocimiento científico tiene un valor religioso: el culto más sublime que puede darse a allah es el conocimiento de sus obras, que nos conduce a conocerlo en toda su realidad. Lo que sucede, dice Averroes, es que el pensamiento de Algazel está lleno de confusiones. Una confusión de enorme calado es la concepción antropomórfica de Allah propia del vulgo: los teólogos han convertido a Allah en un hombre eterno y para ellos el mundo está fabricado como los productos de un 214 " nombrE autor o autorEs artesano. Por eso aparecen contradicciones en el razonamiento entre la creación del mundo y su eternidad, así como entre lo finito y lo infinito, o entre causalidad y libre albedrío, etc. Sin embargo, Allah puede crear eternamente el mundo, como ya había advertido Avicena, pues el mundo es creado en cuanto a su esencia –que depende de la existencia de Allah-, pero eterno en cuanto a su existencia, lo que es más consistente desde el punto de vista racional pues 'nada puede surgir de la nada'. Allah crea el mundo desde toda la eternidad. Además hay varios tipos de infinito, como el infinito de los números reales, que representa la cantidad continua, y el infinito de los números naturales que representa una cantidad discreta. Las contradicciones que puedan surgir en las matemáticas y en la razón en general, pueden siempre resolverse adecuadamente por medios racionales. La importante cuestión de la causalidad es resuelta por Averroes de una forma completamente moderna que recuerda a Kant. Algazel había afirmado –como haría Hume más de seiscientos años después– que la noción de causa deriva de la costumbre. Nuestra percepción de una relación causal entre dos fenómenos proviene de la mera costumbre de que aparezcan juntos; en cambio, Allah puede suspender esa correlación produciendo un milagro. La respuesta de Averroes es formalmente idéntica a la que dará Kant para la modernidad: concede que la noción de causa deriva de nuestra costumbre de formar juicios, pero esa costumbre no es un acto irracional, sino todo lo contrario, establecer la causa es un acto de la razón al que el ser humano está abocado por su propia naturaleza. El entendimiento humano comprende la realidad cuando establece las causas de los fenómenos, y ésa es la esencia de la racionalidad humana. La cuestión, por tanto, es si esa comprensión del universo se corresponde con la realidad material del mismo; y Averroes afirma que sí, pues el cosmos es un conjunto de causas y efectos, y las cosas sólo pueden existir en conjunción –dicho de otro modo: Dios crea el mundo El PEriPlo dE la razón " 215 en forma que resulte comprensible para el ser humano–. Lo que sucede es que el conocimiento humano es conjetural, se basa en posibilidades, pues sólo la ciencia que Allah tiene del mundo es necesaria. De nuevo la confusión de Algazel consiste interpretar todo conocimiento como ciencia divina que conoce con toda necesidad la realidad; pero el saber humano es un conocimiento contingente y parcial de la realidad. Algazel intenta eliminar la causalidad para dar cabida a los milagros, los cuales sirven de apoyo a la creencia en la profecía. Pero Averroes admite la profecía como una realidad humana que no necesita de los milagros para ser aceptada y dar lugar a una fe. Su sentido racional es la confianza que despierta en el pueblo y que es necesaria para una vida social fundada en la cooperación entre múltiples personalidades con diferencias psicológicas, étnicas y culturales. La fe en Allah no es más que la confianza en el ser humano, y la misión de la profecía es promover esa fe. Por eso la doble verdad es una afirmación racional de los diferentes niveles de realidad ontológica en los que se mueve la existencia humana, pero no una afirmación hipócrita de labios para afuera, como fue entendido por los teólogos conservadores, que confían en el ritualismo para crear sectas excluyentes, opuestas y en conflicto. La verdad religiosa contiene los principios de organización social en los que Averroes cree; pero la propia tolerancia del Islam, sin dogmas y respetuoso con las otras religiones, implica una libertad de experimentación acerca de las formas de organizar esa vida colectiva. Y eso mismo, según Averroes, debe ser la explicación de la agitada vida política de la cultura andalusí. La creencia en la profecía es un elemento esencial de la religión, junto a la creencia en un solo Allah y en el Juicio Final. El monoteísmo es entendido como una elevación espiritual de las masas hasta los principios racionales descubiertos por la reflexión metafísica: la unidad profunda del Cosmos, manifestada 216 " nombrE autor o autorEs en su armonía y belleza, en el orden de los acontecimientos que responde a las leyes eternas de su existencia. El Juicio Final es la creencia en una justicia cósmica que produce la armonía indispensable para la propia existencia del mundo. Todos los demás símbolos, ritos, ceremonias y conceptos de la religión, sólo son elementos de desarrollo de estos tres primeros, que sirven para explicarlos y afianzarlos. La verdad religiosa es válida para todo ser humano y no es incompatible con la verdad de la razón; por el contrario, la religión contiene los principios de la razón explicados de forma alegórica al pueblo –se trata de interpretar correctamente los símbolos religiosos–. La teoría de las dos verdades, propia de la filosofía islámica, no deriva de las dificultades de hacer compatible el discurso racional y el religioso –hay una verdad para el vulgo que es religiosa y otra para la elite que es racional–, sino que entiende la religión como parte del programa educativo de la humanidad, como un paso en el camino de la racionalidad. Averroes reduce la verdad religiosa a lo esencial, a lo que es imprescindible creer para no quedar fuera de la fe, y al hacerlo descubre su identidad con la verdad racional –la cual es válida para todos los hombres–; ése es el fundamento del humanismo musulmán como, tesis de la universalidad de la razón humana. Del mismo modo, que hay dos formas de la verdad, hay que distinguir dos niveles de la realidad, el físico y el metafísico. Lo físico es el mundo que percibimos por los sentidos; en cambio, lo metafísico es una realidad construida por la razón humana. La sistematización de la experiencia sensible da origen a la ciencia; en cambio en la metafísica están contenidos los ideales de la razón. Esa distinción conlleva la crítica de Averroes al mal empleo de la analogía en la explicación científica, como una confusión de cosas diferentes: la experiencia sensible y los conceptos racionales. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 217 Al distinguir entre lo físico y lo metafísico, Averroes establece dos niveles diferentes de la realidad humana: la experiencia sensible por la que conocemos nuestra realidad material, por una parte, y la razón con los fines y objetivos ideales de la acción humana contenidos en la reflexión filosófica, por otra. La primera se hace racional mediante el conocimiento empírico de las causas; definir con precisión los segundos se logra mediante la crítica racional de la creencia. En su respuesta a Algazel, Averroes rechaza el antropomorfismo como elemento de la creencia, para avanzar en la educación popular hacia una mayor plenitud racional de la vida colectiva. El culto musulmán manifiesta un rasgo de intelectualismo profundo al rechazar el uso de imágenes para representar la divinidad, lo que supone no hacer concesiones al sentimentalismo de las masas –si bien las restricciones que pone a la representación artística en general pueden considerarse absurdas, a causa de un rigor moral excesivo; de ahí que la tolerancia sea el complemento indispensable de la religión–. Los campos de acción son diferentes: mientras la razón utiliza la demostración, la religión se dirige a los sentidos y la imaginación porque es un discurso dirigido a todo el mundo. Pues el contenido esencial de la creencia religiosa es corregir la conducta; en cambio, formar el pensamiento es la tarea de la razón. El objetivo de ambas es una misma verdad, conseguir la virtud; la religión conduce a los fieles directamente hacia ella, en cambio, la razón lo hace a través del pensamiento especulativo. Por tanto la filosofía y la religión son perfectamente compatibles y la especulación demostrativa no contradice la ley divina. De ese modo, ha dado pasos de gigante para la práctica racional de la religión; se deben poner condiciones a la religión, una de las cuales es que debe ser siempre compatible con la razón, en dos sentidos: primero, en la aceptación tolerante de las diferencias, que intenta convencer por la superioridad de la conducta moral y entiende que el mal conlleva el propio castigo; 218 " nombrE autor o autorEs y además en los mandatos morales que resultan adecuados para alcanzar la plenitud humana. Ése fue el sentido auténtico de la revolución islámica en su momento histórico. 4.4.2. el sistema de las ciencias El racionalismo de Averroes se manifiesta también en su concepción de la ciencia, que más que una colección de datos empíricos, consiste en la comprensión del orden y la armonía de las cosas y el mundo. Esa armonía tiene su razón de ser en el orden y la armonía de la Inteligencia divina, pues el cosmos es una manifestación de Allah. No es que provenga de Allah, sino que Allah habita en él. Averroes rechaza la teoría emanatista propia de la metafísica oriental, sustituyéndola por una idea cósmica de tipo panteísta. Allah es el Alma del Cosmos: es necesario que exista una fuerza espiritual difundida entre todas las partes que componen el mundo. Como el alma es la causa de la unidad y el movimiento del cuerpo, así es Allah con respecto al universo creado. Allah se convierte en una fuerza espiritual que se difunde por el universo en su conjunto, integra sus partes y mantiene su existencia.34 Averroes fue capaz de señalar que la llamada teología de aristóteles era un libro espurio, cuya redacción no correspondía 34. Herbert A. Davidson, alfarabi, avicenna and averroes. on intelect, New York – Oxford, Oxford Univesity Press, 1992, sostiene que la metafísica de Averroes es similar a la expuesta por al-Farabi y Avicena, y diverge en pequeñas particularidades: averroe's original epitome of the Metaphysics advocates an emanation scheme that diverges only in particulars form the scheme of alfarabi and avicenna (223). Eso es cierto en términos generales, según mi opinión, si bien tanto Yabri como Martínez Lorca, han subrayado las diferencias que Averroes mantiene con los pensadores orientales, como matices importantes en la comprensión cosmológica y científica. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 219 a Aristóteles, y rechaza el neoplatonismo implícito en él. Pero aunque en ese aspecto su metafísica es panteísta –interpretando la teoría aristotélica del Primer Motor según el inmanentismo, una línea tradicional en el racionalismo islámico–, la explicación hylemórfica de los seres, la teoría de las cuatro causas, la lógica silogística, los principios del conocimiento y su noción de ciencia, son aristotélicas. Por eso Averroes es sobre todo conocido por haber introducido a Aristóteles en Europa –y con esto puso en marcha el programa de investigación que daría lugar a la revolución científica–. Sus comentarios a la Metafísica fueron la fuente principal para el conocimiento del pensamiento aristotélico en Europa durante todo el Medievo y crearon una corriente filosófica denominada averroísmo latino. Pero su pensamiento subraya el materialismo científico sin bloquear el espíritu racional, por oposición al espiritualismo irracionalista de los teólogos dogmáticos; de modo que su pensamiento fue condenado repetidamente en Europa, y Tomás de Aquino dedicó la mayor parte de su trabajo intelectual a obtener una interpretación de Aristóteles diferente de la averroísta. He aquí algunas de las ideas que Averroes expone en sus aclaraciones a la Metafísica aristotélica y que nos muestran la interpretación materialista de la realidad. en el seno de la materia, las formas van madurando como disposiciones latentes de la materia, la cual retoma así el papel protagonista que habíamos observado en Avicena; de tal modo, Allah se reduce a ser la causa final del Universo, limitándose a sacar a la luz las formas subyacentes a la materia. Y de esas premisas se saca la consecuencia de un origen material del espíritu humano: también las almas y los pensamientos están dispuestas ya en la materia. Por lo demás, la forma del cosmos viene dada por la teoría geocéntrica según la cual el Primer Motor se encuentra alojado en los cielos y produce la realidad mundana: el movimiento circular del cielo 220 " nombrE autor o autorEs hace surgir de la materia las formas eficientes alojadas en ella desde la eternidad.35 Ese Primer Motor, que crea el orden universal en el mundo natural, se identifica con el mismo Intelecto Agente, que produce los universales y los infunde en el entendimiento humano, que puede conocer así la realidad. De ese modo, el ser humano puede conocer la realidad, en contacto con la iluminación divina de su entendimiento: en sintonía con las afirmaciones de Aristóteles en su tratado de anima, Averroes puede indicar que el intelecto tiene la virtud de llegar a ser todas las cosas. Y por eso la ciencia es un camino hacia el conocimiento de la divinidad, hacia la salvación y la felicidad personal. El alma humana alcanza a vislumbrar la eternidad en cuanto que es pensamiento de los inteligibles eternos, mientras que es mortal con el cuerpo personal corruptible al que pertenece. El receptor de los inteligibles, que es el intelecto pasivo o potencial de los individuos, capta los inteligibles por la acción del intelecto agente; en ese aspecto los inteligibles, que constituyen el intelecto adquirido, son múltiples y corruptibles, pues mueren con el alma; ya que fuera del alma, más allá de su dimensión espiritual, los universales no tienen existencia sino por los cuerpos que los encarnan –que también son perecederos–, no son más que las formas inscritas en los cuerpos materiales en continuo cambio de generación y descomposición. Esta distinción entre dos formas de los universales, que vemos aparecer en Averroes, eternos en cuanto pensados por el Intelecto Agente, pero corruptibles en cuanto parte del alma humana, anuncia la exposición de Tomás de Aquino, según la cual los universales pueden ser ante re –en el pensamiento 35. Esta idea es subrayada por Bloch en la obra citada. También por Davidson: the movement of the heavens heat sublunar matter to various negrees and thereby turn it into the four elements, and they mix the elements into a variety of configurations... (op.cit.). El PEriPlo dE la razón " 221 divino–, in re –en cuanto forma de los objetos naturales, y post re– abstracciones de la mente humana. También Averroes explica la física y la biología aristotélicas, aunque su modelo de ciencia tiene un fuerte carácter axiomático, lo que da a la metafísica su carácter de piedra angular de su pensamiento. En medicina se mantuvo en el campo teórico sin entrar a fondo en las cuestiones prácticas, redactó varios tratados; el más conocido de ellos fue el colliget, tratado de las generalidades de la medicina, donde sistematizó los conocimientos provenientes de las obras de Galeno. Toma las prohibiciones alcoránicas como recomendaciones dietéticas y considera la dieta como el primer paso en el tratamiento de las enfermedades –el rigorismo moral tiene pues un sentido racional–. La higiene y la dieta forman parte de una medicina preventiva, cuya práctica encuentra la salud evitando las enfermedades y tiene su fundamento en un modo de vida ordenado a la perfección de la persona. Su influencia como médico teórico se dejará sentir en la Europa moderna, especialmente en la Universidad de Padua. La actividad científica y filosófica de Averroes, en consonancia con su racionalismo, defiende que el conocimiento empírico está subordinado a los principios de la filosofía natural. El método científico es deductivo, se basa en el orden sistemático que gobierna el universo y que el ser humano puede descubrir mediante su razón y representar de forma lógica. Eso se traduce para la ciencia médica, en la idea de que el organismo sano es el que se adecua al orden natural, en cambio la rotura del sistema orgánico es la enfermedad. El cuerpo vivo es un conjunto funcional de órganos que se complementan entre sí. Cada órgano realiza una función, una actividad necesaria para que el sistema completo pueda mantenerse en vida. La función es más importante que el órgano, pues la causa final está por encima de la causa eficiente: no se hizo la función para el órgano, sino 222 " nombrE autor o autorEs el órgano para la función. El universo tiene una estructura teleológica, está orientado hacia una finalidad establecida por Allah, que es la belleza mediante la armonía y el equilibrio. El cuerpo humano, como parte de la naturaleza, es también una estructura ordenada a un fin natural inmanente, que es su pleno desarrollo vital de sus facultades. La ciencia averroísta tiene carácter deductivo y sus fundamentos se encuentran en la metafísica aristotélica, que aclara el método científico exponiendo los principios generales del ser y los conceptos que explican racionalmente los fenómenos. De ahí las características principales del racionalismo de Averroes: – la separación entre filosofía y religión, afirmando las especificidades respectivas del discurso religioso y del filosófico; – un panteísmo de corte racionalista en el que Allah constituye el principio de unidad y armonía universales –que puede interpretarse también en la línea emanatista, pero abandonando los conceptos triádicos propios del neoplatonismo oriental–; – la teoría del entendimiento agente o activo común a todos los hombres, divino y eterno –que es propia de la cultura islámica medieval–; – el concepto de la divinidad equivale a un principio de confianza racional en las capacidades humanas: el Intelecto Agente que ilumina el conocimiento humano es también el Primer Motor que crea las formas naturales. – concepción dialéctica de la razonabilidad humana, según la cual la verdad nace del debate público y la contraposición de ideas –como método para la sistematización de la experiencia colectiva que da origen a la ciencia–; – conceptualismo: la razonabilidad implica la existencia de universales de carácter subjetivo, los inteligibles que son El PEriPlo dE la razón " 223 conceptos creados por la Inteligencia cósmica: los universales existen en la mente humana, no fuera de ella; – materialismo: lo que existe fuera del alma son los individuos perceptibles por los sentidos; – el método científico se basa en el principio de causalidad –todo suceso tiene una causa, según el 'principio de razón suficiente'–, como instrumento intelectual para el conocimiento racional del universo físico; – reconocimiento de los límites del saber tanto científico como religioso: potencialmente el intelecto humano es ilimitado para el conocimiento, pero tiene límites temporales en la actualidad –lo que necesita ser acompañado por una noción de progreso intelectual–. Finalmente aquí hemos podido vislumbrar la idea ilustrada de un progreso de la humanidad hacia el conocimiento de la realidad universal, que había sido formulada en forma novelesca por Abentofail. Como veremos en la teoría política, Averroes concebía el proceso histórico como una experimentación de la naturaleza por la humanidad, que debía producir un conocimiento cada vez más ajustado del universo en el que se encuentra. Lo que nos confirma que aquellos andalusíes estuvieron adelantados a su tiempo, elaborando ideas y conceptos que marcaron el desarrollo del racionalismo europeo moderno; eso explica que su pensamiento dejara una fuerte impronta en los siglos que siguieron a su muerte, durante el final de la Edad Media y el principio de la Moderna.36 36. Andrés Martínez Lorca en su averroes. el sabio cordobés que iluminó europa, ha expuesto con erudición y amplitud este tema, si bien con matices en su interpretación de la filosofía averroísta. 224 " nombrE autor o autorEs 4.4.3. La teoría ética y política En el aspecto político, Averroes, alto funcionario del Estado, era partidario de un califato fundado en normas legales que gobernase sobre una sociedad mercantil con hegemonía de la burguesía urbana. Lo bueno para el ser humano –animal político y racional, según la definición aristotélica– es la vida en sociedad, y todo lo que contribuya a hacer ésta más perfecta y armoniosa: la moral, la unión de comunidades diferentes, la variedad de puntos de vista que amplíen el saber, la riqueza de habilidades, capacidades y virtudes, que multiplican las satisfacciones humanas, etc. El poder político tiene la misión de poner orden y coordinar todas esas actividades y se funda en la ley y el derecho. Una sociedad perfecta, como es la comunidad religiosa del profeta, umma, no necesita el derecho, pues se basta con la moral personal para establecer las relaciones sociales justas; pero las sociedades en las que vivimos son imperfectas y en ellas vale el principio jurídico. Esa idea del imperio de la ley proveniente de la tradición platónica, casaba muy adecuadamente con su profesión, pues pertenecía a una familia de jueces muy conocidos en al-Ándalus, los Beni Rusd; su abuelo fue un jurista famoso, su padre fue su mentor directo y también sus descendientes continuaron la tradición familiar. De ese modo, Averroes es un jurista que ha reconocido las servidumbres de su profesión, como le conviene a un filósofo consecuente: Platón en su República ha afirmado que le corresponde el gobierno a aquél que menos desea gobernar. En su investigación sobre la política la obra averroísta adopta un talante empírico propio del aristotelismo. Es esto una prueba notable de su profunda inteligencia y su dominio del método científico, porque los filósofos medievales de ámbito islámico –incluido Averroes–, desconocieron la Política de Aristóteles; en cambio, la República de Platón, de carácter más teórico y utópiEl PEriPlo dE la razón " 225 co, fue comentada ya por al-Farabi y constituyó el libro fundamental de la reflexión musulmana sobre la constitución política de la sociedad. Averroes dueño del método a la vez empirista y racional de la filosofía aristotélica, utiliza las categorías políticas descubiertas en Platón para realizar una investigación de la rica historia política de al-Ándalus, en lugar de limitarse al uso meramente teórico de las mismas. El ideal social de Averroes es la umma, la comunidad fraternal de los creyentes; pero considera que ésta no es posible nada más que en los tiempos de la fundación del credo religioso y entonces propone un modelo social alternativo: un Estado fundado sobre las normas legales que regulan la vida social. El poder legal, que hoy llamamos Estado de derecho, fue propuesto por Platón como posibilidad real tras su fracaso en la construcción de una sociedad utópica. Ese orden justo habría sido un 'despotismo ilustrado' –pues en la época no hubiera sido concebible una monarquía constitucional–; un orden social que tardaría todavía siglos en establecerse en Europa, y que fue inviable en al-Ándalus medieval por varios motivos: en primer lugar, la debilidad de los califas almorávides, que se entregaron a la timocracia y al hedonismo, la pasión por las riquezas y los placeres; en segundo lugar, la derrota de los almohades por los cristianos causada en parte por sus errores estratégicos cuando intentaron apoyarse en el integrismo religioso –o fueron incapaces de superarlo–. Como conclusión puede decirse que Averroes concebía el sistema jurídico como la forma de embridar el poder político, sometiéndole a un escrutinio racional, en sintonía con la importancia concedida al derecho y al papel social de los jueces en la civilización islámica. Pero el equilibrio de poderes en la sociedad andalusí estaba roto ya en su época y no encontró a mano las instituciones sociales que hicieran posible restituir esa función de control del poder político. Hubiera sido necesario 226 " nombrE autor o autorEs establecer una clara división de poderes y la independencia del poder judicial. En ese sentido la política almohade fue también avanzada, respetando el sistema judicial andalusí, si bien centralizó el poder político de los jueces reservándose el Califa el derecho a imponer la pena de muerte.37 Pero el conflicto estaba inscrito en la misma sociedad, pues Averroes tuvo que sufrir la enemistad y las intrigas de sus propios compatriotas. La existencia de un corpus jurídico extensamente trabajado, no fue capaz de dominar los órganos estatales que estructuran la violencia social al servicio de la norma, posiblemente por la fuerte jerarquización de los aparatos militares y de policía que acumulan el poder político; pero también por los conflictos internos a la sociedad civil, una vez abandonado el racionalismo y la confianza en el sentido común. La educación racional del pueblo más los mecanismos mercantiles de la economía, constituyeron una sociedad civil con una importante riqueza material, pero indefensa ante la violencia organizada. En la crítica que Averroes –funcionario del Estado almohade, jurista y médico, además de filósofo– hace de la sociedad de su tiempo, contenida en su explicación a la 'República' de Platón, señala que la forma política predominante en el mundo musulmán es la timocracia, el poder de los ricos y acaudalados comerciantes. Su interés de clase exige un Estado que asegure las vías de comunicación y garantice el funcionamiento de los mecanismos de mercado, regulando los precios y evitando el robo y el fraude; además los intereses generales piden una administración eficaz de los bienes públicos. Pero la timocracia es una de las formas que adopta la oligarquía, es decir, el gobierno de unos pocos cuando éstos buscan su propio interés en detrimento del bien público. El idealismo de los filósofos musulmanes consiste 37. Andrés Martínez Lorca, op.cit., señala que de los 361 jueces de al-Ándalus, bajo el poder almohade 284 eran andalusíes. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 227 en pensar que, gracias a la educación, la razón puede imponerse sobre las pasiones y los vicios derivados del poder de la clase dominante; si bien puede interpretarse la reflexión política de al-Farabi, Avempace y Averroes, como la constatación de esa dificultad en el orden social. Del mismo modo, puede explicarse la condena de Averroes como una consecuencia de los conflictos de una personalidad de recto carácter moral y profundo sentido de la justicia, frente a las clases dominantes de su época.38 Averroes también señala que en otros momentos se produce la demagogia –el gobierno de la mayoría pobre–, refiriéndose al gobierno de los reinos de taifas en el siglo XI, cuando el califato se colapse tras la muerte de Almanzor. En otras ocasiones, nos dice Averroes, predomina la tiranía, como cuando las segundas taifas descompusieron al-Ándalus tras el fracaso almorávide en la primera mitad del siglo XII; en ello encuentra nuestro filósofo una confirmación de aquella teoría de los clásicos griegos según la cual la demagogia se convierte en tiranía.39 Pero debemos entender las palabras de Averroes teniendo en cuenta su posición de clase y su defensa del Estado almohade. No es fácil que un alto cargo del gobierno absoluto tenga confianza en la democracia, por mucho que su talante sea racionalista, afirme la libertad de pensamiento y afile su crítica en los males de su tiempo. Por otra parte, es cierto que algunos jefes militares se comportaron de 38. Martínez Lorca en op.cit. argumenta que la crítica de la tiranía que realiza Averroes, está dirigida en contra de las clases dominantes de la sociedad andalusí, que habían adoptado una ideología integrista y conservadora, de modo que intrigaban contra el Estado almohade revolucionario. La imposibilidad de realizar el proyecto político ilustrado derivaría entonces del desinterés de la burocracia estatal y los funcionarios corrompidos. 39. Miguel Cruz Hernández, La crítica de averroes al despotismo oligárquico andalusí, en AA.VV., al encuentro de averroes, edición de Andrés Martínez Lorca, Madrid, Trotta, 1993. 228 " nombrE autor o autorEs forma tiránica, tras la descomposición del imperio almorávide, y los andalusíes tuvieron que soportar las campañas fraticidas entre ellos. Quizás fuera esa crítica de la sociedad andalusí contenida en su teoría política la que le valiera la enemistad del sultán almohade, mal aconsejado por cortesanos envidiosos, pues Averroes era un funcionario leal sin más ambiciones políticas que cumplir bien sus tareas de Estado. O sus conclusiones revolucionarias en el terreno del derecho que le valieron la inquina de los juristas. Eso añadido a las presiones de los religiosos ortodoxos por su crítica a la teología de Algazel, que le hizo enemistarse con el clero musulmán. La propia revolución almohade acabó convirtiéndose en un integrismo, al contacto con las realidades sociales de su tiempo; defendía un credo progresista basado en la vuelta a los orígenes como racionalización de la vida social, pero se vio lastrada por los intereses particulares de las clases en pugna, que promovieron un error político muy grave, la persecución de cristianos y judíos en al-Ándalus. Lo que fue aprovechado por Alfonso I el Batallador para una incursión en donde se llevó una parte importante de la población mozárabe andalusí. Otro índice de que se habían desarticulado los mecanismos políticos y sociales que hicieron posible la brillante cultura medieval en el sur peninsular. Como ya he señalado la situación de estos filósofos funcionarios es ambigua; por un lado constituyen una fuerza de la razón en la sociedad islámica que impulsa su evolución en un sentido progresista. Por otro lado, dependientes de un sistema de explotación injusto del que forman parte en su cúspide política, son una parte importante de su justificación. Tomando las ideas de Averroes en conjunto con las de Avempace y Abentofail, tal vez se pueda entender que éstos veían su situación actual como un camino hacia la perfección futura; por lo que dentro de su El PEriPlo dE la razón " 229 posición defensora del orden vigente, es posible observar una importante crítica social en sus teorías, que resultó excesiva para el Estado andalusí. Por eso puede decirse que sus ideas no estaban hechas para su tiempo, sino que miraban al futuro; el humanismo de los filósofos, su convicción de que la razón común de todos los hombres debe ser el fundamento de una cultura laica más allá de las divergencias religiosas, no prosperó en un medio social reclamado por la guerra santa. Ese ideal de regulación social que se fundaba en la economía mercantil y el Estado legal, fracasó por la falta de un mecanismo regulador del poder establecido; los funcionarios andaluces consiguieron regular el mercado, pero no supieron controlar el poder político por falta de instrumentos sociales adecuados. Las tesis jurídicas reformistas de Averroes no se llevaron a la práctica, y poco después de su muerte en 1198, al-Ándalus y su brillante cultura desaparecieron como realidad práctica para pasar a ser memoria viva de la humanidad: en 1212 la batalla de las Navas de Tolosa abre las puertas del valle del Guadalquivir a los príncipes cristianos, anunciando el fin de la más avanzada cultura del Medievo. 4.4.4. La teoría jurídica En definitiva, una vez descartado el modelo utópico propuesto por la religión como irrealizable en la práctica actual de una sociedad, el problema social de alcanzar un sistema equilibrado y justo es fundamentalmente el control del poder político. No se trata ya de realizar el mejor sistema imaginable, sino de conseguir uno que sea lo menos malo posible. Es en ese sentido que Aristóteles señal que la democracia era el menos malo de los sistemas corrompidos de gobierno, idea que recoge la moderna filosofía política, escéptica con la idea de un gobierno bueno y 230 " nombrE autor o autorEs desinteresado. Pero Averroes no conoció la filosofía política de Aristóteles, y sí la experiencia directa de una idea platónica: la demagogia degenera a menudo en tiranía, lo que sucedió precisamente en los segundos reinos de taifas. Por lo tanto en la práctica, como juez que juega un papel clave en el orden social musulmán, Averroes defendió el derecho como instrumento de un orden social racional, que organiza las relaciones de la comunidad dentro de los límites establecidos por la ley. Los jueces en el Islam tienen una importante autonomía, y juegan un papel de autoridad popular, que los gobernantes no discuten. Averroes se limitó a establecer la validez práctica del derecho, confiando en su capacidad para regular el poder político; con lo cual el problema de la racionalidad del orden político se nos convierte en la cuestión de la racionalidad del sistema legal y las instituciones que deben hacerlo valer. En el desarrollo de la ciencia jurídica de Averroes podemos observar la aplicación de las categorías racionales a la investigación de las leyes; pero al mismo tiempo, puesto que el derecho recoge el legado de una tradición de normas y costumbres que se remontan a la época del profeta Mahoma, en el campo del desarrollo legal podemos ver la tensión entre los datos de la Revelación y la aplicación de las categorías racionales. Escribió varias obras sobre el derecho, entre ellas la bidaya, un estudio comparativo de las ideas de las diferentes escuelas jurídicas en el ámbito islámico, que ha tenido una enorme difusión en la cultura musulmana. Mientras que la mayoría de los juristas andalusíes, pertenecientes a la escuela malikí, eran rutinarios e inmovilistas, cerrados en la defensa de los principios de su propia tradición, dominados por una mentalidad racalcitrante en contra el libre pensamiento, Averroes se nos muestra con un espíritu abierto al diálogo con otras escuelas y a la tolerancia hacia las opiniones divergentes. Predispuesto a utilizar métodos racionales en la mejora del derecho, el estudio comparativo le sirve para construir un método de investigación El PEriPlo dE la razón " 231 que pueda dilucidar los casos no contemplados por la ley. De ese modo aparece otro aspecto del racionalismo averroísta como la convicción de que la verdad surge del debate y la confrontación de ideas. A través de la contrastación de opiniones diversas se puede alcanzar un criterio personal, que permite emitir juicios válidos sin imitación servil de los modelos tradicionales. Bien entendido que todo pensamiento se hace siempre desde determinada tradición y que Averroes no renunció a la escuela malikí que había profesado su familia. El tema de la ciencia jurídica es la cuestión de las fuentes del derecho. Generalmente se reconocen tres: a) leyes contenidas en la Revelación y en la Sunna (tradición del Profeta); b) consenso ideal entre los musulmanes; c) la analogía. La primera fuente deriva de las ideas contenidas en la predicación de Mahoma y aceptadas por los musulmanes. Viene a ser completada por la tradición y las costumbres de Medina, transmitidas de padres a hijos a lo largo de las generaciones. La segunda fuente podría originar una teoría del contrato, pero es considerada por Averroes como secundaria, por ser objeto de frecuentes manipulaciones, pues no se refiere a un contrato por venir, sino a un contrato ya realizado en el pasado y que obliga en el presente. La tercera es el método científico de análisis y clasificación, que tan espectaculares resultados tiene que rendir utilizada por una mente como la suya. Como la segunda fuente es poco apreciada por Averroes, su pensamiento se centra en la búsqueda de un equilibrio entre la tradición y la innovación racional. Sin embargo, bien utilizado como resultado de un debate racional sobre la actualidad, el consenso de los musulmanes –que expresa el principio de la soberanía popular que reside en la asamblea de los creyentes–, podría ser el fiel de la balanza de un equilibrio no artificial entre las otras dos. Pero de nuevo estaríamos hablando de la democracia, lo que no corresponde a la época que vivió nuestro filósofo: para dirigir con efectividad el orden social, el 232 " nombrE autor o autorEs consenso entre los musulmanes necesita instituciones consolidadas y procedimientos racionales que eviten la demagogia. A falta de éstos, la función de la judicatura juega un papel fundamental como autoridad popular, capaz en algunos casos de censurar al propio califa. La palabra del profeta está recogida en al-corán y contiene determinados problemas derivados de las divergencias de interpretación y que exigen el análisis cuidadoso de los textos. En la discusión de la Revelación, la aplicación de la racionalidad consiste en el análisis textual, que puede dar a divergencias diversas, originadas en la clasificación de los textos, los significados de la expresión, las diferencias entre lo literal y lo metafórico, los diferentes niveles de lectura, las contradicciones entre los textos. Un tipo de trabajo que se remonta al análisis crítico de los símbolos religiosos de la Antigüedad, que se nos muestra ya muy desarrollado en la ciencia jurídica islámica y que hemos visto usar a los filósofos judíos de al-Ándalus. La tradición está recogida en los hadices, que relatan los hechos y dichos del Profeta; éstos plantean el problema de su autenticidad y Averroes expone dos criterios de discriminación entre las tradiciones válidas y espurias: la aceptación mayoritaria y la variedad en sus orígenes. Una tradición que se remonta a un solo compañero del Profeta y con pocos seguidores no tiene fuerza legal. En cambio sí la tiene una tradición ampliamente aceptada y que fue establecida por un grupo numeroso de los primeros musulmanes. Por eso, en cierto modo el problema de la tradición remite a la segunda fuente del derecho, el consenso entre los musulmanes. Averroes demuestra que en numerosas ocasiones se trata de casos manipulados sin fuerza probatoria y la considera fuente espuria y secundaria. La analogía es el método racional de investigación: descubrir verdades ocultas a partir de lo ya conocido. Sirve para rellenar las lagunas legales, aplicando el derecho en los casos no contemplados por la ley. Frente a los tradicionalistas que El PEriPlo dE la razón " 233 piensan que todo caso legal está ya contenido en la normativa heredada adecuadamente consultada, Averroes señala que el método racional es imprescindible puesto que la codificación es un sistema finito, mientras que la realidad material es un proceso infinito, que por serlo no puede caber en lo ya establecido. De nuevo aparece una tensión entre la fe y la razón y el objetivo de Averroes es conciliar ambas, por ello afirma que la analogía es válida siempre que vaya reforzada por algún texto sagrado, pero se busca un subterfugio que refuerza el análisis racional: el texto sagrado es siempre interpretable, pues tiene carácter alegórico. Hay que comprender por la razón las expresiones de la Revelación que contienen un aspecto oculto al lado de otro explícito. El proceso histórico es así un proceso de descubrimiento de la verdad que incluye al propio texto alcoránico, cuyas virtualidades todavía no se han revelado completamente en el pasado. La analogía tiene una forma débil, menos consistente, que es la similitud entre situaciones o casos. La forma fuerte es la analogía conceptual que se funda en la noción de causa. El razonamiento del jurista puede equivocarse, pero Averroes cita alcorán para recordar que son disculpables los errores cometidos en el esfuerzo racional por entender y dominar la realidad; y si se acierta entonces la recompensa es doble. Claro que existe el peligro de arbitrariedad, por lo que se recomienda un buen uso de la razón, que encuentra sus límites en el sentido común. Hay que abandonar una analogía aparente en caso de causar daños mayores, y la analogía libre debe estar guiada por el interés común; el jurista mantiene una opinión personal que vela por el interés público. Y como ya se ha señalado ese criterio personal nace de la comparación entre diferentes puntos de vista. Por eso, el método racional en jurisprudencia, además del análisis comparativo que produce la analogía, es la dialéctica entendida como debate y discusión. Con la consecuencia de que no hay que condenar las opiniones contrarias, como hace la ortodoxia, 234 " nombrE autor o autorEs en lo que podemos ver un nuevo argumento crítico contra las posiciones de Algazel. Ni tampoco hay que dormitar en el seno de la propia tradición de derecho, ignorando los descubrimientos de las otras tradiciones. Averroes encuentra un oponente digno de su interés en la escuela zahirí, que en al-Ándalus fue introducida por Abenhazem. Según ésta, todo es lícito menos lo explícitamente prohibido por un texto sagrado. Averroes reconoce que en esa idea hay un principio válido en algunas ocasiones; pero para su gusto y formación peca por un excesivo liberalismo. Lo que no resta un ápice de su talante racionalista y librepensador, que pudo forjarse en el ambiente de libertad que se produjo en los reinos de taifas y después en la apertura intelectual con los almohades. Y ese talante se manifiesta en su aceptación de los textos y sus diversas interpretaciones, pero también en el reconocimiento del criterio racional como una intuición personal no sujeta a regla, pero que puede formarse con el estudio y la discusión. Y esa actitud dio un fruto extraordinario para su tiempo en su posición acerca de los derechos de la mujer. Averroes estableció las condiciones para la libertad de las mujeres, afirmando la obligación del marido de cumplir las condiciones de la esposa; la necesidad de consentimiento de la mujer adulta para el matrimonio, a la que no se le puede impedir casarse con quien quiere; el castigo de los malos tratos matrimoniales, aprobando el divorcio por esa causa; la no obligación de usar el velo, aunque sea recomendable para mantener el pudor; y finalmente el reconocimiento de que las mujeres también pueden ejercer el cargo de juez. Cabe preguntarse por la finalidad de estas recomendaciones: o bien responden a una intención progresista por parte de Averroes, o bien pretenden defender unos derechos asentados en la vida pública de al-Ándalus desde antiguo; si tenemos en cuenta que la involución integrista del mundo islámico en el siglo XII, y leemos la poesía erótica de Abenhazem como una muestra El PEriPlo dE la razón " 235 de autonomía en la situación de la mujeres, podemos sospechar que se trata de lo segundo, que las mujeres habían alcanzado cierta autonomía bajo la cultura islámica, pero ésta fue recortada posteriormente –al mismo tiempo que se eliminaba la libertad de pensamiento–. Recuérdese que uno de los motivos reconocidos de la predicación de Mahoma, fue impedir la práctica del asesinato de niñas recién nacidas entre los árabes pre-islámicos. En todo caso, las afirmaciones de Averrores constituyen toda una demostración de la fuerza del racionalismo para impulsar la emancipación humana. 236 " nombrE autor o autorEs El PEriPlo dE la razón " 237 EPíLOgO LA PROYECCIÓN hACIA ADELANTE 1. LA CRISIS DE LA CIvILIzACIÓN MUSULMANA DEL SIgLO XII AL Xv Y EL RETROCESO DEL RACIONALISMO En el siglo XII el racionalismo musulmán comenzó a tener problemas con el autoritarismo religioso, azuzado por intereses políticos y luchas entre facciones opuestas. La tolerancia inicial se convirtió en luchas fraticidas por el poder político. Ya Abenhazem, partidario del derrocado califato Omeya en el siglo XI, fue testigo de una quema de sus libros en Sevilla –tal como lo sería Averroes más tarde, en Córdoba el 1196–; pero se lo tomó con filosofía y escribió unos versos sobre el tema: dejad de prender fuego a pergaminos y papeles, y mostrad vuestra ciencia para que se vea quién es el que sabe. y es que aunque queméis el papel nunca quemaréis lo que contiene... Los racionalistas, convencidos de la superioridad de la razón y de su carácter connatural para la humanidad, tal vez no se preocupen de las locuras humanas más que lo suficiente para evitar el desastre. Tampoco se molestarán ni poco ni mucho por las discrepancias –excepto cuando éstas envuelvan mendacidad manifiesta, y sólo si ésta se propaga entre las masas por métodos violentos–; puesto que la esencia de la razón consiste en el debate entre puntos de vista alternativos, se encuentran dentro de su elemento en la polémica y la discrepancia. De ese modo, en el 238 " nombrE autor o autorEs Islam proliferan las escuelas de pensamiento jurídico y religioso: las escuelas teológicas fundamentan sus puntos de vista alternativos acerca de la interpretación de la ley y las escrituras sagradas en la polémica doctrinal; y en el terreno del derecho, diferentes perspectivas se complementan en el descubrimiento de procedimientos eficaces para alcanzar la justicia en las relaciones humanas: Abenhazem fue partidario de una interpretación literal de las sentencias de al-corán y la ley islámica, sharía, enmarcando la moralidad en una perspectiva liberal –que anuncia el principio jurídico de Montesquieu: la libertad consiste en hacer todo lo que permiten las leyes–; frente a él, Averroes prefirió utilizar la analogía para dar sentido a la aplicación de las leyes en los casos concretos, que siempre contienen matices diferenciadores. Igualmente sucede en la reflexión sobre la religión: la teología de los mutazilíes aboga por el racionalismo filosófico y el determinismo moral, mientras que la escuela asariya defiende la primacía de la revelación coránica y la responsabilidad personal. Que ambas perspectivas sean complementarias, es algo que merece una profundización reflexiva en la naturaleza humana. Mientras las disputas permanezcan en el terreno intelectual y sus consecuencias prácticas no sean incompatibles con el orden social, mientras haya procedimientos para zanjar las cuestiones del bien común y acción colectiva, la razonabilidad de la especie humana constituye una parte importante de su gran fuerza para el desenvolvimiento de sus capacidades. Pero cuando las disputas envuelven enfrentamientos violentos y no hay forma de llegar al acuerdo razonado en la organización política, las guerras intestinas anuncian el final del Estado y la civilización. Es claro que esos conflictos derivan de las pasiones humanas y no de la capacidad racional de la especie; pero es cierto también que el pensamiento integrista negaba que esa capacidad racional fuera suficiente para establecer un orden social coherente e integrado, que proporcionase la felicidad a las gentes. El inicio de El PEriPlo dE la razón " 239 la decadencia del imperio de los árabes –según la expresión de Ibn Jaldún–, la teología irracionalista de la escuela asariya, pasó con Algazel a ser la principal corriente de pensamiento islámico ortodoxo. La inestabilidad del Estado y los conflictos políticos, junto con la presión de la Europa cristiana, cuyas autoridades habían decidido confrontar el Islam por las armas mediante las Cruzadas, fueron las causas de la decadencia de la civilización musulmana en los siglos finales de la Edad Media. La investigación científica y filosófica más avanzada pasó a realizarse en Europa desde el siglo XIII, pero es claro que se produjo a través de la influencia de la cultura andalusí y como continuación del desarrollo cultural que se había producido en la civilización islámica. La conquista de al-Ándalus por la Cruzada cristiana, fue un auténtico desastre cultural. Un importante número de intelectuales árabes se exilió, y otros quedaron limitados a las traducciones de los textos árabes al latín. Cuando los Reyes Católicos conquistaron Granada, decretaron la conversión forzosa al cristianismo de creyentes en otras religiones, lo que en la práctica significó la expulsión inmediata de 50.000 judíos y 300.000 musulmanes, entre los que contaban numerosos trabajadores cualificados e intelectuales. Cientos de libros escritos en árabe, que contenían la sabiduría casi milenaria de la civilización islámica, fueron quemados por orden del Cardenal Cisneros en Granada a principios del siglo XVI. Los que se convirtieron para poder quedarse, tuvieron que sufrir enormes persecuciones y humillaciones, expolios, torturas y en muchos casos también la hoguera, por parte de la Inquisición y de los llamados 'cristianos viejos'. Muchos de ellos acabaron exiliándose más tarde. Pero a pesar de esas hogueras que alumbraron el nacimiento de la Edad Moderna, donde ardieron los mártires del pensamiento racionalista, el impulso de la civilización medieval tuvo su continuidad en la Europa renacentista. Así como Ibn Jaldún 240 " nombrE autor o autorEs continuó la tradición musulmana andalusí en el norte de África, podemos considerar que Luis Vives y Baruch de Spinoza fueron los últimos representantes directos en el exilio europeo de esa brillante tradición de pensamiento judeo-andalusí. Si la biografía de ambos pensadores es dramática, la historia de Juan Luis Vives es particularmente ilustrativa. Su padre, un comerciante textil valenciano, fue acusado en el año 1500 de seguir practicando, tras una conversión aparente, el judaísmo en secreto, y se le abrió un proceso inquisitorial que duró hasta el año 1524 ó 1526, cuando fue quemado en la hoguera. Su madre murió de peste, pero se desenterró su cadáver para quemarlo, con el objetivo de deshonrar su memoria.40 Por eso, Vives fue enviado a estudiar en París a los 17 años y no volvió a pisar tierra española en toda su vida; pasó en su mayor parte en Brujas, siendo profesor en la Universidad de Lovaina –excepto una temporada que pasó en Londres a las órdenes de Catalina de Aragón, esposa de Enrique VIII–. Vives llegó a ser amigo de Erasmo de Rotterdam y de Tomás Moro, formando con ellos el trío de humanistas católicos más insigne y celebrado de la época, un grupo que intentó sin éxito evitar la guerra de religiones que se extendió por Europa hasta bien entrado el siglo XVII. Lo curioso es que desde antiguo viene contándose una fabulación, según la cual Juan Luis Vives sería descendiente de una familia noble catalana y que murió peleando valientemente en la batalla como capitán de los ejércitos de su Majestad Serenísima, el Emperador Carlos V. Esa falsificación aprovechó la circunstancia de que el apellido de Vives coincide con el de una familia de 40. transcripción textual de los protocolos del proceso inquisitorial de blanca March, madre de juan Luis vives, José María de Palacio y de Palacio, publicado por Miguel de la Pinta Llorente, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), Instituto Arias Montano, 1964. Las fechas de esa aventura se conocen aproximadamente. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 241 la nobleza catalana, que participó en la ocupación de Valencia con Jaime el Conquistador. En el Centenario de la muerte de Vives, en los años 40 del pasado siglo, los ideólogos del franquismo escribieron extensos panegíricos sobre su figura, abundando en su condición de intelectual humanista, perteneciente a una modélica familia católica. La adulteración de la historia forma parte de la ideología más rancia de la clase dominante en todas las sociedades decadentes –y especialmente de la Iglesia católica, la cual, a fuerza de torturas, es capaz de hacer comulgar a sus fieles con ruedas de molino–. Y esa leyenda bufa de Vives católico es sintomática de una historia trágica y mal contada. 2. LOS fILÓSOfOS DE LA INMANENCIA versus LA TRASCENDENCIA DOgMáTICA Las breves reseñas biográficas esbozadas anteriormente en la segunda parte, nos deben ilustrar acerca del carácter de los pensadores musulmanes. Son médicos, juristas, científicos, que tratan con el mundo material y participan de la vida social como miembros del Estado, dentro de un proceso revolucionario en el desarrollo medieval de las fuerzas productivas por el Islam. A veces se enfrentan a los poderes constituidos, si lo consideran necesario, y viven una vida íntegra sin recortes ascéticos y monacales; desempeñan un puesto de altos funcionarios en la corte de una monarquía absoluta, y su objetivo es construir un Estado justo por medios racionales. Son completamente diferentes a los filósofos medievales cristianos, monjes en su mayoría y defensores del dogma, que ponen sus inteligencias al servicio de la Iglesia y su poder temporal, y que juegan un papel conservador en el intento de frenar el desarrollo económico y político europeo, finalmente fracasado durante el Renacimiento. Esas características biográficas deben aparecer también en la filosofía islámica, como un pensamiento más cercano a la in242 " nombrE autor o autorEs vestigación de los seres materiales y con más interés por conocer el mundo sensible. Por eso, Ernst Bloch ha llamado a estos sabios la 'izquierda aristotélica', frente a los monjes cristianos que elaboraron el dogma católico con categorías metafísicas idealistas, constituyendo así una 'derecha aristotélica' en oposición a la expansión de la filosofía racionalista en Europa. El militarismo cristiano y la política de las Cruzadas tenían un trasfondo de irracionalidad incompatible con una filosofía avanzada –y un papel que todavía perdura en nuestros días–. Esa derecha tuvo un carácter reactivo frente a las innovaciones conceptuales que fueron introducidas en la cultura occidental por la sabiduría del mundo musulmán. El objetivo de la teología escolástica fue parar la avalancha de ideas materialistas que llegaba desde al-Ándalus, e intentó ahogar sin conseguirlo el impulso racionalista que penetraba en Europa desde el sur. El concepto que defiende la ortodoxia religiosa no es sólo la trascendencia del mundo espiritual, los valores e ideales que pertenecen a la esencia divina, sino que esa trascendencia solo puede ser descubierta y conocida por la Iglesia gracias a una inspiración directa de la divinidad. Esa tesis es el fundamento del autoritarismo dogmático y frente a ella los filósofos racionalistas defenderán la inmanencia del espíritu al mundo material; como se ha señalado, desde este punto de vista materialista la trascendencia es un resultado de la existencia social de la humanidad –una 'emergencia' en terminología de la ontología contemporánea–. La reacción que siguió a las Cruzadas cristianas, en plena decadencia del modo de producción feudal, golpeó durante siglos contra los pensadores que promovían el progreso científico e impidió la organización racional de la sociedad, hasta que fue derrotada por la revolución burguesa en el siglo XVII, cuya divisa principal fue la tolerancia y las libertades de pensamiento expresión y conciencia. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 243 Sin embargo, a pesar de la reacción clerical, tanto en el medio teológico del Islam como en las universidades europeas, una filosofía tan importante como la de Averroes no podía quedar sin continuación. La decadencia de al-Ándalus privó al pensamiento averroísta de seguidores de altura en la península ibérica y en el resto de la cultura musulmana. Pero sus obras fueron traducidas al latín y sus ideas penetraron profundamente en la cultura europea al final de la Edad Media, fecundando el pensamiento científico de las Universidades italianas y francesas. De ahí nació una corriente de pensamiento, denominada averroísmo latino, que alimentó durante siglos la investigación científica europea. La Iglesia católica intentó por todos los medios erradicar su influencia –al mismo tiempo que la de Avicena, Avicebrón y demás pensadores panteístas y racionalistas de la civilización islámica–; así buena parte de la reflexión de Tomás de Aquino (1225-1274), de Raimon Llull (1232-1315) y de la Escolástica cristiana en el siglo XIII, se dirigió fundamentalmente a criticar y refutar la obra de Averroes, reinterpretando a Aristóteles en sentido compatible con los dogmas cristianos. Durante el siglo XIII se repiten los ataques de la ortodoxia a los pensadores racionalistas que seguían el impulso de la filosofía judeo-musulmana en Europa. Los tribunales de la Inquisición creados para reprimir a los albigenses del Languedoc y encargados de la pureza de la fe, se emplearon a fondo con las herejías intentando limitar la libertad de pensamiento. El obispo de París condenó el aristotelismo en 1277; la alquimia fue prohibida en 1317 por una bula del Papa Juan XXII; numerosos científicos y filósofos fueron condenados. La influencia de la cultura islámica se dejó sentir también en el aspecto político. Los averroístas Juan de Jandún (†1328) y Marsilio de Padua (1275/80 –1342/3) exponen una teoría política en su defensor pacis, donde se nos muestran como promotores de un Estado laico; en éste la autoridad civil se funda en la soberanía popular y adquiere independencia frente al poder eclesiás244 " nombrE autor o autorEs tico. En esa idea de que el poder político tiene supremacía sobre el Clero, es evidente la influencia de la concepción racionalista de los filósofos musulmanes, y sobre esa idea apoyaron la lucha de las monarquías europeas por adquirir autonomía frente a la Iglesia al final del feudalismo. Pero en el defensor pacis también se aboga por un orden democrático, donde los ciudadanos puedan tomar decisiones legislativas bajo el criterio de la mayoría cuantitativa –lo que es un paso adelante respecto de la política de Averroes y anuncia la teoría política liberal en un nuevo modo de producción capitalista–. Como otros pensadores y filósofos, éstos dos tuvieron que sufrir el exilio, refugiándose en la corte del Emperador alemán. Por tanto, a pesar de las condenas y las persecuciones –que en algunos casos costaron la vida a los pensadores independientes, como en el caso de Sigerio de Brabante–, la asimilación del racionalismo filosófico musulmán y la recepción de la brillante literatura en lengua árabe fueron responsables directos del Renacimiento europeo. Ese avance no se consiguió sin rodeos: el nominalismo fue un remedio que los científicos medievales encontraron para sortear la ortodoxia católica, defendida mediante procedimientos expeditivos por los tribunales de la Inquisición. Con ese fin, procuraron evitar los pronunciamientos sobre las cuestiones metafísicas, reconociendo la omnipotencia divina como principio teológico fundamental: la arbitrariedad del poder absoluto de la divinidad, únicamente limitado por el principio de no contradicción, era un espejo de la irracionalidad del poder despótico del Clero. En reconociendo esto y aceptando sus imposiciones, los científicos podían seguir sus investigaciones sin ser molestados gravemente. Cierto que esa posición tiene la ventaja de delimitar el campo de investigación, expulsando las interferencias metafísicas –dando origen al principio de simplificación ontológica–; pero tiene el inconveniente de dejar la organización social y la El PEriPlo dE la razón " 245 moral pública en manos del irracionalismo religioso ortodoxo y dogmático. Es muy posible que al hacerlo así, los nominalistas estuvieran siguiendo, más o menos conscientemente, las tesis de Algazel, que supusieron el comienzo de un fuerte retroceso del racionalismo en Oriente, el final de un proyecto de racionalización cultural que no puedo seguir adelante. Como crítico escéptico, e incluso como promotor de la investigación científica, Algazel es un importante filósofo que fue leído y aprovechado por los pensadores europeos. Su reflexión puede haber sido un antecedente de la corriente nominalista, que se desarrolló en Europa en el siglo XIV con Guillermo de Ockam (1288-1348), y en muchos aspectos Algazel anuncia ideas filosóficas de la modernidad, que fueron transmitidas por los escolásticos y los científicos europeos al final del Medievo. En definitiva, los nominalistas consiguieron salvar la investigación científica –y su propia vida– frente a la ortodoxia católica, que había iniciado una peligrosa ofensiva antirracionalista, gracias a que escondieron su trabajo de investigación empirista bajo la teología de Algazel y la escuela asariya; y paradójicamente un pensamiento que entre los musulmanes había consistido en un ataque a la razón se convirtió en una trinchera defensiva de la crítica racional y el desarrollo científico entre los cristianos. ¡Hasta tal punto se diferencia la concepción religiosa musulmana de la católica! De tal manera, podemos considerar que la filosofía de Algazel es precursora de la modernidad, también en el sentido de que su manera de enfocar los problemas filosóficos se parece a lo que Manuel Sacristán llamó la 'alianza impía', una alianza antirracionalista entre el positivismo científico y la mística religiosa.41 Pues del mismo modo que el nominalismo europeo, 41. Sacristán definía la 'alianza impía' siguiendo al marxista irlandés John D. Bernal y al lógico de la antigua RDA Georg Klaus como 'la coincidencia del positivismo cientificista con el pensamiento teológico o mís246 " nombrE autor o autorEs el escepticismo de Algazel cae en una metafísica irracionalista, que sin negar el interés por la investigación científica, señala la absoluta omnipotencia divina y la imposibilidad de conocer sus designios. Si bien podemos entender que en el debate, que mantuvieron los musulmanes entre el racionalismo filosófico y la teología nominalista, se prefigura la necesidad de distinguir entre una la teleología objetiva o funcionalista, propia de los sistemas holistas, y otra teleología subjetiva fundada en la libertad del ser humano, por otro lado la Destrucción de los filósofos de Algazel tuvo consecuencias de carácter antirracionalista. Por eso, de forma paralela y centurias después, en el siglo XX el positivismo agnóstico negará la posibilidad de establecer una racionalidad teleológica para la acción ético-política de la humanidad a través de la historia, con el objetivo confeso de destruir el racionalismo ilustrado marxista. En definitiva, los filósofos de la civilización musulmana son transmisores de la ciencia y la filosofía desde Oriente hasta Occidente en la Edad Media. La Escolástica cristiana, en sus diferentes versiones, ortodoxas como heterodoxas, es una continuación de la tradición musulmana medieval, a veces en contra de esta misma. La filosofía andalusí ofreció a la cultura europea los instrumentos conceptuales de un nuevo desarrollo intelectual. Así, la recepción del aristotelismo proporcionó el formato para el plan de estudios científicos de la naturaleza –metafísica, lógica, teoría del conocimiento, estética, método científico, junto con los primeros atisbos de diferentes disciplinas particulares–, lo que significó el primer paso hacia la revolución científica en el Renacimiento. Fueron numerosas las ideas que los escolásticos tico de la tradición en la empresa en común del agnos ticismo filosófi co' (horitzons, 2, Barcelona, 1960,14), es decir, la negativa a utilizar criterios racionales para orientar la práctica política de la sociedad y la renuncia a continuar la empresa humanista de la razón. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 247 medievales recibieron de los filósofos musulmanes y judíos, y que constituyeron el fermento de los avances científicos y culturales. Entre esas ideas podemos contar las siguientes: – la distinción metafísica entre esencia y existencia, proveniente de al–Farabi, sirve de base a la teología de Tomás de Aquino a través de Averroes y Avicena –véase su estudio de ens et essentia–; – la polémica escolástica acerca de los universales, así como sus ideas acerca de la relación entre razón y fe, toman el modelo musulmán pero invirtiendo su racionalismo. – la afirmación metafísica según la cual Dios ha creado el mejor de los mundos posibles, que proviene de Avicena y fue recogida por Duns Scoto (1265–1308); – la ciencia europea que se desarrolla a partir de las investigaciones árabes, como es el caso de la Universidad de Oxford con Grosseteste y Francis Bacon, que adoptan el llamado 'agustinismo avicenista', así como los avances de medicina a partir del canon de Avicena y el colliget de Averroes; – la defensa de la teoría atómica como explicación del mundo físico, desarrollada por Nicolás de Autrecourt (12991369) al mismo tiempo que su escepticismo metafísico; ambas concepciones beben de una misma fuente, Algazel. – la crítica del racionalismo medieval centrado en el modelo geocéntrico del universo, por parte de Algazel, así como las dudas que ese modelo ofrecía a los astrónomos musulmanes, como al propio Averroes, incidió también sobre la concepción cosmológica, haciendo posible pensar un mundo que no tuviera por centro la esfera terrestre –idea que sería recogida por Nicolás de Oresmes (13231382) en el siglo XIV, quien especuló sobre la posibilidad del heliocentrismo–. 248 " nombrE autor o autorEs 3. UN NUEvO CONCEPTO DE MATERIA Según Bloch, la izquierda aristotélica se originó ya con Estratón, tercer director del Liceo fundado por Aristóteles, quien adoptó un punto de vista materialista para dedicarse a la investigación empírica desde la teoría atomista y llegó a hacer experimentos controlados para comprobar sus hipótesis. Otro jefe de la escuela, que ejerció alrededor del año 200 bajo el emperador Septimio Severo, Alejandro de Afrodisia escribió un comentario de la Metafísica de Aristóteles que tuvo especial importancia como trasmisor de la doctrina a los filósofos orientales, modificando el conceptualismo de Aristóteles en un sentido nominalista, al afirmar que las ideas generales sólo existen en la mente a través del lenguaje. Por otra parte, el entendimiento agente, que forma esas ideas generales, es único y existe separado del alma humana; ésta sólo tiene un entendimiento pasivo donde aquél deposita las ideas. El alma individual sólo tiene una capacidad pasiva de aprehender las ideas generales, pero no de crearlas. Esta doctrina fue recogida por al-Kindi y pasó a la filosofía musulmana. A esa concepción nominalista proveniente de las ideas de Alejandro de Afrodisia, los musulmanes añadieron el naturalismo –el propio Allah es una realidad cosmológica, íntimamente asociada al mundo natural-, afirmando que las realidades naturales son las únicas existentes; lo que significa que la materia, además de potencia pasiva que indica la posibilidad de existir, es una potencia activa capaz de desarrollo inmanente. Esta versión de la metafísica creó una dirección propia del pensamiento aristotélico –alejandrinismo–, su aristotelismo influyó en la formación de la filosofía islámica y más tarde fue recuperado en el Renacimiento. Al adoptar esta interpretación de Aristóteles, los sabios musulmanes rechazan la versión dualista de la metafísica platónica, propia de la teología cristiana que se apoya en la transcendencia, y de ese modo dieron continuidad al neoplatonismo que estaba El PEriPlo dE la razón " 249 extendido en Oriente desde la Antigüedad –ya hemos visto cómo con Numenio en el siglo II se incluía la materia en la naturaleza divinizada por la doctrina de la emanación–. Podemos seguir la evolución de esa corriente aristotélica en la región de Siria, donde se contaminó con las influencias neoplatónicas y espiritualistas con Jámblico (240-325), y más tarde Proclo (410-485), a través de los cuales la síntesis de aristotelismo y neoplatonismo pasó a Irak y Persia. En el siglo IX alFarabi explica el primer sistema filósofico de cultura musulmana y vierte las categorías lógicas al árabe; en el XI Avicena recogió la corriente para construir el sistema filosófico más importante de su tiempo; después entró en el caudal de la filosofía islámica y judía de al-Ándalus, con una pléyade de intelectuales de la que ya hemos venido hablando largamente. Éstos eran a la vez literatos, médicos, juristas, teólogos, filósofos y científicos experimentalistas, que desarrollaron el conocimiento empírico del mundo sensible; su actividad cultural estaba protegida por los califas y los príncipes árabes, pues al mismo tiempo desempeñaban cargos importantes como funcionaros de la corte. Su interés por el conocimiento empírico les impulsa a revalorizar el concepto de materia, pero su trabajo con la medicina y las humanidades colorea su idea de la materia, entendida como algo no mecánico, sino dotado de virtualidades inmanentes y aspiraciones finalistas. Una materia creadora que se despliega en el mundo de la naturaleza. De ahí los conceptos de 'forma sensible' o 'esencia individual', que sintetizan en una sola realidad las cualidades de forma y materia, transmitiendoos la idea de una potencia material que no es meramente pasiva o mecánica, sino que es actividad porque contiene en sí la actualidad de la forma y su finalidad inmanente. Para desarrollar la investigación empírica de la naturaleza, los filósofos elaboran un concepto de materia que sirva para la interpretación los fenómenos naturales. Si bien la herencia 250 " nombrE autor o autorEs neoplatónica es visible en la equiparación de la materia con la nada, ese no-ser de la materia es el principio mismo del poder ser, del cambio y el movimiento: se subraya la categoría de posibilidad que pertenece a la materia. Es, pues, una interpretación existencialista de la nada que tendrá profundas repercusiones y que tiene una modernidad indudable. Como se ha visto, eso se hace posible por las peculiaridades de las lenguas semitas frente a las indoeuropeas. En definitiva, en la corriente principal de la filosofía musulmana y judía medieval, la influencia del empirismo aristotélico se hace sentir en la elaboración de un nuevo concepto de materia, como substancia esencial del cosmos natural: una materia activa poseedora en su interior de la energía suficiente para hacer posible el despliegue de las infinitas formas que constituyen la realidad sensible –una materia que es energía, dinamicidad, y está dotada de un principio activo, las leyes inmanentes que rigen el devenir del universo–. Quizás la elaboración más desarrollada de 'materia' sea la del judío Avicebrón en su fons vitae, cuando afirma que no es posible que la materia no exista, y que no tenga subsistencia por sí misma. La materia es una sola esencia universal que compone el sustrato de todos los seres; toda forma se produce y existe acompañada de la materia, excepto el Ser Esencial, en cuanto que es 'acto puro'. En efecto, siguiendo el esquema aristotélico, la materia es ser en potencia y tiene ser cuando se abraza a la forma espiritual; ahora bien, toda forma existe unida a la materia. De modo que en la reflexión materialista se mezclan las propiedades de materia y forma, para reordenarse en un esquema nuevo que es claramente panteísta, y que nos habla de una 'forma sensible', el término inferior de la materia universal en el orden existencial de los seres. Así establece un panteísmo materialista que tendrá una importante continuación en el pensamiento europeo, en pugna con la dogmática eclesial apoyada en el dualismo jerárquico de la forma espiritual y la materia sensible, y así sostener un orden El PEriPlo dE la razón " 251 clasista hecho plausible mediante conceptos oscuramente prefabricados. Por eso quizás no sea tan importante la coherencia del sistema de Avicebrón –poeta insigne y apasionado–, como la subversión de las categorías que buscan comprender la realidad de un modo innovador, acorde con el desarrollo de una nueva cultura científica. Los filósofos de esa corriente acusan también la influencia neoplatónica adoptando su misticismo naturalista, en el que la identificación con la naturaleza entera toma rasgos panteístas de comunión con la divinidad. De ahí nace su fácil trato con los sufíes, místicos de la vida cotidiana, que se encuentran con Allah a través de la más humilde materialidad de las cosas corrientes, y cuya enseñanza supera las particularidades sectarias islamistas para buscar la religión universal y la comunión de todos los hombres por el amor a la verdad. Esa influencia idealista mezclada con la sensualidad más apasionada, es perceptible en un gran poeta del siglo XI, Avemhazem de Córdoba, que escribe el collar de la paloma sobre los arrebatos del amor, y es también teólogo, moralista y jurista, además de historiador crítico de las religiones y las escuelas filosóficas y teológicas. Y también en su contemporáneo, el judío Avicebrón, gran poeta erótico al tiempo que metafísico de la materia espiritualizada por la belleza. Esa raíz neoplatónica –que hemos explicado como una filosofía religiosa–, es también causa de que la complementariedad entre la razón y la fe aparezca con naturalidad en todos los pensadores musulmanes; en todos menos en Algazel, quien mediante su escepticismo se encargó de la triste tarea de liquidar esta brillante tradición racionalista en Oriente Medio. Especialmente interesante para entender ese matrimonio de fe y razón es Abentofail, escritor de la novela filosófica El filósofo autodidacta. En realidad la razón humana, además de descubrir las leyes que rigen el mundo de la naturaleza, es capaz por sí sola de encontrar la verdad espiritual del ser humano sin ayuda de la 252 " nombrE autor o autorEs tradición religiosa. El descubrimiento racional de la existencia de un Único Ser Divino es anterior a la predicación religiosa, la cual queda reducida a ser una manera de divulgar los conocimientos alcanzados por la razón. Tal forma de enfocar el saber, intenta conseguir que las creencias religiosas no interfieran en el conocimiento científico de la realidad. 4. EL MATERIALISMO PANTEíSTA ENTRE LOS CRISTIANOS A pesar de su debilidad cultural, entre los cristianos medievales se ve aparecer esta corriente también en el siglo IX con Escoto Eriúgena, cuya filosofía racionalista e inmanentista le vale el título de hereje. Eriúgena, como un espejo que refleja un lejano destello de luz, bebe de fuentes orientales –las mismas que alimentan el desarrollo filosófico musulmán–, especialmente del sirio Pseudo Dionisio Areopagita (siglo VI), que desarrolló su concepción de la divinidad bajo la inspiración neoplatónica, dando origen a una interpretación panteísta e inmanente del cristianismo. Más tarde la influencia del pensamiento andalusí fermentará en heterodoxias cristianas condenadas como herejías panteístas por defender la inmanencia, como la de David de Dinant quien afirmaba, marchando tras las huellas de Avicebrón, que 'dios, la materia y la forma son una sola substancia'. La divinidad es la materia prima universal de lo que surge todo, que existe preñada de formas que se desarrollan según la voluntad divina, la energía que activa el cosmos. Identidad de materia y Dios, afirmaciones que suscribirían los herejes panteístas Amalrico de Bene y Jaoquim de Fiore. Más tarde el maestro Eckart desarrolla una mística de la divinización de la razón y la deificación del ser humano, un humanista opuesto al otro misticismo clerical, aliado con la ortodoxia y enemigo del saber. Escribía antinomias como 'dios y las criaturas El PEriPlo dE la razón " 253 son lo más distinguible' y 'dios y las criaturas son indistinguibles', porque le parecía que afirmar sólo la primera proposición es decir una verdad a medias que deja fuera de cada expresión mucho de la realidad. En Eckart la trascendencia y la inmanencia divinas son las dos caras de la verdad esencial, y quedarse con una de ellas eliminando la otra es amputar la verdad. Las autoridades eclesiásticas naturalmente vieron en ello un peligro, de modo que el papa Juan XXII condenó 28 tesis tomadas de sus escritos en 1329, dos años después de su muerte. El pensamiento de Aristóteles tendrá su máximo exponente medieval en el cordobés Averroes, cuyos comentarios a las obras aristotélicas expondrán de forma canónica las ideas de éste. La influencia de Averroes creará una corriente del pensamiento europeo conocida como averroísmo latino, cuyos seguidores defienden la eternidad de la materia, la unidad del intelecto agente separado y la teoría de la doble verdad, una religiosa y otra filosófica. Estos averroístas fueron condenados por herejes en el siglo XIII (219 tesis fueron condenadas en 1277), y el más importante de ellos fue Sigerio de Brabante (1235-1284), de cuya muerte hay dos versiones diferentes quizás no incompatibles; la primera afirma que fue condenado a cadena perpetua, la segunda que fue asesinado.42 Este pensador dio un paso adelante en la reducción de los poderes de la trascendencia divina por vía de transferirlos a la realidad inmanente, cuando afirmó que Dios es la Causa Final del universo, pero ni mucho menos la causa eficiente que es la materia. La 'creación desde toda la eternidad' que postulaba Avicena admite interpretaciones y derivaciones, que si no estaban presentes en éste, sí fueron sacadas más adelante por sus lectores y continuadores. 42. Andrés Martínez Lorca en su averroes sigue la versión de que fue apuñalado por su secretario en el destierro, y que ese secretario era en realidad un sicario. 254 " nombrE autor o autorEs La influencia de Avicena fue muy intensa entre los franciscanos de Oxford, Grosseteste (1175-1253) y Roger Bacon (12141294), que en el siglo XIII comenzaron el camino de la ciencia europea moderna –Bacon tuvo que sufrir años de reclusión por sus opiniones heterodoxas y según algunas versiones también padeció la cárcel por su defensa de la pobreza–. Ese grupo y sus seguidores crearon una corriente avicenista cuyo máximo exponente es Duns Scoto. El franciscanismo, que bebió de fuentes filosóficas racionalistas, revalorizó la vida práctica frente al dogmatismo de la jerarquía eclesiástica y exigió la coherencia de la moral cristiana con la doctrina evangélica, constituyendo un movimiento revolucionario en el cristianismo del final de la Edad Media, a través del cual se abrió paso la cultura moderna. El hecho de que las relaciones comerciales y precapitalistas se intensificaran en los países europeos a partir del siglo XIII, no es ajeno a ese desarrollo. Pero la máxima intensidad de la inspiración racionalista y materialista, que estamos ahora estudiando, se producirá en Giordano Bruno, quemado en la hoguera en el año 1600 por defender sus propias ideas sin renunciar a la libertad de pensamiento. Influido por los sabios judíos y musulmanes defenderá una concepción de la materia autárquica que se fecunda a sí misma. Partiendo de las ideas de Avicebrón llega a una concepción según la cual la materia es el Dios omnipresente, artífice de la formación del mundo; las formas no son más que accidentes de la materia, la cual posee las capacidades para la creación y sostenimiento de la naturaleza. Como diría Hegel, 'la forma es la riqueza y la vida interior de la materia'. En Europa occidental la izquierda aristotélica se desarrolló sobre todo a través del averroísmo latino y el avicenismo, impulsando la investigación científica y creando no pocos quebraderos de cabeza a la dogmática católica, hasta que Tomás de Aquino se tomó el trabajo de expurgar la metafísica transmitida por los El PEriPlo dE la razón " 255 sabios musulmanes de sus contenidos subversivos. A pesar de eso, la obra médica de Avicena fue explicada durante siglos en Europa y la influencia de Averroes fue importante y duradera entre los científicos europeos. A esa influencia podemos achacar la actitud de Galileo, todavía en el siglo XVII, frente al tribunal de la Inquisición que le juzgaba por afirmar la teoría heliocéntrica; esa actitud consiste en distinguir una verdad de la fe y otra de la razón: ante el tribunal Galileo afirmó que la Tierra está quieta en el centro del universo, según afirma la verdad religiosa; luego, ya fuera del tribunal, se dice que afirmó: 'eppur si muove' –'pero se mueve'–: como científico siguió creyendo que la Tierra gira alrededor del Sol, la verdad de su razón no coincidía con la de la Iglesia. La teoría de la doble de verdad puede ser interpretada como hipocresía y así lo fue por los clérigos integristas de las tres religiones monoteístas, que exigen del creyente una entrega sin reservas a la fe. Pero tiene una honda justificación racional, y, como se ha visto en este libro, no sólo como expediente para burlar la represión de los inquisidores. 5. PROLONgACIONES MODERNAS Finalmente, toda esta corriente desemboca en Spinoza durante el siglo XVII, quien afirma la divinidad de la naturaleza, deus sive natura, y que recoge de manera rigurosamente pensada la filosofía de Avicebrón, en lo que puede ser considerada la arquitectura de pensamiento más equilibrada y sublime del mundo moderno. Pero también hemos visto aparecer su idea determinista del cosmos en al-Farabi y su afirmación del conatus o amor por la existencia, está perfectamente diseñada en la metafísica de Avicena. Por eso, aunque la moderna historiografía pretenda entender a Spinoza desde sus prolongaciones ateas e ilustradas en el siglo XVIII, no lo logrará plenamente si no bucea hacia sus raíces en la filosofía medieval. 256 " nombrE autor o autorEs Spinoza pudo enseñar su pensamiento gracias a la reforma protestante y la libertad de conciencia que ésta propugnaba; la herejía triunfante unía el pensamiento de la inmanencia a la confianza la razón de los humanos. Su magisterio se produce en medio de la Revolución Holandesa, de la que fue uno de sus inspiradores más cualificados desde su ala republicana. Del mismo modo que la república fue pronto sustituida por una monarquía constitucional, la filosofía de Spinoza fue ignorada, tachada de atea y materialista hasta que fue recuperada por los ilustrados del siglo XVIII. Con la República holandesa, confederación de pequeñas ciudades-estado que derrotó al Imperio integrista católico, llegó un tiempo en que la humanidad estaba madura para que el pensamiento de la radical inmanencia pudiera producir sus efectos, sin que sus frutos pudieran permanecer entre nosotros más que el tiempo de verano que dura una fruta en el árbol. La monarquía liberal sustituyó la república tras un golpe de Estado, frente al que Spinoza se posicionó activamente. Pero sus semillas perduraron para alumbrar el camino de la humanidad. También el pensamiento musulmán andalusí fue una de las fuentes de la Ilustración europea del siglo XVIII con su culto a la razón, su interés práctico por las cosas de este mundo, sus valores universalistas y su vocación por la tolerancia intelectual. Una de las obras más leídas en aquella época fue la novela filosófica de Abentofail, obra de manifiesta confianza en las capacidades de la razón humana para alcanzar las verdades supremas, prescindiendo de las verdades de la fe como cuentos para niños. Además de la confianza en la razón, un buen número de temas ilustrados están anunciados por la filosofía islámica: la unidad de la humanidad por el conocimiento, la tolerancia frente a las opiniones divergentes, la religión universal como religión verdadera, la importancia del conocimiento científico y práctico, el materialismo filosófico,... Frente a esas concepciones la El PEriPlo dE la razón " 257 derecha clerical no dejará de oponer a lo largo de los siglos su visión fanática e intolerante con las consecuencias por todos conocidas. Pero con sus altibajos, sus victorias y fracasos, sus mártires y sus guerreros, esa concepción del mundo progresista e ilustrada no ha desaparecido: de la Ilustración pasamos a Marx y Engels, el materialismo dialéctico que no es más, pero tampoco menos, que la última formulación afortunada de esta doctrina que todavía está esperando el tiempo de su realización. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 259 Bibliografía PRIMERA PARTE Para los Diálogos de Platón, la Editorial Gredos publicó la colección completa en 9 vol., con Introducción de Emilio Lledó Íñigo y traducciones de éste mismo, J. Calonge Ruiz y Carlos García Gual. También las obras de Aristóteles así como de otros autores clásicos griegos están publicadas en forma excelente por esta Editorial Gredos. Para los autores cristianos ver la Bibloteca de Autores Cristianos, B.A.C. Entre éstos merece destacar La Ciudad de Dios de San Agustín. Sobre las filosofías estoica y cristiana analizadas desde el punto de vista de la crítica de la ideología marxista, Gonzalo Puente Ojea tiene sendos ensayos con los títulos, Ideología e historia: el fenómeno estoico en la sociedad antigua, e Idelología e historia. La formación del cristianismo como fenómeno ideológico, publicados en Madrid por la editorial Siglo XXI, con numerosas ediciones. Diversos autores, entre los que cuentan Max Weber, E.M.Staerman, explican el cambio del modo de producción antiguo al feudal, en AA.VV., La transición del esclavismo al feudalismo, Madrid, Akal, 1980, 3a edición revisada. 260 " nombrE autor o autorEs Y en J.M. Blázquez junto con otros autores, realiza una interesante aproximación histórica en AA.VV. Cristianismo primitivo y religiones mistéricas, Madrid, Cátedra, 1995. SEGUNDA PARTE Para conocer la filosofía musulmana, la editorial Trotta está publicando una magnífica colección de pensamiento islámico dirigida por Andrés Martínez Lorca, de la que entresacamos los siguientes títulos: Henry Corbin, Historia de la filosofía islámica, Madrid Trotta, 2000 (2a edición) Mahomed Ábed Yabri, El legado filosófico árabe, Madrid, Trotta, 2001. Andrés Martínez Lorca, Maestros de occidente, Madrid, Trotta, 2007 También una interesante aportación está contenida en el libro Al encuentro de Averroes, editado por Andrés Martínez Lorca, Madrid, Trotta, 1993. Merece consultarse la magnífica introducción a la filosofía islámica de Miguel Cruz Hernández, Historia del pensamiento en el mundo islámico, 3 vols., Madrid, Alianza, 1996. Por otra parte la tradición de los estudios arabistas en España ha sido siempre importante y merece la pena destacar los trabajos de Miguel Asín Palacios que se remontan a la primera mitad del siglo, entre ellos Dante y el Islam, (Madrid, Voluntad, 1927). El médico Esteban Torre realizó un estudio del Colliget, con traducción desde el latín de la edición veneciana de 1553, aunque sólo de la Introducción y los libros I y II de los siete que comprende la obra. Su estudio se publicó con el título Averroes y la ciencia médica, Madrid, Ediciones del Centro, 1974. El PEriPlo dE la razón " 261 Y no se puede dejar de mencionar el ensayo de Ernst Bloch, Avicena y la izquierda aristotélica, (Madrid, Ciencia Nueva, 1964), de tendencia marxista. Una interesante investigación es la de Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes. On Intelect, New York – Oxford, Oxford Univesity Press, 1992. Y entre las fuentes consultadas merecen destacarse los trabajos del profesor de la UNED y miembro de la Academia de Toledo, Andrés Martínez Lorca, con su libro Averroes, el sabio cordobés que iluminó Europa, Córdoba, El Páramo, 2010, así como su página web, http://www.andresmlorca.com/, donde recoge interesantes artículos sobre la filosofía musulmana. También la tesis doctoral del palestino Simón Haik, Las traducciones medievales y su influencia, Edición facsímil de la Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 1981. Respecto a la historia de al-Ándalus, la magnífica obra de Emilio González Ferrín, Historia General de Al Ándalus, Almuzara 2006, ofrece una convincente perspectiva de la revolución islámica medieval y su devenir en la península ibérica, que es complementaria de las tesis defendidas sobre la revolución islámica en este Periplo de la razón, que ahora acaba. Entre los libros traducidos merecen destacarse: Abucháfar Abentofail, El filósofo autodidacta, Ediciones Obelisco, Barcelona 1987, con sucesivas reediciones. Al-Farabi, La ciudad ideal, presentación Miguel Cruz Hernández, Madrid, Tecnos, 1985. Avempace, El régimen del solitario, traducción de Miguel Asín Palacios, Madrid/Granada, Instituto Miguel Asín, Escuela de Estudios Árabes de Madrid y Granada, 1946. Averroes, Exposición de la República de Platón, traducción de Miguel Cruz Hernández, Madrid, Tecnos, 1996; y Sobre el Intelecto, edición e introducción de Andrés Martínez Lorca, Madrid, Trotta, 2004. Avicebrón, La fuente de la vida, Barcelona, Riopiedras, 1987. Avicena, Sobre Metafísica, traducción y notas de Miguel Cruz Hernández, Madrid, Revista de Occidente, 1950. Maimónides, Guía de perplejos, Madrid, Trotta, 2005 (4a edición)

WEIGHT IN GREEK ATOMISM 1. Introduction The testimonia concerning weight in early Greek atomism appear to contradict one another. Some reports assert that the atoms do have weight, while others outright deny weight as a property of the atoms. A common solution to this apparent contradiction divides the testimonia into two groups.The first group describes atoms within a ÎfiÛÌÔ , where they have weight; the second group describes atoms outside of a ÎfiÛÌÔ , where they are weightless1. Important to advocates of this solution is the δνς, or vortex2.The vortex, they claim, fulfills a crucial role in the ascription of weight to atoms, and detailed accounts are offered to explain how its rotation and consequent effects reconcile the otherwise conflicting reports. Despite its endorsement by many notable scholars, I am sympathetic with those who question the tenability of this interpretive solution3. Suspicions tend 1. D. FURLEY,The Greek Theory of the Infinite Universe, Journal of the History of Ideas, 42, 1981, pp. 571-585, at pp. 572-573 helpfully reminds his reader that the Greek word ÎfiÛÌÔ (and compare the Latin mundus) refers to a limited, organized system, bounded by the stars. The universe as a whole, by contrast, is referred to by Greek writers as Ùe ÄÓ (and compare the Latin phrases omne quod est, omne immensum and so forth). For those Greek writers who subscribed to an infinite universe, then, a ÎfiÛÌÔ represents the bounded area beyond which begins the rest of the infinite universe.And compare the following lines from Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, 1.73-75: ergo vivida vis animi pervicit et extra processit longe flammantia moenia mundi atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoque; «And so his mind's might and vigor prevailed, and on he marched far beyond the blazing battlements of the world, in thought and understanding journeying all through the measureless universe» (SMITH trans.). 2. On varying conceptions of the vortex in early Greek philosophy, as well as Plato and Aristotle, cf. J. FERGUSON, ¢π¡√TM, Phronesis, 16, 1971, pp. 97-115. On the vortex's rotation and consequent effects in Empedoclean physics, cf. S. TIGNER, Empedocles's Twirled Ladle and the Vortex-Supported Earth, Isis, 65, 1974, pp. 432-447. 3. Proponents include: C. BAILEY, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928, pp. 128-132 and pp. 144-146; J. BURNET, Early Greek Philosophy, 4th edn., London, Adam & Charles Black, 1930, pp. 341-346; W. K. C. GUTHRIE, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965, pp. 400-404; G. S. KIRK, J. Philosophia, 45, 2015, pp. 76-99 to center on its appropriation of Aristotelian cosmological notions or its reading of particular testimonia. While I share such suspicions, my primary concern is different. If the common interpretive solution is correct, then we appear committed to the claim that the atoms themselves can undergo a significant change. Of course, and in a sense, the atoms can undergo changes. For instance, an atom's present trajectory can change if it collides with another atom. But when this happens, the atom itself does not change; its size and shape are not altered.And it is clear from the testimonia that an atom's weight is dependent upon its size. But if an atom's size cannot change, then how can its weight change? It would seem that it cannot. Yet this is just what the above interpretive solution contends: if an atom is within a ÎfiÛÌÔ , then it has weight; if it is outside of a ÎfiÛÌÔ , then it is weightless. In what follows, I shall put pressure on the common interpretive solution by focusing chiefly on one of the testimonia –report 1.3.18 from the first– century BCE doxographer Aëtius.This report is crucial to the above interpretive solution for two reasons. First, it apparently denies weight as a property of the atoms. And second, it supposedly describes the atoms when they are outside of a ÎfiÛÌÔ . Together these aspects of the report contribute to the present interpretive difficulty, which I intend to resolve by reinterpreting the testimonium. In Section 2, I review briefly the pertinent testimonia. Here I also take up a question important to the present topic: what kind of property is weight? Though some scholars contend that weight is described as a basic property of the atoms, I will show that weight is in fact described as a dependent property. This, in turn, sets up my first engagement with report 1.3.18 from Aëtius. I will argue that the report does not outright deny weight as a property of the atoms. Rather, it denies only that weight is a basic property of the atoms. Then, in Section 3, I turn my attention to the claim that report 1.3.18 WEIGHT IN GREEK ATOMISM 77 E. RAVEN, and M. SCHOFIELD, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd edn., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 421-423; and cf. C. C. W. TAYLOR, The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1999, at pp. 182-183. The interpretation has been challenged chiefly by Furley and D. O'Brien. Cf. D. FURLEY, op. cit.; D. FURLEY, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967; D. FURLEY,Weight and Motion in Democritus' Theory, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 1, 1983, pp. 193-209; D. O'BRIEN, Heavy and Light in Democritus and Aristotle: Two Conceptions of Change and Identity, Journal of Hellenic Studies, 97, 1977, pp. 64-74; D. O'BRIEN, Theories of Weight in the Ancient World, vol. 2., Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1981. For responses to Furley, cf. D. KONSTAN, Problems in Epicurean Physics, Isis, 70, 1979, pp. 394418, at pp. 408-417; and T. O'KEEFE, Epicurus on Freedom, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, at p. 120, n. 28. D. FURLEY, 1983, op. cit., contains some pointed criticisms of D. O'BRIEN, 1981, op. cit. M. AUGUSTIN78 supposedly describes the atoms when they are outside of a ÎfiÛÌÔ . It has been argued that the phrase «ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ÏËÁFÉ», or «by the impact of weight», in the report refers to the cause of natural motion (i.e., downward and in parallel, straight lines) for Epicurus's atoms. And where this kind of motion occurs, the context is surely outside of a ÎfiÛÌÔ . I do not deny that an atom's weight is the cause of that atom's downward motion for Epicurus. However, I shall argue that an atom's weight does not move the atom downward by an impact. As such, the phrase, «by the impact of weight», does not refer to the cause of natural motion for Epicurus's atoms. Consequently, there is no reason to suppose that the report describes the atoms when they are outside of a ÎfiÛÌÔ . Although these are largely negative conclusions, we are not left without a solution to the present interpretive difficulty. It will turn out that, when read correctly, Aëtius 1.3.18 agrees with those reports that describe weight as a dependent property of the atoms.And as for the other conflicting report, itself also from Aëtius, it can be read in a way such that it too agrees with these conclusions. Once our testimonia concerning weight in early Greek atomism are examined thoroughly, it is clear that there is no conflict among them. 2. Weight as a dependent property Let us begin with two reports from Aristotle. (1) De Gen. et Corr., 326a8: Î*›ÙÔÈ ‚*Ú‡ÙÂÚfiÓ Á Î*Ùa ÙcÓ ñÂÚÔ ‹Ó ÊËÛÈÓ ÂrÓ*È ¢ËÌfiÎÚÈÙÔ ≤Î*ÛÙÔÓ ÙáÓ à‰È*ÈÚ¤ÙÓ. (2) De Cael., 309a1-2: ÙÔÖ ‰b ÛÙÂÚÂa ÌÄÏÏÔÓ âÓ‰¤ ÂÙ*È Ï¤ÁÂÈÓ Ùe ÌÂÖ ÔÓ ÂrÓ*È ‚*Ú‡ÙÂÚÔÓ *éÙáÓ. (1) «Democritus says that each of the indivisibles is heavier in proportion to its excess [i.e., size]». (2) «[Those who assert that the primary elements are] solids [i.e., bodies] are better able to maintain that the larger are heavier». The first report is straightforward. It asserts that, according to Democritus, atoms are heavier in proportion to their size. The second report, however, requires some explanation. It appears in an argument against a theory of Plato's from the Timaeus (63 c 1 ff.), according to which the primary and indivisible particles are «surfaces». Plato's theory, Aristotle contends, is absurd for supposing that from these surfaces there can be bodies of which the larger are the heavier. However, he continues, «[those who assert that the primary elements are] solids [i.e., bodies] are better able to maintain that the larger WEIGHT IN GREEK ATOMISM 79 are heavier»4. That is, the Atomists. Whatever we might make of Aristotle's argument itself (something that I shall not discuss here), it is sufficient to note that these two reports are in agreement. Atoms, according to Aristotle's testimony, are more or less heavy depending on their size –the larger an atom is, the heavier it will be. A passage from Theophrastus confirms this interpretation5. (3) De Sens., 61: ‚*Úf ÌbÓ ÔsÓ Î*d ÎÔÜÊÔÓ Ùá ÌÂÁ¤ıÂÈ ‰È*ÈÚÂÖ ¢ËÌfiÎÚÈÙÔ . Âå ÁaÚ ‰È*ÎÚÈıÉ öÓıÂÓ ≤Î*ÛÙÔÓ, Âå Î*d Î*Ùa Û ÉÌ* ‰È*ʤÚÔÈ ‰È*ʤÚÂÈ, ÛÙ*ıÌeÓ iÓ âd ÌÂÁ¤ıÂÈ ÙcÓ Ê‡ÛÈÓ ö ÂÈÓ. (3) «Democritus distinguishes heavy and light according to size; for if they were separated from one another individually, whatever their differences in shape, they would have weight dependent on their size». As with (1) and (2), here too is it reported that an atom's weight is dependent upon its size.We have, then, three passages that describe weight as a property of the atoms, and explain the difference between heavier atoms and lighter atoms as due to their size. At this point it is worth asking: what kind of property is weight? Some scholars contend that the testimony of Aristotle and Theophrastus describes weight as a basic property of the atoms6. By basic property, I mean a property that is explanatorily primary. This may be made clear if we look again at reports (1)-(3). Aristotle writes of heaviness as a product of an atom's size (literally excess, ñÂÚÔ ‹), such that a greater size results in a heavier atom. And Theophrastus writes that, whatever the differences in shape between individual atoms, an atom's weight is dependent on (â›) its size. In each report, then, we find that a difference in weight between individual atoms is explained by a difference in size. As such, size is a property of the atoms in virtue of which some other property, and variations among particular 4. H. CHERNISS, Aristotle's criticism of Presocratic philosophy, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1935, at p. 211, n. 253, and W. K. C. GUTHRIE, op. cit., p. 403, n. 2, argue that *éÙáÓ in (2) refers to compound bodies. But D. O'BRIEN, 1977, op. cit., p. 65, and D. FURLEY, 1983, op. cit., p. 93, note rightly that this reading ruins the antithesis: ÙáÓ ‰b Û Óı¤ÙÓ. It must be the case, then, that *éÙáÓ in (2) refers to the primary and indivisible particles. 5. For an alternative rendering of this passage, cf. J. MCDIARMID, De Sensibus, 61-62: Democritus' Theory of Weight, Classical Philology, 55, 1960, pp. 28-30. But cf. D. O'BRIEN, 1977, op. cit., p. 66 and D. O'BRIEN, 1981, op. cit., pp. 116-125, for criticisms of McDiarmid's rendering. O'Brien's criticisms seem convincing. 6. See, for instance, D. FURLEY, 1976, op. cit., p. 81. Although Furley himself does not use the term «basic» –he describes weight as a «primary, irreducible property of the atoms»– his description is in-line with what follows. M. AUGUSTIN80 instantiations of that property, is both present and explained. It is in this sense that size is explanatorily primary and, therefore, a basic property of the atoms. Since an atom's weight is not explanatorily primary, it is not a basic property of the atoms. Rather, and in accordance with what has been seen so far, weight is a dependent property of the atoms7. We should not be concerned that, on this reading, an atom's weight might become explanatorily primary if we shift our focus from individual atoms to atomic aggregates. After report (2), Aristotle continues by noting that the weight of atomic aggregates is not dependent solely on their bulk (ùÁÎÔ ). Rather, an atomic aggregate's weight is dependent upon both its bulk and the amount of void imprisoned (âÌÂÚÈÏ*Ì‚¿Ó) within the aggregate itself. As a result, for any atomic aggregate, its weight is determined by the ratio of solid to void, such that a change in this ratio yields a change in its weight.And this is so too for relative weights between two (or more) atomic aggregates. Consider, for instance, a situation in which there are two atomic aggregates, and each aggregate is composed of an equal number of equally-sized, solid parts. Suppose also that one of the aggregates is heavier than the other aggregate. What accounts for this difference in weight? According to the atomists, the greater amount of void imprisoned within one of the atomic aggregates; a greater amount of void makes it lighter than the other aggregate (De Cael., 309 a 8-10). Now consider a similar case, in which there are two atomic aggregates, and each aggregate is composed of an equal number of solid parts. Suppose too that both atomic aggregates imprison an equal amount of void, yet one aggregate is heavier than the other aggregate. In this case, the difference in weight must be explained by one atomic aggregate's possessing a greater bulk –its solid parts are, collectively, greater in size– than the other aggregate (De Cael., 309 a 12-15)8. As such, even when our focus shifts from individual atoms to atomic aggregates, size (alongside void) retains its explanatory primacy. And an atomic aggregate's weight, when considered either by itself or relative to another atomic aggregate, also remains a dependent property. Let us return to the testimonia. The next report is preserved by the firstcentury BCE doxographer Aëtius. Here is the report in full. (4) 1.3.18 (= pseudo-Plutarch, 1.3.18): \E›ÎÔ ÚÔ ¡ÂÔÎÏ¤Ô \AıËÓ*ÖÔ Î*Ùa ¢ËÌfiÎÚÈÙÔÓ ÊÈÏÔÛÔÊ‹Û* öÊË Ùa àÚ a ÙáÓ ùÓÙÓ ÛÒÌ*Ù* ÏfiÁ ıÂÚËÙ¿, à̤ÙÔ * ÎÂÓÔÜ, àÁ¤ÓËÙ* à‰È¿Êı*ÚÙ*, ÔûÙ ıÚ* ÛıÉÓ*È ‰ Ó¿7. D. KONSTAN, op. cit., p. 410, arrives at the same conclusion. And both C. BAILEY, op. cit., p. 129 (cf. pp. 131-132), and J. BURNET, op. cit., p. 342, seem to regard weight as a dependent property of the atoms. See also D. O'BRIEN, 1981, op. cit., pp. 233-238. 8. A similar explanation of these two situations is found at DRN, 1.358-369, where Lucretius points to differences in weight between macroscopic objects as evidence for the existence of void. WEIGHT IN GREEK ATOMISM 81 ÌÂÓ* ÔûÙ ‰È¿Ï*ÛÈÓ âÎ ÙáÓ ÌÂÚáÓ Ï*‚ÂÖÓ ÔûÙ àÏÏÔÈıÉÓ*ÈØ ÂrÓ*È ‰b *éÙa ÏfiÁ ıÂÚËÙ¿Ø Ù*ÜÙ* ̤ÓÙÔÈ ÎÈÓÂÖÛı*È âÓ Ùá ÎÂÓá Î*d ‰Èa ÙÔÜ ÎÂÓÔÜØ ÂrÓ*È ‰b Î*d *éÙe Ùe ÎÂÓeÓ ôÂÈÚÔÓ Î*d Ùa ÛÒÌ*Ù* ôÂÈÚ*Ø Û Ì‚Â‚ËΤÓ*È ‰b ÙÔÖ ÛÒÌ*ÛÈ ÙÚ›* Ù*ÜÙ*, Û ÉÌ* ̤ÁÂıÔ ‚¿ÚÔ . ¢ËÌfiÎÚÈÙÔ ÌbÓ ÁaÚ öÏÂÁ ‰‡Ô, ̤ÁÂıfi Ù Î*d Û ÉÌ* ï ‰b \E›ÎÔ ÚÔ ÙÔ‡ÙÔÈ Î*d ÙÚ›ÙÔÓ ‚¿ÚÔ ÚÔÛ¤ıËÎÂÓØ àÓ¿ÁÎË Á¿Ú, ÊËÛ›, ÎÈÓÂÖÛı*È Ùa ÛÒÌ*Ù* ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ÏËÁFÉØ âÂd Ôé ÎÈÓËı‹ÂÛÙ*È. ÂrÓ*È ‰b Ùa Û ‹Ì*Ù* ÙáÓ àÙfiÌÓ àÂÚ›ÏËÙ*, ÔéÎ ôÂÈÚ*. Ìc ÁaÚ ÂrÓ*È Ì‹Ù\ àÁÎÈÛÙÚÔÂȉÂÖ Ì‹Ù ÙÚÈ*ÓÔÂȉÂÖ Ì‹Ù ÎÚÈÎÔÂȉÂÖ Ø Ù*ÜÙ* ÁaÚ Ùa Û ‹Ì*Ù* ÂûıÚ* ÛÙ¿ âÛÙÈÓ, *î ‰b ôÙÔÌÔÈ à*ıÂÖ ôıÚ* ÛÙÔÈ. ú‰È* ‰b ö ÂÈÓ Û ‹Ì*Ù* ÏfiÁ ıÂÚËÙ¿. Î*d ÂúÚËÙ*È ôÙÔÌÔ Ôé ¬ÙÈ âÛÙdÓ âÏ* ›ÛÙË, àÏÏ\ ¬ÙÈ Ôé ‰‡Ó*Ù*È ÙÌËıÉÓ*È, à*ıc ÔsÛ* Î*d à̤ÙÔ Ô ÎÂÓÔÜØ (4) «Epicurus of Athens, the son of Neokles, who philosophized in accordance with Democritus said that the principles of existing things are bodies that can be contemplated by reason, which have no share of void, are ungenerated, imperishable, neither able to be broken nor to be reshaped in respect of their parts, nor susceptible to alteration. And these are contemplated by reason. But these move in the void and through the void. Both the void itself is infinite and the bodies are infinite. The properties of the bodies are these three: shape, size and weight. Democritus, on the one hand, said there are two: size and shape; and on the other hand, Epicurus added to these a third, weight. For it is necessary, he said, that the bodies be moved by the impact of weight. Or else they would not move. And the shapes of the atoms are ungraspable, but not infinite. For they are not hookshaped or trident-shaped, or ring-shaped. For these shapes are easily broken, but the atoms are free from affection and unbreakable.They have their own shapes that can be contemplated by reason. And it is called an "atom" not because it is smallest, but because it cannot be cut, being free from affection and having no share of void»9. 9. Portions of this report are found in Stobaeus, 1.10.14, preserved by Aëtius under the heading ¶ÂÚd àÚ áÓ Î*d ÛÙÔÈ Â›Ó Î*d ÙÔÜ *ÓÙfi . I omit the end of the passage, which (and here I agree with H. DIELS, Doxographi Graeci, Berlin, de Gruyter, 1879, p. 286, n. 1) seems to be an interpolation. Still, for the sake of completeness, here is the text: oeÛÙ âaÓ ÂúFË ôÙÔÌÔÓ, ôıÚ* ÛÙÔÓ Ï¤ÁÂÈ Î*d à*ıÉ à̤ÙÔ ÔÓ ÎÂÓÔÜ. ¬ÙÈ ‰¤ âÛÙÈÓ ôÙÔÌÔ , Û*ʤ Ø Î*d Á¿Ú âÛÙÈ ÛÙÔÈ ÂÖ* àÂd ùÓÙ* Î*d á* ÎÂÓa Î*d ì ÌÔÓ¿ . There is an oddity in this report that merits a brief comment. Notice that the report describes atomic shapes not as infinite (ôÂÈÚÔ ), but as ungraspable (àÂÚ›ÏËÙÔ ). The early Greek atomists contended that the atoms are of infinitely many shapes, since there is no more reason for them to be one shape rather than another shape (Simp., In Phys., 28.4-27). Epicurus rejected the possibility of infinitely many shapes. But, interestingly, not for the reason given here: that some shapes (e.g., hook-, trident-, or ring-shapes) are easily broken. Instead, Epicurus's rejection of infinitely many atomic shapes proceeds in two steps. First, M. AUGUSTIN82 Of present interest is the italicized portion of this report.These lines tell us that, for Democritus, size and shape are properties of the atoms, and that later Epicurus added weight as a third property to the atoms. Now there is some question as to how this ought to be understood.On some interpretations, these lines are read as implicitly denying that weight is a property –that is, any kind of property– of the atoms for Democritus. As such, the testimonia are Epicurus declares that infinitely many atomic shapes entails atoms of infinitely many sizes (Ad Herod., 43).While he does not defend this entailment in Ad Herodotum, Lucretius offers a possible defense by appeal to an atom's minimal parts. (It remains an open question whether Epicurus himself defended this entailment by appeal to an atom's minimal parts. His discussion of minimal parts at Ad Herod., 56-59 contains no mention of their use to limit the number of possible atomic shapes. Instead, it is concerned with just those paradoxes involving infinite divisibility propounded by Zeno of Elea.) Consider, for instance, an atom composed of three minimal parts. Once these parts are positioned on top and bottom, swapped left and right, and in short every possible permutation considered, then it is possible to determine what each arrangement of the parts yields with respect to the atom's shape. Consequently, if there are to be additional atomic shapes, there must be additional minimal parts. And this, in turn, entails an increase in an atom's size. As a result, if there are to be infinitely many atomic shapes, so too must there be atoms of infinitely many sizes (DRN, 2.478-499). But why should this be rejected? The answer, and so second step, is provided at Ad Herod., 56: while some (ÙÈÓ*) variation in the size of atoms will yield better explanations of the events reported by our feelings (¿ıË) and sense-perceptions (*åÛı‹ÛÂÈ ), the possibility of atoms of every (ÄÓ) size is not useful ( Ú‹ÛÈÌÔ ) for this purpose; and if every size were possible, then we ought to experience visible atoms (ïÚ*Ù¿ ôÙÔÌ*). But that is not seen to happen, nor is it possible to conceive of a visible atom. It is possible to flesh out the first of these reasons by again turning to Lucretius. (For this way of interpreting Lucretius's argument, cf.A.A. LONG and D. N. SEDLEY, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, §12).The possibility of infinitely many atomic shapes would obliterate the limits that circumscribe all natural phenomena. Take, for example, some phenomenal predicate F. However F a given thing is, if there were infinitely many atomic shapes, then there would always be a possibility of some atom turning up that would produce something still F-er. But, as is revealed by our experiences, there is a limit to how F a given thing can be. Therefore, there are finitely many atomic shapes (DRN, 2.500-514). The second reason suggests that Epicurus is also concerned with a possibility from earlier atomic systems: really big atoms. Democritus, for instance, supposedly put no upper limit on the possible size of atoms –presumably for the same reason that there is no limit on the possible shapes of atoms – with the consequence that an atom could be as large as a ÎfiÛÌÔ (STOBAEUS, 1.14.1; EUSEBIUS, Prae. Evan., 14.23.2-3).And Epicurus suggests that such a possibility would allow for atoms that are large enough to be seen (LONG and SEDLEY, op. cit., §12, note rightly that Epicurus's concern here is puzzling, for it does not accord with his theory of perception). But this is unacceptable, for the atoms are necessarily imperceptible. Therefore, there must be a finite number of atomic shapes so as to preclude the possibility of visible atoms. In the light of these reasons, one cannot help but wonder why some atomic shapes would be thought easily broken, and why this would be the grounds on which an Epicurean would argue against there existing atoms of infinitely many shapes. WEIGHT IN GREEK ATOMISM 83 understood as Aristotle and Theophrastus describing weight as a property of the atoms, and Aëtius denying (in this report and the next, which we will see shortly) weight as a property of the atoms10. But to read these lines of report (4) as implicitly denying weight as a property of Democritus's atoms is a mistake. Recall the distinction between a basic property and a dependent property introduced above. A basic property of the atoms is one that is explanatorily primary, in the sense that it is a property in virtue of which some other property, and variations among particular instantiations of that property, is both present and explained. Size is a basic property of Democritus's atoms. For it is in virtue of an atom's size that an atom has weight, and a variation in weight between, say, two individual atoms is explained by a variation in their size. Consequently, weight is not a basic property of Democritus's atoms. Rather, it is a dependent property of his atoms. But the case is more complicated for Epicurus's atoms.When it comes to atomic motion, Democritus contends that the atoms are moved by collisions. Indeed, the atoms are moved by an infinitely long series of collisions (Arist., De Cael., 300 b 8-301a 11). But Aristotle found this explanation lacking (Phys., 8.1.252 a 32-b2; cf. Phys., 4.8.215 a 1-13). He criticized Democritus for failing to provide an àÚ ‹, or first principle, that explains the unending series of atomic collisions. It would seem that Epicurus was sensitive to Aristotle's criticisms. (Whether or not he knew of them from Aristotle's writings directly is another matter). For his own atomistic physics contains an account of natural atomic motion. The natural motion of the atoms, for Epicurus, is in a privileged direction defined as «downwards» (cf. Ad Herod., 60). And this motion is explained by their weight (Ad Herod., 61; Lucr., DRN, 2.217-218). In addition, Epicurus introduces the swerve –a slight shifting to the right or left of one spatial minimum– which enables him to explain the beginning of collisions among atoms, out of which come to be ÎfiÛÌÔÈ and everything that inhabits them (Lucr., DRN, 2.216-224). Notice what has happened here. For Epicurus, the natural motion of the atoms is explained by their weight. Weight is now a property in virtue of which some other property –natural motion in a privileged direction defined as «downwards»– is both present and explained. As such, weight is reclassified by Epicurus as a basic property of the atoms. I suggest, then, that the contrast between Democritus and Epicurus in the 10. Cf., for instance, J. BURNET, op. cit., pp. 341-342; G. S. KIRK, J. E. RAVEN, and M. SCHOFIELD, op. cit., p. 422; C. C.W.TAYLOR, op. cit., p. 179. But see D. O'BRIEN, op. cit., p. 67, who suggests, as I shall demonstrate, that (4) does not outright deny weight as a property of the atoms. In fact, it should be read in agreement with the evidence of Aristotle and Theophrastus. M. AUGUSTIN84 italicized portion of report (4) is just this: for Democritus, size and shape are basic properties of the atoms. Later, and in response to Aristotle's criticisms of Democritus, Epicurus reclassifies weight as a basic property of the atoms. For the natural motion of the atoms is both present and explained by their weight. The two concluding sentences support this suggestion: «For it is necessary, he [i.e., Epicurus] said, that the bodies be moved by the impact of weight. Or else they would not move»11. Since this portion of report (4) is concerned just with those properties that are basic properties of the atoms, it does not deny –not even implicitly– that weight is a property of Democritus's atoms. Rather, it denies only that weight is a basic property of his atoms.Therefore, it should be read in agreement with the testimony from Aristotle and Theophrastus, where weight is described as a dependent property of the atoms. The last report is also from Aëtius. It reads, (5) 1.14.6 (= Stobaeus 1.14.6): ¢ËÌfiÎÚÈÙÔ Ùa ÚáÙ¿ ÊËÛÈ ÛÒÌ*Ù*, Ù*ÜÙ* ‰\ q Ùa Ó*ÛÙ¿, ‚¿ÚÔ ÌbÓ ÔéÎ ö ÂÈÓ, ÎÈÓÂÖÛı*È ‰b Î*Ù\ àÏÏËÏÔÙ ›*Ó âÓ Ùá à›Ú. (5) «Democritus said that the primary bodies (those he called the solids) had no weight, but were moved by mutual impact in the infinite [i.e., void]». Here there is an explicit denial of weight as a property of the atoms: Democritus said that the atoms had no weight, but were moved by mutual impact in the infinite. So, there appears to be a conflict in the testimonia. There are three reports that describe weight as a dependent property of the atoms, one report that should be read in agreement with them, and one report that appears to outright deny weight as a property of the atoms. But here too a reconciling interpretation is forthcoming. Notice that this report also includes a reference to atomic motion. Above I noted that Democritus's atoms do not have a natural motion. Instead, they are moved by an infinitely long series of collisions. But Epicurus's atoms do have a natural motion, and this motion is both present and explained by their weight. With this in mind, I submit that report (5) should be interpreted in the following way: «Democritus said that the primary bodies (those he called the solids) had no weight [sc. as a cause of atomic motion], but were moved by mutual impact in the infinite [i.e., void]». 11. It will turn out that, however an atom's weight moves the atom downward, it is not by an impact. I address this matter in Section 3. On this interpretation, report (5) does not outright deny weight as a property of Democritus's atoms. Instead, it denies only that weight has any connection with atomic motion. Here report (5) agrees with the italicized portion of report (4). There the contrast between Democritus and Epicurus should, I argued, be understood in the light of Epicurus's response to Aristotle's criticisms of Democritean atomism. Democritus did not provide an àÚ ‹ that explains the unending series of collisions between the atoms. And to this Aristotle objected. Epicurus, it would seem, sought to meet Aristotle's requirement by providing an àÚ ‹. He begins by reclassifying weight as a basic property of the atoms. Consequently, weight becomes a property in virtue of which some other property –natural motion in a privileged direction defined as «downwards»– is both present and explained.Then Epicurus introduces the swerve, which enables him to explain the beginning of collisions among atoms. Of significance at present is the connection made by Epicurus between weight and natural atomic motion. For it is here that there is an agreement between report (5) and the italicized portion of report (4). Weight is not a cause of atomic motion for Democritean atoms; they are moved all and only by collisions. For this reason, weight is a dependent property of his atoms. But weight is a cause of atomic motion for Epicurean atoms. For the natural motion of the atoms in a privileged direction defined as «downwards» is explained by their weight. Recall too the concluding sentences from the italicized portion of report (4): «For it is necessary, he [i.e., Epicurus] said, that the bodies be moved by the impact of weight. Or else they would not move». For Epicurus, then, weight gains explanatory primacy. Consequently, it becomes a basic property of his atoms. Therefore, just as report (4) may be read in agreement with the testimony of Aristotle and Theophrastus, so too, I contend, should report (5) be read in agreement with their testimony. Let us now take stock. In response to an apparent conflict in the testimonia concerning weight in early Greek atomism, a common interpretive solution divides the testimonia into two groups. Those testimonia that describe weight as a property of the atoms, they claim, also describe the atoms when they are within a ÎfiÛÌÔ . And those testimonia that deny weight as a property of the atoms, they claim, also describe the atoms when they are outside of a ÎfiÛÌÔ . That is, within a ÎfiÛÌÔ , the atoms have weight; outside of a ÎfiÛÌÔ , the atoms are weightless. But this cannot be correct. For according Aristotle's and Theophrastus's testimony, an atom's weight is dependent upon its size. Now insofar as size is a property of the atoms, because all atoms have some size, and an atom's weight is dependent upon its size, it follows that all atoms have some weight. Weight must be a property of the atoms for all atomists, regardless of whether they are within or outside of a ÎfiÛÌÔ ! But if this is so, then what of those testimonia that apparently deny weight as a property of the atoms? I began by distinguishing two kinds of properties: a basic property and a dependent property. A basic property is one that is explanatorily primary, in the sense that it is a property in virtue of which some other property, and WEIGHT IN GREEK ATOMISM 85 M. AUGUSTIN86 variations among particular instantiations of that property, is both present and explained. Size is a basic property of the atoms, while for Democritus weight is a dependent property. But for Epicurus weight becomes a basic property.The natural motions of the atoms is explained by –and only by– their weight. Weight becomes a cause of atomic motion.And this is of the utmost significance. For I argued that the two reports from Aëtius, which apparently deny weight as a property of Democritus's atoms, in fact deny only that weight is a basic property of Democritus's atoms and that weight has any connection to atomic motion. The second point is the crux of my argument. But it is confirmed by Aristotle's criticisms of Democritean atomism, and Epicurus's subsequent modifications in his own atomistic physics. As a result, Aëtius's testimony may now be read in agreement with the testimony from Aristotle and Theophrastus. Consequently, there is no conflict in the testimonia concerning weight in early Greek atomism. 3. Cosmic and Extra-Cosmic States The interpretation and arguments offered in the previous section challenge those who would accept that Aëtius's testimony denies weight as a property of Leucippus's and Democritus's atoms. But this is only one part of what supports the common interpretive solution. According to some scholars, report (4) describes the atoms when they are outside of a ÎfiÛÌÔ . If this is correct, then the apparent conflict in the testimonia can be reconciled in the following way: when the atoms are within a ÎfiÛÌÔ , what I will henceforth refer to as a cosmic state, the atoms have weight. This accounts for the testimony of Aristotle and Theophrastus. However, when the atoms are outside of a ÎfiÛÌÔ , what I will henceforth refer to as an extra-cosmic state, the atoms are weightless.And this accounts for the testimony of Aëtius. So, insofar as the testimony of Aristotle and Theophrastus and the testimony of Aëtius describe the atoms in different states, there is no conflict between them. Provided, that is, that there is some reason for why atoms in a cosmic state should have weight, while atoms in an extra-cosmic state should be weightless. In this section, I will argue that those reasons marshaled in support of reading report (4) as describing the atoms in an extra-cosmic state cannot withstand scrutiny. As such, there is no more reason to suppose that report (4) describes the atoms in an extra-cosmic state than in a cosmic state12. 12. In Section 4, I shall address why someone might maintain that it is only in a cosmic state that the atoms have weight. And there I will show why it would be wrong to maintain such a position. Our attention will be focused once more on the italicized portion of report (4). For the sake of convenience, here it is again: Û Ì‚Â‚ËΤÓ*È ‰b ÙÔÖ ÛÒÌ*ÛÈ ÙÚ›* Ù*ÜÙ*, Û ÉÌ* ̤ÁÂıÔ ‚¿ÚÔ . ¢ËÌfiÎÚÈÙÔ ÌbÓ ÁaÚ öÏÂÁ ‰‡Ô, ̤ÁÂıfi Ù Î*d Û ÉÌ*, ï ‰b \E›ÎÔ ÚÔ ÙÔ‡ÙÔÈ Î*d ÙÚ›ÙÔÓ ‚¿ÚÔ ÚÔÛ¤ıËÎÂÓØ àÓ¿ÁÎË Á¿Ú, ÊËÛ›, ÎÈÓÂÖÛı*È Ùa ÛÒÌ*Ù* ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ÏËÁFÉØ âÂd Ôé ÎÈÓËı‹ÛÂÙ*È. «The properties of the bodies are these three: shape, size and weight. Democritus, on the one hand, said there are two: size and shape; and on the other hand, Epicurus added to these a third, weight. For it is necessary, he said, that the bodies be moved by the impact of weight. Or else they would not move». After contrasting Democritus with Epicurus, who, as I argued in the previous section, reclassified weight as a basic property of the atoms, the report concludes, «for it is necessary, he said, for the bodies to be moved by the impact of weight. Or else they would not move».This comment, some claim, describes the atoms in an extra-cosmic state because invites comparison with Epicurus's remarks on the movement of atoms prior to any collisions. Prior to any collisions, the atoms fall downward in parallel, straight lines. And where the atoms fall downward in parallel, straight lines, the context is surely an extracosmic state. If this is correct, then there is still some support for the common interpretive solution. To motivate such a comparison, proponents of this reading begin with a reference to the following report from Simplicius, In Phys., 42.10-11: ¢ËÌfiÎÚÈÙÔ Ê‡ÛÂÈ àΛÓËÙ* ϤÁÓ Ùa ôÙÔÌ* ÏËÁFÉ ÎÈÓÂÖÛı*› ÊËÛÈÓ. «Democritus said that the atoms are by nature immobile and are moved by an impact». Here Simplicius reports that, according to Democritus, the atoms have no natural motion, but are moved by an impact. Simplicius's report is significant because it mirrors, but with an important difference, the italicized portion of report (4) from Aëtius. Aëtius Α: àÓ¿ÁÎË Á¿Ú, ÊËÛ›, ÎÈÓÂÖÛı*È Ùa ÛÒÌ*Ù* ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ÏËÁFÉ . . . Simplicius Α: Ùa ôÙÔÌ* ÏËÁFÉ ÎÈÓÂÖÛı*› ÊËÛÈÓ. Aëtius Β: . . . âÂd Ôé ÎÈÓËı‹ÛÂÙ*È. Simplicius Β: ¢ËÌfiÎÚÈÙÔ Ê‡ÛÂÈ àΛÓËÙ* ϤÁÓ Ùa ôÙÔÌ*. . . The Α portions of each report assert that it is necessary for the atoms to be WEIGHT IN GREEK ATOMISM 87 M. AUGUSTIN88 moved «by an impact», while the Β portions of each report assert that without such an impact the atoms would not (or do not) move. But there is an important difference that provides a valuable clue concerning the context of Aëtius's report: the addition of ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ to the simpler formula ÙFÉ ÏËÁFÉ. That is, Democritus's atoms (according to Simplicius) are moved ÙFÉ ÏËÁFÉ, or «by an impact», while Epicurus's atoms (according to the report preserved by Aëtius) are moved ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ÏËÁFÉ, or «by the impact of weight». That Epicurus's atoms are moved τ FÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ÏËÁFÉ, it is asserted, recalls Ad Herodotum, 6113. Here Epicurus writes that each and every atom moves at an equal velocity throughout the void. Heavier and larger atoms do not move faster than lighter and smaller atoms. Moreover, atoms that have been knocked into an upward or sideways trajectory do not move quicker than those that fall downwards because of their individual weights (Ôûı\ ì ôÓ Ôûı\ ì Âå Ùe Ï¿ÁÈÔÓ ‰Èa ÙáÓ ÎÚÔ‡ÛÂÓ ÊÔÚ¿, Ôûı\ *î ο٠‰Èa ÙáÓ ‚*ÚáÓ).These lines, some maintain, suggest that movement τFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ÏËÁ‹, is internal to the atom itself –it is a ÏËÁ‹ from within the atom– and is therefore the cause of its downward motion14. And this is supported, it is further claimed, by a later line from section 61, which reports that an atom will continue along its current trajectory until ≤ àÓÙÈÎfi„FË j öÍıÂÓ j âÎ ÙÔÜ å‰›Ô ‚¿ÚÔ Úe ÙcÓ ÙÔÜ Ï‹Í*ÓÙÔ ‰‡Ó*ÌÈÓ, «knocked aside either from without or from its own weight <reacting> against the force of the atom which struck it» (O'BRIEN, 1981, op. cit., p. 231, n. 1, emphasis in original). The phrase ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ÏËÁFÉ, then, should be interpreted as referring to the cause (for Epicurus) of an atom's downward motion, in parallel, straight lines and prior to any collisions. And wherever this kind of atomic motion occurs, the context is surely an extra-cosmic state15. 13.A connection between report (4) and Ad Herodotum, 61 was first noticed, it seems, in C. BAILEY, op. cit., p. 131 n. 4. However, he does not pursue the implications of such a connection. 14. For instance, in his commentary on Ad Herodotum, 61, D. FURLEY, 1967, op. cit., p. 123, seems to endorse such an idea when he writes, «[i]f a falling heavy atom collides with a light atom, then the heavy atom may perhaps be only slightly deflected, or else it may be turned directly about but move upward through only a few space units before its weight reasserts itself» (my emphasis). While D. KONSTAN, op. cit., pp. 412-415, is right to challenge Furley on this point, he arrives at the wrong conclusion. I return to this below. 15. D. O'BRIEN, 1981, op. cit., p. 231, also comments on an earlier line in report (4) from Aëtius, which reads Ù*ÜÙ* ̤ÓÙÔÈ ÎÈÓÂÖÛı*È âÓ Ùá ÎÂÓá Î*d ‰Èa ÙÔÜ ÎÂÓÔÜ, that «the duplication of the expression seems to me very likely to be a reference to the downward movements of Epicurus's atoms». But he offers no reasons to support this contention. I myself do not understand why the duplication should be thought to make such a reference. For it is certainly correct to say of any atom that it moves, in whatever direction it is presently moving, in the void and through the void. The contention central to this argument –that an atom's weight exerts an impact from within the atom itself, that then drives it downwards– is very puzzling. How could this happen?! After all, the atoms are *-ÙfiÌÔÓ, uncuttable.Therefore, there are no physical parts of an atom that could, if moved in some way, exert an impact from within the atom and thereby drive it downwards. Fortunately, an explanation for how this event could occur is not needed. For neither do the cited passages from Ad Herodotum, 61, nor, for that matter, another report preserved by Aëtius support such a contention. Instead, whenever a striking or an impact is mentioned, it is always between atoms. Let us look more closely at the pertinent texts. Here are lines 1-6 of Ad Herodotum, 61: Î*d ÌcÓ Î*d åÛÔÙ* ÂÖ àÓ*ÁÎ*ÖÔÓ Ùa àÙfiÌÔ ÂrÓ*È, ¬Ù*Ó ‰Èa ÙÔÜ ÎÂÓÔÜ ÂåÛʤÚÓÙ*È ÌËıÂÓe àÓÙÈÎfiÙÔÓÙÔ . ÔûÙ ÁaÚ Ùa ‚*Ú¤* ıÄÙÙÔÓ ÔåÛı‹ÛÂÙ*È ÙáÓ ÌÈÎÚáÓ Î*d ÎÔ‡ÊÓ, ¬Ù*Ó Á ‰c ÌˉbÓ à*ÓÙ÷Ä *éÙÔÖ Ø ÔûÙ Ùa ÌÈÎÚa ÙáÓ ÌÂÁ¿ÏÓ, ¿ÓÙ* fiÚÔÓ Û‡ÌÌÂÙÚÔÓ ö ÔÓÙ*, ¬Ù*Ó ÌËıbÓ Ìˉb âΛÓÔÈ àÓÙÈÎfiÙFËØ Ôûı\ ì ôÓ Ôûı\ ì Âå Ùe Ï¿ÁÈÔÓ ‰Èa ÙáÓ ÎÚÔ‡ÛÂÓ ÊÔÚ¿, Ôûı\ *î ο٠‰Èa ÙáÓ å‰›Ó ‚*ÚáÓ. «Moreover, the atoms must be of equal velocity whenever they travel through the void and nothing collides with them. For neither will the heavy ones move faster than the small light ones, provided nothing runs into them; nor will the small ones move faster than the large ones, through having all their trajectories commensurate with them, at any rate when the large ones are suffering no collision either. Nor will either their upward motion or sideways motion caused by knocks [be quicker], or those downwards [be quicker] because of their individual weights» (LONG and SEDLEY, trans., modified slightly). It is certainly correct to find here confirmation that an atom's weight is a cause of that atom's downward motion. The last sentence makes that much clear. Notice, though, that it does not describe how it is that an atom's own weight causes the atom to fall downwards. Much less, for that matter, does it indicate that such a cause is a kind of impact exerted from within the atom and by its own weight. And though the previous clause mentions a ÎÚÔÜÛÈ , a striking, smiting or collision, this undoubtedly refers to a striking or collision between two atoms. The second section of Ad Herodotum, 61, too, does not describe how weight moves the atoms downwards. Here are lines 6-8: âÊ\ ïfiÛÔÓ Á¿Ú iÓ Î*Ù›Û FË ëοÙÂÚÓ, âd ÙÔÛÔÜÙÔÓ ±Ì* ÓÔ‹Ì*ÙÈ ÙcÓ ÊÔÚaÓ Û ‹ÛÂÈ, ≤ àÓÙÈÎfi„FË j öÍıÂÓ j âÎ ÙÔÜ å‰›Ô ‚¿ÚÔ Úe ÙcÓ ÙÔÜ Ï‹Í*ÓÙÔ ‰‡Ó*ÌÈÓ. «For however far along either kind of trajectory [sc. upwards, sideways or downwards] it [i.e., the atom] gets, for that distance it will move as fast as WEIGHT IN GREEK ATOMISM 89 M. AUGUSTIN90 thought,until it is in collision,either through some external cause or through its own weight in relation to the force of the impacting body» (LONG and SEDLEY, trans., my emphasis). While the genitive participle ÙÔÜ Ï‹Í*ÓÙÔ (of Ï‹ÛÛ, a cognate of ÏËÁ‹) is present, the sentence's structure makes clear that the impact is not from within, but is from the outside. In addition, although the sentence draws a contrast (j...j...) between an external cause (öÍıÂÓ) and an atom's own weight (âÎ ÙÔÜ å‰›Ô ‚¿ÚÔ ), which may have lead some scholars to find here support for the contention that a ÏËÁ‹ may refer to a kind of internal impact, this is not the kind of contrast Epicurus has in mind. Rather, the contrast describes the only possible and primary influences for an atom's new trajectory after a collision. That is, an atom's present trajectory is always the result of a collision (àÓÙ›ÎÔ„È ) with another atom. But the primary influence on its new trajectory may either be some external force –that is, the force of the impacting body on the atom in question– or the atom's own weight as resistance to the force of the impacting body16. So much, then, for these two sections of Ad Herodotum, 61. There is a later report in Aëtius (= pseudo-Plutarch, 1.12.5) that will help to drive home the point under development. Here is the text: \E›ÎÔ ÚÔ ‰b àÂÚ›ÏËÙ* ÂrÓ*È Ùa ÛÒÌ*Ù* Î*d Ùa ÚáÙ* ‰b êÏÄ, Ùa ‰b âÍ âΛÓÓ Û ÁÎÚ›Ì*Ù* ¿ÓÙ* ‚¿ÚÔ ö ÂÈÓØ ÎÈÓÂÖÛı*È ‰b Ùa ôÙÔÌ* ÙfiÙ ÌbÓ Î*Ùa ÛÙ¿ıÌËÓ ÙfiÙ ‰b Î*Ùa *Ú¤ÁÎÏÈÛÈÓ, Ùa ‰b ôÓ ÎÈÓÔ‡ÌÂÓ* Î*Ùa ÏËÁcÓ Î*d *ÏÌfiÓ. «Epicurus said that the bodies are ungraspably many and the primary bodies are simple, and all things compounded of them have weight. And that the atoms sometimes move in a plumbline, and sometimes swerving, and some of them are sent upwards by an impact and vibration». I only want to point out here that though the word ÏËÁ‹ is present, it again refers to a collision between two atoms. As we have seen in these texts on Epicurean atomic motion, whenever a word is present that denotes a striking, collision or an impact (ÎÚÔÜÛÈ , àÓÙ›ÎÔ„È or ÏËÁ‹), it always picks out such an event between two atoms and never an event that occurs within an atom. 16. I am in agreement here with D. KONSTAN, op. cit., p. 413 (and cf. p. 415). In addition, this is sufficient to demonstrate that Furley is wrong when he writes that sometimes an atom, after collision, will move only a few minima in a particular direction before its weight reasserts itself. Before returning to the phrase ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ÏËÁFÉ from report (4), there is one more passage that requires consideration. For it has been cited by some scholars in support of the idea that weight exerts a kind of internal impact, which is the cause of an atom's downward motion. It is from Cicero's De Fato, 20.46: «Declinat», inquit, «atomus». Primum cur? Aliam enim quandam vim motus habebant a Democrito impulsionis quam plagam ille appellat, a te, Epicure, gravitatis et ponderis. C. Bailey, in a footnote, cites this passage in support of weight exerting an impact from within the atom, which then drives the atom downwards (op. cit., p. 131, n. 4). Unfortunately, he does not offer any argument or commentary to support such an interpretation. However, D. Konstan too finds support for such an idea here and does provide some commentary (op. cit., p. 415). Pointing to the parallel construction of the genitives gravitatis and ponderis with impulsionis, which he reads as dependent on the accusative plagam, Konstan contends that gravitatis and ponderis too must depend on plagam. As such, he translates the passage as follows: «The atom, says he [Epicurus], swerves. In the first place, why? For they had another kind of power of motion from Democritus, which he calls "the blow of collision," and from you, Epicurus, the blow of heaviness and weight». But there is good reason to reject this translation and, consequently, its implications for the phrase ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ÏËÁFÉ. First, recall that neither section of Epicurus's Ad Herodotum, 61, nor the later report in Aëtius provide evidence in support of such a translation. That is, one where an atom's own weight exerts a kind of internal impact, which moves the atom downwards. Second, this translation stretches the meaning of plaga, the Latin equivalent of the Greek ÏËÁ‹, so that it now signifies something more general like «force». But this seems unacceptable, for a plaga, as with a ÏËÁ‹, always refers to a striking or impact between two things (cf. LS, s.v. plaga, especially §I). Finally, as to the parallel between the genitives gravitatis and ponderis, and impulsionis, it is more natural to read each of them as dependent not on plagam, but on vim. And this is, I suggest, how H. Rackham understands the passage. He translates it as follows: «"The atom does swerve", he says. In the first place what causes the swerve? For the motive force that they will get from Democritus is a different one, a driving force termed by him a "blow"; from you, Epicurus, they will get the force of gravity or weight». WEIGHT IN GREEK ATOMISM 91 Why is this translation «more natural»? For one, it does not require stretching the meaning of plagam. Indeed, «force» is a perfectly natural translation for vim. And this, in turn, produces a passage where the downward motion caused by an atom's weight accords with what we have seen in both Ad Herodotum, 61 and Aëtius, 1.12.5. Finally, this translation fits better with Cicero's general point. Here Cicero is objecting once again to the atomic swerve (cf. De Fin., 1.19-20). Among other questions raised by Cicero here, one is: why should Epicurus bother positing such an event in the first place? It is surely not to account for atomic motion simpliciter. For Democritus provided one such explanation: an impact.And Epicurus himself posited another, and altogether different, kind of explanation: the force of gravity or weight.To read gravitatis and ponderis as dependent on plagam makes this passage no longer about causes of atomic motion, but about differences between Democritus and Epicurus on the role of a plaga in their respective physical systems. It is hard to see why, at least here, Cicero would be interested in such a topic. Let me now bring all of this together. It has been suggested that report (4) supports an interpretive solution concerning weight in early Greek atomism where some reports are understood as describing the atoms in an extra-cosmic state. And when the atoms are in an extra-cosmic state, they are weightless. In the previous section, I argued that report (4) denies only that weight is a basic property of the atoms. As such, report (4) can be read in agreement with the testimony of Aristotle and Theophrastus, where weight is described as a dependent property of the atoms. In this section, I have been concerned with the contention that report (4) describes the atoms in an extra-cosmic state. Support for this claim derives from the phrase ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ÏËÁFÉ, which supposedly refers to the cause of downward motion for Epicurus's atoms.And where atoms fall downwards in parallel, straight lines, the context is surely an extra-cosmic state. But the texts cited to support the phrase ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ÏËÁFÉ as a description of how an atom's weight moves the atom downwards do not, in fact, do so. If my analysis of these and additional texts is correct, then there is no support for understanding the phrase ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ÏËÁFÉ as referring to a kind of internal impact exerted by an atom's weight, and so it is not the cause of the downward motion exhibited by Epicurus's atoms prior to the start of collisions. As such, there is no reason to suppose that report (4) describes atoms in an extra-cosmic state any more than it describes atoms in a cosmic state. 4 .A Few Loose Ends The two previous sections present a significant challenge for those who appeal to report (4) in support of the common interpretive solution. At this point, there are a few loose ends that should be tied up. I mentioned one of these near the beginning of Section 3: dividing the M. AUGUSTIN92 WEIGHT IN GREEK ATOMISM 93 testimonia into two groups –a group that describes the atoms in a cosmic state, and a group that describes the atoms in an extra-cosmic state– is defensible provided that there is some reason for why atoms in a cosmic state should have weight, while atoms in an extra-cosmic state should be weightless. What evidence is there for why this should be so? Let us begin with the following passage from Simplicius, In De Cael., 569.5-9: Ôî ÁaÚ ÂÚd ¢ËÌfiÎÚÈÙÔÓ Î*d ≈ÛÙÂÚÔÓ \E›ÎÔ ÚÔ Ù¿ àÙfiÌÔ ¿Û* ïÌÔÊ ÂÖ ÔûÛ* ‚¿ÚÔ ö ÂÈÓ Ê*Û›, Ùá ‰b ÂrÓ*› ÙÈÓ* ‚*Ú‡ÙÂÚ* âÍıÔ‡ÌÂÓ* Ùa ÎÔ ÊfiÙÂÚ* ñ\ *éÙáÓ ñÊÈ *ÓfiÓÙÓ âd Ùe ôÓ Ê¤ÚÂÙ*È, Î*d Ô≈٠ϤÁÔ ÛÈÓ ÔyÙÔÈ ‰ÔÎÂÖÓ Ùa ÌbÓ ÎÔÜÊ* ÂrÓ*È Ùa ‰b ‚*Ú¤*. «The followers of Democritus and later Epicurus say that all atoms are of the same nature and have weight, but because some are heavier, the lighter ones are pushed up as they [i.e., the heavier ones] sink down, thus, they say, it appears that some are light and some heavy». For ancient philosophers in general, but especially the early Greek philosophers, an important phenomenon to be explained is the twin tendencies of some objects to sink and other objects to rise17. The atomists accounted for this phenomenon in part by a theory of öÎıÏÈ„È , displacement or extrusion. Part of their explanation is contained in the above passage from Simplicius: heavier atoms have the capacity to squeeze out lighter atoms, thereby pushing the lighter atoms upwards. But such a phenomenon can occur only when the atoms have weight. For, as Simplicius writes, it is a difference in weight between atoms that explains why some of them are squeezed out and upwards, while the others sink down. But weight is not sufficient (or so it sometimes claimed) for the atomists to explain the twin tendencies of some objects to sink and other objects to rise. An appeal to the vortex seems necessary. D. Konstan provides a helpful explanation here18. He writes: «... I submit that this power of atoms to jostle their lighter neighbors out of the way was precisely the property to which Democritus attached the name weight. We may observe that weight in this sense has nothing whatever to do with tendency of atoms or compound bodies to fall; whenever a group of 17. On this point, see D. KONSTAN, op. cit., p. 410. 18. Konstan himself does not endorse the line of reasoning under examination here. I cite him only because he provides a most helpful explanation of the phenomenon under consideration. In addition, it is not clear to me that the vortex is a necessary condition for the phenomenon of öÎıÏÈ„È . I elaborate on this below. M. AUGUSTIN94 atoms is moving in a uniform direction and encounters a resisting surface or texture of corpuscles, the heavier (if they are atoms) or the denser (if they are compounds) will force their way further in the given line of progress and displace the lighter. To be sure, this process will only yield the regular contrariety of direction exhibited in the perceived motion of lighter and heavier substances when the random atomic movements are organized into a more or less uniform current, and such a current was assumed by Democritus to arise out of chance turbulences evolving into vortices. That is, the vortex is a necessary condition of the observed phenomena of displacement. But, in the first place, the vortex is not a sufficient condition: it must be supplemented by the power associated with weight. In the second place weight is not even a necessary condition for the formation of the vortex and the tendency of matter to fall. Against the hypothesis that Democritus saw any connection between weight and some privileged direction in the universe, I may add that I see no reason at all to suppose that according to his theory the vortices in different cosmoi necessarily had the same orientation» (op. cit., p. 410). Let us work through this explanation19. The first sentence is, more or less, Simplicius's report concerning the theory of öÎıÏÈ„È held by Democritus and Epicurus. Now if displacement or extrusion is to explain the twin tendencies of some objects to sink and other objects to rise –a phenomenon that occurs with observable regularity– then there must be something else involved that will secure this aspect of the phenomenon.The rotation and consequent effects of a vortex can fulfill such a role. A vortex's rotation produces centripetal force that drags or pulls objects downwards along its vertical axis. Now since the speed of rotation is greater, and so the centripetal force stronger, towards the bottom of the vortex, heavier atoms and denser bodies are pulled further downwards along the vertical axis than lighter atoms and rarer bodies. Consequently, when such lighter atoms and rarer bodies are in the path of these heavier atoms and denser bodies, the latter displace or extrude upwards the former –there is, quite literally, a squeezing out (öÎıÏÈ„È )– along the vertical axis until such objects settle at some higher point in the vortex. So, a vortex's continual rotation produces an environment in which bodies (either atomic or compound) can and will move in a more or less predictable, uniform current within the vortex. And this more or less predictable, uniform current secures that heavier atoms and denser bodies that are being pulled downwards, and so towards the bottom of the vortex, can encounter lighter atoms and rarer bodies.When this occurs, the heavier atoms and denser bodies 19. Here I am indebted to S.TIGNER, op. cit., p. 440, and D. KONSTAN, op. cit., p. 410. will displace the lighter atoms and rarer bodies. In this way, then, an atom's weight in conjunction with the vortex's rotation and consequent effects explain the twin tendencies of some objects to sink and other objects to rise. We are now in a position to state why some might contend that atoms in a cosmic state should have weight, while atoms in an extra-cosmic state should be weightless. Simplicius's testimony suggests that the phenomenon of öÎıÏÈ- „È can occur only when the atoms have weight. For it is a difference in weight between atoms that explains why some atoms are squeezed out and upwards, while other atoms sink down. But it also necessary (or so it is sometimes claimed) that the phenomenon of öÎıÏÈ„È can occur only within a vortex. And this is so because an environment suitable for the occurrence of this phenomenon is produced only within a vortex. Given these two contentions, it is not unreasonable to then draw an additional conclusion that it is only within a vortex that the atoms have weight. That is, just as a vortex's rotation and consequent effects produce an environment suitable for occurrences of öÎıÏÈ- „È , so too does a vortex's rotation and consequent effects produce those conditions necessary for the ascription of weight to the atoms. Even if it is correct to claim that the phenomenon of öÎıÏÈ„È can occur only within a vortex, though, this will fail as a demonstration for why atoms in a cosmic state should have weight, while atoms in an extra-cosmic state should be weightless. First, there is no need to invoke the vortex as producing those conditions necessary for the ascription of weight to the atoms. According to the interpretation proposed above, an atom's weight is dependent upon that atom's size. And since all atoms have some size, it follows that all atoms have some weight regardless of whether they are in a cosmic state or an extracosmic state. Put differently, those conditions necessary for the ascription of weight to the atoms are produced, if you will, by the atoms themselves. Second, all that has been explained here is the conditions under which an atom's weight becomes, so to speak, perceivable. Konstan puts the point well when he writes a little later that it is only under certain conditions that an atom's weight can manifest itself –namely, within a vortex and in relation to other atoms– as a single atom, considered in isolation, presents itself only as a geometric form (op. cit., p. 410). But this does not preclude the atoms from in fact having weight; even if it cannot be seen (if you will), this does not entail that it is not there! I submit, then, that appeal to Democritus's use of öÎıÏÈ„È to explain the twin tendencies of some objects to sink and other objects to rise does not support the contention under consideration. Therefore, there is no reason, pace the common interpretive solution, why atoms in a cosmic state should have weight, while atoms in an extra-cosmic state should be weightless. As a final comment on this matter, allow me to explain why it is not clear to me that the vortex is a necessary condition for the phenomenon of öÎıÏÈ„È . It seems possible for a stream of atoms or atomic aggregates to be moving through the void, where this movement occurs in an extra-cosmic state, and moving towards them in the opposite direction is another stream of atoms or WEIGHT IN GREEK ATOMISM 95 M. AUGUSTIN96 atomic aggregates. Now assuming that one of these streams of atoms or atomic aggregates is heavier or denser than the other stream of atoms or atomic aggregates, when they meet the stream of heavier atoms or denser atomic aggregates will displace the stream of lighter atoms or rarer atomic aggregates. There is no reason –at least, none that I can see– for why an event of this sort would not occur at some point in an extra-cosmic state. If so, then it is incorrect to claim that the vortex is a necessary condition for the phenomenon of öÎıÏÈ- „È . However, a closely related claim does seem correct: the vortex is a necessary condition for the phenomenon of öÎıÏÈ„È to occur regularly. For, as we saw above, the vortex's rotation and consequent effects produce an environment in which bodies (either atomic or compound) can and will move in a more or less predictable, uniform current.And this sort of predictability is required if Democritus is to explain the observable regularity of some objects to sink and other objects to rise. So much, then, for this loose end. The other loose end concerns (once more) the italicized portion of report (4). Much of the controversy concerning the natural motion of Epicurus's atoms and its connection to an extra-cosmic state could have been avoided, it seems to me, if only it were realized that there was no time at which the atoms actually fell downward in parallel, straight lines. Allow me to explain20. Above I stressed the influence that Aristotle's criticisms of Democritean physics had on Epicurus's own atomistic physics. Epicurus reclassifies weight as a basic property of the atoms, and he maintains that atoms swerve. The former modification satisfies Aristotle's demand for an account of natural atomic motion; the latter modification provides an àÚ ‹ that explains the beginning of collisions among atoms, out of which come to be ÎfiÛÌÔÈ and everything that inhabits them. But it is a mistake to then infer on the basis of these modifications that there was some time during which the atoms, for Epicurus, in fact fell downwards until a swerve started the unending series of collisions. Epicurus is quite clear that the atoms are, and have always been, in collision with one another at Ad Herodotum, 43-44: ÎÈÓÔÜÓÙ*› ÙÂ Û Ó á *î ±ÙÔÌÔÈ ÙeÓ *åáÓ*, Î*d *î ÌbÓ Âå Ì*ÎÚaÓ à\ àÏÏ‹ÏÓ ‰ÈÈÛÙ¿ÌÂÓ*È, *î ‰b *éÙÔÜ ÙeÓ *ÏÌeÓ úÛ Ô Û*È, ¬Ù*Ó Ù‡ ÛÈ ÙFÉ ÂÚÈÏÔÎFÉ ÎÂÎÏÂÈ̤Ó*È j ÛÙÂÁ* fiÌÂÓ*È *Úa ÙáÓ ÏÂÎÙÈÎáÓ. ≥ Ù ÁaÚ ÙÔÜ ÎÂÓÔÜ Ê‡ÛÈ ì ‰ÈÔÚ› Ô Û* ëοÛÙËÓ *éÙcÓ ÙÔÜÙÔ *Ú*ÛΠ¿ ÂÈ, ÙcÓ ñ¤ÚÂÈÛÈÓ Ôé Ô¥* Ù ÔsÛ* ÔÈÂÖÛı*ÈØ ≥ Ù ÛÙÂÚÂfiÙË ì ñ¿Ú Ô Û* *éÙ*Ö Î*Ùa ÙcÓ Û‡ÁÎÚÔ ÛÈÓ ÙeÓ àÔ*ÏÌeÓ ÔÈÂÖ, âÊ\ ïfiÛÔÓ iÓ ì ÂÚÈÏÔÎc 20. Here I am indebted to T. O'KEEFE, op. cit., pp. 110-122 (and cf. T. O'KEEFE, Does Epicurus need the swerve as an Archê of collisions?, Phronesis, 41, 1996, pp. 305-317). R. SHARPLES, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy, London and New York, Routledge, pp. 40-43 advances a similar claim. WEIGHT IN GREEK ATOMISM 97 ÙcÓ àÔÎ*Ù¿ÛÙ*ÛÈÓ âÎ ÙÉ Û ÁÎÚÔ‡Û ‰È‰á. àÚ c ‰b ÙÔ‡ÙÓ ÔéÎ öÛÙÈÓ, àȉ›Ó ÙáÓ àÙfiÌÓ ÔéÛáÓ Î*d ÙÔÜ ÎÂÓÔÜ. «The atoms move continuously forever, some separating a great distance from each other, others keeping up their vibration on the spot whenever they happen to get trapped by their interlinking or imprisoned by atoms that link up. For the nature of the void brings this about by separating each atom off by itself, since it is unable to lend them support; and their own solidity causes them as a result of their knocking to vibrate back, to whatever distance their interlinking allows them to recoil from the knock. There is no beginning to these [i.e., these sorts of atomic motion, including rebounds], because the atoms and void are eternal» (LONG and SEDLEY trans., modified slightly) Epicurus's two modifications to Democritean physics are only explanatory àÚ *› and do not provide a temporal starting-point for either atomic motion or collisions21. If there is, then, no point in time during which Epicurus's atoms fell downward in parallel, straight lines, which would require a swerve to start a chain of collisions, and the phrase ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ÏËÁFÉ does not refer to how an atom's weight causes the atom itself to move downward, then what should be made of the italicized portion of (4)? H. Usener emended the passage, substituting ïÏÎFÉ for ÏËÁFÉ. If such an emendation is accepted, the passage would then read: ¢ËÌfiÎÚÈÙÔ ÌbÓ ÁaÚ öÏÂÁ ‰‡Ô, ̤ÁÂıfi Ù Î*d Û ÉÌ* ï ‰b \E›ÎÔ ÚÔ ÙÔ‡ÙÔÈ Î*d ÙÚ›ÙÔÓ ‚¿ÚÔ ÚÔÛ¤ıËÎÂÓØ àÓ¿ÁÎË Á¿Ú, ÊËÛ›, ÎÈÓÂÖÛı*È Ùa ÛÒÌ*Ù* ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ïÏÎFÉØ âÂd Ôé ÎÈÓËı‹ÛÂÙ*È. How should the phrase ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ïÏÎFÉ be understood? A ïÏÎFÉ denotes «a drawing» or «a dragging» (cf. ≤ÏÎ, literally «to draw» or «to drag»). As such, it is possible to render the phrase ÙFÉ ÙÔÜ ‚¿ÚÔ ïÏÎFÉ in English as, «by the drag of weight». «Democritus, on the one hand, said there are two: size and shape; and on 21. This claim is admittedly controversial, and therefore requires further discussion and defense. For reasons of space, though, I cannot provide such a discussion or defense here. Still, let me offer this much. An immediate concern is the label «explanatory àÚ *›». What does the downward motion and swerve explain if, at this point in our discussion, they amount of nothing more than dialectical moves available to an Epicurean when confronted with a demand for natural motion and an àÚ ‹? I am inclined to see them fulfilling an important, explanatory role in Epicurus's attempt to embrace atomism, while at the same time avoiding a commitment to determinism. In a future article, I plan to investigate this inclination. the other hand, Epicurus added to these a third, weight. For it is necessary, he said, that the bodies be moved by the drag of weight. Or else they would not move». This is not the place to argue for the acceptance of such an emendation. However, the above arguments seem to lend some philosophical support to the philological emendation proposed by Usener. 5. Conclusion The interpretation offered in this article gives primacy to Aristotle's and Theophrastus's testimony. But not simply to their contention that the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus have weight. It stresses, as other commentators have observed, the relationship between an atom's weight and its size. This relationship is stressed in part by my distinguishing between two types of properties: basic properties and dependent properties. The distinction is, perhaps, of the utmost importance. For I wish to resist accepting at face value Aëtius's testimony, but I also wish to avoid discrediting Aëtius's testimony as historically valueless (pace O'BRIEN, 1981, op. cit.). With this distinction in place, it is possible to read Aëtius's testimony not as outright denying weight as a property of Leucippus's and Democritus's atoms. Rather, the reports deny only that weight has any connection to atomic motion; that weight has the explanatory primacy Epicurus would later grant it in response to Aristotle's criticisms of Democritean atomism. The relationship between an atom's weight and size described in Aristotle's and Theophrastus's testimony is stressed in another way too, which appeared at the end of Section 2. And this point drives my entire interpretation. According to Aristotle and Theophrastus's testimony, an atom's weight is dependent upon that atom's size. Now insofar as size is a property of the atoms, because all atoms have some size, and an atom's weight is dependent upon its size, it follows that all atoms have some weight. Weight must be a property of the atoms for all atomists, regardless of whether they are within or outside of a ÎfiÛÌÔ ! To accept the common interpretive solution in light of this point requires far too much.We must accept Aëtius's testimony at face value. And we must reject the very relationship between an atom's weight and its size described in the reports of Aristotle and Theophrastus. For it is not possible to accept this relationship and at the same time maintain that the atoms are weightless when outside of a ÎfiÛÌÔ . Finally, though many of the arguments offered here advance negative conclusions, this does not leave us without a solution to the present interpretive difficulty. With the distinction between basic properties and dependent properties in place, and recognition of the connection between an atom's weight and atomic motion later established by Epicurus, the following results: M. AUGUSTIN98 WEIGHT IN GREEK ATOMISM 99 there are three reports that describe weight as a property of the atoms, where it is a dependent property; there is one report that should be read in agreement with them, for it denies only that weight is a basic property of Democritus's atoms (contra Epicurus); and there is a final report that should also be read in agreement with these four, as it denies only that weight has any connection to atomic motion (contra Epicurus). Consequently, there is no conflict among the extant testimonia concerning weight in early Greek atomism22. Michael J. AUGUSTIN (Santa Barbara) TO BAPOΣ ΣTOYΣ EΛΛHNEΣ ATOMIKOYΣ Π ε ρ λ η ψ η O γραπτς μαρτυρ ες σν ρ τ
ρς στν πριμ λληνικ τμισμ α νεται ν ναιρν ! μ α τ"ν #λλη. K$πιες ναρς %ε%αινυν τι τ #τμα &'υν %$ρς, )ν* #λλες σα*ς ρννται τ %$ρς +ς /δι:τητα τ*ν τ:μων. M α κιν" λ<ση σ α=τ"ν τ"ν πραν" ντ αση διαιρε τ>ς μαρτυρ ες σ δ< ?μ$δες. @H πρτη ?μ$δα περιγρ$ει τ #τμα μAσα σ Bναν κ:σμ, πυ &'υν %$ρςC ! δε<τερη ?μ$δα περιγρ$ει τ #τμα &Dω π Bναν κ:σμ, πυ δν &'υν %$ρς. M α μαρτυρ α «κλειδ » πE συνεισAρει σF α=τ"ν τ"ν λ<ση εGναι τ FAAτιυ, 1.3.18. A=τ" ! μαρτυρ α )μαν*ς ρνεται τ %$ρς +ς /δι:τητα τ*ν τ:μων κα> Jπθετικ περιγρ$ει τ #τμα ταν %ρ σκνται &Dω π τν κ:σμ. FEπι'ειρηματλγ* )ναντ ν α=τPς τPς ρμηνευτικPς λ<σης δε 'νντας πρ*τν τι ? FAAτις, 1.3.18, δν ρνεται τ %$ρς +ς /δι:τητα τ*ν τ:μων. ∆ε<τερν, )πι'ειρηματλγ* τι ! ναρ δν περιγρ$ει τ #τμα ταν %ρ σκνται &Dω π τν κ:σμ. Mλν:τι α=τ εGναι ε=ρAως ρνητικ συμπερ$σματα, Jπστηρ Rω τι δν πμε ναμε 'ωρ>ς λ<ση στ"ν παρσα ρμηνευτικ" δυσκλ α. FAπ τ" στιγμ" πE  μαρτυρ ες πE ρν τ %$ρς στν πριμ λληνικ τμισμ )Dετ$Rνται διεDδικ$, εGναι σας τι δν Jπ$ρ'ει διαμ$'η μεταD< τυς. Michael J. AUGUSTIN (Mτρ. Xριστ να ΣINOY) 22. An earlier version of this article was presented at the International Association for Presocratic Studies Fourth Biennial Conference, hosted jointly by Aristotle University of Thessaloniki and the Interdisciplinary Center for Aristotle Studies. Here I received important comments from Pieter Hasper. Also, I wish to express my gratitude to Jessica Berry, Richard Bett, Justin Clark, Robert McIntyre, Richard McKirahan, Timothy O'Keefe, and Voula Tsouna, who all provided valuable feedback during my writing of this article.

К О М П А Р А Т И В І С Т И К А УДК811.161.3 Volha Artsiomava THE GRAMMATICAL CATEGORY OF TIME AS A MEANS OF THE EXPRESSION OF TEMPORAL DEIXIS IN BELARUSIAN AND ENGLISH IN THE COMPARATIVE ASPECT The article analyzes the grammatical category of time as a means of actualizing temporal deixis in Belarusian and English in typological aspect. It is revealed that the category of time represented by the verbal forms in Belarusian and English is not identical to the physical time model and has an indexical nature, where the point of reference depends on the congruence or divergence of the moment of perception and the time of the speech act. In the relative temporal model of the narrative mode of interpretation, there is a shift of the deictic personal center in the Belarusian language in contrast to the English language, where thereis a shift of personal and temporal deictic centres together. Keywords: temporal deixis, grammatical category of time, observer, speaker,perception, aspect, narrative mode of interpretation, secondary deixis. The category of deixis is one of the fundamental problems of modern linguistics. Orienting the speech processto the speaker and listener (personal deixis) and relating the utterance to the spatio-temporal parameters of communication (spatio-temporal deixis), this category is a linguistic universality characterized by a variety of ways of expression. Traditionally, the means of temporal deixis representation in languages are adverbs of timewhereas verbal forms, as a rule, are rarely recognized as actualizers of this type of indexality. However, the results of research of A. V. Bondarko [Bondarko 1987], O. N. Veselkova [Veselkova : 2004], V. B. Kashkin [Kashkin : 1991], A. A. Novozhilova [Novozhilova : 2006] prove thedeictic character of the verbal category of time, since it implements «the temporal localization of an event or action directly or indirectly related to the real or imaginary hic et nunc ―here and now‖ [Vremya], and «orientates them in accordance with a certain reference point, which can be called the axis (of orientation)» [Hatcher 1951 : 790]. As a rule, the reference point of temporal deixis is the moment of speech. There is another point of view according to which it is necessary to take into account both the speaker and the observer [Apresyan; Kravchenko 1996 : 75]. In this article we will analyze the grammatical category of time in Belarusian and English in terms of these pragmatic parameters in the comparative aspest. The factual material was 260 selected from Belarusian and English parallel corpuses of Russian National Corpus [RNC] and other Internet resources. The verbal grammatical category is commonly identified as «a specific linguistic reflection of the objective time for the temporal localization of the event or state presented in the utterance, by contrasting temporal forms (verbal times) indicating simultaneity, precedence or succession of the event in relation to the moment of speech, situation or some other reference point» [Vremya]. In the Belarusian language, the grammatical category of time is closely related to the category of the aspect (imperfective, perfective). Y. D. Apresyan, comparing two statements Я прочитал―Войну и мир в раннем детстве‖and ―Я читал Войну и мир в раннем детстве‖, makes the conclusion that the differences between them are determined not by the distance of the past event from the moment of speech, but by the speaker's perception of the time of the action. When using the perfective verbпрочитал, the speaker perceives the time of the event as the whole with the time in which he thinks of himself with keeping the result of the action in the present. When using the imperfective verbчитал, the speaker perceives the time of the event as different from the time in which he thinks ofhimself [Apresyan : 281]. In the English language the use of 12 tenses (Past Simple, Past Continuous, Past Perfect, Past Perfect Continuous, Present Simple, Present Continuous, Present Perfect, Present Perfect Continuous, Future Simple, Future Continuous, Future Perfect, Future Perfect Continuous) depends on the oppositions perfection / imperfection and progressiveness / non-progressiveness [Hatcher : 1951]. In Belarusian and English verbs in the absolute use represent an action, event or phenomenon as preceding (past tense), simultaneous (present tense), or subsequent (future tense) to the moment of speech as the starting point of reference. The past tense in the Belarusian language is represented: 1) synthetically by imperfective verbs in the past tense which express: a) an action that occurred at a certain time in the past: Учора ў дзевяць гадзін раніцы я збіраў грыбы каля Старой Яліны (А. Якімовіч. Сем гісторый пра вожыка) [Yakímovích]. In English, this meaning is rendered by Past Continuous:―What were you doing behind the curtain?‖ he asked. ―I was reading.‖ (Ch. Brontë. Jane Eyre) [NRC]; b) an action that began in the past and lasted until a certain point in the past:Затым некалькі месяцаў рабіў шараговым шафѐрам, пакуль ДАІ не адабрала правы (В. Быкаў. Ваўчыная яма) [NRC]. In English, this meaning is expressed by Past Perfect Continuous: There was a document up on the screen – maybe he really had been working and on the phone to America (H. Fielding. Bridget Jones's Diary) [NRC]; c) habitual, repeated actions in the past: Я тут кожны дзень бяды якой чакала, ну, думаю, няўжо ж мне і далей будзе так шанцаваць? (В. Быкаў. 261 Пакахай мяне, салдацiк) [NRC]. In Englishthis meaningis expressed byPast Simple or by the analytical constructionsused to / would + an infinitive:I usually went up there in the morning while Catherine stayed late in bed (E. Hemingway. Farewell to Arms) [NRC]; I used to write for the paper in college, I thought to myself, and hell, I even had an essay published in a monthly magazine once in high school (L. Weisberger. The Devil Wears Prada) [NRC] ; On occasion I would be driving up or walking my dog – when he was alive – and I would see the kids climbing up there (M. Connelly. City Of Bones) [NRC]. 2. Perfective verbs in the past tense which express a) a completed past action: Кананок пабег на агнявую, а я вярнуўся ў вэстыбюль (В. Быкаў. Пакахай мяне, салдацiк) [NRC]. In English, this meaning is expressed by Past Simple: I ran away. I thought that it would be best for them to not hear from me, to not even know about me (M. Connelly. City Of Bones) [NRC]; b) consistent actions in the past: Халодны восеньскі ліст упаў мне на лоб, і я прачнуўся і ўбачыў, што непадалѐку ад мяне стаяць двое, стары і юнак (Л. Дайнека. След ваўкалака) [NRC]. In English, this meaning is expressed by Past Simple:Finally, I got up and went out in the living room and got some cigarettes out of the box on the table and stuck some in my pocket (J. D. Salinger. The Catcher in the Ryе) [NRC]; с) a completed action that occurred in the past, but its result is evident at the time of speech: – Я купіў раба. Яны тут не дорага каштуюць, – растлумачыў еўнух (Л. Дайнека. След ваўкалака) [NRC]. In English, this meaning is expressed by Present Perfect: – Look here, I have bought this bonnet (J. Austen. Pride and Prejudice) [NRC]. The specific temporal duality of Present Perfect semantics is predetermined by two temporal plans, «which are connected in some way with the preceding and the subsequent» [Bondarko 1987: 195]. It leads to differences in the explanation of its meaning, which is either interpreted as a past tense [Leech 1974 : 30; McCoard 1978 : 151] or the action preceding the moment of speech [Matthews 1987 : 171]; d) analytically with the auxiliary verb быць in the past tense and the perfective form of the verb in the past tense for expressing the action that took place before another action in the past: Напісаў быў я табе і тое таксама, як Кароль Я. М. раіў мне, Што кароль Сцяпан яму пра тое падарожжа раіў [Peregrynatsyya Míkalaya Kryshtafa Radzívíla]. In English this meaning is expressed by Past Perfect: – Just as I had written the last word, a Kafir came up my avenue of orange trees, carrying a letter in a cleft stick, which he had brought from the post (H. R. Haggard. King Solomon's Mines) [NRC]. Traditionally, the present tense is similar to the time of the action or state at the time of speech. In A. V. Kravchenko's opinion, such an "egocentric" model of temporal relations in the language reflects the wish of some researchers to identify 262 objective physical time model with the grammatical one and has significant shortcomings, since thispoint coincides not with the moment of speech, but with the moment of observation [Kravchenko 1992]. The necessity to take into account the observer as well is implied by the term present, formed from the participle of the verb praeesse with the meaning "to be seen, be at hand" [Present]. In the Belarusian language, the actual present is expressed by imperfective verbs in the present tense (Зараз я пытаю, ці не ведаеце вы чалавека, мянушка якога «Лікол», проста «Лікол»? (У. Караткевіч. Дзікае паляванне караля Стаха) [NRC]), in English – by Present Continuous: I am asking if you believe in God (D.Brown. Angels and Demons) [NRC]. According to H. Marchand, «the progressive form expresses one particular action observed in the dynamic process of its development» [Marchand 1955 : 47]. Thus, in addition to the coincidence of the observer's and the speaker's spaces, there is a convergence of the time of observation of the situation and the time of speech. This temporal and spatial congruity forms the basic progressive meaning of the present actual tense. At the same time, the explicitness of the «reference to the observer» explains the aspectual unmarkedness of Present Simple and allows this form to act in the general meaning when the situation is not the object of immediate physical perception [Hatcher 1951 : 259]:―I patrol past it [the sculpture]everyday,‖ the guard said (D. Brown. Angels and Demons) [NRC]. This meaning in Belarusian is expressed by imperfective verbs in the present tense: Жыву я з табой трыццаць гадоў ікожны дзень разгадваю новую загадку (І. Шамякін. Атланты і карыятыды) [NRC]. The imperfective forms signify: a) actions that began in the past and continue at the moment of speech : – Я больш як дваццаць год чакаю...(У. Някляеў. Лабух) [NRC]. In English language this meaning is expressed by Present Perfect Сontinuous: Something I have been doing a lot these last days (J. Fowles. The Collector) [NRC]; b) events that took place in the past, when the speaker wants to give vividness and clarity to the narrative (Praesens Historicum): І тут чуем з-за гары шорах нейкі (А. Адамовіч. Я з вогненнай вѐскі...) [NRC]; Then the bones come up, he reads it in the paper and puts two and two together. We show up and he starts confessing before we're three feet in the door (M. Connelly. City Of Bones) [NRC]. Praesens Historicum means that the speaker takes the position of the observer with a switch to another time mode in order to present the imagined situation without changing the event line. There are two points of view on the contradiction between the form of Preasens Historicum and its semantics. According to the first point of view, the form Preseans Historicum, being formally present, has the meaning of the past, when the speaker wants to convey the previous events for the listener to become their participant or observer. According to the other point of view, Praesens Historicumperforms the deictic function of referring to the imaginary events (deixis 263 ad Phantasma) [Bühler 1982], when the speaker is brought to the past and becomes the subject of observation. The future tense expresses the action that will take place after the moment of speech. In the Belarusian language, the future is expressed: 1) synthetically by perfective verbs which denote: a) a completed future action with the semantics of result:– Яверу, доктар, прыдзечас, і вы будзеце спецыяльна пасылаць хворых на Месяц, дзе мы пабудуем санаторыі і лячэбніцы (М. Гамолка. Цытадэль неба) [NRC]. In English, this meaning is expressed by Future Simple ("What matter? We will build another windmill. We will build six windmills if we feel like it (G. Orwell. Animal Farm) [NRC]) or Future Perfect (By the time you read this I will have left you (M. Lee. Fugitive Bridе) [NRC]); b) a future timeless action with a generalized meaning in proverbs: Не плюй у калодзеж – давядзецца вады напіцца. In the English language this meaning is expressed by Future Indefinite: Сhickens will always come home to roost; 2) analytically by the combination of the future tense form of the auxiliary verbбыць and the imperfective infinitive of the main verb which express actions that will occur at some point of time in the future: – Заўтра я буду насіць залатыя порты [Порты - адзенне] князя Рагвалода Свіслацкага(Л. Дайнека. Меч князя Вячкі) [NRC]. In English, this meaning is expressed by the Future Continuous form: I suppose it should go over the desk where, Thon Taddeo –" (Why does he pause like that whenever he says it, Dom Paulo wondered irritably.) "– will be working." (W. M. Miller, Jr. A Canticle For Leibowitz) [NRC]. The relative time model of verbs correlates with another point of reference, different from the moment of speech. In English there are special forms for expressing relative time. This feature is reflected in the rules of sequence of tenses in compound sentences: when the verb-predicate of the main clause is used in one of the past forms (Past Simple, Past Continuous, Past Perfect, Past Perfect Continuous), the verb in the subordinate clause must be in one of the past tenses(Past Simple, Past Continuous, Past Perfect, Past Perfect Continuous) or in the future form from the point of view of the moment in the past (Future-in-the-Past) [Vasil'yev]: Well, my father looked in his drawers and said that Arthur had taken clothes (M. Connelly. City оf Bones); Vernet said he would take us a safe distance out of the city (DanBrown. The Da Vinci Code) [NRC]. Some researchers believe that the existence of relative tenses cannot be viewed as a mere mechanistic transformation from direct speech to indirect one, since an utterance with direct speech out of the context cannot have a one-to-one correspondence with the form of this utterance with indirect speech [McKay 1978 : 9], especially in the media, where the relevance of the information reported is of paramount importance, and sequence of tenses rule is almost never used [Leitner 264 1986 : 197]. In the deictic concept, the relative verb tenses of the English language are the sphere of the narrative mode of interpretation [Paducheva] or secondary deixis with the location of the mental subject in the imaginary situation: As soon as I saw him I understood that the Monkey and the Tarkaan had set him there to slay any who came in if he were not in their secrets ... (C. S. Lewis. The Chronices of Narnia. The Last Battle) [NCR]. In this example, the subordinate clause with indirect speech contains three deictic elements: him, there and the Past Perfect verb had set as the grammaticalization of the deictic center shift in relation to another deictic center taken as the given point of reference, expressed by the verb saw in Past Simple. In the Belarusian language indirect speech is characterized by the shift of the personal deictic from the 1 st person to the 3d with verbal temporal deictic elements remaining unchanged: Я зразумеў, чаго яна баiцца (I. Шамякiн. Сэрца на далонi) [NRC]. Thus, the category of time represented by the verbal forms in Belarusian and English is not identical to the physical time model, has an indexical and subjective nature, where the point of reference depends on the congruence or divergence of the moment of perception and the time of the speech act. In the relative temporal model in narrative mode of interpretation, there is a personal deixis shift in Belarusian whereas in the English language the temporal deictic centre expressed by verbs is shifted as well. References Apresyan, Yury. Deyksis v leksike i grammatike i naivnaya model' mira (Deixis in the vocabulary and grammar and the naïve model of the world) [Electronic resource]. URL:http: lpcs.math.msu.su›~uspensky...siio/35/35_12APRES.pdf.(Accessed: 10.04.2015) Bondarko, Alexander. Teoriya funktsional'noy grammatiki: Vvedeniye. Aspektual'nost'. Vremennaya lokalizovannost'. Taksis (The theory of functional grammar: Introduction. Aspect. Temporal localization.Taxis). Leningrad.: Nauka, 1987. Vasil'yev, Alexander. Angliyskiy: pravila proiznosheniya i chteniya, grammatika, razgovornyy yazyk (English: rules of pronunciation and reading, grammar, spoken language). URL: http://padaread.com/?book=177639. (Accessed: 14.02.2017) Veselkova, Olga. Temporal'naya organizatsiya nemetskogo narrativa: Deykticheskaya traktovka preterita: (The temporal organization of the German narrative: the deictic interpretation of preterite). Diss. Arkhangel'sk, 2004. Vremya (Tense) / Lingvisticheskiy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar' (Linguistic Encyclopedic Dictionary). URL: http://tapemark.narod.ru/les/089a.html. (Accessed: 10.04.2017). Kashkin, Vladimir. Funktsional'naya tipologiya perfekta (The functional typology of the perfect). Voronezh: VSU, 1991. Kravchenko, Alexander. Voprosy teorii ukazatel'nosti: Egotsentrichnost'.Deyktichnost'. Indeksal'nost' (The Issues of the theory of indications: self-centeredness. Deixicality.Indexality). Irkutsk, 1992. 265 Kravchenko, Andrey. Yаzyk i vospriyatiye: kognitivnyye aspekty yazykovoy kategorizatsii (Language and perception: the cognitive aspects of language categorization). Irkutsk, 1996. Novozhilova, Anna. Vremennaya referentsiya. Deyksis i anaphora (Temporary reference. Deixis and anaphora) ―Aktual'nyye problemy lingvistiki XXI veka: Sb. st. po mat. mezhdunar. nauch. konferentsii, 6-7dekabrya 2006 g.‖ (Actual problems of linguistics of the XXI century). Kirov, 2006. Paducheva, Yelena. Rezhim interpretatsii kak kontekst, snimayushchiy neodnoznachnost' (Interpretation mode as a context to remove ambiguity). ―Trudy mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii «Dialog 2008»‖ [Electronic resource]. URL: http:// www.lexicograph.ruslang.ru (Accessed: 10.04.2017). Peregrynatsyya Míkalaya Kryshtafa Radzívíla – Líst pershy [Electronic resource]. URL: be.wikisource.org›wiki/Peregrynatsyya_Míkalaya. (Accessed: 05.05.2017). Yakímovích A. Sem gístoryy pra vozhyka (Seven stories about the hedgehog). ―Gazeta Slonímskaya‖ [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.gs.by/ru/940/kids/.htm. (Accessed: 14.02.2017). Bühler K. Deixis Ad Phantasma and the Anaphoric Use of Deictic Words. ―Speech, Studies in Deixis and Related Topics‖. Chichester, N. Y., 1982. Ducrot, Oswald., Todorov Tzvetan., Dahl Östen. Tense and aspect systems. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985. Hatcher, Anna Granville. The use of the progressive form in English: A new approach. ―Language‖. 1951. Vol. 27. N 3. Huddleston Rodney. Some observations on tense and deixis. ―Language‖. 1969. Vol. 45. N 4. 777–806. Leech, Geoffrey. Meaning and the English verb. London: Longman, 1974. Leitner, Gerhard. Reporting the 'events of the day': Uses and function of reported speech // Studia anglica posnaniensia. 1986. Vol. 18. 189–204. Matthews, Richard. Present perfect tenses: Towards an integrated functional account // A. Schopf (ed.). Essays on tensing in English. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1987. Vol. 1. 111–176. McCoard, Robert. The English perfect: Tense-choice and pragmatic inferences. Amsterdam, etc.: North Holland, 1978. McKay, John. Some problems in the analysis of point of view in reported discourse // Centrum. 1978. Vol. 6. N 1. 5–26. Present / Online Etymological Dictionary [Elektronnyy resurs]. URL: http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=present. (Data obrashcheniya: 03.06.2017). Marchand, Hans. On a question of aspect: A comparison between the progressive form in English and that in Italian and Spanish // Studia Linguistica. 1955. Vol. 9. N1. 45–52. Sources of examples RNC – Russian National Corpus [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.ruscorpora.ru/search-para-be.html (Accessed 16.05.2017). 266 Abstract Volha Artsiomava THE GRAMMATICAL CATEGORY OF TIME AS A MEANS OF THE EXPRESSION OF TEMPORAL DEIXIS IN BELARUSIAN AND ENGLISH IN THE COMPARATIVE ASPECT Background. The article analyzes the grammatical category of time as a means of actualizing temporal deixis in Belarusian and English in the typological aspect. Traditionally, the reference point of temporal deixis is the moment of speech. Nevertheless, it is important to take into account both the speaker and the observer. Purpose. The purpose of the research is to carry out the comparative analysis of the grammatical category of time in Belarusian and English in terms of the speaker and the observer, as well as to reveal universal characteristics and national and specific features. Methods. The research is based on the contexts selected from Belarusian and English parallel corpuses of Russian National Corpus and Internet resources. Results. It has been revealed that the category of time represented by the verbal forms in Belarusian and English is not identical to physical time model, has absolute and relative uses and is characterized by the indexical nature, where the point of reference depends on the congruence or divergence of the moment of perception and the time of the speech act. Belarusian and English verbs in the absolute use represent an action, event or phenomenon as preceding (past tense), simultaneous (present tense), or subsequent (future tense) to the moment of speech as the starting point of reference. The relative time model of verbs correlates with another point of reference, different from the moment of speech. In the English language there are special forms for expressing relative time. This feature is reflected in the rules of sequence of tenses in compound sentences: when the verb-predicate of the main clause is used in one of the past forms, the verb in the subordinate clause must be in one of the past tenses. Discussion. The existence of relative tenses is not a mere mechanistic transformation from direct speech to indirect one, since an utterance with direct speech out of the context cannot have a one-to-one correspondence with the form of this utterance with indirect speech, especially in the media, where the relevance of the information reported is of paramount importance, and sequence of tenses rule is almost never used. In the deictic concept, the relative verb tenses of the English language are the sphere of the narrative mode of interpretation or secondary deixis with the location of the mental subject in the imaginary situation which is accompanied by the shift of personal and temporal deictic centres of the utterance in contrast to the Belarusian language with the shift of the deictic personal center only. Keywords: temporal deixis, grammatical category of time, observer, speaker, perception, aspect, narrative mode of interpretation, secondary deixis.

Morality and Aesthetics of Food* Shen-yi Liao and Aaron Meskin The Oxford Handbook on Food Ethics On The Smiths's song "Meat is Murder" (1985), Morrissey indignantly sings And the flesh you so fancifully fry Is not succulent, tasty or kind It's death for no reason And death for no reason is murder and Kitchen aromas aren't very homely It's not comforting, cheery, or kind It's sizzling blood and the unholy stench Of murder It is obvious that Morrissey is making a statement about the moral status of meat: as the song's title says, it is murder. Even though it is less obvious, Morrissey also seems to be making a statement about the aesthetic status of meat: it is not succulent, tasty, homely, or comforting.1 Plausibly, by making these two statements together, Morrissey is thereby making a third, philosophically provocative statement about the interaction between moral and aesthetic values of food: the moral defect of meat makes for an aesthetic defect. In recent times, the humor-oriented and hipster-approved T-shirt company Threadless has responded to Morrissey. One of their most popular shirts is emblazed with the slogan: Meat is murder. Tasty, tasty murder. Threadless thus agrees with Morrissey on the moral status of meat: it is murder. However, even while acknowledging the moral status of meat, Threadless disagrees with Morrissey on the aesthetic status of meat: it is, in fact, tasty. Plausibly, by making these two statements together, Threadless is also thereby making a third, philosophically provocative statement about the interaction between moral and aesthetic values of food: the moral defect of meat is aesthetically irrelevant. * For their helpful feedback, we thank Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, Tyler Doggett, Andy Egan, Simon Fokt, Eileen John, Hanna Kim, Alex Plakias, and members of Hans Maes's graduate seminar on the art and aesthetics of food and drink. 1 Some readers might resist the thought that succulence and tastiness are aesthetic attributes. See section 3 for discussions of different senses of aesthetic value that might be relevant to this debate. 2 Our chapter is more or less about this exchange between Morrissey and Threadless. We will explore the interaction between moral and aesthetic values of food, in part by connecting it to existing discussions of the interaction between moral and aesthetic values of art (§1). Along the way, we will consider the artistic status of food (§2), the aesthetic value of food (§3), and the role of expertise in uncovering aesthetic value (§4). Ultimately we will argue that the interaction between moral and aesthetic values of food is more complicated than the disagreement between Morrissey and Threadless suggests. Indeed, we will suggest a position concerning this interaction that differs from Morrisey's and Threadless's (§5). We will conclude by drawing out broader implications of this position for discussions on the ethics of food and discussions on the interaction between the moral and aesthetic values of art (§6). 1. Interaction Between Morality and Aesthetics of Art Philosophical discussions on the interaction between morality and aesthetics have been primarily focused on art. Specifically, philosophers have been centrally concerned with the morality-to-aesthetics connection in the ethical criticism of art debate.2 We can give one taxonomy of this debate centered on this question: what is the connection between the moral value and the aesthetic value of an artwork?3 Art autonomists say that an artwork's moral value is unconnected to its aesthetic value.4 That is, both moral defects and moral virtues are aesthetically irrelevant. Although one can certainly criticize an artwork on moral grounds, such moral criticism is never relevant to aesthetic criticism of the artwork. Art moralists say an artwork's moral value is directly connected to its aesthetic value.5 On a stronger formulation, exemplified by Berys Gaut's ethicism, a work's manifesting a morally defective attitude always makes for an aesthetic defect and, correspondingly, manifesting a moral virtuous attitude always makes for an aesthetic virtue. On a weaker formulation, arguably exemplified by Noël Carroll's moderate moralism, some moral defects make for aesthetic defects and some moral virtues make for aesthetic virtues, even if there are also moral defects and moral virtues that are aesthetically neutral. All variants of art moralism endorse the valence constraint (Harold 2008): the claim that a feature's effect on the work's moral value must have the same 2 Harold (2006) and Stecker (2005) are exceptions that discuss the aesthetics-to-morality connection. 3 As Harold (2008: 45-46) says, "The literature on this subject is now rich with variants of moralism and autonomism, making it difficult to give a general characterization of either view that all of those associated with that view would accept." As such, with the following taxonomy, we only aim to provide one reasonable way to bring out different views' central tenets and draw out their respective differences. See Eaton (2016), Giovanelli (2007), McGregor (2014), and Stecker (2005) for alternative taxonomies of the ethical criticism of art debate. 4 Defenders of art autonomism include Anderson & Dean (1998), Cooke (2014), Harold (2011), Lamarque & Olsen (1994), and Posner (1997; 1998). In our experience, art autonomism is also a common default view amongst people who are not professional philosophers. 5 In our experience, art moralism is the dominant view amongst philosophers of art. Defenders of art moralism include Booth (1998), Carroll (1996; 1998), Clifton (2013), Eaton (2001), Gaut (1998), Gilmore (2011), Hanson (1998), Harold (2008), Kieran (2001), Mullin (2004), Nussbaum (1998), and Stecker (2008). Hume (1757) is sometimes cited as a historical predecessor of contemporary art moralism, but this interpretation of Hume is highly contested (cf. Mason 2001 and Dadlez & Bicknell 2013). 3 valence as its effect on the work's aesthetic value, regardless of the magnitude of the effect. The valence constraint accommodates both ethicism and moderate moralism; moderate moralists simply include some effects with zero magnitude. Given their adherence to the valence constraint, all art moralists say that a moral defect can never make for an aesthetic virtue and a moral virtue can never make for an aesthetic defect. Art immoralists say artworks exhibit different connections between moral value and aesthetic value.6 Specifically, they deny the valence constraint; they say that sometimes an artwork's moral value is inversely connected to its aesthetic value. However, despite their misleading name, they do not say that an artwork's moral value is always inversely connected to its aesthetic value; sometimes an artwork's moral value is directly connected to its aesthetic value, and other times an artwork's moral value is unconnected to its aesthetic value. (Indeed, sometimes this position is called "contextualism" instead to avoid false implications.) When art immoralists reject the valence constraint, they focus specifically on cases in which the connection between an artwork's moral defect and its aesthetic virtue is no accident. However, different art immoralists spell out this non-accidental connection in different ways. Indeed, within the ethical criticism of art debate, one can find various characterizations of the relevant connection between moral and aesthetic value.7 Some theorists suggest that the relevant connection is "internal" or conceptual. For example, Matthew Kieran (2006: 130-131) frames the debate in terms of whether there are internal relations between the moral and the aesthetic or, instead, they are conceptually distinct. Some theorists suggest that the relevant connection is quasicausal or explanatory. For example, A.W. Eaton (2012: 283) argues for the claim that "an immoral feature of an artwork can make a significant positive aesthetic contribution precisely in virtue of its immorality." Some theorists suggest that the relevant connection is counterfactual dependence. For example, Daniel Jacobson (2005: 342) argues for the claim that "the very features of an artwork that render it morally dubious can contribute essentially to its aesthetic value". That is, if one took away the moral defect by taking away the underlying features, then one would also thereby take away the aesthetic virtue that involve the same underlying features. Obviously, the taxonomy given above is complicated by these different characterizations of the relevant connection between moral and aesthetic value. Given these different characterizations, it would be unsurprising to find in this literature, say, a self-professed variant of art moralism that turns out to be compatible with a self-professed variant of art immoralism.8 So, to be clear, our 6 Defenders of art immoralism-though sometimes under other names, such as "art contextualism"-include Eaton (2012), John (2005), Jacobson (1997; 2005), and Kieran (2003, 2006). Even though Jacobson, in his pioneering "In Praise of Immoral Art" (1997), identifies immoralism with anti-theory, this conception is not widely shared by others. Stecker (2008) argues that anti-theorists need not (and should not) be immoralists, and the other immoralists named above tend to not position themselves as anti-theorists. 7 In fact, the relevant connection between moral and aesthetic value is sometimes unspecified or underspecified. See McGregor (2014) for related complaints about the vague terminology in this debate. Although McGregor's complaints primarily concern the vagueness of "moral defect" and "aesthetic defect", such vagueness has the downstream effect of making the relevant connection between moral defect and aesthetic defect unclear as well. 8 For one example, John (2005) is classified as an immoralist on our taxonomy even though she calls her view "opportunistic moralism" because she allows that, even though it is not standard, a moral defect can make for an 4 philosophical interests do not lie with whether some particular position is best labeled as 'autonomism', 'moralism', or 'immoralism'. Instead, our philosophical interests lie with the substantive questions about the connection-or, more likely, connections-between moral and aesthetic value. Thinking about the central tenets associated with these labels and potential points of disagreement is simply a convenient way to gesture toward the substantive questions. It should also be emphasized that this debate is concerned with pro tanto, rather than all-things-considered, connection between moral and aesthetic value. For example, in describing his view, Gaut explicitly states that "the ethicist principle is a pro tanto one: it holds that a work is aesthetically meritorious (or defective) insofar as it manifests ethically admirable (or reprehensible) attitudes" (1998: 182). Hence, even according to the ethicist, there can be an artwork that contains a moral defect that is still all-things-considered aesthetically meritorious. The debate between art autonomists, art moralists, and art immoralists have centered on works that are traditionally considered to be art, such as novels and films. As such, before we can consider applying or extending this debate to food, we will have to start by saying more about the artistic status of food and the aesthetic value of food. 2. The Artistic Status of Food Is food art?9 There is no univocal answer to this question because food and art are both highly heterogeneous categories. In this section, we consider three ways of answering this question and their relevance, if any, for applying or extending the ethical criticism of art debate to food. 2.1. Food-Based Art One way we can answer the question "is food art?" is to consider works that are recognizably art and centrally involve food. To start, consider artworks that use materials that would normally be recognized as food. Kara Walker's A Subtlety, or the Marvelous Sugar Baby, an Homage to the unpaid and overworked Artisans who have refined our Sweet tastes from the cane fields to the Kitchens of the New World on the Occasion of the demolition of the Domino Sugar Refining Plant (2014) involves a massive sculpture made of sugar. Daniel Spoerri makes tableaux pièges (or "snare-pictures") that aesthetic merit. For another example, Jacobson (2005) maintains that the slogan of Carroll's moderate moralism (1996; 1998) is compatible with Jacobson's variant of immoralism. And, indeed, Carroll (2000, 2013) officially maintains that moderate moralism is logically compatible with immoralism. However, Jacobson also argues that, when one looks beyond the simplistic slogan, other aspects of Carroll's theory in fact commits him to a minimally moralist position that is incompatible with immoralism. And Eaton (2013) echoes Jacobson's observation of the disconnect between the official statement of moderate moralism and other claims that Carroll makes about the connection between moral and aesthetic values of artworks. 9 Meskin (2013) gives an accessible overview of the contemporary responses to this question. In addition to contemporary responses that this section highlights, earlier responses to this question can be found in Harris (1979), Quinet (1981), and Winterbourne (1981). 5 involve affixing various items, often the leftovers of meals, to various surfaces. Viviane Le Courtois's 2012 exhibition at the Boulder Museum of Contemporary Art, Edible?, contained melted candy sculptures, video installations of eating and food preparation, and an interactive installation involving an indoor garden and the chance to make tea from herbs grown there. One might worry that a number of the previous examples are not really cases of food-based art; after all, they are not designed to be experienced through eating. That is, they do not function as food even if-in the case of the works by Spoerri and Le Courtois-they were made with materials that were food at one time. It is instructive here to consider Marcel Duchamp's readymades. His In Advance of a Broken Arm (1915) involved the selection and display of an ordinary snow shovel, but although there is a sense in which this shows that a snow shovel can be a work of art, it does not show that something can function as both a snow shovel and a work of art at the same time. (Similarly, the possibility of a collage made of cuttings from pornographic magazines does not establish that something can function as both art and pornography.10) So although the fact that these items were made with food is relevant to their appreciation, they do not seem like the most interesting cases of food-based art. True food-based art would thus have to centrally involve food functioning as food. Such works exist. For example, Hermann Nitsch's Das Orgien Mysterien Theater (1957) is performed on some occasions with the experience of eating food being a component. Rupe (1999) describes one such performance as follows: ... an invading tank (yes, an actual war-sized tank) trampled onto the castle grounds to be doused with both animal blood and roses. The deaths of the three bulls during the play were offered as life for the participants. There was no hiding the fact that the meat came from the death of an animal: This is not a hamburger, this is a dead bull, and you're eating it. For a less disturbing example, Rirkrit Tiravanija's Untitled (Free) (1992) involves converting the gallery into a kitchen space where the artist served Thai curry and rice to the audience. Despite their notable differences, both artworks centrally involve food that functions as food, and therefore count as true food-based art. The ethical criticism of art debate applies straightforwardly to food-based art. For example, with Nitsch's Das Orgien Mysterien Theater, an autonomist would say that the moral defect involved in the live animal slaughtering-assuming there is such a defect-does not make for an aesthetic defect but a moralist would say that it does. An immoralist might even say that it makes for an aesthetic virtue-without it, the work would be far less transgressive and thus aesthetically interesting, at least on its initial performance. So, there are artworks that centrally involve food that is experienced as such, and the ethical criticism of art debate is directly relevant to these artworks. Yet, these cases seem to not be fully relevant to discussing morality and aesthetics of food 10 See the essays collected in Maes and Levinson (2012) for discussions about the relationship between art and pornography, especially whether the two are mutually exclusive categories. 6 because they seem quite distant from what we typically think of when we think of food. Let us consider two other ways of answering the question "is food art?" to see if even more relevant cases can be found. 2.2. Artified Food Another way we can answer the question "is food art?" is to consider food that are "artified"-the kind of high-brow food that might be recognized as art. Arguably the best contemporary examples are from the so-called molecular gastronomy movement, such as the dishes and meals that were once found at Ferran Adrià's El Bulli. For example, El Bulli's reverse spherical olive (2005) is an elaborate reconstruction of olive oil and olive juice in the shape of an olive, using a technique that is new to gastronomy. This kind of food might to be thought to be a hybrid art form that combines haute cuisine, sculpture, various technologies, and performance art or theatre. If this kind of food is art, then the ethical criticism of art debate is also directly relevant, in just the same way that this debate is relevant for Nitsch's Das Orgien Mysterien Theater. However, while these cases are more recognizable as food than food-based artworks, they still seem fairly distant from our ordinary culinary experiences. A robust understanding of the interaction between the morality and aesthetics of food requires a consideration of what we will call "food of everyday life". 2.3. The Food of Everyday Life The food of everyday life is the food we consume on a day-to-day basis, such as pizza, ramen, tacos, and spinach salads. Many will intuitively deny that all food of everyday life count as art. Microwaveable French fries, sausage rolls, and tofu hot dogs do not seem to be art. However, that leaves open the possibility that some of the food of everyday life counts as art, even if much of it does not-in the same way that some films are plausibly art even if others are not. Whether some food of everyday life can count as art is a question that has been taken up by a number of contemporary philosophers. Many of them allow that such food can count as art but that it does not rise to the level of the "major" or "fine" arts. So, for example, Elizabeth Telfer argues that food can count as art in its own right and that cookery is an art form since some dishes are "intended or used wholly or largely for aesthetic consideration" (Telfer 1996: 46). But Telfer characterizes food as both "simple" and "minor"-simple because taste allows for less formal complexity and minor because it is alleged to be "necessarily transient, it cannot have meaning and it cannot move us" (Telfer 1996: 58). Carolyn Korsmeyer responds to Telfer's claim that food cannot have meaning by arguing that food often exhibits the form of symbolization that Nelson Goodman called "exemplification" where an object both refers to a property and possesses it (Korsmeyer 1999: 128-131). According to Korsmeyer, an item of food may similarly do more than simply possess a property (such as freshness, smokiness, spiciness); it may call our attention to that property and, in so doing, exemplify it and, hence, possess a form of meaning. 7 (Consider a very spicy curry which calls attention to that spiciness; perhaps by the use of a huge number of brightly colored chilies.) Despite this, and a number of other symbolic functions which she argues food may possess, she concludes with a position that is not so different from Telfer's. Food is not art "in the full sense of the term" (Korsmeyer 1999: 141); that is, it is not a fine art because it lacks the requisite history, but it may nevertheless count as a minor, decorative, functional or applied art (Korsmeyer 1999: 144). Even more skeptically, Tim Crane (2007) has argued that although wines are aesthetic objects, they do not count as works of art.11 If Telfer is right, at least some of the food of everyday life is art in the full sense of that term, and the debate about the ethical criticism of art applies in just those cases. If Korsmeyer is right things might be a bit less clear-the standard debate focuses on fine art and its near relations, not the decorative, functional or applied arts. (But it is hard to see why that debate couldn't be extended to concern the decorative or functional arts.) On the other hand, if the food and drink of everyday life is not art, then the ethical criticism of art debate, as such, is not directly relevant to it. However, even if this is the case there remains the possibility that something analogous to that debate is relevant to our appreciation of everyday food. Remember, the core of the ethical criticism of art debate is a question concerning the connection between moral and aesthetic value. And it is widely accepted that moral and aesthetic value can be found outside the sphere of art. For example, food shares with art the potential for ethical significance due to its entwinement with human intentions, activity, and impact. So, even for those who do not count food of everyday life as art, there remains the possibility of extending the ethical criticism of art debate to this domain, as long as the food of everyday life possesses aesthetic value. We have already seen that Crane holds that this is the case for wine. In the next section, we explore whether there is good reason for thinking this is the case for food. 3. The Aesthetic Value of Food Does the food of everyday life possess aesthetic value? Since everyday food may be visually appealing and even beautiful (consider an attractively decorated cake or a piece of nigiri sushi), the answer is obviously yes. A trickier issue has to do with whether the food of everyday life may possess aesthetic value in virtue of its flavors and odors and it is this question that we focus on below. Answering this question requires disambiguating various senses of aesthetic value and considering nearby concepts. In this section, we consider three ways of answering this question. The upshot is that, no matter how one characterizes aesthetic value, the debate about ethical criticism remains relevant to appreciating food, including the food of everyday life. 3.1. Wide Aesthetic Value 11 For skeptical views of food as art in the popular press, see Poole (2012) and Deresiewicz (2012). 8 In his Critique of Judgment, Immanuel Kant initially characterizes the idea of an aesthetic judgment as one that is distinct from a cognitive or "logical" judgment in that it is grounded in something subjective and non-conceptual; namely, pleasure or displeasure (Kant 1790/1987: 44). This conception of the aesthetic includes not only judgments of beauty and the sublime, but also judgments of what Kant calls "the agreeable", which express sensuous pleasure and mere liking. Judgments of agreeability make no claim to universality, and lack the disinterestedness (i.e., disconnection from the faculty of desire) that Kant associates with judgments of beauty and the sublime (Kant 1790/1987: 47-48, 55-56). Nevertheless, insofar as sensuous pleasure has value (qua pleasure) it is legitimate to treat such judgments as ascribing a sort of value-we shall call that value wide aesthetic value. Some philosophers hold that judgments of tastiness and succulence are not full-fledged aesthetic judgments because they are merely judgments of agreeability. But this is because they do not have the notion of wide aesthetic value in mind. Clearly, food of everyday life can possess wide aesthetic value: Kant's own discussion of agreeability refer to judgments about canary wine (Kant 1790/1987: 55). To call something tasty or succulent, then, is arguably to ascribe to it wide aesthetic value. 3.2. Narrow Aesthetic Value However, those who question whether food possesses aesthetic value typically are not thinking of wide aesthetic value.12 Instead, they are thinking of narrow aesthetic value, which roughly corresponds to Kant's "judgment of taste" (i.e., judgments of beauty and the sublime) and excludes Kant's judgments of the agreeable. Unlike judgments of agreeability, judgments of taste do, according to Kant, make claim to universality, and they are disinterested (Kant 1790/1987: 45-46, 55-56). These features have often been seen as characteristic of judgments of narrow aesthetic value.13 On Kant's account, judgments of beauty are disinterested insofar as they are neither based on nor the source of desire. But, then it seems that food cannot possess narrow aesthetic value because nothing seems more connected to desire than the pleasures we take in tasting and smelling delicious food. One response to this worry is to argue that, in certain cases, we may in fact take disinterested pleasure in the tastes and smells of food (Monroe 2007: 142). For example, in trying to "do justice" to the food, we might try to taste it and appreciate it with a focus beyond satisfying our mere desires.14 Another response to this worry is to deny that the aesthetic is essentially linked to disinterestedness, as Kant thought. Contemporary philosophers have offered alternative conceptions of narrow aesthetic value. So, for example, Kendall 12 For example, Thomas Aquinas questions specifically whether there can be judgments of beauty with tastes and smells. He would thus be skeptical of the possibility that food, with respect to those modes of perceptual engagement, can possess narrow aesthetic value. For discussion, see McQueen (1993). 13 Roger Scruton is, perhaps, the best-known contemporary defender of the idea that judgments of beauty and aesthetic value are essentially disinterested. See, for example, Scruton (2009). 14 We thank Eileen John for this suggestion. 9 Walton argues that something possesses aesthetic value when it is appropriate to take aesthetic pleasure in it, where aesthetic pleasure is understood, at least to a first approximation, as "pleasure which has as a component pleasure taken in one's admiration of something" (Walton 2008: 14). Robert Stecker develops an account of aesthetic value rooted in his "minimal conception" of aesthetic experience: "the experience of attending in a discriminating manner to forms, qualities or meaningful features of things, attending to these for their own sake or for the sake of this very experience" (Stecker 2006: 4). On these alternative conceptions of narrow aesthetic value, it is difficult to see what could preclude ordinary food from possessing it. Since we may admire the flavors of an everyday meal and take pleasure in our admiration, it is clear that, according to Walton, the food of everyday life can possess narrow aesthetic value. And Stecker holds that "any object that can be attended to in the way picked out by the minimal conception can be ...a potential source of positive aesthetic value" (Stecker 2006: 5). Since we can attend to qualities of everyday food items for their own sake or the sake of that experience, nothing keeps the food of everyday life from having aesthetic value. 3.3. Aesthetic-ish Values Even for the strict Kantian who insists that food cannot possess narrow aesthetic value, there is a way in which the core of the ethical criticism of art debate remains relevant to appreciating food. The fallback option is to appeal to values that we might think of as "aesthetic-ish", such as culinary or gustatory values, and then use the ethical criticism of art debate as a model. For example, we might develop analogous positions on which the debate between moralists, autonomists, and immoralists becomes a debate about the relationship between moral and gustatory value. However, since we believe that food of everyday life can possess narrow aesthetic value, we believe that this fallback option is not needed. 4. Aesthetic Value, Normativity, and Expertise There are two related core features of narrow aesthetic value that are worth remarking on. First, narrow aesthetic value possess normativity: when we say that a painting is beautiful (i.e., aesthetically good), we are doing more than expressing our "mere" individual preferences; we are also inviting our interlocutors to share our judgment. Second, there can be expertise in aesthetic value of a particular domain, which consists in tracking what aesthetically matters to people who are psychologically similar. In this section, we expand on these two core features of narrow aesthetic value (hereafter simply 'aesthetic value') as it applies to food. The normativity of aesthetic value associated with food is evident in how we talk about food in our daily lives. First, when we talk about a new restaurant we have tried and we say, "the food there is delicious", we are often not just describing our own experience, but also making a recommendation. That is, we are often not just reporting our own preference, but also suggesting that our interlocutors ought to share our judgment. Second, our typical explanations go from value to preference, 10 and not the other way around. It is much more natural to say "I liked this dish because it was delicious" than to say "this dish was delicious because I liked it". The fact that we tend to try to explain our preferences in terms of aesthetic evaluations suggest that aesthetic value cannot be a matter of individual preferences, but instead something independent that we take to be a constraint on our preferences. Perhaps the apparent normativity exhibited in common discourse is only illusory, though. Skepticism about the reality of value has always lurked in the background of any discussion on aesthetic value, and maybe it is even more salient for food than for art. Although we will not try to conclusively answer the skeptic in this chapter, the literature on metaaesthetics (cf. Zangwill 2014) and metaethics offers many possible answers. We will only sketch one such answer here: a naturalist realist account of narrow aesthetic value based on Peter Railton (1998)'s interpretation of Hume (1757). We are especially attracted to this account because it emphasizes the role of human psychological commonalities in grounding narrow aesthetic value's normativity, and it helps to explicate what aesthetic expertise with respect to food might consist in. As Railton (1998: 68) summarizes the project, [Hume] is giving an account of the features of human sensibility and the world we inhabit in virtue of which aesthetic value can exist and afford a domain of objective judgment, a domain in which expert opinion is possible. The 'joint verdict' of expert opinion is offered by Hume as a solution to the problem of finding a standard of taste, not as a way of saying what constitutes aesthetic value. Delicacy of sentiment, freedom from prejudice, extensive practice, comparative knowledge, and so on are important so that the expert critic can discern matches, that is, can 'discer[n] that very degree and kind of approbation or displeasure which each part is naturally fitted to produce'. On this account, although individual aesthetic experiences do not constitute aesthetic value, when sufficiently reconstructed, they can offer a standard for aesthetic evaluation.15 The reconstruction is far from trivial, though, since it requires us to have "delicacy of sentiment, freedom from prejudice, extensive practice, comparative knowledge, and so on". Experts will be better at making the correct aesthetic discernments than ordinary folk, in virtue of possessing these features to a higher degree, but we can also gain some of these features as a community by pooling together individual aesthetic experiences across cultures and times. There is a sense in which aesthetic value is "subjective": its standards are dependent on subjects like us-creatures who share perceptual, sentimental, and cognitive infrastructures of human psychology. Collectively speaking, individual preferences matter-insofar as they together reflect the infrastructures of human psychology. However, in a much more important sense, this form of value is not "subjective": it cannot be identified with any particular individual's preference. 15 The distinction is subtle, so let us borrow Ralton (1998: 69)'s example to clarify it. Suppose there is a watch that is perfectly precise. The time as told by the watch still would not constitute real time. However, the watch does serve as a true standard of time: there is a regularity between the watch's time and real time that we can identify a posteriori. 11 Instead, its standards are determined from the impartial aggregation of all aesthetic experiences across cultures and times, such that the "noise" from prejudice and other distorting factors cancels out, and the "signal" reflecting our perceptual, sentimental, and cognitive psychology remains.16 On this account, expertise in aesthetic value consists in a capacity to respond in ways that track regularities in our shared responses. Features like "delicacy of sentiment, freedom from prejudice, extensive practice, comparative knowledge, and so on" are all useful for tracking what aesthetically matters to us. As Railton (1998: 70) says, True judges can exist because there is a subject matter with respect to which they can develop expertise, authority, and objectivity. This subject matter is afforded by the underlying sensory and cognitive structures that we share with other humans and, in particular, with such judges. If refinement on their part led to a fundamental alteration in their underlying sensory and cognitive structures, they might be subtle judges, but their 'joint verdict' would no longer represent expertise about our taste, or human taste. We differ from the experts not so much in what matches best and most durably the potentials of our underlying structures as in how well we can detect these matches. As a result, we accord greater authority to those with genuinely acute and experienced palates, and greater authority to ourselves as our palates become more acute and experienced. In other words, expertise in aesthetic value is not something that one is born with, but something that one can acquire through attention and experience. In fact, on this account, we structure our social practices in order to acquire expertise: that is why we have so many ways of exchanging aesthetic evaluations. Railton (1998:71) gives a prescient summary of contemporary foodie culture, even though he did not obviously have food in mind: We seek not only to have good taste, but to be taken as having good taste and to identify other possessors of good taste. We are relentless producers and consumers of opinions, advice, and guides. Our conversation often turns to the exchange of judgments, and we are eager to share our enthusiasms and to find confirmation of our judgments in the opinions or experiences of others. Nowadays, services such as TripAdvisor, Yelp, and Foursquare all have users who relentlessly review dining spots and vote on each others' reviews, as well as other users who use those reviews to decide on their next meal. We produce and consume these reviews to be taken as having good taste and to identify other possessors of good taste. Indeed, even those foodies who have not read Hume appear to have taken in his insight: we typically do not rely on any single review, but the "joint verdicts" of different reviews. 16 Hume would have liked the social scientific work on wisdom of crowds, which show that under the right conditions, crowds can guide us to the truth much better than any individual, including individual experts. See Surowiecki (2004) for an accessible introduction to wisdom of crowds. 12 At the theoretical level, Railton's naturalist realist account makes sense of why aesthetic experiences collectively matter to aesthetic value, and also why aesthetic value is more than just individual preference. At the practical level, this account also makes sense of our various social practices regarding aesthetic value of food, and what expertise in this domain consists in. Nevertheless, it is only fair for us to remind readers of a key assumption in this account: the existence of psychological similarities in the relevant population. Whether we all largely share the same perceptual, sentimental, and cognitive psychology when it comes to aesthetic evaluations of food is an open question, and an empirical one. Only further research into the psychology of taste can answer that.17 5. Interaction Between Morality and Aesthetics of Food We are finally ready to return to the interaction between morality and aesthetics of food. Our reference point in this section will be Korsmeyer (2012), which is the only other philosophical discussion of this interaction that we know of. We will build on some of the frameworks that Korsmeyer provides. But we will also argue against the food moralist position that Korsmeyer endorses. Immediately, discussing the interaction between morality and aesthetics of food faces a difficult question: where is the morality in food? With artworks, philosophers typically appeal to the moral perspective that the artwork endorses or the moral perspective that the artwork engenders in making their moral assessments about the works. For example, an art moralist might say that The Birth of a Nation (1915), a film that glorifies White Supremacy, is aesthetically worse for its endorsement of racist ideology and/or for its effects on viewers' racial attitudes. However, on the face of it, food-and certainly food of everyday life-does not typically endorse any moral perspective or engender any moral attitudes.18 Korsmeyer proposes locating the moral value of food in its causal history- explicitly borrowing from a strand of art moralism that is called "means moralism", which says that the fact that a work is produced in a morally dubious manner can count as a moral defect of the work.19 Korsmeyer (2012: 96) thinks linking a work's 17 Examples of such research into the psychology of taste can be found in Monell Chemical Senses Center and in psychologist Charles Spence's Crossmodal Perception Laboratory at Oxford. 18 Morrissey might disagree. As the slogan "animals are friends not food" demonstrates, calling something food is arguably a moral act in itself. That is, arguably the presentation of something as food constitutes an endorsement of a moral perspective and engenders moral attitudes. For example, the presentation of animals as food seems to constitute an endorsement of a moral perspective that permits killing animals for human consumption, and seems to engender moral attitudes about the permissibility of such killings. For a discussion on the moral implicatures of calling something food, see Haslanger (2011: 192) and Plakias (2016). 19 We can distinguish three aspects of a work in which moral qualities may be located: causal history, content, and causal influence. (See Liao and Protasi (2013) for a discussion on the three corresponding kinds of moral criticisms of pornography.) In this section, we are following Korsmeyer in focusing on the causal history of food, and arguing against her version of food moralism on her own terms. However, this focus on the causal history of food does generate a disanalogy between the ethical criticism of food debate, as we have characterized it in this chapter, and the ethical criticism of art debate, as it is standardly characterized. In the art debate, philosophers typically focus more on moral qualities of a work's content, such as the moral perspective it endorses, and on moral qualities of a work's causal influence, such as the moral perspective it engenders. In footnote 18, we outline possible ways of locating moral qualities in the content and causal influence of food, and we believe it is possible that analogous positions can 13 causal history with its moral status in this way is especially appropriate: "means moralism seems especially apt for the assessment of foods and their enjoyments because cultivating tastes frequently requires noticing flavors that are the result of the way they were produced". That is, a work's causal history can become part of a work proper when it affects our perception or perceptual experience of the work. In discussing the interaction between morality and aesthetics of food, Korsmeyer mainly focuses on causal history that is directly accessible via narrow sensory perception.20 (We will say more about the idea of directly perceiving causal history when we discuss her notion of trace.) However, she also briefly considers causal history that enters into our broad perceptual experience, which can contain cognitive and affective components in addition to sense data.21 We will consider cases of both types below. According to Korsmeyer, a trace is a causal historical quality that is directly perceptible via our senses. Importantly, not all causal histories are manifested via traces, but only some are. Korsmeyer (2012: 95-96) gives the following contrasting examples: on the one hand, "[o]ne cannot cultivate a taste for foie gras without cultivating a taste for fatty liver of a force-fed geese"; on the other hand, "[t]una caught in nets that also kill dolphins are harvested in ways that use unfortunate means, but this is not evident in the flavor of the tuna." According to Korsmeyer, while there is moral defect in the causal history in both cases, that causal history is only perceptible in the foie gras case. In other words, while the force-feeding left a trace in the foie gras, the driftnetting and trawling did not leave a trace in the tuna. So, it is only the moral defectiveness of foie gras production that can directly affect our narrow sensory perception.22 The exact relationship between a trace and its morality and aesthetics is unclear.23 Sometimes, Korsmeyer (2012: 97) speaks as if the trace itself is at one perceptual, moral, and aesthetic: "we can take cruelty of means of production as a fairly clear example of how aesthetic taste properties merge with moral taste properties." Or perhaps, by saying so, she means that a trace is a perceptual quality on which aesthetic and moral qualities simultaneously depend on. Other times, it seems that a trace is a perceptual and aesthetic quality that in some sense contains a distinct moral quality: "we have moral properties infused in the taste properties of be developed in the ethical criticism of food debate that focuses on those kinds of moral qualities, using similar examples. However, we do not investigate this possibility further in this chapter. 20 She acknowledges that "[t]races of means in flavors are by no means the only indication of moral aspects of eating" but also says that it is with traces that "the case for ethical gourmandism is most strongly rooted" (96). 21 As she wonders in the coda of her essay, "Suppose human flesh tastes delectable. Is it okay to cultivate a taste for faux human being? Isn't there something enduringly terrible about having a taste for human flesh, even if that taste is to be satisfied by means of a substitute?" (100). 22 Foie gras may have not been the best example. According to Barber (2014), there is now a farmer in Spain, Eduardo Sousa, who produces foie gras without force-feeding, and that this foie gras tastes-allegedly-as good as, if not better than, foie gras produced with force-feeding. (It is not so clear from Barber's account that this foie gras does taste as fatty, however.) Regardless, Korsmeyer can make the same point with a number of other real-world cases. For example, it is well known that stress prior to and during slaughter of animals negatively affects perceived meat quality (Grandin 1980). In other words, a violent slaughter of an animal can leave a trace in the resulting meat. 23 We thank Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, Tyler Doggett, Andy Egan, Simon Fokt, and Eileen John for pressing us to clarify what Korsmeyer means by "trace". Indeed, the two authors of this chapter disagree about the best interpretation of Korsmeyer's notion. 14 food" (2012: 96). For our aim of arguing against Korsmeyer, this unclarity with the notion is not especially problematic, given the variety of characterizations available-from the ethical criticism of art literature-for the relevant connection between moral and aesthetic value. Nevertheless, we want to flag this unclarity because it can complicate how we think about the parallels between the interaction of morality and aesthetics of food and of art. Setting those details aside, it is clear that the notion of trace plays an important role of Korsmeyer's argument for (moderate) food moralism-which says that a food's moral value is directly connected to its aesthetic value-and against food autonomism-which says that a food's moral value is unconnected to its aesthetic value. Food autonomism is false, Korsmeyer argues, because there can be qualities of food-namely, the traces-that make for both moral and aesthetic qualities. So, depending on the exact nature of a trace, the moral and aesthetic qualities are either connected because they are one and the same, or connected via the perceptual quality they simultaneously depend on. She summarizes her conclusion as follows: "if certain kinds of meal preparation are morally dubious, and if the object and its preparation impart a trace on flavor, then this quality is simultaneously aesthetic and moral" (Korsmeyer 2012: 97). We entirely agree with Korsmeyer on this conditional conclusion. However, we disagree with Korsmeyer that food moralism is the only alternative to food autonomism. To see that acceptance of the consequent of Korsmeyer's conditional conclusion does not imply the acceptance of food moralism, we must return to the defining thesis of moralism-the valence constraint. Remember that the valence constraint says a feature's effect on the work's moral value must have the same valence as its effect on the work's aesthetic value. In contrast, the consequent in Korsmeyer's conditional conclusion only says that there can be qualities of food that make for both moral and aesthetic qualities; it does not say that the moral and aesthetic qualities must have the same valence. We think the most plausible view with respect to the interaction between morality and aesthetics of food is one that Korsmeyer overlooks. We endorse food immoralism, which denies the valence constraint. Since different art immoralists spell out the non-accidental connection between moral value and aesthetic value differently, we will consider two cases in the food domain that plausibly demonstrate different connections between moral and aesthetic value. The first case, which constitutes our primary response to Korsmeyer, specifically shows that a trace can be morally defective but aesthetically virtuous. In this case, if one took away the moral defect by eliminating the trace, then one would thereby take away the aesthetic virtue too (compare: Jacobson's variant of art immoralism). The second case shows a different kind of connection that can take place in broader perceptual experience, where it is precisely in virtue of the immorality that the food is aesthetically better (compare: Eaton's variant of art immoralism). Our first case for food immoralism concerns the practice of ikizukuri, where a skilled chef cuts off parts of a live fish and re-plates them as sashimi slices on the fish and serves them to the customer immediately, sometimes with the fish still showing some lingering signs of life. By cutting up fish that is still alive, the chef 15 causes even more pain to the sentient creature than typical seafood preparation practices. As such, we think ikizukuri sashimi is morally defective. Nevertheless, by cutting up fish that is still alive, the chef is also able to serve sashimi that is as fresh as possible. As such, we think ikizukuri sashimi is aesthetically virtuous because freshness is a highly valued aesthetic feature of sashimi in general. The connection between the moral defect and aesthetic virtue of ikizukuri sashimi is non-accidental; one could not have one without having the other. The same causal historical quality associated with ikizukuri, cutting up fish that is still alive, give rise to a trace in the sashimi that makes for both a moral defect and an aesthetic virtue. No doubt some readers are already recoiling at the thought of this practice and having a hard time imagining tasting the result as delicious. We have three comments in response. First, we want to urge these readers to recall the discussion of experts and normative values in section 4. In aesthetics, as is the case with other normative domains, there should be a prima facie deferral to experts, where expert opinions are available.24 Many real world gourmands seek out and enjoy experiences of eating ikizukuri sashimi and its kin.25 Remember that one feature that is conducive to expertise is freedom from prejudice. Perhaps the fact that many Western gourmands seek out and enjoy experiences of eating ikizukuri sashimi and its kin is a sign that they are better able to overcome cultural prejudices in their aesthetic evaluation than are ordinary folk. At least, one should question whether one's initial repulsion is a product of the kind of prejudice that Hume warned us against. Second, most people actually already acknowledge the central aesthetic virtue of ikizukuri sashimi: freshness.26 Specifically, for sashimi, freshness is perhaps the most salient quality in taste besides the fish source. So, in a way, it is not at all surprising that serving sashimi as freshly as possible-by cutting it off from a live fish-should result in an aesthetically virtuous product. The preference for freshness, especially in such a highly perishable food category, seems exactly the kind of thing that would be basic in human psychological infrastructure. The gourmands who recommend ikizukuri sashimi, then, can be said to be Humean experts who are able to track what aesthetically matter to us, given our psychological infrastructures. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that saying ikizukuri sashimi is delicious is absolutely not the same as saying eating it or selling it is ethically or legally permissible. Indeed, the whole point of this case being a data point in favor of food immoralism is that the practice of ikizukuri is, in fact, morally defective. Whether a 24 We do want to also acknowledge that it is notoriously tricky to appeal to expertise in the context of the interaction between morality and aesthetics. It is difficult to say anything definitive and substantive without begging the very central question of the debate. For example, one cannot require aesthetic expertise to include moral sensitivity without presupposing the falsity of autonomism. Indeed, Jacobson (2005) has argued that Carroll (2000) begs the question in exactly this way when he invokes an idealized audience in arguing for art moralism. We make no assumptions about the moral sensitivity of real world gourmands. 25 Similar practices can be found in other East Asian cuisines. For example, Korean cuisine has sannakji, which is the practice of serving live octopus, and Chinese cuisine has yin-yang shrimp, where only the body is flash fried and the head remains uncooked. 26 We are thinking of freshness as an aesthetic quality in itself. However, our argument is compatible with thinking of freshness as a shorthand for a cluster of more basic aesthetic qualities. We thank Eileen John for raising this worry and suggesting this response. 16 morally defective practice should be outlawed is a separate and difficult question. Answering the question requires judging how moral value ought to be weighed against other human values, such as aesthetic value, in structuring our social practices. It is perfectly reasonable, and perfectly consistent with food immoralism, for someone who thinks moral value is the sole value relevant to law to believe that, no matter how delicious the sashimi is, ikizukuri should be outlawed. Our second case for food immoralism concerns the practice of zoophagy, where gourmands seek out exotic animals-sometimes, that means animals that belong to endangered species-to consume as food. It is easily imaginable that such gourmands would still seek out endangered species to eat even if there were nonendangered species that can provide the same exact narrow sensory perception. Presumably, they would do so because it is the knowledge that the meat comes from an animal that belongs to an endangered species that heightens aesthetically their broad perceptual experience. The novelty of the experience is inextricably bound to the knowledge of the animal's endangered status. So, according to such gourmands, it is precisely in virtue of the known immoral causal history that the food is aesthetically better. Of course, the food may still be aesthetically not good, all things considered, because connections between moral and aesthetic value are only pro tanto and because there can be many different pro tanto connections between moral and aesthetic value with respect to the same food.27 With these two cases as our paradigms, it is not difficult to find other data points in favor of food immoralism. Indeed, we believe that Korsmeyer (2012: 98) inadvertently gives another case when she quotes the renowned gourmand (and occasional novelist) Alexandre Dumas:28 In Toulouse they have a special way of fattening ortolans which is better than anywhere else; when they want to eat them, they asphyxiate them by immersing their heads in a very strong vinegar, a violent death which has a beneficial effect on the flesh. Dumas is acknowledging that this way of eating ortolans is morally defective-the asphyxiation results in an unnecessarily violent death. (Nowadays, ortolans are also considered endangered in France.) Indeed, it is so morally defective that diners are said to cover themselves up while eating the ortolans in order to shield themselves from the eyes of God. Yet, on our reading, Dumas is also saying that the same causal historical quality-the violent asphyxiation-leaves a trace in such ortolans 27 This clarification is especially salient with the case of zoophagy. Although we focus on the moral qualities located in the causal history of food and their pro tanto connections to aesthetic qualities, we acknowledge (in footnote 18) that there can also be moral qualities located in the content and causal influence of food. And these moral qualities may have distinct pro tanto connections with aesthetic qualities. Hence, in the case of zoophagy, the expressive moral value in presenting and eating endangered species as food may also make it aesthetically worse through distinct pro tanto connections between moral and aesthetic value. 28 We believe that further examples can be found in Korsmeyer (2002), which discusses how cuisine can sometimes transform the disgusting into the delicious. 17 ("beneficial effect on the flesh") that makes them aesthetically more virtuous ("better than anywhere else") than ortolans prepared without the violent asphyxiation.29 We think cases like ikizukuri, zoophagy, and ortolans suggest that the valence constraint is false in the food domain. As such, we should be food immoralists, who say that food can exhibit different types of connections between moral value and aesthetic value, including ones that invert the valence. We leave the application of this conclusion to the case of meat as an exercise to the reader. 6. Further Philosophical Implications In this chapter, we have outlined the shape of a debate on the interaction between morality and aesthetics of food, and argued for an overlooked position in this debate-food immoralism. We close by briefly suggesting two further philosophical implications of our discussion. First, for many people, food autonomism is likely to be the default position. Many other chapters in this handbook discuss in detail various moral considerations that are relevant to food. If we (and Korsmeyer) are correct in our rejection of food autonomism, then one surprising consequence is that the various moral considerations discussed in this handbook can also turn out to be highly relevant to aesthetic considerations. So we need to think further about how each of those moral considerations interacts with aesthetic value. Second, considerations about the interaction between morality and aesthetics of food can guide us to new considerations regarding the interaction between morality and aesthetics of art. As we have argued, the food debate is either an extension of or analogous to the art debate. As such, the position that one accepts in the food debate at least provides a pro tanto reason in favor of the analogous position in the art debate.30 This pro tanto reason can be overridden or undercut, of course, but doing so requires further philosophical discussion on, say, why the art domain is distinct from the food domain in terms of basic interactions between human values. 29 However, given what we now know about the effect of violent slaughter on meat quality (see footnote 22), it is also plausible that the ortolan case is-contrary to Dumas's own characterization-more like the zoophagy case than the ikizukuri case. That is, it is plausible that it is really the knowledge of the immoral causal history that heightened aesthetically Dumas's broader perceptual experience. 30 The structural analogy between ethical criticism of art and ethical criticism of food therefore mirrors the structural analogy between ethical criticism of art and ethical criticism of humor. For example, Jacobson (1997) argues for art immoralism by way of an analogy to jokes, and Smuts (1999) responds by arguing for comic moralism (and thus also art moralism). However, see footnote 19 for a disanalogy between the ethical criticism of food debate, as we have characterized it in this chapter, and the ethical criticism of art debate, as it is standardly characterized. 18 References Anderson, James C. and Dean, Jeffrey T. (1998). "Moderate Autonomism". British Journal of Aesthetics 38(2): 150–166. Barber, Dan (2014). The Third Plate. New York: Penguin. Booth, Wayne C. (1998). "Why Banning Ethical Criticism is a Serious Mistake". 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Wringe, Bill. An Expressive Theory of Punishment London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2016. Pp. 186. $99.00 (hardcover) Theories of punishment operate at different levels: they can provide a justification for the practice of state-imposed punishment; and they may also explore certain aims or purposes of punishment, which are typically thought to depend upon some broader justification. A justification for punishment generally provides good reasons why society is warranted in denying offenders liberties, or imposing other harm, in response to certain acts. Such justificatory theories tend to be either forward-looking (e.g. consequentialist), or backward-looking (e.g. legal moralism); or they might represent some hybrid of forwardand backwardlooking justifications. Specific aims or purposes that might be achieved via imposition of punishment include delivering to an offender their "just deserts" (where this aim may be justified as a means to apply blame to an offender for an immoral act), or deterring, incapacitating, and rehabilitating potential offenders (where these aims may be justified via their good consequences; e.g. lower crime rates). This book represents Wringe's comprehensive expressivist theory of punishment. Expressivism about punishment claims that it is essential to an act's constituting punishment that it expresses social disapproval (see J. Feinberg "The Expressivist Function of Punishment," The Monist 49 [1965]: 397-423; A. Duff, Punnishment, Communication, and Community [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009]). Expressivist theories of punishment do not fit neatly within the above schema: it often isn't clear whether an expressivist theory is offered as a justification for punishment, or as an account of a particular purpose of punishment. This is true of Wringe's book. There are moments in the book when Wringe seems to be offering a justification for punishment; and others have interpreted his project in this book as a justification (for example, see AYK Lee's review of An Expressive Theory of Punishment, in Philosophical Quarterly [2016]: advance online). However, Wringe says he is "...not attempting to provide anything that might be an expressive justification of punishment" (18), and that "...[W]e need not assume that on a denunciatory [expressivist] account, punishment can have no other goals than that of expressing a message of a particular sort" (103). 2 In the end, the success of Wringe's theory depends on how broadly we interpret his theory. As a detailed defense of expressivism as one aim or purpose of punishment, the book is very successful: Wringe's arguments for denunicatory expressivism are clearly-articulated, persuasive, and well-defended. However, Wringe does not provide a broad justification of state-imposed punishment of offenders. Thus it would have been helpful for Wringe to make clear the way his theory interacts with justifications and other purposes of punishment. The first half of the book (chapters 1-4) defends the way in which Wringe's particular theory, 'denunciatory' expressivism, handles paradigmatic cases of punishment as compared to non-expressivists and other versions of expressivism. The second half (chapters 4-8) discusses several difficult cases for any theory of punishment from the perspective of this theory, including whether "perp walks" constitute punishment (chapter 5), and whether corporations and states can be punished (chapters 7 and 8). The traditional contemporary conception of punishment can be traced back to HLA Hart, who defined punishment as harsh treatment, inflicted on an offender by one with appropriate authority, in response to some wrongdoing (HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility [Oxford: Clarendon, 1968]). Expressivist theories tend to accept this traditional conception, but add a further condition that the punishment communicate something to the offender or society (94-95). Wringe's expressivism departs from the views of another prominent expressivist theorist, Antony Duff. Duff argues that the audience of punishment's expression of disapproval is the offender him or herself, with the aim of inducing remorse or regret (A. Duff, Punnishment, Communication, and Community [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009]). Wringe instead argues that the audience at which our expressive acts of punishment are aimed are the community in which both offender and victim are members, arguing that such within such groups "membership in the community is something it makes sense for individuals to value" (13). Punishment sends a message of disapproval to the community that "certain norms are in force and that transgressions against them are viewed seriously" (24). Hence the 'denunciatory' label. 3 One worry about expressivism is that it may treat offenders as a means to an end (39), a criticism also often lobbed at consequentialist justifications of punishment. Wringe responds to this challenge by arguing that on his version of expressivism, an offender is addressed by the state not qua offender, but qua citizen (58). The message communicated is that the offender has committed a particular crime, and thus has acted wrongly (60). In addressing an offender as a citizen, a state – conceived as a body of individuals who have undertaken a joint commitment – emphasizes to the offender and society that he is "one of us" with societal commitments (64). Because punishment is aimed sending a message to group to which the offender is a member, sending that message via punishment of that offender ought not to be seen as using him as a means to an end. Wringe addresses two other major challenges to expressivist views of punishment the "harsh treatment" and "publicity" challenges. The harsh treatment challenge rests upon the notion that, all things being equal, treating another person harshly, such that they are likely to suffer, is wrong. Thus, the specific harm caused to offenders by the state in the name of punishment must be justified. On retributive notions of punishment, the state may claim that it can cause such harm because an offender deserves to suffer in response to the moral wrong she has committed. Wringe argues that punishment must consist in harsh treatment to communicate to society that violation of norms are taken seriously; however, he argues that delivering such harsh treatment does not necessarily involve acting with the intention of harming the offender, as some theories of punishment claim (19, citing D. Boonin, The Problem of Punishment [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008]). Wringe thus attempts to avoid the task of having to justify punishment as state action expressly aimed at harming offenders: although it is not incidental that punishment imposes suffering, it need not involve intentional infliction of suffering this is not its aim. Instead, persons who are punished suffer not because this is a necessary part of punishment, but due to the "normal and foreseeable workings of our penal institutions," because the expressive aim of punishment cannot be achieved in ways which do not involve some level of suffering (20). For Wringe, the harm caused to offenders in the process of expressing disapproval via punishment is just a necessary but somewhat unfortunate side-effect (86-87). 4 Here again Wringe wants to distinguish himself from Anthony Duff's version of expressivism, which holds that the suffering caused by punishment is justified at least in part as communication aimed at offenders with the hope of prompting remorse and reconciliation (71). Duff's theory runs into the problem of unreceptive offenders – those who are unable or unwilling to grasp the message punishment is intended to communicate, and thus will not experience remorse (81). On Duff's theory, punishment in the case of the unreceptive offender will have failed; but on Wringe's theory, if the state fails to cause suffering in a particular offender via their punishment, the punishment itself has not necessarily failed, precisely because the punishment can still communicate something to society. This is an important payoff of Wringe's denunicatory theory. There are offenders who do not internalize the law in HLA Hart's sense; who feel so disenfranchised by American society that they do not feel the law gives them reasons to act or refrain from acting. And there are offenders for whom jail or prison are an improvement over their lives on the "outside," and thus their punishment of incarceration may be seen as a benefit, not a harm. In these cases, Wringe may hold that a message regarding the importance of certain norms can still be successfully delivered, and thus avoid the project of having to promote new sorts of punishment that may be experienced as harsh by unrepentant offenders such that they may feel remorse. In the second half of the book, Wringe uses his denunciatory expressivism to analyze several sticky cases of punishment, including "perp walks" (chapter 5), war crimes (chapter 6), and punishment of corporations (chapter 7) and states (chapter 8). These chapters generate mixed results. Although I appreciated the way in which application to a specific state action – the treatment of offenders after arrest but prior to trial – helped solidify aspects of the theory in my mind, I was not convinced that perp walks ought to be considered unjustified punishment, as Wringe argues. Neither was I convinced that his theory can give a clean account of punishment of actors who commit war crimes or states who violate international law. The reason why corporations may be successfully punished, but not states, is because there are good arguments that at least some corporations are members of a society (e.g. a society where they are legally incorporated and utilize laws and the court system to their benefit). Punishment of corporations may indeed express a message about the seriousness with which society views violation of certain norms by a corporation who is a member of that 5 society. However, Wringe did not convince me there is an identifiable society to which punishment may speak in the case of nation states – the international community is too nebulous, and state ties to international law are too weak. Much of what is written here has been published as journal articles or book chapters elsewhere. This is a negative aspect of the book: given that many readers can now find electronic papers via Google Scholar or The Philosophical Underclass, a book is really only a wise investment if it contains a decent cache of new material. And there are some issues with the way in which the previously published material is pieced together. There is some overlap and repetitiveness between the chapters, and a few weird moments when the author seems to be confused with regard to which instance of punishment he discussing: for example, on page 133, he refers to punishment of the state, although the issue at hand in the chapter is the punishment of business corporations. These blemishes aside, the book has a nice flow, and is methodically and persuasively argued – it is a very nice example of contemporary analytic social political philosophy, where even the purpose of conceptual analysis is defended before Wringe is willing to push his argument further (5-8). It was especially nice to read a book on such a complex issue that delves deeply into the relevant literature but does not get mired in it; instead, Wringe swiftly addresses counter-arguments and then continues to move the ball forward, so the reader never gets lost in the argument. I think the tone of a philosopher's argument is an underappreciated facet of philosophical writing: it can make a difference to the reader's willingness to plod on and receptiveness to a philosophical theory. Wringe's tone is friendly and helpful. One can easily imagine sitting and having a collegial conversation with him. The way Wringe he discusses other theories make clear that he refuses to set up straw men; he responds kindly and thoroughly to imagined objections. Wringe's clear and conversational style of writing reminds me of those great philosophers beloved by undergraduates and non-philosophers for their ability to deliver complex ideas in clear and entertaining sentences: Putnam, Searle, and Nussbaum come to mind. In sum, Wringe sounds like a nice guy who is hesitantly critical of other views in order to advance the reader's 6 understanding, and this inspires granting him the benefit of the doubt when he made a move that seemed odd. In the end, my faith in Wringe paid the dividend of a very thoughtful and complex theory of expressivism. However: this theory addresses just one purpose of punishment – one of many, perhaps – and does not constitute a grand justification of punishment. Wringe indicates that he might consider his theory a part of a 'unified' theory of punishment, on which punishment is justified insofar as it achieves a number of aims (such as is discussed in T. Brooks, Punishment [London: Routledge, 2012], 123-148). But he does not provide readers any sense of what such a unified justification of punishment might consist in (Which aims are to be included? How would this a theory differ from a hybrid justificatory theory?). Wringe could nest his theory within a broader backward-looking justification. For example, we might be justified in state punishment of persons who have certain moral capacities and cause harm because these people are morally blameworthy, and one purpose of such punishment (in addition to retribution) might be to communicate to society our commitment to certain norms and the seriousness with which we take violations of those norms. Interestingly – given his apparent distaste for consequentialism – Wringe's brand of expressivism might also be given a broad consequentialist justification. Manuel Vargas justifies holding persons responsible based upon the good impacts the practice of praise and blame has on moral agency at the societal level (M.Vargas, Building Better Beings [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013]). Wringe might claim that punishment's communications have the consequences of enhancing moral agency at the group/society level (where the offender is a member of the group/society), and thus avoid the worry that a consequentialist justification for punishment treats offenders as a means to an end. It seems unlikely that any version of expressivism can justify harsh treatment of an offender based solely upon the message it sends, either to society or to the offender. To my mind, punishment must be justified via the offender's blameworthiness (where blameworthiness is related to moral capacities or agency in some way); or via punishment's desired consequences (e.g. social order), or both. Otherwise, even if one believes punishment is communicative, the message of punishment is either undeserved or ineffective. The 7 explicitly claimed purposes of punishments in the US – for example, those embraced in the "purposes" section of the US Model Penal Code (section 1.02), and most state penal codes – include retribution and deterrence, broadly construed. It would be instructive to hear how these aims fit with Wringe's expressivist theory of punishment. KL Sifferd Elmhurst College

Forthcoming in a collection of essays in honor of Nenad Miscevic, Thought Experiments between Nature and Society, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016. IS THE SPEED OF LIGHT KNOWABLE A PRIORI? Ilhan Inan ABSTRACT Given the current "definition" of the concept of meter a simple argument appears to show that some scientists could come to know the answer to the question "how many meters does light travel in a vacuum in one second?" without having to do any observations or calculations. It would then seem that their knowledge of the speed of light would have some unusual epistemic properties such as being certain, infallible and indubitable, and perhaps also analytic. What is more shocking is that we may also be able to conclude that these scientists know the speed of light a priori. This appears to be a new version of the puzzle about how long the "standard meter bar" is, which Wittgenstein discusses in his Philosophical Investigations, later taken up by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity yielding the puzzling conclusion that certain contingent truths are knowable a priori. In this talk I discuss how the new version of the puzzle differs from the old one, why Nathan Salmon's and Keith Donnellan's "solutions" to the old puzzle are really not solutions, how the current literature on mental files can be employed to approach the puzzle. I then argue the notion of apriority employed in the argument requires further elaboration so that we may conclude, following Nenad Miscevic, that "interesting a priori knowledge cannot be gotten for cheap." Naming by description gives rise to some puzzling results. If you define 'meter' as the length of a certain stick, then the question about how long the stick is appears to be a very strange one. The issue was perhaps first brought to attention by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations (§50) where he famously remarked: There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris.-But this is, of course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a metre-rule.1 Years later the matter was resurrected by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity who complained that "this seems to be a very 'extraordinary property' for any stick to have" 1 Wittgenstein's intention here, is not to present a new philosophical riddle, but to give an example of how a language game is based on following a rule. His point is that such a rule makes saying possible, and therefore, it cannot be said with the language game. 2 (p.54).2 The stick after all is a physical object with a certain length, and that length could be nothing other than one meter, given the way in which the term 'meter' was "defined" at the time. The definition does not provide a synonym for the term 'meter', Kripke argues, rather it merely determines the length to which the term refers: it does not fix the meaning of the term, but it merely fixes its referent. After the naming ceremony the name 'meter' refers to the same length in all possible worlds making it a rigid designator of a certain length. The reference-fixing description 'the length of the stick at t', on the other hand, refers to the same length in the actual world, but only accidently, given that it is not an essential property for any stick to be of a certain length. In other words there are possible worlds in which the description refers to lengths longer or shorter than a meter, and thus it is not a rigid designator. We may now merge the name with the description to construct an identity statement expressed by a sentence such as "the length of the stick at t is one meter". Now though it is clear that the stick has no extraordinary property as Kripke claims, it appears that such a sentence does have some very unusual characteristics. First and foremost it appears that the reference-fixer could come to know that it expresses a truth without having to do any measurements. Such an argument, Kripke claims, shows that there are contingent truths that are knowable a priori. After Kripke gave this argument, the term 'meter' was redefined in 1983 by the International Committee for Weights and Measures (CIPM) as the length of the path travelled by light in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299 792 458 of a second. Following Kripke we may say that the experts at CIPM re-fixed the reference of the term 'meter' by this description, and preserved its rigidity. The definite description used in the new definition is again not rigid, at least not metaphysically or logically. That is because it seems that that there is no contradiction in imagining a counter-factual situation in which the speed of light in vacuum is faster or slower than it actually is. Now it may be the case that the speed of light being what it is, is physically necessary. In other words the assumption that the speed of light being slower or faster than the actual magnitude may in fact violate the laws of physics. If so then the description may be said to refer to the same speed in all possible worlds in which the laws of physics are the same with that of the actual world. In 2 Kripke also does not present this as a puzzle; rather he wishes to show that not all a priori knowledge is of necessary propositions. See also fn.4. 3 that sense we may say that it is physically a rigid designator, which of course would be welcomed by scientists. Nonetheless from a metaphysical or merely logical point of view the description is an accidental designator. So now we have an instance of a new identity statement expressed by the following sentence: S. The length of the path travelled by light in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299 792 458 of a second is one meter. Though S expresses a contingent truth, it appears again that the reference-fixers are in a privileged position to know the proposition expressed by it a priori. In fact not just the actual reference-fixers, but anyone who is aware of the new definition and understands it would thereby be in a position to know that it expresses a truth without having to do any measurement or calculation, or it would seem. Kripke's claim that such definitions merely fix the reference, finds support from the fact that a majority of the users of the term 'meter' today are totally unaware of the reference-fixing description. If the description had become a synonym for the term as a result of the definition, we would have had to conclude that the normal users of the term 'meter' either do not grasp the meaning of the term, or that they use it to mean something different from what the experts mean by it. In fact even the ones who are aware of the definition may have difficulty grasping it, for there is another technical term it, namely 'second', which also has its own definition. CIPM defined the duration of a 'second' in 1967 as "the duration of 9 192 631 770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the cesium 133 atom." Many, including the present author, know close to nothing about the cesium 133 atom, and what a hyperfine level is, and what a ground state of an atom is etc. Only a handful of experts presumably are able to grasp the definition of 'second', and consequently of 'meter' which is defined in terms of it. Nonetheless we have no problem in using such terms in daily or even in scientific discourse, which gives some support to Kripke's thesis that such names are not mere abbreviations for their reference-fixing descriptions. The new puzzle differs from the old one in several ways. First Wittgenstein's cryptic remark about the standard meter bar would appear to be even more obscure once we apply it to the new definition. This time we would have to conclude that the speed of light is 4 ineffable in meter-talk. Secondly, the claim that it is possible to know a contingent fact a priori sounds even more startling now for it is not the length of a stick, but the actual speed of light that would turn out to be knowable a priori. Thirdly a popular counter-argument which tries to block the apriority of the proposition in question that appears to have some prima facia plausibility in the case of the old puzzle seems to loose some of its force in the case of the new one. The argument, due to Nathan Salmon, is based on the premise that the reference-fixer has sense-experience of the length of the stick prior to introducing the term 'meter', which, so it is argued, plays a role in the justification of the reference-fixer to come to know that the stick is one meter long, making that piece of knowledge a posteriori.3 It is not clear how such an argument could plausibly be applied to the new puzzle. Did the reference-fixers have sense experience of the distance that light travels in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299 792 458 of a second? Putting the problem in terms of the popular category of the contingent a priori is somewhat misleading.4 If the mere introduction of a name does give us knowledge, it is what we may call "effortless" knowledge, and in that sense it ought to be a priori. Obviously not all a priori knowledge is effortless. Coming to know Fermat's Theorem required more than 300 years of careful research by some of the brightest minds, and though this piece of knowledge is also a priori it is what we may call "demanding" a priori. This is one reason why putting the puzzle in terms of the a priority of the acquired knowledge does not 3 Among the various reactions to Kripke's argument for the contingent a priori, two stand out, one is Salmon(1988) and the other is Donnellan(1979). Interestingly in their arguments against Kripke, Salmon only concentrates on the meter-case, whereas Donnellan focuses only on the Neptune-type of examples. See Inan (2012) Chapter 12-Limits of Curiosity and its Satisfaction for a discussion of the differences between these two types of examples, and an account of why these "solutions" are not satisfactory. 4 This should not be taken as a criticism of Kripke, for, as I read him, Kripke's main purpose in Naming and Necessity in giving this controversial argument was to provide support for his thesis that the a priori/a posteriori distinction is an epistemic one, whereas the contingent/necessary distinction is a metaphysical one. Kripke showed that the Kantian prejudice we have that all a priori proposition are necessary, and that all a posteriori propositions are contingent, is ill-grounded. His examples of a posteriori propositions which are necessary convinced the philosophical community fort he most part, though his other category of the contingent a priori was taken to be a puzzle to be solved. 5 capture its essence. What we need is, not the general distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge, rather, the more subtle distinction between effortless and demanding knowledge. Secondly the puzzle is not how we can come to know a contingent proposition effortlessly either, for it could have been equally puzzling if the proposition in question had been necessarily true. In fact we can easily generate the same puzzle by using, for instance a mathematical example, concerning a proposition which we may agree in advance to be both necessary and knowable a priori. Once we introduced the name "π" we were in a position to come to know that π is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter without even having to calculate what number that is. Ones who have acquired this name in general would know that it refers roughly to a number slightly larger than 3.14, but this is not required for them to know that π is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter. When asked what that ratio is, one can truthfully respond by saying "it is the number π, but I have no idea what number that is". If by merely naming an entity by description automatically gives us access to a piece of knowledge, then it would seem that we could answer any what-question about any entity to which we can refer. What is the 98th prime number? Let us name that number "α"; now we know that α is the 98th prime number. What planet is perturbing Uranus? Let us call that planet 'Neptune' now we know the answer5; who is responsible for mailing these bombs? Let us call that person "the Unabomber"; etc. 6 Even for empirical examples putting the puzzle in terms of the contingent a priori would not always do, for we may think of cases in which the referencefixing description refers to the named entity through one of its essential properties. It is not the contingency of the proposition per se, but the nature of its content that seems to matter; that is the proposition in question does not strike us as being trivial at all, in fact it appears to have substantial content. One source of our puzzlement may then be expressed 5 This is Kripke's other example for the contingent a priori where we roll back to the time to when Le Verrier hypothesized that there was a unique planet perturbing the orbit of Uranus. 6 Kripke was aware of this problem. In a lecture he gave in Mexico in 1990's on the contingent a priori (which to my knowledge has never been published) he jokingly said that if someone were to ask him how tall he was, he could respond by saying "I am one Kripke tall" by introducing the term 'Kripke' as a unit of measurement that refers to his actual height. 6 in general as this: it appears that we can come to know that a certain proposition is true merely as a result of a linguistic stipulation, despite the fact that the proposition in question appears to have substantial content corresponding to a substantial fact in reality. This fact can be an empirical fact-as in the case of the Unabomber or Neptune-or it could be a mathematical fact-as in the case of π and the 9th prime number-or it could be any other kind of fact. Given that the linguistic stipulation involved in these cases is simply the introduction of a name, we may pose the crucial question as: how can the mere introduction of a name give us access to effortless knowledge of a substantial fact? To learn that an object has a certain property, under normal circumstances, gives one substantive knowledge. Let us call a property a knowledge-enhancer relative to an entity just in case when that property is predicated of that entity it extends our knowledge of it. We may model this in mental-file talk.7 For every entity that we can think and talk about, we have a mental file of that entity which includes a list of some of its properties. We extend our knowledge of the entity by adding new properties to that list. Every property in the list could be a knowledge-enhancer. This simple model of learning seems to collapse when a name is introduced by description. Given that the constituent properties of the description are used to fix the reference of the name, the file in question, soon as it is opened up, will automatically contain all the relevant properties. The name 'helium', for instance, was first introduced as the chemical element causing a specific bright yellow line that was observed in the solar spectrum. The naming ceremony allowed the interested scientists to open up a helium-file in their minds8 long before helium was discovered. This is what I call inostensible reference. It is a powerful tool that allows us to represent unknown or unexperienced entities in our minds, to become curious about them, and then to inquire into them.9 Now the helium file back then had to include all the properties included within the reference-fixing description. For instance if the description included the property of being a chemical element, then it must have been included in the file as well. Same for the 7 For a rigorous account of mental files see Recanati (2012). 8 I am assuming that it was a happy speech act which I believe there is good historical and philosophical evidence to think so. 9 For the distinction between ostensible and inostensible reference see Inan (2012). 7 property of causing the bright yellow line in the solar spectrum. Scientists did not learn that helium had these properties by adding them to their helium file, for it was through these properties that they opened up the file in the first place. Given its peculiar role we may call the description used to fix the reference in such a case a file-opener. Now one source of the puzzle is that a file-opener can never be a knowledge–enhancer. This however is not the end of the story, for it does not provide a satisfactory answer to our original question: "is the speed of light knowable a priori?" This interrogative sentence in fact has two separate readings, giving rise to two different questions. If we take the verb to know in the propositional sense we get one reading; we may call this the de dicto reading. If, on the other hand we take to know in the objectual sense we get another reading which is de re. In the propositional sense the question asks: can one come to know a priori a true proposition in the form [α is the speed of light]? It seems to me that the argument that Kripke gives shows that the answer to this question-with a certain qualification-ought to be "yes", but that should not be all that startling. In the other reading the question asks: If α is the speed of light, can one come to know a priori of α, that it is the speed of light? The answer to this question is a definite "no". Obviously I am not a latitudinarian; de dicto knowledge of the speed of light does not entail de re knowledge of it. Now ones who think that the distinction between de dicto and de re knowledge, or the distinction between propositional and objectual knowledge is suspect would not be convinced by such an argument. There is another less technical and perhaps a more intuitive way to argue for a similar conclusion. This requires us to distinguish between knowing that a proposition is true, on the one hand, and, knowing the fact that makes a proposition is true, on the other. Once this intuitive distinction is countenanced, then we can show that it is possible to know that a proposition is true without knowing the fact that makes it true. One may, for instance, know that the proposition the Unabomber mailed the bombs is true, without knowing who the Unabomber is, and if not then one would not know the fact that makes the proposition true. So even if the truth of the proposition is knowable effortlessly (and in that sense it would be a priori), the same is not the case for the latter type of knowledge which would require empirical experience. The best way to substantiate all of this is to appeal to a distinction I have made in earlier work between two forms of propositional knowledge; what I call "inostensible" 8 versus "ostensible" knowledge respectively.(Inan, 2012). A term is ostensible for a subject just in case the subject has sufficient acquaintance of the referent of that term, so that the subject may be said to know the entity to which the term refers; otherwise the term is inostensible for the subject. The distinction applies to all referring expressions. The most intuitive kind of examples are definite descriptions. The term "my mom" in my idiolect is ostensible given that I have sufficient acquaintance with its referent, but for most of you who have never met my mom and know nothing about her--except that she is my mom--, the term is closer to the inostensible end of the scale. Certain important terms are inostensible for all of us, as for instance "the closest planet to earth on which there are intelligent beings". To convert such a term into an ostensible one would require a groundbreaking discovery. We not only do not know to which planet this term refers, but we do not even know whether it has a referent. If we were to discover that the term does indeed have a referent that would be a huge epistemic progress, though the term may still remain as inostensible if we still did not know which planet that was. At times we have sufficient justification to come to know that a term has a referent, though we do not know of any entity as being the referent of that term. We all know, for instance, that there must have been a cause for dinosaurs to become extinct, but this does not entail that we know what that cause is, and if not then the term "the cause of dinosaurs becoming extinct" is inostensible. If, following Frege, we take declarative sentences to be referring expressions, then the distinction between the ostensible and the inostensible would apply to sentences as well. The paradigm case of a sentence being inostensible is when the subject does not know whether it expresses a truth or a falsity. This could be nicely accommodated by Fregean semantics which takes sentences to refer to truth values. If, however, we take sentences to be referring expressions that purport to refer to portions of reality, then we get a different kind of picture. When we say that the earth is round, one part of our sentence refers to the earth and the other part refers to the property of being round, and the whole sentence then may be taken to refer to a fact that is composed of the referents of its parts. This may simply be taken to be the fact of the earth's being round. On the other hand when ancients said that the earth is flat, they wished to refer to a fact, the fact of the earth's being flat, but given that the earth is not flat and there is no such fact, they failed to 9 refer. I call this simple theory the Referential Theory of Truth and Falsity.10 The theory in a nutshell says that a sentence is true just in case it refers to a fact, and a sentence is false just in case it fails to refer. We may also say that the proposition expressed by a true sentence is made true by the fact to which it refers. This theory allows us to formulate the distinction between ostensible and inostensible knowledge more precisely. Concerning any declarative sentence that expresses a proposition in a given context, there are two separate things that one may know; the first is whether the sentence refers to a fact, and the other is the fact to which the sentence refers (assuming that it is true). Knowing a proposition could then happen in two different ways, in one case the subject knows both that the proposition is true, and the fact that makes it true. This is ostensible knowledge. In the other case knows that the proposition is true, but does not know the fact that makes it true. This is inostensible knowledge. Just to take a simple example, suppose a friend of yours says that his lover's eyes are his favorite color. If you take his word for it, now you know a proposition expressed by the sentence (in the appropriate context) : "his lover's eyes are is favorite color". Though you know that the proposition is true, you may still not know what make it true, that is, you may not know the fact to which the sentence refers. This would be the case if you do not know your friend's lover, or what his favorite color is, or both. The sentence would then be inostensible for you, not because you do not know whether it expresses a truth-you already know that it does-but rather because you do not know the fact to which it refers. The same proposition is also known by your friend of course but ostensibly, for he knows who his lover is, and her eye color. If unbeknownst to you his lover is Sue, and his favorite color is brown, then the sentence refers to the fact of Sue's eyes being brown. If you learn this, say by being introduced to Sue as the lover, and observing her eye color, then you could convert your piece of inostensible knowledge into a piece of ostensible knowledge. Quite obviously inostensible knowledge is a lot easier to attain, and when one attains it, one may need further experience to gain ostensible knowledge. Given this we are now in a position to see why the question of whether a given proposition is knowable a priori has two separate readings. Let us go back to the speed of light to see this. 10 I discuss this theory in detail in a new manuscript titled Truth As Reference, Falsity As Failure which is currently under consideration for publication. 10 Concerning the proposition expressed by the above sentence that states what the speed of light is, there are two distinct things one may know; one is whether it expresses a truth, and the other is the fact that makes it true (assuming that it is true). Similar to the lover-case, when a subject only knows the former, but not the latter, the knowledge in question would be inostensible. To know it ostensibly one would have to have some experience of the fact that makes the proposition true. My main thesis is then that even if the inostensible knowledge of this proposition could be said to be a priori-with a certain qualification that I will get to shortly- acquiring ostensible knowledge of it cannot be a priori. The reason for this is that the mere introduction of the name 'meter' gives rise to a priori knowledge of the truth of the proposition in question, but that does not entail that one also knows the fact that makes the proposition true. Now the fact is an empirical fact concerning the magnitude of the speed of light, and to know this fact requires empirical experience, and therefore is plainly a posteriori. The reason why we are puzzled is because we are conflating ostensible knowledge with inostensible knowledge here. When 'meter' was redefined in 1983, the relevant scientific community already had some partial knowledge of the speed of light based on careful measurements. That is why their knowledge of the proposition in question was closer to being ostensible. This is not always the case. Consider an example due to Miscevic. Suppose upon being asked what the cause of cancer is, one introduces the name "glub" for whatever is that cause. Now we may claim that we know the cause of cancer, it is glub. Unlike Donnellan (1979) I believe that there is nothing wrong with introducing such a name into language and using it. The name however would be an inostensible name assuming that we do not know the cause of cancer. As said previously there have been many such examples of the use of such names in history, and "glub" could have been another one. Knowing that cancer is caused by glub obviously would be inostensible knowledge, and in one sense it would be a priori. What is epistemically more valuable of course is to attain ostensible knowledge of this proposition, and that would require us to come to know the fact that makes the proposition true. To achieve that one would have to come to have knowledge of the referent of "glub". That is what we lack, and quite clearly such knowledge can only be attained by empirical inquiry. Similarly knowing the speed of light ostensibly requires more than simply introducing a name; it requires empirical data and careful measurements. Scientists had such experience prior to 1983. In fact the sole reason why they decided to fix the reference of the term 'meter' by a 11 description that involves such a precise number, is because they already had some experience of what the speed of light is, and given that it was believed at the time to be constant, it served as a secure way of defining 'meter'. In other words the reference-fixers did not choose this description arbitrarily; they already knew that it refers roughly to the same length as our old meter, and they knew this as a result of the scientific work conducted on what the speed of light is based on the old definition. Can we then safely conclude that no one is in a position to know a priori that the length of the path travelled by light in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299 792 458 of a second is one meter? In one sense we can, but in another sense we cannot. That is because, as I said, there are two different ways in which one can come to know this proposition; in one of these ways the knowledge in question will turn out to be a priori, in the other, it will not. Knowing the speed of light, in the sense of knowing the fact that makes the proposition true, was based on experience, and can never be a priori. The mere linguistic fact of introducing a name for some entity does not, by itself, give us knowledge of that entity. So acquiring ostensible knowledge of the proposition was not a priori. Having mere inostensible knowledge of the proposition is another matter, and with a certain qualification, it is a priori, but that is not an earth shattering result. It appears that anyone who grasps the definition of 'meter' could come to know that this proposition expresses a truth. If this is a priori knowledge, then it is not demanding, but effortless a priori, for it appears to be based merely on linguistic facts. As I said earlier this requires some qualification though, that is because the mere act of introducing a name by description does not guarantee that there is such a referent. Knowing that the description in question does indeed have a referent, is existential knowledge. For empirical matters, such as the speed of light, such knowledge is not a priori. Though on the surface the truth of the proposition appears to follow from the definition and in that sense it is effortless a priori, its ultimate justification will have to be based on our knowledge of certain existential facts which makes the proposition a posteriori. This is reminiscent of a distinction due to Miscevic between "superficial" and "deep" a priori: A belief in a proposition is superficially a priori if the proximal ground of its justification is non-empirical...A belief is deeply a priori if the distal and ultimate ground of its justification is non-empirical. 12 By appealing to this distinction Miscevic provocatively argues that propositions that involve conceptual analysis are at times superficially a priori, but deeply a posteriori. The same point can be made concerning the proposition expressed by S. On "proximal grounds" we may call it a priori, given that it can easily be derived from the definition of 'meter', but the "distal and ultimate ground" for its justification is empirical: it is superficially a priori, but deeply a posteriori. The reason for this is because when scientists re-defined the term 'meter' they already had reasons to believe that the speed of light in vacuum was constant, which obviously is a piece of knowledge that can never be attained on a priori grounds alone. If it turns out that they were mistaken about this, then the description in question would be what Russell called an "improper" definite description. It would be improper in that it would then not have a fixed referent. In general when a name is introduced by description sentences in which the name is used would have certain presuppositions among which is the presupposition that the name has a fixed referent, and this, quite obviously, is not knowable a priori in any sense of the term. Strictly speaking then what can be knowable a priori is only the truth of the conditional: "If the speed of light is constant in vacuum, then the path travelled by light in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299 792 458 of a second is one meter". Knowing that the conditional is true on a priori grounds would give one merely inostensible knowledge, but there is nothing shocking about that given that it is trivial; coming to know even this conditional ostensibly is not trivial at all, and can only be based on empirical justification, and therefore is not a priori.11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This paper was presented in a symposium in Maribor in 2015 in honor of Nenad Miscevic. I wish to thank the audience for lively discussion, especially Miscevic himself. I owe my gratitude to Janez Bregant who invited me to the symposium, to Bojan Borstner who was an excellent host, and to Smiljana Gartner for all her support during my visits to Maribor. Since I first met him in 2008 in Budapest when I was visiting the Central European University, I have had a very rewarding relationship with Nenad Miscevic, both philosophically 11 Kripke does not conditionalize the meter-sentence, but in his other example concerning Neptune he does. 13 (especially given our mutual interest in curiosity), but also as a friend. It is thus a great pleasure to be contributing to this volume in honor of his work and all his achievements. References Donnellan, K. "The Contingent A Priori and Rigid Designators." Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language. P. A. French, T. F. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein, eds. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979, pp. 45–60. Inan, I. The Philosophy of Curiosity. New York: Routledge, 2012. Kripke, S. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. Recanati, F. Mental Files. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Miscevic, N. "A Priority and Stipulation: On Boghossian" Miscevic, N. "Empirical Concepts and A Priori Truth" Salmon, N. "How to Measure the Standard Metre." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 88 (1987/1988): 193–217. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations. Tr. G. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.

The Problem with Truthmaker-Gap Epistemicism Mark Jago Forthcoming in Thought. Draft of March 2013. Abstract: Epistemicism about vagueness is the view that vagueness, or indeterminacy, is an epistemic matter. Truthmaker-gap epistemicism is the view that indeterminate truths are indeterminate because their truth is not grounded by any worldly fact. Both epistemicism in general and truthmaker-gap epistemicism originated in Roy Sorensen's work on vagueness. My aim in this paper is to give a characterisation of truthmaker-gap epistemicism and argue that the view is incompatible with higher-order vagueness: vagueness in whether some case of the form 'it is determinate that A' or 'it is indeterminate whether A' is true. Since it is highly likely that there is higher-order vagueness (and indeed, Sorensen is adamant that there is higher-order vagueness), truthmaker-gap epistemicism is in an uncomfortable position. Keywords: Vagueness, epistemicism, higher-order vagueness, truthmaking, grounding, Sorensen 1 Introduction Epistemicism about vagueness is the view that a proposition's vagueness is an epistemic matter. Epistemicism holds that propositions about vague cases – or, as I'll say, indeterminate propositions – are always either true or false, but we cannot know which (Sorensen 2001, 13). Epistemicism, in its modern form, originated with Roy Sorensen (1988; 1994; 2001) and Timothy Williamson (1994). One distinctive feature of epistemicism is its strict adherence to classical logic, and in particular, to a bivalent semantics with Boolean negation: every proposition is either true or false, but not both. As a consequence, each day there's a moment around noon – a noonish moment – and a moment just a nanosecond later which isn't noonish.1 The argument is familiar: if there were no such moments then (assuming classical reasoning) it must be the case that if n nanoseconds after noon is noonish, then so is n+1 nanoseconds after noon. Applying this principle enough times, we get the absurd conclusion that 6pm is noonish. The classical features of epistemicism are at once its strength and its weakness. They are a strength because every non-classical approach to vagueness faces serious logical problems.2 They are a weakness because many nd it inconceivable that there could be a sharp boundary between the noonish and the non-noonish moments. How could a mere nanosecond take us from a noonish to a non-noonish moment? As Sorensen says, 1. These cut-off points may change from context to context (Sorensen 2001, 2). 2. By way of example, some non-classical approaches treat classical tautologies as being less than fully true; some treat 'something is F' as true even when no particular thing is an F. 1 many people believe the same truth-value must be assigned to sentence pairs of the form 'n nanoseconds after noon is noonish' and 'n + 1 nanoseconds after noon is noonish'. They dismiss that there could be a value for n at which the rst is true and the second is false: 'What could make the rst true and the second false?' (Sorensen 2001, 176) Sorensen (2001) then offers an interesting response to this worry for epistemicists. He agrees with the objector that nothing could possibly make 'n nanoseconds after noon is noonish' true and 'n + 1 nanoseconds after noon is noonish' false. Nevertheless, he holds that, for some value of n, the former is true and the latter is false. For this value, 'n nanoseconds after noon is noonish' is true but is not made true: it is an ungrounded truth. These cases constitute the indeterminate truths, on Sorensen's truthmaker-gap view. The view supports Sorensen's brand of epistemicism, on which indeterminate truths absolutely unknowable (2001, 12, 13, 39). If a truth has no grounding, then (at least in non-a priori cases) there is no way of coming to know that it is true. A belief in its truth would be similarly ungrounded – a lucky guess – and such true beliefs do not sufce for knowledge (Sorensen 2001, 171, 175). Indeterminate truths are absolutely unknowable because they are ungrounded truths.3 My aims in this paper are to provide a characterisation of truthmaker-gap epistemicism, including some of its formal details (which Sorensen does not do), and argue that the view is incompatible with higher-order vagueness: vagueness in whether some case of the form 'it is determinate that A' or 'it is indeterminate whether A' is true. This conclusion is serious for an epistemicist who wants to adopt the truthmaker-gap account, for it is very plausible that there are instances of higher-order vagueness. As Williamson says, We have as much reason to acknowledge higher-order vagueness as we have to acknowledge rst-order vagueness; the difculty of applying the higher-order classications to a sorites series is of just the same kind as the difculty of applying the rst-order classication, which was what led us to recognize the problem of vagueness in the rst place. (Williamson 1999, 127) Moreover, epistemicism (in general) is perhaps the best-placed theory of vagueness to deal with higher-order vagueness. Theories which do not accept rst-order sharp cutoffs nevertheless seem to be lumbered with higher-order sharp cutoffs (between degrees of truth, for example). This is often taken to be a strong argument in favour of epistemicism, but it is unavailable to the truthmaker-gap epistemicist if she also rejects higher-order vagueness. Quite aside from this point, adopting truthmaker-gap epistemicism whilst denying higher-order vagueness will leave one with an unprincipled, ad hoc metaphysics (§5). I take it to be a serious aw of truthmaker-gap epistemicism that it cannot accommodate higher-order 3. This account is not epistemicist in the sense of a theory on which vagueness consists in unknowability (Greenough 2008, 229). Rather, on the truthmaker-gap account, vagueness consists in ungrounded truth. The unknowability of such truths is a consequence of their lack of grounding and hence a consequence, rather than the source, of their vagueness. 2 vagueness. Indeed, Sorensen himself explicitly accepts that there is higher-order vagueness (1985; 2010).4 The paper will proceed as follows. In §2, I set out Sorensen's truthmaker-gap epistemicism in more detail. In §§3–4, I set up the case against truthmaker-gap epistemicism, in terms of an incompatibility argument with higher-order vagueness. This constitutes the main argument of the paper. In §5, I argue that the truthmakergap epistemicist who avoids this problem by denying higher-order vagueness is saddled with an unattractive metaphysics. §6 is a brief conclusion. 2 Truthmaker-Gap Epistemicism In this section, I set out Sorensen's truthmaker-gap epistemicism in more detail. A truthmaker for proposition ⟨A⟩ provides a ground for that truth (Sorensen 2001, 165–184); a truthmaker for its negation ⟨¬A⟩ provides a ground for ⟨A⟩'s falsity. We can think of a truthmaker for ⟨¬A⟩ as being a falsemaker for ⟨A⟩. When a proposition has neither a truthmaker nor a falsemaker, it is an ungrounded proposition. A commitment of epistemicism is that such propositions nevertheless have a truth-value: each proposition is true or false, whether grounded or not. So some truths have no ground. Indeterminate truths are ungrounded in this sense; they are indeterminate because they are ungrounded. Such truths correspond to no fact in the world (and are not knowable a priori), and so are utterly unknowable: there is absolutely no epistemic access to such truths. They are epistemic islands (2001, 175–6); epistemically, 'there is no way on to the island' (2001, 175). When a truth has a ground, by contrast, it corresponds to a fact in the world and so is at least in principle knowable. So by epistemicist lights, such truths are determinate truths. I'll write 'Tx⟨A⟩' for 'x is a truthmaker for ⟨A⟩'.5 To say that a proposition is ungrounded is to say that it has neither a truthmaker nor a falsemaker: ¬∃x(Tx⟨A⟩ ∨ Tx⟨¬A⟩).6 Following Williamson (1999), I'll write '△A' for 'it is determinate that A' (i.e., determinate that ⟨A⟩ is true), and I'll write '▽A' for 'it is indeterminate whether A' (i.e., indeterminate whether ⟨A⟩ is true or false).7 The key principles of truthmaker-gap epistemicism are then as follows: (1) If ⟨A⟩ is indeterminate, then it is ungrounded. ▽A → ¬∃x(Tx⟨A⟩∨ Tx⟨¬A⟩) 4. Sorensen associates the existence of higher-order vagueness with the view that 'vague' is itself a vague predicate. This may or may not be the case; I do not rely on this assumption here. 5. I intend, as Sorensen does, to be completely neutral as to what kinds of entity serve as truthmakers. Note also that a truth may have many distinct truthmakers: 'there are people in India' has billions of truthmakers. 6. Note that ⟨¬A⟩ is ungrounded iff ⟨A⟩ is. 7. Other authors write '△A' for the non-factive 'it is determinate whether A' (i.e., ⟨A⟩ is either determinately true or determinately false). It is most convenient here to use a factive determinacy operator on the model of the necessity operator '◻'. '▽' is then the analogue of the contingency operator, not the possibility operator. 3 (2) If ⟨A⟩ has a truthmaker, then it is a determinate truth. ∃xTx⟨A⟩→△A For a large class of propositions, we can use (1) and (2) as denitions of '▽' and '△'. But Sorensen holds that (at least some) a priori truths are ungrounded (2005, 716), for they need no truthmaker to be true. And yet, since they are knowable, they must (by epistemicist lights) be determinate. For such a priori propositions ⟨A⟩, (3) A↔△A. But for all non-a priori propositions, (4) ▽A↔ ¬∃x(Tx⟨A⟩∨ Tx⟨¬A⟩). (5) △A↔ ∃xTx⟨A⟩. As an epistemicist theory, truthmaker-gap epistemicism accepts bivalence and classical logic in general (2001, 8), including conditional proof, and so (in contrast to supervaluationism) accepts that A ⊢ B iff ⊢ A → B. Sorensen allows additions to standard classical logic, including inference rules governing '△' and '▽', as these only expand the set of valid inferences from those of classical rst-order logic (2001, 8). But he will not allow 'deviant' logics, such as paraconsistent, relevant or intuitionistic logics, which subtract from the set of classically valid inferences (2001, 8–11). All classically valid inferences remain valid for the truthmaker-gap epistemicist. Because of this, truthmaker-gap epistemicism allows for true instances of 'A∧▽A'.8 Whenever ⟨A⟩ is indeterminate, it is either the case that A∧▽A or that ¬A∧▽A. Given (3), (4), (5) and classical logic, we can establish the following principles (regardless of whether A and B are a priori):9 (△1) If ⊢ A then ⊢△A (△2) △(A → B)→ (△A →△B) (△3) △A → A (▽1) ▽A↔▽¬A (▽2) ▽A↔ ¬△A∧¬△¬A These principles (on which the logic of '△' is a normal modal logic at least as strong as KT) are common to most logics of vagueness. That they are validated by truthmaker-gap epistemicism goes some way to showing that it provides a sensible logic of vagueness. I now turn to the argument that truthmaker-gap epistemicism is incompatible with higher-order vagueness. 8. Perhaps such instances are never assertable, since they cannot be known. Nevertheless, such instances can be true. 9. The proofs are all straightforward, and so I omit them here. 4 3 Troubles with Higher-Order Vagueness My case against truthmaker-gap epistemicism will be that it is incompatible with higher-order vagueness. Higher-order vagueness is vagueness in whether some case of the form △A or ▽A holds. If rst-order vagueness is vagueness in whether x has property F, then second-order vagueness is vagueness in whether it is determinate or indeterminate that x has (or lacks) F. Where rst-order vagueness for 'red' gives us borderline cases of redness, second-order vagueness for 'redness' gives us borderline cases of borderline cases of redness.10 A theory that allows secondorder vagueness for a predicate 'F' must allow instances of ▽△Fx, ▽△¬Fx and ▽▽Fx.11 In general, a theory that allows for higher-order vagueness must allow instances of ▽△A and ▽▽A. All such instances lead to absurdity within truthmaker-gap epistemicism. I'll show that truthmaker-gap epistemicism veries the principle that whatever is determinate is determinately determinate: (DD) △A →△△A It is sometimes said that this principle alone rules out higher-order vagueness. But we need to be clear just what 'ruling out' means here. A theory with (DD) as a theorem can consistently contain '▽△A' and '▽▽A'.12 So (DD) does not rule out higher-order vagueness on logical consistency grounds. Rather, (DD) rules out higher-order vagueness by drawing absurd conclusions from any instance of '▽△A' or '▽▽A'. If ▽△A, then it should be open whether ⟨A⟩ is determinately true or indeterminate: both '▽△A∧△A' and '▽△A∧¬△A' should be consistent.13 But given (DD), '▽△A' is inconsistent with '△A' (for '▽△A' entails '¬△△A'). This is the sense in which (DD) rules out higher-order vagueness, and why (DD) 'is likely to be rejected in any plausible account of higher-order vagueness' (Williamson 1999, 134).14 The case against truthmaker-gap epistemicism, therefore, will be that it is committed to (DD), which is incompatible (in the sense just described) with higherorder vagueness. The argument, in outline, goes as follows. Whether a truth ⟨A⟩ 10. In such a case, it is indeterminate whether the patch is indeterminately red. It is either unsettled whether the patch is determinately or indeterminately red, or else unsettled whether the patch is determinately or indeterminately non-red. (Note that a patch is indeterminately non-red iff it is indeterminately red.) 11. Note that these are equivalent to ▽¬△Fx, ▽¬△¬Fx and ▽¬▽Fx, respectively. The nal sentence is also equivalent to ▽▽¬Fx and ▽¬▽¬Fx. 12. As Williamson (1999) shows, KT5 (=S5) is the weakest normal modal logic which permits vagueness whilst being inconsistent with higher-order vagueness. So KT4 (=S4), which is strictly weaker than KT5, is at least consistent with instances of higher-order vagueness. Truthmaker-gap epistemicism is at least as strong as KT4, but is weaker than KT5. My claim is that, whilst truthmaker-gap epistemicism is logically consistent with instances of higher order vagueness, it is nevertheless absurd to combine truthmaker-gap epistemicism with such instances. 13. This is not the case in every account vagueness, since some accounts deny that '▽A∧ A' can ever be true. But truthmaker-gap epistemicism is committed to such instances by its adherence to classical bivalence. 14. Indeed, Sorensen (2010, 399) explicitly rejects the principle '▽▽A →▽A', which is entailed by (DD). 5 is determinate or indeterminate turns on the existence of a truthmaker for ⟨A⟩, according to truthmaker-gap epistemicism. But existence is always a determinate matter, and whether some entity is a truthmaker for ⟨A⟩ is likewise always a determinate matter, according to truthmaker-gap epistemicism. Or so I claim: I'll argue for each of these premises in detail below. If we grant them, then it is always determinate whether a truthmaker for ⟨A⟩ exists. If ⟨A⟩ in fact has a truthmaker, then it is determinate that ⟨A⟩ has a truthmaker. But, given the truthmaker-gap analysis of determinacy, it follows that if ⟨A⟩ is determinate, it is determinately determinate: if △A then △△A, just as (DD) says. My aim in the next section, therefore, is to show that truthmaker-gap epistemicism is indeed committed to the two premises required by this argument. 4 The Incompatibility Argument My aim in this section is to establish the two claims made at the end of the previous section, that according to truthmaker-gap epistemicism: (DE) Existence is always a determinate matter: x exists →△x exists. (DT) Truthmaking is always a determinate matter: Tx⟨A⟩→△Tx⟨A⟩. The argument for (DE) is simple. Take any existential statement ⟨x exists⟩. Trivially, it depends for its truth on the existence of x. If x exists, then ⟨x exists⟩ is true and, moreover, is true in virtue of x's existence. In other words, the very entity that witnesses the truth of ⟨x exists⟩ is a truthmaker for that truth. These are paradigm cases of truthmaking. So, if x exists then ⟨x exists⟩ has a truthmaker. But if ⟨x exists⟩ has a truthmaker, then ⟨x exists⟩ is determinately true (according to truthmaker-gap epistemicism) and hence it is determinate that x exists. So if x exists, then it is determinate that x exists, just as (DE) says. The argument for (DT) requires a little more argument. In outline, the case is this. First, if x is a truthmaker for ⟨A⟩ then, necessarily, x is a truthmaker for ⟨A⟩ if x exists: (6) Tx⟨A⟩→ ◻(x exists → Tx⟨A⟩) Second, whatever is a necessary truth is a determinate truth: (7) ◻A →△A I'll argue below that truthmaker-gap epistemicism is committed to both (6) and (7). If so, we can argue for (TM) as follows. Assume that Tx⟨A⟩. By (6), we have ◻(x exists → Tx⟨A⟩) and so, by (7), we have △(x exists → Tx⟨A⟩). Given (△2), this entails that △x exists → △Tx⟨A⟩. Given our assumption that Tx⟨A⟩, we infer that x exists and hence, by (DE), △x exists. Modus ponens on the previous result then gives us △Tx⟨A⟩. Discharging the assumption, we have shown that if Tx⟨A⟩ then △Tx⟨A⟩, just as (DT) says. 6 Why should a truthmaker-gap epistemicist accept (6)? One reason is that it captures (part of) what most philosophers mean by truthmaking.15 As RodriguezPereyra (2006a, 188) notes, (6) is accepted by the majority of truthmaker theorists, including Armstrong (2004, 5), Cameron (2008, 28; 2007, 413, 421), Fox (1987, 189), Lewis (2003, 28), Restall (1996, 332) and Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006b, 332). Since truthmaker-gap epistemicism is supposed to appeal to the standard use of 'truthmaker', this is some (but clearly not conclusive) evidence in favour of (6). One might try to resist (6) by holding that the truth of a proposition depends on both the existence of a truthmaker and the way that truthmaker is. The truthmaker for ⟨Boris is fat⟩, on this view, is just Boris himself. But whether ⟨Boris is fat⟩ is true depends not only on Boris existing, but also on whether he is fat. Boris may exist and yet not be fat, in which case, he would not be a truthmaker for ⟨Boris is fat⟩. In general, on the view under consideration, whether some x is a truthmaker for ⟨A⟩ depends (in part) on how x is and so (in general) the truthmaking relation will not hold of necessity. The truthmaker-gap epistemicist cannot accept this notion of truthmaking. The view holds that Boris counts as a truthmaker for ⟨Boris is fat⟩ (according to world w) just in case he is fat (according to world w). But now suppose that Boris is fat. Then, on the view just sketched, Boris counts as a truthmaker for ⟨Boris is fat⟩. According to truthmaker-gap epistemicism, therefore, ⟨Boris is fat⟩ is determinately true (since it has a truthmaker). Discharging the assumption, we have show that: if Boris is fat, then it is determinate that Boris is fat. But a truthmaker-gap epistemicist cannot accept this conclusion, for she must allow for the possibility that Boris is fat but indeterminately so. Consequently, the truthmaker-gap epistemicist has to reject the view of truthmaking just sketched: she must accept that the relationship between truthmaker and proposition is a necessary one. In other words, she must accept (6). Why should a truthmaker-gap epistemicist accept (7)? Sorensen (2001, 173–4, 176) holds that non-a priori ungrounded truths are counterexamples to Bigelow's (1988) and Lewis's (1999) principle that truth supervenes on being. Sorensen calls such propositions epistemic islands: 'there is no access to [their] truth via a truthmaker' and so 'one cannot have objectively justied true belief[s]' in such propositions (2001, 175). This failure of supervenience (of the truths on the facts) entails that there are two possible worlds, alike with respect to the facts, which differ with respect to the truths. More precisely, for any borderline-F case x, there are possible worlds w and w′ alike with respect to the facts such that x is F according to w but non-F according to w′. The borderline between the Fs and the non-Fs shifts groundlessly between w and w′, according to Sorensen: it falls here or there but could easily have fallen elsewhere, even with all the worldly facts held constant. So if x is a borderline F (i.e., it's indeterminate whether x is F), then it could have been F and could have been non-F (without any of the worldly 15. By 'truthmaker for ⟨A⟩', Fox (1987, 189) means 'something whose very existence entails A'; Lewis (2003, 28) means an entity x such that 'every world where [x] exists is a world where [A] is true'; and Restall (1996, 332) means '[x] exists, and it is impossible that [x] exist without A'. Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006b, 961–2) argues that (6) must be true, 'otherwise, how could the proposition be true in virtue of the alleged truthmaker?'. 7 facts changing). The point generalises. If it is indeterminate whether A, then ⟨A⟩'s truth-value depends on where some particular borderline falls, but where that borderline falls is not itself xed by the facts. That ungrounded borderline could have fallen elsewhere without the worldly facts changing, in such a way as to affect ⟨A⟩'s truth-value: hence it is possible that A and also possible that ¬A. Consequently, ▽A → (◇A∧◇¬A). Contraposing, we have (◻¬A∨◻A)→ ¬▽A. Since '◻' is factive, we have ◻A → (A ∧ ¬▽A) and hence ◻A → △A, just as (7) says. A truthmaker-gap epistemicist must accept (6) and (7), and consequently is committed to (DT), as well as to (DE). The argument from (DT) and (DE) to (DD), sketched in §3, is then as follows. Assume △A. Given truthmakergap epistemicism, ⟨A⟩ has a truthmaker t, i.e. Tt⟨A⟩. Then (DT) entails that △Tt⟨A⟩ and, since t exists, (DE) entails that △t exists. From △Tt⟨A⟩∧△t exists we infer that △(Tt⟨A⟩ ∧ t exists).16 Given truthmaker-gap epistemicism, the embedded 'Tt⟨A⟩∧ t exists' entails '△A' and so we infer from△(Tt⟨A⟩∧ t exists) to △△A.17 Discharging the assumption, we have shown that, if △A then △△A, just as (DD) says. So truthmaker-gap epistemicism is indeed committed to (DD) and hence is incompatible with higher-order vagueness. 5 Denying Higher-Order Vagueness Truthmaker-gap epistemicism is committed to (DD) (§4), which rules out higherorder vagueness (§3): it is absurd to combine truthmaker-gap epistemicism with instances of higher order vagueness. As I argued in §1, this is a serious cost for Sorensen's general project of analysing vagueness in terms of absolute unknowability. Without truthmaker-gap epistemicism in play, Sorensen loses his explanation of why indeterminate truths are absolutely unknowable. An epistemicist must then say that something makes 'n nanoseconds after noon is noonish' true and 'n+1 nanoseconds after noon is noonish' false. Explaining what could possibly do this is a serious challenge for epistemicism. Perhaps epistemicism is plausible; perhaps not. The point here is that the epistemicist is left with the heavy burden of explaining what makes 'n nanoseconds after noon is noonish' true and 'n + 1 nanoseconds after noon is noonish' false for some value of n. What if an epistemicist, faced with this worry, wishes to adopt truthmaker-gap epistemicism whilst rejecting higher-order vagueness?18 She will then hold that there can be no instance of ▽△A or ▽▽A, and so (DD) will be rendered trivially true and hence unproblematic. Consequently, this move avoids the argument I've given above. Yet the move is not a good option, as I'll argue for the remainder of this section. 16. The inference is from '△(A ∧ B)' to '△A ∧△B', which holds in any normal modal logic and a fortiori holds according to truthmaker-gap epistemicism, given (△1) and (△2). 17. The inference is from A ⊢ B and '△A' to '△B', which again follows from (△1) and (△2). 18. This would be a somewhat strange move, since epistemicism is perhaps the best-placed theory of vagueness to accept higher-order vagueness (§1). 8 In accepting rst-order but not higher-order vagueness, one accepts a logic of '△' at least as strong as KT5 (Williamson 1999) and hence accepts the (E) principle: (E) ¬△A →△¬△A In terms of truthmaker-gap epistemicism, this says that for every lack of a truthmaker, the statement of that lack of truthmaker must itself have a truthmaker: (8) ¬∃xTx⟨A⟩→ ∃yGy⟨¬∃xTx⟨A⟩⟩ Consequently, every true statement concerning the existence or non-existence of a truthmaker must itself have a truthmaker. Questions of the existence or non-existence of facts cannot go ungrounded. What kind of general metaphysical view could support this claim? Presumably, the world of facts permits gaps with respect to the facts about Boris (according to truthmaker-gap epistemicism) because of the kind of physical being Boris is. In contrast to the number 1, or the set {∅,{∅}}, for instance, Boris can possess properties indeterminately and so the worldly facts may fail to answer certain meaningful questions about Boris. What goes for Boris goes for any other physical particulars and, presumably, also for physical events, physical qualities and so on. The picture would seem to be that there may be gaps in the facts concerning any physical entity. But not so, on the view under consideration: the one exception being facts about the physical facts themselves, which permit no gaps.19 This single exception to the general rule looks ad hoc. What is it about the nature of physical facts, as opposed to the natures of other physical entities, that permits no gaps in the facts about those entities? I don't see that any answer can be given. The worry becomes even more pressing if we think of physical facts as being composed of physical particulars and properties (Armstrong 2004). If there may be fact-gaps concerning physical particulars and properties, then surely there may also be fact-gaps concerning entities comprised of physical particulars and properties (including facts). But not so, on the view under consideration. To my mind, that makes the higher-order-vagueness-denying version of truthmaker-gap epistemicism an unappealing position to hold (even if it is in general plausible to deny that there is higher-order vagueness, which I doubt). This is, however, the only available version of truthmaker-gap epistemicism (§4). That's sufcient reason to reject truthmaker-gap epistemicism. 6 Conclusion Truthmaker-gap epistemicism tries to explain how there can be precise but unknowable cut-offs. For some n, 'n nanoseconds after noon is noonish' is true whilst 'n +1 nanoseconds after noon is noonish' is false. This can be so, according 19. Note that we have to think of these facts as physical entities, in order for them to play the right kind of worldly grounding role. 9 to truthmaker-gap epistemicism, because 'n nanoseconds after noon is noonish' is an ungrounded truth. But truthmaker-gap epistemicism is incompatible with higher-order vagueness: any instance of higher-order vagueness leads to absurdity within the truthmakergap epistemicist's theory (§4). This is a blow for Sorensen, who is explicit that there are instances of higher-order vagueness. The objection is not merely ad hominem, for it is highly plausible that Sorensen is correct in accepting higherorder vagueness. But even if not, truthmaker-gap epistemicism does not sit well with the denial of higher-order vagueness (§5). So either way, truthmaker-gap epistemicism is not a tenable analysis of vagueness. References Armstrong, D. (2004). Truth and Truthmakers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Bigelow, J. (1988). The reality of numbers: A physicalist's philosophy of mathematics, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Cameron, R. (2007). How to be a truthmaker maximalist, Nous 42(3): 410–421. Cameron, R. (2008). Truthmakers and necessary connections, Synthese 161(1): 27–45. Fox, J. (1987). Truthmaker, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65(2): 188–207. Greenough, P. (2008). Indeterminate truth, Midwest Studies In Philosophy 32(1): 213–241. Lewis, D. (1999). A world of truthmakers?, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge University Press, pp. 215–220. Lewis, D. (2003). Things qua truthmakers, in H. Lillehammer and G. Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds), Real Metaphysics, Routledge, London, pp. 25–38. Restall, G. (1996). Truthmakers, entailment and necessity, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(2): 331–40. Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2006a). Truthmakers, Philosophy Compass 1(2): 186–200. Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2006b). Truthmaking, entailment, and the conjunction thesis, Mind 115(460): 957–982. Sorensen, R. (1985). An argument for the vagueness of 'vague', Analysis 45(3): 134–137. Sorensen, R. (1988). Blindspots, Oxford University Press, New York. Sorensen, R. (1994). A thousand clones, Mind 103(409): 47–54. Sorensen, R. (2001). Vagueness and Contradiction, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Sorensen, R. (2005). A reply to critics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(3): 712–728. Sorensen, R. (2010). Borderline hermaphrodites: Higher-order vagueness by example, Mind 119(474): 393–408. 10 Williamson, T. (1994). Vagueness, Routledge, London. Williamson, T. (1999). On the structure of higher-order vagueness, Mind 108(429): 127– 143.

Mill y Marx: dos visiones de la libertad1 Mill and Marx: two visions of freedom César Augusto Mora Alonso Escuela Normal Superior de Cartagena de Indias/ Universidad de Cartagena Giovanni Mafiol de la Ossa Universidad de Cartagena Resumen Este texto analiza las concepciones que J. S. Mill y K. Marx defienden sobre la libertad, con el fin de establecer si entre ellas hay puntos de convergencia, a pesar de las diferentes motivaciones que las impulsan. En este sentido, la tesis que se propone es que ambos pensadores coinciden en la defensa que realizan de la libertad, dado que le otorgan un papel destacado a la autodeterminación, el libre desarrollo de la individuali1 Este trabajo ha sido el resultado de la participación en dos eventos dedicados a homenajear la vida y obra de John Stuart Mill, a saber: Simposio John Stuart Mill: vigencia y legado de su pensamiento filosófico y V Congreso Internacional y VIII Nacional de Filosofía del Derecho, Ética y Política. Este tuvo lugar en la Sede Candelaria de la Universidad Libre (Bogotá) del 26 al 28 de agosto de 2015; aquel, entre tanto, se desarrolló en Tunja, en las instalaciones de la Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia (UPTC), los días 24 y 25 de agosto del mismo año. César Augusto Mora Alonso, Giovanni Mafiol de la Ossa104 dad y a la existencia de condiciones materiales para su concreción. Así las cosas, las distancias que las separan no constituyen ningún óbice al momento de abogar por lo que consideran como el valor fundamental del ser humano. Palabras clave: Mill, Marx, libertad, autodeterminación, libre desarrollo de la individualidad Abstract This paper analyzes the conceptions that J. S. Mill and K. Marx expresses on freedom, in order to establish whether there are convergence points among them, despite their different purposes. In this regard, we affirm that both thinkers agree on their defense of freedom, since they give a prominent role to self-determination, the free development of individuality and the existence of material conditions for its concretion. Thus, the distances that separate them are no obstacle, when advocating for what they consider as the fundamental value of the human being. Key words: Mill, Marx, freedom, self-determination, free development of individuality Una relación complicada No cabe duda de que la influencia de John Stuart Mill y Karl Marx ha sido decisiva en la filosofía y política contemporáneas. Ambos, a su manera, se destacaron por la promoción de sociedades libres y democráticas. El primero buscaba blindar al individuo de los abusos del poder estatal y, sobre todo, de la tiranía que ejercen las tradiciones y costumbres sociales, mientras que el segundo tenía como propósito la emancipación de la humanidad del yugo alienante del modo de producción capitalista. Con esto, aspiraba a una sociedad en la que el libre desarrollo de cada cual terminara por convertirse en una condición indispensable para el libre desarrollo de todos. Mill y Marx: dos visiones de la libertad 105 Sin embargo, buscar puntos de convergencia entre Mill y Marx puede que de entrada no sea una tarea sencilla, ya que en el primer volumen de El Capital las críticas y los ataques que se dirigen contra el filósofo inglés destacan por su implacabilidad. En efecto, allí se dice que es un presumido –"se proclama a sí mismo como el Adam Smith de los tiempos presentes" (1981: 89)– cuyas investigaciones no son profundas ni significativas, por la razón de que se limitan a repetir, pero a repetir mal, los alegatos endebles de los primeros divulgadores de David Ricardo (1981: 463). Básicamente, Marx se refiere a Mill en los siguientes términos: Después de demostrarnos con la claridad que hemos visto cómo la producción capitalista existiría siempre, aunque no existiera, Mill es lo bastante consecuente para probar que este régimen de producción no existe ni aun cuando existe: "Y aun en el caso anterior [cuando el capitalista adelanta al obrero todos sus medios de subsistencia] el obrero puede ser considerado bajo el mismo punto de vista, es decir, como capitalista. Pues, al suministrar su trabajo por un precio inferior al del mercado, [¡] puede entenderse que adelanta a su patrono la diferencia [!] etc.". En realidad, el obrero adelanta al capitalista su trabajo gratis durante una semana, etc., para percibir al final de la semana, etc., su precio en el mercado; y esto convierte al obrero, según Mill, ¡en capitalista! En tierra llana hasta un montón de arena puede parecer una colina; por el calibre de sus "personajes intelectuales" podemos medir todo el adocenamiento en que ha caído la burguesía (1981: 465)2. A pesar de ello, Marx reconoce que Mill es consciente tanto de la situación precaria del proletariado como de la legitimidad de sus aspiraciones, y que por eso se esfuerza por conciliar las exigencias de esta clase con los postulados esenciales de la economía política capitalista. De ahí que lo 2 Salvo indicación expresa, corresponden a los autores mencionados todas las comillas, cursivas y corchetes que aparezcan dentro de las citas. César Augusto Mora Alonso, Giovanni Mafiol de la Ossa106 considere no como un simple sofista y sicofanta de la clase dominante, sino como un hombre que desea obtener cierta importancia científica, motivo por el cual merece que no se le ubique en la misma cohorte de los economistas vulgares y apologéticos3. El problema es que Marx considera que esta propuesta –la de armonizar las reivindicaciones de la causa obrera con los principios del capitalismo– termina en un vacuo sincretismo que concilia lo inconciliable, y que representa, en últimas, "la declaración en quiebra de la economía "burguesa" (1981: XVI). Por su parte, en la obra de Mill no se encuentran comentarios despectivos de la personalidad o los escritos de Marx; es más, es posible que no exista ninguna alusión explícita de carácter positivo o negativo sobre él. Lo más probable es que Mill no haya estudiado sus trabajos y, en caso de que los hubiera leído, no fueron, a lo mejor, lo suficientemente significativos como para referenciarlos. Es cierto que Mill en su Autobiografía (2008) se denomina socialista. De hecho, su política económica rechaza el monopolio capitalista de los medios de producción y promueve impuestos redistributivos de la riqueza destinados al desarrollo de obras sociales benéficas; pero la verdad es que sus posiciones, en este sentido, están más cercanas al "socialismo utópico" que al "socialismo científico". Además, en Sobre la libertad, expresa sus reservas contra ciertas actitudes de los movimientos socialistas y de masas. Una de ellas, quizá la más grave, es la de imponer la opinión mayoritaria. La razón estriba en que esta tendencia o sentimiento democrático puede coartar los dos requisitos indispensables para el despliegue del potencial humano, a saber: la libertad y la variedad de situaciones; lo que conduce, inevitablemente, a 3 De hecho, en el primer volumen de El Capital, en el capítulo titulado "Conversión de la plusvalía en capital", se cita un pasaje de Principios de economía política de Mill para ilustrar la miseria de los obreros: "Hoy día, el producto de trabajo se divide en razón inversa al trabajo: la parte mayor va a parar a los que nunca han trabajado, la siguiente a aquellos cuyo trabajo casi es puramente nominal, y así, descendiendo en la escala, la recompensa va haciéndose menor y menor a medida que el trabajo se hace más duro y más desagradable, hasta llegar al trabajo físico más fatigoso y agotador, que a veces no rinde siquiera lo estrictamente necesario para vivir" (Mill, citado por Marx, 1981: 555). Mill y Marx: dos visiones de la libertad 107 la uniformidad de los individuos. A juicio de Mill, el modo en que tales movimientos acometen dicha uniformidad es a través de la elevación de las clases bajas y el rebajamiento de las altas (2014: 142, 162-163). Otro pasaje da cuenta del proceder pernicioso de muchos miembros de la clase trabajadora: Solo tenemos que suponer una considerable difusión de las ideas socialistas, con lo cual se volverá intolerable a los ojos de la mayoría poseer una propiedad que vaya más allá de una pequeña cuantía, o algún ingreso que no se haya ganado mediante el trabajo manual. En principio, opiniones como estas prevalecen ya ampliamente entre la clase artesana, y pesan de una manera opresiva sobre los que están sujetos principalmente a la opinión de dicha clase, esto es, sus propios miembros. Es sabido que los malos trabajadores, que constituyen la mayoría de los operarios en muchas ramas de la industria, son de la firme opinión de que deberían recibir los mismos salarios que los buenos, y que no se debería permitir a nadie, a través del trabajo a destajo o de otro modo, ganar a causa de una mayor habilidad o aplicación más que otros que no las tengan. Y emplean una policía moral, que en ocasiones se convierte en física, para impedir que los trabajadores hábiles reciban, y que los patrones les den una remuneración superior por un servicio más útil (2014: 162-163). Aun así, pese a las distancias que en este sentido hay entre ambos autores, consideramos que es posible establecer puntos de convergencia entre ellos. Los nexos podrían hallarse en la defensa que realizan de la libertad, pues la autodeterminación y el libre desarrollo de la individualidad son los imperativos éticos que definen sus reflexiones filosóficas. Por ello, nuestro propósito aquí es poner de relieve las coincidencias que estas dos visiones presentan a la hora de promover sociedades democráticas, en las que los individuos puedan desarrollar plenamente sus proyectos de vida, sin la interferencia de poderes externos. Para eso, primero se hace necesario abordar por separado cada una de estas propuestas; luego, reconocer sus César Augusto Mora Alonso, Giovanni Mafiol de la Ossa108 diferencias y, finalmente, lograr apreciar los puentes que, en relación con la libertad, se pueden construir entre Mill y Marx. Marx y su visión de la libertad4 En la obra de Marx, el tema de la libertad aparece estrechamente vinculado al de la revolución comunista, ya que su objetivo es la liberación de las grandes mayorías de la explotación y miseria a la que las somete el capitalismo. En el fondo, lo que se busca es el establecimiento de una sociedad en la que se hayan franqueado las barreras que impiden la autorrealización humana. La idea es que cada quien pueda desarrollar libremente su individualidad y contribuir, al mismo tiempo, al fomento de la de sus semejantes. En suma, la sociedad comunista sería aquella en la que el libre desarrollo de uno termina siendo la condición fundamental para el libre desarrollo de todos (Marx y Engels, 1998: 67). Uno de los medios para alcanzar la liberación es la crítica tajante del statu quo. De acuerdo con Marx, esta crítica debe caracterizarse por la indignación y la denuncia (2012: 50), así que su tarea estriba en "desenmascarar la enajenación del hombre en su forma profana" (2012: 48). En este orden de ideas, también tiene como propósito el hacer que los explotados tengan conciencia de la condición en la que se hallan. En últimas, lo que se persigue es la transformación del ser humano en lo más valioso, al cumplir con la obligación moral de erradicar todos los factores que lo oprimen y esclavizan (2012: 54-55). A juicio de Marx, la explotación del hombre por el hombre se presenta porque las relaciones de producción del sistema capitalista generan y 4 La mayor parte de esta sección retoma los argumentos de un artículo titulado "Sobre la idea de justicia en Marx", de la autoría de César Augusto Mora Alonso (2017), que aparece publicado en Cuestiones de Filosofía, 3(21), 45-63. Revista de carácter semestral, editada por la Escuela de Filosofía y Humanidades de la Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia (UPTC). Mill y Marx: dos visiones de la libertad 109 sostienen una división entre la minoría que posee los medios de producción y la mayoría, que únicamente tiene la fuerza de trabajo para poder sobrevivir. La cuestión radica en que estos trabajadores –pese a toda la opulencia que generan– se encuentran en la más absoluta miseria. De ahí que Marx afirme que se hallan en estado de enajenación, pues sus actividades laborales son forzadas, lo que se traduce en la ausencia de dominio sobre sus propias vidas. De lo que se trata, entonces, es de acabar con el trabajo que enajena, para darle lugar al trabajo que libera, que humaniza (Marx, 1985). Es por esto que la idea de "emancipación humana" ocupa un lugar destacado en el proyecto liberador de Marx. En Sobre la cuestión judía (2008), dicha idea se presenta de la siguiente manera: Toda emancipación es la recuperación del mundo humano, de las relaciones, al hombre mismo. La emancipación política es la reducción del hombre, de una parte, a miembro de la sociedad burguesa, al individuo egoísta independiente y, de otra, al ciudadano del Estado, a la persona moral. Solo cuando el hombre individual real recupera en sí al ciudadano abstracto y se convierte como hombre individual en ser genérico, en su trabajo individual y en sus relaciones individuales, solo cuando el hombre ha reconocido y organizado sus forces propres como fuerzas sociales y cuando, por tanto, no separa ya de sí la fuerza social en forma de fuerza política, solo entonces se lleva a cabo la emancipación humana (2008: 196-197). No obstante, es el mismo proletariado el que debe realizar esta emancipación, puesto que es el que más padece, por cuanto es una clase "con cadenas radicales (...) al que su sufrimiento universal le confiere un carácter universal; que no reclama un derecho especial, ya que no es una injusticia especial la que padece, sino la injusticia a secas (...)" (2012: 59). Este es el motivo por el cual Marx considera que la emancipación de la clase trabajadora solo puede darse en el momento en que se libere de –pero también libere a– los sectores sociales restantes, por la razón de que dicha César Augusto Mora Alonso, Giovanni Mafiol de la Ossa110 clase representa "la pérdida total del hombre y (...) solo recuperándolo totalmente puede ganarse a sí misma" (2012: 59). Por eso es que todas las miradas de Marx apuntan a la autorrealización (Selbstbestimmung), que concibe como la capacidad que tiene cada persona para determinar su propia vida, al desplegar –completa y voluntariamente– todas sus aptitudes. Sin embargo, aclara que esto solamente se dará una vez que hayan sido destruidas la división del trabajo y las contradicciones de clase. Lo que abrirá las puertas a un nuevo tipo de organización social, en la que se establece que el libre desarrollo de todos depende en gran medida del libre desarrollo de cada uno (Marx y Engels, 1998: 67). Marx denomina comunista a ese nuevo tipo de organización social. En ella, todos sus miembros trabajan de manera libre y voluntaria, al ya no estar enajenados por el trabajo forzado. En ese sentido, la regulación de las condiciones de producción hace posible "que yo pueda dedicarme hoy a esto y mañana a aquello, que pueda por la mañana cazar, por la tarde pescar y por la noche apacentar el ganado y, después de comer, si me place, dedicarme a criticar, sin necesidad de ser exclusivamente cazador, pescador, pastor o crítico, según los casos" (Marx y Engels, 1994: 46). En función de este panorama, Marx introduce la célebre distinción entre el "reino de la necesidad" y el "reino de la libertad". En el tercer volumen de El Capital (1981), concretamente en el capítulo XLVIII de la sección séptima, asegura lo siguiente: En efecto, el reino de la libertad solo empieza allí donde termina el trabajo impuesto por la necesidad y por la coacción de los fines externos: queda, pues, conforme a la naturaleza de la cosa, más allá de la órbita de la verdadera producción material. Así como el salvaje tiene que luchar con la naturaleza para satisfacer sus necesidades, para encontrar el sustento de su vida y reproducirla, el hombre civilizado tiene que hacer lo mismo, bajo todas las formas sociales y bajo todos los posibles sistemas de producción. A medida que se desarrolla, desarrollándose Mill y Marx: dos visiones de la libertad 111 con él sus necesidades, se extiende este reino de la necesidad natural, pero, al mismo tiempo, se extienden también las fuerzas productivas que satisfacen aquellas necesidades. La libertad, en este terreno, solo puede consistir en que el hombre socializado, los productores asociados, regulen racionalmente este intercambio de materias con la naturaleza, lo pongan bajo su control común, en vez de dejarse dominar por él como un poder ciego, y lo lleven a cabo con el menor gasto posible de fuerzas y en las condiciones más adecuadas y más dignas de su naturaleza humana. Pero, con todo ello, siempre seguirá siendo este un reino de la necesidad. Al otro lado de sus fronteras comienza el despliegue de las fuerzas humanas que se considera como fin en sí, el verdadero reino de la libertad que, sin embargo, solo puede florecer tomando como base aquel reino de la necesidad. La condición fundamental para ello es la reducción de la jornada de trabajo (1981: 826-827). Así las cosas, la sociedad comunista vendría a ser la concreción de este "reino de la libertad". En su seno, cada quien podrá realizar libremente su individualidad, debido a la desaparición de los obstáculos que impedían el desarrollo total de las potencialidades humanas. Por lo tanto, las riendas estarán sueltas para la realización integral de los distintos proyectos personales de vida. En suma, emancipación, libertad y autorrealización son los imperativos éticos que definen el pensamiento de Marx. En estos, la humanidad encuentra su carácter genérico (Marx, 1985). Además, en un artículo de la Gaceta Renana, titulado "Los debates sobre la libertad de prensa y sobre la publicación de las sesiones de la Dieta", deja claro lo que representa la libertad. Sobre ella afirma lo siguiente: La libertad es en tal grado la esencia del hombre que incluso sus enemigos la realizan al combatir su realidad, tratando de adueñarse como de la joya más preciosa de aquello que rechazan como joya de la naturaleza humana. Ningún ser humano combate la libertad, lo que combate es a lo sumo la libertad de los otros. Por lo tanto, siempre ha existido una César Augusto Mora Alonso, Giovanni Mafiol de la Ossa112 forma de libertad, solo que en un caso como prerrogativa especial y en otro como derecho general (1983: 75). Pese a ello, lo que Marx asume como libertad no puede ser identificado sin más con la concepción que de ella tiene la tradición liberal, por cuanto esta última –con su divisa de hacer y deshacer, siempre y cuando no se perjudique al otro, y cuya aplicación práctica se concreta en el derecho de la propiedad privada– termina por convertir a las personas en mónadas aisladas y replegadas. En una sociedad en la que reina la desunión y el egoísmo, lo que puede encontrar un individuo en otro no es la materialización, sino más bien la limitación de su libertad (Marx, 2008: 190-191)5. De ahí que el ejercicio de esta únicamente sea posible en lo que Marx llama comunidad (Gemeinschaft), dado que en ella el ser humano despliega toda su naturaleza social y cooperativa (Marx, 1985); lo que posibilita que la expresión individual de una vida no deje por fuera la de los demás, pues en las relaciones sociales debe prevalecer, ante todo, la solidaridad, y no el provecho particular por cuenta del perjuicio colectivo. No obstante, esto no constituye un impedimento para el desarrollo de los proyectos personales de vida, en razón de que el comunismo se caracterizaría por ser una asociación de hombres y mujeres libres en actividad libre, en la que representaría una condición necesaria para el libre desarrollo de todos, el libre desarrollo de cada cual (Marx y Engels, 1998: 67). 5 No cabe duda de que Marx observaba con desconfianza las "libertades burguesas", como consecuencia de su íntima relación con el egoísmo y el lucro individual, pero, como lo advierte acertadamente G. Restrepo (1999), es innegable que Marx reconoce la importancia y el sentido de estas libertades, si se confrontan con las restricciones a la libertad que se imponían en la Edad Media. Además, él es consciente de la función que cumplen en las reivindicaciones de la clase proletaria por dignificar sus condiciones de trabajo y, ante todo, por el establecimiento de las condiciones propicias para el arribo de la "verdadera libertad". Nuevamente, G. Restrepo acierta al destacar que el Manifiesto comunista arremete contra los derechos económicos (libertades de empresa, contratación y apropiación), pero que no ocurre igual con los derechos individuales y políticos (libertades de pensamiento, expresión y asociación). Mill y Marx: dos visiones de la libertad 113 J. S. Mill y su visión de la libertad Mill, en Sobre la libertad, declara con preocupación que se experimenta, en su época, una fuerte tendencia a aumentar el dominio de la sociedad sobre la vida de las personas; y que esto se hace a través de dos poderes diferentes, pero que aparecen íntimamente vinculados, a saber: la legislación y la opinión (2014: 64). Por eso, en esta obra, tiene como propósito determinar hasta dónde debe llegar la jurisdicción de estos poderes, en lo que respecta a la autonomía o independencia individual, dado que es preciso establecer con claridad la proporción entre el control social legítimo y el ámbito de las libertades individuales. Un tema en el que Mill considera que queda todo por hacer y que se revela "como la cuestión vital del futuro" (2014: 47). Esto, para el filósofo inglés, reviste suma importancia porque la soberanía popular tiene la facilidad de convertirse en tiranía de la mayoría, al desear oprimir a una parte de la sociedad o a aquellos individuos que no se adaptan a los patrones establecidos. Mill advierte que esta opresión se da cuando –al margen de las decisiones gubernamentales– la sociedad impone dictámenes en asuntos que no son de su competencia. Y si bien estos dictámenes no se ejecutan mediante graves castigos, sí son muy efectivos, pues consiguen ejercer presión sobre los aspectos más íntimos de la vida personal. Por esta razón afirma lo siguiente: Se necesita también protección contra la tiranía de imponer opiniones y sentimientos; contra la tendencia de la sociedad a imponer, por otros medios diferentes a las sanciones civiles, sus propias ideas y prácticas como reglas de conducta sobre aquellos que disienten de ellas; contra la tendencia a coartar el desarrollo y, si es posible, impedir la formación de cualquier individualidad que no esté en armonía con sus costumbres, obligando a todos los caracteres a formarse a sí mismos sobre el modelo de la propia sociedad (2014: 52). César Augusto Mora Alonso, Giovanni Mafiol de la Ossa114 En función de todo lo anterior, Mill plantea el principio de la libertad. Este proclama que no debe existir interferencia de ninguna índole en lo que concierne a los intereses particulares del individuo, por la razón de que estos aspectos de su vida y su conducta solo le pueden afectar a él. Mill llama a esto "la región propia de la libertad humana" (2014: 61). Una región sagrada que no debe ser vulnerada por los poderes estatales y sociales. En ella, la espontaneidad individual aparece de tres maneras: como libertad de pensamiento y expresión, como libertad de gustos e inclinaciones y como libertad de asociación. El filósofo inglés advierte que una sociedad que no respete estas libertades no puede ser denominada libre, independientemente de su sistema político; "y ninguna es completamente libre si [tales libertades] no existen en ella de forma incondicional y absoluta" (2014: 62)6. No obstante, Mill sostiene que, en ciertos casos, tanto el Estado como la sociedad se encuentran legitimados para imponer restricciones sobre la libertad de acción de una persona. Estos casos son aquellos en los que se puede ver amenazada la integridad de uno o varios miembros de la comunidad, lo que quiere decir que únicamente se debe actuar en contra de la voluntad de alguien con el fin de salvaguardar a los otros de un inminente daño. Y en el evento de que el daño se haya consumado, aparecen todos los motivos para sancionarlo legal o moralmente. De acuerdo con Mill, la única dimensión de la espontaneidad individual que debe estar sujeta al control externo es la que atañe a sus semejantes; en las demás, o sea, en las que son de estricta incumbencia personal, ningún otro tiene potestad (2014: 58 y 60). Este es el famoso principio de daño7. A juicio del filósofo inglés, todo aquello que apunta a la destrucción de la individualidad merece que se le llame despotismo (2014: 130). Este se 6 Los corchetes son nuestros. 7 Dicho en palabras de J. S. Mill: "El único aspecto de la conducta por el que se puede responsabilizar a alguien frente a la sociedad es aquel que concierne a otros. En aquello que le concierne únicamente a él, su independencia es absoluta. Sobre sí mismo, sobre su propio cuerpo y su propia mente, el individuo es soberano" (2014: 58). Mill y Marx: dos visiones de la libertad 115 vale de la represión y la censura para llevar a cabo dicho cometido. Por eso, en Sobre la libertad, se realiza una defensa categórica de la libertad de pensamiento y discusión, ya que de ambas depende el bienestar mental del individuo, condición básica de los demás tipos de bienestar (2014: 115). El mérito de Mill, con esta defensa, es el haber desarrollado una metodología rigurosa para que la libertad se exprese en términos efectivos (Silva et al, 2007). La individualidad, la pluralidad, el debate y la crítica se presentan como los antídotos que contrarrestan el dogmatismo y la intolerancia de los arbitrarios. Aquí también resultan ganadoras las diversas disciplinas del conocimiento. El diálogo y la argumentación son las herramientas para alcanzar y preservar la verdad. Pero si todas las personas poseen el derecho a pensar y expresar lo que quieran, ¿por qué, entonces, no pueden tener la libertad de conducir sus vidas de acuerdo con las ideas que profesan? Para Mill, la libertad de gustos e inclinaciones aparece aquí como la consecuencia natural y práctica de la libertad de conciencia y opinión. De hecho, la libertad de conducta es la que permite que la individualidad se afirme a sí misma a través de su propio desarrollo; de ahí que la considere como uno de los principios esenciales del bienestar, como "el ingrediente fundamental del progreso individual y social" (2014: 120). En efecto, el libre desarrollo de la individualidad es lo que permite que cada persona despliegue todas sus capacidades al máximo y vea en su existencia algo valioso, dado que, al autoafirmarse, puede alcanzar un alto grado de satisfacción. Ello, en palabras de Mill, tiene repercusiones positivas en la sociedad, porque cuando hay mayor plenitud de vida en las personas, "hay también más vida en el conjunto que está compuesto por ellas" (2014: 129); lo que, indudablemente, sienta las bases para el logro de la justicia social. El principio utilitarista –que propende al máximo de bienestar para el mayor número– debe allanar el terreno para que las personas desarrollen, por completo y sin restricciones, sus facultades morales e intelectuales. La libertad se presenta, entonces, como la fuente permanente e inagotable del desarrollo social (2014: 138-139). César Augusto Mora Alonso, Giovanni Mafiol de la Ossa116 Así pues, la libertad en Mill no es una formalidad, un mero derecho político abstracto. Tampoco se reduce a la justificación para no intervenir en los asuntos que forman parte de la esfera privada del individuo; en otras palabras, no representa una simple vindicación del concepto negativo de libertad, entendido como alejamiento de los demás. Si bien para el filósofo inglés este resulta relevante, la verdad es que se halla en función del concepto positivo de libertad (Ruiz Sanjuán, 2014: 34), puesto que lo crucial en su obra es la autorrealización, el libre desarrollo de la individualidad, el despliegue máximo de las facultades de la persona. Aquí residen los pilares del bienestar y la felicidad. De ahí que Mill sostenga que su defensa de la individualidad no sea una apología del egoísmo y la indiferencia social, que pretenda que a los seres humanos no les importe la vida de los demás, a menos que estén en juego sus propios intereses. Por el contrario, considera que lo indispensable para fomentar el bienestar social es la cooperación y el aumento del esfuerzo desinteresado (2014: 146). Por ello, Mill hace tanto hincapié en la idea de que una sociedad que garantice la libertad debe brindar las condiciones materiales para que los individuos se autodeterminen, ya que la pobreza y la ausencia de derechos sociales representan serios obstáculos para llevar a cabo ese propósito (Ruiz Sanjuán, 2014: 35). Bajo estas circunstancias, el principio de la utilidad sería una quimera. Divergencias y convergencias Es indiscutible que Mill y Marx coinciden en el momento de realizar una defensa a ultranza de la libertad. A primera vista, sin embargo, las motivaciones de cada uno en esta cuestión parecen ser distintas, pues, en el caso de Mill, se busca determinar "la naturaleza y los límites del poder que la sociedad puede ejercer legítimamente sobre el individuo" (2014: 47). Su finalidad es protegerlo de la tiranía que ejerce el Estado y la opinión pública a través de las tradiciones y las costumbres. En el caso de Marx, entre tanto, la intención es emancipar a la humanidad de la opresión capitalista Mill y Marx: dos visiones de la libertad 117 para establecer el comunismo. Un tipo de sociedad que representaría "el verdadero reino de la libertad", en la medida en que el libre desarrollo de cada uno sería la base para el libre desarrollo de todos. Esto significa que en el pensamiento de Marx la libertad real solo puede surgir con una revolución que destruya los fundamentos políticos y económicos de la sociedad del capital. Las cosas no son así en la propuesta de Mill, dado que no se necesita la destrucción del aparato estatal ni de la economía que lo sustenta para garantizar los derechos y las libertades individuales; de hecho, es el Estado el que los propicia y mantiene. Además, Mill muestra sus simpatías con la doctrina del libre cambio, "que descansa sobre una base diferente –aunque igualmente sólida– que el principio de la libertad individual (...)" (2014: 173). Marx, por el contrario, ve al Estado como un órgano de dominación que ofrece libertades en un plano meramente formal, y que desaparecerá en la etapa suprema del comunismo, pues, con la desaparición de los antagonismos de clase, ya no será necesario un sistema artificial que concilie los intereses en conflicto. El desarrollo de la productividad y de las condiciones de trabajo establecerá un régimen de abundancia que fomentará el libre desarrollo de la individualidad de cada uno de los asociados (1977: 12). En suma, para Marx, la libertad verdadera es la meta o el resultado de la revolución proletaria, mientras que, para Mill, es un derecho o conquista histórica que no se debe perder, sino que hay que maximizar a través del despliegue continuo de las distintas individualidades y de la sociedad en su conjunto. A juicio del filósofo inglés, la expresión de la libertad es la fuente permanente e inagotable de desarrollo de las sociedades actuales. No obstante, pese a las diferencias, es posible encontrar puntos en común entre ambas visiones de la libertad. Uno de ellos, quizá el principal, es la idea de que los individuos puedan desarrollar a plenitud sus proyectos de vida, sin la interferencia de poderes externos. A pesar de ello, tanto en Mill como en Marx, la libertad no se expresa simplemente en términos César Augusto Mora Alonso, Giovanni Mafiol de la Ossa118 negativos, es decir, como ausencia de obstáculos que coaccionan la personalidad. Para ellos, ante todo, la libertad es sinónimo de autorrealización: el hecho de que cada quien, al ser dueño de su propia voluntad, sea responsable de su propia existencia. Los dos estiman que la libertad es lo distintivo del ser humano. Gracias a su puesta en práctica, este puede dar rienda suelta a toda su naturaleza social y cooperativa. La autoafirmación de cada una de las individuales impacta positivamente a la sociedad en su conjunto. En ambos, por tanto, hay un rechazo rotundo del egoísmo y la indiferencia. De igual manera, ponen el acento en la existencia de condiciones materiales para garantizar una verdadera libertad. Otro punto de convergencia es la defensa que realizan de la libertad de pensamiento y expresión. A partir de aquí se pueden tender puentes entre el segundo capítulo de Sobre la libertad y los artículos publicados por Marx en la Gaceta Renana; en especial, el "Editorial del n. ° 179 de la Gaceta de Colonia", las "Observaciones sobre las recientes instrucciones para la censura en Prusia" y "Los debates sobre la libertad de prensa y sobre la publicación de las sesiones de la Dieta". En estos escritos, Marx rechaza la censura y defiende, por consiguiente, la idea de tratar en los periódicos temas de cualquier índole. Asegura que la censura es un monstruo civilizado o un aborto perfumado, mientras que la prensa libre representa la expresión de la esencia de la libertad. Aquí, al igual que Mill, confía en que la libertad de discusión y el debate público son la puerta de acceso a la verdad y el desarrollo social. No podemos concluir sin preguntar si aún se mantienen vigentes las reflexiones que estos dos pensadores realizan sobre la libertad. Sin embargo, no resulta tan sencillo responder inmediatamente que sí. La razón estriba en que han sido ampliamente cuestionados los modelos políticos que sustentan sus propuestas. Una razón suficiente para pensar en una noción de libertad que rescate lo mejor de ambas. Sin lugar a dudas, una tarea necesaria, pero de largo aliento. Mill y Marx: dos visiones de la libertad 119 No obstante, no se debe soslayar el hecho de que Mill y Marx llegan a un mismo resultado, a pesar de haber asumido el problema con perspectivas muy distintas. Como dijimos, el quid está en la apuesta por la autodeterminación, el libre desarrollo de la individualidad y la existencia de condiciones materiales para concretarlas. Es aquí donde, a nuestro parecer, estas propuestas continúan vigentes en una sociedad como la colombiana, en la que la pobreza y la desigualdad impiden que un gran sector de la población disfrute de las libertades y derechos que consagra su constitución política. Por eso, como lo hicieron estos pensadores, hay que ejercer una defensa categórica de la libertad, ya que en estos momentos se nota más que nunca que está siendo reducida a un simple formalismo. Una prueba de ello está en las restricciones que impone el nuevo código de policía y en las presiones que grupos políticos y religiosos influyentes ejercen contra las minorías, la pluralidad y la diversidad. De ahí que aún resulte pertinente la defensa que Mill ejerce, dado que nos da la clave para oponernos a las arbitrariedades y a las imposiciones restrictivas que hacen de la libertad una simple aspiración. Lo mismo sucede con Marx, puesto que, sin unas condiciones materiales adecuadas, es imposible que la libertad se concrete de manera efectiva. En definitiva, para que no sean más que un anhelo, el llamado de ambos es a seguir luchando por las libertades. César Augusto Mora Alonso, Giovanni Mafiol de la Ossa120 Referencias bibliográficas MARX, Karl. (1977). Crítica del programa de Gotha. Moscú: Editorial Progreso. MARX, Karl. (1981). El Capital. (Vols. I y III). La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales. MARX, Karl. (1983). Los debates sobre la libertad de prensa y sobre la publicación de las sesiones de la Dieta. En J. L. Vermal (Ed.). En defensa de la libertad. Los artículos de la Gaceta Renana (1842-1843). (pp. 49-102). Valencia: Fernando Torres-Editor. MARX, Karl. (1985). Manuscritos de economía y filosofía. Madrid: Alianza. MARX, Karl., y ENGELS, Friedrich. (1994). La ideología alemana. Valencia: Universitat de València. MARX, Karl., y ENGELS, Friedrich. (1998). Manifiesto comunista. Barcelona: Crítica. MARX, Karl. (2008). Sobre la cuestión judía. En R. Jaramillo Vélez (Ed.). Escritos de juventud sobre el derecho. Textos 1837-1847. (pp. 171-204). Barcelona: Anthropos. MARX, Karl. (2012). Para una crítica de la filosofía del derecho de Hegel. Introducción. En F. Groni (Ed.). Páginas malditas. Sobre la cuestión judía y otros textos. (pp. 47-60). Buenos Aires: Libros de Anarres. MILL, John Stuart. (2008). Autobiografía. Madrid: Alianza. MILL, John Stuart. (2014). Sobre la libertad. Madrid: Akal. MORA ALONSO, César Augusto. (2017). Sobre la idea de justicia en Marx. Cuestiones de Filosofía, 3(21), 45-63. Tunja: UPTC. RESTREPO, Guillermo. (1999). Ética y libertad en Marx. En J. Caycedo y J. Estrada (Comps.). Marx vive. (pp. 139-153). Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Mill y Marx: dos visiones de la libertad 121 RUIZ SANJUÁN, César. (2014). La libertad en el pensamiento político de John Stuart Mill. En C. Ruiz Sanjuán (Ed.). Mill, J. S. Sobre la libertad. (pp. 5-40). Madrid: Akal. SILVA, Alonso., MALDONADO, Jorge., y AGUIRRE, Javier. (2007). Individualidad, pluralidad y libertad de expresión en J. S. Mill. Praxis filosófica, (24), 115-135. Cali: Universidad del Valle.

Patrimônio etnobotânico: a feira livre Meg Stalcup* Resumo O trabalho analisa o patrimônio etnobotânico da feira livre, com base em um estudo feito no bairro da Tijuca, na cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Durante dois anos de trabalho de campo com quatro ervatários, que tinham média de 15 anos de experiência, foram coletados plantas e dados sobre nomes vulgares, usos e o preparo dos remédios. A coleta resultou em 151 espécies distribuídas em 59 famílias, de procedência diversa: comprada de terceiros, cultivada nos jardins particulares dos vendedores, ruderal, e coletada da Mata Atlântica (40%). Analisa-se o papel das plantas na saúde e na vida religiosa das pessoas do bairro, o conhecimento dos ervatários e a coleta das plantas da Mata Atlântica. Palavras-chave: Feiras-livres. Etnobotânica. Religiosidade. | |132 Cadernos do CEOM Ano 26, n. 38 Patrimônio, Memória e Identidade Introdução As feiras barulhentas e coloridas, com o cheiro de peixe que demora-se no ar, fazem parte do cotidiano carioca. O grito do vendedor com rosto um pouco lúgubre, resultante talvez do cansaço de quem chega ainda na calada da madrugada para arrumar sua barraca, chama os fregueses a comprar as frutas douradas e hortaliças frescas. Os montinhos de especiarias espiam o mundo de sacos brancos, ao lado das colheres de madeira, adaptadores de tomada elétrica e pequenos imãs na forma do turbante de Carmen Miranda. Na feira, encontra-se um pouco de tudo, a poucos metros da sua porta. Na periferia dos galinheiros e da kombi do pastel e caldo-de-cana, ou de vez em quando com uma tábua baixinha encostada em uma parede no meio da muvuca comercial, encontra-se outro tipo de feirante. Suas mesas precárias são cobertas por densa mata folhosa, indistinguível ao olho do passante comum, e oferecem o perfume verde das pilhas de ervas como remédio para corpo e alma. Aqui os ervatários vendem a promessa de alívio para a perna inflamada e o peito encatarrado, e também para a depressão e o quebranto. As plantas de todos os tipos e de diversas origens apresentam aos moradores do bairro uma alternativa à medicina convencional. A grande procura pelas ervas pode ser interpretada como uma preferência pela cura natural e a sabedoria caseira, evidência da força das religiões afro-brasileiras, ou simplesmente um tratamento acessível em comparação aos elevados preços dos remédios industrializados. Independente das razões, os ervatários e seus produtos preenchem um espaço verdadeiro na vida, na cultura e no imaginário brasileiro. Para Pierre Bourdieu (1977), o espaço não tem sentido separado da prática; o sistema de disposições generativas e que estruturam, ou habitus, constitui e é constituída pelo movimento dos atores no espaço. As práticas sociais não são fixas no espaço, mas são invocadas pelos atores, homens e mulheres, que trazem seu próprio conhecimento discursivo e as intenções estratégicas para a interpretação dos significados especiais. Ao mesmo tempo, elas não ocorrem somente | |133 Patrimônio etnobotânico: a feira livre Meg Stalcup no espaço, mas se desenvolvem junto a ele – por causa do espaço que lhes influenciam – e são específicas e próprias do lugar. As práticas ativam os significados sociais. Este trabalho explora algumas das práticas relacionadas às plantas de uso medicinal e ritual em uma feira livre do Rio de Janeiro. A feira semanal é criada no tempo e no espaço da rua através de transações com pessoas e plantas. Uma transação é uma atividade comunicativa que pode envolver seres animados e inanimados; o que a define é como as partes se afetam ou influenciam reciprocamente uma a outra. Assim, a transação pode significar a mudança de uma pessoa, coisa ou estado para outra pessoa, coisa ou estado. Esta transformação mútua ocorre claramente tanto para a pessoa quanto para a planta quando se compra plantas para uso medicinal ou ritual. Existe a transação econômica, que é a compra e venda de plantas, em que maços de folhas verdes, cascas retorcidas e flores perfumadas são transformadas em potencialidades terapêuticas. Dentro desta transação há uma outra, a comodificação do conhecimento dos ervatários sobre a identificação, nome popular, venda e, até certo ponto, o uso das plantas. O ato de transformar algo num commodity é geralmente visto como uma atividade econômica, mas o espaço específico da feira revela que tal ato não pode ser separado do social. Após a apresentação dos aspectos naturais e culturais relevantes desta pesquisa, este artigo se concentra em como as interações entre poder, conhecimento e lugar se manifestam na feira livre, fenômeno cultural e econômico, que faz parte do patrimônio brasileiro, e, de fato, humano. A maneira em que as ervas e o conhecimento foram transformados em commodities refletiram os discursos regionais, brasileiros e globais sobre a medicina natural e a saúde. A feira livre é resultado da combinação do ambiente da floresta de onde os espécimes foram coletados, o ambiente da rua em um bairro do Rio de Janeiro e o meio ambiente social onde noções da natureza, tradição, espiritualidade, medicina popular e biomedicina se misturam com a realidade das mudanças da sociedade brasileira, e a disparidade social, ainda marcante. Os vendedores de ervas medicinais e religiosas vêm de grupos sociais marginalizados, mas os materiais | |134 Cadernos do CEOM Ano 26, n. 38 Patrimônio, Memória e Identidade botânicos oferecidos à venda, e o presumível conhecimento das espécies e os usos, inverte, até certo ponto, as relações dominantes de poder. Porém, os vendedores também estão sujeitos às atitudes de classe e etnia que invariavelmente são expressas na feira, e afinal eles são dependentes economicamente nas decisões de compra dos seus fregueses. Métodos As ideias aqui apresentadas surgem de um levantamento etnobotânico realizado de setembro de 1998 ao início de 2000, e um acompanhamento realizado em 2003 (STALCUP, 2000). Inerente a este tipo de trabalho, resultante de uma parceria entre o pesquisador e o participante, é a responsabilidade de contribuir com a comunidade, dando um retorno para as informações que foram concedidas. Durante a pesquisa, ficou estabelecido que, em troca do tempo e das plantas dos ervatários, me disporia a fotografá-los e seus familiares, para subsequentemente fornecer-lhes os retratos, e também entreguei cópias do trabalho aos ervatários. A feira ocorreu toda quarta-feira em uma rua residencial do bairro da Tijuca. Frutas, legumes, peixes, produtos avícolas e outros itens de cozinha e casa foram vendidos por vendedores devidamente licenciados, e geralmente tinham quatro a sete ervatários, que alugaram seus tabuleiros de madeira do mesmo organizador, mas que conseguiram passar desapercebidos pela fiscalização do governo. Embora tenha anotações sobre o que foi dito, entrevistas formais não foram feitas. O procedimento normal era chegar de manhã cedo, examinar os tabuleiros e perguntar que plantas tinham aquele dia, para depois coletar e fotografar as amostras, que eu etiquetava para indicar onde e de quem o espécime tinha sido coletado. Os dados incluíam os nomes populares, o uso medicinal e ritual, e o preparo. Embora um determinado espécime fosse adquirido de um ervatário particular, a discussão envolvia os outros vendedores e fregueses que por acaso estivessem nas proximidades, comprando ou falando sobre ervas. | |135 Patrimônio etnobotânico: a feira livre Meg Stalcup Dos quatro ervatários com quem trabalhei, um vivia em uma favela da Tijuca e os outros viajavam cerca de duas horas, vindo da Baixada Fluminense. Três eram mulheres e um era homem. Todos aprenderam sobre plantas com parentes por parte de mãe que vieram de Espírito Santo ou Minas Gerais há uma ou duas gerações. Os quatro ervatários compraram ervas aromáticas comuns, porém introduzidas, como o manjericão, da Central Estadual de Armazenamento (CEASA), mas também cultivavam algumas das ervas, e colhiam outras que brotavam espontaneamente nas áreas degradadas perto das suas moradias. Uma grande percentagem das espécies à venda era fruto de tempo gasto na procura da sua mercadoria em áreas remanescentes da Mata Atlântica na Baixada Fluminense e no Parque Nacional da Floresta da Tijuca. As ervas aromáticas introduzidas compunham o grupo de plantas mais procurado para compra, mas a diversidade notável das espécies expostas era resultado da extração de plantas nativas encontradas na Mata Atlântica. Estas perfaziam um total de 40% das 151 espécies coletadas para a pesquisa. As espécies silvestres não requeriam um investimento de capital, o que era importante, embora sua coleta exigisse um gasto considerável de tempo e fosse considerada um risco para as ervatárias fazerem sozinhas, necessitando, assim, da companhia de um parente do sexo masculino nas expedições. O maior número de plantas, 68%, eram para uso exclusivamente medicinal, 13% eram usados em rituais e os 19% restantes tinham utilidades múltiplas. Além do uso medicinal e ritual, os ervatários contaram que seus fregueses compravam as plantas para fazer simpatias. Os ervatários não indicavam nenhuma espécie para o uso em simpatias, mas comentavam que este uso representava um fator significante nas vendas. Memória: caracterização e breve histórico do local de pesquisa O bairro da Tijuca é descrito, mesmo pelos poetas, como sendo "um bairro de classe média colado ao centro da cidade do Rio | |136 Cadernos do CEOM Ano 26, n. 38 Patrimônio, Memória e Identidade de Janeiro" (VELOSO, 1997, p. 45) e os moradores citam entre os atributos seu aspecto residencial, suas ruas arborizadas e seus numerosos supermercados. Esse baluarte da burguesia, com nome de origem tupi – ty-iuc – que significa "terreno cheio de lama", pertencia à antiga fazenda dos Jesuítas no século XVIII. Os Jesuítas concederam terrenos para cultivo a particulares, e com o decreto de expulsão da Companhia de Jesus do Brasil, em 1759, esses sítios e chácaras, em regra de grande tamanho, foram vendidos (IMBIRIBA, 1999a, p. 6). No final do século apareceram as primeiras grandes plantações de café no Rio, com muito sucesso na Tijuca, mas "[...] tal exploração imprópria e predatória da região foi determinante no declínio rápido da produtividade da terra e na decadência dos cafezais, ainda na primeira metade do século XIX." (IMBIRIBA, 1999b, p. 7). Em 1835, a área passou a ser reconhecida como freguesia urbana, e começou a ser povoada por ricos comerciantes; a Tijuca era marcada por seus lindos solares até a segunda metade daquele século, quando apareceram pequenos núcleos de habitação. Esse padrão de desenvolvimento continuou durante mais de cem anos, com gradual adensamento da população, mas a mesma reputação de dinheiro e respeitabilidade até meados dos anos 1970, quando o narcotráfico e o aumento na violência fizeram com que o adjetivo "nobre", comumente aplicado ao bairro, se tornasse parte do passado. Mesmo assim, a Tijuca ainda pode ser caracterizada como sendo de classe média e classe média alta. Nos últimos anos observou-se a multiplicação dos supermercados e a substituição dos cinemas por igrejas, mas no geral preserva as características de um bairro residencial entrelaçado por áreas comerciais, com uma feira livre em alguma rua todos os dias da semana. Locais de coleta Das espécies obtidas na feira, 40% foram deste ambiente chamado de Mata Atlântica. As plantas eram retiradas do Parque Nacional da Tijuca, ou da área de Piabetá, distrito Vila Inhomirim, ou dos remanescentes da floresta próximos às moradias dos ervatários. A | |137 Patrimônio etnobotânico: a feira livre Meg Stalcup história destes lugares é de longa interação com o homem, o que influi na composição florística e consequentemente no valor do lugar como área de coleta de plantas medicinais ou de uso ritual. A área como a conhecemos hoje começou com sua quase total desfiguração no início do século XIX quando se iniciou o plantio na Serra da Tijuca. Em 1810, o Conde Aymar Marie Jacques Gestas começou a cultivar o café e a cana-de-açúcar em suas terras na Fazenda da Boa Vista, e junto com as plantações de outros estrangeiros e brasileiros que seguiram nos seus passos de sucesso, resultou em vasto desflorestamento. Essa destruição coincidiu com a chegada de D. João VI, que resultou em um súbito povoamento da cidade do Rio de Janeiro, e em um aumento proporcional na demanda por água. A opinião pública estava convencida de que as repetidas crises de abastecimento de água, que abalaram a cidade a partir de 1840, eram consequências da ocupação das Serras de Tijuca e Carioca. Em vista disso, em 1850 a área foi designada Floresta Nacional, e em 1861 a portaria n. 577 dava instruções provisórias para o replantio e conservação das florestas da Tijuca e Paineiras, com o Major Manuel Gomez Archer como administrador. Quando o Major iniciou seu trabalho, encontravam-se apenas 16.075 árvores no local. Ciente da importância da silvicultura de valiosas madeiras nativas, o Major "[...] dava preferência à vegetação originária de Mata Atlântica, cujas mudas ele buscava em seu sítio em Guaratiba ou na região das Paineiras, que não se encontrava tão devastada [...]", salvando a floresta de se transformar em uma plantação de eucalipto (MENEZES, 1996, p. 86). Ele plantou oitenta mil árvores, das quais 45.777 vingaram. O próximo administrador, o Tenete-Coronel do Exército Gastão d'Escragnolle, tinha menor apreço pelos recursos nacionais, implantando 35 mil mudas "[...] escolhidas pelo critério único da beleza, tais como o eucaliptos e a dracena." (MENEZES, 1996, p. 88). Destas, 21.489 vingaram. O processo de reflorestamento ainda passou pelas mãos de vários outros administradores depois de d'Escragnolle, até cessar completamente em 1907, deixando a floresta continuar sua recuperação sozinha. Em 1961, a área foi elevada a Parque Nacional, | |138 Cadernos do CEOM Ano 26, n. 38 Patrimônio, Memória e Identidade e em 1991 passou a ser considerada Reserva da Biosfera. Outro local de coleta era Piabetá, situada no município de Magé. A história deste município está relacionada com o ciclo destrutivo de cana-de-açúcar, iniciado em 1565, quando o português Cristóvão de Barros recebeu uma sesmaria, instalando um engenho na região. Contudo, Magé contém relativamente grandes remanescentes de Mata Atlântica. Com 376 quilômetros quadrados e somente 350 mil habitantes, há áreas descritas pelos ervatários como sendo "mata fechada", "região serrana" e "brejo". De acordo com o comentário anterior, as excursões de coleta, feitas uma ou duas vezes por semana, não eram consideradas muito seguras. Identidade As ervas parecem a oferecer a possibilidade de manter ou melhorar o bemestar do indivíduo, seja no domínio físico, seja no espiritual, ou nos dois. A medicina popular corresponde ao conjunto de práticas empregado pelo povo na utilização dos recursos naturais como forma de tratamento e cura de doenças (DI STASI, 1995, p. 18). No Brasil, esta sabedoria se baseia em um conhecimento empírico europeu, africano e indígena, formando uma extensa farmacopeia oral que aproveita a vasta diversidade taxonômica botânica do país junto com espécies exóticas. As curas tradicionais são de suprema importância quando se constata que no Brasil "[...] 20% de nossa população consome 63% dos medicamentos disponíveis e o restante encontra nos produtos de origem natural, especialmente nas plantas medicinais, a única fonte de recurso terapêutico." (DI STASI, 1995, p. 12). Embora a dependência das ervas provavelmente diminua em um ambiente urbano, como na cidade do Rio de Janeiro, os remédios industrializados, em grande parte resultantes da experiência milenar da raça humana, ainda permanecem fora do alcance regular da maioria, inclusive dos ervatários. Consequentemente, eles, cujo conhecimento vem de uma longa tradição oral, retêm por necessidade uma sabedoria cultural, a medicina popular, da qual se utilizam para ganhar o seu sustento. | |139 Patrimônio etnobotânico: a feira livre Meg Stalcup Os fregueses da feira, por outro lado, têm condições financeiras adequadas para comprar remédios na farmácia, de acordo com a condição socioeconômica do bairro. A utilização da medicina popular pode evidenciar pressões econômicas temporárias, como a súbita inflação dos remédios, ou uma preferência pelo tratamento alternativo, ao menos quando os sintomas se apresentam dentro de um determinado quadro – não muito sérios ou resistentes às tentativas da medicina erudita. Um elemento da opção pelas ervas é a percepção, não sempre correta, de que elas oferecem uma alternativa benigna. "A planta não mata", como disse uma balconista de farmácia de ervas industrializadas em Nova Iguaçu (LOYOLA, 1983, p. 38). Seu emprego satisfaz o desejo de tratar a doença, mas de uma forma vista como natural, sem os efeitos colaterais dos fortes remédios industrializados. Contudo, as plantas vendidas na feira podem ser tóxicas, especialmente se preparadas incorretamente ou tomadas na dosagem errada. Das indicações de uso encontradas na pesquisa, muitos foram para banho ritual, o que se refere às cerimônias de diversas religiões afro-brasileiras, geralmente candomblé e umbanda. Não cabe a esta redação se aprofundar nos detalhes das cerimônias, nem dos sistemas religiosos em si. Contudo, estas plantas fazem parte do complexo cultural-médico de um segmento da população; por meio da sua utilização nas obrigações religiosas e nas cerimônias de cura se mantém o equilíbrio da vida. "As ervas... são um elemento constitutivo de sua cosmogonia, de seu sistema explicativo e classificatório, de sua teoria dos orixás [as divindades]." (LOYOLA, 1983, p. 62). A base comum das religiões afro-brasileiras é o culto aos espíritos, em que o fenômeno da possessão tem um papel preponderante. Guardada as suas singularidades, a cosmovisão geral é de que "a existência se processasse simultaneamente em dois planos" (LOYOLA, 1983, p. 62-63). Entre o mundo comum, e o outro, espiritual e abstrato, há uma relação dinâmica; no que se refere à saúde, "[...] os pais e mães-de-santo atuam como intermediários | |140 Cadernos do CEOM Ano 26, n. 38 Patrimônio, Memória e Identidade entre os pacientes e os orixás, que são os verdadeiros detentores dos conhecimentos médicos." (LOYOLA, 1983, p. 62-63). No candomblé "[...] existe um sistema de correspondência entre uma divindade, uma parte do corpo humano e determinada planta curativa e, enfim, entre esta planta e o orixá correspondente." Enquanto que, na umbanda, também existem as analogias entre as plantas e as divindades, "[...] eles procuram, via de regra, determinar primeiro se as causas do mal têm origem material ou espiritual." O tratamento que se segue pode combinar os dois mundos, como um banho curativo sugerido por um espírito. Dentro desta visão, as doenças refletem a relação do indivíduo com o sobrenatural ou com a sociedade. Em relação ao sobrenatural, "[...] a doença pode resultar da violação de tabus ou de preceitos religiosos, do fato do axé do indivíduo estar fraco, ou até mesmo de uma mediunidade não desenvolvida (doença-de-santo)." Outras moléstias "[...] ocorrem quando o doente é perseguido ou possuído por um espírito infeliz em busca de ascensão espiritual (doença-de-encosto)." (LOYOLA, 1983, p. 63). Na sociedade, a relação que o indivíduo mantém com pessoas que o veem com desconfiança ou hostilidade pode efetuar o mal-estar. "São as doenças provocadas pela força negativa de um olhar ou de um sentimento (doença-de-mau-olhado) e as que resultam da ação maléfica – feitiçaria ou magia – praticada por um intermediário, que atua no lugar de quem lhe deseja o mal (doença-de-coisa-feita)." (LOYOLA, 1983, p. 63). É para curar os doentes de mau-olhado que se aplica o banho de descarrego, e é com o termo genérico "para banho" que os ervatários se referem a todas as ervas de uso ritual. No entanto, as ervas servem de outras formas não elaboradas pelos informantes, conforme indica a literatura (BARROS, 1993; CAMARGO, 1988; SILVA, 1993; VARELLA, 1973). O emprego das ervas é dividido por Silva (1993) entre as funções práticas espirituais e as curas espirituais. Barros acrescenta que as ervas são usadas no preparo de "[...] amaci – banhos destinados a induzir bem-estar – nos quais somente são empregados 'folhas verdes,' recém-coletadas, maceradas e imediatamente usadas." Ademais, fazem parte da feitura de santo, o que ele define como "a | |141 Patrimônio etnobotânico: a feira livre Meg Stalcup reconstrução do que está explícito nos mitos", em que os vegetais são "mediadores entre a essência (elementos naturais), o modelo (orixá) e o indivíduo que está se construindo socialmente." (BARROS, 1993, p. 81). Os ervatários atribuíram a venda da sua mercadoria mesmo quando era de se imaginar que o movimento diminuísse (no período em que não havia surto de gripe, por exemplo), como sendo resultante da procura de ervas para 'simpatias'. A simpatia é uma maneira ritual de pedir, ou forçar, poderes ocultos a satisfazerem uma vontade. Distingue-se pelo fato de não exigir uma pessoa especial ou com conhecimento avançado, mas pode ser usada "[...] pelas pessoas em geral, para evitar o mal e alcançar o bem, mudando o curso dos acontecimentos." (NERY, 2006, p. 9). Porém, ela é receitada e oferecida pelas benzedeiras, isto é, profissionais do sagrado (CALVELLI, 2011). Enquanto existem simpatias para arrumar trabalho, ter sorte no amor, corrigir o nariz torto e tudo mais, apenas as "simpatias que curam" e os banhos de cheiro incorporam as plantas como elemento constante e crítico à eficácia. As receitas pedem espécies medicinais, rituais ou as que podem ser consideradas como pertencendo a ambas as categorias, e eliminam totalmente a delimitação, frequentemente já tênue, entre a medicina e a religião. A fé na sua eficácia é o fator essencial, independente de a quem (o deus católico, espíritos, santos etc.) o apelo é feito; é necessário acreditar nas forças ocultas para que os resultados concretos aconteçam. Segundo um ditado esotérico, "[...] é como as folhas balançando ao sabor do vento. As folhas você vê, mas o vento não. A simpatia é como o vento que balança as folhas." Patrimônio: a feira livre As ervas encontradas na feira são destinadas a tratamentos preventivos e curativos utilizados pelos moradores da Tijuca, ambos no campo físico e espiritual. Do número de ervatários observados e da grande quantidade de ervas disponíveis podemos inferir que uma quantidade significativa da população aproveita este recurso. Sugerimos que há diversos fatores contribuindo para a popularidade | |142 Cadernos do CEOM Ano 26, n. 38 Patrimônio, Memória e Identidade das ervas: o comportamento dos fregueses em relação à saúde e doença; uma tendência a romantizar as plantas e considerá-las seguras; o hábito de automedicação; a situação econômica que favorece a opção pelos tratamentos de preço mais acessível que as plantas apresentam; e modificações nos costumes das religiões afrobrasileiras. O Brasil é o quarto mercado de medicamentos no mundo (WEISE, 2012), apesar de ocupar o 54o lugar em renda per capita (Fundo Monetário Internacional, 2012). Greenfield (1987, p. 1105) comenta: [...] a preocupação com a doença é endêmica no Brasil. Qualquer um que passe um tempo lá, e venha a conhecer os brasileiros, não importa sua classe social nem região nativa, se torna consciente de que, no geral, as pessoas estão doentes, acreditam que estão doentes, temem que logo ficarão doentes, ou estão muito envolvidas com a doença de um amigo ou parente. Sendo a feira situada num bairro de classe média, onde moram pessoas com um poder aquisitivo adequado para se alimentar corretamente, e que se disponibilizam dos cuidados preventivos e da tecnologia médica existente, a grande procura pelas plantas pode ser representativa de uma procura por tratamento em geral. Outro fator é sugerido por um estudo que indica que o livre acesso à saúde no Brasil esbarra nos altos preços dos medicamentos, "[...] principalmente no que diz respeito às chamadas 'doenças da civilização', como enfermidades cardíacas e circulatórias, câncer ou diabetes, cujo tratamento depende muitas vezes de medicamentos de preços elevado." (WEISE, 2012). A compra de plantas para uso medicinal ou para simpatias é de certa forma equivalente à compra de remédios sem receita, ou o uso de medicações antigas, no sentido que é automedicação. Existe uma tendência de analisar sintomas socialmente, receitar remédios entre conhecidos, e, enfim, tratar-se sem o auxílio de um profissional da área médica. Enquanto este comportamento é mais comum entre os indivíduos com menor poder aquisitivo, é também observado entre as classes abastadas. A automedicação se limita, nesta | |143 Patrimônio etnobotânico: a feira livre Meg Stalcup interpretação, aos fregueses que compram plantas medicinais para remédios autorreceitados ou para as simpatias (que por definição são feitas pelos leigos). A ampla aceitação dos tratamentos naturais como inofensivos favorece seu uso na automedicação e, portanto, a popularidade da opção pelas plantas. A feira é também sustentada pelo prestígio romântico concedido às plantas medicinais. Amorozo (1996, p. 56) observa sucintamente que [...] uma tendência, entre a população urbana medianamente educada, a uma supervalorização, às vezes sem qualquer embasamento científico, de facetas deste modo de vida mais 'natural', identificado com o destas populações. Isto é notório no uso de plantas para fins curativos. Porém, isso não explica completamente a escolha das ervas como a forma de tratamento. Decerto que uma percentagem dos fregueses opta pela medicina alternativa por considerá-la mais natural, mas, a partir disso, a opção pela feira ao invés de uma farmácia homeopática implica em outras razões. Outro fator significativo parece estar relacionado às plantas usadas em rituais; sem poder quantificar a importância das simpatias, a percentagem das plantas de uso em rituais afro-brasileiros encontrada nas mesas e conversas informais com os fregueses indicaram que os devotos utilizam o recurso da feira. Na teoria, as plantas de uso no candomblé e umbanda teriam de ser coletadas especificamente para este propósito e por pessoas qualificadas. Porém, há ampla evidência na literatura que a prática não ocorre sempre desta forma. Bastide (1973, p. 170) observa que [...] as ervas que servem para a lavagem também não podem ser arrancadas de qualquer maneira e em qualquer lugar; existe o rito da 'colheita' (embora, ao que nos pareça, ele nem sempre seja seguido na Bahia, devido à facilidade de encontrar as ervas nos erveiros). Barros, no seu livro sobre os sistemas de classificação de vegetais no Candomblé Jê-je-Nago, confirma este papel atual dos ervatários | |144 Cadernos do CEOM Ano 26, n. 38 Patrimônio, Memória e Identidade vinculados ou não com as Casas de Culto dizendo que "[...] são independentes, prestam serviços e vendem mercadorias às diferentes comunidades religiosas, e este conhecimento processa-se de maneira transgeracional." (BARROS, 1993, p. 57). Sua observação corrobora o que foi visto na feira e com as declarações dos informantes. Ele acrescenta que a compra das ervas sagradas é funcional em parte porque os ervatários compartilham a mesma cosmovisão que os religiosos, e que "[...] embora tenha ocorrido uma redefinição de papéis historicamente demonstráveis, esta não alterou profundamente o quadro das representações do grupo nem a relevância da relação homem/vegetal." (BARROS, 1993, p. 58). Quando o ervatário indica plantas e receitas, ele exerce um papel terapêutico, que pode ser tão espiritual como médico, sendo ambos aplicados por um especialista, embora somente um seja reconhecido pela medicina ocidental. Entretanto, o papel de ervatário nem sempre abrangia o de curandeiro. Apesar de alguns fregueses perguntarem que produto havia para uma ou outra moléstia, um número igual ou maior estava a procura de itens específicos, aproveitando a feira meramente como fornecedora de material, não como lugar de consulta. Ao contrário desta observação, na pesquisa de Loyola (1983), os moradores de um bairro pobre em Nova Iguaçu utilizavam os ervatários como se fossem médicos, mesmo tendo de ir ao centro do município para ter acesso aos seus serviços. Ademais, em sua pesquisa, os ervatários se conceberam de uma forma não observada no trabalho na Tijuca, como exemplifica esta citação de Loyola: Embora seus produtos sejam dirigidos ao comércio, o erveiro [ervatário] não se define como um comerciante, mas como um produtor ou, melhor ainda, como um criador, espécie de artista, que, dotado de conhecimentos específicos, é capaz, como um músico, de combinar os elementos necessários para compor uma harmonia. (LOYOLA, 1983, p. 41). Mesmo não se descrevendo como sendo presenteados com um "dom", os ervatários acreditam no seu conhecimento e nas plantas, utilizando-as no tratamento de si mesmos e de seus familiares. As | |145 Patrimônio etnobotânico: a feira livre Meg Stalcup populações semirrurais ou das desprivilegiadas áreas urbanas – para quem a falta de hospitais, médicos e até farmácias, torna a utilização dos recursos vegetais uma necessidade – adquiriram a prática no cotidiano. Isso é uma situação distinta ao uso das plantas praticado pelos tijucanos, que, mesmo sabendo o nome de algumas plantas, frequentemente não reconheciam a espécie. Em parte, os ervatários atuam como ponte entre estes dois mundos, difundindo o seu conhecimento entre pessoas, sem esta tradição, que procuram saber. Não cabia a esta pesquisa tentar definir com exatidão a interação de conhecimentos na feira, nem a possível influência da instrução de um dos participantes, mas acrescenta-se aqui a observação de Camargo (1998, p. 194): Como todos os fenômenos sociais sofrem a influência indireta dos meios de comunicação e intelectualizados, tais como escolas, igrejas, jornais, rádio, televisão etc., o mesmo acontece com a medicina popular. Aí está a razão de uma série de modificações ocorridas com respeito ao uso e ao preparo dos remédios caseiros. Na compra e venda de ervas medicinais, podemos perceber que as práticas econômicas são inerentemente sociais. As vendas ocorrem porque um certo valor é atribuído às crenças em face do seu propósito e eficácia, e em razão do peso social da importância destes. "Commodities são coisas com um tipo específico de potencial social", segundo Appadurai (1986, p. 6). As plantas, e o conhecimento delas, se tornam commodities porque podem ser trocadas por alguma outra coisa. "A troca econômica gera valor. O valor é materializado nos commodities que são trocados" e isso significa que não trocamos as coisas porque têm valor mas as coisas têm valor porque são trocadas.1 Diversas influências estão em jogo na feira que afetam a autenticidade e o valor dado aos ervatários e seu conhecimento. Algumas estão relacionadas à medicina popular, outras às tradições religiosas trazidas da África. Historicamente, as plantas, seus usos, seus preparos e nomes refletem o conhecimento botânico e as curas da Europa colonizadora, misturado com o conhecimento dos grupos indígenas e as tradições e os idiomas dos escravos africanos. Tal | |146 Cadernos do CEOM Ano 26, n. 38 Patrimônio, Memória e Identidade combinação produz a medicina popular na forma que encontramos na feira; as pessoas que compram as ervas utilizam a medicina popular por várias razões. Para os aposentados que vivem de uma renda fixa reduzida, a compra das ervas para fazer remédios caseiros, como xarope para tosse ou pomada para artrite, se torna mais econômica do que comprar remédios industrializados. Para outros, tais tratamentos são preferíveis por serem vistos como sendo mais naturais e, para eles, o vínculo com a natureza é visto de uma maneira positiva. Alguns fazem seus próprios remédios porque suas mães ou avós também os faziam. Para outros, os preparos de ervas são a última esperança após a ineficácia da biomedicina. Embora a medicina popular tenha as suas raízes na tradição, a escolha de usá-la, sua autenticidade e as práticas no cotidiano são inevitavelmente influenciadas pela apresentação pela mídia da etnobotânica, que, por sua vez, reflete a pesquisa e os discursos nacionais e internacionais sobre a etnobotânica. Por exemplo, após uma série de artigos e uma reportagem apresentada na televisão sobre um frei que promovia o aloe vera para prevenir e tratar o câncer, houve uma forte demanda na feira pela babosa. Mesmo depois de passados alguns anos, os fregueses citavam tal uso como a razão da sua compra. Tradicionalmente as espécies precisavam ser colhidas conforme instruções tradicionais, por uma pessoa designada e para uso logo em seguida. Entretanto, tal procedimento não é viável para muitos que moram no ambiente urbano. A compra de espécies para o uso nas cerimônias da candomblé e da umbanda que já acontecem a mais de trinta anos na Bahia, berço da cultura afro-brasileira, foi frequentemente vista na feira. Para os devotos que compram plantas, o conhecimento e o trabalho dos ervatários substituíram alguém em um papel tradicional e isto garante aos ervatários um certo respeito e poder. As práticas socioeconômicas ligadas à valorização das plantas e o conhecimento delas inevitavelmente envolvem o poder. Como foi demonstrado na análise das valorizações sociais em relação ao status de commodity das plantas e do conhecimento a elas associado, | |147 Patrimônio etnobotânico: a feira livre Meg Stalcup os processos históricos de poder também afetam aspectos múltiplos da medicina popular e o papel exercido pelos ervatários. Michel Foucault sugeriu que uma vez que há [...] uma administração de conhecimento, uma política de conhecimento, relações de poder que passam pelo conhecimento, e que, se trata-se de transcrevê-los, leva à consideração de formas de dominação designadas por tais noções como campo, região e território. (FOUCAULT, 1980, p. 70). Embora a divisão de conhecimento em campos, regiões e territórios possa ser usada de forma repressiva, existe também uma alternativa. A feira funciona como um lugar onde os ervatários resistem às estruturas atuais de classe e cor de pele, e lhes oferece espaço para a renegociação das relações dominantes de poder. Os ervatários descreveram sua profissão, que lhes dá uma renda líquida de somente dois salários mínimos, como uma escolha que lhes proporciona individualidade e independência. Eles sentiam que suas atividades lhes permite uma segurança razoável e uma posição econômica digna, e não queriam ser empregadas ou faxineiras, embora isto pudesse resultar em uma renda mais alta. O ofício de ervatário requer uma prática: eles colheram as mercadorias pessoalmente, e seu conhecimento é um tipo de poder reforçado pelo ato de selecionar uma espécie solicitada dentre o emaranhado de plantas no tabuleiro. O domínio dos ervatários com relação às plantas lhes garante um respeito e uma autoridade intelectual, um contato diferente da violência e da violação que caracteriza a interação entre classes no Rio. Os ervatários são ocasionalmente céticos com relação àqueles fregueses que têm noções idealísticas da medicina tradicional ou natural. Expressavam ambivalência sobre seu próprio ofício, titubeando com relação à biomedicina. Faziam xaropes, tônicas, compressas e pomadas para si e seus familiares, mas descreveram tais práticas como "dando um jeito" ou "medicina de pobre". Uma ervatária disse que talvez preferisse levar seu filho ao médico quando adoecia, mas isso implicaria em um dia de longas filas, descaso dos | |148 Cadernos do CEOM Ano 26, n. 38 Patrimônio, Memória e Identidade burocratas e inevitáveis despesas, então nem sempre isso era possível. Entretanto, como grupo exprimia sua preferência pela independência e a flexibilidade que lhes proporcionava o fato de serem ervatários. Trabalhar na feira significa acordar cedo, mas apenas duas a quatro vezes por semana, e a coleta de ervas poderia ser feita de acordo com sua disponibilidade de tempo sem estar sujeito a um patrão. Quando uma criança adoece, o ervatário pode trocar o dia do trabalho, atuando em alguma outra feira desde que tenha os contatos pessoais necessários na localidade. As crianças também podem ser trazidas para a feira, para ficar sobre a supervisão do pai ou da mãe. Isto era um hábito muito comum entre os ervatários, tanto masculinos quanto femininos, especialmente durante o período de férias escolares. Algumas formas de conduta também podem ser interpretadas como exercício de independência e atos de resistência às expectativas de comportamento normativo. Embora não necessariamente amigos íntimos, os ervatários geralmente se apoiam mutuamente. Competindo tecnicamente para conquistar fregueses, apresentam uma fronte unida ao público, sempre indo buscar uma erva solicitada do tabuleiro de outro ervatário e depois repassando o dinheiro, em vez de mandar o freguês procurar com outro vendedor. Eles também desafiam as definições de comportamentos sociais apropriados, começando a beber cerveja entre 9 e 10 horas da manhã. Tendo começado seu dia por volta das 3 da manhã, aquela hora já era para eles o meio do dia. E quando não estavam conversando com seus fregueses, mantinham comentários francos e brincalhões sobre o mundo em volta, relações entre outros vendedores da feira e suas próprias vidas. O papel dos ervatários também pode ser visto como fazendo um apelo aos estereótipos da relação dos negros à floresta exótica ou ao mundo tumultuado dos espíritos. A necessidade de atrair fregueses – que são de classe média ou idosos que eram de classe média mas que perderam o poder aquisitivo – e fazer vendas, acarreta no comportamento subserviente. Embora vender ervas tenha valor como profissão autônoma, não proporciona uma vida fácil e | |149 Patrimônio etnobotânico: a feira livre Meg Stalcup problemas relacionados ao poder, especialmente para as mulheres, surgiram repetidamente durante a pesquisa. Dos quatro ervatários, a que faltava com mais frequência relacionava a sua ausência a necessidade de cuidar dos filhos, especialmente um de saúde frágil. Para todas as mulheres, a independência ficava comprometida pela necessidade de uma companhia masculina nas expedições para colheita de ervas. Os remanescentes da Mata Atlântica onde as plantas são encontradas eram locais isolados que as ervatárias consideravam arriscados para uma incursão desacompanhada devido ao risco de estupro, e por causa dos cadáveres ocasionalmente ali encontrados. Esta independência também era problemática em relacionamentos pessoais. Em uma visita posterior, em 2003, uma ervatária tinha parado de vender plantas, depois de 13 anos na profissão. Os outros ervatários disseram que ela tivera problema com o marido que fazia objeções às expedições para a colheita de planta e a prolongada ausência proveniente do tipo de trabalho. Conclusão Apesar destes impedimentos, o mercado exerce um papel vital, de fato, um tipo de patrimônio, que enriquece a vida social e econômica dos ervatários e seus fregueses. Entretanto, as interações não estão limitadas a tais características, mas abrangem ao meio ambiente ecológico e social mais amplo. Alguns aspetos da coleta e venda de plantas na feira não foram analisados aqui e serão apenas mencionados. O grande número de espécies vendidas na feira, se levarmos em conta as 182 feiras semanais do Rio de Janeiro, indicaria que a colheita dos ervatários pode ter um impacto ambiental significativo. No que diz respeito ao uso medicinal das ervas, muitas das espécies e seus efeitos são bem conhecidos. Nas plantas pesquisadas, entretanto, o nome popular na literatura da espécie coletada nem sempre correspondia ao nome popular citado pelos ervatários. As pessoas usavam as plantas em preparos tradicionais, mas sem saber reconhecer as espécies e isso pode levar à possibilidade de uso incorreto. Conforme sugerido por último, há | |150 Cadernos do CEOM Ano 26, n. 38 Patrimônio, Memória e Identidade uma modificação contínua da sabedoria e das práticas em relação às plantas e a procura por elas. Existem flutuações no acolhimento popular da biomedicina ou dos tratamentos chamados "naturais". Os ervatários e seus fregueses refletem tais fluxos em conhecimento e importância, bem como a sua continuidade. Nota * Pesquisadora do Centro de Futuros Biológicos, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, e afiliada ao corpo decente do Departamento de Antropologia da Universidade de Washington. Sua pesquisa enfoca a segurança e a governança de vida, em domínios tais como o policiamento, as drogas, a política, a saúde global e as mudanças climáticas. Meg Stalcup is a research fellow at the Center for Biological Futures, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, and affiliate faculty in the Department of Anthropology, University of Washington. Her research concerns security and the governance of life, in domains such as policing, drugs, policy, global health, and climate change. Referências AMOROZO, M. C. M. A abordagem etnobotânica na pesquisa de plantas medicinais. In: DI STASI, L. C. (Org.). Plantas medicinais arte e ciência: um guia de estudo interdisciplinar. São Paulo: Editora da Universidade Estadual Paulista, 1996. p. 47-68. APPADURAI, A. Introduction: commodities and the politics of value. In: ______ (Ed.). The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. BARROS, J. F. P. O segredo das folhas. Rio de Janeiro: Pallas, 1993. BASTIDE, R. Estudos afro-brasileiros. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1973. BOURDIEU, P. Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. CAMARGO, M. T. L. Plantas Medicinais e de Rituais Afro-Brasileiros. São Paulo: ALMED, 1988. ______. Plantas Medicinais e de Rituais Afro-Brasileiros: Estudo Etnofarmacobotânico. São Paulo: Ícone, 1998. | |151 Patrimônio etnobotânico: a feira livre Meg Stalcup CALVELLI, H. G. Um olhar antropológico sobre as benzedeiras, cartomantes e videntes na Zona da Mata mineira. Revista de C. Humanas, Viçosa, v. 11, n. 2, p. 359-373, jul./dez. 2011. CASCUDO, L. C. O que é preciso saber sobre Mercados e Feiras Livres. Rio de Janeiro: Perspectiva, 1982. DI STASI, L. C. Plantas Medicinais: Arte e Ciência – Um Guia de Estudo Interdisciplinar. São Paulo: Ed. Unesp, 1995. FOUCAULT, M. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings: 1972-1977. New York: Harvester Press, 1980. Fundo Monetário Internacional. World Economic Outlook Database. Nominal GDP list of countries. Dados para o ano de 2011. 2012. Disponível em: <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/ weodata/index.aspx>. Acesso em: 21 abr. 2012. GREENFIELD, S. M. The return of Dr. Fritz: spiritist healing and patronage networks in urban industrial Brazil. Social Science and Medicine, v. 24, n. 12, p. 1095-1108, 1987. IMBIRIBA, L. E. Era uma vez... Jornal O Quarteirão, ano 1, n. 4, set. 1999a. ______. Era uma vez... Jornal O Quarteirão, ano 1, n. 5, out. 1999b. LOYOLA, M. A. Médicos e Curandeiros. São Paulo: DIFEL, 1984. MENEZES, P. D. C. Trilhas do Rio. Rio de Janeiro: Salamandra, 1996. NERY, Vanda Cunha. Rezas, Crenças, Simpatias e Benzeções: costumes e tradições do ritual de cura pela fé. In: Encontro dos Núcleos de Pesquisas da Intercom, 6., 2006, Brasília. Anais... Brasília: UnB, 2006. SILVA O. J. Ervas: raízes africanas. Rio de Janeiro: Pallas, 1993. STALCUP, M. Plantas de uso medicinal ou ritual numa feira livre no Rio de Janeiro, Brasil. 2000. 202 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciências Biológicas) – Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio | |152 Cadernos do CEOM Ano 26, n. 38 Patrimônio, Memória e Identidade de Janeiro, 2000. VARELLA, J. S. C. Ervas Sagradas na Umbanda. Rio de Janeiro: Espiritualista, 1973. VELOSO, C. Verdade Tropical. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1997. WEISE, C. ONG questiona preços, remédios e publicidade de grupos farmacêuticos no Brasil. Detsche Well, 29 nov. 2012. Disponível em: <http://dw.de/p/16sSY>. Acesso em: 5 fev. 2013. Recebido em 06 de fevereiro de 2013. Aprovado em 15 de maio de 2013. | |153 Patrimônio etnobotânico: a feira livre Meg Stalcup Abstract This article discusses the ethnobotanical patrimony of urban markets, drawing on a study conducted in Tijuca, Rio de Janeiro. Over two years of fieldwork with four vendors averaging 15 years market experience, plant specimens and data were collected on common names, origin, uses and preparations of folk remedies. The result was 151 species distributed among 59 families, of diverse origins: bought from a third party, cultivated in the herb vendors' gardens, spontaneous on degraded land near the vendors' homes, and collected from the Atlantic rainforest typical of Brazilian coastal areas (40%). An analysis is presented of the role of the herb vendors in the health and religious life of the neighborhood, the knowledge of the venders and the collection of plants from the Atlantic coastal rainforest. Keywords: Urban markets. Ethnobotany. Religion.

9 Artifi ce and Authenticity Gender Technology and Agency in Two Jenny Saville Portraits Diana Tietjens Meyers As a gender variant visual artist I access "technologies of gender" in order to amplify rather than erase the hermaphroditic traces of my body. I name myself. A gender abolitionist. A part time gender terrorist. An intentional mutation and intersex by design, (as opposed to diagnosis), in order to distinguish my journey from the thousands of intersex individuals who have had their "ambiguous" bodies mutilated and disfi gured in a misguided attempt at "normalization." I believe in crossing the line as many times as it takes to build a bridge we can all walk across. Del LaGrace Volcano, September 2005 Taking this deft self-description as a point of departure, I refl ect as a feminist philosopher on feminist artist Jenny Saville's portrait of its author, Del LaGrace Volcano, together with a Saville self-portrait as a cosmetic surgery patient.1 In this study of Matrix (1999, oil on canvas, seven feet by ten feet) and Plan (1993, oil on canvas, nine feet by seven feet), I analyze how Saville's artistic practice conveys differential agency in these two paintings and draws out the implications of these fi ndings for the philosophy of personal identity and action. Before I can proceed to my principal concerns, however, I must defend classifying Matrix and Plan as portraits, for neither Saville nor Volcano accepts this label. Saville explicitly eschews it: "I am not interested in portraits as such. I am not interested in the outward personality. I don't use the anatomy of my face because I like it, not at all. I use it because it brings out something from inside, a neurosis" (quoted in Mackenzie 2005). To counter Saville's disavowal of self-portraiture, it is worth pointing out that Shrage_Ch09.indd 155 4/7/2009 6:37:13 PM 156 "YOU'VE CHANGED" the most renowned portraits do not purport to be solely about the "outward personality," nor do they gratify their subjects' narcissistic needs. Rembrandt's self-portraits (1620–1669) and Velázquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X (1653) are paradigmatic examples of one strand of western portraiture. Rightly or not, such works are widely venerated for capturing the essential character-the inner being-of the sitter. In this genre, the face is the focus of attention because the face is presumed to reveal character. Posture, gesture, clothing, jewelry, and tools merely denote the sitter's social standing and occupation. The mind is the locus of selfhood, and the face is the public side of the interior self. Hence the body and even the sitter's location in social space are subsidiary. Saville's images certainly penetrate her subjects' subjectivity in the requisite way and to the requisite degree. But, in my view, her work surpasses the baseline standard, for she does what might be dubbed "whole-person portraiture." She represents her subjects' faces, as the conventions demand, but she exceeds the requirement that a portrait perspicuously render its subject's face by also representing her subjects' distinctive bodies stripped of garments and accouterments. Bursting the boundaries of western portraiture, Matrix and Plan are portraits that give the body equal if not prime billing.2 These works are premised, so to speak, on the proposition that the self is no less corporeal than mental. As a whole-person portraitist specializing in nude, anatomically unorthodox bodies, Saville is able to convey what I call the psychocorporeality of selfhood: the intertwining of cognition, affect, and desire in the constitution of intelligent, embodied subjects. In the western tradition, the nude and the portrait have long been mutually exclusive genres. Archetypal nudes, such as Botticelli's Birth of Venus (ca. 1485) and Titian's Venus of Urbino (1538), idealize their models and claim to capture female corporeal perfection-that is to say, no one in particular and no body at all. There is a strand of western portraiture that is akin to the tradition of the nude. In these works, the painter glorifi es the subject-say, by representing an emperor as a god. But Saville's nudes always deviate from accepted beauty ideals, and the Matrix and Plan fi gures are highly individualized. Never catering to her subjects' vanity, Saville's images bring sexuality to portraiture and suffuse bare bodies with personality and agency.3 After you've seen Saville's work, conventional portraiture may look incomplete, even superfi cial, by comparison. Volcano is ambivalent about his relationship to Saville's image of him: I don't feel like this painting [Matrix] is a portrait of me. I simply provided the raw material. No one needed to know who the body actually belongs to. Yet the act of writing this piece locates it absolutely within the realm of the personal. This requires and allows me to own it in a way that is not comfortable, rather than disown it, which would be more so. (1999) I concede that Saville's titles preserve the anonymity of her subjects, which is at variance with the usual proper name labeling of portraits. Moreover, Saville speaks of creating "a landscape of gender" and "landscapes of the body" as opposed to portraits (Schama 2005; Mackenzie 2005). I grant that Saville's facture is seductive enough to induce viewers to forget the specifi city of Volcano's humanity and become absorbed in the canvas's brilliantly orchestrated interplay of colors and textures. Still, I disagree that no one needs to know who posed for Matrix. Shrage_Ch09.indd 156 4/7/2009 6:37:13 PM Artifi ce and Authenticity 157 I'm sure that reading Volcano's texts and viewing his photography, especially his self-portraits, enriched my understanding of Matrix. Whatever the virtues of formalism, it's clear that relevant background information-for example, about Volcano's genetic inheritance, his struggles against body hatred, and his embellishment of his body-heightens sensitivity to artworks. If more needs to be said, comparing Matrix with Passage, a 2004–2005 Saville painting that portrays an anonymous transgendered, intersexed person, confi rms that she does not treat Volcano as the personifi cation of transgendered, intersexed people. On the contrary, Saville particularizes the Matrix and the Passage fi gures, and she gives a layered, nuanced account of each of her courageously exposed models. My disagreement with Volcano notwithstanding, it is necessary to be mindful of Saville's mediating point of view. She readily acknowledges that ideas animate her art and that her reading in feminist theory infuses her thinking (Schama 2005; Gayford 1999). Moreover, she is fascinated by medical technologies of corporeal manipulation. All of Saville's work to date is directly concerned with corporeity, much of it with gender, the body image, and the dynamics of agentic power and disempowerment. Matrix and Plan are exemplary Saville works, and they raise the two questions that this chapter addresses: 1. Why aren't sex-reassignment treatments analogous to elective cosmetic treatments that are popular with U.S. women, including breast augmentation, liposuction, and dermabrasion? 2. What is the role of the body and the body image in transgendered identity and agency? Because Saville's paintings convincingly represent lived human bodies-subjectivized, agentic corporeity, as distinct from inert, objectifi ed fl esh-they provide an invaluable aid to refl ection on these issues. Her sympathetic engagement with stigmatized bodies helps to reconfi gure the standard gestalts of the human body that viewers typically carry with them and thus to convert fear and disgust into empathetic attention if not appreciation and understanding.4 Based on my account of the pathos of Plan and the agentic vitality of Matrix, I argue that conceiving the agentic subject as a rational deliberative capability that uses a conjoined body as the instrument of its will is not conducive to understanding the agency of transgendered people. If, instead, agentic subjects are viewed as embodied subjects and embodiment is understood as a locus of practical intelligence, the agency of transgendered individuals becomes intelligible. Impaired Agency and Medical Technology It would be irresponsible to comment on Matrix before placing it in the social context from which I view it. To some extent, my U.S. context overlaps with Saville's British context. In both countries, countless nontransgendered girls and women suffer grievously because of disparities between their body images and culturally ubiquitous beauty ideals, and this suffering is coupled with gale-force commercial and interpersonal pressures to "solve" these problems by resorting to a medical fi x.5 In the Shrage_Ch09.indd 157 4/7/2009 6:37:13 PM 158 "YOU'VE CHANGED" United States, the soaring popularity of breast augmentation as a sixteenth birthday or high school graduation present for girls and the "mommy makeover"-a menu of postnatal procedures to lift sagging breasts, tighten the vagina, and siphon off extra pregnancy weight-attest to the virulence of this blight (Boodman 2004; Singer 2007). The U.S. insurance industry and the British National Healthcare Service deem reconstructive procedures elective unless they are prescribed to remedy a diagnosed psychiatric or other medical condition. Whereas health insurance commonly covers breast implants after a mastectomy, it does not pay for breast augmentation sought for personal aesthetic reasons. In the United States, most patients or their families foot the bill for cosmetic treatments. Saville got to know this medicalized gender climate while observing a New York City cosmetic surgeon at work and incorporated what she learned in a number of her subsequent paintings. It is fi tting, then, to begin with one of the bluntest and most poignant of these works, Plan (fi gure 9.1). Figure 9.1. Plan. © Jenny Saville. Courtesy Gagosian Gallery, New York. Shrage_Ch09.indd 158 4/7/2009 6:37:13 PM Artifi ce and Authenticity 159 Plan Jenny Saville used her own face and body for the fi gure in Plan-a towering frontal nude of a pre-op liposuction patient after she has been prepped for her procedure. That Plan is a portrait of the artist marked by an aesthetic surgeon and ready for sculpting is not its sole irony. The pre-op inscriptions span most of the fi gure's body. Except for a single horizontal line traversing her lower belly, the principal markings consist of four sets of concentric, irregularly spaced, wobbly circles. The crude target patterns look as if they had been drawn by a sloppy artist using a magic marker, not a twenty-fi rst-century surgeon using sterile tools. These epidermal drawings turn the fi gure's surface into a topographic map of a fl awed terrain. The sculptor-cum-surgeon's corrective labors will produce a geography that satisfi es current taste in the lineaments of female fl esh. The notional post-lipo map has a more level, more symmetrical, presumably more pleasing design. Approaching this tall, vertical painting, you immediately register huge thighs topped by a mass of pubic hair. Your eyes travel up the torso, and the last thing you notice is a face. Either you are looking at a foreshortened standing fi gure seen from a kneeling position or a foreshortened prone fi gure seen from a point just above the fi gure's knees. The perspective exaggerates the size of the thighs, accentuates the pubic area, and shrinks the size of the head. Indeed, the tiny head is tilted at a painful angle straining to cram itself inside the picture frame but doesn't quite succeed. The fi gure's knees and calves are cropped, and her inscribed torso and thighs nearly fi ll the canvas. The offending, targeted central body is the subject of this work. Doubly symbolic, the target patterns represent both the objectifi cation of the fi gure's body and the subjugation of this body. Many other details of this work reiterate the themes of body alienation and defeated agency. The geometry of the painting doesn't settle whether the fi gure is lying on an unpolished steel gurney or standing against a dull gray background. Although no platform is delineated, the distribution of the volumes of the fi gure's body suggests a fl accid body lying fl at rather than a tensile body holding itself erect.6 The seemingly prone position of the fi gure heightens the sense that she is at the mercy of demands and processes that are beyond her control. Not only does Saville's foreshortening minimize the size of the fi gure's head, the horizontal line of the fi gure's right arm partially occludes it. The cropping and marginalization of the head notwithstanding, the face Saville depicts is haunting. The complexion is bluish grey-colors of injury, stupor, dismay, and sorrow. The lips slightly part as if a cry has just been emitted or a plea is about to be uttered. The eyes gaze down toward the viewer, yet they seem to be staring at nothing. This face is a study of helplessness and silent supplication. The spatial obscurity of the fi gure's head, the forlorn, plaintive expression on her face, and her blank eyes read as signs of diminished agency compounded by desolation. Still, this fi gure is clearly doing something-she is trying to protect herself. Between the dense whorls of her marron pubic hair and her head are huge mammary mounds. Trying to conceal them and perhaps reacting to the chill of the clinic Shrage_Ch09.indd 159 4/7/2009 6:37:14 PM 160 "YOU'VE CHANGED" as well, the fi gure wraps her thick right arm around her chest and clasps her fi ngers tightly to the opposite shoulder. Although the arm hides her nipples, its weight squashes her breasts, making them appear more conspicuous because they bulge down toward the viewer. This desire for concealment prompts her to glue her gargantuan thighs together. Trying to make herself as compact as possible, she simultaneously tries to defend her genitals from prying eyes and instruments.7 Her effort is wasted, however, for no one can will herself to shrink, and she'll soon be under anesthesia. Plan does not echo the demure gestures of feminine modesty that typify classic female nudes. It shows end-game gambits that cannot succeed-piteous, futile, defensive gestures. Cruelly exposed as she is, Plan's nude is naked and agentically neutralized. Despite the evident tension in the fi ngers gripping her shoulder and between her thighs, no defi ned musculature-no sign of agentic potency-is anywhere to be seen. The greyish creme pallor of the fi gure's skin and dirty tan and bruise-blue passages that defi ne the volumes of her limbs and torso cement this body's inertness. The woman-patient that Saville portrays has compressed herself as much as she can short of self-infl icted implosion. All the agency that is left to her is to ante up and hand herself over to the medicalized beauty industry. Desperate and out of options, she is doing just that. Plan is sympathetic to her plight but vehemently denies that she is an exemplar of postfeminist agency.8 Saville represents a desexed victim who gives the lie to the ideology of choice and liberation through medicine. Cosmetic surgery has been a vexed topic in the feminist art world at least since Orlan began performing episodes of The Ultimate Masterpiece: The Reincarnation of St. Orlan before art audiences in 1990. It remains contentious among feminists to this day.9 The best that can be said for it is that hiring these services may be the "best solution under the circumstances" for some women (Davis 1991, 31). I have no doubt, though, that as a rapidly and noticeably aging woman, it is incumbent on me not to dye my greying hair, botox out my wrinkles, or lipo away my cellulite. I don't pretend to be immune to the blandishments of the industries clamoring for my patronage. However, I don't believe in fabricating an illusory simulacrum of eternal youth or runway beauty, and I believe strongly in resisting the infl iction of unachievable and insulting standards of feminine attractiveness.10 Like Saville, I regard the alternative as agentically disenfranchising. Transgendered Bodies and Medical Technology There are no "after" images among Saville's paintings of female fi gures-no pictures of smiling post-op women feeling great because they look so great. There's a postop head-looking battered with ugly stitches around her ear and a tube protruding from her mouth-but no happy outcome images (Knead 1994, oil on canvas, sixty by seventy-two inches). The reverse is true of Saville's paintings of transgendered, intersexed people-Matrix and Passage. These works are by no means banal "satisfi ed customer" images, but they do not depict disowned, subjugated bodies. They depict defi ant corporeity and sexual agency. Shrage_Ch09.indd 160 4/7/2009 6:37:14 PM Artifi ce and Authenticity 161 Other philosophers incisively analyze how dominant gender norms and the medical establishment constrain the agency of transgendered people (e.g., Nelson 2001, 125–35; Butler 2004, 75–101). To obtain access to pharmacological or surgical technology, transgendered individuals are each obliged to construct a version of their life stories that coincides with a stock script: "From the beginning, I've felt like a man trapped in a woman's body (or vice versa), and I've always preferred acting in masculine (or feminine) ways." Perhaps this template and the diagnosis of gender dysphoria that it licenses actually fi t the lives of some transgendered individuals. They certainly don't fi t everyone's. Any inquiry into the agency of transgendered individuals must acknowledge the adverse impact of the institutionalized regimentation and pathologization of transgender in western societies. But I won't rehearse objections to these repressive practices, for Saville's artwork doesn't recapitulate them. Instead, it provides a glimpse of agentic possibilities that a transgendered person may seize in the teeth of a hostile social context. If you are heterosexual, nontranssexual, and nonintersexual, and if you suppose that normalized schemas for human bodies are not deeply entrenched in your psyche, you'll (very probably) come away from Saville's Matrix or Passage disabused of your beliefs about your own open-mindedness and comfort zone. Here is art critic Suzie Mackenzie (2005). exclaiming about Passage: "Penis and breasts all at the same time. It's electric, it's like wow! To see something in a way you have not looked at it before." She might as well be naively reacting to a carny "freak show" or transported into the mind of a child confronted by the "primal scene." Art criticism is usually couched in more measured, analytic terms. To my own chagrin, when I saw Matrix and Passage in New York exhibitions, I latched onto the question of how the models came to have the anatomical confi gurations Saville depicts, and I took some pains to fi nd out. In interviews, Saville outlines the biomedical interventions that gave rise to her models' bodies. She supplies this information without being asked to. Why? Her observations about cognition and history in relation to gender and corporeity answer the question: I'm painting Del LaGrace Volcano at the moment-intersex person who's been taking testosterone for three-and-a-half years. Del's body fascinates me as it represents a human form proceeding through a self-initiated process of body transition. He/she is a mutational body with gender defying body parts. You want to push Del's body into a category of male or female but can't-he/she is in a process of becoming. (Gayford 1999)11 And: With the transvestite [depicted in Passage] I was searching for a body that was between genders. I had explored that idea a little in Matrix. The idea of fl oating gender that is not fi xed. The transvestite I worked with has a natural penis and false silicone breasts. Thirty or forty years ago this body couldn't have existed and I was looking for a kind of contemporary architecture of the body. I wanted to paint a visual passage through gender-a sort of gender landscape. (Schama 2005, 126) Clearly, Mackenzie's discombobulation and my prurient curiosity about the genesis of these bodies are symptoms of our purblind investment in dual conceptions of Shrage_Ch09.indd 161 4/7/2009 6:37:14 PM 162 "YOU'VE CHANGED" properly gendered bodies, no doubt shored up by simplistic assumptions about biological naturalness. Our resulting suspicion of the artifi cial and presumed ability to ferret it out must be dispelled if either Matrix or Passage is to be interpreted with any insight whatsoever. In the interest of space, I confi ne myself to exploring Matrix. Matrix "I grew up believing I was a walking monstrosity, not quite female, not really male, fat ugly and unworthy of anyone's gaze" (Volcano 1999). Because the resemblance between this remark and many self-descriptions given by nontransgendered girls and women who suffer from body-image problems is unmistakable, I focus on the contrasts between Saville's nude portrait of Volcano and her nude self-portrait as a liposuction patient. In particular, I ask what sort of agency she bestows on Volcano's body in Matrix (fi gure 9.2) but withholds from her own in Plan. As I've said, Volcano had been actively cultivating his intersexed body for three years before he posed for Matrix.12 But the painting isn't about how Volcano came to be endowed as he is-his reconciliation to being intersexed and his enlisting of medical services to accentuate his body's "hermaphroditic traces." The painting is about the amplifi cation of his agency that results from his acceptance of his body and his use of male hormones. Volcano avers that his project is to mobilize "technologies of gender," as distinct from technologies of anatomy. Characterizing himself as a "gender abolitionist," he assigns himself the role of embodying a "bridge we can all Figure 9.2. Matrix. © Jenny Saville. Courtesy Gagosian Gallery, New York. Shrage_Ch09.indd 162 4/7/2009 6:37:14 PM Artifi ce and Authenticity 163 walk across" (2005). He's a nonpareil humanist activist, and Saville's painting keeps faith with his self-understanding. A nude portrait befi ts Volcano because his body is the vehicle of both his art and his politics. Both Plan and Matrix show fi gures of colossal proportions-vast expanses of fl esh. As in Plan, the Matrix fi gure is prone, but unlike in Plan, a cushioned platform is inserted beneath the Matrix fi gure. Whereas Matrix presents a wellsupported individual, Plan presents one with no visible means of support, nothing to sustain her. Like the Plan fi gure, the Matrix fi gure is foreshortened-the thighs appear massive, the genitalia outsized. Volcano's sex is thrust forward and painted in saturated hues. It's the fi rst thing you see. But, unlike in Plan, his head is in no way diminished-neither in size nor in force of character. By defi ning the contours of the head using planes of color, Saville gives it an appearance of strength. There's a hint of a sneer on Volcano's lips. His eyebrows slightly raised, he lifts his head to gaze directly at viewers. In contrast to the submissive, lowered eyes of the fi gure in Plan, Volcano's glance is challenging. In more ways than one, this fi gure defi es "anatomical correctness." Inasmuch as this work portrays Volcano's self-styled, hormone-boosted, gender-abolitionist body, its subject is a body that has been deliberately manipulated to transgress corporeal norms. Saville's professed purpose in making this work (and Passage) is to represent "the idea of fl oating gender that is not fi xed" (Schama 2005, 126). She sought out Volcano to model for her because "he/she is a mutational body with gender defying body parts" (Gayford 1999). To get across her vision of "fl oating gender," Saville distorts some somatic spatial relations. On the left side of the canvas is Volcano's masculine head perfectly framed by womanly breasts that are sited exceedingly high on his chest. On the right side of the canvas, Saville places the predominantly female genitalia so conspicuously far forward in the crotch that they encroach on the fi gure's abdomen. Despite the resulting emphasis on the seeming contradictions of Volcano's body, the fi gure does not look like a hodgepodge of mismatched body parts. On the contrary, the fi gure in Matrix fuses presumptively incompatible corporeal elements to constitute a new human form. Certain corporeal anomalies are plain to see. The fi gure has a moustache and goatee plus breasts and minus a regulation penis and testicles. Why doesn't this image collapse into a biomedical collage-a pick-your-own-parts body composite? This fi gure doesn't look undone by incoherence because Saville adroitly merges or juxtaposes other compositional elements. An androgynous tattooed decorative band encircles the slim upper arm, which morphs into a mountain of a shoulder. Directly in front of the shoulder, a big, soft breast slumps to one side. Together they form a pair of hills, natural neighbors. Volcano's genital region is visually salient, both because Saville's facture in this section is especially lavish and because the fi gure's hips tilt forward to show off the genitalia. The paint here is layered on in thick swathes and dabs of color-shades of pink-tinged creams, tans, and browns. The drawing is not at all like an anatomy textbook image. It's impossible to distinguish the parts you studied in sex-education class. Chromatic brushstrokes blend into one another, blurring the genitalia and creating folds of delicate fl esh. Volcano has made sure that his genitals aren't neatly classifi able, and Saville paints him that way. Shrage_Ch09.indd 163 4/7/2009 6:37:15 PM 164 "YOU'VE CHANGED" I agree with Donald Kuspit that Saville "restores beauty to the primitive genital organ" (1999). However, I think that he errs in interpreting Matrix as a descendant of Gustave Courbet's Origin of the World (ca. 1866). Matrix doesn't resurrect the ageold metaphor tying female reproductive paraphernalia to creativity. Saville's pigment tones and paint application are so lush that the tissue she describes looks sensual, excitable, sexually engaged. Kuspit notwithstanding, Matrix depicts the seductiveness and vitality of erogenous tissue in a manner that conveys sexual agency. Though by no means pornographic, this bit is very sexy. Still, Matrix is hardly a rapturous celebration of gender-bending, medically mediated corporeity. Volcano is well aware of the hazards of gender abolitionism, and Saville ensures that her rendering of his body incorporates this danger.13 The Matrix fi gure perches precariously at the edge of the supporting platform with an arm hanging straight down and a thigh dangling off the edge. Tilted toward the viewer, the fi gure is a little off balance. Although Saville provides solid support below the fi gure, she has had him assume an uneasy pose-a pose that comports with Volcano's disequilibrated, disquieting stance regarding gendered embodiment, not to mention his vexed social status. Viewers of Matrix see a form that is at risk of falling, yet somehow holding steady. Yet, they also encounter a fi gure who offers himself for viewing.14 Commenting on his own photographic work, Volcano affi rms his recently found artistic and sexual agency: I am using my body and body parts as source material in my photographic practice with increasing frequency. . . . To reach the point where I could become my own subject took twenty years. At last I was able to own my body enough to give it away visually. While producing these images I felt the power one can access when freed from conventional notions about what constitutes an attractive body. (Volcano 1999) Saville grasps the agency Volcano gained by refi ning and augmenting his intersexed body and making images of himself. Matrix captures Volcano's agency of evolving and self-presenting as a well-nigh postgender, corporeal amalgam.15 At fi rst, Saville's title, Matrix, seems antithetical to Volcano's express desire to spotlight his masculine identity and agency and to downplay his femininity, for one defi nition of "matrix" is "womb," and the prominent genitals of the Matrix fi gure appear to me to be closer to female organs than male ones.16 Yet, other defi nitions of "matrix" align her title with his identity as a gender abolitionist. Clearly, Volcano aspires to spark "a situation within which something else originates, develops, or is contained" and perhaps to be something like the "principal metal in an alloy" or a brand-new "mold or die" (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/matrix). Transgender, Corporeity, and Agency In discussing the gender-medicine juncture, it may be tempting to focus exclusively on political analysis. However, this temptation must be resisted, for it leads to neglecting the diversity of individuals' needs, values, motivations, and strategies Shrage_Ch09.indd 164 4/7/2009 6:37:15 PM Artifi ce and Authenticity 165 for negotiating interpersonal derogation and institutional subordination.17 Nothing is gained by unconditionally condemning or endorsing biomedical gender interventions. Here I seek to balance political, interpersonal, and personal viewpoints in order to clarify disanalogies between the mass medical come-on to nontransgendered women and the heterosexual mating scene that supports it, on the one hand, and various sex-reassignment options and the social context in which they are considered, on the other.18 Volcano's body and "hermaphrodyké" self-presentation constitute a standing critique of normative gender binarism and an ongoing reproach to anyone who, in Indra Windh's words, can't "count past two" (Volcano and Windh 2003).19 In contrast, a nontransgendered, female cosmetic surgery customer's postprocedure body complies with and helps to perpetuate this invidious ideology.20 Not surprisingly, there are interpersonal and discursive pressures in transgender support groups to consolidate a transsexual identity (Mason-Schrock 1996).21 Although quite a few advertisements for Asian clinics turn up in a Google search for sex-reassignment surgery, and anecdotal evidence indicates that some surgeons regale audiences at conferences for transgendered people with exaggerated claims about the need for and benefi ts of their services, the western medical profession is not selling sex-reassignment procedures to transgendered people in the aggressive and systematic way that it is selling femininity-perfecting procedures to nontransgendered women. Whatever pressures there may be to buy sex-reassignment technology, they certainly have not gained the juggernaut power and cultural omnipresence of the beauty business's marketing to nontransgendered women (and increasingly to nontransgendered men). Indeed, resistance within transgendered communities to availing yourself of medical technology is on the rise (Heyes 2007, 58). In my view, then, Volcano is right to ascribe both progressive political agency and personal autonomy to his appropriation of hormone treatment. However, because neither political agency nor personal autonomy is an all-or-nothing achievement, I acknowledge, as does Volcano, that bigotry and other repressive forces unjustly limit the political impact of his dissident body and art, as well as the freedom with which he enacts and the satisfactions he derives from his transgendered, intersexed identity. Whereas Plan proffers an ironic allegory of art and medicine as conjoint practices in virtue of gender norms and power relations, Matrix brackets medicine for the sake of exploring the positive agentic possibilities of transgendered embodiment. Obviously, lots of women who have undergone cosmetic procedures testify that submitting to the knife or needle enhances their agency. Now that they are more attractive, they feel better about themselves. Consequently, they act with more confi dence in a wider range of social situations. No doubt, many of these claims are true, and I have no reason to believe that Saville would dispute this. But since Matrix depicts enhanced transgendered agency, I'll concentrate on this topic and ask what this portrait, in conjunction with Volcano's autobiographical texts and self-portraiture, implies for agency theory. It is useful to recall Volcano's assertion that it took him twenty years to free himself from ideals of attractiveness grounded in gender dimorphism and to gain Shrage_Ch09.indd 165 4/7/2009 6:37:15 PM 166 "YOU'VE CHANGED" suffi cient body-esteem to start photographing himself. Judith Butler concludes an essay on justice and the struggles of intersexed people by striking a similar chord. Rejecting modernist suggestions that either a universal human core or an ineffable individual core can legitimate an intersexed person's demands for biomedical treatment, Butler proposes that a conviction that standard issue genitalia are irrelevant to the "lovability" of a person does legitimate these demands (Butler 2004, 71–74). Following Butler, Volcano's recollection of his own history might be understood as a process of crediting his own lovability and developing a healthy form of self-love. Because Jay Prosser contests Butler's rejection of the claim that agency presupposes an individualized self to direct action, his reliance on Didier Anzieu's account of the "skin ego" seems altogether incompatible with Butler's thought (Prosser 1998, 65 ff). In some respects, Prosser's and Butler's accounts are indeed irreconcilable.22 However, Sandra Bartky's discussion of a somatic dimension of love provides a point of intersection between them. Refl ecting on a six-month separation from her partner, Bartky writes, "I realized after several months that I was suffering from something I had never seen described: it was a skin hunger. It wasn't sex that I missed so much as the comfort of a warm body in bed, the feeling of being held and stroked-touched" (Bartky 2002, 102). Whereas Butler's suggestion about lovability make senses of the loneliness of skin hunger, Prosser's psychoanalytic account of the need for sex-reassignment procedures makes sense of the necessity of undergoing some or all of these interventions as a precondition of feeling worthy of a loving touch. Prosser recognizes, as does Butler, the facility with which the medically mandated narrative template of transsexuality infests the personal life stories of transgendered individuals, yet he counterposes this worry with a psychoanalytic account that lends a bit of credence to that "master narrative." In my view, his use of Anzieu's theory of embodiment and subjectivity is helpful for purposes of grasping the agency of transgendered individuals who seek out medical body modifi cations. According to Prosser, "the transsexual does not approach the body as an immaterial provisional surround, but, on the contrary, as the very 'seat' of the self " (Prosser 1998, 67). Following Anzieu, he holds that your awareness of the surface of your body together with your sense of ownership with respect to your material form are integral to your body image, which, in turn, is integral to your sense of selfhood and agency (68–73; see also Gallagher 2005, 24–25, 35, 38). Your body image is not simply an imaginary replication of your corporeal contours. It is an emotionally charged construal of your body. Consequently, your "authentic body"-your owned body image-may fail to coincide with your actual body (Prosser 1998, 70). This disjuncture is familiar from studies of phantom limbs (Prosser 1998, 78–84; Grosz 1994, 41, 70–73; Gallagher 2005, 86–106). Prosser characterizes the way discrepancies between a stubbornly intact body image and a body that has undergone amputation register affectively as "nostalgia" for a missing bodily attribute (Prosser 1998, 84). Ballerina Tanaquil Le Clercq (1929–2000), who was stricken with polio and paralyzed from the waist down at the age of twenty-seven, describes a similar experience: Shrage_Ch09.indd 166 4/7/2009 6:37:15 PM Artifi ce and Authenticity 167 "I had dreams in the beginning, for years," she says, "of going to the theater and discovering I'd forgotten my toe shoes, or rushing from one ballet to another and not being able to get my hair up. Anxiety dreams about all the horrible things that could happen to you as a dancer-when I couldn't even dance anymore. I outgrew those dreams eventually. Well, it was a hundred years ago. But when I dream now, I'm still walking, never wheeling. I know." She rolls her eyes. "After all this time, you'd think I'd get the message." (Brubach 1998) So does Ahuva Cohen, who had sex-reassignment surgery at the age of thirty-three: I had experienced my fi rst epiphany about my true sexual nature under rather sleazy circumstances. When my college roommate persuaded me to take the subway down to Forty-Second Street with him to see The Devil in Miss Jones, I became transfi xed by the images of Georgina Spelvin copulating on the screen. My simple erotic fantasies of the images of female bodies began to evolve into more elaborate fantasies of possessing a female body myself. When I met a girl and began having sex with her in my dorm room, I would imagine that someone else was doing to me what I was doing to her. . . . I would argue, however, that the intense "nostalgia" that I had begun to feel for a feminized body had been more than skin deep. Becoming a woman for me was not about wanting to play with dolls, or about wanting to adorn myself with jewelry, or about wanting to avoid military service, or about wanting to feel comfortable in social interactions, or just about wanting to feel comfortable in my own skin, but rather about needing to be fucked like a woman. (Cohen n.d.) Both Le Clercq and Cohen speak of ineradicable, emotional bonds that connect them to body images encoded in dreams or fantasies that are at odds with their actual anatomies. Of signal importance for understanding posttreatment transgendered agency, Prosser points out that an amputee's experience of a phantom limb can jumpstart adjustment to a prosthetic device (Prosser 1998, 85). Likewise, a transgendered person's pretreatment emotional investment in and fantasized anticipation of a posttreatment anatomy facilitate posttreatment ownership of and agentic acclimation to a reconstructed body (85–89). Alas, Prosser does not theorize the agentic enhancement that hormonal or surgical treatment can underwrite for a transgendered person. Although Volcano does not write about this dimension of his life in any detail, his self-portraiture supplies abundant evidence of amplifi ed agency.23 Moreover, as I have argued, Saville's portrait trumpets his agentic transmutation. Saville's whole-person approach to portraiture allows her to include dimensions of Volcano's identity and agency that would ordinarily be excluded from a portrait and to represent Volcano's identity and agency more fully than would ordinarily be possible. Two themes provide foci for Matrix's composition, and they are key to interpreting this work: (1) Volcano's "throwing down the gauntlet" attitude, centering on but not confi ned to his head, and (2) the unabashed sexual agency of Volcano's body, centering on but not confi ned to his genitalia. I note, as well, the tender image of Volcano's breasts framing his face. Saville conjures up a "Madonna with Child" synthesized in a single person-a mischievous, you might say "devilish," metaphor for Volcano's self-love and lovability. Shrage_Ch09.indd 167 4/7/2009 6:37:15 PM 168 "YOU'VE CHANGED" If Matrix does not egregiously misrepresent Volcano, it sets a challenging agenda for philosophy of action. In what follows, I consider why the structure of many theories of identity and agency precludes explicating Matrix's depiction of Volcano's agentic enhancement, and I suggest a criterion of adequacy that a theory of agency must satisfy if it is to accommodate the agentic advances that Matrix spotlights. While differing in many details, a number of infl uential philosophical accounts of personal identity and agency rely on one of two versions of a top-down model, both of which position the mind as the supervisor of the body. The basic idea of the identity construction model is that the mind deliberates and decides which of your qualities and desires to endorse, tolerate, or try to acquire.24 When you act on accepted attributes, you act autonomously. The basic idea of the action production model is that the mind deliberates and decides what to do.25 Autonomous action issues from these determinations. I cannot review all of these accounts here, but, in my view, Saville's representation of Volcano is incompatible with top-down views of identity and agency. Nothing in Matrix warrants the inference that Volcano's mind has a monopoly on governing his conduct. What is missing in these theories, central to Prosser's view and memorably described in Matrix, is intelligent corporeity. To be sure, Volcano knows his own mind and acts accordingly, but Matrix foregounds his agentic body. In some philosophical quarters, Kantian insistence on pure reason as the ruling faculty of an autonomous agent is losing favor. More and more, philosophers are acknowledging the contributions of affect to discerning what sort of person to aspire to be or what would be best to do. Basal affective states, such as self-trust, have gained entrée into some theories as necessary conditions for autonomy (e.g., Govier 1993; Benson 2000). Harry Frankfurt's contention that love demarcates the boundaries of the will further underscores the role of affect in identity and agency (Frankfurt 1988, ch. 7; Frankfurt 1998, chs. 11, 14). This salubrious trend opens the possibility that more philosophers of action will recognize the link between affect and embodiment and realize how crucial embodiment is to identity and agency. Purely mental affect is the exception rather than the rule, and somatically situated feelings are indispensable to intelligent agency.26 The most promising philosophical antecedent for a theory of corporeal practical intelligence is Maurice Merleau-Ponty's account of embodied habit. For MerleauPonty, habit is "the [body's] power to respond with a certain type of solution to situations of a certain general form" (Merleau-Ponty 1962/2004, 164–65). By virtue of habit, you corporeally apprehend the possibilities for action that an environment presents; select movement that comports with your needs, values, and aims; and rally your fund of know-how to act appropriately and meaningfully (129, 151–52, 161, 165). Although the term "habit" colloquially connotes mindless routines, such as smoking cigarettes or watching hours of escapist television, Merleau-Ponty's conception of habit references a fl exible capability that is attuned to new information and responsive to it. As he puts it, habit constitutes "our power of dilating our being-inthe-world, or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments" (166). Your know-how expands as you put it to use. Although culturally mediated, your body is agentic-that is, capable of improvisation and innovation.27 Shrage_Ch09.indd 168 4/7/2009 6:37:16 PM Artifi ce and Authenticity 169 In my view, one of Merleau-Ponty's examples of the workings of habit presciently anticipates key problems in theorizing transgendered agency. Consider a fashionable woman wearing a hat adorned with a long feather who effortlessly adjusts her movements to accommodate the feather's extension of her height (MerleauPonty 1962/2004, 165). According to Merleau-Ponty, she temporarily incorporates her apparel into her body image. Armed with this preconscious self-knowledge, she navigates the world without poking nearby people in the eye or crushing her feather in a cab door. Of course, she consciously donned this hat when she left home. Still, she didn't consciously revise her body image or consciously alter her behavior to take the plume into account. Merleau-Ponty maintains that people expand and contract their sense of their own spatial boundaries with surprising ease and frequency and that habit enables them to adjust their movement patterns accordingly. Artist Rebecca Horn's prosthetic inventions and her fi lms of performances in which individuals wear them demonstrate the human body's agentic malleability and versatility. For Finger Gloves (Handschuhfi ngers 1972), Horn constructed black hand attachments with straight, rigid "fi ngers" about three feet long. In the fi lm, the performer uses her prostheticly elongated digits to feel her way around what appears to be a patio or balcony paved in stone. Through her artifi cial fi ngers, she fi nds her way around, encountering the surfaces of a low boundary wall and making contact with the back of a nude male body lying face-down on the stone paving. Horn never gives viewers a wide-angle look at the setting. Allowed to see only what the "gloved" performer comes across, viewers are vouchsafed a glimpse of the lived experience of an alternative embodiment. Horn's artistic method for her Personal Art series is collaborative. The device she creates for each performer refl ects her understanding of that individual's agentic identity. She describes her process as follows: The actual performance is preceded by a process of development in which the chosen performer participates. The performer's desires and projections determine the manner in which he presents himself. The "garment" is constructed and made to fi t the body of the wearer. Through the act of fi tting it and wearing it time after time, a process of identifi cation begins to evolve, an essential factor for the performance. During the performance, the person is isolated, separated from his everyday environment, in order to fi nd extended forms of self-perception. (Horn et al. 2000, 24) What Merleau-Ponty invites you to imagine and Horn's fi lms demonstrate is practically intelligent corporeity-affectively infl ected proprioceptive and sensory awareness together with conatively triggered corporeal competencies. Your repertoire of know-how not only indexes your agentic identity but also functions as a vehicle of self-reimaging and self-direction. Still, passé headgear and trendy artistic conceits might seem irrelevant to transgendered agency. After all, transgendered agentic identities and uses of medical technology do not concern appurtenances to be put on or taken off at will. They concern a person's experienced and experiencing fl esh and the option of tampering with it. While acknowledging this disparity, I submit that the continuities are more philosophically signifi cant. Shrage_Ch09.indd 169 4/7/2009 6:37:16 PM 170 "YOU'VE CHANGED" Horn, recall, did not dream up costumes and then recruit volunteers to try them out. She designed garments to "fi t" her performers psychocorporeally-to echo their yearnings, fantasies, and emotionally fueled body images. Likewise, Merleau-Ponty's lady of fashion dresses as she does because the fi gure-plus-hat gestalt she sees in her mirror pleases her. By her reckoning, it successfully synthesizes social standards of accessorization, her personal style, and her body image. She, too, is guided by affect and desire, and, like Horn's performers who developed strong identifi cations with their couture prostheses, she identifi es with her mirror image.28 In my view, Volcano's experience of gendered embodiment, as portrayed in Matrix, is analogous. Whatever role rational calculation may have played in his decisions about ingesting hormones and posing for Saville, Matrix takes no notice of it. Urgent desires, compelling feelings, and vivid fantasies centering on a radically unorthodox body image underwrite the bodily confi guration Volcano engineered for himself and the self-presentation Saville ascribes to Volcano. Neither Plan nor Matrix etiolates gendered subjectivity. In both works, libidinized gender saturates the models' bodies. The Plan fi gure is a victim of the clash between her body and feminine beauty ideals. Because her body image of gendered inferiority subdues her agency, she challenges philosophers of action to explicate corporeal agentic dysfunction-anomic, numbed, deskilled, immiserated embodiment. In contrast, Matrix represents corporeal agentic competence-attuned, versatile, confi dent, intelligent embodiment. In Matrix, the fi gure embraces his "mutant" body image, and the coordination of his feelings, desires, and body image quickens his agency. Paralleling Merleau-Ponty's philosophy and Horn's performance art, Matrix features Volcano's vibrant embodied subjectivity and credits his visceral experience as an arbiter of his agency.29 notes 1. Volcano makes a similar statement in a 1999 essay: "I no longer identify as 'woman,' and feel uncomfortable being read as female. I am intersex by design, an intentional mutation and need to have my gender specifi ed as existing outside of the binary gender system, rather than an abomination of it." 2. I am not suggesting that Saville's work is unprecedented in western portraiture. For example, her work is often compared with Lucien Freud's nude portraits. Although I don't have space to make the case for this claim here, I believe that her work constitutes a signifi cant advance in this genre in virtue of its evocation of psychocorporeality-the inextricability of selfhood, personal identity, and individual agency from the enculturated and intelligent human body. 3. For additional discussion of agentic bodies in Saville's oeuvre, see Meyers forthcoming, "Jenny Saville Remakes the Female Nude." 4. For relevant discussion, see Meagher 2003. 5. For discussion of the relevance of nontransgendered women's body issues to the topic of transgendered identity and agency, see Heyes 2003, 1097–98, and Heyes 2007, 40–42. 6. For a related reading of the geometry of Plan, see Rowley 1996, 93–96. 7. She also holds her left arm rigidly straight and pulls it tightly against her left side. For relevant discussion of women's need to make themselves as small as possible and to take up as little room as possible, see Bordo 1993, 185–212, and Bordo 1997, 127–33. Shrage_Ch09.indd 170 4/7/2009 6:37:16 PM Artifi ce and Authenticity 171 8. In addition to Saville's generous painterly treatment of the fi gure in Plan, the fact that she herself modeled for this painting provides evidence of her sympathy for the fi gure she portrays-indeed, her identifi cation with this fi gure. 9. For my views about Orlan's work, see Meyers 2002, 133–37. 10. For further discussion of my views regarding feminine beauty ideals, personal identity, and agency, see Meyers 2002, chs. 5 and 6, and Meyers 2004, ch. 4. 11. Volcano says that a physician told him there's a 90 percent probability that he has a genetic mutation called "46XX true hermaphroditism" (Volcano 2000, 99). Recounting Volcano's intertwined personal and artistic development, Prosser reports that he fi rst let his beard grow and then took male hormones and identifi ed as a "Hermaphrodyké," a "queeridentifi ed intersexual" (Prosser 2000, 10). 12. Although Saville uses bi-gendered pronouns to refer to Volcano, I'll use the masculine pronoun because Volcano affi rms that he valorizes his "mutant maleness" and doesn't want to be read as female (Volcano 1999). I do this with misgivings, however, because Volcano characterizes himself as a gender abolitionist. Given the existing English framework of gendered or neuter pronouns, I suspect that far-reaching cultural changes would need to occur before language could be established that would neither gender nor thingify (I think I'm borrowing this term from Catherine MacKinnon) gender abolitionists who live their beliefs as Volcano does. As things are, we can have a third gender or an in-between gender, but we don't have the linguistic resources to refer to a nongender that isn't an "it." 13. Volcano outlines how he copes with the dominant gender regime: "Out on the street I often feel the need to pass (as male). But in my own queer community I don't want to pass as male or female. I want to be seen for what I am: a chimera, a hybrid, a herm" (Volcano and Windh 2003). Elsewhere he describes being assaulted on a London bus (Volcano 2004). 14. In this connection, it is worth noting that Saville inspires confi dence in her models partly by taking risks herself. Volcano recalls: "She had photographed herself in the positions she wanted me to attempt, before I arrived. The fact that she exposed her own crevice impressed me and produced in me a desire to do whatever was required no matter how undignifi ed or painful" (Volcano 1999). 15. For an interpretation of Matrix as a "study in body dysphoria" and an articulation of the thesis that you can't really choose to become the "opposite sex," see Halberstam 2005, 111. I fi nd this view of Matrix dubious because Volcano assimilates his experience posing for Saville to what subjects have told him about their experiences posing for him and praises Saville's work (Volcano 1999). 16. I emphasize that this passage of Matrix looks this way to me because I take seriously Prosser's comment about the visual effect of Volcano's close-up perspective and enlargement of the images in his Transcock suite. Prosser claims that the size of these artistic manipulations enable many viewers who would not otherwise see these former clitorises as penises to grasp the "felt reality of this part as a penis" for the transsexual man who posed for the photograph (Prosser 2000, 9). 17. I discuss the interplay of individual autonomy, cultural norms, and political critique in a number of other essays-for example, Meyers 2002, chs. 1, 2, and 6, and Meyers 2004, chs. 2, 4, 10, and 13. 18. In contrast, Heyes underscores the analogies and continuities between the experience of women and transsexuals in order to make a case for feminist solidarity with transgendered people (Heyes 2007, 45). Shrage_Ch09.indd 171 4/7/2009 6:37:16 PM 172 "YOU'VE CHANGED" 19. Here is the context in which Windh uses this expression: "INDRA: The lenses through which I perceive the world allow me to see more than double. In fact I take in a beautifully shifting kaleidoscopic reality, an amazing mosaic of gender variance and norm deviance. Luckily, I have learnt to count past two and deliberately trained my eyes, and other senses, to detect a multiplicity of gendered possibilities all around and within me. I appreciate, value, respect, desire, admire and love what I see" (Volcano and Windh 2003). 20. It is worth bearing in mind that feminist dieters are also complicit in perpetuating oppressive norms of feminine heterosexual attractiveness (Heyes 2007, 59; see also Bartky 1990, 71–78). 21. For commentary on pernicious coercion that paradoxically enforces sex reassignment surgery as an exit route from the stigma of homosexuality in Iran, see Ireland 2007. 22. I do not have space to engage Prosser's critique of poststructuralist accounts of the subject, nor can I take up problems in psychoanalytic accounts, such as Anzieu's. In this essay, I isolate what I consider insightful in each position. 23. For reproductions of the self-portraits I refer to, see Volcano 2000, 88–98, 168–79. 24. The views of Harry Frankfurt (1988), Marilyn Friedman (2003), and John Christman (2005) exemplify this approach. 25. David Velleman's work (2000a; 2000b; 2002) exemplifi es this approach. 26. For defense of these claims about embodied affectivity, see Meyers "Affect, Corporeity, and Practical Intelligence." Unpublished manuscript. 27. For complementary work in this area, see Dreyfus 1998; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1999; Grimshaw 1999; Sheets-Johnstone 1999; and Sullivan 2000. 28. Prosser underscores the prominence of "mirror scenes" in transsexual autobiographies (Prosser 1998, 99 ff). 29. When Laurie Shrage fi rst proposed that I write for this volume, I shrank from the task. I questioned whether I had any right to talk about life situations so different from my own. But Laurie persisted, and Ahuva B. Cohen, who underwent sex-reassignment surgery twenty years ago, permitted me to read and quote from parts of her memoire. Her text evidences such extraordinary candor, introspective insight, and skepticism about theories that I decided to try, with all due self-doubt, to take a fi rst step toward understanding transgendered and transsexual agency. I want to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to both Laurie Shrage and Ahuva Cohen. I would not have attempted this essay, were it not for their help. I also thank Maureen Bray, director of the Sean Kelly Gallery for refreshing and correcting my memory of Rebecca Horn's Finger Gloves. references Bartky, Sandra Lee. 1990. Femininity and Domination. New York: Routledge. --- . 2002. "Sympathy and Solidarity" and Other Essays. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefi eld. Benson, Paul. 2000. "Feeling Crazy: Self-Worth and the Social Character of Responsibility." In Relational Autonomy, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar. New York: Oxford University Press. Boodman, Sandra G. 2004. "For More Teenage Girls, Adult Plastic Surgery: Rise in Breast Implants, Other Procedures Raises Doubts About Long-Term Effects." Washington Post. October 26, 2004, p. A01. Shrage_Ch09.indd 172 4/7/2009 6:37:16 PM Artifi ce and Authenticity 173 Bordo, Susan. 1993. Unbearable Weight. Berkeley: University of California Press. --- . 1997. Twilight Zones. Berkeley: University of California Press. Brubach, Holly. 1998. "Muse, Interrupted." New York Times, November 22, 1998, sec. 6, p. 60. Butler, Judith. 2004. Undoing Gender. New York: Routledge. Cohen, Ahuva B. n.d. "The Road to Jerusalem." In Testimony. Unpublished ms. Christman, John. 2005. "Autonomy, Self-Knowledge, and Liberal Legitimacy." In Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, ed. Joel Anderson and John Christman. New York: Cambridge University Press. Davis, Kathy. 1991. "Remaking the She-Devil: A Critical Look at Feminist Approaches to Beauty." Hypatia 6, no. 2 (1991): 21–43. Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1998. "Intelligence without Representation." At www.hfac.uh.edu/cogsci/ dreyfus.html. Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Stuart E. Dreyfus. 1999. "The Challenge of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Embodiment for Cognitive Science." In Perspectives on Embodiment, ed. Gail Weiss and Honi Fern Haber. New York: Routledge. Frankfurt, Harry. 1988. The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. --- . 1998. Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Friedman, Marilyn. 2003. Autonomy, Gender, Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. Gallagher, Shaun. 2005. How the Body Shapes the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Gayford, Martin. 1999. "A Conversation with Jenny Saville." In Jenny Saville: Territories, ed. Mollie Dent-Brocklehurst. New York: Gagosian Gallery. Govier, Trudy. 1993. "Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem." Hypatia 8: 99–120. Grimshaw. Jean. 1999. "Working Out with Merleau-Ponty." In Women's Bodies: Discipline and Transgression, ed. Jane Arthurs and Jean Grimshaw. London: Cassell. Grosz, Elizabeth. 1994. Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Halberstam, Judith. 2005. In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives. New York: New York University Press. Heyes, Cressida J. 2003. "Feminist Solidarity after Queer Theory." Signs 28: 1093–1120. --- . 2007. Self-Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies. New York: Oxford University Press. Horn, Rebecca, et al. 2000. Rebecca Horn. Trans. Matthew Partridge. Stuttgart: Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen. Ireland, Doug. 2007. "Change Sex or Die." Gay City News. At http://gaycitynews.com/ site/news.cfm?newsid=18324930&BRD=2729&PAG=461&dept_id=569346&rfi=6. 05/10/2007 (accessed June 1, 2008). Kuspit, Donald. 1999. "Jenny Saville: Gagosian Gallery, New York City, New York." ArtForum December. Mackenzie, Suzie. 2005. "Under the Skin." Guardian,y October 22, 2005. Mason-Schrock, Douglas. 1996. "Transsexuals' Narrative Construction of the 'True Self.' " Social Psychology Quarterly 59, no. 3: 176–92. Meagher, Michelle. 2003. "Jenny Saville and a Feminist Aesthetics of Disgust." Hypatia 18, no. 4: 23–41. Shrage_Ch09.indd 173 4/7/2009 6:37:16 PM 174 "YOU'VE CHANGED" Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1962, reprinted in 2004. Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Colin Smith. New York: Routledge. Meyers, Diana Tietjens. 2002. Gender in the Mirror: Cultural Imagery and Women's Agency. New York: Oxford University Press. --- . 2004. Being Yourself: Essays on Identity, Action, and Social Life. New York: Rowman and Littlefi eld. --- . "Affect, Corporeity, and Practical Intelligence." Unpublished ms. --- . Forthcoming. "Jenny Saville Remakes the Female Nude: Feminist Refl ections on the State of the Art." In Beauty Revisited, ed. Peg Zeglin Brand. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Nead, Lynda. 1992. The Female Nude: Art, Obscenity, and Sexuality. New York: Routledge. Nelson, Hilde Lindemann. 2001. Damaged Identities: Narrative Repair. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Prosser, Jay. 1998. Second Skins: The Body Narratives of Transsexuality. New York: Columbia University Press. --- . 2000. "The Art of Ph/Autography: Del LaGrace Volcano." In Sublime Mutations, ed. Del LaGrace Volcano. Tübingen: Konkursbuchverlag. Rowley, Alison. 1996. "On Viewing Three Paintings by Jenny Saville: Rethinking a Feminist Practice of Painting." In Generations and Geographies in the Visual Arts: Feminist Readings, ed. Griselda Pollock. New York: Routledge. Schama, Simon. 2005. "Interview with Jenny Saville." In Jenny Saville. New York: Rizzoli. Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 1999. The Primacy of Movement. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Singer, Natasha. 2007. "Is the 'Mom Job' Really Necessary?" New York Times, October 4, 2007, at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/fashion/04skin.html?pagewanted=1 (accessed June 3, 2008). Sullivan, Shannon. 2000. "Reconfi guring Gender with John Dewey: Habit, Bodies, and Cultural Change." Hypatia 15, no. 1: 23–42. Velleman, J. David. 2000a. "From Self Psychology to Moral Philosophy." Philosophical Perspectives: Action and Freedom 14: 349–77. --- . 2000b. The Possibility of Practical Reason. New York: Oxford University Press. --- . 2002. "Identifi cation and Identity." In Contours of Agency, ed. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Volcano, Del LaGrace. 1999. "On Being a Jenny Saville Painting." In Jenny Saville: Territories, ed. Mollie Dent-Brocklehurst. New York: Gagosian Gallery. --- . ed. 2000. Sublime Mutations. Tübingen: Konkursbuchverlag. --- . 2004. "Leap Day." At http://www.dellagracevolcano.com/text3.html (accessed May 21, 2008). --- . 2005. Statement, at http://www.dellagracevolcano.com/statement.html (accessed May 7, 2008). Volcano, Del LaGrace, and Indra Windh. 2003 "Hermlove." At http://www.dellagracevolcano .com/text2.html (accessed May 21, 2008). Shrage_Ch09.indd 174 4/7/2009 6:37:16 PM

STRUCTURE AND GESTALT to be the director of the bank. In her estimation he would not sink, no matter how much his image had otherwise been dented. THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS: NOTES ON AUSTRIAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY FROM BOLZANO TO WITTGENSTEIN Barry Smith §1. The internal front §2. Bernard Bolzano: logic and the theory of science §3. On nationalities of a higher order §4. The movement of human capital The present paper takes the form of a series of sketches of 19th century Austrian political and intellectual history, allied with a number of reflections of a more general nature which it is hoped will contribute to our understanding of some of the peculiar characteristics of Austrian thought, particularly Austrian philosophy and economics, in the period in question. This concern with historical background should not be taken to imply sympathy with any view which would relativise the truth of a doctrine or the validity of an argument to the context within which it is produced. The suggestion is simply that it may be impossible to grasp, say, a philosophical theory which originated within an alien culture, without some understanding of that culture and of the forces within it which may have contributed to the development of the theory. All too often the temptation is simply to ig-* nore this background in the belief that one may thereby produce an unprejudiced (context-free) understanding of the 212 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT theory in question, where what is obtained is often merely an interpretation, within the framework of one's own expectations, from which all but the barest trace of the original doctrine has been lost. This may as, notoriously, in the case of Anglo-Saxon interpretations of the later Wittgenstein lead to the development of a prestigious body of theory; but the task remains, in all such cases, to compare interpretation with original, and this leads back to historical investigations of the type attempted here. §1. Th e in t e pnal fron t As is by now well-understood, the citizen of a German state in Metternich's day inhabited a world bearing little resemblance to the scientifically conceived universe of the present day. He would feel himself subservient to a system of forces emanating from God, and permeating the world through God's chosen Emperor, Elector or Prince. He would take for granted a web of absolute limitations upon his freedom of thought and action, set by custom, by common opinion, and by the scaffolding of law,l and this would determine his experience of the natural world as of a closed, finite whole. The citizen would conceive himself and would be conceived by those set in authority over him as having a proper business and a proper place and station within this whole, beyond which he was not expected, nor indeed allowed, to tread. 2 Thus the prince alone was the locus of political authority; the people, either collectively or as individuals, played no role in the political life of the state. There was no suggestion that the citizen may properly seek to influence his ruler, for example, or that the ruler ought properly to seek the opinions of his citizens. THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS 213 The rights of the citizen were exhausted, in effect, in this, that he was allowed to be the subject of the prince (though this, too, was a right which might at any time be rescinded and the individual banished from the state). Perhaps the most convincing depiction of a world experienced as subject to this scaffolding of law is contained in Kleist's novel Michael Kohlhaa s. Kleist reveals how deeply embedded was the assumption that the prince, as the representative of God on earth, was an intrinsically adequate guarantor of justice, that injustice in the society could therefore ensue only from errors of his agents, which could be rectified if they coul d be rectified without question, upon petition to the prince. Apparent injustices which could not be righted in this manner thereby proved themselves to be not injustices at all, but higher forms of justice, constituent elements of a larger plan, unintelligible to the citizen and therefore not, on any account, subjectable to question or criticism. This state of resignation of the members of a society will not, of course, withstand all forms of behaviour on the part of their ruler. It calls, rather, for the conscious or unconscious adoption on his part of a quite specific form of conservatism, constructed around the idea of preserving this system of expectations. It demands, for example, the taking of measures against the growth in influence of liberal elements whose views would tend to call into question the edifice of relations of trust within the society, and it calls forth also political opposition to new ideas, to scholarship, and to science, all of which might undermine the world upon which the edifice is built. It would not be too much of an over-simplification to say that, largely thanks to the political skills of his chancellor 214 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT Metternich, the Emperor of Austria, still at that time the most powerful of all the German princes, was able to impose this kind of conservatism upon much of Europe for a period of three decades leading up to 1848. Specifically, the Empire was able to exert pressure upon the principali ties of ausser~st erreiehische s Deu tsehland 3 in order to gain their support for a policy which consisted, in effect, in the holding in place of everything on the map of Europe as it then stood, and particularly of the preservation of the patchwork of small German principalities which was believed to constitute an artificial check upon the expansion of any islands of liberal (or messianical or nationalistic) sentiment which might come to be established. This constituted the external aspect of the Metternichsystem imposed jointly by Austria and Prussia upon each other and upon the remaining German states. The internal policy of the system was based upon the principle of establishing at all levels within the society what were called internal fr onts against the growth of radicalism. Here it is not our purpose to reach a judgment concerning the rights or wrongs of this policy. Certainly it now seems, in retrospect, that Germany may have profited from the early growth of liberalism which Metternich perhaps prevent ed, since this might have enabled democratic institutions within that country to have become entrenched sufficiently to withstand the rise of fascism a century later. But what might safely have been risked within the German states, where all citizens shared a common language and a common background of traditions and institutions, might well have led to disaster in Austria, where the continually pressing need of those in authority was simply to hold together within the Empire a mixture of peoples at different stages of development and having conflicting interests and tradTHE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS 215 itions. In practice, the internal policy of the Metternichsystem consisted in the imposition of an elaborate system of controls of all public gatherings and associations, censorship of the press and of the mails, regulation of aliens , of travel, of place of residence, and so on. One predictable consequence of these overt controls was that such political groups as continued to exist were driven underground, and were constrained, where normal forms of political persuasion had been made imposSible, to turn to subversion. After 1848 this was met by the authorities by the formation of new , political arms of the police, and the Empire came to be criss-crossed at all levels with a system of spies, granted powers which included blackmail , torture and ~sassination. Again, the granting of such powers expressed a deep-seated view of the relation between the Emperor and his peoples as something comparable to the relation between the father of a large family and his children: the father who may find it necessary, in times of need , to take measures for the protection of his children which might to them seem extraordinary. Thus arms of the police were established also with the task of preserving public hea lth ( Hyge in epoZizei) and morals ( SittenpoZizei) . In some states the police took upon themselves the task of maintaining emergency food-depots as a means of preventins uprisings which might be fomented by shortages of food.4 There was established an extremely complicated system of passports and registration of domicile, responsibility for which was exercised by the Pos spoZizei , and this enabled the authorities again in their role as fathers of the people to determine the precise wherea bouts of any citizen at any time. (Those same authorities prided themselves upon the fact that no one could get lost within the Empire.) 216 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT A not incidental benefit of the fact that all journeys and all changes of address were subject to official approval and registration was that it became possible for politically suspect individuals to be isolated from those centres of population where they might do most damage. To the members of such a family, accustomed at every turn to feel the protective hand of their paternal Emperor, the opponent of the state appears as something inexplicable. And not being capable of understanding the mentality which might lead certain types of individuals under certain circumstances to agitate or rebel, the authorities find it sufficient to conceive all such individuals indiscriminately as 'destructive elements' and allow themselves to recognise no distinctions between those among them who were motivated by say liberalism or nationalism, and those motivated merely by some petty local or personal grievance. All such individuals were conceived in their totality as something partaking of the nature of a cancerous growth, against which all measures on the part of the civil and political police seemed justified. But not only were the people shielded in this way from dissident or eccentric individuals. A ring of protection was constructed to shield them also from new ideas. Metternich's system involved not only the censorship of the press, but made room also for a policy of nurturing established and accepted opinions through a network of state information bureaux. Censorship was applied further in the arts, particularly the theatre, and there arose in response a tendency for artists to revert to classical forms, to that which had been tried and tested. 5 But this ring of protection was applied with most serious effect to the universities, for even there, because of the danger of infection, new ideas THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS 217 were to be prevented from taking root. The principles of such Protektion were expressed by Franz I in an address to the professors of the newly founded University of Laibach: Be faithful to the old, for this is also the good. It is not scholars that I require, but honest, rightly-formed citizens. Whoever serves me must teach as I command; whoever cannot do this, or comes with new ideas, can go or I will see that he is removed. Regulation of the universities was exercised in practice by administrators sponsored by the political police, and specifically by the use of officially approved textbooks or manuals, usually neither original nor scholarly, which presented their content within a framework designed primari l y to draw out its practical (ethical) consequences. By various means, including the employment of spies among the students, it was ensured that individual teachers adhered rigidly to the content of the textbooks which had been prescribed. Not even the rapidly evolving natural sciences served as seedbeds of dissent, as had been the case in other parts of Europe. The majority of students were in any event engaged in the study of law, or of some related discipline, in preparation for an almost inevitable career in the imperial civil service. The predictable result of all of this, of course, was a virtual stagnation of intellectual activity in the Empire. Almost no achievement of note in the pure sciences was produced in any Austrian university until Carl Menger's Grund s~tz e der VoZkswi r tscha f tsleh r e , which initiated new and important ideas in the field of economic theory. This was published in 1871, by which time many of the residual effects of absolutistic control of the universities had 218 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT been allowed to disappear. It should not however be assumed that the controls adopted are to be universally condemned. They enabled Austrian universities to withstand successively the Kantian, Hegelian, and various derivative metaphysical systems which had done so much dam~ge to generations of students in German universities outside the Empire. Austria, indeed, served in many respects as the last intellectual outpost of the Latin renaissance traditioñ She was thus able to preserve the insights and assumptions of classical and scholastic philosophers (particularly of Aristotle whose works formed a significant part of the curriculum of the Austrian classical Gymnasien and of the Spanish scholastics 7 ) and I want to claim this contributed greatly to the fertility of her thinkers in the subsequent decades. It is impossible, for example, to understand Menger's work, and to comprehend the nature of the opposition between Austrian economic theory and historicist economics as then practised in Germany, except by reference to the system of Aristotelian-scholastic assumptions which permeated the intellectual life of the Empire in the period.8 §2. Bernard Bolzano: Logic and the theory of science The ideas of the preceding section are well-illustrated by the case of Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848), another Austrian thinker profoundly influenced by Aristotelian modes of thought and perhaps the most brilliant philosopher to have been produced by the Empire as a whole. 9 Bolzano made important contributions not only to philosophy, to theology and social theory, but was responsible also for significant insights in logic and the foundations of mathematics. Much of his work, however, consisted of largely ephemeral THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS 219 contributions to the various religious and theological disputes pervading central Europe at that time. Despite the relative security of Prague, where Imperial surveillance was less effective and taken less seriously than in the capital of the Empire, Bolzano found himself the victim of frequent attacks from both the political and religious establishments, the suspicion of the authorities having been encouraged, for example, by his refusal to use an officially recommended textbook in his courses, and by the fact that he served as the spokesman for the more liberal wing in religious disputes. He was finally discredited officially by being blamed for student unrest which had broken out in a local theological seminary. He was dismissed from his chair by Emperor Franz in 1819 and in the remaining thirty years of his life he never again held a teaching position. During this period Bolzano developed the philosophical ontology which is presented in his WissenschaftsZehre (1837), virtually the only major scientific achievement of the Metternich era in Austria. This work, although it partakes of many of the characteristics of the Austrian university textbook in the sense of §1. above,including a pedantic concern for the correction of previous views on each of the topics discussed, an encyclopedic (Aristotelian) format, and an evident lack of concern for either stylistic sophistication or conceptual profundity for their own sakes was far from constituting a typical representative of its species. It was much more itself the record of a scientific investigation of the concept textbook and a disquisition on the c on s truc ti on of textbooks and therefore also on the recognition and demarcation (by mortal man) of bodies of (eternal) scientific truths. Hence the central thesis of the work is the necessity of distinguishing between the 220 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT transient realm of human knowledge, of thoughts, impressions, and artefacts of language, and a further realm, consisting of eternal abstract in telligi bilia , which Bolzano called 'propositions in themselves', 'theories in themselves', 'truths in themselves', 'falsehoods in themselves', and so on. Propositions in themselves, for example, represent the objective, intelligible content of actual and possible individual sentence-using acts (acts of judgment). Theories in themselves represent the objectively delineated totalities of propositions in themselves which would correspond to correctly constructed textbooks. Each entity in itself is held to exist (have being) outside both space and time, and absolutely independently of whether it is understood, recognised, acknowledged, or grasped in any way by any thinking subj ect. (Indeed Bolzano stressed that his originality in relation to 'platonist' thinkers who had preceded him consisted in the fact that whilst they had all of them regarded 'universals', or 'ideas', or 'forms' as standing in a relation of dependence upon or of necessary accessibility to our thinking (of) them, he himself had affirmed the existence of an absolute gulf between the realm of concrete thinking acts and the objective totality of inteZ ligi bili a which he conceived himself to have discovered. What, now, can be said about the historical origins of Bolzano's ontology? Present-day thinkers may find it difficult to conceive the effects which a threatened collapse of one's nation, or of one's religion, may have on the range of theories and arguments which might seem meaningful or important. The fact that the associated ideas of national and religious consciousness are so unfamiliar to and are regarded so unsympathetically by modern intellectuals may hold them back from a complete understanding of a thinker whose work has been coloured, even in part, by the existence of such a THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS 221 threat. Even in the case of Bolzano, I would argue, we have an example of a philosopher whose recognition of the religious and political instability of the society in which he lived, and of the impossibility of shoring up that society by means of practical reforms, determined his thought in a way which contributed to his conception of an idealised alternative world, freed of the possibility of conflict and of decay, a world which would serve as a substitute for the hitherto unquestioned Catholic intellectual world-picture the crumbling apart of which he and his contemporaries were beginning to experience through the schisms of the period.l 0 What is remarkable in Bolzano's case is that in developing this ontology he succeeded in establishing the foundations of a theory of logic which brougoctogether very many highly original and fruitful insights, some of which have only recently, with the development of mathematica: logic, been recognised for their true worth. §3. On nat ionaliti e s of a highe r orde r During the second half of the 19th century each of the four great German cities of central Europe (Vienna, Prague, Buda and Pest) experienced a severe decline in the political dominance of its middle-class German and German-speaking Jewish populations. The culture and intellectual effects of this decline in the case of Vienna have been well-documented by Schorske,11 Johnston,1 2 and others,1 3 who have demonstrated how, especially after the loss of their political power through abrupt re-establishment of authoritarian rule in the second half of the century, there arose a tendency amongst members of the Viennese middle classes to turn to literary, artistic and related fields, effectively in order to fill the resulting psychological and economic gap in their lives. 222 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT The German middle classes of Budapest and Prague however suffered no such sudden loss of power. They experienced rather a steady increase in the political activity of the various more or less anti-German communities about them, and a gradual recognition of the need to come to terms with these communities. In Hungary this gave rise to an unparalleled merging or melting away of all that had been peculiarly German into the Magyar background . This submission of one culture to another quite distinct from the more familiar phenomenon of an individual immigrant adopting the culture of a host country is of much psychological and historical interest; indeed it might seem to offer a model, if only it could be repeated at will, for the solution of one particularly intransigent type of political problem. Of course the con ditions which made it possible were by no means simple in character, and certainly not of the kind which can be artificially re-created . The success of Magyarisation depended first of all upon the guileless and singleminded resolution of the Hungarians themselves that it should be brought about, a resolution which expressed itself at all levels within the society, and even determined the strategy adopted by Hungary in its contribution to the formation of the Imperial foreign policy. It depended upon the readiness of t he more chauvinistically German Germans to emigrate, even at the expense of abandoning ties and privileges acquired in Hungary; and it depended further upon the willingness of those who remained to fall into line, to accommodate themselves to the process of Magyarisation (which typically involved the adoption of both a Hungarian name and of the Hungarian language, at least for public use). This may in some cases have reflected a certain conformist strain in the German character, but it reflected also a desire on the part of many Germans to hold THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS 223 on to status and possessions and to a familiar environment even at the cost of their national identity. Finally other, apparently quite independent factors also played a role: for instance the desire of some Austrians in Hungary particularly after the 1914-18 war to make a personal gesture of contempt for German (that is, in this context, particularly Prussian) ways.14 The German-speaking communities of Bohemia and Moravia exhibited a quite different reaction to the withering away of their political power and administrative responsibility. Far from bringing about the submission of one culture to another , as in Hungary, there took place amongst the Czechs a peculiar splitting of cultures, poignantly expressed in the splitting of the University of Prague into independent Czech and German faculties in 1880 . For with the growth in number and authority of the Slavs around them, the Germansin Prague seem to have adopted a peculiar cultural seige mentality and to have embarked upon a deliberate attempt at intellectual and cultural self-preservation.15 This led to the creation of a uniquely fertile intellectual environment within which a number of important philosophers, social theorists and writers found a home.16 As already stated, our assumption is that it is sometimes necessary to consider a philosophy and its social and cultuml background as more or less inseparable components (moments ) of a single whole , that at least in some cases the two are , in the terminology of the phenomenologist, co-realising correlates. From this point of view the issues before us suffer complications of a special kind in comparison with what would be invo lved in an investigation of the philosophy or letters of, say, England or Russia, each of which is in an important sense both politically and culturally self224 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT sufficient. For the German-P.ohemian community stood in an obvious relation of dependence upon the wider Austro-Hungarian culture, which was in its turn at least partially dependent upon the culture of the German Reich. Thus the Gennan-Bohemian communi ty was, so to speak, a na tionali ty of a higher order in relation to both Austria and Germany. Parallel complications are created also by the existence within each of these societies of more or less self-contained communities of Jews, who constituted a different kind of higher order national grouping (or system of such groupings) in the central Europe of the later 19th century. As we shall see, one important mechanism in the establishment and consolidation of political and cultural dependence-relations amongst national groupings turns upon the emigration from one region to another. In this regard it is interesting to note how many of the most important Bohemian and Moravian emigrants to AUstria and Germany among them Zimmermann, Husserl, Mahler, Bohm-Bawerk, Kraus, Freud, Loos, Kelsen, and Schumpeter were Jews. It is unfortunately impossible to provide here even the briefest account of all the many conflicting religious, political, cultural and historical factors which led to the peculiar status of the Jew, and particularly of the Jewish liberal intellectual, in Europe at that time.17 We shall however claim that considerations such as those which follow apply no less to Jewish than to other communities of the period. §4. The movement of human capital Dependence-relations between nationalities and other groupings, whereby the politics and culture of one community is wholly or partly determined by another, are not, of THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS 225 course, exclusive to Austria-Hungary. Indeed it would be possible to formulate certain principles pertaining to the correlation between political and economic subservience and cultural dependence amongst national groupings which would rest, in the end, upon the principles governing the formation of markets in human and intellectual capital in developed societies.IS Here we can do no more than sketch one or two of these principles and provide some indications as to how a complete account may be developed. We note, first of all, the existence of a network of motivations on the part of the individual members of such groupings which are, in the most general sense, economic in character. Individuals of talent tend, it seems clear, to be drawn to particular centres of high income and of concentration of population, simply because it is there that the tools and services of the artist or thinker libraries and publishing houses, universities and galleries, newspapers and newspaper offices, theatres and concert halls, coffee houses and restaurants are most readily accessible, and where his potential mentors and competitors, in the form of other artists and thinkers speaking an intelligible language, are to be found.19 This clearly serves to create a wide gulf between cosmopolitan centres and their surrounding areas, but it serves also to create conditions within which an order of ranking may come to be established amongst the centres themselves (and, derivatively, amongst the national groupings which they may represent) . The existence of such an order of ranking in Europe at the turn of the century is well-illustrated by the rise of Mahler up the hierarchy of his profession, from his first conductor's post in Bad Hall, through Laibach, Olmlitz, Kassel, Prague, Leipzig, Budapest, Hamburg and Vienna, to his final winters in New York. The primary .mechanism in 226 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT the creation of hierarchies of this kind is clearly the ability of larger and more prosperous centres to bid away talent from their smaller and less prosperous neighbours. This brings about a range of secondary effects, as potential audiences, students, disciples and other associated hangerson of such talent are attracted in its wake. A complex network of systems of concentric circles of influence is thereby established: Berlin, for example, predominates over other Prussian centres; Vienna predominates over Prague, which predominates in turn over BudweiB and Brunn. And whilst there are perhaps no strongly felt cultural dominance relations between,say, Berlin and Vienna, it can yet be said that Germany as a whole predominates over Austria as a whole, as Great Britain, say, predominates over Ireland and its other Imperial Dominions. One powerful precondition for an intellectual dominance relation between centres is a common language (a precondition which, for obvious reasons, has less force in the visual arts; consider the position of Paris as a training and marketing centre for painters in respect to, say, the towns and cities of Spain and the Netherlands). Yet in some cases a community of language may be established artificially: compare the use of Latin, and subsequently German (now also Russian?) amongst Hungarian writers, and the virtual disappearance, to the benefit of English, of Gaelic and Welsh as literary languages. Since transaction costs amongst intellectuals are at a minimum when all the workers in a given field accept and understand a common language, there is a powerful tendency at least in periods of relative peace, when the relevant processes are not hindered by other, divisive forces towards the dominance of a single language in all intellectual centres. (Again Latin, which has of course until very recently remained the THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS 227 official language of the Church, is an obvious example; compare also the role of German in the field of psychopathology, and of English, increasingly,in all remaining disciplines.) A second precondition for such a relation is the possibility of more or less free movement of human capital between the centres in question. Thus dominance relations are established almost automatically between the cities of a single state, even of a multi-national state such as the Habsburg Empire. They will however be established only imperfectly, if at all, where freedom of movement across frontiers is impeded. Thus switzerland has almost certainly cut herself off from the main currents of intellectual and artistic life of Europe by the rigid restrictions which she has imposed upon the employment of aliens within her borders. h can be concluded concerning the standards What, ten, of intellectual and artistic production in the more dominant centres (that is, in the centres where both monetary and ps ychic incomes are relatively high)? Would it be correct to assume that there intellectual product is in all respects o f a higher quality than in subservient centres? A moment's reflection upon certain obvious examples will show that this is not the case. Once again there are economic forces at work which will give rise, in the course of time, to a certain characteristic conformism in the former and to a high degree of innovation and experiment _ accompanied by a large amount of noise 20 in the latter. An interesting comparison can be made with the opposition between mature and immature industries in the sphere of production of material goods. Mat~re industries are 228 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT characterised by high incomes and low profits, as specialists who have reasons of their own for resisting nontrivial innovations in their respective fields compete against each other in the production of well-entrenched ranges of goods of high surface brilliance which have evolved to the point where they are in fundamental respects identical. Immature industries, in contrast, are characterised by high risk, and thus also by high profits and losses, since they consist in the production by highly inventiv e or eccentric individuals of new and unfamiliar goods, often lacking in outward refinement. Many of these goods will prove unmarketable; some few, however, will serve to determine the mature industries of the future. Putting this distinction to work in the sphere of intellectual and artistic production we can say that the associated communities and institutions in the relatively dominant regions say England in relation to Ireland or Australiai Germany in relation to Austria or Denmark; Austria in relation to Bohemia or Slovenia will tend to take on more of the characteristics of mature industries than will their counterparts in the more subservient regions. 21 Individuals and publishing houses in the latter will tend to take more risks, to exhibit greater extremes of quality, and to place greater weight upon what, in the material sphere, would be called advertising. And the best such individuals may experience the pressure to migrate to the ~elatively conformist and relatively secure) centres of high income, where their talents can, within certain limits, be more fruitful ly employed. Thus a Joyce, or a Wilde, or a Shaw, is unthinkable as a wholly English phenomenon. And we can perhaps begin to understand some of the reasons for the apparently cyclical THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS 229 development of philosophy,2 2 and for the production in the great German universities of a homogeneous range of grandiose metaphysical systems. We can begin also to see why such a high proportion of the artistic and intellectual innovations produced within the German-speaking world both for the good and for the bad should have had their origin in Austria, and not least in the peripheral cities of the Empire. And we can understand also why Austria should have gained the not wholly deserved reputation of having culpably mistreated her most distinguished sons by allowing them to leave for more congenial or more prestigious climes, and by failing (through lack of appropriate specialists of her own) to recognise their greatness until this has been pointed out by others. Note s 1. Cf . Marcic, 1968, and Smith, 1978. 2. In a future paper I hope to show in detail how this frame of mind came gradually to be transformed into the exaggerated passion for the law which is characteristic of the work of Kafka or of Kraus. Provisionally it might be said that this transformation reflects the passage from a time in which a faith in the God-given order of the world is generally shared by all the members of a society, to a time when only the barest remnants of such a faith are possessed by certain isolated individuals. 3. There are Turkish drinking songs still to be heard in the bars of Istambul lamenting the loss of Sicily to the Italians. A mental shift from the cartographical provincialism of the late 20th century of almost equal magnitude is needed in order to understand this concept of 'extra-Austrian Germany'. For whilst Austria (i.e., crudely, the German-dominated regions of the Habsburg Empire) was not strictly speaking a German principality, it could yet look back to common ethnic, cultural and of course linguistic origins with the prinCipalities, something which was exploited politically by the Pan-German movement in Austria in the half-century leading up to Hitler's Ansch[uss. The idea of a peculiarly Austrian culture or literary tradition was vehemently rejected by Kraus, for example, and it is only comparatively recently that the arguments for the existence of such a culture, as of a distinctively Austrian philosophy, psychology, or economics, could coherently and diSinterestedly be assembled. 230 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT 4. The idea of a universal state welfare or dole however gained little foothold in Habsburg Austria. where it would have been regarded as alien to the principles of Christian charity. It is interesting how many of the institutional proposals put forward by Hayek. for example in his 1979. recall features of Habsburg society. His suggestions for state provision for the improvident as an insurance policy against revolution springs to mind, as somewhat more trivially does his proposal for the establishment of 'associations of contemporaries', which surely derives from his experiences of the Geistkreise so common in pre-War Austria. 5. This tendency is discernible even in those. such as Grillparzer. who were willing to risk conflict with the censor. 6. A list of law professors at the University of Vienna in the 16th century given by Marcic includes, for example. a certain Michael O'Lynch (op.cit .• p.122) . 7. See the useful survey by Rothbard, 1976, and also Marcic, op.cit. It is useful to note also that the works of Pufendorf were extensively used as textbooks in the Austrian universities. The issues discussed here are somewhat complicated by the Thun reforms of the Austrian law faculties after lB4B. It nevertheless remains true that the ontological (as distinct from ethical) framework presupposed within Austrian and even German jurisprudential writings in the period up to 1930 has predominantly Aristotelian features. See e.g. Engisch, 1953, esp. ch.5, and also the remarks in Smith and Mulligan, 19Bo. B. Cf. e.g. Hutchinson, 1973, but note the criticisms in Bostaph, 197B. Austrians themselves have characteristically underestimated the importance of this Aristotelian background since of course having shared in it themselves they take so many of its elements for granted. Thus Hayek reports (in conversation with the author) that he had initially reacted with ridicule to the suggestion that Menger's thought exhibited certain features of Aristotelianism. 9. Here, and elsewhere, I am indebted to Johnston's book (1972) for providing the starting point of my reflections. 10. Cf. also Nyiri, 1974, for a further development of this interpretation. 11. See his 1960/61 and 1966/67. 12. Op.cit. 13. See especially Ny1.ri, op.cit., and also his 1976. 14. A number of interesting comments on these issues are to be found in the (unpublished) memoirs of Aurel Kolnai. See also the paper by Kolnai published in the present volume. 15. Thus in 1900 the Germans in Prague, who by then constituted as little as 7.5% of the population, retained for their own exclusive use several secondary schools, a university and technical college, two theatres, a concert hall, two daily newspapers, and a number of clubs. THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS 231 16. Besides Kafka and Brod and the various groups of writers with whom they associated, and besides the various groups of (largely Brentanist) philosophers to be found in Prague (discussed in my paper on Kafka and Brentano in this volume), such important thinkers as Stumpf, E. Hering, Mauthner, Mach and Einstein had also made a home there, as well as, somewhat later, a number of linguists around R. Jakobson (cf. Holenstein, 1976 and 1979} , and important economists such as Zuckerkandl and Englgnder. The continued fertility of the German Czech community after the fall of the Empire was undoubtedly enouraged by the liberality of Masaryk, the first president of the Republic and himself a student of Brentano and former colleague of Husserl. The latter was indeed offered a brief refuge in Prague towards the end of his life (cf. Patocka, 1976). 17. Cf. ch.l of Johnston, op.cit. lB. On the economics of human capital see e.g. the work of G. Becker and a number of the essays in Alchian 1977. 'Economics', here, should be understood in a highly general sense, embracing not only all that pertains to monetary income and capital (commercial economics), but also all forms of psychic income and capital; see McKenzie and Tullock, 197B. 19. Hayek has shown convincingly, e.g. in his 197B, that there is an important sense in which competition in the market is a knowledgediscovering process. His arguments apply no less, of course, to the market in ideas. 20. Under 'noise' we are thinking particularly of the antics of certain Freudians, and of the lesser members of the Vienna Circle, especially Neurath. 21. The opposition between 'mature' and 'immature' applied to groups of scientific workers will recall the distinction between 'normal' and 'revolutionary' science put forward by Kuhn. Unfortunately he and his followers have drawn illegitimate conclusions as to the (truth-) cont ent of theories from premisses which relate, in effect, only to their manner of production. 22. Cf. Brentano, lB95. i, ( ~, .., 2 3 2 Al c hian, A.A. (1977) Beck e r, G. (1975) Bolzano , B. (18 37) Bostaph, S. (1978) Br en tano , F. ( 18 95 ) Eng isc h, K. (1953) Ha ller , R. (1979 ) Haye k, F.A. (1978) ( 1979 ) STRUCTURE AND GESTALT Bibliogr'ap hy Economic FOr'ces at Wõk . India napolis; Liberty Press. Human Capi taL 2nd. ed., New York: Columbia University Press. i*h.ssenschaf ts lehr>e . Jiel"such einel" ausfilhr>lic hen und gl"~sstentheils neuen Da:rstel lung der' Logik mit s te ter' Rtlcks i cht aUf del"en bishel"igen Beal"beiter'. 4 vols. Sul zbach. "The methodological debate betwee n Car l Menger a nd the German historicists", Atlantic Economic Review, 6, 3-16. "Die vier Phasen der Philosophie", as repro in Die vier Phasen der' Philosophie . Hamburg; Meiner, 1968, 3-34. Die Idee del" Konkl"etisie~ung in Recht und Rechtsw1:ssenschaft unsel"el" Zeit . Heidelberg : Winter. "Wittgenstein und die 'Wiener Schule''', as r epro in his St udien Z UY' 8s tel"r'eichischen Phil osophie . Amsterdam: Rodopi. Eng . tr a ns. forthcoming in J . C.Nyiri, ed., Austr'i an Philosophy . Text s and Studies . Munich: Philosophia. "Competition as a Discovery Procedure", New Studies in Philosophy, Polit ics, Economics and the History of I deas. London: Routledge, 179-90. Law, Legis la t ion and Liberoty, TTI. The Po l i tica l Or'de l" of a F~ee Society . Londo n: Ro utledge. Holenstein, E. (1976 ) Roman Jakobson 's App~oach t o Language : Phenomenological Stl"ucturaZism . Indiana University Press. (1979) "Prague Structuralism An Off -shoot of the Phenomenological Movement", in J . Odmark, ed., Language, Li t eratur e and Meaning, I . Amsterdam: Benjamins. Hutchinso n, T.\~. ( 19 73) "So me Themes from Investigat ions i nto Method", in J.R.Hicks a nd W.Weber, eds ., Carl Menge l" and t he Austr'ian School of Economics. Oxford ; O.U . P. THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS 233 J ohnston, W.M. ( 1972 ) The Aust r'ian Mind: An Intell ectual and Soc ial Kol nai, A. McKe nzie, R.B. and Tullock, G. (19 78) Marcic, R. (1968 ) Menger, C. (18 71 ) Nyiri, J .C. (1974) His tor'y, 18481938 . Uni vers ity of California Press. "Identity and Division as a Fundamental Theme in Politics" (in this volume) . Twentieth Centur'Y Memoir' s , (unpublished) . The New Wor ld of Economi cs . Explorations into the HLunan Expe~ience . Homewood: Irwin. "Rechtsphilosophie in Osterreic h", fv'i ssenschaft und Weltbild. 21, 1 2638. Gl"Undsatze de~ Volkswir' tschaft s lehl"e, as r epro in vol.l of F.A.Hayek, ed., The Col lected Wõks of Cã l Menger'. London Schoo l of Economics, 1934. "Beim Sternenlicht der Nichtex istierenden . Zur ideologiekritischen Interpretation des p l a t o nisierenden Antipsychologismus". Inquiry. 17 , 399 443. (1 976 ) "Zur Philo sophiegeschichte Osterreich-Ungar ns. Eine sozialpsyc ho logische Skizze", Annales Univ er s itatis Sciential"ium Budapestinensis de Rolando E8tvCfs Nominatae. 10, 9 3-113. Patocka, J. (197 6 ) "Erinnerungen an Husserl", in Die Welt des l'vienschen Die Welt del" PhiZosophie. Haag: Nijhoff, viixix. Ro thbard , M. N. (1976 ) "New Lig ht on the Prehistory o f the Austrian School", in E.G.Dolan, ed., The Foundations of Modern Austri an Economics . Kansas: Sheed and Ward, 52-74. Schorske, C.E. (1960/ 61) "Politics and the Psyche in fin de s i ?!cle Vienna: Schnitzler and Hofmannsthal", American Historical Review. 66, 930-46. ( 1966/67) "The Transformation of the Garden: Ideal and Society in Austrian Litera t u re", Amer'ican Histõ- i cal Revi ew . 72, 1283-13 20. Smith, B. (1978) (1980) "La,." and Escha tology in IHttge n s tein's Ea rly Thought", Inquiry. 21, 42541. (with K. Mulligan) "Parts and Moments. Eleme nt s of a Theor y ", in B. Smith, ed . , Pa:rts and Momen t s Studie s in Logic and FOr'mal Ontology (forthcoming,.

Informat ion and E x i s t e n c e Three Essays and Appendices by Dan Kurth (version: draft, 24.08.2013) To the memory of my beloved mother ____ __ _____ ___ ____ _____ ___ ____ __ _____ _____ _____ ____ ____ _____ Den hebräischen Text aus Sefer_Yetzirah_Kaplan.pdf, (Seite 1 von 25 (1:1)) kopieren, und zwar 1) die ganze erste Zeile (Text, d.h. nach dem ersten Doppelpunkt), dann ' ... ' 2) dann ab inkl. dem vierten Wort der vorletzten Zeile bis zum Schluss Hier auf hebräisch: Sefer ha-Yetzirah With 32 mystical paths of Wisdom engraved Yah ... Whose name is Holy - ... And He created His universe with three books (Sepharim), with text (Sepher) with number (Sephar) and with communication (Sippur). Sefer ha-Yetzirah∗ ___ ______ _____ Den hebräischen Text aus Sefer_Yetzirah_Kaplan.pdf, (z.B. Seite 2 oder3,4 etc. von 25 (1:2, 1:3 etc.) kopieren. Achtung: es handelt sich um die ersten 3 Worte der Abschnitte Hier auf hebräisch: Sefer ha-Yetzirah ∗ Sefer Yetzirah – The Book of Creation, (ed. Aryeh Kaplan), York Beach ME, Boston MA, 1997, p 5 Ten Sefirot of Nonexistence ... Sefer ha-Yetzirah CONTENT PAGE Preface XX Introduction XX The Emergence of Existence – XX from Pregeometry to Prephysics http://www.academia.edu/4310644/The_Emergence _of_Existence_-_from_Pregeometry_to_Prephysics Names and Objects XX Outlines of an Essentialist Nominalism http://www.academia.edu/4310705/Names_and_Objects__Outlines_of_an_Essentialist_Nominalism Information Monism XX and its Concepts of Substance, Attributes, and Emergent Modes http://www.academia.edu/4310969/Information_Monism__and_its_Concepts_of_Substance_Attributes_and_Emergent_Modes Appendices: Aefo QM TowTu Topem Preface I've written the essays presented in this book in the years 2011 to xxxx. But I followed the main ideas, which led to the central statements in these essays, already since the late eighties of the last century. And since I've made the experience, that some philosophers somehow seem to be forced to think, what they think, and even more so, how they think, with a degree of freedom much smaller than they think, I probably could trace the earliest indications of such thinking back much further. Some steps in the development, which led to these essays, can be examined in the appendices. Authors are no good commentators of their writings, and philosophers certainly are not the best interpreters of their works, but obviously many of them feel compelled to pretend it would be otherwise. A preface may be a good place to let one get away with such pretension. Thus, looking for some labels, one could say, that in particular in the third essay concerning information monism, we will find an attempt of meinongifying Spinoza and also a bit vice versa. The main topic of this essay is clarifying the notion of substance in the context of information monism. This will also have the integration of some results of – in particular – the first essay into a comprehensive conceptual scheme as a consequence. The second essay on 'Names and Objects' could go as an experiment of kryptonizing, pardon: kripkenizing, Super Quine. Seen from another angle this could also go as clarifying the notion of essence in the theory of objects or, from again a further angle, as a radical ingression from the side of the theory of objects into conventional semantics. The first essay, however, is ... de profundis, – what for once should be read as 'up from gunk'. There I will try to overcome some seemingly unsurmountable difficulties in a literally 'fundamental' philosophy of everything. To attain that end some less philosophical considerations have also to be employed. One of the mentioned unsurmountable difficulties, usually not dicussed in the repective physical theories, is, what I've called 'the paradox of reductionism' (see also appendix NN, TowTu), i.e. the paradox, that the reductionist program necessarily seems doomed to fail in its zenith, since it impossibly can ultimately terminate. But then termination is that, what the reductionist program finally is all about. To accomplish its object some objectological measures had to be taken. That mentioned ultimate failure of the reductionist program then also necessitates the consequence, that a purely scientific foundational explanation of everything is not possible. At least an additional philosophical assumption concerning the relations of a primordial substance to its only two attributes is indispensable. This then translates into the considerations of the third essay concerning 'information monism'. In case some more labels are requested a condensed declaration might help: In the three essays presented in this book I will try to outline a strictly monist, nominalist, and – perhaps surprisingly – essentialist approach to such traditional philosophical questions as the theory of objects (including all of ontology as a minor part) and the theory of universals, yet I will sometimes do so with not so traditional means. Some collateral damage also will be caused in parts of the philosophy of language. In all three essays some perhaps will find glimpses of a parousia of the ecstatic spirit of David Lewis. Although I don't share his materialist and his modal realist convictions, and disagree in most details of the answers he gave, I then, with the greatest sympathy, agree, on what the very questions are. The essays and papers of this book have also been inspired by thoughts and ideas of Giordano Bruno, Baruch Spinoza, Alexius Meinong, Stanislaw Lesniewski, John Archibald Wheeler, Hugh Everett III, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Saul Kripke, and – of course – many others too. My thanks go to Vera, for her patience with and loyalty to a far to often absent partner, and for much more. Thanks also go to Anke, who bravely walks a fine line, Ayhan, who always will fight his way(s) through, Linda for being the most amiable Aztec priestess ever, and to Crissy, Alexander, Werner, Roland, and even Reinhard, and to all the other girls and guys in my favourite γυμνασιον, with whom I had much fun in the time, when I wrote the essays presented in this book. Special thanks go to Vitalij, who steadily motivitated me to do something to maintain my health, and helped a lot in that respect. Frankfurt am Main, in Month of 20xx Hier Odyssee Scylla und Charybdis Griechisch FN.: english Introduction In the three essays, which make up the primary content of this book, I've tried – from different angles – to give some arguments for a new and radical version of neutral monism, which I've called 'information monism'. The first essay is about the emergence of existence, which, in my view, necessitates first and foremost to consider the giveness of nonexistence, in particular the ways of being there of nonexistent objects, which once had been proposed by Alexius Meinong in his 'Theory of Objects'. Starting from these considerations the line of arguments then – quite distantly – follows some mathematical (in particular topos theoretical and mereotopological), logical (in particular mereological) and – rather speculative – ideas in physics (in particular related to 'pregeometry' as once proposed by John A. Wheeler). In the course of these arguments it then turns out, that existence doesn't properly emerge, but that it becomes eventually effected or actualized at a particular level of mathematical structural stabilty or complexity attained in a 'sequence' of emergent nonexistent objects. I.e. although existence 'emerges'1 at such a level of minimal structural stability, existence still isn't at all originated by the nonexistent objects (and their structures) at that level, but existence is an attribute immediate to substance. Space and time then would become secondary modes, utterly relational in the sense of Leibniz2, and supervenient on the primary effected existent objects The second essay is about a theory of universals appropriate for that objectological3 position of information monism, and also some linguistic consequences of that. 1 In the sense, that it becomes manifest. 2 "Et hoc ... modo spatium fit ordo coexistentium phaenomenorum, ut tempus successivorum;" (Letter from Leibniz to des Bosses of June 16.1712, in: G.W.Leibniz, Die Philosophischen Schriften (ed. G.J.Gerhardt), Bd.II, p 450) ("In this way ... space becomes the order of the coexisting things as time becomes the order of the successively existing things;"). Since information monism doesn't allow for an ontological privilige of allegedly existing objects over nonexisting ones, some deep rooted referential claims as well as linguistic Platonistic overload will be questioned. Language or logico-linguistic forms are not the matrix of ontology. "Language is a social art"4, a means of social interaction. In particular language in itself doesn't make a distinction between existing and nonexisting objects. Language doesn't ontologize. That is something we have to do and to endure (the consequences). But by the act of naming we create all the objects, some of which may turn out to exist even without us creating them. And by using names we claim the identity of the named, as an essence preceding existence. The nonexistent as well as the existent objects designated by their names then should have a purely intelligible way of their essential nature being there (or being given). I'll try to show, what that could mean. I also try to show, that as a consequence of the 'Überwindung des Vorurteils zugunsten des Wirklichen'5, the entire scope of ontology becomes just a minor part of objectology, i.e. the theory of objects.6 'Overcoming of the prejudice in favour of the actual' taken literally and seriously then – as any overcoming of any prejudice – yields at least a liberation. Yet due to the graveness of the fundamental prejudice of ontology, which here becomes questioned, objectology (or the theory of objects) necessitates nothing less than a liberation of metaphysics – or rather: a libertarian metaphysics7. 3 'Objectological' here means 'in the way of the theory of objects', i.e. 'objectological' is meant to be the respective adjective or adverbial form of 'theory of objects' and – by this – would become an English equivalent of 'gegenstandstheoretisch'. 4 Willard van Orman Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge MA, 1960, p ix. This famous quote is the first sentence of the preface to 'Word and Object', at least that far I'm in consent. 5 Alexius Meinong, Über Gegenstandtheorie, in: Alexius Meinong, Gesamtausgabe, vol II, Abhandlungen zur Erkenntnistheorie und Gegensandstheorie, Graz – Austria 1971, pp 481-530, p 485. Meinong's famous phrase goes in English as: 'The overcoming of the prejudice in favour of the actual'. 6 Thus using the notion of 'objectology' instead of 'the theory of objects' has the immediate merit of clarifying its relation with the subject of 'ontology' – albeit at first in a rather general way. I.e. objectology fully comprehends the subjects of ontology as well as mêontology. The distinction of ontology and mêontology however is not identical with the distinction of existent and nonexistent objects, since traditional ontologies deal with a lot of nonexistent objects. Yet the unions of ontology and a reasonable mêontology, i.e. a mêontology, which doesn't claim to substantiate 'nothing(ness)', on the one hand and of existent objects and nonexistent objects on the other are – at least ultimately – perfectly coextensive. 7 Here the notion of 'metaphysics' is not confined to the topics and concepts of Aristotelian Metaphysics, and is – by its very Meinongian reason – in particular distinct from any ontology; (cf. the preceeding footnote). In the three essays of this book I will always treat nonexistent objects with an utmost nominalist rigour, in particular including mereological and mereotopological means. This may sometimes even lead to the impression of a naturalistic approach to nonexistent objects, which of course it isn't and it couldn't be. Yet I will treat nonexistent objects not differently from existent objects, except for the only difference, that matters here, namely that the further are nonexistent and the latter existent. From this follow two – for the subsequent arguments – basic proposition 1) All objects are or have been either existent or nonexistent at the same time. or equivalently 2) There is no object existent and nonexistent at the same time and as further annotations 3) A formerly or actual existing object cannot have attributes presupposing, requiring or implying its nonexistence (e.g. its merely fictional existence) or eqivalently 3a) A formerly or actual existing object cannot truthfully be predicated by any attribute, that presupposes, requires or implies its nonexistence (e.g. its merely fictional existence) and 3') A nonexistent object cannot have attributes presupposing, requiring or implying its former or actual existence or eqivalently 3'a) A nonexistent object cannot truthfully be predicated by any attribute, that presupposes, requires or implies its former or actual existence Now there are some objects, which are at certain times actually existent and at other times no more, for the reason that they decease or dissolve or vanish in any way. These once actually existing objects, like for example Julius Caesar, Leonardo da Vinci et. al., won't ever become proper nonexistent objects, because they are still connected to all actually existing objects by potential spatio-temporal trajectories (or possible world lines), but they become 'not actually existing objects' or 'formerly existing objects' instead. Being a 'not actually existing object' may not lead to semantic difficulties in the case of proper individuals designated by names. Yet in the case of objects denoted by quasi-singular terms it seems to have led to (false or inadequate) denotations. One of the reasons for that could be the chimaeric nature of certain (quasi-)singular terms, namely these which are singular only by just being temporal or spatial particularisations of general terms. Another reason may be a violation of (3a). Sometimes both reasons may have played a role together. Hier Russell 'on denoting' zitieren, Problem exponieren 4) The present King of France is bald. A careful analysis of 4) shows, that 4) consists of a complex denotation 4p1) 'The present King of France' and a predication 4p2) 'is bald' related to that complex denotation. Both of these parts of 4), 4p1) and 4p2), are far more intricate than it seems at the first look. 4p1) 'The present King of France' is only the supposed denotation it is, as long as all its linguistic elements, i.e. words, come up properly together, since there have been many Kings of France and there could be more as well, but there only can be one 'present King of France' at one particular time. And here it also becomes obvious, that 'present' isn't an elementary determination within a complex denotation but rather a cover of a covert inexplicated part of that denotation, – and with respect to the question of nonexistent or existent objects, including existent and nonexistent Kings of France, a most significant part at top of that. 'Present' here is an inexplizit version of 'actually existent', since that is that, what 'present' means. Then 4p1) in the appropriate explicit version goes as 4p1*) 'The actually existing King of France'. But unfortunately 'present' isn't the only linguistic element in 4p1) 'The present King of France', which is severely inexplicit. The other is the only one left, namely 'King of France'. Already for the reason, that today, btw. not other than in the year 1905, there doesn't resp. didn't exist an actual King of France, we shouldn't take the occurrence of that titulus8 lightly. And since we made some effort to explicate 'present' as a covert version for 'actually existing' and then also took notice, that suspiciously there was no 'actually existing King of France' in 1905, when on the other hand there was so much denotative action directed to some 'King of France'then, it seems imperative for avoiding any further covert ambiguities to rigorously distinguish between two different sorts of Kings of France: formerly and actually existing Kings of France and not formerly and not actually existing Kings of France. The latter mentioned 'not formerly and not actually existing Kings of France' then just are nonexistent or fictional Kings of France. There are of course many of these fictional Kings of France. As an example may serve the Louis XIV of Alexandre Dumas' 'The Man in the Iron Mask'9 or of his 'The Vicomte De Bragelonne'10. The Louis XIV of these novels is of course a purely fictional, i.e. nonexistent object, notwithstanding that this fictional King of France seemingly bears the same name and title as the formerly existing historical Louis XIV. The fictional Louis XIV also shares a lot of seemingly similar features with the historical one, but mercifully none of them was bald. There are however not only the very many nonexistent Kings of France, which are just fictional versions of formerly or actually existing Kings of France11, but even 8 The latin 'titulus' translates – somewhat indeterminate – as 'heading', 'label', 'title', 'placard', 'pretext', and as 'distinction', 'honour', 'inscription', and 'reputation'. 9 Cf. Alexandre Dumas, The Man in the Iron Mask (Oxford World's Classics) Oxford University Press, USA, 2009 10 Cf. Alexandre Dumas, The Vicomte de Bragelonne (Oxford World's Classics) Oxford University Press, USA, 2009. In earlier editions of 'Vicomte De Bragelonne, or Ten Years Later' 'The Man in the Iron Mask' was just a part of it. 11 These are at least as many as there are fictional figures in novels, poems, movies, theater plays, etc., which in these fictional contexts go by the name of a formerly or actually existing 'King of France'. many more, i.e. as many as one can imagine having been or being a fictional King of France. After all that distinguishing exercise it seems to be a proper precautionary measure to accordingly distinguish between two sets (or ensembles) namely the set of formerly and actually existing Kings of France € KF{ } and the set of nonexistent, i.e. fictional Kings of France € KF{ }. Before coming back to this distinction between € KF{ } and € KF{ } we at first will substitute 4p1) by 4p1*) in 4) and as a result get 4a) The actually existing King of France is bald. If we want to bring 4a) closer to the inevitable formal notation, we should before prepare it in normal language. To prepare for the existential quantifier, we transform 4a) to 4b) There is an actually existing King of France and he is bald but about the 'he' in 4b) something can obviously not well be predicated. Again that has to be substituted by what it really stands for, and thus fully explicated it becomes transformed to 4c) There is an actually existing King of France and the actually existing King of France is bald that now is sufficiently prepared for being presented in an albeit unfinished formal version 4c'a) € ∃(x) E!x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( )∧ E! x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( ) is bald . with € E! being no operator, but the predicate 'is actually existing'; and € KF{ } the set of formerly and actually existing Kings of France providing for the other denotative part 'the King of France'. Less agreeable however is 4c'b) € ∃(x) E!x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( )∧ E! x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( ) is bald . with € E! being no operator, but the predicate 'is actually existing'; and the set of nonexistent, i.e. fictional Kings of France € KF{ }.here being the other denotative part 'the King of France'. 4c'b) contains – already in its denotative part – the obvious self-contradiction, that the actually existing King of France is also a fictional King of France at the same time. This is also in contradiction to 3) and 3a), which said 3a) A formerly or actual existing object cannot truthfully be predicated by any attribute, that presupposes, requires or implies its nonexistence (e.g. its merely fictional existence). Later, when we will have fully explicated all covert implicated elements of 4) The present King of France is bald, we will come back to 4c'b) (and that apparent self-contradiction in it) and assess, what it means for it with respect to being true, false or meaningless. But before we will do so, we have to care about the baldness of this (or these) King(s), since already in 4c'a) it also became apparent, that not only the pesence of this (or these) King(s) is somehow questionable, but so is his (or their) baldness. At least this rather unwelcome feature is ambiguous with respect to the existence or nonexistence of its – to add insult to injury – bearer. In case that bearer is actually existent, let's say it is 'the actually existing King of France', his baldness should be expressed as 4c'p2) € E!x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( )∈ BM{ } with € KF{ } being the set of formerly and actually existing Kings of France and € BM{ } being the 'set of actually existing bald men'. Then 4c'p2) says: 'the actually existing King of France' is a member of the 'set of actually existing bald men', which is an appropriate way of predicating the feature of (actual) baldness to that allegedly actually existing King of France. 4c'p2) will be a true proposition, iff an actually existing King of France exists and iff he is bald. And the answer to the question, if indeed these both conditional facts are the case, is a completely extra-logical and extra-linguistic matter, which is in no way determined by 4c'p2) or the original 4). However we know, that there is no actually existing King of France, and it had been stated, that predicating (actual) baldness to a not actually existing King would only lead to an either false or meaningless proposition, and – even worse – the negation of that proposition wouldn't do better. But then only a fool would predicate actual baldness to a not actually existing King. And there is no reason and no need at all to do so, since in case the bearer of the baldness is not actually existent, let's say it is 'the not actually existing or fictional King of France', his then also not actually existing, but merely fictional baldness should be expressed as 4c''p2) € E! x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( )∈ BM{ } with € KF{ } being the set of nonexistent, i.e. fictional Kings of France and € BM{ } being the 'set of not actually existing bald men'. And of course there are such sets of 'nonexistent, i.e. fictional Kings of France'12 as well as 'not actually existing, i.e. fictional bald men'.13 The predicate 'is bald' is not at all as unequivocal as it seemed in the original 4) The present King of France is bald, since, if 'is bald' is properly analyzed, it becomes obvious, that it equally relates to two different interpretations. 'x is bald' predicates the feature of baldness, usually to persons and mostly to men. But with respect to our topic we should make a distinction between two different sets (or ensembles) of men, namely actually or formerly existing men and nonexistent, for example fictional men. And the baldness of an actually or formerly existing man then is the actual or former baldness of this man, i.e. that man is or was a member of the sets (or ensembles) of actually or formerly existing bald men. In contrast to that the baldness of a fictional man is the fictional baldness of a fictional man, i.e. that fictional man is a member of the set (or ensemble) of fictional (and therefore not existing) bald men. Sometimes occurrences of actually or formerly existing bald (or bald-shaved) men, i.e. members of the sets (or ensembles) of actually or formerly existing bald (or 12 That assertion has been graphically justified in the preceding, cf. the discussion following the first occurrence of 4p1*) concerning the Louis XIV of Alexandre Dumas' 'The Man in the Iron Mask'. 13 That assertion will be graphically justified in the immediate following. bald-shaved) men and fictionally bald fictional men, i.e. members of the set (or ensemble) of fictional bald men can even be seen or respectively imagined in an utmost close proximity, so – in a nontechnical sense – to speak: in superposition. Good examples for that are the late actors Yul Brynner and Telly Savalas on the one hand and the retired gunslinger Chris Adams, (who together with six other magnificent gunmen gained some merit in defending the rights of the inhabitants of a Mexican village) and Detective Lieutenant Theo Kojak on the other. An even more intricate superposition of actually or formerly bald-shavedness, fictional baldness (or fictional bald-shavedness), and a related second actually or formerly baldness (or bald-shavedness) can be encountered in the musical film 'The King and I' of 1956, where the actually or formerly existing bald-shaved actor Yul Brynner plays the fictionally bald (or fictionally bald-shaved) fictional character 'King Mongkut of Siam'14, which however relates directly to the formerly existing bald (or bald-shaved) King Rama IV (18 October 1804 – 1 October 1868) of Siam (Thailand), known in Western countries as King Mongkut of Siam. Alas, one has no easy game with bald Kings; they may be Kings of Siam or – Kings of France. After having finally explicated all linguistic elements within the original 4) The present King of France is bald carefully and after having found various possible admissible versions of any of these elements, we eventually can look how many now explicable versions of 4) had been jointly concealed in that covert original 4). And we will analyze them and their various negations with respect to the question of how many sense they make relating to the problem of predication on actually existing and actually not existing objects. By substitution of the formerly inexplicated linguistic elements of 4) by the explicit ones we at first get 4d) € ∃(x) E!x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( )∧ E! x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( )∈ BM{ } with € E! being no operator, but the predicate 'is actually existing'; and € KF{ } the set of formerly and actually existing Kings of France 14 The 'King Mongkut of Siam' of the musical film 'The King and I' of 1956 is an adaptation of the semi-fictional figure 'King Mongkut of Siam' of the 1944 novel 'Anna and the King of Siam' by Margaret Landon. providing for the other denotative part 'the King of France', and € BM{ } being the 'set of actually existing bald men'. 4d) says, that there is an actually existing King of France and the actually existing King of France is actually bald. 4d) is obviously true, iff there is an actually existing King of France and iff he is actually bald. If however there is – as we know – no actually existing King of France, then 4d) is false. And so it becomes already merely for the first part of its propositional content within the quantification € E!x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( ), which is fairly soothing, since the respective second part € E! x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( )∈ BM{ } looks definitely less welcome. That second part says, that the actually existing King of France is actually bald, but even if we know, that an actually existing King of France doesn't actually exists, then that second part still says, that this existentially self-contradictory King of France is actually bald. That is a most severe ontological or objectological confusion, yet it is not a proper semantic inconsistency, since at first that confusion is entirely due to our external knowledge of the world and not the internal composition of 4d) and secondly – if no actual King of France exists – 4d) becomes false to the facts (and not meaningless) already and sufficiently for the first part of its propositional content within the quantification € E!x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( ), and that dubiously placed baldness doesn't matter for that at all. But then it has been said, that the negation of 4d) would lead to real semantic inconsistencies. Yet it will turnout, that a more interesting question would have been, which negation would lead to what version of a semantic inconsistency, if any. A negation of the entire sentence 4d) would yield 4d-ne) € ¬ ∃(x) E!x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( )∧ E! x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( )∈ BM{ }( ) 4d-ne) then says, that it is not the case (or not true) 'that there is an actually existing King of France and the actually existing King of France is actually bald.' 4d-ne) is obviously false, iff there is an actually existing King of France and iff he is actually bald. The matter here however becomes less pleasant, if it is not the case, that an actually existent King of France actually exists. 4d-ne) then becomes true already for the first part of its propositional content within the quantification, i.e. for € E!x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( ), since if it is not the case, that an actually existent King of France actually exists, then the entire ' € ∃(x) E!x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( )∧ E! x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( )∈ BM{ }' becomes false, and its entire negation 4d-ne) becomes true. Unfortunately the second part of its propositional content within the quantification, i.e. € E! x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( )∈ BM{ }, then still says, that the actually existent King of France, which – as we know – doesn't actually exist, is actually bald, i.e. is a member of the set of actually existing bald men. And now, since 4d-ne) is a formally true sentence, that is obviously utter nonsense, i.e. it is the celebrated semantic inconsistency. Yet the question is, how much that matters, since there are not only other negations of 4d) admissible than just 4d-ne), but there are also other substitutions of the formerly inexplicated linguistic elements of 4), respectively with even more possible negations attached, as we will see. The neagation of the aggregate sentence 4d) then goes as 4d-na) € ∃(x)¬ E!x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( )∧ E! x ∧ x∈ KF{ }( )∈ BM{ }( ) 4d-na) says, that there is a € x , i.e. something, for which it is the case (or true), that it is not the case (or true), 'that it actually exists and that it is the actually existing King of France and that this actually existing € x , which is the actually existing King of France is actually bald, i.e. a member of the set of the actually existing bald men.' Anders als in 4d-ne) bleibt die Aussage dass es etwas gibt (Meinong's giveness) bestehen!! Zunächst alle Versionen aufführen auch die mit globaler negation, die unzulässig, weil wider besseres Wissen falsch zuordnen Achtung: fictional present Kings of France must be sited in a fictional presence. Beispiel für co-/non-/existence the present, i.e. actually existing Queen of England and the fictional Queen of England of the 2006 film "The Queen" played by the actress Helen Mirren But what about Balmoral Castle if a castle could act one should say, that the actually existing Balmoral Castle in the film 'The Queen' acts as the fictional Balmoral Castle, of that film, but since castles do not act, one better says 'it stands for'. Actors which plays themselves. Here also applies, what already has been said concerning other conditions: something or someone cannot be just a bit fictional wg. Sätze 2) und 3) und weil's stimmt. hier weiter alle Versionen, neither Quantification nor predication matters at all, but only the fact(s) if there is an actually existing KF or not and if he is bald or not. I.e. existence as well as nonexistence are real predicates and not something evoked or erased by an (existential) quantifier. Dann die 4 zulässigen versionen 2 x positiv 2x negiert aufführen und analysieren Now, after having analyzed, i.e. explicated 4) The present King of France is bald thoroughly, we will get two quite different admissable versions of its previously somewhat covert propositional contents, together with their respective negations. Now are two possibilties left. a) Either 4c) is an ordinary proposition, which ordinarily claims to be true, then this claim fails, since there is no actually existing King of France, and 4c) is false, and consequently 4a), 4b) and 4) are also false. A negation of 4c) then goes as 4d) It is not the case/true, that 'there is an actually existing King of France and the actually existing King of France is bald' € ¬ ∃(x) E!x ∧ x=KF( )∧ E!x ∧ x=KF( )∈ BM{ }( ) hier: Die falsche Auflösung, nämlich die Negation der zweiten Hälfte von 4d) vorher anführen und verwerfen, auch die richtige Negation der ersten Satzhälfte, noch vorher After that careful analysis of all the covert implicated presuppositions, which had been elementary for 4) The present King of France is bald already in the first place, it has turned out, that 4) never was a good example for the argument, it then was famously used for, namely that the admittance of singular terms related to nonexistent objects (or persons) in predicative propositions would lead to semantic inconsistencies or worse. Quite on the contrary 4) has been shown to be perfectly distinctive with respect to the possible existence or nonexistence of the object signified by the denotative term, if only that denotation as well as the related predication become adequately analyzed. € ∃(x)¬ E!x ∧ x=KF( )∧ E!x ∧ x=KF( )∉ BM{ } das ist die richtige Auflösung, der gesamte Satz ist wahr ,ohne dass irgendetwas über die Kahlköpfigkeit des akt Königs ausgesagt wurde, sondern nur das ein nichtexistierender König nicht zur menge der akt. exist Kahlköpfe gehört. Argumentation muss noch verbessert werden!! obviously the negation of the first part of the quoted proposition 4c) 'there is an actually existing King of France' is true, since it rightly says, that there is no actually existing King of France. Now let's look at the negation of the second part of the in 4d) quoted proposition 4c) 'the actually existing King of France is bald'. First of all the second part of 4c) turns out to be identical with 4a) The actually existing King of France is bald This of course already shows, that a neagation of the second part of 4c), will always lead – first by reverse substitution to 4b) and then to 4c) and finally – again to the negation of the entire sentence 4c) There is an actually existing King of France and the actually existing King of France is bald, since explicating 4a) will always lead again to 4c) – possibly by infinite iteration15. Consequently the negation of the second part of 4c) 'the actually existing King of France is bald' is also false and entirely for the same reason as the first part, namely that there is no actually existing King of France. I.e. already the original Russellian example 4) The present King of France is bald doesn't – against all appearances – contain a statement, that would matter for the truth of 4), about the baldness (or non baldness) of a nonexistent object, namely the present, i.e. actually nonexistent, King of France. There is simply no actual baldness predicated about an actually not existing King of France, since that would be neither true nor false but utter nonsense. And therefore the formerly puzzling question, if one of the propositions, namely either, that this nonexisting 'actually existing King of France' is bald or, that he is not bald, could become true or false or in any way referential in the course of such 15 And neither commuting the first and the second half of 4c) nor even commuting the sequence of implicit and explicit predication in the original 4), e.g. to € ∃ x( ) x ∈ BM{ }∧ x= pKF( ), (with € BM = the set of 'actually existing and actually not existing bald men', and € pKF = the 'present King of France') is admissible, since being the 'present King of France' is no predication of the set of 'bald men', but a denotation of € x . Being a member of a) the set of 'actually or formerly existing bald men' (like for example Telly Savalas) or being a member of b) the entirely different set of 'not existing bald men' (like for example Detective Lieutenant Theo Kojak) is an admissible predication of a possible secondary attribute of – in the case of a) – any actually or formerly existing or– in the case of b) – not existing man, respectively including existing and not existing Kings of France. a play with negations, doesn't – together with a lot of semantical deliberations – arise anymore. The other of the two remaining possibilities after having reached 4c) is b) here 4c) isn't meant to be a proposition, which claims to be true. The proponent is rather well informed enough, to know, that there is no actually existing King of France, but he is also unscrupulous enough to tell a story, in which a fictional 'actually existing King of France' plays a role, and not enough, that dubious proponent also ridicules this nonexistent 'actually existing King of France' and makes him bald. Here the expression 'actually existing King of France' isn't part of an ordinary proposition, which makes a statement about the actual existence of an actually existing King of France, but it is rather like a name of a fictional character in a fictional story. And that fictional character then has the (fictional) feature of being (fictionally) bald. In the context of such a story 3c) could very well be 'true', yet truth is in such complicated intensional contexts even more of a puzzle than anyway. From a) as well as b) follows the same: one cannot predicate or ascribe actual (existing) baldness to a nonexistent person. Or in general: one cannot predicate (actually) existent properties of nonexistent objects. In a) one could see, that the proposition 4d) always turns out to be false already before the predication of actual existing baldness ever comes into question. It also had been shown that 4d) is merely the negation of an explicated and an equivalent version of 4). In b) it has been shown, that a nonexistent fictional (feature of) baldness can obviously be predicated about a nonexistent fictional person. This at least adds evidence to a central proposition of the essays of this book, namely that language and logic do not matter with respect to the existence or nonexistence of objects, language and logic do not even add or take away anything concerning the question, if objects exist or not exist. The questions, if objects exist or not exist, will rather be decided by (theory based) justified knowledge, experience, rational considerations, common sense, and other ways of informed praxis. Gegen Russell 'on denoting' Sir Walter Scott is the author of 'Waverley' Sir Walter Scott is the 'Author of 'Waverley'' (s. Wikipedia) William Shakespeare is the author of 'The Comedy of Errors' Marcel Proust is the author of 'À la recherche du l'auteur vrai' B. Traven is the author of '' The case of Shakespeare is the the real case: we can never know beyond any possible doubt if any author is the true author of a novel or a poem or even a philosophical essay or any artist is the genuine creator of a certain piece of art, as the very many revisisions of creatorship in the sciences and the business of arts is witness of. After that little distraction let's proceed with some more introductary remarks about the essays in this book. The third essay is mainly about the peculiar (conceptual) relationship between substance, which, I will claim, is itself an ineffable nonexistent object (or rather a gunky16 bunch of them), and its merely two primordial attributes, namely nonexistence and existence. Against abstract objects: the idea of preexisting abstract objects is utterly incompatible with informationmonism and its claim, that all objects, i.e. nonexistent anf existent objects are equally emergent from a primordial stratum of gunky nonexistent objects, which is the one and only substance. I.e. all objects are manifestations or instantiations of this substance. Existent objects however are – independently – also structurally emergent of another kind of nonexistent objects, which, in the broadest sense, could be called pregeometric objects. Yet their quality of being existent (objects), i.e. the manifestation of the primordial attribute of existence, is instantanously emergent of the ineffable substance17. Existence is 16 'Gunky' here is used as an – admittedly somewhat fishy∗ sounding – terminus technicus, cf. David Lewis, Parts of Classes, Oxford, Cambridge MA, 1991, p 20. ∗'Fishy' is not a terminus technicus. 17 Calling substance 'ineffable' is not meant to denote it as being of a mystic nature or being mysteriously. Following the arguments in these essays one will find out, that it is a thoroughly inseparably linked, i.e. coextensive, with actuality. Therefore it makes no sense at all to claim any other kind of existence than actual existence. That excludes the possibility of preexistent abstract objects18, most of which traditionally had been called Platonic objects. Information monism is a neutral monism very much in the form as it had been originated by Baruch Spinoza, even if it differs in most of the relevant concepts and in nearly all details. The most fundamental difference however is not due to modern terminology and concepts of science, but concerns a quite traditional point, that could have already been raised in a 17th century discourse. This difference relates to Spinoza's theory of attributes, since it becomes apparent, that by the distinction of his two main attributes, namely extension and thought19, Spinoza has still been stuck in the cartesian paradigm of the dualism between res extensa and res cogitans. Despite effectively laying the fundaments of a neutral monism by introducing his concept of one substance prior to all its attributes and all possible predications, that cartesian infected distinction of extension and thought is inadequate and detrimental. Thought (or cogitatio or mens or intellectus) isn't of the same rank as extension at all. Rather thought et.al. requires extension as an indispensable precondition for it becoming actual.20 sober statement, and simply the proper characterisation of substance. I.e. already for nonexistence and existence being the only two attributes of substance and furthermore for all predicables indirectly being predicates of substance, which then also leads to infinitely many contradictory assertions being true with respect to substance, substance cannot be denoted by any combination of any amount of predicates imaginable. Yet the utmost immediate emergent mode of substance is predicable, and I will make a proposal for as what. 18 For a concise introduction into the matter of abstract objects, with some discussion of their difference to Meinongian (nonexistent) objects, cf. Edward N.Zalta, Abstract Objects, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster 1983 19 Cf. Spinoza, Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata – Ethik mit geometrischer Methode begründet, Pars Secunda – Zweiter Theil, Propositio I, Propositio II, in: Spinoza, Opera – Werke, vol.ii, pp 90 – 557, pp 162 – 165; Darmstadt 1967 20 Demonstratio brevis. Evidenter. (Short proof. By evidence.). Demonstratio longa. Quia exsistentia data est et nonexsistentia attributum substantiae, exsistentia autem non potest emergere ab nonexsistentia, consequitur exsistentiam attributum substantiae. (Long proof. Since existence is given and since nonexistence is an attribute of substance, and for the further reason, that existence cannot emerge from nonexistence, it follows, that existence is an attribute of substance.). Scholium. Exsistentia ratiocinati ratio est exsistentiam attributum substantiae. Quod quasi sit adaequatum cum indicis functione observatoris in status relativi interpretatione quantummechanicae. (Annotation. The existence of the reasoning person is the reason for the fact, that existence is an attribute of substance. That somehow corresponds to the index-function of the observer in the relative state interpretation of QM.) Yet there is an intelligible attribute of substance, which together with a more manifest version of the not quite so intelligible extension, makes the other of the only two attributes of substance: nonexistence (the other then being: existence). Being intelligible then has nothing to do with thought or cogitatio, mens or intellectus it rather means: not being actual, i.e. being something, that cannot be encountered by interaction. Therefore the concept of nonexistence or nonexistent objects, which plays that major role in the essays in this book, has no epistemic connotations whatsoever, i.e. it has no particular spiritual, mental, cognitive or noetic characteristics or meaning. Nonexistence here is a purely objectological concept, and not an epistemological concept at all. And not at least for this reason the theory of objects or objectology should not be mistaken for something alike or a different version of phenomenolgy. In his theory of objects Meinong radically departed from the background of Brentano's philosophy, and he departed for a very different end than that of Husserl. The reason for this is, that in Meinong's 'Theory of Objects' the central concept (of Brentano's philosophical endeavours) for the determination of an object, i.e. intentionality, becomes ultimately obsolete.21 The objects, nonexistent as well as existent ones, just stand in and for themselves, and merely shadows of intentionality remain as an inefficacious residual in (the acts of) naming them. 21 Cf., for that topic, Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, Gegenstandstheorie und Theorie der Intentionalität bei Alexius Meinong, Dordrecht 2007. Chrudzimski analyzes various differing views in the development of Meinong's positions related to this topic, and doesn't come to such a radical conclusion.

INTRINSICALLY/EXTRINSICALLY1 CARRIE FIGDOR (Final draft; please contact me for citation) Men of all sorts take a pride to gird at me: the brain of this foolish-compounded clay, man, is not able to invent anything that tends to laughter, more than I invent or is invented on me: I am not only witty in myself, but the cause that wit is in other men. (Sir John Falstaff, in Henry IV Part 2, Act I, Scene 2) Shakespeare recognized a distinction between something's having a property in and of itself, and something else's having the same property only when certain external conditions hold. So do we all. Plato distinguished between a fire's being hot by its nature and another thing's being hot because of the fire in it.2 Some basketball fans claim that Michael Jordan is a world-class player in and of himself, while Scottie Pippen plays world-class basketball only when he's on the court with Jordan. Many people would agree that Paris, France is intrinsically worth living in, but McMurdo Station, Antarctica is not. And Lawrence Summers, the former president of Harvard University, suggested (to his eventual dismay) that while men have an aptitude for science intrinsically, women do not have this aptitude in the same way (assuming they have it at all). In short, in both philosophical and everyday contexts we recognize that things have some of their 1 I would like to thank audiences at the Long Island Philosophical Society, the Claremont Colleges, University of Iowa, College of William & Mary and Oklahoma State University for comments and discussion, in particular Andrea Borghini, James Cain, Stephen Davis, Richard Fumerton, Paul Hurley, Amy Kind, Peter Kung, Alex Raczji, Peter Thielke, Masahiro Yamada and Charles Young. 2 Plato, Phaedo (102b8-105c7), trans. H. Tredennick, in E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, eds., The Collected Dialogues of Plato (Princeton, N..J.: Princeton, 1961), 83-87; see also Charles Young, "A Delicacy in Plato's Phaedo", The Classical Quarterly, New Series vol. 38, No. 1 (1988), pp. 250-251. Michael Jacovides, "Cambridge Changes of Color", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2000): 142-163, interprets John Locke (An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Peter H. Nidditch, ed., (New York: Oxford, 1700/1975): Book II Ch. 8 §19) as arguing that the changing color of porphyry in different lighting conditions is not a "real alteration" in the porphyry because it has its color extrinsically. properties intrinsically and others extrinsically, and also that the same property can be intrinsically by one thing and extrinsically by another. The primary goal of this paper is to outline an approach to distinguishing the ways in which things have properties along the "had intrinsically"/"had extrinsically" dimension. I will call the target of my discussion the intrinsically/extrinsically (I-ly/E-ly) distinction, to contrast it with the intrinsic/extrinsic (I/E) distinction. The latter is a distinction between properties. The former is a distinction between ways in which particulars have properties; roughly, it registers the relative independence of a characteristic of an object from relevant changes in that object's environment. The second goal of this paper is to show that we can and should explain the I-ly/E-ly distinction apart from how we classify properties under the I/E distinction. For this reason, I will avoid terms like "intrinsic properties" (which is ambiguous between the two distinctions) and even "intrinsic properties of objects" in favor of the precise, albeit sometimes awkward, "properties had intrinsically". The third goal is to show the impact of this analysis of the I-ly/E-ly distinction on its relation to the I/E distinction. The result is a unified framework that illuminates the way we use the I-ly/E-ly distinction and explains the pervasive but philosophically puzzling phenomenon of cross-classification, in which properties classified as extrinsic can be had intrinsically and properties classified as intrinsic can be had extrinsically. The structure of this paper is as follows. In section I, I motivate an explanation of the I-ly/E-ly distinction. In section II, I distinguish intrinsicness and extrinsicness from those notions captured in the essential/accidental, internal/external, and other nearby distinctions. In sections III, IV and V, I offer an analysis of the I-ly/E-ly distinction and a basic framework that explains its relation to the I/E distinction. My discussion proceeds from well-known a priori analyses (Kim, Langton and Lewis) in section III to an a posteriori analysis (Ellis) in section IV to a hybrid analysis that draws on psychological research in counterfactual reasoning in section V. I also suggest how this model applies to other distinctions that have motivated philosophical interest in the I/E distinction: the distinctions between real and mere Cambridge change, intrinsic and instrumental value, qualitative and numerical identity, and strong and global supervenience. In section VI, I elaborate on the basic model in the light of some puzzling cases. Section I. Motivating An I-ly/E-ly Distinction Philosophical discussion of the I/E distinction often begins with an intuitively compelling difference that the subsequent formal analysis is intended to capture. Here's a representative sample of the motivating intuitions: Intuitively, a property is intrinsic just in case a thing's having it (at a time) depends only on what that thing is like (at that time), and not on what any wholly distinct contingent object (or wholly distinct time) is like.3 You know what an intrinsic property is: it's a property a thing has (or lacks) regardless of what may be going on outside of itself.4 A thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that thing itself, and nothing else, is. Not so for extrinsic properties, though a thing may well have these in virtue of the way some larger whole is. The intrinsic properties of something depend only on that thing; whereas the extrinsic properties of something may depend, wholly or partly, on something else.5 3 Peter Vallentyne, "Intrinsic Properties Defined", Philosophical Studies vol. 88 (1997): 209-219. 4 Stephen Yablo, "Intrinsicness", Philosophical Topics, vol. 26, No. 1 & 2 (Spring and Fall 1999): 479-505. 5 David Lewis, "Extrinsic Properties" Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 197-200. Properties considered typical of each side of the distinction are then listed: for example, being an uncle or being six miles from a rhododendron, as opposed to having mass or being square. It is not at all obvious, however, that the distinction motivated by these platitudes is the I/E distinction. A property that a thing has regardless of what's going on outside itself is simply a property that it has intrinsically. Whether the property itself is intrinsic is logically a separate question. For example, one might have a Platonic model of properties as universals that exist independently from particulars, in which the properties are classified a priori as intrinsic or extrinsic, and the distinct ways in which particulars may instantiate these properties is another matter. The idea that the I/E distinction simply reflects the distinct ways in which properties are had by particulars requires a theory that connects the two distinctions in this way, for it is a theory which, unlike the Platonic theory, makes the distinction between the properties dependent on the distinction between the ways in which properties are had. This non-Platonic theory is implicit in the way we think of essential properties and innate properties: each property-level distinction is just reflection of a distinction in the ways properties are had.6 One thing can be a mathematician essentially and another accidentally, and that is all; there is nothing further to be said in this regard about the property of being a mathematician. Because of this implicit policy, we are not tempted to think that something has a property essentially or innately because the property is 6 Alternatively, one might say that there is no genuine property-level distinction in these cases, just a distinction in how properties are had. essential or innate (tout court). For there's simply nothing more to being an essential property than being a property that is had essentially by some individual.7 If we treated the I/E distinction this way, an intrinsic property would just be a property that is had intrinsically by some individual and an extrinsic property just one that is had extrinsically by some individual. We would say that Falstaff is witty intrinsically and Prince Hal is witty extrinsically, and that Mr. Smith is an uncle extrinsically and has his mass intrinsically, and there would be nothing further to say about the properties of being witty, being an uncle or having mass. We could even explicitly reject the idea that properties are intrinsic or else extrinsic, since the distinction we would be drawing does not depend on the existence of a property-level distinction. And there would still be philosophical work to do, since we would have the I-ly/E-ly distinction to explain. But we don't treat the I/E distinction this way. We think the definition of a property determines whether the property is intrinsic or extrinsic, whereas the definition plays no such role in whether a property is essential, accidental, innate or acquired. As a result, the intuitive distinction expressed in the platitudes and our policy for clarifying it are at odds. The platitudes reflect an a posteriori distinction, but the analyses that are supposed to illuminate this distinction are a priori. We can diagnose the problem more precisely. There already exists widespread recognition of the I/E and I-ly/E-ly distinctions, called the "global" and "local" 7 I do not mean to imply that essentialism is false; I am neutral on that issue. My point is simply that the locution "essential property" is not ambiguous in the way "intrinsic property" is; properties are essential (or not) relative to individuals that have them. distinctions. 8 It is also widely recognized that the relation between these distinctions cannot be straightforward. For example, we can start from the I/E ("global") distinction, and hold that if a property is intrinsic, then all of its instances have it intrinsically; or we might start from the I-ly/E-ly ("local") distinction, and hold that if anything has a property intrinsically, the property is intrinsic. The same would hold for extrinsicness.9 The usual cases used to illustrate the lack of a straightforward relation are disjunctive properties, such as being made of tin or next to something made of tin, or being square and accompanied or red and lonely. Such designer properties are typically introduced as counterexamples to particular analyses of the I/E distinction. They are used to show, for example, that properties whose definitions are such that they count as intrinsic by the analysis have instances that intuitively are had extrinsically, and so therefore the properties should be classified as extrinsic, pace the analysis in question. But the possibility is not even considered that any classification of how properties are had that is based purely on property definitions is inadequate. This possibility will not become evident by focusing on disjunctive properties that are designed by definition to act as counterexamples. It becomes immediately evident when we look at the practices that give rise to the motivating platitudes. For suppose one claimed that being witty is extrinsic because it means, or one stipulates that it means, "makes other people laugh". It doesn't follow that Falstaff isn't witty intrinsically. Shakespeare knew what "being witty" 8 I.L. Humberstone, "Intrinsic/Extrinsic", Synthese vol. 108 (1996): 205-267 (see p. 206). I avoid this wellknown terminology because, as will become clear below, the I-ly/E-ly distinction is not just the I/E distinction applied to instances, nor is the I/E distinction just the I-ly/E-ly distinction applied to properties. 9 The first option is called deriving a local notion from a global one, the second deriving a global one from a local one (Humberstone, ibid.; Brian Weatherson, "Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2007 edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/. Weatherson claims the first is "undoubtedly true" but doubts the second due to disjunctive properties. I think both are false, for reasons explained in the text. meant when he distinguished Falstaff's wit from everyone else's in this way. Or suppose one claimed that shape is intrinsic because, given its definition, there's no logical inconsistency in something's having the shape it does in an otherwise empty world; it doesn't follow that a stretched rubber band does not have its shape extrinsically.10 The obvious feature these cases share with many disjunctive properties is that, intuitively, some particulars have these properties intrinsically and others have them extrinsically. But what these cases reveal, and many disjunctive properties do not, is that property definitions are not invariably determining whether we think a property is had intrinsically or else extrinsically. Yet these are the practices that are used to motivate I/E analyses based on property definitions. It is unlikely that we will understand the puzzling relation between any I/E distinction and the ways in which properties are had until we examine the I-ly/E-ly distinction more closely. We can start this task by expressing the original motivating intuitions as perhaps they always ought to have been: You know what it is to have a property intrinsically: it's for a thing to have (or lack) a property regardless of what may be going on outside of itself. This claim unambiguously motivates an explanation of the I-ly/E-ly distinction. Representative examples of what we want to explain would include Mr. Smith's being an uncle and Mr. Smith's having mass, not being an uncle or having mass. It doesn't follow that the I-ly/E-ly distinction will be wholly a posteriori. For the definition of a property presumably plays some role in determining whether its instances are had intrinsically or else extrinsically. The burden of this paper is to explain what else must be going on. 10 The example is from Brian Ellis, The Philosophy of Nature (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's, 2002): 51-54; see also Humberstone (op. cit.) and Bradford Skow, "Are shapes intrinsic?", Philosophical Studies 133 (2007): 111-130. I discuss Ellis below. Section II. A Brief Interlude: Other Distinctions. Before analyzing the I-ly/E-ly distinction, it may be worthwhile to take a moment to clarify how having a property intrinsically or extrinsically differs from some of the other ways of having them: essentially or accidentally, internally or externally, or innately or by acquisition. Falstaff is not claiming that he was born witty, nor that he would cease to exist if he ceased being witty, nor is he locating his wit spatiotemporally – although he might done any or all of these things too.11 If we think of a property heuristically as a standard that all its instances meet, then ways of having a property are different ways of meeting that standard. We distinguish how an individual came to meet the standard to begin with (innately or via acquisition), whether it would still exist if it no longer met the standard (essentially or accidentally), whether it is met in virtue of something located inside the individual (internally or externally) and whether it would still be met in relevant counterfactual circumstances (intrinsically or extrinsically). A probable reason for highlighting when a thing has a property intrinsically is because properties had this way are considered dependable: they are not vulnerable to loss due to factors beyond the thing's control – often, factors literally beyond the thing, many of which tend not to be in its control.12 Put the other way around, a property had intrinsically 11Many of those discussing the I/E distinction take care to distinguish it from the essential/accidental distinction, although they may hold that essential properties are a subset of the intrinsics (e.g., Ellis, p.50) – more precisely, that the properties a thing has essentially are a subset of the properties it has intrinsically. This is not universal; Lynne Rudder Baker, in Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (New York: Cambridge, 2000), p. 30, fn. 10, remarks that she "departs from the tradition in holding that not all essential properties are intrinsic." 12 Christine M. Korsgaard ("Two Distinctions in Goodness", The Philosophical Review vol. 92, no. 2 (April 1983): 169-195), while discussing G.E. Moore's view of intrinsic value ("The Conception of Intrinsic Value", Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922); Ethics (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford, 1912), Ch. VII) explains on p. 175 that on that view intrinsic goodness "is dependent only on the thing's intrinsic nature and is just as constant: so long as the thing remains what it is it has the same value: and the is one that is highly impervious to the impact of novel circumstances; from this point of view, having a property intrinsically implies an unfortunate inability to adapt. Of course, in ordinary contexts we often use terms like "essentially", "internally", "innately" and "intrinsically" interchangeably (mutatis mutandis for "extrinsically" and the other contraries) even if the terms pick out different distinctions. For example, comedian Richard Pryor, who died on Dec. 10, 2005, was eulogized as follows: Paul Mooney, a longtime friend and a frequent writing collaborator, said Mr. Pryor's skills "came from God". "It was innate," said Mr. Mooney, who called himself Mr. Pryor's "black writer" and lent the comic his first car, a 1952 Ford, during his early days. "He could have been born in Japan and it still would have been there. Geniuses just are." (The New York Times, Dec. 13, 2005) A property can be had innately in that one is born with it, and yet not had intrinsically in that in relevant counterfactual circumstances one might lack it. Otherwise there would be no wasted natural talents. But however the terms might be used or confused in ordinary conversation, we are asking different questions when we want to know whether or not a thing acquired a property, whether or not it would cease to be what it is if it lost a property, whether or not a thing has a property by virtue of what is currently located inside itself, and whether or not it would still have a property in relevantly different counterfactual circumstances. That said, there is a sense of "in and of itself" in which it is used to denote an internal/external (or interior/exterior) distinction, rather than a claim about independence. The two senses are distinct. The internal/external sense involves spatiotemporal claims, value is the same, of course, for everyone and so also objective." Young (p. 250) describes Socrates as seeking an explanation of when an object has a property "its title to which is insecure, in the sense (to judge from 102b8-c8), that the object's having the property is not guaranteed by its being what it is." whereas the independence sense is essentially modal.13 A part can be had intrinsically by a whole in the internal sense, but not had intrinsically in the independence sense; similarly, a sniper's bullet is had intrinsically in the internal sense, but not the independence sense, by her victim. The interior/exterior distinction is arguably prior to the independence sense, since many standard analyses of the I/E distinction essentially involve reference to objects that are distinct from, in that they share no parts with, the object that has the property in the way it does.14 In this paper, I will focus on the sense more widely associated with "in and of itself" – that of independence from relevant external circumstances. This is the sense that is of most concern in discussions of intrinsicness and extrinsicness. For example, when we want to know whether something has its value intrinsically, we are asking whether it would still be valuable in relevant counterfactual circumstances, not where its value is spatiotemporally located (assuming the latter question even makes sense). Section III. Explaining The I-ly/E-ly Distinction: Definitions. An adequate account of the I-ly/E-ly distinction must explain what kinds of factors determine whether a property is had intrinsically or else extrinsically in any given 13 There is also a sense of 'internal' that may be understood as 'included in a thing's nature', which is roughly the same as the independence sense. I'll discuss this sense of 'internal' in Section VI. 14 Most also consider the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction distinct from the non-relational/relational distinction (but see Robert Francescotti, "How to Define Intrinsic Properties" Nous vol. 33 no. 4 (1999): 590-609), even though the two relations are often conflated in other contexts (e.g., Marc Lange, in An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), on p.18 characterizes the properties a thing has intrinsically as those which "depend only on itself, not on its relations to other things", while "a typical non-intrinsic ("extrinsic") property is the property of standing in a certain relation to something else.") However, the non-relational/relational distinction is distinct from both senses of intrinsic. Every object is identical to itself, but an object stands in this relation in and of itself; the property of containing a spinal column is one a vertebrate has in and of itself, yet it involves a relation. Humberstone (pp. 212-13) argues persuasively that the non-relational/relational distinction is best understood as a distinction between predicates: since we can change 1-place predicates into 2 (or n) -place predicates at will (and vice versa), it is simple to make a property "involve a relation" or not. case, and how they do. It is helpful to consider an ordinary example to see what this task involves. When a basketball fan tells me that Jordan is a world-class basketball player in and of himself, I am not being told that this is so because he would still have that property at a world in which he exists in complete isolation. Such worlds are irrelevant.15 I'm not told that Pippen is a world-class basketball player extrinsically because there are necessary existents; if there are any, they're irrelevant. Most importantly, the role of the nature of being a basketball player – which by definition involves a team of five people – in determining how this property is had is not at all clear, since Jordan and Pippen are indistinguishable in this regard. There are, in short, implicit constraints on the counterfactual possibilities we normally consider when making I-ly/E-ly classifications, both in terms of the relevant sorts of objects and the relevant class of possible worlds.16 An adequate account must explain these relevance parameters and how they are applied. Standard I/E analyses provide a useful point of departure, since they aim to capture the notion of independence involved in intrinsicness and extrinsicness, and the Ily/E-ly distinction shares this core idea.17 To fix ideas, we can begin with Kim's influential I/E distinction: (KE) F is extrinsic = df. Necessarily any object x has F only if some contingent object wholly distinct from x exists. 15 Experimental social psychologists have identified consistent constraints on the alternative possibilities that people normally entertain in counterfactual reasoning about events (Seelau et. al. 1995). I discuss these constraints in Section V; at this point, I ask the reader only to imagine herself in an ordinary context in which an I-ly/E-ly distinction, such as this one about Jordan, might be drawn. 16 It is also likely that properties may be had I-ly or E-ly in degrees, as some recent analyses of the innate/acquired distinction also allow (e.g., Andre Ariew, "Innateness and Canalization", Philosophy of Science, vol. 63 supplement: proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part I: Contributed Papers (September 1996): S19-S27. I set this question aside here. 17 I set aside definitions of intrinsicness in terms of duplication, whereby (roughly) an intrinsic property of a thing is one shared by all of its duplicates (e.g., Lewis "Extrinsic Properties"). Any mention of the I/E distinction in this paper can be analyzed in the idiom of duplication if the reader desires. (KI) F is intrinsic = df. Possibly some object x has F although no contingent object wholly distinct from x exists.18 It is presupposed that the question of whether or not a property can be had by a thing that exists in an otherwise empty world depends entirely on the property's definition and what logically follows from it. This assumption ensures that the notion of independence at the heart of the I/E distinction is logical (or conceptual) independence. We can swiftly obtain an I-ly/E-ly distinction by modifying Kim's distinction as follows: (KE-ly) x has F extrinsically = df. x has F, and necessarily x has F only if some contingent entity wholly distinct from x exists. (KI-ly) x has F intrinsically = df. x has F, and it is possible both that x has F and no contingent entity y wholly distinct from x exists.19 (KI) and (KE) do an admirable job of classifying many properties, but Kim's analysis is widely considered vulnerable to a counterexample raised by Lewis involving the property of being lonely.20 A thing is accompanied iff it coexists with some wholly distinct contingent object, and lonely iff it is not accompanied. Lewis objects that being lonely is just as extrinsic as being accompanied, but (KI) classifies it as intrinsic. Intuitively, a 18 Jaegwon Kim, "Psychophysical Supervenience", Philosophical Studies 41 (1982): 51-70, reprinted in his Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (New York: Cambridge, 1993), 175-193. I use Lewis's ("Extrinsic Properties") version of Kim's original distinction, which Kim expressed as follows: (i) G is rooted outside the objects that have it = df. necessarily any object x has G only if some contingent object wholly distinct from x exists; (ii) G is internal = df. G is neither rooted outside times at which it is had nor outside the objects that have it. Vallentyne also provides a more concise version of Kim's definition: P is intrinsic = df. Px is compatible with ~Ax, where A is the property of being accompanied by at least one distinct contingent object; and what's not intrinsic is extrinsic. (See also Humberstone, p. 229). Vallentyne explains the intuition behind Kim's definition of intrinsic as follows: "The intuitive idea is that P can be had by an object even in a world with no other distinct objects." That may be true of Kim's or Vallentyne's intuitions; it is unlikely to be true of Shakespeare's or Summers'. At the very least, none of the intuitions expressed in the platitudes requires it to be true that a property I have intrinsically is one that I would have in an otherwise empty world. 19 Derk Pereboom, in "Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist", Synthese vol. 88 (1991): 341-358, offers a local version of Kim's definition: F is an extrinsic property of x iff x's having F logically entails or rules out there being a contingent thing wholly distinct from x; otherwise a property is had intrinsically. However, this definition is closer to (LLE-ly), described below, rather than (KE-ly). 20 "Extrinsic Properties", pp. 198-199. thing's being lonely depends on what the world is like; since the core idea of intrinsicness is contextual independence, the property ought to be classified as extrinsic. However, it is not clear that being lonely is a counterexample to (KI), as opposed to (KI-ly). The definition of being lonely is such that it gets classified as an intrinsic property by (KI). To consider this classification wrong and (KI) inadequate on the basis of how things have their properties is to assume, inconsistently, that we do not apply (KI) and (KE) based entirely on property definitions. It may not be a mark in (KI)'s favor that it yields intrinsic properties that are had extrinsically, but (KI) is not contradicted by this fact given how the I/E distinction is drawn. (KI-ly), in contrast, classifies a thing's being lonely as a property it has intrinsically, and this does seem incorrect. (By analogy: S's being an only child does not just depend on S.) (KE-ly) is also in trouble. (KE-ly) says that if a thing has a property extrinsically, it cannot be the only contingently existing thing. But anything that is lonely can be the only contingently existing thing. We can consistently take Lewis's counterexample as an objection to (KI-ly) and (KE-ly) because differences in how things have their properties are precisely what these analyses are meant to capture. In response to the alleged counterexample to (KI) and (KE), however, Langton and Lewis (1998) propose an influential alternative I/E analysis based on Kim's: (LLI) F is intrinsic = df. Fx is compatible with Ax and with ~Ax, and so is ~Fx, where A is the property of being accompanied and ~A is the property of being lonely, defined as above; and what's not intrinsic is classified as extrinsic.21 By this definition, 21 Rae Langton and David Lewis, "Defining 'Intrinsic'", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 58 no. 2 (June 1998): 333-345; see also David Lewis, "Redefining 'Intrinsic'", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 63 no. 2 (2001), Special Symposium: Defining Intrinsic: 381-398. In the text I use Vallentyne's version of (LLI); Langton and Lewis express this conception, but do not display the an intrinsic property is one that is independent of accompaniment or loneliness, and to be independent of accompaniment or loneliness is for these four cases to be logically possible as determined by the property's definition: there can be an accompanied individual that has F, a lonely individual that has F, an accompanied individual that lacks F and a lonely individual that lacks F. Being lonely comes out extrinsic by this analysis, since its definition entails that there cannot be an accompanied individual that has it or a lonely individual that lacks it. Unfortunately, the success of this I/E distinction does not carry over entirely to the corresponding I-ly/E-ly distinction: (LLI-ly) x has F intrinsically = df. x has F, and x's having F is compatible with x's having A and with x's having ~A. (LLE-ly) x has F extrinsically = df. x has F, and x's having F is not compatible with either x's having A or else x's having ~A. (These analyses are simplified because in I-ly/E-ly judgments there is no need to consider how other objects might have the property.) By these definitions, a thing's being lonely is correctly classified as a property it has extrinsically. (LLE-ly) also avoids the problem that beset (KE-ly), for an object's being the only existing thing is plainly incompatible with its also not being the only contingently existing thing. Nevertheless, these analyses fail to capture many of the I-ly/E-ly classifications we make. If Falstaff is witty in and of himself and Prince Hal is not, this is not because we judge that Falstaff would have this property in an otherwise empty world and Prince Hal wouldn't: by incorporating A and definition in this (or any) form. Their analysis is subject to two restrictions: it does not apply to impure, or non-qualitative, properties (properties that contain reference to particular objects, places or times) nor to disjunctive properties. Langton and Lewis also distinguish between basic intrinsics, which are natural properties, and non-basic intrinsics, which are disjunctive properties or their negations. These are propertylevel restrictions on the application of (LLI) or (LLE) which do not affect my analysis of the I-ly/E-ly distinction; disjunctive properties are (often) just properties that can be had either way. ~A in the definitions, (LLI-ly) and (LLE-ly) require us to consider worlds that are irrelevant to the distinction Falstaff drew between himself and Prince Hal. Nor does it explain how he did draw the distinction given what is required by definition to be witty, since Falstaff and Prince Hal are alike in this regard. In short, using (LLE) we may (correctly) classify the property of being witty as extrinsic based on its definition, but (LLE-ly) gives us no clue as to how this extrinsic property might coherently be had intrinsically. The cross-classification problem remains as puzzling as ever. But we can begin to address the problem with slight revisions of the definitions of being lonely and being accompanied: one is lonely if one is the only relevant contingently existing thing at a relevant world, and one is accompanied if one co-exists with the relevant contingently existing object(s) at a relevant world. In nearly all cases (we will see degenerate cases below), relevantly lonely worlds are those that lack relevant external objects. These revisions explicitly raise the issues of how we determine which objects must go missing for something to be relevantly lonely (as opposed to lonely tout court, which we may call Lewis-lonely) and how we determine which worlds are relevant if we do not (or almost never) consider the logically possible worlds where an object is Lewislonely. We can make these relevance parameters explicit in a set of revised definitions: (I-ly) x has F intrinsically = df. x has F, and x's having F is compatible, in the relevant set of possible worlds, with x's having AR and with x's having ~AR; (E-ly) x has F extrinsically = df. x has F, and x's having F is not compatible, in the relevant set of possible worlds, with x's having AR or else x's having ~AR, where AR is the property of being relevantly accompanied and ~AR that of being relevantly lonely.22 This analysis does not yet explain, but only makes room for 22 Some recent analyses of the I/E distinction build relevance implicitly into their I/E definitions (Vallentyne; David Denby, "The Distinction between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties", Mind vol. 115 explaining, how Falstaff can be intrinsically witty and Prince Hal extrinsically witty, and how a stretched rubber band can have its shape extrinsically and a hardened steel band can have the same shape intrinsically. But what determines the relevance parameters in (I-ly) and (E-ly)? Section IV. Explaining the I-ly/E-ly Distinction: Relevance, Step One Consider again the claim that Michael Jordan is a world-class basketball player in and of himself, while Scottie Pippen is a world-class player only when he's on the court with Jordan. An ordinary fan may make coherently make this claim even though both men are alike (at times) in being world-class basketball players; even though she knows that no one can play basketball without four other people; even though what's needed for Jordan and Pippen to exist implies that many other things exist at every possible world she considers; and even though she does not even consider a Lewis-lonely world as relevant to her distinguishing them.23 How does she do this? How do we? In what follows, I will argue that the relevance parameters in (I-ly) and (E-ly) follow the same heuristics that constrain the relevant alternatives considered in ordinary counterfactual reasoning. This is because the I-ly/E-ly distinction serves an explanatory purpose that depends on such reasoning for its success. Since these constraints reflect our empirical knowledge, empirical facts, not just property definitions, play an essential role in drawing this distinction. (2006): 1-17), but do not explain what determines relevance. Such analyses are roughly analogous to (LLI) and (LLE) when "relevantly-lonely" and "relevantly-accompanied" are substituted into the original formulas and left unexplicated. 23 The latter claim is supported by empirical research on counterfactual reasoning discussed in section V. Before explaining the Jordan/Pippen (or Falstaff/Hal) examples, consider the superficially simpler case of Mr. Smith's being an uncle. We judge that Mr. Smith has this property extrinsically; his being an uncle is not compatible with his being relevantly lonely. In this case it seems clear that the definition of being an uncle determines the relevant external objects. If offspring of Mr. Smith's sibling or siblings did not exist, he would not have the property. Although this case seems straightforward, if not trivial, there are two unexplained features that bear emphasis. First, when making our judgment we don't consider those worlds where Mr. Smith is female, even though these are also worlds where he wouldn't have the property. But the definition didn't require us to restrict our counterfactual reasoning to those worlds where Mr. Smith is just as he is (and everything else is just as it is) except the relevant external objects are absent. So what determines the class of relevant worlds? Second, our judgment about Mr. Smith's being an uncle may seem trivial because it is not logically possible for any male who does not have siblings with offspring to be an uncle. Anyone who knows the definition knows this immediately – it just follows from the definition that he has this property extrinsically, one might say. But when considering the I-ly/E-ly distinction, our concern is only with whether Mr. Smith would be an uncle in the relevant counterfactual circumstances; it is not with what we think we can infer about how other objects have a property just from the definition of the property. If such inferences were always valid, there would be no distinction between Falstaff and Hal to explain. So why does the inference fail generally? And why does it go through in this case? I will return to these questions below. Now consider a physical object's shape. Shape is usually classified as an intrinsic property, but most physical objects (unlike the shapes of some abstract objects) have their shapes extrinsically.24 The actual shapes of physical objects partly depend on the external physical forces acting on them. A stretched rubber band illustrates this clearly, but even unstretched bands are subject to external stresses. So if shape is an intrinsic property, it is an intrinsic property that is had extrinsically in many actual cases.25 Resistance to this claim does not stem from lack of basic familiarity with physical theory, since it is common to classify mass as intrinsic and weight as extrinsic, presumably because the latter depends in part on gravitational forces. Instead, it seems symptomatic of the assumption that property definitions determine not just whether a property is intrinsic or else extrinsic, but also how properties are had. It is quite true that (e.g.) being a square is being a plane figure with four equal sides and four equal angles, and that based on this definition being a square will be classified as an intrinsic property by standard I/E definitions. But the present discussion is about actual squares, and the problem with actual squares having their shapes the way we know they do is that it confounds a purely a priori approach to the I-ly/E-ly distinction.26 24 It is possible that in classifying shape as intrinsic the intended interpretation of "intrinsic" is the "internal" sense. For example, Lewis ("Extrinsic Properties") declares that "some properties of things are entirely intrinsic, or internal, to the things that have them: shape, charge, internal structure". However, this would at best be an equivocation, since the subsequent definition motivated by the case of shape explicates intrinsicness in terms of logical independence of external circumstances (or duplication), not spatiotemporal location. 25 So apparently is molecular structure, in a molecular model consistent with both quantum mechanics and observation (R. Wooley, "Must a Molecule Have a Shape?", Journal of the American Chemical Society 100 (1978): 1073-1078 and "The Molecular Structure Conundrum" Journal of Chemical Education 62 (1985): 1082-1084; Pierre Claverie and Simon Diner, "The Concept of Molecular Structure in Quantum Theory: Interpretation Problems", Israel Journal of Chemistry vol. 19 (1980): 54-81; Steven Weininger, "The Molecular Structure Conundrum: Can Classical Chemistry be Reduced to Quantum Chemistry?" Journal of Chemical Education 61 (1984): 939-944; Robin LePoidevin, "Space and the Chiral Molecule", in Nalini Bhushan and S. Rosenfeld, eds., Of Minds and Molecules: New Philosophical Perspectives on Chemistry (Oxford: Oxford, 2000): 129-142. 26 This may explain Ellis's complaint (p. 51) that philosophers "have not succeeded in explicating a concept [of intrinsic] that is of much relevance to the theory or practice of science." To address this problem, Ellis proposes an I/E distinction based on what he calls causal independence, rather than logical (definition-based) independence. Stated in terms of an I-ly/E-ly distinction, the essence of his proposal is as follows: (CI-ly) x has F causally-intrinsically iff x has F, F is posited by physical theory T, and Fx is compatible with the absence of relevant properties and laws posited by T; and what's not had CI-ly is had CE-ly.27 The idea is that while a physical object typically has its actual shape in a way that depends in part on external forces acting on it, the way in which they have these shapes is distorted from the point of view of our theoretical models. Within these models, the theoretical analogues of actual things have their shapes in an undistorted way – that is, in a way not dependent on the relevant forces. This is the way actual things would have their shapes if they were not subject to the forces posited by the model. In short, to have a shape causally-intrinsically is to have a shape in an undistorted way, where what's undistorted is determined by the model. Actual physical objects can have their shapes causally-intrinsically, although simply having a shape like that of the relevant model-theoretic analogue is not sufficient; it must have that shape in an undistorted way. To use Ellis's example, a strip of hardened steel shaped the way a given rubber band is shaped when stretched "would have this shape naturally, independently of any accidental forces. Therefore, in the causal sense of 'intrinsicality', the actual shape of a body may or may not be the same as its intrinsic shape." That is, the steel band, but not the rubber band, has its shape in an undistorted way, because if the relevant forces were removed the steel band would still have its shape 27 Ellis does not display a definition, so (CI-ly) is based on his remarks. This I-ly/E-ly form may best express Ellis's intent, since he claims: "Intrinsicality in the causal sense is therefore not a property of properties, as many of those who have tried to explicate a logical concept of intrinsicality have supposed. It has more to do with the role that the property has in physical theory." He also applies his model to rest mass (the mass the object would have were it not in motion relative to us) and a particle's spin. but the rubber band would not.28 Again, we need not consider the steel band's shape in a Lewis-lonely world, only in a relevantly lonely world. The importance of Ellis's proposal in this context is that it provides a model of how the relevance parameters in (I-ly) and (E-ly) can be determined other than by definitions. In other words, (CI-ly) is just a special case of (I-ly) in which the relevant external objects are fixed by physical theory. It is still the case that the definition of being square determines what is necessary and sufficient for being square; by this definition, and (LLI), being square counts as an intrinsic property. But the definition does not determine what's relevant to a thing's being square intrinsically or else extrinsically. In the case of physical objects, physical theory tells us what's relevant to whether a thing has its shape in one way or the other. In general, the relevant external objects may be determined by a theoretical model of the system's behavior, including but not limited to the models of basic physical theory.29 This insight will not yet get us out of the woods. For consider again the case of Michael Jordan. Being a world-class basketball player, unlike having a particular shape, is not a property that is posited by physical theory or any other theoretical model, so Ellis's proposal seems inapt. Yet the definition of being a world-class basketball player, unlike that of being an uncle, also does not determine which objects or worlds are relevant to drawing the distinction between Jordan and Pippen. For the fan who draws this distinction can surely infer from its meaning, as we do, that no one could be a 28 Its having its shape in an undistorted way also depends on the relevant forces not being present; so the steel band would have to have the shape its theoretical analogue has both when the forces are present and when they are not in order to have it causally-intrinsically. (CI-ly) would need to be modified for this. 29 It is worth emphasizing the fact that Ellis's proposal can be incorporated naturally into my account. In the literature on the I/E distinction, his contribution is either ignored or mentioned briefly only to be set aside. basketball player in a world that lacks at least four other people. But she doesn't thereby infer that no one can have this property intrinsically. She – like Shakespeare, like Summers, like all of us in many ordinary contexts – draws the distinction in spite of this logical fact. But if what's relevant to drawing her distinction is not determined by a definition nor by a theoretical model, we still lack an adequate explanation of how the Ily/E-ly distinctions are drawn. Since the Jordan/Pippen case was presented as a typical example of the I-ly/E-ly distinction, one may be tempted to think that that the I-ly/E-ly distinctions we make are either too vague or unsystematic or even incoherent to theorize about. If so, then the fact that the I/E distinction is a priori is a relief – although it would still follow that we should not necessarily judge a candidate I/E distinction by whether it captures intuitions about how properties are had. But this pessimistic conclusion about the I-ly/E-ly distinction is unwarranted. Section V: Explaining the I-ly/E-ly Distinction: Relevance, Step Two Turn again to the case of Falstaff and Hal, which is parallel to the Jordan/Pippen case. Suppose being witty is defined as "makes other people laugh". How can Falstaff be intrinsically witty and Prince Hal not? How can Falstaff be intrinsically witty at all, given what is necessary for being witty? There is a very simple explanation. What would distinguish their wittiness is a quality of Falstaff – a disposition – that is the source of his wittiness and the cause of wittiness in others. Falstaff's being witty would be compatible with his being relevantly lonely, because Falstaff would have this disposition even if other people did not exist.30 In the relevantly lonely worlds he would still be witty, but his wittiness would not be manifested. We may not accept his boast, but we certainly understand it: we understand the distinction that Shakespeare is drawing and how it is possible for Falstaff to be witty even at the relevantly lonely worlds. Similarly, the sports fan might say Jordan is a world-class basketball player intrinsically because he would still have the disposition to play as he does at a relevantly lonely world – where, for example, he's alone on the court – even though it would not be manifested. In short, having a property intrinsically is, in some cases, having another property intrinsically – in this case, a disposition – that explains why the object has the first property at all.31 But is this simple explanation the right one, in these ordinary cases? Plausibly, yes. It is standard procedure to seek explanations of observable phenomena in terms of other, usually more basic, phenomena. This explanatory tendency is not limited to scientific pursuits. The same approach is reflected in the thought that Jordan has some underlying cause of his talent; the fan merely adds that this source is something he possesses in and of himself. It is also revealed in Summers' distinction between those who have an intrinsic aptitude for science from those who do not: he drew the distinction to explain why there are relatively few women in the upper reaches of science. We needn't posit dispositions. We don't think Paris, France has a disposition that makes it worth living in intrinsically. But to someone who distinguishes Paris from McMurdo 30 In effect, Falstaff himself is the relevant object for being or not being witty. He can both co-exist with the relevant object, and so be relevantly accompanied, and be the only relevant object, and so be relevantly lonely. In this degenerate case, the distinction between being relevantly accompanied and being relevantly lonely collapses, since being accompanied just by oneself is equivalent to being lonely. Relative to Hal, Falstaff is the relevant external object, and the usual accompanied/lonely distinction revives. Since this is the usual case, I will typically write of "relevant external objects" in the text. 31 This is not circular: dispositions can also be had I-ly or E-ly. See also section VI. Station in this way, some ineffable je ne sais quoi explains why Paris is worthwhile being in independently of any further reasons we might have for being there. The important point is that I-ly/E-ly distinctions are typically drawn in order to provide explanations, however rudimentary or proleptic, of how a thing has its properties. By an explanation, I mean nothing more fancy than an answer to a why-question.32 Such explanations may involve positing an additional property (or properties), of which dispositions are just a well-known type, that are not required by definition for having a property but which serve the purpose of explaining how the property is had. In such cases it is the way in which the explanans property is had, or are thought to be had, that determines whether an explanandum property is had intrinsically or else extrinsically, whether the explanandum property itself is classified as intrinsic or else extrinsic. In these cases, the inference from what is required by definition for having a property to the way in which any individual has that property can fail. It is also plausible that when no further explanation can be given – for example, when we have explained how the disposition that explains Falstaff's wittiness is had – the ultimate explanans property is had intrinsically or else extrinsically as determined by its definition or by a theoretical model, likely in physics. So in principle there is no need to list further ways of determining the relevant objects in (I-ly) and (E-ly). However, that analysis does require the following revision: (I-ly*) x has F intrinsically = df. x has F, and (i) x's having F is compatible, in the relevant set of possible worlds, with x's having AR and with x's having ~AR, or (ii) x has G intrinsically, and x's having G explains x's having F. 32 In particular, the explanations I have in mind need not satisfy models of scientific explanation, and they are typically incomplete relative to scientific or philosophical standards of completeness. For example, Summers's suggestion regarding the scientific aptitude of women was an answer to the following question: Why are there so few women in the highest ranks of science? The why-questions that motivate the other Ily/E-ly examples (or answers) I've used throughout the text are similarly straightforward. (E-ly*) x has F extrinsically = df. x has F, and (i) x's having F is not compatible, in the relevant set of possible worlds, with x's having AR or else x's having ~AR; or (ii) x has G extrinsically, and x's having G explains x's having F. With this analysis, plus the claim that the I-ly/E-ly distinction plays an explanatory role, we are in a position to explain the I-ly/E-ly distinction and its relation to the I/E distinction in a way that solves the puzzle of cross-classification. First, the idea that the I-ly/E-ly distinction is drawn for explanatory purposes allows us to explain how the relevant sets of possible worlds are determined. As with the I/E distinction, the core of the I-ly/E-ly distinction is the idea of independence from the environment, cashed out in counterfactual terms. But because of its explanatory function, the counterfactuals that support the I-ly/E-ly distinction will be constrained to those alternatives that are relevant to the proposed explanation. Moreover, we can explain these constraints if we recognize this reasoning as just a special case of ordinary counterfactual reasoning, which follows robust constraints on which counterfactual possibilities are entertained. These general constraints can explain how we limit the set of worlds to a contextually relevant class in the special case of drawing I-ly/E-ly distinctions. Following Kahneman and Tversky, psychologists have sought to isolate the parameters that govern and constrain everyday counterfactual reasoning and develop cognitive models that explain these regularities.33 The constraints concern which 33 D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, "The simulation heuristic", in D. Kahneman, P. Slovic and A. Tversky, eds., Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (New York: Cambridge): 201-208; Daniel Kahneman and Dale T. Miller, "Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives", Psychological Review vol. 93 no. 2 (1986): 136-153; Ruth M.J. Byrne, "Mental models and counterfactual thoughts about what might have been", Trends in Cognitive Sciences vol. 6 no. 10 (October 2002): 426-431; Eric P. Seelau, Sheila M. Seelau, Gary L. Wells and Paul D. Windschitl, "Counterfactual Constraints", in Neal J. Roese and James M. Olson, eds., What Might Have Been: The Social Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking, (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1995); Ahogni N'gbala and Nyla R. Branscombe, Nyla R., "Mental Simulation and Causal Attribution: When Simulating an Event Does Not Affect Fault Assignment", Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 31 (1995): 139-162; Gary L. Wells and Igor Gavanski, "Mental Simulation of Causality", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology vol. 56, no. 2 alternative possibilities are considered, which facts are more easily mutable, and which are more likely to be mutated. One source of constraint appears to be the purpose the reasoner has for reasoning counterfactually.34 A primary purpose is to explain how and why something occurred. By entertaining alternative possibilities, we may seek to isolate necessary causes (John's father's stopping to chat with neighbors on the way to picking John up from school) and sufficient causes (a drunken driver's hitting John while he was waiting to be picked up). Other goals include assigning responsibility and blame, providing consolation to others and oneself, amplifying negative and positive affective responses, and guiding future behavior. (These need not be mutually exclusive.) Besides the conscious purposes we may have, there are constraints that operate automatically in that without conscious effort they sharply restrict the infinite range of alternative possibilities that could be entertained to a very small set. The natural-law constraint includes ("folk") knowledge of basic physical, chemical and biological laws and facts. Possibilities with mutated natural facts are almost never considered in normal discourse. For example, when mutating the event of a plane crash, we never consider "if only it had fallen up". (This possibility would also violate the purpose constraint, on the assumption that we are trying to isolate a sufficient cause of the crash or assign fault.) On the other hand, when we seek to explain the 1986 Challenger disaster, subjects commonly consider "if only the O-rings had been checked". (1989): 161-69. The experimental social psychological research focuses on counterfactual reasoning about events (often those that evoke regret or other affective responses); quite plausibly, the same constraints apply to counterfactual reasoning about objects. Kahneman and Miller explicitly link their concept of mutability – a modal notion referring to that feature of some aspects of reality under which these aspects are more or less easily altered in counterfactual reasoning than others – to David Lewis's analysis of counterfactuals (Counterfactuals (Blackwell and Harvard, 1983)), in which some possible worlds are "closer" or involve "smaller" changes. 34 Here I largely follow Seelau et al., "Counterfactual Constraints". The availability constraint involves factors that make certain mutations more likely than others. For example, we are more likely to mutate exceptions rather than normal events (e.g., Tom's taking a new route home when he got into a crash, rather than his usual route), actions rather than inactions (e.g., subjects judge that Dick, who is unhappy after having transferred to a new college, feels more regret than Harry, who is unhappy after not having transferred), aspects of reality over which we may have control rather than those that we do not (e.g., the O-rings), and more recent events rather than those earlier in a series (e.g., the last missed field goal in a football game that was lost by 2 points). In general, an event or aspect that is contextually salient is more available for mutation. The natural-law, availability and purpose constraints can always be violated, and regularly are in science fiction and philosophical discussion. But we see clear evidence of them in the ordinary I-ly/E-ly distinctions discussed above. In the case of Mr. Smith's being an uncle, we do not bother to consider the world where he is female, as this would violate the natural-law constraint; our omission also makes sense if we are consciously focusing on the definition in order to identify the external objects that might affect his having the property. We also do not to consider being an uncle the sort of property that calls for further explanation. Jordan's talent, on the other hand, does cry out for explanation: why is his level of play so extraordinary? Yet when the sports fan distinguishes Jordan from Pippen, she does so in a way that also follows the constraints. For example, she does not consider worlds where everyone else is 10 feet tall. Such worlds would not only violate the natural-law constraint; they would obviate her attempted explanation of Jordan's talent and her attempt to assign him full credit for his success. The same goes for Falstaff when he seeks to credit himself for his wittiness: worlds where he couldn't be witty, for whatever reason, are simply not relevant. In all these cases, the person drawing the distinction can be wrong; the I-ly/E-ly distinction is not subjective (at least, that claim goes beyond what I have argued for here). But the distinction that is drawn reflects the purposes of the person drawing it, even if it can be challenged. Second, we have a natural explanation of the puzzle of cross-classification, when a property classified as extrinsic (such as being witty) can be had intrinsically, and a property classified as intrinsic (such as being square) can be had extrinsically. Crossclassification arises when something's having a property that counts as intrinsic by definition is explained by its having another property extrinsically; mutatis mutandis for extrinsic properties that are had intrinsically. The following diagram (fig.1) illustrates this relation between the I/E and I-ly/E-ly distinctions: Fig. 1: A Framework for the I/E and I-ly/E-ly Distinctions35 The overall account of the I-ly/E-ly distinction remains fairly simple, however: (i) definitions and empirical theory each can determine the relevant external objects in (Ily*) and (E-ly*); (ii) empirically-determined constraints on ordinary counterfactual reasoning reliably determine the relevant worlds in (I-ly*) and (E-ly*); (iii) cross- 35 Being Escher-shaped is having the shape of an Escher-drawn object that cannot be had by an actual physical object. Although I use Langton and Lewis's I/E distinction to illustrate, the reader may plug in her favorite analysis. For example, Gene D. Witmer, William Butchard and Kelly Trogdon ("Intrinsicality without Naturalness", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 70, no. 2 (March 2005): 326-350) propose a two-tiered account of the I/E distinction – superficially similar to this element of the present Ily/E-ly account -to eliminate Langton and Lewis's reliance on the natural/unnatural property distinction. Definitions of Properties Being an uncle Being square Being witty Being Escher-shaped Entails or rules out other contingent objects (being an uncle, being witty) EXTRINSIC PROPERTIES Does not entail or rule out other contingent objects (being square, being Eschershaped) INTRINSIC PROPERTIES I/E Distinction (e.g. LLI/LLE) No additional explanation x's being an uncle HAD E-LY Additional Explanatory Property (e.g., disposition, fundamental physical magnitude) x's being witty, x's being square HAD I-LY OR ELSE E-LY No additional explanation x's being Eschershaped HAD I-LY I-ly/E-ly Distinction classification between the I/E and I-ly/E-ly distinctions can arise when something's having one property is explained by its having another; (iv) because of (iii), we cannot invariably infer from what is required by definition to have a property to how it is had in any particular case.36 I should note that despite the emphasis on explanation in this model, the I-ly/E-ly distinction itself is metaphysical. The distinction matters to us because of its explanatory utility. Merely ascribing a property to a thing to explain its behavior is often insufficient to provide a satisfactory explanation; one reason for this is because other things can have that same property but not behave the same way. This account does not require us to change how we draw the I/E distinction. We may still classify properties as intrinsic or extrinsic depending on their definitions, as current I/E analyses do, although in this case single-case cross-classifications are not necessarily counterexamples to a proposed I/E analysis. Nevertheless, we might consider a better analysis to be one that yields fewer cross-classifications, or that best distinguishes those cases where cross-classification is very rare or non-existent. Note that the crossclassification issue is just the problem (not always recognized as such) of how to classify what have been called "mixed" cases in the literature. Kim's I/E analysis classifies a property as intrinsic if it is logically possible for it to be had intrinsically (i.e., it can be had in a Lewis-lonely world). Most other analyses classify a property as extrinsic if it is logically possible for it to be had extrinsically; disjunctive properties with "mixed" instances, such as being square or (Lewis-) accompanied, are routinely classified as 36If divine power were invoked to explain Jordan's prowess, the distinction between him and Pippen would not be an I-ly/E-ly distinction, but a divinely-inspired/not divinely-inspired distinction. But while Jordan would have his prowess extrinsically, it would not be because of the definition of being a world-class basketball player, but because of his dependence on God (Pippen might still have this property extrinsically because of his dependence on Jordan). So two individuals can have the same property extrinsically, and both because of an explanatory factor had extrinsically, but the explanatory factors need not be the same. extrinsic. But in the absence of arguments that the I/E distinction must satisfy a kind of law of excluded middle, and that there is a non-arbitrary reason to classify properties with "mixed" instances on one side of the distinction rather than the other, it is hard to see which side, if either, is correct. An alternative solution would be to allow that the I/E distinction comes in degrees, such that a property is intrinsic (extrinsic) if most of its instances are had intrinsically (extrinsically), assuming some way of counting instances. But this solution would tie the I/E distinction to the I-ly/E-ly distinction in a way that would mark a sharp departure from the a priori methods used so far. Before elaborating on the empirical element of this model in the following section, I should note briefly how it applies to disjunctive and conjunctive properties and to the philosophical tasks for which the I/E distinction has been used. In the case of disjunctive properties, the relevance parameters are those that hold for each disjunct when it is had individually (not as a disjunct). For example, a relevantly-lonely red square can have the property of being red or relevantlyaccompanied either intrinsically or extrinsically, depending on whether colors can be had intrinsically or extrinsically (which in turn depends ultimately on our best explanation of color). A relevantly-accompanied blue square presumably would have this disjunctive property extrinsically, depending just on the property's definition (assuming, reasonably, that no further explanation is wanted). For conjunctive properties, the relevance parameters for how a conjunctive property is had are not so reducible. The property of being red and relevantly-accompanied would be had extrinsically by a relevantlyaccompanied red square (on the assumption that no further explanation of how it has this property is wanted). What is crucial to keep in mind, in both cases, is whether there is a reason to posit an additional explanatory property, and, if so, how that property is had. As noted, it is a consequence of the model that we cannot invariably infer from a property's definition whether it is had intrinsically or else extrinsically in particular cases. As for how this model affects the philosophical tasks to which the I/E distinction has been put, its use in clarifying the real vs. mere Cambridge change distinction will serve as an illustration. According to Geach, Cambridge changes are changes in the predicates true of a thing.37 All changes are Cambridge changes, but some are such that (a) there is a change of predicates true of a thing and (b) there is a real change in the thing. A change that satisfies (a) and (b) is a real change, while a change that satisfies only (a) is a mere Cambridge change. For example, when Socrates dies, there is a real change in Socrates but a mere Cambridge change in Xanthippe, who becomes a widow. The I/E distinction has been used to explain this difference: real changes are changes in intrinsic properties, while mere Cambridge changes are changes in extrinsic properties. However, this explanation is too quick: some properties that may be classified as intrinsic by their definition, such as shape, may be had extrinsically. The above model provides the means for a more precise understanding of the real/mere Cambridge change distinction. The model allows us to distinguish between two claims: real changes are those that involve changes in properties had intrinsically, or real changes are those that involve physical changes in a thing. The first option seems unjustified except insofar as it is implicitly assumed to be a variant of the latter. The latter option makes the real/mere Cambridge change distinction compatible with what physical theory tells us about how things have their physical properties. For whether physical changes are changes in properties a thing has intrinsically or else extrinsically depends on physical theory, not on 37 Peter Geach, God and the Soul (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969): 70-72. property definitions.38 The upshot is that we can no longer strictly identify real change with change in intrinsic properties, but we can say that real change is typically (but not by definition) a change in the properties a thing has intrinsically. The I/E distinction would remain a reliable indicator of the real/mere Cambridge change distinction. VI. Elaborating The Basic Model: Causes and Conditions, Constancy and Mutability It may seem that by using dispositions as an illustrative case of explanatory properties, I have made the I-ly/E-ly distinction dependent on the I/E distinction, since dispositions are widely considered to be intrinsic properties. But there is no circularity here, because dispositions – and any other explanatory property – are subject to the Ily/E-ly distinction too. A disposition can be had intrinsically or else extrinsically even if they are all classified as intrinsic properties.39 One way a sports fan could be wrong about Michael Jordan is if it turns out that he has his disposition, or the physical properties that explain it, extrinsically. The basic model could be elaborated to distinguish between the ways in which properties are had according to our "folk" intuitions about the natural world and the ways in which they are had according to our best physical theories. I have not done so for two reasons: first, "folk" intuitions are updated in the face of physical 38 Jacovides suggests that real change involves a change in fundamental explanatory properties. Carol E. Cleland, "The Difference Between Real Change and Mere Cambridge Change", Philosophical Studies 60 (1990): 257-280, argues that they involve changes in dispositions posited by physics. 39There may well be extrinsic dispositions (e.g., see Jennifer McKitrick, "A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 155-174), although that is an I/E claim about which I remain neutral. But well-known counterexamples to a simple conditional analysis of dispositions also may be considered cases where a disposition that is classified as intrinsic is had extrinsically (e.g., the finked wire in C.B. Martin, "Dispositions and Conditionals", The Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1994): 1-8, or the gold challice in Mark Johnston, "How to Speak of the Colors", Philosophical Studies 68 (1992): 221263. According to a simple conditional analysis, an object is disposed to M when C iff it would M if it were the case that C (Michael Fara, "Dispositions", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/dispositions/. Further discussion of these possibilities must be left for another occasion. theory, although not always or immediately; second, the role of explanatory properties in the I-ly/E-ly distinction would not change. It also seems that we are willing to allow some slippage when drawing I-ly/E-ly distinctions. For example, if we are willing to say that some physical objects are square, then we also ought to be willing to say that some physical objects have their squareness intrinsically. That is, if being square is a property that can be had by physical objects, then a physical object's being square intrinsically will be acceptable to a similar extent. Ellis seems to take this for granted in his steel band example. This vagueness does not undermine the I-ly/E-ly account any more than it forces us to deny that some physical objects are squares. However, bringing empirical theory into the picture raises other problems, nicely illustrated by hydrangeas.40 A difference in soil pH determines the flowers' color by affecting the aluminum content in the plant. If the soil is acidic, the flowers are blue, and if it is basic they are pink – the opposite of litmus paper. So do a hydrangea's flowers have their color extrinsically, or are they just caused to have their color by the soil pH? In general, given that empirical theory can determine whether a property is had intrinsically or else extrinsically, how do we distinguish an external cause of a thing's having a property and an external condition that determines whether it has the property intrinsically or extrinsically? I'll address this problem in steps. 40 See http://hgic.clemson.edu/factsheets/HGIC1067.htm, downloaded on June 2, 2008. Many thanks to Amy Hurshman for this example. To begin with, the problem is not that of the well-known context-relativity or vagueness between a cause and a condition.41 It is relative to our explanatory purposes which factor in a total cause we pick out as a sufficient cause (e.g., the match's being lit) and which as a necessary cause or condition (e.g., the presence of oxygen). These differences between causal factors highlighted as causes and those treated as background conditions are reflected in ordinary counterfactual reasoning.42 A chemist seeking to discover the nature of a hydrangea's color might try to isolate a sufficient external cause. If when the soil pH is changed from its original state, the hydrangea's new flowers bloomed in a different color, he might conclude that the soil pH is a sufficient external cause of their color, relegating the other factors to background conditions. But this is not sufficient for the hydrangea to have its color extrinsically. That depends on whether the same flowers would change color whenever soil pH changes – for example, from pink to blue when switched from basic to acidic soil, and back again to pink if replaced in basic soil. It is this sort of dependence on external conditions that matters in the I-ly/E-ly distinction and that must be distinguished from external causes. We can begin to illuminate the nature of this dependence with the following case. Suppose we inject a hydrangea with permanent pink dye such that all its flowers would remain pink through any change in soil pH. Does it have its color intrinsically? We might say, with Plato, that the dye is pink intrinsically but the hydrangea is pink because it contains the dye, and hence it is pink extrinsically. On this view, although the dye is constantly present and spatiotemporally internal, it counts as external to the plant in terms 41 John L. Mackie, "Causes and Conditions", in E. Sosa and M. Tooley, eds., Causation (New York: Oxford, 1993): 33-55, reprinted from American Philosophical Quarterly 2/4 (October 1965): 245-55, 2614. 42 See N'gbala and Branscombe, "Mental Simulation and Causal Attribution: When Simulating an Event Does Not Affect Fault Assignment" and Wells and Gavanski, "Mental Simulation of Causality". of its nature. (This is the other sense of internal/external I mention in fn.9.) But there is another option: we could say the dye is now part of the hydrangea's nature because of its permanence. Its constancy in the face of relevant external change might justify the claim that it has its color intrinsically, even though its color had an external cause and it is the only hydrangea to have its color in this way. Our background knowledge about plants would probably lead us to side with Plato in this case; more precisely, our modal intuitions about plants and their properties would follow the natural-law constraint. But there may be no principled way to determine when a constant condition that had an external cause becomes part of a thing's nature, and hence makes it or any property explained by that condition a property it has intrinsically, or whether the constant condition forever remains external to the thing's nature (wherever it might be spatiotemporally located) and makes it or any property explained by that condition a property it has extrinsically. In the case of weight, we automatically choose the latter route, perhaps because gravity or other physical forces are not divisible and so are not even candidates for becoming part of an individual's nature the way a dram of dye can be. This does not undermine the model so much as prompt further inquiry into any general principles under which a constant condition either remains or ceases to be external to a thing's nature. Acquired dispositions are good test cases. But there is an important distinction that this discussion has elided so far, brought out by the following case. Assume that pain is always had intrinsically, on the assumption (granted for the sake of argument) that we identify pain with pain qualia. If I always wear a cilice that causes pain (like the character Silas in The Da Vinci Code), there is a constant external condition that is sufficient for my pain. Do I have my pain extrinsically? No, because what matters in the I-ly/E-ly distinction is mutability, and mutability and constancy lie on distinct continua. Mutability is a modal notion; it is that feature of some aspects of reality by which they are altered in counterfactual reasoning more or less easily or often. The natural-law and availability constraints are constraints on mutability. Constancy is a temporal notion. The cilice is a constant external condition, but it is highly mutable: I could remove it at any time if I so chose. Dependency on an condition that is constant, rather than immutable, does not determine that a property explained by the presence of that condition is had extrinsically. The same principle holds for the dyed hydrangea. By assumption the dye is immutable, and not merely constant, once injected; its immutability, not its constancy, makes it a candidate for becoming part of the hydrangea's nature. The term "permanent" is ambiguous between these notions. The cilice case also reflects the difference between mutability and constancy, in a more subtle way. In that case, our automatic response is to think of it as remaining external to my nature no matter how long and constantly I wear it. For without this response, the cilice case would not present a problem to considering the pain as something that I have intrinsically. And it is the fact that it is highly mutable, despite its constancy, that makes it ineligible for being considered part of my nature – in sharp contrast to the psychological disposition I have that explains why I always wear it. Thus, the cilice remains a constant external condition (or sufficient cause) of my pain; it is neither an immutable external condition (which would make my pain something I have extrinsically) nor an immutable part of my nature (which would make my pain something I have intrinsically in an atypical way). So I do have my pain intrinsically in the intuitionsanctioned way, given the identification of pain and pain-qualia. The Falstaff/Hal case also shows how mutability and constancy come apart. Falstaff need not be constantly in Hal's presence for Hal's wittiness to depend on Falstaff's in the relevant sense. What matters is whether Hal's wittiness is mutable in the relevant counterfactual situations, given Falstaff's claim that he himself is the relevant external object (external to Hal). From Falstaff's perspective – which is the one that matters, given that it is he who is drawing the distinction – the answer is clearly yea. Concluding Remarks. I have proposed an analysis of the distinction immediately motivated by our intuitions that properties can be had intrinsically or else extrinsically: the I-ly/E-ly distinction. The basic difference between this distinction and the I/E distinction is that the former depends on a posteriori as well as a priori ways of determining which objects and worlds are relevant for classifying the ways in which properties are had. I also argue that the I-ly/E-ly distinction is used for explanatory purposes, and that the counterfactual reasoning that supports it falls within the purview of empirical studies on the nature of and constraints guiding ordinary counterfactual reasoning in general. I further propose a model for understanding the relation between the I/E and I-ly/E-ly distinctions that explains the puzzle of cross-classification: how intrinsic properties can be had extrinsically and vice versa. Finally, I suggest how the model affects the philosophical tasks for which the I/E distinction has been used, and elaborate on it in response to some puzzling cases.

A Place without a Form? David Kolb, 1981 The old spiritual masters told us to be in the world but not of it. We moderns have given this a secular twist. We are in our world - we have values, ways of life, world pictures - but not of it - we are to be aware of our freedom, aware of the contingency of our world and its dependence on factors many of which are or will be under our control. We both inhabit our world and enjoy the status of distanced controllers. Or, if our lack of control and our dependence on historical and social factors is being emphasized, we are to inhabit our world with a certain knowing irony, since we understand the process by which it came about, even if we cannot change it. We hnave found ways to institutionalize this split-level identity. Such institutions posit a separation of form and content. In the free market, in procedural justice, in free speech we live out that separation. This parallels cognitive and volitional theories of Kantian and Utilitarian descent, which make the same separation. All these give us freedom by having us seek our identity in a formal process above all content, but at the cost of introducing distance and irony. Martin Heidegger's response to modernity often sounds like a romantic flight from modern distances. He clearly wants to overcome our split-level existence, the uneasy balance of facticity and freedom, which for him is but another manifestation of the will to power which he fines lurking behind our tradition. But to what degree is his own overcoming of modernity also susceptible to split-level living and ironic distance? More precisely, to what degree is Heidegger's strategy of locating modernity within the context of the history of being and das Ereignis itself a kind of formalism? Does it become a vehicle for romantic or ironic meta-positions? I am invoking a Hegelian theme, for it was Hegel who saw in modernity a break between form and content which permitted the expression of a formal, empty subjectivity that dominated and swallowed all substantial content in its own self-affirmation by negation. This subjectivity shows up in modern religion, art economics and politics, and philosophy. Hegel tries to overcome this by showing that the dance of subjectivity and distance is located within the whole, whose movement does not allow an ultimate distinction of form from content.1 For Heidegger such formalism and distance is a sign of the will to power and the metaphysical drive to total presence. It is the "age of the world-view" where we become the pure formal observer, one with the formal process of creating world-views, dominating any given view by power, or at least irony. This becomes institutionalized in our ways of teaching and reading, in our schools and museums. Heidegger would, however, reject Hegel's metaphysical solution to this plight. Yet his own approach shows affinities to both Hegelian holism and Kantian formalism. 2 In this essay I take it for granted that Heidegger does talk of modernity as one unified world whose manifestations can be seen in power lines, art museums, war-and-peace, and so on, "The wasteland grows..."2 Most solutions offered are only the will to power replayed. Heidegger pursues a strategy of locating modernity within a larger context. What we experience in das Gestell as the constellation of man and Being through the modern world of technology is a prelude to what is called Ereignis. . . . For in das Ereignis the possibility opens to us of overcoming the simple dominance of das Gestell in a more original happening (Ereignen) (ID 101/36). We can see modernity whole when we can hear it in the call of das Gestell (ID 116/50). We can live attuned to what calls. This gives us a dimension of ourselves that escapes the official meaning given us by that call. In this larger context it would seem we might repeat the modern move, determining the form of our correspondence with das Ereignis, interpreting ourselves as pure "corresponders" and distancing ourselves thereby from the content or our epoch. Is the place where Heidegger locates modernity immune to this? Is it a place without a form? The kind of formalism possible within Heidegger's "step back" bears on the question to what extent Heidegger is a transcendental philosopher. Though he is not fond of the label "transcendental" his step back into more primal spaces has a transcendental look to it. In Identity and Difference the pervasive image of a road or way travelling into ever more comprehensive spaces appears on the first page of the first essay. This way leads to the region (Bezirk) within which we live, and from there to the realm (Bereich) which surrounds our local region (ID 102/38, cp. WHD 57/33). The Kantian flavor of this repress is enhanced by the repeated injunctions to reverse our conception about what determines what. Things that seem to be independent turn out to be determined by what we had thought were their results. (Cf. the discussions of identity and difference, of belonging together, and so on.) There is much talk of the "earlier" and the "primal"; when we stop hearing this as Platonic it sounds Kantian. More primal than the concrete manifestations of modernity is das Gestell, and more primal still das Ereignis. The final realm is not without a kind of structure. There is the circling of beings and Being (ID 138/58), and the pervasive relation of presence and absence within the correspondence of man's nature and das Ereignis (ID 137/53). Though this is a realm where metaphysical language fails us (ID 140/71), it is here that thinking is brought into its own light (WHD 10/28). This is the objectless (ID 132/64) realm that is nonetheless the source of all measure (WHD 153/132). All this can sound quite Kantian and formal. To some extent it must be truly so, or there will be no new self-interpretation beyond that offered by das Gestell. Yet we are given no new world, no new meaning of being, only das Gestell understood as a fate, a call. This, however, is just what the totalizing self-sufficiency of das Gestell denies; in living it as a call we escape its limits. But 3 this means that to some degree we live it as our content of a process or relation whose form could contain other contents. If there is at least this much formalism, there would seem to be room for ironic distance. I will argue, however, that though there is a kind of irony there is no room for assuming meta-positions and ironic distance. In what follows I will criticize Heidegger's image of the way and its two stages, and the romantic, right-wing Heideggerianism it can lead to. Das Gestell is the first step on the journey it describes. Heidegger moves from modern incidents and symptoms to the unified sense of Being that underlies them, calling men and beings to dwell together in a certain way. The discussion of das Gestell parallels Hegel's move from definite cultural objects to the shape of spirit behind them. But a Hegelian shape of spirit is arrived at in two ways, from concrete phenomena and purely, in the Logic. A shape of spirit is a shape the whole assumes within its movement to itself. In any shape, definite poles are separated and united in definite ways. The shape has a determined genesis and internal tensions. Das Gestell, on the other hand, has no dialectical genesis. Nor is there any pure access to it; we come to it only by hearing it within what surrounds us. Nor is it the result of any dialectical mediation. It concerns us "überall unmittelbar," everywhere and immediately. It gathers us and beings into a space with special contours. But we were not there prior to the gathering, waiting to be given shape. Nor has this space been put together from poles, nor modulated from a previous space. It is not a concrete dialectical unity. Each of the two members of the relation between man's nature and the Being of beings already implies the relation itself. To speak from the matter itself: there is no such thing here as members of the relation, nor the relation, for themselves [für sich the moment of separation in an Hegelian dialectic]. Accordingly, the relation we have here named between the nature of man and the Being of beings allows no dialectical maneuvers in which one member of the relation is played off against the other....not only that all dialectic fails but that there is simply no place left for a failure of this kind (WHD 74/79). All our motions of representation and willing take place within this space. There is no room for a move to a meta-position, or rather all meta -positions are moves within this space, not its transcendence. While the parallel between das Gestell and a Hegelian shape of spirit is tempting, it is ultimately misleading because das Gestell is simple, without parts or aspects. It is the gathering within which even dialectic is possible.3 Yet for all its simplicity das Gestell brings determination. Das Einfache bringt Mass und Gefüge, aber zugleich An-lass und Ausdauer. The simple brings measure and structure, and also initial power and endurance. (WHD 153/132)4 4 Note that the role of bringing measure and structure and endurance resembles that the ancients assigned to "form". Das Gestell is like a form in some of Aristotle's uses of the word, but not a form in the modern sense of a structure to be isolated and brought forward. It has itself no contours to be traced; it is not a structural element of modernity. It has no form to be made present, though many forms and structures can be made present in the gathering it rules. On the other hand, das Gestell is but one determinate gathering; it is a call opening a space. Others are possible. Das Gestell is not an ultimate; something more primal speaks through it (ID 100/36). There is a place beyond the ground it assigns (ID 104/39). In Heidegger's metaphor of the road, the way continues from our region to the surrounding realm. This suggests the kind of formalism where we live our relation to das Ereignis, with das Gestell as our (unfortunate) content of this relation. Our relation to das Ereignis is our true home. But this kind of formalism is out of place in Heidegger. Neither a formal nor a dialectical reading can be given of the relation between us and das Ereignis, if indeed it should be called a relation at all. Any dialectical interpretation of das Gestell is prohibited because there is no structure of das Gestell to exploit. But either can there be a dialectic of the way from das Gestell to das Ereignis. That way contains a discontinuity. In ID Heidegger refers to the need for a leap; there is no bridge from the one to the other (ID 96/33). I interpret this Kierkegaardian language to mean that any epoch of Being, such as das Gestell, is complete. There is no gap in the world to be filled by the move to das Ereignis. There is no dialectical tension to be resolved by such a move. There is no structural connection where our epoch is completed by the transition. Any world is fully rounded on its own. It does not need to be made whole in some larger world. There is no larger world. The move beyond comes from hearing the arrival of the world, not from finding strains and cracks within it. This is quite unlike Hegel, where limited worlds give way due to internal strains, revealing their larger context. For Heidegger the terror of das Gestell comes precisely from the fact that it is complete, a seamless whole within which all can come to presence, albeit a presence which enforces a forgetfulness of its own geschicht-lich character. But that Geschehen is not a missing item within the world. So no dialectical transition can be made in either direction from das Gestell to das Ereignis. This seems to leave open, the possibility of a more Kantian relation of content and form between them. But there can be no Critique of the History of Being. Heidegger has no transcendental method which provides access to a pure form of man-in-the-history-of-Being. In ID Heidegger makes this point by adapting one of Hegel's images. A man asks for fruit and is offered apples, bananas, and pears, but refuses them because none of them are fruit. For Hegel this brings out the necessary distinction and connection of universal and particular, which connection is, when understood, the pure form of the universal, Heidegger applies the image to the relation of Being and its various epochal coinages. 5 There is Being only in this or that particular historical coinage (geschichtlichen Pragung): physis, logos, hen, idea, energeia, substantiality, objectivity, subjectivity, will, the will to power, the will to will. This also holds valid for the experience of the current coinage of the difference between Being and beings.... What has been said holds true above all for our own attempt to step back out of the forgetfulness of the difference as such (ID 134-5/66-7). Our thinking of das Ereignis remains within the sway of our own epoch. This is one reason there is no pure form of man-plus-Ereignis available for various transcendental or modern maneuvers of analysis and distance. But Heidegger has a kind of formalism nonetheless. He continues the above passage oy citing the ways we think about our correspondence with das Ereignis in terms of concealing andrevealing, transcendence, presence and absence, endurance. He notes that the Western era speaks through these words. Then he adds Perhaps this discussion of the difference between Being and beings in terms of perdurance (Austrag) as the approach (Vorort) of their essence brings to light something pervading which pervades the history of Being from its beginning to its completion. Yet it remains difficult to say how we should think this pervading, if it is neither a universal which is valid for all instances, nor a law guaranteeing the necessity of some dialectical process (ID 135-6/67-8). The mention of "completion" suggests the history of being here spoken of is the era of metaphysics; nothing is said directly about what happens beyond that completion in das Gestell. But taken together with Heidegger's use of categories drawn from the pre-Socratics to describe our relation to das Ereignis (as in WHD and other works), this passage does put forth a point of view we can call "formal." While there is no dialectical form of transition, nor any set of formal conditions of possibility for an epoch of Being, there is the steady belonging together approached in the ID lectures. What is together yet different yet belonging to each other is familiar: man's nature, Being, das Ereignis, presence and absence, nearness and appropriation and correspondence. Heidegger discusses these under many names. Despite his changes of terminology we recognize that structure when we hear it, and we wait for all the pieces to be produced in any given essay. There is something going on here we can legitimately call formal and transcendental. The elements which belong together have not been gleaned by an historical survey or analysis of various epochs; they are encountered as the conditions of the possibility of any epoch. They are not like Kantian formal conditions, present everywhere as rules of synthesis. Nevertheless even after ail the appropriate precautions have been taken we can make a distinction of form and content between the belonging together of the elements Heidegger discusses and any given epoch such as das Gestell.6 6 The romantic interpretation of Heidegger fastens on this species of formalism. It sees us as called to an ontological level of existence beyond the ontic content of this or that epoch, called to a dwelling with das Ereignis akin to the religious demand to dwell with God or the German Idealists' call to be one with the process of the Absolute. This is to free us from das Gestell by bringing us into a larger project and a deeper dwelling as man-in-the-history-of-Being. Perhaps we might someday be sent the pure land, granted an epoch that is transparent to das Ereignis as far as possible. Heidegger does talk of our achieving a more original dwelling with things, and he does dream at times of the return of the gods. But he does not call upon us to dwell with das Ereignis, or to identify ourselves with the formal process of man in history. Such an injunction would fall into the pit discerned by Hegel: das Ereignis by itself would be empty, form and content would remain distinct, and we would be forced to oscillate between a pure identification and a resigned acceptance of the sad world. Our situation would be that of the Stoic in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. But the problem raised by this romantic interpretation is genuine, for Heidegger does provide a kind of formalism plus a denial of any link between the form of the process and the content of any given epoch. We seem caught in between, forced to live on both levels at once. Split-level modernity seems to be our only home and modern language kindly provides a split-level house of Being, complete with meta-levels and formal balconies. Heidegger thus does seem to leave us in the situation Hegel described. We find ourselves within some formally described process of man in history, but since there is no connection with the content of our world, we live at best an ironic distance. Hegel overcomes this split by making these separations a moment within a larger movement. "Getting the form of man in history purely present" is itself the form of the whole. If we try to enforce an ultimate separation of form and content we only imprison ourselves in a past stage of spirit and refuse to dwell concretely where we already are. For all their profound differences, Heidegger's way is parallel to Hegel's here. Heidegger too avoids the separation of form and content by trying to show that in the ultimate place where we already are, such a separation is impossible. Yet for both of them, that separation is, in a sense, re-enacted and also healed by our dwelling there. It is true that, for Heidegger, there is a pattern among what belongs together: man's nature, das Ereignis, Being. The "relations" among these persist and are conditions for any epoch. But we cannot appropriate this as a "form" of the "whole" and use it to define a meta-position on the "process." It is not the right sort of form for that, and we are not the right sort of thinkers. Four considerations support this conclusion: 7 (1) To dwell in the ultimate realm means to let it and ourselves be what and where we are (WHD 18/44, 104/169).But das Ereignis recedes. Where it truly is, its own space, where we must let it be, is Vergessenheit, Entzug, withdrawal (WHL 5/9). It is present only as withdrawn and enabling; there is nothing further to make present and dwell alongside. We are with it when we receive our world as a gift or call and dwell questioningly open to the withdrawing event. Thinking the mutual belonging and mutual need of man's nature and das Ereignis is the hardest task; it cannot be thought out. Still less does this mutuality have a presentable form that will support a meta-position. (2) Like Kant, Heidegger discerns the form of the "process" from the inside. Both in his interpretation of Kant and in his own philosophy he rejects the German Idealist demand to specify a meta-position from which transcendental method is accomplished, but, unlike Kant, that form is not ours, nor the form of some subjective process. Nor, as in Hegel, is it a form of pure thought. It is not the form of anything. That is the point of the discussion or belonging together, of Identity and Difference. (3) In thinking the definite character of our correspondence with das Ereignis, Heidegger does not connect it with any drive to final unity or wholeness. the finitude of Being, of das Ereignis...is no longer thought in terms of relation to infinity, but rather as finitude in itself: finitude, end, limit, one's own -to be secure in one's own.7 The multiplicity and finitude of our correspondence with das Ereignis is not itself a way station. In Kant there is the totalizing synthesis of Reason, in Fichte the formless drive of the Ego. Even in Hegel, who rejects his predecessors on this point, the logical category of "determinate being" gives way to the dialectic of Sollen and Grenze, drive and limit.8 Heidegger wants to think' definiteness and determination, and thus form, without thinking it as the limit of some transcending that reaches beyond it. This is the break with the tradition which reaches from Plato's eros to Nietzsche's will.9 In his works of the SZ period Heidegger tries to develop a concept of transcendence that is not an example of a drive overreaching a limit. There is therefore nothing we can ride to a meta-position. (4) Earlier we saw that any epoch is complete, without structural gaps or dialectical tensions leading to a larger world. This is related to the point about limits made just above. But there is a further implication: like our world, we are complete. Our projects are within the world granted along with us. Granted along with us, not to us; we and the world are called to presence together. We have no project of receiving a world from das Ereignis. In the language of SZ, our task is to live ourselves authentically as thrown projects. Our awareness of the contingently fateful character of our epoch does not derive from experiencing our epoch as limiting a pure project of relating to das Ereignis. 8 If we read Heidegger's urgings to a deeper dwelling, for example the Memorial Address in Gelassenheit, as saying we can lift our core selves out of das Gestell into some purer relation, we will be back at the romantic impasse. It is things we are to dwell with, not das Ereignis, though we can dwell in it by our caring for what we are given, as such. Das Ereignis als Er-eignis denken, heisst, am Bau dieses in sich schwingenden Bereiches bauen. Das Bauzeug zu diesem in sicn schwebenen Bau empfängt das Denken aus der Sprache....insofern unser Wesen in die Sprache vereignet ist, wohnen wir im Ereignis. To think das Ereignis as ap-propriation means to build on the structure in this realm that resonates within itself. Thinking receives from language the building tool for this structure that floats in itself..,. Insofar as our essence is ap-propriated in language, we dwell in das Ereignis. (ID 102/38) We dwell when we are owned by what is spoken-given-revealed by language in the original sense. We build at the structure, but given Heidegger's use of bauen this also means we dwell caringly and thankfully in the home granted us. With all the overtones, the point is made that there can be no separation of form and content. Das Ereignis is not some separate happening, but is "experienced in the revealing done by language as that which allows it".10 Heidegger urges us to dwell in the ultimate realm, and what he does is study the Greeks and the poets. We have been following the spatial imagery of ID, the way that leads to the region of das Gestell and finally to the realm of das Ereignis and our correspondence with it. This imagery needs to be severely qualified. In the ultimate realm there is no place to stand. Das Ereignis is not a place but the opening of a place. The place opened is definite, with content, but there is no prior opening of a pure space to be filled with content. The move we are urged is not to some formal metaposition but into a deeper retrieve of what we are given, as given, contingent, groundless yet claiming us to build and dwell. There is room here for a kind of irony, not that of the superior viewpoint which affirms the self's elevation above it all, but the humbler irony of aware contingency and incompletion, a bit rueful and a bit amused. In Walden, Thoreau says: I love to weigh, to settle, to gravitate toward that which most strongly and rightfully attracts me; --not hang by the beams of the scale and try to weigh less, --not suppose a case but take the case that is; to travel the only path I can, and that on which no power can resist me.11 We split-level moderns try to suppose cases and weigh less; Heidegger urges us to take the case that is and increase our gravity by dwelling where we are and pondering its reception. ***** 9 Hegel's philosophy suffered a split into right and left interpretations. Heidegger, too, can be seen from the romantic right or the deconstructionist left. I have tried to argue for a centrist Heidegger against the right, but I have said nothing about the left. That is another task, except for this: there are problems with the position I have just sketched. The problems concern the success of Heidegger's attempt to enclose dialectic within phenomenology, and the difficulty of linking the history of Being with ordinary ontic history, and, above all, the task of thinking positively the new notion of form and finitude without reference to limits and infinity. When these problems are faced, they push Heidegger's ideas away from their Hegelian side and towards their Nietzschean side. At this point the left Heideggerian reading becomes more possible and attractive, and the question-worthy withdrawal of das Ereignis is reworked as the simplicity of das Gestell is rethought. Any left Heideggerian view will make use of the notion of belonging together from ID to extend the critique of formalism into the ontic region as well. Notes Hegel's ideas are presented most compactly in the Philosophy of Right. I made a fairly elaborate comparison of Hegel and Heidegger on modernity in my "Hegel and Heidegger as Critics" (The Monist, 1981, 481-499). The present essay attempts an answer to questions raised in the last sections of that article. 2. This quote from Nietzsche is discussed at length in WHD, part I. References to that work and to ID will be incorporated into the text, with the German pagination followed by the English. For Was Heisst Denken the editions used are the third German edition and the Wieck and Gray translation in paperback, for Identity andDifference the Harper paperback containing the German text and the Stambaugh translations. I have often altered the translations. 3 Whether Heidegger succeeds in so locating dialectic within phenomenology and making the call of das Gestell simple seems to me importantly questionable. This kind of transcendental move may not itself be as ultimate as Heidegger would like. 4. The reference to "das Einfache" is to the unity that holds together the various meanings of the question about thinking. I think the extension to das Gestell is warranted. 5. In his lectures at the 1978 Collegium Phenomenologicum in Perugia, Reiner Schürmann discussed this form and Heidegger's varied approaches to it. 6 "Elements" is not a good word, but I cannot find one that does not carry too much independence. "Element" has one advantage, though, the connotation of the element we move and live within, as fishes water and birds air. 7. Time and Being (Harper paperback), p. 54. 10 8. Hegel too is trying to overcome the association of determination with limit, but how he succeeds on how one interprets the concepts of good infinity and universality. He removes the drive to the infinite by making it parat of the concrete whole which is infinite in a new sense, Still, as my colleague Mark Okrent put in conversation, Hegel does this by a presence that enfolds any absence, Heidegger by an absence that allows any presence. 9. Yet both Plato and Nietzsche to some degree escape from this tradition. 10. Unterwegs zur Sprache (fifth German edition), p. 258, and On the Way to Language (Harper edition), p. 1-7. Translation quite modified. 11. Walden, "Conclusion". The excerpt is quoted by Henry Bugbee in his Inward Morning entry for July 28. references bugbee uws owtl time and bj WHD, part I. References to that work and to ID will be incorporated into the text, with the German pagination followed by the English. For Was Heisst Denken the editions used are the third German edition and the Wieck and Gray translation in paperback, for Identity and Difference the Harper paperback containing the German text and the Stanbaugh translations. I h h as c mponist phil rt sz

Como os sete sociopaths que governam China estão ganhando a guerra de mundo três e três maneiras de pará-los Michael Starks Abstrata A primeira coisa que nós devemos manter na mente é que ao dizer que China diz isto ou China faz aquele, nós não estamos falando do povo chinês, mas dos sociopaths que controlam o CCP--partido comunista chinês, isto é, os sete assassinos seriais sociopathic Senile (SSSSK) do th e Comitê ereto do CCP ou os 25 membros do Politburo etc... Os planos do CCP para WW3 e a dominação total são dispostos completamente claramente em publicações e em discursos chineses do govt e este é "sonho de China de Xi Jinping". É um sonho apenas para a pequena minoria (talvez algumas dezenas de algumas centenas) que governam a China e um pesadelo para todos os outros (incluindo 1.400.000.000 chinês). O 10.000.000.000 dólares anuais permite que eles ou seus fantoches para possuir ou controlar jornais, revistas, canais de TV e rádio e colocar notícias falsas na maioria dos grandes meios de comunicação em todos os dias. Além disso, eles têm um exército (talvez milhões de pessoas) que troll todos os meios de comunicação colocando mais propaganda e afogando-se comentário legítimo (o exército 50 Cent). Além de descascar o mundo 3RD de recursos, um grande impulso da correia de vários trilhões de dólares e estrada iniciativa está construindo bases militares em todo o mundo. Eles estão forçando o mundo livre em uma corrida de armas de alta tecnologia maciça que faz com que a guerra fria com a União Soviética olhar como um piquenique. Embora o SSSSK, eo resto dos militares do mundo, estão gastando enormes somas em hardware avançado, é altamente provável que WW3 (ou os compromissos menores que levam até ele) será dominado software. Não é fora da pergunta que o SSSSK, com provavelmente mais hackers (codificadores) que trabalham para eles então todo o descanso do mundo combinado, ganhará guerras futuras com conflito físico mínimo, apenas paralisando seus inimigos através da rede. Sem satélites, sem telefones, sem comunicações, sem transações financeiras, sem rede elétrica, sem Internet, sem armas avançadas, sem veículos, trens, navios ou aviões. Há somente dois trajetos principais a remover o CCP, liberando 1.400.000.000 prisioneiros chineses, e terminando a marcha lunática a WW3. O Pacífico é lançar uma guerra de comércio all-out para devastar a economia chinesa até que os militares começ fartos acima e carregadores para fora o CCP. Uma alternativa a encerrar a economia de China é uma guerra limitada, tal como uma batida alvejada por dizem 50 zangões termobárica no 20th Congress do CCP, quando todos os membros superiores estão em um lugar, mas aquele não ocorrerá até 2022 assim uma pode atingir a reunião plenária anual. Os chineses seriam informados, como o ataque aconteceu, que eles devem depor seus braços e se preparar para realizar uma eleição democrática ou ser nuked na idade da pedra. A outra alternativa é um ataque nuclear. A confrontação militar é inevitável dado o curso atual do CCP. Ele provavelmente vai acontecer sobre as ilhas no mar da China Meridional ou Taiwan dentro de algumas décadas, mas como eles estabelecem bases militares em todo o mundo que poderia acontecer em qualquer lugar (ver agachado tigre etc.). Os conflitos futuros terão aspectos do hardkill e do SoftKill com os objetivos declarados do CCP para emfatizar o ciberguerra cortando e paralisando sistemas de controle de todas as comunicações militares e industriais, equipamento, centrais eléctricas, satélites, Internet, bancos, e qualquer dispositivo ou veículo ligado à rede. Os SS são lentamente Fielding uma disposição mundial de superfície tripulada e autônoma e submarinos ou drones submarinos capazes de lançar armas convencionais ou nucleares que podem estar adormecidos aguardando um sinal da China ou mesmo procurando a assinatura de navios ou aviões dos EUA. Ao destruir nossos satélites, eliminando assim a comunicação entre os EUA e nossas forças em todo o mundo, eles vão usar o deles, em conjunto com drones para alvejar e destruir nossas forças navais atualmente superiores. Claro, tudo isso é cada vez mais feito automaticamente pela ia. 2 De longe o maior aliado do CCP é o partido democrático dos EUA. A escolha é parar o CCP agora ou prestar atenção enquanto estendem a prisão chinesa sobre o mundo inteiro. Claro, a vigilância universal e digitalização de nossas vidas é inevitável em todos os lugares. Qualquer um que não pensa assim está profundamente fora de contato. Claro, é o optinévoas que esperam que os sociopatas chineses para governar o mundo, enquanto os pessimistas (que vêem-se como realistas) esperam ai sociopatia (ou como eu chamá-lo-ou seja, a estupidez artificial ou sociopatia artificial ) para assumir, talvez por 2030. Os interessados em mais detalhes sobre o caminho lunático da sociedade moderna pode consultar meus outros trabalhos, como o suicídio pela democracia-um obituário para a América eo mundo 4a edição 2019 e ilusões utópicas suicidas no 21St Século: filosofia, natureza humana e o colapso da civilização 5th Ed (2019) A primeira coisa que nós devemos manter na mente é que ao dizer que China diz isto ou China faz aquele, nós não estamos falando do povo chinês, mas dos sociopaths que controlam do CCP (partido comunista chinês, isto é, os sete assassinos seriais sociopathic Senile (SSSSK) do S Comité de tanding do CCP ou dos 25 membros do Politburo. Eu assisti recentemente alguns programas de notícias esquerdistas típicos falsos (muito bonito o único tipo pode encontrar na mídia, ou seja, quase tudo agoraou seja, Yahoo, CNN, o New York Times, etc) no YouTube, um por VICE que mencionou que 1000 economistas (e 15 Prêmio Nobel vencedores) enviou uma carta para Trump dizendo-lhe que a guerra comercial foi um erro, e outro que entrevistou um economista acadêmico que disse que o movimento de Trump foi uma provocação para começar a guerra mundial 3. Eles estão certos sobre a ruptura do comércio global, mas não têm compreensão do grande quadro, que é que os sete sociopatas têm total dominação do mundo, com a eliminação da liberdade em todos os lugares, como seu objetivo, e que há apenas duas maneiras de pará-los-um total embargo de comércio que devasta a economia chinesa e conduz seus militares para forçar para fora o CCP e para prender eleições, ou WW3, que podem ser limitados (os braços convencionais com talvez alguns armas nucleares) ou o total (todas as armas nucleares de uma vez). Claro como o dia, mas todos esses acadêmicos "brilhantes" não conseguem vê-lo. Se os sociopatas não forem removidos agora, em tão pouco quanto 15 anos será tarde demais e seus descendentes lentamente mas inexoravelmente estarão sujeitos ao mesmo destino que o chinês - vigilância total com sequestro, tortura e assassinato de qualquer dissidente. Naturalmente, o CCP começou WW3 há muito tempo (você poderia ver suas invasões de Tibet ou de Coreia como o começo) e o está perseguindo em toda a maneira possível, à exceção das balas e das bombas, e virão logo. O CCP lutou os EUA em Coreia, invadiu e massacrou Tibet, e lutou escaramuças da beira com Rússia e India. Ele conduz operações de hacking massivas contra todas as bases de dados industriais e militares em todo o mundo e roubou os dados confidenciais em praticamente todos os actuais E.U. e militar Europeu e sistemas espaciais, analisou as suas fraquezas e fielded versões melhoradas dentro alguns anos. Dezenas de milhares, e talvez centenas de milhares, de funcionários CCP têm sido hackeando em bancos de dados militares, industriais, financeiros e de mídia social em todo o mundo desde os primeiros dias da rede e há centenas de hacks recentes conhecidos nos EUA sozinho. Como as principais instituições e militares têm endurecido seus firewalls, o SSSSK mudaram-se para instituições menores e para os subcontratados de defesa e para os nossos aliados, que são alvos mais fáceis. Enquanto ignora a pobreza esmagadora de centenas de milhões e a existência marginal da maioria de seus povos, construiu uma presença maciça dos militares e do espaço, que cresce cada ano, e cuja a única razão para a existência está travando a guerra para eliminar a liberdade em toda parte. Além de descascar o mundo 3RD de recursos, um grande impulso da correia de váriostrilhões de dólares e da iniciativa rodoviária é construir bases militares em todo o mundo. Eles estão forçando o mundo livre em uma corrida de armas de alta tecnologia maciça que faz com que a guerra fria com a União Soviética olhar como um piquenique. Os russos não são estúpidos, e apesar de fingir amizade com os sociopatas, eles certamente compreender que o CCP vai comê-los vivos, que a sua única esperança é aliar-se com o Ocidente, e Trump está certo sobre o dinheiro em amizade Putin. Naturalmente, os fascistas Neomarxist do terceiro mundo Supremacist(isto é, o partido democrático) tomarão provavelmente o controle total dos EUA em 2020 e nada poderia ser mais ao gosto do CCP. Snowden (outro clueless vinte algo) ajudou o SSSSK mais do que qualquer outro indivíduo único, com a possível excepção de todos os presidentes americanos desde WW2, que têm perseguido a política suicida de apaziguamento. Os EUA não tem escolha, mas para monitorar todas as comunicações e para compilar um dossiê sobre 3 todos, como é essencial não só para controlar os criminosos e terroristas, mas para contrariar o SSSSK, que estão rapidamente fazendo a mesma coisa, com a intenção de remover a liberdade Completamente. Embora o SSSSK, eo resto dos militares do mundo, estão gastando enormes somas em hardware avançado, é altamente provável que WW3 (ou os compromissos menores que levam até ele) será dominado software. Não é fora da pergunta que o SSSSK, com provavelmente mais hackers (codificadores) que trabalham para eles então todo o descanso do mundo combinado, ganhará guerras futuras com conflito físico mínimo, apenas paralisando seus inimigos através da rede. Sem satélites, sem telefones, sem comunicações, sem transações financeiras, sem rede elétrica, sem Internet, sem armas avançadas, sem veículos, trens, navios ou aviões. Alguns podem questionar que o CCP (e naturalmente os níveis superiores da polícia, do exército e do escritório 610) são realmente mentalmente aberrante, assim que aqui são algumas das características comuns de sociopaths (chamados anteriormente psicopatas) que você pode encontrar na rede. Claro, alguns destes são compartilhados por muitos autistas e alexithymics, e sociopatas diferem de pessoas "normais" apenas em grau. Charme superficial, manipulativa e astúcia, grandiosa sensação de auto, falta de remorso, vergonha ou culpa, emoções rasas, incapacidade para o amor, calosidade/falta de empatia, controles comportamentais pobres/natureza impulsiva, acredite que eles são todos-poderosos, todos sabendo , com direito a todos os desejos, sem senso de limites pessoais, sem preocupação com o seu impacto sobre os outros. Problemas em fazer e manter amigos. Comportamentos aberrantes como crueldade com pessoas ou animais, roubo, Promissidade, versatilidade criminal ou empreendedora, alterar sua imagem conforme necessário, não percebem que nada está errado com eles, autoritário, secretivo, paranóico, procurar situações onde seu comportamento tirânico será tolerado, condoned, ou admirado (por exemplo, CCP, polícia, militar, capitalismo predatório), aparência convencional, objetivo da escravização de suas vítimas, procure exercitar o controle despótico sobre cada aspecto da vida de outros, Ter uma necessidade emocional para justificar suas ações e, portanto, necessidade de afirmação de sua vítima (respeito, gratidão), objetivo final é a criação de uma vítima disposta.Incapaz de apego humano real a outro, incapaz de sentir remorso ou culpa, narcisismo extremo e grandiosidade, seu objetivo é governar o mundo. Mentirosos patológicos. Este último é uma das características as mais impressionantes do CCP. Praticamente tudo o que dizem em oposição aos outros é uma mentira óbvia, ou distorção, principalmente tão absurdo que qualquer bemeducado de dez anos deidade vai rir deles. No entanto, eles persistem em saturar todos os meios de comunicação todos os dias (umn estimado $10000000000 orçamento anual apenas para a propaganda estrangeira) com declarações absurdas. O fato de que eles estão tão fora de contato com a realidade que eles pensam que serão levados a sério mostra claramente o que qualquer pessoa racional vai considerar como doença mental (sociopatia). Há somente dois trajetos principais a remover o CCP, liberando 1.400.000.000 prisioneiros chineses, e terminando a marcha lunática a WW3. O Pacífico é lançar uma guerra de comércio all-out para devastar a economia chinesa até que os militares começ fartos acima e carregadores para fora o CCP. Os EUA precisam, por qualquer meio necessário, juntar-se a todos os seus aliados na redução do comércio com a China para perto de zero-nenhuma importação de qualquer produto da China ou qualquer entidade com mais que 10% Propriedade chinesa em qualquer lugar do mundo, incluindo qualquer produto com qualquer componente de tal Origem. Nenhuma exportação de qualquer coisa para a China ou qualquer entidade que reexporta para a China ou que tem mais de 10% de propriedade chinesa, com consequências severas e imediatas para qualquer infratores. Sim, seria temporariamente custar milhões de empregos e uma grande recessão mundial, e sim, eu sei que uma grande parte de suas exportações são de joint ventures com empresas americanas, mas a alternativa é que cada país se tornará o cão dos sete sociopatas (e como todo o animal comestível mantêm cães em gaiolas pequenas quando os engordar para a matança) e/ou experimentam os horrores de WW3. Outras etapas possíveis são enviar para casa todos os estudantes e trabalhadores chineses na ciência e na tecnologia, congelam todos os bens de toda a entidade mais de 10% chineses possuídos, proíbem o curso extrangeiro a todo o cidadão chinês, proíbem todo o chinês ou qualquer entidade mais de 10% possuído pelo chinês de 4 comprando qualquer empresa, terra, produto ou tecnologia dos EUA ou de qualquer de seus aliados. Todas estas medidas serão progressivamente eliminadas, consoante o caso. Devemos ter em mente que o monstro chinês é em grande parte devido aos delírios utópicos suicidas, covardia e estupidez de nossos políticos. Truman se recusou a deixar McArthur Nuke-los na Coréia, o Presidente Carter deu-lhes o direito de enviar os alunos para os EUA (há atualmente cerca de 300.000), usar a nossa propriedade intelectual sem pagar royalties, deu-lhes o status de negociação nação mais favorecida, e por Decreto cancelou o nosso reconhecimento de Taiwan e nosso acordo de defesa mútua (ou seja, sem voto por ninguém – ele deve ser um membro da CCP honorário, juntamente com os arbustos, os Obamas, os Clintons, Edward Snowden, etc.). Estes foram os primeiros de uma longa série de gestos conciliatórios à ditadura mais cruel do mundo, que tornou possível para eles prosperar, e definir o palco para a sua vinda invasão de Taiwan, as ilhas do mar do Sul e outros países como quiserem. Estas medidas junto com nossa falha invadir nos 40 ' s para impedir seu Takeover de China, nossa falha para nuke seu exército e daqui o CCP fora da existência durante a guerra Korean, nossa falha impedir seu massacre de Tibet, nossa falha fazer qualquer coisa quando expl Oded suas primeiras armas nucleares, a nossa incapacidade de tirá-los em 1966, quando lançou o seu primeiro nuclear ICBM capaz, a nossa (ou melhor, Bush) não fazer nada sobre o massacre de Tiananmen, a nossa incapacidade de encerrar os institutos Confúcio presente em muitos universidades em todo o mundo, que são frentes para o CCP, a nossa incapacidade de proibir a compra de empresas, propriedade, direitos de mineração, etc em todo o mundo, que é uma outra maneira de adquirir alta tecnologia e outros ativos vitais, a nossa incapacidade de fazer nada ao longo dos últimos 20 anos sobre a sua espionagem industrial e militar contínua e invadir nossas bases de dados roubando quase todas as nossas armas avançadas, a nossa incapacidade de parar seus aliados Coréia do Norte e Paquistão de desenvolver bombas nucleares e ICBM e recebendo equipamentos da China (por exemplo, seu celular lançadores de mísseis, que eles alegam que eram para transportar toras e foi pura coincidência que exatamente se encaixam os mísseis coreanos), a nossa incapacidade de impedi-los de violar o nosso embargo ao petróleo do Irã (eles compram muito dele, registrando seus navios no Irã), e seu programa nuclear (equipamentos e técnicos ir e voltar para a Coréia do Norte através da China), a nossa incapacidade de impedilos de fornecer tecnologia militar e armas em todo o mundo (por exemplo, Coréia do Sul, Irã, Paquistão, os cartéis no México, e mais de 30 outros países), a nossa incapacidade de parar o fluxo de drogas perigosas e seus precursores direta ou indiretamente (por exemplo, quase todo o Fentanyl e carfentanyl emitido no mundo inteiro, e os precursores do meth para os cartéis mexicanos vêm de China), e nossa falha fazer qualquer coisa sobre seu edifício " portos "(i.e., bases militares) em todo o mundo, que está em curso. Uma alternativa a encerrar a economia de China é uma guerra limitada, tal como uma batida alvejada por dizem 50 zangões termobárica no 20th Congress do CCP, quando todos os membros superiores estão em um lugar, mas aquele não ocorrerá até 2022 assim uma pode atingir a reunião plenária anual. Os chineses seriam informados, como o ataque aconteceu, que eles devem depor seus braços e se preparar para realizar uma eleição democrática ou ser nuked na idade da pedra. A outra alternativa é um ataque nuclear. A confrontação militar é inevitável dado o curso atual do CCP. Ele provavelmente vai acontecer sobre as ilhas no mar da China Meridional ou Taiwan dentro de algumas décadas, mas como eles estabelecem bases militares em todo o mundo que poderia acontecer em qualquer lugar (ver agachado tigre etc.). Os conflitos futuros terão aspectos de hardkill e de SoftKill com os objetivos declarados do CCP para enfatizar o ciberguerra cortando e paralisando sistemas de controle de todas as comunicações militares e industriais, equipamento, centrais eléctricas, satélites, Internet, bancos e qualquer dispositivo ou veículo ligado à rede. Os SS são lentamente Fielding uma disposição mundial de superfície tripulada e autônoma e submarinos ou drones submarinos capazes de lançar armas convencionais ou nucleares que podem estar adormecidos aguardando um sinal da China ou mesmo procurando a assinatura de navios ou aviões dos EUA. Ao destruir nossos satélites, eliminando assim a comunicação entre os EUA e nossas forças em todo o mundo, eles vão usar o deles, em conjunto com drones para alvejar e destruir nossas forças navais atualmente superiores. Talvez o pior de tudo é o rápido desenvolvimento de robôs e drones de todos os tamanhos e capacidades que inevitavelmente serão empregadas por criminosos e terroristas para atuar a partir de qualquer lugar do mundo, e enxames maciços dos quais serão usados por ou em vez de soldados para lutar guerras cada vez mais numerosas e viciosas. Claro, tudo isso é cada vez mais feito automaticamente pela ia. Tudo isso é totalmente óbvio para qualquer um que gasta um pouco de tempo na rede. Duas das melhores fontes para começar são o livro Crouching Tiger (e os cinco vídeos YoutUbe com o mesmo nome), e a longa série de peças satíricas curtas na China canal sem censura em vocêTUbe ou seu novo www.chinauncensored.tv. os planos do CCP para o WW3 e a dominação total são dispostos completamente claramente em publicações e em discursos chineses do govt e este é "sonho de China de Xi Jinping". É um sonho somente para a minoria minúscula (talvez algumas dúzias a algumas cem) que governam China e um pesadelo para todos mais (que incluem 1.400.000.000 chineses). O 10.000.000.000 dólares anuais permite que eles ou seus fantoches para possuir ou controlar jornais, revistas, canais de TV e rádio e colocar notícias falsas na maioria dos grandes meios de comunicação em todos os dias. Além disso, eles têm um exército (talvez milhões de pessoas) que troll todos os meios de comunicação 5 colocando mais propaganda e afogando-se comentário legítimo (o 50 Cent exército). A regra do SSSSK (ou 25 SSSK se você se concentrar no Politburo ao invés de seu comitê permanente) é uma tragicomédia surrealista como branca de neve e os sete anões, mas sem branca de neve, personalidades cativantes, ou um final feliz. Eles são os guardas da maior prisão do mundo, mas eles são de longe os piores criminosos, cometendo por procuração a cada ano milhões de assaltos, estupor, roubos, subornos, sequestros, torturas e assassinatos, a maioria deles presumivelmente por sua própria polícia secreta do 610 Office criado em 10 de junho de 1999 por Jiang Zemin para perseguir os meditadores Qigong de Falun Gong, e qualquer outra pessoa considerada uma ameaça, agora incluindo qualquer um que faz qualquer comentário crítico e incluindo todos os grupos religiosos e políticos não a sua regra direta. De longe, o maior aliado dos sete anões é o partido democrático dos EUA, que, em um momento em que a América precisa mais do que nunca para ser forte e unida, está fazendo todo o possível para dividir a América em facções em guerra com cada vez mais de seus recursos vai sustentar as legiões florescendo das classes inferiores e conduzi-lo em falência, embora, naturalmente, eles não têm nenhuma visão sobre isso. O CCP é de longe o grupo mais mal na história do mundo, roubando, estuprando, sequestrando, aprisionando, torturando, morrendo de fome e matando mais pessoas que todos os outros ditadores na história (um estimado 100 milhões mortos), e em poucos anos terá um total Estado de vigilância gravando todas as ações de todos na China, que já está em expansão em todo o mundo como eles incluem dados de hacking e de todos os que passam através de territórios seu controle, comprar bilhetes em companhias aéreas chinesas etc. Embora o SSSSK nos trate como um inimigo, na verdade, os EUA é o maior amigo do povo chinês e do CCP seu maior inimigo. De outra perspectiva, outros chineses são os maiores inimigos do chinês, como eles demolir todos os recursos do mundo. Naturalmente, alguns dizem que China desmoronará de seu próprio acordo, e é possível, mas o preço de estar errado é o fim da liberdade e WW3 ou uma série longa dos conflitos que os sete sociopaths ganharão quase certamente. Deve-se ter em mente que eles têm controles sobre sua população e armas que Stalin, Hitler, Gaddafi e Idi Amin nunca sonhou. Câmeras de CCTV (atualmente talvez 300 milhões e aumentando rapidamente) em redes de alta velocidade com análise de imagem AI, software de rastreamento em cada telefone que as pessoas são obrigados a usar, e rastreadores GPS em todos os veículos, todas as transações a pagar apenas por telefone já dominante lá e universal e obrigatório em breve, total de monitoramento automático de todas as comunicações por AI e um estimado 2 milhões censores humanos on-line. Além de milhões de policiais e Cadres do exército, pode haver tantos como 10 milhões a polícia secreta de 610 escritório criado por Jiang Zemin, com prisões negras (ou seja, não oficial e não marcado), atualização instantânea do dossiê digital em todos os 1.400.000.000 chinês e em breve todos na terra que usa a rede ou telefones. É muitas vezes chamado de sistema de crédito social e permite que os sociopatas para encerrar as comunicações, a capacidade de compra, viagens, contas bancárias, etc de qualquer um. Isso não é fantasia, mas já em grande parte implementado para os muçulmanos de Xinjiang e se espalhando rapidamente-See YouTUbe, China sem censura etc. É claro que a vigilância universal e a digitalização de nossas vidas são inevitáveis em todos os lugares. Qualquer um que não pensa assim está profundamente fora de contato. A escolha é parar o CCP agora ou prestar atenção enquanto estendem a prisão chinesa sobre o mundo inteiro. O aliado o mais grande do CCP é o partido democrático dos EUA. Naturalmente, é os otimistas que esperam os sociopatas chineses governar o mundo quando os pessimistas (que vêem-se como realistas) esperam a sociopatia do ai (ou como eu o chamo-isto é, estupidez artificial ou sociopatia artificial) para tomar sobre. É a opinião de muitas pessoas pensativas-musk, Gates, Hawking etc, incluindo os principais pesquisadores de ia (ver as muitas conversas TED no YouTube) que a ia vai atingir o crescimento explosivo auto (aumentando seu poder milhares ou milhões de vezes em dias, minutos ou microssegundos) em algum momento nas próximas décadas – 2030 às vezes é mencionado, escapando através da rede e infectando todos os computadores suficientemente poderosos. AS será imparável, especialmente porque parece que ele será executado em computadores quânticos que irá aumentar a sua velocidade mais milhares ou milhões de vezes). Se você é optimista, manterá seres humanos e outros animais ao redor como animais de estimação e o mundo transformar-se-á um jardim zoológico com um programa de melhoramento cativo eugênica, se um pessimista, eliminará seres humanos ou mesmo toda a vida orgânica como uma competição irritante para recursos. A ficção 6 científica de hoje é susceptível de ser a realidade de amanhã.

QIKJS-Part.IV.I Qualitative Inquiry of Korean Judicial System Kiyoung Kim Professor of Law and Public Policy Dept. of Law, Chosun University Gawng-ju South Korea The Qualitative Research and Conceptual Framework In the qualitative approach, the conceptual framework can be used to meet the challenges arising through various stages of research operation. Its use could change to meet the emerging need for the researchers, who have to conduct a reiterative journey for the data collection and analysis, through a write-up. Therefore, it can help to frame a thought of researchers with the ideas, terms, concepts through paragraphs and chapters, but is not necessarily pre-orderly that can be modified and revised with the progress and to the end. Since the theory is constantly referred for and interconnected with the substance and content, it generally defines the magnitude and directions to structure the content cohesively and with a scholarly focus and balance dealing with the variables. In this understanding of theory for the qualitative studies, the researchers may not prefer to borrow the theory as a whole, instead work on the conceptual framework, and can begin even without a theory, as well as construct his own to explicate, discuss, argue and suggest. As in my case, this trait will be denser when the researcher plans on the GT approach since it finally can aim to develop a theory for the better understanding of research object. The PAKJS and Conceptual Framework A conceptual framework to deal with the PAKJS (public administration of Korean judicial system) has been developed with the in-depth interviews and heuristics or hermeneutics of texts and public documentations. The framework has triple pillars of structure and can be developed into a mosaic of connections and relationships to construct the stories, themes, politics, ideals and values, and alternatives (Kim, 2014a,b; 2015a,b). The three pillars encompass various concepts from the discipline of PPA, major phenomena or themes to be explored, as well as the some diagnosis to conclude on the phenotype and policy side implications of PAKJS. At this stage, the preliminary survey was conducted with 15 law professors and attorneys, who were asked to list the major problems and events relating with PAKJS. A focus group was readily arranged for one and half hour lunch meeting that helped to reinforce the initial findings earned by the preliminary survey. Over time, my critical 2 reading was practiced extensively on the Korean texts, articles, conference materials, which amount at hundreds of pieces considered as exhaustive to guarantee the validity and credibility of my research. Since both data and sources are in Korean version, the translation has to be authenticated to verify the narratives as well as my understanding and interpretations. Hence the general standard of data analysis techniques had been applied, and two sophisticated ways of processing the literature of basically foreign sources are to be expected to restore a rich and dense information to construct the better picture of PAKJS. The use of NVivo was very helpful with the frequencies of words and other meaningful statistics that develop to determine the key concepts, their relationships and interconnections. Although the sources to gather information for the content of dissertation are massively available with the Korean version, the tools of analysis and elements of PPA will be indebted to the work of scholars, say, mostly those of English speaking countries, France, Germany and so. The concepts from the framework I are necessary to delineate the policy side analysis of PAKJS, which are denoted as the elements of PPA. 1. Philosophy or political and social morality is generally foundational to discuss the agendas and issues arising as a matter of public policy. This concept is not only useful, but can finely replicate with the historical realism in addressing the characteristic of PAKJS. 2. Agenda setting or PET theory seems to be a reincarnation of allegedly moral consensus that generally will be determined at the practical level and underlying power relations. 3. For understanding of the policy side PAKJS, we have to borrow the traditional concept of public policy that will distinct of three forms of policy network, say, formal institution, subsystem or policy actors and judicial actors. The judicial actors had been neglected, but an increasing awareness of their importance had been verified over the contemporary policy research. The importance of judicial actors can be reinstated with two rationales. First, the research topic of mine is concerned of PAKJS, in which the judicial actors themselves are a principal player to shape the public policy of Korean judicial system. I have defined it as the role of judicial actors a priori. Second, the judicial actors often exercise a decisive power to determine many areas of public policy. For example, any rigorous policy to sanction the violation of monopoly act by large companies may be frustrated with the judges of liberal advocacies or apprehended with the value of Wall Street. The issues and controversies on PAKJS itself also disclose this kind of power relations that was historically evidenced. For example, the law school reform is being disputed in the constitutional court to argue on its unconstitutionality. The intractable issues of society can be remedied at one event of constitutional adjudication that can be a important refreshment for the policy actors. This also does not mean that the judiciary is absolute, but the practice affirms its final authority and oversight role within the separation of powers principle. 3 4. Substantially, various concepts to deal with the question of policy diffusion had made a focus on the policy actors, in which learning, imitation, coercion and so would be an important factor to facilitate or retard the policy diffusion. 5. The concepts enable to delineate a dynamic understanding of policy process, which are input, throughput, and output and prompt to apply to PAKJS. In this case, input has a special meaning that the policy area of judicial system is generally dominated in reliance on the professional knowledge and monopolized systemically by the state endorsement of their qualification. The aspect of throughput was given a focus on the KBA's grading policy for the bench and public prosecutors, which bears an implication to ensure the democratic value of judicial power. My focus on these concepts can be singled out based on the presurvey and focus group meetings, for example. An output has been analyzed and made into the story and themes as involved with a contentious progress toward the globalization and liberalization of legal service market. This focus also was decided on the preliminary investigation that was developed into my conceptual framework. The conceptual framework II will be informed by the stories and themes that had been identified and interpreted on the text of Korean sources including articles, books, public documents, other forms of scholarly materials and artifacts, as well as documentaries of TV and columns of newspaper. The concepts or even theories will be derived from the authorities of Korean political and legal scientists, in which we can identify four major sections of historic transformation pertaining to the PAKJS. I consider that these sections will comprise the chapter titles of my dissertation, in which we can delineate (i) the draft of 1948 constitution and ideological chaos of Korean people (ii) charismatic leadership with classic ethos (iii) charismatic leadership with the haunt and control for the national development, (iv) civilian government, globalization and liberal market (v) continuing theme of bureaucratic pathology and political regionalism. The conceptual framework III will be reflexive to characterize the phenotype of Korean judicial system and policy side findings in the grand perspective of social science disciplines. Table The Conceptual Framework and Draft Chapters 4 The Roles of Theory and Its Use for my Research 5 "The poor get poorer, and the rich get richer" is a usual phrase to describe the legal service market nowadays. This phenomenon charted through the turbulence years of globalization and international commitment to the level playing field is quite a symptom that affects the traditional notion of prestige and economic well being with the privilege of attorney qualification. One job portals of Korea reported the trend of legal market, "the legal profession is hoped by college graduates as one of best job in the nation...many hopefuls take the Judicial Exam or apply for the law schools...nevertheless, the lawyers will be pushed forward to respond with the harsh conditions of changing paradigm within the market, and will hardly survive without a competitiveness." The report highlighted an increasing number of lawyers as a primary cause of intense competition among the lawyers. It introduced the statistical data compiled by the Korean occupational information agency (KOIA); (i) 60 percents increase in number had been identified from 2008 through 2013 (14,242) (ii) the national quota of law school graduates are 2,000 at ceiling and 75 percents of passage rate plays as a leverage to regulate an excessive provision (iii) the growth of lawyers in number will continue with the termination of Judicial Exam in 2017. The report attempted to provide a solution by citing one law professor of Kwang-un university suggesting two alternatives, (i) development of expertise for diverse legal issues (ii) organizing their work arrangement into the law firm rather than risky solo practice (iii) technological exposure to big data for the expert system now in prevalence within Europe and US. For example, the report stressed that the lawyers could not compete any more without a specialty developed through his career years beyond the general area of legal service, such as civil and criminal disputes. It related the opinion of KOIA about the need of expanding the area of legal practice, such as merge and acquisition, fair trade and anti-competition law, corporate counseling, bankruptcy, international trade, foreign investment, corporate finance, security law, patent, intellectual property, product liability, information technology, maritime law and on. The most important roles of theory in my qualitative studies is that it is presumed to analyze the field data collected from the interviews and examination of public documents.1The analysis of data and interpretation will be conducted by employing the concepts and theories relevant to my research purpose. The concept of meta-capital and habitus from Bourdieu's socio-economic theory, for instance, will be presumed to evaluate information gleaned from 1 Maxwell illustrated an example of using the theory, "..... he used three broad theories of the social organization and control of work... He showed how all three theories provide insight into the day-to-day work of the group he studied, and he drew far-ranging implications for public policy from his results....he also used existing theory in a more focused (and unexpected) way to illuminate the results of his research. ...He presented striking similarities between the medical practice he studied and the French peer group structure identified by Pitts. He coined the phrase, "professional delinquent community" to refer to professional groups such as the one he described, and used Pitts's theory to illuminate the process by which this sort of community develops and persists (pp.50-51)." 6 the field data. The lawyers, notwithstanding the senior and new class, now have a common perception; the legal professions are no longer a privileged status insulated from the rules of liberal market, meaning that the kind of habitus had already formed and continues to be inculcated through their self-reflexivity and recurrent experience within the work community. The policy makers interested and empowered to deal with the challenge of different voices also need to have an awareness that they are knowledgeable to respond with the challenge. As the Weber expounds, bureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination through knowledge, and its best practice arises from the rational-legal authority.2 On the other, the economist, such as Mises, provided a powerful view that the bureaucracy should be universally opposed and noticed that even progressives would not buy such institution. The policy area of judicial institution needs to be differentiated in terms of identifying the policy makers and its addresses. The group of lawyers is not just a group of lobbyists or policy addresses, but importantly involves in the shaping of PAKJS. The senior judges and prosecution officers also do not disregard the voice of lawyers that the profession often is their future occupation in Korea. The policy network generally tends to be communicated by the enclaves of judicial background through the Blue House, judicial committee of KNA, DOJ, and Supreme Court, in which the KBA (Korean Bar Association) plays a distinct role as a quasi-government. The KBA can have same attribute with the civic pressure group devoted to the judicial monitoring, but 2 The term is French in origin combining bureau and rule of political power. It was coined by the French economist Goruney in the mid-18th century and found in his letter, "...which bids fair to play havoc with us; this illness is called bureaumania." It was described as a forth or fifth government under the heading of bureaucracy. The notion of Weber is second of hard nuance to Mills' terms in nature and over history. J. Mills perceived it as a distinct form of government, hence most hard that can be separable from the representative democracy. He interlinked it as an essence of monarchies. This can be interpreted to corroborate even the contemporary practice of constitutional monarchy in Britain, in which the House of Lords actually would be a supreme court of nation. A fusion between the legislative and judiciary in Britain simply implies that the government would be a prototype relating more conceptually with the attribute of bureaucracy than representative democracy. The popular understanding of government nowadays in terms of separation of powers principle and representative democracy, is therefore, related with the public learning and education, which is an essential concept within the discipline of PPA. Karl Marx, another German philosopher, also agreed in his work on the Hegel's philosophy, so that it plays the role of public administration. He juxtaposed it with the corporations in the private society, which are symbiotic as a counterpart for the econo-political aims and structure of exploitation. This notion is moderated in one sense given it is not purely of political power or staticism, but more radical or ideological with the working class revolution. This understanding is proximate with the belief of Wilson that it would be one distinct notion of government and linked with the public administration. A difference arises from the hierarchy of superstructure that the US community is disposed historically and in practice with the constitutional supremacy, in which the liberty and wealth are protected that cannot arbitrarily be violable by the power of government. In this sense, the discourse of Wilson can have a same theme and passion to be compatible with Weber's, in which the rational-legal authority has a centerpiece of concept and ethics so that a loyalty to the government or professional competence is essentially stranded. The understanding of bureaucracy also can be from a sociological elaboration by Merton, in which he perceived in terms of players and as one of cultural group – partly borne with my approach to investigate PAKJS. 7 officially be recognized as one of participants in shaping the contentious policies.3 Then we need to surmise how the lawyers shall perceive and interact with the reform of legal service market. We may provide the extreme lens of analysis, perhaps close to the thought line of Marxists or antagonists of neo-liberalization, if the expansion of liberal market may be the kind of conspiracy or plot of major governments that shall be opposed. We can also borrow the approach of epistemological construction through the power relation, politics, ideals, values with the notion of self-government or construction of identity– perhaps Faucauldian. The lawyers in Korea also can seek an alternative for the use of law firms or expansion of expertise by creating a potential clientele. These alternatives may be related with the theories of public administration, say, some conceptual ingredient including learning, participation, communication, network and organizations or division of labor and professional ethics. In this way, the theories contribute to the analysis of field data and ontological discourse of PAKJS. References Kim, Kiyoung, Human Rights: Are They Just a Tweak for the Policy Makers or Administrators? (March 3, 2015a). European Academic Research, Vol. II, Issue 6, September 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2572951 Kim, Kiyoung, The Constitution and Tripartite System of Government: From the Mutiny for the Limited Government Through the Interbranch Subtlety. (September 1, 2014). International Journal of Advanced Research (2014a), Volume 2, Issue 9, 392-401. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2574711 Kim, Kiyoung, Theories and Tenets: An Impalpable Troll for the Policy Makers, Research Officers and Administrators? (March 4, 2015b). International Journal of Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies (IJIMS), 2014, Vol 1, No. 8, 30-50.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2573526 Kim, Kiyoung, The Separation of Powers Principle: Is it a Lynchpin or Pushpin for the Voyage of American Public? (August 1, 2014b). International Journal of Advanced Research (2014), Volume 2, Issue 8, 887-895. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2573560 3 Most of all, the KBA is a principal partner to approve and oversee the government-endorsed law schools that will probably be a unique ground to qualify the attorneys. It also enjoys representation in the process of nominating the candidates for the post of Supreme Court justices. On the while, the KBO maintains the grading system for the bench and expanded its ambit reaching out to the public prosecutors, which can affect their promotion and tenure.

Before Beyond Function Saturday, August 8, 2009 9:55:14 AM US/Pacific http://www.dkolb.org/arch.urb/bbfunction.html Page 1 Before Beyond Function David Kolb Bates College Architecture was not a field Hegel had studied widely. Perhaps as a result, his treatment of architecture in his Lectures on Aesthetics does not attempt the historical thoroughness of his discussions of literature and painting. He relies heavily on a few sources and then restricts his chosen examples even further. One major source for Hegel's treatment of architecture was the work of his elder Berlin colleague Alois Hirt, who had written widely on ancient architecture. For the most part, Hirt's work is historical narrative, trying to produce a sense of the life (lebendiges Bild) of the ancient buildings. But Hirt also seeks to discover laws (Gesetzen Grundsatze Formen Einrichtungen) that lie behind the form of each type of ancient building. As the overall law that underlies ancient architecture, Hirt proposes: Ihre Formen, ihre Verhältnisse, ihre Neben und Uebereinanderstellungen der Theile gehen immer auf das Zweckmässige. Das Bequemliche und Wohlgefällige ist immer der Ergebnis der einfachsten Mittel. Selbst das Grösste und Prachvollste folgte derselben Regel. (Hirt 3, vi) Its forms, its relations, its placement of parts near and above one another always aim at what is appropriate to a goal. The comfortable and the agreeable are always the result of the simplest means. Even the greatest and most magnificent followed the same rule. Here, Hirt sounds like a nineteenth century modernist espousing functionalism. However, as Joseph Rykwert has shown, this kind of discussion of ancient architecture in terms of its function already had a long history by Hirt's time. What is unusual is not that Hirt should say such things but that Hegel should disagree with them. External Function Hegel's discussion of architectural function is complex and nuanced. Hegel describes architecture's difference from related arts in terms of the externality of function in the architectural work. Further, his three stages of architecture are organized around their relation to function: symbolic architecture comes before any posited separation of function and means, classical architecture achieves a perfect balance of the two, and romantic architecture goes beyond the dominance of function. die Architektur . . . ist die Kunst am Äusserlichen. . . so dass hier die wesentlichen Unterschiede darin bestehen, ob dies Äusserliche an sich selbst seine Bedeutung erhält oder als Mittel behandelt wird für einen ihm anderen Zweck oder sich in dieser Dienstbarkeit zugleich als selbständig zeigt. (A 14.271/2.634) Architecture . . . is the art of externality, so that here the essential differences depend on whether this external object has its meaning within itself or whether, treated as a means, it subserves an end other than itself, or whether in this subservience it appears at the same time as independent. Function remains external in architecture: what architecture builds with has no inner purpose of its own. Architecture deals with the external as such, nature on the level of purposeless exterior other. Architecture shapes this into a purposive world around us. But those purposes remain external to the building. Stones and bricks are not part of an organism with an inner guiding form that expresses itself in their being and actions. Given this general characterization, however, the relation of purpose and built form varies in the different stages of architecture. The Stages of Architecture and Function Hegel's overall treatment of art is arranged according to his necessary logical sequence universal particular individual. He first discusses the universal ideal of art in general (der noch unentwickelten Einheit seiner Grundbestimmungen). Then he discusses the ways in which that ideal particularizes itself into forms of art, the symbolic, classical, and romantic (entfaltete sich . . . in sich selbst zu einer Totalität von Kunstformen,). Finally he discuss the individual arts and actual individual works of art embodying and realizing the general ideal of art and its particularizations. (das Kunstwerk wahrhaft konkret, ein zugleich reales, in sich abgeschlossenes, einzelnes Individuum). (A 14.245)) In his treatment of the individual arts and works of art, Hegel is confronting their actual existence, not their notional essences. Nonetheless, he is still interested in finding necessary relations. Philosophy does not just catalog the empirical; it is always on the lookout for content which stands firm on its own. For example, in the course of treating some puzzling forms of symbolic art Hegel remarks: Im allgemeinen geht es damit im Ästhetischen wie mit gewissen Tierklassen oder sonstigen Naturvorkommenheiten in den Naturwissenschaften. In beiden Gebieten liegt die Schwierigkeit darin, dass es der Begriff der Natur und Kunst selber Before Beyond Function Saturday, August 8, 2009 9:55:14 AM US/Pacific http://www.dkolb.org/arch.urb/bbfunction.html Page 2 ist, der sich einteilt und seine Unterschiede setzt. Als die Unterschiede des Begriffs sind dies nun auch die warhaft begriffsmässigen und deshalb zu begreifenden Unterschiede. . . . Die wahre Einteilung aber darf nur aus dem wahren Begriff hervorgehen, und zwitterhafte Gebilde können nur da ihren Platz finden, wo die eigentlichen, für sich feststehenden Formen anfangen, sich aufzulösen und in andere übergehen. (A 13.491/1.382) In general, therefore, it is the same in aesthetics as it is in the natural sciences with certain classes of animals or other natural phenomena. In both spheres the difficulty lies in the fact that it is the very concept of nature and art which partitions itself and posits its differentiations. As the differentiations of the concept, they are now the differentiations which are truly adequate to the concept, and therefore conceivable. . . . The true classification, however, may proceed only out of the true concept, and hybrid productions can only find their place where the proper explicitly stable forms begin to dissolve and pass over into others. In his aesthetics Hegel is concerned to examine the individual arts with a view to their necessary and essential features. Hegel wants more than insightful arrangement of historical material; he is out to find some necessity that will be normative. This normativity can be seen at work in his remarks against various kinds of excess in architecture, which we will discuss later. Given Hegel's systematic goals, his discussion of necessary structure will be carried out by tracing divisions and transitions implicit in the categories of art, and connecting these with spatial and temporal diversity and development. In Hegel's treatment many different notional and historical developments are going on at once: €the development of the concept of art and its Ideal €the development of each of the three particular kinds of art €the development of the different arts in relation to one another €the development of the actual arts as they appear over time. €the development within each art, and within each stage of that art These sequences do not always proceed neatly in step, nor do they follow the same logical transitions. Symbolic Architecture: Immediate Function The beginning of architecture is the production of works that while they have been mediated by human creative activity, have a content and mode of signification that remains in a kind of unmediated immediacy. On this level, not only are ends and means not separated, but architecture and sculpture are not clearly distinct. (A 14.268) Hegel says, speaking of the relation of the first stage, symbolic architecture, to its function, that such architectural works will für sich selbständig dastehen und ihre Bedeutung nicht in einem anderen Zweck und Bedürfnis, sondern in sich selber tragen. (A 14.269/2.632) stand there independently in themselves [and] carry their meaning in themselves and not in some external aim and need. He writes something similar about the third stage, romantic architecture. That type of architecture vereinigt beide Momente und erscheint daher innerhalb dieser Trennung zugleich als für sich selbständig. . . . gleichsam unbekümmert um diesen Zweck, für sich selbständig gestalten und erheben. (A 14.270/2.635f) unites both factors [goals and means] and therefore appears within this cleavage as independent at the same time. . . . undisturbed, as it were, by this purpose . . . framed and erected on their own account and independently. This means that of the three stages of architecture, only the second, classical architecture, contains a balanced distinction of ends and means, with a clear and formally dominant external purpose. But Hegel tells us that having an external purpose is part of the essence of architecture. (Should we then say that there is something non-architectural about the beginning, and the end, of architecture?) Symbolic architecture is different. For one thing, it is not a well-structured category for Hegel. Hegel's treatments of the other two stages of architecture are divided as is his overall treatment of art: universal particular individual. The general character of the stage is first described, followed by a particularized division of its features and necessary aspects, concluding with a discussion of individual works or categories of works. However, for symbolic architecture the general description, while it comes first, is not one of the three main sections, and all of the sections concern both particular types and individual works. Hegel admits that he is unsure about how to divide up symbolic architecture, which escapes systematic organization. He attributes this to the lack of differentiation in the content and the resultant externality inherent in the symbolic mode of signification (A 14.274). It is also striking that Hegel begins his discussion of art and architecture with constructed things that are neither quite works of art nor quite buildings. Hegel begins his treatment of symbolic architecture with the towers of Babylon and Belus; the first is not a building but an artificial mountain, serving as a rallying point of unity for a folk creating itself out of scattered tribes; Hegel takes this construct to have no meaning except that of willed unity; pure immediate undifferentiated unity. The second tower adds differentiated meaning in the form of cosmological symbolism, but neither construction manipulates or creates Before Beyond Function Saturday, August 8, 2009 9:55:14 AM US/Pacific http://www.dkolb.org/arch.urb/bbfunction.html Page 3 an enclosed space, Given the eighteenth century discussion in France about the "primitive hut" as the beginning of architecture, Hegel's choice of a beginning is unusual and significant. In Laugier's writings the primal architectural act is erection, support, and enclosure. Hegel (who was aware of these opinions at least to the extent of later citing Goethe's polemic against them) makes the primal act one of marking and assembling. Enclosed spaces as such do not enter Hegel's discussion until the third sub-stage of symbolic architecture, which is described as a transition to the classical. And even there, Hegel says explicitly that the cave or hole comes (at least conceptually) before the hut (A 14.289). Extending a natural cave into a subterranean room unites into one seamless action the extending, the surrounding, and the creation of limits, and it produces one undivided surface that plays all these roles at once. Only with classical architecture will these roles be posited as separate and as assigned to separated units of the architectural structure. As a result, the function fulfilled in symbolic architecture remains globally identical with the structure, without either being rationally articulated. To maintain this position, Hegel has to keep Egyptian temple architecture from becoming classical; he does this by stressing the naturalistic imagery dominating the shape of columns and other building parts, and the lack of organic unity in the whole assemblage. Although no architectural work can have organic unity in the strong sense in which an animal body possesses such unity, symbolic architecture is particularly unorganic. Hegel emphasizes the paratactic nature of symbolic unities. Egyptian temples combine sculptures, columns, gates, rooms, and so on, but the mode of combination is an uncontrolled one-thing-next-toanother. Such adjacency and addition is characteristic both of the thinking and the construction in symbolic art. Bei den symbolischen Gestaltungen . . . ist die architektonische Zweckmässigkeit blosse Nebensache und eine nur äusserliche Ordnung. (A 14.296/2.655). In the case of symbolic formations . . . architectonic purposefulness is simply adjoined and only an external ordering. This adjoined-ness or next-to-ness is crucial. Being added on, being next to (a Nebensache) is not only characteristic of symbolic art; it is what is specifically architectural. Speaking of the different parts of classical columns, Hegel says of these divisions that auch in ihrer Unterscheidung zum Vorschein kommen müssen, so ist es andererseits ebensosehr notwendig, dass sie such zu einem Ganzen vereinen. Auf diese Einigung, welche in der Architectur mehr nur ein Nebeneinandertreten und Zusammenfügen und eine durchgängige Eurhythmie des Masses sein kann. (A 14.318/2.674, my emphasis) the differences . . . must come into appearance as differences, on the other hand it is equally necessary for them to be united into a whole . . . this unification, which in architecture cannot be more than a juxtaposition, and an association, and a thorough-going eurhythmy of proportion. The specifically architectural quality involves next-to-each-other-ness and stuck-together-ness, or paratactic order. All architecture is in this sense symbolic architecture. In the symbolic the overall assemblage lacks an overall organizing form that would reflect the function of the whole. Classical architecture, though it remains paratactic, will be called 'organic' because it has a rationally necessary order guiding its parataxis. Romantic architecture will then go beyond parataxis by creating a whole that overreaches its posited internal divisions. But these successes remain shadowed by the externality of their medium and of the fundamental constructional act: putting something next to something else. Classical Architecture: Self-Showing Function We can ask, if parataxis is the fundamental mode of architectural unity, why should classical architecture be the most authentic stage of architecture? The official answer is that classical architecture achieves a special free totality and unity in a special mode of self-relation and self-showing. Die klassische Schönheit hat zu ihrem Inneren die freie, selbständige Bedeutung, d. i. nicht eine Bedeutung von irgend etwas, sondern das sich selbst Bedeutende und damit auch sich selber Deutende. (A 14.13/1.427) Classical beauty has for its inner being the free independent meaning, i.e. not a meaning of this or that but what means itself and therefore intimates itself. Symbolic architecture "meant" through paratactic unities of many diverse representations and ideas, mostly drawn from Before Beyond Function Saturday, August 8, 2009 9:55:14 AM US/Pacific http://www.dkolb.org/arch.urb/bbfunction.html Page 4 nature. In what sense is classical architecture so different, indeed so closed in on itself that Hegel can call it sich selbst Bedeutende? Whereas Hegel despairs of a rational division for symbolic architecture, he is proud of his way of organizing the basic forms and divisions of classical architecture. Unlike the symbolic, the classical has a unifying basic type (Grundtypus), namely, the form of a house surrounding an inside while remaining open to the environing context. This basic type can have notionally precise divisions. Hegel refuses to trace the necessity behind classical architecture's forms to their acknowledged origins in wood construction. Instead he claims the forms (column, base, capital, the parts of the architrave, the roof profile, the style of walls, and so on) take their necessity from conceptual divisions posited by and within the overall function of enclosure: for instance, bearing loads (columns are die materielle Anschauung des Tragens (A 14.314)), being borne, enclosing (Umschliessen), and so on. The three major classical orders are then connected not to any anthropomorphic imagery but to particular aspects of the notion of a building that stands securely and receives ornament. Hegel knows about more anthropomorphic and ligno-morphic analyses of classical architecture. But he treats these imagistic and metaphorical origins as at best secondary and at worst excessive in relation to the "true" deduction of the parts from the basic ideas of standing and enclosing. This is particularly evident in his discussion of half-columns: he says that they are contradictory (widerlich) because they mix two opposed functions that have no inner necessity of being together. A true column should be round and complete in itself as it gives visible expression to the notion of support (A 14.316). Hegel here admits he may be going against the received picture of the historical development of columns, as represented by his colleague Hirt. (It is in this context that Hegel quotes Goethe against the primitive hut.) The categorial background of the language of classical architecture, then, involves the building's own act of standing and enclosure. This sounds like Hirt's discussion of function as the guiding rule of architecture. But, as Hegel indicates in his discussion of half-columns, there are crucial differences. The function Hegel is talking about is peculiarly self-related. Levels of Identity and Function This self-relation or self-showing in classical architecture needs to be examined in order to understand the way function doubles itself in Hegel's vision of architecture. We can distinguish at least six levels that are relevant here. Level 0: absence of purpose A building is a heavy thing, describable in mechanical and chemical terms. On this level there is no teleology, nor any clear delineation of the building from the surrounding physical and chemical things. There is no work of art. Hegel allows that teleological systems can be described in this way, but says that to do so misses their essence. An organism described chemically and mechanically is being described as dead. Level 1: Pragmatic Purpose A building is a manifestation of subjective and realized purpose; it embodies and realizes some pragmatic function. On this level the building is a tool. It brings people together, entombs the dead, surrounds or marks an area, houses the gods or provides a location for celebration and ritual, and so on. This is the level conventionally referred to as the program for the building. Level 2: Self-Showing No matter what its program or pragmatic function, a building can have the additional function of showing forth or embodying (darstellen) its own notional and performative essence. This is not the same as its pragmatic function. The Greek temple's pragmatic function is to house the gods and provide a point of assembly for the community. Its columns and walls and roof could fill those functions in many ways. The temple should also look like something that is housing the gods, but this too could be done in many ways. But Hegel insists that function on that pragmatic level cannot be the final determinant of the form of the building. Hegel is concerned that in addition to these requirements the classical building should have each of its parts each show forth their own notionally determined role or action. A column should show forth load-bearing, a roof should show forth being borne and not itself bearing (as in Hegel's argument why southern building have pitched roofs even though there is no snow to worry about). What should go on is a kind of self-reference, where the building reveals its own inner activities of standing and surrounding. Those activities are not the same as the building's external pragmatic function, though in the classical building they are derived from the basic type and its overall function. This self-showing of architectural function is posited explicitly only in classical architecture, which is another reason why classical architecture is the authentic form of architecture. This level of self-showing is missing in symbolic architecture, whose underlying categories cannot provide notional control and whose form becomes as a consequence fantastical and multiple. On the other hand, romantic architecture has articulated notional control, but this concerns the overall plan and leaves the particular parts freer than does the classical. Hegel is willing to correlate with notional divisions the classical orders and the differences between Ionic and Doric architraves. He will also find notional necessity in the cruciform plan of a Before Beyond Function Saturday, August 8, 2009 9:55:14 AM US/Pacific http://www.dkolb.org/arch.urb/bbfunction.html Page 5 romantic church, and in its spires, but he leaves without notional guidance the particularities of decoration and symbolism and the different kinds of vaulting and pillars that replace the classical orders. The romantic does not lack resources to make inner distinctions but it has gone beyond any relation among its parts that can be stated in terms of categories of the Understanding. Level 3: Expressing the People's Basic Thoughts A work of art, by fulfilling its functions on levels 1 and 2 can fulfill yet another level of function; it can embody the thoughts of the people, their basic categories and general representations, their notions of individuality and its relation to the universal. This embodying is more than the pragmatic purpose of the building, and also more than the self-showing of the parts of the building in their own notionally assigned roles. The temple keeps the rain off the statues and provides a place of assembly; it also shows forth support and load and such rational divisions. It does still more: on this new level it embodies the relation of an articulated inner unity of meaning that is fully expressed in the perfected particularity of an outside. This is the logical unity appropriate to classical civilization. So the architecture is also expressing a category or metaphysical vision of human life and cosmic form. Just as with the first and second levels (pragmatic and self-showing functions), so the second and third levels (self-showing and expressing the basic categorial thoughts of a people) are fully distinct only in classical architecture. The levels are mixed in the other stages of architecture. Symbolic architecture has for its first level pragmatic function exactly this third level showing of a people's unifying conceptions (consider the tower of Babel, which expresses only the notion of immediate unarticulated unity). In romantic architecture as well, embodying the contemporary notion of spirit's unity becomes the first level pragmatic purpose and the second level self-showing of the building. This third level overreaches the other two. But this is not yet the end. More than the historical people are involved with the building. There are also "we" philosophical observers, and for us there are two more levels of function. Level 4: Doing What Architecture Does By fulfilling its functions on the previous levels, the building is, to the eyes of the philosophical observer, fulfilling a still more general function within the overall development of architecture. For "us" the building's particular mode of unity and its achievement on the second and third levels fit in as a stage in a narrative which is not the narrative of this or that people but the story of architecture as a whole relating inner meaning and function to outer form and expression. Level 5: Doing What Art Does But the narrative of architecture is itself a part of the deeper narrative of art as a whole. We philosophical observers can also see the building as functioning within the movements and transitions involved in art as a mode of absolute spirit coming to itself. On this level all of architecture remains a first stage, functioning throughout in the symbolic mode of signification. These fourth and fifth levels of function are not available to the members of the historical peoples, nor‹if you grant an unargued claim about the spread of philosophical vision in Hegel's modern state‹to the citizens of the rational state. They are the privilege and the task of the philosophical observer. We might, however, envision a situation where these levels also became available to the ordinary people as art becomes further self-conscious. I will speak about this possibility below. Function and Constraint These levels of function put constraints on buildings. Talking of the arrangement of his chapter on symbolic architecture, Hegel makes it clear that what he would like would be fixed types and non-arbitrary assignments: Fragen wir jedoch nach einer nähren Gliederung dieses Kapitals und der Hauptgebilde, welche hierher gehören, so kann bei dieser Architektur nicht wie bei der klassichen und romantischen von bestimmten Formen, von der des Hauses, z.B., aus gegangen werden; den es lässt sich hier kein für sich fester Inhalt und damit auch keine feste Gestaltungsweise als das Prinzip angeben, das sich dann in seiner Fortentwicklung auf den Kreis der verschiedenen Werke bezöge. (A 14.274/2.636f) Yet if we ask for a more detailed systematic arrangement of this chapter and the chief productions belonging here, we cannot in the case of this architecture, as we can in that of the classical and romantic kinds, start from specific forms, e.g. a house; for here there cannot be cited any explicitly fixed meaning, or, therefore, any fixed mode of configuration, as a principle which then in its further development is applicable to the range of different works. When Hegel thinks that there exists such content that is fixed in itself and can be the principle of a fixed mode of configuration, then he feels justified in criticizing deviations from such essential tasks and forms of architecture. For example: Saulen zum blossen Schmuck gehören in der eigentlichen Architektur nicht zur wahren Schönheit. Before Beyond Function Saturday, August 8, 2009 9:55:14 AM US/Pacific http://www.dkolb.org/arch.urb/bbfunction.html Page 6 In architecture proper there is no true beauty in columns used merely for adornment. Such designs, and the use of human figures in columns, are at best ein blosser Überfluss, insofern ihre Bestimmung nicht das eigentliche Tragen ist. (A 14.299/2.637) a purely superfluous use of these figures, because their real purpose is not to carry a load. (For other examples of Hegel censuring excess in classical architecture, see A 14.310 on the thickness of columns, A 14.319 on the proportions of the whole classical temple, or A 14.322 on Roman orders and garlands on columns.) There should be no excess, no Überfluss beyond what is proper for the proper Bestimmungen. The form should be controlled by essences derived from (speculatively) fixed content. Nonetheless, in both symbolic and romantic architecture there is uncontrolled excess. In symbolic architecture form is not controlled because there is no speculatively fixed content to provide a measure; symbolic architecture is all excess. In romantic architecture excess comes in the detail of decoration, sculpture, and other particularizations that are not defined by the overarching Spinozistic unity of the building in the way that the building's basic plan is defined. We should not, however, think of Hegel as a modernist trying to control form and decoration by reference to a building's pragmatic function. For Hegel the teleology which is to control excess is not the functional teleology of the building as a tool (on the first level of function), but rather the special teleology of self-showing and of expressing the grounding categories of the time (the second and third levels of function). For example, in discussing the difference between posts and columns, Hegel remarks that for a post seine bestimmte Länge, sein Anfangen und Aussein gleichsam nur als eine negative Begrenzung durch Anderes, als eine zufällige Bestimmtheit, die ihm nicht für sich selber zukommt. its specific length, its beginning and end seem as it were to be a negative limitation imposed by something else, or to be determined accidentally in a way that does not emerge from the post itself. Whereas, for a column Anzufangen aber und sich zu endigen sind Bestimmungen, die im Begriff der tragenden Säule selbst liegen und deshalb auch an ihr selbst als ihre eigenen Momente müssen zum Vorschein kommen. (A 14.310/2.666, my emphasis) beginning and ending are determinations implicit in the very nature of a column as support and on this account must come into appearance on it as constituent features of its own. Because there is this notional control, while excessively thin or thick columns and half-columns may be quite functional for supporting the roof they fail to present properly their own action of support. In this control by notional essences, Hegel is close to modernist insistence that building parts show their own function. But Hegel envisions those functions more narrowly, even as they are allowed to admit and control un-modern decoration. Notice that because this control comes from the level of self-showing function, it is most effective only on the level of classical architecture, where that level of function is explicitly posited. Pillar heights in symbolic and romantic architecture are under no such constraints (in symbolic architecture there is no measure, and in romantic architecture the pillars are part of a structure whose overall showing does not depend on such clearly demarcated measurable functions, so the ratio of length to width can become, as Hegel says, visually incalculable). Hegel does find one kind of excess that is possible on the first level pragmatic functionality. Hegel says that if a building tries to fulfill too many pragmatic functions at once then beauty becomes only embellishment (Zierde), and goal relatedness (Zweckmässigkeit) rules the building's form (A 14.348). But this exception proves my point; Hegel worries about a building trying to fulfill too many first level functions just because this gets in the way of the building fulfilling its second and third level functions. So he does not intend to control the form of a building by function in the sense in which Hirt‹and some modernists‹use the word. This becomes even more obvious when we turn to romantic architecture. Romantic Architecture: Beyond Function While the classical attains a beauty that goes beyond the impressiveness of the symbolic, classical beauty is in its turn subordinated in the romantic, which introduces self-related infinity into architecture. The romantic building hat und zeigt einen bestimmten Zweck, aber es hebt sich in seiner Grandiosität und erhabenen Ruhe über das bloss Zweckdienliche zur Unendlichkeit in sich selber hinaus. (A 14.331/2.685) Before Beyond Function Saturday, August 8, 2009 9:55:14 AM US/Pacific http://www.dkolb.org/arch.urb/bbfunction.html Page 7 has and displays a definite purpose; but in its grandeur and sublime peace it is lifted above anything purely utilitarian into an infinity in itself. Romantic architecture goes beyond the classical harmony of differentiated structure with its task. Romantic architecture unifies its differentiated parts within a motion that goes beyond the building itself. If classical architecture expresses its own standing and rising, the symbolic expresses the concentration of the spirit within (der sammlung der Gemuts in sich welche sich raumlich abschiesst) (A 14.332). Hegel develops the particular divisions of the form of the romantic building out of the basic type of a house closed in upon its own interiority and there open to the infinite, rather than the classical house open to the environment while surrounding the images of the gods. The colonnade of the classical temple let one stand facing outward toward the world, but the windows of the gothic church raise one up to the indeterminate openness of the sky and a light that is not that of the Greek sun. The classical column speaks its own load-bearing, while the romantic pillar rises upwards, bearing its load without effort within a movement that cannot be defined by the task of resisting gravity (Das Emporstreben gerade das Tragen in den Schein des freien Aufstigens verwandelt (A 14.336, see also 338)). The calculable proportions of the classical give way to a romantic effect of the whole that goes beyond measure. The limited functions in the interior of the classical temple change to the open independent space of the church that is generously indifferent to what takes place within it. Its overall pragmatic function is swept up within its third level function, or, more accurately put, its third level function is to express the people's notional self-conception, which at this point itself is the third level awareness of spirit's motion that sweeps up any first level pragmatic function within the its movement. In a letter describing his impressions of the Cologne cathedral, Hegel wrote: Cologne is huge. I searched out the Cathedral right away. The majesty and gracefulness of it, or of what exists of it [building had just recommenced], the slender proportions, the elongation in them, which do not so much give the impression of a rise as of upward flight, are worth seeing and are wholly admirable as the conception of a single human being and the enterprise of a single city. In the Cathedral one vividly beholds in every sense a different dimension, a human world of a quite different sort, as also of another time. There is no question here of utility, enjoyment, pleasure, or satisfied need, but only a spacious ambling about enveloped by high halls that exist for themselves, and, as it were, simply do not care whether people use them for whatever purpose. An empty opera house, like an empty church, has something lacking in it. We encounter here a tall forest, though admittedly a spiritual forest full of art, standing for itself, existing there regardless of whether people crawl around down below or not. It could not care less. What it is, it is for itself. It is made for itself, and whatever ambles or parades about within its walls‹or tours about in it with a green oilcloth knapsack and an admittedly still unlit pipe in the mouth‹is, along with the caretaker, simply lost in it. All this‹standing and walking around in it‹simply vanishes in it. (Letter #436, Hegel to his Wife, from Cologne, September 28, 1822, HTL 585 ) Such a romantic building relates to its particular parts in ways beyond explanation through relations of the understanding such as part and whole, or function and means. Such buildings are als schlechthin zweckgemäss, aber ihr eigentlicher Charakter liegt gerade darin, über jeden bestimmten Zweck fortzugehen und als in sich abgeschlossen für sich selber dazusein. Das Werk steht da für sich, fest und ewig. Deshalb gibt kein bloss verständiges Verhältnis mehr dem Ganzen seinen Charakter. (A 14.331/2.684) entirely suitable for [their functional goals], but their real character lies precisely in the fact that they transcend any specific end and, as perfect in themselves, stand there on their own account. Therefore no simple relation of the understanding determines the character of the whole. Romantic architecture goes beyond the relations of the understanding and gives us a presentation of spirit, whose turn inward is also a rising to the universal. But this is not spirit in its full being-for-itself, since the externality of architecture cannot capture that movement. The universal that this movement expresses is in is in its way more Spinozistic than Hegelian: Es ist die Substzanz des Ganzen, welche sich in unendliche Teilungen einer Welt individueller Mannigfaltigkeiten auseinanderstellt und zerschlägt, aber diese unübersehbare Vielheit einfach sondert, regelmässig gliedert, symmetrisch verteilt, zu befriedigendster Eurhythmie ebenso bewegt als fest hinstellt und diese Weite und Breite bunter Einzelheiten zu sicherster Einheit und klarstem Fürsichsein ungehindert zusammenfasst. (A 14.331f/2.685) The substance of the whole is dismembered and shattered into the endless divisions of a world of individual variegations, but this incalculable multiplicity is divided in a simple way, articulated regularly, dispersed symmetrically, both moved and firmly set in the most satisfying eurhythmy, and this length and breadth of varied details is gripped together unhindered into the most secure unity and clearest independence. The classical is the realm of organic totality, where parts have a precise function in terms of the self-referential function of the whole. The romantic expresses a unity that includes and goes beyond functional divisions. It expresses both the particularity of the individual parts (the statues, the arches, the plan) and the life of the substantial whole which moves beyond them. Before Beyond Function Saturday, August 8, 2009 9:55:14 AM US/Pacific http://www.dkolb.org/arch.urb/bbfunction.html Page 8 We recall that symbolic architecture comes before explicit function; it is all function, and all means, and all independent construction. Romantic architecture refuses to be determined by the functions it nonetheless fulfills. Only classical architecture is dominated by function, but that is the second level self-showing. So architecture in general refuses to be reduced to pragmatic function. A Supplement Hegel's descriptions of romantic architecture emphasize a complex task done with grace and transcendence. If the classical surrounds a usable interior and expresses that function in ways that the symbolic cannot manage, the romantic achieves that and more, not indifferent to function but overreaching it in the movement of recollection and inward transcendence. If the classical posits the essential divisions in its own concept in a way that the symbolic never could (because it had no unified concept), the romantic also posits its internal divisions, but affirms an intenser unity than the classical. If the goal of art is to bring spirit to presence in outward forms, then the romantic achieves that goal better than any other architecture. Given these considerations, we can ask once again: why does Hegel say that classical architecture is the most authentic and proper architecture? Hegel would answer that the Ideal of art is a perfect equilibrium of a self-articulated inner meaning and proportioned outer form. That is achieved in classical architecture. In romantic architecture the inner has begun to predominate. If, for Hegel, romantic painting and poetry bring the end of art, perhaps we should say that romantic architecture brings the end (or selftranscendence) of architecture. But this emphasis on inner and outer suggests a way to renew our question: if architecture as such always involves externality of purpose and paratactic unities, and if as a result architecture cannot really ever achieve a perfect balance of inner and outer‹which is why architecture remains low on the hierarchy of the arts‹then why should we not consider the symbolic be the most authentic stage of architecture? Hegel's reply would be that in the symbolic the necessary self-articulated totality of meaning has not yet been posited. But perhaps we should wonder about the possibility of that articulated totality of meaning. I argue elsewhere that externality will not be so neatly subsumed. Furthermore, the classical unity refuses to be as tidily harmonious as Hegel would have us believe. Hegel's notion of classical architecture maintains its purity only by a too rigorous exclusion of naturalistic and other "excesses" of meaning. Is the Egyptian temple really so un-classical as Hegel says, and are the Greek temple forms so purely dominated by notional second-level functions? If there is some contamination of the classical that compromises the purity that keeps it apart from the other stages, then it might not be so strange to suggest that a hybrid of symbolic and romantic architecture may be where we now live: symbolic parataxis plus free externality, plus a self-conscious movement that acknowledges but goes beyond domination by inner divisions or by any level of function. Hegel himself takes a step in this direction. Speaking of the walls and colonnades of Greek temples, he says that In diesen Prostylen und Amphiprostylen, diesen einfachen und doppelten Säulengängen, die unmittelbar ins Freie führen, sehen wir die Menschen offen, frei umherwandeln, zerstreut, zufällig sich gruppieren; denn die Säulen überhaput sind nichts Einschliessendes, sondern eine Begrenzung, die schlechthin durchgängig bleibt, so dass man halb innen, halb aussen ist und wenigstens überall unmittelbar ins Freie treten kann. In derselben Weise lassen auch die langen Wände hinter den Säulen kein Gedränge nach einem Mittelpunkte zu, wohin der Blick, wenn die Gänge voll sind, sich richten könnte; im Gegenteil wird vielmehr das Auge von solchem Einheitspunkte ab nach allen Seiten hingelenkt, und statt der Vorstellung einer Versammlung zu einem Zweck sehen wir die Richtung nach aussen und erhalten nur die Vorstellung eines ernstlosen, heiteren, müssigen, geschwätzigen Verweilens. (A 14.320f, my emphasis) In these prostyles and amphiprostyles, these single and double colonnades, which led directly to the free open air, we see people wandering openly and freely, individually or in accidental groupings; for the colonnades as such enclose nothing but are the boundaries of open thoroughfares, so that people walking in them are half indoors and half outside and at least can always step directly into the free open air. In the same way the long walls behind the columns do not admit of any crowding to a central point to which the eye could turn when the passages were full; on the contrary, the eye is more likely to be turned away from such a central point, in every direction. Instead of having an idea of an gathering together with a goal, we see a direction outwards, and get the idea of people staying there cheerfully, without serious purpose, idle, and just chatting. An un-earnest, loquacious, un-economical Verweilen. Here the tension of inner and outer is placed within a movement of dwelling with people and things in time; Hegel's temple is acting rather like Heidegger's Greek temple, to open a world. Like the Cologne cathedral, it offers a space not dominated by function, not even by the second-level self-showing function that for Hegel is so crucial to classical architecture. This dwelling with things is, like the symbolic, without a systematic or functional center, yet like the romantic, it includes but is not dominated by goal or purpose. But unlike the romantic it does not turn inward or upward in a motion of its own that goes beyond the agora. Such a more open notion of the classical might make possible a joining with the symbolic and the romantic. That in turn Before Beyond Function Saturday, August 8, 2009 9:55:15 AM US/Pacific http://www.dkolb.org/arch.urb/bbfunction.html Page 9 might lead towards a Hegel-derived notion of the postmodern, one that avoids endless irony and facile facade-ism, as well as purist formal play. Such a postmodern Ver-weil-en would be self-conscious life in a stronger way than the agoraic life looking out from the Greek columned porch. This dwelling would have become aware of itself as expressing itself in art as such. In terms of our earlier discussion, we might imagine that the fourth and fifth levels of function had become available to the community as part of what the community expected of a building. Hence the building would publicly perform in a communal narrative about art and architecture's history and career. In this stage beyond (or completing) the romantic, the perspective of "we" philosophical observers and that of the observed community would come together. This would perhaps be an artistic parallel to the achievement of self-consciousness in the modern state, or to the way the "we" and the observed consciousness come together at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit. This joining would continue the never-complete liberation of architecture from determination by function.

Forthcoming+in+Philosophy)and)Phenomenological)Research+ Seeing&As)in)the)Light)of)Vision)Science) Ned Block NYU Introduction I will discuss the issue of what we see, using the framework of Tyler Burge's wonderful and monumental book Origins of Objectivity (Burge 2010). On Burge's view, every percept is constituted by a "perceptual attributive" (that represents an attribute) and a singular element (that represents an individual). The format of a percept is map-like or iconic, and could be symbolized as "That F".1 The most basic perceptual judgments and beliefs are conceptualized and propositionalized versions of percepts in which the attributive need not be bound to a time and place. What are the actual perceptual attributives? Vision science picks out a small set of basic low level attributives that are products of sensory transduction and are causally involved in the production of other visual attributives: shape, spatial relations (including position and size), geometrical motion, texture, brightness and color. Burge discusses a higher level attributive for objects ("integrated body") and considers that there may be some higher level attributives for some biologically important properties like food, danger and shelter. However, he notes (and I agree) that probably there are no culture-specific higher level attributives for teacups and recessions (p. 101). Terminological note: I will abbreviate the list of low level environmental attributives with "color, shape and texture" and I will refer to all attributives that are not low level as "high level". Seeing and Concepts One tradition in philosophy holds that all seeing is conceptual. Brian O'Shaughnessy (O'Shaughnessy 2012) argues (p. 42) that according to Wittgenstein, "...the work of the Understanding lies at the center of visual perceptual experience." This point of view appears in a different form in Jerry Fodor's forthcoming review of Burge's book (paraphrased with permission). Fodor's argument is: (1) No seeing without seeing as; (2) No seeing as without conceptualization; (3) No conceptualization without concepts. So seeing is inherently conceptual. Fodor has justified (2) on the ground that "...perception involves constancies and constancies require inferences, so those visual attributions involve concepts." (Fodor 2007). Since Helmholtz, computations whose successful operation depends on facts about the world have been called "inferences" but this is a metaphorical use of the term that does not justify the attribution of concepts to the visual system. Premise 2 is false. Burge refutes the idea by appealing to the fact that we share ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1+More+fully,+the+singular+element+in+the+percept+is+an+occurrent+context8bound+ application+of+'that'+referring+to+a+non8repeatable+property8instance+such+as+an+ object+or+event+or+a+"trope".+ + 2+ some perceptual attributives with lower animals, even insects. (Note that insects have color vision.) Further, given that we know that some insects can see but we do not know (and indeed doubt) that they are capable of conceptual thought, we should not suppose that there is any a priori argument that visual attribution requires concepts. 'Concept' is used in different ways so this disagreement may seem verbal. However, Burge, Fodor and I would agree that a concept is constitutively apt to function in a propositional structure. And we would agree on a difference in computational role between percepts and concepts. Roughly: perception is informationally encapsulated and concepts play an inferentially promiscuous role in cognition. Burge and I think there is a format difference as well: perception is iconic. In what follows I will be less concerned with characterizing the difference between concepts and percepts than with with explaining how to tell whether there is a form of seeing-as that is comfortably on the perception side of the perception cognition joint in nature. I do not have the space to discuss controversies over whether there is in fact a joint in nature between perception and cognition (but see (Firestone 2013; Firestone and Scholl 2013)) except to note that such a joint is compatible with causation from one to the other and with the existence of borderline cases. There is a joint in nature between living and non-living things but also borderline cases such as viruses and prions. Acquiring New Visual Attributives? Endre Begby describes Burge's view as a "peculiarly reductive account of what we are capable of perceiving, properly speaking" (Begby 2011). One thing that is supposed to be reductive is that there are no visual attributives specific to teacups and CD players. The claim that there are culture-specific perceptual attributives is often based on the phenomenological consequences of perceptual expertise-e.g. learning to recognize pine trees changes our experience of them (Siegel 2010). However, there is an alternative explanation of this effect in terms of low level attributives. Early vision is highly influenced by contours in the environment. For example, Mary Peterson has shown that viewers are more likely to see the white part of the left item of Figure+1 as figure (rather than ground) compared to the white part on the right item (Peterson, Harvey et al. 1991). (The border appears to shape the figure but the ground appears shapeless, which suggests something for which there is ample additional evidence (Peterson and Skow 2008), that the figureshape suppresses the ground-shape.) The difference between the left and right no doubt reflects greater familiarity with contours of standing women in western dress than inverted standing women . + 3+ Figure'1' Caption+to+Figure+1:+Viewers+are+more+likely+to+see+the+white+parts+of+the+left+item+as+ figure+than+for+the+inverted+version+on+the+right+though+Gestalt+principles+favor+the+ small,+closed,+convex+and+symmetric+black+portions+in+both+cases.++From+(Peterson,+ Harvey+et+al.+1991)+courtesy+of+the+American+Psychological+Association.+ End+of+caption888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888+ Recognitional Coextension If moderately complex pictures-e.g. scenes or faces-are presented one after another with no advance information, subjects can perceive them moderately well at a rate of 6 per second and better than chance at 12 per second (Potter, Staub et al. 2004; Potter, Wyble et al. 2012). We must do this on the basis of bottomup processing of low level features since there is no time for a substantial topdown influence (VanRullen and Koch 2003). Are there clusters of low level features that are what I will call "recognitionally coextensive" with, e.g. faceness that is, coextensive with faceness-to-the-extent-that-we-can-recognize-it? If so- as it must be for quick context-less recognition to be possible-the question arises as to how we can possibly distinguish the use of a face-attributive from a recognitionally coextensive congery of low level attributives. Susanna Siegel (Siegel 2010) has argued for culture-specific perceptual attributives and even perceptual attributives for named individuals, e.g. being John Malkovich. Her "method of phenomenal contrast" appeals to the best explanation of pairs that differ phenomenally, and so in principle allows for experimental evidence as part of the best explanation, but when she actually applies the method, only armchair considerations are used. However, only empirical evidence can distinguish among the following: (1) complexes of low level attributives, (2) the high level attributives that are recognitionally coextensive with them, (3) conceptual attributives that are part of perceptual judgments rather than perceptions themselves. I will discuss three empirical phenomena. The first will provide prima facie + 4+ evidence for facial expressions being perceptual attributives but will not settle the recognitional coextension issue. The second will show that there are high level attributives for some aspects of face perception but will not settle the perceptual rather than cognitive nature of those attributives. The final case will consider the issue of whether the technique used in the first two discussions really isolates perceptual attributives as opposed to cognitive attributives instantiated in an occurrent perceptual judgment. Unfortunately these three cases concern three different classes of attributives, the last is not high level and none of the high level attributives are cultural along the lines of teacups and CD-cases. My concern is more with the methodology of answering the questions rather than the actual answers. That methodology is based on perceptual adaptation, what John Frisby (from an idea of John Mollon) called the "psychophysicists' microelectrode" (Mollon 1974; Frisby 1979). Just as the neuroscientist can first raise, then reduce a neuron's firing rate by direct stimulation with a microelectrode, the psychophysicist can first raise, then reduce a neural system's activity by stimulating it with its preferred stimulus. Perceptual adaptation was known to Aristotle who described (in "On Dreams") what we now call the "waterfall illusion" in which "...when persons turn away from looking at objects in motion, e.g. rivers, and especially those which flow very rapidly, things really at rest are seen as moving" (Aristotle 1955, p. 731). Staring at something moving down raises the threshold for detecting downward motion, biasing the percept towards upwards motion, so stationary things look like they are moving upwards . Figure 2 Caption to Figure 2: Cover the two pictures on the left with a blank piece of paper. Stare intently at the picture on the right for 1 minute. Then look at the center picture. Now cover the two pictures on the right and stare intently at the picture on the left for one minute. Now look at the center picture again. It will appear to have a different expression. Similar experiments show adaptation that is at least coextensive with facial aspects of race, gender and individual identity. From (Butler, Oruc et al. 2008) with + 5+ permission from Elsevier. End+of+caption888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888+ The middle picture in Figure 2 is ambiguous between anger and fear. When one stares at the fearful face on the right, the threshold for firing of neural systems (Butler, Oruc et al. 2008)(Butler, Oruc et al. 2008)(Butler, Oruc et al. 2008)that code for fearfulness is raised, so the perception of the middle picture is biased towards anger. And the opposite happens when one stares at the angry face first. Similar phenomena occur for other facial expressions, face identity and face gender. This phenomenon grounds a prima facie case that we have visual attributives for facial expressions. And there is additional evidence that the effect is not mainly due to recognitionally equivalent low level attributives. One can vary the low level properties and so long as the emotional expressions are kept constant, adaptation obtains, though diminished somewhat, suggesting that face perception utilizes both low and high level attributives. It would take baroque congeries of low level properties to explain this fact (Butler, Oruc et al. 2008). (See also Rossion and Boremanse (2011)). A further line of evidence (Susilo, McKone et al. 2010) is based on two ideas. The first idea is to compare adaptation effects between inverted and upright faces on the assumption that adaptation effects that work for inverted faces are likely to derive from low level attributives, whereas extra adaptation for upright faces is likely to involve high level perceptual attributives specific to faces. Susilo, et. al. note that adaptation for height transfers from one shape to another. For example, staring at an elongated ellipse (the "adaptor") makes a rectangle ("adaptee") look shorter and staring at a short adaptor ellipse makes an adaptee rectangle look longer. Susilo et. al. designed an experiment that examined transfer of adaptation from the letter 'T' of various heights to faces whose eye to mouth distance also varied as shown in Figure+3 and also the reverse transfer of adaption. They used adaptor items (both 'T's and faces) of three different elongations, testing the effects of these differences in adaptors on a variety of elongations of "adaptee" faces and 'T's. + 6+ Figure'3' Caption to Figure+3: The most elongated faces are shown in right side of (A). The pixels mentioned corresponded to .29% of full head height. A short and long face and 'T' are shown in (B). (C) has 'T's and faces of various different elongations used as the adaptees. From (Susilo, McKone et al. 2010) with permission of the Association For Research in Vision and Ophthalmology. End+of+caption888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888+ The technique was to ask the subject to stare at a face or a 'T' of one of the three elongations for 4 seconds, then to view a face or a 'T' of one or another elongation, judging whether the test item was longer or shorter. A subject who has adapted to an elongated stimulus will see another stimulus as shorter than it would otherwise have looked, so to the extent that perception of upright and inverted faces is low level, transfer of adaptation within stimulus types should be the same as between stimulus types. Using 'F-F' to mean transfer from face to face, there are four types of transfers that should all be the same if perception is entirely low level, i.e. F-F = F-T = T-T =T-F. But if upright face perception and aftereffects derive only from face-specific attributives, there should be no transfer in either direction between faces and 'T's. The results were that for inverted stimuli, F-F, F-T, T-T and T-F were nearly the same, only 8% of the aftereffect was face-specific. Inverted faces are seen almost entirely via low level shape-general attributives. In the case of upright faces, 55% of the aftereffect was face-specific and 45% was low level. So high Unlike many other types of facial distortions, eye height has a single simple shape manipulation to which transfer can be tested, namely length of the vertical bar in a T-shape. The only alteration to an eye-height manipulated face is essentially a change in the proportions of the internal "T" structure of the eyes–nose–mouth region. Since this alteration can be neatly captured in a non-face stimulus by moving the horizontal bar of a T up and down, we can reasonably make the following predictions. If a face aftereffect has a purely shape-generic origin, then we should observe full transfer of adaptation to a T-shape. A prediction of this nature cannot be made for more complex facial manipulations (e.g., race, identity), because no one particular type of manipulation to a basic shape test stimulus can fully capture the shape changes present in the face. This means that, for complex manipulations, even a purely shape-generic origin of inverted face aftereffects would predict only partial transfer to any one particular type of simple-shape test stimulus, thus failing to discriminate between face-specific and shape-generic origins. Our three experiments proceed as follows. In Experiment 1, we use face aftereffects to test opponent and multichannel models of upright and inverted face aftereffects. In Experiment 2, we test aftereffect transfer between faces and T-shapes, to examine whether upright and inverted aftereffects originate in different parts of the visual system. In Experiment 3, we integrate the results of the first two experiments by testing whether T aftereffects derive from opponent or multichannel coding. Experiment 1: Comparing opponent and multichannel models for upright and inverted after ffects Experiment 1 tests whether inverted face aftereffects derive from opponent or multichannel coding (see Figure 2). Both opponent and multichannel odels can explain e existence of adaptation aftereffects. Under most circumstances (the exception being where the adaptor is the average face in the opponent model), adaptation will reduce the strength of one pool more than the other/s, leading to shifts in the total population response and thus in the face perceived as most normal. For upright faces, the coding strategy is opponent. This has been demonstrated using direct measurement of the shape of tuning functions in monkey face-selective neurons (Freiwald, Tsao, & Livingstone, 2009; Leopold, Bondar, & Giese, 2006), effects of opposite versus nonopposite adaptors relative to the average face (Anderson & Wilson, 2005; Leopold et al., 2001; Rhodes & Jeffery, Figure 1. Stimulus examples. (A) The four test individuals (left) and the four adaptor individuals (right). (B) Overlaid faces and Ts at normal (+0 pixel) and adapted (+50 pixels) posi ions. (C) Sample t st values for both faces and Ts. Journal of Vision (2010) 10(13):1, 1–16 Susilo, McKone, & Edwards 3 + 7+ level face-specific attributives play a slightly larger role than low level attributives. Of course no single result can rule out that the result is due to differences between low level features of right-side-up and upside-down faces (e.g. the downward rather than upward curve of the eyebrows). These results show us how evidence can bear on what attributives the visual system actually uses. But do these results concern a technical sense of 'see'? Tim Williamson asked me in a presentation of this material whether in this sense of 'see' one can see New College. It is useful to distinguish primary from secondary seeing. We can take primary seeing to be the application of a visual attributive to a "visual object", i.e. an object that is itself picked out by a demonstrative element in a percept of the sort described in the 2nd paragraph of this article. Secondary seeing involves hybrids of visual attributives and concepts applied to objects of primary seeing and complexes of them in states that put together perception with perceptual judgment. Such hybrids can represent things that are not visual objects (i.e. not the referents of the demonstrative elements in perceptions) on the basis of visual objects that compose them. Thus the notion of seeing in which we see New College is secondary seeing and it can be reconstructed in terms of the sciences of perception and cognition. Perception vs Cognition The face in the middle in Figure 2 looks first angry then fearful. But can we be sure from introspection that those "looks" are really perceptual, as opposed to primarily the "cognitive phenomenology" of a conceptual overlay on perception, that is, partly or wholly a matter of a conscious episode of perceptual judgment rather than pure perception? Moving to the Susilo experiment, if a subject sees the adaptee as less elongated than the adaptor, how do we know whether this case of seeing-as is purely perceptual as opposed to partly or wholly a matter of perceptual judgment? (One might raise this worry separately for the adaptor and adaptee.) There is reason to think that concepts don't adapt in the way percepts do. Ambiguous figure-ground stimuli (see Figure+1) engender oscillating percepts that change every few seconds. Both behavioral and neural evidence indicate that the figure representation suppresses the ground representation, with the strongest suppression directed towards the strongest competitors (Peterson and Skow 2008; Salvagio, Cacciamani et al. 2012). The suppression is short-lived, putting a switch of figure and ground within the realm of possibility, but the switching itself is a result of adaptation (Alais, O'Shea et al. 2010). Such forms of multistable perception have three fundamental properties (Logothetis and Leopold 1999): exclusivity (the multistable percepts are not present simultaneously, although transitions can have elements of both), inevitability (one interpretation will eventually replace another) and randomness (the duration of one alternation is not a function of previous durations). Of course figure-ground alternation can be modulated somewhat via intentions, and there are ambiguous figures where cognition makes a difference to perception (Potter 1964), but these facts do not show conceptual adaptation. + 8+ In displays like those in Figure+1, subjects obtained-as figure-the meaningful shapes like the white shape on the left faster and were able to intentionally maintain them longer only when the figures were roughly upright rather than rotated or inverted-and crucially, whether or not they knew what the shapes were (Peterson and Gibson 1994). The orientation-dependence shows the adaptation is at least partly perceptual, and the independence of what the subjects know suggests the adaptation is not cognitive. So at least some kinds of figure-ground alternations are perceptual, not conceptual. Further, the point of perception is to register news, and adaptation contributes to that by filtering out old news; old news however, is important to cognition, so one would not expect adaptation in cognitive systems. Other things equal, if there were conceptual adaptation one would expect conceptual-without-perceptual adaptation-e.g. conceptually ambiguous situations would show alternations. For example, a morally ambiguous situation might lead to alternating interpretations that show the same three fundamental properties. No such phenomena have been reported to my knowledge. I conclude that there is evidence that the alternations observed for facial expressions and other aspects of faces (e.g. identity and gender) are perceptual in nature. And there are other types of evidence that can at least in principle be used in deciding the question in a particular case of whether adaptation is perceptual. If the locus of adaptation is in cortical visual areas, that would provide some evidence that it is perceptual, but even then there could be a cognitive element. For example, working memory, an at least partly cognitive capacity, makes use of neural coalitions involving perceptual representations that provide part of the contents of working memory representations (Curtis and D'Esposito 2003). I will describe evidence that in one case adaptation is wholly perceptual. The technique compares adaptation with priming, an effect that works in the opposite direction from adaptation. Adaptation to a feature makes that feature harder to see; priming makes it easier. For example, exposure of a tenth of a second to a stimulus moving to the left biases the viewer towards seeing an ambiguous stimulus (ambiguous between rightward and leftward motion) as moving leftwards, so long as the ambiguous stimulus is presented immediately afterward (Kanai and Verstraten 2005). Priming of this sort is thought to result from briefly spreading activation in the visual system. Caspar Schwiedrzik and Lucia Melloni investigated adaptation and priming simultaneously in perception of tilt. Subjects first saw oriented grids of the sort of the leftmost or rightmost grid in Figure+4 for 4 seconds, then indicated which direction of tilt they saw. Then they saw a grid with ambiguous tilt (like the middle one) and indicated its direction of tilt. + 9+ Figure'4' Caption+to+Figure+4:+The+leftmost+grid+is+more+likely+to+be+seen+as+oriented+to+the+ northeast+(stipulated+to+be+0o)+than+the+northwest+whereas+the+rightmost+grid+is+ northeast+(90o),+and+the+middle+grid+is+multi8stable+as+between+the+two.+++This+figure+ is+similar+to+part+of+Figure+1+in+(Schwiedrzik,+Ruff+et+al.+2013).++With permission from Oxford University Press, publishers of Cerebral Cortex. End+of+caption888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888+ The idea of the experimental design is that an attractive effect of perception of the first grid on perception of the second (ambiguous) grid indicates priming, whereas a repulsive effect indicates adaptation. The first result is unsurprising: the more 0o-ish the first grid was objectively, the more likely subjects were to classify it as 0o. See Figure+5A which maps the probability of reporting 0o on the first grid (vertical axis) against the objective tilt of the first grid (horizontal axis). Priming is exhibited in Figure+5B by the black line being above the gray line: subjects were more likely to classify the second (ambiguous) grid as 0o if they classified the first grid as 0o. Higher on the vertical axis indicates a greater probability of reporting 0o on the second grid and the black line reflects subjects for whom that the first grid was reported as zero. This difference between the black line and the gray line shows attraction between the first report and the second report: priming. Most importantly and surprisingly: the more 90o-ish the first grid was objectively, the more likely subjects were to classify the second grid as 0o. This is an adaptation effect and is indicated by the upward slope of both lines in Figure+5B as compared with the downward slope of the line in Figure+5A. Crucially this effect held both for those who classified the first grid as 0o and those who classified the first grid as 90o. The black and gray lines are parallel, so the adaptation effect worked in the same way independently of what the subjects thought they saw: what was important for adaptation was not how the subjects took themselves to have seen the first grid but the actual objective tilt of the first grid as registered in the visual system. + 10+ Figure'5 Caption to Figure+5: See text. This figure is similar to Figure 2 in (Schwiedrzik, Ruff et al. 2013). I am grateful to Caspar Schwiedrzik for adapting this figure to the needs of this article. With permission from Oxford University Press. End+of+caption888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888+ + 11+ Since adaptation does not depend on what the perceiver judges, it is hard to see how it could be a cognitive effect. The upshot for our discussion of face adaptation is that at least one kind of adaptation is probably perceptual and not cognitive. Schwiedrzik and Melloni also scanned the subjects, finding that priming engaged a wide range of brain areas in the front and middle of the brain whereas adaptation engaged only early visual areas (V2 and V3) in the back of the brain. What is significant here-given the earlier remark about working memory-is that the adaptation does not involve the frontal and parietal areas that are thought to underlie concepts and cognition. They conclude that "adaptation is a purely local phenomenon..." What I like about this experiment is that there is a mesh between the psychological and neural evidence and both suggest that-at least for the admittedly simple stimuli used in this experiment-adaptation is perceptual rather than cognitive. Thus we can distinguish empirically among (1) a high level perceptual attributive, (2) the holistic constellation of color, shape and texture attributives that are recognitionally coextensive with that attributive and (3) the conceptualized attributives that play a role in conscious episodes of thought and judgment rather than perception. Direct realists often claim, on a priori grounds, that representations in perception are all sub-personal (Travis 2004, p. 59). This view is a mistaken product of a deeply wrongheaded armchair methodology. I have described-unfortunately only briefly--evidence that we have visual representations of fearfulness of faces and similar experiments show visual representations of other emotions and of gender and race. These representations are both perceptual and play a direct role in relation to personal level interests and values. That makes them personal, not sub-personal. Painting with an infamously broad brush, Wittgenstein (1958, p. 232) complains of the "confusion and barrenness of psychology" saying "... in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion." (As with many of Wittgenstein's less wise remarks, Wittgensteinians (Hacker forthcoming) have tried to show that this quotation means something other than what it says. ) However, the real confusion lies with philosophers who try to settle the nature of seeing-as in ignorance of the sophisticated conceptual apparatus that has been developed in psychology to approach such issues. Is this Philosophy? This article reports the results of a number of psychological experiments and so it may occur to philosophers reading it to wonder whether this article-and the chapters of Burge's book that appeal to facts about perception-are philosophy rather than psychology. Both are both! Philosophy of mind is a mix of empirical and relatively a priori considerations, both of which can be seen both as philosophy and as theoretical psychology. However, it would be a mistake to + 12+ think that those who know nothing of the science of the mind can just stick to the relatively a priori parts of philosophy of mind, since one needs to understand the empirical facts to even know where there is room for relatively a priori philosophy. 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IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Seele. in: Hämel, B. / Th. Schreijäck (eds.): Basiswissen Kultur und Religion. Kohlhammer-Verlag, Stuttgart: 2007, 127-29. SEELE Unter dem Seelischen versteht man den geistigen Aspekt der →Wirklichkeit. In den Anfängen der westlichen →Tradition wird dieser mit dem gr. Wort Psyche u. dem hebr. Wort Ruach beschrieben. Sowohl im AT wie auch in der griechischen Geisteswelt bedeuten diese Begriffe auch „Hauch", „Atem". Die S. durchdringt u. belebt das Materielle. In der frühen griechischen Philosophie wurde der Bereich des Seelischen oft sehr umfassend gedacht. Alles was durch inneren Antrieb der Selbstbewegung fähig war, wurde als lebendig u. beseelt aufgefasst. Plato entwickelt dann den Gedanken einer vom Körper unabhängigen GeistS. des Menschen. Der Mensch kann sich durch seine Vernunft über den Bereich des Sinnlichen u. Materiellen erheben u. muss deshalb seiner Natur nach dem Bereich des Geistigen angehören. Aristoteles bindet die S. enger an die Materie u. sieht in ihr die organisatorische Struktur der Lebewesen: Pflanzen, Tiere u. Menschen haben je einen eigenen „Bauplan" u. damit eigene S.nvermögen. Nur dem Menschen kommt eine VernunftS. zu. Die christliche Philosophie des Mittelalters folgt nach einer platonischen Periode mehr dem aristotelischen Erbe, da in ihm die Leib-S.-Einheit des Menschen besser gedacht werden kann. Diese Sicht entspricht eher dem biblischen Menschenbild (→Bibel, Anthropologie) u. kann auch die christliche Lehre von der leiblichen Auferstehung besser integrieren. Das neuzeitliche Denken setzt das selbstbewusste Subjekt u. damit die S. von der physischen Natur ab. Am klarsten kommt dies im Körper-Geist-Dualismus R. Descartes' zum Ausdruck. Da hier die physische Welt als geistloser Mechanismus verstanden wird, gelingt es nicht mehr dem Geist in der Natur einen Platz einzuräumen. Bis heute ist die Gegenüberstellung von →Geist u. Natur ein zentrales Motiv in der Debatte des Leib-S.-Problems. Die vordringlichste Fragestellung ist daher die nach der Möglichkeit der „Naturalisierung" des Geistes. Es sind v.a. zwei Aspekte der menschlichen S., die sich bisher einer befriedigenden naturwissenschaftlichen Erklärung entziehen: intentionaler Gehalt u. qualitatives Erleben. Unter „Intentionalität" versteht man die Fähigkeit, sich auf einen geistigen Gehalt zu beziehen. Wenn man etwa an den Satz des Pythagoras denkt, bezieht man sich auf eine logisch notwendige, wahre Aussage. Wie kann ein natürliches System wie das Gehirn eine solche abstrakte →Wahrheit erfassen, sich auf sie ausrichten? Ein Computer kann zwar mathematische Sätze in einem Programm abarbeiten, aber er kann sie nicht erfassen, einsehen, od. in einem Urteil als wahr behaupten. Unter „qualitativem Erleben" versteht man die Fähigkeit, etwas auf bestimmte Weise zu erfahren: als süss od. sauer, angenehm od. schmerzhaft, blau od. rot. Ein Computer kann mittels eines Thermostats auf die Temperatur reagieren. Er weiss aber nicht, wie es sich anfühlt, wenn es behaglich warm ist, weil er nichts erlebt. Diese Erklärungslücken werden von einigen als Beleg für die Eigenständigkeit des Geistes u. damit den Leib-S.-Dualismus gewertet. Andere versuchen das Geistige als eine höherstufige Systemeigenschaft der Materie zu verstehen. Wieder andere glauben, dass der Geist nur aus der Materie hervorgehen kann, wenn er „von Anfang an" in einer primitiven Vorform in ihr vorhanden war. Die klassischen Positionen der Philosophie werden also heute in verfeinerter Form noch immer vertreten, ohne dass eine Lösung des Leib-S.-Problems in Sicht wäre. Brüntrup, G., Das Leib-Seele-Problem, Stuttgart 2009. Kläden, T., Mit Leib und Seele, Regensburg 2005 Godehard Brüntrup 1 von

E d u a r d o C h a g a s O l i v e i r a A " N O V A R E T Ó R I C A " : D A " R E G R A D E J U S T I Ç A " A O " A D H O M I N E M " Tese de Doutorado apresentada ao Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, do Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH), da Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), sob a orientação do Prof. Dr. Arley Ramos Moreno. U n i v e r s i d a d e E s t a d u a l d e C a m p i n a s I n s t i t u t o d e F i l o s o f i a e C i ê n c i a s H u m a n a s C a m p i n a s - 2 0 0 7 - 2 - E d u a r d o C h a g a s O l i v e i r a A " N O V A R E T Ó R I C A " : D A " R E G R A D E J U S T I Ç A " A O " A D H O M I N E M " Tese de Doutorado apresentada ao Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, do Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH), da Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), sob a orientação do Prof. Dr. Arley Ramos Moreno. U n i v e r s i d a d e E s t a d u a l d e C a m p i n a s I n s t i t u t o d e F i l o s o f i a e C i ê n c i a s H u m a n a s C a m p i n a s - 2 0 0 7 - 3 - © by Eduardo Chagas Oliveira, 2007. CATALOGAÇÃO NA FONTE ELABORADA PELA BIBLIOTECA DA FACULDADE DE EDUCAÇÃO/UNICAMP Bibliotecário Rosemary Passos - CRB-8a/5751 Oliveira, Eduardo Chagas. O347n A "nova retórica": da "regra de justiça" ao "ad hominem" / Eduardo Chagas Oliveira. -- Campinas, SP : [ s.n.], 2007. 224p. Orientador : Arley Ramos Moreno. Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. 1. Perelman, Chaïm, 1912-1984. 2. Linguagem. 3. Argumentum ad hominem. 4. Retórica. 5. Filosofia. I. Moreno, Arley Ramos. II. Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. III. Título. - 4 - A "NOVA RETÓRICA": DA "REGRA DE JUSTIÇA" AO "AD HOMINEM" por Eduardo Chagas Oliveira Tese apresentada para cumprimento parcial das exigências para o título de Doutor Universidade Estadual de Campinas 2007 Aprovada por ________________________________________________ Dirigente da Comissão Fiscalizadora _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ Programa autorizado para oferecer o título de: ________________________________________ Data - 5 - Resumo A "NOVA RETÓRICA": DA "REGRA DE JUSTIÇA" AO "AD HOMINEM" por Eduardo Chagas Oliveira As interpretações que sucedem a publicação do Tratado da Argumentação: A Nova Retórica (1958), costumam centrar o foco da teoria de Perelman nos problemas de natureza jurídica. O nosso trabalho, entretanto, procura fundamentar a análise do seu pensamento sob uma perspectiva que privilegia as suas motivações filosóficas e a preocupação com a questão da linguagem. Nossa proposta visa a investigação do percurso intelectual de Chaïm Perelman, desde os seus primeiros escritos (1931) até a publicação do Tratado da Argumentação (1958), com o intuito de desvendar como a sua teoria constrói um processo de reabilitação acadêmica da Retórica. Neste comenos, a afirmação de que "toda argumentação é uma argumentação ad hominem" precisa ser analisada, porque traz elementos essenciais à compreensão da natureza do empreendimento filosófico erigido por Perelman. A questão perpassa a reestruturação de concepções que envolvem a Lógica dos juízos de valor, a teoria das noções confusas e, sobretudo, a distinção entre os modos de convencer e os modos de persuadir, procurando no pensamento argumentativo a sustentação para uma racionalidade específica que se exerce nas práticas humanas. Palavras-chave: Perelman – Argumentação – Ad hominem – Persuasão – Linguagem - 6 - Abstract THE "NEW RETHORIC": FROM "RULE OF JUSTICE" TO "AD HOMINEM" by Eduardo Chagas Oliveira The study shows some reviews that Perelman made in his discursive concept of rationality. The work investigates the intellectual way of Chaïm Perelman since first writings (1931) until the publication of "The New Rhetoric: a treatise on argumentation" (1958) to discover as the theory of the argumentation constructs a Theory of Practical Reasoning behind the idea of Justice and the problem of argument. The New Rhetoric rejects structural validity as the measure of arguments because nonmathematical reasoning offers only probable conclusions. Perelman's theory emphasizes adherence of the audience as both the object and starting point of argumentation. To achieve persuasion the rhetor must utilize values and beliefs shared with the audience. As a result, that audience serves as an inventional tool that aids in the creation of the discourse. If formal logic and its language are not the model of argumentation, then Perelman and other rhetoricians must work within the ambiguities of natural language. Current linguistic theories are applied to persuasive discourse to provide a linguistic description of argumentation. Using script theory, pseudo-invariant and invariant assumptions as well as semantic recursion triggers are identified in texts to support Perelman's argument that 'quasi-logical' arguments gain strength because of their linguistic resemblance to formal logical structures. As Perelman views it, arguments gain strength by using language to achieve 'presence' in the mind of the audience, an act which involves creating an association between concepts which are accepted by the audience and those which are less readily accepted. This notion applies to Perelman's quasi-logical arguments, as well as techniques based on the structure of reality and techniques establishing the structure of reality. Thus, we analyze the affirmation: "all argument is an ad hominem argument" in order to understand the Perelman's philosophical proposal. Key-words: Perelman – Argumentation – Ad hominem – Persuasion – Language - 7 - SUMÁRIO Introdução 09 PARTE I – O PROBLEMA LÓGICO E A QUESTÃO DA LINGUAGEM Capítulo I O DESENV OLV IMENTO INTELECTUAL DE PERELMAN 1. Os Escritos Iniciais e a Questão do Método 19 1.1. O Método em Filosofia e as Noções Confusas 28 1.2. O Pluralismo Entre os Juízos de Fato e os Juízos de V alor 40 1.3. Os Meios de Prova 46 1.4. A Regra de Justiça e o Ideal da Razão Prática 50 1.5. Perelman e Kelsen 66 PARTE II – A FILOSOFIA DE CHAÏM PERELMAN Capítulo II O CAMPO DO RAZOÁVEL E O IDEAL DA RAZÃO PRÁTICA 2. O campo do Razoável e o Ideal da Razão Prática 75 2.1. À Procura de Lógica dos Juízos de V alor 84 2.2. Sobre uma Possível Lógica dos juízos de V alor 88 2.3. De Paulhan a Aristóteles 93 2.4. A Noção de Filosofia 102 2.5. Razão e Racionalidade 115 2.6. Racionalidade e Razoabilidade 122 Capítulo III ENTRE A PERSUASÃO E O CONVENCIMENTO 3. Entre a Persuasão e o Convencimento 126 3.1. A desconexão do critério de evidência [Diálogo e Discussão] 129 3.2. (Con-)verter ou (Con-)vencer? 134 3.3. Persuasão e Convencimento na Teoria da Argumentação Perelmaniana 145 3.4. A Razoabilidade e a Natureza dos Auditórios 156 - 8 - PARTE III – O "AD HOMINEM" DE PERELMAN Capítulo IV A ARGUMENTAÇÃO AD HOMINEM DE PERELMAN 4. Toda Argumentação é Ad Hominem? 168 4.1. Perelman e a Concepção Aristotélica do Ad Hominem 174 4.2. Duas Interpretações à Luz da V ersão Aristotélica do Ad Hominem 178 4.3. Uma Segunda Interpretação à Luz da V ersão Aristotélica do Ad Hominem 181 4.4. O Ad Hominem sob inspiração de Schopenhauer 184 4.5. Crítica ao Ad Hominem de Inspiração Schopenhaueriana 187 4.6. A Concepção Perelmaniana do Ad Hominem 192 4.7. A Controvérsia de Johnstone e o Ad Hominem de Perelman 199 Considerações Finais 207 Bibliografia 214 - 9 - I n t r o d u ç ã o O Tratado da Argumentação: a Nova Retórica 1 representa uma das mais substanciais contribuições do século XX para o estudo das perspectivas argumentativas em Retórica. Escrito em parceria com Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca 2 , essa obra denota a consolidação de um projeto iniciado por Chaïm Perelman 3 em 1947 4 e exprime o seu grande interesse pelos problemas concernentes à argumentação. As primeiras incursões de Perelman nesse campo do conhecimento, entretanto, ocorreram ainda na escola secundária. Pode-se incluir no seu elenco inicial de estudos retóricos os escritos de Richard Whately 5 (Elements of Rhetoric, 1826), além de tópicos relacionados ao silogismo e às figuras de estilo. Esses elementos pareciam 1 PERELMAN, Chaïm ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, Lucie. Tratado da Argumentação: A Nova Retórica. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1999. 2 Lucie Tyteca nasceu em uma rica família belga no ano de 1899. Seu pai era psiquiatra e um dos fundadores do Tyteca Institute for Neuropsychiatry. Em 1925, licenciou-se em Ciências Sociais e Econômicas pela Université Libre de Bruxelles. No mesmo ano, casou com o estatístico Raymond Olbrechts, de quem Lucie herdou o sobrenome, passando a ser conhecida como Olbrechts-Tyteca. Embora possuísse uma vasta leitura da literatura francesa e alemã, bem como na sociologia, na psicologia social e na estatística, Olbrechts-Tyteca não atuou em seu campo de formação, nem tampouco se empenhou em obter maior titulação acadêmica. Após acompanhar vários encontros e reuniões ocorridos durante a década de 1940, passou a mostrar interesse pelo trabalho de Perelman. Começaram o projeto da Nova Retórica em 1947 e trabalharam neste, conjuntamente, durante os dez anos subseqüentes culminando com a publicação do Tratado da Argumentação, em 1958. Depois desta colaboração, Olbrechts-Tyteca publicou individualmente, pelo menos, mais quatro artigos e um livro, todos em francês. Dotada de um pensamento tão fecundo quanto o próprio Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca demonstrou durante toda a sua carreira, um grande interesse e aplicação no estudo dos problemas concernentes à argumentação estando em nível equivalente à maioria dos pesquisadores das mais importantes instituições européias da época. Olbrechts-Tyteca morreu sob circunstâncias misteriosas em 1988. De acordo com a filha de Perelman, funcionários declararam que ela "desapareceu", inexplicavelmente, numa pequena região afastada do centro cerca de um ano antes da sua morte (Cf. WARNICK, Barbara. Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's Contribution to "The New Rhetoric". In: WERTHEIMER, Molly Meijer. Listen ing to Their Voices: The Rhetorical Activit ies of Historical Women. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987, p. 69-85). 3 Chaïm Perelman nasceu em Varsóvia, na Polônia, em 20 de maio de 1912, mas transferiu-se para a Bélgica, juntamente com a sua família, em 1925. As informações biográficas sobre Perelman foram obtidas através das seguintes fontes: ARNOLD, Carroll. Introduction. In: PERELMAN, Chaïm. The Realm of Rhetoric. Trans. William Kluback. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982; PERELMAN, Chaïm. The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. In: The Great Ideas Today. Chicago, IL: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1970. p. 272; Who's Who in World Jew ry: A Biographical Dictionary of Outstanding Jews. 3. ed. New York: Pittman, 1972. p. 681; PERELMAN, Chaïm. Editor's note. The New Rhetoric and the Rhetoricians: Remembrances and Comments. Quarterly Journal of Speech, n.70, (May) 1984, p.196; e através de correspondência eletrônica com a filha de Chaïm Perelman, a Dra. Noémi Perelman Mattis, no mês de Novembro de 2003. 4 WARNICK apud WERTHEIMER, 1987, p. 71. 5 Richard Whately, 1787-1863. Filósofo de Oxford, educador, teólogo e economista. O texto de 1826, Elements of Logic, pertencente a Whately, foi o primeiro tratado inglês a fornecer uma defesa vigorosa da Lógica como um campo de estudo específico. Outro texto (1826), Elements of Rhetoric, foi igualmente importante e continua a ser muito utilizado nos estudos sobre Retórica da atualidade. - 10 - absolutamente desconexos, gerando uma inquietação em Perelman que, "since then I have often wondered what link a professor of rhetoric could possibly discover between the syllogism and the figures of style with their exotic names that are so difficult to remember." 6 Outra inquietude de Perelman: harmonizar a ação e a razão. Essa preocupação, inclusive, transcendia o campo acadêmico e adentrava no plano da atuação pessoal. Os mais próximos costumam dizer que ele não era apenas uma pessoa de idéias, mas, sobretudo, um homem de [boas] ações. Durante a segunda guerra mundial, ele e sua esposa, Fela Perelman, "desempenharam um papel heróico e anônimo durante a ocupação nazista" 7 na Bélgica. Por causa do seu interesse pelos assuntos relacionados às questões jurídicas, Perelman estudou a natureza da Justiça desde cedo em sua carreira profissional. Esses estudos conduziram-lhe ao desenvolvimento do conceito de justiça formal apresentado como um princípio da ação de acordo com o qual os seres de uma mesma categoria essencial devem ser tratados na mesma maneira. 8 Perelman logo descobriu que a aplicação deste princípio em casos particulares conduzia a perguntas sobre valores e, por conseqüência, ao questionamento: "como é possível raciocinar sobre valores?". Percebeu, então, que as respostas fornecidas pela literatura filosófica ao problema da razão no âmbito dos valores eram altamente insatisfatórias, motivo pelo qual imaginou não haver maneira de resolver questões acerca do valor no campo do racional: Indeed, as I entirely accepted the principle that one cannot draw an 'ought' from an 'is'– a judgement of value from a judgement of fact–I was led inevitably to the conclusion 6 PERELMAN, Chaïm. The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, 1979a, p. 273. 7 A esse respeito existe uma declaração escrita, embora não publicada, da Dra. Noémi Perelman Mattis, intitulada "Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca: A Personal Recollection". Esse texto foi apresentado pelo Prof. Dr. Ray Dearin na Convenção Anual da Associação de Comunicação e do Discurso realizada em 12 de Agosto de 1994. A Dra. Noemi ressalta, ainda, que o professor Jean-Philippe Schreiber, um historiador da Universidade Livre de Bruxelas, preparou, após longos anos de investigação, um trabalho sobre o que ela denomina a "tarefa heróica dos seus pais" durante a resistência. Trata-se de "Les curateurs du ghetto. L'Association des Juifs en Belgique sous l'occupation nazie". (Cf. SCHREIBER, Jean-Philippe ; DOORSLAER, Rudi Van. Labor: Bruxelles, 2004. 590 p.) 8 PERELMAN, Chaïm. The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument. Trans.: John Petrie. New York: Humanities, 1963, p. 16. A esse respeito, ver também: PERELMAN, Chaïm. Império Retórico. Lisboa: ASA, 1999, p.83-88. - 11 - that if justice consists in the systematic implementation of certain value judgements, it does not rest on any rational foundation. 9 Diante da impossibilidade de conciliar a Justiça com a Lógica formal, Perelman conduziu a sua investigação para outro rumo, a saber, perquirir "como" as pessoas raciocinam sobre valores, tais como a justiça. Crosswhite 10 sustenta que uma parte da motivação de Perelman para fazer um exame acerca do estudo da argumentação consiste em a direct result of the impasse he reached in his work on the theory of justice (...) In his Genoa lectures, translated as Justice 11 , Perelman describes his one-time skepticism as absolute: 'As for the value that is the foundation of the normative system, we cannot subject it to any rational criterion: It is utterly arbitrary and logically indeterminate'. 12 Os trabalhos de Perelman sobre a Justiça e o campo da argumentação foram motivados, segundo ele mesmo 13 , pela postura filosófica assumida pelo racionalismo crítico que reduziu o papel da razão e pela actual historical situation of Europe's undergoing the physical and moral-political devastation of World War II. Nationalist and ethnic allegiances had overwhelmed the modern political project of articulating more universal, transnational principles that might protect the rights of individuals and help mediate conflicts among groups. 14 Sob essas condições, o trabalho de Perelman no campo jurídico e na Retórica foi conectado a seus interesses filosóficos e à sua forma de atuação na resistência belga. Nesta perspectiva, seu empreendimento pode ser visto como "a philosophical response to a postmodern Europe shaped by systemic (and systematic) violence and unconstrained 9 PERELMAN, Chaïm. The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. In: HINTIKKA, Jakko ; COHEN, Robert S. ; DAVIDSON, Donald ; NUCHELMANS, Gabriel ; SALMON, Wesley. The New Rhetoric and the Humanit ies: Essays on Rhetoric and Its Applications. Trans. William Kluback. Dordecht [Germany]: D. Ridel, 1979, p. 8. 10 CROSSWHITE, James. Philosophy, rhetoric, nature writing, theories of wilderness and the wild. The Rhetoric of Reason: Writing and the Attractions of Argument. The University of Wisconsin Press, 1996. 11 PERELMAN, Chaïm. Justice. Random House: New York, 1967. 12 CROSSWHITE, James. Is There an Audience for This Argument? Fallacies, Theories, and Relativisms. Philosophy and Rhetoric, n.28, 1995, p.135. 13 PERELMAN, Chaïm. Ética e Direito. Martins Fontes: São Paulo, 2000, p.64. 14 Cf. CROSSWHITE, op.cit., p. 135. - 12 - fragmentation, where the massive counter-violence of the war might prove to be only a temporary hedge against the future". 15 Motivado pelos horrores do holocausto, Perelman ficou afastado da Lógica e se dedicou a procurar respostas para suas perguntas relativas à justiça e sobre como os seres humanos raciocinam acerca da questão dos valores. Perelman sugere que uma teoria da argumentação é necessária para que os valores possam ser avaliados de maneira racional. Pretende sustentar que as questões atinentes aos valores são especialmente relevantes para a Retórica, pois a argumentação é não somente importante, mas essencial de um ponto de vista pedagógico, uma vez que promove um consenso nas mentes dos ouvintes a respeito dos valores que são apresentados no discurso." 16 É de particular interesse investigar como o orador e o auditório discutem sobre valores, porque acredita que esta questão pode ser tratada melhor pela Retórica do que pela Lógica. Perelman fez uso da sua perícia em Lógica e nas questões jurídicas – no sentido mais estrito –, para o desenvolvimento de uma estrutura teórica integrada, cujas bases se fincam sobre uma forte justificação, permitindo identificar as relações entre a lógica formal e a "quase-lógica" para fazer uma distinção significativa entre o racional e o razoável. Uma análise descritiva da discursividade ajudou-lhe a investigar a função argumentativa de dispositivos estilísticos e de estruturas discursivas além de buscar sustentação para o estudo acerca do uso dos valores nos discursos e, em particular, em pares filosóficos, valores hierárquicos e dissociações. Esse percurso conduziu à publicação do trabalho de maior repercussão desenvolvido por Perelman: Tratado da Argumentação: a Nova Retórica 17 . Escrito com a colaboração de Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca foi originalmente publicado em 1958 18 e traduzido para o inglês em 15 CROSSWHITE, op.cit., p. 137. 16 PERELMAN, Chaïm. The New Rhetoric. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1979, p. 277-78. 17 PERELMAN, Chaïm ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, Lucie. Tratado da Argumentação: A Nova Retórica. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1999. 18 PERELMAN, Chaïm ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, Lucie. Traité de la Argumentation: la nouvelle rhétorique. Bruxelles: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles: 1958, 1970. 734p. - 13 - 1969. 19 Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca complementaram-se bem: Perelman era o filósofo, o teórico, enquanto Olbrechts-Tyteca era a empirista que se encarregava de buscar uma aplicação prática para as teorias. 20 Inicialmente, procuraram seguir os métodos do lógico alemão Gottlob Frege, que estudou os exemplos do raciocínio que os matemáticos usaram para moldar a nova lógica. Decidiram, então, investigar de que forma os autores de diversos campos do conhecimento raciocinam sobre valores. O método incluía o estudo de exemplos encontrados em textos argumentativos concernentes a questões axiológicas. Estudaram também as especificidades dos discursos político e filosófico, as razões dadas por juízes para justificar suas decisões e outras formas de discurso que envolvem deliberações sobre matérias de valor. Por quase dez anos, Olbrechts-Tyteca e Perelman conduziram incessantemente tais inquéritos e análises. O próprio autor ratifica: We obtained results that neither of us had ever expected. Without either knowing or wishing it, we had rediscovered a part of Aristotelian logic that had been long forgotten or, at any rate, ignored and despised (. . .) We called this new, or revived, branch of study, devoted to the analysis of informal reasoning, the new rhetoric. 21 Rejeitaram a designação Nova Dialética em favor de Nova Retórica por algumas razões bem específicas: em primeiro lugar, porque a utilização do termo dialética poderia ensejar alguma confusão com os usos modernos desse termo, sobretudo em teorias marxistas; além disso, o termo retórica estava disponível para ser desenvolvido e aplicado desde que a 19 PERELMAN, Chaïm. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, Lucie. The new rhetoric: a treatise on argumentation Translated by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press: 1969. 566 p. 20 Este ponto é contestado por Noemi Perelman Mattis em "Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca: A Personal Recollection". Ela escreve: "Olbrechts-Tyteca se manteve afastada da construção teórica porque consumia todo o seu tempo lendo e revisando referências coletadas em arquivos. O trabalho de organização estrutural da obra coube, exclusivamente, a Perelman, enquanto a maior parte dos exemplos coube a Olbrechts; e eles compartilharam a escrita. Cada qual cumpriu sua tarefa sem pensar no peso desta colaboração. A colocar o nome de Olbrechts-Tyteca no Tratado da Argumentação Perelman recompensava a sua colaboradora pelos (impagáveis) esforços dedicados, por mais de dez anos, ao empreendimento do professor" [sic]. Escolhemos este trecho para contrapor à concepção de Warnick, porque o argumento desta última sugere que os escritos, em especial o Tratado da Argumentação, trazem fortes indícios de que, Olbrechts-Tyteca, foi de fundamental importância inclusive no tocante à elaboração teórica, não se restringindo, portanto, ao trabalho de catalogação ou redação da obra. (Cf. WARNICK, Barbara. Op. Cit., p. 83). 21 PERELMAN, Chaïm. The New Rhetoric and the humanities, 1979b, p. 9. - 14 - Retórica havia caído em descrédito e tinha deixado de ser usada na literatura filosófica substancial; não obstante, a noção de audiência assumia um papel central tanto em teorias retóricas antigas como nas demais. 22 Ao investigar o deslocamento intelectual de Perelman a partir da cronologia dos seus escritos, o nosso trabalho procura atender um objetivo bastante específico: identificar o "fio condutor" que leva Chaïm Perelman a acreditar que "toda argumentação é uma argumentação ad hominem". Para atender a este objetivo, tornar-se-á imprescindível, inicialmente, identificar o interesse filosófico que desperta a Teoria da Argumentação e, em seguida, perceber de que maneira a afirmação de que "toda argumentação é uma argumentação ad hominem" permite compreender melhor a natureza do empreendimento filosófico erigido por Perelman. Este polonês, radicado na Bélgica, construiu uma vasta obra que integra mais de duzentos artigos, além de livros e conferências publicados no período compreendido entre 1931 e 1984. Sua relevância intelectual pode ser traduzida pelo fato de conseguir angariar o acordo de pensadores pertencentes a diferentes correntes filosóficas como Martial Gueroult 23 , Émile Bréhier 24 , Paul Ricoeur 25 , John Rawls 26 , Hans Kelsen 27 e Michel Villey 28 . A extensão da obra de Chaïm Perelman dificulta uma incursão ao conjunto dos seus escritos, motivo pelo qual procuramos sustentação para a afirmação de que "toda argumentação é uma argumentação ad hominem" nos textos publicados desde o início da década de 1930 até o aparecimento do Tratado (1958), realizado em parceria com Olbrecths- Tyteca. 22 De acordo com Robert M. HUTCHINS e Mortimer J. ADLER, "mais do que qualquer outro artigo, este trabalho – A Nova Retórica – despertou um interesse renovado na idéia [de retórica]". (Cf. HUTCHINS, Robert M. ; ADLER, Mortimer J. (eds). The Great Ideas Today. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1970, p. 272.) 23 VILLEY, Michel. Droits et Régles: à propos de la Justice de Perelman. Seize Essais de Philosophie du Droit. Paris : Dalloz, 1969, p.226. 24 Diz Bréhier a respeito do autor: " M. Perelman, si connu par la précision et la rigueur de ses analyses des concepts employés en philosophie et surtout en morale, traite un sujet dont je voudrais montrer la nécessite et l'opportunité par quelques considérations historiques. BRÉHIER, E. Préface. PERELMAN, Chaïm. Rhétorique et philosophie pour une théorie de l'argumentation en philosophie Paris: PUF, 1952, p. VII. 25 Cf. RICOEUR, Paul. Rhétorique, Poétique et Herméneutique. MEYER, Michel. De la métaphysique à la rhétorique: essais à la mémoire de Chaïm Perelman avec un inédit sur la logique. Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles: 1986, p.147. 26 RAWLS, John. Théorie de la Justice. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1987, p.89 et p.148. 27 KELSEN, Hans. Justice e droit naturel. Le droit naturel. Paris : PUF, 1959, p. 10, 12 et 58. 28 VILLEY, Michel. Os meios do Direito. Fi losofia do Direito. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2004, p.258. - 15 - O trabalho está dividido em quatro capítulos que visam conceder um tratamento exaustivo da questão, por meio de tópicos que investigam desde a influência dos autores que orientam o trabalho de Perelman, até o comportamento adotado pelo autor acerca da produção de argumentos. Ainda no primeiro capítulo, confere-se uma discussão crítica acerca da construção arquitetônica da Teoria da Argumentação, delineando o perfil dos escritos iniciais – incluindo, neste caso, a Teoria das Noções Confusas – e a distinção entre Juízos de Fato e Juízos de Valor cuja aplicação é concedida no âmbito dos Meios de Prova. A postulação da necessidade de uma regra de justiça de natureza formal aparece, neste mesmo capítulo, como uma conseqüência direta da impossibilidade de construção de um método analítico para analisar rigorosamente as noções confusas. Esta análise é absolutamente necessária para facilitar o acesso à estrutura da Teoria da Argumentação perelmaniana, eminentemente ligada aos argumentos "ad hominem", que servem de sustentação à controvérsia filosófica. A regra de justiça é utilizada, por Perelman, para sustentar os argumentos provenientes da associação entre fatos ou circunstâncias anteriores de natureza igual ou semelhante, ou seja, evoca-se o precedente como critério de aferição em deliberações que envolvem práticas semelhantes, ocorridas em momentos distintos, para instituir que devem ser tratados da mesma forma. Em síntese, a análise da regra de justiça mostra como a aplicação desta última se converte em "ad hominem" ao exigir fidelidade aos argumentos sustentados, noutro tempo, em casos essencialmente semelhantes. O passo subseqüente consistiu em analisar O campo do razoável e o ideal da Razão Prática, conforme está descrito no segundo capítulo. Após apresentar a oposição que se institui entre o pensamento de Perelman e as idéias de Hans Kelsen, mostra-se que o projeto filosófico de Perelman está associado a uma tentativa de construir uma Teoria da Argumentação que correspondesse a uma Teoria Geral da Razão Prática. Nesse sentido, a proposta perelmaniana de reconstrução do conceito de racionalidade, funde o modelo descritivo de racionalidade aos conceitos da Teoria da Argumentação e da Retórica. O modelo concentra-se, basicamente, nos aspectos lógicos do processo de persuasão, sobretudo nos pontos relativos à criação de raciocínios a partir do uso de padrões de argumentação (tópicos). A possibilidade de criação de uma Lógica dos Juízos de Valor, capaz de orientar as ações humanas, aproxima o pensamento de Perelman ao critério da razoabilidade, tal como esboçado nas idéias de Luís Recaséns Siches. - 16 - O terceiro capítulo é basicamente dedicado à distinção que se impõe entre os modos de convencer e os modos de persuadir. No conjunto da obra de Perelman, a abordagem oferecida às questões que giram em torno da argumentação (por convencimento ou persuasão) está, intrinsecamente relacionada à noção de auditório e suas respectivas tipologias. Segundo ele, ainda que acreditemos na existência de um matiz apreensível entre as noções de persuadir e convencer na linguagem que utilizamos hodiernamente, o matiz é bastante delicado, impreciso e essencialmente dependente da idéia que o orador faz da encarnação da razão 29 , cabendo à natureza do auditório determinar o aspecto que assumirão as argumentações quanto ao caráter (persuasivo ou convincente) e o alcance que lhes serão atribuídos (universal ou particular). Compreender as distinções que se impõem diante desse par de matizes discursivos se mostra essencial porque permite um tratamento específico acerca dos fenômenos relacionados à persuasão (e à dissuasão), de um lado, e aqueles associados ao convencimento, por outro. A distinção que se impõe não tem caráter absoluto, exceto se observada à luz de certas considerações, que visam construir uma separação artificial entre âmbitos distintos. Nossa incursão ao problema, desta forma, apresenta descrições parciais e postulados, porém, atentando para o fato de que todos podem estar submetidos a uma discussão mais extensa. Afinal, o propósito principal dessa investigação implica em despertar o pensamento para a sustentação da afirmação de que toda "argumentação é ad hominem". No quarto capítulo, há um resgate do sentido e da importância do Argumentum ad hominem na construção de discursos, observando os aspectos do desenvolvimento desta modalidade (discursiva), suas possibilidades de exploração dos auditórios e a interferência no processo de "formação de opiniões". Há uma espécie de "obscuridade conceitual" que dificulta a apreensão daquilo que Perelman considera uma argumentação ad hominem, motivo pelo qual se tornou imperativo empreender um esforço adicional para distingui-la das demais formas de argumento que a elas se assemelham. Tal é o caso da argumentação ad humanitatem e dos argumentos ad personam, por exemplo. O entendimento de Perelman acerca da noção de ad hominem, embora inspirado na concepção aristotélica, possui as suas bases fincadas no pensamento de Henry Johnstone Jr., além de estreita relação com as idéias de Schopenhauer. 29 Cf. PERELMAN, 1964a, p. 127-138. - 17 - As considerações finais retomam os problemas colocados ao longo do trabalho, para apresentar a compreensão que se pôde extrair das investigações acerca da função teórica da Argumentação ad hominem na Nova Retórica, além de indicar uma crítica à idéia da racionalidade. Ademais, permite reconhecer a complexidade das manifestações inter- relacionais entre argumentação, persuasão e convencimento no processo discursivo, buscando subsídios para a interpretação dos valores do orador e do auditório. - 18 - I. O PROBLEMA LÓGICO E A QUESTÃO DA LINGUAGEM - 19 - Capítulo 1 O DESENVOLVIMENTO INTELECTUAL DE PERELMAN 1 . Os E scr i t os I ni ci a i s e a Quest ã o do M étodo As interpretações que sucedem a publicação do Tratado da Argumentação: A Nova Retórica, 30 centram o foco da teoria de Perelman em problemas de natureza jurídica. A despeito dessas interpretações, fundamentaremos nossa análise sob uma perspectiva que põe a questão da linguagem como elemento impulsor das suas motivações filosóficas. Nossa proposta opõe-se à tese de que "ponto de partida de Perelman, [é] o modo pelo qual se entendeu o raciocínio jurídico, isto é, o relacionado com a aplicação do Direito, a partir da codificação napoleônica". 31 Procuramos identificar os questionamentos que perpassam o pensamento perelmaniano, ao alçar a vertente belga da Teoria da Argumentação, por meio de uma investigação dos elementos de natureza filosófica integrados ao percurso intelectual de Perelman. Consideramos essa análise essencial, para evitar deturpações no entendimento de uma teoria cujas bases estão fincadas na natureza da controvérsia filosófica, deveras dependente dos argumentos do tipo ad hominem para sua sustentação. A Teoria da Argumentação erigida por Perelman, em meados do século passado, procurou identificar no pensamento argumentativo uma racionalidade específica que se exerce nas práticas humanas 32 . O contexto era especialmente propício para esse intento, porque havia uma diversidade de estudiosos empenhados em estabelecer uma interlocução nesse sentido. 30 Cf. PERELMAN, Chaïm ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, Lucie. Tratado da Argumentação: A Nova Retórica. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1999. 31 Cf. COELHO, Fábio Ulhôa. Prefácio à Edição Brasileira. In: PERELMAN, Chaïm ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, L. Tratado da Argumentação: A Nova Retórica, 1999, p. XIV. Também Rui Alexandre Grácio, em "Racionalidade Argumentativa" (Lisboa: ASA, 1993, p.29) destaca que "na origem da reflexão que conduzirá Perelman à elaboração de uma Teoria da Argumentação e de uma Filosofia do razoável – que receberão a designação genérica de "Nova Retórica" – encontra-se um estudo sobre a Justiça." 32 Abordagem detalhada no tópico desta tese intitulado Racionalidade e Razoabilidade, p. 122-125. - 20 - Stephen Toulmin 33 à mesma época estava desenvolvendo The Uses of Argument 34 em Cambridge. Na Pensilvânia, Henry W. Johnstone Jr. 35 sustentava, por entre as páginas de Philosophy and Argument 36 , uma articulação necessária entre Filosofia e Argumentação; enquanto Perelman, em Bruxelas, contava com a parceria de Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca para publicar o Tratado da Argumentação: a Nova Retórica. Esses autores discutem questões relacionadas à reestruturação de noções que envolvem a Lógica, a Argumentação, a Linguagem, a Retórica e, conseqüentemente, a própria Filosofia. Esta efervescência temática, no entanto, se dissipou logo em seguida. Na década de 60', Stephen Toulmin havia retomado as suas pesquisas no âmbito da Epistemologia e Filosofia da Ciência, enquanto Perelman buscava nos problemas jurídicos um campo de aplicação para a sua Teoria da Argumentação. Johnstone Jr., por sua vez, procurou dar continuidade aos seus trabalhos em torno da Filosofia pré-socrática e assumiu a responsabilidade pela Revista Philosophy and Rhetoric, em 1968, 33 Stephen Toulmin desenvolveu um modelo para analisar argumentos e testar criticamente as idéias. Ficou fascinado com a maneira que os retóricos desenvolviam e provavam os seus argumentos com o uso da "arte retórica". Em conseqüência, concluiu que a maneira preliminar de convencer um auditório através de um argumento se justificava através de uma elaboração correta do raciocínio e isso exigia uma formação específica (como um curso de retórica, por exemplo), motivo pelo qual desenvolveu o modelo de argumentação que permite que uma pessoa disseque um argumento a fim ver facilmente como um orador justificou o argumento em questão. O "modelo de Toulmin" não se fundamenta no julgamento do sucesso ou da falha de uma tentativa em provar um argumento, mas ajuda estudantes de Lógica a analisar (em linguagem natural) as bases de um argumento desde as suas partes mais básicas. O "modelo de Toulmin" ajuda a mostrar como fortemente Toulmin acreditou em argumentos firmemente construídos. Cabe ressaltar que, do mesmo modo que ocorre com a Teoria dos Atos da Fala, o trabalho de Stephen Toulmin –que também analisa os argumentos em Linguagem Natural- não corresponde às expectativas do enfoque que fornecemos ao problema dos argumentos. 34 O livro de Stephen Toulmin consiste no desdobramento de idéias expostas em ensaios publicados anteriormente nas Revistas Mind, Proceedings e em Supplementary Volumes da Aristotelician Society, alguns dos quais foram publicados em Essays in Conceptual Analysis (FLEW, A.G.N. London: Macmillan, 1956) como resultado de discussões acerca do problema das inferências dedutivas com os professores Gilbert Ryle e D.Taylor, dentre outros. Existe uma tradução deste livro feita por Reinaldo Guarany para a língua portuguesa. (Cf. TOULMIN, Stephen Edelston. Os usos do argumento. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2001. [Coleção Ferramentas]. Originalmente em inglês: TOULMIN, Stephen Edelston. The Uses of Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958.) 35 Henry Johnstone Jr. foi um dos primeiros estadunidenses a escrever sobre argumentação. Como a maioria de filósofos que trabalham na área, era freqüentemente incluído entre os dialéticos: os teóricos da argumentação que defendem uma modalidade específica e especial da argumentação com seu próprio jogo de valores, atitudes e procedimentos que podem ser etiquetados como 'dialéticos'. Fazer a dialética, segundo a sua ótica, é procurar por um resultado que seja indisputável, que se aproxime da verdade; assim, o objeto de estudo do dialético está acima daquilo em que os concorrentes se opõem. Não se pode acreditar na posição ingênua que a dialética produz a verdade, mas a verdade pode ser trazida pela argumentação [uma herança do pensamento platônico- socrático]. Johnstone defende que a função do dialético é conduzir a argumentação de acordo com regras e convenções que servem para identificar a teoria ou verificar as melhores formas de ataque e crítica às idéias do interlocutor. Um retórico, por outro lado, acredita que tais regras e procedimentos são elas mesmas objeto do procedimento retórico e, assim, da parte e do pacote da teoria que se ajusta para fora para defender (vide WEIMER, 1984). Com exceção de Johnstone, dentre os "filósofos dialéticos" se incluem Rescher e Toulmin, enquanto entre os retóricos costuma-se incluir Perelman e Naess. 36 Cf. JOHNSTONE JR., Henry W. Philosophy and Argument. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1959. - 21 - tentando transformá-la em um canal internacional de discussão sobre a Retórica a partir de uma perspectiva interdisciplinar. Em alusão ao percurso de Perelman, especificamente, é possível dizer que ele foi acolhido precocemente pela Jusfilosofia. Desde então, muitas das suas idéias têm sido subaproveitadas, porque ficaram constritas às implicações da Teoria da Argumentação no âmbito da Argumentação Jurídica. Enquanto se privilegia a questão da Justiça como força motriz para a criação do Tratado da Argumentação (que é, indubitavelmente, a sua obra de maior repercussão), dá-se pouca importância ao fato de que a Teoria da Argumentação construída por Perelman possui um acentuado liame com os escritos publicados desde a sua juventude. Afinal, ao compilar os elementos essenciais para a construção de uma Nova Retórica, Perelman reúne conceitos e teorias apresentados em trabalhos precedentes como De la méthode analytique en philosophie (1947), Logique et dialectique (1948), Le problème du bon choix (1948) e De la preuve en philosophie (1952), dentre outros. A cronologia dos escritos de Perelman mostra que existe uma inquietude com questões de Lógica e uma preocupação com o problema da linguagem surgindo antes das investigações relativas ao Direito e à Justiça que passam a marcar sua obra a partir de 1945 com a publicação do artigo intitulado De la Justice 37 . Os seus conhecimentos no campo da Lógica, aliás, foram essenciais para o estabelecimento da sua Teoria da Argumentação, como se pode verificar nos escritos destinados aos Cursos de Lógica 38 ministrados no período compreendido entre 1951 e 1966. No terceiro módulo desses Cursos de Lógica 39 , publicados posteriormente em três volumes, aparecem, pela primeira vez, as críticas ao modelo de razão que advém do pensamento cartesiano, como se pode constatar na seguinte transcrição: Par suite d'un développement qui se situe dans le prolongement du rationalisme cartésien, la logique, l'étude des moyens de preuve, a été de plus en plus réduite à la 37 Embora as referências de Perelman acerca deste trabalho se refiram ao ano de 1944 (Cf. PERELMAN, 1976, p. 164. Ver também: PERELMAN, 1998, p.137), o De la Justice foi publicado originalmente na Coleção das Actualités Sociales (Nouvelle Séries, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Institut de Sociologie Solvay, Bruxelles: Office de Publicité, 1945) e reeditado em 1963 na publicação de Justice et Raison (Bruxelles : Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles). 38 Cf. PERELMAN, Cours de logique, 1951-1952. 39 Quando os dois primeiros cadernos do Curso de Lógica foram publicados pela Editions Desoer (1951-1952) o terceiro volume estava em sua versão pro-manuscrito, tendo sido publicada anos mais tarde com a incorporação dos avanços advindos da repercussão da publicação de seu primeiro livro em parceria com Lucie Olbrechts- Tyteca, Rhétorique et Philosophie (1952) no qual se encontram os primeiros resultados de uma pesquisa que, ao ser aprofundada, engendraria o Tratado da Argumentação (1958). - 22 - logique formelle, à la étude de la technique démonstrative des mathématiciens. Est prouvée toute suite de signes qui à l'aide d'opérations conformes au système envisagé, pourrait être obtenue par une machine à calculer. (...) Mais que faire quand les résultats ainsi obtenus sont insuffisants pour déterminer notre conviction ? Devons-nous abbandonner aux forces irrationelles la conduite des affaires humaines dans tous les domaines où la conception classique de la preuve ne peut rien pour étayer nos croyances ? 40 A aproximação entre o raciocínio e a demonstração formal traz consigo algo de depreciativo, motivando as críticas de Perelman ao racionalismo herdeiro do pensamento de Descartes. A redução do raciocínio à demonstração implica em condenar ao campo da irracionalidade quaisquer tipos de raciocínio elaborados com o objetivo de sustentar normas de ação, de justificar um comportamento ou qualquer outra realização que se configure como objeto da nossa aspiração. A repulsa perelmaniana a uma associação natural entre o racional e o necessário, e, por conseguinte, à identificação que se estabelece entre o não-necessário e o irracional, contribuiu para fomentar as idéias acerca da Nova Retórica, que foram desenvolvidas em parceria com Olbrechts-Tyteca, motivo pelo qual, desde as primeiras linhas do Tratado da Argumentação, pode-se encontrar o anúncio de "uma ruptura com uma concepção da razão e do raciocínio, oriunda de Descartes" 41 . Diante desse rompimento com a tradição cartesiana, a Nova Retórica se firma como uma Teoria da Racionalidade Argumentativa, conquistando uma boa recepção, sobretudo entre os autores e pesquisadores exteriores ao eixo europeu, em especial nos Estados Unidos onde os programas de Speech Communication dedicam atenção especial ao estudo da Retórica como técnica da comunicação consagrada ao discurso persuasivo. De acordo com Johnstone Jr. 42 , a aproximação de Perelman com os colegas da Speech Communication Association se destaca pela natureza 40 PERELMAN, Cours de logique, 1951-2., v.3, p.75. 41 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p. 1. 42 Henry Johnstone Jr. (USA), como a maioria dos filósofos que escrevem sobre argumentação, era freqüentemente incluído entre os dialéticos: os teóricos da argumentação que defendem uma modalidade específica e especial da argumentação com seu próprio jogo de valores, atitudes e procedimentos que podem ser etiquetados como 'dialéticos'. Fazer a dialética, segundo a sua ótica, é procurar por um resultado que seja indisputável, que se aproxime da verdade; assim, o objeto de estudo do dialético está acima daquilo em que os concorrentes se opõem. Não se pode acreditar na posição ingênua que a dialética produz a verdade, mas a verdade pode ser trazida pela argumentação [uma herança do pensamento platônico-socrático]. Johnstone Jr. defende que a função do dialético é conduzir a argumentação de acordo com regras e convenções que servem para identificar a teoria ou verificar as melhores formas de ataque e crítica às idéias do interlocutor. Um retórico, por outro lado, acredita que tais regras e procedimentos são elas mesmas objeto do procedimento retórico e, assim, da parte e do pacote da teoria que se ajusta para fora para defender (vide WEIMER, 1984). Com exceção de Johnstone Jr., dentre os "filósofos dialéticos" se incluem Rescher e Toulmin, enquanto entre os retóricos costuma-se incluir Perelman e Naess. - 23 - incomum da participação de um filósofo belga em universidades norte-americanas; além disso, Perelman constatou que os departamentos de Filosofia na América do Norte tendem a estabelecer a sharp distinction between philosophy and rhetoric, denigrating the latter and pursuing the former on the assumption that rhetoric had nothing to do with it. (This polarity is probably less sharp today than it was in Perelman's time). 43 Antes do seu contato com os professores norte-americanos, Perelman supôs que a Retórica e a Argumentação eram assuntos absolutamente negligenciados no mundo acadêmico. Em 1962, a convite dos professores Henry W. Johnstone Jr., do Departamento da Filosofia, e Robert Oliver, docente do Departamento de Speech Communication, Perelman esteve como professor visitante na Pennsylvania State University. "I was very perplexed," noted Perelman, "for I knew nothing of 'speech,' a discipline entirely unknown in European universities (...) I chose as the title of my course, 'The Philosophical Foundations of Rhetoric,' but I could not prepare my lessons, because I did not know what the preoccupations of the members of the Department of Speech were. 44 A sua aceitação nesses grupos, além de consistir em uma rara exceção, denota a importância da Teoria da Argumentação desenvolvida por Perelman. 45 Contudo, é imperativo ressaltar que apesar do amplo reconhecimento da sua obra, a produção pregressa ao Tratado da Argumentação permanece absolutamente desprezada, como se pode perceber em uma análise das principais coletâneas de ensaios dedicados ao pensamento de Perelman nos últimos trinta anos: La Théor ie de L'argumentation: perspectives et applications (Centre National Belge de Recherches de Logique, 1964), Pratical reasoning and human affair s: studies in 43 JOHNSTONE Jr., Henry W. Editor's Introduction. Argumentation, n.7, (November) 1993, p. 379. 44 Cf. PERELMAN, Chaïm. The New Rhetoric and the Rhetoricians: Remembrances and Comments. Quarterly Journal of Speech, n. 70, 1984, p. 188-189. 45 A Teoria da Argumentação de Perelman ficou inconclusa e repleta de lacunas complexas. Quando Perelman faleceu, estava começando a escrever uma grande síntese da sua Teoria da Argumentação. Por diversos anos havia preparado um projeto voltado para este intento e queria intitulá-lo From Metaphysics to Rhetoric. Em sua homenagem, seu amigo Michel Meyer, publicou um trabalho homônimo destinado a contemplar algumas dessas lacunas, como se pode confirmar em: MEYER, Michel. Foreward: The Modernity of Rhetoric. From Metaphysics to Rhetoric, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989, p. 1. - 24 - honor of Chaïm Perelman. (Golden; Pillota, 1986), Chaïm Perelman et la pensée contemporaine (Haarscher, 1993) e a edição especial da Revue Internationale de Philosophie [Honor of Chaïm Perelman] (127-128, 1979). Neste conjunto, composto por mais de uma centena de artigos, não se verifica referências ligadas ao pensamento perelmaniano em contexto anterior às origens do Tratado da Argumentação (1958), exceto nos casos em que se faz alusão ao De la Justice (1945) para estabelecer um vínculo entre a sua obra e questões relativas ao campo jurídico. Esses fatores exercem uma interferência substantiva sobre a avaliação da obra de Perelman. Consideramos essa interferência um fato parcialmente negativo porque, nessas condições, torna-se ainda mais difícil uma recuperação dos elementos constituintes da formação intelectual do autor. Ademais, a falta de uma averiguação sistemática dos escritos iniciais de Perelman favorece a consolidação de uma idéia que vincula a origem do Tratado da Argumentação aos problemas de natureza jurídica que, na verdade, sobrevieram após a publicação do extenso De la Justice. Diante dessa lacuna, associada ao equívoco de vincular a origem da Teoria da Argumentação às questões relativas ao Direito e à Justiça, estabelecemos duas ilações arbitrárias como orientação para perquirir: (1) O ponto de partida pode ser resgatado por meio de um perscrutar minucioso da sua tese de doutorado 46 , uma vez que o reconhecimento da obra de Frege para a ascensão do logicismo poderia possuir alguma relevância na construção do seu entendimento acerca da linguagem e suas implicações no campo da argumentação em linguagem natural; (2) Os problemas centrais da Teoria da Argumentação estão associados a um conjunto de conceitos extraídos do pensamento de Eugène Dupréel, visto que noções fundamentais utilizadas por este último, são retomadas em diversos escritos perelmanianos. A problematização exigiu um resgate do Etude sur Frege, cuja existência permanece praticamente na obscuridade, pela exígua bibliografia a respeito. Em que pesem as expectativas a respeito deste trabalho, seu empreendimento consiste em realizar a reconstituição explícita do pensamento de Frege, com o intuito de refazer o seu percurso argumentativo, considerando as articulações internas da sua obra, de maneira que se torne possível reapresentá-la segundo a ordem das razões, para compreendê-la e reapreciá-la de 46 A tese de Perelman, intitulada Étude sur Frege, foi defendida em 1938 e seu exemplar fotocopiado encontra- se disponível apenas para consulta na Biblioteca do Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da Universidade Livre de Bruxelas. - 25 - acordo com uma nova ótica, a saber: conforme a sua ordenação lógica. A tese apresenta limitações na abordagem crítica do problema lógico e se restringe a realizar uma síntese do pensamento de Frege, feita à luz de um método inovador para o contexto 47 . Cabe não ignorar, entretanto, que se trata de um estudo sobre a Lógica de Frege e não de um trabalho de Lógica que se propõe a instaurar teorias ou avanços significativos neste campo do conhecimento. A objeção a essa primeira conjectura faz perceber que mesmo sendo admirador do pensamento fregeano, Perelman preferiu adotar noções básicas do pensamento de seu mestre, Eugène Dupréel, na construção da sua Teoria da Argumentação, motivo pelo qual retoma, a partir de 1948 48 , investigações acerca de temáticas encontradas em seus estudos iniciais. Considerando essas observações de natureza preliminar acerca do desenvolvimento intelectual de Perelman, estabeleceremos agora uma caracterização dos escritos situados no princípio da carreira acadêmica desse autor. Os primeiros escritos de Perelman fornecem indícios para afirmar que a busca por uma sustentação lógica para os juízos de valor é o que demarca o seu interesse pela questão lógica, visto que os seus estudos de Lógica permitiram- lhe compreender os juízos de valor em uma perspectiva estritamente negativa. Esses escritos iniciais compõem uma série de sete artigos publicados em periódicos, sobretudo da própria Universidade de Bruxelas. São eles: Esquisse d'une logistique des valeurs (1931) 49 ; A propos de la philosophie de M. Dupréel (1932) 50 ; Le statut social des jugements de verité 51 e De l'arbitraire dans la connaissance (1933) 52 ; L'antinomie de Gödel (1936) 53 ; L'équivalence, la 47 Esse método inovador consiste no próprio estruturalismo, como se pode confirmar através de citação pertencente a Victor Goldschmidt no artigo Temps historique et temps logique dans l'interprétation des systèmes philosophiques onde se lê: "Expusemos esta idéia numa conferência, feita em 1950 no Collége philosophique, sobre 'A Idéia de Sistema em Filosofia': ela foi formulada e precisada, de outro ponto de vista, por Chaïm Perelman", in Études de philosophie des sciences, em homenagem a Ferdinad Gonseth (Neuchâtel, 1950, p. 141). Deixaremos, entretanto, essa abordagem para outro contexto por considerá-la irrelevante para a argumentação agora empreendida. 48 Em 1948, Perelman publica o artigo intitulado Le problème du bon choix (PERELMAN, Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie, n.3, 1948, p.383-398) e, em 1950, Sociologie de la connaissance et philosophie de la connaissance. (PERELMAN, Revue internationale de philosophie, n.13, (juillet) 1950c, p.1-9), ambos dedicados aos problemas que caracterizaram os seus escritos iniciais, profundamente influenciados pelo pensamento de E.Dupréel. 49 Cf. PERELMAN, Revue de l'Un iversité de Bruxelles, 1931. 50 Cf. PERELMAN, Revue de l'Un iversité de Bruxelles, 1932, p.385-399. 51 Cf. PERELMAN, Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie, 1933, p.1-7. 52 Cf. PERELMAN, Archives de la Société Belge de Philosophie, 1933, p.5-44. 53 Cf. PERELMAN, Bulletin de l'académie Royale de Belgique (Classe des Sciences), 1936, p.730-736. - 26 - definition et la solution du paradoxe de Russell 54 e Une solution des paradoxes de la logique et ses consequences pour la conception de l'infini (1937) 55 . Tal série possui dois momentos distintos, visto que os quatro primeiros artigos foram redigidos sob forte influência das idéias de Eugène Dupréel, 56 enquanto os outros três retratam uma afinidade com os problemas lógicos propriamente ditos. De qualquer forma, há um traço distintivo, que não se pode delir do pensamento de Perelman desde esses escritos iniciais, conferindo um caráter especial à construção do Tratado: a questão da interferência dos valores [axiológicos] no julgamento das ações humanas. Embora possuísse como mestre e orientador, no campo da Filosofia, o lógico Marcel Barzin (1891-1969) 57 , Perelman sempre destacou a influência das teorias de Dupréel em sua formação intelectual. 58 A presença de questões oriundas do pensamento de Dupréel nas teorias de Perelman se torna ainda mais clara quando se observa o uso da noção de idéias confusas, que esse último acolhe para o interior do seu pensamento, com o intuito de sustentar uma Lógica dos juízos de valor. Na tentativa de estabelecer uma abordagem das noções confusas, por meio de um método analítico inspirado no modelo positivista, Perelman busca uma sustentação lógica capaz de propiciar uma abordagem confiável dos problemas relativos a juízos de valor. Essa é a perspectiva do lógico que se envolve com questões de natureza prática e, sob a influência positivista, procura contornar dificuldades típicas do campo filosófico. Perelman pretende abarcar o domínio das noções filosóficas e buscar o componente axiológico que lhes é intrínseco, para conferir uma fundamentação objetiva. Movido por uma inquietude decorrente da afirmação de que "o domínio das Ciências Humanas é o das idéias confusas" 59 , renuncia à oposição dicotômica que se estabelece entre idéias claras e distintas 54 Cf. PERELMAN, Enseignement mathématique. Revue Internationale, 1937, p.350-356. 55 Cf. PERELMAN, Travaux du IX e Congrès International de Philosophie, 1937a, p.206-210. 56 Cf. PERELMAN, À propos de la philosophie de M. Dupréel, 1932; Ver também : À propos d'Eugene Dupréel: contribution à un portrait philosophique, 1968. 57 Ao seu mestre, Perelman dedica o artigo: Le Philosophe Marcel Barzin. Le Flambeau, 1961, p.171-176. 58 A célebre passagem que retrata essa reverência ao mestre ocorreu quando Perelman foi condecorado pelo Rei de Bélgica com o prêmio Francqui, em 1962, pelos seus trabalhos sobre a Argumentação e a Retórica. Nesta ocasião, Perelman reforçou publicamente a importância dos ensinamentos de M.E. Dupréel acerca da relevância das noções confusas para a construção da sua teoria. Em 28 de Janeiro de 1978, em conferência proferida no Colóquio "Rhetoric and Public Policy" na Universidade de Iowa, Perelman tornou a mencionar a sua gratidão referindo-se àquela passagem do recebimento da ordem. O texto integral da conferência está disponível em Logique et Analyse, n.21, 1978, p. 5-18. 59 Cf. DUPREEL, E. Le Rapport Social, Paris : Alcan, 1912. - 27 - associadas à razão e idéias obscuras e confusas vinculadas ao campo da irracionalidade. Recusando essa herança do pensamento de Descartes, compreende que as noções confusas correspondem ao objeto próprio de investigação filosófica e, por isso mesmo, não podem constituir conteúdo de desprezo intelectual. Desta forma, tenta criar um método analítico de dissecação dessas noções, introduzindo-as no âmbito lógico-formal com o intuito de reduzi-las a estruturas abstratas comuns. - 28 - 1 . 1 . O M étodo em F i l osof i a e a s N oções C onfusa s Antes de decidir se existem, de fato, boas razões para aceitar a proposta perelmaniana de construir um método analítico de dissecação das noções confusas, para reduzi-las a estruturas abstratas comuns, é preciso entender em que sentido essas noções são apresentadas por Perelman. Ademais, é necessário questionar como se mostra possível introduzi-las no âmbito lógico-formal. Afinal, o uso da expressão noções confusas, costuma suscitar uma aproximação conceitual com idéias remanescentes da modernidade, presentes, sobretudo, em pensadores como Descartes 60 e Leibniz 61 . Contudo, Perelman ratifica a posição sustentada por Dupréel 62 sobre as idéias claras e as idéias confusas renunciando ao significado meramente intelectual da dupla oposição. Ora, uma vez que Perelman retoma a abordagem dupréeliana acerca das noções confusas, cumpre investigar inicialmente em que sentido Dupréel faz uso dessa expressão e, mais especificamente, como o resgate dessa concepção se mostra útil à argumentação perelmaniana. A preocupação que conduz Dupréel a uma abordagem das noções confusas está associada à questão da produção do conhecimento e da origem do erro, motivo pelo qual ele resgata as idéias de Descartes, Leibniz e Spinoza para estabelecer a sua insuficiência no que se refere à natureza das idéias confusas. Cumpre, então, questionar: é possível demarcar, de 60 Descartes é, indubitavelmente, o autor moderno sobre o qual recaem as mais severas críticas de Perelman. No tocante à questão da "oposição das idéias", por exemplo, Perelman herda de Dupréel a rejeição da dicotomia instituída por Descartes, visto que discorda do "racionalismo clássico, segundo o qual nossas idéias inatas são claras e distintas e garantem a verdade das proposições evidentes constituídas de tais idéias" (Cf. PERELMAN, Chaïm. Analogie et métaphore en science, poésie et philosophie. Revue internationale de philosophie, 23e ann., n.87, fasc.1, 1969, p.12). O fundamento da sua oposição reside no fato de que "nas concepções clássicas, racionalistas e empiristas, toda decisão humana, que não seja submissão às evidências racionais ou à intuição sensível, é causa de erro" (Cf. PERELMAN, Chaïm. O papel da decisão da teoria do conhecimento. Atas do 2o Congresso Internacional de Fi losofia das Ciências, Neuchatêl, 1955, v.I, p.150-159 apud PERELMAN, Chaïm. Retóricas. Martins Fontes: São Paulo, 1997, p.347). 61 Perelman se opõe à concepção leibniziana porque, para Leibniz, as idéias são como "os objetos internos da alma". Com isso, ele pretendia reservar o termo idéia apenas para o conhecimento claro, distinto e adequado, passível de ser analisado em seus constituintes últimos e isento de contradições. Em suas palavras: "Comme une idée claire est celle dont l'espirit a une pleine et évidente perception telle qu'elle est, quand il la reçoit d'un objet extérieur, qui opère dûment sur une organe bien disposé; de même une idée distincte est celle où l'espirit aperçoit une différence qui la distingue de toute autre idée ; et une idée confuse est celle qu'on ne peut pas suffisamment distinguer d'avec une autre, de qui elle doit être différent". (LEIBNIZ, G.W. Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain. Paris : Garnier-Flammarion, 1966, II, 29, §4, p. 198). 62 Cf. DUPREEL, E. Le Rapport Social, Paris : Alcan, 1912. - 29 - forma lacônica, a distinção que se estabelece entre uma noção clara e uma noção confusa? Para Dupréel, la distinction du clair et du confus, dans la connaissance, s'impose, elle est elle-même, peut-on dire, de sens commun. On tient qu'une idée est claire lorsqu'on croit comprendre ce que veut dire exactemement celui qui l'exprime ; ceci entraîne que l'idée claire ne corresponde qu'à quelque chose d'unique, d'identique et d'invariable. L'idée étant réputée claire, celui à qui l'on parle peut et doit la recevoir dans le même sens que lui donne celui qui parle. 63 Como conseqüência dessa afirmação, pode-se inferir que a clareza e a univocidade estão estritamente associadas, uma vez que uma idéia se manifesta com clareza ao mostrar-se idêntica e invariável. Em contrapartida, são consideradas confusas as noções que não tenham assegurada essa invariabilidade que caracteriza as idéias claras. Assim, as idéias de justiça, felicidade e liberdade, por exemplo, se configuram como idéias confusas porque não existe assegurado um acordo prévio – universal e formalmente expresso – sobre o que estas noções designam. Se buscássemos explicitar o conceito de justiça, por exemplo, certamente incorreríamos na utilização de uma regra para o uso desse conceito, advinda das nossas experiências de aplicação da noção de justiça. Essa noção se apresentaria agregada a valores e seria passível de contestação. Dessa forma, algumas pessoas podem defender que a justiça consiste na aplicação de uma determinada regra, enquanto outras podem objetar considerando que essa mesma regra é injusta e a realização da justiça implica em não aplicá-la. Essa natureza controversa das noções confusas não é compartilhada pelas idéias claras, porque estas não comportam uma multiplicidade de atribuições, nem tampouco dependem do contexto da sua enunciação. Assim é, pois, que ao utilizarmos o conceito de "cubo" ou "retângulo" não encontramos outra aplicação imediata senão aquela vinculada às figuras geométricas. Ao adotar uma abordagem acerca das noções confusas para fundamentar a sua investigação sobre a questão da produção do conhecimento e da origem do erro, Dupréel foi além das concepções clássicas de noções confusas, visto que tais concepções ficam constritas às noções relacionadas aos sentidos. Tal é o caso das noções de calor, cor, prazer ou dor, cuja exatidão não pode ser garantida em virtude da sua vinculação aos órgãos sensoriais e, por 63 Cf. DUPREEL, E. Le Rapport Social, Paris : Alcan, 1912. - 30 - conseguinte, à carga subjetiva de quem avalia. Diante dessa perspectiva estendida de apresentação das noções confusas, para além do plano dos sentidos, é que a investigação dupréeliana se mostra útil à argumentação de Perelman, uma vez que este último resgatará essa aplicação dos conceitos imprecisos no campo da investigação filosófica, com o intuito de reduzi-las a estruturas abstratas comuns, de caráter universal. Cumpre, então, destacarmos em que sentido as noções resgatadas do pensamento de Dupréel são apresentadas por Perelman e qual a função de tais noções na arquitetura da sua obra. O presente fragmento do Tratado da Argumentação serve para aclarar o alcance da sugestão concedida por Perelman: Uma noção clara é aquela cujos casos de aplicação são todos conhecidos e que não admite, portanto, novo uso 64 ; enquanto uma noção confusa é aquela que só pode ser especificada e aplicada quando escolhemos e colocamos em evidência alguns de seus aspectos, incompatíveis com outros. 65 Resulta, pois, que as idéias confusas são de tal natureza que "não se pode representá- las exatamente, exceto em sua relação com as ações dos seres conscientes que as conhecem e as afirmam, embora requeiram, para serem postas na sua natureza exata, uma pluralidade de espíritos determinados". 66 Representá-las fora desta relação implicaria em deturpá-las sob o pretexto de analisá-las ou esclarecê-las, porque as idéias confusas somente ganham significação no interior do contexto social do qual emanam. Elas não têm significado por si sós e dependem diretamente dos valores que são reconhecidos ou atribuídos pelo grupo que as ampara. Uma idéia confusa, com todas as suas características, sobrepõe, se é possível dizer, várias consciências tanto passadas como presentes. Ela evoca uma idéia que outro elaborou e da qual compreende apenas uma parte; o ouvinte, por sua vez, reencontra na idéia evocada elementos que aquele que se serve desta idéia não possui 67 . Há idéias confusas que um progresso ulterior permite abandonar e substituir por outras mais claras; entretanto, existem 64 Cf. PERELMAN, Chaïm. Problèmes de Logique Juridique [Essais de Logique Juridique]. Journal des Tribunaux, 22 de Abril de 1956, p.272. 65 Cf. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.148-149. 66 Daqui emanam as noções sobre a natureza dos auditórios, bem como, as questões relativas ao reconhecimento dos valores encontrados no Tratado da Argumentação e extremamente importantes para a compreensão de outros conceitos inerentes à sua teoria. (Cf. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p. 20-49). 67 A importância da figura do ouvinte na Nova Retórica de Perelman [e Olbrechts-Tyteca] se caracteriza justamente pelo fato desta – Nova Retórica – diferentemente da Retórica Antiga, concentrar a sua atenção no que se refere à natureza do auditório, motivo pelo qual a noção de idéia confusa e o reconhecimento dos valores são elementos essenciais, utilizados por Perelman na construção da sua teoria. - 31 - outras que não podem ser eliminadas de uma vida social, tais como a idéia de Mérito, Bem, Justiça e suas respectivas antonímias. 68 Perelman, a exemplo de Dupréel, sustenta a impossibilidade de eliminação das noções confusas nos domínios da teoria e da prática. Afinal, reconhecer a natureza confusa de algumas idéias não implica que elas são más e devem ser substituídas por outras melhor constituídas logicamente. Isto seria uma resposta a um problema prático, de resto subordinado à pergunta de saber se continua possível substituir a uma idéia confusa, e logicamente defeituosa, outra mais perfeita que possa substituí-la adequadamente. Ora, nem sempre é necessário trazer as idéias confusas à condição de idéias claras, nem rejeitá-las exclusivamente porque são confusas. Contudo, Faz séculos que a linguagem artificial dos matemáticos fornece, a muitas pessoas de tino, um ideal de clareza e de univocidade que as línguas naturais, menos elaboradas, deveriam empenhar-se em imitar. Nessa perspectiva consideram-se imperfeições toda ambigüidade, toda obscuridade, toda confusão, elimináveis não só em princípio, mas ainda de fato. A univocidade e a precisão de seus termos fariam da linguagem científica o melhor instrumento para as funções de demonstração e verificação, e são essas características que se queria impor a toda linguagem. 69 A esperança de uma assepsia da linguagem natural nutriu projetos de criação de uma linguagem artificial capaz de atender às exigências do pensamento científico, tornando a clareza das noções um ideal de excelência. O perquirir de uma consistência inequívoca da expressão procurou eliminar as ambigüidades da linguagem natural e, por conseguinte, a natureza confusa de algumas noções. Mas a imprecisão de certos conceitos e a desorganização de algumas idéias, em decorrência da carga valorativa que está incutida em ambos (conceitos e idéias), revela a existência de um número extenso de noções concernentes a conjuntos 68 É preciso não confundir as noções confusas com as noções referentes a totalidades não formalizadas. Estas últimas correspondem às noções que se referem a conjuntos indeterminados e, habitualmente são compostas por expressões negativas, do tipo: "os que não acreditam no partido", "Não-vivo". Integram o elenco destas noções complementares em relação a totalidades parecidas, tais como a noção de universo e de coisa, por exemplo. Esta observação se faz necessária porque no Tratado da Argumentação as duas espécies de noção parecem indissociadas, ou seja, tanto as noções confusas quanto as noções referentes a totalidades não formalizadas parecem compor um mesmo rol de noções. Esta dúvida se desfaz mais precisamente no texto de 1955, Les Notions et l'argumentation (Archivio di Fi losofia, Roma, p. 249-269) 69 Cf. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.147. - 32 - indeterminados 70 que somente podem ser especificadas em sua aplicação, ressaltando peculiaridades que a tornam incompatíveis com outras. Assim, uma noção somente ganha significação "quando se trata de avaliar referindo-se, a um só tempo, ao sujeito atuante e ao resultado obtido". 71 Nesse sentido, "uma noção só pode ser considerada unívoca se seu campo de aplicação for inteiramente determinado, o que só é possível em um sistema formal do qual se pode eliminar qualquer imprevisto". 72 Para sustentar essa idéia, Perelman se apóia em uma citação de Waismann que reproduzimos a seguir: Definimos o ouro contrastando com outros metais, tais como as ligas. Isto basta para as nossas necessidades atuais e não buscamos mais adiante. Temos a tendência de menosprezar o fato de que sempre há outras direções nas quais o conceito não foi definido. E, se o fizéssemos, poderíamos facilmente imaginar condições que poderiam necessitar de novas limitações. Em suma, não é possível definir um conceito como o ouro com absoluta precisão, ou seja, de tal maneira que todo recôndito e toda fissura ficassem bloqueados contra a entrada da dúvida. 73 A opinião de Waismann parece consolidar a idéia de que sequer o campo da ciência estaria imune às imprecisões da linguagem, visto que mesmo o âmbito científico encontrar-se- ia contaminado por idéias vagas, na medida em que a imprevisibilidade de experiências futuras não permitiria o estabelecimento de um conceito enquanto acabado. 74 A ausência de formalização das noções, reitera a dinâmica ardilosa da linguagem natural, cujo domínio de aplicação não dispõe de convenções fundadas no plano estritamente teórico. Uma noção perfeitamente clara, isenta de ambigüidades, apenas poderia existir em um sistema formal que está muito distante da realidade sobre a qual está assentado o uso hodierno da linguagem. Assim, a redução das noções confusas a estruturas abstratas comuns implica em um esforço de 70 Podemos considerar conjuntos indeterminados uma reunião de objetos, determinados e diferenciáveis (quer esses objetos pertençam à realidade exterior, quer sejam objetos do pensamento), que relacionados a outros que lhe são concomitantes, guardam consigo propriedades da imprecisão e da vagueza que lhes transforma em construções intrinsecamente dependentes da interpretação do intérprete. A esse respeito Perelman (1999, p.149) destaca as expressões negativas, do tipo: "O que não é vivo" ou, ainda, "os que não pagam impostos" que constituem conjuntos indeterminados. 71 Cf. DUPRÉEL, 1912, p.227 apud PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.149. 72 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.148. 73 Cf. WAISMANN, Verifiability. FLEW, A. Essays on Logic and Language. Oxford: Blackwell, 1951, p.120 apud PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.148. 74 A esse respeito Perelman menciona a abordagem crítica concedida por Max Black e A. Benjamin. (Cf. BLACK, Max. Vagueness. Philosophy of science, n.4, 1937; BENJAMIN, A. Philosophy of science, n.6, 1939 apud PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.148. - 33 - criação de um método analítico equivalente a uma lógica do pensamento confuso, capaz de conceber uma vasta abrangência a noções que normalmente teriam a sua aplicação e entendimento restrito a grupos específicos, concedendo margem para ambigüidades diversas na aplicação do conceito. Uma lei fundamental para a lógica do pensamento confuso encarna a seguinte concepção: no caso das idéias confusas, a principal causa de sua difusão é a suscetibilidade a aplicações práticas, que ultrapassa em importância o seu valor lógico. Por este princípio, a lógica do pensamento confuso se aproxima singularmente da lógica afetiva 75 e da lógica do útil tal como Théodule Ribot 76 formulou (as leis) e como Remy de Gourmont, 77 na Cultura das Idéias, aplicou ao estudo de diversos conceitos sociais. A lógica afetiva de Thèodule Ribot, se comparada à Lógica tradicional, consiste em uma lógica deturpada, visto que – contrariamente ao que ocorre no modelo tradicional – a presença de elementos afetivos participam da atividade racional e freqüentemente governam o ser pensante. 78 A teoria de Ribot apóia-se em trabalhos de psicanálise desenvolvidos e publicados entre o final do século XIX e início do século XX. Para ele, tais estudos são instrutivos sobre a influência da via afetiva na atividade intelectual. No artigo La logique affective et la psycho-analyse, 79 publicado em 1914, ele mesmo associa a sua lógica afetiva ao estado psicológico estudado por Lévy-Brühl. Não existe, tal como ocorrerá em Perelman, por exemplo, a tentativa de alargar a compreensão de Lógica, nem tampouco o interesse em comparar tipologias. A intenção é defender a inclusão de uma tipologia lógica, denominada de 75 Cf. RIBOT, Théodule. P roblèmes de psychologie affective, Paris, Alcan, 1910. 356 p. 76 Os problemas de Lógica afetiva, aos quais Perelman se refere, estão estritamente ligados aos trabalhos de Psicologia afetiva desenvolvidos por Théodule Ribot (Professor do Collège de France e Diretor responsável pela Revue Philosophique de France et de l'étranger [1876-1909]) cujo foco se concentra em uma perspectiva que busca contrapor a Lógica afetiva, e suas particularidades, à Lógica proposicional e à linguagem formal com suas tabelas de verdade e cálculo de predicados (Cf. RIBOT, Théodule. Les Maladies de la Volonté. Paris : Alcan, 1888. 185 p.). 77 Cf. GOURMONT, Remy de. La Culture des Idées, Paris, Mercure de France, 1900. 324 p. 78 Desde os gregos antigos, em especial no pensamento de Aristóteles, a retórica - política e forense, pelo menos - existe para afetar a tomada de decisões, motivo pelo qual o orador deve tentar fazer o argumento do seu discurso digno da crença. Além disso, deve elaborar os seus juízos de maneira que os seus ouvintes possam decidir, movidos pela certeza da melhor escolha. Para tanto, deve fazer prevalecer os melhores elementos do seu caráter, para que o público possa sentir que ele possui a prudência, a virtude e a boa vontade. Todos esses elementos, uma vez integrados, mostram-se especialmente relevantes em uma reunião deliberativa. Nos tribunais legais, por outro lado, é especialmente importante que ele deva ser capaz de influir nas emoções, ou afetos morais do júri que avalia o caso. Os elementos afetivos e os caracteres emocionais ganham enorme relevância nesse âmbito, visto que é preciso considerar os estados da mente afetada pelas emoções descritas ou amplificadas pelo discurso, bem como os efeitos esperados e alcançados no auditório ao qual se dirige. (Cf. ARISTÓTELES. Arte Retórica. Lisboa: INCM, 1998, 1378a–1400b. ARISTÓTELES. Ética a N icômaco. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1979, 1126a-1127a.) 79 Cf. RIBOT, Théodule. La logique affective et la psycho-analyse. Revue Philosophique de France et de l'étranger. 39e année, tome LXXVIII, Paris, 1914, p. 144-162. - 34 - lógica afetiva [ou lógica dos sentimentos] no rol dos tipos de Lógica possíveis. Ele apresenta ciência, entretanto, de que "pela natureza dos produtos que os une, ela não é mais que a sombra de uma lógica sólida e rígida como a Lógica formal". 80 Todavia, se a lógica afetiva [lógica dos sentimentos] se afasta do tipo de lógica racional em decorrência do número e da heterogeneidade dos elementos afetivos que ela contém, existe um ingrediente especial que serve para entender em que ponto Dupréel e Perelman consideram a relevância dos trabalhos de Ribot. A origem remonta à publicação da Logique des sentiments 81 – mais precisamente no capítulo III – na qual se concentra o esforço para fixar e descrever, com base na experiência cotidiana, suas principais formas, a saber: raciocínio passional, imaginativo, de justificação e de composição mista. Tais formas de raciocínio carregam consigo essa denominação – de racionais – porque existe uma razão que se agrega a elementos não racionais (paixão, afetividade, imaginação, etc.) para servir de estímulo a uma ação. Em outras palavras, são formas de raciocínio que conduzem ao agir e, nesse sentido, podem ser consideradas uma Razão Prática. Perelman parte dos seguintes questionamentos: "Peut-il y avoir un usage défendable de notions confuses? Le fait d'utiliser une notion confuse, sans s'efforcer de la préciser et de la clarifier, ne constitue-t-il pas un abus toujours condamnable?". 82 A base para os questionamentos de Perelman se orienta pelo pressuposto de que "o objeto específico da investigação filosófica consiste no estudo sistemático das noções confusas". 83 O raciocínio de Perelman visa sustentar a idéia de que o uso de tais noções se mostra defensável em campos de investigação nos quais a imprecisão dos termos se desfaz no âmbito das relações sociais. Não se trata de defender o uso de tais noções mas, antes, de atenuar a imprecisão que se lhes concerne, pois os termos que designam um valor ou uma qualidade seriam carregados de múltiplas significações, e essa multiplicidade apenas se dissiparia no interior do contexto social da qual emana. Contexto este, responsável por reduzir a um número cada vez menor a pluralidade de sentidos daquele termo, fazendo-o restringir-se a um único sentido, quando possível, tornando-o menos confuso. Defender a aplicabilidade de noções confusas implica 80 Cf. LUPI, J. Lévy-Brühl: a pré-lógica e o irracional. Revis ta Portuguesa de Filosofia. Tomo L-1/3, 1994, p.146, p.221-230. 81 RIBOT, Théodule. La Logique des sentiments, Paris, 1912. 82 PERELMAN, 1978, p. 5-17. 83 Cf. DUPRÉEL, Le Rapport Social, 1912. - 35 - resguardar à linguagem ordinária características que lhe são intrínsecas como a imprecisão e ambigüidade; e a busca de uma sustentação para a teoria das noções confusas, teoria esta que será, como perceberemos adiante 84 , um dos pilares da Teoria da Argumentação de Perelman, contraria a opinião bastante admitida entre os lógicos de identificar a Lógica com a lógica formal. Como pensar, então, à maneira de Dupréel? Mais particularmente, seria ingênuo falar de uma lógica dos valores [axiológicos]? Os valores [axiológicos] não seriam, de fato, passíveis de formalização? Se observarmos a evolução da Lógica, desde meados do século XIX, constataremos que os lógicos, em sua grande maioria, são matemáticos. O estímulo de estudos desenvolvidos por Boole, Morgan, Peano e, sobretudo, Frege, fizeram a Lógica tomar um grande impulso e desfrutar de um enorme prestígio por identificar-se quase que exclusivamente com uma álgebra generalizada; isso lhe valeu, aliás, em autores como Church e Bochenski, a designação de Lógica Matemática. Essa nova lógica, autônoma, auto-suficiente e supostamente capaz de dar conta dos problemas de natureza lógica – independentemente da área da qual emanam – praticamente foi elaborada por Frege em virtude das suas análises acerca do raciocínio. As leis lógicas, sob esta ótica, independem da matéria do raciocínio, e por isso são consideradas formais, motivo pelo qual podem gozar de uma generalidade que possibilita a sua aplicação nas mais diversas áreas. Embora Perelman seja um herdeiro desta tradição, está disposto a defender o uso das noções confusas e empreenderá esforços, num primeiro momento, para formalizar os valores [axiológicos] que se mostram imunes à formalização. Seu posicionamento inicial, portanto, não significa uma recusa à formalização; pelo contrário, implica em uma tentativa de introduzir o formalismo em um domínio que parece excluí-lo. O próprio Perelman não hesita em destacar: Decidi imitar o lógico alemão Gottlob Frege, cujos trabalhos havia estudado e que, há cerca de um século, a si mesmo tinha colocado uma questão análoga a propósito da lógica empregue pelos matemáticos. (...) Não seria possível retomar estes mesmos métodos, aplicando-os, desta vez, a textos que procuravam fazer prevalecer um valor, 84 Abordagem detalhada no Capítulo 2, em tópico destinado à Noção de Filosofia [2.4], p.102. - 36 - uma regra, mostrar que uma determinada ação ou escolha é preferível a outra? Não seria possível (...) destacar esta lógica dos juízos de valor? 85 Perelman pretende trazer o formalismo para o campo dos valores e não o contrário, ou seja, não há o interesse de contaminar a assepsia do formalismo lógico com a inserção dos valores no seu domínio. Quando se vê inclinado a pensar conforme Frege 86 , empenha-se para prover uma sustentação lógica às noções confusas. Sendo a justiça, por exemplo, uma noção confusa por excelência, está passível de mudança no decorrer do tempo. Esta transformação, entretanto, não concerne à lingüística, porque a alteração de significado do conceito de justiça não indica que a palavra está sofrendo mutação. É a noção de justiça que está vinculada a uma realidade social e precisa necessariamente ser pensada no interior deste contexto específico. No entanto, Perelman acredita que deve existir uma unidade mínima que transcende ao temporal e permite conceber o "justo" independentemente do conjunto exterior no qual se enuncia o termo. A justiça não pode estar vinculada a uma noção de justo [de natureza particular], mas precisa ser relativa a um valor amplamente reconhecido. Contudo, se o problema é uma fuga ao subjetivismo e a busca de uma sustentação lógica, não se corre o risco de cair num idealismo exacerbado ao pensar a justiça desvinculada do real? Uma noção que transcende a temporalidade e se vincula à questão dos valores exige a adoção de uma lógica dos valores. Neste ponto é que Perelman busca manter-se fiel às suas origens 87 , procurando integrar as regras da Lógica aos juízos de valor e às noções confusas. De fato, se considerarmos a forma de raciocínio de maneira restrita, tal como é efetivamente manejada pelos matemáticos, não há como imaginar a existência de uma lógica dos valores [axiológicos] e, por conseguinte, não há como pensar à maneira de Perelman. Mas, pretendendo manter a idéia de que é inevitável o recurso a noções confusas em Filosofia, em Moral, e mesmo nos diálogos corriqueiros do cotidiano, Perelman se dispõe a estudar o logicismo e verificar neste a possibilidade de sustentação de uma Lógica dos juízos de valor 85 Cf. PERELMAN, 1999a, p.14-15. 86 Cf. PERELMAN, 1977, p. 14-15. 87 Perelman se debruçou inicialmente sobre essa questão no início da década de 1930, quando ainda estava fortemente influenciado pelos poloneses da escola positivista ao publicar o seu primeiro texto, o Esquisse d'une logistique des valeurs (PERELMAN, Revue de l'université de Bruxelles, n.2, 1931). Quando retoma essas pesquisas iniciais, passa a voltar-se não mais para a sustentação das noções confusas em geral, mas à sustentação de uma noção confusa que emergia como o foco das suas novas pesquisas: a idéia de justiça. - 37 - amparada por noções confusas. Afinal, inúmeros são os tipos de situação concretos em que a aplicação das noções confusas torna-se indispensável para promover uma diversidade de objetivos. Há casos, por exemplo, em que somos obrigados a utilizar noções confusas, promovendo ambigüidades e indistinções; em outros, somos compelidos a precisar uma noção confusa dentro de um determinado contexto, o que termina por enquadrar-lhe em um novo uso, podendo vir a aumentar a confusão dessa noção examinada fora do contexto em que foi aclarada. Enquanto se manteve empenhado nos estudos de Lógica, entre 1930 e 1939, Perelman interessou-se pela criação de uma lógica dos juízos de valor, ou seja, uma Lógica capaz de fornecer critérios objetivos e universais para a aferição de valores [axiológicos], em vez de relegá-los ao arbítrio de cada um. Ao perquirir este intento, desprezava a posição daqueles que ao limitar o papel da Lógica, do método científico e da razão à solução de problemas de fundo meramente teórico, abandonam a solução dos problemas humanos à emoção, aos interesses e à violência. Acreditava que seguindo a ótica do logicismo, caso fosse possível demonstrar a veracidade de alguns fatos e de proposições Lógicas e Matemáticas, poderia ser possível fazê-lo também com um juízo de valor, mesmo sendo este controvertido. 88 Sendo possível provar racionalmente que 2+2=4, não se pode demonstrar que uma determinada atitude é mais justa 89 do que outra? Uma resposta negativa implicaria no dissentimento em relação à possibilidade de uma solução racional 90 para os problemas que envolvam um juízo de valor, motivo pelo qual Perelman se lançou à procura de uma racionalidade ética, de uma lógica específica para os valores [axiológicos] tomando como orientação uma idéia esboçada no livro Theory of Values 91 do americano Wilbur Marshall 88 PERELMAN, 1979, p. 134-135. 89 A Justiça é uma noção confusa por excelência. Não há com reduzir a idéia de justiça a um único significado independentemente do contexto no qual se insira. Este é o motivo pelo qual Perelman elege a noção de Justiça como o principal exemplo para a aplicação das suas construções teóricas. 90 No final da década de 1940, Perelman entenderá que o problema se situa no entendimento acerca da noção de racionalidade e buscará a determinação de modelos distintos de racionalidade através da ruptura com a tradição cartesiana que vincula a racionalidade com o critério de evidência. Perelman tentará construir um novo entendimento sobre o racional inspirando-se no critério de razoabilidade instituído por Aristóteles e amplamente estudado pelo hispano-mexicano Recaséns Siches que o aplica com êxito no campo jurídico. No capítulo dedicado ao critério de evidência e a noção da razoabilidade retomaremos esta questão. 91 URBAN, Wilbur Marshall. Theory of Values. New York, 1909. - 38 - Urban, 92 citado por Ribot em La logique affective et la psycho-analyse 93 presente no seguinte excerto: Toute valeur, dit-il, est subjective, en ce sens qu'elle suppose et sous-entend un sujet sentant pour qui son contenu psychique est un état de conscience. Toute valeur est sentie et non pas seulement perçue. Nous pouvons l'appeler un Meaning, c'est-à-dire un sens, attribué à un ensemble d'états de conscience. Un chose n'a de valeur ou tel degré de valeur que pour l'individu qui parle. 94 Observar-se-á que, segundo a caracterização acima, "todo valor é subjetivo e diretamente relacionado ao sujeito que fala"; somente o reconhece enquanto tal, aquele que compartilha do sentimento de pertencer a um mesmo grupo, tornando-o aceitável e aprovado no contexto de sua apresentação. De acordo com essa perspectiva, os valores consistem em objetos de acordo tácito que não pretendem atingir a adesão de qualquer pessoa indistintamente considerada (como no caso de uma argumentação direcionada ao auditório universal 95 ), mas indivíduos específicos que estão agregados em categorias essenciais 96 . Em favor dessa idéia, podemos observar que uma negação dos valores está condicionada à apresentação prévia de razões contrárias à sua aplicação, posto que, 92 Wilbur Marshall Urban (1873-1952) ficou conhecido no campo da Filosofia por ser um dos primeiros autores a utilizar o termo axiologia, tradução da expressão alemã Werttheorie, para designar a teoria dos valores, ou seja, àquela parte dos estudos filosóficos que se dedica a realizar uma análise reflexiva dos valores (Cf. URBAN, Wilbur M. Valuation: Its Nature and Laws. London: S. Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1909). Sua teoria entende que o âmbito do psicológico é demasiadamente estreito para o ato de valoração dos objetos ou atitudes da vida do ser humano, pois não podemos reduzir o problema a um simples cálculo lógico ou matemático; mas (antes), devemos levar em conta condicionantes psicológicos, inclusive emotivos, para situar o problema em seus termos adequados. Daí resulta que o método axiológico está mais vinculado a aspectos de caráter ético ou estético do que a pura racionalidade. 93 Cf. Op. Cit. 94 Cf. URBAN, Wilbur Marshall. Theory of Values. New York, 1909. apud. RIBOT, Théodule. La logique affective et la psycho-analyse. Revue Philosophique de France et de l'étranger. 39e anée, tome LXXVIII, Paris, 1914, p. 146-147. 95 Ao distinguir entre diferentes tipos de auditório (individual, um grupo de especialistas, um grupo heterogêneo de pessoas, ou mesmo um auditório universal – constituído por todos os sujeitos que podem considerar-se racionais) se estabelece também diferentes formas ou graus nos quais um argumento pode ser válido. Perelman trata das especificidades de cada um desses tipos de auditório em alguns dos seus escritos, e mais detalhadamente no Tratado da Argumentação. (Cf. PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1958, p. 40-53). É uma abordagem que requer um tratamento minudenciado, caso se deseje uma construção mais elaborada; contudo, existem muitas divergências acerca do enfoque fornecido pelo autor ao problema. Talvez este seja, inclusive, o ponto mais controverso e discutido acerca do pensamento perelmaniano. 96 Antes de prosseguirmos com o exame da questão dos valores, conforme enunciada nos trabalhos de Perelman que apresentamos até o presente momento, podemos observar que a utilização da expressão "categorias essenciais" está em conformidade com o pensamento de Perelman que, ao desenvolver a uma aplicação da sua regra de justiça, como veremos adiante (p. 46), estabelece o enquadramento dos indivíduos em determinadas categorias essenciais que lhes conceda garantia de aplicação de um mesmo tipo de tratamento em casos de natureza semelhante (Cf. PERELMAN, 1999, p. 248) - 39 - Quando se trata de um valor, podemos desqualificá-lo, subordiná-lo a outros ou interpretá-lo, mas não podemos, em bloco, rejeitar todos os valores: estaríamos, então, no domínio da força e não mais no da discussão. 97 De acordo com a perspectiva defendida por Perelman, os valores se mostram intervenientes como base discursiva de qualquer raciocínio argumentativo, motivo pelo qual a análise do juízo de valor, juntamente com a análise da noção confusa, tornar-se-ão, na Teoria da Argumentação perelmaniana, instrumentos indispensáveis ao estudo da Retórica. 98 O empenho de Perelman visa compreender como a noção confusa é manejada, qual é o seu papel e capacidade de alcance. Esse afinco terá como resultado, sobretudo, mostrar que noções consideradas absolutamente claras apenas o são mediante a eliminação de certos equívocos. Portanto, longe de comprazer-se na confusão, trata-se de levar a análise das noções o mais longe possível; mas, conforme avançam os estudos de Perelman, ele toma ciência de que tal empenho não pode converter-se em uma redução de qualquer pensamento a elementos perfeitamente claros. Daí advirá a sua posterior crítica ao critério de evidência que destacaremos adiante 99 . Por ora, detenhamo-nos na distinção entre juízos de fato e juízos de valor, estabelecida por Perelman em seus escritos iniciais. 97 Cf. PERELMAN, 1999, p. 85. 98 Cf. PERELMAN, Logique et Rhétorique, 1950b. 99 Em tópico destinado às críticas ao Critério de Evidência [3.1], p.129. Ver Também: A Noção de Filosofia [2.4.], p.102. - 40 - 1 . 2 . O P l u r a l i smo E nt r e os J u í z os de F a t o e os J u í z os de V a l or Ao publicar o De l'arbitraire dans la connaissance, em 1933, Perelman discorre a propósito da distinção entre os juízos de fato e os juízos de valor, indicando que se pode tentar definir, unicamente, os juízos de verdade, reservando-se à outra categoria de juízos uma definição completamente negativa. 100 Esta distinção reaparece em outro artigo, do próprio Perelman, que se chama Jugements de valeur, justification et argumentation 101 , onde se lê: Os juízos de fato 102 expressam proposições verdadeiras ou falsas e só têm sentido cognitivo se processos científicos permitirem verificá-los ou falseá-los, confirmá-los ou infirmá-los. Os juízos de valor, em contrapartida, que expressam atitudes próprias de um indivíduo ou de um grupo, podem ser mais ou menos fundamentados ou justificados, mas não são verdadeiros nem falsos e não podem, portanto, tornar-se elemento constitutivo de um conhecimento objetivo. 103 Os juízos de fato se configuram como juízos dependentes de processos científicos, visto que, apenas por meio destes é que adquirem sentido cognitivo. A intenção de Perelman consiste em mostrar que os juízos de verdade são, por definição, os julgamentos necessários ou verificáveis. Tal afirmação sugere que somente é possível estabelecer o valor – verdade ou falsidade – de juízos de verdade. Nos demais casos, não há como provar a verdade do que se enuncia 104 . Contudo, sua afirmação suscita um questionamento: seriam realmente os juízos de fato os únicos tipos de julgamento que comportam a verificabilidade? Perelman acredita que 100 Essa compreensão manifestada por Perelman traduz uma forma de pensamento oriunda dos ensinamentos obtidos em Varsóvia, no início da década de 1930. A forte influência da escola polonesa de matemática, lógica e filosofia positivista, fez Perelman direcionar o seu pensamento ao formalismo inspirado pelos lógicos poloneses. Neste período, inclusive, adquiriu o respeito e a admiração do professor Tadeusz Kotarbinski, considerado um símbolo do pensamento polonês, que facilitou o seu contato com os estudos da famosa escola que – juntamente com Círculo (filosófico) de Viena – foi também um dos suportes do pensamento liberal, racionalista e progressivo na Polônia, na época sujeita à ditadura militar e à ascensão do movimento fascista. (Cf. MANELI, 1986, p. 351-367. Ver também: GIANFORMAGGIO, 1993, p. 429-450). 101 PERELMAN, 1961, p. 325-335. 102 Perelman também utiliza a expressão juízos de realidade (cf. PERELMAN, 1996a, p. 167). 103 PERELMAN, 1996a, p. 167. 104 Devemos assinalar que neste ponto encontramos um conceito com o estatuto de palavra-chave no contexto do Tratado da Argumentação de Perelman. A noção de prova é um dos pontos cruciais para o entendimento de sua compreensão de Lógica Dialética (Cf. PERELMAN, 1952d, p.561-569). - 41 - ao tratarmos de juízos de valor, não existe um fato objetivo capaz de sustentar que alguém está certo ou errado, mas fatos relacionados à condição de um indivíduo que pode estar mais fundamentado, ter maior autoridade para afirmar ou ser mais persuasivo. Em qualquer caso, a falta de um lastro objetivo capaz de demarcar os limites entre o que é certo ou errado, exige a construção de convenções que correspondem a uma objetividade baseada em acordos subjetivos. Os juízos de valor, em geral, versam sobre a nossa prática valorativa, motivo pelo qual estão condicionados a certas convenções. 105 O objeto jurídico, por exemplo, impõe uma consideração normativa que é estabelecida por convenção. Neste caso, os juízos de valor são objetivos sob um ponto de vista diante do qual nenhuma coletividade ou indivíduo pode se enganar no que se refere aos critérios de demarcação para o certo ou errado. Mas, os juízos de valor não comportam prova e, por isso mesmo, podem ser considerados arbitrários, porque são juízos cujo valor de verdade não pode ser provado, uma vez que a racionalidade aplicada aos procedimentos inferenciais não se mostra adequada à resolução de problemas associados à prática valorativa. Nesses tipos de julgamento não cabem as provas que sustentam os demais. Os instrumentos que são utilizados para se chegar à verificação desses juízos são mecanismos distintos dos meios de prova dos juízos de verdade, visto que, neste caso especificamente, cabem ferramentas de natureza distinta, tais como a demonstração, a verificação empírica, a indução, a analogia e, em alguns casos, o recurso às convenções particulares. A situação é bastante diferente quando temos uma frase declarativa, suscetível de receber um valor de verdade, porque exprime uma proposição. Uma frase declarativa é completamente indiferente à nossa prática valorativa, porque o conteúdo inerente a sua afirmação não exprime qualquer juízo de valor. O problema que se põe em discussão refere-se ao controle dos instrumentos de verificação e sua respectiva validade, motivo pelo qual se pode esboçar a seguinte questão: como enquadrar os juízos que afirmam a validade dos instrumentos de verificação? O juízo que afirma a validade destes não seria arbitrário? Ora, para que ele não fosse arbitrário, tornar- se-ia preciso provar que as pessoas aceitam este método incondicionalmente. Em princípio, isto é inadmissível. Por limitações empíricas, é possível dizer que um empreendimento desta natureza é impossível. Essa seria, entretanto, a única condição que permitiria destituir a 105 Ninguém é obrigado a concordar com um valor que nós admitimos simplesmente porque, com base em nossa prática, afirmamos, por exemplo, que "a prevaricação é errada". - 42 - arbitrariedade deste tipo de juízo. Diante da impossibilidade, sua arbitrariedade mostra-se inconteste e dela é possível extrair outra idéia de semelhante relevância. Dado que os juízos de verdade estão vinculados a critérios de verificação previamente determinados, e ainda, considerando-se que esses critérios são originalmente arbitrários, segue-se que "todo juízo de verdade supõe um juízo de valor anterior". Nesse caso, há verdade apenas dentro do grupo que admite este julgamento de valor. Observemos o seguinte excerto: La proposition suivante: l'expérience sensible constitue um moyen de vérification valable (...) est um jugement de valeur; et ce será le cas pour tous les jugements semblables, quand on ne pourra pas les démontrer par un procédé de vérification préalablement accepté au moyen d'un jugement de valeur; de même on sera obligé de considérer comme jugements de valeur les jugements hiérarchisant les différents moyens de vérification. 106 Ao sugerir que a experiência sensível é um meio de verificação válido, Perelman pretende mostrar que ela serve como parâmetro para os julgamentos semelhantes. Com isso, sugere que a impossibilidade de demonstrar uma proposição por um método de verificabilidade previamente aceito [por meio de um julgamento de valor] obriga o indivíduo a considerar como juízos de valor os julgamentos que classificam os diferentes meios de verificação. 107 A existência de regras arbitrárias se evidencia pela alusão aos juízos de valor acerca dos quais alguns indivíduos, enquanto reunidos em um determinado grupo, estão de acordo. É preciso ressaltar que, por serem arbitrárias, ninguém está condicionado a aceitá-las sem restrições; não há um poder de coerção – intrínseco a tais regras – capaz de compelir os indivíduos a aceitar-lhes incondicionalmente, pois elas são convencionadas pelos integrantes de um grupo que lhe confere suporte. Talvez isso justifique porque numerosos grupos, embora bastante diferentes, são capazes de coabitar pacificamente; a característica arbitrária das regras que os constituem exige que a sua aceitação seja necessária para compartilharem os seus valores e crenças, por exemplo. Em virtude dessa situação torna-se possível dizer que o arbitrário origina o pluralismo. 106 PERELMAN, 1933a, p. 21. 107 Sobre os problemas de classificação dos valores conforme os argumentos, Perelman dedica o texto Some reflections on classification. (Philosophy today, 1963a, p.268-272). - 43 - Desde os escritos de 1933 108 Perelman faz notar o quanto o pluralismo é mais que uma "conseqüência prático-operativa" 109 das diversas elaborações teóricas sustentadas. Em De l'arbitraire dans la connaissance, especialmente, salienta que a construção teórica equivale a uma série de definições inconsistentes porque são estabelecidas sem qualquer justificação aparente. Este, aliás, é o fim desejado quando sublinha que tal construção "comporta o pluralismo". De resto, para Perelman, que durante este período também segue Dupréel no tocante a este ponto, o pluralismo é claramente um valor. Em De la Nécessite 110 , um ensaio crítico à idéia de necessidade, Dupréel determina que "La nécessité est comme le recours de l'individu contre l'oppression des opinions étrangèrs " 111 , visto que a tarefa da necessidade é servir de critério para distinguir certas proposições verdadeiras de todas as outras, verdadeiras ou falsas. Afinal, é pela prova da necessidade que se descobre as verdadeiras leis do pensamento, fundamento de toda explicação filosófica. 112 Ainda que aceitemos a necessidade como um critério pelo qual distinguimos o verdadeiro do falso, permanecerá subjacente um questionamento: quando uma proposição é necessária? Como é possível reconhecê-la como tal? Em outras palavras: qual o critério que define este critério? Perelman adota a resposta que Dupréel concede a tais questionamentos como pressuposto de fundamentação do arbitrário. Conforme Dupréel, "a verdade necessária é simplesmente aquela que nos parece necessária" 113 , motivo pelo qual a necessidade não é um critério infalível. Dupréel está simplificando situações complexas e englobando, em um mesmo grupo, problemas de natureza distinta. Esta simplificação pode ser compreendida à luz de dois focos diferentes. O primeiro deles concentra-se na força motriz que conduz à construção do artigo em questão: o problema da hierarquização das sociedades e a questão da liberdade da ação dos indivíduos. A segunda questão está centrada na idéia de um pluralismo que se firma no arbitrário. Neste caso, se mostra a infalibilidade do critério da necessidade, 108 Cf. notas 51 - 52. 109 Cf. GIANFORMAGGIO, 1993, p. 431. 110 DUPRÉEL, E. De la nécessite. Archives de la société Belge de Philosophie, 1928. Republicado em: DUPRÉEL, E. Essais P luralistes, 1949, p. 70-105. 111 DUPRÉEL, De la nécessite, 1949, p. 72. 112 DUPRÉEL, 1949, p. 75. 113 DUPRÉEL, 1949, p. 76. - 44 - porque nem sempre se chega a um acordo no tocante à necessidade de certas proposições e, mesmo quando se firmam acordos ou pactos em torno dela – a necessidade – nunca há garantias de que ela não possa ser refutada futuramente. Dito de outro modo, a idéia que Perelman compartilha com Dupréel sustenta que uma verdade cujo fundamento se encontra no critério da necessidade é, em última análise, tão arbitrária quanto uma opinião à que se adere por consenso, visto que, nos dois casos, o fundamento último da verdade foi o arbitrário. Este, por sua vez, é absolutamente dependente dos valores reconhecidos por aqueles que o sustentam. Ainda no De l'arbitraire dans la connaissance, Perelman mostra o fundamento do arbitrário e, para isso, busca sustentação no ensaio à crítica da idéia de necessidade publicado por Dupréel em 1928. Esta problematização reaparecerá, alguns anos mais tarde, tanto na Introduction à une idée philosophique de valeur 114 de Dupréel, quanto em Jugements de valeur, justification et argumentation de Perelman. 115 Este último resgata no pensamento de Dupréel a concepção de verdade como valor. Naquele contexto, ambos pareciam devidamente convencidos de que as raízes do valor de verdade são a sua utilidade e a sua singularidade específica; 116 a preeminência, todavia, resulta de um acordo que ajusta o valor do múltiplo em relação àquele da unidade. No prefácio dos Essais pluralistes, Dupréel desvela o seu pensamento apresentando, un pluralisme foncier opposant l'explication par le multiple et l'hétérogène à toutes les doctrines classiques dominées par le recours à l'unité sous les formes du simple, de l'élément, du continu, de l'indéfectible et de l'assuré d'avance. 117 O pluralismo se configura como alternativa possível para superação do individualismo, da intolerância, dos conflitos interpessoais e da parcialidade. Não obstante, a concepção sociológica de Dupréel caracteriza-se pela abertura de uma via alternativa às concepções dualistas e dicotômicas das doutrinas clássicas, servindo, portanto, de fundamento 114 DUPRÉEL, E. Introduction à une idée philosophique de valeur. Esquisse d'une philosophie des valeurs. Paris : Alcan, 1939. 115 PERELMAN, Jugements de valeur, justification et argumentation, 1961a, p. 1-9. 116 DUPRÉEL, E. Les deux racines de la valeur du vrai, (1934), publié en 1935. Essais pluralistes, 1939. 117 DUPRÉEL, Essais P luralistes, 1949, p. VIII. - 45 - para a abordagem filosófica concedida por Perelman em sua teoria acerca das noções confusas. 118 Temos, no pensamento de Perelman, a estruturação de uma filosofia do pluralismo cujo fundamento está situado na natureza controversa das noções confusas. O pluralismo é uma noção confusa 119 que parte do pressuposto de que a vida social consiste em esforços simultâneos de colaboração e conflito entre indivíduos e grupos. 120 Os conflitos, que se exprimem na forma de desacordos e controvérsias, são inevitáveis e recorrentes, motivo pelo qual, o pluralismo "renonce à un ordre parfaite élaboré en fonction d'un seul critère, car il admet l'existence d'un pluralisme des valeurs incompatibles. De là, la nécessité de compromis raisonnables, résultant d'un dialogue permanent, d'une confrontation de points de vue opposés". 121 Assim, a revelação de um pluralismo fundamental que opõe a explicação do múltiplo e do heterogêneo às doutrinas clássicas dominadas pelo recurso à unidade sob formas do simples, do elemento, do contínuo, e do indestrutível, permite uma forte crítica porque se opõe às bases de um movimento extremamente forte que se consolida no contexto em que emanam tais idéias: o logicismo 122 . Isso faz crer que a discussão da qual tratam os escritos mencionados está no plano da concepção de Lógica e do entendimento sobre os meios de prova. 118 Esta linha de raciocínio encontra sustentação no pensamento de autores como Bertrand Russell, por exemplo, visto que a opção por um pluralismo reflete a insatisfação com o modelo de Filosofia influenciado pela maneira matemática de enxergar o mundo a partir do modelo cartesiano de pensamento. (Cf. RUSSELL, Bertrand. Ensaios Céticos. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1957, p. 64). 119 Cf. PERELMAN, 1979a, p.5 120 Alexy destaca que, num trabalho posterior ao Tratado (Fünf Vorlesungen über Gerechtigkeit. Über die Gerechtikeit: Munique, 1967) Perelman parece considerar que as questões referentes ao preferível também podem ser discutidas diante do auditório universal (Cf. ALEXY, Robert. Teoria de la Argumentación Juríd ica. Trad.: Manuel Atienza e I. Espejo. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1989, p.165). Esquece, entretanto, que este trabalho consiste em uma tradução alemã do texto de 1945. 121 Cf. PERELMAN, 1979a, p.11. 122 Cf. PERELMAN, 1979a, p.17. - 46 - 1 . 3 . Os M ei os de P r ova Embora as concepções da Lógica sejam numerosas e variadas, elas se aproximam, sem exceção, da idéia de prova. Conforme Perelman 123 , a Lógica nada mais é que o estudo dos meios de prova, e qualquer concepção que ultrapasse esta designação está condenada ao fracasso. Por sua vez, seja qual for a idéia que se tenha de prova, ela sempre concerne a uma tese formulada e consignada dentro de certa linguagem, seja ela natural ou artificial. A Lógica clássica, tal como formulada por Aristóteles, ou mesmo a de Port-Royal, assim como os trabalhos de certos lógicos contemporâneos 124 , agregou as considerações relativas à elaboração de nosso pensamento. Se desenvolvimentos semelhantes apresentaram um interesse filosófico inegável, importa distingui-los da teoria da prova propriamente dita. Perelman integrou esses desenvolvimentos na Teoria do Conhecimento e incorporou esse conteúdo nos dois primeiros volumes dos seus Cursos de Lógica. 125 A adoção deste procedimento indica o interesse pessoal de Perelman em qualificar como conhecimento "uma opinião posta a prova, que conseguiu resistir às críticas e às objeções e da qual se espera com confiança, mas sem uma certeza absoluta, que resistirá aos exames futuros 126 ", visto que, sustenta Perelman, "não podemos crer na existência de um critério absoluto que seja o fiador de sua própria infalibilidade". 127 O terceiro volume dos seus Cursos de Lógica, a propósito, foi consagrado exclusivamente ao estudo dos meios de prova. Mas, em que consiste a prova? Para Aristóteles, "quando se acha que o que foi dito não pode ser refutado, acredita-se ter apresentado uma prova, porquanto a prova é sempre demonstrada e perfeita". 128 O silogismo, por exemplo, é uma prova nesse sentido. O mesmo vale para John Stuart Mill, 129 para quem a prova não é o que determina a crença, mas o que deveria determiná-la, conforme o fato. Do 123 PERELMAN, 1963, p. 218-219. 124 Cf. HUSSERL, Edmund. Investigações Lógicas. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1980. 125 Cf. PERELMAN, Cours de logique, 1951-2. 126 PERELMAN, 1996, p.160. 127 PERELMAN, 1996, p.160. 128 Cf. ARISTÓTELES, 1998. ( I, 2, 1357 b5 ). 129 Para J.S. Mill, a base filosófica para a lógica e a matemática precisa começar com uma análise da experiência que está antes de todo pensamento formal. Como corolário ao seu princípio, Mill admite a crença no indefinido progresso do estado mental e perpétuo melhoramento da espécie humana. Ainda que estivesse longe de poder vir adotar o preceito utilitarista, para Mill, é absurdo se pensar, a partir do seu estágio atual, que a humanidade não possa vir assumi-lo plenamente (Cf. MILL, Utilitarismo, 1976). - 47 - ponto de vista racionalista, a prova consiste em uma operação que deve conduzir ao reconhecimento da verdade de uma proposição, ou seja, consiste na adoção de razões com vista à aceitação de uma proposição supostamente verdadeira. Do ponto de vista empirista, a prova se apresenta como um mecanismo de adequação de uma crença ao real, posto que na concepção empirista a prova corresponde a um procedimento que visa tornar uma crença conforme a um fato. Essas concepções que apresentam o ponto de vista racionalista e empirista na matéria, se assemelham em pontos específicos: tratam da característica normativa da prova e insistem não mais sobre a maneira como raciocinamos, mas como deveríamos raciocinar para bem conduzir nossos pensamentos, para torná-los conforme um aspecto objetivo da realidade, a certos fatos ou à verdade de certas proposições. Este aspecto normativo da Lógica a aproxima da Psicologia, porque a tarefa da Lógica é dirigir nossos pensamentos. O importante dentro desta concepção, não é a maneira como raciocinamos de fato, mas como deveríamos conduzir nossas idéias para raciocinar de maneira correta, ou seja, conforme as regras da Lógica. Distante dessas concepções clássicas, Perelman defende que a prova consiste em qualquer argumento capaz de diminuir dúvidas e suprimir hesitações. 130 Embora esta concepção pareça demasiado sintética pode-se afirmar que a noção perelmaniana de prova – apenas aparentemente – não alimenta grandes pretensões porque, ao sintetizar, amplia o sentido da palavra concedendo-lhe a possibilidade de abarcar procedimentos que extrapolam o campo da prova científica incorporando elementos dialéticos e argumentativos no rol das ferramentas de fortalecimento e sustentação de nossas convicções. Em suas palavras: Essa ampliação da noção de prova nos permite estudar, ao lado da prova clássica, que poderíamos qualificar de lógica, as numerosas espécies de prova dialética ou retórica, que, via de regra, diferem da prova lógica porque dizem respeito a qualquer tese – e não somente à verdade das proposições ou à sua conformidade aos fatos – e porque não são coercivas ou necessárias. Essas provas são mais ou menos eficazes, ou seja, determinam 130 PERELMAN, 1996b, p. 266. - 48 - uma adesão das mentes, de sua formação, de seu condicionamento fisiológico ou social. 131 Perelman acredita que a característica normativa da Lógica a torna solidária de uma Teoria do Conhecimento, cuja tarefa seria justificar o lugar especial que nós atribuímos às regras lógicas para a direção do nosso pensamento; de dizer porque essas regras devem ser admitidas pelos que são dotados de razão, e porque nós devemos desqualificar aqueles que põem estas regras em dúvida. É assim que a característica normativa da Lógica vai de par com a afirmação da existência de uma faculdade comum aos homens: a razão, que não tem necessidade de prova por reconhecer a evidência dos princípios da Lógica. Na concepção clássica, outrossim, estes princípios coincidem com as leis da razão, porque são evidentes e devem servir para demonstrar as proposições que não são do mesmo nível da evidência. Perelman sustenta que a adoção de comportamentos semelhantes ao citado anteriormente consistem em resquícios da tradição herdeira do pensamento de Descartes, que condicionou o saber humano a mercê do saber matemático e negligenciou o que não era evidente. A Lógica formal, tal como ela é compreendida, comporta apenas o estudo dos meios de prova utilizados na demonstração matemática, ou seja, o estudo da dedução necessária. Mas, excluindo a prova experimental, 132 as provas elementares – às quais atribuímos algum valor – são utilizáveis em matemática? Os meios de prova utilizados pelas Ciências Humanas, no campo do Direito e na Filosofia, por exemplo, são de natureza bem diferente e revelam não mais uma teoria da inferência necessária, mas, melhor que isso, de uma teoria da racionalidade argumentativa que trate das noções confusas. 133 A lógica não-formal, que se ocupa do estudo da argumentação, apenas fornece provas não-constringentes – aliás, esta é a razão pela qual os lógicos, especialmente antes da renovação da Lógica formal na metade do século XIX, a 131 « Cette extension de la notion de preuve nous permet d'étudier, a côté de la preuve classique, que nous pourrions qualifier de logique, les nombreuses espèces de preuve dialectique ou rhétorique, qui diffèrent de la preuve logique, en règle générale, parce qu'elles concernant n'importe qu'elle thèse – et pas seulement la vérité des propositions ou leur conformité aux faits – et qu'elles ne sont ni contraignantes ni nécessaires. Ces preuves sont plus ou moins efficaces, c'est-à-dire déterminent une adhésion des esprits d'une intensité variable, et cette efficacité, on pourrait espérer l'étudier d'une façon expérimentale, en tenant compte de la diversité des esprits, de leur formation, de leur conditionnement physiologique ou social » (PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1952a, p.123.) 132 Considera-se prova experimental, neste caso especificamente, aquela que põe o problema das relações entre proposições e outra coisa que as proposições, podendo, a este título, ser estudada na Teoria do Conhecimento. 133 Durante a década de 1950 Perelman irá reformular esta análise e dirá que "Os meios de prova utilizados pela Filosofia, são de natureza distinta e revelam não mais uma teoria da inferência necessária, mas, em seu lugar, de uma teoria da argumentação". (Cf. PERELMAN, Cours de logique, 1951-1952). - 49 - negligenciaram completamente. Como os homens, na prática, jamais abandonaram o exercício da argumentação, Perelman sustenta que a Lógica formal está longe de exaurir o domínio que devemos conferir ao estudo dos meios de prova. É assim que sua concepção de Lógica se divide em duas partes, a primeira comportando os elementos de Lógica formal, e a segunda o esboço de uma teoria da argumentação. As análises aqui empreendidas conduzem a pensar consoante a idéia de que a busca por uma sustentação lógica para os juízos de valor é o que demarca o interesse de Perelman pela questão lógica. A procura por uma lógica dos valores [axiológicos] estabelece uma espécie de salvação da teoria das noções confusas, que lhe eram caras, e isso possibilitaria expressar a limitação da lógica tradicional e a necessidade de se firmar uma esfera na qual a significação dos valores não estaria entregue à sorte dos desejos individuais, mas se encontrariam em conformidade com certas normas. Desta forma, o significado das noções confusas estaria condicionado e regido por uma modalidade lógica distinta daquela aceita e imposta pelo logicismo, uma vez que este sequer admitiria tal proposta, e assim sendo, era preciso mostrar como se daria esse fundamento e em que bases ele estaria fincado. - 50 - 1 . 4 . A R egr a de J u st i ça e o I dea l da R a z ã o P r á t i ca Quando apresentamos a proposta perelmaniana de construir um método analítico para analisar rigorosamente as noções confusas 134 vimos que uma lógica do pensamento confuso tem como principal causa de sua difusão a predisposição a aplicações práticas. Parece consensual, pelo que se viu no presente capítulo 135 , que a noção de Justiça parece ser uma das mais controversas que existe. Em litígios e conflitos, por exemplo, não é incomum perceber que cada uma das partes que se opõem acredita que a sua causa é a única justa, ou melhor, acredita que a Justiça consiste em aceitar a sua causa como a única dotada de verdade e condições de aceitabilidade. No entanto, existem outras noções que, embora sejam igualmente confusas, parecem despertar menos controvérsias pela sua livre associação a critérios de verificabilidade universais. É o caso, por exemplo, da noção de igualdade, cuja susceptibilidade a uma definição formal e irrefutável, decorrente da sua associação à Matemática e suas fórmulas, disfarça sob falsas aparências a natureza confusa que se lhe concerne. Os problemas relativos à noção de igualdade somente se tornam manifestos quando nos apercebemos da sua constante associação com a noção de Justiça. Quase nunca aproximamos as duas noções imediatamente. Entretanto, pensadores se detiveram nesta tarefa alcançando, inclusive, um êxito satisfatório 136 e, mesmo na atualidade, ela encontra grande amparo nos mais diversos segmentos do campo jurídico ao filosófico 137 . Perelman considera a possibilidade de estabelecer paralelos entre as duas noções e, após constatar que a noção de Justiça, confusa por excelência, permitia uma aproximação com a noção de igualdade, que naturalmente se distancia da controvérsia, se dedicou à tarefa de procurar estabelecer uma regra de justiça formal. 134 Na abordagem do "Método em Filosofia e as Noções Confusas" [1.1.], p.28. 135 Cf. p.28-ss. 136 Hobbes, por exemplo, aproximava as duas noções para ressaltar o caráter de reciprocidade. A esse respeito pode-se ver, em especial no Leviatã, a discussão que está vinculada ao Direito Natural (jus naturale) no capítulo intitulado "Da primeira e segunda Leis Naturais e do Contrato": Cf. HOBBES, Thomas. Leviatã. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1978, I, 14. e também: HOBBES, Thomas. Do Cidadão. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1998. III, § 6. 137 A esse respeito, observar as noções de formalismo kantiano e a justiça como igualdade, bem como, o Neo- kantismo de Del Vecchio e Radbruch. (Cf. DEL VECCHIO, G. Lições de Filosofia do Direito. Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1979. RADBRUCH, G. Filosofia do Direito. Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1979). - 51 - Em Egalité et Justice 138 , por exemplo, Perelman faz uso de trechos pertencentes a autores como Bernard Shaw, cujas conferências sobre o tema da igualdade foram historicamente utilizadas para exaltar esta noção como o ideal que deve ser realizado pela revolução socialista 139 . Neste caso, especificamente, o regime socialista é aventado como justo pelo tratamento igualitário que é concedido aos seus integrantes. Pretendendo destacar que o tratamento igualitário é incontestavelmente justo, esta identificação entre os conceitos, permite sustentar o quanto se pode relativizar a idéia de igualdade quando ela é aproximada da noção de justiça. No plano formal, entretanto, a relação de igualdade assume características absolutas. No campo da aritmética, ao demonstrarmos a igualdade existente entre a expressão 2 + 2 e o número 4 estamos provando que a conexão entre eles se dá por meio de simetria. 2 + 2 = 4 não é uma mera tautologia, mas uma verdade lógica cuja constestabilidade não se aplica. O mesmo se dá com relações de desigualdade tais como 2 + 2 ≠ 5. Em tais exemplos, temos proposições verdadeiras que claramente demonstradas não concedem a possibilidade de optar, ou seja, não podemos preferir a igualdade ou a desigualdade, simplesmente temos de aderir à constatação que se impõe por si mesma, pela força da evidência. É suficiente tomar conhecimento de que, o número resultante de uma operação que envolve outros dois (tal como é o caso de 2 + 2), não pode ser substituído por qualquer outro número que dele difira. Nesse contexto, é impossível realizar a igualdade quando ela não existe. Mas, se existe uma proximidade tentadora entre as noções de justiça e igualdade, há também uma aproximação entre os conceitos de igualdade e identidade que permite tornar ainda mais confusa a noção de justiça. Tal é o caso que Perelman destaca: "Segundo a definição de Leibniz, dois seres, "a" e "b" , são idênticos se toda afirmação relativa a um deles for equivalente a uma afirmação relativa ao outro 140 . Embora Perelman não cite a fonte da qual ele extrai o seu excerto, podemos imaginar que uma melhor elaboração do pensamento seria dizer que a sugestão de Leibniz compreende que dois seres, "a" e "b" , ser iam idênticos se toda afirmação relativa a um deles fosse equivalente a uma afirmação relativa ao outro. Devemos fazer esta ressalva porque embora pareça que Leibniz considera a possibilidade de se instituir a identidade dos indiscerníveis, ele está, na verdade, enunciando um princípio 138 Cf. PERELMAN, 1977, 1984, p. 176-182. 139 Cf. SHAW, George Bernard. Road to Equality. Ten Unpublished Lectures and Essays. 1884-1894, Bacon Press, 1971. 140 PERELMAN, 1999a, p. 83. - 52 - hipotético, pois está convencido da impossibilidade de existir indivíduos ou coisas indiscerníveis, mencionando inclusive, que "pôr duas coisas indiscerníveis é admitir a mesma coisa sob dois nomes". 141 Semelhante idéia se expõe nos Novos Ensaios sobre o Entendimento Humano, conforme excerto abaixo: O princípio de individualização reduz-se, nos indivíduos, ao princípio da distinção (...). Se dois indivíduos fossem perfeitamente semelhantes e iguais e (em uma palavra) indistinguíveis por si mesmos, não haveria princípio de individuação; ousaria até dizer que não haveria distinção individual ou diferentes indivíduos nesta condição. 142 O exemplo em questão trata do problema da "identidade dos indiscerníveis", cujo princípio é associado a Leibniz. Nesse caso, se "a" e "b" têm exatamente as mesmas propriedades, são idênticos. Simbolicamente, o princípio da identidade dos indiscerníveis, pode ser expresso da seguinte maneira: F (Fa ↔ Fb) → a = b. Em outras palavras, se "a" e "b" possuem todas as propriedades em comum, eles são idênticos. Este princípio se agrega ao da "indiscernibilidade dos idênticos", segundo o qual se "a" é idêntico a "b", todas as propriedades que "a" tem, "b" também possui, e todas as propriedades que "b" tem, "a" também dispõe. A indiscernibilidade dos idênticos, simbolicamente, assim se expressa : a = b → F (Fa ↔ Fb). Desta forma, se "a" e "b" são idênticos, eles têm todas as propriedades em comum. A síntese de tais princípios é conhecida, por vezes, como lei de Leibniz 143 . Esta concepção de identidade enunciada por Leibniz é especialmente consistente para Perelman em virtude da aproximação que se institui entre os conceitos de identidade e igualdade, uma vez que as coisas são tomadas como idênticas quando se pode substituir uma à outra. Neste caso, idênticas são todas as coisas que se podem substituir uma à outra salva veritate. Sendo assim, caso "a" esteja contido em uma proposição verdadeira e, colocando "b" no seu lugar, a 141 "to put two undiscernible things means to put the same thing under two names" (Cf. LEIBNIZ, Gottfried Wilhelm ; CLARKE, Samuel. Letter a Clarke, IV. The Leibn iz-Clarke correspondence. New York: Manchester University Press, 1956, 1998, p. 755-756.) Em Português: LEIBNIZ, G. W. Correspondência com Clarke. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1979, IV, p.183. 142 « Le principe d'individuation revient dans les individus au principe de distinction (...). Si deux individus étaient parfaitement semblables et égaux et (en un mot) indistiguables par eux-mêmes, il n'aurait point de principe d'individuation ; et même j'ose dire qu'il n'y aurait point de distinction individuelle ou de différents individus à cette condition » (Cf. LEIBNIZ, G.W. Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain. Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966. II, 27, §3, p.180.) Em Português: LEIBNIZ, G.W. Novos Ensaios sobre o Entendimento Humano. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1980, p. 173. 143 A propósito da Lei de Leibniz, consulte-se o trabalho de MARBACH, Eduard. Théorie de l'identité : La Loi de Leibniz. Cours de Introduction à la philosophie de l'esprit. Fribourg : Université de Fribourg, 2003. - 53 - proposição resultante continuar sendo verdadeira, e ainda, se o mesmo acontecer em qualquer outra proposição, diz-se que "a" e "b" são idênticos; em contrapartida, se "a" e "b" são idênticos, a substituição proposta pode ocorrer sem qualquer espécie de prejuízo. Disso resulta a afirmação perelmaniana de que seria plausível tratar da mesma maneira os seres idênticos, pois não existe nenhuma razão para tratá-los de outra forma. 144 Para considerar a intermutabilidade entre dois seres idênticos, entretanto, é necessário admitir previamente a existência de seres idênticos, visto que, do contrário, o princípio que os considera intermutáveis jamais poderia ser aplicável. Perelman entende que, se seguirmos o caminho trilhado por Frege, verificaremos que dois seres diferentes nunca se identificam. Entretanto, é possível que duas maneiras diferentes de designar o mesmo ser, sejam aplicadas. É o caso, por exemplo, do que Frege apresenta no seguinte excerto de Über Sinn und Bedeutung: a = a e a = b são, evidentemente, sentenças de valor cognitivo diferentes; a = a sustenta-se a priori e, segundo Kant, deve ser denominada de analítica, enquanto que sentenças da forma a = b contêm, freqüentemente, extensões muito valiosas de nosso conhecimento, e nem sempre podem ser estabelecidas a priori. A descoberta de que o sol nascente não é novo a cada manhã, mas é sempre o mesmo, foi uma das descobertas astronômicas mais ricas em conseqüências. Mesmo atualmente, o reconhecimento de um pequeno planeta ou de um cometa nem sempre é evidente por si. Assim, se quiséssemos considerar a igualdade como uma relação entre aquilo a que os nomes "a" e "b" se referem, pareceria que a = b não poderia diferir de a = a, desde que a = b seja verdadeira. Deste modo expressaríamos a relação de uma coisa consigo mesma, relação que toda coisa tem consigo mesma, mas que nunca se dá entre duas coisas distintas. Por outro lado, parece que por a = b quer-se dizer que os sinais ou os nomes "a" e "b" referem-se à mesma coisa, e neste caso, a discussão versaria sobre estes sinais; uma relação entre eles seria asserida. Mas esta relação se manteria entre os nomes ou sinais, apenas na medida em que denominassem ou designassem alguma coisa. Ela seria mediada pela conexão de cada um dos sinais com a mesma coisa designada. 145 Daí se segue o conhecido exemplo utilizado por Frege acerca da utilização das expressões "estrela da manhã" e "estrela da tarde" como referência ao planeta Vênus que, em contexto perelmaniano, servirá para ilustrar a condição de possibilidade da intermutabilidade 144 A esse respeito ver as considerações acerca da regra de justiça. [Cf. PERELMAN, 1963d, p.77. Ver também: PERELMAN, 1999, p. 248-250. E ainda: PERELMAN, 1999a, p. 83-88. 145 FREGE, Sobre o Sentido e a Referência. Lógica e Fi losofia da Linguagem, 1978, p. 61. - 54 - entre dois seres considerados idênticos. Façamos como Perelman e deixemos ao próprio Frege a apresentação do problema: A referência de "Estrela da Tarde" e "Estrela da Manhã" [pode ser] a mesma, mas não o sentido. (...) O sentido de um nome próprio é entendido por todos que estejam suficientemente familiarizados com a linguagem ou com a totalidade de designações a que ele pertence. 146 O comentário acima nos permite compreender que a "Estrela da Manhã" é idêntica à "Estrela da Tarde" por terem, ambas, a mesma referência, e mostra um caso típico em que expressões diferentes designam um e o mesmo objeto; neste caso, especificamente, um corpo celeste 147 . Note-se que, há uma distinção entre os dois casos em questão. No primeiro deles, pertencente a Leibniz, se está a apresentar o germe da regra de justiça de Perelman, visto que Leibniz está a inferir que é possível estabelecer uma identidade entre dois seres distintos (neste caso, especificamente, denominados "a" e "b"), desde que a afirmação que se faça acerca de um deles seja equivalente à afirmação relativa ao outro. No segundo caso, entretanto, Frege traz a questão para o plano da linguagem. Estabelece, a partir daí, que duas expressões (manteremos a designação "a" e "b" ) podem manter uma identidade, uma vez que designam um mesmo objeto, tal como exposto no exemplo da "estrela da manhã" e da "estrela da tarde". A alusão a esses argumentos, baseada na referência ao princípio de identidade, põe o problema no campo da regra de justiça. Se o rigor metodológico do pensamento fregeano impossibilita o tratamento incondicional de seres distintos ("a" e "b") como idênticos a partir da equivalência que se institui entre eles por intermédio da afirmação comum a eles atribuída, resta a Perelman, buscar elementos capazes de sustentar os casos nos quais é cabível fornecer um tratamento semelhante para dois seres, ou ainda, duas situações diferentes, assemelhados uns aos outros. Deve-se perceber que não se trata, então, de uma identificação completa e irrestrita tal como parecia preconizar a sugestão Leibniziana. Pelo contrário, consiste em uma 146 FREGE, Lógica e F ilosofia da Linguagem, 1978, p. 62-63. 147 Frege utiliza a palavra "igual" e o sinal " = " no sentido de "o mesmo que", "não outro senão", "idêntico a". Esta utilização está em conformidade com o pensamento de E.Schröder (Vorlesungen über die Álgebra des Logik,Vol.I, §1, Leipzig, 1890), onde, no entanto, Frege critica o fato de não se distinguir duas relações fundamentalmente diferentes, a de cair um objeto sob um conceito e a de estar um conceito subordinado a outro conceito. (Cf. FREGE, Johann Gottlob. Über Begriff und Gegenstand. Vierteljahrsschrift für Wissenschaftliche, Philosophie, XVI, 1892, p. 196 apud FREGE, Sobre o Conceito e o Objeto. Lógica e Filosofia da Linguagem, 1978. p. 91, nota ). Problema semelhante é tratado em Fundamentos da Aritmética, § 66, nota. (Cf. FREGE, 1980). - 55 - identificação parcial. A justificação da sua aplicabilidade, resulta do negligenciamento das diferenças que são desprezadas em proveito das semelhanças consideradas essenciais para o estabelecimento da identidade e, por conseguinte, dos casos em que se pode fornecer tratamentos semelhantes. A justificação aqui aventada, embora aceitável, reserva certas limitações se pensamos que o negligenciável permanece privado de uma designação melhor detalhada. Ainda que aceitemos não examinar convenientemente as diferenças, por buscar as semelhanças, a determinação do que é negligenciável requer uma melhor consideração. Se não em termos práticos, uma vez que serão descartadas para uma aproximação conceitual, ao menos em termos técnicos a sua explicitação se impõe como necessidade, pois é preciso conhecer os critérios que determinam o que não se deve levar em conta. Somente uma posição que considera o negligenciável intrinsecamente relacionado ao fim perseguido é capaz de levar a cabo a justificação concedida. Em outras palavras, aquilo que deve ser negligenciado, ou não, é essencialmente dependente do fim a que se persegue. Quando se trata de estabelecer ilações entre eventos distintos, de maneira que se torne possível prever, com boa margem de probabilidade, que um evento qualquer se segue a outro que lhe é imediatamente anterior, o que serve de fundamentação para o estabelecimento preciso dessa associação de fatos? Sem dúvida, é a experiência lastreada por uma teoria capaz de lhe conceder suporte, que possibilitará estabelecer os elementos essenciais de um evento, servindo como condição para a ocorrência do outro. É assim que podemos compreender os procedimentos que estão ligados diretamente ao fato, e descartar aqueles que embora pareçam correlacionados, somente o são contingencialmente. Fazendo uso de procedimento análogo, podemos elaborar classificações, identificar regularidades ou leis da natureza e, sobretudo, conhecer e descartar o negligenciável para aquele determinado evento (específico). Como, porém, é possível pensar o problema relativo a leis normativas levando-se em consideração o que, até aqui, foi dito? Talvez não fosse prudente adotar a postura de desconsiderar as diferenças, segundo a qual apenas as semelhanças precisam ser destacadas. Mas quando se trata de firmar regras de conduta para estabelecer as obrigações que devem ser impostas àqueles situados em uma determinada condição, bem como para determinar as obrigações que se devem ter para com eles, a especificidade das suas propriedades está correlacionada aos fins que a regra pretende atingir. Perelman reporta-se à questão nas seguintes palavras: "Quando se - 56 - trata de leis normativas, e não simplesmente descritivas, o caráter essencial ou negligenciável de uma ou outra das suas propriedades depende dos fins que a regra instaurada se propõe perseguir". 148 Pensemos na noção de justiça que se ampara na concepção de "dar a cada qual a mesma coisa" 149 . Embora seja puramente igualitária, porque não exige a aplicação de certa proporcionalidade, o problema desta concepção é que ela agrega os seres aos quais se deseja aplicar a justiça em uma categoria essencial universal, ou seja, embora não seja segregativa, incorre no erro de generalizar e acreditar que todas as pessoas fazem parte de apenas uma categoria essencial. Quer tratemos da humanidade, ou mesmo de alguns integrantes de um grupo específico, ao se designar "cada qual", já não há qualquer característica que sirva de ferramenta de distinção. As diferenças existentes entre os seres, são ignoradas porque não são consideradas essenciais. O essencial, neste caso, é aquilo que preserva a unidade entre os seres, no caso específico da Justiça, o conceito de humanidade, o resto é negligenciável. A intenção desse tipo de enquadramento é conduzir-nos a distinguir, entre as qualidades que diferenciam os seres, aquelas que são essenciais e as que podem ser consideradas secundárias, porque irrelevantes para a aplicação da Justiça. Entretanto, a concepção que preconiza conceder a "cada qual a mesma coisa" embora seja, de fato, igualitária, não corresponde necessariamente à idéia de um humanismo igualitário. Para que pudéssemos associar as duas idéias, seria necessário que a classe dos seres aos quais se ansiaria aplicar esta noção fosse composta por todos os homens. Contudo, o campo de aplicação desta fórmula se restringe, no mais das vezes, a uma categoria bem menos estendida. Perelman, no De la Justice, faz uso de um exemplo específico para demonstrar como, constantemente, se utiliza a noção de Justiça como concessão da "mesma coisa a cada qual". Nas palavras do autor: Em Esparta, essa fórmula igualitária era aplicada unicamente à classe dos homoïoï 150 , os aristocratas, a classe superior da população. Não teria passado pela cabeça dos homoïoï 148 PERELMAN, 1977a, p. 94. 149 Perelman concede um tratamento exaustivo acerca desse entendimento – segundo o qual a justiça consiste em "dar a cada qual a mesma coisa" – no primeiro capítulo do livro intitulado De la Justicia (PERELMAN, Chaïm. De la Justicia. Trad.: Ricardo Guerra. México D.F.: UNAM, 1964, p.17) 150 Acerca dos homoïoï citados por Perelman, podemos dizer que, dentro das regras estipuladas pelo regime político espartano, os homoïoï - os pares ou iguais -, também denominados de esparcíatas, eram os únicos que desfrutavam de direitos políticos plenos na polis e, por isso mesmo, podiam desfrutar do direito de conviver em acampamentos e comer juntos na mesma mesa. (Cf. HODKINSON, Stephen J. Social Order and the Conflict of Values in Classical Sparta. Chiron, n.13, 1983, p. 239-281. A esse respeito, ver também: HODKINSON, S. J. ; POWELL, Anthony (ed.). Sparta: New Perspectives, 1999). - 57 - espartanos querer aplicar essa concepção da justiça às outras camadas da população, com as quais não viam nenhuma medida em comum. 151 Com o presente exemplo, Perelman deseja expressar que a fórmula igualitária da Justiça, embora pareça estar vinculada a um ideal humanitário, se constitui em um instrumento de fortalecimento dos laços de solidariedade entre os membros integrantes de uma classe, que se põe incompatível com as demais, porque superior. Se essa fórmula parece realizar, mais do que qualquer outra, o ideal de justiça perfeita, é porque existe a possibilidade de determinar arbitrariamente a categoria dos seres aos quais é aplicável a justiça igualitária. Perelman percebe, entretanto, que a partir dela, pode-se chegar a desenvolver outra definição da justiça formal, mais flexível e compatível com os seus objetivos. Observa ser necessário precisar que se entende por "cada qual" os membros da mesma categoria essencial, e assim se obtém a fórmula "a cada membro da mesma categoria essencial, a mesma coisa" que é equivalente a definição de justiça formal que se converterá na chamada regra de justiça. Essa possibilidade de conversão foi resgatada de Pierre De Tourtoulon 152 visto que, em Trois Justices, este autor cogitou a possibilidade de fazer da fórmula igualitária o ideal da justiça perfeita, embora centrado na sua impossibilidade de realização. Para ele, a condição irrealizável da justiça perfeita consistiria na impossibilidade de igualdade completa entre os homens. Tourtoulon estava certo de que a igualdade perfeita é irrealizável e só pode constituir um ideal para o qual se deve inclinar incondicionalmente. Há certo idealismo platônico no desejo do autor ao considerar a justiça-igualdade, em sua plena concretização, como uma espécie de limite do qual se pode tentar aproximar, na medida do possível, mesmo ciente da sua inatingibilidade. Diz Tourtoulon: Logicamente, as diversas concepções da justiça-igualdade, muito longe de serem contraditórias, são da mesma essência. Diferem apenas por sua possibilidade de realização. Sendo a igualdade perfeita uma idéia limite, sua possibilidade de realização é 151 Cf. PERELMAN, De la Justice, 1945 apud PERELMAN, 1963d, p.27 152 Cf. TOURTOULON, Pierre. Les principes philosophiques de l'histoire du droit. 1919. Trans. by Martha M. Read as Philosophy in the development of law, Modern Legal Philosophy Series, Vol. XIII. Boston, 1922). - 58 - nula. As possibilidades de realização aumentam à medida que as outras concepções igualitárias vão se afastando desse ponto situado no infinito. 153 Seguindo essa idéia que considera as [outras] concepções da justiça meras tentativas imperfeitas de realizar a igualdade, Perelman busca uma adaptação da regra igualitária pela qual se extrai a universalidade do "cada qual" e o aproxima do "cada membro da mesma categoria essencial". A categoria essencial, nesse caso, é pensada como o grupo de pessoas que estão sob a égide da Lei. Mas pensar desta forma equivale a associar-se a outra concepção de justiça segundo a qual se deve conceder "a cada qual o que a lei lhe atribui". O maior problema desta fórmula consiste em admitir, em sua aplicação, tantas variantes quantas legislações existir, visto que, cada sociedade possui o seu sistema jurídico e o seu respectivo conjunto de leis. É a idéia de igualdade perante a lei que serve de orientação ao pensamento, visto que, conforme o exposto, compreendemos que o principio do Direito segundo o qual "todos os seres devem ser tratados da mesma maneira" subsume que a noção de igualdade deve ser entendida como igualdade perante a lei, ou seja, "todos os indivíduos que possuem as propriedades exigidas pela lei" serão tratados da mesma maneira, isto é, da maneira determinada pela lei. A inclusão da expressão "que possuem as propriedades exigidas pela lei" no interior do princípio supracitado confere-lhe um sentido bastante diferente daquele segundo o qual "todos os indivíduos devem ser tratados da mesma maneira" 154 . A incondicionalidade desta modalidade pretende uma universalidade que não comporta aplicação prática, porque inexeqüível. O seu cumprimento implica uma noção de igualdade que perpassa o absurdo na medida em que sugere dar "a cada um a mesma coisa", ou melhor "dar a todos a mesma coisa", ignorando as particularidades de cada indivíduo tomado isoladamente, ou no interior do grupo em que se enquadra. Essa concepção tenta subjugar a idéia de igualdade em despeito da inconteste conclusão de que os "homens não são iguais", ou seja, admitir ser justiça conceder "a cada qual a mesma coisa", equivale a considerar que todos os seres devem ser tratados da mesma forma, sem levar em conta nenhuma das particularidades que os 153 TOURTOULON, Pierre. Les Trois Justices. Paris : Sirey, 1932. apud PERELMAN, De la Justicia, 1964, p.24. (Cuaderno 14). 154 Tal como no caso da noção de justiça que se apóia na concepção de "dar a cada qual a mesma coisa", conforme apresentado anteriormente. (Cf. p. 56). - 59 - distingue. 155 Deve-se ressaltar, neste ponto, que o debate sobre a distinção das qualidades essenciais e secundárias não pode ser dirimido de modo satisfatório para todos, pois sua solução representaria a solução de outros problemas concernentes a valores. Além disso, essa noção de justiça pode ser convertida, paradoxalmente, na mais injusta de todas, visto que, "seja-se jovem ou velho, doente ou saudável, rico ou pobre, virtuoso ou criminoso, nobre ou rústico, branco ou negro, culpado ou inocente, considera-se justo que todos sejam tratados da mesma forma, sem discriminação alguma, sem discernimento algum". 156 A restrição do tratamento igualitário aos seres detentores de qualidades específicas estabelecidas pela Lei, consiste em uma tentativa de transformar o princípio universal de justiça igualitária, em uma regra de justiça de natureza formal. Esta regra é formal porque, inicialmente, não exprime as diferenças que devem ser consideradas essenciais em detrimento das "não essenciais". Ademais, simplesmente expressa que os seres essencialmente semelhantes devem ser tratados de um mesmo modo, porém não indica como é necessário tratá-los. Neste caso, subentende-se que determinadas diferenças sejam relevantes em alguns casos e desprezíveis em outros. A partir do condicionante, Perelman pretende estabelecer que "os seres de uma categoria essencial devem ser tratados da mesma forma". A ausência do condicionante concedido por Perelman converteria a regra de justiça na seguinte máxima universal: "todos os seres devem ser tratados de maneira semelhante". Entretanto, a mera inclusão da expressão restritiva não concede ao autor a possibilidade de dar origem à chamada regra de justiça, visto que, se considerarmos apenas a delimitação da categoria essencial aos seres que conservam os elementos prescritos pela norma jurídica, incorreremos no erro de tomar uma aplicação da regra de justiça como o remate da sua expressão acabada. O enquadramento perante a Lei é, exclusivamente, um exemplo da regra de justiça em sua execução e não o coroamento da 155 Observemos, a esse respeito, o comentário de Noberto Bobbio: "É necessário ter em mente que os homens não são iguais. Dever-se-ia distribuir de acordo com as diferenças. Este conceito de distribuição a todos da mesma coisa é uma concepção da justiça chamada de igualitária. Pertence aos primeiros movimentos revolucionários, como, por exemplo, o movimento revolucionário de Babeuf, ou conjuração dos iguais, que hoje não é mais aceita por ninguém". (Cf. BOBBIO, N. Que é justiça, dentro de sua concepção de direito? CARDIM, Carlos Henrique (Org). Bobbio no Brasil: Um Retrato Intelectual Brasília. UnB; São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial, 2001. 156 A esse respeito Perelman faz uma referência anedótica: "no imaginário popular, considera-se que o ser perfeitamente justo é a morte que vem atingir a todos os homens, sem levar em consideração nenhum dos seus privilégios." (Cf. PERELMAN, De la Justice, 1945. apud. PERELMAN, 1963d, p.16) E nós acrescentamos: "Considerar esta noção de justiça equivaleria a substituir a balança e a tira dos olhos na imagem da Justiça, por uma foice e um manto negro." - 60 - regra como tal. Do contrário, Perelman não faria menção ao tratamento (desumano) concedido por aqueles que consideram apenas a Justiça em conformidade com Lei dos seus países. 157 Nesse caso, a discussão transbordaria do âmbito da Justiça para o âmbito da legalidade. O que está em conformidade com a Lei é legítimo, e não necessariamente justo, porque é vernáculo embora não seja lídimo, por conta dos interesses unilaterais que comportam o estabelecimento da Lei. A regra de justiça precisaria estar ligada a uma espécie de legitimidade moral que transcende a letra da Lei. Mas voltemos ao esforço de fundamentação que conduz Perelman a desenvolver a regra de justiça para verificar o que está subjacente. A regra de justiça reclama tratamento igual em situações semelhantes, e a sua aplicação supõe a existência de precedentes capazes de instruir as pessoas acerca das possibilidades de resolver situações semelhantes à que se apresenta 158 . Com base naquilo que existe na experiência do indivíduo ou no histórico de casos semelhantes resolvidos à luz de uma tradição específica, resolve-se um problema sugerindo uma solução que se enquadre em moldes semelhantes. Não há uma rigidez estática nessa forma de proceder, nada impede que se aja de outra maneira, a exemplo do raciocínio lógico formal que compele o indivíduo, mas é razoável imaginar que se deva agir de modo semelhante uma vez que esse caso implica um tratamento igual àquele. Evocar um precedente significa, neste caso, insistir nas semelhanças em detrimento das diferenças. A ausência de razões suficientemente fortes para descartar, ou ignorar, determinados elementos que antecedem um evento específico consiste na aplicação da regra de justiça enunciada por Perelman. Isso significa que tal regra consiste na manifestação de um "princípio de letargia" (inércia) de acordo com o qual, torna-se plausível reagir de maneira semelhante a anterior, em situações similares. É o caso, no Direito, da jurisprudência, onde casos concretos submetidos a 157 Aliás, conforme expusemos no princípio deste capítulo [p.18], ao escrever o De la Justice no período em que se encontrava exilado, Perelman pretendia exteriorizar a ojeriza concernente às noções de Justiça amparadas por critérios unilaterais ou exclusivamente vinculados à lei de certos países porque, nestes casos, a ausência de imparcialidade converte a idéia de justiça à satisfação de interesses coletivos de determinados grupos, setores ou Estados, em detrimento de outros. 158 A regra de justiça formulada por Perelman, originalmente publicada no texto de 1945 intitulado de De la Justice [Cf. nota 26, p.18] tornará a ser analisada em outros trabalhos a exemplo do Tratado da Argumentação: a Nova Retórica [1958, §52], bem como em O Império Retórico [1999a, p.83-88] devido à sua importância para o estabelecimento do estatuto epistemológico das teses em um processo argumentativo. Sustentamos essa hipótese com base em um relatório exposto pelo próprio autor durante sua apresentação no segundo Colóquio da Associação dos Sociólogos de Língua Francesa, realizada em Royaumont, no dia 18 de Março de 1959 e publicada na forma de texto, no mesmo ano, sob o título de Os Âmbitos Sociais da Argumentação (Cf. PERELMAN, 1959, p. 123-135. Republicado em : Le champ de l'argumentation, 1970, p. 24-40). - 61 - julgamento, recebem interpretação reiterada da lei ou, na ausência desta, da aplicação de juízo razoável, conforme outro previamente concedido em situação análoga. Os costumes que concedem um valor normativo para uma forma habitual de agir têm a sua origem em procedimentos desta natureza. A utilização argumentativa da regra de justiça pode ser ilustrada pelo seguinte excerto do sermão de Demóstenes, citado por Perelman: Pretenderiam eles porventura que uma convenção, se é contrária à nossa cidade, é válida, ao passo que, se lhe serve de garantia, recusam reconhecê-la? É isso que vos parece justo? Como? Se algo do que foi jurado é favorável aos nossos inimigos, mas nocivo para nós, eles afirmarão a sua validade; se, ao contrário, aí se encontra uma estipulação a um só tempo justa e vantajosa para nós, mas desfavorável para eles, acreditam-se obrigados a combatê-la sem descanso! 159 No comentário acima, o autor acentua a concepção habitual que considera injusta qualquer ação em que se constatam procedimentos diferenciados em relação a duas situações essencialmente semelhantes. A ausência de imparcialidade na condução de um (procedimento) similar a outro que o precede, torna-o injusto. O excerto de Demóstenes, por exemplo, é um clamor à imparcialidade, pois ser justo não implica, igualmente, abdicar dos benefícios próprios, mas concerne em não ser desigual na observância da concessão de vantagens privilegiando a si mesmo. Se nem os atenienses, nem seus adversários, gozam de uma situação privilegiada, a regra de justiça requer que o comportamento de uns e de outros, como partes de uma convenção, não seja diferente. O apelo a essa regra apresenta um aspecto de inegável racionalidade. Quando se demonstra a coerência de uma conduta, quase sempre se fará alusão ao respeito da regra de justiça. 160 159 « Prétendraient-ils par hasard qu'une convention, si elle est contraire à notre ville, est valable, alors que, si elle lui sert de garantie, ils refusent de la reconnaître ? Est-ce là ce qui vous semble juste ? Quoi ? Si quelque chose de ce qui a été juré est favorable à nos ennemis, mais nuisible pour nous, ils en affirmeront la validité ; et si, au contraire, il s'y trouve une stipulation à la fois juste et avantageuse pour nous, mais défavorable pour eux, ils se croient obligés de la combattre sans relâche ! » (Cf. DEMÓSTENES, Orações, t.II: sobre o Tratado com Alexandre, §18 apud PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p. 248-249.) 160 « si ni les Athéniens, ni les adversaires, ne jouissent d'une situation privilégiée, la règle de justice demande que le comportement des uns et des autres, comme parties dans une convention, ne soit pas différent. L'appel à cette règle présente un aspect de rationalité indéniable. Quand on fait état de la cohérence d'une conduite, on fera presque toujours allusion au respect de la règle de justice. » (cf. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p. 249.) - 62 - O excerto acima permite, entretanto, que a regra de justiça e o recurso ao precedente que dela resulta, possam ser alvo de, pelo menos, duas objeções. A objeção inicial coloca em evidência a assimilação de duas situações essencialmente diferentes. Esta primeira objeção pode ser ilustrada com uma citação do romance de C.V.Gheorghiu, intitulado La vingt- cinquième heure 161 , que o próprio Perelman utiliza, tanto no Tratado da Argumentação: A Nova retórica 162 , quanto no Império Retórico 163 . Vejamos o trecho na sua íntegra: (...) essas frações de homens, que não têm mais do que pedaços de carne, recebem a mesma quantidade de alimentos que os prisioneiros em perfeita posse dos seus corpos. É uma grande injustiça. Proponho que esses prisioneiros recebam rações alimentares proporcionais à quantidade de corpo que ainda possuem. 164 A crítica em que se pode apoiar um pensamento semelhante ao de Gheorghiu, serve para indicar o caráter arbitrário das classificações administrativas passíveis de amparar a regra de justiça ao pleitear enquadrar "as situações essencialmente semelhantes". No caso específico do autor do excerto citado, a sua apreciação consiste num clamor em oposição à desindividualização humana exercida pelos procedimentos de inserção dos indivíduos em categorias administrativas. Em outras palavras, trata-se de um protesto contra a mecanização dos homens. Se o ponto de partida para se conceber a regra de justiça é a aplicação da noção de categorias essenciais, nas quais os indivíduos se enquadram, e segundo as quais podemos pensar em conceder um tratamento indiferenciado aos seus integrantes, então, a sua aplicação avigora a necessidade de afastar-se de concepções comparáveis à de Gheorghiu. Ainda que a avaliação deste último esteja centrada na contestação da desindividualização dos homens, a sua revolta implica em uma séria objeção à regra de justiça em que Perelman se apóia, uma vez que representa, igualmente, uma revolta contra a inserção dos indivíduos nas mais variadas categorias administrativas (essenciais). Mas pensar os indivíduos como membros intercambiáveis de uma classe é retirar a sua individualidade? A crítica traduzida pela análise 161 Cf. GHEORGHIU, C. Virgil. La vingt-cinquième heure. Traduit du Roumain par Monique SAINT-CÔME, Préface par Gabriel MARCEL. Paris : Plon, 1949, p. 274. (Feux Croisés). 162 Cf. PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p. 249. 163 Cf. PERELMAN, 1977a, p. 75. 164 « (...) ces fractions d'hommes qui n'ont plus que des morceaux de chair, reçoivent la même quantité de nourriture que les prisonniers en parfaite possession de leur corps. C'est une grande injustice. Je propose que ces prisonniers reçoivent des rations alimentaires proportionnelles à la quantité de corps qu'ils possèdent encore. » (Cf. GHEORGHIU, 1949 apud PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p. 249.) - 63 - mórbida de Gheorghiu caminha neste sentido, mas Perelman certamente objetaria com base no critério da negligência, visto que este critério permite desconsiderar aquilo que é a diferença, neste caso específico, as particularidades de cada elemento, em prol da valorização do que os caracteriza enquanto semelhantes e, por conseguinte, integrantes de uma mesma classe ou categoria. Isto é o que deve ser considerado em detrimento do resto. A adoção desse posicionamento reforça a idéia de que cada cultura, e isto também vale para os mais diversos segmentos do campo do conhecimento, tem a responsabilidade de determinar o tratamento que será concedido a cada um dos elementos que a ela estão submetidos, e elaborar as categorias que, neste ou naquele domínio, precisam a noção vaga de essencialmente semelhante. O que é, ou não, importante, as diferenças que são irrelevantes e as que são determinantes, nada disto é fixado ao acaso ou por alguma intuição, mas é definido em conformidade com as exigências e com os critérios vigentes em cada técnica e em cada disciplina científica. 165 Quanto à segunda objeção possível, no que se refere à forma de empregar a regra de justiça, podemos situá-la no que diz respeito ao tratamento que concedemos a duas situações que assemelhamos uma à outra. É assim que Locke se espanta por não se deixar a cada um o cuidado de procurar, à sua maneira, a salvação de sua alma, enquanto que se lhe permite gerir, a seu bel-prazer, o seu patrimônio 166 . Pretendia que se aplicasse em matéria religiosa o mesmo liberalismo que em matéria civil. Mas, nos nossos dias, em que a economia se encontra cada vez mais regulamentada, a assimilação poderia produzir o efeito oposto e levaria, no domínio da consciência, à intervenção crescente dos poderes públicos, como acontece no domínio econômico. 167 O próprio Locke assim descreve, no Segundo Tratado sobre o Governo Civil 168 : Homem nenhum se queixa do mau governo dos negócios do seu vizinho. Homem nenhum se irrita contra outro por um erro cometido ao semear seu campo ou ao casar a filha. Ninguém corrige um pródigo que consome seu patrimônio nas tabernas... Mas, se algum homem não freqüenta a Igreja, se ali não adapta exatamente a sua conduta às 165 PERELMAN, 1959a, p. 138. 166 Cf. LOCKE, John. The second treatise of civil government and A letter concerning toleration. Oxford, 1948, p. 136 apud PERELMAN, 1999a, p. 85. 167 PERELMAN, 1999a, p. 85-86. 168 LOCKE, J. Segundo tratado sobre o governo civi l. São Paulo, Abril Cultural, 1978. (Coleção Os Pensadores). - 64 - cerimônias habituais, ou se não leva seus filhos para serem iniciados nos mistérios sagrados desta ou daquela congregação, isto causa imediatamente um tumulto. 169 Locke faz uso da tolerância no tocante às questões civis, bastante habituais em seu contexto, para suscitar a aplicação da mesma regra para as questões religiosas. A utilização da regra de justiça presume, para a sua execução, o assentamento no concreto, atado a opiniões e acordos constatáveis. Idênticas, portanto, são as situações que apresentam a mesma referência, embora possuam designações, elementos e contexto distintos. O que há de essencial e serve de base para a construção da regra de justiça de Perelman é a referência. E isso é o que distingue a sua teoria das demais concepções de justiça, inclusive aquelas que se assemelham à sua, conforme expusemos. É o critério da referência que ele traz da Lógica Formal para servir de suporte à sua noção de justiça de natureza essencialmente formal. Ao dizer que é necessário "oferecer um tratamento igual aos seres que se encontram em situações essencialmente semelhantes", Perelman está sugerindo a necessidade de se tomar a mesma referência como fonte de fundamentação para a motivação de ações que devem ser adotadas quando houver a dúvida no tocante ao agir justamente. É preciso salientar, a partir das objeções já apresentadas, que embora haja um detalhamento minucioso do problema da Justiça e acerca das inúmeras variações da noção, Perelman não está preocupado em definir Justiça, uma vez que considera esta tarefa bem executada por inúmeros filósofos. Sua preocupação reside no fato de que ele pretende sustentar a idéia de uma regra de justiça que não pode ser amparada por critérios unilaterais, parciais ou subjetivos. Por esse motivo, a lógica formal se apresenta como uma fonte de inspiração em busca do estabelecimento de uma regra de justiça formal. Embora a parte puramente formal da atividade racional possa ser fornecida pela regra de justiça, o conteúdo ao qual essa regra se aplica e o modo de indicar, com exatidão, o que ela abandona à vagueza é obra de opiniões humanas. Estas opiniões, responsáveis pela caracterização da personalidade de seu autor, descrevem os seus valores, refletindo o seu passado, a sua formação, a tradição que ele protrai e, quando necessário, ele aperfeiçoa e restaura. 170 A regra de justiça, mesmo pretensamente apoiada em um ideal "lógico- positivista", se utiliza deste último mais como inspiração que necessariamente como 169 LOCKE apud PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p. 250. 170 Cf. PERELMAN, 1959a, p. 138. - 65 - fundamentação. A exemplo da afirmação de Tourtoulon 171 que exterioriza a sua forte crença na inatingibilidade de uma justiça plena e absoluta, a regra de justiça perelmaniana é a exacerbação da convicção de ser tão ilusório querer reduzir a noção de justiça a um significado (único) comum a todos os indivíduos, quanto o é, igualmente ilusória, a crença na possibilidade de enumerar exaustivamente os sentidos possíveis da noção de justiça. A regra de justiça termina sendo uma forma de expressar o caráter inconciliável das diversas noções de justiça, desde as mais correntes às mais remotas, visto que a exposição da referência como critério de estabelecimento do essencial promove um entendimento acerca da justiça que se mantém atado ao ideal de formalização, sem abandonar o discernimento de que a noção possui também um conteúdo emotivo, uma carga subjetiva. A regra de justiça, a despeito dos que acreditam cegamente no seu ideal, é uma espécie de definição sintética da noção de justiça, porque sustenta um vínculo entre um conceito (arbitrário porque pretensamente analítico) e uma emoção (traduzida pelo sentido subjetivo que está vinculado ao termo definido). Essa regra difere, por exemplo, do positivismo jurídico de Kelsen ao qual Perelman se opõe. Ciente da impossibilidade de apagar a carga emotiva contida na noção de justiça pela simples redução analítica do termo, Perelman está buscando uma espécie de assepsia parcial do vocábulo em questão, para torná-lo mais crível, independentemente do auditório ao qual se dirija, pleiteando um ideal de universalidade e uma ampliação do seu campo de atuação, mas o mantendo unido aos valores que lhe servem de sustentação. Ao sugerir que "é necessário oferecer tratamento idêntico aos indivíduos que se encontram em situações essencialmente semelhantes", Perelman está consolidando a expressão formal da regra convertida em máxima, ratificando a imprescindibilidade da recorrência aos valores amplamente reconhecidos para assumirem o status de "referencial", condicionando os demais critérios a uma posição secundária e, por conseguinte, possível de ser negligenciada. 171 Cf. nota 152, p. 57. - 66 - 1 . 5 . P er el ma n e Kel sen O interesse perelmaniano de criar uma regra de justiça resulta de dois fatores: (1) a necessidade de amparar a noção de justiça, confusa por sua própria natureza, por meio de recursos capazes de transcender as limitações espaço-temporais; (2) o interesse de afastar qualquer interferência subjetiva do entendimento de Justiça, tornando-o independente das interpretações parciais e dos interesses pessoais de normas jurídicas tomadas em particular. Ambos resvalam na busca de uma sustentação que podemos denominar lógica, em seu sentido mais amplo, para os denominados juízos de valor. O referido empreendimento conduz Perelman à criação de uma regra de justiça de natureza formal, capaz de solucionar o impasse que se lhe impõe no tocante à noção de justiça. O projeto filosófico de Perelman origina-se de uma tentativa obstinada de construir uma teoria da argumentação que procurasse ser também uma teoria geral da razão prática. Aquilo que passa por razão prática engloba elementos oriundos da razão jurídica, ética e política; em síntese, congrega todas as manifestações do conhecimento em que o uso da razão serve de maneira instrumental para a realização de práticas humanas. Por isso mesmo, a Nova Retórica se converte em uma metodologia destinada a ampliar a possibilidade de reflexão no campo do Direito e da Filosofia. Ao criticar os limites que anteriormente eram postos pela Lógica formal ao raciocínio jurídico, por exemplo, defende-se uma visão da atividade jurídica mais próxima do paradigma democrático. Perelman, interessado em sustentar uma regra de justiça que funcione como imperativo, está preocupado com o problema da justiça 172 , e sua vinculação aos problemas de natureza moral, cujas implicações nas ações humanas exigem que se pense em uma (constante) revisão dos valores, motivo pelo qual ele recusa a vinculação da idéia de Justiça ao que é estabelecido pela lei, ainda que isso o favorecesse, conforme observamos 173 , porque possibilitaria converter o caráter universal do princípio segundo o qual é "justo conceder a todos a mesma coisa" em uma regra de justiça de natureza formal, tal 172 Conforme mencionamos anteriormente, no item 1.4., p. 50-65. 173 Cf. p. 59-60. - 67 - como ele desejava. Se Perelman busca aproximar os mais diversos segmentos do campo do saber (Direito, Filosofia, Teoria da Justiça, Lógica, Epistemologia e Teoria do Conhecimento), evidenciando o que cada um deles ganha em uma perspectiva interdisciplinar, interessa ressaltar a independência do contexto como algo desejável, mas inexeqüível. A arbitrariedade das normas esbarra na impossibilidade de restringir a noção de justiça, confusa por excelência, a um critério formal. Entretanto essa limitação não é vista como algo constrangedor porque existe a possibilidade de encontrar uma regra de justiça submetida a um imperativo moral cuja universalidade não constringe, como ocorre com a Lógica formal. Além disso, as noções confusas, demasiadamente carregadas emotivamente, tais como justiça, bem, virtude, etc., são noções que se encontram indissociavelmente ligadas a valores, e como tais não podem ser reduzidas a definições estritamente analíticas como sugere Kelsen, por exemplo: Os juízos de valor segundo os quais uma conduta real corresponde a uma norma considerada objetivamente válida e, neste sentido, é boa, isto é, valiosa, devem ser distinguidos dos juízos de realidade que, sem referência a uma norma considerada objetivamente válida – o que, em última análise, quer dizer: sem referência a uma norma fundamental pressuposta – enunciam que algo é ou como algo é. 174 A Teoria Pura do Direito elaborada por Kelsen, para consolidar o status de Ciência do Direito precisava descartar do seu âmbito de investigação os elementos concernentes ao campo da política e da ética, além de quaisquer outros conteúdos que fizessem referência a juízos de valor. Compete à Ciência do Direito ocupar-se com a legalidade, os atos jurídicos e as normas que os autorizam e, por conseguinte, lhes confere validade. Recai sobre essa tentativa de tratar o Direito como Ciência diversas críticas de Perelman, visto que ela separa de modo demasiado rígido o direito do fato, faz concessões excessivas ao arbítrio do juiz dentro do âmbito da lei, despreza o papel essencial da regra de justiça formal, que requer tratamento igual para situações essencialmente semelhantes, e recusa toda referencia a juízos de valor, como se a justiça e a equidade fossem noções alheias ao Direito. 175 174 Cf. KELSEN, Hans. Teoria Pura do Direito, 2003, p. 19. 175 Cf. PERELMAN, Chaïm. Lógica Jurídica. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2000, p.94. - 68 - Ainda que as noções de justiça e eqüidade sejam vagas e habitem com igual nível de participação os campos do Direito, da Moral, da Política e da Religião, o positivismo jurídico de Hans Kelsen esforça-se para reabilitar a normatividade nas teorias jurídicas a partir de uma exclusão das teses e argumentos das teorias do Direito Natural. Esse esforço pela reabilitação da normatividade nas teorias jurídicas resultou na construção da Teoria Pura do Direito, que procurava se privar de todo e qualquer pensamento ideológico, motivo pelo qual enuncia um sistema jurídico fundado sobre um edifício de normas hierarquizadas cuja validade depende de uma norma sempre superior, à qual se denomina de norma fundamental. Para justificar essa última norma que, por sua vez, não pode depender de uma norma anterior, Kelsen faz uso de um argumento transcendental de inspiração Kantiana, argumento esse análogo àquele que se encontra na primeira Crítica. Nessa perspectiva o projeto de Kelsen consiste em um neokantismo, visto que tal como a Crítica da Razão Pura procura libertar a razão de todas as suas cargas dogmáticas. O positivismo de Kelsen busca imunizar o direito contra as questões que lhes são exteriores para compreendê-lo como uma "pirâmide normativa" que se auto- engendra pelas regras e pelas normas que regem sua formação e aplicação. A visão sintética do Direito proposta por Kelsen, a partir da hierarquia das normas, propõe que toda regra de direito deve respeitar a norma que lhe é superior, formando assim uma ordem hierárquica. Desta forma, o Direito se purifica de toda referência metafísica passando a ser objeto de sua "auto-fundação". Neste aspecto "auto-fundador" do projeto da Teoria Pura do direito é que se põe o problema da norma fundamental. Mas a norma fundamental não é posta no cume da pirâmide como uma norma que prescreve a obediência ao direito, ela é suposta como condição lógica transcendental do conhecimento do Direito. Neste ponto se reconhece a dificuldade relativa à possibilidade lógica e o estatuto ontológico da norma fundamental, visto que a pirâmide normativa de Kelsen se concebe e se interpreta como um movimento regressivo em direção à norma superior, que é fonte de validade das normas inferiores até atingir a norma fundamental. Mas, qual o fundamento de validade desta norma fundamental? Por que essa norma não pode submeter-se aos mesmos princípios de validade e de eficácia das outras normas? Em primeiro lugar porque o estabelecimento constante de normas superiores conduziria o processo a um regresso ao infinito. Em segundo lugar, porque a outra solução possível inclinaria a sustentação da norma fundamental a uma autoridade extra-jurídica, quiçá metafísica. Tais - 69 - soluções se mostram incompatíveis com a proposta kelseniana, porque ao invés de ser posta com as demais normas, a norma fundamental é pressuposta como condição lógica de possibilidade de uma ordem positiva válida e eficaz. A única solução possível ao impasse que se impõe ao projeto kelseniano consiste em sustentar a validade da norma fundamental na pressuposição. É preciso ressaltar, entretanto, que a norma fundamental não é propriamente uma "norma", consiste em uma hipótese lógica destinada a fundar não o direito positivo, mas a ciência da qual ele é objeto, motivo pelo qual o significado de norma fundamental se mostra ambíguo e suscetível a diversos significados. Uma "norma", para Kelsen, "é uma regra que expressa o fato de que alguém deve agir de certa maneira, sem que isso implique que alguém realmente 'queira' que a pessoa aja de tal modo". 176 Em virtude desse entendimento pode-se falar na independência do valor da norma em relação à sua efetiva aplicação. Essa independência, no entanto, não implica em desconhecimento acerca da sua origem, tampouco indica uma desconexão com o domínio da experiência humana a que destina regular. Existem normas que não derivam da vontade humana, ou seja, não decorrem necessariamente do arbítrio individual de alguém - nesse sentido encontramos o entendimento kelseniano acerca da "hierarquização das normas". No que se refere ao conceito de justiça, entretanto, Kelsen destaca que significa a manutenção de uma ordem positiva através de sua aplicação escrupulosa. Trata-se de justiça "segundo o Direito". A afirmação de que o comportamento de um indivíduo é 'justo' ou 'injusto', no sentido de 'legal' ou 'ilegal', significa que sua conduta corresponde ou não a uma norma jurídica, pressuposta como sendo válida pelo sujeito que julga por pertencer essa norma a uma ordem jurídica positiva. 177 Esse entendimento acerca da noção de justiça não está sujeito às conseqüências decorrentes das diferenças, mesmo as mais elementares, dentre as mais recorrentes doutrinas do Direito, pois qualquer que seja a concepção de norma – em Direito Natural ou em Direito Positivo, assim como na acepção de Norma Moral – a Justiça equivalerá à conformidade do comportamento à norma. 176 KELSEN, Hans. Teoria Geral do Direito e do Estado. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2000, p.50. 177 KELSEN, 2000, p.20. - 70 - O motivo pelo qual Kelsen situa a noção de justiça constrita a uma perspectiva meramente formal é pelo seu entendimento acerca da idéia de juízo de valor. Uma vez que um comportamento 'justo' ou 'injusto' equivale ao comportamento consoante ou destoante da norma jurídica, tal afirmação tem, logicamente, o mesmo caráter de uma afirmação pela qual subordinamos um fenômeno concreto a um conceito abstrato. (...) certa conduta corresponde ou não a uma norma legal, chamada 'julgamento de valor', isto é 'julgamento objetivo de valor', que deve ser claramente distinguido de um 'julgamento subjetivo' pelo qual a vontade ou o sentimento do sujeito que julga é expresso. 178 Não faz parte do nosso objetivo, no presente trabalho, apontar os efeitos práticos da concepção elaborada por Kelsen. Cabe ressaltar, entretanto, que a assepsia pleiteada por Perelman possui natureza bastante distinta daquela pretendida por Kelsen, haja vista que a pretensão perelmaniana não é uma obsessão que desvincula a noção de justiça das demais, colocando-a, inclusive, dissociada da Ética. 179 A realidade da vida moral mostra a insuficiência dessa concepção mecanicamente esquematizada. Perelman recorre a dados empíricos para mostrar que, na prática da moralidade concreta, é incomum encontrarmos desacordo no que se refere aos princípios primordiais, sendo mais freqüente um acordo geral sobre os princípios, acompanhado de um constante desacordo acerca da aplicação deles em casos particulares. 180 Em outras palavras, os diferentes princípios da moral não são contestados por indivíduos pertencentes a contextos histórico-culturais distintos. São interpretados de maneira diferenciada porque as tentativas de interpretação sob nenhuma condição serão definitivas e, a cada nova situação, tornar-se-á necessária uma adaptação do princípio aos âmbitos do contexto. Tais elementos, por conseguinte, consolidam a funcionalidade da regra de justiça como imperativo. Quando os juízos morais referentes às situações particulares estão sujeitos à relatividade da sua aplicação, a regra de justiça promove 178 KELSEN, 2000, p.20-21. 179 Ao falar de uma Ética e de uma Justiça que habitam campos separados, Hans Kelsen se aproxima da dicotomia instituída pelo estadista florentino Niccolò Machiavelli (Maquiavel), em O P ríncipe, ao defender a idéia de que a esfera da Moral é separada da esfera da Política. Não se trata de uma proposta que visa um imoralismo, mas de uma espécie de Justiça, que transcende o juízo moral, negando a existência de valores morais superiores às normas jurídicas. A respeito desta dicotomia não dedicaremos um grande esforço pois já a destacamos em nossa Dissertação de Mestrado. (Cf. OLIVEIRA, O Discurso Político e o Universo das Falácias, 2001). 180 Cf. PERELMAN, 1962, p. 84-85. - 71 - uma deliberação moral cuja imparcialidade decorre da indistinção entre os indivíduos que pertencem a uma mesma categoria essencial. Assim o juízo moral decorre da apreciação de situações particulares inseridas em categorias, tratando da mesma maneira as situações essencialmente semelhantes. Isso representa o propósito da regra de justiça que conduz tanto à regra de ouro 181 quanto ao imperativo categórico 182 . A referência à chamada regra de ouro ratifica a universalidade da regra de justiça. Desde a Antiguidade a regra de ouro ("Ama a teu próximo como a ti mesmo" e "Trate os outros do modo como você mesmo gostaria de ser tratado") tem sido uma referência moral que se caracteriza pelo poder de produzir um efeito real. Pensadores e teóricos da Ética costumam resgatar esse princípio, para indicar sua posição privilegiada como regra fundamental da existência humana. A regra de Justiça, contrariamente à maior parte das formulações da regra de ouro, tem um caráter imperativo positivo. Ela indica que "devemos tratar de maneira igual àqueles que são essencialmente semelhantes" recomendando a concessão de tratamento da mesma natureza àqueles considerados essencialmente semelhantes. Em outras palavras, se a referência (os valores) que utilizamos para exigir um tratamento pessoal adequado para nós mesmos, for a mesma evocada por outras pessoas, é necessário que o tratamento que devemos conceder ao próximo, seja semelhante àquele que devemos ter conosco e que podemos solicitar para nós mesmos. Desta forma, os valores que evocamos para nós mesmos devem servir como referência para os valores que devemos reconhecer no outro e para o outro. Isso significa dizer que não reconhecendo em si mesmo os valores que devem ser evocados como referência para o estabelecimento daquilo que organiza os indivíduos dentro de uma mesma categoria essencial, dificilmente se terá a medida certa do tratamento que deverá ser concedido aos 181 Nas mais diversas sociedades, conforme as mais variadas religiões e nos mais diversos contextos históricos, poderemos encontrar a chamada regra de ouro como um princípio moral primordial. No confucionismo ela aparece com a seguinte construção: "Não faças aos outros o que não gostarias que te fizessem" (Analectos 15:23). O mesmo ocorre entre os budistas onde se encontra a seguinte inscrição: "Não firas o próximo de um modo que tu próprio acharias doloroso" (Budismo, Udanavarga). O povo islâmico segue a mesma regra conforme se segue: "Nenhum de vós será um crente até que deseje para o seu irmão aquilo que deseja para si mesmo (Islamismo, Sunan). Tal como o Hinduísmo que prega: "Não faças aos outros o que te magoaria se te fosse feito" (Mahabharata, 5:1517). Entre os Cristãos, a máxima "O que desejas que os homens te façam, faze a eles" (Lucas, 6:31), aparece em diversas passagens da Bíblia, e sob as mais diversas formas de expressão havendo o coroamento através da seguinte aplicação: "...Porque toda a lei se cumpre em uma só palavra, nesta: Amarás ao teu próximo como a ti mesmo." (GL 5:14). A esse respeito vale observar: (LC 10:27), (JO 15:12-17), (RM 13:9-10), (GL 5, 3, 6, 10). 182 Os imperativos categóricos, segundo Kant, são os imperativos (fórmula que expressa uma norma da razão) da moralidade, ou seja, correspondem às leis morais. Em termos práticos, o imperativo pode ser traduzido com uma expressão que designa um dever. Assim sendo, um imperativo categórico, como a expressão de um dever moral, tem a função de indicar, por imposição, que uma ação é boa em si mesma e, por conseguinte, é por si mesma necessária. (Cf. KANT, Crít ica da Razão P rática, 1997. [I, cap. III]. Ver também: Cap. I, §7. ) - 72 - demais. Em contrapartida, a regra de ouro, exceto em sua modalidade cristã, tem um caráter imperativo negativo, e diz "não faça ao outro..." como uma medida preventiva diante de possíveis implicações decorrentes da sua não-aplicação. Os princípios morais e as técnicas empregadas para a sua aplicação, oferecem um conjunto de instruções de ordem geral, destinadas a mostrar os elementos de reconhecida relevância para a deliberação moral. Sua tarefa consiste em servir de instrumentos reguladores nos casos em que o juízo moral é incerto ou controverso, motivo pelo qual não deve ser considerada irrelevante. A necessidade de dicotomizar Direito e Moral faz Kelsen reconhecer os riscos decorrentes da interpretação que vê o Direito como parte da Moral. Neste caso, os valores morais, que são condicionados pelo tempo e pelo espaço impossibilitariam o estabelecimento de uma Teoria Pura do Direito porque não podem estar vinculados a uma Moral Universal. Uma distinção entre o Direito e a Moral não pode encontrar-se naquilo que as duas ordens sociais prescrevem ou proíbem, mas no como elas prescrevem ou proíbem uma determinada conduta humana. O Direito só pode ser distinguido essencialmente da Moral quando – como já mostramos – se concebe como uma ordem de coação, isto é, como uma ordem normativa que procura obter uma determinada conduta humana ligando à conduta oposta um ato de coerção socialmente organizado, enquanto a Moral é uma ordem social que não estatui quaisquer sanções desse tipo, visto que as duas sanções apenas consistem na aprovação da conduta conforme as normas e na desaprovação da conduta contrária às normas, nela não entrando sequer em linha de conta, portanto, o emprego da força física. 183 Ao desvincular os conceitos, Kelsen põe a relação da Justiça com a lei de uma maneira que se mostra inconcebível diante da teoria de Perelman, visto que a desconexão faculta ao Direito a possibilidade de ser moral, mas sem a necessidade de o ser 184 . A regra de justiça de 183 KELSEN, Hans. Teoria Pura do Direito. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2003, p.71. 184 O professor Fábio Ulhoa Coelho, comentador de Perelman e responsável pelo prefácio da edição brasileira do Tratado da Argumentação (Cf. COELHO, Fábio Ulhôa. Prefácio à Edição Brasileira. In: PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS- TYTECA, 1999, p. XI-XVIII), explica que, na visão de Kelsen, o Direito é formado por uma rede de competências que transfere a validade de uma norma para outra, cuja edição foi realizada de acordo com a competência definida em sua antecedente. Assim, o que distingue a ordem de um assaltante daquela de um agente do Tesouro Nacional é a validade. A norma fundamental deste ordenamento seria aquela que prescreve obediência aos editores deste ato. Se passasse a haver uma obediência generalizada às ordens do chefe do bando de assaltantes, a ordem do assaltante teria validade, ocorrendo o que Kelsen chama de revolução. Não há, portanto, qualquer vinculação Ética com essa forma de se fazer Justiça (Cf. COELHO, Fábio Ulhoa. Para entender Kelsen. 2a. ed. São Paulo: Max Limonad, 1997.) - 73 - Perelman, embora consciente da relatividade do valor moral está propensa a uma adequação universal porque permite o livre reconhecimento dos valores que serão considerados essenciais como referência. Ao apontar os valores servindo de referência para sustentar a regra de justiça, Perelman desloca o eixo do problema para o campo da razoabilidade, porque os critérios formais mostram-se insuficientes para sustentar problemas que decorrem de noções confusas. A incompatibilidade da sua regra de justiça com o positivismo lógico do qual ele provinha o fez migrar para outras formas de fundamentação da sua regra de justiça, uma vez que ela se mostra inconciliável com a tradição positivista, sobretudo no campo jurídico onde a ambição de transformar o Direito em Ciência fez das teses de Kelsen uma orientação teórica com muitos adeptos. Uma incursão aos fundamentos da Filosofia de Perelman se mostra imprescindível para encontrarmos os elementos que o fizeram sustentar a regra de justiça por meio de uma teoria dos valores firmada na razoabilidade, e não na razão. A ausência de um elemento coercitivo capaz de impor um determinado critério ou noção fará Perelman encontrar na prática jurídica um exemplo para caracterizar a aplicação do método no campo da Filosofia e das humanidades, motivo pelo qual, em sua discussão acerca do conceito de justiça, Perelman emprega um método de "variação" com vista a decifrar uma composição formal de justiça. - 74 - PARTE II – A FILOSOFIA DE CHAÏM PERELMAN - 75 - Capítulo2 O CAMPO DO RAZOÁVEL E O IDEAL DA RAZÃO PRÁTICA Em nossa primeira parte, fizemos uma investigação preliminar acerca dos escritos de Perelman para mostrar que o seu interesse pela Lógica está associado à busca de uma sustentação rigorosa para os juízos de valor. Ao procurar descobrir se a questão lógica e as preocupações com a linguagem são, ou não, elementos essenciais para compreender a construção da Teoria da Argumentação de Perelman, pretendíamos reconstruir a trajetória das idéias que o conduzem a elaborar, em parceria com Olbrechts-Tyteca, o Tratado da Argumentação: A Nova Retórica 185 . Nesta segunda parte, passaremos ao exame dos problemas que perpassam o período de transição do pensamento de Perelman: a noção de justiça, sua fundamentação e seus desdobramentos. Poderíamos adotar, como referência, a nomenclatura estabelecida por Gianformaggio 186 e denominar o período compreendido entre 1944 e 1948 como a fase emotivista 187 ; entretanto, preferimos denominá-lo simplesmente como fase de transição, visto que não existe um apelo afetivo na construção teórica deste período, mas um questionamento relativo à idéia de justiça diante da realidade vivida em tempos de guerra. Nesta fase, Perelman manifesta um espírito crítico de caráter revolucionário, sem estar propenso, contudo, à emotividade. Exteriorizará, pelos seus escritos, uma amofinação a certas noções de justiça amparadas por critérios unilaterais, ou estritamente vinculados à letra da Lei, procurando evidenciar uma espécie de imperativo que se impõe diante de qualquer norma estabelecida por convenção. Há autores, a exemplo de Mieczyslaw Maneli 188 , que consideram a produção deste período a mais rica passagem das composições de Perelman. Esta fase, nitidamente influenciada pelas perturbações decorrentes da segunda grande guerra, se 185 Consideramos este percurso essencial porque a sua ausência cria uma lacuna para o entendimento de uma teoria cujas bases estão fincadas na natureza da controvérsia filosófica, profundamente dependente dos argumentos do tipo "ad hominem" para a sua sustentação. 186 Cf. GIANFORMAGGIO, 1993, p.429-431. 187 A divisão proposta por Gianformaggio considera a existência de cinco fases distintas no percurso intelectual de Chaïm Perelman, são elas: A Fase Pluralista (1933~1938), a Fase Emotivista (1944-1948), A Curva [virage] (1948-1950), A Fase Dialética (1950-1966) e a Fase Retórica (1966-): [Cf. GIANFORMAGGIO, 1993, p.429- 439]. 188 Cf. MANELI, 1986, p. 356-357. - 76 - caracteriza essencialmente pelo perscrutar atento de algumas noções que ocuparam a sua atenção em contexto anterior. Embora parte dos estudos sobre o autor, em especial aqueles estritamente voltados para a fundamentação de teorias jurídicas, ignore a sua orientação acadêmica, o interesse filosófico da Teoria da Argumentação consiste na busca de um modelo de racionalidade argumentativa que se exerce nas práticas humanas e, em especial, na atividade filosófica, com vista à sustentação de crenças ou valores pertencentes ao orador e ao auditório que se pretende persuadir ou convencer. O próprio Perelman, aliás, destaca: Meu interesse pelo estudo do raciocínio jurídico – sob todos os seus aspectos – resulta do fato de o Direito constituir uma tentativa de formalizar, na medida do possível, o campo da ação sob os seus mais diversos aspectos. Desejo interessar-me, enquanto filósofo, pelo problema filosófico [...] de um raciocínio que tomará o Direito como objeto de suas reflexões. 189 Essa tentativa de formalização no campo do Direito, à qual Perelman faz referência, tem origem, sobretudo, na vertente positivista do pensamento jurídico que possui como principal representante o austríaco Hans Kelsen (1881-1973). O Racionalismo dogmático (ou normativismo jurídico) de Kelsen procurou resolver racionalmente o problema do conhecimento jurídico-científico, fundamentando-o sobre a norma básica. Essa solução se expressa pela Teoria Pura do Direito que pretende preservar a pureza do sistema normativo, sustentando sua validade em uma idéia a priori, independente de qualquer fato empírico. O cerne da questão está vinculado à idéia de que a validade da norma fundamental é uma validade por suposição. A segurança jurídica, neste caso, se restringe à aplicação da Lei, visto que há uma progressiva redução das fontes do Direito à norma escrita. Decorre deste ideal filosófico-jurídico do positivismo legalista o entendimento aplicável no âmbito do senso comum, segundo o qual a "lei é a lei". Por esse motivo, a concepção positivista de Kelsen será objeto das críticas de Perelman; afinal, os problemas humanos são concretos, controversos e envolvem valores. Não é possível ver no Direito apenas uma ordem fechada, nem tampouco aproximar o rigor do Direito àquele pertencente ao campo das matemáticas. Um juiz, por exemplo, ao evocar uma disposição legal aplicável a situações concretas, não se comporta 189 PERELMAN, 1997, p. 36. - 77 - como um lógico formalista que limita o campo de atuação do seu sistema, visto que sua decisão envolve motivações, valores e imprecisões intrínsecas ao âmbito jurídico. Ainda que o positivismo jurídico defenda uma limitação do poder dos juízes, proclamando uma neutralidade axiológica e uma fundamentação lógica das decisões, a subjetividade dos magistrados aparece em suas decisões e sentenças revestida por uma suposta assepsia capaz de assegurar uma interpretação unívoca das palavras da lei, traduzindo a mais alta aspiração de pureza idealizada pelo positivismo jurídico. O exame dos comportamentos judiciários e seus respectivos problemas se mostra relevante à análise filosófica, na medida em que trata de compreender as questões que envolvem decisões e estão revestidas por valores. Os valores se consolidam como a base fundamental de todas as formas de entendimento acerca do mundo e da vida. Por esse motivo, os valores não significam mera subjetividade 190 , uma vez que a subjetividade está vinculada ao relativismo histórico. Considerar essa condição de valores como mera subjetividade traria a discussão para o campo do relativismo, colocando os valores fundamentados no agrado ou desagrado de sujeitos particulares determinados. Na concepção perelmaniana, entretanto, os valores devem ser vistos como elementos dotados de objetividade e absolutamente independentes das preferências pessoais de quem faz uso deles, mantendo a sua forma de realidade para além de toda aplicação individual, motivo pelo qual ele defende o uso de uma razão capaz de estabelecer uma Lógica dos Juízos de Valor. Ainda que uma incursão aos problemas concernentes ao campo do Direito pareça deslocada do nosso intento de pesquisa, ela se torna necessária em virtude da regra de justiça, utilizada para sustentar os problemas argumentativos decorrentes da associação de um fato a circunstâncias anteriores de natureza igual ou semelhante. Esta associação ao precedente é evocada como critério em deliberações que envolvem práticas posteriores semelhantes e, por conseguinte, serve para instituir semelhanças entre casos ou eventos que devem ser tratados da mesma forma. Nestes casos, a aplicação da regra de justiça se converte em "ad hominem" por exigir fidelidade aos argumentos levantados e defendidos outrora, em casos essencialmente semelhantes. No ensaio intitulado De la Justice 191 , Perelman aprofunda a sua abordagem sobre 190 Esse enquadramento da noção de valor associado à subjetividade já foi tratada neste trabalho tomando como referência fragmentos do pensamento de Marshall Urban e do próprio Chaïm Perelman (Cf. URBAN, 1909. apud. RIBOT, 1914, p. 146-147 ; PERELMAN, 1999, p. 85. 191 Escrito durante a ocupação nazista e publicado em 1945 (Cf. PERELMAN, De la Justice, 1945). - 78 - os temas que lhe foram caros na primeira fase do seu pensamento 192 . Examina cuidadosamente, revisando e procurando corrigir os aspectos teóricos que se apresentam problemáticos ao pensar a questão da justiça em regra. Nos escritos da década de 30, por exemplo, em especial no artigo cujo título é De l'arbitraire dans la connaissance 193 , Perelman sustentava que "(...)les procédés de justification susceptibles d'être analysés se réduisent, en tout et pour tout, à une pure déduction logique". 194 Ao dedicar-se – posteriormente – aos problemas concernentes à Justiça, entretanto, Perelman percebe que em matéria de justiça é preciso salientar que as teses relativas à justiça formal e abstrata, bem como os métodos de justificação não são os únicos que podem ser defendidos, mas são aqueles que podem ser mais facilmente controláveis pela sua baixa, se não inexistente, flexibilidade. O fundamento de um sistema normativo se mostra logicamente arbitrário, da mesma maneira que as conclusões normativas – e as justificações delas mesmas – que não decorrem do sistema 195 . O reconhecimento desta característica arbitrária, por sua vez, constitui um convite à tolerância: C'est pourquoi um être épris de justice ne se contentera pas d'appliquer strictement et aveuglément les règles qui découlent de son système qui n'est pas, et ne peut pas être, un système parfait. Il n'oubliera pas qu'à côté des valeurs reconnues par lui, il existe d'autres valeurs pour lesquelles des gens se dévouent et se sacrifient et qu'une révision des valeurs est toujours possible. 196 Existe uma relação entre a abordagem concedida ao problema da "arbitrariedade lógica" que serve de fundamento a um sistema normativo e a noção de eqüidade abordada por Aristóteles no capítulo XXIII da Arte Retórica 197 em que se reconstrói uma concepção acerca das relações de justiça e de equidade também apresentadas no livro V da Ética a Nicômaco 198 . 192 A esse período Gianformaggio atribui o nome de fase pluralista, mas preferimos denominá-lo como "não- retórico" [Cf. GIANFORMAGGIO, 1993, p. 429-439]. 193 Cf. PERELMAN, Chaïm. De l'arbitraire dans la connaissance. Archives de la Societé Belge de Philosophie, .n.3, 5e année. Bruxelles : Lamertin, 1933, p. 5-44. 194 PERELMAN, 1933, p. 5-44. 195 Tais são os casos em que se recorre ao recurso denominado por Aristóteles de Equidade (Cf. ARISTÓTELES, 1978, V, 14, 1137b 26), ou seja, nos casos em que a decisão independe da lei positiva, mas está em conformidade a um sentimento do que se considera justo, tendo em vista a causa e as intenções. Nestes casos, as decisões são movidas pela arbitrariedade concernente aos valores pelos quais se manifesta preferência em prol da sua escolha, mesmo sendo, tais valores, passíveis de revisão. 196 PERELMAN, 1963d, p. 77. 197 Cf. ARISTÓTELES, 1998 [ XXIII, II ]. 198 Cf. ARISTÓTELES, 1978 [ V, 10 ]. Ver também: Livro V, 14, 1137b 26. - 79 - Para Aristóteles, "o eqüitativo parece ser justo, mas é justo independentemente da lei escrita [visto que] (...) a própria natureza da equidade é a retificação da lei no que esta se revela insuficiente pelo seu caráter universal" 199 , motivo pelo qual ele considera que Mostrar-se eqüitativo é ser indulgente com as fraquezas humanas; é também ter menos consideração pela lei do que pelo legislador; ter em conta não a letra da lei, mas a intenção do legislador, não a ação em si, mas a intenção premeditada. 200 A concepção aristotélica apresentada na Arte Retórica se mostra mais adequada ao propósito de Perelman. Entretanto, ele resgata a noção de equidade contida na Ética a Nicômaco, para sustentar a abordagem concedida ao fundamento de sistemas normativos, porque somente entrou em contato com a Retórica de Aristóteles após 1947 201 , depois de iniciar o projeto que buscava uma Lógica dos Juízos de Valor que fosse capaz de sustentar a sua regra de justiça 202 . Além disso, ao escrever o De la Justice a sua preocupação está voltada para os problemas de natureza moral e às implicações das ações humanas em conformidade com a Justiça e a necessidade de uma revisão dos valores. Em um contexto que não admite qualquer fundamento ou justificação para a adoção de um valor melhor que outro, o conceito de "revisão" das escolhas de valores permanece enigmático. Rever significa, sobretudo neste caso, reconsiderar, recolocar em causa um problema resolvido previamente e cuja solução não mais se mostra adequada. Partindo desse princípio, parece possível fundar a tolerância sobre o relativismo sem a discriminação que resulta da aceitação do caractere irremediavelmente arbitrário das escolhas de valores: mas se poderia, igualmente, bem fundar sobre esse relativismo, o fanatismo e a intolerância 203 . É necessário, contudo, destacar que no De la Justice, o sentido atribuído à palavra arbitrário não corresponde ao sentido de arbitrativo, como usualmente se observa na linguagem hodierna, visto que o ato arbitrário é considerado como logicamente indiferente. Como observa Perelman: 199 Cf. ARISTÓTELES, 1998. [XXIII, II]. 200 ARISTÓTELES, 1998. [XXIII, II]. 201 Sustentam essa afirmação os argumentos apresentados por Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca em Rencontre avec la Rhétorique (Cf. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1964, p.3.) além de declarações do próprio Perelman (Cf. PERELMAN, 1998, p. 138.) 202 No item [1.4], p.50-65, abordamos a discussão acerca da Regra de Justiça. 203 Cf. KOYRÉ, A. Compte-rendu de la Justice, 1948, p. 98. - 80 - C'est une grave erreur de croire que toutes les définitions sont completement arbitraires [...]. Chaque fois qu'il s'agit de définir une notion, qui ne constitue pas un signe nouveau, mais qui préexiste dans le langage, avec tout son sens émotif, tout le prestige qui s'y attache, on ne pose pas un acte arbitraire, logiquement indifférent. Il n'est nullement indifférent que l'on définisse la justice, le bien, La vertu, La réalité, de telle ou telle façon, car on détermine par là le sens accordé à des valeurs reconnues (...). 204 A afirmação de que "é um grave erro acreditar na absoluta arbitrariedade das definições" indica que os lógicos tão somente admitem essa natureza arbitrária porque ela estabelece uma operação capaz de substituir um grupo de símbolos conhecidos por um símbolo novo, mais curto e de manuseio mais fácil do que o grupo de signos que o define. Entretanto, o sentido desse novo símbolo, indubitavelmente arbitrário, é concedido exclusivamente pelo conjunto de signos que lhe serve de definição. E esse é o seu único sentido. Na ausência de outro sentido para esse novo símbolo, qualquer sentido adicional que lhe seja concedido, implica em cometer uma falácia de dupla definição. De fato, se nos servimos de uma única noção em dois sentidos distintos, sem evidenciar que eles são coincidentes, podemos cometer o equívoco de atribuir dupla definição a um único objeto; e assim sendo, corremos o risco de incorrer em paralogismos. Perelman faz uma restrição curiosa ao afirmar que "se chega normalmente a um sofisma cada vez que se define uma noção com maiúscula 205 ". Entretanto, não podemos esquecer que um erro de lógica desta natureza passa, freqüentemente, de maneira despercebida para quem o mero raciocínio, inspirado nos moldes da matemática, parece ser suficiente. Nesses casos, a falta não consiste em uma demonstração explícita e facilmente detectável de dupla definição, mas, antes disso, equivale à definição que se quer fazer admitir do sentido emotivo desse termo. Esse é o caso de noções como Justiça, Liberdade, Bem e Virtude, por exemplo; visto que, em tais casos, o sentido emotivo/carga subjetiva desses conceitos permite a concessão de um valor ao que é definido como justiça, liberdade, bem e virtude. Decorre dessa análise a proposta de Perelman acerca do uso de maiúsculas e, por conseguinte, de uma propensão a cometer falácias quando do seu uso em noções confusas. Tais noções mantêm o prestígio que a elas se vincula, pois o sentido conferido a valores aceitos se converte em verdadeiras forças sociais. Ao admitirmos a definição de uma noção desse gênero, estamos expressando aquilo que prezamos ou 204 PERELMAN, De la Justice, 1945. apud. PERELMAN, 1963d, p.77. 205 PERELMAN, 1963d, p. 10. - 81 - desprezamos. A força dessas noções permitem que orientemos as nossas ações, determinando, inclusive, o sentido delas mediante uma escala de valores que serve como guia em nossa existência. Uma noção fortemente carregada em sua perspectiva afetiva, quando definida, transpõe essa carga afetiva para o sentido conceitual que se lhe atribui. Quando se determina que uma definição é estritamente analítica e, por conseguinte, arbitrária, está se afirmando que não há qualquer sentido emotivo vinculado ao termo definido. Desta forma, quando se considera uma definição como a afirmação de um juízo analítico, possivelmente estabelecido de forma arbitrária, despreza-se a transferência da emoção impregnada no termo que define o sentido conceitual que lhe serve de definição. Quando ocorre essa transferência, a definição não é analítica, nem tampouco arbitrária, pois afirma um juízo sintético, a existência de um liame que agrega um conceito a uma emoção. Determinar o sentido atribuído aos valores reconhecidos não é, por conseguinte, um ato arbitrário, logicamente indiferente. Que é, então, que ele pode significar? Caso se exclua a palavra logicamente que parece não ter aqui exatamente o seu lugar – salvo se imaginarmos que, em 1945, Perelman já estava atraído inconscientemente ou de maneira involuntária por uma concepção alargada da Lógica –, encontra-se esboçada, em algumas linhas, a situação de indivíduos que tomam suas próprias posições em relação a um valor e a valores, dentro de uma comunidade cultural determinada. Contrariamente ao que se expressa no texto de 1933 206 , onde a escolha dos valores e dos critérios fundamentais significavam a escolha de pertença a um grupo, há nesta fase de transição – e, em especial, no texto de 1945 – a representação de um grupo no interior do qual é possível exprimir seu desacordo 207 . Neste caso, o espaço para o debate e as objeções criam uma nova concepção de enquadramento para os valores que são admitidos ou reconhecidos pelos integrantes de um grupo; não se trata, como parece sugerir Perelman no texto de 1933, de uma adesão incondicional. Ainda que de maneira tácita, isso implica a aquisição de uma autonomia do indivíduo no que diz respeito ao grupo. Não por acaso, no decorrer do mesmo 206 Cf. PERELMAN, De l'arbitraire dans la connaissance, 1933. 207 Este elemento será imprescindível à construção da Teoria da Argumentação pela vinculação à noção de controvérsia filosófica colhida do pensamento de Henry Johnstone Jr. - 82 - período - em um contexto parcialmente diferente -, Perelman reconhece aos indivíduos um valor particular. No texto Libre examen et démocratie 208 , de 1946, escreve: La valeur absolue de verité dépend, dans cettte conception, uniquement des êtres qui y adherent et qui, par leurs aspirations et l'attitude, témoignent de la place éminente qu'elle oocupe dans leur conscience. C'est cette adhésion à une valeur absolue qui donne aux hommes qui la professent une dignité particuliere, qui en fait des personnes morales auxquelles il convient de reconnaitre une valeur autre que celle d'un simple rouage dans la machine sociale. Porteurs d'une valeur indépendante de tout groupe particulier, les hommes acquierent par là une dignité éminente qui en fait des individus libres, auxquels on doit plus de respect qu'à un simple moyen de réaliser une fin sociale. Si le principe du libre examen suppose que l'on accorde à la vérité une valeur absolue, il a pour conséquence de reconnaitre à tout être, porteur d'une telle valeur, une dignité particulière. 209 A abordagem concedida por Perelman acerca dos conceitos de dignidade e valor absoluto apresenta uma estreita relação no tocante ao tratamento oferecido por Kant aos mesmos conceitos. O conceito de dignidade em Kant é um pressuposto fundamental do discurso kantiano acerca da moral, visto que a partir do conceito de dignidade torna-se possível estabelecer uma relação entre a forma do princípio prático subjetivo e a forma do princípio prático objetivo. Em outras palavras, a dignidade estabelece a possibilidade das formulações básicas da segunda fórmula do imperativo categórico. Essa segunda formulação corresponde à seguinte máxima: "age de tal forma que trates a humanidade, tanto na tua pessoa quanto na pessoa de qualquer outro, sempre também como um fim e nunca unicamente como um meio". 210 De acordo com essa formulação do imperativo, todo ser racional, como fim em si mesmo, possui um valor absoluto que lhe é intrínseco. Esse valor é superior a qualquer preço e, por conseguinte, não possui qualquer equivalência. O princípio do livre exame, cuja relevância se manifesta quando analisado em suas relações com a ciência e a busca da verdade, nesse contexto, procura ressaltar a independência dos indivíduos no tocante à sustentação de valores por ele reconhecidos. Perelman reforça, conforme exposto no excerto, 208 Esse tema será retomado por Perelman na década de 60. Em aula inaugural do curso de "Filosofia Moral" de 5 de janeiro de 1966, consagrada às relações da moral com o livre exame, Perelman apresenta um texto intitulado Moral et Libre Examen que retoma a questão esboçada no texto de 1946. (Cf. PERELMAN, 1966, p. 320-331. Ver também : PERELMAN, 1976, p. 169-177. 209 PERELMAN, 1946, p.43. 210 KANT, Immanuel. Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes. Rio de Janeiro: Tecnoprint/Ediouro, 1991, II. - 83 - a possibilidade de julgar as proposições, sistemas ou normas, de acordo com as provas que podem ser apresentadas a seu favor e independentemente da autoridade da pessoa que as enuncia. Ao fazê-lo, Perelman manifesta o interesse de buscar a verdade, no que se refere à conduta, a partir da natureza dos indivíduos. Para tanto, procura definir a verdadeira justiça e encontrar regras passíveis de serem aproveitadas por todas as pessoas, ou por um grupo delas, sem distinção de aplicação. Com isso estariam asseguradas a autonomia do indivíduo, a sua liberdade e, por conseguinte, sua responsabilidade, visto que, a renúncia a uma autoridade exterior à qual estaríamos incondicionalmente submetidos permite aos particulares recorrerem à razão para assegurar o modo mais adequado de agir. Esse recurso à razão, intrínseco aos indivíduos autônomos, ao assegurar o exercício da liberdade individual, impõe a cada qual a responsabilidade pelas escolhas efetuadas. O resgate da autonomia do indivíduo consolida o ideal de uma lógica dos juízos de valor consoante o estabelecimento de uma racionalidade específica que se exerce nas práticas humanas. Essa razão prática, que orienta as ações individuais, respaldando o modo de agir das pessoas e destituindo-o da natureza irracional à qual estariam condenados pelo ideal de razão proveniente da modernidade, reitera uma recusa ao critério de evidência como fundamento de aferição da verdade. Afinal, o evidente é claro e impositivo, sua natureza inconteste não concede espaço a contestações ou controvérsias, uma vez que é compreendido imediatamente. O campo das ações humanas, pela sua própria natureza, é o campo das adversidades e dos conflitos de opinião. Nesta esfera, nada se impõe de maneira óbvia, tudo é passível de contestação; a falibilidade dos homens permite a aplicação de métodos e o estabelecimento de hipóteses que os aproximem da verdade e sejam capazes de melhor conduzir suas ações. Assim, o campo do razoável, cujo ideal consiste no exercício de uma razão prática, permite o estabelecimento de uma noção de filosofia, argumentativa por excelência, que procura encontrar alguma racionalidade na organização do conhecimento e de ações que são essencialmente falíveis, incompletas, mas não irracionais. - 84 - 2 . 1 . À P r ocur a de u ma L ógi ca dos J u í z os de V a l or Durante o período compreendido entre 1930 e 1939, Perelman esteve interessado no estudo da Lógica. Após a publicação do De la Justice 211 suas investigações se concentram no interesse de criar, ou pelo menos sustentar, uma Lógica dos Juízos de Valor capaz de fornecer critérios objetivos e universais para a aferição de valores [axiológicos]. Parecia inconcebível, sobretudo em virtude da necessidade de afirmação da sua regra de justiça, subordinar os juízos de valor ao arbítrio individual de cada pessoa. Se esse interesse apresenta preocupações típicas de um herdeiro da tradição lógica ele, entretanto, ainda não é capaz de fornecer quaisquer indícios acerca da posterior vinculação do autor a uma tradição mais "maleável" que o rigor lógico, ao mesmo tempo que apresenta, por intermédio dos autores eleitos para conceder sustentação teórica, um firme propósito de se manter fiel à linhagem da qual emana. O ideal de criação, ou defesa, de uma Lógica dos Juízos de Valor aponta uma incompatibilidade com a sua formação acadêmica, ainda que não ateste contrariamente ao seu percurso intelectual. Demonstra o interesse de seguir um caminho contrário à posição positivista responsável por cercear o papel da Lógica restringindo-lhe à tarefa de utilizar o método científico – o único legitimamente possível de ser considerado racional 212 – para a solução de problemas cujo escopo é meramente teórico. A adoção de uma postura que promove uma espécie de ruptura e continuidade – por mais paradoxal que isto possa parecer – em relação à tradição lógica que lhe serve de referência, representa uma condição de contestação ao abandono dos problemas humanos concernentes à ação. 213 É possível compreender a postura adotada por Perelman quando se observa a ótica positivista e se percebe que os denominados juízos de valor [axiológicos] são, segundo esta 211 PERELMAN, De la Justice, 1945. 212 Cf. LAUGHLIN, Stanley K. ; HUGHES, Daniel T. The rational and the Reasonable: Dialectic or Parallel Systems? GOLDEN, James L. ; PILOTTA, Joseph J. Pratical Reasoning in Human Affa irs. Dordrecht: D.Reidel Publishing Company, 1986, p. 187-206. (Synthese library; v.183). Ver Também: PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS- TYTECA, La Quête du Rationnel, 1952a, p. 110-121. 213 E se agregam a estes, aqueles que direta ou indiretamente a eles estão vinculados, tais como os relativos à emoção, aos interesses e à violência. (Cf. PERELMAN, 1979, p. 134-135) - 85 - última, naturalmente controvertidos e se mostram impossíveis de serem submetidos ao crivo da demonstração de veracidade. Em contrapartida, certos fatos e proposições lógicas ou matemáticas podem, certamente, submeter-se sem quaisquer problemas, uma vez que estão sujeitos à certificação conforme a aplicação dos critérios de aferição do modelo cientificista 214 . Em outras palavras, é possível se provar "racionalmente" que a soma dos ângulos internos de um triângulo retângulo será, incondicionalmente, igual a 180o independentemente do contexto no qual se aplique tal propriedade; entretanto, é impossível pensar a afirmação de que uma determinada ação humana é mais justa do que outra, independentemente do contexto espaço- temporal ao qual esta ação especifica se vincule. A objeção perelmaniana a esse tipo de afirmação 215 , está alicerçada no interesse de sustentar a sua regra de justiça. Esta motivação, por sua vez, serve como fundamento para os argumentos que são apresentados em defesa da regra de justiça. Há, neste caso, uma tentativa de utilização da racionalidade científica para justificar a inaceitabilidade de determinados comportamentos humanos escamoteados pela falta de critérios objetivos que lhes sirvam de limitadores naturais. A impossibilidade de recorrer à Lógica como anteparo à solução do seu problema faz Perelman reagir negativamente à orientação positivista 216 , pois raciocínios semelhantes aos que decorrem desta vertente e contestam a possibilidade de afirmar e justificar racionalmente a preferência por uma determinada atitude em detrimento de outra considerada menos justa ou inadequada porque menos nobre, consiste no abandono de uma tradição aristotélica, e em certo sentido também kantiana 217 , que admite uma razão prática, aplicável aos campos nos quais há interferência da ação humana. Por não ser uma perspectiva agradável a Perelman, por motivos cuja exposição já fizemos prévia 218 , essa negação da possibilidade de uma solução racional para os problemas que envolvem juízos de valor [axiológicos] o conduziu a procurar uma espécie de 'racionalidade ética' capaz de se converter – ou de se constituir – em uma Lógica específica para a questão dos valores [axiológicos]. 214 Cf. PERELMAN, 1979, p. 134. 215 Cf. Cap. 1 [1.4.] dedicado à "Regra de Justiça". 216 Cf. PERELMAN, 1979, p. 134. 217 Cf. KANT, Crítica da Razão Prática, 1997. 218 Cf. Cap. 1 [1.2] "O Pluralismo entre Juízos de Fato e Juízos de Valor". - 86 - É imprescindível salientar o quão rapidamente Perelman se afasta da Epistemologia pós-positivista e se aproxima de uma espécie de Epistemologia dialética – idoneísta defendida, sobretudo no final dos anos 40', por Gonseth e o grupo Dialectica, que estavam esboçando uma Teoria da Consciência a partir do princípio de dialeticidade da consciência científica 219 . A dialeticidade da consciência científica significava, para Gonseth, que "en principe, toute vérité est sommaire, toute idée est en devenir, toute position est révisable ". 220 A revisibilidade de qualquer opinião, idéia, crença ou posição, não originava, segundo eles, qualquer distinção entre verdade e valores. Mas, se Gonseth e seu grupo possuem razão e, de fato, a Ciência, como a Filosofia, é inacabada e constantemente sujeita à revisibilidade, a Filosofia, por sua vez, assim como a Ciência, é regressiva. A esse propósito Perelman escreve: [ele] é muito menos um sistema acabado e perfeito do que uma concepção que implica o caráter incompleto e inacabado de toda construção filosófica, sempre susceptível de uma nova amplificação e de uma nova retificação. Os partidários de uma filosofia regressiva são capazes de entender-se, de discutir, de confrontar suas opiniões, de adaptá-las. A discussão constitui um elemento essencial para o desenvolvimento de seu pensamento que é, por princípio, um pensamento aberto. Seus desacordos estão destinados a ser solucionados e, nisso, assemelham-se aos desacordos entre cientistas; isso porque uma retificação, no sistema deles, não constitui uma renegação, uma traição aos seus princípios, mas, pelo contrário, a prova de uma fidelidade para com eles. 221 O excerto acima exposto ratifica a afirmação de Gianformaggio 222 , segundo a qual é precisamente a idéia de que os desacordos entre os filósofos estão destinados a se ajustar - idéia esta que Perelman sustenta como inerente à Epistemologia Dialética - que o afasta da Epistemologia pós-positivista. Esta afirmação parece razoável porque o profundo interesse dedicado ao desacordo representa uma constante nas diferentes fases da especulação de 219 Cf. GIANFORMAGGIO, 1973, p. 117-133. Ver também: GIANFORMAGGIO, 1993, p.435. 220 Cf. GONSETH, F. Philosophie Mathématique. Paris : Hermann, 1939, p.38. 221 « [elle] est beaucoup moins un système achevé et parfait qu'une conception qui implique le caractère incomplet et inachevé de toute construction philosophique, toujours susceptible d'une nouvelle amplification et d'une nouvelle rectification. Les partisans d'une philosophie régressive sont capables de s'entendre, de discuter, de confronter leurs vues, de les adapter. La discussion constitue un élément essentiel pour le développement de leur pensée qui est, par principe, une pensée ouverte. Leurs désaccords sont destinés à être résorbés et, en cela, ressemblent aux désaccords entre savants ; en effet, une rectification, dans leur système, ne constitue pas un reniement, une trahison à l'égard de leurs principes, mais, au contraire, le preuve d'une fidélité à leur égard » (PERELMAN, 1949, p. 186. ; PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1952, p. 96.) 222 GIANFORMAGGIO, 1993, p.435. - 87 - Perelman 223 . Com efeito, quer seja relativo a crenças ou opiniões, o desacordo precisa ser considerado insuperável, porque impossível de ser transposto no campo das disputas argumentativas, para justificar a disputa do livre exame e da tolerância, tais como Perelman sempre as reivindicou. Por outro lado, para Perelman, desacordos de crença e desacordos de opinião devem ser formas de desacordo bem diferenciadas porque se pode fundar sobre a primeira a reivindicação do livre exame no domínio teórico, e sobre a segunda a reivindicação da tolerância no domínio prático. Sem dúvida a aparição de um desacordo de crenças, assim como Perelman concebeu, não pode resultar da escolha prévia de certos critérios de verdade diferentes, ou do fato de que uma crença é verdadeira ao passo que a outra é falsa. Em contrapartida, a aceitação do desacordo entre as opiniões e a valorização deste, resultam precisamente de que as opiniões não são verificáveis nem demonstráveis, ou seja, de que elas pertencem a um outro campo das crenças. Em decorrência das idéias expostas até este momento, verificaremos as principais fontes de sustentação investigadas por Perelman com o intuito de alicerçar o seu pensamento. Por intermédio desta verificação compreendemos os elementos que o fazem encontrar a Retórica, bem como, observamos o caminho seguido para sustentar uma idéia que se tornará secundária e, por vezes ignorada, diante da sua maior construção teórica que é, indubitavelmente, a Nova Retórica. Contudo, é preciso ressaltar que a Teoria da Argumentação perelmaniana se mostra essencialmente dependente de, pelo menos, duas noções: (1) a noção de Regra de Justiça, que envolve a idéia de uma Lógica dos Juízos de Valor e os critérios para a definição da noção de racionalidade; (2) a noção de Argumentum Ad Hominem oriunda da concepção de Controvérsia Filosófica, amparada pela divergência em relação à noção de 'racionalidade' e originalmente desenvolvida por Henry Johnstone Jr. 223 Para melhor compreender este momento de 'transição' do pensamento de Perelman pode ser útil recorrer aos tópicos em que observamos, através de breves incursões, as principais características concernentes à fase de transição e ao período não-retórico, como antecessores à época em que o pensamento do autor estará voltado aos problemas relativos à construção de uma Teoria da Argumentação: o período retórico. - 88 - 2 . 2 . S obr e uma P ossí vel L ógi ca dos J u í z os de V a l or A regra de justiça segundo a qual os "seres de uma mesma categoria essencial devem ser tratados de maneira semelhante", objetivava o estabelecimento de um critério de natureza formal e empreendido em um espírito positivista. Entretanto, a aplicabilidade dessa regra demanda um elemento de demarcação para o que é essencial e o que não é, assim como para a distinção entre o negligenciável e o importante. Pensar essa dicotomia implica em recorrer a juízos de valor [axiológicos] que Perelman considerava completamente arbitrários e logicamente indeterminados. 224 Era necessário, então, entender como se pode raciocinar sobre valores, bem como, retomar a antiga questão que busca descobrir a existência, ou não, de métodos racionalmente aceitos segundo os quais é possível preferir o bem ao mal, o justo ao injusto, e assim por diante. Ciente do ceticismo que envolvia os positivistas, no tocante à possibilidade de demarcação explícita – capaz de instituir e fazer preferir o bem ao mal – Perelman se dedicará à tarefa de encontrar uma Lógica dos Juízos de Valor, motivo pelo qual identificará na obra de Edmond Goblot um suporte adequado para a fundamentação dos seus argumentos. Existe um aspecto, entretanto, que nos causa curiosidade ao estudar este percurso evolutivo da formação do pensamento perelmaniano. Embora seja filosoficamente meritória a sua busca de uma "lógica dos juízos de valor", Perelman parece ignorar, ainda que a sua formação testemunhe contrariamente a isso, que ao migrar para a esfera dos valores em busca de critérios "racionais" para justificar a opção por certa conduta em detrimento de outra, atribuindo hierarquias e qualidades específicas para cada uma dessas forças motrizes engendradoras da opção por agir, passa-se a refletir fora do campo da Lógica e mais próximo do campo da Ética. Aliás, Logique des jugements des valeurs, 225 de Edmond Goblot, longe de ser uma obra de Lógica é, antes e sobretudo, um compêndio de reflexões sobre problemas de natureza moral, embora o interesse de Goblot seja demarcadamente diferenciado. Isso faz crer que ambos os autores, neste caso Perelman e Goblot, cometem o mesmo deslize, a saber: 224 Mais especificamente nos textos de 1933. 225 GOBLOT, La Logique des Jugements de Valeur, 1927. - 89 - acreditar na possibilidade de desenvolver, ou pelo menos encontrar, uma Lógica capaz de estabelecer critérios que delimitem os pares antagônicos que estão nos extremos da escala de valores que orientam as ações humanas. Tomemos como questionamento essencial aquele que conduz Perelman à busca de uma lógica dos juízos de valor, ou seja, "existem métodos racionalmente aceitáveis que permitam preferir o bem ao mal?". 226 O caminho trilhado por Perelman, visa estudar a Lógica dos Julgamentos de Valor por meio de análise e desconstrução dos raciocínios. Uma investigação mais apurada, entretanto, mostra que Perelman está potencializando, talvez arbitrariamente, um método que Goblot havia aplicado para escrever La Barrière et le Niveau. 227 Neste livro, como em outro publicado no mesmo período sob o título de Exercices Logiques sur des jugements des valeur, Goblot mostra – de maneira crítica – que um lógico pode "se converter acidentalmente em sociólogo como também pode se converter acidentalmente em um geômetra quando, para estudar o raciocínio dedutivo, ele utiliza os seus exemplos na geometria". 228 Embora Le Barrière et le Niveau seja "um estudo sociológico sobre a burguesia contemporânea", Goblot observa: "Ce sous-titre n'est pas inexact, car j'avais pris pour matière de mes analyses des jugements collectifs constituant une classe dans une société". 229 Da análise do comportamento social, Goblot extraiu a idéia de que os juízos de valor incorporados por uma sociedade, apresentam duas características que interessam especificamente ao lógico: (1) Os juízos de valor podem ser de um ilogismo inaudito sem que a pessoa se aperceba disso, porque os indivíduos que os reconhecem como válidos para orientar a sua conduta raramente os submetem à crítica. (2) A força com a qual eles se impõem ao indivíduo somente pode ser diminuída pela crítica que ele institui ao perceber o ilogismo que nele se encontra. A Lógica dos Juízos de valor que Perelman adota como ponto de partida para a sua argumentação requer para si mesma o estatuto de Lógica tomando como orientação a existência de uma distinção entre a sua constituição e a daquela a que Goblot chama de Lógica Comum da qual essa Lógica dos Juízos de Valor se distinguiria. Ora, se os juízos de valor são, 226 PERELMAN, 1999a, p.14. 227 Cf. GOBLOT, La Barrière et le Niveau, 1930. 228 Cf. GOBLOT, La Logique des Jugements de Valeur, 1927, p. I 229 Cf. GOBLOT, 1927, p. I. - 90 - independentemente de qualquer coisa, juízos, esses, tais como os demais, podem ser afirmativos ou negativos, universais ou particulares, categóricos ou hipotéticos. Se eles são provados ou servem de prova, os argumentos que eles contêm são indutivos ou dedutivos, empíricos ou racionais. Poder-se-ia crer que os juízos de valor têm as mesmas propriedades formais que os juízos de predicação relativos às regras comuns. Mas, isso é um erro – não negligenciável – por imaginar que a aprovação e a desaprovação são, nos juízos de valor, propriedades formais como a afirmação e a negação nos juízos de predicação. Os juízos de bom e de mau, de bem e de mal, de aprovação e de desaprovação, de elogio [encômio] e de censura, de respeito ou de desprezo, bem como os de estima, apreciação e avaliação, jamais representam o papel de uma cópula, pois ainda que tomemos o lugar da cópula "é", por exemplo, ele teria uma diferença de forma entre os juízos de valor e os juízos de predicação ou juízos de existência. Estes conceitos pertencem ao atributo do juízo e, por conseguinte, à sua matéria. De resto, quando o verbo ser representa a tarefa de cópula e exprime a atribuição, ele não contém mais a idéia de existência que aquela de valor. O verbo substantivo ser é, por sua vez, cópula e atributo nos juízos tais como Deus é. Como atributo ele é o conceito de realidade, de substancia ou de existência. Como cópula, ele é o conceito de conveniência do atributo ao sujeito. O conceito de existência é o conceito de conveniência do atributo ao sujeito. O conceito de existência corresponde à matéria do julgamento, e o mesmo ocorre com o conceito de relação. 230 O gênero Relação compreende ainda muitas outras espécies cuja enumeração poderia ser impossível: (1) relações de grandeza: maior, menor, igual; (2) de posição no espaço: coincidente, mais alto, mais baixo; à direita, à esquerda; adiante, atrás; dentro, fora; (3) de tempo: durante, antes, depois; (4) de ordem, em qualquer sentido da palavra: primeiro, segundo, terceiro, etc.; (5) de parentesco: pais, filhos; avós, netos; tios, etc.; (6) de valor: equivalente, melhor, pior, etc. A lista das relações não poderia ser exaurida; seria como confundir os termos da relação com os termos do julgamento que ela exprime. A relação como um todo, com os seus termos, constitui um dos termos do julgamento e pertence à sua matéria. Por julgamentos de existência se deve entender aqueles nos quais o verbo ser é verbo substantivo, aqueles que afirmam ou negam que o sujeito existe, quer seja de uma existência concreta e substancial, como coisa singular que é uma res, uma realidade, quer de uma 230 GOBLOT, 1929, §117. - 91 - existência concreta e fenomenal como dado empírico, quer de existência ideal, como quando se diz que existe um nome, um ponto, um plano, etc.; com tais e tais propriedades. Neste sentido é que se diz e se demonstra que um conceito existe, o que significa que um objeto, ao qual esse conceito pode ser atribuído, pode ser encontrado em nossa experiência. Os julgamentos de existência, como os julgamentos de valor, suscitam problemas lógicos especiais, que são as maneiras próprias de se demonstrar e de se refutar. Mas, em sentido estreito, não é verdadeiro que todo julgamento seja ou julgamento de existência ou julgamento de valor. Juízos do tipo: Todo homem é mortal ou dois e dois são quatro não são nem uma coisa nem outra. O que se opõe aos juízos de valor são os juízos que não são juízos de valor; e, como não dispomos de um nome específico para designá-los, somos obrigados, para nos fazer compreender, a empregar a expressão de julgamentos de existência, em um sentido abusivo. Os gramáticos têm legitimado esta figura de estilo, o abuso de palavras, e lhes dão um nome conhecido: seria quase tão difícil de se exprimir sem catacreses quanto sem metáforas. Em geral, deseja-se mais retirar a melhor parte da língua comum a crer em uma linguagem técnica para uso dos filósofos. Esta língua artificial não poderia ser útil, pois diante da condição de ser perfeita, não pode evoluir. Os termos técnicos dos filósofos se usam e se demolem com terrível rapidez. Empregamos, então, a expressão julgamentos de existência em sentido abusivamente enlarguecido, por oposição a julgamentos de valor; e, por vezes, chegamos mesmo a empregar esta mesma expressão em seu sentido próprio e restrito. A lógica dos julgamentos de valor não é, portanto, uma lógica formal, uma vez que a Lógica formal não se sustenta por si mesma e que, mesmo nas ciências – das mais abstratas às mais puramente dedutivas – não somente a validade do raciocínio, mas sua simples possibilidade, não é independente dos objetos sobre os quais se raciocina. Os métodos se diversificam segundo a capacidade de raciocinar sobre o real e o ideal, sobre o empírico e o racional, sobre a causalidade e a finalidade, sobre a existência das coisas e o seu valor. É do domínio da Lógica considerar a conveniência dos métodos à natureza dos problemas. Por conseqüência disso, Perelman acredita, então, que deve haver uma lógica não-formal, subordinada à matéria dos juízos e dos raciocínios, visto que a lógica geral e formal que precede e condiciona toda lógica material e especial, não vai ao raciocínio e, por conseguinte, não conclui qualquer questão, se ela não se prolonga por alguma dessas lógicas materiais e especiais, como a lógica dos julgamentos de valor, por exemplo. Segundo Perelman, os - 92 - julgamentos de valor se distinguem dos julgamentos positivos (isto é bom, isto é ruim) e dos julgamentos comparativos (este é melhor ou pior que aquele). Esta distinção tem uma importância para o lógico, porque os julgamentos positivos já estão implicados nos julgamentos comparativos, a comparação se acrescenta à aprovação, ou ao seu contrário, como uma operação lógica distinta, e estas duas formas de julgamento se justificam e se constatam por métodos diferentes. Mas a relevância dessas constatações são irrelevantes para a sustentação do empreendimento perelmaniano. Diante do insuficiente desempenho das investigações em prol do estabelecimento de uma Lógica dos juízos de valor de natureza formal, em meio a condução do seu projeto inicial em parceria com Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, Perelman observa que no apêndice do livro de Jean Paulhan 231 existem excertos da Retórica de Brunetto Latini 232 utilizados para ressaltar a anterioridade dos problemas relativos aos argumentos do discurso. Percebe, então, que o domínio da Retórica é capaz de solucionar o problema dos juízos de valor, incapaz de ser resolvido sob a égide do pensamento rigoroso inspirado no modelo matemático tal como pretendera até então. Se existe, portanto, uma grande importância de Perelman para a divulgação e amplificação da obra de Paulhan, a reciprocidade entre ambos é de uma relevância inigualável, uma vez que a na leitura casual do Les Fleurs des Tarbes 233 permitirá o reencontro de Perelman com a Retórica. 234 231 Jean Paulhan (1884-1968) foi crítico literário, crítico de arte e ensaísta. Filho de um filósofo, fez os seus estudos em Letras. O seu caminho no mundo das Letras acontece em decorrência da sua participação como combatente durante a primeira guerra mundial, onde foi gravemente ferido. Sua obra, como um todo, reflete o estilo critico e combatente de um homem profundamente marcado pelos horrores promovidos pela guerra. Após o conflito, torna-se colaborador da revista surrealista Littérature, e mais tarde, em 1920, a secretaria da Nouvelle Revue Français, cargo no qual permanece até a morte de Jacques Rivière em 1925, quando ocupa a direção fazendo da sua ocupação uma espécie de magistério. 232 Brunetto Latini (1220-1295) foi um famoso poeta que escrevia em italiano (e não em latim, como era comum entre os nobres). Seus trabalhos de Retórica e Filosofia, costuma-se dizer, foram marcantes pela grande influência que exerceram para a formação de Dante Alighieri. (Cf. LATINI, Brunetto. édition critique par Francis J. Carmody, Li livres du trésor, Genève, Slatkine Reprints, 1975. 458 p. [Reimp. de l'ed. de Berkeley Los Angeles, 1948. Version remaniée de la thèse soutenue par l'auteur, Basel, 1965.] 233 PAULHAN, Jean. Les Fleurs des Tarbes ou La Terreur dans les Lettres. 2 e . ed. Paris: Gallimard, 1949. 234 Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, colaboradora de Chaïm Perelman e co-autora do Tratado da Argumentação, era admiradora dos livros de Paulhan e, em especial, de Les fleurs des Tarbes. Foi através dela que Perelman encontrou o acesso a obra do escritor e, por conseguinte, à Retórica. (Cf. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, Lucie. Rencontre avec la Rhétorique. La Théorie de L'argumentation: perspectives et applications [recueil publié par le Centre National Belge de Recherches de Logique]. Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts, 1964, p. 5). - 93 - 2 . 3 . D e P a u l ha n a A r i st ót el es No Tratado da Argumentação, Chaïm Perelman cita - diversas vezes - Les Fleurs des Tarbes de Jean Paulhan, ensaio publicado originalmente em 1941 235 mas cuja ressonância não havia ultrapassado senão uma estreita elite literária francesa 236 . Faz referência, também, a um estudo anterior de Paulhan, ainda menos divulgado, sobre a função do provérbio na conversação tradicional malgaxe 237 . Não é por acaso que a influência de Paulhan começou verdadeiramente a se exercer nas Universidades francesas, sobre os professores de Literatura e depois sobre os lingüistas, ao mesmo tempo em que o pensamento de Perelman se difundia entre os juristas e os filósofos. A garantia filosófica que o Tratado da Argumentação pôde dar às reflexões do escritor francês sustentou a sua autoridade e amplificou o seu raio da atuação. Perelman contribuiu para fazer reler Paulhan e com isso desempenhou um importante papel na evolução dos estudos literários fora do impasse promovido pelos engajados a um estruturalismo vulgarizado, sobretudo nos anos 1960. O Tratado da Argumentação não pretendia propor uma teoria da invenção propriamente literária, ainda que muitos textos literários sejam citados nesta obra. Mesmo em O Império Retórico, onde Perelman efetua uma generalização das suas teses, não se pretende englobar a literatura, embora soubesse bem, naquele contexto, que os literários "liam e utilizavam os seus trabalhos". 238 Nem mesmo o caráter específico da retórica literária, que preocupa Paulhan em Les Fleurs des Tarbes, reteve a atenção de Perelman. Permaneceu em sua própria perspectiva, epistemológica e jurídica, interessando-se pela literatura apenas na medida em que esta, quando argumenta, faz uso do mesmo método persuasivo que convém ao conjunto das atividades propriamente humanas que visam a verossimilhança. 235 PAULHAN, Jean. Les Fleurs des Tarbes ou La Terreur dans les Lettres. 2 e ed. Paris: Gallimard, 1949. 236 Em 1945, Jean Paulhan recebeu o grande prêmio de Literatura da Academia Francesa pelo conjunto da sua obra. Aqui estão, alguns das centenas de artigos, além dos romances, tais como Le Guerrier, publicado em 1917, Le Pont traversé, La Guérison sévère. Mas, é sobretudo pelos seus ensaios que ele marcou o seu tempo com Les Fleurs de Tarbes ou la fureur des lettres (1941), À demain la poésie (1947), De la paille et du grain (1948), Poètes d'aujourd'hui (1948), Petite Préface à toute critique (1951), Les Paroles transparentes (1955). Encontra-se também muitas obras sobre estética como, Georges Braque, Le Clair et L'obscur, L'art informel. 237 O malgaxe é uma língua da família malaio-polinésia, falada em Madagascar e em algumas das ilhas vizinhas. Região na qual Paulhan viveu durante inúmeros anos. (Cf. PAULHAN, Jean. Les Hain-tenys. Paris: Genthner, 1914. Gallimard, 1938, p.37). 238 Cf. FUMAROLI, Marc. Théorie de l'argumentation et invention littéraire. Chaïm Perelman et la pensée contemporaine. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1993, p. 309. - 94 - Os literários devem a Perelman a oportunidade de reler Paulhan com uma compreensão nova. Ele fez perceber que a Literatura, por mais singular que esteja no universo do discurso, destaca-se sobre um fundo geral de disciplinas humanas. Este é o "império retórico" ao qual Perelman dedicou-se a atribuir legitimidade filosófica. Marc Fumaroli destaca: A première vue, cependant, la rencontre entre Perelman et Paulhan était fort improbable. Le fait qu'elle ait eu lieu démontre la générosité d'esprit et la curiosité du philosophe bruxellois. Les deux auteurs sont partis de deux étonnements, et donc de deux problèmes, apparemment sans rapport entre eux. 239 O contato com o livro de Jean Paulhan encaminhou as pesquisas de Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca à Retórica de Brunetto Lattini. A partir desta obra eles puderam retroceder, no sentido positivo que este termo possa ensejar no percurso de uma pesquisa conceitual, à tradição greco-latina da Retórica. Na continuidade das investigações alcançaram a Retórica de Aristóteles, por meio da qual expandiram e acresceram à pesquisa as informações complementares contidas nos Tópicos. 240 Perelman muito contribuiu para restaurar no campo filosófico a Retórica aristotélica; considerada uma das células-mãe da literatura européia. Mas a Retórica de Aristóteles é um fator comum de várias disciplinas, tais como a controvérsia política e a disputa judicial, dentre tantas. Se ela interessa também à Literatura, está longe de resumir-se a esta, motivo pelo qual Perelman buscará sustentação no pensamento aristotélico para mostrar que o imenso campo da Retórica não pode ser abandonado pela razão. Para restaurar os direitos da razão, onde o formalismo dos lógicos modernos não queria mais os 239 Cf. FUMAROLI, Marc. Théorie de l'argumentation et invention littéraire. Chaïm Perelman et la pensée contemporaine. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1993, p. 310. 240 Confirmam-se tais informações por meio do texto de Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca em que se pode ler: " (...) en appendice, [de Les Fleurs des Tarbes], montrent un vieil auteur, qui, lui aussi, se posait des problèmes relatifs aux arguments du discours. Et s'il se les posait, ce n'était pas à titre personnel, mais parce que d'autres j'avaient fait avant lui. De là à remonter à la grande tradition classique et notamment À Aristote, celui des Topiques et de la Rhétorique, il n'y avait qu'un pas. (Cf. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, Lucie. Rencontre avec la Rhétorique. La Théorie de L'argumentation: perspectives et applications [recueil publié par le Centre National Belge de Recherches de Logique]. Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts, 1964, p. 6). - 95 - ver, ele redescobre o que Lévi-Strauss chamaria velho "bricolage" 241 , uma antiguidade "pensada selvagem" da qual a Retórica do estagirita é o mais completo testemunho. É também à Retórica, mesmo que não remonte a Aristóteles, que Paulhan se dirigiu para opor ao terror nas Letras um regime mais liberal. Longe de ser um constrangimento, a retórica libertava o escritor da escravidão de ser original; a sua disciplina, provada pela tradição, apontava para a novidade. Os dois movimentos seguem trajetos paralelos e conduzem à mesma descoberta, ainda que operando em ordens diferentes e querendo curar patologias que não têm nada de comum. Não é surpreendente, por conseguinte, que o eco encontrado pela obra de Perelman concorreu, para outro estágio da reflexão, à radiação do pensamento de Paulhan. Pode-se extrair da obra de Perelman uma renovação da Epistemologia Jurídica, ou mesmo dos procedimentos políticos e diplomáticos de negociação; mas não se pode tirar uma teoria da literatura nem mesmo um método de análise literária. A partir de 1945, um livro mostra uma via de ação destinada aos historiadores e aos críticos literários. Com ciência e erudição, Ernst-Robert Curtius, em Literatura Européia e a Idade Média Latina 242 , renovava a definição da literatura e o método dos estudos literários unindo-os à sua célula-mãe, a Retórica. Enquanto Paulhan, prudentemente, dedicava-se a conter e domar o "terror" recordando-lhe a existência de um antigo regime da literatura, Curtius não hesitava a identificar este antigo regime à própria literatura, em seu funcionamento normal e permanente. Curtius não evoca o "terror" modernista porque, para ele, consiste em uma patologia momentânea, um fenômeno de decadência provisória que um cientista - herdeiro de Goethe e do seu desdém pelo romantismo - devia ignorar. É-lhe suficiente descrever a norma; mas esta norma não é uma axiomática, motivo pelo qual Curtius limita-se a levar a cabo o método filológico, para fazer emergir dos próprios fatos os textos literários, as recorrências que atestam a ordem profunda, permanente e viva, da qual se alimentam. O argumento sobre o 241 Bricoleur, do francês, significa uma pessoa que faz todo o tipo de trabalho, trabalhos manuais. Bricoler, um verbo, tem o sentido de ziguezaguear, fazer de forma provisória, falsificar, traficar. Em outras palavras, jogar por tabela, utilizar meios indiretos, tortuosos e rodeios. Bricole, um substantivo, "catapulta, ricochete, engano, astúcia, trabalho inesperado" ou "pequeno acessório, coisa insignificante". E, bricolage, "trabalho de amador; na antropologia, trabalho onde a técnica é improvisada, adaptada ao material, às circunstâncias". Usado por Claude Lévi-Strauss, o termo bricolage descreve como as pessoas utilizam-se de diversos objetos à sua volta para desenvolverem e assimilarem novas idéias. A bricolagem não possui um projeto pré-concebido e se afasta do caminho conhecido, pois constrói a partir de sobras, pedaços de material já utilizado, do desmonte de peças. A bricolagem é como um jogo de decomposição e recomposição, onde coisas velhas ou estragadas podem ser reconstituídas; ou à partir do trabalho com objetos usados algo novo pode surgir. (Cf. LÉVI-STRAUSS, C. O Pensamento Selvagem. Campinas: Papirus, 1989). 242 CURTIUS, Ernst Robert. L iteratura Européia e Idade Média Latina. Trad.: Paulo Rónai e Teodoro Cabral. São Paulo, Edusp/Hucitec: 1996. 760 p. (Coleção Clássicos) . - 96 - qual repousa a tese de Curtius pode-se resumir assim: se a literatura, desde a sua origem grega, pôde constituir-se em tradição autônoma, isto se deve à utilização de uma retórica adequada aos seus próprios fins, razão pela qual se constituiu em uma instituição oratória sui generis. Ela se realiza no centro das humanidades e pode sair apenas negando-se a si própria. O método filológico do qual se serve Curtius é atribuído ao seu objeto: o seu rigor é de outra ordem que a exatidão dedutiva e matemática; o que não implica dizer que tem menos rigor demonstrativo e classificatório, mas o seu próprio. Diante desse imenso inquérito metódico, resulta que a invenção literária sempre se apoiou sobre um tópico relativamente estável. O recurso aos lugares comuns, longe de fazer- lhe pagar a sua fidelidade mnemotécnica por uma esterilidade repetitiva, foi o princípio da sua variedade, de sua incessante renovação, das suas querelas e da sua vitalidade propriamente liberal. Isso foi possível por duas razões: (1) porque os lugares comuns literários (que trata de conteúdos ou formas) não são axiomas unívocos, mas fontes e recursos polissêmicos, que o καιρος dos gregos, o aptum dos latinos sabem fazer variar e modificar apropriando-o a situações inéditas, a novas relações entre o público e os autores; (2) porque a tópica literária não é um corpus conceitual, mas um conjunto simultaneamente orgânico e leve, alimentado de diferentes riquezas filosóficas e susceptível de uma combinação criativa. A aplicação desta memória pela invenção deve levar em conta o imprevisível e a novidade da diversidade dos talentos e das situações humanas: ela traz uma antiga experiência acumulada e estabilizada em quadros gerais já conhecidos. Há, por conseguinte, uma espécie de racionalidade literária que permite o julgamento, a avaliação e o que pode mesmo tomar apoio sobre um conjunto de critérios estáveis, mas não imóveis. Esta evidência do julgamento literário não é uma evidência matemática. Tem no poder de evocar um texto a sua capacidade de fazer ver e viver na imaginação, a emoção que uma definição racional limitar-se-ia a enunciar. Essa evidência, o enarghj dos gregos, pode reunir sobre o seu sucesso ou sobre o seu malogro um consentimento geral e duradouro. Ninguém contesta ou pode contestar a descrição do incêndio de Tróia, no Canto II de Eneida 243 , tampouco a peste de Atenas em De Natura Rerum, de 243 A Eneida (30-19 a.C.) consiste na epopéia de Virgílio [Publius Vergilius Maro (70-19a.C.)] que trata da viagem de Enéias, de Tróia à Itália. - 97 - Lucrécio 244 . A partir daí pode-se não somente inventar, mas avaliar outras descrições literárias análogas. Esta possibilidade de um julgamento por comparação tem em conta o caráter específico da invenção literária: o talento, a inspiração, a singularidade de uma voz ou uma imaginação. A sua capacidade de fazer-se entender em uma conjuntura precisa e de sobreviver a esta conjuntura, são tanto melhor servidos e sustentados que aqueles que se exercem em situações já reconhecidas. O sucesso é percebido tanto melhor que pode ser comparado com precedentes ou tentativas rivais. A relativa objetividade tradicional dos lugares, dos tipos, das figuras e dos estilos serve, por conseguinte, de marcador para a comparação e o julgamento. A literatura é um universo de espelhos em que se reflete a mobilidade da vida humana. A vizinhança cronológica entre a Literatura Européia de Curtius e o Tratado da Argumentação de Perelman não supõe que este último tenha lido o primeiro. A semelhança entre os dois se limita por ter uma referência comum: a Retórica de Aristóteles e a sua tradição pedagógica, da qual Quintiliano é referência capital. A obra de Curtius não foi menos ocultada nos estudos literários franceses pelo modo estruturalista que se impôs nos anos 1960-1970. O estruturalismo, que se deu para ciência geral do homem e da linguagem, era realmente a conclusão e a canonização cientifica do subjetivismo absoluto preconizado pelos surrealistas nos anos 1920. Terminava a exclusão da razão retórica da literatura, pela aposta na condição das Letras em uma análise do tipo formalista. O terror do par significante-significado, complementado por uma teoria literária doutrinária, sistematizava por outras vias o terror surrealista da beleza explosiva fixa. Nos dois casos, a subjetividade dos fenômenos de linguagem (o agradar e o comover inseparáveis) era evacuada em proveito de uma transcendência e de modelos abstratos que pretendiam dar conta da linguagem nos mesmos moldes dos experimentos científicos em laboratório. O sonho de uma lingüística científica, independente da Retórica e da Dialética, abarcava o intento de uma poesia indiferente à literatura. Os anos circunjacentes à publicação do Tratado da Argumentação foram também aqueles nos quais se redescobria o pensamento de Giambattista Vico, cujo livro Perelman ajudou a repor em evidência. Diversos terrores contemporâneo projetavam – retrospectivamente – um novo enfoque sobre a controvérsia 244 Titus Lucretius Carus (Roma, ~98-55 a.C.) é autor do poema De Natura Rerum (Da natureza das coisas), sua única obra conhecida, um longo poema filosófico que tentava explicar o universo em termos científicos com ênfase para a superstição e o medo do desconhecido das pessoas, uma exposição das doutrinas de Epicuro. (Cf. LUCRÉCIO, T. Da natureza. São Paulo: Abril, 1973. (Os pensadores). - 98 - heróica que Vico havia conduzido contra o cartesianismo que triunfa em seu tempo. Vico apoiava-se também sobre as características subjetivas da Retórica, que o autor napolitano das Institutiones Oratoriae 245 tomou como objetos de análise da via normal da conversação, no que se refere à felicidade em sociedade. Diversos terrores do século XX, de origem metafísica ou científica, reverberaram sobre a controvérsia solitária que Vico conduziu no século XVII contra o método cartesiano que pretendia ser aplicável fora do seu campo adequado. Essa controvérsia alertava para o perigo que corria a prática do diálogo entre os homens quando se deseja, quer pela gnose, quer pela matemática, desqualificá-lo em nome de uma evidência exclusivamente racional. A recordação, a experiência, a imaginação, a emoção, da qual as línguas naturais e o simbólico literário são os veículos e os intérpretes, tinham-se encontrado, a partir da idade de Malebranche e de Fontenelle, rejeitadas à fila de remanências pueris por uma ciência moderna que fazia tábula rasa para melhor edificar o seu próprio saber verdadeiro e verificável. A "ciência nova" de Vico (que desempenhou tão grande papel na reação romântica contra o racionalismo das Luzes) representa um precedente clássico do movimento que levou Perelman a propor uma Nova Retórica, ciência nova que permite a revitalização dos campos dos Direito e da jurisprudência. O "terror" tem a sua própria trajetória, caminhando na história do pensamento europeu, pari passu com a Retórica. 246 Em Segredo profissional (1922), Jean Cocteau escreveu em termos que remetem a Quintiliano: s'il est vrai que la multitude des regards patine les statues, les lieux communs, chefs-d'oeuvre éternels, sont recouverts d'une épaisse patine qui les rend invisibles et cache leur beauté. Mettez un lieu commun en place, nettoyez-le, frottez-le, éclairez-le de telle sorte qu'il frappe avec sa jeunesse et avec la même fraîcheur, le même jet qu'il avait à sa source, vous ferez oeuvre de poète. 247 A literatura francesa dos anos 1920, incluindo Valéry, Gide, Cocteau e Larbaud despertou da modernidade, mas manteve o sentimento de reverência à autoridade do mundo moderno sobre a tradição herdada. Ainda que atenta ao καιρος, o aptum e, por conseguinte, a singularidade das situações modernas, faz uso dos lugares comuns renovados, mas provados 245 VICO, Giovanni Battista. Institutiones Oratoriae (1711-1741); The Art of Rhetoric. Trad.: PINTON, Giorgio A. ; SHIPPEE, Arthur W. Amsterdam / Atlanta : Editions Rodopi B.V., 1984. 246 Uma Sociedade dedicada à história da Retórica foi criada em 1974. Perelman assistiu ao seu primeiro Colóquio Internacional em Zurique, em 1976. Era um Colóquio de "literários" decididos a combater, em suas respectivas disciplinas, a tirania do estruturalismo. O apoio que lhes concedia Perelman, tão atento aos exemplos literários, era-lhes precioso. 247 COCTEAU, Jean. Le Secret professionnel (1922). Le rappel a l'ordre. Paris: Librairie Stock, 1926. - 99 - pela tradição. Cocteau, por exemplo, foi um referencial cultural da França dos anos 1920. 248 Há, por conseguinte, profunda homologia entre a confiança reencontrada na tópica dos retóricos por Perelman e a confiança intacta no tópico literário típico dos grandes escritores franceses dos anos 1914-1940 – do qual Paulhan, à sua maneira, se fez posteriormente teórico. A diferença entre eles se manifesta em dois pontos essenciais. O primeiro é uma pergunta acerca da abordagem. A retórica literária engloba a argumentação, que visa persuadir e fazer a decisão na vida prática: mas o seu fim último é contemplativo e mediado, porque reflete as situações humanas e o elemento de persuasão recíproco que elas contêm. É por esta reflexão, inclusive, que visa indiretamente alterá-lo. A argumentação, na acepção de Perelman, não é da ordem reflexiva da μίμησις, mas do êxito imediato de todos os domínios da interação social, jurídica e política. Define uma regra do jogo persuasivo muito mais flexível e mais pragmática que a lógica formal, embora seja muito geral. A invenção literária não é geral, pois consiste na reinvenção viva de uma tradição. Os lugares comuns de uma tradição têm um sabor único, posto que o seu reemprego pelo escritor é, por si só, um jogo de espelhos de características singulares. Para compreender a literatura, o que não era o objetivo de Perelman, torna-se necessário adotar um ponto de vista afastado do formalismo lógico e do pragmatismo controvertido. A singularidade da palavra literária é a fidelidade a uma língua, à memória de uma língua, e acessoriamente a esta fidelidade reflexiva diante de um auditório é que a atualidade importa. Neste sentido, a lição da Bíblia se junta à da retórica literária de acordo com Curtius: os lugares comuns da Bíblia já estão na linguagem bíblica e mesmo as suas sílabas: a prodigiosa variedade e vitalidade da Escrita é, para os fiéis, transformação destes lugares em referências para aqueles que se desviam ou esquecem dos seus laços. Sob vários aspectos, é um exemplo análogo ao que Curtius analisa em sua Literatura européia (...) que se limita, no entanto, ao domínio latino e românico. Se a invenção literária nunca é tão elevada quando reencontra e reafirma diferentemente um lugar comum - como no caso em que Dante pede a Virgílio para ajudá-lo a recomeçar à descida de Enéas 249 aos Infernos 250 -, não tem por 248 Considerado o "príncipe dos poetas", ele foi um dos pilares da produção cultural na França entre o fim da Primeira Guerra Mundial ao início da Segunda. 249 Enéas, personagem da mitologia romana e herói da Eneida, de Virgílio, é filho de Vênus e Anquises (príncipe troiano). Na Eneida, Enéas escapa de Tróia após a guerra e funda a cidade de Roma. 250 Dante conhecia as obras de Virgílio e louva-o por ter influenciado seu estilo poético. De acordo com vários dantólogos, Virgílio também tem um sentido alegórico: simboliza o intelecto, a razão do peregrino Dante. É a razão "que apagada estivera, talvez por excessivo silêncio" que pode guiá-lo para fora da selva escura. (Cf. ALIGHIERI, Dante. A Divina Comédia. Trad.: J. P. Xavier Pinheiro. Rio de Janeiro: W. M. Jackson, 1960). - 100 - fim persuadir, provocar uma ação, motivar uma decisão: como os Salmos bíblicos. Neste caso, a alegria que se manifesta é de outra ordem. Torna-nos participantes de uma energia que habitualmente deixamos em repouso, por preguiça ou utilitarismo: a energia da língua e na língua, o verbo, seja λόγος ou μῦθος. O verbo bíblico funda e renova a participação no pacto consagrado que une Deus ao seu povo, e o que lhe dita a sua via, é oração e profecia. O verbo literário, tal como a Grécia domesticou com a retórica, veicula e transmite qualquer experiência humana refletida por símbolos, lugares ou fábulas e estes precedentes familiares tornam reconhecíveis e mesmo compreensivos o imprevisível. A "comunidade doxográfica", que Perelman freqüentemente menciona em seu Tratado e onde vê as premissas e a garantia da negociação e do consenso, pode ser vista como uma comunidade mais profunda, mais essencial, mais natural e menos ligada aos objetivos imediatos como a persuasão utilitária e conjuntural. No Livro II da Retórica, Aristóteles recomenda ao orador, quando esgotou o efeito dos argumentos entinemáticos, que recorra à citação de uma Fábula. Mesmo Platão, quando está no princípio da maiêutica demonstrativa, recorre ao mito. Nos dois casos, a comunidade doxográfica conclama outra comunidade mais profunda, mais reflexiva, mais reminiscente. A Fábula e o mito são imediatamente reconhecidos por eles mesmos. Revelam- se ao se fazer reconhecer. A literatura recorre, também, ao socorro da probatio por propiciar um eficiente suporte à consciência. A fábula do retórico aristotélico (emprestada por Esopo ou Homero) é aqui, como a citação das escrituras no discurso religioso, um caminho ascendente que conduz a uma evidência transcendente aos erros pontuais da comunidade, e que a reúne no ato de fé ou no sentimento de pertença a uma natureza duradoura. A invenção literária supõe um ato de fé em um direito natural, por exemplo. A partir daí, a adesão às obras novas, atribuídas às circunstâncias novas, tomam qualquer sentido de fidelidade e de aprofundamento. A pragmática controvertida, como a define Perelman, é mais liberal que as pesquisas empíricas da conversação, ou as doutrinas supostamente científicas que congelam e subvertem o diálogo. É um método atribuído aos diversos tipos de negociação que postulam uma democracia política e comercial moderna, em que as opiniões flutuam e diante das quais é necessário apoiar-se sobre o que os une para chegar a conciliar, concluir, decidir e agir. A literatura, na acepção de Curtius, assegura sua autoridade e obtém um consentimento por referência a precedentes freqüentemente antigos: intervém na esfera pragmática e conjuntural, - 101 - mas abre luzes para esferas esquecidas. Hoje, se propaga na sociedade de consumo um espelho cujos reflexos são emprestados a uma antiga sabedoria, a um antigo regime de formas; testemunhas de uma beleza e moralidade onde tudo parece um surpreendente jogo de valores em permanente desacordo e absolutamente flutuantes. A argumentação, nos moldes da teoria desenvolvida por Perelman, encontra traço comum com a literatura porque faz admitir uma ordem de conhecimento própria às humanidades, distinta daquela pertencente às ciências da matéria e ao formalismo lógico. Assim, a técnica da negociação retorna a uma tópica prevalecente na atualidade (do discurso) e no imediato. Sua utilidade e eficácia são preocupações das circunstâncias, podendo exercer-se apenas em uma relativa retirada que lhe permite fazer dialogar e que reside com o que passa, num jogo de espelhos cognitivos que introduz a ironia e a memória na avaliação das conduções humanas. A incursão de Perelman ao pensamento de Paulhan permitiu o acesso às idéias de Aristóteles e, por conseguinte, ao vasto campo da Retórica que se lhe mostrou indicado para a resolução dos problemas envolvendo os juízos de valor. - 102 - 2 . 4 . A N oçã o de F i l osof i a Seguindo o pensamento de Goblot - que também buscou estabelecer uma Lógica dos Juízos de Valor - Perelman, insatisfeito com a definição de racional a partir do critério de evidência, se predispõe a pensar em uma Lógica capaz de orientar as ações humanas, ou seja, apta a lidar com valores. Seria uma lógica específica das normas, tal como a lógica deôntica de Von Wright 251 , bastante estudada no campo jurídico e responsável por fornecer um tratamento aos modos de pensamento não-formais, como a retórica e a tópica. O interesse de Perelman está centrado na idéia de estabelecer uma forma de raciocínio – considerado lógico – que embora não esteja em conformidade com os critérios da lógica formal, não seja considerado irracional ou ilógico. Conquanto o próprio Perelman (não declaradamente), seguindo o pensamento de Edmond Goblot, denomine essa nova lógica de lógica dos juízos de valor, podemos dizer que se trata de uma lógica do diálogo (dia-lógica), uma lógica do razoável e da persuasão, uma teoria da argumentação e da interpretação a que ele preferirá denominar de Nova Retórica. Mas, uma vez que Perelman, sob as mais diversas fontes de inspiração e suporte teórico, consagrou a utilização do termo Nova Retórica, pergunta-se que conceito ou compreensão pode corresponder a esse termo? Nouvelle Rhétorique ou Nouvelle Dialectique? Questionamos a possibilidade da Nova Retórica ser mais bem representada pela designação de Nova Dialética. Na segunda parte da Introdução do Tratado, Perelman ensaia uma justificativa para sustentar a sua opção. Em suas palavras: (...) nosso Tratado se relaciona, sobretudo com as preocupações (...) dos autores gregos e latinos, que estudaram a arte de persuadir e de convencer, a técnica da deliberação e da discussão. É por essa razão também que o apresentamos como uma nova retórica. Nossa análise [, entretanto,] concerne às provas que Aristóteles chama de dialéticas, examinadas por ele nos Tópicos, e cuja utilização mostra na Retórica. 252 251 Em 1951, Von Wright (1916-2003) escreve um paper intitulado "Estudos sobre a lógica deôntica", publicado na revista Mind, que analisa como o legislador formula de modo abstrato as regras que organizam a sociedade. Como o legislador organiza seu discurso? Quais os fatores? Nisso se concentrou a preocupação de Von Wright. Assim, a lógica jurídica ganha autonomia porque a lógica deôntica pode dar à Jurisprudência o fundamento da dedução no domínio das normas. Portanto, a lógica jurídica só vem a nascer com sua preocupação delimitada no séc. XX, com a obra "lógica deôntica" de Von Wright. Trata-se essa obra de um vanguardismo na discussão de como o juiz chega a construir decisões justas. (cf. VON WRIGHT, Georg Henrik. Deontic Logic. Mind, LX, no. 237, 1951, p.1-15). 252 PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.5. - 103 - Esse suposto ponto de chegada proposto pelo autor, entretanto, não é senão ponto de partida, visto que, longe de fechar a discussão acerca da natureza da nomenclatura e, por conseguinte, do objeto de investigação da sua obra, só faz mantê-la aberta a questionamentos e problematizações. [Nova] Retórica ou [Nova] Dialética? É possível que a melhor resposta para esse questionamento emane de uma investigação acerca da finalidade da Nova Retórica. A Nova Retórica tem como objeto "o estudo das técnicas discursivas que permitem provocar ou aumentar a adesão dos espíritos às teses que se lhes apresentam ao assentimento" 253 e, assim sendo, sua finalidade se caracteriza pela busca de uma eficácia discursiva. Essa noção encontra amparo, aliás, em outra passagem da obra de Perelman, mais especificamente em Logique et Rhétorique, onde o autor afirma que "(...) ce que la correction est pour la grammaire, la validité pour la logique, l'efficacité l'est pour la rhétorique" 254 . Desta maneira, a preocupação com a eficácia discursiva permite que se desfaça qualquer conexão entre a Nova Retórica e elementos reguladores externos. A Nova Retórica se define como uma técnica e, assim sendo, é preciso conhecer e aplicar os seus meios para atingir os resultados específicos, ou seja, a adesão dos interlocutores e a anuência do auditório. Desse ponto de vista, o melhor argumento é o mais forte. A força, no sentido retórico, é vista como uma noção que está situada entre a eficácia psicológica e a validade lógica. Mas, em meio a essa situação, encontra-se um relativismo moderado, visto que não existem garantias para a eficácia do discurso. As teses que aceitamos ou defendemos não estão fundadas sobre uma verdade objetiva, mas sobre uma referência a um contexto argumentativo. Existem, aqui, duas situações distintas que permitem compreender a finalidade da Nova Retórica e, por conseguinte, sustentar sua vinculação com a Dialética, por um lado, e com a Retórica, por outro. Se aceitarmos a hipótese de que qualquer argumentação se destina a um auditório, pois quando se argumenta, objetiva-se conquistar a adesão do seu interlocutor, a Nova Retórica está mais próxima da Retórica. Mas, se considerarmos que Aristóteles, no princípio dos Tópicos, ao fundar as bases do seu método dialético, define que seu propósito consiste em "encontrar um método de investigação graças ao qual possamos raciocinar, partindo de opiniões geralmente aceitas, sobre qualquer problema que nos seja proposto, e 253 « l'étude des techniques discursives permettant de provoquer ou accroître l'adhésion des esprits aux thèses qu'on présente à leur assentiment » (Cf. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1958, p.5. A esse respeito ver também: PERELMAN, 1970e, p. 105.) 254 Cf. PERELMAN, 1950b, p.98. - 104 - sejamos também capazes, quando replicamos a um argumento, de evitar dizer alguma coisa que nos cause embaraços" 255 , teremos a Nova Retórica mais próxima da Dialética, visto que esta última também se propõe a ser um método de raciocinar apoiando-se em idéias plausíveis. Será possível, então, desfazer ou simplesmente decifrar, esse híbrido teórico a que Perelman designa com o nome de Nova Retórica? Tentemos encontrar em suas próprias palavras alguns elementos que nos conduzam neste sentido. Diz Perelman: Se, entre os antigos, a retórica se apresentava como o estudo de uma técnica para o uso do vulgo, impaciente por chegar rapidamente a conclusões, por formar uma opinião para si, sem se dar ao trabalho prévio de uma investigação séria, quanto a nós, não queremos limitar o estudo da argumentação àquela que é adaptada a um público de ignorantes. 256 Observemos que, mais uma vez, ao tentar sustentar a sua Teoria da Argumentação como uma Nova Retórica, o autor aproxima a sua concepção do pensamento dialético de Aristóteles. Afinal, este último é enfático ao descrever que "o raciocínio é dialético quando parte de opiniões geralmente aceitas". 257 Ora, são "opiniões 'geralmente aceitas' aquelas que todo mundo admite, ou a maioria das pessoas, ou os filósofos – em outras palavras: todos, ou a maioria, ou os mais notáveis". 258 Entretanto, "não se deve argumentar com todo mundo, nem praticar argumentação com o homem da rua". 259 Assim, embora o raciocínio dialético, na concepção aristotélica descrita nos Tópicos, consista no debate cru de opiniões "geralmente aceitas", esse entrave dialógico somente se dá entre homens hábeis em propor questões e levantar objeções, pois não se deve praticar argumentação com qualquer pessoa. Nos dois casos, ou seja, nos Tópicos de Aristóteles e na Nova Retórica de Perelman, existe uma ressalva comum ao se propor uma seleção para que se firme um diálogo efetivo. Desta forma, as semelhanças entre a finalidade da Nova Retórica e o objeto dos Tópicos tornam possível, a fortiori, estabelecer uma vinculação mais estreita entre a Teoria da Argumentação e a nomenclatura que lhe poderia caber de Nova Dialética. 255 ARISTÓTELES, 1978, 100 a 18. 256 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.7. 257 ARISTÓTELES, 1978, 100b 18. 258 ARISTÓTELES, 1978, 100b 22. 259 ARISTÓTELES, 1978, 164b 10. - 105 - Uma vez que a Teoria da Argumentação, sob inspiração da Dialética 260 de Aristóteles, procura encontrar a melhor opção para um tratamento teórico sistemático, com critérios e normas bem definidos para a construção de discursos, é possível que uma incursão ao sentido encontrado no pensamento antigo possa oferecer alguma contribuição para o recorte que efetuamos, visto que o fundamento do gênero de diálogo que importa à nossa pesquisa possui as suas bases na tradição que se consolidou pelo pensamento inspirado no modelo socrático- platônico. Desde a antiguidade é possível observar que o termo dialética não é utilizado pelos filósofos gregos com o mesmo significado. A natureza confusa do conceito, embora não permita uma definição, uma concepção unívoca acerca da dialética, permite um recorte bem definido que possibilite o entendimento do termo. Em virtude dos múltiplos significados que o conceito assumiu no curso da história do pensamento ocidental, Perelman destaca 261 que a noção de dialética sempre foi apreciada com certa reserva, como se pode constatar nas palavras do lógico holandês Evert Willem Beth: A dialética de Platão ramificou-se, logo em sua origem, em três doutrinas separadas, das quais somente uma desenvolveu-se de uma forma retilínea e contínua, de modo que atualmente apenas a lógica constitui uma construção sólida cuja importância para o pensamento científico já não poderia ser seriamente posta em dúvida. A arte de discutir e a metafísica, em contrapartida, mostram de forma manifesta as enfermidades da velhice e parecem estar condenadas a incorporar-se na Lógica. Em conseqüência, parece-me inoportuno tentar reintroduzir o termo "dialética" na terminologia da filosofia científica, tanto mais que tal termo foi , no palavreado de certas escolas filosóficas, associado a pretensões particularmente ambiciosas, incapazes de se realizar no campo do pensamento científico. 262 As palavras de Beth sinalizam a necessidade de criar uma espécie de assepsia filosófica, extraindo do vocabulário especificamente filosófico tudo aquilo que conduz à controvérsia. O confuso, devido à sua inconsistência e conseqüente equivocidade, deve ser 260 O sentido etimológico da expressão diálogo poderia fornecer alguma luz para a solução do nosso problema, a saber: descobrir se a Teoria da Argumentação consiste em uma Nova Retórica ou em uma Nova Dialética, visto que, do ponto de vista etimológico, o termo dialogov resulta da fusão das palavras gregas dia e logov. dia significa "por meio de" ; logov foi traduzida para o latim ratio (razão), mas possui significados bastante diferentes como "palavra", "expressão", "fala" e "verbo". Em uma concepção estritamente vinculada ao sentido etimológico da palavra, o Diálogo pode ser visto como uma forma de fazer circular sentidos e significados por meio de palavras, promovendo uma troca ou discussão de idéias, opiniões e conceitos, com vista à solução de problemas, ao entendimento ou à harmonia. Em um grupo que dialoga, as palavras circulam entre as pessoas, passam entre elas, sem que sejam necessárias concordâncias ou discordâncias imediatas. 261 PERELMAN, 1997, p.3. 262 PERELMAN, 1997, p.3-4. - 106 - banido da prática filosófica, bem como tudo quanto é possível de produzir concepções pessoais, subjetivas e passíveis de serem contaminadas por juízos de valor de natureza parciais, mutáveis e contingentes. 263 Esse entendimento se contrapõe à concepção de dialética em Platão, por exemplo. A tradição platônica se constitui a partir de um procedimento dialógico através do qual o raciocínio avança gradativamente, sendo constantemente avaliado e ratificado por meio da anuência do interlocutor. Em outras palavras, através do método dialético cada estágio do procedimento discursivo deve ser acompanhado de uma reavaliação dos aspectos discutidos em consonância com a aceitação do ouvinte que deve emitir um juízo acerca do que se trata. Desta forma, as idéias precisam ser submetidas à formação conjunta de um raciocínio exigente e comprometido com o resultado que deverá corresponder à verdade. Ainda que a dialética conduza à busca da verdade, a controvérsia é o seu combustível. Incompatibilidades e controvérsias, características da argumentação retórica, são formuladas e descartadas. 264 Não se faz imperativo concordar ou discordar, mas apresentar idéias à apreciação do(s) interlocutor(es), visto que o diálogo tem como função permitir a circulação de idéias entre várias pessoas. Isso quer dizer que por meio do diálogo a palavra liga, permeia, em vez de separar. Agrega em vez de fragmentar. Essa noção nos leva a perceber que a interação dialógica não é um instrumento para que as pessoas defendam e mantenham suas posições, tal como acontece na discussão e no debate. Na esfera da Teoria da Argumentação, qualquer diálogo implica em contextualização, audiência e eloqüência, porque os argumentos estão situados em um determinado momento histórico, dirigem-se a um auditório determinado e são atribuídos a um orador que, por meio do seu discurso, pretende exercer uma ação – de persuasão ou convencimento – sobre o auditório. A Nova Retórica espera que os ouvintes estejam dispostos a escutar, a sofrer a ação do orador. O desejo de persuasão, por sua vez, implica que o orador em vez de dar ordens ao auditório, deverá procurar adquirir a sua adesão intelectual. Essa adesão nada tem a ver com a verdade ou falsidade das teses que o orador procura defender, mas está associada ao seu poder argumentativo [discursivo], pois o argumentar permite pressupor que é tão possível defender uma tese como a sua contrária. 263 PERELMAN, 1997, p.24. 264 PERELMAN, 1997, p.78. - 107 - Para provocar a adesão do auditório a certas teses, entretanto, é fundamental que o orador conheça os valores inicialmente admitidos por esse auditório, pois eles deverão constituir o ponto de partida do discurso 265 . Para conhecer os valores do auditório, por sua vez, é comum recorrer ao questionamento – é a essa técnica que Sócrates recorre nos diálogos platônicos – donde se reafirma a importância da Dialética. Visando a resolução argumentativa dos entraves dialógicos, a Teoria da Argumentação propõe um tratamento racional dos conflitos de opinião. Esse é um traço específico que a afasta das concepções de Retórica, visto que a Teoria da Argumentação não propõe um sistema de regras normativas para a discussão crítica. É igualmente difícil sustentar a sua aproximação com uma concepção de Lógica, tal como pretende Perelman, pois a sua teoria se apóia em noções confusas que promovem – e sofrem – mudanças argumentativas constantes. Não se propõem regras para o orador ser bem sucedido em sua relação com o auditório. A Nova Retórica simplesmente faz uma análise dos modelos discursivos e mostra o ideal da discussão crítica a partir de uma análise acurada das complicações concretas do discurso argumentativo. É possível, sob este aspecto, que a designação de Nova Dialética melhor coubesse à Nova Retórica. Talvez, inclusive, tenha sido este o motivo pelo qual Eemeren e Grootendorst tenham aprofundado as questões levantadas pela Nova Retórica para constituir a Nova Dialética. Entretanto, as especificidades desta última aproximam-na de uma reconstrução da Retórica, enquanto as características da Nova Retórica permite-nos aproximá-la de uma reconstrução da Dialética. A interpretação de expressões cristalizadas por seu uso e aplicação, tal como ocorre com a expressão em questão, é um assunto de considerável dificuldade, visto que, o termo costuma ser empregado, interpretado e aceito sem maiores contestações. Entretanto, tal como a própria teoria sugere, é preciso salientar que a construção de uma interpretação, já carrega consigo mesma, a certeza de sua possibilidade de contestação; ou seja, qualquer teoria, conceito ou interpretação é potencialmente contestável. Ademais, é possível distinguir pelo menos três aplicações que buscam caracterizar a Nova Retórica: (1) Apresentando-a como uma reconstrução inerte da Retórica Antiga, mantendo-a como uma espécie de oratória digna de apreço, embora desprovida de conteúdo; (2) Caracterizando-a como uma técnica desenvolvida para a aquisição e uso persuasivo da linguagem; (3) Apontando-a como um meio 265 A esse respeito conferir a detalhada referência aos pontos de partida da argumentação no Tratado da Argumentação. (Cf. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p. 73-130). - 108 - de construir argumentos, por meio de um procedimento dialógico que angaria valores e crenças na composição de idéias que pretendem sustentar uma afirmação. Michel Meyer, por exemplo, no prefácio do Tratado da Argumentação, considera que a Nova Retórica representa uma espécie de (...) discurso do método de uma racionalidade que já não pode evitar os debates e deve, portanto, tratá-los e analisar os argumentos que governam as decisões. Já não se trata de privilegiar a univocidade da linguagem, a unicidade a priori da tese válida, mas sim de aceitar o pluralismo, tanto nos valores morais como nas opiniões. A abertura pra o múltiplo e o não coercitivo torna-se, então, a palavra-mestra da racionalidade. 266 Entende-se, neste caso, a Nova Retórica como uma lógica do diálogo, cuja estrutura se forma por meio de questionamentos e opiniões emitidos acerca de um determinado problema. Nesse sentido, a Nova Retórica corresponde a um método filosófico de investigação que fomenta o ambiente crítico em que prevalece a controvérsia e a especulação. Nele, o trabalho filosófico, enquanto diálogo e discussão, é mediado pela anuência dos interlocutores. Esta, por sua vez, se mostra essencial porque serve de ponto de partida para a argumentação; não porque se trata de um concurso de duas opiniões destoantes, mas porque essa concordância representa a expressão de uma adesão generalizada às proposições em questão. A concordância dos interlocutores, assim, concerne àquilo que é considerado válido ou obrigatoriamente aceito, no meio em que representam, até sua contestação efetiva. Por outro lado, o ponto inicial de uma argumentação dialética não consiste em proposições necessárias, incondicionalmente válidas (independente do contexto), mas em proposições efetivamente aceitas em dado meio e que, em outro meio ou contexto histórico e social, poderiam não usufruir da aprovação geral 267 . Na concepção de Goblot: A Dialética procede mediante perguntas e respostas, para jamais passar de uma asserção para a seguinte sem se estar seguro do assentimento do interlocutor. A arte do dialético é agir de modo que esse assentimento nunca possa ser recusado. Esse método do diálogo é essencialmente oral e exige o concurso de pelo menos duas pessoas. Por que Platão pensa, entretanto, que possa ser praticado em uma obra escrita, em que a mesma pessoa, o autor, faz igualmente as perguntas e as respostas? Seu próprio assentimento dá-lhe o direito de seguir em frente? Platão pensa estar seguro de que nenhum interlocutor 266 Cf. MEYER, Michel. Prefácio. In: PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p. XX. 267 Cf. PERELMAN, 1970a, p.77-83. apud PERELMAN, 1989, p.52. - 109 - poderia responder de modo diferente de quem ele faz falar. Essa é toda a arte da dialética (...). 268 As palavras de Goblot parecem sugerir que Platão pensa de acordo com uma suposta racionalidade universal, ou seja, ao antever a reação intelectual do seu interlocutor, Platão pensa na recepção de um auditório universal, ainda que se dirija, em diálogo, a um indivíduo particular (ou virtual). Sendo correta a interpretação de Goblot acerca da noção de dialética e, de fato, o desdobramento do diálogo sendo completamente indiferente à personalidade do interlocutor, a forma dialogada não passaria de uma adulação astuciosa, visto que o indivíduo que responde aos questionamentos em um diálogo, ao responder, somente estaria encarnando as reações de uma mente normal perante o óbvio. Perelman discordará de Goblot, porque este ignora que "a dialética platônica constitui um esboço do sistema dedutivo" 269 num processo em que as teses decorreriam umas das outras criando uma correlação entre a Dialética e lógica analítica, e transformando o procedimento dialético em algo tão coercivo quanto a demonstração formal. Mas, se o diálogo transcorre sem a interferência da personalidade de um interlocutor, como Perelman interpreta a afirmação de Goblot, a expressão do diálogo consiste num engodo arriscado capaz de conduzir à idéia, certamente equivocada, de que o interlocutor não desempenha qualquer papel no diálogo. Assim sendo, a dialética platônica seria um bosquejo do sistema dedutivo por meio do qual as afirmações se sucederiam umas das outras, por intermédio de um mecanismo interno, capaz de conduzir, mecanicamente, a um procedimento conclusivo razoável, transformando o método dialético num sistema dialético integrado. A crítica que Perelman desenvolve acerca da idéia de Goblot sobre a Dialética parece guardar uma contradição no tocante às suas próprias concepções. A suposta racionalidade universal a que Platão apela é bastante semelhante ao auditório universal proposto por Perelman. Além disso, ao prever a reação do ouvinte, na busca de um acordo prévio para as suas idéias, Platão está pensando na recepção de um auditório universal, tal como o próprio Perelman sugere ao narrar a necessidade de se buscar um acordo prévio com o 268 GOBLOT, 1927, p. 16-17. PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.40. 269 PERELMAN, 1997, p. 48-49. - 110 - auditório. 270 Além disso, Perelman parece estar equivocado porque não cogita a construção de uma "personalidade virtual". Denomino "personalidade virtual" aquela que se torna presente onde, de fato, não há um elemento instalado, visto que é possível construir um diálogo a partir de certos dados concernentes a uma personalidade que não possui assento no mundo real, empiricamente dado. Isso, aliás, não consiste em qualquer novidade: (1) Quando Goethe 271 ou mesmo Sheakspeare 272 constroem os seus diálogos para Fausto ou Hamlet, respectivamente, estão elaborando um tipo de "personalidade virtual" que Perelman parece desprezar (...) (2) Em Filosofia, além de Platão, também Voltaire constrói personagens que descrevem criticamente traços da personalidade de certos grupos. Assim, um bom brâmane assemelha-se, em muitos aspectos, a elementos que crêem cegamente nos entes metafísicos presentes na natureza, etc. Não se trata de um procedimento do tipo causa-efeito, donde decorreria do questionamento X uma resposta Y para quaisquer casos em que X se aplique, porque os elementos, racionais e razoáveis pensarão da mesma maneira. Pelo contrário, acredita-se que dado a ocorrência do questionamento X, é provável que Y seja a resposta, considerando-se as características do elemento ao qual tal pergunta estará sendo encaminhada, o contexto no qual ela se inserirá, a pressão que será impressa no mesmo, o tempo e a atenção que serão empregadas para isso, o rigor que se espera da resposta, e a resposta que se espera do questionamento, dentre outros fatores. Também esses dados correspondem ao que empresas de publicidade desenvolvem na produção das suas campanhas visando atingir o seu público. O efeito psicológico dos argumentos não precisa ser testado no mundo empírico, real e concreto. Com base em informações acerca do seu público alvo, que nesse caso em específico é o seu interlocutor, podem-se construir diálogos hipotéticos baseados na estrutura virtual de uma cena comum do cotidiano. Assim, por "construções virtuais", que também podem ser chamadas de "simulações de diálogo", pode-se conviver com a interpretação de Goblot sem que, para isso, se tenha de criar uma idéia de essencialismo tal como prega a compreensão desenvolvida por Perelman ao dizer que: 270 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.75. 271 Cf. GOETHE, Johann Wolfgang. Fausto. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1976. 272 Cf. SHAKESPEARE, William. Hamlet. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1976. - 111 - (...) O método dialético, correlativo, em nossa mente, de um pensamento dialogado, se transformaria num sistema dialético, monolítico, no qual a partir de teses iniciais, as conseqüências se desenvolveriam de forma automática que não deixaria nenhum espaço à personalidade não só de quem responde, mas também do próprio dialético. Dialética e Lógica analítica coincidiriam. O procedimento dialético não seria tão coercivo quanto a demonstração formal e, para consegui-lo, deveria beneficiar-se da mesma univocidade dos termos aos quais se aplica e do mesmo caráter indiscutível de suas regras operatórias. Tornando-se uma Lógica a Dialética se transforma em um sistema de encadeamentos necessários, mas à custa do abandono de qualquer conformidade com um diálogo real, cujo desenrolar é condicionado tanto à personalidade dos interlocutores quanto às intenções que os animam. 273 Perelman condena o procedimento de tornar a Dialética uma Lógica, mas em outro momento 274 ele mesmo defende a idéia de que a Lógica não pode ser engessada e estática como a lógica formal à qual aquela ficou seriamente reduzida devendo ser revista e empreendida sob a iluminação de uma Dialética e ou de uma Retórica. Ainda que Perelman omita, é indubitável que as palavras de Goblot fornecem o alicerce sobre o qual se edificam algumas noções capitais do pensamento perelmaniano, como a noção de "deliberação consigo mesmo" e, sobretudo, a noção de dialética que serve de pilar para a reconstrução da Retórica na contemporaneidade. 275 A idéia de Perelman acerca da Retórica está em conformidade com o pensamento de Platão acerca da Dialética. Daí porque insistimos em aproximar a Nova Retórica perelmaniana de uma Nova Dialética. O método dialético, pelo menos antes de Platão, era essencialmente dependente da presença de no mínimo dois interlocutores in locu expressando oralmente os seus assentimentos e discordâncias sobre aquilo em torno do que se discorria. Se Platão transpõe o diálogo para o plano da linguagem escrita, Perelman faz o mesmo com a Retórica, atraindo-a para um campo alheio à sua atuação original, ou seja, para outros campos da expressão lingüística, em especial, a escrita. Do mesmo modo, se Platão acredita que um único indivíduo e sua obra podem exercer a dialética pela criação de um diálogo virtual, entre dois personagens imaginários que travam um debate sobre um assunto específico, Perelman vê nessa aplicação da noção de Dialética uma utilização de ordem prática, uma vez que ele próprio enuncia algo semelhante ao tratar da deliberação consigo 273 PERELMAN, 1997, p.49 274 PERELMAN, 1998, p. 5-6. 275 A esse respeito publiquei As múltiplas faces de um único termo: Dialética (OLIVEIRA, 2000, p. 21-36). - 112 - mesmo, considerada uma modalidade de auditório em que se aplicam regras destinadas à condução do próprio pensamento. Que se pretende dizer com isso? Objetiva-se exprimir que o indivíduo que delibera consigo mesmo elabora as perguntas e, em seguida, formula com o maior rigor possível, as respostas mais adequadas para aquele questionamento, levando em conta as possíveis objeções que poderiam ser concedidas às suas respostas. Neste caso, o indivíduo aprimora a sua habilidade argumentativa considerando antecipadamente a possibilidade de suas afirmações serem refutadas. Não parte do pressuposto que a sua concepção é perfeita e acabada, impossível de ser refutada; não incorpora falsas pretensões ou suposições absurdas como acreditar na possibilidade de esgotar os problemas da Filosofia. Longe de imaginar acabar com a Filosofia, essa concepção a trata como algo incessantemente em construção, mutável, inconsistente e surpreendentemente vigorosa, por sua capacidade de autoconstrução, e por ser essencialmente controversa e aberta a novas possibilidades de compreensão. No que se refere à deliberação consigo mesmo e ao crédito que pode ser concedido a esta modalidade de argumentação, vale destacar que a sua compreensão se torna mais simples quando se resgata o pensamento platônico como exemplo. Quando Platão desenvolve um diálogo filosófico empreendendo perguntas e simulando respostas prováveis para aquele tipo de questionamento, está imaginando como pessoas racionais, esclarecidas e capazes poderiam responder, de uma forma (mais ou menos) elaborada conforme o seu nível de formação e a importância dedicada ao tema em discussão. Quanto mais óbvio possa parecer um questionamento, menor será a intensidade de atenção dedicada ao mesmo e, por conseguinte, maior será a rapidez com a qual ele será respondido. Essa atenção reduzida decorre do excesso de confiança do indivíduo inquirido, que crê cegamente na solidez inabalável dos seus conhecimentos e, por extensão, na sua experiência. Esse tipo de comportamento é absolutamente antifilosófico, porque mascara as outras possibilidades de interpretação de um mesmo evento. A noção de racional, neste caso, aproxima-se da concepção de razoável encontrada no pensamento de Aristóteles 276 , resgatada por Perelman e seguida, nos últimos anos, por outros pensadores a exemplo de Recaséns Siches 277 . A noção platônica, resgatada 276 São razoáveis as "opiniões geralmente aceitas" tal como se vê nos Tópicos: "são, por outro lado, opiniões geralmente aceitas aquelas que todo mundo admite, ou a maioria das pessoas, ou os filósofos -–em outras palavras: todos, ou a maioria, ou os mais notáveis e eminentes" (Topiques, 100b 21). A esse respeito pode ser útil a leitura do texto intitulado A Quadratura do Círculo na Física de Aristóteles (OLIVEIRA, 2002, p. 45-66). 277 Cf. nota 90, p.37. - 113 - por Perelman, acerca da possibilidade de uma Dialética que opera num único indivíduo recorre à idéia sustentada no ideal de racionalidade específica segundo o qual existe uma capacidade (predisposição) igual nas pessoas para pensar de maneira semelhante sobre um mesmo evento. O diálogo torna-se dialético quando, para além de ter coerência interna em seus discursos, os interlocutores procuram chegar a um acordo no tocante às opiniões que consideram mais sólidas. É a partir desse estágio que o dialogo passa a ter um interesse filosófico construtivo. Se Platão utiliza a busca da verdade como força motriz para a utilização do método dialético, Aristóteles usa o método dialético estruturando a sua argumentação a partir de proposições geralmente aceitas. Assim, a distinção entre o método analítico e o dialético perpassa a questão estrutural de ambos, visto que o primeiro deles toma como ponto de partida as proposições necessárias que conduzem a conclusões evidentes, enquanto o segundo se orienta a partir de proposições geralmente aceitas para chegar às conclusões que mais estejam em conformidade com a opinião comum (dos mais sábios ou dos mais esclarecidos). Esta é a concepção de Perelman: O que caracteriza o discurso filosófico é que ele visa a todos os homens razoáveis, e que cada um destes tem, portanto, o direito de contestá-lo. Tradicionalmente, um discurso assim era apresentado como verdadeiro, supondo-se que a verdade deveria ser universalmente admitida. Mas, para poder pretender o reconhecimento universal, uma tese não deve ser necessariamente verdadeira: o uso prático da razão não exige a verdade das regras de ação, mas unicamente a conformidade delas ao imperativo categórico, tal como Kant o havia concebido, ou ao princípio de generalização ou de universalização. (...) Nessa perspectiva, um discurso filosófico, ainda que não pretenda, como o discurso científico, exprimir uma verdade impessoal, não pode ater-se a tirar conclusões das premissas próprias do filósofo, pois, normalmente, a controvérsia filosófica, quando ocorre, diz respeito a validade dessas próprias premissas. A crítica dessas premissas só poderá ser feita a partir de pressupostos que, estima-se, todos admitam. Para refutar as críticas e defender seu discurso, o filósofo deverá, por sua vez, questionar a validade, a universalidade ou a interpretação desses pressupostos. 278 A função do filósofo e, por conseguinte, do discurso que lhe caracteriza, na perspectiva perelmaniana, representa um afastamento de postulações epistêmicas extremistas como o realismo e o idealismo, cuja derivação criticista concede origem ao conhecimento a priori e a 278 PERELMAN, 1997, p. 85. - 114 - posteriori, respectivamente. Perelman foge da unilateralidade que caracteriza cada um desses posicionamentos, procurando uma síntese doutrinária de caráter agregador. Nesse sentido, seu entendimento segue uma metodologia dialética consistente, que engloba elementos opostos apresentados pelos discursos, não apenas por meio de uma justaposição de conteúdos, mas por intermédio de incorporação de elementos que, embora sejam opostos, se complementam na busca de um entendimento comum, fundamentado em um modelo de racionalidade argumentativa. - 115 - 2 . 5 . R a z ã o e R a ci ona l i da de Raciocinar, segundo o racionalismo herdeiro de Descartes, é demonstrar. Mas demonstrar racionalmente com o objetivo de fundar normas de ação, de justificar uma atitude ou um ideal, conduz ao irracionalismo. Em contrapartida, renunciar à razão demonstrativa permite fazer jus a uma autêntica razão. Essa é a proposta de Perelman: fugir da razão demonstrativa e do mundo absurdo a que ela conduz. Em virtude da sua formação lógica, Perelman começou compartilhando as convicções e pressupostos do racionalismo, sobretudo a idéia segundo a qual o raciocínio por excelência é a prova demonstrativa. Em vista da incompatibilidade deste pensamento com a sua intenção de justificar as ações humanas por meio de razão – nos moldes da idéia de racionalidade que ele compartilhava – Perelman foi conduzido a romper com o seu ponto de partida racionalista, visto que percebeu conseqüências absurdas e insensatas às quais se chegava por meio da aplicação do raciocínio demonstrativo às condutas humanas. Contudo, ele não abandona o raciocínio demonstrativo para cair no vazio. Pelo contrário, busca amparar-se por uma forma de racionalidade mais original, humana, autêntica e limitada – uma vez que o raciocínio demonstrativo se propõe universal, porque aplicável a qualquer situação imaginável. A renúncia de Perelman ao modelo de racionalidade, entretanto, não se deve a uma mudança de opinião do filósofo mas consiste em uma reação diante de algo que acontece fora do campo filosófico, sobretudo no campo das Ciências Sociais, e de alguma forma resvala na Filosofia. De Mill a Feyerabend 279 , vários autores buscaram na concepção de racionalidade uma sustentação para as suas teorias. No entanto, conforme os filósofos começaram a interessar-se pelo que se havia formado nas diferentes áreas de conhecimento no tocante à concepção de racionalidade, se percebeu que era necessário haver uma harmonização conceitual, pois a mesma expressão – Racionalidade – designava coisas bastante heterogêneas, ignorando, por vezes, o que autores clássicos da história da Filosofia já haviam 279 Principalmente no campo das Ciências Sociais, o tema da Racionalidade encontrou boa acolhida. Inicialmente a Economia, por John Stuart Mill, passando pela teoria sociológica da ação de Max Weber, na etnologia de Winch, pela Teoria das explicações racionais, pela metodologia das Ciências Sociais e, por fim, as teorias de Popper e Feyerabend que discutiam questões relativas ao problema da racionalidade. (Cf. BURGOS, Gerardo Mora. Racionalidad y tipos de racionalidad. Revista de Filosofia de la Universidad de la Costa Rica. XLI. n.103. Enero-Junio, 2003, p. 93-100. - 116 - apresentado acerca deste problema. É possível, inclusive, que esta mesma reação crítica recaia sobre Perelman, visto que, ele também efetua uma abordagem vinculando a questão da racionalidade com o tema da teoria da ação sem mencionar os aspectos epistemológicos envolvidos na discussão que perpassa o seu projeto de elaboração de uma Teoria da Argumentação, a saber: a existência de uma racionalidade específica que se exerce nas práticas humanas. O pensamento moderno, segundo Perelman, está sob a égide do racionalismo porque permanece ligado à idéia de que a demonstração, entendida como raciocínio monológico, necessário e constringente é o raciocínio por excelência. Em outras palavras, ainda que monológico e necessário, a demonstração consiste no verdadeiro raciocínio lógico, ou melhor, o modo da prova lógica. Esta redução dos raciocínios lógicos à demonstração implica uma redução da própria Lógica, entendida como estudo dos raciocínios, ao exame da prova demonstrativa. A aceitação da demonstração como modelo das formas de raciocínio, dos modos da prova lógica, se traduz na cristalização da demonstração como norma do raciocínio que se pretende rigoroso. A demonstração, assim, se converte no ideal de prova lógica que se pretenda convincente. Esta redução da Lógica ao estudo das demonstrações, traz consigo uma redução da argumentação (não-demonstrativa) a uma arte da eloqüência, a uma mera técnica que visa assegurar o sucesso de um orador ou de uma causa. Essas reduções, por conseguinte, provocam uma limitação da Retórica ao estudo dos discursos não-demonstrativos, alheios à Lógica ou ao uso da razão, quer seja pelo exame da argumentação como arte da eloqüência, quer pelo exame das técnicas de ornamentação dos discursos (a Retórica como estudo da Arte Poética). Como romper, então, com a concepção moderna de razão, estritamente vinculada à demonstração? Perelman procura estender o uso da razão ao campo da argumentação (não- demonstrativa), ou seja, procura um meio de ajustar a Lógica ao estudo das provas argumentativas, tais como as provas que Aristóteles chamava dialéticas. Com isso, acredita ser possível estabelecer uma razão argumentativa, não-demonstrativa, mas necessária para o campo da Retórica, que trata da análise dos discursos não-demonstrativos, mas dotados de uma racionalidade prática que se exerce nas práticas humanas. Por intermédio de uma razão argumentativa, Perelman pretende romper com a tradição dos modernos, pregando uma - 117 - reabilitação da Retórica e, de certa maneira, promovendo um retorno aos antigos, visto que a Nova Retórica restabelece uma ligação com uma tradição retórica mantida ao longo da antigüidade, como se percebe notadamente por meio das obras de Platão, Aristóteles, Cícero e Quintiliano. Trata-se, pois, de uma ruptura com a herança cartesiana, e um retorno aos antigos sob a forma de uma reabilitação da retórica ou, pelo menos, de um reconhecimento da razão argumentativa. Essa idéia de ruptura com os modernos, entretanto, requer uma melhor explicitação. O posicionamento de Perelman pode ser visto como uma ruptura com o pensamento herdeiro do cartesianismo, pois a idéia segundo a qual a razão demonstrativa – monológica e constringente – é a razão, termina dominando a modernidade: ela não é apenas reivindicada pelos cartesianos, mas também é expressa por Hobbes e pelos empiristas, persistindo pelo século XIX por meio da concepção de que uma tese somente pode ser tida como verdadeira se for evidente, empiricamente evidente ou racionalmente evidente. Uma tese precisa ser demonstrada, seja por deduções necessárias a partir de teses evidentes, pela necessidade do movimento dialético 280 ou, ainda, por meio de deduções decorrentes de sinais operados em seqüências de signos construídos por convenção. A reabilitação da Retórica proposta por Perelman segue, originalmente, dois caminhos: (1) consiste na ruptura com a concepção moderna da verdade, fundamentalmente cartesiana; (2) consiste no estudo da argumentação como um meio de prova que não reside na evidência, empírica ou racional, nem tampouco em uma dedução necessária ou constringente. A noção de demonstração como raciocínio hipotético-dedutivo, à qual Perelman se refere, é rigorosamente expressa por Platão em uma passagem d' A República: Suponho que sabes que aqueles que se ocupam da geometria, da aritmética e das ciências desse gênero, admitem o par e o ímpar, as figuras, três espécies de ângulos e outras doutrinas irmãs destas, segundo o campo de cada um. Estas coisas dão-nas por sabidas, e, quando as usam como hipóteses, não acham que ainda seja necessário prestar contas disto a si mesmos nem aos outros, uma vez que são evidentes para todos. E, partindo daí e analisando todas as fases, e tirando as conseqüências, atingem o ponto cuja investigação se tinham abalançado. 281 280 Dialético, neste caso, no sentido hegeliano do termo. 281 PLATÃO, A República. Lisboa : Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1980, 510 c-d, p. 314-315. - 118 - De acordo com esta apresentação do raciocínio matemático, a demonstração é caracterizada essencialmente pelos seguintes traços: é um método específico, levado a efeito por ciências como a geometria, a aritmética, e demais disciplinas do mesmo tipo; supõe como as coisas são conhecidas e é intrinsecamente circular. Seguindo esta forma de pensar, uma tese se revela verdadeira quando se deixa deduzir a partir de hipóteses; mas, estas são escolhidas por aqueles que demonstram e conforme o que procuram, de modo que a tese demonstrada, no fim das contas, é ponto de partida tomado como impulso da sua investigação. Mas, em que medida o pensamento moderno quebra com esta concepção platônica de demonstração? A tradição moderna, cartesiana, rompe com a concepção grega, platônica e aristotélica, na medida em que tende a estabelecer três princípios: (1) a universalidade do método demonstrativo, (2) a simplicidade do fundamental, (3) a unidade sistemática do saber humano. A universalidade do método demonstrativo é afirmada por Descartes sem a mínima reserva: Essas longas cadeias de razões, todas simples e fáceis, de que os geômetras costumam servir-se para chegar às suas mais difíceis demonstrações, haviam-me dado ocasião de imaginar que todas as coisas possíveis de cair sob o conhecimento dos homens seguem- se umas às outras da mesma maneira e que, contanto que nos abstenhamos somente de aceitar por verdadeira qualquer que não o seja, e que guardemos sempre a ordem necessária para deduzi-las umas das outras, não pode haver quaisquer tão afastadas a que não se chegue por fim, nem tão ocultas que não se descubram. 282 O racionalismo dogmático, herdeiro do pensamento de Descartes, é propenso a considerar que não pode haver desacordo entre decisões racionalmente fundadas. Nesta perspectiva, caso duas pessoas discordem, pelo menos uma delas tem de estar errada . 283 Neste caso, o desacordo sobre um mesmo assunto significa que pelos menos uma das decisões é irracional. Duas razões podem ser apresentadas para justificar este posicionamento. A primeira delas defende que a decisão equivocada decorre do conhecimento imperfeito dos fatos; a segunda, por sua vez, sustenta que ela – a decisão – resulta de motivações não racionais, como a paixão, o interesse, o capricho, etc. Descartes em suas Regulae ad 282 DESCARTES, Discurso do Método. Trad. : J.Guinsburg e Bento Prado Jr. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1979, p. 38-39. 283 Diz Descartes: "De cada vez que dois homens fazem sobre uma mesma coisa um juízo contrário, é certo que um dos dois se engana. Mas há mais, nenhum dos dois possui a verdade; porque se tivesse uma visão clara e distinta, podê-la-ia expor ao seu adversário de tal modo que acabaria por forçar a sua convicção". (DESCARTES. OEuvres. T. XI: Règles pour la direction de l'espirit. Paris , 1826. p.205-6. apud. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS- TYTECA, 1999, p.2 . - 119 - orientationem ingennii 284 , adota uma postura ainda mais radical; identifica o "desacordo" com a "falta de racionalidade" e acrescenta que "se dois homens exprimem juízos contrários sobre a mesma matéria, no limite, nenhum deles possui a verdade porque, se algum deles estivesse na sua posse haveria de ser capaz de convencer o outro do seu erro pondo fim ao conflito 285 ". Essa atitude, supostamente dirimente, caracteriza-se por considerar o desacordo uma nódoa indelével, um sinal de irracionalidade. Segundo Perelman, tal postura possui efeitos perniciosos na formação cultural ocidental, sendo parcialmente responsável pelo descrédito da Retórica. Porquê? Porque impossibilita a discussão crítica de idéias, essencial ao pensamento filosófico, promovendo a paralisação da discussão racional de "pontos de vista" divergentes. Essa é a razão pela qual Perelman recusa "o recurso a idéias intemporais e universais, tais como a verdade, a razão e a evidência que permitem dispensar a adesão efetiva dos ouvintes". 286 A oposição de Perelman ao pensamento cartesiano segue o raciocínio de Hume, que no Tratado da natureza humana 287 , opõe-se à tese cartesiana da unicidade da razão introduzindo a distinção entre juízos relativos àquilo que é (susceptíveis de verdade e falsidade) e juízos relativos àquilo que deve ser (expressão de reações emotivas e subjetivas). Segundo Hume, a razão pode ser competente para distinguir a verdade do erro, mas não é suficientemente competente no que tange à apreciação de normas e valores, visto que não dispõe de um critério racional para esse fim. Desta forma, Hume conserva a insolubilidade do "desacordo", pois a razão, apesar de fazer luz sobre os atos humanos não dispõe de critérios que permitam justificar as nossas escolhas e decisões, nem tampouco avaliar os nossos atos e servir de guia para nossas ações. Hume com o seu cepticismo positivista e acentuadamente niilista não seria capaz de dissolver o problema que aflige Perelman por meio desta teoria, uma vez que supõe não existir verdade ou critério racional em matéria de avaliação de normas e valores associados à justificação da ação humana. Este posicionamento não é distinto do 284 DESCARTES, Regras para a direção do Espírito, 1937. 285 Para Descartes, o desacordo era impossível de ser aceito porque representava o mais óbvio dos sinais de erro. Considerando-se, entretanto, que o desacordo é o campo de eleição da retórica, ao menos da sua vertente argumentativa, contrariamente ao que pretendia Descartes, Perelman tenta retoricamente pensar a possibilidade de soluções diferentes sem que o desacordo seja inevitável. 286 PERELMAN, 1997, p. 181. 287 HUME, David. Tratado Sobre a Natureza Humana. São Paulo: UNESP, 2001. - 120 - constrangimento legado pelo dogmatismo racionalista a uma "filosofia moral" que acredita na objetividade das regras morais e na possibilidade de obtermos para cada caso a solução objetivamente melhor. 288 Perelman esforça-se para justificar o desacordo entre proposições racionalmente fundadas, propondo como ilustração desta sua tese a tradição judaico- talmúdica, que consente a razoabilidade simultânea das razões expressas em teses opostas, desde que fundamentadas a partir da interpretação da Bíblia. No mesmo sentido encontra-se a proposta de P. Winch, expressa num artigo intitulado Universalizability of Moral Jugements, onde há que "dois juízos morais diametralmente opostos sobre um mesmo problema concreto podem ser ambos respeitáveis e razoáveis". 289 O desacordo poderá ter a sua origem apenas no fato de as pessoas terem avaliado de modo diferente uma circunstância particular, qualquer que seja ela, atribuindo-lhe uma importância relativa distinta. Isso é suficiente para que tais pessoas, adotando razões igualmente objetivas, decidam de modo diferente sobre o mesmo assunto. Dever-se-á então, conforme orientação de Perelman, considerar imparcial uma decisão desde que a pessoa que a toma, assuma esta decisão como critério para o futuro e tenha o propósito de aplicar-lhe a todas as situações essencialmente semelhantes, independendo de quem possam ser os destinatários da sua decisão. No entanto, sempre que alguém tenha decidido razoavelmente acerca do que é moralmente justo para si, não tem legitimidade para supor que estabeleceu o critério de razoabilidade para futuras decisões de outrem, uma vez que a justiça de uma decisão não fica indelevelmente marcada pela necessidade e constringência lógicas que afetam a verdade de uma proposição. 290 O precedente judiciário, sob este aspecto, será apenas uma ancoragem exigida pelos imperativos da segurança e da coerência do Direito. Algumas vezes, torna-se necessário estabelecer, por razões de ordem prática, uma linha de conduta uniforme visando ultrapassar o limiar em que um mesmo estado de coisas pode ser razoavelmente justificado por juízos de valor diferentes. Sempre que o desacordo acontece em sede de um 288 Esta marca da objetivação em filosofia moral está presente em Methods of Ethics (SIDGWICK, 1907). Que, nesta obra, formula a sua "máxima de justiça e equidade", em M. G. Singer, nos critérios em que funda o seu "princípio de generalização", que ele reconhece filiado quer na Regra de Justiça de Perelman e na máxima de justiça ou equidade de Sidgwick). 289 WINCH, P., The universalizability of moral judgments. Monist 49 (1965), reprinted in WINCH, P. Ethics and Action. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972, ch.8. 290 A esse respeito pode-se ler o item especificamente destinado ao tratamento da regra de justiça. - 121 - tribunal coletivo, por exemplo, o critério de decisão por maioria pode ser reconhecido como critério que se justifica por razões de oportunidade. - 122 - 2 . 6 . R a ci ona l i da de e R a z oa bi l i da de O conceito de razoabilidade ou de razoável e, por conseguinte, sua respectiva antonímia, é de importância fundamental para a teoria da racionalidade argumentativa de Perelman. O problema é que a idéia de razoável aparece às vezes como uma noção de caráter geral, aplicável a qualquer tipo de argumentação embora por vezes se apresente como uma noção especifica, como um conceito que cobra importância em certos tipos de argumentações, tal como no caso da argumentação jurídica, por exemplo. É o que ocorre com o artigo 5o da Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil que trata Dos Direitos e Garantias Fundamentais (Dos Direitos e Deveres Individuais e Coletivos): Art. 5o Todos são iguais perante a lei, sem distinção de qualquer natureza, garantindo-se aos brasileiros e aos estrangeiros residentes no País a inviolabilidade do direito à vida, à liberdade, à igualdade, à segurança e à propriedade. 291 O mesmo se dá no artigo 14 da constituição espanhola, como se pode observar: los españoles son iguales ante la ley, sin que pueda prevalecer discriminación alguna por razón de nacimiento, raza, sexo, religión, opinión o qualquier otra condición o circunstancia personal o social. 292 Em qualquer dos casos citados, se abre um problema de interpretação, a saber: o que se entende por termos como "igualdade" ou "discriminação" que são duas noções confusas por excelência, tal como se expõe no capítulo destinado ao estudo destas. Deve-se salientar que, neste caso especificamente, não são razoáveis as noções, mas o procedimento aplicado na interpretação delas. Por isso mesmo, 291 Constituição da República Federativa Do Brasil de 1988, TÍTULO II (Dos Direitos e Garantias Fundamentais), CAPÍTULO I (Dos Direitos e Deveres Individuais e Coletivos), Art. 5o. 292 Constitución Española (Aprobada por las Cortes el 31 de octubre de 1978, Ratificada en Referéndum el 6 de diciembre de 1978, Sancionada por S.M. el Rey el 27 de diciembre de 1978, [BOE 311-1, de 29-12-1978]) CAPITULO SEGUNDO, Derechos y libertades, Artículo 14. - 123 - A vaguidão de certos conceitos termos, que figuram num texto legal ou regulamentar, dá latitude ao intérprete, mas, a não ser que se considerem certas expressões, tais como "interesse comum", "urgência" ou "equidade" como expressões vazias, há limites para o poder de apreciação. 293 O conceito de razoabilidade ou de razoável, enquanto conceito específico, é designado muitas vezes com o uso de outras expressões como "trato eqüitativo", "bom pai de família", etc. Generalizando ainda mais, poderia se dizer que a noção de razoabilidade é um componente comum que se costuma chamar, com freqüência, de "conceitos jurídicos indeterminados". 294 Seria, então, o conceito de razoabilidade um dos conceitos aos quais Perelman designou como "noções confusas"? Ainda que extrapolem o campo da aplicação da Justiça, os "conceitos jurídicos indeterminados" são noções que refletem o resultado da aplicação, em campos distintos, de um mesmo conceito básico: o de razoabilidade. Mas, mesmo que se trate de uma noção variável, não implica que seja também uma noção confusa porque, para Perelman, o razoável tem um limite que vem marcado pelo auditório. O problema é que esta última noção, como se pode verificar ao longo deste trabalho, embora seja 293 PERELMAN, Chaïm. Ética e direito. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1996, p.432. 294 Os conceitos jurídicos indeterminados são assim chamados porque seu conteúdo é menos preciso que o dos conceitos jurídicos determinados (exemplo destes, os numéricos 18 anos, 24 horas , daqueles, "casa particular"). Os conceitos jurídicos indeterminados podem ser descritivos (ex. patrimônio, cobrança) ou normativos (ex. justa causa, boa-fé) (cf. ENGISH, Karl. "Direito dos juristas. Conceitos jurídicos indeterminados, conceitos normativos, poder discricionário". Introdução ao Pensamento Jurídico [Einfürhung in das juristiche Denken, 1977, 1956]. Trad.: J. Baptista Machado. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1964, 1988, p. 210.). Os normativos exigem valoração. No caso da dignidade humana, o conceito, além de normativo, é axiológico porque a dignidade humana é valor a dignidade é a expressão do valor da pessoa humana. Todo "valor" é a projeção de um bem para alguém; no caso, a pessoa humana é o bem e a dignidade, o seu valor, isto é, a sua projeção. Princípio jurídico, por sua vez, é a idéia diretora de uma regulamentação (cf. LARENZ, Karl. Derecho justo: fundamentos de ética jurídica [Richtiges Recht Grundzüge einer Rechtsethik, 1978]. Trad. Luís Díez- Picazo. Madri: Civitas, 1985, p. 32). O princípio jurídico não é regra mas é norma jurídica; exige não somente interpretação mas também concretização. Desta forma, pode-se contrapor os conceitos jurídicos determinados aos conceitos jurídicos indeterminados. Aqueles delimitam a realidade à qual se referem de maneira precisa e inequívoca, ou ao menos possibilitam certa precisão quando inseridos em um contexto, enquanto estes possuem um grau de indeterminação que dificulta a apreensão de seu conteúdo. De maneira mais aprofundada, Marcelo Harger ensina que os conceitos indeterminados "são dotados de um grau de indeterminação bastante elevado, o que dificulta a apreensão de seu conteúdo. Apesar de procurarem delimitar a realidade, eles não o conseguem, a não ser dentro de limites bastante amplos, pois não podem ser quantificados ou determinados rigorosamente" (HARGER, Marcelo. A discricionariedade e os conceitos jurídicos indeterminados. Revista dos Tribunais: São Paulo, v. 765, p. 11). Apesar de não delimitarem seu significado com precisão, os conceitos indeterminados apresentam um campo significativo mínimo. Desta forma, a existência de indeterminação em um conceito não significa que inexistam meios para suprimi-la ou reduzi-la. Isto porque "todo conceito indeterminado é finito, uma vez que as palavras têm um conteúdo mínimo, sem o qual a comunicação seria impossível." (Cf. ENGISCH, Karl. Op. Cit, p.170-221). - 124 - central para a concepção perelmaniana de argumentação, é muito "escorregadiça". 295 Além disso, a noção de auditório ou, mais especificamente, do acordo do auditório, que demarca o limite do aceitável ou do razoável, padece, na obra de Perelman, de uma certa ambigüidade pois, por um lado, se configura como um acordo ou um consenso ideal e, por outro lado, parece estar ligado a fatos contingentes de caráter social e cultural. Outra dificuldade do conceito repousa em sua escassa potencialidade crítica, desde o momento em que Perelman pressupõe que, diante de um mesmo caso, pode-se tomar diversas decisões que (respeitados certos limites, que parecem configurar-se de maneira bastante clara) haveria de considerar como aceitáveis e, portanto, como igualmente justificáveis. 296 Outrossim, a vinculação da noção de razoabilidade com a idéia de auditório permite considerar irrazoável tudo aquilo que é considerado inadmissível em uma comunidade em um determinado momento, motivo pelo qual "o razoável não remete a uma solução única, e sim implica uma pluralidade de soluções possíveis; porém, há um limite para essa tolerância, e é o desarrazoado que não é aceitável." 297 Como se pode perceber neste excerto em que Perelman aplica o conceito no campo jurídico: Enquanto, em Direito, as idéias de razão e de racionalidade foram vinculadas, de um lado, a um modelo divino, do outro à lógica e à técnica eficaz, as do razoável e de seu oposto, o desarrazoado, são ligadas às reações do meio social e à evolução destas. Enquanto as noções de "razão" e de "racionalidade" se reportam a critérios bem conhecidos da tradição filosófica, tais como as idéias de verdade, de coerência e de eficácia, o razoável e o desarrazoado são ligados a uma margem de apreciação admissível e ao que, indo além dos limites permitidos, parece socialmente inaceitável. 298 As noções de razoável e de desarrazoado apresentadas por Perelman foram bastante utilizadas na obra do jurista espanhol Luís Recaséns Siches, responsável pelo desenvolvimento de uma lógica do razoável 299 , na década de 1950. Para Siches, a insuficiência ou inadequação 295 Sempre que há a impossibilidade argumentativa de sustentar uma teoria, Perelman recorre à noção de auditório. Isso ocorre com o conceito de "noções confusas", com a distinção entre convencer e persuadir, bem como no caso da noção de razoabilidade. Em qualquer dos casos, Perelman deixa margem à contestação pela fragilidade da própria noção de auditório universal que, por vezes, é associada à idéia dos universais lógicos e, por outras, a uma noção de imperativo da razão. 296 Ver "regra de justiça" [1.4], p. 50. 297 PERELMAN, 2000, p. 432. 298 PERELMAN, 2000, p. 436. 299 A denominada "Lógica do Razoável" possui grande aplicação no âmbito Jurídico –onde as questões de Lógica não-formal têm encontrado grande possibilidade de desenvolvimento. No âmbito da discursividade política, bem como ocorre no âmbito jurídico, por vezes, temos de nos precaver para não penetrarmos na esfera do logos meramente formal. - 125 - da Lógica tradicional, da lógica físico-matemática ou do modelo "racional" para tratar de problemas práticos como os da interpretação do Direito ou da Filosofia exigia o desenvolvimento de uma outra Lógica capaz de fornecer ferramentas para tratar de problemas de natureza prática. Em sua opinião, La lógica formal (...) no agota ni remotamente la totalidad del logos, de la Razón, sino que es tan sólo uma província o un sector (...). Aparte de la lógica de lo racional, aparte de la lógica formal de la inferencia, hay otras regiones que pertenecen igualmente al logos, pero que son de indole muy diversa de aquella lógica de lo racional en sentido estricto. Entre esas otras zonas o regiones (...), figura el ámbito Del logos de los problemas humanos de conducta practica, al que yo he llamado logos de lo razonable. 300 O fato de que nos problemas jurídicos, em particular, nos problemas de interpretação, não se possa utilizar a lógica formal não implicaria, pois, "uma fuga da lógica" mas a utilização de uma lógica distinta: a lógica do humano ou do razoável, que é uma lógica material, uma lógica dos conteúdos. Parece que o conceito de "razoável" (ou do logos do razoável) não chega a ter, na obra de Recaséns Siches, um grau elevado de elaboração teórica. A caracterização concedida se restringe a uma série de afirmações substancialmente vagas, com as seguintes características: o logos do razoável está limitado, está condicionado y está influído por la realidad concreta del mundo en que opera; está impregnado de valoraciones; tales valoraciones son concretas; las valoraciones constituyen la base o apoyo para la formulación de propósitos; la formulación de propósitos o establecimiento de finalidades no sólo se apoya sobre valoraciones sino que además está condicionado por las posibilidades que depare la realidad humana social concreta; el logos de lo humano está regido por razones de congruencia o adecuación entre la realidad social y los valores, entre los valores y los fines, etc; y está orientado por las enseñanzas sacadas de la experiência vital e historica, esto es, individual y social. 301 A afirmação de que o razoável é uma noção de conteúdo variável 302 ou mesmo um valor função 303 deve ser entendida tanto em um sentido histórico - ou social - como em um 300 SICHES, Experiência jurídica, natureza de la cosa y lógica "razonada", 1971, p. 519. 301 SICHES, 1971, p. 525-526. 302 PERELMAN, 1978a, p. 35-42. 303 MACCORMICK, Neil. On Reasonableness. PERELMAN ; ELST, Les Notions a Contenu variable en Droit, 1984. - 126 - sentido lógico, visto que aquilo a que se considera razoável está condicionado por circunstâncias espaciais e temporais (sentido histórico), bem como depende do campo em que se aplique a noção (sentido lógico), uma vez que há de se entender por razoável aquilo que, em cada caso, existe em função da aplicação do conceito. No percurso até então empreendido, a tentativa de mostrar como a noção de razoável perpassa a teoria da argumentação de Perelman parece insuficiente, se não limitada. Restaria, entretanto, indagar: como é possível sustentar uma teoria da argumentação em pilares tão frágeis como o conceito de razoabilidade, por exemplo? Podemos considerar razoável a noção de razoável proposta por Perelman? Se for possível, como sustentar o critério de razoabilidade que adotamos? Se não for, com base em que critérios podemos refutar? Como se caracterizam os problemas para os quais a razoabilidade pode ser usada como critério no intuito de resolvê-los? Para elaborar uma noção que se possa ver como uma reconstrução do razoável tal e como se utiliza na prática argumentativa que serve de foco para a construção da teoria da argumentação de Perelman, é necessário que esta noção tenha uma certa potencialidade crítica, ou seja, é necessário que se possa utilizar como um critério, ou um esquema sistemático de ajuste conceitual, que ajude a justificar porque uma determinada interpretação ou decisão é preferível em detrimento de outra. Ora, parece crível que a noção de preferível se ajusta ao nível de elaboração conceitual de uma argumentação, donde decorre que a fundamentação de uma exposição a torna mais ou menos preferível porque melhor ou pior justificada. - 127 - Capítulo 3 ENTRE A PERSUASÃO E O CONVENCIMENTO A demarcação de uma fronteira entre os campos da persuasão e do convencimento é essencial para se compreender a afirmação de que "toda argumentação é uma argumentação ad hominem", visto que é preciso determinar qual o objetivo de um procedimento argumentativo para estabelecer os critérios que serão adotados pelo orador ao construir os seus argumentos e, por sua vez, determinar, conforme os valores que se reconhece, qual a melhor estratégia de abordagem do interlocutor vislumbrando persuadi-lo ou convencê-lo. A questão do convencer, que é um desafio para diferentes autores – inclusive Perelman – parece basear-se, incondicionalmente, em pressupostos que refletem a opinião das partes em discussão. Mas como distinguir o convencer do persuadir? É possível distinguir, de maneira estanque, os modos de convencer dos modos de persuadir? Em caso positivo, pode-se dizer que o convencimento se dá por meio de argumentos razoáveis, enquanto a persuasão ocorre pela aplicação de outros procedimentos? Neste caso, apenas se pode argumentar diante da razão? Os demais tipos de argumentos são condenáveis? Qual é a noção de racionalidade que perpassa esta discussão? A posição ideal orador/auditório inclui a simetria e a liberdade, condições necessárias para que exista a possibilidade de convencer. Antes de qualquer posição moral ou moralista, deve-se ressaltar que a questão não é a condenação da sedução como ferramenta de adesão, mas perceber se existe, de fato, uma dicotomia entre a sedução, feita para persuadir, e uma argumentação feita para convencer. Aristóteles defende que é necessário utilizar o ato de sedução, mas que este deve decorrer da argumentação e não substituí-lo. Argumentar o provável não se faz por meio de provas lógicas, decorrentes de uma razão cartesiana (para Descartes, o que se pode discutir é necessariamente falso) ou matemática, porque o provável - 128 - se discute sempre. 304 A primeira preocupação do orador deve ser procurar pessoas com as quais estamos de acordo: o exemplo de Aristóteles se refere a tiragem de sorte dos jurados, costume que está longe de satisfazê-lo. O seu argumento é o seguinte: caso se entregassem ao destino os profissionais do esporte, em que tornar-se-iam os resultados e o desporto em si mesmo? E os jurados profissionais, podem submeter-se ao acaso? A relação e a argumentação faz-se por analogia: estes dois casos de figura são comparáveis, ele pode exatamente discutir da validade da relação. 304 A legalização ou descriminalização da maconha ou a proibição do aborto são problemas desta natureza. - 129 - 3.1. A desconexão do critério de evidência [Diálogo e Discussão] A Nova Retórica implica na sistematização de critérios para o estabelecimento de um diálogo capaz de produzir efeitos [persuasivos] nos indivíduos que dele participam. Neste sentido, o diálogo funciona como um mecanismo de intercâmbio de idéias que amplia a percepção cooperativa do real. A função de um diálogo, portanto, não é a apreensão da verdade, mas o reconhecimento de valores capazes de sustentar a preferência por um entendimento, em detrimento de outros, porque este se mostra mais razoável que os demais. Assim, ainda que o diálogo propicie o compartilhamento de experiências, a informação e o entretenimento, sua verdadeira função se consolida por meio da produção de percepções e idéias novas. A proposta da Nova Retórica não inclui a pretensão de chegar a sínteses nem tampouco procura atingir a verdade. Antes, procura fomentar decisões. Neste ponto encontramos aquilo que diferencia o diálogo de outros procedimentos discursivos como a discussão e o debate, por exemplo. A disputa e a vitória não são finalidades do procedimento dialógico, mas caracterizam a discussão e o debate. Na interação dialógica, o propósito é exercitar novos modos de ver e criar significados em conjunto, fazendo prevalecer aquela visão mais coerente e organizada, cuja fundamentação se mostra mais sólida e menos propensa a contestações porque alicerçada sobre os valores reconhecidos pelos interlocutores durante o diálogo. Por esse motivo, a denominação Nova Retórica poderia se mostrar inadequada, sendo preferível utilizar a designação de Nova Dialética. Ademais, em nossa cultura ocidental, herdeira do cartesianismo, aquilo que conhecemos com a designação de retórico é essencialmente negativo. Por conta disso, a Retórica se vê associada a uma disputa verbal - não interativa - em que por meio de uma discussão ou debate, os participantes defendem posições, argumentam, negociam e, eventualmente, chegam a conclusões ou acordos. A Dialética, contrariamente à Retórica, procura conciliar pontos de vista, apresentar justificativas e provas capazes de sustentar uma opinião que se pretende mais sólida que as demais. Embora o termo retórica já esteja consagrado pelo seu uso, é necessário buscar formas de atenuar as confusões - 130 - e equívocos derivados da inadequação de sua aplicação. Poder-se-ia abandonar a palavra retórica e substituí-la por outra, mas isso não se mostra adequado porque compete à retórica efetuar a particularização dos elementos da oratória. Por essa razão, a proposta de Perelman é que a utilizemos - no sentido em que é considerada neste texto - complementada pela explicação de que é uma atividade cooperativa de diálogo, reflexão e observação da regra de justiça. A Teoria da Argumentação de Perelman, concebida como uma Nova Retórica – embora também possamos interpretá-la como uma Nova Dialética – se estende pelo campo da discursividade que visa convencer ou persuadir, independentemente do auditório ao qual se dirige e do conteúdo ao qual se refere. Sua função consiste em fornecer argumentos, ou seja, conceder razões a favor ou contra uma determinada afirmação [tese]. Assim, a Teoria da Argumentação resgata e renova, simultaneamente, a Retórica dos gregos e dos romanos, incorporando também a Dialética e a Tópica que são, respectivamente, as artes do diálogo e da controvérsia. A Nova Retórica possibilita uma espécie de investigação do instrumental argumentativo para justificar decisões e escolhas, tornando-as preferíveis em relação a outras possíveis. Apoderando-se do legado histórico aristotélico, Perelman trata de instituir uma Teoria da Argumentação indissociavelmente ligada à problemática grega sobre a Retórica, motivo pelo qual as raízes da Nova Retórica são fincadas no pensamento grego, particularmente em Aristóteles. Essa referência helênica consiste no resgate de uma tradição rompida pela modernidade e o reatar dessa tradição se impõe como uma ruptura com o pensamento moderno que, por intermédio de Descartes, marcou profundamente a filosofia ocidental. O reatamento com a tradição grega implica em uma ruptura com a tradição da modernidade cartesiana. Assim, cerca de vinte e cinco séculos passados desde a sua origem, a Retórica e o problema da argumentação voltam a assumir um papel de extrema relevância no interior da sociedade ocidental. Mas, uma vez que a Nova Retórica é uma atividade cooperativa de diálogo, reflexão e observação da regra de justiça, ela sustenta uma metodologia de produção de novas idéias e significados compartilhados. Ou, posto de outra forma: permite que as pessoas pensem e compartilhem suas crenças sem procurar obter certezas deste procedimento. Na prática, a Nova Retórica pretende ser uma espécie de metodologia filosófica, visto que Perelman desenvolve um sistema ordenado de critérios por meio dos quais se torna - 131 - possível sustentar uma idéia. Esses critérios estimam a plausibilidade, a verossimilhança e a razoabilidade promovendo um resgate de termos – fortemente ligados ao pensamento aristotélico. A verossimilhança se distingue em relação à verdade pelo fato de que essa semelhança ao vero se decide apenas na instância interlocutória que é um auditório. Existe a necessidade de se obter uma adesão e é para isso que as provas são utilizadas. Entretanto, estas provas não podem aspirar mais do que o estatuto da probabilidade e do plausível. A verdade, que cartesianamente se impõe pela evidência, não resulta de uma deliberação argumentada, nem tampouco é objeto de um consenso. Deliberação e evidência são, no limite dessa investigação, duas expressões contraditórias. De um modo geral - e para fins didáticos - a construção de argumentos toma como ponto de partida as opiniões e valores dos interlocutores. Ocorre o seguinte procedimento: (1) Orador expõe seu ponto de vista; (2) Interlocutor expõe o seu ponto de vista; (3) As diferenças emergem; (4) Busca-se apontar as contradições e fragilidades do argumento do oponente; (5) Os dois lados percebem que é preciso fazer escolhas; (6) Os argumentos mais sólidos são mantidos; (7) As opiniões pouco fundamentadas são desprezadas e/ ou abandonadas. Quando se pretende dialogar, cada qual assume a fragilidade das suas opiniões e escolhem as opiniões cujas provas são mais sólidas. Neste caso, os interlocutores se dão por convencidos acerca daquilo que se discute e optam pela via mais coerente. Esta, por sua vez, embora mais sólida, não é inquestionável, nem tampouco incontestável. Permanece válida enquanto não sobrevier outra mais verossímil, razoável e plausível. Entretanto, quando não há acordo, as posições entre as partes se acirram e os interlocutores desejam fazer a sua opinião prevalecer, mantendo inabalada a sua crença acerca daquilo que se discute. A crença se cristaliza, convertendo-se em verdade para aquele que a sustenta. A vontade de converter o outro, fazendo-o compartilhar das mesmas crenças, impondo a sua verdade, impede a consolidação do diálogo e fomenta o estabelecimento de um debate, onde a controvérsia não se mostra edificadora, mas nociva. Nestas circunstâncias, a persuasão se impõe como meio de conquistar a adesão do interlocutor por um procedimento de aquiescência por conversão ou, se preferir, pela imposição. O diálogo é diferente da discussão/debate que é uma forma de disputa: implica a exclusão das idéias desprovidas de fundamentação. Ao disputar, os interlocutores trabalham no sentido de ganhar algo, embora nesse esforço tenham de ceder um pouco daquilo que pretendiam ganhar. Depois de uma discussão/debate há uma conclusão - - 132 - pelo menos é isso que se deseja - efetiva e pretensamente definitiva. No diálogo não se visa concluir, chegar a um resultado único, nem tampouco equivalente a uma verdade absoluta. Tudo o que se quer é fazer emergir idéias, significados novos e compartilhá-los. A sinopse abaixo mostra correlação existente entre o diálogo e a discussão/debate: Diálogo → Visa abrir questões → convencer → estabelecer relações → compartilhar idéias → questionar → aprender → compreender→ Vê a interação entre as partes e o todo → Faz emergir idéias → Busca a pluralidade de idéias. Discussão / Debate → Visa fechar questões → persuadir → demarcar posições → defender idéias → persuadir → ensinar → explicar → vê as partes em separado → Descarta as idéias "vencidas"→ Busca acordos. Cabem aqui algumas observações a respeito do relação acima estabelecida. Em primeiro lugar, ela não pretende hierarquizar, afirmando que o diálogo é melhor ou pior do que a discussão e o debate. Trata-se de maneiras diferentes - porém complementares - de argumentar. Esta ausência de uma hierarquização é imprescindível, porque há situações em que precisamos dialogar e circunstâncias nas quais precisamos discutir e debater; há casos em que o persuadir é necessário, porque existe a real necessidade de mover o indivíduo para uma ação, enquanto há casos em que é preciso ser convincente, ou seja, apresentar boas justificativas para sustentar uma tomada de posição. As opções são adotadas conforme as circunstâncias, o tipo de auditório, os valores que são reconhecidos pelos interlocutores, etc. Além disso, como as opções são acolhidas no próprio contexto argumentativo, na prática, a separação entre uma coluna e a outra não se mostra tão estanque. O processo argumentativo apresenta lacunas incessantes, permitindo que as pessoas muitas vezes alternem o seu posicionamento entre a discussão/debate e a interação dialógica e vice-versa. O "esquematicismo" deve ser evitado, sobretudo porque Perelman não desenvolve um Manual de Retórica, como se poderia imaginar, mas uma Teoria da Argumentação. Desta forma, o esquema acima utilizado tem objetivos meramente ilustrativos e serve para destacar a associação forçosa que se efetua entre o diálogo e o convencimento, a discussão e a persuasão. - 133 - No diálogo existe a necessidade de promover um entendimento, submeter as provas e justificativas à avaliação crítica e escolher a mais razoável das opções. No outro caso, trata-se de situações nas quais é necessário lidar com sentimentos, emoções e manipulação de valores. Em qualquer dos contextos existe a aplicação de perguntas e respostas. No caso da experiência dialógica, os interlocutores não desenvolvem uma postura litigante, na qual tudo merece uma réplica e as pessoas competem para ficar com a última palavra, isto é, para vencer. No diálogo, aquele que usa a palavra não espera nem objeta contestações - que seria como uma reação à sua fala -, pois o objetivo final se mantém na composição de idéias que emergem dos argumentos apresentados pelos interlocutores. Não se trata de responder ou contestar o que foi dito pelo outro, mas falar complementando ou acompanhando o que ele disse, buscando agregar maiores justificativas, sustentar melhor as opiniões e descartar as posições que parecem mais frágeis pela ausência de fundamentação, produzindo algo que não existia antes em cada interlocutor e que surge como propriedade emergente no fluxo da relação. Alguma coisa é produzida - algo que não existia nos interlocutores em separado a não ser em estado latente. No diálogo, as idéias novas surgem por meio da cooperação, não pelo confronto de crenças, pois no diálogo não há enfrentamento ou competição. Existem interações, ligações e competências interpessoais. Existem algumas passagens do pensamento de Perelman que concedem um destaque especial ao tratamento deste problema. Algumas delas, contudo, permitem contestações em virtude de aparentes contradições internas. Tal é o que ocorre, por exemplo, em dois trechos da sua obra. O primeiro deles pertence ao Tratado da Argumentação 305 e o segundo está em Recherches Interdisciplinaires sur L'argumentation 306 . 305 Cf. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1958, p. 34. 306 Texto originalmente publicado em 1968 pela revista Logique et Analyse. (Cf. PERELMAN, 1968b, vol. XI, p. 502-511). - 134 - 3 . 2 . ( C on- ) ver t er ou (C on- ) vencer ? O presente texto visa destacar duas passagens distintas da obra de Perelman. A primeira delas pertence ao Tratado da Argumentação, na qual ele destaca ser imperativo distinguir os modos de convencer dos modos de persuadir. 307 A segunda, entretanto, pertence a um texto de 1965, intitulado Recherches Interdisciplinaires sur L'argumentation 308 no qual Perelman menciona que entre as condições prévias da argumentação, deve-se levar em consideração aspectos essenciais como: o desejo de persuadir, a vontade de escutar e a de se deixar convencer, bem como a existência de uma linguagem comum ao orador e ao auditório 309 . As duas passagens destacam a incompatibilidade entre o que se afirma na primeira e aquilo que se defende na segunda. Considerando-se a distância de quase oito anos entre as duas publicações, teria Perelman descartado o problema, aparentemente crucial do Tratado, e adotado a concepção mais comum que considera a valorização da sinonímia entre os termos? Ou seria um problema de interpretação do excerto? As próximas linhas dedicam-se à tarefa de abordar esse problema da distinção entre convencer e persuadir à luz do conjunto do pensamento do autor, em sua unidade, descartando as peculiaridades concernentes a cada um dos contextos da sua obra e ressaltando o que há de comum no que se refere à compreensão dos modos de adesão ao discurso e suas características essenciais. Perelman, juntamente com Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, se empenhou na tarefa de mostrar a distinção entre convencer e persuadir, no Tratado da Argumentação 310 , destacando a diferença entre as técnicas que visam persuadir das que procuram convencer. Para tanto, investigou aquelas em que o auditório engloba o próprio orador, como ocorre em uma deliberação íntima 311 , bem como uma argumentação que se pretende válida para todos. 312 Estando ciente - 135 - da diferença entre os termos, achou-se na obrigação de destacar a imprecisão que eles possuem na sua aplicação hodierna, motivo pelo qual salientou a distinção entre as técnicas específicas utilizadas em cada caso. A sua incursão ao problema, enfatiza a necessidade de analisar a dicotomia, mas não oferece nenhuma colaboração significativa. Problematiza e destaca a distinção 313 , embora se mostre incapaz de resolvê-la, abrindo uma lacuna para a investigação filosófica da mesma. Perelman mostra que, fora do campo filosófico, costuma-se promover uma aproximação entre os termos convencer e persuadir referendando-lhes com a atribuição de sinonímias. Pensar desta maneira equivale a dizer que, aquele que persuade convence, bem como que aquele a quem se convence, persuade-se. É possível imaginar que uma argumentação convincente realiza a persuasão, enquanto efeito, no indivíduo a quem se dirige. Em contrapartida, a inversão da idéia, ou seja, acreditar que um discurso persuasivo gera, como resultado, o convencimento do seu ouvinte, parece uma transposição arbitrária do raciocínio, visto que é perfeitamente possível compreender a existência de palavras suasórias que, no entanto, sejam incapazes de convencer. Pode-se inferir, diante do exposto, a existência de uma fragilidade na concepção meramente lexicográfica que aproxima as duas noções. A designação filosófica que os conceitos ensejam, permite a percepção de uma fronteira, ainda que aparentemente vaga, razoavelmente clara entre eles. A alternativa de oferecer um sentido técnico, ou talvez filosófico, a persuadir, diferente do de convencer, parece uma exigência que se justifica pela própria aplicação dos conceitos, promotores de interpretações distintas, conforme cada caso de aplicação, e pela impossibilidade de serem perfeitamente intercambiáveis, independentemente do contexto, como se espera que ocorra no caso dos sinônimos legítimos. Demarcada a distinção, desaparece a ilusão de que a 307 Cf. PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1958, p. 34. 308 Cf. PERELMAN, 1968b, p. 502-511. 309 PERELMAN, 1970c, p.112. 310 Cf. PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1958, p. 34. 311 O § 9 do Tratado da Argumentação é dedicado exclusivamente à questão da deliberação consigo mesmo. A deliberação íntima, como também é chamada, consiste em uma das alavancas utilizadas pelo autor no intuito de estabelecer os âmbitos da argumentação e a distinção entre os meios de conquistar a adesão do interlocutor. (Cf. PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1958, p. 53). 312 Assim como o faz com a deliberação íntima, Perelman também consagra um parágrafo ao tratamento do auditório universal (§7). Contudo, os desdobramentos da discussão acerca dessa modalidade de auditório são mais complexos e exigem maior atenção. (Cf. PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1958, p. 40). Em momento oportuno, essa questão será retomada. 313 Cf. PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1958, p. 34. - 136 - dicotomização entre os termos poderia corresponder a uma violência contra a linguagem natural, uma arbitrariedade desnecessária e incapaz de promover qualquer benefício. Mas, imagine-se que, ainda assim, alguém faça reservas ao apartamento entre convencer e persuadir, firmando as bases de sua objeção no fato de que as duas noções mantêm algo de comum entre elas, permitindo, portanto, a sua associação. Ainda que haja algo de comum à persuasão e ao convencimento como a capacidade de conquistar, na condição de resultado, a adesão de um simples interlocutor, ou mesmo de um grande auditório, isso não atribui a ambos a mesma significação. Embora apresentem a conquista da adesão como objeto de sua função, em cada caso existe uma particularidade manifestando-se como fim último dos processos. O discurso persuasivo visa vencer o colocutor, impor a sua opinião perante um auditório, e essa vitória se dá por meio de procedimentos capazes de alterar significativamente o conjunto de crenças deste último, fazendo-lhe reconhecer a superioridade - ainda que inexistente ou ilusória - dos argumentos apresentados pelo orador a favor de suas próprias idéias. O argumento convincente, por sua vez, conquista a adesão do interlocutor por intermédio de uma convenção. O indivíduo se vê compelido a compartilhar da mesma crença, em virtude da apresentação de boas justificativas, e não por uma determinação do outro. Quem cede ao poder de um argumento convincente, assim o faz por não dispor – ainda que temporariamente ou momentaneamente – de qualquer possibilidade de contestação. A audiência concedida pode ser voluntária, mas a submissão ao argumento é uma injunção racional em detrimento da vontade ou do desejo. Desde já, torna-se imperativo sublinhar que, nos casos em discussão, e este é o ponto relevante para a Teoria da Argumentação, importam apenas os meios discursivos, ou argumentativos, empregados com o intuito de convencer ou persuadir. 314 Essa observação é importante por excluir, de imediato, algumas estratégias voltadas para a conquista da adesão do interlocutor, ou do ouvinte, se não exteriores ao contexto linguístico-comunicacional, pelo menos próximas de maneira tangencial. Dentre essas ferramentas suasórias, descartadas a priori, encontra-se o recurso à força física, por exemplo. As ameaças e a lavagem cerebral, 314 Nem todo discurso é eminentemente persuasivo, pois um discurso puramente constatativo, uma descrição de um acontecimento ou, no âmbito jornalístico, a reportagem de um acontecimento não é "necessariamente" persuasiva. Nesses casos se tem um discurso puramente constatativo ou denotativo. Também o discurso poético não é necessariamente persuasivo. Quando se lê um Fernando Pessoa ou um Carlos Drummond de Andrade, não é propriamente essa função persuasiva da linguagem aquela que se espera, e nem por isso a sua forma de expressão deixa de ser discursiva. Entretanto, essas modalidades discursivas, que não são persuasivas nem tampouco visam convencer ao interlocutor, não interessam à Teoria da Argumentação de Perelman. - 137 - também podem ser elencadas nesse enquadramento, pois são modalidades de persuasão que, embora aproximadas do contexto argumentativo pelo uso da linguagem para a obtenção de resultados, utilizam-na pela sua relevância e eficiência psicológica em detrimento do aspecto lógico – do ingrediente racional. Os inúmeros procedimentos utilizados para angariar a adesão dos ouvintes são previamente descartados da sua análise, porque Perelman está seguro de que esses métodos de persuasão, não são necessariamente mediados pela argumentação. Por isso mesmo, ele os considera procedimentos persuasivos de ação direta 315 . Correspondem a tais procedimentos, em linhas gerais, o uso da força e suas variantes, além dos contatos pessoais de natureza física. Contudo, uma vez excluídos os métodos que se encaixam no exposto, resta a modalidade persuasiva de natureza lógica que, por sua vez, interessa a Perelman. Esse aspecto lógico tem um sentido bastante amplo e transcende a compreensão de lógica à qual se costuma empregar o termo. Ademais, também integram o elenco das preocupações perelmanianas os meios empregados, a título de prova, para granjear a adesão do interlocutor. A persuasão soa, neste caso, como uma espécie de estado de consciência, embora seja algo além disso. Restringir a persuasão a um estado de consciência seria mantê-la constrita a um aspecto psicológico que apenas corresponde a uma das suas peculiaridades. Aquele que se preocupa exclusivamente com o resultado, vê no persuadir algo mais desejável do que convencer. Para ele, a persuasão é capaz de acrescentar ao convencimento uma força necessária para conduzir à ação. O ato de convencer seria desprovido desta força. Para ilustrar, Perelman destaca que na enciclopédia espanhola, por exemplo, consta que convencer é apenas uma primeira fase do processo - o essencial é persuadir, ou seja, abalar a alma para que o ouvinte aja em conformidade com a convicção que lhe foi comunicada. Quando se pretende hierarquizar o persuadir e o convencer, a partir de uma dicotomização em termos absolutos, gera-se um problema de enquadramento entre os mesmos, porque não existe um consenso e, para alguns, o persuadir é superior ao convencer, enquanto para outros, ocorre o inverso. 316 No primeiro caso, ou seja, nos casos em que a persuasão é mais valorizada que o convencimento, em geral, há um desprezo pela crítica e pelo entendimento, porque se está preocupado com a aceitação. Não se defende, todavia, que a persuasão seja mais digna de crédito. Defende-se a sua aplicação em virtude da eficácia, e não pela sua vinculação com o 315 Cf. PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1952c, p.3. 316 Cf. PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1952c, p.4. - 138 - esclarecimento ou com a verdade. Ocorre que ela – a persuasão – produz um engajamento, uma adesão quase incondicional a uma idéia, ou a um conjunto delas, pela aproximação aos interesses individuais do ouvinte. São instrumentos do persuadir, a sedução e a conversão. 317 Quem deseja persuadir sabe, de antemão, que o indivíduo-alvo da sua sedução não compartilha do seu conjunto de crenças, nem tampouco estaria disposto a aceitá-las pela exposição de justificativas meramente racionais, ou seja, pautadas exclusivamente na necessidade. Pelo contrário, está ciente de que é preciso atacar o seu oponente expondo motivos que o agradem em virtude da sua vontade. Aquele que ouve, por sua vez, sente-se motivado a aderir ao conjunto de crenças do orador, porque este último se apresenta como promotor de uma ilusão encantadora, impossível de não ser desejada. A adesão da qual se trata na Nova Retórica é voluntária. Persuadir é, neste caso, motivar as outras pessoas para que elas aceitem voluntariamente a forma de ver as coisas com os olhos daquele que fala. Envolve também a questão do respeito e apreciação a esse olhar para defender ativamente as propostas que ele projeta. A persuasão representa um trabalho de encantamento pela linguagem. A promessa, aliás, é desta natureza. Quando se promete qualquer coisa a outrem, firma-se um pacto de agrado. Há o estabelecimento de que uma determinada coisa, que interessa à parte beneficiada, será concedida por conta de um acordo. Quem ouve, e conseqüentemente é persuadido pela promessa, atribui crédito àquele que fala porque o vê dotado de autoridade para concretizar o pacto. Jamais firmaria o mesmo se não acreditasse na possibilidade de realização por parte de quem prometeu. O encantamento é despertado pelas palavras que fornecem ao ouvinte a possibilidade de realização de um desejo, movendo-o a agir conforme solicitado pelo orador. O caráter pragmático da promessa, como todo discurso persuasivo, promove uma ação ou desperta uma predisposição para a sua concretização. Os discursos políticos e as promessas de fé, firmadas por pessoas de grande crença religiosa, são exemplos desta modalidade de discurso persuasivo. A diferença está no indivíduo–alvo, que no primeiro caso é o eleitor, sujeito ativo, livre e fisicamente presente. No segundo caso, entretanto, o pacto é firmado com um ente metafísico, sobrenatural, uma 317 A esse respeito encontramos no sermão do Padre António Vieira: "Que cousa é a conversão de uma alma, senão entrar um homem dentro em si e ver-se a si mesmo? Para essa vista são necessários olhos, é necessário luz e é necessário espelho. O pregador concorre com o espelho, que é a doutrina; Deus concorre com a luz, que é a graça; o homem concorre com os olhos, que é o conhecimento. Ora suposto que a conversão das almas por meio da pregação depende destes três concursos: de Deus, do pregador e do ouvinte, por qual deles devemos entender que falta? Por parte do ouvinte, ou por parte do pregador, ou por parte de Deus?" (VIEIRA, Padre António. Sermão da Sexagésima. Sermões Escolhidos). - 139 - entidade divina. Desta forma, a natureza da relação, deste segundo exemplo, assume outras características porque o prometedor não ousa enganar o promissário temendo os efeitos prejudiciais de uma ação deste porte. Além disso, não se tem certeza de que o promissário está certo da capacidade de realização do feito, por conta do promitente, embora o outro tenha plena certeza da competência do primeiro. Pretende-se persuadir o divino a realizar um feito com vista à satisfação do seu desejo. As palavras servem para promover uma intervenção, que não deixa de ser uma modalidade de ação, da divindade a seu favor. Mas essa não é a modalidade que interessa à Teoria da Argumentação. A promessa veiculada por meio do discurso político, no entanto, merece atenção da Teoria da Argumentação porque encarna aspectos essenciais discutidos pela teoria no que se refere ao estilo persuasivo que possui. O candidato, ao pleitear um cargo público, promete a realização de uma série de eventos por conta da necessidade de votos que precisa para conquistar o seu intento. Em busca da realização dos seus desejos, projeta o seu discurso favoravelmente à realização dos anseios dos seus potenciais eleitores 318 . Estes últimos, em virtude da promessa do candidato, são conduzidos a uma ação específica: votar. Ainda que não votem, conforme espera o candidato, sabem que o objetivo do orador é conduzi-los a agir, e por isso avaliam as promessas e sua possibilidade de execução. Neste caso, o discurso possui as características típicas do discurso persuasivo, ou seja, opera por meio da beleza e da agradabilidade. A função da sedução, enquanto ferramenta suasória, é transformar a crença do orador na mesma do ouvinte. Em outras palavras, o processo de persuasão é utilizado, neste caso especificamente, como instrumento para o orador incutir a sua crença no ouvinte, por meio de um discurso penetrante e cativador. Uma vez convertido à crença do orador, compartilhando e defendendo os mesmos princípios e idéias, torna-se possível notar que, além da sedução, operou-se a conversão. Nesses casos, a sedução serve para converter, o que não ocorre no caso das promessas, nos quais se seduz com o intuito exclusivo de conquistar uma ação específica. Mas, como qualquer discurso visa granjear a adesão, se o outro não compartilha das mesmas crenças, motivo pelo qual se pretende persuadi-lo, é necessário sobremaneira fazê-lo compartilhar das mesmas idéias. Não se seduz, nem tampouco se converte, por causa da verdade enunciada. Em um debate, ninguém abandona uma crença exclusivamente porque alguém apresentou provas verdadeiras contra ela, pois isso implicaria 318 Cf. OLIVEIRA, 2001, p.23. - 140 - assumir a inutilidade e a fragilidade da sua crença, ao passo que, concomitantemente, representaria a superioridade do oponente e sua conseqüente vitória. Por conseguinte, isso negaria completamente os ideais e os valores reconhecidos inicialmente para provocar a discussão. Ao falar da persuasão nesses termos têm-se a impressão de que ela é meramente negativa, esquecendo-se que a adesão da qual se está tratando na Nova Retórica é voluntária. A persuasão se faz necessária porque há um entrave de idéias, e a vontade de uma das partes em fazer prevalecer o seu ponto de vista. É por isso que o procedimento adotado visará mostrar (por meio da sedução) ou impor (pela conversão) as vantagens de ver as coisas pelo seu ângulo de observação. Não há esclarecimentos no processo persuasivo, ocorre a apresentação de um conjunto de modos de entendimento que devem ser assimilados à custa dos benefícios que serão conquistados ao se adotar essa conduta. O discurso persuasivo se dá no interior de um jogo de interesses. Em geral, o persuadido não busca sê-lo; a persuasão chega sem que ele a procure. É um tipo de discurso que ocorre sem que ele tenha a intenção de encontrá-lo. Chega, agrada e encontra audiência, porque atinge pontos de seu interesse, motivo pelo qual o discurso persuasivo termina sendo incorporado às crenças do ouvinte: ele manifesta ou satisfaz os desejos de quem ouve. O indivíduo propenso à persuasão é do tipo que não quer, não procura, mas se deixa conduzir pelas circunstâncias; é vencido pela beleza, pelo agradável. A ilusão é o seu grande encanto; a solidez e a sustentação são secundárias, pois ele quer aquilo que lhe inspira desejo. O convencido, pelo contrário, procura sê-lo. Geralmente, está diante de uma dúvida e busca esclarecimento. Está a procura de segurança, fundamentação para algo que o atormenta pela falta de consistência. Dá-se por convencido quando sai do estado de angústia provocado pela inconsistência daquilo que julga ou julgava saber. Não tem o objetivo de ganhar ou perder o jogo, nem tampouco se importa se ratificará ou retificará o seu conhecimento, pois quer saber a verdade. Vai à busca e ouve atentamente porque anseia por esclarecimentos. Se as crenças daquele que fala são incorporadas, não é porque agradam aos seus interesses, nem tampouco porque satisfaz os seus desejos, mas porque esclarecem as suas dúvidas de maneira fundamentada. O indivíduo que pretende convencer, por sua vez, não compartilha da intenção de ir contra as idéias do outro, o contexto de sua atuação é de outra natureza, porque visa mostrar ao interlocutor as suas idéias (com base em boas justificativas) para que este venha a pensar do - 141 - mesmo modo que ele. Ao procurar convencer pretende-se promover o esclarecimento. A apresentação de razões tem a função de promover a compreensão do modo de ser das coisas. Acredita-se que um indivíduo devidamente convencido há de se comportar conforme a adoção das razões, porque é inconcebível conhecer a realidade e permitir ser conduzido pelas artimanhas dos jogos persuasivos. Um indivíduo esclarecido jamais poderia se deixar levar pela ilusão do encantamento. A esse respeito, a Teoria da Argumentação de Perelman permite inferir que a verdade, os procedimentos lógico-formais e o raciocínio válido possuem um campo de atuação mais restrito do que se imagina. Uma avaliação do procedimento das pessoas faz ver que, mesmo quando esclarecidas, elas são mais facilmente conduzidas pela beleza que pelo esclarecimento. A força dos procedimentos persuasivos e o seu conseqüente encantamento é o que faz a diferença. Embora a Teoria da Argumentação [de Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca] sugira diversos critérios para distinguir os argumentos fortes dos fracos 319 , tais critérios parecem ineficientes, sobretudo quando concedemos à noção de força de um argumento um significado empírico. Tomemos como exemplo a questão de adaptação ao auditório, que se apresenta como princípio fundamental para avaliar a força de um argumento. Nas palavras de Perelman: O princípio capital, [no tocante à avaliação da força dos argumentos], continua a ser a adaptação ao auditório, às teses por ele admitidas, levando em conta a intensidade dessa adesão. Não basta escolher premissas nas quais se apoiar; cumpre prestar atenção, uma vez que a força do argumento se deve em grande parte à sua possível resistência às objeções, a tudo quanto o auditório admite, mesmo ao que não se tem nenhuma intenção de usar, mas que poderia vir a opor-se à argumentação. 320 A força de um argumento se manifesta tanto pela dificuldade que haveria para refutá-lo como por suas qualidades próprias, motivo pelo qual a força dos argumentos variará conforme os auditórios e conforme o objetivo da argumentação, a saber: convencer ou persuadir. A força é, portanto, o termo que perpassa a discussão acerca da dicotomia entre o persuadir e o convencer. Um argumento científico, por exemplo, concentra a sua força na verdade daquilo que afirma. Sua fundamentação decorre de experimentos e práticas capazes de validar a sua 319 Destina-se ao tratamento deste problema o capítulo V do Tratado da Argumentação [em especial os § 97 e 98] destinado à interação dos argumentos. (Cf. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p. 523-534). 320 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p. 525. - 142 - afirmação buscando torná-la algo inconteste a qualquer espírito racional. Entretanto, as pesquisas científicas são menos eficientes, quando se trata de penetrar no intelecto do indivíduo, do que o ardil da publicidade. 321 A força da persuasão garante a ação, a força da verdade permite o esclarecimento. A primeira garante a ação, conquista a adesão, a segunda promove a razão, adquire o entendimento. A partir dessa discussão, ao menos previamente, chega-se à seguinte conclusão: é possível convencer o interlocutor com idéias bem fundamentadas, mas para fazê-lo agir, é possível que se tenha de usar a persuasão. Afinal, para persuadir alguém, é preciso trabalhar o campo das ilusões e dos desejos – desde os mais explícitos aos mais obscuros – dessa pessoa. Isso implica em sensibilizar o outro para que ele aja da maneira que se deseja. Para convencer, entretanto, é preciso demonstrar, explicitar a procedência de um raciocínio, fazendo-o claro ao entendimento do interlocutor. É possível dizer que o convencimento desnuda e apresenta a realidade tal como ela é, enquanto a persuasão mascara e exibe a realidade tal como se gostaria que fosse. Na abordagem da distinção que importa discutir, sob a ótica da Teoria da Argumentação, não se negligencia a eficácia das inúmeras modalidades suasórias exteriores à esfera da linguagem. No entanto, a funcionalidade delas é tão explícita, que independe de uma análise pormenorizada, se o que se deseja é apontar a suposta diferenciação entre convencer e persuadir. Cabe, portanto, pensar tal distinção no que se refere aos casos em que se imagina haver a inexistência de uma dessemelhança entre os conceitos, porque não se recorre a expedientes extralingüísticos no processo discursivo-argumentativo. Nesses casos, persuade-se quando se apresentam provas que parecem convincentes, mas não são. Os discursos persuasivos levam a crer ou a aceitar uma coisa pela natureza e particularidades, do contexto em que são enunciados, e não pela força da qual dispõem. São, neste aspecto, fracos. Não resistem a uma análise mais apurada e, no geral, adquirem a adesão pela pressão do momento em que são enunciados, impossibilitando uma análise crítica minuciosa. O convencimento, pelo contrário, mesmo quando submetido a uma avaliação mais rígida, tende a se manter inalterado em virtude do peso dos argumentos que o engendraram. Está se falando no âmbito de uma argumentação não constringente e, por isso, fala-se de uma tendência a inalterabilidade e não de uma impossibilidade de alteração, como se poderia impor caso se 321 Parece mais fácil converter indivíduos incrédulos a usar preservativos porque uma estrela da televisão o faz, do que tentar fazê-lo utilizar o artefato por conta das doenças sexualmente transmissíveis que ele pode contrair. - 143 - discutisse o problema no interior da Lógica formal, por exemplo. Quem convence, desperta no interlocutor (ouvinte) uma crença provida de solidez porque apresenta provas fundamentadas em juízos bem construídos, ou seja, o argumento convincente apela a razões, se não imutáveis, garantidas pela razoabilidade que se lhe concerne. Quando Perelman, em Recherches Interdisciplinaires sur L'argumentation, resolve especificar as condições prévias da argumentação, menciona: o desejo de persuadir, a vontade de escutar e de se deixar convencer, e a existência de uma linguagem comum ao orador e ao auditório 322 . É preciso compreender que o primeiro ponto, ou seja, o desejo de persuadir, refere-se ao agente; enquanto os outros dois, no caso, a vontade de escutar e a de se deixar convencer, são relativas ao ouvinte. O último desses aspectos salientados por Perelman, "a vontade de se deixar convencer", corresponde ao ato voluntário mencionado anteriormente. Com isso ele pretende reafirmar a exigência que se impõe ao indivíduo: ele é que tem de se deixar ser convencido. E esse é um pressuposto presente desde o Tratado da Argumentação. Na verdade, a origem de tais pressupostos e, em especial, da necessidade do ato voluntário pertencente ao indivíduo que se deixa conduzir pelo discurso, está esboçada em um outro texto 323 , de 1950, também escrito em parceria com Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. Desde lá, subentende-se a importância da contribuição (voluntária) do sujeito, para o orador obter a sua adesão. Tal menção é relevante para reafirmar a exclusão dos procedimentos persuasivos que se impõem ao indivíduo independentemente do seu consentimento. Ao ressaltar a importância do ato voluntário, a afirmação de Perelman, constante no excerto apresentado, desvela uma incompatibilidade entre o que se diz, e o que perpassa o conjunto da obra, no que se refere ao uso dos termos. Quem deseja persuadir, precisa conquistar a audiência do seu interlocutor tornando-lhe potencialmente propenso a ser persuadido; enquanto quem pretende ser convincente precisa achar bons argumentos para apresentar àquele que queira ser convencido. Em qualquer dos casos é necessário encontrar alguém disposto a lhe conceder audiência e permitir, voluntariamente, a apresentação de argumentos razoáveis. A abordagem do problema, pelo que fornece a unidade do pensamento de Perelman, não permite compreender, tal como expresso literalmente no texto de 1965, como pode o desejo de persuadir (do orador) 322 "Parmi les préalables de l'argumentation, il faut retenir le désir de persuader, celui d'écouter et de se laisser convaincre, l'existence d'un langage commun à l'orateur et à l'auditoire". (PERELMAN, 1968b, vol. XI, p. 505). 323 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1952c, p. 1-43 - 144 - ser aplicável, e conseqüentemente, conquistar a anuência daquele que quer se deixar convencer. Possivelmente, uma abordagem mais detalhada do problema, tal como ele se apresenta no Tratado da Argumentação, ajude a sustentar o grande equívoco encontrado nesta afirmação de Perelman do Recherches Interdisciplinaires sur L'argumentation. - 145 - 3 . 3 . P er sua sã o e C onven ci ment o na T eor i a da A r gumen ta çã o P er el ma ni a na Ainda nos primeiros capítulos do Tratado da Argumentação, Perelman e Olbrechts- Tyteca oferecem um destaque especial ao problema da persuasão 324 e, conseqüentemente, à relação que se estabelece entre esse conceito e a noção de convencimento, habitualmente apresentada como sua correlata. A concessão de um tratamento minudenciado e destacado para essa questão não é fortuita; na verdade, uma abordagem dessa natureza demonstra a necessidade de uma análise detalhada acerca da utilização dos termos que, embora aproximados pelo uso comum, conservam uma sutil distinção no seu emprego, sobretudo no campo da filosofia, e mais especificamente, nas discussões sobre argumentação e retórica. Perelman traz essa investigação à contemporaneidade com a intenção de suscitar a importância da aplicação desses termos para a construção da sua Teoria da Argumentação. Entretanto, o debate decorrente desse problema é bastante antigo e se impõe há séculos 325 , visando dicotomizar os conceitos em questão, vinculando o convencimento à verdade e a persuasão à opinião. Essa controvérsia encontra amparo no ideal que procura uma objetividade capaz de sustentar uma conclusão, independentemente de sua vinculação histórica com o contexto, fazendo-a transcender as limitações temporais. 326 Em Logique et rhétorique, um artigo de 1950, Perelman confirma: 324 Cf. PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1958, p. 34. 325 Se entre muitas questões existem claras divergências entre os principais pensadores do mundo antigo, há uma que une estes filósofos: estabelecer os limites entre retórica e filosofia; embora cada um estime esses limites de maneira diferente. A principal preocupação de Sócrates e Platão, por exemplo, ao pensar em estabelecer tais limites, será subordinar a retórica à filosofia, isto é, vincular a expressividade de um discurso à exigência primeira de busca da verdade. Aristóteles, apesar de encarar a retórica, como o faz Platão, somente a partir de seu aspecto empírico, atrelando-a a necessidade de conhecimento da verdade, elabora esta disciplina teoricamente, sistematizando-a como arte da confirmação e refutação, complementar à exposição própria da dialética. Em todos os casos, existe uma referência à Retórica como "arte do persuadir" e uma preocupação em dicotomizar os meios de conquistar a adesão do ouvinte, mostrando a diferenciação entre as formas de adquirir a anuência do interlocutor. Um célebre ensaio consagrado a esta discussão na antiguidade é o Górgias de Platão. Neste é possível encontrar os primeiros indícios da oposição entre os modos de convencer e os modos de persuadir. Cf. PLATÃO. Sofista. In : Diálogos. v.3-4. Trad.: NUNES, C. A. Belém: UFPA. p.8. (Coleção amazônica. Serie Farias Brito). 326 Perelman está, em toda a sua obra posterior a 1945, tentando mostrar que a objetividade é um ideal plantado e cultivado por uma tradição herdeira do cartesianismo. Para ele, embora esse ideal seja nefasto para a argumentação e, por conseqüência, para a própria filosofia, a sua busca encontrou campo fértil para propagação através de um isolamento do contexto, conforme proposto pelo formalismo lógico. Embora ele próprio parta da lógica formal, tendo a ela se dedicado por mais de duas décadas, inúmeras serão as críticas que por ele desenvolverá acerca do estudo da linguagem através do isolamento do contexto. (Cf. PERELMAN, Une théorie philosophique de l'argumentation, 1970e, p. 19. - 146 - Uma distinção clássica opõe os modos de convencer aos modos de persuadir, os primeiros são conhecidos como racionais, os segundos como irracionais, uns se endereçam ao entendimento, os outros à vontade. 327 Não há qualquer informação subseqüente sobre a localização precisa da distinção clássica à qual ele se refere. Mas, no Tratado da Argumentação, o autor oferece pistas acerca do alvo da sua crítica, ao dizer: "De fato, nós assistimos aqui a reprise do debate secular entre os partidários da verdade e os da opinião, entre os filósofos, investigadores do absoluto e retóricos, engajados na ação". 328 A crítica se dirige à tradição que se origina em Platão, e visa destacar a sua oposição a essa acepção. Segui-la, segundo Perelman, equivaleria a aceitar que o convencimento se torna eficaz nos contextos em que existe uma propensão para encarar fatos e idéias de um ponto de vista puramente racional, enquanto a persuasão, descartada do nicho restrito e seletivo da racionalidade, por exclusão, estaria condenada a coabitar o espaço dominado pela irracionalidade. Dessa contraposição dos termos convencer e persuadir, que se perpetua na tradição filosófica ocidental, que se encontra o suporte de outras oposições dicotômicas, tais como: racional/irracional, inteligível/sensível, entendimento/vontade. Essa concepção, que também opõe a persuasão ao convencimento, comete erro semelhante àquela que vê na persuasão apenas o seu aspecto psicológico, ou seja, em sua condição de estado de consciência. 329 É uma visão restritiva, cerceadora e, sobretudo, limitada. Este enfoque vê uma superioridade "natural" do convencer em relação ao persuadir, porque os modos de convencer estão vinculados ao entendimento, possuindo, por sua vez, uma dimensão racional que, qualitativamente, é muito superior à persuasão, desprovida de racionalidade, sob esta ótica, porque associada à vontade e à opinião. Essa aplicação do irracional como próprio da persuasão extirpa a mesma de qualquer aplicação séria, inclusive afastando-a do plano filosófico. Cabe ao filósofo convencer, sendo inconcebível imaginá-lo pensando em persuadir. A tarefa de suadir cabe ao sofista, pelo menos essa é a imagem e o entendimento que perpassa o campo do filosofar desde Platão. Mas, essa tomada de posição parece pouco crítica e, assim 327 "Une distinction classique oppose les moyens de convaincre aux moyens de persuader, les premiers étant conçus comme rationnels, les seconds comme irrationnels, les uns s'adressant à l'entendement, les autres à la volonté" (PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1952c, p.3). 328 En fait, nous assistons ici à la reprise du débat séculaire entre les partisans de la vérité et ceux de l'opinion, entre philosophes, chercheurs d'absolu et rhéteurs, engagés dans l'action (Cf. PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1958, p. 35). 329 Cf. tópico anterior [3.2.], (Con-)verter ou (Con-)vencer?, p. 134. - 147 - sendo, pouco filosófica, quando analisada à luz de um questionamento mais apurado acerca da dimensão pragmática do processo argumentativo. Se couber ao filósofo promover a ação pelo argumentar, duas serão as espécies de instrumentos promotores da ação por vias argumentativas: o persuadir e o convencer. A distinção entre elas pertence ao campo das provas. A natureza das provas será capaz de definir a intensidade do valor argumentativo e a sua solidez, ou a sua fragilidade, e demarcará se o argumento é persuasivo ou convincente. Mas, será a natureza das provas, por si só, capaz de determinar a força de um argumento? A visão clássica é parcial porque ignora que uma argumentação visa conduzir o individuo a uma tomada de posição, ou seja, visa à ação. Quando se argumenta, pretende-se, antes de qualquer coisa, conduzir o seu auditório a uma ação. Comportar-se conforme sugere a concepção clássica, segundo Perelman, equivale a valorizar excessivamente o que está, de alguma forma, vinculado à (objetividade da) razão, em detrimento de tudo o mais. Assim, um possível demérito da persuasão advém do fato que o alvo da persuasão é o autômato 330 , querendo designar com este, o corpo, a imaginação, o sentimento; em suma, tudo o que escapa ao domínio da razão e é relativo aos comportamentos afetivos e habituais do homem, consoante a designação atribuída por Pascal. Por conta disso, a persuasão tende a ser considerada, freqüentemente, uma transposição injustificada da demonstração, em conformidade com os moldes aristotélicos, porque na persuasão o indivíduo tende a contentar- se com a apresentação de justificativas afetivas e pessoais, que comportam os seus valores e são tidas como provas. É por isso, destaca Perelman a título de ilustração, que afirmar acerca de um determinado silogismo ser ele convincente, mas não persuasivo, é estar a isolar esse mesmo silogismo de um contexto e consiste em supor que as suas premissas existem no espírito, desligadas do resto, transformando-lhes em verdades inabaláveis e inatingíveis sob a perspectiva estritamente racional. Assim, o critério que serve para caracterizar um argumento convincente, e conseqüentemente para definir convencimento, não se funda unicamente em uma diferenciação dos meios de prova, nem tampouco das faculdades postas em jogo. Opera, igualmente, pelo isolamento de certos dados do seu contexto próprio, naturalmente repleto de complexidades que terminam sendo ignoradas. 330 Cf. PASCAL apud PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1958, p. 35. - 148 - Ainda sobre a caracterização dos argumentos, se persuasivos ou convincentes, pode-se dizer que uma abordagem digna de destaque, pela influência que exerce ainda nos dias atuais, pertence aos pensadores modernos que, sob a égide do racionalismo cartesiano, fixaram a zona limítrofe entre as noções de persuasão e convencimento no critério de evidência. Perelman recusa-se a aceitar uma distinção demarcada pela evidência porque não concebe a existência de uma argumentação contra algo evidente, do mesmo modo que discorda da possibilidade de deliberação quando a solução é necessária. A propósito, "la nature même de la délibération et de la argummentation s'oppose à la nécessité et à la evidence (...)". 331 É preciso salientar, entretanto, que a idéia de evidência criticada por Perelman é aquela que se impõe como característica da razão. Ao criticar o critério da evidência como elemento de demarcação entre as fronteiras da persuasão e do convencimento, Perelman retira as barreiras entre as duas noções, aproximando-as de tal forma que a sua distinção torna-se quase inapreensível, quiçá, inconcebível. Mas, esse posicionamento não é arbitrário; pelo contrário, é preventivo, porque sustenta a sua oposição à tradição filosófica herdeira do cartesianismo, consolidando a ruptura do seu pensamento com a concepção de razão e raciocínio oriunda de Descartes, inviabilizando assim, futuras críticas, nesse aspecto, à sua Teoria da Argumentação, que se afasta claramente da idéia tradicional de evidência. O critério de evidência e, por conseguinte, a objetividade que se lhe concerne, podem, inclusive, ser vistos como o mais eficiente meio de demarcar as esferas de aplicação de cada uma das expressões; entretanto, a sua vinculação com o ideal de objetividade torna-lhe exterior ao contexto de aplicação dos argumentos, isolando-os das complexidades e ambigüidades típicas da linguagem natural que a torna aplicável e significativa, ou não, em diferentes contextos conforme o seu uso. Tendo descartado o critério de evidência, Perelman buscará uma outra espécie de critério para sustentar uma sutil distinção entre os dois conceitos, persuasão e convencimento, ressaltando que "na linguagem utilizada hodiernamente, o matiz entre as duas noções é bastante delicado, impreciso e essencialmente dependente da idéia que o orador faz da encarnação razão". 332 O critério que Perelman utiliza para substituir a evidência na função de 331 Cf. PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1958, p.1. 332 Essa referência ao problema da "encarnação da razão" ganha corpo no interior de uma discussão perelmaniana que destaca um elemento intermediário entre o racional e o irracional: o razoável. Existem, contudo, dois textos específicos nos quais o autor se dedica ao tratamento isolado sobre o problema do racional. (Cf. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1952a. PERELMAN, 1964a, p. 127-138). - 149 - zona limítrofe entre persuasão e convencimento é, a princípio, obscuro, conquanto sutil e cauteloso. Alguns elementos corroboram para essa obscuridade concernente à distinção supracitada. Primeiro, porque tal oposição, na medida em que se afasta do critério de evidência, se aproxima de outras duas noções próprias do seu pensamento, ficando a ela condicionadas; são elas as noções de auditório particular e auditório universal 333 . Segundo, porque a distinção entre os tipos de auditório é tão imprecisa quanto aquela encontrada entre os termos convencer e persuadir. Uma simplificação possível, mas inadequada, para compreender como Perelman distingue persuasão de convencimento, sugerirá uma oposição bastante semelhante àquela encontrada no pensamento dos antigos filósofos e sofistas da tradição grega responsáveis, em boa parte, pela sustentação teórica dos seus escritos. Será possível, então, sugerir uma aproximação entre as idéias de Perelman e a concepção Kantiana exposta na Crítica da Razão Pura 334 , no tocante à oposição entre os termos em discussão? Kant defende a tese de que a persuasão e o convencimento correspondem a duas espécies de crença. A primeira delas, a persuasão, possui o seu fundamento exclusivamente na natureza particular do sujeito e sua falsa solidez decorre da aparência que lhe serve de suporte. Na verdade, ocorre uma transposição arbitrária imposta pelo sujeito que detém a crença e nela deposita credibilidade, transformando em princípio objetivo algo que está unicamente nele – no sujeito. Logo, essa crença não é objetiva, e acreditar na sua objetividade implica em erro, uma vez que ela não possui a mesma validade para todos. Em contrapartida, o convencimento é tido como uma crença que se efetiva "quando é válida para cada qual, ao menos na medida em que este tem razão e seu princípio é objetivamente suficiente". Um juízo dessa natureza transcende a validade individual e, na medida que pode comunicar-se, afasta-se do campo da subjetividade em busca do firmamento. Nas palavras de Kant: "A crença (das Füwahrhalten) é um fato de nosso entendimento suscetível de repousar em princípios objetivos, mas que exige também causas subjetivas na mente de quem julga. Quando é válida para alguém, pelo menos na medida em que este tem razão, seu princípio é objetivamente suficiente e a crença se chama convicção. Se ela só tem 333 Embora exista uma estreita relação entre a idéia de auditório e os termos que, por ora estão sendo discutidos, é prudente deixar a abordagem do problema acerca dos auditórios para um momento oportuno, caso se faça necessário. 334 Cf. KANT, 1927, p.634. apud PERELMAN ; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1952, p.5. - 150 - fundamento na natureza particular do sujeito, chama-se persuasão. A persuasão é uma mera aparência, porque o princípio do juízo que está unicamente no sujeito é tido como objetivo. Por isso um juízo desse gênero só tem um valor individual e a crença não se pode comunicar". 335 Nessa perspectiva o que pode produzir o convencimento é possível de ser afirmado e, consecutivamente, consignado como um juízo necessariamente válido para alguém. Daí porque conclui: "não posso afirmar, ou seja, expressar como um juízo necessariamente válido para alguém, senão o que produz a convicção. Penso guardar para mim a persuasão, se me dou bem com ela, mas não posso, nem devo, fazê-la valer fora de mim" 336 . Deste último ponto de vista, segue-se uma configuração que contrapõe realidade, razão, ciência, objetividade e convencimento a aparência, sugestão, opinião, subjetividade e persuasão. Em qualquer caso, não se pode esquecer que o sujeito, na acepção kantiana, corresponde à autoconsciência que determina e condiciona a atividade cognoscitiva. O sujeito é o "eu penso" da consciência, e este "eu" torna-se sujeito quando seus pensamentos lhe são inerentes como predicados, ou ainda, enquanto determina a união entre sujeito e predicado nos juízos, na medida em que é atividade sintética ou judicante. Assim, ele é espontaneidade cognitiva, portanto consciência, autoconsciência ou apercepção. Ao dizer que a ausência de solidez da crença persuasiva está relacionada ao fato de que a aparência lhe serve de suporte não implica dizer que a persuasão tem o seu fundamento na ilusão, ou seja, que a persuasão é uma crença ilusória. É preciso compreender que, para Kant, "as aparências são os fenômenos como objetos da intuição sensível e, em geral, da experiência". Nesse sentido, o fenômeno não é exclusivamente a aparência sensível que se contrapõe à realidade, como se pode pensar. Para Kant, os fenômenos são realidade, aliás, as únicas realidades que o homem pode conhecer e de que pode falar. Uma crença objetiva corresponde ao que é empiricamente real e, para Kant, o empiricamente real é produto de uma síntese que, para ser efetuada na consciência comum ou genérica, vale para todos os sujeitos pensantes, e não para um só deles. Em contrapartida, os juízos são subjetivos quando as representações se referem apenas a uma consciência, em um sujeito, e nele se unificam; enquanto são objetivos quando estão interligados em uma consciência de modo genérico, ou 335 KANT apud PERELMAN, 1997, p.60. 336 KANT apud PERELMAN, 1997, p.60. - 151 - seja, necessário. Em linhas gerais, a concepção kantiana de convencer está bastante alinhada ao uso comum do termo, segundo o qual o convencimento corresponde a uma espécie de crença dotada de suficiente base objetiva para ser admitida por qualquer pessoa. Kant defende que o fundamento de uma crença, desde que dotado de razão, é objetivamente suficiente, quando ela é válida para todos. Assim, o caráter objetivo do convencer contrasta com o subjetivo do persuadir. Se existe uma aproximação possível entre as idéias de Perelman e Kant no que se refere ao problema da distinção entre persuasão e convencimento é porque ambos compartilham, cada qual ao seu modo, da concepção segundo a qual parece manifesto que convencimento e persuasão se identificam com duas espécies de crença. Entretanto, é necessário ressaltar que eles divergem no que tange ao critério de distinção, visto que a concepção kantiana faz uso da oposição subjetivo-objetivo como base para a contraposição entre persuadir e convencer. Para Kant, o convencimento se apresenta superior à persuasão porque é, por si só, comunicável. Nesse caso, apenas ela pode ser provada, pois é fundamentada na verdade de seu objeto e, por isso mesmo, válida para qualquer ser racional. Por conseguinte, a condição de inferioridade da persuasão decorre, segundo Kant, da sua abrangência restrita, visto que tem um alcance unicamente individual, limitado ao sujeito. Daí porque o critério de distinção perelmaniano, embora se aproxime da proposta de Kant em razão das suas conseqüências, difere-se dele em termos de princípio. Perelman deseja mostrar que Kant, assim como Descartes, sugere a universalidade como sinal de racionalidade, sendo que o primeiro adota como critério a necessidade das proposições, enquanto o outro acata a evidência das intuições. Se Perelman rejeita tais critérios, não é por discordar que se deva exigir de uma argumentação racional que tenha pretensões à universalidade, pelo contrário, é por não acreditar em uma posição filosófica que seja capaz de algures, conquistar e agregar a adesão unânime dos indivíduos, nem no presente, nem tampouco na eternidade dos tempos, conforme a pretensão de atemporalidade dos modelos criticados por ele. Pascal, por exemplo, compartilha de opinião semelhante à de Kant, no tocante à superioridade do convencimento em relação à persuasão, conforme se verifica no seguinte excerto: Ninguém ignora que há idéias entradas por onde as opiniões são recebidas na alma, que são as suas duas principais potências: o entendimento e a vontade. A mais natural é a do entendimento, pois sempre se deveria aceder apenas às verdades demonstradas. Porém a - 152 - mais comum, embora contra a natureza é a da vontade; (...) esta via é baixa, indigna e estranha: por isso todos a desaprovam. Cada qual declara publicamente que só crê e mesmo que só ama se sabe, merecê-lo. 337 Se Pascal, tal como os racionalistas, concede ao convencimento um grau de superioridade em relação à persuasão, esse seu posicionamento gera um entrave: qual o lugar que cabe ao conhecimento religioso? Associá-lo à persuasão constituiria um demérito, mas aproximá-lo do entendimento seria inconcebível. Não é função desse texto analisar tal problema, mas um questionamento desse teor serve para evidenciar a complexa dificuldade que decorre de uma dicotomia simplista. Não se quer dizer com isto que a abordagem Pascaliana foi irresponsável ou superficial, mas pretende-se salientar a preocupação de Perelman ao apresentar os dois conceitos como distintos, ainda que quase indiscerníveis. A utilização de pensadores como Descartes, Pascal e Kant servem para mostrar que Perelman reconhece que tanto o senso comum, como a tradição filosófica, impôs uma distinção entre convencer e persuadir equivalente à diferença entre raciocínio e sugestão. É por conta de uma análise desse tipo que se costuma acreditar que uma oposição entre convencimento-persuasão somente cabe quando se está na esfera de um racionalismo estrito capaz de propiciar o exame dos diversos meios para obter a adesão das mentes. Acredita-se, portanto, que ao sair dos âmbitos de um racionalismo estrito, ocorre uma insuficiência da capacidade de distinção entre o persuadir e o convencer, pela falta de critérios objetivos, dosáveis e quantificáveis, capazes de instituir até onde se permanece em um campo e quando se migra para o outro. 338 A crítica perelmaniana reside na contestação dessa abordagem, porque seguir uma orientação dessa natureza equivaleria a aceitar a idéia de que para precisar a oposição entre convencer e persuadir seria necessário determinar o valor objetivo ou o caráter universal e inambígüo de uma argumentação para atribuir a esta a qualidade de convincente; cabendo, nos demais casos, serem chamados de modos de persuasão. O posicionamento pessoal de Perelman opõe-se à tese cartesiana, porque ele reconhece o valor de uma "opinião posta à prova que conseguiu resistir às críticas e às objeções e da qual se espera com confiança, mas sem uma certeza absoluta, que resistirá aos exames futuros". Sua 337 PASCAL apud PERELMAN, 1997, p. 61. 338 Cf. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1952, p.8. - 153 - oposição ao cartesianismo reflete sua desconfiança na existência de um critério absoluto, que seja o avalista de sua própria infalibilidade; em contrapartida, acredita-se em intuições e em convicções, às quais se concede confiança, até prova em contrário. 339 A rejeição aos critérios cartesiano e kantiano, respectivamente, decorre da orientação adotada por Perelman, segundo a qual um orador somente deve utilizar enunciados e meios de prova que ele acredita serem suscetíveis de adquirir a anuência do seu interlocutor. O indivíduo, portanto, tem em sua mente, uma idéia acerca dos argumentos cuja aplicabilidade seja possível para conquistar a adesão de todas as mentes razoáveis. Os esforços desse indivíduo deveriam seguir, e propor a outrem, apenas argumentos capazes de valer conjuntamente nos termos de uma universalidade das mentes, considerando-se os valores e as condições sócio-culturais do contexto do qual emerge, e no qual se aplica. Os critérios fornecidos por Descartes e Kant, evidência e objetividade, são rejeitados, mas o indivíduo deve encarnar um ideal de racionalidade, que ele supõe estar compartilhado entre todas as pessoas, porque o racional concebido por Perelman não é eterno e imutável. Logo, cada época, cada civilização, cada disciplina deverá ter uma concepção de racional distinta e peculiar. Assim, a consciência coletiva racional à qual se dirige quando se argumenta com a intenção de convencer é específica, e o indivíduo que a ela se dirige deve reconhecer e adotar os seus valores na construção dos discursos caso deseje conquistar a sua adesão. O mistério que permeia a distinção entre persuadir e convencer evanesce à medida que os critérios do racional deixam de ser intemporais e impessoais, como na concepção cartesiana. Perelman parece inspirar-se em análises contemporâneas do pensamento científico para apresentar uma nova concepção do racional que servirá de critério para delimitar a zona de confluência entre o convencimento e a persuasão. Ainda que o critério da razoabilidade já se apresente em escritos integrantes do Organon aristotélico, em especial nos Tópicos e Argumentos Sofísticos, essa nova concepção mostra um aspecto pelo qual busca-se a comunhão e o entendimento, nos moldes da comunidade científica que desde Bachelard, dissociou-se de concepções que lhe eram caras, como o critério da evidência e acepções que reportam o racional às proposições necessárias e ao conhecimento a priori. Trata-se de uma crítica à tradição que se herdou na sociedade contemporânea, na qual sugere-se um destaque 339 Cf. PERELMAN, 1997, p. 160. - 154 - especial ao racional em detrimento do irracional. Seguindo essa orientação, herdeira, sobretudo, dos pressupostos racionalistas, tende-se a preferir o apelo à razão ao apelo à vontade e, por conseguinte, a distinção entre convencer e persuadir seguirá os mesmos moldes "e será da mesma forma essencial, sendo os meios, e não os resultados, que serão avaliados, e a primazia será conferida à convicção". O afastamento do critério de evidência, bem como da oposição subjetividade-objetividade, e a aproximação com a plausibilidade na condição de critério para demarcação de fronteira entre a persuasão e o convencimento, constitui o meio encontrado por Perelman para mostrar a inexistência de superioridade prévia por qualquer das partes. É o uso do termo, e nesse aspecto o contexto é de fundamental importância, que determinará a sua aplicabilidade e significação. Assim, existirão casos em que a persuasão implicará superioridade, em outros constituirá em uma etapa do processo de convencimento, e haverá outros, ainda, em que ela será o fim que se deseja alcançar. De qualquer forma, a recusa aos critérios dogmatizantes tradicionais, serve para apresentar os termos como formas específicas de crença, concebidas por uma argumentação que utiliza os valores reconhecidos pelo interlocutor, e cuja solidez decorre da sustentação de suas idéias. Se não existe uma verdade absoluta, capaz de ser atingida por um método objetivo, cuja certeza de obtenção possa ser dada previamente; então não há, igualmente, uma crença sólida e absoluta que corresponda à verdade, e portanto, possa ser considerada superior. Existem crenças mais ou menos próximas do real, conforme o ângulo de observação ou a compreensão que se tenha dele. Daí é que decorre a plausibilidade como critério e a revalorização da opinião, sublevada à condição de irracional por muito tempo, como formas de aproximação da verdade e, conforme o caso, capazes de sustentar uma crença, pouco importando se persuasiva ou convincente, porque ambas detentoras de valor específico, e aplicáveis conforme o caso. Uma classificação dos procedimentos de argumentação, agrupados de forma gradativa da lógica à sugestão, é capaz de permitir a justificação dessas divergências de opinião no que refere aos modos de convencer e os de persuadir. Acredita-se que, quanto mais os expedientes se aproximam da lógica, menos nefasta torna-se a sua percepção como expediente; e quanto mais se aproxima da sugestão, mais nociva ela se torna. 340 Entretanto, é preferível dizer que, persuadir implica em abalar a alma do indivíduo inadvertido que se submete ao aceite de provas pouco fundamentadas, porque carentes de solidez. Em contrapartida, convencer 340 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1952, p. 21. - 155 - consiste em converter o indivíduo a um outro estágio da crença, supostamente superior porque mais sólida do que aquela que fazia parte do seu arcabouço. Mas isso seria insuficiente porque a intensidade da crença é que define se ocorre persuasão ou convencimento. Quanto mais forte a crença, maior a proximidade com a verdade. Neste caso, as provas apresentadas são mais sólidas e mais difíceis de serem refutadas. O assentimento está suscetível a graus de intensidade, que podem variar de maior a menor, conforme a força da tese que se tenta expor. Uma tese, quando admitida, pode não preponderar se confrontada a outras com as quais pode entrar em conflito. Nesse caso, a intensidade da adesão mostra-se insuficiente. É por isso que qualquer alteração na intensidade pode corresponder a uma nova hierarquização dos juízos por parte do ouvinte. Essa nova hierarquização corresponde a uma mudança de crença, podendo ser, esta última, sólida ou frágil, durável ou rápida, consistente ou inconsistente, convincente ou persuasiva. 341 Somente é concebível a adesão a uma tese durante o tempo em que os argumentos que se lhe contrapõem são incapazes de abalar a confiança na mesma. Contudo, se em um contexto diferente abdica-se da sua defesa, mesmo que outros motivos corroborem favoravelmente à mudança de crença, os valores que orientam essa tomada de posição não serão incontestáveis ou inexoráveis. É por isso que cabe ao filósofo a tarefa de justificar o que é discutível, mas somente por razões efetivas. Esse ponto de vista acerca da justificação, sugere que a mesma ocorre em qualquer ocasião na qual se constata a existência de uma predisposição para a ação, utilizada pelos indivíduos em suas tomadas de posição. É imperativo sublinhar que essa noção de justificação ocorre pela sua inserção em um contexto prévio. Esse contexto é um elemento que não pode ser ignorado, pois não há justificação que não seja relativa a um contexto específico. Justificação é justificação de algo, e de algo que ocorre em um dado momento, de um determinado lugar. Por sua vez, esse próprio contexto também não é inexorável, e cada um de seus elementos é passível de contestações caso razões efetivas possam ser evocadas para tanto. Assim é que justificar implica em refutar objeções a respeito de um ato ou de uma atitude. 341 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1952, p.1. - 156 - 3 . 4 . A R a z oa bi l i da de e a N a tur ez a dos A udi t ór i os A discussão acerca da razoabilidade e do critério da evidência possui como "pano de fundo" a necessidade de sustentar um modelo de racionalidade dissociado deste último. Considerando-se a distinção entre o convencer e o persuadir é possível perceber que, em última instância, existe o desejo de apresentar um tipo de racionalidade que seja capaz de mover o indivíduo à ação. Em outras palavras, se o modelo de razão – herdeiro do pensamento cartesiano – é capaz de sustentar uma tese e convencer o seu interlocutor, há um outro modelo de racionalidade que é capaz de persuadir o auditório, movendo-o a uma ação. Esta dissociação que Perelman tenta promover não é tão original. Basta retomar o pensamento de Hume, em especial ao Tratado da Natureza Humana (1739-1740), para verificar que este último já havia instituído limites para o uso da razão, estando ciente de que esta era insuficiente para mover os indivíduos a fazer alguma coisa. Em uma leitura perelmaniana poderíamos dizer que Perelman, tal como Hume, estava ciente de que a razão pode convencer, mas é incapaz de persuadir alguém, na medida em que consideramos o persuadir como um procedimento capaz de conduzir o indivíduo a uma ação. Ora, se Perelman diz que convencer é necessário, mas insuficiente, é porque só a persuasão pode acrescentar aos argumentos convincentes uma força capaz de conduzir o interlocutor à ação. Isto quer dizer que é preciso ter conteúdos axiológicos demarcando a zona limítrofe que os distingue. O interesse de Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca com a argumentação, os conduz a centrar o foco das suas investigações no papel das audiências, motivo pelo qual afirmarão que toda argumentação é uma argumentação ad hominem 342 . Contrariamente às retóricas clássicas, a Nova Retórica centraliza o seu foco no auditório e não no orador. A ênfase está em quem ouve (para quem se fala) em detrimento de quem fala. Embora Perelman [e Olbrechts-Tyteca] omitam essa informação, é inconteste que a adoção deste pressuposto está em conformidade 342 Cf. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.126. - 157 - com o exposto por Aristóteles na Retórica, pois toda argumentação deve ser planejada com relação a uma audiência 343 : "A speech must be heard, as a book must be read 344 ". Algumas vezes, certos grupos supõem que não se dirigem a uma audiência e, por sua vez, não relatam meramente os fatos. Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca rejeitam tal atitude porque ela (...) resulta da ilusão, muito difundida em certos meios racionalistas e científicos, de que os fatos falam por si sós e imprimem uma marca indelével em todo espírito humano, cuja adesão forçam, sejam quais forem suas disposições. 345 Mas, por qual motivo Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca insistem que os fatos "não falam"? Pela nossa interpretação, tal rejeição se apóia na idéia de que os fatos transformam-se em fatos somente quando uma audiência consente em aceitá-los enquanto tais; por isso mesmo, eles sustentam que a audiência é necessária para a argumentação sobrevir. Donde decorre, a fortiori, a sua concepção de ad hominem. Um contato das mentes ou, em suas palavras, a "formação de uma comunidade efetiva dos espíritos" deve existir para viabilizar a argumentação. Como se segue: Para que haja argumentação, é mister que, num dado momento, realize-se uma comunidade efetiva dos espíritos. É mister que se esteja de acordo, antes de mais nada e em princípio, sobre a formação dessa comunidade intelectual e, depois, sobre o fato de se debater uma questão determinada. 346 Esta reunião das mentes é um contato intelectual que requer das pessoas envolvidas na argumentação, o compartilhamento de algum sentimento, valor ou referência evocados. Ao 343 Acerca do conceito perelmaniano de audiência são referências importantes: RAY, John W. Perelman's Universal Audience. Quarterly Journal of Speech, n.64 (December) 1978, p. 361-75; SCULT, Allen. Perelman's Universal Audience: One Perspective. Central States Speech Journal, n.27, (Fall) 1976, p.176-80; ANDERSON, John R. The Audience as a Concept in the Philosophic Rhetoric of Pere lman, Johnstone, and Natanson. Southern Speech Communication Journal, n.38, (Fall) 1972, p.39-50; PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1969, p. 11-62; PERELMAN, 1982, p. 9-20; PERELMAN, 1970d, p. 285-86. 344 PERELMAN, 1982, p. 10. 345 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.20. 346 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.16. - 158 - apresentar a noção de auditório, Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca consideram primeiramente se a noção deve estar limitada às audiências físicas do orador, motivo pelo qual eles não impõem esta limitação em sua definição, explicando que "um membro do parlamento inglês, ao dirigir- se ao presidente, pode estar procurando convencer não só os que o ouvem, mas ainda a opinião pública de seu país". 347 Ao mesmo tempo, entretanto, existem situações em que o orador pode optar por ignorar determinadas pessoas a quem a argumentação é dirigida porque estão além do alcance do seu apelo. Assim, Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca definem as audiências de acordo com as finalidades da retórica, conforme as características daqueles a quem o orador deseja influenciar por sua argumentação. Seu conceito de auditório está em conformidade com a idéia que o orador faz dos ouvintes. Tal como se segue: (...) em matéria de retórica, parece-nos preferível definir o auditório como o conjunto daqueles que o orador quer influenciar com sua argumentação. Cada orador pensa, de uma forma mais ou menos consciente, naqueles que procura persuadir e que constituem o auditório ao qual se dirigem seus discursos. 348 Os auditórios, por sua vez, subdividem-se em três espécies distintas, conforme enunciam Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca: O primeiro, constituído pela humanidade inteira, pelo menos por todos os homens adultos e normais, que chamaremos de auditório universal; o segundo formado, no diálogo, unicamente pelo interlocutor a quem se dirige; o terceiro, enfim, constituído pelo próprio sujeito. 349 O auditório universal é composto por todas as pessoas razoáveis e competentes; um auditório particular é demarcado pela interlocução direta e engloba qualquer grupo de pessoas, sejam elas razoáveis e competentes ou não. Os auditórios particulares podem variar 347 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.21. 348 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.22. 349 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.34. - 159 - conforme as pessoas que estão fisicamente presentes e são compostos por uma ocasião particular, formando um grupo específico de pessoas a quem o orador está tentando influenciar. Os auditórios particulares para um político, por exemplo, podem incluir todos os eleitores, mesmo que o discurso seja apresentado somente a um grupo reduzido do conjunto de eleitores. Para um médico, um auditório particular pode ser o paciente, mesmo se a família inteira estiver presente. Às vezes, um auditório particular é composto de elementos variados que se deve considerar "um auditório heterogêneo" 350 , porque os membros de uma audiência composta podem ter uma variedade de valores diferentes ou ao menos podem agregar seus valores diferentemente; neste caso o orador deve usar uma multiplicidade de argumentos para conquistar sua adesão. Em contraste aos auditórios particulares, os auditórios universais "podem ser toda a humanidade, ou ao menos todos aqueles que são competentes e razoáveis (...) e pode ser composto de uma variedade infinita de audiências particulares" 351 . O auditório universal é um conceito que o orador constrói em sua mente; assim, cada cultura e talvez cada orador têm uma noção de auditório universal diferente. O auditório universal não é composto por uma audiência da elite ou mesmo uma audiência dos peritos em uma área específica, como geralmente se pode imaginar. Aqueles que desejam apelar às audiências da elite podem vindicar-lhes para estar acima das pessoas comuns; mas, neste caso, se corre o risco de cometer uma falácia de apelo à autoridade: O auditório de elite só encarna o auditório universal para aqueles que lhe reconhecem o papel de vanguarda e de modelo. Para os outros, ao contrário, ele constituirá apenas um auditório particular. O estatuto de um auditório varia conforme as concepções que se têm. 352 350 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.24. 351 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.33. 352 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.38. - 160 - Uma audiência da elite pode, ou não, incorporar o auditório universal dependendo da atitude do orador. O auditório universal não tem que ser composto de muitas pessoas – pode ser uma pessoa na busca do nivelamento. A argumentação de um único ouvinte pode incluir um filósofo que tenta convencer outro para aceitar a sua posição em uma questão sobre Ética, por exemplo. Similarmente, a maioria das pessoas discute ocasionalmente consigo mesma. Estes exemplos constituem a argumentação dos auditórios universais somente quando o orador escolhe os argumentos e as apelações que merecem uma consideração além dos auditórios particulares. Nestes casos, "o homem às voltas consigo mesmo e o interlocutor do diálogo são considerados encarnação do auditório universal 353 ". A característica que distingue o auditório universal dos demais, não depende do número das pessoas que escutam o orador, mas do apelo à razão utilizado por este último para conquistar a anuência do seu interlocutor. Sendo assim, Poderíamos conceber o apelo à razão, tal como é praticado tradicionalmente pelos filósofos, como o apelo ao auditório ideal, tão informado e tão exigente quanto possível. [...] Para nós, o apelo à razão se dirigiria ao auditório universal. Uma argumentação racional seria, como a ação moral em Kant, conforme ao imperativo categórico: o melhor argumento seria aquele que, na mente do orador, deveria convencer todos os homens suficientemente informados. Mas, como a argumentação, mesmo racional, não é coerciva, só pode tratar-se de uma intenção de racionalidade na cabeça do orador. De fato, é bem raro que se obtenha a adesão unânime a uma das teses debatidas. É realmente preciso, sobretudo se o debate não pode prolongar-se indefinidamente, se se deseja chegar a uma decisão, que sejam previstos procedimentos para tanto. 354 O conceito de auditório universal atende a duas finalidades do orador: (1) serve como um dispositivo automático de entrada na escolha dos argumentos e das apelações - ou como uma metáfora que funcione como uma ferramenta de invenção. (2) servem como uma norma [ou um padrão] para diferenciar os argumentos bons dos maus argumentos. No primeiro caso, 353 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.34. 354 PERELMAN, 2000, p. 536. - 161 - o orador começa com um conceito de auditório universal e toma as decisões a respeito dos tipos de apelações que parecem as mais apropriadas para aquele auditório. Ao selecionar apelações e argumentos, o orador realmente está selecionando o auditório universal ou particular para quem a argumentação é dirigida. A segunda finalidade é mais relevante ao argumento filosófico do que ao argumento diário. Para argumentos filosóficos, o auditório universal fornece um sentido de racionalidade porque dá seu assentimento aos argumentos bons e os diferencia daqueles que considera maus. Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca não consideram a verdade absoluta e a validade na argumentação e afirmam que a argumentação deve fornecer uma variedade de interpretações para a realidade: To reconcile philosophic claims to rationality with the plurality of philosophic systems, we must recognize that the appeal to reason must be identified not as an appeal to a single truth but instead as an appeal for adherence of an audience. 355 As várias audiências e os vários membros dos auditórios, naturalmente, têm concepções variadas acerca do que deve ser fornecido antes que o assentimento seja concedido. Assim, o conceito de auditório universal implica que a qualidade do argumento depende da qualidade da audiência que aceita a tese do orador. Embora a adesão de uma audiência particular não possa ser indicativo de um bom argumento, a adesão do auditório universal é o fim da racionalidade na teoria de Perelman e de Olbrechts-Tyteca. Por isso mesmo, um argumento dirigido a um auditório particular pode ser persuasivo àquele auditório, mas não ao auditório universal. Entretanto, apesar do exposto, poder-se-ia imaginar que, no pensamento de Perelman, existe efetivamente um modo de distinguir os bons dos maus argumentos, quando essa noção é interpretada num sentido mais normativo que empírico. Um bom argumento (um argumento forte) é o que valeria diante do auditório universal. Essa última noção, como já vimos, desempenha um papel central na construção perelmaniana, mas há algumas razões para 355 PERELMAN, 1969, p. 285. - 162 - duvidar da sua solidez. Com bastante freqüência já se assinalou que o conceito perelmaniano de auditório universal é ambíguo, mas a ambigüidade não foi sempre vista do mesmo modo. Aarnio 356 , por exemplo, localiza a ambigüidade exclusivamente no fato de o auditório universal ter, por um lado, um caráter ideal – o auditório universal seria "a humanidade ilustrada" – mas, ao mesmo tempo, estar histórica e culturalmente determinado, quer dizer, depender de fatos contingentes. É certo que uma teoria realista da argumentação precisa dar conta tanto do postulado da racionalidade quanto da relatividade histórica e social da argumentação 357 , mas isso não se consegue simplesmente construindo conceitos em que ambas as dimensões apareçam sem nenhum tipo de articulação ou, pelo menos, sem nenhuma articulação convincente. Alexy, por seu lado, parece aceitar que o caráter ideal da noção, mas entende que, em Perelman, encontram-se dois sentidos diferentes de auditório universal: (1) o auditório universal seria uma construção do orador (daí o seu caráter ideal), dependendo, portanto, das idéias de indivíduos particulares e de diferentes culturas. Mas nesse caso um auditório só é um auditório universal para quem o reconhece como tal, com o que o papel normativo da noção é seriamente limitado 358 . (2) a noção de auditório universal, se inspira no imperativo categórico de Kant 359 , e que é assim formulada: "você deve se comportar como se fosse um juiz cuja ratio dicidendi deva proporcionar um princípio válido para todos os homens"; o acordo do auditório universal é o acordo de todos os seres racionais ou simplesmente de todos. Alexy entende que, a partir disso, o auditório universal pode ser determinado como "a totalidade dos homens no estado em que se encontrariam se tivessem desenvolvido as suas capacidades argumentativas" e que tal estado corresponde à situação de 356 Cf. AARNIO, Aulis. The Rational as reasonable. A treatise on legal justification. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987, p.221. 357 Cf. NEUMANN, Ulfrid. Juristische Argumentationslehre. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgessellschaft, 1986, p.89. apud ATIENZA, Manuel. Las Razones del Derecho. Teoria de la Argumentación Jurídica. Madri: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 2000. 358 Cf. ALEXY, Robert. Teoria de la Argumentación Jurídica. Trad.: Manuel Atienza e I. Espejo. Madrid: Centro de Estúdios Constitucionales, 1989, p.162. 359 Alexy cita, a esse respeito, a obra de Perelman: Fünf Vorlesungen über Gerechtigkeit. Über die Gerechtikeit: Munique, 1967. Esta, consiste em uma tradução alemã do texto de 1945. - 163 - diálogo habermasiana. 360 Alexy não descarta a possibilidade de que ambas as determinações sejam compatíveis, mas nesse caso ele duvida que um conceito tão amplamente formulado possa servir como medida para avaliar os argumentos. A formulação do conceito de auditório universal, traz elementos resgatados de São Tomás de Aquino, Aristóteles e Kant. Talvez essa diversidade de fontes explique, em parte, a ambigüidade que se pode encontrar na noção. 361 Gianformaggio vê a ambigüidade da noção por outra vertente, mas também compreende o conceito susceptível a duas interpretações diferentes: (1) A idéia de que argumenta diante de um auditório universal aquele que o faz com seriedade e boa fé, convencido das conclusões que sustenta e dos procedimentos que utiliza; assim interpretada, a noção não seria problemática, mas resultaria banal e, evidentemente, não justificaria o interesse por ela despertado. (2) a noção de que argumenta diante de um auditório universal quem não argumenta ad hominem, quer dizer, quem não apenas está convencido da correção e da lealdade do procedimento que usa, como também está convencido da evidência das premissas em que se baseia. Essa segunda interpretação, entretanto, é inconsistente sem a noção de juízo de valor defendida no Tratado: "se de modo consciente se assumem juízos de valor como premissas da argumentação, então seria logicamente impossível se dirigir ao auditório universal, pois os juízos de valor só valem diante de auditórios particulares". 362 De qualquer modo, a questão da natureza dos auditórios, apesar das limitações que lhes são intrínsecas, não perdeu o seu estatuto de elemento estrutural da Teoria da Argumentação perelmaniana. Emana do reconhecimento dos auditórios a possibilidade de conquistar a adesão dos ouvintes, visto que "o objetivo de toda argumentação é provocar ou aumentar a adesão dos espíritos às teses que se lhes apresentam ao assentimento(...) de forma que desencadeie nos ouvintes uma disposição para a ação". 363 Ora, por promover ou atenuar uma disposição para a ação, a 360 Cf. ALEXY, Teoria de la Argumentación Jurídica, 1989, p.163. 361 Cf. GOLDEN; PILLOTA. Pratical reasoning and human affairs: studies in honor of Chaïm Perelman, 1986. p. 14, 287. 362 Cf. GIANFORMAGGIO, 1973, p. 218-219. 363 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.22. - 164 - argumentação requer o reconhecimento dos valores do seu auditório e, para tal, se propõe a fazer uso das noções confusas, eminentemente dependentes dos valores que lhe concedem suporte. Em síntese, existem três tipos de auditórios: (1) Universal; (2) Particular; (3) Íntimo. Ao primeiro cabe a utilização de um discurso convincente, ou seja, "aquele cujas premissas e cujos argumentos são universalizáveis, isto é, aceitáveis, em princípio, por todos os membros do auditório 364 ". Esta variante dos auditórios possui destaque diante das outras, porque as demais só adquirem um status privilegiado, de natureza filosófica, quando são tidas como encarnações do auditório universal. Ainda assim, por objetivar o convencimento, o discurso convincente é insuficiente para promover uma ação no auditório. O segundo, o auditório particular, circunscreve um grupo (ou indivíduo) específico com valores e crenças bem demarcados. Por estar situado temporal e espacialmente, exige do orador a adoção de medidas que visem uma adaptação aos seus próprios valores. Ao reconhecer os valores admitidos pelo auditório particular, o orador torna-se apto a buscar persuadi-lo, visto que é capaz de argumentar em conformidade àquilo que é aceito por aquele auditório em particular, tendo em vista que as ferramentas utilizadas para persuadir este determinado auditório pode não obter eficácia em outro. O terceiro, o íntimo, consiste naquilo que Perelman denomina de argumentação consigo mesmo, ou deliberação íntima, e implica no exercício reflexivo da razão que, por não ser inato – tal como pretendia Descartes, cuja teoria acerca da razão Perelman rejeita – corresponde igualmente a uma forma de argumentação 365 . Não convém, entretanto, nos determos nele agora. O que nos importa extrair desta breve digressão é a compreensão de que o Universal e o Particular se distinguem em função do convencimento e da persuasão. O convencimento estaria assentado em juízos cujo fundamento conserva uma vinculação efetiva aos fatos objetivos – motivo pelo qual se espera que sejam aceitos por (quase) todas as pessoas. A persuasão, por outro lado, implica num juízo demarcado pelo reconhecimento de valores e crenças pertencentes a uma pessoa ou grupo específico. As distinções de Perelman entre tipologias de auditório e a sua vinculação entre o convencer o persuadir aproximam as idéias do nosso autor ao pensamento de Hume, na 364 PERELMAN, 1999a, p.37. 365 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.54, §9, - 165 - medida que este último defende que a razão sem o suporte das paixões é incapaz de nos fazer preferir a ou b. Para Hume, o caráter inerte da razão e, por conseguinte, a sua impotência para nos fazer tender para a, b ou c, subjuga a razão a ser "escrava das paixões", não devendo ou podendo aspirar outra coisa senão servir e obedecer 366 . Mas o que Hume quer dizer com 'razão'? Em que medida a contenda levantada por Perelman já estava previamente estabelecida por Hume? Para Hume a razão, que por vezes é definida como a descoberta da verdade e da falsidade, concernente a idéias ou a fatos reais, consiste no aspecto representativo da mente. Mas, consoante a teoria humeana, esta dimensão representativa da mente é incapaz de oferecer soluções para problemas que envolvem as ações humanas, ou seja, a dimensão lógica (instrumental-calculadora) da mente está inabilitada para a condução das ações humanas, porque não permite avaliar probabilidades e ajustar meios a fins com o intuito de verificar como bem dirigir as ações humanas. Entretanto, contrariamente ao anseio de Perelman, Hume jamais pensou na possibilidade de desenvolver uma Lógica dos Juízos de Valor. Em vez disso, desenvolveu uma teoria cujas bases estão bem estabelecidas no Tratado Da Natureza Humana, segundo a qual apenas as paixões (enquanto componentes persuasivos) movem os indivíduos à ação. Aliás, a conclusão essencial que se extrai do Livro III do Tratado Da Natureza Humana, consiste na afirmação de que a Moral que nos conduz a ação não pode ser derivada da razão, visto que, para Hume, nem as "regras" morais advêm da razão, nem tampouco a "virtude" é concebível como algo em conformidade com esta. Esta concepção humeana se antepõe à concepção dualista que põe as paixões e sensações em oposição à razão. 367 Assim sendo, de um ponto de vista humeano é possível dizer que a razão, em si mesma, não inclina a nada, visto que apenas nos informa acerca das situações nas quais agimos e acerca dos resultados possíveis, e mais ou menos prováveis, das nossas ações. Em última análise, um indivíduo absolutamente racional não seria movido ou motivado para a ação, porque uma vez convencido acerca de algo, estaria plenamente consciente deste algo independentemente de uma escolha. O indivíduo que se permite persuadir, por outro lado, se 366 Cf. HUME, David. Tratado da Natureza Humana, Livro II, Parte III, Secção III. 367 Uma outra oposição pode ser feita em relação à teoria platônica bem descrita no Fedro, segundo a qual a razão representa uma espécie de cocheiro que mantém o controle dos cavalos que simbolizam as paixões e a concupiscência associadas a irracionalidade. (Cf. PLATÃO. Fedro. Diálogos. Trad.: Carlos A. Nunes. Belém: UFPA, 1975, 246 a-b) - 166 - vê propenso a agir em virtude das razões que lhe foram apresentadas e que representam fortes interesses em conformidade com os valores aceitos por este indivíduo naquele dado momento em que se persuade. A sua opção por agir é um ato voluntário, e não uma injunção da razão. Desta maneira, o indivíduo razoável, de um ponto de vista humeano, é aquele que se deixa persuadir, que se sente abalado por justificativas que estão em conformidade com os valores que ele acata e reconhece como "acertados". Perelman e Hume adotam rumos distintos para a solução de um mesmo problema, a saber: a concepção de racionalidade. A questão nodal à qual ambos os autores estão atados reside no campo do que se convencionou denominar, desde Kant, "razão prática". Mas, o que significa esta "razão prática"? Como Kant e Hume viam este problema e por que Perelman não considera suas teorias suficientes para resolver as suas inquietações? Considerando-se que o adjetivo "prática" significa, simplesmente, "relativo à práxis", ou seja, "relativo à ação", quando falamos em "razão prática", estamos a referir-nos à razão relativa à ação. A expressão "razão relativa à ação", porém, guarda consigo ambigüidades que não são encontradas em expressões outras que estão igualmente vinculadas ao adjetivo "prática" 368 . É preciso ressaltar, entretanto, que a razão prática não se ocupa exclusivamente dos critérios que fazem de uma ação (ou de um desejo) racional, mas também de procurar saber o que significa ter uma razão para agir. O problema se edifica a partir da seguinte constatação: o fato de uma ação ser racional não implica que tenhamos uma razão para a realizarmos. Do mesmo modo, o fato de termos uma razão para realizar uma ação não implica que essa ação seja racional. Neste caso encontramos o ponto de dissociação entre o pensamento dos autores em questão, pois o problema que interessa a Kant e Hume reside na questão da racionalidade na ação, enquanto a Perelman importa descobrir, conversamente, as razões para o agir, visto que a sua preocupação reside na necessidade de buscar alternativas para sustentar "racionalmente" a escolha por uma atitude específica em detrimento de outra considerada menos justa ou inadequada. 368 Tal como ocorre com a "ética relativa à ação", por exemplo. A única pergunta que a ética aplicada fará em relação a uma ação será: terá essa ação sido eticamente correta? Deste modo, em uma associação arbitrária poderia parecer (equivocadamente) que a única pergunta que a razão prática poderia estabelecer seria: terá essa ação sido racional? - 167 - PARTE III – O "AD HOMINEM" DE PERELMAN - 168 - C a p í t u l o 4 TODA ARGUMENTAÇÃO É AD HOMINEM ? A expressão latina ad hominem significa, de forma literal, "para o homem" e indica algo endereçado ao homem ou dirigido ao homem. O sentido etimológico de uma argumentação ad hominem, entretanto, não está circunscrito à indicação de uma argumentação dirigida ao homem. Esse é um uso objetivo, por meio do qual não se atinge o sentido empregado por quem diz ou relata, mas tão-somente traduz o que a expressão exprime em si mesma. Uma argumentação ad hominem sugere um sistema argumentativo que contraria o adversário pelo uso de suas próprias palavras ou cita o seu modo de proceder para evidenciar uma incompatibilidade qualquer. Neste sentido, o argumento ad hominem opõe-se ao argumento ad rem, visto que este último indica um tipo de argumento que atinge o âmago da questão, sendo relativo à coisa e indissociavelmente ligado a ela. Uma argumentação ad rem, por isso mesmo, corresponde a uma argumentação que se pretende válida para qualquer ser racional, ou seja, para a humanidade. Por este motivo, Perelman sustenta que esta modalidade argumentativa implica em uma argumentação ad humanitatem, que seria um caso particular da argumentação ad hominem, mantendo a idéia de que "toda argumentação é uma argumentação ad hominem". No entanto, a posição que dicotomiza os argumentos ad hominem e ad rem comete o erro de ignorar que a forma de perceber a coisa é relativa ao indivíduo que a observa e, neste caso, depende da sua anuência porque a verdade [acerca de uma coisa] precisa ser admitida. Há, entretanto, uma obscuridade conceitual que dificulta a apreensão daquilo que Perelman considera uma argumentação ad hominem para distingui-la das demais formas de argumento que a esta se assemelham. Tal é o caso da argumentação ad humanitatem e dos argumentos ad personam. O princípio que serve de orientação à construção teórica de Perelman está em outros conceitos inacabados. A variedade de tipos de argumentos ad hominem, por exemplo, se apresenta tão ampla quanto aquela concernente aos tipos de auditórios. Somente o argumento ad humanitatem visa o auditório universal, sendo este, - 169 - portanto, a modalidade argumentativa de caráter filosófico que destina sua validade não apenas a grupos específicos, mas ao conjunto de indivíduos que compõe a humanidade. Esta idéia de uma suposta argumentação ad humanitatem procura sustentar a teoria das tipologias de auditório e, por conseguinte, a distinção que se dá entre o convencer e o persuadir. Uma argumentação desta natureza – ad humanitatem – visaria o auditório universal e evitaria o reconhecimento de valores isolados, bem como procuraria atingir os indivíduos por meio de crenças sólidas e válidas para qualquer pessoa, independentemente da sua vinculação a grupos particulares. Esta noção, inspirada na concepção aristotélica de que deve haver um tipo de argumento voltado para "além da opinião geral" [ou, no mínimo, dos mais esclarecidos] possui as suas bases fincadas no pensamento de Henry Johnstone Jr. 369 As reflexões precedentes já acenaram que há um problema de natureza conceitual na construção desta tese de Perelman acerca do argumento ad hominem, uma vez que ele se propõe a qualificar como ad hominem, no sentido estrito, aquele argumento que o orador sabe não ter peso suficiente para ser aplicado no auditório universal. Perelman sustenta, em um trecho da Nova Retórica 370 , que a argumentação ad humanitatem é um caso particular da argumentação ad hominem. Sendo um caso particular desta última, não deixa de ser uma ocorrência dela e, desta forma, continua sendo um ad hominem e, sendo ad hominem, não se aplica ao auditório universal. Mas, se "toda argumentação é ad hominem", a ad humanitatem também é ad hominem, tal como sugerido, e, por conseguinte, também pode ser aplicada ao auditório universal, donde se segue que a outra afirmação, de que há tipos de argumentos ad hominem que não se aplicam ao auditório universal, é inconcebível. Como, então, desfazer este estorvo? A resposta está localizada no sentido atribuído por Perelman à expressão ad hominem. A argumentação ad hominem, dirigida a uma pessoa determinada para refutar-lhe as palavras é, pelo seu próprio uso e aplicação, uma falácia de relevância amplamente reconhecida. Neste caso, que corresponde ao uso geral da expressão ad hominem, a noção se constringe à idéia de um ataque pessoal dirigido ao individuo que fala, em detrimento dos argumentos que ele expõe, utilizando-se de um pretexto associado à sua conduta pessoal para 369 JOHNSTONE Jr., Philosophy and argumentum ad hominem, 1978 370 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p. 125, § 2o. - 170 - desqualificar ou ignorar o que ele diz. Sua aplicação, em geral, está associada às situações em que não se sabe como refutar os argumentos do oponente ou, ainda, nos casos em que se deseja contra-atacar o indivíduo, reforçando os seus preconceitos, para fugir do debate. Kahane 371 , por exemplo, descreve o ad hominem como uma falácia que ocorre sempre que o argüente é acusado "de atacar o oponente ao invés de apresentar argumentos e provas". Van Eemeren e Grootendorst 372 , por sua vez, garantem que o ad hominem consiste em uma infração à regra fundamental do debate crítico, que afirma categoricamente ser necessário que "as partes [em disputa] não impeçam a possibilidade de avançar no ponto de vista ou de lançar dúvidas sobre os argumentos". Esta vertente combativa aceita diferentes tipos de ad hominem (ad hominem abusivo, tu quoque e circunstancial) como modalidades de violação desta regra. Em todo caso, é suficiente observar que o ataque do debatedor ao oponente se configura como uma tentativa ilegítima de negar-lhe o direito de defender o seu ponto de vista. A eficácia do argumento ad hominem permite que ele seja amplamente utilizado. Afinal, a melhor forma de se manter o controle sobre um auditório é isolando-o de qualquer contato com informações ou opiniões divergentes. Assim, os seus valores se cristalizam e tornam-se facilmente reconhecíveis e manipuláveis. Com a adoção de comportamentos dessa natureza se impede a proliferação de idéias, valores e crenças; por conseguinte, a capacidade de atingir o indivíduo por seu comportamento, opiniões e idéias se torna muito maior. Em vários casos, generalizações excessivas, termos pejorativos e mesmo a proibição de qualquer contato são usados para se criar a idéia de que aqueles que discordam de uma opinião amplamente aceita têm falhas de caráter, ignorando a possibilidade de objeção por razões de consciência, discordância doutrinária e uma série de fatores que podem levar alguém a reavaliar honestamente suas crenças. Desta forma, pode-se coibir a possibilidade de um debate ou questionamento por parte dos que não questionam, já que eles serão desencorajados a procurar entender os motivos dessa objeção. Outra variante do ad hominem é o denominado tu quoque 373 cuja melhor formulação pode ser descrita pelo provérbio "faça o que eu digo, não o que eu faço". Suposto que a Lógica não-formal confere ênfase à apreciação de argumentos 371 KAHANE, Howard. Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric: The Use of Reason in Everyday Life. 7a. ed. Belmont: Wadsworth, 1995, p.65. 372 EEMEREN, Frans H. van ; GROOTENDORST, Rob. Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1992. 373 A expressão tu quoque significa, em latim: [para] "você também". - 171 - reais, a avaliação das questões que ela envolve podem ser melhor abordadas por meio de algumas considerações. Em alguns casos, uma simples observação pode ser vista como um argumento natural, composto por uma ou mais premissas e uma conclusão [implícita ou não]. Ainda que a abordagem dialógica dos argumentos assuma uma estrutura teórica diferente da teoria das falácias, ela convida a uma análise similar a este exemplo. Outras abordagens da Lógica não-formal se distinguem por uma atitude mais simpática aos argumentos ad hominem, pois reconhecem que a crítica de um argüente (que se oponha a seu ponto de vista) pode ser procedente. Neste caso, um argumento ad hominem não é necessariamente uma falácia, desde que aplicado em uma circunstância adequada, porque ele não se apresenta como um erro de raciocínio. Embora se saiba que os argumentos que atacam o argüidor, e não os seus argumentos, se caracterizem pela apresentação de um conteúdo estranho à discussão, é igualmente certo que o conteúdo da mensagem não se estabiliza, nem tampouco se desestabiliza, em função do sujeito que a expõe ou profere. Douglas Walton 374 é um dos entusiastas dessa perspectiva que destitui o caráter eminentemente falacioso dos argumentos ad hominem. Em Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation, o autor dedica um capítulo específico aos argumentum ad hominem. Walton distingue três tipos de argumentos ad hominem associando-lhes a três categorias de falácias: o argumento ad hominem abusivo, o ad hominem circunstancial e o poço envenenado. Os ataques pessoais, para Walton, nem sempre são falaciosos, uma vez que em alguns contextos as questões de conduta, caráter e motivos pessoais, são legítimos e relevantes. É possível apresentar dúvidas razoáveis ao raciocínio do argüente observando que lhe falta o conhecimento necessário do objeto em questão para fazer juízos confiáveis, ou salientar que o argüente tem um interesse velado. Estes apelos têm um papel importante nos raciocínios em linguagem natural, pois ocorrem em contextos nos quais a restrição de tempo torna impossível uma análise cuidadosa dos argumentos apresentados, forçando-nos, freqüentemente, a aderir a um deles com base na confiança depositada no juízo do argüente. Consideremos uma situação em que um partido nomeia para assumir o cargo de tesoureiro da organização um indivíduo cujo passado é preenchido por notórios crimes contra o erário público; neste caso, não se pode recriminar alguém por evitar a nomeação deste sujeito, posto que a probidade da pessoa é tão relevante 374 WALTON, Douglas. Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 292 p. - 172 - quanto a lógica do que ela diz. Trata-se, então, de uma precaução razoável e justificada. Em situações desta magnitude é possível estabelecer a distinção entre racional e razoável. 375 Embora essa abordagem do ad hominem (que não o rejeita inteiramente) o torne uma forma de raciocínio em princípio aceitável, ela não salva certos casos da sua aplicação, visto que há situações em que o ad hominem não se apóia em uma critica aceitável do argüente. Ao invés disso, se converte em algo semelhante a um insulto. Em situações desta natureza, pode- se alegar que ele forja uma acusação pesada e não substanciada, de interesse velado, contra o debatedor que advoga algo favorável a si mesmo. Ainda que o uso do ad hominem seja validado em algumas circunstâncias, destituindo-lhe a conotação falaciosa, há casos em que ele sequer oferece uma oportunidade para discutir os méritos e deméritos da opinião apresentada, voltando-se estritamente contra o caráter dos debatedores e convertendo-se em uma acusação particularmente inadequada diante de um debate cujo propósito seja defender idéias. Outra abordagem dos argumentos ad hominem permite analisá-los do ponto de vista retórico e parte da compreensão sugerida por Aristóteles segundo a qual o ethos de um falante tem um papel central quando determinamos se um argumento é persuasivo ou não. De acordo com essa explicação, um argumento ad hominem pode ser um ataque eficiente (e, do ponto de vista retórico, aceitável) sobre o ethos de um argüente, mas não no caso em questão, porque não é digno de crédito. De fato, pode-se argumentar que a natureza imoderada deste ad hominem em particular não mina o ethos da pessoa atacada, mas do falante que o apresentou. Mas, se há divergências entre o sentido etimológico e o uso coloquial da expressão, resta-nos apreender em que sentido Perelman faz uso da expressão para afirmar que toda argumentação é uma argumentação ad hominem. O problema de Perelman não se restringe ao âmbito da sua Teoria da Argumentação. Como muitas vezes aconteceu, no decurso da história da Retórica, ou os problemas foram levantados pela primeira vez por meio da Filosofia, ou receberam da Filosofia a sua verdadeira dimensão. Se o ad hominem tem a sua aplicação no campo retórico, não foi a Retórica quem o elaborou sistematicamente, mas a Filosofia. Afinal, a questão da aplicação e uso dos argumentos ad hominem propriamente dita foi desenvolvida por Aristóteles. A preocupação deste, por sua vez, não é retórica, mas filosófica. Não se trata de eliminar o ad hominem, mas 375 Verificar o Capítulo II, tópicos [2.5] e [2.6.], especificamente destinados à questão da racionalidade. - 173 - de interpretar como este se faz persuasivo. Neste plano se agregam duas funções específicas para os argumentos desta natureza. - 174 - 4 . 1 . P e r e lma n e a C o n c e p ç ã o Ar i s t o t é l i c a d o Ad H omi n em Uma análise detalhada da concepção aristotélica de argumento ad hominem indica que existem duas versões para este tipo de argumento, cada uma delas com suas respectivas características. Estas variações correspondem, grosso modo, às variantes distinguidas pela Lógica contemporânea que os considera modelos de falácias não-formais, a saber: o ad hominem abusivo e o circunstancial. Existem boas razões para efetuar uma desconexão entre esse tipo de argumento e a idéia de argumentação falaciosa. Neste caso, uma reconstrução das duas versões aristotélicas, juntamente com a noção oriunda do século XIX, permitem examinar se o argumento ad hominem pode ou não ser visto como um dispositivo falacioso do diálogo em Perelman. Do ponto de vista contemporâneo, o argumento ad hominem é censurável porque consiste no questionamento de circunstâncias pessoais ou, ainda, na contestação da integridade de caráter do argüidor ou daquele que expõe uma idéia ou pensamento 376 . A questão deste caráter falacioso levará em consideração regras próprias para o tipo de diálogo em que se põe o ad hominem como um argumento ou contra-argumento. Em outras palavras, o uso estratégico do ad hominem pode ser relevante em determinados contextos, para despertar no interlocutor uma suspeita em relação ao que se diz, em virtude do "background biográfico" do orador. Entretanto, isso não deve ser visto como um dispositivo de contestação imediata da argumentação do opositor, tão somente em virtude de circunstâncias especiais em que a pesssoa se encontra, nem tampouco em decorrência da sua conduta prévia. A história da argumentação mostra que o ad hominem absorve uma reputação negativa a partir do século XVII, embora significados semelhantes possam ser encontrados em certos escritos 376 A esse respeito há boas referências em: WALTON, Douglas. The Ad Hominem Argument as an Informal Fallacy, Argumentation. n. 1. Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987. p. 317–331; CHICHI, Graciela Marta. The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument. Argumentation. n. 16. Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, p. 333–348. - 175 - aristotélicos. 377 Nuchelmans 378 , por exemplo, sustenta a existência de duas linhas de desenvolvimento distintas, cada uma delas com uma dupla fundamentação em escritos aristotélicos. A primeira via, denominada dialética, advém Dos Argumentos Sofísticos e da Metafísica, 379 enquanto o segundo – e melhor – caminho relaciona-se aos sofismas, como se pode ver em Dos Argumentos Sofísticos e na Retórica. 380 Estes sugestivos e bem documentados ensaios – de Hintikka e Nuchelmans – têm sido amplamente questionados e submetidos às mais diversas críticas. Podemos sintetizar, entretanto, esses dois pontos de vista da seguinte maneira: (1) o argumento ad hominem aristotélico seria um outro tipo [inferior] de solução de uma falácia que consiste em um questionamento-resposta [contra-argumento] que se dirige na seguinte direção: um sofisma pode ser dissolvido por um apelo a qualquer situação embaraçosa envolvendo o ouvinte, e diante da qual este último [o ouvinte] admite pelo diálogo uma co-participação; essa estratégia argumentativa pode ser chamada de solução ad hominem 381 . (2) seria um artifício concernente à argumentação, sustentando "a prova de que é possível relativizar qualquer resposta, mas não absolutamente". 382 Isto significa questionar com base em questões particulares e responder conduzindo o interlocutor a participar de um jogo dialético. 383 O primeiro sentido que Hintikka reconstruiu de Nuchelmans corresponde a uma estratégia retórica que consiste em um ataque ao oponente no diálogo, cuja vantagem é atestada, conforme este último autor, ininterruptamente desde os comentadores 377 Jaako Hintikka cita algumas passagens das seguintes obras: Das Refutações Sofísticas: 20 177b33–34; ibid. 22, 178b15–17; ibid. 33, 183a21–23; ibid. 8, 170a12–19 (HINTIKKA, Jaakko. Socratic Questioning, Logic And Rhetoric. Revue Internationale de Philosophie. n. 184, 1993, p. 18) e nos Tópicos VIII, 11 161a21–2. (HINTIKKA, Jaakko. The Fallacy of Fallacies. Argumentation, n. 1, 1987, p. 226; HINTIKKA, Jaakko. Socratic Questioning, Logic And Rhetoric. Revue Internationale de Philosophie. n. 184, 1993, p. 17–18). 378 Cf. NUCHELMANS, G. On the Fourfold Roots of the 'Argumentum Ad Hominem'. In: KRABE, E.C.W.; DALITZ, R.J. ; SMIT, P. (eds.). Empirical Logic and Public Debate. Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 1993, p. 37–47. 379 ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica IV, 4, 1005b35 [Textos Didáticos. n.45. Trad.: Lucas Angioni. Campinas: IFCH/UNICAMP, 2001] ; ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica IX, 5, 1062a2–3 [Ed. Trilíngue por V. G. Yebra. Madrid: Gredos, 1987]. ARISTOTLE. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1997. 2, 165a37–b6 ; Para dirimir possíveis dúvidas a respeito da tradução, na construção deste capítulo utilizamos, também, a versão francesa : ARISTOTE. Les Réfutations sophistiques. Paris: J. Vrin, 1995. 380 ARISTOTLE. De Sophisticis Elenchis. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1997, 2, 165a37–b6 ; ARISTÓTELES. Retórica, I, 1. 381 Cf. HINTIKKA, Jaakko. The Fallacy of Fallacies. Argumentation, n. 1, 1987, p. 226; HINTIKKA, Jaakko. Socratic Questioning, Logic And Rhetoric. Revue Internationale de Philosophie. n. 184, 1993, p. 18–19. 382 Cf.: HINTIKKA, Jaakko. Socratic Questioning, Logic And Rhetoric. Revue Internationale de Philosophie. n. 184, 1993. p. 19. Ver também : ARISTOTE. Les Réfutations sophistiques, 8, 170a12–19). 383 Cf. HINTIKKA, Jaakko. The Fallacy of Fallacies. Argumentation, n. 1, 1987, p. 227; HINTIKKA, Jaakko. What was Aristotle doing in His Early Logic, Anyway? A Reply to Woods and Hansen. Synthese, n. 113, p. 243. - 176 - modernos por meio do qual passou a ser chamado, por assim dizer, solutio ad hominem. 384 O segundo significado pode ser visto como um argumento ex concessis ou como uma prova indireta para sustentar uma razão por meio de falsas premissas. 385 Neste contexto faz sentido que J. Woods e H. Hansen 386 acrescentem a Metafísica 387 como elemento comprobatório. 388 Nesta obra, Aristóteles defende que não há provas dos princípios (por exemplo, o princípio da não-contradição) em um sentido absoluto ('haplós') mas somente de maneira relativa para uma pessoa em particular ('prós tónde'). Para Nuchelmans 389 , o Livro IV da Metafísica 390 concede atenção a um caso especial de 'peirastikós lógos' 391 , no qual a primeira concepção aristotélica do argumentum ad hominem, como um argumento ex concessis, se origina. 392 Embora este significado tenha se difundido, sobretudo no século XVII, a expressão 'ad hominem' inicia sua longa carreira por meio dos comentários de São Tomás de Aquino acerca da Metafísica de Aristóteles. 393 A expressão 'prós tónde' enfatiza "a natureza relativa da única maneira de provar primeiras verdades". 394 Reforça essa interpretação, o ponto de vista de Hintikka acerca do argumento ad hominem como ex concessis 395 , motivo pelo qual se mostra relevante investigar a origem do argumento ad hominem analisando a sua correspondência com a concepção aristotélica. Na seqüência, 384 Cf.: HINTIKKA, Jaakko. Socratic Questioning, Logic And Rhetoric. Revue Internationale de Philosophie. n. 184, 1993, p. 44-46. 385 Cf. NUCHELMANS, G. On the Fourfold Roots of the 'Argumentum Ad Hominem'. In: KRABE, E.C.W.; DALITZ, R.J. ; SMIT, P. (eds.). Empirical Logic and Public Debate. Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 1993, p. 41-43. 386 WOODS, J. ; HANSEN, H. Hintikka on Aristotle's Fallacies. Synthese. n.113, 1997, p.217–239. 387 ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica IV, 4, 1005b35 [Textos Didáticos. n.45. Trad.: Lucas Angioni. Campinas: IFCH/UNICAMP, 2001]. 388 WOODS J.; HANSEN H.V. Hintikka on Aristotle's Fallacies. Synthese, (November) 1997, v. 113, no. 2, p. 237, note 4. 389 NUCHELMANS, G. On the Fourfold Roots of the Argumentum Ad Hominem. In: KRABE, E.C.W. DALITZ R.J. and SMIT, P. (eds.), Empirical Logic and Public Debate. Amsterdam-Atlanta, Rodopi, 1993, p. 37–47. 390 Especificamente no Capítulo 4 e, também, no Livro IX, capítulo 5. (Cf. ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica IV, 4, 1005b35 [Textos Didáticos. n.45. Trad.: Lucas Angioni. Campinas: IFCH/UNICAMP, 2001] ; ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica IX, 5, 1062a2–3 [Ed. Trilíngue por V. G. Yebra. Madrid: Gredos, 1987]). 391 ARISTOTLE. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1997, 2, 165a38–b6. 392 Cf. NUCHELMANS, G. On the Fourfold Roots of the 'Argumentum Ad Hominem'. In: KRABE, E.C.W.; DALITZ, R.J. ; SMIT, P. (eds.). Empirical Logic and Public Debate. Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 1993, p. 37-41. 393 Op.Cit. 394 'the relative nature of the sole way of proving first truths' (Cf. NUCHELMANS, G. On the Fourfold Roots of the 'Argumentum Ad Hominem'. In: KRABE, E.C.W.; DALITZ, R.J. ; SMIT, P. (eds.). Empirical Logic and Public Debate. Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 1993, p. 39–40). 395 Cf. HINTIKKA, J. The Fallacy of Fallacies, Argumentation, n.1, 1987, p. 211–238. Ver, mais especificamente as notas 28 [onde aparece o sentido da expressão, conforme cunhado por Locke] e a nota 19 [complementar]. - 177 - consideraremos duas versões da argumentação ad hominem cunhadas respectivamente por Aristóteles e Arthur Schopenhauer para observar em que sentido este autores consideram-na, ou não, uma boa argumentação. Por fim, pretendemos mostrar que há duas versões do argumento ad hominem em alguns textos aristotélicos, um dos quais [a segunda versão], tem sido ignorada ou abandonada pelos estudiosos no contexto deste problema. Apresentaremos ambas versões sucessivamente como uma orientação cujas trilhas podem ser seguidas [cada qual] separadamente uma da outra, como se fossem duas vias diferentes. Duas versões que correspondem ao que se chama de abusivo e circunstancial na moderna literatura sobre as falácias não-formais. 396 396 Douglas Walton, por exemplo, apresenta quatro variantes: a abusiva também chamada de argumento ad hominem direto; a circunstancial, conhecida como tipo indireto [indirect type]; o tipo oblíquo [bias type] ou tu quoque; e o tipo envenenando o poço [poisoning the well type] (Cf.WALTON, Douglas. A P ragmatic Theory of Fallacy. Tuscaloosa-London: University of Alabama Press, 1995. p. 212–218; Fallacies Arising From Ambiguity. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer, 1996. p. 228–232). Na chamada pragmadialectics, os três variantes do argumentum ad hominem visam, cada uma deles por seu próprio caminho, ir eliminando o oponente como em uma séria discussão, desprezando-o como estúpido, mal, não-confiável, etc. (abusivo), lançando suspeitas sobre os seus motivos (circunstancial), ou apontando uma inconsistência entre suas idéias e ações (tu quoque) (Cf. EEMEREN, F.H. van; GROOTENDORST, R. Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussion. A Theoretical Model for the Analysis of Discussions Directed Towards Solving Conflict of Opinion. Dordrecht- Cinnaminson: Foris, 1984, p. 190–192; Fallacies in Pragma-Dialectical Perspective. Argumentation, n. 1, 1987. p. 284–285; Relevance Reviewed: The Case of Argumentum Ad Hominem. Argumentation, n.6, 1992. p. 153–154; The History of the Argumentum Ad Hominem Since the Seventeenth Century. In: KRABE, E.C.W.; DALITZ, R.J. ; SMIT, P. (eds.). Empirical Logic and Public Debate. Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 1993, p. 62). - 178 - 4 . 2 . Du a s I n t er pr eta ções à L uz da V er sã o A r i st ot él i ca do A d H omi nem Tomemos como ponto de partida uma versão do argumento ad hominem que aparece no Livro VIII dos Tópicos, como uma descrição aristotélica das regras para se responder diante de objeções. Aristóteles menciona que uma objeção pode ser levantada pela pessoa que pergunta e acrescenta: "muitas vezes, quando não se chegou ainda a uma solução efetiva, o que formula as questões é incapacitado, por esse meio, de levar adiante o seu argumento". 397 O objetivo do interlocutor é obstar o questionamento conforme os argumentos que deseja concluir. A expressão aristotélica que corresponde à construção latina "ad hominem" é "em oposição ao questionador" de tal modo que isto sintetiza este (outro) caminho de sustentar e simultaneamente amplificar objeções, nos casos em que o questionador, a pessoa que põe as questões no diálogo, está no alvo. Mas deve-se atentar para a brevidade e vagueza [imprecisão] da exposição aristotélica, pois a natureza da objeção envolvida neste caso está aberta a interpretações. Autores como Robin Smith 398 , A. Zadro 399 , P. Slomkowski 400 e J. Hintikka 401 reconhecem a objeção ad hominem em diversas passagens dos Tópicos. Slomkowski, por exemplo, sustenta a idéia de que a objeção ad hominem, tal como a estratégia de brincar com o tempo 402 são potencialmente sofisticas e não são mencionadas como objeções em qualquer outro lugar nos Tópicos 403 . Aliás, elas reaparecem no Dos Argumentos Sofísticos como soluções, como se pode perceber no seguinte excerto: 397 Cf. ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978. Livro VIII, 10, 161a 2-4, p.145 (Coleção Os Pensadores). 398 Robin Smith comenta acerca disto: 'in this second case there is a way to counter the objection, but the questioner fails to see it and cannot go on. The answerer therefore succeds in halting the argument, but only because of the questioner's incompetence: this objection is thus "against the questioner".' (Cf. SMITH, Robin. In: ARISTOTLE. Topics. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1997. p. 138). 399 ZADRO, A. Aristotele, I Topici. Napoli: Bibliopolis,1974. 400 SLOMKOWSKI, P. Aristotle's Topics. Leiden, New York: Köln, Brill, 1997. 401 HINTIKKA, J. Socratic Questioning, Logic And Rhetoric, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, n.184, 1993, p. 5–30. 402 No jargão futebolístico, pode-se falar em "jogar com o regulamento". 403 SLOMKOWSKI, P. Aristotle's Topics. Leiden, New York: Köln, Brill, 1997, p.38, nota 154. - 179 - Assim como às vezes é possível dirigir a solução contra o argumento, outras vezes contra o que pergunta e o seu modo de inquirir, e outras ainda contra nenhuma dessas coisas, também é possível dirigir nossas perguntas e nosso raciocínio contra a tese, contra o que a defende ou contra o tempo, sempre que a questão seja mais longa de examinar que o período disponível. 404 Para sustentar uma conexão possível entre esta passagem Dos Argumentos Sofísticos e a concepção de objeção ad hominem presente nos Tópicos, Hintikka sustenta a idéia de que o ad hominem é uma criação aristotélica para solucionar uma falácia de ambigüidade "designando que uma pessoa particular [um interlocutor] se torna vítima por conta de um engano específico". 405 Quando Aristóteles recomenda "um ataque ao falante e não à tese" nos casos em que o interlocutor é maltratado ou insultado pelo seu opositor no diálogo – o questionador – é porque já leva em consideração que o interlocutor deve conceder ao opositor o que ele esperaria aceitar. Este é um caminho semelhante àquele que se encontra na última parte do Górgias, de Platão, quando Cálicles questiona se pode ter infligido o critério do bom diálogo. 406 Pode-se assegurar, de qualquer forma, que esta primeira versão do argumento ad hominem não é necessariamente um argumento, pelo menos no sentido estrito da expressão, mas uma reação repressiva de quem defende uma tese, no contexto dialógico, com o intuito de obstruir o argumento do oponente. Nesses casos, Aristóteles recomenda ao questionador desvelar a reação do contestador 407 , porque este participante não contribuiu para a questão dialética, que consiste em utilizar os melhores argumentos possíveis. Qualquer dos casos apresenta deficiências. No livro VIII dos Tópicos o próprio Aristóteles salienta que "às vezes é necessário atacar a própria pessoa que fala e não a sua posição". 408 Ressalta, entretanto, que este procedimento apenas deve ser utilizado nos casos em que o interlocutor assume uma postura abusiva, não se restringindo a contestar uma tese. Idéia semelhante está no 404 ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978, Cap. 33, 183a 21-26, p. 196. 405 HINTIKKA, J. Socratic Questioning, Logic And Rhetoric, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, n.184, 1993, p. 18. 406 Passagens relevantes sobre o 'bom diálogo', no pensamento de Aristóteles, estão nos Tópicos: VIII 5, 159b4–7; 6, 160a11–16; 8, 160a39–b1 ; 11, 161a33–37. 407 Cf. ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978. VIII, 11, 161a 21-23, p. 196. 408 "accordingly it sometimes becomes necessary to attack the speaker and not his position" (ARISTOTLE. Topics. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1997. Book VIII, 11, 161a21–22) - 180 - pensamento de intérpretes como Hintikka 409 e Hansen 410 que defendem um uso negativo do argumento ad hominem, ou seja, a aplicação do argumento para conter a oposição contenciosa entre os interlocutores [orador e auditório], tal como considera Whately objetivando silenciar o seu oponente. 411 Hansen toma o ad hominem aristotélico como uma alegação de inconsistência, tal como o faz, igualmente, Whately. De qualquer forma esta passagem não pode ser ignorada porque, com base na colaboração mútua dos participantes do diálogo, Aristóteles almeja somente a vitória, e promove outros objetivos semelhantes como treinamento de argumentação, colocando em teste e examinando a tese do interlocutor. Uma vez que não se estabeleceram regras para aqueles que discutem a fim de exercitar- se e de investigar - e o objetivo dos que ensinam e aprendem difere fundamentalmente daquele dos que se entregam a uma competição, como este último difere daquele dos que discutem num espírito de investigação, pois o que aprende deve sempre declarar o que pensa, uma vez que ninguém tenciona ensinar-lhe falsidades; ao passo que em uma competição o propósito do inquiridor é aparentar por todos os meios que está influenciando o outro, enquanto o do seu antagonista é mostrar que não se deixa afetar por ele; por outro lado, em uma assembléia de disputantes que não discutem num espírito de competição, mas de exame e pesquisa, ainda não existem regras articuladas sobre o que o respondente deve ter em vista e que espécie de coisas deve ou não deve conceder para a defesa correta ou incorreta da sua posição – uma vez, pois, que não nos foi transmitida nenhuma tradição por outros, procuremos dizer algo sobre a matéria. 412 No sumário do Livro VIII dos Tópicos, que é o manual em que Aristóteles apresenta sua técnica de discussão e no qual ele começa sua reflexão acerca dos argumentos, Aristóteles introduz como defesa tática a desqualificação do questionador por meio de oposição às suas questões, com o objetivo de expor a reação de contestação do seu interlocutor como uma ação ilegítima no contexto da Dialética. 409 Cf. HINTIKKA, J. The Fallacy of Fallacies, Argumentation, n.1, p. 226. 410 Cf. HANSEN, H.V. Whately on the 'Ad Hominem': A Liberal Exegesis', Philosophy and Rhetoric, n. 29(4), 1996, p.400–415. 411 Cf. HANSEN, 1996, p. 407 412 ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978. VIII 5, 159a25–37, p. 141. - 181 - 4 . 3 . U ma S egunda I nt er pr et a çã o à L uz da V er sã o A r i s t ot él i ca do A d H omi nem A origem do argumento ad hominem, tal como ele é usualmente descrito, remonta a uma passagem do pensamento de Aristóteles freqüentemente ignorada. No décimo quinto capítulo Dos Argumentos Sofísticos há um trecho com características do diálogo erístico. Uma análise desta passagem permite identificar uma segunda versão aristotélica do argumento ad hominem. Ela está formulada como se segue: Assim como nos discursos retóricos, também naqueles que visam à refutação devem-se examinar as discrepâncias da posição do oponente quer com suas próprias afirmações, quer com os pontos de vista daqueles cujos atos e palavras ele admite como retos e justos, e também daquelas pessoas que se supõe geralmente tenham esse tipo de caráter, ou se assemelham a estas, quer com os da maioria ou da totalidade dos homens. 413 De acordo com Miguel de Éfeso 414 , a estratégia conferida a Aristóteles era bastante conhecida entre os retóricos gregos antigos. Era utilizada pelos oradores para reagir contra os seus interlocutores refutando-lhes com os seus próprios discursos nos tribunais. Isso nos permite lembrar que o modus vivendi da Grécia antiga está intrinsecamente ligado à idéia da prova e, por conseguinte, dos julgamentos e das disputas legais, motivo pelo qual o comentador diz que a resposta [retaliação] retórica que inspirou comportamentos análogos 415 , isto é, análogos à regra descrita em Dos Argumentos Sofísticos, consiste em refutar os discursos que refutam ou contradizem a estrutura legal própria dos oradores na pólis. Para Aristóteles a estrutura legal da polis não se refere ao tópico em discussão, além disso, elas deixam dúvidas sobre o que seria uma boa punição. Como se pode ler: 413 ARISTÓTELES. Dos Argumentos Sofísticos. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1978, 15, 174b19–23, p.176. 414 Também conhecido como pseudo-Alexandre I, Miguel de Éfeso (séc. 11) era um filósofo bizantino, nascido em Éfeso e contemporâneo de João Ítalo. Cristão e aristotélico, num tempo em que Platão perdia influência para Aristóteles. Desenvolveu novas idéias sobre a educação, ao comentar a Ética de Aristóteles. Ainda hoje se lêem com interesse páginas Miguel de Éfeso. Obras: Comentários aos livros de Aristóteles: Lógica; Metafísica; Ética; Política; Retórica. (Cf. EVALDO, Pauli. Simpozio. Cap. XII. Art. 2o. Florianópolis: UFSC, 1997. [2216y432] 415 ARISTÓTELES, 1978, 15, 174b19–23, p.176. - 182 - Não se deve examinar todo problema nem toda tese, mas apenas aqueles que possam causar embaraço aos que necessitam de argumento, e não de castigo ou percepção. Pois um homem que não sabe se devemos ou não honrar os deuses e amar nossos genitores necessita de castigo, e aqueles que não sabem se a neve é ou não branca necessitam de percepção. 416 Na visão da erística, da disputa sofística, Aristóteles apresenta uma contra-acusação que beneficia o questionador no processo de refutação do seu oponente. Esta ferramenta consiste em mostrar a contradição entre o que se conclui e o que se propõe com base no que foi mostrado em uma situação retórica análoga. Aristóteles recomenda ao questionador salientar o que existe no discurso do seu oponente e a tese que ele defende ou reconhece, tomando como referência aquilo que ele admite na teoria ou na prática, ou ainda mostrando que esta resposta contradiz o que é aceito pelos mais sábios, ou pelas pessoas, ou pela maioria deles sobre os conteúdos em geral. Um leitor dos Tópicos pode sugerir, a partir desta última descrição 417 , que Aristóteles recomenda responder indicando uma contradição em referência ao que se aceita na maioria das vezes, isto é o critério dialético da discussão aristotélica 418 . Mas, se for assim, por que Aristóteles apresenta tal recurso da contra-argumentação entre as ferramentas da discussão erística típica? Ora, refutar o argumento do oponente, indicando a contradição do que é dito pelo interlocutor no que diz respeito à sua própria tese, não parece ser falacioso ou repreensível, mas uma réplica legítima do diálogo. De acordo com esta idéia, Aristóteles explica o que a refutação significa 419 e como trabalha dentro dos limites de uma discussão dialética. 420 Discutir dialeticamente consiste em respeitar este critério. 421 Por outro lado, se nós fizéssemos um exame apurado da natureza falaciosa do recurso da contra- acusação, não valeria a pena indicar tais contradições a fim responder ao argumento do opositor em um diálogo. A resposta teria o direito de ser inconsistente com a sua própria tese, bem como com sua própria opinião, estejam ou não reconhecidos explicitamente. Há boas 416 ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978. I, 11, 105a2–7, p. 14. 417 ARISTOTLE, De Sophisticis Elenchis, 1997, 174b22–23, p.15. 418 ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978. I, 1 100a29–30, b21–23; ibid. VIII 5, 159b8–9, 13–15; ibid. 6, 160a12–16; e, também, o capítulo 11. 419 ARISTOTLE, De Sophisticis Elenchis, 1997, 1, 165a2–3; ibid. 5, 167a23–27. 420 ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978. VIII 2, 158a8–13; ibid. 5, 159b4–6; ibid. capítulo 12. 421 ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978. I 1, 100a18–21; ibid. VIII, cap.4; ARISTOTLE. De Sophisticis Elenchis, 1997, 2, 165b3–4. - 183 - razões a favor da primeira interpretação. É uma proposta razoável, no campo da dialética, refutar a argumentação do oponente indicando possíveis contradições entre a tese proposta e o que se admite no jogo dialógico de questões e respostas; primeiramente, porque há vagueza e inconsistência para o diálogo e para a comunicação como um todo; em segundo lugar porque o mais geralmente aceito é outra orientação da dialética aristotélica. Mesmo assim, não devemos considerar ilegítima esta segunda versão do argumentum ad hominem aristotélico. Devemos, ainda, explicar porque tal dispositivo de refutação aparece no capítulo de Dos argumentos sofísticos, onde Aristóteles orienta o questionador a respeito da discussão sofística. Apesar dos aspectos filológicos envolvidos nesta questão, acreditamos ser possível manter o caráter não- sofístico deste dispositivo do debate. A questão filológica, entretanto, requer uma melhor e mais aprimorada investigação. - 184 - 4 . 4 . O A d H omi n em sob i nspi r a çã o de S chopenha uer Arthur Schopenhauer tem suas próprias razões para endossar o uso falacioso do argumento ad hominem. O décimo sexto artifício da Arte da Controvérsia, indubitavelmente inspirado pela versão aristotélica do capítulo XV Dos Argumentos Sofísticos. Aparece em seu Eristische Dialektik como segue: Argumentum ad hominem ou ex concessis. Se o adversário faz uma afirmação, devemos perguntar-lhe se não está, de algum modo – ainda que seja só em aparência – em contradição com algo que anteriormente disse ou aceitou, ou com os princípios de uma escola ou seita que ele elogie ou aprove, ou com o comportamento de membros dessa seita (ainda que se trate de membros não autênticos ou só aparentes), ou com a conduta do adversário mesmo. Se, por exemplo, defende o suicídio, logo gritamos: "Por que você não se enforca?" Ou, se afirma que Berlim é uma cidade incômoda, gritamos de imediato: "Por que você não vai embora na primeira diligência?". De uma maneira ou de outra sempre estamos sujeitos a nos deixar apanhar por semelhante tramóia. 422 Interessa-nos a versão mais forte deste "movimento erístico", isto é, aquele que não apela ao que parece ser genuíno. Com o título de argumentum ad hominem ou ex concessis Schopenhauer tem a idéia de uma reação a uma proposta, indicando que o oponente contradiz o que endossa no contexto do diálogo. Faz sentido que Schopenhauer tenha escolhido esse título para um dos seus trinta e oito estratagemas, porque esse décimo sexto mostra uma das duas maneiras possíveis (modos) de refutação de um argumento. O caminho do argumento ad hominem denota a coerência das afirmações e com isto também a verdade subjetiva relativa. Por esta razão o artifício é também chamado de ex-concessis por Schopenhauer. A ferramenta de refutação ad rem, por outro lado, está de acordo com a verdade absoluta objetiva definida como uma correspondência à realidade. A versão de Schopenhauer do argumento ad hominem estabelece ligação com a fonte aristotélica, mas expande as dimensões da contradição até o ponto de julgar a opinião ou os princípios reconhecidos pelo interlocutor por causa de sua 422 SCHOPENHAUER, 1970, vol. III, p. 666–695. - 185 - vinculação a um grupo particular. Se este artifício fosse um dispositivo erístico genuíno, não seria um procedimento dialógico justo refutar apelando à coerência entre as indicações ou as admissões do oponente e sua própria prática. De acordo com a concepção schopenhaueriana de dialética, e com base na sua teoria cética sobre a verdade, faz sentido que o participante da disputa ao utilizar a refutação ad hominem responda sem colocar na pergunta a verdade daquilo que se afirma. A razão para isto é que no argumento ad hominem o orador se afasta da matéria objetiva a fim de examinar o que o interlocutor admitiu ou disse sobre o assunto 423 . O tratamento padrão do argumento ad hominem 424 acrescenta importância à distinção que nós encontramos nos textos de Schopenhauer, colocando a verdade ou a matéria da tese, de um lado, e o orador, do outro. Esta abordagem é conhecida desde que Frauenstädt publicou os primeiros esboços da Dialética Eristica (1817), cujo sumário foi publicado no segundo capítulo de Parerga und Paralipomena intitulado Zur Logik und Dialektik 425 . Richard Whately, a quem considerável importância é atribuída na literatura recente sobre o assunto, destaca o argumento ad hominem, e demais argumentos ad, como os argumentos ad rem, em Elementos de Lógica, de 1828. Literalmente, eles são endereçados a circunstâncias peculiares, caráter, opiniões admitidas, ou diante da conduta do indivíduo e se refere, conseqüentemente, a ele tão somente, não sustentando diretamente e absolutamente uma questão real, como o argumentum ad rem, por exemplo, o faz. A idéia de Whately acerca do argumento ad rem está baseada em como as coisas são, e não em acordos pessoais. O objetivo da argumentação ad hominem, em contrapartida, é silenciar ou convencer pela apelação aos compromissos pessoais e, por conseguinte, as proposições estabelecidas são particulares e relativas exclusivamente àqueles que a elas aderiram ou se comprometeram. De fato, Whately desenvolveu uma síntese do que os escritores lógicos disseram sobre os argumentos ad, incluindo o ad hominem. Por que esta preferência? 426 423 SCHOPENHAUER, A. Dialética Erística. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1997. p. 148-149. No Original: SCHOPENHAUER, A. Eristische Dialektik. Der handschriftliche Nachlass. Frankfurt : Waldemar Kramer, 1970, p. 694, 10-12. 424 HAMBLIN, Charles Leonard. Fallacies. Virginia: Vale Press, 1970, p. 13 425 Constatamos que Zur Logik und Dialektik (1851) corresponde ao capítulo preliminar de The Art Of Controversy. (Translated: T. Bailey Saunders. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim. New York: Macmillan & Co., Lim. 1896). O leitor atento poderá perceber, ainda, que boa parte dos conteúdos é de natureza irônica. 426 JOHNSTONE Jr., Locke and Whately on the Argumentum Ad Hominem, 1996, p. 91. - 186 - Essa outra maneira ilegítima de se proteger de uma derrota atacando diretamente o interlocutor do diálogo com um tom de insulto ou desafiador aparece no último estratagema de Schopenhauer: Quando percebemos que o adversário é superior e que acabará por não nos dar razão, então nos tornamos pessoalmente ofensivos, insultosos, grosseiros. O uso das ofensas pessoais consiste em sair do objeto da discussão (já que a partida está perdida) e passar ao contendor, atacando, de uma maneira ou de outra, a sua pessoa. Isto poderia chamar- se argumentum ad personam, para distingui-lo do argumentum ad hominem. Este se afasta do objetivo propriamente dito para dirigir-se àquilo que o adversário disse ou admitiu. Em troca, quando argumentamos ad personam, o objeto é deixado completamente de lado e encontramos o ataque na pessoa do adversário, e a objeção se torna insolente, maldosa, ultrajante, grosseira. É um apelo desde as forças do espírito às do corpo, à animalidade. Esta regra é muito popular, pois todo mundo é capaz de aplicá- la e, por isto, é usada com freqüência. Mas é preciso perguntar-nos que contra-ataque poderá empregar a parte contrária, pois, se quiser pagar na mesma moeda, se chegará a uma rixa, a um duelo ou a um processo por injúria. 427 O argumento ad personam mencionado no trigésimo oitavo estratagema abandona o objeto da disputa - como no ad hominem - para concentrar-se no antagonismo e atacar a pessoa apropriada. Antes de declarar a discussão perdida, quando se enfrenta alguém mais inteligente ou hábil, é comum escolher a conservação do orgulho, da vaidade ou da dignidade cobrindo as diferenças de opinião por uso da força ou da violência. O único remédio contra este tipo de manobra consiste em manter a calma a fim ignorar os insultos que estão fora do jogo e retornar a atenção às razões expressadas no diálogo. Schopenhauer cita o provérbio de Themistocles a Eurybiades: "ataque, mas deixe-me falar" 428 . Na primeira parte deste trabalho nós vimos que Aristóteles condena o uso deste recurso e sugere seu uso em reação a um interlocutor desonesto. 429 Schopenhauer sustenta que um debate justo ocorre entre os pares somente quando ambos os participantes estiverem dispostos a aceitar os bons argumentos do seu interlocutor no diálogo. 430 427 SCHOPENHAUER, 1970, p. 694. 428 SCHOPENHAUER, Dialética Erística, 1997, p. 183. 429 ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978, Livro VIII 11 161a21–23 430 SCHOPENHAUER, A. Dialética Erística, 1997, p. 183. No original: SCHOPENHAUER, A. Eristische Dialektik. Der handschrift liche Nachlass. Frankfurt : Waldemar Kramer, 1970, p. 695. - 187 - 4 . 5 . C r í t i ca a o A d H omi nem de I nspi r a çã o S chopenha u er i a na Schopenhauer apresenta as duas versões aristotélicas do argumento ad hominem em Eristische Dialektik e distingue os dois tipos diferentes sob as seguintes designações: (1) o ad hominem e (2) ad personam. A distinção sugerida por Schopenhauer é semelhante àquela que separa o ad hominem em duas variantes, a saber: o abusivo e o circunstancial. Conforme a avaliação que efetuamos, pode-se constatar duas concepções do ad hominem no pensamento aristotélico. A primeira delas, corresponde a uma técnica da discussão, tal como se pode verificar nos Tópicos 431 aristotélicos, enquanto a segunda corresponde à idéia aristotélica da discussão erística 432 . No primeiro caso, ou seja, o ad hominem como técnica de discussão, há uma semelhança com a noção schopenhaueriana de ad personam 433 , como se percebe no trigésimo oitavo estratagema da Dialética Erística. O segundo caso, por sua vez, mantém o componente negativo que carrega a expressão e assemelha-se ao que o próprio schopenhauer designa como argumentum ad hominem. 434 O primeiro caso sugere uma situação que pode ser representada da seguinte maneira: Ω → Ю ↔ β Ω → β Neste caso especificamente, Ω representa o interlocutor que contesta os argumentos de β [o orador]. Os argumentos, no modelo acima, são representados pelo símbolo Ю. Os argumentos de β são obstruídos por Ω que sequer os avalia, mas os utiliza em benefício 431 ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978, Livro VIII, 10, 161a2–4 (regra 67) e ibid. 11, 161a21–23; 432 ARISTOTLE, De Sophisticis Elenchis, 1997, 15, 174 b 19–23. Trecho correspondente a regra 11 do capítulo 15. 433 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, Dialética Erística, 1997, p. 180-185. 434 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, 1997, p. 148-149. - 188 - próprio, retrucando as afirmações ou questionamentos de β. Desta forma, Ω obstrui Ю desqualificando (com insultos) β que ofereceu Ю como questão. Deste modelo proposto é que advém a origem do ad hominem abusivo. O outro tipo de relação pode ser representado conforme se segue: Ω → Ю ← β ~ Ю Ω → β Neste segundo caso os argumentos são ignorados porque Ω [o interlocutor] ataca Ю [o argumento] pois β [o orador] diz Ю. Ora, se β diz Ю, então admite ~ Ю [a sua negação]. O interlocutor ataca o orador porque o seu argumento é incompatível com o posicionamento adotado por este último em outra circunstância. Deste segundo modelo se origina a versão circunstancial do ad hominem. A fim de mostrar como as duas versões reconstruídas diferem uma da outra, vislumbramos a construção dos modelos acima descritos. Interessa ilustrar o movimento da reação pessoal descrito no primeiro modelo e no contra-ataque do interlocutor descrito no segundo modelo. As duas versões aristotélicas do argumento ad hominem estão intimamente associadas à sua dialética, isto é, ao método de argumentar a partir das afirmações geralmente aceitas. Ao comentar a primeira versão aristotélica do ad hominem tomamos como orientação uma das maneiras de obstruir o argumento de um oponente, dentre as quatro modalidades apresentadas nos Tópicos aristotélicos 435 . Para tal, simulamos uma objeção ao orador, para ilustrar a variante abusiva da falácia do argumento ad hominem, que é um procedimento do diálogo, mas não é um argumento, pois consiste em uma eficaz estratégia de ataque pessoal ao interlocutor. Contrariamente ao que se pode encontrar na vasta literatura acerca do problema das falácias em Aristóteles 436 , esta primeira versão aristotélica não possui qualquer correlação 435 ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978, Livro VIII, 10, 161a 436 Merecem destaque, a esse respeito, os seguintes trabalhos: HINTIKKA, J. The Fallacy of Fallacies, Argumentation, n.1, 1987, p. 211–238. HINTIKKA, J. Socratic Questioning, Logic And Rhetoric. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, n.184, v.1, 1993, p. 5–30. HINTIKKA, J. What was Aristotle doing in His Early Logic, Anyway? 'A Reply to Woods and Hansen', Synthese, n. 113, 1997. p. 241–249. NUCHELMANS, G. On the Fourfold Roots of the Argumentum Ad Hominem. In: KRABE, E.C.W. ; DALITZ, R.J. ; SMIT, P. (eds.). Empirical Logic and Public Debate. Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 1993, p. 37–47. - 189 - com o pensamento sofístico, como Hintikka e Nuchelmans sustentam, por exemplo. A sua segunda versão, por sua vez, aparece como um dispositivo eficaz para os interlocutores mostrarem que o seu oponente infligiu as regras do diálogo e caiu em contradição, comprometendo suas próprias admissões ou colocando em questão certos princípios reconhecidos em seu próprio comportamento. Esta visão corresponde a uma descrição da variante circunstancial do argumento ad hominem. Schopenhauer apresenta ambas as versões como dois artifícios diferentes da dialética erística passíveis de uso em qualquer tipo de discussão em que se deseje levar vantagem ante seus leitores ou ouvintes - mesmo havendo outros trinta e seis estratagemas – fazendo uso do diálogo em benefício próprio independentemente daquilo que se afirma. 437 A análise aristotélica da primeira versão é descritiva 438 . Isso representa uma diferença em relação à aproximação normativa que se estabelece entre o argumento ad hominem e as falácias, posto que o interpreta como uma violação das regras do diálogo para a resolução de entraves 439 . Por este motivo, Aristóteles orienta como agir e reagir tanto no contexto do jogo dialético 440 como nas controversas disputas do diálogo erístico 441 . O uso de tais dispositivos pode ser interpretado como regra para os dois tipos de diálogo, porque define uma determinada extensão para ações eficazes dos participantes. Mesmo as falhas ou as ações incorretas foram identificadas de um ponto de vista descritivo nos Tópicos 442 onde Aristóteles explica como as aparentes refutações podem ser resolvidas. Em contrapartida, algumas visões atuais acerca do diálogo focalizam a sua atenção na necessidade de obter o acordo racional, associando o dialético e o erístico a meros jogos não cooperativos no sentido que somente um dos lados tem uma tese a ser defendida. O erístico, por sua vez, se beneficia dos erros decorrentes de argumentos aparentes. Schopenhauer interpretou ambos os tipos de jogos 437 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, Dialética Erística, 1997, p. 148-149. 438 ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978, Livro VIII, 10. 161a ; 11, 161a21–23. 439 EEMEREN, F.H. van ; GROOTENDORST, R. Fallacies in Pragma-Dialectical Perspective. Argumentation, n.1, 1987, p. 296; 1993, p.61–62. 440 Cf. ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978, Livro VIII. 441 ARISTOTLE, De Sophisticis Elenchis, 1997, Chap. 15–17. 442 ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978, Livro VIII, 11–13 (ver, 'epitímesis', 'hamartía', 'pseudós lógos') e em Dos Argumentos Sofísticos, 4, 5, 19 - 32. - 190 - aristotélicos sob um e o mesmo título de Dialética erística em livro homônimo 443 , mas alguns questionamentos poderiam contestar a natureza falaciosa do argumento ad hominem. Para a concepção aristotélica do diálogo, a segunda versão do ad hominem 444 expõe uma ação legítima e justa da resposta ou do contra-ataque, porque refuta adequadamente as duas estruturas deste diálogo: (1) a vagueza da inconsistência, (2) o éndoxon, isto é, a nota ou o critério de definição da dialética aristotélica. Desta forma, não devemos considerá-lo, incondicionalmente, uma ação ilegítima na dialética erística de Schopenhauer. Defender a coerência das admissões do interlocutor em um diálogo seria uma ferramenta indispensável e serviria de critério para a argumentação, somente nos casos em que ambos os participantes não soubessem a verdade da sua própria tese, nem pudessem contar com o critério da verdade ad rem, que Schopenhauer se empenha em defender. Conseqüentemente, a consistência ou a não- contradição devem ser uma condição suficiente para a verdade de qualquer proposição; visto que contradições entre afirmações – avivadas pelo artifício do ad hominem – devem ser uma condição necessária para detectar a falsidade e o absurdo no contexto de um diálogo. Assim ocorre quando os participantes do diálogo não sabem se uma proposição "p" é verdadeira. Na base da coerência com que a ferramenta ad hominem opera, é possível saber, ao menos, se sustentar o "p" contradiz ou não outras afirmações ('q', 'r', 's') reconhecidas ou passíveis de serem admitidas. Isto é válido para todas as maneiras de refutação reconhecidas por Schopenhauer como a 'nego consequentiam', a 'ad hominem' e a 'reductio ad absurdum' 445 . As refutações indiretas não mostram que a tese a ser defendida é falsa, mas denunciam que pode não estar absolutamente certa. De qualquer forma, o uso de um ad hominem pode ser mais eficiente e dispor de mais força, que uma argumentação considerada válida para o padrão lógico. Mas o ad hominem é válido, no sentido de indicar a contradição entre a teoria e a prática do falante? Devemos especificar melhor o ponto de vista a partir do qual a noção de ad hominem está sendo observada. O argumento ad hominem se traduz em uma ferramenta razoável, porque se dirige exclusivamente ao adversário e não vai de encontro a todos (ad omnes). Sua natureza é semelhante à atitude do cético que se auto-refuta ao sustentar que algo 443 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, Dialética Erística, 1997. 444 ARISTOTLE, De Sophisticis Elenchis, 1997. 445 SCHOPENHAUER, 1970, p. 677. - 191 - não pode ser conhecido com absoluta certeza. Os debates filosóficos, por exemplo, aceitam validade do recurso chamado auto-refutação ou refutação pragmática. Esta prova indireta atribui um papel fundamental não somente para argumentar contrariamente, mas também para tentar refutar a posição relativista ou cética, naquelas versões que supõem que os atores quiseram e puderam colocar as teses que reivindicam serem universais. Por outro lado, o tipo abusivo do ad hominem parece ser muito diferente. O indivíduo que faz uso do ad personam, indiscriminadamente, sequer finge argumentar, porque golpeia o interlocutor ou desqualifica-o por pertencer a um determinado grupo. Sua finalidade é atacar, por extensão, a posição do oponente ou os argumentos que são parcialmente considerados, quando deveriam ser vistos em sua relação com o todo. Ademais, a aproximação padrão do argumento ad hominem a uma falácia de relevância parece estar relacionada à concepção formal da lógica dedutiva e especialmente à visão monolítica do argumento no seu âmago. Para a verdade ser considerada um atributo do discurso e, conseqüentemente, das premissas do argumento, os defensores de uma lógica asséptica excluíram as questões relacionadas ao contexto do assunto e da matéria da lógica, confinando-lhes no campo da Retórica. Desta forma, eles mantêm a distinção categorial entre as duas maneiras de refutar uma afirmação: (1) por meio do ad hominem e (2) pelo ad rem no estilo schopenhaueriano. Rejeitou-se a idéia de que é imprescindível que a verdade seja aceita por um interlocutor do diálogo ou por um auditório. Os resultados e dilemas que apresentamos indicam que seria valor a revisar o caráter falacioso do argumento ad hominem discutindo a possibilidade de uma concepção dialética de argumento. - 192 - 4.6. A Concepçã o Perelmaniana do A d H ominem A questão da argumentação, em Perelman, possui um sentido tão específico quanto abrangente. A sua Teoria da Argumentação ganhou reconhecimento e notoriedade, mas o sentido em que se emprega este termo na esfera do pensamento perelmaniano, precisa ser revisitado para o entendimento da estrutura arquitetônica da sua obra. A argumentação, tal como sugere Perelman 446 , representa uma construção sistemática e rigorosa das idéias que depende decididamente da anuência do auditório. Mas, em que sentido se entende uma perspectiva de construção sistemática? O que isto sustenta e como se fundamenta? A construção sistemática dos argumentos, conforme a validação do auditório que lhe confere crédito, ou não, acatando-a ou rejeitando-a, coloca em questão a própria idéia de que a Nova Retórica representa uma reconstrução da Retórica aristotélica, conforme sugestão de comentadores como Hoogaert 447 e Villey 448 , por exemplo. Sob a ótica de Aristóteles, a noção de argumento está ligada aos lugares [topoi] que constituem o objeto de investigação dos Tópicos 449 [em uma perspectiva mais direta] e da Retórica 450 [de uma maneira transversal]. A importância atribuída por Aristóteles aos topoi, por sua vez, indica a influência que a escolha destes possui na obtenção de resultados efetivos no processo argumentativo. Por outro lado, ao vincular incondicionalmente a argumentação à adesão, Perelman mostra que a sua Teoria está intimamente ligada à questão do assentimento. Para escapar da amplitude polissêmica da noção de argumentação, cujo sentido é generalíssimo, sugere que apenas há argumentação no campo em que há liberdade de adesão. Neste caso, a idéia de argumentação se mostra próxima da noção de Diálogo, visto que o papel do auditório é imprescindível para que se argumente. Essa vinculação estabelecida por Perelman, entre argumentação e auditório, apresenta uma noção de argumentação puramente discursiva, que associa sistematicamente os elementos 446 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.5. 447 HOOGAERT, Corinne. Perelman et Toulmin. Hermes, n.15. Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1995, p.167. 448 VILLEY, Michel. Os meios do Direito. Fi losofia do Direito. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2003, p.258. 449 ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos, 1978. 450 ARISTÓTELES, A rte Retórica. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda (INCM), 1998. - 193 - postos à prova do interlocutor, deixando-a livremente subordinada a uma atividade de propor teses, problematizá-las e respaldá-las pela adoção de razões, para criticá-las e refutá-las indefinidamente 451 , visto que o procedimento argumentativo pressupõe a aplicação de técnicas discursivas que produzem ou fazem crescer a adesão dos interlocutores 452 . Seguindo os passos indicados por Perelman, que levam a uma aproximação da concepção de argumentação proposta por Toulmin, encontramos uma idéia que bem reflete o sentido em que Perelman faz uso da expressão, motivo pelo qual acatamos, nos limites desta investigação, o entendimento de que argumentar consiste em prover de justificativas uma idéia que se pretende incutir em outrem. O senso comum sustenta, embora assistematicamente, que o termo argumento equivale ao próprio processo argumentativo. A Teoria da Argumentação perelmaniana adotou uma perspectiva diferente, por considerar que o termo congrega acepções mais abrangentes. A Nova Retórica sustenta que a argumentação se apresenta como um procedimento para sustentação de uma ou mais idéias que se pretende submeter à anuência do auditório. Implica em um processo de adução de razões capaz não apenas de sustentar as premissas de uma proposição, mas capaz de transpor a aceitação concedida às premissas para a conclusão. A argumentação, então, representa uma espécie de mecanismo discursivo passível de transportar a anuência das justificativas à conclusão e vice-versa. Os argumentos, sob esta perspectiva, consistem em meios pelos quais os indivíduos sustentam as suas idéias no intuito de captar a audiência ou assentimento do seu interlocutor para persuadi-lo ou convencê-lo. 453 Embora o termo argumento também seja empregado para designar o assunto de um discurso, ou mesmo o conteúdo acerca do qual o discurso versa, é necessário observar-se que essa idéia implica em demasiada limitação da amplitude cognitiva que o termo propicia no campo da Teoria da Argumentação. Assim, uma concepção mais abrangente e compreensiva da noção de argumento parece ser a mais adequada, porque confere maior precisão à idéia resgatada do 451 Esta proposta se encontra esboçada, inclusive, em uma reconstrução do pensamento de Stephen Toulmin, onde se lê: "The term argumentation will be used to refer to the whole activity of making claims, challenging them, backing them up by producing reasons, criticizing those reasons, rebutting those criticisms, and so on" (Cf. TOULMIN, Stephen; RIEKE, Richard; JANIK, Allan. An introduction to reasoning. London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1978, p.14. 452 "Uma teoria da argumentação tem como objeto o estudo das técnicas discursivas que visam a provocar ou a aumentar a adesão das mentes às teses que se apresentam ao seu assentimento." (Cf. PERELMAN, Retóricas, 1997, p. 207) 453 Essa distinção entre o persuadir e o convencer é nodal, tal como se pode perceber no capítulo 3, especificamente destinado à sua investigação. - 194 - senso comum, segundo a qual "um argumento é o que permite à mente o assentimento acerca de alguma coisa". No entanto, Para que a argumentação retórica possa desenvolver-se, é preciso que o orador dê valor à adesão alheia e que aquele que fala tenha a atenção daqueles a quem se dirige: é preciso que aquele que desenvolve sua tese e aquele a quem quer conquistar já formem uma comunidade, e isso pelo próprio fato do compromisso das mentes em interessar-se pelo mesmo problema. 454 Essa observação é importante porque resguarda a distinção entre a argumentação e a exposição, uma vez que os argumentos se configuram como elementos imprescindíveis à confirmação da razoabilidade de uma afirmação. Faz-se necessária, portanto, uma minuciosa análise das palavras do orador, pois os maus argumentos – sofismas ou falácias – são capazes de suscitar a audiência e persuadir como se fossem razoáveis. A argumentação ad hominem, por exemplo, é habitualmente associada a um tipo de raciocínio inválido [falacioso] em virtude do argumentum ad hominem, que é uma falácia não-formal de ambigüidade tal como Locke descreve ao apresentar como "uma técnica que consiste em pressionar um homem com as conseqüências extraídas de seus próprios princípios ou concessões" 455 . Por esse motivo, a afirmação presente no Tratado – de que toda argumentação é uma argumentação ad hominem – costuma gerar mal entendidos e contestações prévias. Mas, o sentido em que Perelman faz uso da expressão, pretende evidenciar que o homem é o alvo de qualquer forma de argumentação enunciada. Afinal, o homem vive em sociedade, discute com seus semelhantes e tenta, intencionalmente ou não, levá-los a compartilhar de algumas opiniões e realizar certas ações. É relativamente raro que recorra, para tanto, unicamente à coação. Em geral, procura persuadir ou convencer e, com esse intuito, raciocina – na acepção mais ampla deste termo – e administra provas, donde decorre a importância (vital) da sua argumentação. Ante a afirmação aristotélica de que o homem é um animal político (zoon politikon), poderíamos considerá-lo um animal argumentador, pois a sua vida política (na pólis) depende diretamente de sua habilidade argumentativa. 454 PERELMAN, 1996, p. 70. 455 LOCKE, John. Ensaio acerca do entendimento humano. São Paulo: Abril, 1978, p.335. (Os Pensadores) - 195 - A associação da Teoria da Argumentação à Retórica pode suscitar uma aproximação do processo argumentativo ao entrave dialógico, diante do qual, em um clima bélico, duas pessoas se armam de palavras e travam uma espécie de disputa verbal com o intuito de fazer prevalecer o seu ponto de vista. Entretanto, essa batalha de palavras ou idéias não se constitui necessariamente na exposição de argumentos. Em uma perspectiva razoável, tal como a proposta por Perelman, apresentar um argumento consiste em fornecer um conjunto de razões que favoreçam a aceitação de uma conclusão. Assim sendo, a idéia de que um argumento seja visto como a afirmação da cosmovisão de um indivíduo específico deve ser descartada, assim como não é possível concebê-lo como uma mera disputa ideológica. Os argumentos são tentativas de fundamentação de certas opiniões de maneira razoável. Neste sentido, os argumentos e, conseqüentemente, o estudo deles são de importância fundamental. Uma boa argumentação possibilita, dentre outras coisas, uma explicação concisa de uma idéia, ou de um conjunto delas, fazendo com que alguns pontos de vista prevaleçam em relação a outros menos fundamentados. Um bom argumento oferece elementos para que o interlocutor seja cativado e creia que as idéias fornecidas são capazes de possibilitar a formação de uma nova opinião acerca daquilo que se discorre. Se o argüente possibilita a mudança de itinerário do pensamento do seu auditório e faz com que seu ouvinte seja movido a mudar de idéia, em função da organização racional dos seus pontos de vista, diremos que o argumento foi bem sucedido e a argumentação foi eficiente. A sustentação de que toda argumentação é uma argumentação ad hominem permite desvelar o que se encontra encoberto pela freqüente imprecisão e ambigüidade que perpassa a exposição de alguns oradores. Algumas hipóteses sugeridas por um orador, nem sempre são apoiadas com boas razões e sua obscuridade faz perder a exata dimensão da utilidade delas. Muitas vezes, não é possível sequer identificá-los como provas. Diante disso, torna-se comum solicitar a apresentação de outros argumentos. Quanto mais argumentos são necessários para se conseguir a anuência de um auditório, menos relevantes são as provas que apóiam suas diferentes conclusões. A argumentação, no campo da Nova Retórica, é uma habilidade desenvolvida com o objetivo de sustentar opiniões e a obtenção da audiência representa um sinal dessa capacidade. Perelman sugere, por sua vez, a inexistência de idéias evidentes (óbvias), que se sustentem por si mesmas, motivo pelo qual apresenta a argumentação como um processo de fundamentação de idéias que se torna possível por meio de uma organização - 196 - articulada das palavras, com base no reconhecimento dos valores e dos lugares (topoi). Por meio da argumentação se oferecem, de forma encadeada, determinadas razões para sustentar uma tese e buscar adesões a esta última. Essas razões são susceptíveis de múltiplas interpretações e freqüentemente marcadas pela subjetividade de quem argumenta e do contexto em que o faz. Assim, Um argumento que persuade um auditório pode exercer apenas um pequeno efeito sobre um outro. Para apreciar o valor, e não somente a eficácia dos argumentos, é normal, à míngua de critérios objetivos, referir-se à qualidade do auditório que é persuadido pelo discurso. 456 A preocupação e importância do auditório na aplicação dos argumentos desvela a estreita relação que existe entre o processo argumentativo e o campo da Retórica, motivo pelo qual a argumentação, para Perelman, implica em reunir provas e justificativas capazes de sustentar uma idéia que se pretende incutir em outrem 457 . A aceitação desta concepção não esclarece, todavia, o que Perelman quer dizer ao afirmar que "toda argumentação é ad hominem". Afinal, a afirmação perelmaniana se fundamenta no pressuposto segundo o qual a argumentação depende do reconhecimento de valores e da vontade de se deixar convencer ou do desejo de persuadir. No primeiro caso, temos a noção de auditório demarcando a possibilidade da argumentação; no segundo, a distinção entre o convencer e o persuadir se dá como elemento de mediação no estabelecimento de acordo entre as partes envolvidas no diálogo. Em qualquer caso, há indivíduos dialogando entre si com o intuito de provar algo e, para isso, fazendo uso de expedientes retóricos eficazes para fazer prevalecer suas idéias diante dos demais. Este processo de construção, refutação ou sustentação de crenças, coloca os indivíduos em processo permanente de disputa, apresentando diversos elementos para sustentar suas próprias idéias, justificar uma opinião, ou mesmo para compor um argumento comum. Perelman estabelece quatro tipos de argumentação próximos entre si pela sua estrutura e aplicação: (1) a argumentação ad rem, (2) ad hominem, (3) ad personam e (4) ad humanitatem. Todas parecem estar fundamentadas no estudo schopenhaueriano, conforme 456 PERELMAN, 2000, 536. 457 Cf. p.12, Introdução. - 197 - sugere, inclusive, as notas e citações do próprio autor, sobretudo no caso da primeira e terceira delas, ou seja, no caso das tipologias ad rem e ad personam. A argumentação ad hominem sofre interferências da noção aristotélica, mas aparece confusa no pensamento de Perelman. Não se percebe, ao certo, se há uma aproximação entre o ad hominem e as falácias de relevância. De qualquer forma, preferimos dissociar essa aproximação tomando como base a afirmação do próprio Perelman de que "os argumentos ad hominem são, em geral, [erroneamente] 458 qualificados de pseudo-argumentos". Cabe ressaltar, inclusive, que a pseudo-argumentação é uma forma deturpada de apresentação de idéias que, por sua imperfeição, se opõe à argumentação dirigida ao auditório universal, sendo esta, por sua vez, equivalente ao ideal, ao melhor. Ora, para que se possa desenvolver uma argumentação é preciso, efetivamente, reconhecer algumas premissas que serão previamente admitidas no início do processo argumentativo. Tais premissas servem de sustentação para uma tese que se pretende defender ou contestar. No primeiro caso, ou seja, no caso em que se pretende defender uma conclusão (tese), é preciso angariar a adesão do auditório acerca das premissas que são apresentadas para fazê-lo aceitar, por conseqüência, a tese que delas decorre. No segundo caso, entretanto, para contestar a tese que se expõe torna-se necessário fragilizar as premissas da argumentação do interlocutor fazendo-o reconhecer sua improcedência e/ou suas limitações para sustentar a conclusão que delas decorre. Em qualquer um dos casos, o ponto de partida de argumentação consiste no assentimento daquilo que se admite como válido para o desenvolvimento do diálogo. É neste sentido que Perelman afirma ser toda argumentação – em amplo sentido – uma argumentação ad hominem, visto que toda argumentação depende do que o interlocutor esteja disposto a admitir. A afirmação do caráter ad hominem da argumentação está vinculada à associação que se faz entre a argumentação e a questão do auditório. A importância da anuência do auditório se consolida pelos objetos de acordo que podem ser fatos, verdades, presunções, valores, hierarquias e lugares. Esses objetos de acordo, por sua vez, são apresentados por Perelman como pontos de partida da argumentação. Portanto, os pontos de partida de uma argumentação são elementos que dependem da anuência do auditório. Ou seja: para que haja argumentação é preciso haver não apenas um auditório, mas um acordo prévio acerca das premissas que serão admitidas como ponto de partida para a discussão. Chegamos, destarte, à 458 Grifo Nosso - 198 - conclusão de que sem a anuência do auditório não há argumentação. Considerando-se que toda argumentação está voltada para um auditório, e este, por sua vez, é composto por indivíduos que têm opiniões e reconhecem valores, pode-se entender o que Perelman estava sugerindo ao afirmar que toda argumentação é ad hominem. Para haver uma argumentação é necessária a existência de um acordo prévio, garantindo que os interlocutores não venham a pôr em dúvida – posteriormente – aquilo que se admite como pertinente para a discussão [afirmação] que se propõem a discutir [defender]. Quer dizer, no processo argumentativo é preciso evocar a plausibilidade, o razoável, como sustentação da tese que se pretende defender. Neste ponto, a teoria de Perelman acerca da argumentação busca amparo no princípio da inércia que serve como base para a técnica jurídica do precedente, utilizada por Perelman para sustentar a sua regra de justiça, visto que a inércia permite contar com o normal, o habitual, o real, o atual e valorizá-lo, quer se trate de uma situação existente, de uma opinião admitida ou de um estado de desenvolvimento contínuo e regular.. a mudança em compensação, deve ser justificada; uma decisão, uma vez tomada, só pode ser alterada por razões suficientes. 459 Em outras palavras, não existe uma "rocha dura" em que se pode firmar uma argumentação tornando-a sólida e incontestável, porque os argumentos se baseiam em opiniões/valores que se supõe admitidos pelo auditório – sendo dependentes da anuência do interlocutor que lhe confere aval e relevância conforme o caso. Mas, diante da inexistência de uma "rocha dura" capaz de suster um argumento, é possível que se cometa o equívoco de supor admitidas teses e premissas que, de fato, não estejam admitidas pelo interlocutor / auditório. Quer dizer, o orador pode incorrer no erro de apoiar-se em premissas não admitidas pelo auditório fundamentando-se em valores ou teses não compartilhadas por este último. Neste caso, postula-se o que se quer provar e, desta forma, incorre-se em petição de princípio, visto que se supõe erroneamente que o auditório já aceitou uma tese que se pretende que ele admita. Desta forma, a afirmação perelmaniana de que "toda argumentação é ad hominem" está vinculada à noção de Controvérsia Filosófica que Perelman adota de Johnstone Jr. 459 PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p. 120, § 2. - 199 - 4 . 7 . A C ont r ovér s i a de J ohns tone e o A d H omi nem de P er el ma n Para Johnstone Jr., a argumentação consiste em uma ferramenta estratégica utilizada sempre que desejamos "controlar a ação ou a crença de outra pessoa". Sua função é estritamente suasória e sua aplicação está condicionada à existência de um interlocutor e ao efetivo compartilhamento de idéias. O seu campo de atuação implica na ausência de provas concretas ou irrefutáveis, pois requer a presença de conteúdos subjetivos ou condicionados à anuência dos interlocutores. Na linha dessa afirmação, é possível lembrar que o seu uso se aplica quando faltam outros mecanismos mais eficientes para o controle efetivo das ações de um auditório ou quando os meios disponíveis mostram-se inadequados em virtude de critérios exteriores à sua esfera de atuação. A argumentação é, na concepção de Johnstone, um controle não efetivo, motivo pelo qual a sua utilização implica no constante risco de falhar. Nesta acepção, o processo de Argumentação é movido por uma intencionalidade, cujo fim último é a persuasão do interlocutor, visto que o exercício da argumentação pressupõe a vontade de modificar o comportamento de uma pessoa ou de um conjunto de pessoas. O indivíduo que argumenta quer suscitar a adesão do auditório às suas teses. Porém, como não se trata de uma demonstração em que o consentimento se impõe à razão, em uma argumentação a adesão do auditório não se impõe, nem tampouco pode ser imposta; precisa ser conquistada. Uma argumentação é susceptível de ser refutada a partir de uma contra-argumentação, porque os dados apresentados num processo argumentativo são controversos ou propensos à controvérsia. Johnstone destaca que a argumentação é o método filosófico por excelência, visto que o fim de uma argumentação não é deduzir conseqüências de certas premissas, mas provocar ou aumentar a adesão de um auditório às teses que se apresentam ao seu assentimento. Mas, contrariamente ao que se pode imaginar, a argumentação nunca se desenvolve no vazio, ela precisa de elementos prévios que lhe sirvam de base à contestação. Este elemento prévio consiste nas afirmações adotadas anteriormente pelos seus autores: suas teses e ou teorias. Há, contudo, algo de específico no que concerne à argumentação filosófica. Mas, em que sentido é - 200 - possível falar de uma especificidade da argumentação filosófica? Qual a natureza e função da noção de controvérsia desenvolvida por Johnstone? Que tipo de ruído ou interferência as teses de Johnstone provocam na Teoria da Argumentação de Perelman? No que se refere à especificidade da argumentação filosófica é dispensável salientar que existe uma diferença essencial entre a construção de argumentos no campo filosófico e a construção de argumentos na esfera das ciências, sobretudo entre as lógico-dedutivas. Mas, em que ponto eles se distinguem? Conforme sugere Johnstone, a argumentação filosófica não enuncia, como acontece no campo das ciências lógico-dedutivas, por exemplo, proposições verdadeiras ou falsas 460 . Pelo contrário, suas afirmações são completamente ambíguas num contexto exterior àquele que a suscitou, ou seja, a argumentação filosófica é naturalmente controversa porque suas afirmações, teses ou conclusões necessitam de uma análise rigorosa e apurada acerca da aplicação dos seus conceitos e noções na tentativa de reduzir, ao máximo, as ambigüidades naturais que podem emanar de uma interpretação descomprometida com o rigor filosófico. Nessa perspectiva, a atitude de um filósofo se distingue claramente da atitude de um matemático, visto que The mathematician is free to assume the postulate of parallels or not, depending upon his purposes. The assumption he makes represents a selection from the class of possible geometries, and this class is itself a subject of possible mathematical study. But the supposition that the mechanical explanation is the only one possible does not represent a selection from a class of possible suppositions. From the point of view of the scientist who supposes it, there is no choice between this supposition and others; there is only a choice between this supposition on the one hand and irresponsibility, superstition, or nonsense on the other. In order to be scientific at all, one must suppose ( or the scientist in this historical situation supposes that he must suppose ) that the mechanical explanation alone is possible. This mode of explanation is not merely a supposition; it is rather a presupposition of scientific thinking. The scientist is free to choose his assumptions, but he is not free to choose his presuppositions. Indeed, they are not even 460 "A proposition is, after all, true or false regardless of whatever arguments have been devised in favor of it or against it; this is a part of the meaning of the term "proposition: ' An alternative reply is that where there is no positive assurance that future arguments cannot be brought to bear against a scientific statement, the latter is not regarded as true at all, but only as probable or tentative. A true statement is, strictly speaking, one open to no further revision. Scientific statements are not true at all if their truth is relative to anything, such as argument, that is capable of serving as the occasion of revision. If true, they are, in the sense that the present context requires, absolutely true. If experimental science can properly make no such statements at any stage of its history, the conclusion is not that its truths are relative to argu-ment, but rather that the notion of absolute truth must operate as an ideal goal of scientific inquiry. To think of a scientific statement as true is to think of it as independent of any argument, whether or not there actually ever have been such statements". (Cf. JOHNSTONE Jr., Argument and Truth in Philosophy, 1959, p.24). - 201 - his presuppositions; they are the presuppositions of science. Humans assume; statements and systems of statements presuppose. 461 Um geômetra, por exemplo, pode desenvolver um sistema de geometria euclidiano e, para reforçar as suas hipóteses, lançar mão de um sistema não-euclidiano, pois neste caso há de se fazer uma opção diante do elenco de geometrias disponíveis 462 . O mesmo não ocorre no caso da filosofia, visto que contrariamente ao matemático, o filósofo precisa dirimir os seus problemas pautando-se na incompatibilidade resultante de afirmações que não decorrem necessariamente da experiência, facultando-lhe a capacidade de resolver as incompatibilidades que se lhes concerne pela sua conformidade com o real. Desta forma, resta-lhe recorrer a soluções baseadas em compromissos ontológicos – e, em certos casos, axiológicos – previamente assumidos. Em outras palavras, a solução de um problema filosófico requer o desenvolvimento de um sistema baseado em acordos previamente assumidos. Assim sendo, a argumentação filosófica é controversa porque o sentido das suas afirmações está atrelado ao contexto filosófico do qual elas emanam, restringindo a possibilidade de interpretação das suas teses ao seu contexto argumentativo. Esta vinculação ao contexto, entretanto, traz algumas complexidades que apenas podem ser dissolvidas quando se entende a natureza e função da controvérsia filosófica. Há de se questionar, contudo, qual a natureza e função da noção de controvérsia desenvolvida por Johnstone. A controvérsia filosófica objetiva a manutenção do desacordo, sua função é a conservação da divergência porque a sua natureza é essencialmente dissentânea. Nessa perspectiva, o dissentimento é o que promove o engrandecimento da atividade filosófica. 463 Entretanto, há de se compreender que a estruturação de um sistema filosófico não surge de idéias fundadas exclusivamente na opinião daqueles que a enunciam, mas pressupõe o 461 JOHNSTONE Jr., 1959, p.33. 462 Endossando esta concepção, observa Johnstone, em outro texto: "No one claims, for example, that Boolean algebra is incompatible with projective geometry, and no one attempts to eliminate the latter in favor of the former or vice versa". (JOHNSTONE Jr., Formal Systems and Ontological Systems, 1959, p.118). 463 Cf. Argument and Truth in Philosophy (JOHNSTONE Jr., 1959, p.19-37). - 202 - máximo de força e relevância das suas afirmações 464 , motivo pelo qual se inspira no modelo de argumentação válido sem, contudo, ficar dependendo de uma correção meramente formal. Uma boa ilustração apresentada por Johnstone em Argumentation and Selfhood 465 traz teorias pertencentes a Aristóteles e Hume. Tais exemplos pretendem ratificar que uma argumentação filosófica procura, sempre que possível, manter-se fiel aos commitments 466 assumidos pelo filósofo. Mas, é preciso ainda verificar que tipo de ruído ou "interferência" as teses de Johnstone provocam na Teoria da Argumentação de Perelman. De antemão cabe ressaltar que as teorias desenvolvidas por Johnstone a respeito da controvérsia, bem como as sugestões acerca da argumentação ad honimem são anteriores à publicação do Tratado de Perelman. Muitas das teorias encontradas no Tratado da Argumentação, aliás, estão presentes em trabalhos de Johnstone publicados no início da década de 1950 do século passado. A concepção de que "qualquer controvérsia filosófica pertinente tem de consistir em uma argumentação ad hominem", incorporada por Perelman no Tratado da Argumentação 467 , por exemplo, foi apresentada em Philosophy and Argumentum ad Hominem, publicado no Journal of Philosophy, em 1952. 468 O mesmo ocorre com a questão da controvérsia filosófica, cujas bases se encontram em escritos publicados, sobretudo, entre 1953 e 1958. 469 464 "A rigorous proof, however, can have force; indeed, this is part of the meaning of saying that it is rigorous. Among formally valid arguments with respect to which the question of force arises at all, only those lack force whose premises, while claimed to be true, are in fact open to doubt. But since the truth of a philosophical premise can always be doubted, all formally valid philosophical arguments will lack force. So the notion of formal validity does not seem to be of much use in answering the question whether valid philo-sophical arguments are possible. The very attempt to set up a philosophical argument in such a way as to make it possible to ascertain whether it is formally valid or not seems inevitably to result in a misrepresentation of the argument". (JOHNSTONE Jr., 1959, p. 67). 465 Cf. JOHNSTONE Jr., 1959, p. 123-ss. 466 Preferimos não adotar a tradução da expressão Commitments por Compromissos, por acreditarmos que embora seja a mais adequada, não é capaz de traduzir com fidelidade o sentido empregado por Johnstone. Afinal, os commitments, em Johnstone, funcionam como a "aceitação de valores" proposta por Perelman, mas a tradução de Commitments por adesão, por exemplo, pareceria forçosa e desnecessária. Assim, mantivemos a expressão em sua escrita original. 467 Cf. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.125. 468 JOHNSTONE Jr., 1952, p. 489-98. 469 A esse respeito pode-se verificar os seguintes escritos: The Methods of Philosophical Polemic. Methodos. n. 5, v.18. Milan: 1953, p. 131-40. ; The Nature of Philosophical Controversy. Journal of Ph ilosophy. n. 51, v.10: 1954, p. 294-300. ; A New Theory of Philosophical Argumentation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. n. 15, v.2: 1954, p. 244-52. ; Some Aspects of Philosophical Disagreement. Dialectica. n. 8, v.3: 1954. p. 245-57. ; The Logical Powerfulness of Philosophical Arguments. Mind. n. 64, v.3, 1955, p. 539-41. ; Argument and Truth in Philosophy. Philosophy andPhenomenological Research n.18, v.2: 1957, p. 228-36. ; New Outlooks on Controversy. Review of Metaphysics. n. 12, v.1: 1958, p.57-67. ; Systémes formels et systémes ontologiques. Logique et analyse. n.1, v.1: 1958, p. 24-27. - 203 - Façamos uma leitura de Johnstone à luz do pensamento de Perelman, para compreendermos como as teses do primeiro foram capazes de influenciar o pensamento do segundo. Perelman faz distinção entre os tipos de auditório, concedendo um destaque especial aos auditórios particular e universal. 470 O auditório universal seria aquele que manipula apenas a prova lógica, enquanto os auditórios particulares comportariam as provas dialéticas. No primeiro caso teríamos um campo dotado de condições para a aplicação de enunciados que comportem juízos do tipo verdadeiro ou falso, enquanto no segundo encontramos afirmações que podem ser plausíveis ou não. As questões filosóficas se enquadrariam nesta segunda categoria. Para Johnstone, as questões filosóficas têm o seu campo de aplicação determinado pelos diferentes e variados contextos nos quais podem estar situadas. Sua significação está condicionada pelo contexto filosófico, pois somente em seu contexto argumentativo as teses filosóficas adquirem significado. Tal afirmação parece ter como objetivo extirpar do contexto filosófico as questões relativas aos fatos. Contudo, é preciso observar que um sistema filosófico não consiste em uma construção conceitual completamente alheia ao conjunto dos fatos, mas implica em interpretações diversas, de um mesmo conjunto de fatos, a partir dos seus modos de assimilação. Assim sendo, é possível verificar que Johnstone cometeu um equívoco ao colocar as questões relativas aos fatos totalmente alheias à Filosofia, pois um sistema filosófico não se constitui fora dos fatos, mas integrando-os à sua maneira. Não é por mera coincidência que um sistema filosófico jamais pode apresentar-se como pronto, fechado e acabado, mas está em constante submissão à prova, levantando novas dificuldades e promovendo fecundas discussões; afinal, quanto maior o número de fatos que podem ser agregados ao sistema filosófico, maior será a sua demonstração de fecundidade. Ora, se a argumentação consiste em uma ferramenta para controlar a ação ou a crença do auditório, e a argumentação filosófica é naturalmente controversa, porque suas afirmações estão intrinsecamente relacionadas ao contexto do qual emanam, a argumentação filosófica, além de ser persuasiva por natureza, está associada à manutenção do descordo, visto que 470 Grande, aliás, tem sido a quantidade de artigos e teses dedicados a este tema. Como referência cabe algumas citações especiais: GOLDEN, G. ; PILLOTA, Joseph. J. The Universal Audience Revisited. Pratical reasoning and human affairs: studies in honor of Chaïm Perelman. Reidel: Dordrecht, 1986. ; RAY, John W. Perelman's Universal Audience. Quarterly Journal of Speech, n.64 (December) 1978, p. 361-75. ; SCULT, Allen. Perelman's Universal Audience: One Perspective. Central States Speech Journal. n.27, (Fall) 1976, p.176-80. - 204 - decorre da divergência de opiniões a necessidade de revisão, aclaramento e reinterpretação das noções que se lhes compõe. O essencial é, porém, a suposição de Johnstone segundo a qual a controvérsia filosófica consiste no uso apropriado do argumento ad hominem. Em suas palavras: A constructive philosophical argument, when valid, is very much like a valid argumentum ad hominem. The only important difference is that the philosopher using a constructive argument considers what he himself is bound to admit, in conformity to his own principles of reasoning or in consistency with his own conduct or situation, rather than considering what someone else is bound to admit. The constructive argument is thus essentially an argumentum ad seipsum. 471 Cabe observar que, enquanto a controvérsia filosófica se traduz pelo uso apropriado do argumento ad hominem, a única possibilidade de réplica que se põe a esse tipo de argumentação consiste na utilização do que Perelman qualifica como regra de justiça, ou seja, requisitar um "tratamento igual diante de questões essencialmente semelhantes". A aplicação do ad hominem, requisitada e defendida por Johnstone, equivale, portanto, ao uso da regra de justiça preconizada por Perelman desde a construção do De la Justice. Esta constatação serve de amparo para não destituirmos de Perelman os méritos concernentes ao desenvolvimento da sua teoria. Através de Johnstone, Perelman conseguiu encontrar mais elementos para sustentar uma idéia que já lhe era clara há algum tempo. Diante de um conjunto de idéias, naturalmente inacabadas, Perelman se viu ante novas dificuldades que possibilitaram o ajuste de sua teoria a uma outra – desenvolvida por Johnstone – que não lhe era concorrente, mas semelhante em seus propósitos. Desta forma, a afirmação de que "toda argumentação é uma argumentação ad hominem" 472 , em Perelman, tem função semelhante a afirmação de que "qualquer controvérsia filosófica pertinente tem de se constituir em uma argumentação ad hominem", tal como sugerido por Johnstone 473 . Nos dois casos, subjaz a idéia que mesmo um argumento construtivo, ou seja, que não consista num ataque ao interlocutor, constitui um argumento ad hominem por meio do qual o filósofo se atém a defender uma posição adotada anteriormente. Tal como proposto pela regra de justiça, o uso do ad hominem consiste na utilização dos 471 Cf. JOHNSTONE Jr., 1959, p. 79. 472 Cf. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.125. 473 Cf. JOHNSTONE Jr., 1959, p. 79. - 205 - próprios argumentos do interlocutor, mostrando que este último fez uso de princípios que ele mesmo recusou anteriormente. Em outras palavras, a utilização do argumento ad hominem afere a idéia de que a pessoa com quem se dialoga não concedeu "tratamento igual em situações essencialmente semelhantes", constituindo, portanto, uma petição de princípio. "A petição de princípio consiste [no plano da teoria da argumentação] 474 no uso do argumento ad hominem quando ele não é utilizável, porque ela supõe que o interlocutor já aderiu a uma tese que o orador se esforça por fazê-lo admitir 475 ". Corresponde a um erro estratégico supor admitidas premissas ou valores que, de fato, não o foram concebidas pelo interlocutor. Tal é o caso do argumento de Eudoxo 476 , apresentado por Aristóteles no segundo capítulo do Livro X da Ética a Nicômaco. 477 Nas palavras de Aristóteles: Eudoxo argumentava que o prazer, quando acrescentado a um bem qualquer, como, por exemplo, à ação justa ou temperante, o torna mais digno de escolha, e que o bem só pode ser acrescido por si mesmo. Este argumento parece mostrar que ele é um dos bens, mas que não o é mais do que um outro qualquer; pois qualquer bem é mais digno de escolha quando acompanhado de um outro do que quando sozinho. E é mesmo por um argumento desta espécie que Platão 478 demonstra não ser o bem o prazer. Diz ele que a vida aprazível é mais desejável quando acompanhada de sabedoria do que sem ela, e que, se a mistura é melhor, o prazer não é o bem; porque o bem não pode tornar-se mais desejável pela adição do que quer que seja. Ora, é claro que não só o prazer, mas nenhuma outra coisa pode ser o bem se a adição de uma das coisas que são boas em si mesmas a torna mais desejável. 479 Eudoxo pretende afirmar que o prazer é o maior dos bens, porque qualquer coisa se torna mais desejável com a adição de prazer 480 , mas a objeção de Aristóteles inspirada nas idéias de Platão, faz uso de expediente análogo para sugerir que a sabedoria é que consiste no 474 Grifo nosso. 475 Cf. PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 1999, p.127. 476 Eudoxo de Cnidos (408-355 a.C) viajou a Tarento, atualmente na Itália, para estudar com Arquitas, que foi um discípulo de Pitágoras. Eudoxo fez importantes contribuições para a teoria da proporção, criando uma definição que permitia a comparação de comprimentos irracionais de maneira análoga à multiplicação em cruz hoje existente. O'Connor, John J. ; Robertson, Edmund F. The MacTutor History of Mathematics archive. UK, 2000. 477 O próprio Johnstone utilizou este exemplo em Argumentation and Selfhood (Cf. JOHNSTONE Jr., 1959, p. 64- 67). 478 PLATÃO. Filebo. Trad.: Carlos Alberto Nunes. Belém: Universidade Federal do Pará, 1974, p.60. 479 ARISTÓTELES, Ética a Nicômaco, 1978, 1172b 10. 480 Esta é, inclusive, a mesma idéia que o cristianismo adota em seus cânones. Para São João Crisóstomo, por exemplo, o verdadeiro bem, o bem por excelência, não é aquele que só parece um bem em comparação com o mal ; mas, aquele que ainda é melhor que os bens incontestados. (S. João Crisóstomo, Virg. 10, 1; FC 16). - 206 - bem por excelência, visto que, ao ser acrescentada a uma boa coisa, tornaria igualmente o resultado ainda mais desejável. A utilização de um argumento desta natureza contra a argumentação de Eudoxo consiste em uma contra-argumentação do tipo ad hominem, porque permite concluir, por um argumento semelhante ao deste último, que é a sabedoria, e não o prazer, que constitui o bem supremo. A objeção contra Eudoxo torna-se forte pois, fazendo uso do próprio argumento deste, evoca a regra de justiça para exigir a sua anuência, sob o pressuposto de que diante de situações essencialmente semelhantes é preciso adotar o mesmo tipo de tratamento. Eudoxo, portanto, não poderia escapar à objeção de Aristóteles senão mostrando em que a situação alegada pelo estagirita difere daquela relatada por ele mesmo. - 207 - C o n s i d e r a ç õ e s F i n a i s A preocupação central deste trabalho foi identificar o motivo pelo qual Perelman afirma peremptoriamente que toda argumentação é uma argumentação ad hominem. Compreender o seu posicionamento e as suas expectativas diante de tal asserção era o desafio que movia a necessidade de indagar esta afirmação tão incisiva para tentar pensar conforme o autor. Queria saber em que sentido Perelman afirmava ser toda argumentação uma argumentação ad hominem. A busca de justificativas para este argumento conduziu a duas possibilidades: (1) Toda argumentação é falaciosa porque incorre na falácia de relevância do tipo ad hominem e, (2) A argumentação ad hominem não consiste em uma falácia de relevância, mas representa um recurso criterioso de averiguação da solidez de um argumento. Para esclarecer essas suspeitas foi necessário efetuar uma releitura da formação intelectual de Perelman em busca de elementos e subsídios capazes de sustentar a natureza da afirmação. O perigo inerente a este percurso adotado se traduz pelo risco iminente de abandonar a questão filosófica e adentrar no percurso histórico do autor, esquecendo-se de efetuar as devidas ilações com o propósito da pesquisa. Para prover este propósito procuramos situar O problema lógico e a preocupação com a questão da linguagem no cerne dos interesses perelmanianos antecedendo, inclusive, a sua motivação por temas relacionados ao campo do Direito. Daí foram recolhidas as informações necessárias para compor o elenco de referências [e influências] intelectuais que exerceram grande prestígio sobre a formação do pensamento de Perelman. A afirmação perelmaniana de que toda argumentação é uma argumentação ad hominem, por exemplo, consiste na incorporação apressada de teorias desenvolvidas por Johnstone Jr. que, àquela época, ainda não se encontravam devidamente amadurecidas. Quando optamos pela investigação das idéias de Perelman, desde a sua tenra juventude, procurávamos encontrar, no decorrer do seu desenvolvimento intelectual, bases para justificar o amadurecimento de uma idéia nodal que aparece no Tratado da Argumentação. Esta idéia, embora não mereça qualquer destaque na composição da obra, surge como a mais incisiva afirmação efetuada por Perelman nesse trabalho que, sem qualquer dúvida, é o mais relevante - 208 - e conhecido da sua carreira. Mas por qual motivo terá Perelman incorporado esta afirmação, descomprometendo-se de responsabilidades filosóficas acerca da sustentação das suas suposições? Talvez a certeza de que a discussão acerca dos commitments, em Johnstone Jr. traz consigo a possibilidade de sustentar a sua Teoria da Argumentação fundamentando-a na dissociação entre os tipos de auditório e reforçando a distinção entre os modos de convencer e os modos de persuadir. Os commitments assumidos pelo filósofo permitem a aplicação da regra de justiça e, por conseguinte, concedem destaque ao fato de que somente por meio de uma argumentação ad hominem é possível sustentar argumentos em Filosofia e nas Ciências Humanas. Assim, Perelman encontrou no pensamento de Johnstone Jr. alguns elementos que lhe pareceram essenciais para a sustentação da sua própria teoria. Afinal, já existia uma afirmação acerca da regra de justiça e, por conseguinte, uma distinção entre os modos de convencer e os modos de persuadir, mostrando-os como dissociados, mas, em certos casos, complementares. Seguindo a idéia johnstoniana de que "toda argumentação em filosofia é controversa" e firmada sobre a argumentação ad hominem, Perelman acreditou ter encontrado o sustentáculo ideal aos elementos que lhe pareciam necessários para concluir o Tratado da Argumentação. Pela observação cronológica dos escritos de Perelman pode-se perceber que a construção do Tratado da Argumentação possui interferência técnica de Olbrechts-Tyteca. E mais, pela natureza das idéias, sua edificação foi notadamente marcada por ruídos teóricos oriundos de uma efervescência conceitual resultante de discussões e críticas aprofundadas durante a década de 50', período em que Perelman viajou bastante para a formação de suas idéias. O Tratado é frágil, na medida em que não dispõe de boas premissas para sustentar muitas de suas conclusões. Entretanto, isso não o torna uma obra menor; pelo contrário, ele traz consigo excelentes idéias para uma problematização posterior. Tal é o caso, por exemplo, da Problematologia de Meyer e da Nova Dialética de Eemeren e Grootendorst 481 . Estas novas teorias buscam corrigir ou, no mínimo, atenuar equívocos cometidos pelos autores do Tratado. Em alguns casos, elas procuram dar sustentação a dados que foram pouco aprofundados ou negligenciados no Tratado da Argumentação, mas, no caso específico da afirmação de que "toda argumentação é ad hominem", pode-se perceber que mesmo Perelman sentiu a necessidade de conceder um melhor detalhamento do que queria expressar por meio de sua 481 Cf. p.90 e p.152. - 209 - afirmação, motivo pelo qual, em 1960 escreveu o artigo Philosophie et argumentation 482 , em que ele retoma a questão e confere-lhe a gênese em Johnstone Jr., comentando e apresentando indícios acerca das suas falhas e benesses. Aliás, em relação à fragilidade de certas teses perelmanianas, podemos dizer que, do ponto de vista teórico, a natureza confusa dos conceitos centrais da Nova Retórica é o seu mais grave problema. Embora Perelman defendesse o uso das noções confusas 483 , por serem capazes de promover uma disposição para a ação, conferindo-lhe importância fundamental no processo argumentativo que se exerce no campo das humanidades, isso não o isenta da crítica de promover um bloqueio conceitual no tocante ao esclarecimento de certas noções que ele parece pressupor termos previamente esclarecidas. Duas observações, nesse caso, parecem fundamentais: (1) Argumentar sobre questões práticas é diferente de escrever uma obra teórica sobre a questão da argumentação, motivo pelo qual parece um grande equívoco, cometido por Perelman, partir do pressuposto que temos previamente esclarecidas certas noções que são aplicadas, por vezes exaustivamente, no interior do Tratado. Afinal, uma obra de natureza filosófica deve, sobretudo, explicar e esclarecer a utilização de certos conceitos que lhe são fundamentais - este é, aliás, o seu ponto de partida. Ao eximir-se desta responsabilidade, e fazer valer-se do uso de noções confusas para conceder explicações e esclarecimentos conceituais fundamentais, Perelman obscurece aquilo que é essencial, as noções preliminares para a investigação filosófica. (2) A obscuridade conceitual tem um limite, para que o uso das noções confusas não se converta em abuso 484 - tal como o próprio Perelman apregoa, embora na prática utilize maneira contrária. Deve-se, portanto, mesmo nos casos em que se deseja estritamente persuadir, levar em conta um limite desejável do uso de noções confusas. Ora, se do ponto de vista teórico, a falta de clareza dos conceitos centrais da Nova Retórica, é o mais grave problema encontrado na Teoria da Argumentação de Perelman, do ponto de vista prático esse problema resvala em uma espécie de espírito conservador. Este conservadorismo guarda consigo uma estreita relação com a obscuridade das noções que compõem o escopo teórico da sua Teoria da Argumentação, ou seja, das noções que se apresentam como estruturantes da sua teoria, como é o caso dos conceitos de pluralismo, 482 PERELMAN, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, n.51, 1960, p. 96-100. 483 Cf. p.34 484 PERELMAN, L'usage et l'abus des notions confuses, 1978, p. 5-17. - 210 - razoabilidade e ad hominem que, em último caso, remetem aos de regra de justiça e auditório universal. Com base nos dados recolhidos nessa investigação preliminar, referendados pela cronologia dos escritos de Perelman, tornou-se possível desmistificar certas crenças referentes ao modo como ele se posiciona e cultua a importância do Direito e da Justiça, inclusive para a Filosofia, para fazer entender que a sua Teoria da Argumentação consiste no empreendimento de um grande esforço para sustentar uma concepção alargada de Lógica que supõe um tipo de racionalidade específico que se exerce nas práticas humanas. Esta noção de racionalidade, entretanto, é confusa. De qualquer modo, Perelman 485 encontrará nessa idéia uma posição intermediaria entre o racional (ou seja, as razões necessárias, constringentes) e o irracional (o arbitrário): o razoável. A noção de razoabilidade se interpõe entre a unilateralidade racionalista e uma concepção unilateralmente arbitrária 486 . O razoável se define em função de um auditório, mas esse auditório – por exemplo, no caso do Direito – não é o auditório universal (entendido como os membros esclarecidos da sociedade) nem tampouco um auditório particular, configurado pelos especialistas em Direito, os tribunais superiores ou o legislador 487 . Percebe-se, mais uma vez, que Perelman utiliza um conceito de maneira ambígua e inconsistente, visto que o problema da razoabilidade reside na questão do equilíbrio entre opiniões contrapostas. Evidentemente há muitas razões para duvidar de opiniões controversas, de maneira tal que não é possível tomar uma decisão capaz de satisfazer facilmente a ambas as partes. Como definir, nestes casos, o que consiste em uma decisão razoável? Segundo Perelman 488 , o conceito de decisão razoável varia histórica e socialmente, ou seja, o que é razoável em uma determinada sociedade e em determinado momento pode deixar de sê-lo em outro meio ou em outra época. Todavia, num mesmo momento histórico e meio social pode haver uma pluralidade de decisões possíveis e razoáveis. Mas que decisão se deve tomar? A 485 Perelman orienta seu trabalho com base nas idéias de seu mestre E. Dupréel. 486 Cf. BOBBIO, Perelman e Kelsen. Justice et argumentation: essais à la memoire de Chaïm Perelman (HAARSCHER; INGBER, 1986), p.166. 487 Cf. PERELMAN, La Philosophie du pluralisme et la nouvelle rhetoriqu, 1979a, p.12. 488 Cf. HAARSCHER, Perelman and the philosophy of Law. Pratical reasoning and human affairs: studies in honor of Chaïm Perelman. (GOLDEN ; PILLOTA, 1986), p.225; WROBLÉWSKI, Logique juridique et théorie de l'argumentation de Chaïm Perelman. Justice et argumentation: essais à la memoire de Chaïm Perelman (HAARSCHER; INGBER, 1986), p. 184; ALEXY, Teoria de la A rgumentación Jurídica. Madrid: Centro de Estúdios Constitucionales, 1989. p.170. - 211 - única resposta que Perelman poderia conceder a essa pergunta consiste no reconhecimento de que há ocasiões em que uma decisão pode ser mais aceitável do que outra. Neste caso, Perelman se mantém fiel à concepção pluralista e justifica a adoção de ações razoáveis, ou seja, imparciais e em conformidade com a regra de justiça, visto que não se deve tratar de modo desigual casos semelhantes. Ora, mas sendo uma decisão razoável aquela que está ajustada à imparcialidade e à regra de justiça, isso significa que a razoabilidade implica no principio de letargia (inércia), segundo o qual "só se deve justificar a mudança sobre a base de valores precedentemente admitidos" 489 , de modo que é plausível reagir de maneira semelhante a anterior, em situações similares. Esses critérios, entretanto, além de serem claramente insuficientes, indicam que quando se trata de tomar decisões diante de situações complicadas, Perelman não pode proporcionar critérios adequados, uma vez que, no fundo, ele carece de uma noção consistente do que seja uma decisão racional (ou razoável). Ao perquirir a presente trajetória, tornou-se possível verificar que Perelman procurou construir a sua teoria da argumentação a partir da Retórica de Aristóteles e, mais especificamente, a partir dos raciocínios dialéticos investigados por este último, motivo pelo qual ele se refere a Aristóteles como inspirador dos principais fundamentos da Nova Retórica. Tal é o caso, por exemplo, da oposição entre o raciocínio dialético e o raciocínio analítico que servem de base para a oposição perelmaniana ao critério de evidência oriundo do pensamento cartesiano. A vinculação entre a Retórica aristotélica e a Nova Retórica se dá, sobremaneira, pela referência que aquela concede a esta última. Não se trata, portanto, como alguns sugerem 490 , de uma reconstrução contemporânea da Retórica aristotélica, mas de uma composição teórica que procura resgatar no pensamento aristotélico os elementos que são essenciais para a compreensão do modelo de racionalidade utilizado no campo das práticas humanas. Aliás, a aproximação meramente casual da Retórica e, por conseguinte, da Filosofia aristotélica, que lhe pareciam distantes do seu campo de atuação, exigiram um perscrutar acerca da Construção Arquitetônica da Teoria da Argumentação. Em que pesem as críticas, Perelman dedicou parte da sua vida à busca de uma sustentação lógica para os juízos de valor, procurando encontrar critérios universalmente 489 Cf. GIANFORMAGGIO, 1973, p.226. 490 Cf. HOOGAERT, 1995, p.167. - 212 - válidos que fossem capazes de indicar os motivos pelos quais se deve preferir agir de uma determinada maneira em detrimento de tantas outras. Ao constatar a impossibilidade de encontrar uma Lógica dos Juízos de Valor encontrou na Retórica uma alternativa para sustentar uma racionalidade capaz de se fazer exercer nos campos onde o modelo de razão herdeiro do cartesianismo não era capaz de se impor, tal como no caso das Ciências Humanas, por exemplo. A este modelo de razão Perelman denomina de Racionalidade Argumentativa. A Filosofia, por sua vez, consiste no campo onde este modelo de racionalidade se faz exercer. Ora, a Filosofia é uma atividade essencialmente crítica e controversa, visto que nos seus domínios não há espaço para uma verdade absoluta. Em outras palavras, no campo da Filosofia, a verdade precisa ser admitida e, por conseguinte, depende de aceitação. À vista disso, para fazer aceitar há dois caminhos: convencer ou persuadir. Nos dois casos é preciso lançar mão de provas. As provas, por sua vez, sustentam a crença na verdade daquilo que se afirma. Uma vez apresentada ao interlocutor, a prova tem como fim fazê-lo aceitar a verdade. Embora a natureza das provas seja bastante diversa, no caso específico da Filosofia as provas são argumentativas, em consonância com o modelo de racionalidade que lhe confere suporte. Ora, se as provas são argumentativas, propiciam a reflexão, donde se conclui que um argumento é dirigido ao interlocutor com o objetivo de fazê-lo refletir sobre as boas razões (provas) que existem para aceitar (crer em) aquela verdade daquilo que se afirma. Neste sentido é que se pode afirmar que toda argumentação é ad hominem (no sentido de ser dirigida ao homem). Contudo, ela também pode ser considerada ad hominem no sentido que ao indispor de critérios de aferição – tais como os critérios disponíveis às ciências empíricas – dependem essencialmente dos valores, verdades e crenças admitidos pelo auditório [interlocutor(es)]. Assim, ao buscar a adesão do interlocutor (auditório) a uma tese (verdade) que se quer ver admitida, procura fazê-lo compartilhar de uma crença, em virtude do laço existente entre o que se quer fazer admitir e aquilo em que previamente se acredita. Desta forma, toda argumentação é ad hominem no sentido em que põe o indivíduo em conflito com os seus próprios valores e crenças – tomados como ponto de partida da argumentação – para fazê-lo compartilhar de uma verdade (conjunto de crenças) que é sustentada pela argumentação do orador. 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Being implicated: On the fittingness of guilt and indignation over outcomes Gunnar Björnsson Stockholm University, Department of Philosophy, Sweden [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0003-3112-0673 Abstract When is it fitting for an agent to feel guilt over an outcome, and for others to be morally indignant with her over it? A popular answer requires that the outcome happened because of the agent, or that the agent was a cause of the outcome. This paper reviews some of what makes this causal-explanatory view attractive before turning to two kinds of problem cases: cases of collective harms and cases of fungible switching. These, it is argued, motivate a related but importantly different answer: What is required for fitting guilt and indignation is that the agent is relevantly implicated in that outcome: that the agent's morally substandard responsiveness to reasons, or substandard caring, is relevantly involved in a normal explanation of it. This answer, it is further argued, makes sense because when an agent's substandard caring is so involved, the outcome provides a lesson against such caring, a lesson central to the function of guilt and indignation. Keywords Moral responsibility Reactive attitudes Collective harm Shared responsibility Blame Acknowledgments Various ancestors of this paper have received hearings at Collectivity and Responsibility at Lund University, the Higher Seminar at the University of Gothenburg, Social Ontology 2019 at Tampere University, the Tufts University Colloquium, the NYU Bioethics Center, Conversations on War in Perast, Montenegro, and the MANCEPT Workshops 2019 at the University of Manchester. The current version has benefited greatly from comments received on these occasions; I am grateful to both participants and organisers. I am also grateful for written comments generously provided by Åsa Burman, Jan Willem Wieland, Niels de Haan, Daniel Miller, Meradjuddin "Mirre" Khan Oidermaa, Frank Hindriks, Stefano Cossara, Ninni Suni, Daniel Telech, Massimo Renzo, Helen Frowe, and two anonymous referees for this journal. Work on the paper was funded by the Swedish Research Council [2015-01488]. 1 Being implicated: On the fittingness of guilt and indignation over outcomes When is it fitting for an agent to feel guilt over an outcome, and for others to be morally indignant with her over it? A popular answer requires that the outcome happened because of the agent, or that the agent was a cause of the outcome. In this paper, I motivate a related but importantly different answer: What is required is that the agent is relevantly implicated in that outcome: that the agent's morally substandard responsiveness to reasons, or substandard caring, is relevantly involved in a normal explanation of it. This answer, I further argue, makes sense because when an agent's substandard caring is so involved, the outcome provides a lesson against such caring, a lesson central to the function of guilt and indignation. Throughout the paper, I'll say an agent is responsible for something when they stand in the relation to it that makes guilt and indignation for it fitting. But "responsible" is multiply ambiguous, and my use is partly technical.1 The term could also be used to signify the relation required for an agent to deserve punishment for something, be liable to compensate for a harm resulting from it, or be liable to be harmed in defense of a threat posed by it. I set these latter forms of responsibility aside. It is at least conceptually possible that one can be subject to fair punishment or liable to defensive harm or compensatory demands even if all one's actions have been justified and indignation would be misplaced.2 As stated, my concern is primarily with responsibility for outcomes, or states and events that are not constituted by the agent's actions or responses or lack thereof to a situation: examples include an eroded friendship, a destroyed place of worship, or the deaths of hundreds of thousands of children from economic sanctions. (In line with ordinary moral thinking, but contrary to some luck-based skepticism, I will assume that we can be responsible for such outcomes in ways that make indignation and guilt over those outcomes fitting.3) I focus on outcomes because of the problems that they raise for theories of responsibility, but the account defended will be completely general. Indignation over the injustice of some outcome need not target an agent. But when it does, it presupposes that the agent had (i) some capacity for understanding the values at stake, (ii) some sort of self-control, (iii) some relevant relation to the outcome, typically understood as a relation of control, and (iv) knowledge or access to evidence of that relation. Since my focus here will be entirely on the third condition-the outcome relation-I will take for granted 1 Though technical, the use follows a tradition from Peter Strawson's (1962) "Freedom and Resentment" of understanding responsibility as a precondition for reactive attitudes, and in particular for guilt and indignation. For simplicity, I refrain here from discussing other interestingly related reactive attitudes, including resentment. 2 Cf. Jeff McMahan's (2005) suggestion that liability to defensive harm requires a form of responsibility for the threat, but not the sort of involvement that makes guilt and indignation fitting. One might disagree with McMahan's suggestion, but it is not conceptually incoherent. For some recent discussions of what sort of involvement is required for liability to defensive harm, see e.g. Kutz (2007); Frowe (2014); Haque (2017). 3 For luck-based skepticism, see e.g. Enoch and Marmor (2007). For my account of why intuitions driving such skepticism shouldn't be trusted, see Björnsson and Persson (2012). BEING IMPLICATED 2 that other conditions are satisfied in the cases discussed unless otherwise stated. When I say that someone is the fitting target of indignation over something, I am saying that they satisfy the internal correctness conditions of such indignation, or the conditions that the systems responsible for producing indignation are supposed to track. I am not saying that that everyone or even anyone would be overall justified in nurturing or expressing such indignation.4 I begin in section 1 by looking at problems for some natural accounts of the outcome relation. Section 2 suggests that these problems are avoided if we take the fittingness of guilt and indignation to be premised on a causal-explanatory requirement. Sections 3 and 4 introduce familiar counterexamples to the explanatory requirement: cases involving collective harms and "fungible switches". Both kinds of cases suggest that the causal-explanatory requirement must be weakened. Section 5, finally, proposes such a weakening-it is enough that the agent's substandard will is involved in a normal explanation of the outcome-and motivates it with reference to the nature of guilt and indignation. 1. Closing in on the requirement of explanatory control The idea that responsibility for outcomes involves a causal or explanatory component of some sort is widely accepted, though not universally so.5 One reason is that it faces the sort of counterexamples that will be discussed in Sections 3 and 4. But another reason is that the causalexplanatory relation itself has been notoriously hard to pin down.6 Since some constraints on that relation will be of relevance when considering counterexamples, this section begins to motivate a requirement of explanatory control by noting how some related suggestions get cases wrong. We start with the tempting suggestion that outcome responsibility requires: CONTROL WHETHER: The agent had control over whether the outcome would materialize or not.7 For many cases, this seems to be exactly what makes the agent responsible for something. Consider: Wiley's Window: Suddenly, little Wiley picks up a pebble and throws it at a window, breaking it. A moment before, his big sister Suzy saw what was happening but did not prevent it. Contrast two versions of this case: Arm's Length: Wiley was at arm's length from Suzy, who could easily have stopped him. 4 For the classical discussion of fittingness, see D'Arms and Jacobson (2000). 5 For examples of how causal-explanatory conditions can be incorporated, see e.g. Fischer and Ravizza (1998, ch. 4); Sartorio (2007); Sartorio 2016. For my own previous suggestion, see Björnsson (2017a); Björnsson and Persson (2012). 6 For an excellent overview of many central problems, see Paul and Hall (2013). 7 Cf. what John Fischer (1994) calls regulative control, and the sine qua non condition in some legal frameworks. CONTROL WHETHER also obviously corresponds to the simple counterfactual theory of causation, and is subject to the same counterexamples (see e.g. Lewis (1973); Paul and Hall (2013)), as we shall soon see. BEING IMPLICATED 3 Out of Reach: Wiley was out of reach, and Suzy had no way of stopping him. Suppose that Suzy had no antecedent reason to think that Wiley would do anything like that, and so no reason to keep him within arm's length. Then it seems that Suzy is a fitting target of (perhaps mild) indignation over the outcome in Arm's Length but not in Out of Reach exactly because she controlled whether the outcome would happen in the former case, but not in the latter. (To avoid some tedious repetition, I will focus most discussion on the fittingness of indignation, returning to the fittingness of guilt in the last section.) However, CONTROL WHETHER is in conflict with what most of us would want to say about other cases. Compare: Backup Billy: Suzy mischievously throws a rock at the neighbor's window, shattering it. Unbeknownst to Suzy, Billy was just about to throw a rock at the same window, but held his throw when Suzy's rock hit. Had Suzy not thrown hers, Billy's rock would have broken the window just as badly a couple of seconds later. Solo Suzy: Like Backup Billy, but with Billy absent. It seems that the neighbor can be indignant with Suzy over the sorry state of the window in both cases, even though Suzy had no control in Backup Billy over whether it would be in that state.8 In Backup Billy, it is natural to think that Suzy is responsible for the state of the window because it can be traced back to Suzy's will through a process the earlier parts of which brought about the later parts: based on her desire to break the window, she formed an intention to throw a rock at it, which guided her to do so, which sent the rock flying towards the window, which made it hit the window, which broke the window. In light of this, one might think that rather than CONTROL WHETHER, what is required for outcome responsibility is: PROCESS CONTROL: The agent initiated or directed a causal process or series of processes leading to the outcome. To capture our understanding of the example, we can think of processes as something like the "normal" unfolding of events according to law-like patterns that can be initiated or directed.9 If the outcome relation should be understood in terms of PROCESS CONTROL, this could explain why agents who lack CONTROL WHETHER seem to be responsible for overdetermined outcomes in what is intuitively understood as BACKUP CASES: Cases where the agent had control over whether a certain process would lead to the outcome, but where the outcome would have been ensured by some other process had the first not done the job. 8 Backup Billy illustrates the same point as Missile 2 in Fischer and Ravizza (1998). Cf. Lewis's (1986) backup assassin case. 9 This condition corresponds to accounts trying to understand causation in terms of processes or suitably constrained relations of lawful sufficiency, as in Mackie (1974) or (in a very different way) Dowe (1995). BEING IMPLICATED 4 In line with its name, Backup Billy was such a case, but examples are easily multiplied, and can involve fitting gratitude as well as fitting indignation: Standby Steve: Lara saw me struggling to find my destination and came to my aide. Unbeknownst to Lara, Steve also saw my predicament and would have helped if Lara hadn't. Because Lara's intervention led me to find my way, she is responsible for my timely arrival in a way that might make gratitude for it fitting even if Steve's presence ensured that I would have found my way without Lara's help. However, PROCESS CONTROL is clearly not necessary for outcome responsibility. Sometimes agents are responsible for outcomes in virtue of not having prevented a process leading to it, as in Arm's Length. At other times, they can be so in virtue of having removed or prevented an obstacle to such a process without themselves getting involved in that process: Billy's Board: As Suzy was practicing her throw trying to hit a bullseye painted on a large board, Billy yanked away the board just as Suzy threw a rock. Because of this, the rock hit and broke the window that had otherwise been protected by the board. Billy might clearly be responsible for the broken window, but he did nothing to initiate or direct the process from which it resulted: intuitively, he merely removed something that would have interfered with that process. PROCESS CONTROL is also not sufficient for outcome control. Contrast the following: Redirection: A runaway freight train is carrying dynamite. Unimpeded, it would continue on a track leading into the wilderness. Unfortunately for Rob, he has his handcar parked on that track, and it would be wrecked if hit by the train. To save the handcar, Rob can switch the train over to a track leading to a small town. He realizes that the dynamite might explode when the train crashes into the station, but prioritizes the handcar and makes the switch. Several people die when the cargo explodes at the station. Redundant Redirection: Like Redirection, but unbeknownst to Rob, the track he thought led into the wilderness later remerges with the track leading to town. Had Rob not redirected the train, the deadly outcome would have been just the same. In both cases, Rob can be blamed for willingly risking the lives of the townspeople to save his handcar. In both cases, Rob also gets involved in a process leading up to the explosion and the resulting deaths. But only in Redirection is he responsible for these deaths. Whereas it is fitting to be indignant with Rob for willingly risking people's lives in Redundant Redirection, it isn't fitting to be indignant with him over the outcome.10 Redundant Redirection belongs to a family of examples that are naturally understood as SWITCHING CASES: Cases where the agent's contribution explains why an alreadyevolving process led to the outcome in the way it did, but where the process would have led to the outcome as a matter of course without the agent's contribution. 10 Analogous cases are employed in van Inwagen (1983); Fischer and Ravizza (1998). BEING IMPLICATED 5 As with backup cases, examples are easily multiplied. Consider: Redundant Ride: Moe the Mobster is on his way to beat up a shopkeeper who has refused to pay for "protection" and is about to leave town. Needing a ride there, Moe asks Joe, who is standing idly by his taxi car. Joe has overheard what Moe's plans are, but wanting the money more than he cares about contributing to Moe's plans, he takes the ride. At the destination, Moe disappears into the shop where he breaks the shopkeeper's arm. Had Joe not offered the ride, Moe would have asked some other taxi driver who would have gladly taken him there; though more scrupulous than Joe, the other drivers were ignorant of Moe's mission. The outcome would have been the same. The switching structure is clear here too: When Joe got involved, the process leading to the outcome-Moe's acting on the intention to harm the shopkeeper-was already underway and would run to completion as a matter of course without Joe's contribution; Joe only changed the exact way by which the process reached its destination. (Assume that there was nothing that Joe could reasonably have done to save the shopkeeper; crossing Moe would have meant risking his life.) Moreover, even though it is fitting to be indignant with Joe over his own contribution to Moe's enterprise, being indignant with him over the outcome seems misplaced.11 Again, PROCESS CONTROL seems insufficient for fitting indignation. 2. Explanatory control The cases thus far seem to pull in conflicting directions, suggesting that counterfactual dependence sometimes matters (in switching cases and Out of Reach) and sometimes doesn't (in backup cases), and suggesting that process control sometimes matters (in backup cases) but sometimes not (in switching cases and Billy's Board). Importantly, this complexity closely mirrors a parallel complexity unearthed by the literature on causation and causal explanation. There, varieties of backup cases have provided counterexamples to theories understanding these relations in terms of counterfactual dependence, while switching cases have provided counterexamples to theories trying to understand them in terms of lawful sufficiency or processes.12 The parallel suggests a straightforward explanation for the complexity of the outcome relation, namely that it requires that some relevant aspect of the agent was a cause of the outcome, or that, 11 I'm assuming here that it might be morally problematic to get involved in moral wrongs even when one cannot reasonably affect whether they are committed or what their consequences will be. This is a controversial assumption. For articulation of skepticism for cases where agents cannot significantly affect some grand outcome, see especially Sinnott-Armstrong (2005); Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong (2018). I defend the assumption in Björnsson (2020b); cf. Nefsky (2016). As noted in the introduction, to deny that Joe is the fitting target of guilt or indignation over the beating or the resulting injuries (and so to deny that he is in that sense responsible) is not to deny that Joe is liable to bear restorative costs related to the injuries (and in that sense bears responsibility for it) or that he would be liable to defensive harm in attempts to avert the injuries (see e.g. Frowe 2019). 12 For a recent overview of many of these complexities, see e.g. Paul and Hall (2013), cf. Björnsson (2007). BEING IMPLICATED 6 EXPLANATORY CONTROL: The outcome happened because of a morally relevant aspect of the agent.13 Applied to our cases from Section 1, the requirement of EXPLANATORY CONTROL yields the right verdicts. In cases where the agent seemed responsible for the outcome, there is also an explanatory connection: In Backup Billy, the window is in its sorry state because Suzy wasn't properly concerned with the neighbor, even if Suzy didn't control whether the window would be broken. In Arm's Length, the window is broken because Suzy didn't care enough about the neighbor to bother stopping her little brother, even if Suzy never interacted with the processes leading to the outcome; likewise for Billy in Billy's Board. And in cases where the agent didn't seem responsible, the explanatory connection is also missing: In Redundant Redirection (unlike in Redirection) the deaths didn't happen because Rob cared insufficiently about the risks, and in Redundant Ride, the shopkeeper wasn't assaulted because of Joe's lack of concern for his safety, even if Rob and Joe got involved in the processes leading to these outcomes. As stated, EXPLANATORY CONTROL leaves open what aspect of the agent should be a cause of or explain the outcome in order for moral indignation or guilt to be fitting. But the Strawsonian tradition provides what I think is the best answer, and one in line with what I just said: for these negative reactive attitudes to be fitting, the outcome must be due to the agent's failure to care as can be morally required of her about what is morally important, or her morally substandard quality of will.14 This suggests something like the following: EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY: X is a fitting target of indignation and guilt over Y, and in that sense responsible for Y, if and only if Y is (i) morally bad and (ii) explained (in a normal way) by X's morally substandard will.15 The exact nature of this condition depends on the nature of the because relation. For reasons of space, I offer no informative general account of that relation here. Instead I will rely on what I take to be pretty stable pre-theoretical intuitions about cases, and the sort of rough generalizations that I have offered about backup and switching cases.16 Hopefully, such 13 I have formulated the requirement in terms of explanation rather than causation, as the latter is often understood in too restrictive a way. In Arm's Length, for example, it seems clearly right that the window shattered because Suzy didn't bother to stop her little brother but not clearly right that her lack of concern caused it to shatter. Similarly, one might think that lack of antibodies explains someone's covid-19 illness while denying that the lack of antibodies caused the illness-the virus did! However, a requirement that some aspect of the agent be a cause of the outcome might be fine: it is more natural to say that Suzy's indifference was a cause of the shattering, and that the lack of antibodies was a cause of the illness. (Cf. Sartorio's (2007) formulation of a transmission of responsibility principle.) 14 See e.g. Strawson (1962); McKenna (2005, 2012); Arpaly (2006); Arpaly and Schroeder (2014). 15 I have previously defended a suggestion of this form. See Björnsson (2017b); Björnsson and Persson (2013, 2012). 16 Given that none of the best-known systematic theories of causation or causal explanation (e.g. counterfactual, INUS/NESS, and process theories) does a great job accounting for such intuitions (for difficulties, see e.g. Paul and Hall (2013)), one might worry about trusting these intuitions. However, I argue elsewhere (Björnsson 2007) that explanatory intuitions can be made sense of on a natural systematic development of the view that causal explanation is a secondary relation, having its unity in the way it can serve instrumental reasoning (for an early sketch of such an account, see Menzies and Price (1993)). BEING IMPLICATED 7 intuitions have done enough to create a presumption for a condition of EXPLANATORY CONTROL and will do enough to motivate the modifications to that condition that I will propose in Section 5. Before considering more cases, though, I want to address one worry about this strategy, prior to worries one might have about claims about particular cases: Without recourse to a substantive informative account of the explanation relation, why should we think that a condition like EXPLANATORY CONTROL or EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY provides an independent condition on responsibility? Why not think that when our explanatory judgments about cases mirror our judgments about outcome responsibility, this is because our explanatory judgments track our responsibility judgments rather than the other way around?17 And this worry might seem to be supported by the fact that people are affected by normative considerations in making their causal judgments, standardly favoring factors that violate normative expectations when judging whether something caused a certain outcome: the person who broke the rules, or the mechanism that didn't operate as it was supposed to.18 I will say three things about this worry. The first is that explanatory judgments and attributions of responsibility often come apart. Most obviously, we recognize that when a harm happens because of an agent that could not have foreseen the harm, the agent might not be responsible for it. More subtly, as illustrated in the next two sections, there are cases of overdetermined harms where someone is the fitting target of indignation over the harm even though it cannot be said to have happened because of them. The second is that while normative expectations do guide what we think of as causes of outcomes, this is true whether the judgments concern potentially responsible agents or inanimate mechanisms: the normative expectations at work fall short of judgments about responsibility for outcomes. The third is that standard explanatory judgments about cases like those discussed in Section 1 mirror judgments about cases without potentially responsible agents: indeed, such cases are prevalent in the causation literature. I cannot go through all our cases here and provide structurally equivalent non-agential cases, but for two simple illustrations, consider counterparts to our basic backup and switching cases: Non-Agential Backup: A gust of wind blows a paper off my desk onto the ground. Had it not done that, the gust whipping through the room a couple of seconds later would have done the same. Non-Agential Switch: Like Redundant Redirection, but a falling branch switches the train over to the wilderness track. Just as it seems true about Backup Billy that the neighbor's window is broken because of Suzy's mischievousness, it seems true in Non-Agential Backup that the sheet of paper is on the ground because the first gust of wind. And just as it seems false in Redundant Redirection that the 17 I thank Helen Frowe, Massimo Renzo and an anonymous referee for pressing me on this. 18 For discussion of the view that causal or explanatory judgments are partly normative, see Sartorio (2007): 754ff. For evidence that causal-explanatory judgments generally are sensitive to normative assumptions, see e.g. Knobe and Hitchcock 2009. BEING IMPLICATED 8 deaths at the station happened because of Rob's lack of concern with the townspeople, it seems false in Non-Agential Switch that they happen because of the falling branch. I think that the cases considered thus far provides strong prima facie support for a requirement of EXPLANATORY CONTROL. In the following two sections, however, we will consider how it fails to account for the fittingness of indignation over some collective harms and some harms due to what I will call fungible switches. 3. Fitting indignation and collective harms Collective harms are harms that are explained by the actions or inactions of more than one individual but cannot be said to be explained by the contribution of any one of those individuals.19 Here is a typical case bringing out the particular problem that concerns us, modelled on cases in Held 1970: Demise: As a man's house collapses during an earthquake, a falling beam crushes his leg and pins him to the floor. Unaware of each other, three passersby hear his desperate but fading cries for help, but no one approaches to see what the problem is: the site looks dirty and they are eager to escape the unpleasant weather. Had at least two of them heeded the man's calls, they would have been able to move the beam and bring him to hospital before his demise. But had only one done so, she would have been unable to move the beam, or to get others to help. Assume that each of the passersby is a fitting target of indignation for not responding to the cries for help. Given what she knew, she just lacked sufficiently weighty reasons not to. Further assume that if they all had responded adequately, they would have realized the problem, teamed up, and saved the man. Then it seems that INDIGNATION OVER DEMISE: The passersby are fitting targets of indignation over the man's demise. But it isn't true about any one of them that EXPLANATION OF DEMISE: The man expired under the beam because that passerby didn't care enough about the values at stake.20 19 Problems of responsibility for collective harms have been widely discussed (see e.g. Held 1970; May 1992; Kutz 2000; Isaacs 2011; for a useful overview, see Smiley 2017). But not all is relevant for our current concern with the relation between agents and outcomes that can make indignation with those agents over the outcomes fitting. Much of the general debate concerns other questions, such as the relations required to owe compensation for harms or be liable to defensive harm. Much of the discussion also concerns cases involving cooperative groups and features specific to these, but the collective harm problem that concerns me here arises equally for harms resulting from the uncoordinated actions or inactions of numerous agents and is not essentially liked to cooperation and joint action (Björnsson 2011). Finally, some of the discussions are concerned with when one agent is blameworthy or liable based on their complicity in the wrongs committed by other agents. By contrast, agents in the cases discussed in this section are more saliently implicated in collective harms than complicit in the wrongs of other agents. 20 The explanatory judgments here mirror those of non-agential cases with the same structure: Suppose that a barn door has three latches, that two would have been required to keep it in place when pushed by the BEING IMPLICATED 9 This looks like a problem for EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY. Moreover, Demise is representative for a wide variety of cases, involving both small groups, as in Demise, and very large groups, as in: Climate Threat: We would not have been facing an incredibly serious threat of climate catastrophe if, during the last 30 years, enough people who were aware of the problem had taken steps to promote preventions of it and refrained from supporting and engaging in actions particularly prone to promote greenhouse gas emissions. Assume that it is fitting to be (perhaps mildly) indignant with these individuals over their individual contributions to the threat and their various failures to promote prevention.21 Under that assumption, I think that most of us would also want to say that the group of people who were aware of the problem but did nothing are fitting targets of indignation over the fact that we are now facing a very severe global threat. But, again, this is in conflict with EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY, as it is false of just about every member of that group that we are facing a severe threat because of that member's morally substandard will. One response to the lack of individual control in collective harm cases is to say that the group is responsible for the outcome and a proper target of indignation. That claim is in line with EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY, as it seems true that the man in Demise expired because the substandard wills of three passersby, and true that we are facing a very severe global threat because those aware of the climate risks did not take them as seriously as they should have.22 But it fails to capture the thought that IMPLICATED INDIVIDUALS: Contributors to collective harms are implicated in those harms in ways that make it fitting to be indignant with them over these outcomes and for them to feel guilt. It is not that the indignation or guilt is directed at the groups as entities existing over and above the individual members, but rather that it is directed at the members qua members of such groups. In line with this thought, a number of people have suggested that the agents are jointly responsible for the outcome, or that they share responsibility, or some such.23 But if indignation over an outcome can be fittingly directed at a member of a group in virtue of the group's explanatory control over the outcome and in the absence of the member's control, then EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY is too strict a demand. EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY needs to be weakened, but how? A tempting first proposal would be to merely require that the agent culpably contributed to the causal process leading to heifers, but that all latches were open one day and the door swung open when pushed. It seems correct that it swung open because the latches were open, but false about any one latch that the door swung open because that latch was open. 21 As noted in n. 11, this is a controversial assumption. 22 The group arguably lacks any will of its own, but as I argue elsewhere (Björnsson 2020a), EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY can be generalized to cover both individuals and groups. 23 For some very different accounts, see e.g. May (1992); Kutz (2000); Sartorio (2004); Björnsson (2011). BEING IMPLICATED 10 the harm. But that requirement is too weak, as illustrated by At Arm's Length and Billy's Board. It is also too strong, as illustrated by Redundant Redirection and Redundant Ride.24 An alternative suggestion requires that the agent culpably contributed part of a cause of the outcome.25 But that doesn't seem right either. Consider: Algae Bloom: A massive algae bloom produced large amounts of toxin, enough to kill all the fish in a lake several times over. During the bloom, Adam culpably disposed of paint solvent in the lake, solvent he knew contained a toxin. Though the small amount of toxin that he contributed happened to be the very same that was produced by the algae and thus was part of what killed the fish, it made no difference to the outcome and would have been harmless on its own.26 Though the fish died because of the toxin in the lake, and though Adam culpably contributed to that toxin in a way that makes indignation over his recklessness fitting, it does not seem fitting to be indignant with Adam over the death of the fish. One might think that what distinguishes Demise and Climate Threat from Algae Bloom is that the agent culpably contributes to a cause of the harm that is due to a group of agents. But that also does not seem right: Innocent Polluters: Having been erroneously told by what is normally a very reliable source that a boat paint solvent was non-toxic, a large group of people disposed of it in the lake, enough to kill the fish in the lake many times over. At the same time, Adam culpably disposed of the same paint solvent in the lake, knowing that it contained a toxin. Though the small amount of toxin that he contributed was part of what killed the fish, it made no difference to the outcome and would have been harmless on its own.27 In this case, like in Algae Bloom, Adam seems to be a fitting target for indignation over his reckless handling of the solvent, but not over the death of the fish. This suggest that what is required is that all members of a relevant group culpably contributed to the cause of the harm. Buy why should the culpability of other agents affect whether one is fittingly indignant with this one agent over the outcome? The reason, I will suggest in Section 5, is that when a collective harm happened because of group of agents each failed to live up to demands on their will, then each agent's substandard will is relevantly involved in a normal explanation of the outcome. Because of the nature of guilt and indignation, this sort of involvement is exactly what they require. First, though, we will consider another kind of problem case. 24 Cf. Heinaman's (1986) suggestion that the agent must be "among the causes of" or "part of a full explanation of" the outcome. For criticism, see Fischer and Ravizza (1998). 25 For a closely related view, see Sartorio (2004). 26 Algae Bloom does the same work as Adam's Lake in Björnsson (2011). 27 Innocent Polluters does the same work as Partly Excused Helplessness in Björnsson (2020a). BEING IMPLICATED 11 4. Fitting indignation and fungible switches For the next sort of problem for EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY and the EXPLANATORY CONTROL requirement, consider a series of three related cases, starting with Dealer: Doug, a drug dealer, recognizes Adele, an addict, as she is heading to the supermarket. He approaches and although she had planned to stay off drugs, she buys from him. When Adele later takes the dangerous drug, YXS, it triggers a psychosis during which she drives off a cliff and dies. Assume that Doug had neither good reasons nor good excuses for selling Adele a dangerous drug, and that it is thus fitting to be indignant with Doug over this action. Then it also seems fitting to be indignant with him over Adele's death.28 This is in line with EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY, as Adele died because Doug didn't care as morality demands about the values at stake. Contrast this case with: Dealer v. Pharmacy: As in Dealer, but Adele had a legitimate prescription for YXS and was heading to the pharmacy when Doug approached. Being offered the very same drug at a lower price, she buys it from him. When she later takes the drug, it triggers a psychosis during which she drives off a cliff and dies, just as in Dealer. If Doug had not been willing to sell the dangerous drug, she would have pursued her original plan and had the pharmacy fill her prescription; the outcome would have been the same. This is an ordinary switching case, like Redundant Redirection and Redundant Ride. A process-Adele's intending to get the drug-was under way and would, as a matter of course, lead to Adele getting the drug, having the psychosis, and killing herself by driving over a cliff; what Doug did was merely to change the exact way the process ran to completion. Even assuming that it is just as fitting to be indignant with Doug over his act of selling YXS to Adele as it was in Dealer, it now seems unfitting to be indignant with him over her death. This, again, is in line with EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY, as it is false that Adele died because of Doug's substandard will. But now consider our third case: Dealer v. Dealers: Like Dealer v. Pharmacy, but Adele had no prescription and was heading to her regular dealers to buy YXS when Doug approached. Had Doug not sold her the drug, the outcome would have been the same: she would have followed her original plan, bought the drug from one of the other dealers, and died driving off a cliff. Like Dealer v. Pharmacy, this is a switching case, and here too it seems false that EXPLANATION OF DEATH: Adele died because of Doug's substandard will.29 28 I'm assuming that one can be indignant with Doug over Adele's death while thinking that Adele herself was also responsible for the outcome, and perhaps to a higher degree. 29 One might think that by illegally selling drugs, Doug has indirectly contributed to a system supporting both addictions and the illegal selling of drugs, and that he is thus indirectly responsible for the outcome. To avoid this interpretation, assume that it was Doug's first deal. BEING IMPLICATED 12 But unlike in Dealer v. Pharmacy, and contrary to what one should expect given EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY, it seems to me that INDIGNATION OVER DEATH: Doug is a fitting target of indignation over Adele's death. For Adele would not have successfully executed her plan to get the drug if everyone had just cared as can be demanded about the values at stake. More specifically, here is what I think makes the difference between Dealer v. Pharmacy and Dealer v. Dealers: though it is true about both cases that Adele's death would have happened without Doug's disregard for the values at stake, only in Dealer v. Dealers did the process require that someone disregarded these values in the way Doug did. In virtue of this, Dealer v. Dealers is a case of "fungible switching": FUNGIBLE SWITCHING CASES: Cases where (i) the agent's culpable contribution explains why an already evolving process led to the outcome in the way it did, (ii) for the process to lead to that outcome as a matter of course, someone's culpable contribution was required, and (iii) the agent's contribution was fungible, and someone else would have made the required culpable contribution had the agent abstained.30 So understood, fungible switching cases are legion: A weapons manufacturer hires an engineer to design a part for a land mine that ends up killing and maiming civilians, but numerous other engineers were willing and able to supply that knowledge should this engineer refrain. A fascist political party hires a copy writer for an advertisement campaign when numerous other copy writers would have been willing and capable of doing it instead. A concentration camp hires a guard for a job that numerous others would have been willing to do. In each of these cases, a harm results from an overall process and the availability of agents willing to culpably contribute to that process. And each case provides a counterexample to EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY: the agent enlisted in the project is a fitting target of indignation over the harmful outcome, but it is false that the harms take place because of their substandard will. Why, though, does it matter that someone's culpable contribution was needed for the process to yield the outcome? The reason, I suggest, is that the substandard will of the agent who actually contributes is then involved in what explains the outcome. Even if it isn't true of Dealer v. Dealers that Adele died because of Doug's disregard for the values at stake, it is true that EXISTENTIAL EXPLANATION OF DEATH: Adele died because she found someone who disregarded the relevant values enough to sell her the drug. 30 The idea that agents can be responsible for outcomes in fungible switching cases is closely related to the suggestion that an agent is responsible for an outcome if they culpably provided something required for that outcome, even if it wasn't required that they provided it (cf. Sartorio 2016). However, the latter principle gets a case like Innocent Polluters wrong, and would similarly yield what I take to be the wrong result for Dealer v. Pharmacy. (By contrast, a related view about liability for defensive harm (rather than fitting indignation) seems correct for culpable contributions to wrongful threats. See Frowe (2019).) BEING IMPLICATED 13 Since that someone was Doug, his substandard will is involved in an explanation of the outcome. And the same goes for other cases of fungible switching: they are cases where the outcome takes place because the process at work enlists the contribution of someone willing to ignore certain values. 5. Reactive attitudes and outcomes Cases of collective harms and fungible switches provide counterexamples to EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY. However, I have suggested that the troublesome examples could be handled by something like the following modification of EXPLANATION RESPONSIBILITY: IMPLICATION RESPONSIBILITY: X is a fitting target of moral guilt and indignation over Y if and only if Y is morally bad and X's morally substandard will is involved in a normal explanation of Y-if X is implicated in Y. But more needs to be said about what it is for one's substandard will to be "involved" in a "normal" explanation. The key to understanding this, I will suggest, lies in some central features of moral indignation and guilt. The kind of moral indignation that concerns us here has both a target and an object: we are indignant with someone over something-some action, reaction, omission of theirs, or some outcome. Likewise, the feeling of moral guilt over something targets oneself in relation to the object of guilt. Both sorts of reaction are based on two interrelated evaluations: an evaluation of the object of the emotion as morally bad in some way (instrumentally or non-instrumentally), and an evaluation of the agent's will as falling short of what morality demands of her. Each of these evaluations can have emotional repercussions on its own: sadness, pain, horror, disappointment, contempt, or shame. What makes indignation and guilt special, however, is the relation between the attitudes towards the bad object of blame and the attitudes towards the substandard will. To understand that relation, it is important to understand that demands on the will are demands that we care about things because these things are important: demands that we be alert to what makes it go well with these things and that we adjust our responses accordingly. Importantly, because caring has a psychological function-to protect and promote the object of care-it has functionally normal ways of operating.31 Accordingly, there are normal ways in which caring as demanded about something can make it go well with it: we notice and act skillfully on possibilities to promote or protect what we care about. By extension, there are normal ways in which things go badly with that object because of failures to care as required, as required by IMPLICATION RESPONSIBILITY. Crucially, caring about things as morality requires is a skill the function of which is to adequately promote and protect certain values. Like other skills, it is subject to feedback: when shortcomings are involved in bad outcomes, this can provide direct corrective lessons for the agent or for others learning from her mistakes. Accordingly, both guilt and indignation seem to involve the idea that their objects provide direct lessons about the importance of caring as 31 For one way of understanding the relevant notion of normality, see Millikan (1984). BEING IMPLICATED 14 required. This aspect is often salient in guilt, which paradigmatically involves not only reactions to the object of guilt and to one's own shortcoming in light of that object, but also the sense that the object of guilt highlights the importance of not falling short in that way. It is also salient in paradigmatic instances of indignation targeted at someone over something, which seek exactly recognition of this lesson in the guilty party. The suggestion now is that for one's substandard caring to be involved in a normal explanation of the outcome in the way of IMPLICATION RESPONSIBILITY is for it to be involved in such a way that the outcome provides a direct corrective lesson. What is it to be so involved? Here I can offer no general account. Instead, I will mention three ways in which bad substandard responsiveness to the circumstances can explain outcomes in a way that grounds direct feedback, and illustrate these by non-moral examples involving the substandard responsiveness of only one agent: 1. One instance of substandard responsiveness explains a bad outcome: Kit broke a glass while doing dishes because he was insufficiently concerned with its fragility. That the glass broke because of his carelessness on the occasion provides a lesson against such carelessness. 2. Several instances of substandard responsiveness jointly explain a bad outcome: Because Kim had on numerous occasions imprudently disregarded the need for an economic buffer, she cannot afford repairs when her car breaks down. Because the repairs would be very expensive, it isn't true about any one instance of imprudence that her predicament is due to that instance, as she would have been short even if she had saved up on that occasion. But the outcome nevertheless seems to provide a corrective lesson against such imprudence. 3. The existence of some substandard responsiveness explains a bad outcome: The kids had planned to pillage their parents' candy behind the back of Alex, the babysitter, and did so at a time T, when his attention was elsewhere. If Alex had been attentive at T, however, they would just have had to wait a few minutes, as his attention was frequently on other things than the children. Given this, it is false that the candy was gone when the parents came home because Alex was inattentive at T. But it is nevertheless true that it was gone because there was a moment when he was inattentive. And because of this, the role of his inattention at T in the disappearance of the candy provides a lesson against such inattention. Summing up, the suggestion is that paradigm cases of moral guilt and indignation consist in typical emotional reactions to (i) a bad object, (ii) one or more substandard wills, and (iii) the involvement of the latter in a normal explanation of the former.32 When we think that guilt and indignation over the outcome are fitting in some of the cases that we have considered but not 32 Elsewhere, I discuss other important aspects of these reactions. Particularly important are guilt's tendency towards submission and efforts to mend the situation and indignation's tendency to demand these things of its target. But these tendencies are shaped by the lessons identified by guilt and indignation, and so by the relevant kinds of involvement. BEING IMPLICATED 15 in others, it is these sorts of reactions that we imagine. It should be clear how the various cases that we have looked at exemplify the three types of involvement in explanations of outcomes listed above. Arm's Length, Backup Billy, Billy's Board, Redirection, and Dealer all exemplify the first type, while collective harm cases like Demise and Climate Threat exemplify the second and fungible switching cases like Dealer v. Dealers exemplify the third. Independently of type of involvement, what they all have in common is that the outcomes provide lessons against the substandard caring exemplified by the agent. I have argued that guilt and indignation over an outcome can fittingly target an agent even if the outcome did not happen because of the agent's substandard will. For an agent to be suitably implicated in the outcome, it is enough that the agent's substandard will is involved in a normal explanation of it. If this is correct, it leaves a number of further questions: If someone joins a team engaged in genocide but is never called on to contribute, is that person part of a group whose substandard wills explain the outcome? If someone commits an atrocity expressive of a lack of concern with human life and I share that lack of concern, can I be the fitting target of indignation over the atrocity because of the kind of substandard will that I harbor, even if it isn't due to my token substandard will? Are different degrees of guilt and indignation fitting depending on how an agent is implicated in an explanation of harm? Though the general picture of guilt and indignation presented here is suggestive of answers to these questions, further discussion will have to wait. 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Cambridge: Cambridge U. P. Frowe, H. (2014). Defensive killing: Oxford University Press. Frowe, H. (2019). Civilian liability. Ethics, 129(4), 625-650. Haque, A. A. (2017). Law and morality at war: Oxford University Press UK. Heinaman, R. (1986). Incompatibilism without the principle of alternative possibilities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(3), 266-276. Held, V. (1970). Can a random collection of individuals be morally responsible? The Journal of Philosophy, 67(14), 471-481. Isaacs, T. (2011). Moral responsibility in collective contexts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kingston, E., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2018). What's wrong with joyguzzling? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(1), 169-186. Knobe, J., & Hitchcock, C. (2009). Cause and norm. Journal of Philosophy, 106(11), 587-612. Kutz, C. (2000). Complicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kutz, C. (2007). Causeless complicity. Criminal Law and Philosophy, 1(3), 289-305. Lewis, D. (1973). Causation. The Journal of Philosophy, 70(17), 556-567. Lewis, D. (1986). Postscripts to 'causation'. In D. Lewis (Ed.), Philosophical papers vol. Ii (pp. 172–213): Oxford University Press. Mackie, J. L. (1974). The cement of the universe: Oxford, Clarendon Press. May, L. (1992). Sharing responsibility: University of Chicago Press. McKenna, M. (2005). Where frankfurt and strawson meet. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29(1), 163-180. BEING IMPLICATED 17 McKenna, M. (2012). Conversation and responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. McMahan, J. (2005). The basis of moral liability to defensive killing. Philosophical Issues, 15(1), 386–405. Menzies, P., & Price, H. (1993). Causation as a secondary quality. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44, 187-203. Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, thought, and other biological categories: New foundations for realism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Nefsky, J. (2016). How you can help, without making a difference. Philosophical Studies, 125. Paul, L. A., & Hall, N. (2013). Causation: A user's guide: Oxford. Sartorio, C. (2004). How to be responsible for something without causing it. Philosophical Perspectives, 18(1), 315-336. Sartorio, C. (2007). Causation and responsibility. Philosophy Compass, 2(5), 749-765. Sartorio, C. (2016). Causation and free will: Oxford University Press UK. Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2005). It's not my fault: Global warming and individual moral obligations. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong, & R. B. Howarth (Eds.), Perspectives on climate change: Science, economics, politics, ethics (Vol. 5, pp. 285–307, Advances in the economics of environmental resources). Amsterdam: Elsevier. Smiley, M. (2017). Collective responsibility. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Strawson, P. F. (1962). Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy, 48, 187– 211. van Inwagen, P. (1983). An essay on free will: Oxford: Clarendon.

CA:Wadsworth, 1988), pp. 126–8. The arguments are similar, so we will look at Swinburne's version. 15. II Corinthians 11:14. See also George Mavrodes, "Real vs. Deceptive Mystical Experiences," Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. S.T. Katz (NY: Oxford U.P., 1978), pp. 235–58. 16. A version of this objection can be found in Michael P. Levine's "If there is a God, any Experience which seems to be of God, will be Genuine," Religious Studies 26/2 (1990): 207–218. 17. The Literal Meaning of Genesis IV. 12, trans. J.H. Taylor (NY: Newman Press, 1982), p. 117. 18. Summa Theologica, trans. A. Pegis (NY: Random House). IA IIae, q 104, al. 19. The act of conservation is usually seen as being identical with the act of creation. As Descartes put it "conservation and creation differ merely in respect of our mode of thinking and not in reality." (Meditations, trans. J. Veitch (La Salle, IL.: Open Court, 1950), pp. 58–9). This idea of "Continuous creation" is found also in Thomas (See St Ia Iiae, q 104, al.). 20. So Robert Oakes, "Perishability, the Actual World, and the Existence of God," Religious Studies 19 (1983), pp. 493–504. III.A.6 Divine Hiddenness, Divine Silence MICHAEL REA Michael Rea (1968–) is professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and co-editor of the present volume. His research focuses primarily on metaphysics and philosophical theology. In the present article, he explains why divine silence poses a serious intellectual obstacle to belief in God, and then goes on to consider ways of overcoming that obstacle. After considering several ways in which divine silence might actually be beneficial to human beings, he argues that perhaps silence is nothing more or less than God's preferred mode of interaction with creatures like us. Perhaps God simply desires communion rather than overt communication with human beings, and perhaps God has provided ways for us to experience God's presence richly even amidst the silence. Several years ago, and a short while after her death, some of the private writings of Mother Teresa were published under the title Come Be My Light. The journal entries were shocking- not because they disclosed hidden sins or scandals, but because they revealed something far more troubling. They painted a picture of a woman celebrated for her faith and devotion to God but wracked by pain and doubt for lack of the felt presence of God in her life-a woman who sought God with tears and cried out for years for some small taste of the divine, for some tiny assurance in her soul of God's love and presence in her life, but, like so many of the rest of us, received nothing but silence in response. In one of the most poignant passages of the book, she writes: Lord, my God, who am I that You should forsake me? The child of your love-and now become as the most hated one-the one You have thrown away as unwantedunloved. I call, I cling, I want-and there 266 PART III • REL IG IOUS EXPER I ENCE © C en ga ge L ea rn in g. A ll rig ht s r es er ve d. N o di st rib ut io n al lo w ed w ith ou t e xp re ss a ut ho riz at io n. is no One to answer-no One on Whom I can cling-no, No One.-Alone. The darkness is so dark...The loneliness of the heart that wants love is unbearable.-Where is my faith?-even deep down, right in, there is nothing but emptiness & darkness.-My God-how painful is this unknown pain. It pains without ceasing... I am told God loves me-and yet the reality of darkness & coldness & emptiness is so great that nothing touches my soul. ... The whole time smiling-Sisters & people pass such remarks.-They think my faith, trust & love are filling my very being & that the intimacy with God and union to His will must be absorbing my heart.-Could they but know-and how my cheerfulness is the cloak by which I cover the emptiness & misery.-What are You doing My God to one so small? (Mother Teresa, Come Be My Light: The Private Writings of the Saint of Calcutta, edited with commentary by Brian Kolodiejchuk, New York: Doubleday, 2007, pp. 186–87) What indeed? What are we to make of the silence of God? Divine silence-or, as many think of it, divine hiddenness-is the source of one of the two most important and widely discussed objections to belief in God. It is also, I venture to say, one of the most important sources of doubt and spiritual distress for religious believers. Mother Teresa eventually reconciled herself to a certain extent with God's hiddenness, but (moving all the way to the other edge of the continuum) Friedrich Nietzsche saw it as just one more reason to sneer at religious belief. He writes: A god who is all-knowing and all-powerful and who does not even make sure his creatures understand his intention-could that be a god of goodness? Who allows countless doubts and uncertainties to persist, for thousands of years, as though the salvation of mankind were unaffected by them, or who, on the other hand, holds out the prospect of frightful consequences if any mistake is made as to the nature of truth? Would he not be a cruel god if he possessed the truth and could behold mankind miserably tormenting itself over that truth?-But perhaps he is a god of goodness notwithstanding and merely could express himself more clearly! Did he perhaps lack the intelligence to do so? Or the eloquence? So much the worse! For then he was perhaps also in error as to that which he calls his "truth," and is himself not so very far from being the "poor deluded devil"! (Daybreak, trans R. J. Holingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 89–90) It's pretty clear that Nietzsche thinks that the existence of an all good, all powerful God is outright incompatible with our experience of divine hiddenness. But why? In the next section of this article, I will try briefly to answer this question. That is, I will try briefly to get clear on exactly what the problem of divine hiddenness is supposed to be. (Only briefly, though, because I think we all have at least a basic grasp of what the worry is.) After that, I'll spend the remainder of the article discussing three strategies for dealing with the problem. THE PROBLEM OF DIV INE H IDDENNESS The problem of divine hiddenness starts with the supposition that God exists. There is no problem (for adults) about the hiddenness of Santa Claus, or of unicorns, or leprechauns, or the like. We simply don't believe in these sorts of things. The problem of divine hiddenness arises under the supposition-genuine, or "for the sake of argument"-that God exists. The problem gains traction because our concept of God is the concept of a being that we ought to encounter-tangibly and vividly, it would seem-at some point in our lives. MICHAEL REA • D IV INE H IDDENNESS , D IV INE S I LENCE 267 © C en ga ge L ea rn in g. A ll rig ht s r es er ve d. N o di st rib ut io n al lo w ed w ith ou t e xp re ss a ut ho riz at io n. Again, there is no real problem of the hiddenness of abstract objects. Nobody says, "Well, if there are such things, why don't they show themselves once in a while?" They're just not that sort of thing. God, however, is supposed to be the sort of being who would show up once in awhile. But almost none of us ever really see God, hear God, touch God, or encounter God in any other palpable way. Even those who say that God speaks to them in prayer don't usually mean that they hear voices-or have any other experience apart from the felt conviction that some particular idea they've had is, in some sense, "from the Lord." That, in a nutshell, is the problem. Why do we think that we ought to encounter God? Simple: Our concept of God is the concept of a perfectly rational, perfectly wise being who loves us like a perfect parent. A being like that would want to have a relationship with us; and we all know that, in order to have a relationship with someone, you have to communicate with him or her. This is why the junior high approach to romance does not work. You know how this goes: Boy sees girl; boy likes girl; and.... .boy takes every possible measure to prevent this fact from becoming known to girl. If people never grew out of this sort of immaturity, the human race would die out. So it's a safe bet that a perfectly rational God wouldn't take this approach in trying to relate to us. So it stands to reason that God would show up in our lives once in a while. More seriously: The theistic religions are in full agreement about the fact that it is bad for us to spend our lives without a relationship with God. We all know that, all else being equal, it is bad for a child to grow up without a father or a mother, or to believe-for good reasons or bad-that her father or mother doesn't love her. We all know that good parents go out of their way to talk to their children, to reassure them of their love, to be present in vivid and tangible ways-ways that the child can understand and benefit from at whatever stage of life she's at- and so on. Good parents don't lock themselves in a room day after day, waiting for their children to acquire the wherewithal to seek them out. Good parents don't expect that their children will discover their love for them simply by way of inference from the orderliness of the living room and the presence of fun toys in the basement. Good parents go out of their way to say, "I love you," and to hold their children and to comfort them when they're sad. How much more, then, should we expect the same from a being who (we're told) loves us like a perfect parent? If my daughter were crying out for my presence in the way that Mother Teresa cried out for God's, I would move heaven and earth if I could to be there for her. If my son were in despair because he thought that he had irreparably disappointed me, I would hold his hand and tell him that that's not true. How could I not? And yet I'm selfish, imperfect, lacking in resources, and short on wisdom, only human. How much more then should we expect God to respond to such cries? Of course, I don't mean to suggest that God would be bound to respond in some very particular way to us when we cry out for his presence. Nor, I should think, would God be bound to respond every single time. Good parents sometimes turn a deaf ear to their children's cries, and often for the child's good; they sometimes leave their children with babysitters (even when it's not strictly necessary), ignoring vehement protests; and so on. So what kind of encounter with God am I saying that we ought to expect? Well, it's hard to say exactly. But you might think that, at a minimum we ought to expect at least one of the following to be the case: ■ Our evidence should be conclusive: It shouldn't be the case that one can be fully aware of the available evidence of God's existence and at the same time rationally believe that God does not exist. OR ■ Experience of God's love and presence should be widely available: It shouldn't be the case that, in general, people never (or only very rarely) have experiences that seem to be experiences of the love or presence of God. And yet both of these things that seem like they shouldn't be the case are the case. It is exactly this that I have in mind when I say that God is hidden or silent, and when I say that we don't encounter God 268 PART III • REL IG IOUS EXPER I ENCE © C en ga ge L ea rn in g. A ll rig ht s r es er ve d. N o di st rib ut io n al lo w ed w ith ou t e xp re ss a ut ho riz at io n. often in palpable ways: Our evidence is inconclusive; religious experience-of the interesting and unambiguous sort-is rare. And it's really hard to see any good reason why God might leave matters this way. So it looks like we have only three options: (a) We identify some mistake in our reasoning thus far; (b) we find some believable, good reason why God might remain hidden; or (c) we concede that there is no God. There is really no other way forward. If you're interested in identifying a mistake in the reasoning, it helps to have the premises of the argument carefully laid out and numbered. Like so: 1. Suppose that God exists-that is, suppose that there is a perfectly powerful, perfectly wise being who loves us like a perfect parent. 2. God is mostly hidden from people: Our evidence is inconclusive; religious experience of the interesting and unambiguous sort is rare. 3. There is no good reason for God to remain hidden. 4. If God is mostly hidden and there is no good reason for God to remain hidden, then one of the following is true: a. God exists but, like a negligent father, does not love us enough to make himself known. b. God exists but, like an inept lover, lacks the wisdom to appreciate the importance or proper way of revealing himself to us. c. God exists but is too weak to reveal himself in the ways that he should in order to secure his relational goals. 5. Premises (1)–(4) are inconsistent. 6. Therefore: God does not exist. This will be our official statement of the problem of divine hiddenness.1 DEAL ING WITH THE PROBLEM The advantage to articulating a problem in the way that I just have-with numbered premises and inferences signaled with "therefore's"-is that it gives us a pretty systematic way of addressing the problem. If premises (1–4) really are inconsistent (and I think they are, since our concept of God rules out 4a–4c), then one of them is false. The trick then is to ask about each one, "Is this premise true or false? And if it is false, why is it false?" In the next few minutes, I'll suggest some reasons for thinking that premises (2) and (3) might be false. My own sympathies lie with those who reject premise (3). But I'll start with some thoughts about premise (2). Conclusive Evidence? In St. Paul's epistle to the Romans, Paul writes: The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all the godlessness and wickedness of men who suppress the truth by their wickedness,19 since what may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them.20 For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities-his eternal power and divine nature-have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse.21 For although they knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to him, but their thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened. (Rom. 1:18–21; New Revised Standard Version Bible, copyright 1989, Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America) Does it sound like St. Paul would agree with the claim that God is mostly hidden? No. On Paul's view, as some people read it, there is no reasonable Non-belief: Non-belief is due to sin. Or, a bit more softly, what passes for non-belief is really a kind of self-deception. Being an atheist is sort of like being an alcoholic in denial: You want so badly not to see the truth that you suppress it and convince yourself that things are how you want them to be. This is an offensive doctrine. But I think that it has to be taken seriously. Self-deception is a real MICHAEL REA • D IV INE H IDDENNESS , D IV INE S I LENCE 269 © C en ga ge L ea rn in g. A ll rig ht s r es er ve d. N o di st rib ut io n al lo w ed w ith ou t e xp re ss a ut ho riz at io n. phenomenon; and there is nothing at all implausible about the idea that people would prefer-indeed, would want very badly-for there to be no God. One of my colleagues once pointed out that most sensible people would recoil in horror upon hearing that a person of great power and influence had taken a special interest in them and had very definite, detailed, and not-easily-implemented views about how they ought to live their lives. Along the same lines, eminent philosopher Thomas Nagel, in a now famous chapter entitled "Naturalism and the Fear of Religion," writes: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It is not just that I do not believe in God, and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief. It's that I hope there is no God! I do not want there to be a God; I do not want the universe to be like that.... My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. (The Last Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009; pp. 130–131) So is it really so crazy to think-on the supposition that there is a God, remember-that many people would be in the grip of this kind of selfdeception? No. To be sure, the view implies that a great many people-including many whom we regard as otherwise very wise and intelligent- suffer from a kind of deep-seated irrationality. But I don't think we should shrink from this sort of claim on principle. After all, atheists say that sort of thing about theists all the time. Still, this is a hard doctrine, and it has some real problems as a general explanation of the phenomenon of divine hiddenness. Remember, even believers struggle with God's hiddenness. Many people seem to be utterly broken by divine silence in the midst of their own suffering or the suffering of others, or simply by the ongoing and unsatisfied longing for the presence of God. I've seen more than one friend break down in tears over this sort of thing. And remember Mother Teresa. Moreover, many people are atheists or agnostics despite years of what at least seems to them to be honest seeking after God. Is it possible that all of these people are radically self-deceived? Sure. But then we must ask why a compassionate God would allow such pervasive and destructive self-deception to go unchecked. Every day drug, alcohol, and sex addicts, people with eating disorders and abusive personalities, and many others as well are made to face up to their own self-deception and admit to themselves and others what they very badly want to hide. Often-maybe mostly-they're made to do this by someone who simply confronts them vividly one way or another with the truth. Why wouldn't God do that for us? This question calls out for an answer as much as the original question of why God would remain hidden calls out for an answer. So denying that second premise seems to me to be just a way of relocating the problem-sort of like pushing around a bulge under the carpet instead of stomping it out entirely. And it seems that the only sensible answer is: God must have some very good reason. Good Reason? So now we come to the third premise: Maybe God does have a good reason for remaining hidden. But what could such a reason be? Here I want to consider two different kinds of response. One response says that he does it for our sake. Many philosophers think that, in general, God could be justified in permitting suffering of innocents only if the innocents themselves benefit.2 The idea is that a perfectly loving being wouldn't make me suffer for the benefit of someone else. And even folks who think that God could allow some people to suffer for the benefit of others typically think that, at the very least, there would have to be some benefit to human beings generally in order for God to be justified in permitting the evils that come from his remaining hidden. The other sort of response denies this: God has reasons, but his reasons are his own and have nothing directly to do with benefiting us 270 PART III • REL IG IOUS EXPER I ENCE © C en ga ge L ea rn in g. A ll rig ht s r es er ve d. N o di st rib ut io n al lo w ed w ith ou t e xp re ss a ut ho riz at io n. (which is why we often can't see any benefit to us in God's hiddenness). I'll take each in turn. So first, what might be some of the ways in which we (humans generally) could benefit from divine hiddenness? Here I'll consider two suggestions. First, one might think that hiddenness is necessary for preserving the freedom and integrity of our own responses to God. Some folks suggest that if God were to show himself openly, we would effectively be coerced into submission. I have kids, and they each in their own ways sometimes try to manipulate and bully the other one. I want them to freely choose not to do this-which means I often don't appear in the doorway when I hear that the conditions for manipulation and bullying are growing ripe. If I appear in the doorway, they'll be on their guard; their freedom to grow will be, in a certain way, undermined. That's one way of pitching the idea that divine hiddenness might help to preserve our freedom. But here's another: Suppose Bill Gates were to go back on the dating scene. Wouldn't it be natural for him to want to be with someone who would love him for himself rather than for his resources? Yet wouldn't it also be natural for him to worry that even the most virtuous of prospective dating partners would find it difficult to avoid having her judgment clouded by the prospect of living in unimaginable wealth? The worry wouldn't be that there would be anything coercive about his impressive circumstances; rather, it's that a certain kind of genuineness in a person's response to him is made vastly more difficult by those circumstances. But, of course, Bill Gates's impressiveness pales in comparison with God's; and, unlike Gates, God's resources and intrinsic nature are so incredibly impressive as to be not only overwhelmingly and unimaginably beautiful but also overwhelmingly and unimaginably terrifying. Viewed in this light, it is easy to suppose that God must hide from us if he wants to allow us to develop the right sort of nonself-interested love for him. Note too that if this is God's motivation, divine hiddenness is as much for our benefit as God's. Which brings me to the second, but related, "benefit to us" strategy for understanding divine hiddenness. Perhaps God's hiddenness is good for our souls. Perhaps it helps to produce virtues in us that we wouldn't otherwise acquire. Maybe it teaches us to seek God, to hunger and thirst after him, to not take him for granted. Much in the scriptures suggests that this is what God wants for us. The psalmist writes, "As a deer longs for flowing streams, so my soul longs for you, O God," (Ps. 42:1, New Revised Standard Bible) and the idea seems clearly to be that we all should long after God in this way. Likewise, at one point in the Gospels Jesus gives thanks to God for hiding certain things from those who are not seeking him; and he admonishes us to ask, seek, and knock (Mt. 11:25; Mt. 7:7). God wants us to be seekers after him, and what better way to cultivate that disposition than to hide? Or maybe divine hiddenness teaches us that God cannot be manipulated by us-that God is not at our beck and call. We cannot summon God by performing the right sorts of incantations; God is maximally free, maximally authoritative, and will be manipulated by no one. This too might be a lesson that is good for us to learn, and so it, too, might be among the purposes of divine hiddenness. The Personality of God? Or maybe ... just maybe ... although divine hiddenness often does have these salutary effects, and others, that still is not their point at all. The last suggestion I'd like to consider is one that sees divine hiddenness not as something that God does to produce some great good for us, but rather as something that God engages in for his own reasons, independently of (though not in violation of) our good. Throughout this talk I have sometimes used the term divine silence to refer to the phenomenon of hiddenness. I think that that's a more fruitful way of thinking of God's mode of interaction with us. And what I want to suggest is that perhaps divine silence is nothing more or less than an expression of God's personality. Remember our problem: We experience divine silence and, under the assumption that God MICHAEL REA • D IV INE H IDDENNESS , D IV INE S I LENCE 271 © C en ga ge L ea rn in g. A ll rig ht s r es er ve d. N o di st rib ut io n al lo w ed w ith ou t e xp re ss a ut ho riz at io n. exists, we ask, "What's his problem? Doesn't he love me? Doesn't he care? Doesn't he understand that you have to talk to people to relate to them? What kind of father is he?" The objections implied by these rhetorical questions are altogether natural, but they are flawed. They are flawed in just the same way in which complaints about the behavior of human persons are often flawed: They depend on a particular interpretation of behavior that can in fact be interpreted in a number of different ways, depending upon what assumptions we make about the person's beliefs, desires, motives, dispositions, and overall personality. Someone from your school doesn't greet you in the hallway. Have you hurt her feelings? Does she think you're a fool and not want to be seen talking to you? Does she think so poorly of herself that she thinks you wouldn't want to be seen talking to her? Is she depressed and having a bad day? As a matter of fact, she's the class genius-beautiful mind sort of genius-and she's always off in her own world, introverted and totally preoccupied. Does that affect your interpretation of her behavior? You're on a first date. After a while you notice that you've been doing almost all the talking. You start asking questions to draw her out, but her answers are brief, and the silences in between grow longer and longer. You spend the entire ride home without saying a word. Does she hate you? Does she find you boring? Have you offended her? Or is she just rude? As it happens, she just arrived in the United States and was raised with the view that if you really want to win a man over, you should be quiet and let him do all the talking. Does that information affect your interpretation? My point? Interpreting silence requires a lot of information about what sort of person you're dealing with-about the person's cultural background, about what sorts of social norms he or she is likely to recognize and respect, about his or her views about what various kinds of behavior (both verbal and not) communicate to others, about his or her general "style" of interacting with other people, about what's going on in his or her life, and so on. But if this is what it takes to interpret the behavior of an ordinary human person, imagine how difficult it must be to interpret the behavior of an invisible and transcendent divine person. Seen in this light, the suggestion that divine silence in and of itself somehow indicates disinterest or lack of love and concern on God's part is absurd. God is as alien and "wholly other" from us as it is possible for another person to be. So isn't it almost ridiculous to think that we would have any idea what divine silence would indicate? To assume that divine silence indicates a lack of concern for us involves quite a lot of unwarranted assumptions about the degree to which divine modes of interaction would likely resemble 21st-century human modes of interaction. Granted, divine silence would indicate a lack of concern for rational creatures if we had good reason to think that God had provided no way for us to find him or to experience his presence in the midst of his silence. This would indicate a lack of concern because it would indicate that God is trying to prevent us from finding him, or at least doing nothing to help, and thus bringing about something that is both intrinsically very bad for us and totally beyond our control. But as far as I can tell, we don't have good reason for thinking that God has left us without any way of finding him or experiencing his presence. I think that we have a tendency to assume that we can experience God's presence only if we tangibly perceive something-a voice, a vision, an ache in our stomachs or our heads, a tingly feeling of some sort. But experiencing the presence of a person sometimes involves none of this. Sometimes it is just a matter of the person being present, together with our believing that she is present and taking a certain attitude toward her presence. Consider: You're studying in the library. You look up and you see a reflection in the window: The girl you've been in love with all year but never had the courage to ask out has entered the library behind you. Without seeing you, she turns down the aisle of books adjacent to yours-just a single stack of shelves separates you-and takes up a seat. She's out of your view, but is there any doubt that you'll experience her presence? And you would, even 272 PART III • REL IG IOUS EXPER I ENCE © C en ga ge L ea rn in g. A ll rig ht s r es er ve d. N o di st rib ut io n al lo w ed w ith ou t e xp re ss a ut ho riz at io n. apart from the initial glimpse that alerted you to her presence-all you'd need to experience it-to genuinely experience it-is the true conviction that she's right there on the other side of those books, together with a certain kind of attention and attitude toward that conviction. In her book A Wind in the Door, Madeline L'Engle makes this point very nicely by way of the distinction between communication and communion: "Hey, Meg! [says Calvin] Communication implies sound. Communion doesn't." He sent her a brief image of walking silently through the woods, the two of them alone together, their feet almost noiseless on the rusty carpet of pine needles. They walked without speaking, without touching, and yet they were as close as it is possible for two human beings to be. ... Mr. Jenkins had never had that kind of communion with another human being, a communion so rich and full that silence speaks more powerfully than words." (A Wind in the Door, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1973, p. 171) And, of course, silent communion is not the only way to experience a person unseen. Think of times when you relay a story about an encounter with another person and, after a bit of effort, you falter and say, "Well, you just had to be there." What you communicate, I think, is that your words have failed at their goal-the goal of putting us there, of mediating to us an experience of a person we don't see and maybe have never met. Sometimes we do fail in that way, but often we succeed. When you say "You just had to be there," nobody ever says, "Well, of course! You always have to be there; you simply can't convey an experience like that in words!" Stories about other persons can mediate their presence to us-they can give us a taste of what it is like to be in the presence of the person, sort of like memories give us a taste of what it is like to be in the presence of the remembered event, even when we 're not. Again, though, it matters that we believe that the person reporting the events in question is reporting events involving real persons. When we do, we can be transported and get at least a bit of what it's like to be around the person we're being told about. And this, it seems, is what biblical narrative-and, to a certain extent, the liturgies of the church-can do for us when we approach them with eyes of faith.3 My claim, then, is that divine silence might just be an expression of God's preferred mode of interaction, and that we need not experience his silence as absence-especially if we see Biblical narratives and liturgies as things that in some sense mediate the presence of God to us, if we live out our lives in the conviction that God is ever present with us, and if we seek something more like communion with God rather than just communication. The pressing question, however, is what to do with the fact that God's silence is painful for us. Many believers experience crippling doubt, overwhelming sadness, and ultimate loss of faith as a result of ongoing silence from their heavenly Father. On the assumption that God exists and that a loving relationship with God is a great good, it would appear that many people have been positively damaged by divine silence. Isn't it just this that leads us to take divine silence as evidence of God's lack of concern? Perhaps silence is just an expression of God's personality, but then, the objector might say, God's personality is just that of an unloving and inattentive parent. The problem with this objection is that it completely ignores the fact that sometimes our being pained by another person's behavior is our problem rather than theirs-due to our own dysfunctional attitudes and ways of relating to others, our own epistemic or moral vices, our own immaturity, and the like. In such cases, it is our responsibility to find a way out of our suffering rather than the other person's responsibility to stop behaving in the ways that cause us pain. And maybe this is how it is with divine silence, too. Maybe our suffering in the face of divine silence is unreasonable, due more to our own immaturity or dysfunction than to any lack of kindness on God's part. Maybe it is a result of our own untrusting, uncharitable interpretations of divine silence, or an MICHAEL REA • D IV INE H IDDENNESS , D IV INE S I LENCE 273 © C en ga ge L ea rn in g. A ll rig ht s r es er ve d. N o di st rib ut io n al lo w ed w ith ou t e xp re ss a ut ho riz at io n. inappropriate refusal to accept God for who God is and to accept God's preferences about when and in what ways to communicate with us. And maybe there are ways of experiencing the world that are fully available to us, if only we would strive for maturity in the ways that we ought to, that would allow us to be content with or even to appreciate the silence of God in the midst of our joys and sufferings. Coping with divine silence, then, would just be a matter of finding these more positive ways of experiencing it. It helps, in this vein, to be reminded of a fact about God and a fact about ordinary human relationships. The fact about God is that the most enigmatic, eccentric, and complicated people we might ever encounter in literature or in real life are, by comparison with God, utterly familiar and mundane. The fact about human relationships is that experiencing the silence of another person can, in the right context and seen in the right way, be an incredibly rich way of experiencing the person-all the more so with a person who is sufficiently beyond you in intellect, wisdom, and virtue. A wise and virtuous person who is utterly beyond you intellectually and silently leads you on a journey that might teach you a lot more about herself and about other things on your journey than she would if she tried to tell you all of the things that she wants to teach you. In such a case, objecting to the silence, interpreting it as an offence, or wishing that the person would just talk to you rather than make you figure things out for yourself might just be childish-an immature refusal to tolerate legitimate differences among persons and to be charitable in the way that you interpret another's behavior. And there is no reason to think that the person would owe it to you to cater to these objections-even if her decision to be silent was arrived at not for the sake of your greater good, but simply because that's who she is, and that's how she prefers to communicate with people like you. You might be tempted to object that, on this view, God is like a father who neglects his children, leaving them bereft and unloved while he sits in stony silence thinking "I just gotta be me." But to object like this is to fail to take seriously the idea that God might have a genuine, robust personality and that it might be deeply good for God to live out his own personality. One odd feature of much contemporary philosophy of religion is that it seems to portray God as having a "personality" that is almost entirely empty, allowing his behavior to be almost exhaustively determined by facts about how it would be best for others for an omnipotent being to behave. But why should we think of God like this? God is supposed to be a person not only of unsurpassable love and goodness but of unsurpassable beauty. Could God really be that sort of person if he's nothing more than a cosmic, others-oriented, utility-maximizing machine? On that way of thinking, God-the being who is supposed to be a person par excellence-ends up having no real self. So, as I see it, silence of the sort we experience from God might just flow out of who God is, and it might be deeply good for God to live out his personality. If that's right, and if our suffering in the face of divine silence is indeed unreasonable, the result of immaturity or other dysfunctions that we can and should overcome anyway, then I see no reason why even perfect love would require God to desist from his preferred mode of interaction in order to alleviate our suffering On the view that I am developing, then, it is not true that divine silence serves no greater good. Rather, it serves the good that comes of the most perfect and beautiful person in the universe expressing himself in the way that he sees fit. This is good on its own terms, and it is justified if-as theists generally believe-God has provided ways (not our preferred ways, but ways nonetheless) of finding and experiencing his presence despite his silence. And if, as I have suggested, there are ways of experiencing divine silence that we would find non-burdensome or even beautiful, and if God's persisting in his silence provides opportunities for us to grow in maturity or in our ability to relate to others, then divine silence might even be good for us.4 274 PART III • REL IG IOUS EXPER I ENCE © C en ga ge L ea rn in g. A ll rig ht s r es er ve d. N o di st rib ut io n al lo w ed w ith ou t e xp re ss a ut ho riz at io n. NOTES 1. The most widely discussed articulation of the problem of divine hiddenness is J.L. Schellenberg's Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cambridge University Press). Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) is another important volume which includes both further articulations of the problem as well as a variety of responses. All but the last of the responses that I present in the section entitled "Dealing with the Problem" are represented and defended in some detail in that volume. Finally, see also Ted Poston and Trent Dougherty, "Divine Hiddenness and the Nature of Belief," Religious Studies 43 (2007): 183–98, and my "Narrative, Liturgy, and the Hiddenness of God," pp. 76–96, in Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump, edited by Kevin Timpe (New York: Routledge, 2009). 2. See, e.g., Eleonore Stump, "The Problem of Evil," Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985): 393–423, and "Providence and the Problem of Evil," pp. 51–91 in Christian Philosophy, edited by Thomas P. Flint (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). For critical discussion of this principle, along with references to other philosophers who endorse it, see Jeff Jordan, "Divine Love and Human Suffering," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (2004): 169–78. 3. I develop this idea in more detail in "Narrative, Liturgy, and the Hiddenness of God." The idea takes inspiration from recent work by Eleonore Stump-especially her Wandering in Darkness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 4. This essay has been given as a talk aimed at undergraduate and non-academic audiences on several occasions, most recently at Wake Forest University and Bethel College, South Bend. It is published here for the first time. MICHAEL REA • D IV INE H IDDENNESS , D IV INE S I LENCE 275 © C en ga ge L ea rn in g. A ll rig ht s r es er ve d. N o di st rib ut io n al lo w ed w ith ou t e xp re ss a ut ho riz at io n.

The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 19 Why the Imago Dei is in the Intellect Alone: A Criticism of a Phenomenology of Sensible Experience for Attaining an Image of God1 Seamus J. O'Neill The Memorial University of Newfoundland This paper, as a response to Mark K. Spencer's, "Perceiving the Image of God in the Whole Human Person" in the present volume, argues in defence of Aquinas's position that the Imago Dei is limited in the human being to the rational, intellective soul alone. While the author agrees with Spencer that the hierarchical relation between body and soul in the human composite must be maintained while avoiding the various permeations of dualism, nevertheless, the Imago Dei cannot be located in the human body or the principle of the body considered within the body/soul composite without betraying a number of fundamental Thomistic metaphysical principles. Essential to these includes Aquinas's position that an image of God should image not only the Divine Nature, but also the Trinitarian relations between the Divine Persons. Further, the paper also argues that a phenomenology of sense experience could not, on principle, attain to an image of God in the whole human person within a Thomistic framework generally. Introduction There are two positions one does not want to be in when responding to a learned paper in an academic colloquium. In an episode of Rowan Atkinson's Blackadder III, Hugh Laurie's foppish Prince George rehearses aloud a juvenile and salacious poem he has composed for a woman whom he is courting. At the poem's rather naughty conclusion, Blackadder responds, "It's very moving sir. Would you mind if I change one tiny aspect of it?" "Which one?" "The words." Thankfully, I'm not in this position here today, for if I were, in the very least I would likely be wrong. However, on the other end, absolute amity is neither very interesting nor productive of stimulating discussion. I believe that I have landed somewhere in between these extremes. I agree with Dr. Spencer about what he wishes to avoid: the philosophical conundrums raised by sundry dualisms, anti-cosmic assessments of the body, and muddled renditions of hylomorphism. Also, I affirm what Dr. Spencer desires to preserve: the hierarchical relation between soul and body, and the fundamental doctrines underlying the Augustinian/Thomistic understanding of the imago dei, which Dr. Spencer seeks merely to emend. Most importantly, I agree that a philosophy must correspond to one's experience.2 However, while I generally wonder whether a phenomenology of sensible experience is 1 I would like to thank Dr. Susan Gabriel for her helpful and insightful comments, reflections, and corrections to an earlier version of this article. Any remaining errors and problems are my own. 2 Dr. Spencer writes, ". . . careful accounts of experience ought to constrain anthropology: if some experience cannot fit with a given anthropology, then the latter requires amendment." Mark K. Spencer, "Perceiving the Image of God in the Whole Human Person," The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 1-18, at 11. The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 20 ever universally convincing when marshalled toward any cause, in the case of the image of God in the human being, I find the philosophical method problematic on principle. The more I think it through, the more I am convinced that Augustine and Thomas are correct: the image of God, present in the human soul, cannot be also in the body, or the human person considered as a hylomorphic substance.3 I believe that Dr. Spencer's emendation, and the phenomenological methods used to achieve it, betray a number of fundamental philosophical and theological positions of Aquinas, upon which he builds his understanding of the image of God: must one part ways with Thomas on more deeply rooted doctrines in order to incorporate the image of God into the body? I have no qualms with what Dr. Spencer claims about Augustine and Aquinas themselves, and because most of his explanation of the position is grounded explicitly in Aquinas, I will follow suit. However, I raise a number of theses here that I wish to defend in the following against the claim that there is an image of God in the body: 1) the perfection of the universe requires that the soul of the human being (between the angel and brute on the cosmic hierarchy) is at once a material form and a separable substance; 2) seeing the image of God in the body of the human tends either to a) reduce the eminence of the angelic nature relative to the human and brute, b) reduce the eminence of the human nature relative to the brute or to the community, c) elevate the eminence of the brutes to equality with human beings, or d) flirt with a flat ontology counter to Augustine's and Aquinas's stratified hierarchies of reality; 3) the emendation of Thomas's image of God runs counter to some of Thomas's deeper metaphysical and theological commitments; 4) an image of God should image not only the Divine Nature, but also the Trinitarian relations between the Divine Persons; 5) a phenomenology of sensible experience cannot, and, perhaps on principle could not, yield an image of God; and 6) the emendation of Thomas's image of God seems to re-create a kind of problematic Cartesianism which Spencer explicitly warns against. I agree with Augustine and Aquinas: the image of God is in the rational soul alone, and, as Dr. Spencer puts it: "The best we can do on the Thomistic view is to perceive a likeness or sign of the image of God in the body."4 Not too shabby, in the end. I'm rather content with this limitation, and in the following, I'll explain why. Image, Likeness, and the Hierarchy of Being 3 The image of God is in the hylomorphic human substance only insofar as the human soul is also rational, that is, a separable, substantial form. 4 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 10. The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 21 Dr. Spencer explains very well Thomas's position that the image of God is in the rational soul alone. We need not rehearse this in detail, but I will emphasise a few points.5 Thomas argues, with Augustine, that any image (imago) implies a likeness (similtudo), but not every likeness is an image.6 That is, a thing can be like another without being its image: a red door and a blushing bride are similar in hue, but one is hardly an image of the other because of it. All images, however, possess a likeness to that of which they are images. Likeness is the bigger thing, and, as Aquinas asserts, is essential to an image: there are no images without likeness. The notion of image "adds something" to likeness, namely, that it is "produced as an imitation of something else."7 Thomas further specifies that i) not every effect is an image of its cause, and ii) an accidental likeness between things does not an image make.8 To be an image, Thomas contends, there must be a likeness in species. Because, as Thomas maintains, "specific likeness follows the ultimate difference," . . . "it is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image."9 His reasoning is as follows: all things share a likeness to God insofar as they exist. Some share a further likeness insofar as they also live, and some of those living things also sense.10 But existing, living, and sensing are not the ultimate differentia in the definition of the human species; that is, the human being is a rational animal. Because God possesses intellect and will, those powers that differentiate the human (and angelic) being from all other creatures, the human shares this closer likeness to God by her intelligence.11 Although lower creatures lack intellect, they possess a trace of the divine mind that created them – a footprint (vestigia), or likeness as to a trace.12 If an image requires a likeness in species, and this likeness follows the ultimate difference, then one sees why the image of God (the likeness to God in the human according to species) must be restricted to the rational nature alone.13 Further, Aquinas maintains, following Aristotle, that the power of the intellect is not contained in a bodily organ. Unlike the corporeal and internal senses, it is not limited by material confines. Certainly it requires the senses for the material with which it works, but properly speaking, the intellect is immaterial. For this reason, 5 We certainly need not accept Thomas's definitions of image and likeness, but his definitions supply the context within which we are speaking about the imago dei, and the emendation that Dr. Spencer offers is also working within these notions. 6 ST Ia. Q93. A1. co. Thomas also quotes Augustine's div. qu. 74. I use the text in Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. The Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Name, IN: Ave Maria Press, Inc., 1948). 7 ST Ia. Q93. A1. co.: "... agitur ad imitationem alterius." Further, equality, unless the image is a perfect image, does not belong to the essence of an image. 8 ST Ia. Q93. A2. co. 9 ST Ia. Q93. A2. co. 10 Aquinas here follows Aristotle's ground-up hierarchy. For Aristotle, however, (unmoved movers aside) the higher is never found without the lower; Aquinas's angelology requires him to emend Aristotle's position. 11 This likeness in the human being is, of course, imperfect. Only Christ possesses a perfect likeness of the Father, by which identity Christ is called the perfect image of God, or just the Image of God: he lacks nothing possessed by the Father. See ST Ia. Q93. A1. ad. 2. 12 ST Ia. Q93. A2. ad. 4. 13 Aquinas writes, "Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according to that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature" (ST Ia. Q93. A4. co). The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 22 the image of God can be found only in subsistent forms. Thus, the only creatures that image God in this precise, Thomistic sense, are human beings, angels, and, one supposes, demons. As Spencer points out and explains, the soul of the human being is at once the material form of the human hylomorphic composite, and a subsistent form, "capable of existing and acting intellectually and volitionally apart from matter, though it is naturally meant to actualize matter, and is in an unnatural condition without it."14 As Charles Hart explains the separation of the human soul, Man, in a word, is truly a rational animal. His soul, or active principle, should evidently be something more than simply the form of the body, as is the case in all the material substances below man. If the human form or soul in these higher activities displays a certain intrinsic independence of the body, then it should in some sense be an independent substance even if also the form of the body as the lower activities would indicate. Independent action would logically demand a truly independent substance as its source.15 The human soul is an independent substance on its own, and is not just a co-principle of a hylomorphic substance (though it is also this).16 All other material forms, (the forms of non-human matter/form, body/soul composites) do not image God because they do not possess intellect, that is, the species likeness following from the ultimate difference: 'rational.' They are neither willing nor intelligising substances. Already one sees here that if the intellect were bodily, that is, if intellect and will were contained in a material organ, then the body of a hylomorphic substance, suited materially to actualise these powers, could be, potentially, an image of God. Aquinas maintains, however, that this could not be: the very material limitations that allow an eye to see the violin preclude it from hearing its music; the very organisation of the ear that allows it to hear the "Four Seasons," prevent it from seeing Vivaldi playing it. The intellect, however, can think all things, and thus, on principle, cannot be limited to a material organ. And so, for Aquinas, the subsistent, intellectual form alone is the image of God. To have it any other way, either the intellect must somehow be bodily, or there must be some other image of God in the human being other than the intellect residing in the body, and, unless one wishes to extend the image of God to the brutes, it must exist in the human body alone.17 14 Mark K. Spencer, "What Is It Like to Be an Embodied Person? What Is It Like to Be a Separated Soul?," Angelicum 93 (2016): 219-246, at 219. 15 Charles A. Hart, Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry Into the Act of Existing, Reprint of the 1957 edition (United Kingdom: editiones scholasticae, 2015), 150. Also, according to Hart, "Evidently Aristotle is unwilling to make any fundamental modification of this hylomorphism to meet the fact of man's two contrary types of activities, despite his own clear recognition of their decided difference" (150). 16 See Hart: "A substantial form can also be a whole substance, and it is not necessarily limited to being a mere principle of a substance ... Substantiality need not be limited to purely material or corporeal substances" (151). 17 Hart explains that for Aquinas, "In the lower orders, form is completely dependent on matter for action and therefore for existence. Therefore, such a material form loses its independent substantial character and is reduced to the role of formal principle only of such a composite substance, of which matter is the other principle. Its dependence on matter is complete. By contrast, the soul in man is an incorporeal substance in itself and also the The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 23 To argue otherwise would collapse a fundamental piece of scaffolding undergirding Thomas's cosmology, namely, the view that the perfection of the universe requires that the soul of the human being (between the angel and brute on the cosmic hierarchy) is at once a material form and a separable substance. The "perfection of the universe" (perfectionem universi) is a phrase repeated by Aquinas throughout his works, and regularly summoned forth as a necessary truth according to which other hypotheses are proven right or wrong. In Question 47 of the Prima Pars, Aquinas writes, ". . . as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, so is it the cause of inequality. For the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things."18 Aquinas uses this principle to argue that one should expect a flourishing fullness of variation of Being throughout the universe created by an infinitely powerful and perfect God. A universe that contains lesser things in addition to greater things is ultimately greater than a universe that contained just the greater things alone.19 The hierarchical order of Being suffers no break, as it extends from God at its apex to the shadows of ants at its nadir, because, Aquinas writes: "the perfection of the universe required various grades of being."20 Arthur Lovejoy called this doctrine the "principle of plenitude" in his monumental, The Great Chain of Being.21 Fran O'Rourke has dubbed it "creative diffusion." Under whatever name, the principle is the same: as John Dillon put it: "the world does not tolerate a gap."22 Although there are many sources from which Aquinas could have received this doctrine, he no doubt sees it in a fully developed form in Dionysius, Aquinas's go-to philosophical source on the existence and nature of angels, though it is already present in Augustine's Neoplatonised cosmic schemata.23 Because the universe has its origin in a God with intellect and will, so too must there be creatures that possess some measure of the same, and perfect themselves and return to God by these very powers. Aquinas argues that, even though human beings possess such powers, there must also be separated substances, that is, substances without bodies, who form of the body" (153). 18 ST Ia. Q47. A2. co. 19 As Pope Francis explains in his encyclical, Laudato Si , "The universe as a whole, in all its manifold relationships, shows forth the inexhaustible riches of God. Saint Thomas Aquinas wisely noted that multiplicity and variety 'come from the intention of the first agent' who willed that 'what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another' inasmuch as God's goodness 'could not be represented fittingly by any one creature'" (Laudato Si 86). See Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter Laudato Si of the Holy Father Francis on Care for Our Common Home, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, accessed 20 May, 2018, http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudatosi.html 20 ST Ia. Q89. A1. co. 21 See also Fran O'Rourke: "According to Aquinas, commenting on Dionysius, the universe would not be complete if there were but one grade of goodness in beings, i.e., if they were all equal. Diversity and gradation among beings belongs to the perfection of the universe." Fran O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), at 262. 22 John Dillon, The Middle Platonists (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), at 317. 23 Aquinas explicitly invokes this "principle of plenitude," which claims that the "perfection of the universe" requires every possible grade of Being in a world brought into being and sustained by God, in question 50 of the Prima Pars to argue for the existence of separated intelligences. The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 24 also possess these-otherwise, there would be a gap in the ladder of being extending from God to the material world. Disembodied intelligences fill this gap; like God, they possess intellect and will and are immaterial. Here, Aquinas parts ways with Augustine, who believed that angels and demons possess bodies of aether or fire and air, respectively. Chesterton said that the reason why Aquinas was so interested in angels was because he was more interested in man. One sees here why Aquinas characterises the human soul as he does, as both a separable intelligence and a forma corporis. If humans were simply like other animals, whose souls are material forms only, this would create another chorismos in the cosmos-a gap between the angels and animals. The human being, therefore, fills this gap, possessing a soul that is at once a separable intelligence similar to the angel, but also the form of a body like that of the brutes.24 That the human being fulfills both sides is necessary for the perfection of the universe. Hart explains, Thus the unity of the composite human substance is far higher than that of any living substance below it. Because the human soul is incorporeal and subsistent, the human substance approaches, without of course reaching, the unity of a simple spiritual substance.25 Now consider the human being as an image of God. Yes, the body of the human must be a particular kind of body to perform the kinds of acts that are particularly human acts, as Aristotle claims: we need a human brain, among other things. But our exterior and interior senses differ from those of other animals merely in degree. In fact, as Augustine often observes, in numerous respects, many lower animals possess far superior bodies than do human beings, but we do not consider them more valuable because of them: "What human being can equal the eagle and the vulture in the sense of sight? Or the dog in the sense of smell? Or the hare, the stag, and all the birds in speed? Or the lion and the elephant in strength? Who can equal the longevity of the serpent, which is said to shed old age with its skin and return to its youth?"26 There is nothing particular about the body qua body which necessarily sets the human being apart as an image of God, or even at all, in Augustine's view-indeed, the demons, according to Augustine, possess bodies far superior to our fleshy forms. However, because the intellect and will of the rational soul require no organ, these particular powers are different in kind from those shared by merely ensouled bodies (material forms). In fact, because the image of God is found in the intellect alone, Aquinas claims that the angel possesses this image to a greater extent than does the human, owing to the superiority of the angelic intellect.27 The image of God, therefore, for Thomas, is restricted to only those beings 24 This is why the definition of the human as a rational animal brings together both sides of the human being's nature. 25 Hart, 159. 26 Augustine, civ. Dei 8.15. I use the text in Augustine, The City of God, trans. William Babcock (Hyde Park, New York: New City Press, 2012). 27 Aquinas writes, "the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 25 that possess intellect: angels and demons (subsistent forms) and human beings, whose souls, as both subsistent forms (like angels and demons) and material forms (like those of other animals and plants), straddle both levels of the cosmic hierarchy (the animal and the angelic). Every level of the created hierarchy is a hinge between what is above and below. The problem that Aquinas notes here, and I don't see how he can be wrong, is that were the image of God extended to the human body qua body, or to the human hylomorphic supposit, it would have to be demonstrated what is particular about the human body, to the exclusion of other animal bodies, such that it is such an image. Hart says that Aquinas's emendation of Aristotle's hylomorphism might "[a]t first sight . . . seem to be a confused mixture of Platonism and Aristotelianism, with the soul's incorporeal substance note obviously borrowed from Plato and its substantial form aspect from Aristotle."28 Or one can see the particular human nature as necessarily filling an otherwise gap within the hierarchy of being, between the non-intelligent animal nature and the angelic nature. It seems to me that locating the image of God in the body either i) reduces the human nature to that of the brutes, whereby the image of God is no longer the particular claim of the rational nature, or ii) denigrates the nature of the disembodied angels. The diversity and variation of the hierarchy of being is a fundamental metaphysical Neoplatonic (and essentially Dionysian) principle at the heart of Augustine's and Thomas's cosmologies and upon which many of their positions are structured.29 Spencer is keen to maintain the hierarchical relation between soul and body, but seeking to find the image of God in the body seems to threaten the hierarchy between creatures themselves.30 An Image of the Uncreated Trinity Thomas makes a further claim that will be problematic for certain candidates for the title of "image of God," particularly those nominated by a phenomenology of sensible experience. more perfect . . ." (ST Ia. Q93. A3. co.). As Dr. Spencer notes, Aquinas does speak in this Article of a kind of image of God in the human being in virtue of her body, lacking in the angel, namely, that i) man proceeds from man as God proceeds from God, ii) the whole human soul is in the whole human body and God from God, iii) the whole human soul is in every part of the body as God is in the whole world. See Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 6-9. For the distinction between "trace" and "image," see ST Ia. Q93. A6. co. However, these likenesses amount to only a trace, that is, a representation of something by way of an effect that does not attain to the likeness of the species. Dr. Spencer summarises: "These secondary images of God have a good deal to do with the body, but Aquinas insists that in each case, the image of God is, strictly speaking, in our soul-perhaps the soul in relation to the body, but not in the body as such. The human body, like all physical things, just bears the 'trace' (vestigium) or 'likeness' of God" (Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 9). 28 Hart, 153. 29 This is one point in defence of my 2nd and 3rd theses above: 2) Seeing the image of God in the body of the human tends either to i) reduce the eminence of the angelic nature relative to the human and brute, ii) reduce the eminence of the human nature relative to the brute or to the community, iii) elevate the eminence of the brutes to equality with human beings, or iv) yield a flat ontology, and 3) The emendation of Thomas's image of God runs counter to some of Thomas's deeper metaphysical and theological commitments. 30 Spencer writes, "The second [problematic anthropology] is any personalism on which the image of God is in the whole person to the exclusion of any hierarchy between soul and body; this fails to grasp how the person is given as a hierarchical unity" ("Perceiving the Image," 3). The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 26 Aquinas writes (ST Ia. Q93. A5. co), . . . to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons. So far, Thomas has discussed the rational creature's likeness to God insofar as she imitates God in being (like the First Being), life (like the First Life), and intelligence (like the Supreme Wisdom).31 Now he adds that the Divine Nature includes the Trinity of Persons, and so an image of God must also be a species likeness to the relations that constitute the uncreated Trinity. To grasp what exactly must be imaged in an image of God, therefore, one must first discern how Aquinas understands the processions of and relations between the Divine Persons. In Question 27, Article 1 of the Prima Pars, Aquinas rejects two different and opposed interpretations of "procession" within God. The first is the error of Arius, who claimed that the Son is the effect, or Primary creature, of the Father, and that the Holy Ghost is a creature fashioned by both: the three are really distinct beings. The second is the error of Sebellius, who maintained that the Son is really the Father assuming Flesh, and the Holy Ghost is the Father "sanctifying the rational creature, and moving it to life." That is, the Father impresses His likeness upon some already existing thing. In the first instance, procession is a movement from cause to external effect. In the second, procession is the action of a cause altering its effect, "or impressing its own likeness on it." While both interpretations, according to Aquinas, contradict Scripture, there are the further problems that under the Arian interpretation, it is hard to say how the Son and Holy Ghost are also God, and under the Sebellian, the three are actually identified. Here is how Aquinas characterises the problems: Careful examination shows that both of these opinions take procession as meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession always supposes action, and as there is an outward procession corresponding to the act of tending to external matter, so there must be an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the agent.32 The inadequate conceptions of procession within God fail insofar as each procession results in 31 See also Augustine, Trin. 10.13 ff. I use the text in Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Edmund Hill (Hyde Park, New York: New City Press, 1991). 32 ST Ia. Q27. A1. Co. "Si quis autem diligenter consideret, uterque accepit processionem secundum quod est ad aliquid extra, unde neuter posuit processionem in ipso Deo. Sed, cum omnis processio sit secundum aliquam actionem, sicut secundum actionem quae tendit in exteriorem materiam, est aliqua processio ad extra; ita secundum actionem quae manet in ipso agente, attenditur processio quaedam ad intra." For the Latin texts of Augustine, throughout I use, Saint Augustine, Opera Omnia – Corpus Augustinianum Gissense, Electronic Edition (Charlottesville, Virginia: InteLex Corporation, 2000). The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 27 something external to the originator of the procession-a distinct being or outward effect. For Aquinas, there is something essentially internal about the processions that occur within the Trinity, which can be properly imaged only by the intellect. When one understands something, Aquinas explains, the concept proceeds from one's knowledge of the object. The known issues forth from the very power of the knower and is contained within it, distinct, but not separated, which is why Augustine can advise: "Let the mind then not go looking for itself as if it were absent, but rather take pains to tell itself apart as present."33 The bodily senses are not like this. The object seen is separate from and external to both the eye that sees it and the vision that unites them.34 That is, bodily sensation requires external bodies to complete its actions.35 The intellect, however, knows itself, and can be an object of its own consideration. Its knowledge proceeds (although in this life with the aid of phantasms), from its own powers.36 In Question 27, Aquinas focuses on this particular character of the intellect when explaining procession within God. He writes, As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God, not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual substances; while even the similitudes derived from these fall short in the representation of divine objects.37 Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it is in bodies. . . . Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands procession as existing in God.38 When explaining the processions of the Son from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from the Father and Son, Aquinas emphasizes again that "procession exists in God, only according to an action 33 Augustine, Trin. 10.12. 34 Augustine writes, "Nor is it [the mind knowing itself] like a man being told 'Look at your face,' which he can only do in a mirror; even our own face is absent from our sight, because it is not in a place our sight can be directed at. But when the mind is told Know thyself, it knows itself the very moment it understands what 'thyself' is, and for no other reason than that it is present to itself" (Trin. 10.12). 35 Touch, one might argue, is somehow more akin to the intellect: when I feel my arm, my body is both that which feels and that which is felt, but again, there is a spatial, external distinction between my fingers and my arm; a fingertip cannot touch itself. 36 This is why Aristotle goes so far as to say that the mind, when in act, is nothing other than the forms it presently conceives. 37 Aquinas recognises the danger that Montague Brown raises of thinking that, because the image of God is in the intellect, therefore, God's knowing is the same as human knowing. See Montague Brown, "Imago Dei in Thomas Aquinas," The Saint Anselm Journal 10.1 (Fall 2014): 1-11, at 8. 38 ST Ia. Q27. A1. Co. "Cum autem Deus sit super omnia, ea quae in Deo dicuntur, non sunt intelligenda secundum modum infimarum creaturarum, quae sunt corpora; sed secundum similitudinem supremarum creaturarum, quae sunt intellectuales substantiae; a quibus etiam similitudo accepta deficit a repraesentatione divinorum. Non ergo accipienda est processio secundum quod est in corporalibus, vel per motum localem, vel per actionem alicuius causae in exteriorem effectum, ut calor a calefaciente in calefactum; sed secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod manet in ipso. Et sic fides Catholica processionem ponit in divinis." The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 28 which does not tend to anything external, but remains in the agent itself."39 This is why, for Augustine and Thomas, the intellect is the only power able to image procession in this particularly internal way, for, aside from God, only intellect is capable of "an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the agent."40 Bodily processions, generation and action, are external, and thus, incomplete on their own.41 The Trinitarian logic can only apply to the intellectual creature, for only an intellect can image the particularly internal processions that constitute the divine life. There is no other analogue for the divine Trinitarian processions described by Augustine and Thomas, and thus, Spencer's phenomenology of bodily experience does not seem to be able to maintain the particularly internal, Trinitarian character that Thomas insists is required of an image of God. Two Approaches Rejected by Aquinas To see further why, on Thomistic grounds, bodily experience cannot, on principle, yield an image of God according to the internal nature of Trinitarian procession, I submit for examination Thomas's own rejection of two candidates. In the key article in the Summa Theologiae on the image of God,42 Aquinas cites Augustine's Literal Commentary on Genesis,43 in which the Doctor of Grace distinguishes between three kinds of vision in the human being: corporeal, spiritual or imaginary, and intellectual. Augustine proposes the possibility that, given the trinity in intellectual vision, according to which human beings (and angels) are created to the image of God, perhaps the image exists in the Trinitarian relations in corporeal and imaginary vision as well. Aquinas's rejection of these possibilities raises, in my view, serious issues with a phenomenological approach that would appeal to sense experience to elaborate and explain the image of God in the human being, either in the self or in the other. In both corporeal and imaginary vision one finds a respective trinity. In corporeal vision there is i) the species of the exterior body, ii) an act of vision, whereby there is an impression on the organ of a likeness of the exterior species, and finally, iii) there is "the intention of the will applying the sight to see. . . ."44 As for imaginary vision, there is a trinity consisting of i) the species preserved in the memory, ii) the vision itself caused by the power of the imagination 39 ST Ia. Q27. A3. co. And so, the procession of the Word is an intelligible operation, the procession of the Holy Ghost is a procession of love. See ST Ia. Q93. A6. co. The Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Father, and the procession of Love from them both. It is only the rational creature, according to Aquinas, in which "we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will," and so only in this creature do we attain to "a certain representation of the species" with respect to Trinitarian procession. 40 ST Ia. Q27. A1. co; and again, "This applies most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which remains in the intelligent agent" (ST Ia. Q27. A1. co.). Thus, my 4th thesis: "An image of God should image not only the Divine Nature, but also the Trinitarian relations between the Divine Persons." 41 In ST Ia. Q93. A3. co. and SCG 4.10.18, Aquinas discusses certain bodily processions and shows how these fall short of the divine processions in the Trinity, more properly imaged by the intellect. Bodily processions, in distinction from intelligible processions, proceed externally in space and successively in time. 42 ST Ia. Q93. 43 ST Ia. Q93. A6. arg. 4 44 ST Ia. Q93. A6. ad.4 The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 29 informed by this species, and again, iii) the "intention of the will to join both together."45 Why couldn't these powers also image the Divine Trinity in the human being (and indeed in any animals possessing the psychical powers of sensation and imagination)? As one might expect from what has been said so far, both of these images fail insofar as one of the members of their respective trinities is external to the Trinitarian relation. In corporeal vision, the body seen is exterior to the organ that sees. This might be fine as an Arian imago dei, insofar as for him, the Son is not the Father, but it fails to reflect Thomas's understanding of the Trinity: one substance, three persons. The same problem obtains in imaginary vision. While the species is preserved in the memory, an internal sense, and thus, in this sense, is internal, it nevertheless would not be in the memory if it were not first obtained from sense perception. That is, the species is adventitious-it "comes to" the memory from without. Neither kind of vision, therefore, is self-sufficient, but requires something external for its completion, and thereby, cannot be an image of the uncreated Trinity. In Thomas's words, "in both cases the species falls short of representing the con-naturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons."46 In intellectual vision, however, the mind, knowledge, and love are not three separate entities. Nor is any external to any other. Only in the rational power of the soul does one find the internality of the relations between the members of the Trinity of Persons properly reflected. But this is not all. Not only do corporeal and imaginary vision fail to reflect the internally sufficient character of the Trinity of Persons, but further, the procession of Persons in the Trinity is not imaged either. In the Divine Trinity, the procession of the Son is from the Father alone, while the Holy Ghost proceeds from both. Aquinas, in his discussion of corporeal and imaginary vision in this reply likens the external bodily species and the species preserved in memory, respectively, as the Father; the vision that obtains in each case is the Son; and the intention or will of the person to "see" is the Holy Ghost. In each case, vision (the Son) does not proceed only from the external species (as in corporeal vision) or from the species preserved in memory (as in imaginary vision), alone, as the Son proceeds from the Father alone. Rather, for vision to occur, the species requires the powers of sight and imagination. Without these latter, vision, of either type, does not occur. Thus, the "Father" is not simply the species, but rather, the species plus the power of sense, external (the eye) or internal (the imagination). There seem to be two Fathers. Aquinas concludes, "For these reasons, the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not suitably represented."47 There is a further problem. The Holy Ghost proceeds from both the Father and the Son. In neither corporeal nor imaginary vision can it be shown how the intention or will to unite proceeds from the species and power of the soul, either sensory or imaginary, together: "Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented."48 These sensory trinities discovered in corporeal and imaginary vision fail as potential images of God: 1) the members of these trinities are external to each other, and 2) the processions are either absent, or fail to represent the processions of the Persons of the Trinity. 45 ST Ia. Q93. A6. ad.4 46 ST Ia. Q93. A6. ad.4 47 ST Ia. Q93. A6. ad.4 48 ST Ia. Q93. A6. ad.4 The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 30 One observes a likeness, but not an image. A phenomenological description of bodily sensation for attaining an image of God, therefore, is going to face a number of problems. An experience of the body of the other as an image of God, insofar as the other is external to the perceiving subject, seems unable, on principle, to image the internal Trinitarian relations required by Thomas to be such an image. Spencer recognises, however, the importance of the Trinitarian relations to the imago dei, and attempts to explain how they can be present corporeally: [the human being is] open to forming a communion of persons with others, just as God is a communion of persons. We image God by forming communions, which is first made possible by the structure of the body as masculine and feminine; for male and female bodies to join together in the right context is to renew the image of God.49 Spencer adds, "Furthermore, Christ reveals that God is a communion of Persons-and so we image God best not alone, in our souls, but in a communion of persons."50 Again, however, the relations attempting to imitate the Trinity in a human community are external. The other person with which one forms a community is external to the self. Further, this analogy seems to subordinate the individual to the community. Indeed, it is the community that is the image of God, not the man; the person is a part, externally related to the other persons. At best, we yield a kind of collective, or Marxist version of the imago dei in the community. There might be a trace of the communion of Divine Persons in the human community, or there might exist some analogy between them, but the human community is not an image of God in the Thomistic sense because the externality of the relata to each other remains a problem. One sees how important it is for Aquinas that the image of God in the human reflect the Trinitarian life. In order to qualify as an image of God in Thomas's view, these conditions of internality and proper procession must be met. Anything that falls short is not a proper image, and is at best, a likeness of trace. Aquinas sets out the task one must set for oneself when seeking the image of God in anything, and summarises:51 a) an image is a likeness which in some degree attains to a representation of the species; b) any image of God must represent the Divine Trinity by some kind of representation of the species of the Divine Persons, so far as it is possible for a creature to do so; c) the Divine Persons are distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from both; d) The Word of God proceeds from God by knowledge of Himself; and e) Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. 49 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 13. 50 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 2. 51 In ST Ia. Q93. A8. co. The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 31 It seems to me that any phenomenology of sense experience will be unable, on Thomistic grounds, to advance our understanding of the image of God, due to the inability of its approach and content to live up to these criteria. Problems for a Phenomenology of the Imago Dei Please allow me to preface the following section with a confession. Maybe it's just me, but whenever I hear someone say that their phenomenological account will help to "make sense" of our experience, I rarely find much more sense being made, or even recall experiencing what is alleged to be "our" experience in the first place: selves revealing their own self relations to themselves, thereby constituting themselves; others constituting the selves of others by manifesting their own selves to others by their very otherness; forget responding to the call of infinite responsibility-the phone hardly ever rings. I tend to feel more creeped out by the "gaze of the other" than I feel called ethically and infinitely to respond to it, and when I notice others "gazing" at me, I usually start to worry that they want to hurt me. Worst of all, I fear that accepting that I don't "get" Levinas reveals that I'm probably just a bad person. However, I completely agree that a philosophy should correspond to our experience, and this is a sound check against outlandish philosophical claims. Even if a phenomenological account remains within the bounds of clarity, however, I rarely find them very convincing. Whatever one might claim to experience, and argue based upon it, how does one convert the heretic who doesn't share the feeling? As Memorial University's late Prof. James Bradley once whispered to me upon the conclusion of a phenomenologically dense lecture: "well, I don't experience it that way." Not much else can be said. And arguments about whether one "should" "experience it that way" usually return to ontology and logic, not ethics and descriptions of experience. That is, fundamentally, contra Levinas, I believe that ethics is grounded in ontology; ethics is not first philosophy. But nevertheless, the overlap of experiences (or lack thereof) aside, I would like to focus on a number of internal problems with a phenomenology of sensible experience for developing the Augustinian/Thomistic notion of the image of God. Certainly, one could alter one's requirements for what an such image must be, but i) the emendations that Dr. Spencer makes, drawing from phenomenological descriptions, to my mind, move very far afield from Thomas's notion of image, and ii) they run counter to other and deeper of the Angelic Doctor's philosophical principles and commitments. In the end, Dr. Spencer is right, however, that these are not just semantic quibbles: how one understands the image of God has serious ramifications for one's anthropology and ethics, (again, I think, showing that how one behaves, and ought to behave, depends upon how things are-ontology is prior to ethics). Dr. Spencer argues that the image of God is not only present in the human soul, "but it is also present in our bodies and relationships, such that it is perceivable in and belongs to the The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 32 whole person."52 If I understand correctly, for Spencer, bodily perception (corporeal sensation) of the physical body of the other (as a principle of the whole human person) reveals the image of God in that other bodily and on bodily terms, that is, the body is not just a means through which the psychical image of God is made manifest physically in the hylomorphic substance and available to the corporeal senses, but rather, the image of God is somehow in the human body itself and revealed corporeally in the human person's bodily relations to others. Dr. Spencer draws upon Emmanuel Levinas, among others, to explain this phenomenological experience of the bodily image of God in others (and through them, in ourselves): But in the expressivity of the other's face and acts of speaking, I encounter what is unpredictable and unconceptualizable-that is, what is Infinite, a "trace" of God-to which I must respond, before which I am responsible. I experience myself as being in the image of God, called to the Infinite, in receiving this call to infinite responsibility. All these experiences are bodily: I encounter the infinite in the look and speaking of the other, in his suffering, hunger, and bodily vulnerability. I find myself called not in cognitively grasping an ethical duty, but in feeling my call to aid the other bodily. Contrary to the first problematic anthropology, dualism, I experience my directedness to the infinite not just in my soul, but in my body too, and not in self-cognition or love, but in being ethically called by and to the other.53 Dr. Spencer emphasises the bodily character of the encounter, through which one perceives the infinite in the other person and feels a subsequent openness to this infinite in the other which compels one to respond ethically. The infinite is perceived in the bodies of the other person and oneself; that is, through the encounter with the other, there is a "discovery of the image of God in the infinitude of one's flesh."54 We have not seen Augustine or Aquinas use the notion of 'the infinite' as a term of likeness between the human being and the Divine Nature. However, insofar as God is infinite, there seems no reason on the face of it to exclude the human from being an image of God accordingly if, indeed, there were something infinite in the human being. Levinas provides a description of his experience, and one's experience is one's experience. If you feel cold and I feel hot, and the thermostat says it's 95 degrees, you don't warm up when this fact is pointed out. If you feel cold, you feel cold, and there's a kind of certainty and truth in that (a subjective one, but a kind of truth nonetheless). I've never experienced the infinitude of one's flesh in the face of the other, but I wonder, on philosophical grounds, about the character of the alleged experience-where is it really coming from? Perhaps the face of the other could be a sign of the infinite, or point toward infinitude, but any infinitude 52 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 2-3. 53 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 11. 54 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 12. The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 33 experienced in perception can only be the bad, not the good (philosophical) infinite. The philosophical infinite is often characterised as the infinite which is lacking nothing-all is present to it at once-or, as many philosophers have suggested, a sphere with its centre everywhere and circumference nowhere. This is the divine infinite, neither persisting through time in temporal succession, nor lacking in any perfection. As Aristotle claims, and Thomas affirms, God is pure act.55 Now the human is nothing like this: it is hard to see how the human being images the divine infinity. There might be some likeness to God's infinitude in the person, but not all likenesses are images, as we have seen. The "bad infinite" is the infinite of motion and change-the infinite of Heraclitus and Cratylus. Cratylus might say that Heraclitus is wrong to attest that we cannot step into the same river twice, because we never step into it once: there never is a river. One might consider it as the mathematical infinite, the n+1, forever continuing on in sempiternity. The body is embroiled within this material flux, and this is precisely why, from Heraclitus, through Plato and Aristotle, to Augustine, and to Aquinas, the singular, the material, the finite particular, cannot be known. This is not because there is an overflow of infinite meaning or some such, but rather, because particulars cannot be nailed down in their ever-changing particularity. One does not know Socrates; one knows man. As Dr. Spencer recounts, Jean-Luc Marion "argues that the image does not involve adequate self-understanding and love; rather, it involves seeing that I cannot be grasped in any finite image or concept. . . ."56 The relative infinite perceived through finite experience might indeed "exceed words," as Tina Beattie suggests, and, as Spencer confirms, one cannot know the other, since that would reduce the infinite of the other to a "finite, controllable concept in me."57 But again, the inability to subsume a particular body under a concept while retaining its accidental particularity is not due to any overflow of positive character. Corporeal bodies, of any kind, cannot be defined because of the potencies of matter.58 There is a sense in which I would agree that there might be an infinite "saturation" experienced through one's physical encounter with the other. Dr. Spencer, distinguishing Levinas from Marion, describes it thus: I can be cognitively aware of the other's face as an "icon," which "saturates" or exceeds all that I could conceptualize about the other; to know in this sense is not primarily to find oneself actualised by the other, but to make contact with the inexhaustible richness and depths of the other.59 55 ST Ia. Q4. A1. co. 56 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 12. 57 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 11. 58 Aquinas writes, "Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter, whereas our intellect, as have said [sic] above (Question [85], Article [1]), understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter" (ST Ia. Q86. A1. co.). 59 He continues, "The image of God, the Infinite in the human person, appears in the incomprehensible depths of the The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 34 There is a certain inexhaustibility of the face of another. I can sit here all day long and try to imagine all the ways the face of another can appear to me, and never enumerate them all. In fact, as Descartes rightly pointed out, if I thought I could imagine all the ways that a finite body-pick any one you want-could appear to my senses, I would clearly be wrong about what I thought a finite body was. Included in knowing what a finite body is, is the knowledge that I could never imagine the infinitude of ways it could appear. The human body, qua body, is no different from any other body on this count. The body, therefore, this "ever-changing flesh,"60 to borrow the phrase, can hardly be an image of God, the only pure act. Further, material bodies, being in constant motion, change, and flux, are always lacking something, vulnerable, and weak. As Dr. Spencer points out, we perceive the other's "suffering, hunger, and bodily vulnerability," the very failings that call out for another's succor. There is certainly a logic of ethics present here, that the need for an ethical response to the other is tied up with the other's bodily (and mental) lack and subsequent need, but it is not clear how this bodily lack, need, weakness, and vulnerability, even if it were infinite, can reflect the divine infinite whereby one could thereby claim that there is an image of God in the body. God is nothing like this. I submit that any experience of infinitude drawn from an encounter with a physical body can only be the infinite of motion, not an image of divine infinity. The nature of perceptible flux and change resists words because it is always in motion, and always in motion because it is always lacking, actualising one potentiality to the loss of another actuality. This is not divine transcendence, which resists words and concepts because it surpasses all attempts to limit and determine. Indeed, even the infinitude of motion is not perceived per se, but rather, is an intellectual abstraction from the continual motion that we do perceive. In the end, any phenomenology of perception also fails to measure up to the nature of the Trinitarian relations. All sensible perception is adventitious, and therefore, requires a measure of externality. Aquinas has rejected external and adventitious experience as a proper image of the internality of the Trinitarian relations, and thereby, as a source through which to attain an image of God. I suggest, therefore, that one does not "see" the infinite in the face of the other, unless one is using the word "infinite" in a secular way, and the word "see" metaphorically. But when it comes to another's private, subjective experience, who am I to judge? Perceiving the Image of God "In," or "Through" the Body? The experience of the infinite in the bodily encounter with the other could, perhaps, be explained on Thomistic terms. I would argue that whatever is experienced by the phenomenologist as bodily "contact with the inexhaustible richness and depths of the other" is other, which appear in analogy to the incomprehensible depths of God." (Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 12). 60 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 12. The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 35 not the infinite perceived in the body, but rather, the image of God in the person's rational soul perceived through the hylomorphic union of soul and body. As Dr. Spencer points out, for Thomas, ". . . the human body contains signs of the image of God in our souls."61 The human being is the image of God insofar as she has a rational soul, because of which one experiences the human in a way different from how one encounters any other being. It might be one's bodily actions that suggest the presence of a rational soul-the human acts differently than does a tree or cat-and I perceive these actions with my corporeal senses, but it is still the soul of the human composite, not the body qua body that is the locus of this image. Just because the image of God might be revealed through the body/soul union, or if we feel called toward the infinite bodily, it does not follow that the image of God is necessarily present in the body. If the body is bringing something to the table regarding the image of God, not just as the means through which we encounter the psychical image of God physically, but as providing positive content to the image on its own, corporeal terms, I ask, at the risk of sounding macabre: does one feel the inexhaustible richness and depths of the other in the dead "human" body? If there is something particular about the body, then shouldn't one feel such an incomprehensibility in the presence of a corpse? The soul, as an intelligent substantial form, retains the image of God without the body; the body, however, whether or not it possesses an image of God as a coprinciple of the hylomorphic substance, certainly seems to lack such an image once the soul has taken flight. Crucial here is the distinction between the souls of hylomorphic substances and intellectual, separated souls. It is the very presence of the human soul that makes the human body a "human" body at all. Without the soul, the human body undergoes a substantial change, and is human only in name. The body and soul of hylomorphic compounds are separable only in thought and language-not in reality, and certainly not in perception; the distinction between body and soul in the compound is a formal, not a real distinction. The intellectual soul, however, is still a soul without the body, but the reverse is not true. This is why one can isolate the image of God in the soul apart from the body. It would be difficult, therefore, through experiencing the hylomorphic compound to isolate anything particularly "psychical" (if the soul were simply a material form) or "bodily" at all. If one could isolate a bodily or psychical note, it would only be in abstraction, not in reality or in perception, for in both reality and perception, the two are always together (as long as what is perceived is a human being). The body, however, has no independence apart from the soul. Thus, in the composite, if the body does contribute anything to the image of God, I can't comprehend exactly what that could be in distinction from the soul principle of the compound, and I could not, on principle, experience that isolated bodily contribution apart from the soul principle in sensible experience. Thus, on principle, I cannot see how one can "perceive the image of God in the whole human person," unless one means that through perception of the human body/soul composite, is revealed the image of God in the person's intellectual soul. That 61 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 9. The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 36 is, there is a sign of the intellectual image of God in the human body-precisely what Thomas claims. Dr. Spencer, however, rejects this explanation that the cause of this experience is the inner image of God, manifest somehow through the bodily actions of the human, and thereby, in a way, perceived. He writes, The relation between interior and exterior aspects of the image, is not given as a causal or signifying relation: the fleshy image does not signify a distinct interior image, nor is it caused by the latter. Rather, a single image appears in matter and in sensory and intellectual acts.62 Dr. Spencer wants to collapse the sign/signified distinction in Thomas's view that the body is a sign of the soul's image of God. That is, these phenomenologists claim that the experience of the image is not mediated. Spencer asserts, "I perceive the Infinite directly in the face of the other and in my own flesh."63 He continues, . . . instead of being signified, interior acts can be directly "expressed" in the facial features and bodily acts of persons. I do not see another's facial expression and then infer his or her sadness or joy. Rather, the exterior appearance and the interior act or state are given as one thing seen from two sides, but with a hierarchical structure, the interior "side" of the single phenomenon given as objectively more fundamental than the exterior. . . . The person is given as having a bodily surface and spiritual depths-though there is unity or intertwining between the two, the relation between them is hierarchical. The two are not sundered as on dualism would do, but they also are not merely causally related or related by signification, for they are given as one.64 Dr. Spencer emphasises an important truth here. According to hylomorphism, it is not as if the soul and the body (or form and matter) are distinct things somehow joined. Rather, the soul as material form, in a sense, is its acts. It is the actualisation of the body in particular soul-acts. The body is only a human body insofar as it does particularly human things. The soul is the soul only insofar as the body is actualised in particular activities of life, such as eating, walking, and growing. What is a soul?: it is the particular activities of a certain kind of body. As my own professor, Dr. John Scott, used to tell us, on a certain level, solving E=MC2 is the same as eating a sandwich. Both are actualisations of certain kinds of bodies in certain kinds of acts, which we call "life." However, for Thomas (and Aristotle, as Thomas reads him), there are certain kinds of soul acts that are precisely not actualisations of bodily potencies-the mental acts of intellect and will. Whatever bodily actions one perceives when (we assume) another is intelligising and 62 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 12. 63 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 13. 64 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 13. The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 37 willing, these internal acts are not expressed bodily as two sides of the same coin as are the soulacts of the lower animals. Further, the acts of intelligence and will are the ones, Thomas claims, according to which the human is said to be created to the image God. It is right that true hylomorphism gives us two principles (body and soul) in the one, unified substance. But to extend the image of God to the bodily side of this union is also to extend the image of God to other creatures that perform the same biological actions: certainly to Fido, and, depending on how far down the great chain of being one wants to climb, to the chrysanthemums in your garden, all the while leaving the disembodied Raphael and Gabriel out in the cold.65 I wonder whether the "problem" that the body is not included by Augustine and Thomas in their notions of the image of God arises from re-reading back into Aristotelian hylomorphism a Cartesian dualism that Aristotle denies: that there are really two distinct substances-the human body and the human soul-and all hylomorphism does it stick them together into one substance, avoiding both Spinozist parallelism and Cartesian remote-control causality. That is, a Cartesian trying to understand hylomorphism might maintain a real distinction between body and soul, but thinks that Aristotle just welds them together. Under this view, the body is still a real, separate thing, needing to be accounted for when anything is claimed of the soul, given that they are mysteriously united. In trying to say, "Hey, don't forget the body too!," are we not just separating what does not exist separately from soul in the first place? But because body and soul are always together for Aristotle (not as a union, but as actualisation of potential), that is, the soul is defined through the body, one could not 'leave the body behind' even if he wanted to (if he really believed in hylomorphism), any more than one could leave the soul behind. Ever since Descartes pushed the hylomorphic Humpty Dumpty off the wall, all of philosophy's women and men have spent a lot of time trying to put them back together again. Just leave him alone up there! To perceive the image of God in the body through the notion that the internal acts by which the human is the image of God are at once (not by signification, but by their very nature) external bodily acts is contrary to certain fundamental Thomistic positions: namely, 1) the acts by which the human is said to be an image of God are not the acts of a hylomorphic soul/body composite, but the acts of the soul qua separable intellect-intelligence and will do not actualise a bodily organ. Unless one is some sort of materialist, it seems difficult to get around this; 2) If one wants to suggest other acts that are the soul's actualisations of the body's potential, which 65 Aristotle seemed to think, depending on how one reads De Anima iii, that (the unmoved movers aside) the rational acts of the soul, despite them not requiring a bodily organ, are never found independently of the lower acts of the soul (vegetative and sensitive); that is, he builds his world from the ground up. Thomas, however, builds it from the top down: there are substantial forms, that is, separated intellectual substances. The human soul is at once an intellectual substance and the form of the body. Yet, even for Aristotle, although these particular acts of the rational soul are acts of a soul united to a body, the body is not implicated in these acts. Thomas is actually astonished that people could read Aristotle in any other way. Thomas writes, "All these indications show that he [Aristotle] did not assert that the intellect was a separate substance. Indeed, it is astonishing how easily some have let themselves be deceived by his calling the intellect separate; for the text makes itself perfectly clear what he means, namely that, unlike the senses, the intellect has no bodily organ. For the nobility of the human soul transcends the scope and limits of bodily matter. Hence it enjoys a certain activity in which bodily matter has no share; the potentiality to which activity is without a bodily organ; and in this sense only is it a 'separate' intellect" (In de Anima 3.7.698-99). The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 38 can be perceived insofar as they are at once internal and external, that image God, a) what are they exactly, and b) how, again, is the human distinct from other animals and plants that also possess souls as material forms? Natural and Rational Love Dr. Spencer also argues that the bodily experience of image of God involves a movement toward the infinite. He writes, "According to these phenomenologists, the experience of the image of God is of the impulsion toward the Infinite in us, which is simultaneously bodily, transcendent, and inward."66 One wonders, however, how the impulsion towards the infinite itself would distinguish the human being from any other creature. Why this particular impulsion toward the infinite is characterised as the experience of the image of God is unclear, but further, it blurs the distinction between natural and rational love, which, I argue, further obscures the difference between the human as the image of God and the lower animals. In Dante's Purgatorio Virgil explains to the pilgrim, 'Neither creator nor creature was ever,' He then began, 'my son, without love, Either natural or rational; you know that. Natural love is always without error, But the other kind may err, in the wrong object, Or else through too much or too little vigour. While it is directed to the primal good, And keeps to its limits in relation to the secondary, It cannot be the occasion of sinful pleasure; But when it is twisted to evil, or seeks the good With more or with less concern than it ought to have, The creature is working against the creator. (Purg. 17.90-102)67 Natural love is present in every creature as the impulse to reach its own end or fulfil its own nature-the whole of creation is teleologically involved in the love of God, as He moves all things by being loved. As the acorn becomes an oak, it loves God-not in any willed or conscious sense, but in a natural sense, as it pursues and achieves its divinely allotted end and good. All things have an impulsion towards the infinite in this sense, to do what God wills. How, then, this particular impulsion is an image of God in the human, to the exclusion the rest of creation, is not clear. Certainly it is what Aquinas calls, a trace, insofar as the impulsion is a 66 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 12. 67 I use the text in Dante, The Divine Comedy, trans. C.H. Sisson (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008). The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 39 presence of the cause in the effect, and all effects seek to return to their causes, but it is not an image as defined by Thomas. In the human being (and in the angel), this love also has a rational character insofar as the Infinite Good can be known and willed, the object of love understood and chosen. Natural love is just an unwavering natural tendency; rational love, however, either by faulty aim, or by too much or too little zeal with respect to the actual good of the object loved, can err or hit the mark. Lower creation runs its course in the love of God, but humans and angels have the ability, on the one hand, to pervert the object of desire and to pursue in excess or deficiency, or, on the other, to will the good that is known. The distinction here, again, is in the intellect. It is the rational soul, as created to the image of God, that distinguishes the human and angelic being from all other creatures. To see the impulsion toward the Infinite as an image of God without distinguishing rational love from natural, and identifying the former as the image, again, tends towards leveling the hierarchy of being, contrary to fundamental Thomistic metaphysical positions. Conclusion Dr. Spencer writes, ". . . many reject the Augustinian approach by contending that it undergirds an inadequate, dualist anthropology, on which I am primarily my soul, and the body is a mere aid (or prison) to the soul, or imitates God only through the soul."68 I agree that dualisms of the Cartesian sort must be avoided insofar as they provide inadequate anthropologies of the human person, and because they contradict both experience and reason. And while I resist the characterisation of Platonism as 'dualistic,' it too presents difficulties that hylomorphic accounts of the human being mitigate. But it is unclear how, exactly, the human imitating God only through her soul is necessarily connected to the problems of dualist anthropologies and negative, anti-cosmic views of the body. In the end, the body gets a pretty good deal under Thomistic hylomorphism. Indeed, "it was for the soul's good that it was united to a body."69 There is still a kind of elevation and dignity of the human body, even if it is not an image of God, but kept in its proper hierarchical place. Even if one believes this estimation of the body too low, does it matter? Aside from the admittedly metaphysically problematic time between the Particular and General Judgements, we've always got a body anyway, which is, in some sense, by its association with the soul, implicated in our being created to the image of God. The doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, far from causing problems for thinking the image of God is in the soul alone, rather ensures that that the human being will possess a body in eternity.70 In fact, the period between 68 Spencer, "Perceiving the Image," 2. 69 Thomas writes, "It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and also to understand in another way" (ST Ia. Q89. A1. co.). Elsewhere, Aquinas writes, "Although the intellective power is not the act of a body, nevertheless the essence of the human soul, which is the form of the body, requires that it should be more noble, in order that it may have the power of understanding; and hence it is necessary that a better disposed body should correspond to it" (ST III. Q5. A4. ad 3). 70 In fact, Dante's depiction of the suicides in Inferno 13, trapped in the bodies of trees from which their previous The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 40 the Particular and the General Judgements is only a problem for those who seek to find the imago dei in the body, because it is precisely this that is lost in the time between the Judgements. Is the separated soul less an image of God during the inter-Judgemental period? I can't help but feel that being concerned about the body being "left out" is kind of like looking at my hand and lamenting that it can't see, or thinking that it would be great if I had a bed in my bathroom too. It's not unlike feeling bad for the canvas because the paint is more what makes the Mona Lisa, well, the Mona Lisa. Perhaps our relatively recent philosophical and theological obsessions with the body are forms of penance for our transgression of philosophically separating soul and body, counter to experience, or altogether denying their distinction. Philosophy has since become, like the rest of the world, rather body-obsessed. If the old Victorian sensibilities were one end of the pendulum, I feel that it won't be too long before we find ourselves yanked back in their direction. Montague Brown addresses directly why is it important whether the image of God is in the soul alone or in the whole human composite. He argues that "It matters because there are dangers to the faith if the imago dei is said to be found merely in the intellect."71 I wonder, however, in an attempt to recover the body, have we gone too far from the sound Catholic position maintaining the unity of the body and soul in the human being, while maintaining their hierarchical relation. That is, that there are dangers to the faith from the other direction. The corrections of Cartesianism and certain Platonic tendencies to identify the person with the soul alone, I worry, tend towards an opposite kind of error-the deification of the body and this life in the "here and now" to the neglect of the afterlife, and the flattening of the ontological hierarchy of being.72 The hierarchical distinctions between the grades of being will always, through all eternity, be stratified.73 As Dante has shown poetically, not all of us will enjoy the beatific vision to the same degree either. But in Heaven, we won't care. Dante askes Piccarda, dwelling in the lowest of the heavenly spheres: fleshy bodies hang, lifelessly, just beyond reach, was cause for some scandal. As Boccacio immediately pointed out, this punishment "is strictly contrary to Catholic truth." See my "'How Does the Body Depart?': A Neoplatonic Reading of Dante's Suicides," Dante Studies CXXXII (2014): 175-200, at 193. The fate of the suicides is arguably worse than that of any other in hell, separated, as they are, for all eternity from their very human nature. But the image is a poetic fiction, illustrating, however, a truth about human nature. It's not as if one need to worry about losing the image of God if it is in the soul alone, unless one fears that one might literally lose one's soul and still somehow exist as a human being. 71 Brown, "Imago Dei in Thomas Aquinas," 8. 72 Brown's most convincing reason, to my mind, for locating the image of God in the whole human person has to do with the Incarnation (See ibid., 8-9). But here, it is Christ who lowers himself to us, taking on human nature-not that our human nature is deified, or raised up to equality with the divine. 73 Here too, Aquinas seems to part ways with Augustine (and Anselm). For Thomas, there is a Dionysian hierarchy of disembodied angels. In the afterlife, when the human being regains her body, this distinction between the human and the angels (among the intellectual distinctions between the very angels themselves) remains. For Augustine, human beings in heaven will, after the General Judgement, be made absolutely equal to the angels. He can say this because, for him, angels possess fiery bodies-the very bodies into which fleshy human bodies will be transformed in the afterlife. See my "'aequales angelis sunt': Demonology, Angelology, and the Resurrection of the Body in Augustine and Anselm," The Saint Anselm Journal 12.1 (Fall 2016): 1-18. The Saint Anselm Journal 13.2 (Spring 2018) 41 But tell me: you who are happy here, Do you desire a higher place than you have, To see more, and be more friends with God? (Par. 3.64-66) She responds, 'Brother, the virtue of charity brings quiet To our will, so that we want only What we have, and thirst for nothing beyond that. If we desired to be higher up Our wishes would not be in accordance With the will of him who sets us here; [...] It is indeed the essence of this life That we keep ourselves within the divine will, So that our wills may be made one with his: So that, how we are at various thresholds Throughout this kingdom, pleases the whole kingdom As it does the king who rouses us to his will; And in his will we find our peace: It is the sea to which everything moves Which it creates and which nature makes.' Then it was clear to me how everywhere In heaven is paradise, although the grace Of the highest good does not fall on all in one way. (Par. 3.70-90) The human being is a hinge between the animal and angelic natures, in Neoplatonic fashion, taking part in both. Thomas preserves the knife-edge balance, neither diminishing the angel, nor raising the brute or community to equality with the human. I believe Thomas is right to maintain that "this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind."74 One could always respond that this doctrine fails to account for one's experience, but in addition to the philosophical arguments against this charge, I still must respond, as Prof. Bradley used to say, "I don't experience it that way." 74 ST Ia. Q.93. A6.

Sobre la imaginación y la fantasía en el pensamiento de Hume Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, UNAM Introducción En el Tratado de la naturaleza humana, David Hume presenta su pensamiento como intento de introducir el método experimental de razonamiento en cuestiones morales. Dicho pensamiento inicia con el planteamiento de la llamada Ciencia de la naturaleza humana. Puesto que somos seres que razonan, dice Hume, pero también uno de los objetos en los que razonamos (Hume, 2007, Introduction). El establecimiento de principios en dicha ciencia es requisito indispensable para cualquier desarrollo y progreso en el pantanoso terreno de las ciencias y el conocimiento humano. David Hume supone que la adquisición de cualquier certeza depende de que nuestros poderes y facultades funcionen correctamente. Por ello, antes de aventurar alguna afirmación sobre la realidad, es necesario que investiguemos los alcances de nuestras capacidades y determinemos las cualidades de la naturaleza humana. Para evitar el relativismo que esta investigación puede suscitar, en principio podríamos suponer que existe una realidad completamente independiente de nosotros, una realidad que nunca está presente tal como es por sí misma en nuestra mente. Pero la Ciencia de la naturaleza humana no contiene juicios sobre dicha realidad, sólo tiene por objeto percepciones o lo que puede hacerse presente en la mente a través de los sentidos (internos o externos) como impresión, o bien, que puede representarse en el pensamiento como idea (Hume, 2007, Abstract). Para establecer los principios que se buscan, Hume no se ocupa más que de contenidos mentales que pueden ser objeto del pensamiento y la reflexión, y en especial de los que adquieren más importancia en la vida y curso de las acciones humanas. En efecto, las pasiones o impresiones de reflexión intensas constituyen el objeto principal de la Ciencia de la naturaleza humana. Las impresiones de cap4.indd 51 23/05/17 15:33 En "Imaginación y conocimiento. De Descartes a Freud", ed. Monroy, Zuraya y RodríguezSalazar, Mauricio, Corinter-Gedisa, México, 2016. 52 Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero sensación, que surgen de causas desconocidas, son las percepciones más fuertes o vívidas que existen, pero ya que se presentan en la mente humana, ésta hace una copia o idea -una percepción más débil o menos vívida del mismo objeto- que pierde fuerza conforme se abre paso en el pensamiento hasta convertirse en idea perfecta, la cual, a su vez, puede reincidir en el alma como impresión de reflexión más o menos intensa (Hume, 2007, T. 1.1.2.1). En la descripción del pensamiento ['train of thought'] de Hume se observa que la fuerza o vivacidad de las percepciones disminuye en la medida en que éstas se abren paso en la mente, pero también que puede aumentar considerablemente en cuanto reinciden en el alma, al grado de adquirir tanta fuerza como puede ser la de una pasión desenfrenada; son las pasiones aquellas percepciones que realmente mueven al ser humano en la vida y provocan acciones en el curso de los asuntos humanos. En lo que sigue trataremos de mostrar que la existencia de pasiones supone el concurso de la imaginación o fantasía en tanto que poder de "avivar" ideas o de convertir ideas en impresiones. En este sentido, aunque se suspenda el juicio respecto a la existencia de una realidad completamente independiente de la mente humana, se mantenga cierto escepticismo con respecto a los últimos principios del alma, y se niegue la posibilidad de encontrar una explicación absolutamente racional de la naturaleza humana, sin embargo, es posible concebir la actividad fundamental del ser humano como esa capacidad de actuar a partir de ideas avivadas por la imaginación o fantasía. Se trata, sin embargo, de una actividad bastante problemática cuyo resultado puede ser tan racional como irracional, tan fructífero como fantasioso. Situación hermenéutica David Hume suele ser considerado un empirista cuyo pensamiento se fundamenta por completo en la experiencia sensible. Desde la interpretación tradicional1 del pensamiento de Hume, su filosofía se limitaría a 1 Hay dos etiquetas tradicionales que nos permiten ubicar a David Hume en la historia de la filosofía: empirista y escéptico. En general, sus argumentos "empiristas" son mantenidos por el principio de que todas las ideas simples provienen de impresiones previas, en tanto que su "escepticismo" es un método que utiliza para plantear problemas y desarrollar los temas a tratar. Sin embargo, el principio empirista y el método escéptico son insuficientes para alcanzar el fin práctico de esta filosofía, que consiste en la ilustración de los lectores. Esto último implica una mezcla de lo empírico y racional que un Kant se dedicará a señalar y a evitar sistemáticamente. De hecho, puede decirse que la interpretación tradicional de la obra de Hume, en tanto que empirista y escéptico, inicia con la primera crítica de Kant (Kant, 2008), en donde se parte de la necesidad de resolver el problema principal de la filosofía para ampliar el conocimiento específicamente metafísico. En este contexto, se considera que el tratamiento de Hume es muy desafortunado. Ahora bien, es importante notar que aunque las primeras críticas de Kant se enfoquen a la investigación sobre el entendimiento humano, el problema va más allá de la epistemología. La superación del pensamiento de Hume, tal como se observa en la segunda crítica de Kant (Kant, 2005, p. 84-85) y en la historia de la filosofía de Hegel (Hegel, 1955, p. 379), se presenta como una decisión práctica más que como una necesidad meramente teórica. En este sentido, el razonamiento empírico-escéptico sobre la causalidad que se le atribuye tiene que ser superado si es que se quiere justificar una aplicación del concepto metafísico cap4.indd 52 23/05/17 15:33 53 Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero Sobre la imaginación y la fantasía... demostrar el absurdo del empirismo que él mismo pretendía sostener. Ya que, si somos estrictos, la sensibilidad no puede proporcionar certeza racional ni conocimiento apodíctico de la realidad. Y si lo que afirma Hume con respecto a nuestras creencias es cierto, por ejemplo: que la proposición 'mañana saldrá el sol es igual de racional que la proposición 'mañana no saldrá el sol', ¿qué podemos esperar de nuestro conocimiento en general? Si este último no se fundamenta en la razón, ¿qué nos permite afirmar que todos nuestros juicios son realmente de tal o cual naturaleza? Esta es la parte negativa de su pensamiento. En un primer momento, el escéptico de Hume parece limitarse a afirmar que sólo creemos en una proposición más que en la otra por hábito o costumbre, y hasta por la satisfacción de pensar que las cosas seguirán comportándose como hasta ahora; es muy desagradable aceptar que el día de hoy podría ser el último de nuestra vida. Pero su filosofía va más allá, pese a negar la posibilidad de un conocimiento apodíctico de la realidad, deja abierto otro camino de investigación y reflexión digno de atención. Desde las nuevas perspectivas sobre la obra, vida e influencias de Hume,2 lo que adquiere un papel fundamental en la filosofía no es el problema del conocimiento humano y su derivación de la experiencia sensible, sino el papel de la imaginación, la fantasía y las pasiones en la fijación de creencias y la justificación de las acciones humanas. En efecto, para establecer conexiones necesarias o constantes entre fenómenos y elaborar teorías filosóficas o científicas en la cuales podamos creer, esperamos en el futuro tomar la mejor elección con respecto a lo que queremos o esperamos en el futuro y, en efecto, llevarlo a cabo, es necesario que contemos con el poder -que llamamos 'imaginación' o 'fantasía'- de avivar las ideas o de convertirlas en impresiones. Ahora bien, aunque David Hume utiliza ambos términos de manera indistinta ('imagination', 'fancy'), propondremos una distinción crucial. en cuestión en el ámbito de la moral; puesto que si la causalidad no tuviera más que realidad empírica, entonces la voluntad sería una construcción arbitraria; un principio subjetivo y nocivo para la moral dogmática que se quería fundamentar. 2 Las interpretaciones novedosas de la obra de Hume se han vuelto recurrentes en las últimas décadas y se oponen a la tradicional en varios sentidos, así como a la recepción que Hume obtuvo en la época de la Ilustración, por la cual llegó a ser considerado uno de los escritores más famosos de su tiempo. No se trata ya de lectores ingenuos que buscan entretenimiento refinado y pasajero, sino de académicos que pretenden rebatir conceptos y perspectivas muy concretas para hacer aportaciones específicas a la historia de la filosofía: Barry Stroud, Richard Popkin, Ernest Mossner, Peter Kivy, Don Garret, Fred Parker, Abraham Anderson, entre otros, han tratado de recuperar el espíritu de una filosofía que no se ajusta a los parámetros de aquélla de la razón que pretendió superarla. Pero, en todo caso, ¿qué criterio moral se puede derivar del asombro y la incertidumbre?, ¿qué hábitos y creencias están justificados para alguien que piensa como Hume? Estas cuestiones nos llevan al escabroso tema de la religión y la secularización de la Ilustración, así como a considerar las propuestas morales y estéticas del filósofo en cuestión, las cuales dependen, en mayor o menor medida, del concepto de imaginación o fantasía. cap4.indd 53 23/05/17 15:33 54 Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero Quizá de esta manera podamos salir del escepticismo epistemológico mediante el mismo pensamiento que nos ha invitado a caer en él. En efecto, la imaginación y la fantasía hacen referencia a un mismo poder humano y natural, sin embargo, en el primer caso se concreta como una facultad que opera con libertad, pero según principios, en tanto que en el segundo operaría arbitrariamente. De manera que el poder de producir pasiones es normal, racional y positivo para los seres humanos, pero también puede ser delirante, irracional y negativo. Para comprender lo anterior es pertinente que analicemos el concepto de imaginación. Empirismo e imaginación El empirismo de Hume es bastante limitado o específico. En estricto sentido, no afirma que todo lo que pensamos se deriva directamente de la experiencia sensible, sino que todas las ideas simples provienen de impresiones previas,3 y que la memoria nos permite reconocer el orden en que dichas impresiones se presentaron por primera vez. Por ello, dice Barry Stroud, [...] una correcta inspección de la mente revelaría una correlación uno-a-uno entre nuestras ideas simples y nuestras impresiones simples. Para toda idea simple en la mente, hay una impresión simple 3 Podría objetarse que como el origen de las impresiones es empírico y las ideas simples, que constituyen el pensamiento, provienen de impresiones, entonces, todo lo que pensamos deriva de la experiencia sensible o tiene origen empírico. Al respecto, decimos que para Hume no todo lo que pensamos deriva "directamente" de la experiencia sensible; podemos tener ideas complejas que no derivan directamente de la experiencia sensible, como un caballo alado. En efecto, suponemos que una idea de este tipo se compone de ideas simples que derivan de impresiones previas, pero dicha "composición" implica un elemento intermedio, es decir, imaginación o fantasía; así que sólo se derivan indirectamente de la experiencia sensible. La derivación indirecta de la experiencia sensible es digna de atención, ya que de ella depende la existencia de creencias irracionales o supersticiosas, incluso de ideas que ponen en entredicho el principio empirista de la filosofía de Hume. Recordemos el "fenómeno contradictorio" de la gama de azules en la primera sección del Tratado (T 1.1.1.10). Baste la siguiente explicación de dicho fenómeno: (i) Una persona ha visto, a lo largo de su vida, todos los tonos de azul que existen excepto uno de ellos. De repente, pierde la vista. Ahora quiere percibir el tono de azul faltante. (ii) Siendo que cada idea de tono es diferente a las demás que son implicadas en un mismo color, aunque sea bastante similar puede separarse de ellas (tal como las ideas de cada color se separan entre sí), lo que nos permitiría considerarla como una idea simple, distinta o independiente de las demás. (iii) Si la persona en cuestión pierde la vista después de haber experimentado todos los tonos de azul, excepto uno que ahora intenta percibir, ya que tiene imaginación, en efecto, puede unir las ideas que tiene de cada tono de azul para formar la idea compleja de la gama de azules, en donde falta un tono, ¿por qué no podría formar la idea de ese tono que intenta percibir? ¿A caso no podría mezclar o unir la idea de los dos tonos contiguos al que busca y así obtenerlo? Podemos decir que esto no es más que un ejemplo de cómo una idea puede producirse a partir de ideas derivadas de impresiones previas. El problema es que este tipo de derivación indirecta parecería poner en duda el principio de que todas las ideas simples provienen de impresiones previas. Al respecto, habría que determinar si la idea del azul faltante es en efecto una idea simple. Sin afán de resolver este problema, queda claro que la derivación indirecta es digna de atención. cap4.indd 54 23/05/17 15:33 55 Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero Sobre la imaginación y la fantasía... exactamente semejante, y viceversa. Los aparentes contraejemplos mencionados se refieren a percepciones complejas, y podemos por ende hacerlos a un lado sin peligro (Stroud, 2005, p. 38). El problema es que son propiamente las ideas complejas, y no las ideas simples, las que constituyen el objeto de nuestras reflexiones, valoraciones y creencias. Así es que el principio del origen de nuestras ideas simples, junto con el principio de las operaciones de la memoria, puede asegurar cierto tipo de certeza; sin embargo, para el tratamiento de las pasiones, la Ciencia de la naturaleza humana tiene que ser complementada por el siguiente principio: "la imaginación es libre de trasponer y cambiar sus ideas" (Hume, 2007, T. 1.1.3.4). Este último es un principio problemático. La primera vez que se menciona en el Tratado se manifiesta como la excepción a la regla general del empirismo. Puesto que, como dice Hume: "Yo me puedo imaginar una ciudad tal como la Nueva Jerusalén, con su pavimento de oro, y sus muros de rubíes, aunque jamás he visto algo semejante" (Hume, 2007, T. 1.1.1.4).4 Es gracias a este tipo de ideas que el empirismo ingenuo se vuelve dudoso. Puesto que podemos hablar de cosas que nunca hemos visto, y en esa medida considerar la existencia de objetos que pueden estar presentes en la mente y formar parte de la experiencia sin la intervención de los sentidos; y es que tenemos una facultad de representación que puede operar sin ellos, una facultad que aun siendo común y propiamente humana, tiene el poder de alterar por completo el orden de la naturaleza y confundir todas nuestras experiencias: "las fábulas que encontramos en los poemas y los romances no dejan lugar a dudas: la naturaleza es completamente distorsionada, ahí en donde no hay más que caballos alados, dragones feroces y monstruos gigantes" (Hume, 2007, T. 1.1.3.4). Aunque los dos primeros principios de la Ciencia de la naturaleza humana (sobre las percepciones simples y sobre las operaciones de la memoria) nos permiten solucionar el problema del origen de nuestras ideas, en realidad, podemos replantearlo a partir del tercero (sobre la libertad de la imaginación) de la siguiente manera: aunque todas las ideas simples se deriven de impresiones simples y todas las ideas simples se mantengan en orden uniforme gracias a la memoria, la imaginación puede componer ideas complejas y avivarlas, representarse una percepción en lugar de otra y alterar el orden en el que las impresiones correspondientes se presentaron por primera vez, y sin menoscabo del grado de vivacidad. El principio de la libertad de la imaginación deja abierto un problema que 4 Todas las traducciones son mías. cap4.indd 55 23/05/17 15:33 56 Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero va más allá de la epistemología que sólo podrá resolverse mediante el tratamiento de las pasiones y la moral: Nada es más libre que la imaginación del ser humano, y aunque no pueda sobrepasar el repertorio original de ideas proporcionadas por los sentidos internos y externos, tiene poder ilimitado de mezclar, componer, separar y dividir esas ideas con toda clase de ficciones y visiones. Puede fingir una sucesión de eventos que parezcan totalmente reales, atribuirles un tiempo y un espacio en particular, concebirlos como existentes, y hasta representárselos con todas y cada una de las circunstancias propias de un hecho histórico, en el que cree con la mayor de las certezas (Hume, 2000, EHU, 5.10). De lo anterior pueden surgir varias preguntas. ¿Acaso podemos creer en cualquier cosa que imaginemos? ¿Cuál es la diferencia entre realidad y fantasía? ¿Cómo puedo eliminar a la fantasía de mi sistema de creencias? Pese a que las certezas de la historia, las ciencias y la filosofía sean tan naturales o artificiales como las creencias más aventuradas de la literatura, y en principio seamos libres de adoptar tanto unas como otras, David Hume sostiene que nuestra imaginación puede y debe comportarse como facultad confiable y uniforme, en cuanto opere con base en reglas de composición y principios de relación. La imaginación deja de presentarse como un misterio en cuanto comprendemos que sus invenciones son resultado de operaciones o reglas de composición determinadas: (i) si la imaginación percibe alguna diferencia entre ideas puede separarlas; (ii) si la imaginación percibe dos o más ideas juntas puede unirlas; y (iii) si la imaginación percibe una idea puede atribuirle existencia. Más allá de develar nuestra incapacidad de asegurar el fundamento racional de cada uno de los juicios o proposiciones en las que creemos, a partir de dichas reglas es posible identificar los procedimientos por los que cada una de nuestras creencias llega a ser producida. En cuanto a la segunda regla (ii), que atañe directamente a la composición de ideas complejas, es necesario observar que existen principios de relación que nos permiten unir ideas de manera racional, a saber: por semejanza, contigüidad y causa-efecto. Al hablar de relaciones,5 sin embargo, 5 Hume sostiene que la palabra relación tiene dos sentidos diferentes (Hume, 2007, T 1.1.5.1). Por sentido común, se refiere a la cualidad por la que dos ideas suelen conectarse en la imaginación, de ahí que al pensar en una de ellas, lo más probable es que también pensemos en la otra. Como término filosófico, se refiere a las circunstancias por las que dos ideas pueden ser comparadas arbitrariamente. A partir de ambos sentidos se postulan dos tipos de relación entre ideas: las comunes y las filosóficas. Las primeras se constituyen como principios de las conexiones o asociaciones que solemos hacer con naturalidad, en tanto las segundas se constituyen como principios de las comparaciones racionales y artificiales que suelen ser propuestas por científicos y filósofos. En todo caso, tanto las conexiones como las comparaciones pueden llevar a la unión de las ideas implicadas, o a la producción de ideas complejas a partir de ideas simples. cap4.indd 56 23/05/17 15:33 57 Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero Sobre la imaginación y la fantasía... David Hume no se refiere a las asociaciones y las comparaciones que suele realizar cada quien, sino a las cualidades y circunstancias en las debe apoyarse toda asociación o comparación racional. Así es que los principios de relación son independientes del hecho de que una persona singular conecte y compare sus ideas. Sin embargo, pese a presentarlos como principios universales de la naturaleza humana, Hume se ve forzado a aceptar que no determinan a la imaginación en todo caso. No son más que una fuerza moderada que comúnmente prevalece (Hume, 2007, T 1.1.4.1), ya que también tenemos el poder de juntar ideas arbitrariamente. De manera que la labor de evitar arbitrariedades en lo que respecta a la conexión de nuestras ideas, y de observar los principios de relación que aseguran el orden racional, uniforme y socialmente correcto del pensamiento, no es un supuesto ni una necesidad, sino un trabajo de autonomía. Definición de imaginación y fantasía Con el fin de aclarar la diferencia entre imaginación y fantasía, se hará un breve análisis del concepto. El término imaginación adquiere más de un sentido en el contexto de la Ciencia de la naturaleza humana. En principio, tiene dos sentidos que podemos considerar relativos, ya a la memoria (amplio) o a la razón (más limitado).6 En ambos casos se trata de la facultad que produce nuestras ideas más débiles o menos vívidas; sin embargo, en tanto se opone a la razón, se limita a producir ideas irracionales. Pero hay que notar que el sentido de esta palabra es variable y puede oponerse al de otra (como razón), que sería implicada por aquélla en su sentido amplio. Esto nos lleva a considerar un tercer sentido -no relativo- de la palabra en cuestión que nos remite a la libertad de la imaginación, según el cual ya no se opone ni a la memoria ni a la razón, sino a cualquier facultad humana, o bien, a ninguna de ellas. A. Imaginación respecto a la memoria Se trata de la facultad que produce nuestras ideas más débiles o menos vívidas. Es evidente que las ideas imperfectas de la memoria son más débiles que las impresiones de las que provienen, pero más fuertes que las ideas perfectas de la imaginación, en tanto que la fuerza original u objetiva no se ha perdido por completo. En cuanto dicha fuerza se acaba, en efecto, la memoria deja de funcionar, mientras que la imaginación puede seguir operando. A diferencia de la memoria (facultad de represen6 "Esta palabra se usa comúnmente en dos sentidos diferentes; y aunque no haya nada más contrario a la verdadera filosofía que tal inexactitud, en el curso de mis razonamientos me he visto obligado a caer constantemente en ella. Cuando opongo la imaginación a la memoria, me refiero a la facultad mediante la cual formamos nuestras ideas más débiles. Cuando la opongo a la razón, me refiero a la misma facultad, excluyendo nuestros razonamientos demostrativos y probabilísticos. Cuando no la opongo a ninguna, es indiferente si se toma en el sentido más amplio o en el más limitado, o al menos el significado será suficientemente claro por el contexto" (Hume, 2007, T. 1.3.9n). cap4.indd 57 23/05/17 15:33 58 Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero tación condicionada por los sentidos), la imaginación (facultad de libre representación) puede crear ideas complejas sin más elementos que sus propias ideas. Independientemente de la fuerza o la vivacidad de cada representación, la diferencia fundamental entre la memoria y la imaginación radica en el poder de crear percepciones: un poder que no tiene la primera, pero que sí tiene la segunda. B. Imaginación respecto a la razón (fantasía) Se trata de la facultad que produce ideas irracionales o ideas a partir de otras ideas sin apoyo en principios de relación entre ellas. Puesto que la razón consiste en el descubrimiento de la verdad (Hume, 2007, T 3.1.1), en este sentido, la fantasía es la causa de su tergiversación o perversión natural. Si pudiésemos eliminar su influencia en el pensamiento, la verdad se mostraría ininterrumpidamente, sin las ficciones que alteran el orden de las percepciones. De hecho, David Hume llega a afirmar que "nada es más peligroso para la razón que los vuelos de la imaginación [llámese fantasía], y nada ha provocado más errores entre los filósofos" (Hume, 2007, T. 1.4.7.6). Pero, aun en este sentido limitado y negativo, sigue tratándose de una cualidad de la naturaleza humana, quizá la más poderosa, ya que permite crear ideas completamente nuevas o independientes tanto de la experiencia como de las reglas del entendimiento. C. La imaginación con respecto a sí misma Según Jan Wilbanks, la palabra imaginación para Hume sólo tiene dos sentidos: el primero sería relativo a la memoria (facultad que produce nuestras ideas más débiles), en tanto que el segundo a la razón (facultad que produce ideas irracionales), y "cuando no se le opone a ninguna de estas facultades, [su sentido] es idéntico a alguno de los otros dos, y suele haber cierta indiferencia con respecto a cuál de ellos elijamos" (Wilbanks, 1968, p. 17). Según este intérprete, la imaginación no tendría sentido más que como una facultad entre otras. Así es que para comprender dicho concepto bastaría con distinguir cuál de los dos sentidos definidos es el más adecuado para cada uno de los casos en los que dicha palabra es mencionada. Desde esta perspectiva, pues, no habría manera de comprender cómo es que las ideas de la imaginación pueden ser avivadas o convertidas en impresiones de reflexión. Al respecto, en la conclusión del primer libro del Tratado encontramos la siguiente afirmación: "la memoria, los sentidos y el entendimiento están, todos ellos, fundados en la imaginación o en la vivacidad de nuestras ideas" (Hume, 2007, T. 1.4.7.3). Aquí ya no se habla de una facultad entre otras, sino del fundamento de todas, ya sean sensibles (sentidos), mentales (entendimiento) cap4.indd 58 23/05/17 15:33 59 Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero Sobre la imaginación y la fantasía... o intermedias entre los sentidos y la mente (memoria). Dice Hume que "sin esta cualidad por la que la mente aviva algunas ideas más que otras (la cual parece ser tan trivial y tan poco fundada en la razón), nunca podríamos asentir a ningún argumento, ni llevar a nuestra perspectiva más allá de los objetos que se presentan ante nuestros sentidos" (Hume, 2007, T. 1.4.7.3). De manera que si asentimos a la definición de la imaginación con respecto a la memoria y con respecto a la razón, así como a cualquier argumento, proposición o definición, es gracias a nuestra imaginación. Se trata, pues, del concepto de algo que se puede autodeterminar o definirse a sí mismo. Y es que la imaginación, en tanto que vivacidad de las ideas, permite que las razones sean sentidas o percibidas como impresiones más o menos vívidas, y que las impresiones violentas sean racionalizadas o entendidas. Sin embargo, es necesario reiterar que la misma "cualidad por la que la mente aviva algunas ideas más que otras" puede ser tan racional como irracional. El éxito de toda la empresa filosófica de Hume depende de esta distinción: Puede objetarse aquí que siendo la imaginación, según mi propia confesión, el último juez de todos los sistemas de la filosofía, soy injusto censurando a los filósofos antiguos por hacer uso de esta facultad y por guiarse enteramente por ella en sus razonamientos. Para justificarme a mí mismo debo distinguir los principios de la imaginación que son permanentes, irresistibles y universales –como es la transición de las causas a los efectos y viceversade aquellos que son cambiantes, débiles e irregulares... Los primeros son el fundamento de todos nuestros pensamientos y acciones, y en cuanto hagan falta, la naturaleza humana habrá de perecer e ir a la ruina. Los segundos no son inevitables ni necesarios para la humanidad, tampoco resultan muy útiles para conducirse en la vida; al contrario, parece que sólo tienen lugar en mentes débiles, y siendo opuestos a los otros principios de la costumbre y el razonamiento, pueden ser revertidos fácilmente mediante el contraste y la oposición. Por esta razón, los primeros son recibidos y los segundos rechazados por la filosofía (Hume, 2007, T 1.4.4.1) No hay que olvidar que Hume mismo duda de la necesidad de los principios de relación, que permiten justificar su empresa filosófica y establecer la distinción entre imaginación y fantasía que proponemos aquí. Pero el uso de dichos principios es lo único que le valdría el "glorioso título inventor", según sus propias palabras (Hume, 2007, Abstract, 35). Es justamente por ello que el pensamiento de Hume parece regresarnos cap4.indd 59 23/05/17 15:33 60 Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero al punto de inicio. Lo que nos permitiría salir del escepticismo epistemológico no es algo apodíctico y necesario. Siempre puede dudarse de ello. En efecto, si los principios de relación son imaginarios o inventados por un autor, ¿cómo asegurar que son algo más que fantasías?, ¿por qué creer que son los principios más convenientes que se pueden imaginar? Más que contestar a estas preguntas en la teoría, el pensamiento de Hume nos invita a resolver el problema en la práctica, puesto que, "tal como la naturaleza nos enseña a usar nuestras extremidades, sin darnos conocimiento de los músculos y los nervios por los cuales actúan, así ha implantado en nosotros un instinto que dirige al pensamiento por el curso que corresponde al que ha establecido en los objetos externos, aunque ignoremos por completo los poderes y las fuerzas de los que depende este curso regular y sucesión de objetos depende por completo" (Hume, 2000, EHU, 5.2.22). Conclusión Para concluir, retomaremos las preguntas planteadas al principio. Hemos dicho que el empirismo de Hume nos deja en un estado de incertidumbre indeseable respecto a las leyes y los principios de toda teoría o sistematización de la realidad que pretenda predecir y establecer conexiones necesarias entre fenómenos. El verdadero fundamento de la filosofía y las ciencias se vuelve un tanto misterioso. No es con base en el entendimiento, sino con base en la imaginación que producimos ideas abstractas y reglas generales. Más que la razón es la pasión la que nos guía en nuestras investigaciones y mantiene nuestras creencias. Y ya que la influencia de la razón pura, que acabaría con toda intransigencia y superstición, ha quedado descartada de la vida, no queda más que imaginación o fantasía. Pero al analizar el concepto de aquel poder o facultad por la cual se suscitaron todos estos problemas, nos damos cuenta de que si bien implica cierta libertad para inventar ideas y creer prácticamente en cualquier cosa (a saber, en tanto que fantasía), por otro lado, también nos permite proceder con base en principios racionales y ganar la autonomía del pensamiento humano (en tanto que imaginación). Para Hume "no hay nada más evidente que el hecho de que las ideas a las que asentimos son más fuertes, firmes y vívidas que aquellos ensueños de un constructor de castillos encantados" (Hume, 2007, T. 1.3.7.8). Ya que tenemos la libertad de avivar nuestras ideas y confundirlas con impresiones hasta inventar creencias falsas, siendo ésta la actividad mental y sensible que suele ser facilitada por la literatura, las ciencias y la filosofía, en efecto, la formación racional de la imaginación o el desarrollo del entendimiento humano mediante la crítica literaria, científica cap4.indd 60 23/05/17 15:33 61 Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero Sobre la imaginación y la fantasía... y filosófica se presenta como el propósito más importante de la Ciencia de la naturaleza humana. Puesto que tenemos un poder tan maravilloso como peligroso que sólo va a operar correctamente en la medida en la que nosotros mismos así lo procuremos. Más que tratarse de una necesidad o de una condición de posibilidad de la experiencia, la distinción entre imaginación y fantasía se presenta como exigencia moral de lo que debemos observar constantemente y por propia convicción. Referencias Baxter, D., 2008, Hume s Difficulty. Time and Identity in the Treatise, Routledge, NuevaYork. Deleuze, Gilles, 2002, Empirismo y subjetividad, traducción Hugo Acevedo, Gedisa, España. Garret, D., 1997, Cognition and Commitment in Hume s Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Nueva York. Gracyk, T., 1994, "Rethinking Hume s Standard of Taste", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 52, pp. 168-182. Hegel, G. W. F., 1955, Lecciones sobre la historia de la filosofía III, Ed. Elsa Frost, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México. Hume, D., 2007, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. D. F. Norton y M. J. Norton, Calderon Press / Oxford, Nueva York. _____, 2000, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp, Calderon Press / Oxford, Nueva York. _____, 2000, Four Dissertations, St. Augustine s Press, Indiana. _____, 1826, The Philosophical Works, Ed. Thomas Hill Green y Thomas Hodge Grose (4 vols.), Adam Black and William Tait, Londres. Kant, I., 2008, Crítica de la razón pura, ed. bilingüe, traducción y notas M. Caimi, FCE/UAM/UNAM, México. _____, 2005, Crítica de la razón práctica, ed. bilingüe, tr. y n. Dulce María Granja, FCE/UAM/UNAM, México. Kemp Smith, N., 2005, The Philosophy of David Hume. A critical study of its origins and central doctrines, Macmillan, Nueva York. Kivy, P., 2003, The seventh sense. Frances Hutcheson and Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics, Oxford University Press, Nueva York. Merril, K R., 2008, Historical Dictionary of Hume s Philosophy, The Scarecrow Press, Reino Unido. Mossner, E. C., 1980, The life of David Hume, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Neill, A., 1998, "Hume's singular Phaenomenon", British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 39, pp. 112-125. Norton, D. F., 1993, "Hume, human nature, and the foundation of morality", en The Cambridge companion to Hume, Ed. David Fate, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. cap4.indd 61 23/05/17 15:33 62 Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero Noxon, J., 1974, La evolución de la filosofía de Hume, tr. Carlos Solís, Revista de Occidente, Madrid. Parker, F., 2003, Scepticism and Literature. An Essay on Pope, Hume, Sterne and Johnson, Oxford University Press, Nueva York. Penelhum, T., 1975, Hume, The MacMillan Press, Londres. Popkin, R., 1980, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, Austin Hill Press, Indianápolis. Rábade, S., 1975, Hume y el fenomenismo moderno, Gredos, Madrid. Rose, M. C., 1976, "The importance of Hume in the History of Western Aesthetics", British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 16, pp. 218-229. Salas, J. de y Martín, F., comp., 1998, David Hume. Perspectivas sobre su obra, Editorial Complutense, Madrid. Shelley, J., 1976, "Hume s Double Standard of Taste", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 52, pp. 437-445. Stroud, B., 2005, Hume, Tr. Antonio Zirión, UNAM, México. Townsend, D., 2001, Hume's aesthetic theory. Taste and Sentiment, Routledge, Londres. Wilbanks, J., 1968, Hume's Theory of Imagination, Springer, La Haya. cap4.indd 62 23/05/17 15:

OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD chapter 13 Must I Benefit Myself? Michael Cholbi Altruism-the selfless concern for others-dominates most popular conceptions of morality. Our moral role models tend to be those with reputations for devotion to others' well-being (such as Mother Theresa) or for great personal sacrifice to serve others (such as Nelson Mandela). On this altruistic picture, benevolence and sympathy are the primary moral virtues. A number of philosophers have agreed, arguing that altruism is all there is to the moral point of view. Morality, on this picture, is "purely and essentially other-regarding."1 On its face, consequentialism accords well with this altruistic conception of morality. A central message of consequentialist moral thinking has been that nearly all moral agents are exceedingly partial in their moral outlooks and so cast too narrow a net of moral concern; taking altruism seriously entails becoming far more concerned for the needs or interests of others, including those of distant strangers, future generations, and nonhuman animals, groups often consigned to the periphery of ordinary moral thought. This same message-that morality places stringent demands on our altruism-is also evident in consequentialist writings on practical ethics, which teach that the affluent have moral obligations to donate large portions of their wealth to assist the global poor2; that having met their children's needs, parents ought to prioritize other children's needs above their children's wants3; and that societies should implement schemes to allocate scarce goods such as transplant organs with the aim of saving the greatest number of lives overall.4 Consequentialism thus seems to embrace a picture of morality wherein concern for others is paramount while concern for oneself is minimal or nonexistent, a picture in which morality assigns "no positive value to the well-being or happiness of the 1 Stephen Finlay, "Too Much Morality?" in Morality and Self-Interest, edited by Paul Bloomfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 142. 2 Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972): 229–243. 3 James Rachels, "Morality, Parents, and Children," in his Can Ethics Provide Answers?: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 213–234. 4 John Harris, "The Survival Lottery," Philosophy 50 (1975): 81–87. 0004849990.INDD 253 6/4/2020 10:58:05 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD 254 Michael Cholbi moral agent of the sort it clearly assigns to the well-being or happiness of everyone other than the agent."5 It may therefore be surprising that standard versions of consequentialism seem to entail that sometimes individuals not only may, but in fact must, benefit themselves. Consider these two examples: Enrollment: Josephine, a university philosophy student, is searching for a final course to complete her schedule for the next term. She sees that there is a single spot available in a course offered by her favorite ethics professor. Josephine is about to enroll in the course using the university's online system, but at the last moment, she texts her friend Kelly, who finds ethics tolerable but not engaging, to let her know of the spot in the ethics course, which Kelly takes. Despite knowing that she would benefit more from the ethics course than Kelly would, Josephine ends up enrolling in a lackluster course in modal logic. Evacuation: Igor is a solitary, elderly man with no surviving family and few acquaintances. He is frail and undergoing steady cognitive decline. Working or contributing to socially valuable activities is therefore not a viable possibility for him. These challenges notwithstanding, Igor is able to address his basic physical needs on his own and enjoys a good quality of life. He is content to spend his days reading war histories and watching sports on television. One afternoon, a fire breaks out in his apartment building. Rescue crews quickly arrive and give an immediate evacuation order for all of the apartment's residents. Though he is capable of evacuating the building, Igor remains in his apartment, knowing that he could well die from the fire. He is killed when he inhales the smoke that soon pervades the building. From a naïve or pretheoretical moral view, how should these examples be analyzed and evaluated? In Enrollment, Josephine acts altruistically inasmuch as she foregoes her slot in the ethics course so that Kelly can enroll in it. This seems morally permissible, even laudable. In Evacuation, we might find Igor's decision odd; we would naturally wonder why, unless he had been depressed, and so on, he would willingly choose to end a life that seems congenial if unambitious. And our moral reaction might differ if ending his life caused others to suffer or to grieve. But given his isolation and his inability to contribute much to the happiness of others, his death affected only him, and while questions might be raised about whether Igor acted prudently, he does not seem to act wrongfully. Orthodox forms of consequentialism have difficulty validating such responses though. Standard act consequentialism holds that agents are obligated to bring about the best outcome, that is, the outcome that realizes the greatest good overall in comparison with alternatives. But the agents in Enrollment and Evacuation do not satisfy this standard. In the former, Josephine stood to gain more from enrolling in the ethics course than Kelly did. By giving Kelly the opportunity to enroll in the ethics course, Josephine made Kelly better off, but not by a quantity as great as the quantity of goods Josephine would have enjoyed if she had enrolled in the ethics course herself. By the 5 Michael Slote, "Some Advantages of Virtue Ethics," Identity, Character, and Morality, edited by Owen Flanagan (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 441. 0004849990.INDD 254 6/4/2020 10:58:05 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD Must I Benefit Myself? 255 lights of stand ard act consequentialism, Josephine's altruistic act was wrong: she could have, but did not, perform the act resulting in the greatest good overall. Let us call examples such as Enrollment, in which an agent's action results in good for others but maximal good would have resulted from her choosing to direct greater benefits to herself instead, nonoffsetting failures to self-benefit. Evacuation is not an example of a nonoffsetting failure to self-benefit. For Igor's not evacuating does not result in some quantity of goods being enjoyed by others. Rather, Igor's choosing not to evacuate amounts to him failing to benefit himself, but no one else benefits thereby either. Evacuation thus represents an instance of pure failure to selfbenefit. Nevertheless, standard act consequentialism condemns Igor's choice on the same general grounds as it condemns Josephine's: he too failed to bring about the greatest good in comparison with alternatives. Put differently, when only our own well-being is at stake, consequentialism seems to demand that we maximize our well-being, a result at odds with the sense that failing to benefit oneself (or to benefit oneself to the utmost) may be unwise but is rarely immoral. These examples illustrate that, despite its theoretical and practical emphasis on benefitting others, consequentialism appears susceptible to a compulsory self-benefit objection: it requires that individuals direct benefits to themselves when doing so is entailed by the consequentialist demand to maximize good overall, despite its being intuitively morally permissible, or even praiseworthy, for individuals not to direct those benefits to themselves. The compulsory self-benefit objection has force because it flows directly from features of consequentialism that many of its adherents find attractive. What unites consequentialist theories is the conviction that the moral status of actions is a function solely of the outcomes of those actions, and in particular, how good or desirable these outcomes are in comparison to one another. The compulsory self-benefit objection gets its traction in part from this conviction, since failures to benefit oneself seem to result in outcomes that are worse overall. Likewise, consequentialists generally point with pride at its incorporating a strong notion of impartiality, wherein the concerns, interests, wellbeing, and so on of all affected by an action are taken into account equally when determining how good that action's outcome is.6 Josephine and Igor are seemingly required to benefit themselves because doing so assigns their own concerns, interests, well-being, and so on equal weight to that of others. The theoretical interest of the compulsory self-benefit objection therefore resides in the fact that it arises from features of consequentialism that seem to speak in the theory's favor. Compared to other objections to consequentialism, the compulsory self-benefit objection has garnered little attention. The purpose of this article is therefore to explore how consequentialists might best answer the compulsory self-benefit objection. While some might find "biting the bullet" sufficient-acknowledging the force of the objection but maintaining that the other merits of consequentialism outweigh that force-I shall 6 See Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3rd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 20–24, for a canonical expression of this principle of "equal consideration of interests." 0004849990.INDD 255 6/4/2020 10:58:05 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD 256 Michael Cholbi assume that consequentialists would prefer to answer the objection on its face in a way that does minimal damage to their theory. The challenge, then, is to ascertain how consequentialism might permit individuals not to benefit themselves without relinquishing the commitments that give consequentialism its theoretical appeal. I cannot consider every strategy by which consequentialists might try to answer the compulsory self-benefit objection. Here I will canvass several strategies that either strike me as particularly promising or have not been previously explored.7 Ultimately, the strategies I consider here all founder on one or more of the following three worries: first, they do not account for a broad enough spectrum of the intuitively morally permissible instances of failures to self-benefit (for example, pure failures to self-benefit); second, they address the objection through ad hoc maneuvers that license failures to self-benefit without motivating these maneuvers by appeal to consequentialist principles or commitments; or third, they do not adequately explain how the permissibility of failing to benefit oneself is grounded in a moral option-that is, they do not provide compelling explanations of how both benefitting oneself and failing to do so are morally permissible. I do not take their failures to demonstrate the impossibility of a credible consequentialist response to the compulsory self-benefit objection. But their failures do suggest that the objection is more formidable than the extant literature implies, and defenders of consequentialism would be wise to exert more effort in explicitly answering it. Our discussion unfolds as follows. In the next section, I consider whether consequentialist theories that evaluate actions in terms of their motives can answer the compulsory self-benefit objection. Section 2 turns to two ways of addressing the objection by deviating from standard maximizing forms of consequentialism. In sections 3 and 4, I argue that the objection can be classified as an instance of more familiar objections to consequentialism-that it gives insufficient due to special relationships and is exceedingly demanding, respectively-but consequentialist responses to those more familiar objections do not readily apply to the compulsory self-benefit objection. Section 5 considers whether dual-ranking act consequentialism has the resources to answer this objection through its appeal to the distinction between an agent's moral reasons and her all-things-considered reasons for action. In my concluding section, I propose that an adequate consequentialist response to the compulsory self-benefit object must account for options directed at the self, a notion difficult to reconcile with central consequentialist commitments. 1. Motive Consequentialism As noted at the outset, altruism and beneficence are generally applauded, greed and selfindulgence generally deplored. This might suggest that a consequentialist theory that 7 I engage with some strategies not addressed here in my "Agents, Patients, and Compulsory Self-benefit," Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (2014): 159–184. 0004849990.INDD 256 6/4/2020 10:58:05 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD Must I Benefit Myself? 257 takes motives rather than acts as its focus could offer a satisfactory response to the compulsory self-benefit objection. Suppose that an individual S's action A is obligatory only if S would perform A if S were to act on the basis of a set of desires D that, on balance and over time, leads S to maximize overall goodness through her actions. We might view this as the core of an "ideal motivation" consequentialist theory, wherein acts are judged indirectly, not in terms of whether they themselves maximize overall goodness but in terms of whether an agent whose motivations conduce to maximizing goodness would perform such acts. A crucial question regarding this theory is, "what is D?" This version of consequentialism would be ineffective against the compulsory self-benefit objection if D is the desire to maximize overall goodness. For an agent motivated by that desire would choose to maximize overall goodness, thus ruling out failures of self-benefit. However, some philosophers have argued that the motives the possession of which would maximize overall goodness would not include the motive to maximize overall goodness, much in the way that being motivated to maximize pleasure may actually undercut the aim of maximizing one's pleasure.8 The question at hand, then, is whether the set of goodness-maximizing desires would include, or allow for, failures to self-benefit. On its face, we might expect that a goodness-maximizing set of desires would be primarily benevolent or other-focused: given our egoistic propensities, a set of desires that counteracts those propensities by largely directing our attention and concern toward the interests of others would lead to high levels of goodness overall. A community of altruists, we would anticipate, would be better off than a community of egoists. If so, then agents motivated by those desires that maximize overall goodness would only rarely benefit themselves when doing so is best overall. An ideal motive consequentialism might therefore give significant breadth to failures to benefit oneself. This reasoning is too quick though. For one, in cases of pure self-benefit, no one else's interests are at stake, and yet it seems permissible not to maximize benefits to oneself. An ideally motivated agent should be willing to benefit herself in such a case, in opposition to her generally benevolent motives. This reasoning also neglects how the pursuit of self-interest can sometimes redound to the benefit of others. One need not be a dyedin-the-wool Mandevillean to recognize that at least sometimes the ardent pursuit of one's self-interest can also promote the interests of others. When we pursue our own good through cooperative endeavors with others or when we produce goods we exchange with others, we increase overall well-being despite being guided by selfish motives. Finally, there are dangers in excessive benevolence or concern for others. A theme within some feminist writings is that traditional patriarchal cultures can encourage women to prioritize the interests of others over women's own interests, resulting in the reinforcement of oppressive practices and the diminution of women's self-respect.9 So while an ideally motivated consequentialist agent might be predominantly altruistic, her motivations can err too far in that direction, and there may be a significant number 8 See Robert Merrihew Adams, "Motive Utilitarianism," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 467–481. 9 Diana T. Meyers, "The Politics of Self-Respect: A Feminist Perspective," Hypatia 1 (1986): 83–100. 0004849990.INDD 257 6/4/2020 10:58:05 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD 258 Michael Cholbi of instances wherein purely altruistic motivation fails to be best from a consequentialist perspective because one's own interests are neglected. Sorting out just how often an ideally motivated consequentialist agent would attend to her self-interest is a complex empirical matter that I cannot hope to settle here. Still, any such consequentialist theory will face the problem of how to situate the interests of the self within a largely altruistic motivational economy without ignoring the interests of the self in ways that consequentialism rejects. 2. Nonmaximization Strategies Consequentialists may seek to address the self-benefit objection by adopting a nonmaximizing standard of obligatory action that allows for failures to self-benefit. For example, satisficing consequentialists may propose that so long as agents produce a sufficient amount of good through their actions, they meet their obligations. And in cases of failures of self-benefit, agents may fail to maximize overall good while still producing enough good by consequentialist lights. In both Enrollment and Evacuation, perhaps Josephine and Igor do well enough even if they do not do what is impartially best. Moving to a satisficing rather than maximizing standard has the advantage of explaining how self-benefit is an option: an agent acts rightly if, by failing to benefit herself, she either does well enough or if she exceeds the satisficing standard. A satisficing standard thus permits, but does not require, maximization. The difficulty with this strategy is that the moral permission not to benefit oneself appears very wide, and there is no particular reason to expect that all instances in which an agent fails to benefit herself will meet the satisficing standard. Take Evacuation: suppose Igor foregoes a very large amount of good to himself by failing to evacuate. If doing so is permissible, then satisficing consequentialism would, in order to vindicate this conclusion, have to depart significantly from a maximizing standard. But there is no apparent basis for adopting such a lenient satisficing standard aside from its ability to address failures to self-benefit. Why, after all, should we expect that a qualitative property actions may have (i.e., that they fail to benefit oneself to the greatest degree) will coincide with a quantitative property of actions (i.e., that they produce enough good to meet the satisficing consequentialists' demands) in every instance? We have better reason, I suggest, to expect that any intuitively plausible satisficing standard will at least sometimes disallow apparently permissible failures of self-benefit. Moreover, such a wide departure from maximization would presumably apply not only in instances of failures of self-benefit but across the board, that is, to situations where an individual falls short of maximization solely with regard to how much good her actions produce for others. But absent some rationale for restricting these deviations only to self-regarding deviations, a satisficing strategy for answering the compulsory self-benefit objection runs the risk of asking too little of agents with respect to others' good. 0004849990.INDD 258 6/4/2020 10:58:05 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD Must I Benefit Myself? 259 Another way to answer the compulsory self-benefit objection by jettisoning strict maximization is to incorporate a distinction between benefits to an agent and benefits to others. Ted Sider, for example, has put forth a self/other asymmetrical consequentialist theory wherein if agent S performs act A, then A is obligatory if and only if (1) no other action produces more impartial overall good than A, and (2) no other action produces more good from the "selfless perspective" that excludes those goods that A provided to S.10 Sider furthermore proposes that if two alternative actions A and B are such that A satisfies condition (1) but not condition (2), while B satisfies condition (2) but not condition (1), then A and B represent a moral "tie," in which case an individual can permissibly perform either A or B. Sider's revised consequentialist standard would appear to answer the compulsory self-benefit objection insofar as it denies that self-benefit is morally obligatory. If we apply it to Enrollment, it would seem true that Josephine's enrolling in the ethics course satisfies condition (1) but not condition (2), since there is no action that results in more impartial good, but there is an action-facilitating Kelly's enrollment-that produces more good when the goods that might accrue to Josephine are excluded. Her facilitating Kelly's enrollment is permissible (though Josephine's enrolling would be permissible as well). In the case of Evacuation, however, Sider's asymmetrical consequentialism stumbles. Igor's evacuating rather than remaining in his apartment satisfies Sider's condition (1), since his evacuating benefits him and thus (assuming that others' interests are unaffected by his decision) would be better with respect to overall personal good. But Igor's remaining also satisfies Sider's condition (2), because no other action besides Igor's remaining (including his evacuating) produces more good from the "selfless perspective" that excludes whatever goods that Igor gains from remaining. His remaining rather than evacuating makes no difference from that perspective. Thus, remaining versus evacuating is not a tie, and Igor violates his moral obligations by remaining. Sider's revision to consequentialism thus seems to yield intuitively plausible answers in cases of offsetting failures to self-benefit but not in cases of pure failures to self-benefit. But even if Sider's asymmetrical consequentialism succeeded in making sense of pure failures to self-benefit, it has the deeper theoretical defect of addressing the compulsory self-benefit objection in a largely ad hoc manner. As Sider himself recognizes, his revisions to standard consequentialism may lead to more plausible results about the "moral normative status of actions," but these results are not grounded in any "independently important axiological facts."11 And consequentialists themselves should have reservations about modifying the consequentialist standard to address the compulsory self-benefit objection. Both satisficing consequentialism and Sider's asymmetrical consequentialism tacitly reject maximization, and the latter rejects impartiality. To the extent then that maximization and impartiality are compelling features of the consequentialist moral framework, these revisions to the consequentialist framework represent theoretical costs, and at least some consequentialists (I expect) will find these costs 10 Ted Sider, "Asymmetry and Self-sacrifice," Philosophical Studies 70 (1993): 117–132. 11 Sider, "Asymmetry and Self-sacrifice," 128. 0004849990.INDD 259 6/4/2020 10:58:06 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD 260 Michael Cholbi not a reasonable concession to the theory's critics but the repudiation of what makes consequentialism appealing in the first place. 3. Special Relationships Consequentialists have proven very resourceful in answering the many objections to which their theory has been subject. Thus, if the compulsory self-benefit objection resembles an extant objection to which consequentialists have given compelling replies, then an adequate response to the objection may emerge. Let us now consider whether such a strategy may succeed in connection with the complaint that consequentialism places inadequate stock in special relationships. This objection holds that because consequentialists generally insist on impartiality, their theory cannot make sense of instances where partiality is morally permissible, even laudable. Chief among these instances of laudable partiality is our tendency to accord the interests of those close to us-our romantic partners, children, friends, and family members-greater weight in our decision making than the interests of mere strangers. The compulsory self-benefit objection can be analyzed as an idiosyncratic instance of the special relationships objection. If we are morally permitted not to benefit ourselves even when doing so would be required by the consequentialist demand to maximize overall goodness, then this permission can be viewed as reflecting a permissible "partiality" toward ourselves. This partiality is different from the partiality licensed by other special relationships. For whereas those relationships seem to entitle us to accord certain individuals' interests greater weight in our decision making, the special relationship to self seems to license us assigning lesser weight to our own interests in our decision making, that is, to allow us not to benefit ourselves. Our distinctive relationships toward particular others establishes special obligations; our distinctive relationship to ourselves establishes special options. It is unlikely though that the arguments consequentialists have deployed in order to validate special relationships can be applied in the case of compulsory self-benefit and the special relationship to self. One such argument is that attending to our special relationships, despite being a deviation from impartial consequentialist reasoning, in fact results in the best overall consequences. Realizing impartially best outcomes may sometimes be the result of partiality, so that when we care for our friends to a greater degree than we care for strangers, we strengthen practices that, in general and for the most part, redound to everyone's benefit. It may be, then, that consequentialism does not only permit the cultivation and recognition of special relationships. Rather, the consequentialist project of maximizing overall goodness will require their cultivation and recognition. But this argument extends uncomfortably to our special relationship to self: being "partial" by discounting our own well-being may result in greater overall well-being in nonoffsetting failures of 0004849990.INDD 260 6/4/2020 10:58:06 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD Must I Benefit Myself? 261 self-benefit such as Enrollment, yet it seems unlikely that it results in greater overall well-being in pure failures to self-benefit such as Evacuation. For recall that Igor's remaining in his apartment harms him with no compensating gain to others.12 A second way consequentialists have addressed the special relationships objection is by claiming that such relationships are not means to valuable ends or outcomes, but are intrinsically valuable in their own right. The partiality shown in special relationships is necessary and morally justified because it is part and parcel of something good in itself. Here too it is difficult to see how this line of thought can be extended to the self and apparently permissible failures to benefit ourselves. Again, the failure to benefit ourselves is an option; that is, it is also permissible for agents to choose to benefit themselves as well. To fail in one's special obligations to one's friends, say, is to undercut whatever value our friendships have. But in the case of the special relationship to ourselves, the relationship cannot be undercut by what we do (or fail to do) in the way of benefitting ourselves, and if something is good in itself regardless of whether our actions maintain it or not, it is hard to decipher how the putative good is a good in any recognizably consequentialist sense. If an agent could equally maintain this good by benefitting herself and by failing to do so, then this good is not an outcome of what she does and so does not look like a good with which consequentialist morality is concerned. 4. Demandingness Another familiar objection to consequentialism that resembles the compulsory selfbenefit objection is the complaint that consequentialism is too demanding.13 The usual gloss on this objection is that consequentialism requires us to forego more of our interests or well-being than it is reasonable or morally defensible to demand. The impartial maximization of overall good appears to entail that we are obligated to forego most luxuries in order to donate large sums of money to the poor; that we are obligated to forego the pleasures of meat eating in order to curtail harms to animals; or that we are obligated to choose our careers not on the basis of our aspirations or values but on the basis of which careers will do the most good. Such demands, the objection goes, are unreasonable. Either a more plausible consequentialist theory, making less extensive demands on individuals' well-being, must be expounded or we should reject consequentialism altogether. 12 I take such reasoning to also speak against "sophisticated" consequentialist attempts to answer the compulsory self-benefit objection. See my "Agents, Patients, and Compulsory Self-benefit," for more discussion. 13 See, in a very large literature, Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford, 1984); Liam B. Murphy, "The Demands of Beneficence," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993): 267–292; and Tim Mulgan, The Demands of Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 0004849990.INDD 261 6/4/2020 10:58:06 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD 262 Michael Cholbi So described, the demandingness objection and the compulsory self-benefit objection may seem unrelated. After all, the latter is the complaint that consequentialism requires us to benefit ourselves, whereas the former is the complaint that consequentialism precludes us from benefitting ourselves in ways that seem morally defensible. However, the demandingness objection can be recast in terms of options, with the result that the compulsory self-benefit objection is an instance of it: consequentialism is unreasonably demanding in depriving us of options,14 including the apparently permissible option of failing to benefit ourselves. So depicted, that consequentialism disallows failures to selfbenefit shows that it encumbers us not only in terms of our well-being but in terms of our exercising our capacities of choice. Independently from its constraining (perhaps unreasonably) our pursuit of our well-being, consequentialism is too "confining" with respect to the options it leaves us,15 including options regarding self-benefit. Debates about the demandingness of consequentialism have generally concerned how to temper the demands of beneficence rather than the demands of self-interest. Yet if the compulsory self-benefit objection is an instance of the demandingness objection, then that provides a reason to suppose that consequentialist rejoinders to the demandingness objection might also serve as effective rejoinder to the compulsory self-benefit objection. In particular, this strategy would be effective against the compulsory selfbenefit objection if consequentialist answers to the demandingness objection, despite having been developed to accommodate agents' pursuit of their own interests, could be extrapolated to accommodate agents' abnegation of their own interests. It is difficult to see how such an extrapolation could be achieved though. One possibility is to argue that reductions in overall value due to failures to selfbenefit are mitigated by other goods involved in the exercise of choice. So in the case of Enrollment, even though Josephine's helping Kelly enroll in the ethics course may be worse overall from the standpoint of well-being (since Kelly benefits less from the course than Josephine would), her doing so has value insofar as it is an exercise of liberty, autonomy, or the like. And if the value of Josephine's choosing is equal to or greater than the value of the well-being she foregoes by helping Kelly enroll, then appearances notwithstanding, Josephine has satisfied the consequentialist standard of maximization. For no other action ranks better in terms of overall good than her helping Kelly enroll in the ethics course. This reasoning suffers from two defects, First, the value of choice will, in general, contribute as much value as agents forego when they fail to benefit themselves is an unlikely thesis. Again, suppose in Evacuation that Igor foregoes a great deal of well-being by remaining in his apartment. There is no obvious reason to suppose that this amount of well-being is counterbalanced by some equal or greater quantity of well-being associated with his exercising her power to choose not to benefit himself. Second, recall that the permissibility of failing to benefit oneself rests on an option: It is permissible to 14 David Sobel, "The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection," Philosophers' Imprint 7 (2007) www.philosophersimprint.org/007008/, 2. 15 Samuel Scheffler, Human Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 98. 0004849990.INDD 262 6/4/2020 10:58:06 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD Must I Benefit Myself? 263 benefit oneself or to forego such benefits. This reasoning cannot make sense of such an option. For suppose in Enrollment that Josephine decides instead to enroll in the ethics course herself. In order for this to be a permissible option on a consequentialist view, it must (with respect to overall good) tie with her actual decision to help Kelly enroll in the course. But that appears impossible. For assuming that whatever contribution her choosing makes to the overall value of the ensuing state of affairs remains steady (i.e., that value is the same regardless of which option she chooses), then because her own enrollment promotes the greatest amount of well-being overall, then her enrolling must produce the greatest good overall. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to prove the unlikely claim that when Josephine helps Kelly enroll, the value of her so choosing exceeds the value associated with her choosing to enroll herself. The other general route for addressing the demandingness objection is accommodationist-to establish an "agent-centered prerogative" that allows agents not to "devote energy and attention to their projects and commitments in strict proportion to the value from an impersonal standpoint of their doing so."16 As developed by Samuel Scheffler, the agent-centered prerogative is intended to enable agents to permissibly pursue their central projects and commitments even when doing so would, from a strictly impersonal point of view, not be maximally good. The agent-centered prerogative thus seems to license morally permissible failures of self-benefit, since they too are deviations from what would be maximizing from an impersonal point of view. Here again, that failures to self-benefit are exercises of moral options stymies consequentialist efforts to answer the compulsory self-benefit objection. If the appeal to an agent-centered prerogative amounts to asserting that when agents fail to benefit themselves they do not maximize overall well-being but do realize other goods-the value of choice, autonomy, integrity, and so on-then this is simply a restatement of the strategy we just rejected. But if it is not an appeal to the value of choice, it is hard to see that the considerations that motivate an agent-centered prerogative allowing individuals to forego maximizing good in the service of their central projects and commitments support the moral permissibility of an option not to benefit oneself. For the intuitive basis of this option is not a moral permission not to maximize because of some compelling reason that emerges from within individuals' personal points of view. Consider Evacuation again: Igor presumably does not maximize goodness by remaining in his apartment. But the moral permissibility of his doing so is not faithfully captured by the thought he thereby permissibly fails to maximize overall well-being. Scheffler's agentcentered prerogative allows agents not to maximize impersonal goodness by taking into account agent-centered reasons rooted in their personal projects and commitments. The picture suggested here is that when such reasons are arrayed against impersonal reasons, they will at least sometimes (but not necessarily) be sufficiently compelling to establish a moral permission for agents not to maximize impersonal goodness. Examples such as Evacuation remind us that the moral permission not to benefit 16 Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, 9–10. 0004849990.INDD 263 6/4/2020 10:58:06 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD 264 Michael Cholbi ourselves is very wide, not an option to discount our well-being to some degree but an option to exempt our well-being, partially or in full, from the moral calculus as we see fit. Igor's permission not to benefit himself does not flow from any judgment regarding whether he correctly balances impersonal reasons with agent-centered ones. It instead rests on a right to disregard his well-being for moral purposes, an entitlement to set aside his well-being so far as moral decision making goes. We prescind from moral criticism of choices like Igor's from a recognition that his relationship to his good is his business. Agents thus enjoy a sort of authority with respect to their own well-being. This authority may be cashed out in terms of what Joseph Raz called "exclusionary reasons," reasons "to refrain from acting for some reason."17 When a commanding officer gives a soldier a binding order to X, the order serves as a reason that "excludes" whatever reasons the soldier might otherwise have that bear on X, mooting those reasons in the soldier's deliberation. In like manner, I suggest, the moral permissibility of not benefitting ourselves flows from an authoritative relation we have to our well-being, one that permits us to exclude our well-being from the domain of moral appraisal-to treat our own wellbeing as irrelevant to moral choice. Note that the permissibility of failures to self-benefit is itself a moral permission; for it would be morally objectionable in most cases to compel individuals to benefit themselves. But it is a permission not rooted in the quality or magnitude of a person's reasons, impersonal or agent-centered, but in a basic moral power to exclude one's own good from the practical determination of what is morally best or obligatory.18 Consequentialist responses to the demandingness objection are therefore unlikely to succeed in addressing the compulsory self-benefit objection: if they appeal to how failures to maximize (say) overall well-being can be counteracted by other goods, then it is unlikely that these other goods are just valuable enough to establish an option between benefitting ourselves and failing to do so. And effective ties between these options are unlikely given the apparently wide breadth of permissible failures to self-benefit. If consequentialists attempt to extend the agent-centered prerogative to failure to self-benefit, this incorrectly grounds the permission not to benefit ourselves in the balance of reasons among impersonal and agent-relative reasons. The evidently wide permissibility of not benefitting ourselves, I propose, appears to instead be rooted in a moral power to exclude our own well-being from moral deliberation and choice. 5. Dual-Ranking Consequentialism A final theoretical option for addressing the compulsory self-benefit objection is dualranking act consequentialism. The theory and its philosophical motivations are too 17 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 39. 18 For an elaboration of moral agency in terms of practical powers, see Michael Cholbi, "Paternalism and Our Rational Powers," Mind 126 (2017):123–153. 0004849990.INDD 264 6/4/2020 10:58:06 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD Must I Benefit Myself? 265 complex to investigate in depth here. But the gist of the theory (as articulated by Douglas Portmore19) is as follows: Because they morally evaluate actions in terms of their outcomes, all consequentialist theories are necessarily committed to ranking outcomes in terms of their being better or worse. Orthodox versions of consequentialism rank outcomes in terms of value or goodness from an evaluator-neutral point of view. Portmore's dual-ranking theory diverges from these versions of consequentialism in two ways. First, outcomes are ranked not in terms of the goodness or value resulting from an action but in terms of the desirability of outcomes. Second, outcomes are ranked both in terms of moral reasons (i.e., reasons rooted in what outcomes would be better for others20) and nonmoral reasons, with the latter including what are standardly thought of as agent-relative reasons, such as a person's reason to want to not cause harm to others (understood as distinct from the agent-neutral reason not to want harms to occur). By incorporating these nonmoral, personal reasons, dual-ranking theory provides a ranking that is relative to particular evaluators or agents. Moral permissibility, on Portmore's picture, does not turn solely on moral reasons. For given the truth of moral rationalism-that agents can only be morally required to do what they have decisive reasons to do, all things considered-it may be the case that agents have sufficient reason not to do what moral reasons alone mandate. Moral permissibility thus turns on both moral reasons and an agent's all-things-considered reasons, so that an act is morally permissible for a given agent "if and only if, and because, there is no available act alternative that would produce an outcome that [the agent] has both more moral reason and more reason, all things considered, to want to obtain."21 Dual-ranking act consequentialism appears capable of answering the compulsory self-benefit objection because it provides agents morally permissible options when outcomes diverge with respect to moral versus all-things-considered reasons. The option not to benefit oneself arises when an agent has a nonmoral reason to benefit herself22 such that this reason, in concert with her other reasons, entails that she has most reason all-things-considered to benefit herself but most moral reason not to benefit herself. Thus, in examples such as Enrollment, we may view Josephine as (a) having more moral reason to enable Kelly's enrollment, since that results in the better outcome for others, but (b) most reason all-things-considered to enroll herself. By making logical space for agents to act on options that do not maximize goodness from an all-things-considered perspective, dual-ranking consequentialism looks especially promising in addressing the compulsory self-benefit objection. That said, this strategy faces difficulties on two fronts. First, dual-ranking act consequentialism analyzes options in terms of divergences between moral and nonmoral (or between moral and all-things-considered) agents' reasons. But we may wonder whether all instances of failure to self-benefit can be analyzed in this way. In Enrollment, Josephine may well face a situation in which her moral 19 Douglas Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 20 Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism, 94. 21 Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism, 118. 22 Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism, 40. 0004849990.INDD 265 6/4/2020 10:58:06 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD 266 Michael Cholbi reasons point one way and her nonmoral reasons another way. Perhaps, then, dual-ranking act consequentialism fares well in accounting for cases of nonoffsetting failures of self-benefit. But it appears shakier with respect to cases of pure failures of self-benefit, such as Igor in Evacuation. Again, we may be curious as to what Igor's reasons for not evacuating and so causing himself harm are. But his remaining being permissible does not seem to be a matter of his having more reason all-things-considered to remain in his apartment, reasons in comparison to which his moral reasons are comparatively modest. Only his good is at stake. It looks as if his moral and nonmoral reasons align here such that the permissibility of his not benefitting himself cannot be traced to any facts about how weighty those reasons are in relation to one another. More generally, dual-ranking act consequentialism, even when it logically implies permissible failures of self-benefit, may not provide the most parsimonious explanation of the option not to benefit oneself. Portmore dubs his dual-ranking consequentialism "common sense" inasmuch as it recognizes that moral reasons are not rationally decisive. But I doubt that "common-sense" reactions to cases of failure to self-benefit would judge them permissible because in such instances, an agent has no other act alternative available to her that "would produce an outcome that [the agent] has both more moral reason and more reason, all things considered, to want to obtain." As we noted in the previous section, Igor's failure to benefit himself is immune to moral criticism, most would say, because his not benefitting himself is his right, an option to which he is entitled because he is deciding about his own good instead of the good of others. Other moral agents do not so much judge his act as morally permissible in light of his reasons as they do prescind from judging his reasons at all. For like other competent moral agents, Igor's relationship to his good (and Josephine's to hers) is largely his business, and while he may sometimes be entitled to prioritize his good, he is no less entitled to deprioritize his good without reference to the first-order reasons that motivate his deprioritizing it. Dual-ranking act consequentialism errs, I suggest, in trying to account for options such as the permissibility not to benefit oneself by reference to agents' first-order reasons for action. It is probably correct to deny that moral reasons necessarily give agents decisive reasons for action and so exhaust the factors that determine acts' deontic status. But the permissibility of not acting on what there is most moral reason to do, including failing to benefit oneself, is explained more directly, simply, and elegantly in terms of our having a moral power or authority over ourselves rather than in terms of conflicts between two categories of reasons and the relative magnitudes of the reasons within those categories.23 In fairness, dual-ranking act consequentialism could incorporate the power to exclude one's own good from moral consideration by thinking of this as a second-order reason. Some of our reasons, after all, are reasons rooted in such powers (some moral philosophers would classify these as "reasons of autonomy," etc.). But introducing 23 See my "Agents, Patients, and Compulsory Self-benefit," section VII, for further details about the powers in question. 0004849990.INDD 266 6/4/2020 10:58:06 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD Must I Benefit Myself? 267 second-order reasons threatens to complicate an already complex account of moral permissibility. For the theory must then explain how first-order moral reasons, firstorder nonmoral reasons, and second-order moral reasons (which in turn shape the role first-order reasons play in determinations both of an agent's all-things-considered reasons and of moral permissibility) relate in such manner as to yield options when moral reasons and all-things-considered reasons diverge. It would be premature to claim that such relations cannot be plausibly elucidated, but some a priori skepticism about that project seems warranted. 6. Conclusion: Self, Other, and Directed Options Our discussion has canvassed some, but not all, of the possible consequentialist responses to the compulsory self-benefit objection that attempt to establish the permissibility of not benefitting ourselves. While these responses vary in their shortcomings, their struggles in addressing this objection help illuminate why the objection is troubling for consequentialism. At its heart, consequentialism stands opposed to actions having fundamentally directed deontic status.24 As debates about special obligations indicate, in claiming that our duties rest on bringing about particular outcomes, consequentialism struggles to account for how the performance of our duties can be owed to specific individuals or how failures of duty wrong them. After all, having a duty to a person is crucially different from having a duty to realize some state of affairs. The compulsory self-benefit objection shows that consequentialists similarly struggle to make sense of directed options: the permission not to benefit oneself is an option but not one that an agent has with respect to anyone beside herself; that is, she is not at liberty to assign others' good lesser significance in her moral deliberation. A consequentialist response to the compulsory self-benefit objection would therefore need to invoke some sort of asymmetry between oneself and others to make sense of it as an option. Moreover, as sections 4 and 5 illustrate, the wide breadth of the moral permissibility of not benefitting ourselves implies that consequentialist approaches that try to answer this objection by appealing to the strength of personal (or nonmoral) reasons misrepresent the nature of this permissibility. It rests not on some category of (first-order) reasons whose significance permits us not to benefit ourselves but on a seemingly more basic moral power or right to exclude, to whatever degree an individual sees fit, her good from the deliberative weighing of reasons. 24 See Marcus Hedahl, The Significance of a Duty's Direction," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7, no. 3: 1–29, for discussion of deontic directedness. 0004849990.INDD 267 6/4/2020 10:58:06 PM OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/04/2020, SPi Dictionary: NOAD 268 Michael Cholbi In sum, then, the compulsory self-benefit objection resists an easy consequentialist answer because it requires much more than simply making sense of nonmaximizing options. In resting on a directed option, it exerts pressure on consequentialists' commitment to impersonality, and in having a wide breadth, it exerts pressure on the fundamental consequentialist assumption that all and only outcomes of actions contribute to their deontic status. 0004849990.INDD 268 6/4/2020 10:58:06 PM

Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 1 Why Transparency Undermines Economy This is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Synthese. Abstract Alex Byrne (2005; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c and 2012) offers a novel interpretation of the idea that the mind is transparent to its possessor, and that one knows one's own mind by looking out at the world. This paper argues that his (2011c and 2012) attempts to extend this picture of self-knowledge force him to sacrifice the theoretical parsimony he presents as the primary virtue of his account. The paper concludes by discussing two general problems transparency accounts of self-knowledge must address.1 1. Introduction How do we know the contents of our own minds? One answer is that our own minds are transparent to us; we know simply by inquiring about the world (Evans 1982). I can treat the question 'Do I believe that p?' as equivalent to the question whether p, and by treating the two questions as equivalent, I am almost guaranteed to answer to the first question correctly. Alexander Byrne (2005 and 2011a) has argued for a particular elaboration of transparency, according to which we know our own minds through an inference rule. All of us (or at least all normal humans) reason according to the following principle: 1 Thanks to Colin Klein, Tristram McPherson, Jack Woods, and the two anonymous referees for discussion, criticism, and helpful advice. The research in this paper was substantially funded by a grant from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. LU342612). Ideas in this paper were partly developed while visiting The Australia National University, especially thanks to discussions on the problem of self-knowledge with Ryan Cox and Daniel Stoljar. Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 2 BEL: If p, then believe that you believe that p! Now this principle may seem dubious-I do not believe everything that is the case-but Byrne points out that using it is guaranteed to produce true conclusions anyway. My premises must be the propositions I believe. Byrne thus calls the principle "strongly selfverifying." Because the principle is strongly self-verifying, conclusions reached on its basis are justified; they count as knowledge. The problem is that transparency looks most plausible when we focus on one particular attitude, belief. A person's beliefs are her picture of what the world is like, and so it is reasonable that we could know them by asking ourselves what the world is like. But optical illusions can persist despite our better knowledge, and thus we cannot know how these illusions appear to us by asking ourselves how the world is-since the world visually appears to us other than the way that, as far as we are concerned, the world is. Intentions, for their part, seem to have the role of changing the world, rather than representing the way the world is (cf. Anscombe 1957; and Humberstone 1992) In his (2011c) Byrne offers an extension of this inferentialist account to knowledge of one's own intentions; and in his (2012), Byrne offers a similar extension for knowledge of one's own sensory experiences. If his arguments are successful, then his inferentialist version of transparency begins to look extremely credible as a general explanation of the possibility of self-knowledge. The primary virtue of his account is its theoretical simplicity. As he puts it: Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 3 ...[T]he transparency account is economical: it explains self-knowledge in terms of epistemic capacities and abilities that are needed for other subject matters. (2012: 207) In other words, this account explains how people can know their own mental states without positing any special capacities of self-knowledge (as in Lycan 1996), and without making self-knowledge radically discontinuous with other forms of knowledge (as in McGeer 1996; Moran 2001; Boyle 2011; and arguably Valaris 2014). At the same time, it does not make knowledge of one's mental states essentially third-personal, so that one infers what one thinks on the basis of one's behavior (cf. Carruthers 2013). It preserves, on the one hand, the idea that one's epistemic access to one's own mental states is privileged; at the same time, all that people need for this privileged knowledge is capacities for knowing the external world, plus inference rules. Byrne's account has been criticized on the grounds that those supposedly utilizing the inference rules would regard them as fallacious-anyone with enough sense to recognize her own fallibility does not think that it follows from the truth of p that she believes p-and this casts doubt on whether a person disposed to believe that she believes that p whenever she believes that p is engaged in a process rational enough to be regarded as genuine inference (cf. Boyle 2011; Moran 2012; and Shoemaker 2012; also see Valaris 2011). More recently, Lauren Ashwell (2013) has argued that Byrne's (2011b) account fails as an explanation of knowledge of one's own desires-and only succeeds if we supplement his theory with commitments that undermine its claim to theoretical economy. This paper continues the second line of argument with respect to his account of intention; in the case of perception, on the other hand, it argues that Byrne has already Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 4 taken on commitments incompatible with the goal of economy. Thus, while his attempts to extend the account to perception and intention are ingenious, they rob the account of any claim it might have to theoretical economy, the virtue that was supposed to draw us to inferentialism in the first place. These two objections will illustrate challenges for transparency-based accounts of self-knowledge more generally. 2. Knowledge of Perception How does Byrne's account apply to perception? We start with the assumption that the content of perception is propositional. I see that a chair is a few feet in front of me; I smell that coffee is brewing. Byrne makes a further claim about the content of perception: each perceptual mode takes for its content a special class of proposition, one appropriate to the modality. So the content of visual perception is a visual proposition (or v-proposition), whereas smell takes for its content olfactory propositions (or o-propositions), touch takes tactile propositions, and so on (2012: 197-201). Byrne only provides a detailed account of vision and its relation to vpropositions, though presumably the relation other senses bear to their respective contents will be analogous. For Byrne, propositions in general can be thought of as ways that the world can be. V-propositions, then, are ways that the world can be with respect to its visible objects and properties, whereas o-propositions are ways that the world can be with respect to objects and properties detectable through smell. It is important to emphasize that the propositions in both cases are not specifically visual or olfactory representations of how the world can be; rather, they are what visual or olfactory experience represents-they are the ways the world can be, specified with respect to those properties accessible to the relevant modality. Byrne is explicit that vision, for example, Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 5 represents "v-facts" (2012: 199-200).2 The theoretical importance of this commitment will become clear momentarily; for now it is enough to note that this is a standard commitment about the nature of propositions. The other distinguishing characteristic of v-propositions is complexity. A visual perception of a green leaf, or a silver spoon, or a yellow taxicab presents us with vastly more information about the hue, shade, and spatial relations among the visible parts of the object than we can express in language. A picture is worth a thousand words, and then some: ...[G]iving a theoretically satisfying characterization of v-facts is difficult. ...Complexity or informational richness is no doubt part of the story, but even in the case of viewing a very simple scene-say, a red spot against a grey background-it is unclear just how to proceed. Just concentrating on one feature of the spot, its hue, the predicate 'is red' (or even some made-up predicate like 'is red29') does not quite do it justice. The particular red hue of the spot might be a little yellowish, or alternately a little bluish... (2012: 199-200) If we think of propositions as sets of possible worlds, we can treat v-propositions as sets formed by partitioning possible worlds solely on the basis of visible differences. These visibility-based partitions must be more fine-grained, however, than the partitions that can be expressed in natural language, or than can be made in ordinary belief (visual beliefs will be dealt with in a moment). 2 "Vision, we may say, reveals the visual world: the world of v-facts. In the visual world things are colored, illuminated, moving, and so on, but not smelly or noisy" (2012: 200). Byrne goes on to add: "Vision is, at least in creatures like us, an exclusive conduit for v-facts" (ibid.). Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 6 While Byrne does not pursue this option, it's worth noting his v-propositions could be given a Fregean gloss as well (though a commitment to Fregeanism may sit poorly with his ultimate aim of theoretical economy).3 In this case, the distinguishing feature of such propositions is not that they are ways the world could be with respect to visible properties, but that they are ways the world could be under a visual mode of presentation (Chalmers 2006). On the former understanding of v-propositions, the visual experience that the taxicab is yellow and the belief that the taxicab is yellow have different contents, because the visual experience takes for its content a subset of the set of possibilities that make up the belief. On the latter understanding, the contents differ in roughly the same way that the contents of that belief that x is Hesperus and the belief that x is Phosphorus differ: the contents are composed of different senses (or something very similar to senses), even if they have a common referent. Either interpretation of v-propositions raises questions, though, about the relation of my seeing that the taxicab is yellow with my ordinary, assertible belief that the taxicab is yellow. While Byrne does not spell out the exact relation of v-propositions to other propositions, we can extrapolate the following from his above commitments along with other arguments he goes on to make. I will use pV to name visual propositions, whereas non-visual propositions will simply be identified as p. The v-proposition thetaxicab-is-yellowV entails the-taxicab-is-yellow. The first proposition will pick out some much more specific way that the taxicab is yellow and will presumably include additional visible properties of the taxi, such as the shape of the chassis. Thus, if that proposition is true, the non-visual proposition must be true as well.4 There is still a question of how the 3 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this, as well as noting the problem it might raise for the theory's parsimony. 4 These points will apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Fregean interpretation of v-propositions. Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 7 perception with the first proposition as content justifies one's belief in the second-but a number of answers are consistent with the picture sketched out here. With the v-proposition, Byrne can construct inference rules by means of which we know our visual experiences (2012: 199): SEE: If pV then believe that you see that pV! In other words, one takes the world to be some visibly accessible way of sufficient visible complexity, and concludes on that basis that one sees the world to be such a visibly accessible, complex way. Similar rules could be offered for the other sense modalities. With SEE in place, we can see why Byrne is committed to his various claims about v-propositions. Something must distinguish them from non-v-propositions, otherwise I will apply SEE to every proposition I believe, and so conclude that I see that Henry VIII had six wives. At the same time, Byrne's inferentialist account of selfknowledge is supposed to be a more precise way of capturing the idea that the mind is transparent, and that one knows one's mind by looking out at the world. This rules out identifying v-propositions with specifically visual ways of encoding information, or specifically visual ways of representing the world. Imagine this were not the case. Then, for any given proposition p which I held true, to know whether I should conclude that I see that p on its basis-that is, to know whether it could serve as a premise in SEE-I would first have to identify how I was representing p. But this would mean that application of the inference rule required prior identification of what sort of representational states I was in. Byrne thus identifies v-propositions a particular subclass, not of ways the world could be represented, but simply of the ways that it could be-in particular, ways that its visible properties and objects could be. Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 8 But I may have been blinded, yet believe that there is a brown cow standing in front of me thanks to a friend's report. If SEE told me to infer that I see a brown cow in such a situation, it would not be strongly self-verifying. Byrne's appeal to the complexity of visual propositions is meant to prevent such inferences. Restricted to these propositions, SEE, is a practically self-verifying principle: if an introspecting subject had access to "the-as-yet-unwritten-language of vision" application of SEE would result in false conclusions; but in all ordinary situations these inferences will generate truth (2012: 201). Byrne could likely offer a simpler solution to the difficulties listed above by endorsing the Fregean interpretation of v-propositions suggested earlier, though at some cost to the theory's advertised parsimony. But keep in mind that even with this Fregean account, the ban on treating v-propositions as visual representations would remain in effect, on pain of abandoning transparency altogether.5 3. The First Objection According to Byrne, if you see that pV, you must also believe that pV (2012: 205-6). This is required by the inferentialist picture. To conclude, on the basis of SEE, that I see that pV, I must accept the truth of the premise, pV, at least if my act of concluding is itself supposed to take the form of a belief. Believing the conclusion simply on the basis of, for example, entertaining the premise or desiring it would not be an inference, whatever it was. But if I accept the truth of pV, I believe pV. 6 5 Also on pain of abandoning Fregeanism about visual content; see, for example (Chalmers 2006: 172). 6 Note that this does not in any way contradict or presume to answer Valaris's (2011) objection to Byrne: that inference rules should work just as well in hypothetical or suppositional reasoning as in categorical reasoning. Presumably, Valaris would agree that if I am engaged in hypothetical reasoning, and so do not believe the premise, I need not believe the conclusion. The problem for Byrne which Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 9 A consequence of this is that if I know myself to be experiencing an optical illusion, I must have inconsistent beliefs (2012: 206). I see the Müller-Lyer lines and, being familiar with them, know them to be of equal length. But the illusion persists, so I also believe them to be of unequal length, or I believe a more complex v-proposition that entails that they are of unequal length. But there is nothing irrational about experiencing a persistent optical illusion. It's natural to think that the Fregean interpretation of v-propositions would help. After all, one of the great advantages of Fregeanism is that it explains simply how beliefs with incompatible truth-conditions (e.g., Hesperus is visible in the evening and Phosphorus is not visible in the evening) can be jointly held without irrationality. This does not help with the victim of a persistent optical illusion, however, at least not in those cases in which she herself regards the visual experience as illusory. Even if we grant a Fregean interpretation, the consciously illuded subject would be at best like the person who believes Hesperus is visible in the evening, believes Phosphorus is not visible in the evening, but also believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus; or she would be like someone who believes Phosphorus is not visible in the evening while simultaneously believing that belief of mine about Phosphorus is false. Byrne's commitment to the irrationality of consciously illuded subjects seems unavoidable. In response to this objection, Byrne writes: It will not do simply to claim that the illuded subject is not, or need not be, irrational. Taken as a claim about a rational ideal, its truth is not evident. Taken as an ordinary sort of remark, on the other hand, it is true but not in conflict with belief-dependence [of perception]. The belief that the subject knows to be false (e.g., a certain v-proposition that Valaris identifies is that if I assume for the sake of argument that it is raining, it does not seem that I need to assume for the sake of argument that I believe it is raining. Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 10 is true only if the lines are unequal) does not influence her verbal reports about the lengths of the lines, or any plans for action based on the lengths of the lines. She is not therefore 'irrational' in the practical sense of an ordinary accusation of irrationality. ... (2012: fn. 38) Byrne's position is thus that the subject of persistent optical illusion may be irrational in the strict sense, but we do not ordinarily think of her as so, because her belief in the relevant v-proposition is effectively partitioned off from the rest of her beliefs. How does this partitioning work? On the one hand, the belief survives the judgment that it is false. Byrne compares this with the modularity that delusional beliefs may enjoy-often surviving a person's recognition of their delusional status (2012: 206). At the same time, Byrne explicitly states that the belief in question will not be expressed in assertions or bring about intentions. Presumably the agent will also refrain from drawing inferences on its basis: since the v-proposition the agent believes contradicts another proposition she believes, application of standard inference rules would lead to explosion in her beliefs. Furthermore, the requirement that she not form intentions on the basis of the belief will only be met if she does not draw inferences on its basis (or those inferences are themselves partitioned). The partitioning, then, comes on both sides: the belief does not respond to its standard inputs, such as the belief that it is false, nor does it have any of the standard outputs: assertions, intentions, or further beliefs. One obvious and troubling consequence is that the belief does not seem to play the functional role of a belief. It is a very standard commitment, however, that a given attitude-type possesses its functional properties necessarily. (Note that this is weaker than functionalism about mental states; it does not claim that mental states are functional states, that they have their particular mental properties in virtue of their functional properties, or that functional properties are sufficient to determine mental properties-it Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 11 simply claims that some state is, for example, a belief only if it has the functional properties of a belief.)7 If Byrne wishes to avoid a highly revisionary ontology of mental states, then, he must think that the functional properties are masked rather than missing. Some evidence that this is his position is suggested by this argument in favor of identifying perceptual states with beliefs: ...[P]resumably some animals with visual systems very similar to ours (some other primates, say), cannot cognitively override visual illusions: in this sense, for them, seeing is always believing. Belief is thus built into their visual systems. And since we have basically the same visual systems, seeing is believing for us too. (2012: 205) Now the fact that certain primates cannot override the deliverances of their visual systems, whereas humans can, might suggest that those deliverances play different functional roles in the two kinds of psychologies. But Byrne's idea seems to be that perceptual states had the functional role of beliefs in distant evolutionary ancestors, and that this gives some reason to think that the appropriate functional properties are still latent in our perceptual states. Byrne can insist then that visual states have the functional properties of beliefs, holding only that these properties fail, for some reason, to manifest. He can insist that the relevant functions are masked rather than absent altogether. I don't wish to claim that this is an unreasonable position. What is objectionable, rather, is that no independent 7 The claim could even be further weakened: to be a belief a state must have most or enough of the functional properties of belief. The concern is that Byrne's perceptual beliefs have near to none. Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 12 justification for this interpretation rather than the rival has been provided-that is, he has not provided any independent reason why we should regard visual states in adult humans as possessing "belief-y" dispositions that are masked, as opposed to lacking the dispositions altogether. (His point that "we have basically the same visual systems" is a non-sequitur in this context; the question is whether those visual systems play the same functional role in our psychologies-and if we can cognitively override their deliverances, there is substantial reason to think not.) But this is to say that Byrne's account depends on a contentious metaphysical commitment, which one would have no reason otherwise to make, and that is exactly the sort of thing that makes theories uneconomical. This leads to the basic problem with Byrne's account: the proposed partitioning of the belief is extraordinarily ad hoc, especially in its details. To begin with, Byrne has proposed the existence of a belief that does not go away even after its possessor judges it false, simply because that is what his theory demands. There is no independent reason to accept the presence of such beliefs. The belief must also be partitioned, so that its possessor does not assert, intend, or infer on its basis. But again, the only reason to accept such a partitioning is to answer evidence that appears to disconfirm the theory- namely, that people do not act or reason as though they had such beliefs. This is already objectionably ad hoc. There is also the question of why such extensive partitioning does not undermine the state's status as a belief. Byrne is correct that partitioning may merely mask the relevant functional properties rather than eliminating them. But to go further and say that this is so is to insist on a particular thesis about the metaphysics of dispositions and functional properties in the absence of any argument in its favor-other than that is what inferentialism demands. Even more striking, however, is that the partitioning is not absolute. There will be one exception to the general walling-off of the illusional-belief with respect to inferences: the illuded subject will still apply inference Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 13 rule SEE to it. In other words, the one exception to this general partitioning is, by remarkable coincidence, the one required for the theory of self-knowledge to work in the first place. Even more remarkably, this pattern will be repeated, with the exact appropriate exemption, for the beliefs of every sense modality.8 The main case Byrne offers in favor of his inferentialist account of selfknowledge is, as he puts, economy. But this economical epistemology is purchased through profligacy in the theory of mind: with ad hoc partitionings, further ad hoc exemptions to those same partitionings, and ad hoc commitments on the metaphysics of functional properties. So the theory has not really achieved any sort of theoretical economy. It has simply moved several important lines of its budget onto another theoretical ledger. 4. Intention A transparency-based account of knowledge of one's intentions must identify some fact about how the world is, from the agent's point of view, which indicates to the agent what it is that he or she intends. In the case of Byrne's inferentialist account, this means the relevant inference rule must specify the type of proposition that can serve as premise. 8 A referee wonders if Byrne's partitionings are really that ad hoc. After all, we know the visual system to be relatively encapsulated. Couldn't Byrne explain the specific partitioning of visual beliefs in terms of this general encapsulation of the visual system? Possibly, but this would still fail to address two of the key ways in which the account is ad hoc. First, why don't these partitionings undermine the state's status as a belief? If Byrne wishes to say that it still manifests enough of the functional properties to count as a belief, the burden is on him to state what these manifestations are, given his claim that the state "does not influence [the illuded subject's] verbal reports about the lengths of the lines, or any plans for action based on the lengths of the lines." On the other hand, if Byrne grants (as he seems to) that the manifestations are lacking, he must explain why we should regard the functional properties as present, but masked or otherwise latent, rather than absent altogether. To insist on masking without independent grounds is ad hoc. Second, he must offer some independent grounds why SEE would be an exception to the visual system's general encapsulation. At present, nothing has been offered, and the only justification seems to be that inferentialism requires that it is so. Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 14 One obvious answer is that I determine what I intend to do by looking out at the world and figuring out what I have most reason to do (cf. Moran 2001). This might lead us to an inference rule such as: OUGHT: If you ought to φ, believe that you intend to φ! But such a principle could not be self-verifying, since we can be akratic (2011c: 214). What's more, there will be situations in which the reasons are neutral between several options, but in situations such as these, we still know which of the several acceptable options is the one we actually intend (Way 2007). Consequently, Byrne rejects the idea that we know our intentions by knowing those normative facts that would justify the intended action. Instead, he argues that when a person intends to φ she also believes that she will φ. A person thus knows her intentions on the basis of her belief that she will perform the intended action (2011c: 215ff.). We need, then, a way to distinguish mere predictions about what one will do in the future from intentions. (I may predict that I will eat too much cake at the party because I always do, without intending to eat so much cake.) So Byrne restricts the application of the inference rule to those cases in which the prediction is not based on evidence. He writes: I know that I am going to fail the exam because I know that I am poorly prepared; I know that I will be wearing down my sneakers because I know that I will be wearing them when I run the marathon. That is, I know on the basis of evidence that I will fail the exam and wear down Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 15 my sneakers. However, as Anscombe points out, sometimes one's knowledge of what one will do is not arrived at by these familiar means. ... [T]hose present and future actions that can be known 'without observation' are those that one intends to perform: if I know without observation that I will fail the exam, I intend to fail the exam; if I know without observation that I will run in the marathon tomorrow, I intend to run in the marathon tomorrow. (2011c: 218) Byrne adds that Anscombe's phrase "knowledge without observation" is not strictly speaking accurate, and offers the replacement "knowledge not resting on evidence" (ibid.). So we know our intentions on the basis of our beliefs about what we will do in the future, along with the fact that these beliefs are not based on evidence. The actual inference rule offered by Byrne does not mention anything about evidence, however; this rule, which he calls the "bouletic schema," takes the following simple form: I will φ ____________ I intend to φ (2011c: 216) The restriction to cases in which belief in the premise is not based on evidence is presented in terms of conditions in which the bouletic schema is defeasible. Byrne writes: Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 16 "One will not reason in accord with the bouletic schema if one believes that one's belief that one will φ rests on good evidence that one will φ" (2011c: 218). Once again, Byrne argues this rule, given awareness of the defeating conditions, will be practically strongly self-verifying: Privileged access is explained because the bouletic schema is practically strongly self-verifying: for the most part, if one reasons in accord with the schema (and is mindful of defeating conditions, for instance the one just noted), then one will arrive at a true belief about one's intention. (2011c: 219) So we are now owed an account of how we are able to mind those defeating conditions. 5. The Second Objection I can have evidence that p and believe that p, and yet fail to believe that p on the basis of evidence. I may have good evidence that lowering taxes would reduce unemployment; but the actual basis of my belief may simply be my desire to pay less in taxes. Consequently, there are two ways of specifying Byrne's defeating condition. Byrne could hold that a person should refrain from reasoning according to the bouletic schema when she believes she has sufficient evidence for her belief that she will φ; or he could hold that a person should refrain from reasoning in according with the bouletic schema when she believes that her belief that she will φ is based on sufficient evidence that she will φ. Consider the first interpretation: the mere presence of sufficient evidence that I will φ makes the judgment that I intend to φ unwarranted. But for most of the actions I Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 17 intend, I will have sufficient evidence that I will perform the action. Most of my actions are not akratic, however it may sometimes feel. So most of the time, if I intend to φ, I believe the reasons favor φ-ing. Since I know myself to be rational for the most part, if I believe that the reasons favor φ-ing, I must think there is good evidence that I will φ. What, after all, would a generally rational person do? Even if we agree not to count evidence on the basis of perceived reasons (for the sake of argument-the author has a hard time seeing any justification), inductive evidence often surrounds our intentions-we are predictable creatures. Two akratics could have the same evidence (the same track record of failure), and each could believe of himself that he will eat too much cake at the party (cf. Ashwell 2013: 253ff). But one could also know himself not to currently intend to eat so much, though he knows such an intention will form at some point after his arrival; whereas the other could know himself to be already akratically intending the impending gluttony. But if their evidence is the same, there must be some explanation why it defeats the inference in the first case but not the second. This takes us to the second interpretation, which would allow us to accommodate the two akratics and the other cases as well. But now if we are to be "mindful of the defeating conditions" we must know not only what we believe, but why we believe it. We must know that we have the belief because of that evidential support. But that requires we know, not only what our beliefs are, but, for example, what causal relations hold between our beliefs. Or, if one is unhappy with causal accounts of believing for a reason, we must know some other relation to hold between the beliefs: the counterfactuals under which we would and would not continue to hold the beliefs, or Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 18 which primitive relations of believing on the basis of hold among our beliefs. Whatever the precise relation, we are entitled to ask how we know that. Even independently of Byrne's story about intention, it seems to be part of common sense that people generally know not just what they believe, but why they believe it. Of course, in individual cases we might be self-deceived. But any theory of self-knowledge not aiming at significant revision should predict that we generally know not only our attitudes, but our reasons for holding the attitudes. We could know inferentially, but Byrne has not provided any inference rule that provides knowledge about the causal, counterfactual, or primitively evidential relations that hold between one's beliefs. BEL only leads to conclusions about what one's beliefs are, not how they interact with one another. There is, moreover, a general reason to think that there could not be such an inference rule, given Byrne's existing commitments. Such an inference rule would need to tell us which relations one's beliefs stand in to one another. But consider what the example of the two akratics shows us. Both akratics have beliefs with the same content. But despite identical content, those beliefs stand in different relations to one another: the first akratic believes he will eat too much cake on the basis of believed inductive evidence; the second believes the inductive evidence, and believes he intends to eat too much, but the second belief is held "not on the basis of evidence," at least if it is the type of Anscombean knowledge Byrne's account depends on. Byrne's inferentialist account of knowledge of intention unfortunately precludes any inferentialist account of knowledge of the relations of support among beliefs (and since on his account, knowledge of former depends on knowledge of latter, it cannot work). The simple fact an agent has some set of beliefs underdetermines which relations hold between them, even if we restrict ourselves to very ordinary cases. Sue, for Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 19 example, believes (1) All crows are black, (2) That bird is a crow and (3) That bird is black. But this tells us nothing about the evidential relations holding between those beliefs. She might have reasoned deductively-from (1) and (2) to (3). She might have reasoned inductively to (1), with (2) and (3) jointly forming an instance supporting the generalization. She might have reasoned abductively, concluding that that bird is a crow rather than sui generis black scavenger, in which case (1) and (3) form part of (2)'s support. Those relations that hold between contents-for example, that p and q jointly entail r- also underdetermine the relations that hold between the beliefs with those contents, for the simple reason that neither inductive nor abductive justification tracks entailment at all. But this means that one cannot reason from the relations between the contents to the relations of support among the beliefs: inductive and abductive reasoning don't track the relations among the contents. Nor can one reason from the presence of the attitudes themselves to their relations of support. In order to have inferentialist knowledge of the basis of one's belief, then, one would presumably need to infer from a combination of one's beliefs, and one's judgments about the evidential situation (where that presents itself at least as an objective feature of the world-in order to respect the transparency intuition).9 I will not canvass possible inference rules taking both one's beliefs and one's assessment of one's evidential situation as inputs-only note that they may get quite complicated in order to achieve self-verification. For my purposes it is enough to show that if Byrne is right, and there is the possibility of Anscombean knowledge "not on the basis of evidence," no such rule could be self-verifying, at least with respect to my beliefs about my own future actions. After all, that I have decisive evidence that I will φ doesn't tell me if I believe that I will φ because of that evidence or because of my intention (the two akratics showed us this). 9 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this. Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 20 So, given Byrne's commitments, knowledge of whether my belief is held on evidential grounds cannot be on the basis of an inference rule. So what is the basis? Perhaps we know on the basis of third-personal evidence. Remember, though, the question is whether I believe on the basis of evidence that I will φ. But what about my behavior, or past history, or generalizations about human nature would answer that question for me? It's hard to think of anything. It's very hard to think of anything that will be present in all of the cases in which, according to common sense, I know that I have an intention. But if it isn't inference rules, and it isn't third-personal forms of evidence, what could it be, except some uniquely introspective epistemic capacity? This would mean, though, that Byrne's account completely fails to explain "self-knowledge in terms of epistemic capacities and abilities that are needed for other subject matters." Could Byrne avoid difficulty here with a different inference rule-one that doesn't require the possibility of Anscombean knowledge if we're to mind defeaters? It's possible, but finding one will be tricky. (Ashwell 2013) suggests in passing that we could know our intentions on the basis of our desires, and goes on to offer an inferentialist account of knowledge of desires.10 But just as I sometimes must form an intention in cases where the reasons favor both options equally, I must sometimes form an intention when I am indifferent between my options. It seems I can know what I intend in these cases. An account of self-knowledge must be able to handle knowledge of those intentions that are to some degree arbitrary. 6. The Moral? 10 Ashwell also argues that this account is probably not economical in Byrne's sense. Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 21 So transparency can't be had for cheap. Admittedly, plenty of its advocates have found it compelling enough that they are willing to pay a high price. Richard Moran argues that the transparency of belief and other attitudes makes self-knowledge different in kind from other, philosophically more familiar forms of knowledge (2001 and 2012). In a recent paper, Markos Valaris argues that transparent self-knowledge is explained by a sui generis rational activity (2014: 10). Lauren Ashwell (2013) offers an inferentialist account of the transparency of desire which she frankly admits to be incompatible with considerations of economy. Of course, economy is a theoretical virtue-and if transparency accounts must give it up, that is a cost, even if it is compensated for elsewhere. In any case, there is a wider moral: Byrne's difficulties illustrate two general challenges transparency-based accounts must address. First, attitudes are not simply distinguished on the basis of their content, but also on the basis of how they relate (or relate the agent) to that content. To illustrate, a belief can have the same content as an intention (and so the bouletic schema risked confusing the two). What distinguishes the attitudes when their content is identical is how that content is presented: the belief as a way things are, the intention as an end or aim to be realized. The challenge for the transparency theorist is to explain how we come to know not just the content of our thoughts, but how our thoughts are related to that content, despite her commitment to the transparency of one of the relata. The obvious answer is that you come to know (either inferentially or in some other way) your mental states on the basis of the other relata, the content (cf. Ashwell 2013; and Valaris 2014).11 That may not be possible, however, with all of the relevant 11 Both Ashwell and Valaris argue, for example, that desires in some way present their objects as valuable, allowing us to know our desires by asking what is desireable. This seems to commit them to Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 22 states, as we saw in the case of intention-especially intentions in cases when we are indifferent and judge our options equally reasonable; these must be made arbitrarily, which seems to mean, when there is no distinguishing feature in their content. On the other hand, Byrne did distinguish perceptual states on the basis of content, by proposing categories of v-propositions and o-propositions and so on. Yet even with the special content, the account required multiple ad hoc stipulations to avoid incredible predictions. This points to a second, seemingly more difficult challenge. Perception relates to its content in a manner that does not commit the agent as belief does (cf. Schafer 2013). I can see the lines as unequal, without accepting that they are unequal; but if I believe them to be unequal, that just is accepting that they are unequal. Byrne simply denied that perception was non-committal: seeing was literally believing. This is counterintuitive, but given his commitment to transparency, wellmotivated. For as we said, in a transparency account, the obvious way we come to know the specific ways our mind relates to its content is on the basis of the content itself. But with non-committal states, the question is how I have access to the content, when I do not hold that content to be part of the world.12 Why aren't both relata transparent (or simply invisible)? A transparency-based inferentialist account of self-knowledge actually comes at the price of economy. It does so because of the difficulties of specifying, on the basis of those propositions to which the agent is committed, the variety of attitudes she may hold to that same content. Non-committing states create further problems for it: to explain a guise of the good position on motivation, and in the case of Ashwell, a version especially similar to that found in (Johnston 2001; and Oddie 2005; but also see Tenenbaum 2007; and Schafer 2013). For examples of recent criticisms of such views, see (Schroeder 2008; and Baker 2014). 12 (Valaris 2014: 15) suggests that this could perhaps be explained if perceptual states take nonpropositional content. The suggestion is intriguing, but it would need to be developed in more detail before its promise could be assessed; and we would need to know if this solution could be extended to other plausibly non-committal states, such as, say, imagining. Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 23 access to the content that provides knowledge of these states, it must make counterintuitive claims about commitment. Some other variety of transparency may be better able to solve these problems, but they are problems for which a solution must be given. Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 24 References Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957. Intention. Blackwell University Press. Ashwell, L. 2013. Deep, Dark... or Transparent: Knowing Our Desires. Philosophical Studies 165: 245-56. Baker, D. 2014. The Abductive Case for Humeanism over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire. The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8: 1-29. Boyle, M. 2011. Transparent Self-knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 85: 223-41. Byrne, A. 2005. Introspection. Philosophical Topics 33: 79-104. ________. 2011a. Knowing That I Am Thinking. In Self-Knowledge, ed. A. Hatzimoysis, 105-24. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ________. 2011b. Knowing What I Want. In Consciousness of the Self: New Essays, eds. J. Liu and J. Perry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ________. 2011c. Transparency, Belief, and Intention. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 85: 201-19. ________. 2012. Knowing What I See. In (Stoljar and Smithies 2012: 183-210). Carruthers, P. 2013. The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, D. 2006. The Representational Character of Experience. In The Future for Philosophy, ed. B. Leiter, 153-81. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Humberstone, L. 1992. Direction of Fit. Mind 101: 59-83. Johnston, M. 2001. The Authority of Affect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63: 181-214. Lycan, W.G. 1996. Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Why Transparency Undermines Economy Derek Baker 25 McGeer, V. 1996. Is 'Self-knowledge' an Empirical Problem? Renegotiating the Space of Philosophical Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 93: 483-515. Moran, R. 2001. Authority and Estrangement, Princeton: Princeton University Press. ________. 2012. Self-knowledge, 'Transparency', and the Forms of Activity. In (Stoljar and Smithies 2012: 211-38). Oddie, G. 2005. Value, Reality, and Desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schroeder. M. 2008. How Does the Good Appear to Us? Social Theory and Practice 34: 119-30. Schafer, K. 2013. Perception and the Rational Force of Desire. The Journal of Philosophy 110: 258-81. Shoemaker, S. 2012. Self-intimation and Higher-order Belief. In (Stoljar and Smithies 2012: 239-58). Stoljar, D., and D. Smithies. 2012. Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tenenbaum, S. 2007. Appearances of the Good: An Essay on Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Valaris, M. 2011. Transparency as Inference: a Reply to Byrne. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 111: 319-24. ________. 2014. Self-knowledge and the Phenomenology of Belief. Philosophers' Imprint 14(8): 1-17. Way, J. 2007. Self-knowledge and the Limits of Transparency. Analysis 67: 223-30.

Towards a Reference Terminology for Ontology Research and Development in the Biomedical Domain 1Barry Smith, Ph.D., 2Waclaw Kusnierczyk, M.D., 3Daniel Schober, Ph.D., 1Werner Ceusters, M.D. 1Center of Excellence in Bioinformatics and Life Sciences, Buffalo NY/USA 2Department of Computer Computer and Information Science, NTNU,Trondheim, Norway 3European Bioinformatics Institute (EMBL-EBI), Hinxton, Cambridge, UK Ontology is a burgeoning field, involving researchers from the computer science, philosophy, data and software engineering, logic, linguistics, and terminology domains. Many ontology-related terms with precise meanings in one of these domains have different meanings in others. Our purpose here is to initiate a path towards disambiguation of such terms. We draw primarily on the literature of biomedical informatics, not least because the problems caused by unclear or ambiguous use of terms have been there most thoroughly addressed. We advance a proposal resting on a distinction of three levels too often run together in biomedical ontology research: 1. the level of reality; 2. the level of cognitive representations of this reality; 3. the level of textual and graphical artifacts. We propose a reference terminology for ontology research and development that is designed to serve as common hub into which the several competing disciplinary terminologies can be mapped. We then justify our terminological choices through a critical treatment of the 'concept orientation' in biomedical terminology research. PREAMBLE Ever since the invention of the computer, scientists and engineers have been exploring ways of 'modeling' or 'representing' the entities about which machines are expected to reason. But what do 'modeling' and 'representing' mean? What is a 'conceptual model' or an 'information model' and how can they and their components be unambiguously described? Two questions here arise: To what do expressions such as 'concept', 'information', 'knowledge', etc. precisely refer? And what is it to 'model' or 'represent' such things? If information and knowledge themselves consist in representations, then what could an information representation or a knowledge representation be? There is, to say the least, some suspicion of redundancy here. As we have argued elsewhere, the term 'concept' is marked in a peculiarly conspicuous manner by problems in this regard.1 But the problem of multiple conflicting meanings arises also in regard to other terms, such as 'class', 'object', 'instance', 'individual', 'property', 'relation', etc., all of which have established, but unfortunately non-uniform, meanings in a range of different disciplines. Among philosophical ontologists, the term 'instance' means an individual (for example this particular dog Fido), which is an instance of a corresponding universal or kind (dog, mammal, etc.). In OWL, 'instance' means 'element' or 'member' of a class (where 'class' means 'general concept, category or classification ... that belongs to the class extension of owl:Class'2). Standardization agencies such as ISO, CEN and W3C have been of little help in engendering crossdisciplinary uniformity in the use of such terms, since their standards are themselves directed towards specific communities. Standardization efforts under the auspices of W3C or UML or Dublin Core, too, have not addressed these problems. For while OWLDL, for example, has a rigorously defined semantics,3 this does not by any means guarantee that an ontology formulated using OWL-DL is an error-free representation of its intended domain, and nor – until the day when the use of OWL or of some successor becomes uniform common practice – will it do anything to resolve the problems of semantic ambiguity adverted to in the above. In the domain of biomedical informatics a number of attempts have been made to resolve these problems4,5,6 in light of an increasing recognition that many ambitious terminological systems developed in this field are marked by unclarity over what, precisely, they have been designed to achieve. Are biomedical controlled vocabularies 'concept representations' or 'knowledge models'? And if they are either of these things, how, if at all, do they relate to the reality – the tumors, diseases, treatments, chemical interactions – on the side of the patient? OBJECTIVES AND METHODS The purpose of this communication is to initiate a process for resolving such problems by drawing on the best practices in ontology which are now beginning to take root through the efforts of KR-MED 2006 "Biomedical Ontology in Action" November 8, 2006, Baltimore, MD, CEUR, Vol. 222, 57-65 57 organizations such as the National Center for Biomedical Ontology,7 the Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Consortium,8 the OBO Foundry,9 and others.10 What is needed is a set of terms referring in unambiguous fashion to the different kinds of entities surveyed above, which can serve as common target for mappings from other disciplineand computational idiom-centric terminologies, thereby mediating efficient pairwise translations between these terminologies themselves. Our strategy is to advance precision via clear informal definitions rooted in what we assume are commonly accepted intuitions, providing references to associated formal treatments where possible. In selecting terms we have sometimes chosen expressions precisely because they have not been used by others and hence do not have established (and potentially conflicting) meanings. In other cases we have adapted existing terms to our purposes by providing them with more precise definitions or (in case of primitive terms) elucidations. These proposals are focused primarily on the ontology-related needs of natural science, including the clinical basic sciences, though we believe them to be of quite general applicability. We start out from a distinction of three levels of entities which have a role to play wherever ontologies are used: • Level 1: the objects, processes, qualities, states, etc. in reality (for example on the side of the patient); • Level 2: cognitive representations of this reality on the part of researchers and others; • Level 3: concretizations of these cognitive representations in (for example textual or graphical) representational artifacts. This tripartite distinction will awaken echoes of the Semantic Triangle of Ogden and Richards, to which we return in the sequel. For present purposes we note that the indispensability of Level 1 reflects the fact that even those who see themselves as building for example 'data models' in the domain of the life sciences are attempting to create thereby artifacts which stand in some representational relation to entities in the real world. Level 2 reflects the fact that a crucial role is played in ontology and terminology development by the cognitive representations of human subjects. Level 3 reflects the fact that cognitive representations can be shared, and serve scientific ends, only when they are made communicable in a form whereby they can also be subjected to criticism and correction, and also to implementation in software. Note that the three levels overlap; thus the textual and graphical artifacts distinguished in Level 3 are themselves objects on Level 1. Our talk of 'levels' should thus be interpreted by analogy with talk of 'levels of granularity': if we have apprehended all the liquid in a vessel, then in a sense we have thereby apprehended also all the molecules. Yet for scientific purposes molecules and liquids must be distinguished nonetheless, and the same applies, for the purposes of clarity in our thinking about ontologies, to the three levels delineated in the above. FOUNDATIONS Here we give precise definitions to a number of central terms, which will then be used in conformity thereto in the remainder of the paper. Really existing ontologies and related artifacts are typically constructed to realize a mixture of different sorts of ends (terminologies, for example, to support clinical record keeping and large-scale epidemiological studies, and to serve as controlled vocabularies for the expression of research results). Hence they typically combine the features of artifacts of different basic types. Our reference terminology is designed to reflect these basic types. Hence the definitions we propose for terms such as 'ontology' or 'class' do not imply any claim to the effect that everything called an 'ontology' or 'class' in the literature exhibits just the characteristics referred to in the definition.. An ENTITY is anything which exists, including objects, processes, qualities and states on all three levels (thus also including representations, models, beliefs, utterances, documents, observations, etc.) A REPRESENTATION is for example an idea, image, record, or description which refers to (is of or about), or is intended to refer to, some entity or entities external to the representation. Note that a representation (e.g. a description such as 'the cat over there on the mat') can be of or about a given entity even though it leaves out many aspects of its target. A COMPOSITE REPRESENTATION is a representation built out of constituent sub-representations as their parts, in the way in which paragraphs are built out of sentences and sentences out of words. The smallest constituent sub-representations are called REPRESENTATIONAL UNITS; examples are: icons, names, simple word forms, or the sorts of alphanumeric identifiers we might find in patient records. Note that many images are not composite representations since they are not built out of smallest representational units in the way in which molecules are built out of atoms. (Pixels are not representational units in the sense defined.) If we take the graph-theoretic concretization of the Gene Ontology11 as our example, then the representational units here are the nodes of the graph (taken to comprehend terms and unique IDs), which are intended to refer to corresponding entities in reality. But the composite representation refers, 58 through its graph structure, also to the relations between these entities, so that there is reference to entities in reality both at the level of single units and at the structural level.12 A COGNITIVE REPRESENTATION (Level 2) is a representation whose representational units are ideas, thoughts, or beliefs in the mind of some cognitive subject – for example a clinician engaged in applying theoretical (and practical) knowledge to the task of establishing a diagnosis. A REPRESENTATIONAL ARTIFACT (Level 3) is a representation that is fixed in some medium in such a way that it can serve to make the cognitive representations existing in the minds of separate subjects publicly accessible in some enduring fashion. Examples are: a text, a diagram, a map legend, a list, a clinical record, or a controlled vocabulary. Clearly such artifacts can serve to convey more or less adequately the underlying cognitive representations – and can be correspondingly more or less intuitive or understandable. Because representational artifacts such as SNOMED CT give textual form to cognitive representations which pre-exist them, some have taken this to mean that these artifacts are in fact made up of representations which refer to (are of or about) these cognitive representations (the 'concepts') from out of which the latter are held to be composed. We shall argue below that this reflects a deep confusion, and that the constituent units of representational artifacts developed for scientific purposes should more properly (and more straightforwardly) be seen as referring to the very same entities in reality – the diseases, patients, body parts, and so forth – to which the underlying cognitive representations of clinicians and others refer. Such artifacts are in this respect no different from scientific textbooks. They are windows on reality, designed to serve as a means by which representations of reality on the part of cognitive agents can be made available to other agents, both human and machine. A simple phrase, such as 'the cat over there on the mat', can be used to refer more or less successfully to what is, in reality, a portion of reality of a highly complex sort – and the same applies to all of the types of artifacts referred to above. The window on reality which each provides is, to be sure, in every case from a certain perspective and in such a way as to embody a certain granularity of focus. Yet the entities to which it refers are full-fledged entities in reality nonetheless – the very same, full-fledged entities in reality with which we are familiar also in other ways, for example because they provide us with food or companionship. REALITY The clinician is concerned first and foremost with PARTICULARS in reality (Level 1), (in the vernacular also called 'tokens' or 'individuals'), that is to say with individual patients, their lesions, diseases, and bodily reactions, divided into CONTINUANTS and OCCURRENTS.13 Some particulars, such as human beings, planets, ships, hurricanes, receive PROPER NAMES (they may also receive unique identifiers, such as social security numbers) which are used in representational artifacts of various sorts. But we can refer to particulars also by means of complex expressions – that man on the bench, this oophorectomy, this blood sample – involving GENERAL TERMS of different sorts, including: i. General terms such as 'apoptosis', 'fracture', 'cat', which represent structures or characteristics in reality which are exemplified – the very same structures or characteristics; over and over again – in an open-ended collection of particulars in arbitrarily disconnected regions of space and time. Consider for example the way in which a certain DNA structure is instantiated as a transcript (RNA-structure) over and over again in cells of our body. ii. General terms such as 'danger', 'gift', 'surprise', which draw together entities in reality which share common characteristics which are not intrinsic to the entities in question. iii. General terms such as 'Berliner', 'Paleolithic', which relate to specific collections of particulars tied to specific regions of space and time. General terms of the first sort refer to UNIVERSALS (in the vernacular also called 'types' or 'kinds'). A universal is something that is shared in common by all those particulars which are its INSTANCES. The universal itself then exists in Level 1 reality as a result of existing in its particular instances. When a clinician says 'A and B have the same disease', she is referring to the universal; when she says 'A's diabetes is more advanced than B's,' then she is referring to the respective instances. It is overwhelmingly universals which are the entities represented in scientific texts, and a good prima facie indication that a general term 'A' refers to a universal is that 'A' is used by scientists for purposes of classificiation and to make different sorts of law-like assertions about the individual instances of A with which they work in the lab or clinic. <universal, universal> nose part_of body <particular, particular> Mary's nose part_of Mary <particular, universal> Mary's nose instance_of nose Table 1 – Three Basic Sorts of Binary Relation Both particulars and universals stand to each other in various RELATIONS. Thus particulars stand to the corresponding universals in the relation of 59 INSTANTIATION. This and other binary relations (of parthood, adjacency, derivation) used in biomedical ontologies13 can be divided into groups as in Table 1, which uses Roman for particulars, bold type for relations involving particulars, and italics for universals and for relations between universals. A COLLECTION OF PARTICULARS (of molecules in John's body, of pieces of equipment in a certain operating theater, of operations performed in this theater over a given period of months) is a Level 1 particular comprehending other particulars as its MEMBERS.14 We note that confusion is spawned by the fact that we can use the very same general terms to refer both to universals and to collections of particulars. Consider: • HIV is an infectious retrovirus • HIV is spreading very rapidly through Asia A CLASS is a collection of all and only the particulars to which a given general term applies. Where the general term in question refers to a universal, then the corresponding class, called the EXTENSION of the universal (at a given time), comprehends all and only those particulars which as a matter of fact instantiate the corresponding universal (at that time). The totality of classes is wider than the totality of extensions of universals since it includes also DEFINED CLASSES, designated by terms like 'employee of Swedish bank', 'daughter of Finnish spy'. Languages like OWL are ideally suited to the formal treatment of such classes, and the popularity of OWL has encouraged the view that it is classes which are designated by the general terms in terminologies. (OWL classes are not, however, identical with classes in the usual set-theoretic sense on which we draw also here.) Some OWL classes (above all Thing and Nothing) are 'primitive' (which means: not defined), and these classes are sometimes asserted to constitute an OWL counterpart of universals ('natural kinds') in the sense here defined.15 Because OWL identifies the relation of instantiation with that of membership, however, it in effect identifies universals with their extensions. Through relations of greater and lesser generality both classes and universals are organized into trees, the former on the basis of the subclass relation, the latter on the basis of the is_a relation (whereby, again, in the OWL framework the two relations are identified). Because the instances of more specific universals are ipso facto also instances of the corresponding more general universals, the latter hierarchy is, when viewed extensionally, a proper part of the former. As we shall discuss further in our treatment of the argument from borderline cases below, it is difficult to draw a sharp line between terms designating universals and those designating defined classes. This does not mean, however, that the distinction is of no import. Indeed we believe that taking account of this distinction is indispensable to creating an path to improvement of ontologies.16 We use the term PORTION OF REALITY to comprehend both single universals and particulars and their more or less complex combinations. Some portions of reality – for example single organisms, planets – reflect autonomous joints of reality (that is, they would exist as separate entities even in a world denuded of cognitive subjects). Other portions of reality are products of fiat demarcations of one or other sort,17 as when we delineate a portion of reality by focusing on some specific granular level (of molecules, or molecular processes), or on some specific family of universals (for example when we view the human beings living in a given county in light of their patterns of alcohol consumption). A DOMAIN is a portion of reality that forms the subject-matter of a single science or technology or mode of study; for example the domain of proteomics, of radiology, of viral infections in mouse. Representational artifacts will standardly represent entities in domains delineated by level of granularity. Thus entities smaller than a given threshold value may be excluded from a domain because they are not salient to the associated scientific or clinical purposes.18 REPRESENTATIONAL ARTIFACTS In developing theories, biomedical researchers seek representations of the universals existing in their respective domain of reality. They first develop cognitive representations, which they then transform incrementally into representational artifacts of various sorts. In developing diagnoses, and in compiling such diagnoses into clinical records, clinicians seek a representation of salient particulars (diseases, disease processes, drug effects) on the side of their patients. Drawing on their theoretical understanding of the universals which these particulars instantiate (which in turn draws on prior representations formed in relation to earlier particulars19), they first develop a cognitive representation of what is taking place within a given collection of particulars in reality, which they then transform into representational artifacts such as clinical documents, entries in databases, and so forth, which may then foster more refined cognitive representations in the future. The mentioned representations are typically built up out of sub-representations each of which, in the best case, mirrors a corresponding salient portion of reality. The most simple representations ('blood! ') mirror universals or particulars taken singly; more complex representations – such as therapeutic schemas, diagnostic protocols, scientific texts, pathway diagrams – mirror more complex portions of 60 reality, their constituent sub-representations being joined together in ways designed to mirror salient relations on the side of reality. In the ideal case a representation would be such that all portions of reality salient to the purposes for which it was constructed would have exactly one corresponding unit in the representation, and every unit in the representation would correspond to exactly one salient portion of reality.19 Unfortunately, in a domain like biomedicine, ideal case will likely remain forever beyond our grasp. Researchers working on the level of universals may fall short by creating representations which either (i) fail to include general terms for universals which are salient to their domain, or (ii) include general terms which do not in fact denote any universals at all. Similarly, clinicians working on the level of particulars may fall short of the best case by creating misdiagnoses, either (i) by failing to acknowledge particulars which do exist and which are salient to the health of a given patient, or (ii) by using representational units assumed to refer to particulars where no such particulars exist. A TAXONOMY is a tree-form graph-theoretic representational artifact with nodes representing universals or classes and edges representing is_a or subset relations. An ONTOLOGY is a representational artifact, comprising a taxonomy as proper part, whose representational units are intended to designate some combination of universals, defined classes, and certain relations between them.13 A REALISM-BASED ONTOLOGY is built out of terms which are intended to refer exclusively to universals, and corresponds to that part of the content of a scientific theory that is captured by its constituent general terms and their interrelations. A TERMINOLOGY is a representational artifact consisting of representational units which are the general terms of some natural language used to refer to entities in some specific domain. An INVENTORY is a representational artifact built out of singular referring terms such as proper names or alphanumeric identifiers. Electronic Health Records (EHRs) incorporate inventories in this sense, including both terms denoting particulars ('patient #347', 'lung #420') and more complex expressions involving terms designating universals and defined classes ('the history of cancer in patient #347's family').20 In the best case, again, each of the representational artifacts listed above (ontologies, taxonomies, inventories) will be such that its representational units stand in a one-to-one correspondence with the salient entities in its domain. In practice, however, such artifacts can be classified on the basis of the various ways in which they fall short of this best case, in terms of properties such as correctness, degree of structural fit, degree of completeness and degree of redundancy.16,18 By exploiting such classifications we can measure the quality improvements made in successive versions, and also use such measures as a basis for further improvement.20 To make a representation interpretable by a computer, it must be published in a language with a formal semantics and so converted into a FORMALIZED REPRESENTATION. The choice of language will depend on the complexity of what one needs to express and on the sorts of reasoning one needs to perform. While OWL, for example, can cope well with defined classes, it may not have sufficient expressive power to meet the needs of ontologies in the life sciences domain. Thus it seems to be incapable, for example, of capturing the relations involved even in simple interactions among pluralities of continuants, or of capturing the changes which take place in such continuants (for example growth of a tumor) over time.21,22 Most inventories in the biomedical field (including most EHRs) have still exploited hardly at all the powers of formal reasoning. The paradigm of Referent Tracking represents an exception to this rule,20 since it involves precisely the embedding of a highly structured representation of particulars in a formalized representation of the corresponding universals. THE CONCEPT ORIENTATION We believe that ontologies, inventories and similar artifacts should consist exclusively of representational units which are intended to designate entities in Level 1 reality. Defenders of the concept orientation in medical terminology development have offered a series of arguments against this view, to the effect that such terminologies should include also (or exclusively) representational units referring to what are called 'concepts'.23 First, is what we can call the argument from intellectual modesty, which asserts that it is up to domain experts, and not to terminology developers, to answer for the truth of whatever theories the terminology is intended to mirror. Since domain experts themselves disagree, a terminology should embrace no claims as to what the world is like, but reflect, rather, the coagulate formed out of the concepts used by different experts. Against this, it can be pointed out that communities working on common domains in the medical as in other scientific fields in fact accept a massive and ever-growing body of consensus truths about the entities in these domains. Many of these truths are, admittedly, of a trivial sort (that mammals have hearts, that organisms are made of cells), but it is precisely such truths which form the core of science61 based ontologues. Where conflicts do arise in the course of scientific development, these are highly localized, and pertain to specific mechanisms, for example of drug action or disease development, which can serve as the targets of conflicting beliefs only because researchers share a huge body of presuppositions. We can think of no scenario under which it would make sense to postulate special entities called 'concepts' as the entities to which terms subject to scientific dispute would refer. For either, for any such term, the dispute is resolved in its favor, and then it is the corresponding level 1 entity that has served as its referent all along; or it is established that the term in question is non-designating, and then this term is no longer a candidate for inclusion in a terminology. We cannot solve the problem that we do not know, at some given stage of scientific inquiry, to which of these groups a given term belongs, by providing such terms instead with guaranteed referents called 'concepts'. It may, finally, be the case that it is not the disputed term itself which is at issue, but rather some more complex expression, as when we talk about 'G. E. Stahl's concept of phlogiston', but that the latter refers to some entity – a concept – in (psychological) reality is precisely not subject to scientific dispute. Sometimes the argument from intellectual modesty takes an extreme form, for example on the part of those for whom reality itself is seen as being somehow unknowable ('we can only ever know our own concepts'). Arguments along these lines are of course familiar from the history of philosophy. Stove provides the definitive refutation.24 Here we need note only that they run counter not just to the successes, but to the very existence, of science and technology as collaborative endeavors. Second, is the argument from creativity. Designer drugs are conceived, modeled, and described long before they are successfully synthesized, and the plans of pharmaceutical companies may contain putative references to the corresponding chemical universals long before there are instances in reality. But again: such descriptions and plans can be perfectly well apprehended even within terminologies and ontologies conceived as relating exclusively to what is real. Descriptions and plans do, after all, exist. On the other hand it would be an error to include in a scientific ontology of drugs terms referring to pharmaceutical products which do not yet (and may never) exist, solely on the basis of plans and descriptions. Rather, such terms should be included precisely at the point where the corresponding instances do indeed exist in reality, exactly in accordance with our proposals above. Third, is what we might call the argument from unicorns. Some of the terms needed in medical terminologies refer, it is held, to what does not exist. Some patients do, after all, believe that they are James Bond, or that they see unicorns. The realist approach is however perfectly well able to comprehend also phenomena such as these, even though it is restricted to the representation of what is real. For the beliefs and hallucinatory episodes in question are of course as real as are the persons who suffer (or enjoy) them. And certainly such beliefs and episodes may involve concepts (in the properly psychological sense of this term). But they are not about concepts, they do not have concepts as their targets – for they are intended by their subjects to be about entities in flesh-and-blood external reality. Fourth, is the argument from medical history. The history of medicine is a scientific pursuit; yet it involves use of terms such as 'diabolic possession' which, according to the best current science, do not refer to universals in reality. But again: the history of medicine has as its subject-domain precisely the beliefs, both true and false, of former generations (together with the practices, institutions, etc. associated therewith). Thus a term like 'diabolic possession' should be included in the ontology of this discipline in the first place as component part of terms designating corresponding classes of beliefs. In addition it may appear also as part of a term designating some fiat collection of those diseases from which the patients diagnosed as being possessed were in fact suffering. The evolution of our thinking about disease can then be understood in the same way that we deal with theory change in other parts of science, as a reordering of our beliefs about the ontological validity and salience of specific families of terms – and once again: concepts themselves play no role as referents.20,26 Fifth, is the argument from syndromes. The subject-matters of biology and medicine are, it is held, replete with entities which do not exist in reality but are rather convenient abstractions. A syndrome such as congestive heart failure, for example, is nothing more than a convenient abstraction, used for the convenience of physicians to collect together many disparate and unrelated diseases which have common final manifestations. Such abstractions are, it is held, mere concepts. According to the considerations on fiat demarcations advanced above, however, syndromes, pathways, genetic networks and similar phenomena are indeed fully real – though their reality is that of defined (fiat) classes rather than of universals. A similar response can be given also in regard to the many human-dependent delineations used in expressions like 'obesity' or 'hypertension' or 'abnormal curvature of spine'. These terms, too, refer to entities in reality, namely to defined classes which rest on fiat thresholds established by consensus among physicians. 62 Sixth is the argument from error. When erroneous entries are entered into a clinical record and interpreted as being about level 1 entities, then logical conflicts can arise. For Rector et al., this implies that the use of a meta-language should be made compulsory for all statements in the EHR, which should be, not about entities in reality, but rather about what are called 'findings'.25 Instead of p and not p, the record would contain entries like: McX observed p and O'W observed not p, so that logical contradiction is avoided. The terms in terminologies devised to serve such EHRs would then one and all refer not to diseases themselves, but rather to mere 'concepts' of diseases. This, however, blurs the distinction between entities in reality and associated findings, and opens the door to the inclusion in a terminology of problematic findings-related expressions such as SNOMED's 'absent nipple', 'absent leg', etc. Certainly clinicians need to record such findings. But then their findings are precisely that a leg is absent; not that a special kind of ('absent') leg is present. In the domain of scientific research we do not embargo entirely the making of object-language assertions simply because there might be, among the totality of such assertions, some which are erroneous. Rather, we rely on the normal workings of science as a collective, empirical endeavor to weed out error over time, providing facilities to quarantine erroneous entries and resolve logical conflicts as they are identified. We have argued elsewhere that these same devices can be applied also in the medical context.26 The argument for the move to the meta-level is sometimes buttressed by appeal to medico-legal considerations seen as requiring that the EHR be a record not of what exists but of clinicians' beliefs and actions. Yet the forensic purposes of an audit trail can equally well be served by an object-language record if we ensure that meta-data are associated with each entry identifying by whom the pertinent data were entered, at what time, and so forth. On the other side, moreover, even the move to meta-level assertions would not in fact solve the problems of error, logical contradiction and legal liability. For the very same problems arise not only when human beings are describing, on the objectlevel, fractures, or pulse rates, or symptoms of coughing or swelling, but also on the meta-level when they are describing what clinicians have heard, seen, thought and done. The latter, too, are subject to error, fraud, and disagreement in interpretation. Seventh is the argument from borderline cases. As we have already noted above, there is at any given stage no bright line between those general terms properly to be conceived as designating universals and those designating merely 'concepts' (or defined classes). Certainly there are, at any given stage in the development of science, clear cases on either side: 'electron' or 'cell', on the one hand, and 'fall on stairs or ladders in water transport NOS, occupant of small unpowered boat injured' (Read Codes) on the other. But there are also borderline cases such as 'alcoholic non-smoker with diabetes', or 'age-dependent yeast cell size increase', which call into question the very basis of the distinction. In response, we note first the general point, that arguments from the existence of borderline cases in general have very little force. For otherwise they would allow us to prove from the existence of people with borderline complements of hair that there is no such thing as baldness or hairiness. As to the specific problem of how to classify borderline expressions, this is a problem not for terminology, but rather for empirical science. For borderline terms of the sorts mentioned will, as an inevitable concomitant of scientific advance, be in any case subjected to a filtering process based on whether they are needed for purposes of (for example therapeutically) fruitful classifications, and thus for the expression of scientific laws. Science itself is thereby subject to constant update. A term taken to refer to a universal by one generation of scientists may be demoted to the level of nondesignating term ('phlogiston') by the next. This means also that representational artifacts of the sorts considered in the above, because they form an integral part of the practice of science, should themselves be subject to continual update in light of such advance. But again: we can think of no circumstance in which updating of the sort in question would signify that phlogiston is itself a concept, or that some expression was at one or other stage being used by scientists with the intention of referring to 'concepts' rather than to entities in reality. THE SEMIOTIC TRIANGLE Finally is what we might call the argument from multiple perspectives. Different patients, clinicians and biologists have their own perspectives on one and the same reality. To do justice to these differences, it is argued, we must hold that their respective representations point, not to this common reality, but rather to their different 'concepts' thereof. This argument has its roots in the work of Ogden and Richards, and specifically in their discussion of the so-called 'semiotic triangle', which is of importance not least because it embodies a view of meaning and reference that still plays a fateful role in the terminology standardization work of ISO.26 As Figure 1 makes clear, the triangle in fact refers not to 'concepts', but rather to what its authors call 'thought or reference',27 reflecting the fact that Ogden and Richards' account is rooted in a theory of psychological causality. When we experience a 63 certain object in association with a certain sign, then memory traces are laid down in our brains in virtue of which the mere appearance of the same sign in the future will, they hold, 'evoke' a 'thought or reference' directed towards this object through the reactivation of impressions stored in memory. The two solid edges of the triangle are intended to represent what are held to be causal relations of 'symbolization' (roughly: evocation), and 'reference' (roughly: perception or memory) on the part of a symbol-using subject. The dashed edge, in contrast, signifies that the relation between term and referent – the relation that is most important for the discussion of terminology – is merely 'imputed'. The background assumption here is that multiple perspectives are both ubiquitous and (at best) only locally and transiently resolvable. The meanings words have for you or me depend on our past experiences of uses of these words in different kinds of contexts. Ambiguity must be resolved anew (and a new 'imputed' relation of reference spawned) on each successive occasion of use. From this, Ogden and Richards infer that a symbolic representation can never refer directly to an object, but rather only indirectly, via a 'thought or reference' within the mind. It is a depsychologized version of this latter thesis which forms the basis of the concept orientation in contemporary terminology research. The terms in terminologies refer not to entities in reality, it is held, but rather to 'concepts' in a special 'realm'. The latter are not transparent mediators of reference; rather they are its targets, and the job of the terminologist is to callibrate his list of terms in relation not to reality but to this special 'realm of concepts'.26 The relation between terms in a terminology and the reality beyond becomes hereby obscured. Reality exists, if at all, only behind a conceptual veil – and hence familiar confusions according to which for example the concept of bacteria would cause an experimental model of disease, or the concept of vitamin would be 'essential in the diet of man'.28 'CONCEPTS' AND 'MODELS' How, then, should 'concept' be properly treated in the terminology literature henceforth? There are of course sensible uses of this term, for example in the literature of psychology. In the terminology literature, however, 'concept' has been used in such a bewildering variety of confused and confusing ways that we recommend that it be avoided altogether. It is tempting to suppose that, when considered extensionally, all of the mentioned alternative readings come down to one and the same thing, namely to an identification of 'concept' with what we have earlier called 'defined class'. If 'concept' could be used systematically in this way in terminological circles, then this would, indeed, constitute progress of sorts, though the question would then arise why 'defined class' itself should not be used instead. Unfortunately, however, the proposal in question stands in conflict with the fact that 'concept' is used by its adherents to comprehend also putative referents even for terms – such as 'surgical procedure not carried out because of patient's decision' – which do not designate defined classes because they designate nothing at all. Here again, we believe, a proper treatment would involve appeal to appropriate fiat classes, defined in terms of utterances, interrupted plans, expectations, etc. on the part of the subjects involved. What, now is to be said of terms such as 'concept model', 'knowledge representation', 'information model', and so forth referred to in our premble above? To the extent that concept-based terminological artifacts consist in representations not of the reality on the side of the patient but rather of the entities in some putative 'realm of concepts', the term 'concept model' may be justified. This term is indeed used by SNOMED CT in its own selfdescriptions, though given SNOMED's scientific goals, we believe that, on the basis of the arguments given above, it should be abandoned. Still more problematic is the term 'knowledge model' or 'knowledge representation' (GALEN). For in the absence of a reference to reality to serve as benchmark, what could motivate a distinction between knowledge and mere belief.19 And what, in the absence of a reference to reality, could motivate adding or deleting terms in successive versions of a terminology, if every term is in any case guaranteed a reference to its own specially tailored 'concept'. As to 'information model', here one standard uncertainty concerns the relation between an entity in reality and the body of information used to 'represent' this entity in some information system. Is it information which is being 'modeled' in an information model, or the reality which this information is about? The documentation of the HL7 Reference Information Model (RIM)29 adds extra layers of uncertainty by conceiving its principal formulas as referring to the acts in which entities are observed for Figure 1 – Ogden and Richards' Semiotic Triangle 64 example in a clinical context. Simultaneously, however, it conceives these formulas as referring also to the documentation of such acts for example in an information system. The apparent contradiction is to some degree resolved by the RIM on the basis of its assertion that there is in any case 'no distinction between an activity and its documentation'.30 CONCLUSION Drawing on our distinction of the three levels of reality, cognition and representational artifact we have sought to formulate an unambiguous terminology for describing ontologies and related artifacts. The proposed terminology allows us to characterize more precisely the sorts of things which go wrong when the distinction between these levels is ignored, or when one or other level is denied, so that the approach may also help in improving such artifacts in the future. Acknowledgements This work was supported by the Wolfgang Paul Program of the Humboldt Foundation, the Volkswagen Foundation, the European Union Semantic Mining Network, by BBSRC Grant BB/D524283/1, and by the NIH Roadmap Grant U54 HG004028. Thanks are due also to Jim Cimino, Chris Chute, Gunnar Klein, Alan Rector, Stefan Schulz, and Kent Spackman for fruitful discussions. References (URLs last accessed July 1, 2006) 1. Smith B. Beyond concepts, or: Ontology as reality representation, Formal Ontology in Information Systems (FOIS 2004), p. 73-84. 2. http://www.w3.org/2003/glossary. 3. Patel-Schneider PF, Hayes P, Horrocks I. OWL Web Ontology Language. 2004. http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-semantics. 4. Spackman KA, Reynoso G. Examining SNOMED from the perspective of formal ontological principles. Workshop on Formal Biomedical Knowledge Representation (KRMED 2004), p. 72-80. 5. Johansson I. Bioinformatics and biological reality. J Biomed Inform. 2006;39(3):274-87. 6 Klein GO, Smith B. Concept systems and ontologies. http://ontology.buffalo.edu/concepts /ConceptsandOntologies.pdf. 7. http://ncbo.us/. 8. http://obo.sourceforge.net/. 9. http://obofoundry.org/. 10. Rosse C, Mejino JL, Jr. A reference ontology for biomedical informatics: the Foundational Model of Anatomy. J Biomed Inform 2003;36:478-500. 11. http://geneontology.org/. 12. Wittgenstein L. 1921 Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus, London: Routledge, 1961. 13 Smith B, Ceusters W, Klagges B et al.. Relations in biomedical ontologies. Genome Biol, 2005;6(5):R46. 14. Bittner T, Donnelly M, Smith B. Individuals, universals, collections. Formal Ontology in Information Systems (FOIS 2004), p. 37-48. 15. Drummond N. Introduction to ontologies. http:// www.cs.man.ac.uk/~drummond/presentations/Int roductionToOWL50mins.ppt. 16. Ceusters W, Smith B. A realism-based approach to the versioning and evolution of biomedical ontologies. Proc AMIA Symp 2006, in press. 17. Smith B. Fiat objects. Topoi, 2001;20(2):131-48. 18. Bittner T, Smith B. A theory of granular partitions. Foundations of Geographic Information Science, London, 2003, p. 117-51 19. Smith B. From concepts to clinical reality, J Biomed Inform. 2006 Jun;39(3):288-98. 20. Ceusters W, Smith B. Strategies for referent tracking in Electronic Health Records. J Biomed Inform. 2006 Jun;39(3):362-78. 21. Bera P, Wand Y. Analyzing OWL using a philosophy-based ontology. Formal Ontology in Information Systems (FOIS 2004), p. 353-62. 22. Kazic T. Putting semantics into the semantic web: How well can it capture biology? Pac Symp Biocomputing 2006;11:140-51. 23 Cimino JJ. In defense of the desiderata. J Biomed Inform. 2006;39:299-306. 24. Franklin J. Stove's discovery of the worst argument in the world. Philosophy 2002;77:61524. www.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/worst.pdf. 25. Rector A, Nolan W, Kay S. Foundations for an electronic medical record. Methods Inf Med, 1991;30:179-86. 26. Smith B, Ceusters W, Temmerman R. Wüsteria, Stud Health Technol Inform. 2005;116:647-652. 27. Ogden CK, Richards IA. The Meaning of Meaning. 3rd ed. New York, 1930. 28. The UMLS Semantic Network. http://semantic network.nlm.nih.gov/. 29. HL7 V3 Reference Information Model: Version V 01-20. Normative Ballot 11/22/2005. 30. Smith B, Ceusters W. HL7 RIM: An incoherent standard, Proc MIE, 2006, p. 133-138

Forthcoming in Mind. Please refer to published version. 1 Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements ANNA-SARA MALMGREN ABSTRACT It is commonly held that our intuitive judgements about imaginary problem cases are justified a priori, if and when they are justified at all. In this paper I defend this view-'rationalism'- against a recent objection by Timothy Williamson. I argue that his objection fails on multiple grounds, but the reasons why it fails are instructive. Williamson argues from a claim about the semantics of intuitive judgements, to a claim about their psychological underpinnings, to the denial of rationalism. I argue that the psychological claim-that a capacity for mental simulation explains our intuitive judgements-does not, even if true, provide reasons to reject rationalism. (More generally, a simulation hypothesis, about any category of judgements, is very limited in its epistemological implications: it is pitched at a level of explanation that is insensitive to central epistemic distinctions.) I also argue that Williamson's semantic claim-that intuitive judgements are judgements of counterfactuals-is mistaken; rather, I propose, they are a certain kind of metaphysical possibility judgement. Several other competing proposals are also examined and criticized. I 1.1 Introduction What demarcates philosophy from other academic disciplines, specifically from (other) sciences? One striking difference is that in philosophy we typically do not subject our hypotheses and theories to empirical testing-somehow it is supposed to be sufficient to test a theory in thought. Where the chemist sets up a lab experiment and the sociologist conducts a survey, the philosopher sits back and runs a thought experiment.1 How could that be enough? Indeed, how could an experiment performed in thought tell us anything about the nature of knowledge, consciousness, time, moral value, or any of the other things that philosophers are interested in? To get clear on this, we first of all need a model of the relevant test procedure-the thought experiment, as used in philosophy. In brief outline, it has the following structure: the hypothesis or theory that is under evaluation states or entails some modal claim (typically a necessary biconditional or one-way implication) and in a thought experiment we check that modal claim against our intuitive verdict on an imaginary problem case. If the claim conflicts with our intuitive verdict, this is treated as strong evidence against the theory-indeed the theory may be abandoned as a result. We say that we found a counter-example to it. If not, that is treated as at least some evidence in support of the theory. We say that it accommodates our intuitions about the case. As familiar as this method is (the 'method of cases'), we still lack a good account of how it works-a good explanation of how, if at all, it provides the presumed evidence. In particular, we lack a plausible epistemology for our intuitive judgements about cases. The success of the method seems to depend on the epistemic status of these judgements: other things equal, the method cannot supply us with a justified and reliably true 'output' belief (i.e. a belief that the theory under evaluation is true/false) unless our intuitive judgements about the given problem case are 1 Thought experiments are used in other disciplines too, but there they have a much less central role (and arguably a different structure). In this paper I am exclusively concerned with 'philosophical' thought experiments. 2 both reliable and justified in turn.2 But there is no good explanation available of how they could be-of what, if anything, makes such judgements justified and what, if anything, makes them reliable. Take my intuitive judgement about one of Edmund Gettier's well-known problem cases-loosely put: the judgement that Smith has a justified true belief without knowledge (Gettier 1963); my intuitive judgement about one of Hilary Putnam's 'Twin-Earth cases'-loosely put: the judgement that Oscar1 and his Twin Earthian counterpart Oscar2 do not mean the same thing by 'water' (Putnam 1975); or my intuitive judgement about one of Judith Jarvis Thomson's 'Trolley cases'-loosely put: the judgement that George may not shove the fat man onto the track, even though doing so would bring down the death toll (Thomson 1973). In virtue of what are judgements like these justified, and how-by what mechanism-do they 'track' what goes on in the respective problem cases? Without good answers to these questions, our heavy reliance on intuitive judgements can come to seem like a mere matter of faith. This is especially problematic in light of the mounting sceptical literature on thought experiments.3 The focus on this paper is on the question of justification, indeed on a specific type of answer to it: that intuitive judgements are justified a priori-roughly, independently of experience-to the extent that they are justified at all. Let us call this view 'rationalism'. (But note that you can be a rationalist in this sense and still be a skeptic about the a priori.) It is clearly the received view among participants in the current debate: both proponents and critics of the method of cases tend to hold that intuitive judgements could not be empirically justified.4 Rationalism is also integral to a common conception of philosophical methodology-as distinctively a priori.5 And it is a view with a great deal of prima facie plausibility: it is very hard to see how empirical considerations could help me determine the question at issue in a thought experiment-say, whether Smith has a justified true belief without knowledge. What empirical evidence or grounds could I possibly have for passing one verdict rather than another on the given problem case? This question is particularly pressing on the assumption that intuitive judgements 'really' express claims of metaphysical necessity or possibility. (More on this shortly.) But the basic puzzle does not depend on that assumption-there just does not seem to be any empirical evidence at hand that could do the job, even if we take these judgements at face value. For one thing, it is highly 2 It is plausible that what goes for justification and reliability goes for knowledge too: that the method only supplies us with knowledge (that the target theory is true/false) if our intuitive judgements constitute knowledge in turn. But nothing here turns on this. Another issue on which nothing turns is whether belief is gradable. For convenience I mostly write in terms of outright belief (and outright justification) but the important points can all be restated in terms of partial belief. Last, nothing turns on the exact relationship between reliability and justification-I do distinguish the question what makes intuitive judgements justified from the question what makes them reliable, but I leave open that the answers to these questions may be closely related (or even coincide). 3 Just to mention a few contributions: Cummins 1998; Devitt 1994; Hintikka 1999; Kornblith 2002, 2005, 2006; Machery, Mallon, Nichols & Stich 2004; Stich 1988; Weinberg, Nichols & Stich 2001; Nichols, Stich & Weinberg 2003; Swain, Alexander & Weinberg 2008; Unger 1983, 2002. For some recent attempts at providing a non-skeptical epistemology for intuitive judgements, see Goldman 2007; Goldman & Pust 1998; Graham & Horgan 1998; Margolis & Laurence 2003; Weatherson 2003, and the first set of references in the next footnote. (I lack the space to criticize those attempts individually here.) 4 Rationalist proponents include Bealer 1998, 2000, 2002; Bonjour 1998; Jackson 1998; Pust 2000; Sosa 2007a, 2007b, 2009. Rationalist critics include Devitt 1994; Fodor 1989; Kornblith 2002, 2005, 2006. 5 The thought is this: 'the crucial contrast between philosophical methodology and scientific methodology lies in the nature and role of thought experiments. Not only do philosophers rely on thought experiments to a larger extent than scientists do, but the kind of thought experiment they use can deliver a priori knowledge, whereas the kind that scientists use can only deliver empirical knowledge.' This line of thought presupposes that the intuitive judgements that figure in philosophical thought experiments are capable of being a priori justified (since otherwise those experiments too would at best deliver empirical knowledge). 3 implausible that my visual or auditory perception of a description of the case is (or provides) even part of my justification for believing that Smith has a justified true belief without knowledge-at most the perceptual state enables me to access a justification. We could of course describe a route such that, if I were to take that route, I would end up with an empirically justified belief about the case-say, if I relied on good testimony, or on induction from past experience with relevantly similar problem cases. But for present purposes the route must also be available to me-qua thought experimental subject-and the testimonial and the inductive route are typically not (in fact we try to screen for them).6 The above consideration constitutes a strong prima facie case for rationalism. But it does not yet support non-sceptical rationalism: for all that has been said, intuitive judgements are never justified, a priori or otherwise. To my mind, the main challenge facing non-sceptical rationalism is to explain what it is (or what it would be) for intuitive judgements to be justified independently of experience: to give a positive account of the purported a priori justification. This, in turn, is an instance of a perfectly general challenge: to fully vindicate the claim that some category of judgements are capable of being a priori justified, we must explain what it is for such judgements to be a priori justified. (I do not attempt to meet this challenge here.) Second, a prima facie case is only prima facie-but a prima facie case stands in the absence of good reasons to the contrary. In this paper I defend rationalism against a recent objection, due to Timothy Williamson, that threatens to undermine the prima facie case. In the course of doing so, I discuss the formal structure of thought experiments in more detail; in particular, how to analyze intuitive judgements-what their 'real' content is. To give a brief preview of the issue: intuitive judgements (about imaginary problem cases) appear to commit us to the actual existence of certain objects and states of affairs that we do not believe to be actual. Hence-on pain of having all these judgements come out untrue-it seems we cannot take them at face value. But that is to say that we are not really asserting what we seem to be asserting when we utter a sentence like 'Smith has a justified true belief but does not know'. What, then, are we asserting (if indeed we are asserting anything)? Williamson defends a certain answer to this question-that we are asserting a certain subjunctive conditional-and uses that to argue against rationalism. I will question both his answer and the use he makes of it. But notice that the question is of interest quite apart from its implications, if any, for rationalism. The correct answer is likely to at least constrain the range of available accounts of what makes intuitive judgements reliable and justified. It is also crucial to understanding the role of such judgements in thought experiments: why their status matters to the status of the output beliefs. A promising initial thought is that they matter because the output belief is inferred from the intuitive judgement-the content of that judgement serves as a premise in an inference to the conclusion that the theory under evaluation is true/false. What could the content be, such that the judgement is able to confer justification on the output belief? (This is one among several distinct concerns that will guide my discussion of the 'content problem'.7) 6 If, say, it turned out that my judgement were based on someone else's testimony that would normally-and on the face of it rightly-be taken to invalidate the thought experiment. (Likewise for the envisaged inductively based belief.) 7 On an alternative approach, this problem is better described as an 'attitude problem': the challenge is to explain what we are really doing-not what we are really saying/what belief we are really expressing-when we utter 'Smith has a justified true belief but does not know'. (See e.g. Eagle 2007; Nichols 2004; Walton 1990; Yablo 2001.) Details aside, the key idea is that our 4 A final preliminary remark: I have set up the issue in terms of intuitive judgements, rather than intuitions. This is simply to avoid confusion, and to secure an uncontroversial starting point. The term 'intuition' is often used to denote a special type of mental state, a conscious representational state with a 'quasi-perceptual' phenomenology-a state not reducible to ordinary propositional attitudes such as belief (including occurrent belief, i.e. judgement). It is frequently argued, or just taken for granted, that states of this sort play a crucial role in the method of cases; that they are used as the primary evidence 'against which candidate philosophical theories are evaluated' (Pust 2000, p. 11).8 On that assumption, the natural way to frame the debate is to ask how, if at all, intuitions (thus conceived) could be evidence and what, if anything, makes them reliable. But this framework excludes too many options at the start: in effect, it excludes any non-skeptical account of the method of cases on which there are no intuitions, in the intended sense, and/or on which intuitions do not play the designated epistemic role. The present framework allows for a broader range of options-including accounts on which intuitions do play that role. Such accounts are best regarded as attempts to answer the justification and reliability question about intuitive judgements, not as part of some alternative approach on which these questions lack importance.9 A more complicated issue concerns how to demarcate the relevant class of judgements or beliefs. What counts as an intuitive judgement, for the purpose of this inquiry? On the face of it, we have five broad options: we can identify the intended judgements in terms of their propositional content, their causal antecedents, their epistemic ground, their role in the method of cases, or by reference to examples. The last option seems to me vastly preferable, given the desire for a neutral starting point-all the others are bound to be controversial, and to limit the theoretical possibilities too much in advance. For our purposes, then, an intuitive judgement is any judgement relevantly similar to certain paradigms or examples (where it is left open what exactly makes for relevance); for instance, my judgement about Gettier's Smith and my judgement about Oscar1 and his twin. 1.2 An argument against rationalism Williamson's argument is of particular interest because it seems to be an argument 'from on high'-an argument that rests on principled considerations against rationalism. (Contrast the strategy of assessing specific rationalist explanations one by one and arguing that none of them work.) It is an argument, then, that threatens to rule out any attempt to construe intuitive judgements as a priori. (At least, any 'theoretically interesting' attempt-see below.) That result would considerably simplify our discussion: it would rid us of the great majority of extant accounts of intuitive judgements, and it would provide us with some solid guidelines in our search for the correct account. intuitive 'judgement' is not a genuine judgement or belief at all, but some other cognitive attitude-one that does not carry the problematic existential commitments of a genuine belief (perhaps it is a pretendor a suppositional judgement). But I mention this approach just to set it aside-interesting as it may be, it raises some large and difficult issues that I lack the space to comment on here. (See e.g. Davies & Stone 1998, 2001; Nichols, Stich, Leslie & Klein 1996; Stich & Nichols 1998; Stanley 2001.) Moreover, it is hard to see how the choice between these two approaches (to the content/attitude-problem) could substantially affect the result of our overarching epistemological inquiry. For a related discussion, see Sect. III below. 8 Other people who take this approach include Bealer 1996, 2000; Kagan 2001; Sosa 2007a, 2007b. 9 To see this, consider what so-called 'intuitions' are most plausibly regarded as (direct) evidence for. Surely the only viable proposal is that an intuition that p is evidence that p. But on this understanding of the view, it is clear that it is just a candidate account of the epistemology of intuitive judgements: a candidate explanation of what makes such judgements justified and reliable. This also seems to be the best way to understand the view that beliefs about our intuitions-or about 'what we would say'-are the primary evidence (against which philosophical theories are evaluated). 5 Williamson's basic idea is that intuitive judgements are a certain kind of counterfactual judgements-judgements of certain counterfactuals. This is supposed to dispense with the need for a special causal-psychological explanation of intuitive judgements, but without a special causal-psychological explanation there is no way to sustain (any interesting form of) rationalism. More precisely, he argues that the content of an intuitive judgement is a certain counterfactual or subjunctive conditional (step 1). He writes as if this entails that our capacity to make intuitive judgements is just 'an application of our general cognitive capacity to handle counterfactuals' (2). That, in turn, is supposed to show that these judgements are not formed by means of any specialpurpose capacity or mechanism-e.g. a faculty of rational intuition (3). Some rationalists invoke such a faculty to explain how intuitive judgements are formed, and what makes them reliable and justified.10 Williamson's point is that the motivation for this move falls away once we accept that intuitive judgements are counterfactual judgements (albeit in disguise): there is no need to postulate a faculty of rational intuition-or any other special psychological machinery-to account for the existence and the epistemic status of intuitive judgements, since there is a perfectly ordinary cognitive capacity already in place to do the job: our general capacity to handle counterfactuals. Next, he argues that this general capacity is not 'exclusively a priori' (4), by which he just means that not every justified judgement that the capacity delivers is a priori justified. This should be uncontroversial-many, perhaps most, of our counterfactual judgements are not capable of being a priori justified (e.g. my judgement that if I had made the supper it would have been inedible). But he then goes on to argue that there is no principled way to single out even some such judgements as a priori-at any rate, there is no such way that 'cuts at the cognitive joints' (5). Last, he claims that any a priori/a posteriori distinction that fails to cuts at these joints is of little theoretical interest (6). Ergo: there is no (theoretically) interesting sense in which intuitive judgements are a priori (7).11 In summary: 1. Intuitive judgements are counterfactual judgements. [Premiss.] 2. The cognitive capacity by which intuitive judgements are formed is 'simply an application of our general cognitive capacity to handle counterfactuals'12 [From 1.] 3. Intuitive judgements are not formed by means of any special-purpose capacity or mechanism-e.g. a faculty of rational intuition. [From 2.] 4. Our general capacity to handle counterfactuals is not 'exclusively a priori'. [Premiss.] 10 See e.g. Gödel 1964, and-more recently-Bonjour 1998; Brown 1991; Eagle 2005; Katz 1998. 11 A qualification is in place: Williamson does not affirm that intuitive judgements are a posteriori either. The exact claim is that there is no principled (and theoretically interesting) way to draw an a priori/a posteriori distinction among our counterfactual judgements-and so perhaps he is better represented as saying that intuitive judgements are neither a priori nor a posteriori. (See, in particular, his 2007a, Sect. 3, and 2007b, Ch. 5. See also the discussion in sub-sect. 3.5 below.) But for our purposes this does not matter: I take it that, if intuitive judgements are neither a priori nor a posteriori, then they are not a priori. 12 Williamson 2005, p. 1. The other quoted phrases here are from the same paper. 6 5. There is no principled way to single out only some of the judgements this capacity delivers as a priori-at least there is no way that 'cuts at the cognitive joints'. [Premiss.] 6. Any surviving a priori/a posteriori distinction is of little theoretical interest. [Premiss.] 7. There is no interesting sense in which intuitive judgements are a priori. [From 3 – 6.]13 Unless specified, I will be working with a loose but standard notion of a priori justification-as justification that is suitably independent of the subject's perceptual experience.14 One might wonder what it takes for a notion of a priority to be of 'theoretical interest' (see step 6), but it would take us too far afield to discuss that here. And there is no pressing need to do so, since our main focus will be on the first three steps of the argument. More precisely, my agenda is this: in what remains of the first section, I clarify step 1, and explain the related problematic; then I argue that 1 is false-that intuitive judgements are not counterfactual judgements-and I go on to propose an alternative analysis. In section II, I defend that analysis against a number of objections and competing views (e.g. that they are metaphysical necessity judgements of a certain kind, and that they are fictional judgments). In section III, I return to Williamson's argument, and argue, on independent grounds, that there is no plausible reading of step 2 on which it supports 3: that we do not have a 'general capacity to handle counterfactuals' of the sort that is needed for the argument to go through. This objection also blocks a potential fallback manoeuvre-a structurally similar argument against rationalism that does not rely on the contentious step 1 (indeed, one that is compatible with the analysis that I propose). At the very end of the paper, I briefly discuss some of the considerations that Williamson gives in support of step 5. One upshot of that discussion is that the argument may not, after all, be an argument from on high. 1.3 The content problem As mentioned above, the viability of the method of cases seems to depend on the status of our intuitive judgements: the method only provides me with a justified output belief to the extent that my intuitive judgement is justified in turn; likewise for reliability. A natural explanation of this is that the method involves an inference-roughly, an inference from my intuitive verdict on the given problem case to the truth of the theory under evaluation (call this a 'positive' thought experiment) or to its falsity (a 'negative' experiment). It is time to consider in some detail what this inference might look like. Or rather-since positive and negative thought experiments require separate treatment, and we cannot do everything at once-to consider what the inference that is involved in a negative experiment might look like.15 Throughout I will work with a concrete example: a negative thought experiment of the sort originally designed by Gettier. In asking what this inference might look like, I am asking what form of argument the relevant piece of reasoning exemplifies (or perhaps, what form it best approximates). It may still be misleading to talk of one inference here-even once we bracket positive experiments. There may 13 This is my reconstruction of the argument-as it appears in Williamson 2005 and 2007a. The most recent version looks slightly different (see his 2007b, Ch. 5 – 6). But Williamson has agreed, in conversation, that my reconstruction captures the original version of the argument. And the bulk of my criticism applies to the present version too. 14 Nothing of importance to my arguments here hinges on how that notion is best precisified; e.g. on whether 'perceptual experience' should be taken to include introspection, conceptually rich conscious experience, or only sensory experience. 15 A positive experiment presumably involves an inference to the best explanation, but exactly what kind is a difficult question. 7 be no unique argument form in common to all negative thought experiments, or even to all tokens of the same such experiment. More cautiously, then, the aim is to capture an argument form that is common to at least a core set of negative experiments. (I treat this as understood in what follows.) That core set, in turn, only includes successful thought experiments-experiments that, other things equal, do provide the thought experimenter with a justified and reliably true output belief.16 The argument form of interest, then, is the argument form our reasoning exemplifies in so far as it results in a justified and reliably true belief that the theory under evaluation is false. Let the 'Gettier case' be a specific problem case, a case we might describe as follows: Suppose that Smith believes that Jones owns a Ford, on the basis of seeing Jones drive a Ford to work and remembering that Jones always drove a Ford in the past. From this, Smith infers that someone in his office owns a Ford. Suppose furthermore that someone in Smith's office does own a Ford-but it is not Jones, it is Brown. (Jones's Ford was stolen and Jones now drives a rented Ford.) Let the 'Gettier judgement' be the intuitive judgement that I (and many with me) would make about this case, if asked the appropriate question-a judgement that we might express by saying: 'Smith has a justified true belief, but does not know, that someone in his office owns a Ford.' And let the 'Gettier inference' be the inference by which we get from this judgement to the belief that the target theory-the theory that knowledge is justified true belief-is false. On standard ways of understanding that theory ('the JTB theory') it entails a metaphysical necessity claim: that, necessarily, a subject knows that p if and only if she has a justified true belief that p. As a result of Gettier's thought experiment, we somehow become justified in believing that this claim is false. But how? A first step towards an answer is to say that, by reflecting on the Gettier case, we become justified in believing that some particular person- namely Smith, the person featured in the case-has a justified true belief but does not know, and from this we can rationally infer that it is possible that someone does (which transparently contradicts the necessity claim). But of course, this is only a first step: the question of justification has simply been pushed back-it instantly reappears as the question how reflection on the case could justify us in believing that Smith has those properties. Furthermore, the suggested inference is only sound if the given problem case is actual, and arguably only warranttransferring if known to be actual,17 but the problem cases used in philosophy are usually hypothetical, and known to be so-including (let us suppose) our sample case. This is not to deny that an actual problem case would do just as well as-perhaps even better than -a merely possible case, when it comes to testing a philosophical theory: we could easily bring about an actual Gettier-style problem case, and our intuitive judgement about it would have at least as much weight as our judgement about the corresponding hypothetical case.18 But the problem cases that are used in philosophy are normally hypothetical-or at least not normally known to be actual. (We are, after all, talking about thought experiments.) This much is part of the data about the method of cases as currently practiced, hence it is something that we should aim to capture in our representation of it. (More on the significance of actual cases later on.) 16 So as not to beg the question against a sceptic, we might qualify this by saying that our concern is with successful experiments, if any. (This too will be treated as understood.) 17 Or at least: justifiably believed to be actual. (Nothing here hinges on the difference.) 18 As noted by Williamson; see his 2005, p. 15, and 2007b, p. 192. 8 It is highly implausible, then, that reflection on the case gives us justification to believe that some particular, actual person has a justified true belief but does not know; nor is it plausible that this is what we (unjustifiably) come to believe as a result of such reflection-we are not deluded about the hypothetical nature of the case; we know that the name 'Smith' has no actual referent. On the face of it, however, we are sincerely asserting something when we say 'Smith has a justified true belief but does not know'-but what? What is the ('real') content of our intuitive judgement?19 One line of response is that it is some kind of modal conditional-roughly speaking: that it is a generalization over some range of possible realizations of the Gettier case. What we 'really' judge is that, in any such realization, someone has a justified true belief but does not know. The proposal that Williamson attributes to his opponent-whom we might call the 'target rationalist'-falls into this category of responses (as does his own). The target rationalist identifies the content with a certain strict conditional-a generalization over all metaphysically possible realizations of the case, under a given description. That is, what we really judge is that, NECESSITY necessarily, anyone who stands to a proposition p as in the Gettier case (as described) has a justified true belief that p but does not know that p. From this alone we cannot rationally infer that the JTB theory is false. But given the additional premise that the case thus described could be realized-that it is possible that someone stand to p in the specified way-there is a straightforward entailment to the intended conclusion.20 It is worth emphasizing that NECESSITY is a claim about all subjects who stand to a proposition as in the Gettier case under a given description-all possible subjects who satisfy a standard or canonical description of the case. What does such a case description look like? For one thing, it contains a lot of concrete detail: that there is an office, with at least three office workers, that one of the office workers recently saw another drive a Ford to work, etc. But it leaves out many more-by no means does it specify a complete possible world or situation. Hence there may be many different (internally consistent) ways of 'filling out' the description. This will prove important soon. Second, it exhibits a certain neutrality-it does not specify that the subject does, or does not, know the relevant proposition; nor does it specify that she does, or does not, have a justified true belief in it. (But note that it does specify that she truly believes it.) 19 Perhaps there is even more at stake than the truth of the judgement: if that Smith has a justified true belief but does not know is an 'object-dependent' content, we cannot even think that content unless there exists a particular object for 'Smith' to refer to. (See, e.g., Evans 1982; McDowell 1977; Recanati 1993; Russell 1905.) Since there is a problem here in either case, I prefer to set it up in a way that does not rely on this account of the surface content. (But I leave open that it may be the correct account.) 20 On this view, then, the overall inference can be represented like this: K (x, p) x knows that p JTB (x, p) x has a justified true belief that p GC (x, p) x stands to p as in the Gettier case as described (a) ❒∀x∀p (GC (x, p)  (JTB (x, p) & ¬K (x, p))) (b) ◊ ∃x∃p GC (x, p) (c) ◊ ∃x∃p (JTB (x, p) & ¬K (x, p)) (d) ¬❒∀x∀p (K (x, p)  JTB (x, p)) 9 More generally, a canonical description of a problem case is neutral with respect to the distribution of the 'test properties'-the properties whose modal connection is at issue in the thought experiment: it does not explicitly stipulate that the test properties are or that they are not instantiated in the given case (nor does it stipulate anything that transparently entails that they are/are not instantiated). This is very rough, but it suffices for now. 1.4 Deviant realizations I Williamson argues that mere reflection on the Gettier case does not give us justification to believe anything as strong as NECESSITY, and, moreover, that NECESSITY is 'quite probably false.' As mentioned above, a standard case description is radically incomplete, and there may be ways of completing it on which the subject does not have a justified true belief without knowledge. In fact it is quite easy to complete it in some such ways-e.g. to describe a possible realization of the case in which the subject's true belief is not justified. Here is one such way: suppose that Smith has good reason to believe that he tends to hallucinate people driving Fords to work, and to believe that he tends to misremember what cars people drove in the past (and so on for any other piece of evidence that is specified in the given description). Other things equal, Smith's (prima facie) justification is here defeated-hence his belief is not a counter instance to the JTB theory.21 Williamson does not say so, but it is equally clear that the description can be completed in ways such that the subject does know the relevant proposition, namely by some other means or route- some route not specified in the description. For instance, suppose that Smith has independent testimonial justification (of a strength sufficient for knowledge) to believe that someone in his office owns a Ford. Suppose further that this justification is not in turn defeated and not itself 'Gettierized'-then Smith knows by testimony that someone in his office owns a Ford (and so, again, his belief is not a counter instance). These realizations are not ruled out by anything that is specified in a canonical description of the case. But then NECESSITY is false. For related reasons, it is hard to see how mere reflection on the case-under some such description-could give us justification to believe NECESSITY. Someone might object as follows: 'why is it a problem for the target rationalist that the judgement she ascribes to us is false and unjustified? Surely it is still an open question at this stage of the inquiry whether any given intuitive judgement is true and/or justified? Careful analysis of its content may reveal that it fails on both scores.' Let me reply on Williamson's behalf: as I understand it, the problem is not simply that the candidate content is false and/or unjustified-the problem is that it is too obviously false and unjustified. Our intuitive judgements may indeed be in poor epistemic shape, but it would be highly surprising if it turned out to be this easy to reveal that they are. Indeed, it would be surprising enough if it were this easy to show that the Gettier judgement alone was in poor shape-the usual presumption being that, if any intuitive judgement is in good standing, it is the Gettier judgement. But matters are worse, since parallel arguments are available for many other intuitive judgements.22 21 My example differs from Williamson's own, but the basic idea is the same. (See his 2005, p. 8; 2007b, p. 185.) 22 Take my intuitive judgement about a certain Trolley case (Thomson 1973)-a judgement that I might express by saying: 'George may not shove the fat man onto the track, even though doing so brings down the death toll.' It is consistent with everything that is stated in the given case description that, by shoving the fat man on to the track, George would cause a riot in 10 Next, the proposal under consideration is a psychological hypothesis about the content of our actual judgement, and as such it makes certain predictions that are not borne out. We simply do not behave as we would behave if the proposal were true. In particular, we do not take the possibility of the above realizations of the case to falsify our original intuitive judgement. And on the face of it, this reaction is appropriate-it is not just a result of stubbornness or a reluctance to admit mistakes. Rather, the reason why we do not retract or revise our original judgement is that the envisaged realizations do not agree with our (semantic) intuitions about what the case designer meant. (By 'case designer' I just mean whoever put together the case description. The case designer and the thought experimenter may of course coincide.) These realizations of the case are deviant, and they are easily recognizable as such. That is, the corresponding interpretations of the case description are clearly unintended-the description was not meant to be read in some such way-and we rightly ignore these interpretations when running the thought experiment. And when it is pointed out to us that it can be filled out in some such way, we do not retract our original intuitive judgement or start qualifying it (e.g. by adding 'what I should have said is that Jones does not know - provided that there is no other route to knowledge available to him').23 This suggests that NECESSITY fails to capture the intended generality of that judgement. Rather, Williamson argues, the intended generality is that of a certain counterfactual conditional-in terms of possible worlds, we are generalizing over all 'nearby' realizations of the case, under a given description. That is, what we really judge is that, COUNTERFACTUAL if someone were to stand to p as in the Gettier case (as described), then she would have a justified true belief that p but not know that p.24 1.5 Deviant realizations II To recapitulate, the current puzzle concerns the content of our intuitive judgements, as exemplified by the Gettier judgement. The discussion so far has been guided by the thought that the real content supports-or at least, that it can reasonably be taken to support-the negation of the necessary bi-conditional entailed by the JTB theory.25 The 'surface' content of our judgement-that Smith has a justified true belief but does not know that someone in his office which fifty people die. Or take my intuitive judgement about a certain Twin-Earth case (Putnam 1975)-a judgement that I might express by saying: 'Oscar1 and his physical duplicate Oscar2 do not refer to the same thing by 'water''. It is consistent with the given description that Oscar2 has been travelling slowly back and forth between Earth and Twin-Earth... (See Burge 1988, Boghossian 1989, on 'slow switching'.) 23 Suppose that someone did withdraw her judgement in the face of a clearly deviant realization of the sort outlined above. Other things equal, the natural explanation of this would be that she had not in fact understood the example. 24 Williamson formalizes this as follows: ∃x∃p GC (x, p) ❒ ∀x∀p (GC (x, p)  (JTB (x, p) & ¬K (x, p))). As he himself notes, it is debatable whether this is the right way to represent COUNTERFACTUAL; on the face of it, the string says something quite different-viz. that, if someone stood to a proposition as in the case as described, then anyone who stood that way to it would have a justified true belief without knowledge. But it is not obvious how to do better. This is an instance of a certain general technical problem in semantics-the problem of so-called 'donkey anaphora'. (See Geach 1962.) However, my objection to Williamson is independent of this problem: it concerns whether the counterfactual claim expressed by the relevant English sentence adequately represents the real content of our intuitive judgement in the first place. For my purposes, then, the informal statement of the proposal will do, and I will not discuss the problem of donkey anaphora any further. (Williamson discusses the problem in some detail in his 2007b. He also considers, but ultimately rejects, a couple of competing formalizations. See pp. 194 – 199 and Appendix 2.) For a content proposal similar to Williamson's, see Häggkvist 1996. 25 I am not assuming that the real content deductively entails that claim-alone or in conjunction with other available premises- although the surface content does in fact entail it, and the other two candidates entail it given the additional premise labelled (b) in note 20: ◊ ∃x∃p GC (x, p). The support relation could be weaker, e.g. it could be an inductive or abductive implication relation. (But note that if this turns out to be the case then the thought experiment has considerably less force than we typically assume.) 11 owns a Ford-would do the job, but the surface content commits us to an existential claim that we know to be false, or at any rate know that we lack justification for believing. And the problem is not the falsity or lack of warrant per se; it is that the falsity and lack of warrant are too easily detectable. This brings out a second guiding constraint-roughly, that our intuitive judgement should not come out obviously false or obviously unjustified. A good candidate content should at least be one that we could reasonably take to be true, and that we could reasonably take ourselves to have justification for believing. Third, an adequate content proposal should conform to our semantic intuitions about deviance-it should not count clearly deviant realizations of the given problem case as non-deviant, or conversely. The suggestion that the content of our judgement is 'just what it seems to be' fails on this score too. The proposal that Williamson attributes to his opponent is that the content is a certain strict conditional-NECESSITY. This proposal fails on similar grounds: it attributes a judgement to us that can too easily be seen to be false and unjustified, and it classifies some clearly deviant realizations of the case as non-deviant. His own view is that the content is the corresponding counterfactual-COUNTERFACTUAL. Just like NECESSITY, COUNTERFACTUAL alone does not provide sufficient grounds for rejecting the JTB theory, but together with the additional premise that the case thus described could be realized, it does (other things equal26). Thus COUNTERFACTUAL too satisfies the first constraint articulated above (what we might call the 'epistemic' constraint). But does it fare better than the competitors with respect to the second and third (the 'psychological') constraints? With respect to the second-yes; but, as we will see, not with respect to the third. Unlike NECESSITY, COUNTERFACTUAL cannot easily be shown to be false-in fact, it may for all we know be true. Moreover, we may well have justification to believe it. But it is easy to envisage (or even bring about) situations in which COUNTERFACTUAL is false, and/or we lack justification to believe it, but that nevertheless do not seem to falsify our original intuitive judgement-situations in which we would retain that judgement, and rightly so. Consider, for instance, how we would react to the discovery that the Gettier case is actually realized in the following way:27 my uncle Smith stands to the proposition that someone in his office owns a Ford in the exact way stipulated in the case description, but uncle Smith has good reasons to believe that he is prone to hallucinate people driving Fords to work and prone to misremember what cars people drove in the past (and so on). Other things equal, uncle Smith does not have a justified true belief without knowledge. But then COUNTERFACTUAL is false. However, on learning about uncle Smith's predicament, we would not retract or modify our original intuitive judgement. And just as before, this seems to be the appropriate reaction, since the envisaged (actual) realization of the case-'the uncle Smith realization'-is clearly deviant. It requires that we read the case description in a way we know it was not meant to be read. The fact that the realization is 'nearer' (in fact, as near as can be) does not help.28 26 That is, provided all additional requirements on the acquisition of justification by inference are satisfied. 27 The same point can be made using a non-actual but nearby realization of this sort, or a nearby-actual or non-actual- realization in which the subject knows the proposition in some other way (some way not stipulated in the case description). 28 It was recently brought to my attention (by an anonymous referee for this journal) that Ichikawa & Jarvis 2009 use similar cases to argue against Williamson. Their positive proposal is criticized in sub-sect. 2.5 below. 12 It is hard to see how Williamson could respond to this objection without losing an important part of his motivation for rejecting target rationalism. One option would be to deny that the uncle Smith realization is in fact deviant. But that does not seem viable. If the appeal to our semantic intuitions about deviance is problematic here, surely it is equally problematic when used against NECESSITY. That is not to say that it is never problematic. The point is just that there seems to be no relevant difference between the uncle Smith realization and the corresponding-more 'distant'-realizations of the case that only falsify NECESSITY (and not COUNTERFACTUAL). On the face of it, those realizations are on a par: they are equally deviant, and for the same reasons. Nevertheless, this is what Williamson replied when I first presented him with this objection,29 and it also seems to be his considered response. In his most recent writings on the topic, he briefly considers the possibility of an uncle Smith type scenario (i.e. a seemingly deviant but actual or nearby non-actual realization of the case), and he recognizes that we may not take our original intuitive judgement to be falsified by it. But he then goes on to argue that we would be wrong to so react: that realization would falsify our original judgement, and our failure to acknowledge this is just a symptom of a common character flaw: a general reluctance to admit mistakes.30 However, this move strikes me as completely ad hoc-it is ad hoc to diagnose our (expected) reaction to the uncle Smith type scenario in this way, but not allow the corresponding move to an advocate of the target proposal. Is it not just as plausible (or implausible) that our reaction to the more distant realizations that Williamson exploits against that proposal is erroneous? Note that I am not just arguing that, for all we know, Williamson's content proposal is mistaken since, for all we know, the actual or a nearby world contains a deviant realization of the Gettier case (and so, for all we know, COUNTERFACTUAL is false). The point is that, on Williamson's view, there could be no deviant but actual or nearby non-actual realizations. But that seems wrong: on the face of it, the uncle Smith realization is one such realization, and it is easy to come up with more. This, I submit, is already enough to refute the proposal. In his response, Williamson does not contest the possibility of uncle Smith type scenarios, only their deviance. But he does not explain away their apparent deviance. And it is very hard to see how to do that in a way that does not backfire. To reiterate: why think that we are poor judges of deviance when it comes to nearby realizations of the case, but reliable when it comes to more distant realizations? (If indeed there is an asymmetry here, one might expect it to be the other way round.) The above consideration seems to suggest that COUNTERFACTUAL is too strong; that the range of possible realizations it permits is too wide. In light of this, one might replace COUNTERFACTUAL with its mere possibility-the claim that it is possible that, if someone were to stand to a proposition as in the case as described, then she would have a justified true belief without knowledge.31 The embedded counterfactual would not be falsified by the uncle-Smith realization; 29 In conversation. 30 Thus he writes: 'Many philosophers have the common human characteristic of reluctance to admit to having been wrong. We should not distort our account of thought experiments in order to indulge that tendency' (Williamson 2007b, p. 201). 31 In symbols: ◊ (∃x∃p GC (x, p) ❒ ∀x∀p (GC (x, p)  (JTB (x, p) & ¬K (x, p)))). Williamson considers and rejects this candidate (ibid. Ch. 6) on the grounds that it only yields a good inference within the modal system S5, and that it is implausible to attribute a tacit commitment to S5 to the average thought experimenter; especially since there is another candidate available-viz. COUNTERFACTUAL-that does not require us to attribute that commitment to her. (This objection does not apply to my proposal.) 13 moreover, it is something that we plausibly believe, that we have justification to believe, and that (arguably) would yield a good inference. But this proposal seems like overkill, given that there is another, simpler possibility claim in the vicinity-one that it is also plausible that we believe, that we have justification to believe, that would not be falsified by the uncle Smith realization, and that yields a good inference, namely: POSSIBILITY it is possible that someone stands to p as in the Gettier case (as described) and that she has a justified true belief that p but does not know that p.32 I suggest that this is the real content of our judgement. If that is right, it looks like the Gettier inference has a very simple structure: other things equal, we can rationally infer that the JTB theory is false directly from the Gettier judgement.33 I will now defend this suggestion against some challenges and rival views. II 2.1 Implicit generality I First, it might be objected that POSSIBILITY is too specific. 'As competent thought experimenters, we typically realize right off the bat that many of the details that are included in a given case description are inessential-that we can abstract away from many of the stated facts, and 'import' certain unstated facts, without altering the distribution of the test properties. For instance, it is obvious that Smith's having a justified true belief without knowledge does not depend on Jones's driving a rented rather than a stolen Ford, or on Smith being male rather than female. We may not be able to distinguish all the inessential details from the essential ones, at least not right away, but we do know right away that not all the details matter equally. This suggests that the content of the Gettier judgement is not the highly specific claim that someone could stand to a proposition as in the case as described-be placed exactly as in the given case description, all picturesque details included-and have a justified true belief without knowledge. Our ability to abstract away from some of those details shows that we are committed to something more general. And there is an obvious alternative available: the claim that someone could have a justified true belief without knowledge. Besides, that claim is really all we need to get a good inference off the ground.' Note that there are two distinct complaints here: first, that the (competent) subject, who makes the Gettier judgement, typically realizes right away that she is responding to an instance of a general schema-that the Gettier case, as described, could be altered or 'filled out' in a number of ways, while calling for the same intuitive verdict. She realizes that things do not have to be exactly the way they are stipulated to be, for someone to have a justified true belief without knowledge. But-the objection goes-my content proposal cannot account for this, since POSSIBILITY specifically concerns situations where everything is exactly as stipulated (in the original case 32 We may represent POSSIBILITY as follows: ◊ ∃x∃p (GC (x, p) & JTB (x, p) & ¬K (x, p)). This transparently entails the intended conclusion: ¬❒∀x∀p (K (x, p)  JTB (x, p)). I take it that not any content with the same truth-conditions as POSSIBILITY counts as the same content, but, at least for our purposes, any content with the same logical form does. (The specific grammatical form is certainly not essential.) E.g. each of the following variants counts as the same content: that someone could be related to p as stated in the case description and fail to know that p, despite having a justified true belief that p; that it is possible for someone to stand to p as in the case as described, justifiably truly believe that p but lack knowledge that p; and (perhaps less obviously) that it is possible that someone who stands to p as in the case as described has a justified true belief that p but does not know that p. 33 A little more structure will be suggested in sub-sect. 2.3 below. 14 description). We might put this point by saying that the Gettier judgement has a certain implicit generality that POSSIBILITY fails to capture. The second complaint is that we do not need a premise as specific as POSSIBILITY to secure a good inference-a good inference to the conclusion that the JTB-theory is false. The first conjunct in the embedded clause is completely redundant. All we need is the claim that, POSSIBILITY* it is possible that someone has a justified true belief that p but does not know that p.34 Like POSSIBILITY, POSSIBILITY* transparently contradicts the modal claim entailed by the JTBtheory-thus it too secures a good inference; but, unlike POSSIBILITY, POSSIBILITY* does not introduce any redundant elements, and it captures the implicit generality of the Gettier judgement. (Or so it is argued.) However, not only is POSSIBILITY* an inadequate content proposal-both of the complaints that supposedly motivate it are confused. My reply to the first complaint is, in outline, that the implicit generality of the Gettier judgement can be explained in a way that is consistent with my content proposal. (For reasons that will emerge, the details of this reply are deferred until subsection 2.2.) My reply to the second complaint is that, granted, POSSIBILITY* is all we need to secure a good inference-but a good inference is not good enough. The present aim, recall, is not just to articulate a possible (rational) route to the rejection of the JTB theory (i.e. a so-called 'rational reconstruction' of the Gettier inference); the aim is to articulate our actual route-more precisely, a rational route from our actual intuitive judgement, one that is plausibly available to us. This, of course, is why the content problem matters in the first place: the real content of the Gettier judgement is a crucial premise in the argument that we are trying to spell out.35 Now, as we have seen, there are multiple pressures on candidate solutions to this problem: since the Gettier inference ostensibly embodies a good piece of reasoning, an adequate candidate should meet the epistemic constraint (in effect: it should secure a good inference) but, since it purports to paraphrase the content of our actual judgement, it should also satisfy the other two- the psychological-constraints that we identified in sub-section 1.6. And there may well be further requirements. The crucial question, then, is whether POSSIBILITY* fares as well as POSSIBILITY across the board. (If it does-but only then-perhaps the relative simplicity of POSSIBILITY* tips the balance in its favour.) At first sight it may look like it does: POSSIBILITY* does not fail at the point where NECESSITY or COUNTERFACTUAL fails-it is not obviously false or unjustified, and it does not seem to count any clearly deviant realizations of the Gettier case as non-deviant, or conversely. However, the list of constraints that we compiled above was not exhaustive. For one thing, we must add that an adequate content proposal should generalize in natural ways to intuitive judgements other than the Gettier judgement, and that it should not ride roughshod over our pre-theoretical classifications of those judgements-e.g. by failing to distinguish between intuitive judgements 34 In symbols: ◊ ∃x∃p (JTB (x, p) & ¬K (x, p)). I have encountered this proposal in conversation many times. 35 This, in turn, looks like the right way to proceed if the overall aim is to capture our 'doxastic' justification-our justification for believing that the JTB theory is false. (And that is certainly the appropriate aim if we take ourselves to know that the JTB theory is false, on the basis of Gettier's thought experiment, since doxastic justification is required for knowledge.) 15 that we firmly take to be distinct. But POSSIBILITY* does precisely that (on what looks like the only natural way to generalize the proposal). Simply put: it is hard to see how we could accept POSSIBILITY*-as an analysis of the Gettier judgement-without committing to giving exactly the same analysis of, for example, the intuitive judgement that might be expressed by saying: 'Jill has a justified true belief but does not know that the president has been assassinated', and of the judgement that might be expressed by saying 'Henry has a justified true belief but does not know that there is a barn in front of him.'36 But it is absurd to suppose that the Gettier judgement is the same judgement as-that it has the same content as-either of those judgements. Rather, I submit, the Gettier judgement does concern the highly specific situation stated in the given case description-it expresses the claim that someone could be situated exactly like that and have a justified true belief without knowledge. The corresponding judgement about a structurally similar problem case expresses a distinct possibility claim (of the same abstract form)-for instance, that someone named 'Jill' could read in the paper that the president has been assassinated, be unaware of all the misleading counter-evidence (etc.), and have a justified true belief but not know. 2.2 Implicit generality II Second, it might be objected that POSSIBILITY-indeed any possibility claim-is too weak. 'In effect, what POSSIBILITY says is that there is at least one possible way of satisfying the given case description such that it is a counter instance to the JTB theory. But surely we are committed to something stronger than that? As has already been noted, by the advocate of POSSIBILITY*, we are typically aware that the case description can be satisfied in a multitude of ways-many of which constitute counter instances. (Williamson has only shown that not all of them do.) We are also typically aware that the description can be altered in a number of ways and still yield counter instances. And, importantly, all it takes to realize this is reflection on one specific problem case, under one description. Furthermore, a failure to realize this-or at least, a failure to 'catch on'- is a rationality failure: it betrays some kind of inconsistency or misunderstanding on our part. (This point is overlooked by POSSIBILITY's advocate.) To clarify: by making the Gettier judgement, it seems that I incur a certain rational commitment-a commitment to making the same (or the corresponding) judgement in response to a wide range of possible variations of the original case description. If I make a contrasting judgement-if, say, I judge that the protagonist knows-when presented with a filled-out variation according to which s/he has two sons, I am being confused or inconsistent: there is a problematic discord between my earlier and later judgement. Likewise if I make a contrasting judgement in response to an otherwise identical description according to which, say, Jones now drives a stolen rather than a rented Ford. Now, the natural way to account for this-the natural diagnosis of my apparent rationality failure-is to say that I am here contradicting my original intuitive judgement (or that I am contradicting something that obviously follows from it). But then the real content of that judgement cannot be a mere possibility claim, such as POSSIBILITY (or POSSIBILITY*, for that matter): the possibility claim is perfectly compatible with it being the case that a realization in which the protagonist has two sons is one where s/he knows. Presumably, the content of the judgement is after all some kind of strong modal conditional-most plausibly, it is a suitably restricted necessity claim.' 36 See Harman 1968; Ginet 1975; Goldman 1976. 16 There are different ways to elaborate on this suggestion, but the basic thought is just to weaken NECESSITY by restricting the scope of the necessity operator to some specific subset of possible worlds that satisfy the given case description. (Or better: that satisfy the given description or some slight variant of it-a qualification along these lines is needed to get the right generality. This introduces some additional complications, but we can ignore those here.37) Let us use 'the intended Gettier case' as a placeholder name for that subset of worlds. We can then express the suggestion by saying that the content of the Gettier judgement is the claim that, NECESSITY* necessarily, anyone who stands to a proposition p as in the intended Gettier case has a justified true belief that p but does not know that p.38 Add the premise that the intended case could be realized, and once again we have a good inference. Thus NECESSITY* too meets the epistemic constraint. It also seems to avoid the problems that fault NECESSITY and COUNTERFACTUAL: since the modal operator in NECESSITY* only ranges over the intended (as opposed to all possible, or all nearby) realizations of the case, NECESSITY* is not obviously false or unjustified, and it respects our semantic intuitions about deviance. Last, it looks like NECESSITY*-unlike POSSIBILITY*-has the resources to individuate our intuitive judgements in way that lines up with our pre-theoretical classifications of them. On the face of it, then, NECESSITY* is a good bet-perhaps our best bet, if we wish to maintain that the content of our judgement is a necessity claim, in light of Williamson's objection.39 But it is doubtful that the proposal can be made to work. First, NECESSITY* needs to be spelled out in more detail-in particular, the placeholder ('the intended case') must be eliminated-and this turns out to be extremely difficult. Second, just like with POSSIBILITY*, the complaint that is supposed to motivate the proposal does no such thing: the phenomenon that NECESSITY* is invoked to explain can be explained in a way that is compatible with POSSIBILITY being the real content of our judgement-and there is independent reason to seek an alternative explanation, since that phenomenon also arises in situations where the kind of explanation that NECESSITY* provides is not even remotely plausible (see sub-section 2.3). Let us take these points in turn. As stated, NECESSITY* is way too schematic; we cannot properly evaluate it-in particular, we cannot adjudicate between NECESSITY* and POSSIBILITY-in the absence of more detail. We need to be provided with a more informative characterization of the set of worlds that makes up the intended Gettier case (i.e. the set that the modal operator in NECESSITY* ranges over)-a characterization that captures all and only non-deviant realizations of the Gettier case, but that 37 For one thing, note that there is a tension between achieving the right generality, and avoiding the problem facing POSSIBILITY*: of assimilating judgements that we pre-theoretically take to be distinct. To avoid that problem, the proposal had better not incorporate the qualification I suggest above-the relevant subset of worlds must only include worlds that satisfy the given description. (In what follows I will understand the proposal in this way.) 38 We can introduce a symbol for the intended Gettier case-'IC'-and represent NECESSITY* thus: ❒∀x∀p (IC (x, p)  (JTB (x, p) & ¬K (x, p))). But it is best to think of NECESSITY* as template for a content proposal, and we can expect substantial variation (in the content and truth conditions) of specific proposals that fit the template. See more below. 39 It may even be what the actual rationalists to whom Williamson is reacting had in mind all along-the actual rationalists who maintain that the content of our judgement (and/or 'intuition') is a necessity claim. The exegetical question is complicated by the fact that those rationalists rarely express their view on the matter very rigorously. (At least that goes for those rationalists who were writing prior to Williamson's work on the topic.) Here is Bealer: "when we have a rational intuition-say that if p then not not p-it presents itself as necessary: it does not seem to us that things could be otherwise; it must be that if p then not not p." (Bealer 1998, p. 207, p. 3; cf. his 2000.) More recently, D. Sosa has defended a content proposal that clearly fits the NECESSITY* template (D. Sosa 2006). See also Grundmann & Horvath, manuscript. 17 does not itself contain terms like 'deviance' and 'intended'. Moreover, the characterization had better not make NECESSITY* come out trivial, nor too rich-that is, as presupposing information that the thought experimenter could not yet possess. But it turns out to be very difficult to provide a characterization that meets these constraints. Below I offer my own best attempt. A natural starting point is to look at what specific, deviant realizations of the Gettier case have in common-presumably there is some shared non-trivial feature, or small set of such features, in virtue of which they are all deviant. (If Williamson were right, they would all be relatively 'distant' from the actual world, but as we have seen that is not so.) For brevity, let us refer to a realization of the Gettier case as a 'G-world'. The obvious thing to notice about the deviant Gworlds encountered above is that they are worlds where the featured subject knows the target proposition, and/or her (prima facie) justification to believe it is defeated. This may inspire the suggestion that deviance is a simple function of how things are with the relevant test properties: that the non-deviant G-worlds comprise (all and only) those worlds where someone stands to p as stipulated in the given case description, has no defeaters for her justification to believe that p and does not know that p. But although this may well be true, it is useless for present purposes. We do not have to run a thought experiment to realize that any such world is a world where the subject has a justified true belief that p and does not know that p (but that is what NECESSITY* comes to, on the suggested gloss). Recall that it is stipulated in the given case description that the subject truly believes that p. Conversely, if this were the content of the Gettier judgement, then those who reject that judgement would be seriously confused indeed.40 All the controversy ought to be over whether someone could stand to p as in the case as described, lack defeaters and still fail to know.41 Indeed, on this view, the Gettier judgement turns out to be epistemically idle-it plays no role at all in explaining how we are justified in believing that the JTB theory is false. A more careful look at the specific deviant G-worlds encountered so far reveals that they are not just worlds in which the subject knows or lacks defeaters: they are worlds in which she knows or lacks defeaters in virtue of some 'extraneous' fact-some fact not explicitly stipulated in the case description. Perhaps, then, the range of the modal operator (in NECESSITY*) is restricted to Gworlds that contain no such extraneous facts? But now this, in turn, must be precisified. Exactly what class of extraneous facts makes for deviance? It is tempting to take the phrase 'in virtue of' to express a strong modal dependency relation-e.g. a logical or metaphysical entailment relation. Thus, one way to precisify the above would be to say that the modal operator ranges over all and only G-worlds that contain no set S of extraneous facts, such that S is (logically/metaphysically) sufficient for the subject to know that p, or S is sufficient to defeat her justification to believe that p. But this cannot be right. Consider the first clause: that clause rules out some deviant G-worlds where the subject knows-namely those in which she has a back-up route to knowledge that is modally independent of the stipulated facts. But there are other, and on the face of it equally deviant, G-worlds where she knows because the stipulated facts have been 'enhanced' in certain ways-where she knows that p but would not have done so unless she stood 40 For instance, Pailthorp 1969 and Weatherson 2003. I owe this point to Patrick Greenough. 41 More precisely: over the claim that someone could stand to p as described, lack defeaters for her justification to believe that p and not know that p. A separate premise to this effect must replace (b) above (cf. note 20), lest the overall inference be invalid. (Of course, on my proposal all the controversy is over this claim, but since that claim is also the content of the Gettier judgement, the dialectic is not being misrepresented.) 18 to p as stated in the given case description.42 In light of this, one might modify the last suggestion by saying that the modal operator in NECESSITY* ranges over (all and only) those G-worlds that contain no set S of extraneous facts, such that S and the stipulated facts are jointly sufficient for the subject to know that p, or S and the stipulated facts are jointly sufficient to defeat her justification to believe that p. This rules out all deviant G-worlds that we have encountered so far (and any other that I can think of). But it is problematic for the same reason as the first suggestion mentioned above-it trivializes the Gettier judgement. Here is why: the stipulated facts alone are not sufficient to determine whether the featured subject knows, or whether she is justified-some extraneous facts are needed to settle the matter. (This, of course, is what Williamson exploits against the target rationalist.) The question is which such facts we may legitimately 'import', when we evaluate whether some particular possible world that satisfies the given case description is a counter instance to the JTB theory. The current suggestion is (in effect) that we may import anything except whatever facts, together with the stipulated facts, suffice for the subject to know or for her justification to be defeated. But, once again, that makes the whole exercise idle-we do not need to run a thought experiment to find out that any such world is one in which the subject has a justified true belief but does not know.43 To avoid trivializing the judgement, one might attempt to specify-in more informative terms- the relevant class of facts (i.e. those extraneous facts that, together with the stipulated facts, suffice for the subject to know, or for her justification to be defeated). However, even were that attempt to succeed, it is unclear how it would help. The trouble is that it is implausible that the thought experimenter has access to the needed specification-that she is able to have thoughts (and beliefs) about that class of facts, under a more revealing mode of presentation. It is certainly implausible that she has explicit propositional knowledge of what it takes, for the subject in the case to know the target proposition, or for her justification to be defeated. In so far as an informative specification of the relevant facts is available, accessing it requires a lot of theoretical work-witness the so-called 'post-Gettier industry' (cf. Shope 1983)-work that the thought experimenter cannot be presumed to have carried out prior to making the Gettier judgement. The present problem is reminiscent of a familiar problem pertaining to ceteris paribus laws: it is notoriously difficult to eliminate a ceteris paribus clause-to come up with a non-trivial specification of the intended 'exceptions' (i.e. the conditions under which the ceteris paribus law does not apply). Possible candidates either render the law trivial, or are too rich to plausibly be known by the subjects who subscribe to it-at least too rich to be known in advance of further (here: empirical) inquiry.44 It is not obvious that this problem cannot be solved or, if it cannot, that that shows ceteris paribus laws to be meaningless or vacuous. But it is certainly a problem worth taking seriously; likewise for the analogous problem that pertains to the NECESSITY* 42 For example: suppose that Brown knows that Smith believes that someone in the office owns a Ford on the basis of the false belief that Jones does. Suppose further that Brown also knows that Jones is about to reveal to Smith that he does not own a Ford, but that (for whatever reason) it is important to Brown that Smith keep believing that someone in the office owns a Ford. To ensure this, Brown tells Smith that someone in the office owns a Ford, and Smith thereby comes to know this by testimony. But he would not have come to know it unless he also stood to the proposition as stipulated in the original case description. 43 The same problem arises if we gloss 'in virtue of' as some kind of epistemic or conceptual entailment: here too, the suggested restriction trivializes the judgement. 44 For discussion, see Earman, Roberts & Smith 2002; Fodor 1991; Schiffer 1991; Strevens, manuscript; Woodward 2002. 19 proposal. At the very least, then, the burden of proof lies on the advocate of that proposal-she must show that the problem can be solved, or explain away its apparent significance. That burden is especially pressing, given that NECESSITY* does not seem to be particularly well motivated to begin with-the phenomenon that it is invoked to explain (as I have set things up) calls for a different explanation, one that is compatible with the POSSIBILITY proposal.45 2.3 The generality of reason-based judgements The phenomenon that needs to be explained is the 'implicit generality' of intuitive judgements. We have seen this to be a rather complex phenomenon. The competent thought experimenter typically realizes that there is a wide range of innocuous variations on the given case description: variations that merit the same (or the corresponding) intuitive judgement. And she can be expected to behave accordingly: she can be expected to respond in the same way-with the same intuitive judgement-to any specific variation in that range. But furthermore, there is a sense in which she should respond in the same way to any such variation. Her response to the original description (of, say, the Gettier case) seems to commit her to upholding a certain wider pattern in her intuitive judgements-it commits her to responding in the same way (whatever way that was) to a filled-out variation that stipulates that Smith has two sons, that he dislikes cabbage, or that he wears drag on Wednesdays. Likewise for a variation that features Brown in lieu of Smith-and so on. A failure to respond in the same way to any such variant constitutes a rationality failure. The NECESSITY* proposal diagnoses this rationality failure as the familiar type of rationality failure that we are guilty of when holding contradictory beliefs-when believing (e.g. judging) two or more contents that are logically inconsistent with one another. On this view, then, it is no mystery how a single intuitive judgement can incur a rational commitment to uphold a certain wider pattern in one's judgements: it does so just by having the particular content that it has (given our standing obligation to not hold contradictory beliefs). It is clear that this kind of explanation is not available on my account: POSSIBILITY does not contradict, say, the claim that someone could stand to p as in our sample case description, dislike cabbage, have a justified true belief that p and know that p. But that is a drawback only if the suggested explanation is indeed the natural (read: best) explanation of the commitment-and it is not. To see this, suppose that I encounter a known-to-be actual (non-deviant) Gettier-style problem case, and that I make an intuitive judgement about it, a judgement that I might express by saying 'Smith has a justified true belief, but does not know, that someone in his office owns a Ford'. There is no puzzle about the content of this judgement-the puzzle only arises when the problem case is non-actual. When the case is actual, and known to be so, we can take the judgement's surface content at face value. However, it looks like this judgement too-my intuitive judgement about the actual case-incurs a rational commitment (arguably the very same commitment that was described above). If I retract my original judgement, on finding out that Smith has two sons, or that he dislikes cabbage, then again, I betray some kind of inconsistency or confusion. Similarly if I make a contrasting judgement in response to an otherwise identical case that features Brown rather than Smith (etc.). But there should be no temptation to construe the content 45 The motivation that I offer here, on behalf of NECESSITY*, has to my knowledge not been put forward in print. But it is hard to see what else might motivate the suggestion that the content of our judgement is a necessity claim (of this or any other sort). And the motivation that I offer was recently explicitly endorsed, by Thomas Grundmann and Joachim Horvath, in a paper presented at a conference on Thought Experiments and The A Priori, at The University of Fortaleza in August 2009. 20 of my intuitive judgement about an actual problem case as a suitably restricted necessity claim along the lines of NECESSITY* (or as a modal or conditional claim of any other sort). We need a different explanation here-a different explanation of the apparent rational commitment-and if we can provide a different explanation here, why not apply that explanation across the board? I suggest that, in both cases, the commitment reveals something about the grounds, not the content, of the intuitive judgement. There is a certain generality to my grounds (or reasons) for judging that Smith has a justified true belief but does not know-whether, as it were, Smith is actual or hypothetical-and this generality of grounds rationally constrains my options when it comes to making certain other judgements. (This will shortly be spelled out in more detail.) There are many situations where an explanation of this sort is appropriate-even forced. Here is a straightforward example: suppose that a student in my seminar, Anna, puts her feet up the table and I judge that she should put them down. Other things equal, I can be expected to react in the same way to the next student who puts her feet up. (As before: not only is this a plausible prediction of my behaviour-it seems that I am somehow bound, by my original judgement, to react in the same way.) If I do not, then I betray some kind of inconsistency or confusion. But here too, there is no temptation to paraphrase the content of my original judgement as any kind of modal or conditional claim. The original judgement is just what it seems to be: it is a judgement about Anna. Correspondingly, there is no temptation to say that my subsequent judgement-my judgement that, say, Balder may keep his feet up-contradicts the first judgement. Rather, the natural explanation goes something like this: normally, the reasons for which an (overall reasonable) person would judge that a given student should put her feet down have a certain generality-perhaps they apply to everyone in the room, or at least to everyone in the room whose feet are dirty. What my divergent judgements betray is that I did not in fact base my original judgement on reasons of the presumed generality (even though, perhaps, I should have done so)-or I did, but I failed to see that those reasons applied to the next student too. A third possibility is that my reasons were defeated in some non-obvious way in the latter situation.46 Any which way, the tension between my two judgements reflects something about the reasons on which they are based-in no way does it suggest that my original judgement is not just about Anna (and my subsequent judgement not just about Balder). To be a little more precise: at least some of the reasons, on which each judgement is based, are presumably specific to the case at hand. For one thing, I would not-and I should not-have judged that Anna should take her feet down unless I took her to have put her feet up in the first place. On a very simple syllogistic model of my reasoning, it includes the minor premise that Anna put her feet on the table. But (if the case is normal) it also includes a major premise roughly to the effect that anyone who puts their feet up in my seminar-and, perhaps, meets some further specification-should take them down. Crude as this model may be, it arguably has the right basic structure: a judgement like this-at any rate a rational judgement like this-results from the application of a general principle or rule to a particular instance, an instance that falls under it 46 In the first and third case, the apparent rationality failure may not be genuine-at any rate it is not the kind of rationality failure that we are guilty of when failing to apply our reasons consistently. (But there are at least two other ways in which I may have done something wrong: I may have based my original judgement(s) on bad reasons-perhaps I relied on a principle that unfairly exempts my favourite student-or I may have based it on no reasons at all.) 21 (and/or is taken by the subject to fall under it).47 And 'if I do it once I should do it twice'-I should apply that principle or rule in any other circumstance that is relevantly similar to that in which I first it applied it-unless, of course, the new circumstance provides me with strong grounds for rejecting the principle or rule itself. This point is sometimes expressed by saying that reasons must be consistently applied; and, as the present example serves to illustrate, that requirement is not equivalent to our requirement to not believe logically inconsistent contents. Let me safeguard against another potential confusion: the judgement that Anna should do suchand-such is an overtly normative judgement, and this may invite the suggestion that the rational commitment that is exemplified here is just a commitment to respect a certain supervenience relation-viz. the supervenience of normative facts (or properties) on non-normative facts (or properties).48 But the normativity of the judgement is a red herring. Just suppose, instead, that Anna falls asleep in class, and I judge that she is bored; that Roger runs a five-minute mile, and Anna judges that he is fast; or that Sherlock Holmes finds blood on the butler's knife, and he judges that the butler did it. None of these judgements-that Anna is bored, that Roger is fast, and that the butler did it-are normative, but they all incur a commitment of the type that is at issue: a commitment to making the same (or the corresponding) judgement in any relevantly similar circumstances. Next, that commitment goes well beyond a commitment to respect supervenience-even in those cases where the judgement in question is normative. To say that the normative supervenes on the non-normative is, to a first approximation, to say that there could be no normative difference without a non-normative difference. All I have to do, then, to respect supervenience, is make the same normative judgement in any two circumstances that are alike in all non-normative respects. And that constraint need not be violated, for there to be a problematic discord between my two judgements, in the example where I judge that Anna should put her feet down, but that Balder may keep his up. The two sets of circumstances, that trigger the judgements, may differ in any number of non-normative respects (e.g. Balder is male and Anna female, they occupy different seats, and so on). But there is a problematic discord between my two judgements as long as the triggering circumstances do not differ in any relevant respects-normative or non-normative, as the case may be. In other words, since not any difference is a relevant difference, a commitment to respect supervenience cannot help explain what goes wrong, in a case like this.49 (Granted: a failure to respect supervenience is also a rationality failure, but it is a different rationality failure.) 47 I want to leave open whether this is the right model for all judgements (or judgement types), i.e. whether all rational beliefformation involves the application of general principles/rules. I also want to leave open whether-in the present example, and elsewhere-these principles/rules are best understood as prima facie reasons, or as ultima facie reasons. (This affects how we should think of their contents.) More generally, I want to leave open how the 'crude model' is to be refined. Some reject the model wholesale-viz. proponents of so-called 'particularism'; e.g. McDowell 1979; Dancy 2001, 2004. (Their focus tends to be on moral reasons, but many of their concerns generalize to practical reasons more generally, as well as to reasons for belief.) Note, however, that even the particularist owes us an account of our obligation to apply reasons consistently-one that does not simply reduce it to our obligation to avoid contradictory beliefs. To my mind, extant attempts at doing so (within the particularist framework) have not been successful, but I cannot argue this in detail here. (See e.g. Dancy, 2001, Ch. 5, Sect. 4.) And the most important point is that, since the particularist too must (and typically does) acknowledge that there is a distinctive requirement here-a consistency constraint, of some kind, on the application of reasons-the broad strategy that I adopt in this section may in principle be acceptable even to her. (For more on particularism, and relevant criticism, see e.g. Kaebnick 1999; Jackson, Pettit & Smith 2000; Väyrynen 2006. For other worries about the crude model, see Boghossian 2008.) 48 Thanks to the editor of this journal for pressing this point. 49 See Dancy 2004, pp. 85 – 9, for related discussion. 22 To sum up: my suggestion is that the rational commitment that an intuitive judgement seems to 'bring on' is fundamentally the same kind of commitment that is manifest in the above examples-a commitment that can be found in any reason-based activity (in the practical as well as in the epistemic domain). The nature of this commitment is by no means fully, or even particularly well, understood as yet. But it is a commitment that we are all familiar with. It is implicitly invoked anytime someone is called on to defend why she made a certain judgement (or performed a certain action) in a circumstance C1-given that C1 seems to match another circumstance C2 in all relevant respects, and that, in C2, she made a judgement (or performed an action) of a contrasting type. Of course, sometimes the right response to this challenge is that C2 and C2 are not relevantly similar after all-but the point is that, without a consistency requirement on the application of reasons, the challenge would never be well motivated in the first place. The suggested explanation is compatible with the POSSIBILITY proposal. And recall that it has the distinct advantage-over the explanation that NECESSITY* provides-of applying in the situation where the problem case is actual, as well as in the situation where the case is hypothetical. It is highly implausible that our intuitive judgement about the actual case is a disguised modal judgement; a better explanation, of the commitment it incurs, is that the judgement is based on reasons of a certain generality. But if that is the right thing to say here, when the problem case is actual, surely it is also the right thing to say when the case is hypothetical: my intuitive judgement about the hypothetical case is also based on reasons, reasons of a certain generality- presumably, at least in part, the very same reasons on which my judgement about the actual case is based. However, it is controversial to suggest that intuitive judgements are based on reasons-any reasons. One might even worry that this makes the explanation I have outlined a non-starter, since those judgements are supposed to play a foundational role in philosophical methodology.50 Now, it is not clear to me that that supposition is correct-that said, it is worth noting that the claim that intuitive judgements are reason-based is, at least in principle, compatible with the claim that they play a foundational role. The key feature, that makes a judgement or belief fit to play that role, is that it is non-inferentially justified (or non-inferential, for short)-roughly: that its justification does not rest on the justification of any of the subject's other beliefs. And it is possible for a judgement to be both non-inferential, and based on reasons, provided that not all reasons are themselves beliefs (or belief contents)-that is, provided that there are at least some 'nondoxastic' reasons.51 This principled compatibility would still only be of marginal interest, in the current context, if the kind of explanation of the rational commitment that I outlined above required a doxastic construal of reasons. But, at least on the face of it, it does not require that.52 50 Thanks to Paul Boghossian, and to an anonymous referee for this journal, for pressing this point. 51 For discussion, see e.g. Bonjour 1985; Pollock & Cruz 1999; Pryor 2005. 52 Consider the following case: I enter a brightly lit room, eyes wide open, and I judge that it looks bright in here. This judgement is a prima facie paradigm of a non-inferential judgement, but it too incurs a rational commitment (to making the same, or the corresponding, judgement in any relevantly similar circumstances) and once again, an explanation in terms of reasons, not content, seems to be in place. How, in outline, might the explanation go? Perhaps the best way to conceive of the general reason, that explains the commitment here, is as a rule that takes me from a certain type of visual experience to a certain belief about how things look. (Nothing here hinges on the exact formulation of the rule.) Of course, we also need a story of what makes that rule my ('operative') reason, and the story had better not require me to have a justified belief in the rule, which serves as a step in some suitable reasoning process. But a different story is arguably needed anyway-and not just for the case of perceptual belief. (For related discussion, see Boghossian 2008; Boghossian & Wright, manuscript; Pollock & Cruz, 1999, Ch. 5; Pryor 2005, Sect. 7.) 23 Second, it is in fact independently plausible-although not widely recognized-that intuitive judgements are based on reasons. The guiding thought here is just this: in making the Gettier judgement, we are (loosely put) attributing justified true belief without knowledge to a subject who stands to a proposition in a certain peculiar way-namely, the way that is specified in the given case description. Indeed, on reflection it seems clear that we are attributing those properties to her in part because we take her to stand to a proposition in that peculiar way. Unless we took her to be thus situated, we would not-and we should not-judge that she has a justified true belief but does not know. (Recall and compare the example above: my judgement about Anna.) Of course, since the problem case is hypothetical, there is no actually existing subject to whom we are attributing anything-all of the above must be paraphrased. But the present point can be appreciated independently of any particular solution to the content problem. (And the point applies equally to the situation where the case is actual, and no paraphrases are called for.)53 In brief: an intuitive judgement is always made in response to a specific case description, and it seems very plausible that the thought experimenter's exposure to that description has more than causal significance-specifically, that (some or all of) the information that is explicitly stipulated in that description constitutes a reason for her to make a certain intuitive judgement. (If what I argued above is correct, then the stipulated information at best constitutes some or part of her overall reason(s), but that is all one would expect.) There is obviously much more to be said on this issue, but that is a task for another occasion.54 For now, let it suffice that it is by no means obvious that intuitive judgements are not based on reasons. In fact, it strikes me as a plausible working hypothesis that they are. 2.4 Just another fiction? The next rival content proposal to be considered here assimilates intuitive judgements about cases to certain judgements about standard fiction. On this view, there is no special content problem about intuitive judgements: the Gettier case is just a piece of standard fiction, and the Gettier judgement is just a judgement about a fictional character-specifically, it is an 'internal' fictional judgement, such as the one I might express by saying 'Hamlet is a border liner', or 'Holmes lived on Baker street'. (In general, an internal fictional judgement is one that goes beyond what is explicitly stated in the text, but that does not yet treat the fiction as a fiction.55) There is still a lot 53 On my account, the claim that a subject is related to a proposition as stipulated in the case description is, not surprisingly, paraphrased as the claim that someone could stand to a proposition in that way. (In symbols: ◊ ∃x∃p GC (x, p)). One might wonder how this could be among our reasons for believing POSSIBILITY-how a claim of the form 'possibly p' could be a reason for believing a claim of the form 'possibly p & q'. It may even be argued that I am proposing an absurd justificatory structure. (Compare: how could the claim that someone broke in last night be a reason to believe that someone broke in last night and stole all the silver?). In reply I admit that the structure looks a bit odd, but it is not absurd. And we can relieve some of the oddness. Recall that there are different ways of expressing the candidate content in English (see note 32); e.g. as the claim that someone who stands to a proposition as stipulated in the case description has a justified true belief but does not know. (Compare: Bettie believes that the person who-or whoever-broke in last night stole all the silver in part on the grounds that someone broke in last night. We can easily tell a story in which this is true-e.g. suppose Bettie knows that all her silver is easily accessible and desirable to thieves; this justifies her in believing that if someone broke in they would steal all the silver; that-together with her justified belief that someone broke in last night-justifies her in believing that whoever broke in last night stole all the silver.) 54 For further discussion, see my doctoral dissertation (Malmgren 2009), Ch. 3. 55 As in, say, 'Hamlet is modelled on the legendary folk hero Amleth'. (Cf. Currie 1990; Eagle 2007; Thomasson 2003.) For brevity, I sometimes omit the qualification 'internal' below. I take it that the assimilation of intuitive judgements to any other type of fictional judgements is a non-starter. 24 of disagreement over the semantics of fictional discourse, but whatever the correct account turns out to be, it can be expected to apply to intuitive judgements-or so the suggestion goes.56 This would not constitute a genuine alternative to my proposal, if (internal) fictional judgements were plausibly analyzed along the lines of POSSIBILITY. But I take it that they are not, and not just because we can, it seems, make true judgements even about explicitly impossible fictions.57 Set that problematic aside-perhaps as part of a larger 'divide-and-conquer' approach to fictional discourse-and POSSIBILITY is still not a plausible model. That is, it is not plausible even if applied exclusively to judgements about so-called 'realistic' fiction, such as The Tragedy of Hamlet: Prince of Denmark. (Some of the reasons why will become apparent below.) By way of initial gloss, we might express the new proposal by saying that the content of our judgement-the Gettier judgement-is the claim that, FICTION in the Gettier fiction, Smith has a justified true belief but does not know that someone in his office owns a Ford. FICTION is intended to be compatible with a variety of different accounts of fictional judgements (corresponding to different interpretations of the 'in the fiction-operator');58 the basic idea is just that the Gettier judgement is a fictional judgement-however such judgements are in general to be analyzed. Certain questions cannot be usefully addressed at this level of abstraction (e.g. whether and how FICTION secures a good inference). But others can. We do not need more detail to see that the assimilation of the Gettier judgement to a fictional judgement is a mistake: the intuitive truth-conditions of the respective judgements differ enough to suggest that they do not have the same semantics. For one thing, the judgement that I express by saying 'Hamlet is a border liner' would not be verified (or falsified) by the existence of some actual person who fit all the explicit descriptions provided by Shakespeare, and who did (or did not) have a borderline personality. In contrast, an intuitive judgement-e.g. the Gettier judgement-does seem to be verifiable/falsifiable by actual (non-deviant) realizations of the relevant problem case. We might put the point by saying that fictional characters are essentially fictional,59 whereas characters in philosophical problem cases are not. Just consider, once more, the uncle Smith realization-that realization is deviant, but surely, what makes it deviant does not have anything to do with Smith's being actual. (If uncle Smith did not have the stipulated defeaters, would the realization still be deviant?) For another, what counts as a permissible interpretation of a case description seems to depend, at least in part, on the specific use to which the case is put; more precisely, the tacit constraints that govern our interpretation of a case description are sensitive to the target of the given thought 56 Lewis seems to endorse a view of this sort-see his 1983, p. 278: '... note that the philosophical example is just a concise bit of fiction'. See also Ichikawa and Jarvis 2009. (Their view is discussed separately in sub-sect. 2.5.) 57 Relatedly: some fictions are implicitly impossible-impossible (at least in part) in virtue of some of the extraneous facts that are 'true in the fiction'. But that is precluded by the POSSIBILITY-model. (Cf. n. 71.) 58 FICTION is not compatible with just any account of fictional judgements: it presupposes that some form of 'operator fictionalism' is correct-and, more generally, that the basic problem with fictional judgements is a content problem, rather than an attitude problem (cf. note 7). But my objections against the assimilation of intuitive judgements to fictional judgements, below, do not substantially depend on this framework (although they have to be reformulated if it is incorrect). 59 Cf. Kripke 1980, p. 157; Lewis 1983, p. 265. 25 experiment-to what theory is being tested. Consequently, they may vary with a change in target. For instance, we may not suppose that the subject in the Gettier case has more than one route to knowledge available, but we may suppose that killing him would cause a riot in which fifty other people die. The former extraneous fact is ruled out, but the latter is left open: it is indeterminate whether it obtains in the case.60 (At any rate this is so when the case is used for its original purpose-to test the JTB theory.) The converse holds for the potential victim in a 'Trolley case': we may not suppose that killing him would cause a riot in which fifty people die, but we may indeed suppose that he has more than one route to knowledge available (here: knowledge of any proposition of our choice).61 Interestingly, this shift is not just a result of the (literal) differences between the two case descriptions. Suppose that we explicitly 'tag on' a Trolley scenario to our sample description of the Gettier case. One might expect the resultant text to automatically inherit all the constraints-or rather, the intersection of the constraints-that govern the interpretation of its constituent case descriptions (in their normal contexts). But this is not automatic. What we may and may not import into the 'Gettier-Trolley case' once again depends on what we are using it for: whether we are using the case to test the JTB-theory, Utilitarianism, both-or something else altogether. Note that there is no analogous phenomenon in the case of standard fiction: the interpretation of a fictional text appears to be governed by certain standing constraints, modulo the author's specific intentions-unless, of course, the text is being 'hijacked' for the purpose of a thought experiment. (We might, for instance, construct a Trolley case that features Hamlet. More on this below.) These standing constraints-whatever exactly they are-also seem to impose a greater degree of overall similarity to the actual world (or better: the actual world as the author and her immediate audience takes it to be62) on the fiction, than the corresponding constraints impose on a problem case. At any rate this goes for so-called 'realistic' fiction; perhaps outré fantasy, science fiction and surreal fiction are associated with constraints that are more permissive in this respect. But let us set these genres aside.63 In the case of realistic fiction, the audience is (not only permitted) but required to import a lot of extraneous 'background' facts that obtain in the actual world. These background facts, together with the stated facts, generate further extraneous facts that they are 60 One might wonder: 'If it is indeterminate that some fact obtains in the case, then it is not true (that it does) and so how can we be permitted to import it?' Here a comparison with fiction is indeed useful: we are permitted to creatively embellish a fiction at the points where it is indeterminate (and, it seems, only there); e.g. we can imagine Hamlet with or without a bruise on his leg, as inhabiting a world where there are several species of hedgehog or only one... other things equal, we are any which way imagining Hamlet. Likewise for Smith: we can imagine him as liking or disliking cabbage, as someone whose potential killing does or does not cause a riot... any which way we are imagining Smith. This seems mysterious if we think of a fiction/problem case as a single possible world that is indeterminate with respect to certain facts. But, as Lewis points out, that is in any case implausible (ibid. p. 270, esp. note 11); better to think of a fiction/problem case as a set of possible worlds that differ from one another with respect to certain facts-and as long as a world belongs to that set it is a non-deviant realization of the fiction/problem case. (This may still not be the best way to think about it-at least not the best way to think about fiction. There are a number of problems with understanding fictions in terms of possible worlds at all, especially if we bar the divide and conquer strategy; see e.g. Lewis ibid. p. 277; Proudfoot 2006; and, for a defense, Hanley 2004. But these problems do not seem to carry over to problem cases.) 61 Again: at least when the case is used for its original purpose-to test Utilitarianism, or the Doctrine of Double Effect. See Foot 1978; Kamm 1989; Thomson 1976, 1985. 62 A qualification along these lines is needed to avoid anachronism, and too much specificity, in the fiction (e.g. to avoid the result that it is true in The Tragedy of Hamlet that there are exactly n species of hedgehog, where n is the actual number of species). Compare Lewis's 'Analysis 2', ibid. p. 273. For further discussion of this aspect of fictional discourse, see Alward, manuscript; Byrne 1993; Carlshamre 2004; Currie 1986, 1990; Eagle 2007; Hanley 2004; Proudfoot 2006; Sainsbury 2009; Walton 1990. 63 It is safe to put them aside, since it would be very implausible to assimilate problem cases to, say, outré science fiction stories. (Although some extant case descriptions contain enough bizarre details to inspire such assimilation, most do not-e.g. standard descriptions of the Gettier case, the Trolley case or even the Twin-Earth case.) 26 also required to import. Thus it is true-or 'true in the fiction'-that Hamlet sometimes needs to go to the bathroom, and that water boils at 100 C, even though neither fact is explicitly stated (or is entailed by anything that is explicitly stated) in The Tragedy of Hamlet. And it is false, albeit consistent with the text, that Hamlet wears drag on Wednesdays, and that Ophelia has a local psychic power-say, a telekinetic ability to move cups across tables. Contrast problem cases: on the face of it, Smith in the Gettier case might indeed wear drag on Wednesdays; he (or Brown or Jones) might even have a telekinetic ability to move cups across tables. It is not true-or 'true in the problem case'-that he does, but it is not false either: it is simply indeterminate. I take it that the corresponding claims about Hamlet and Ophelia are determinately false. Likewise for the claim that Hamlet never needs to go to the bathroom, and that, in his and Ophelia's world, water boils at 67 C. In the Gettier case, however, water may or may not boil at that temperature, and Smith may or may not have the relevant physical need. All of this is left open by the constraints that govern the interpretation of case descriptions.64 It is worth noting that standard fictions too contain a lot of indeterminacy-even with respect to actual (or taken-for-actual) background facts. This suggests that we, qua audience of fiction, do not seek to maximize overall similarity between fiction and actuality. But the contrast between fictions and problem cases remains: absent stipulations to the contrary, much more overall departure from actuality appears to be permitted in the interpretation of case descriptions. It is also worth noting that a philosophical problem case can, of course, be presented as a piece of standard fiction (just like a piece of fiction be presented as, and serve the function of, a problem case in a thought experiment). Our sample case description might, for instance, be included in a collection of short stories-and, if it were, then most or all of the disparities that I have drawn attention to would presumably disappear.65 But that is irrelevant. (Compare: both case descriptions and fictional texts can be presented as news reports-with rather drastic effects on their proper interpretation-but I take it that this has little, if any, significance for the respective content problems.) The crucial question, for us, concerns the proper interpretation of a case description in its 'home' context: the context of a (specific) thought experiment. I have argued, in effect, that this context comes with its own set of interpretative principles-a set that differs in several ways from that which is normally operative in our understanding of fiction. And these differences combine to suggest that intuitive judgements and fictional judgements should not receive the same treatment. In defence of FICTION, one might propose that the problematic disparities can be explained away with appeal to the relative brevity of a canonical case description (compared to, say, the text of The Tragedy of Hamlet, or-for that matter-the text of an average short story). But I doubt that 64 To bring home the point, suppose that a thought experimenter informed us that, the way she imagines the Gettier case, Smith wears drag on Wednesdays and water boils at 67 C. In response, we might well complain that she has filled out the given description in idiosyncratic or irrelevant ways-irrelevant, since her colourful embellishments are not going to help her settle how the test properties are distributed in the case. But I do not think we would complain that her embellishments are illegitimate, or that the envisaged realization of the case is deviant-as indeed we would if she had filled it out in such a way that, say, Smith's justification is defeated. (But is this not what we would do, if the FICTION proposal were correct: would we not complain that the realization at hand is deviant-and would we not be right?) 65 Provided that neither author nor audience has any previous exposure to Gettier's thought experiment, and that the question whether Smith has a justified true belief without knowledge is not salient-e.g. is stated in the immediately surrounding text. (Creative elaboration on the original case description-as in Lodge 2001, Ch. 16-may further facilitate a 'fictionalist' reading.) 27 the disparities can be explained away that easily. First, it seems clear that short-even very short-realistic fiction typically requires that we import more actual, or taken-for-actual, background facts than does a problem case.66 Second, even characters in (very) short fiction are essentially fictional. And, third, the relative brevity of a standard case description cannot begin to explain the fact that what is true-and false and indeterminate-'in the case' is partly determined by what theory the case is being used to test, and so may shift with a change in target theory. There is nothing about short fiction, in general, that predicts or explains this. As the attentive reader may have realized, the third point raises a further important question: does FICTION even have the resources to classify all clearly deviant realizations of a problem case as deviant? Roughly put, a realization is deviant if it contains some extraneous facts that in obvious (and unintended) ways affect the distribution of the relevant test properties.67 FICTION had better imply that everything that-for a given problem case and thought experiment-falls into this category is false 'in the case': that it is false in the Gettier case that Smith has another route to knowledge available, false in the Trolley case that killing the victim would cause a riot in which fifty people die, and so on. However, it is not at all clear that the constraints that govern our interpretation of standard fiction (long and/or short) rule out these facts-as opposed to just leave them open. Needless to say, there is no general presumption in force to the effect that, unless stated, a fictional character never has a backup route to knowledge of a proposition they believe. (Or that killing her would never cause a riot... etc.) That suggestion fails to account for the fact that what is true/false/indeterminate in a problem case depends in part on-and can shift with a change in-the target theory; furthermore, it has wildly implausible consequences for the case of standard fiction. I return to this worry below-and elaborate on it in more detail-since it arises in almost identical form for the next (and final) competing proposal. 2.5 A hybrid view Let me wrap up the discussion of rival content proposals by addressing an interesting hybrid-a hybrid of NECESSITY* and FICTION-that was recently put forward by Jonathan Ichikawa and Benjamin Jarvis (Ichikawa & Jarvis 2009). On this view, a problem case is indeed a piece of standard fiction, but an intuitive judgement is not simply a fictional judgement (of the usual kind). Rather, it is a certain necessity judgement about a given fiction-a judgement roughly to the effect that, in any metaphysically possible non-deviant realization of a fiction, the test properties are distributed in such-and-such a way.68 Importantly, the non-deviant realizations are supposed 66 For a stark example, consider the following piece of 'flash fiction': "For sale: baby shoes, never worn." (Allegedly Hemingway, undated, word length: 6.) The brevity of the text notwithstanding, this fiction too contains a lot of detail that is naturally explained (in part) by our operating with a principle of overall similarity to the taken-for-actual world. E.g. presumably (it is determinately true in the fiction that) the baby died-before, during or shortly after birth-but that it was not first abducted by aliens, that both of its parents breathe oxygen, that giant squids are illiterate, and that there is more than one continent on Earth (etc. etc.). For two other examples, consider The Joy (Chekhov, 1883, word length: 697), and The Boy Who Cried Wolf (Aesop, 6th century BC, word length in tr. by Gibbs 1994: 91)-although none of this is explicitly stated, I take it that Mitya in The Joy cannot fly, that he is a citizen of a tsardom, and that (he inhabits a world in which) water freezes at 0 C; and I take it that the shepherd-boy in Aesop's fable has exactly one head, that he sometimes sleeps at night, and that (he inhabits a world in which) wolfs are mortal. 67 This is at best a sufficient condition for deviance, and a circular one at that, but this does not matter-we do not need to solve the problem in sub-sect. 2.3 to formulate the current objection to FICTION. 68 I am going along with the authors' assumption that (internal) fictional judgements 'of the usual kind' cannot be analyzed as necessity judgements-at least not as necessity judgements along the lines of FICTION*. (Here are three prima facie reasons why 28 to be demonstratively identified (in thought): an intuitive verdict is a generalization over all possible worlds in which things are like that-where 'things are like that' just in case everything that is true in the fiction is true simpliciter. In application to the Gettier judgement, then, the new candidate content is the claim that, FICTION* necessarily, if things are like that, then someone has a justified true belief that p but does not know that p.69 Given the additional premise that things could be like that-in effect, that everything that is true in the fiction could be true simpliciter-FICTION* secures a good inference. And the particular fiction in question here is, of course, the 'Gettier fiction': the fiction that results if we read a canonical description of the Gettier case as we would read the text of a standard fiction. The first thing to notice is that FICTION* does not avoid any of the objections that I raised above, against FICTION. If what I argued there is correct, we do not (not normally-in the context of specific thought experiments) read case descriptions in the way that we read standard fictional texts. What is true/false/indeterminate in a problem case does not line up (across the board) with what is true/false/indeterminate in a fiction; in consequence, FICTION threatens to classify some non-deviant realizations of the Gettier case as deviant, and conversely. But it should be clear that the same goes for FICTION*-the necessity operator and the demonstrative component make no difference at all, with respect to this issue. For instance, FICTION* counts any realization of the Gettier case where Smith has a local psychic power as deviant, but that does not seem right. (Some such realizations are presumably deviant, but not for that-or just for that-reason.) Moreover, a deviant realization that is overall sufficiently similar to the actual, or the taken-foractual, world may come out non-deviant70-unless, of course, that realization is ruled out by some other general interpretive constraint(s) on standard fiction. But is it? The burden is on the proponent of FICTION* to show this. And remember that it is not enough that the problematic facts-say, Smith's justification being defeated-come out indeterminate 'in the case'; they should come out false. (To make the point vivid: Smith's justification being defeated is just not on a par with his disliking cabbage, or with Hamlet having a small bruise on his shoulder.) It might be suggested that any such (i.e. any deviant but sufficiently nearby) realization is ruled out, not by some general interpretive constraint associated with standard fiction, but by a specific not: a FICTION*-type analysis of fictional judgements fails to accommodate both impossible fictions and the essential non-actuality of fictional characters; it is also highly uninformative-hardly more informative than FICTION.) 69 Ichikawa and Jarvis represent their proposal as follows: ❒ [r  ∃x∃p (JTB (x, p) & ¬K (x, p)], where r is the proposition that things are like that-or, I should add, some other proposition that is true if and only if all the propositions that are true in the fiction are true simpliciter (Ichikawa & Jarvis, ibid. pp. 229 – 232; Ichikawa 2009, p. 442). But it is unclear what else r could be. The most obvious alternative-the proposition that all the propositions that are true in the fiction are true simpliciter-is explicitly ruled out by the authors' insistence that a good candidate content must not include the concept of truth in fiction, or even the concept of a fiction. (By the same token, I assume, it must not include concepts like that of a story, or of what happens in a story, etc.) It seems that at least some of their reasons for insisting on this are confused-e.g. the observation that intuitive judgements about actual cases are not plausibly analyzed in terms of truth in fiction (ibid. p. 228). But-given the restriction that they set themselves-that things are like that may well be the best way to gloss r. This is why, in the text, I present the proposal in the way that I do. (The authors acknowledge that the only other gloss they provide is psychologically implausible; ibid. p. 231.) 70 Supposing that the Gettier fiction is a piece of realistic fiction. Williamson (2009, p. 466) has essentially the same worry, although he assumes that enough similarity to the actual (rather than the taken-for-actual) world is enough for a realization to be classified as non-deviant by FICTION*. It is clear, however, that that assumption is dispensable. (Note also that FICTION* may not classify any actual deviant realizations as non-deviant, since fictional characters are essentially fictional.) 29 overriding intention on the part of the author/case designer-perhaps an intention that only appears in the context of a philosophical thought experiment. We might think of the proposed intention as an exercise of authorial authority: an author's ability to stipulate what is true and false in her fiction. The idea would be that, by having a certain intention, the author/case designer tacitly stipulates that none of the problematic-the 'deviance-making'-facts obtain in the Gettier fiction. But there are big problems with this move (even if sense can be made of the notion of a tacit stipulation). Note first that, on this elaboration of FICTION*, all the real work is being done by the case designer's intention, rather than by the assimilation of problem cases to standard fiction. Furthermore, the 'specification problem' that faced NECESSITY* crops up in almost identical form-as the problem of spelling out the content of the case designer's intention (in a way that yields the right result, but that is neither question-begging nor too rich). A related problem concerns the minor premise in the present version of the Gettier inference: the claim that things could be like that-in effect, the claim that the Gettier fiction, as a whole, could be realized. Suppose it turns out that, although most of the propositions that are true in that fiction are compossible-including all those that are literally expressed by the case description-there are a few odd men out; perhaps because some of the contingent extraneous facts that we are required to import (to achieve enough overall similarity to the actual, or taken-for-actual, world) are incompatible with others. Ichikawa and Jarvis point out that, in many cases, an apparent impossibility in a fiction can be explained away as an indeterminacy (ibid. p. 234). That is correct, but it cannot always be explained away that way: some fictions really are impossible, in overt or subtle ways.71 The worry here is not the skeptical worry that, for all we know, the Gettier fiction-or some other paradigm 'problem case fiction'-is actually impossible.72 The worry is that, in a hypothetical situation where it turns out to be impossible-specifically, where it turns out to be impossible in some subtle way that, on the face of it, has no bearing at all on the distribution of the test properties-we do not behave as we would behave if the FICTION* proposal were correct. We would not take that discovery to show that the thought experiment fails. But that, it seems, is the behaviour that the proposal predicts (and recommends). Finally, FICTION* fails to capture the fact that, in making the Gettier judgement, we are attributing justified true belief without knowledge to the subject (or to any of a range of subjects), who is related to a proposition in a certain peculiar way. What FICTION* says, in effect, is that any possible world where the case description is satisfied-and everything else that is true in the fiction is true-is a world where some subject(s) or other has a justified true belief without knowledge (in some proposition(s) or other): it need not be the same subject as the subject who plays the 'Smith-role' in that world. Indeed, FICTION* is true even if the only possible worlds in which someone plays the Smith-role are worlds in which that subject does not have a justified true belief without knowledge (but someone else does). On the face of it, however, that is not enough to make the Gettier judgement true.73 71 Arguably, a realistic fiction is never overtly (or explicitly) impossible-impossible in virtue of an overt inconsistency in the text-but it can still be subtly (or implicitly) impossible: impossible once all the inexplicit details are filled out. For more on this, See e.g. Proudfoot, 2006; Sainsbury 2009, Ch. 4. 72 Compare the argument against COUNTERFACTUAL in sub-sect. 1.5. 73 The 'first-stab' proposal that Ichikawa and Jarvis consider (and reject) fares better in this respect; see ibid. p. 227. This problem is reminiscent of the 'donkey anaphora' problem facing Williamson's preferred formalization of COUNTERFACTUAL-cf. note 24. But, in the present case, we have more than just a technical problem-the issue arises even on the natural language formulation of FICTION*. 30 III 3.1 Rationalism revisited I have argued that the real content of the Gettier judgement is certain metaphysical possibility claim-and, in particular, that it is not a counterfactual conditional, a strict conditional, or a claim about fiction. It is time to return to the argument that sparked my discussion of the content problem: Williamson argument against rationalism. In the rest of this paper, I consider the relation between the content problem and the question of rationalism in some detail. I argue that that relation is much less direct than Williamson takes it to be, and I close with a dilemma. Williamson, recall, tries to get a lot of leverage out of his content proposal. In rough outline, he argues as follows:74 'intuitive judgements are judgements of certain counterfactual conditionals; we have a general capacity to handle counterfactuals; hence there is no need to invoke a specialpurpose capacity or mechanism-such as a faculty of rational intuition-to explain the formation and the epistemic properties of intuitive judgements. The general capacity to handle counterfactuals is not 'exclusively a priori'; nor is there a principled way to single out only some of the judgements that this capacity delivers as a priori. So intuitive judgements are not a priori.' I would like to bring attention to the key assumption that we have a general capacity to handle counterfactuals. Is it legitimate to suppose that we do? I will argue that it is not; more precisely, that it is not legitimate to suppose that we have a general capacity at the appropriate level of implementation. (This will be explained shortly.) The immediate upshot is that the argument fails to go through, even if we grant that intuitive judgements are judgements of counterfactuals. Importantly, the consideration that I am about to give also block a certain fallback manoeuvre otherwise available to Williamson: an argument against rationalism that, unlike the above, does not depend on his specific content proposal-indeed, that is compatible with mine. Williamson has recently argued that our judgements of metaphysical modality are not a priori (either).75 But then it looks like he could in principle dispense with the claim that intuitive judgements are judgements of counterfactuals, accept my alternative suggestion instead, and still reach the desired conclusion.76 As we shall see, however, my next objection applies to the 'fallback argument' too. We may summarize the fallback argument as follows: 'claims of metaphysical necessity and possibility are logically equivalent to certain counterfactual claims.77 This suggests that no special-purpose capacity or mechanism is needed to explain our judgements of metaphysical modality either: rather, our general capacity to handle counterfactuals is responsible for those judgements too. (Anything else would indicate a 'bizarre lack of cognitive economy.' [Williamson 2007b, p. 162.]) But, again, this general capacity is not exclusively a priori; nor is there a principled way to single out only some of the judgements it delivers as a priori. Add to 74 For more detail, see sub-section 1.2 above. 75 See Williamson 2007a and 2007b, Ch. 5. The argument is foreshadowed in his 2005, Sect. 3. See also Hill 2006. (My objection applies mutatis mutandis to Hill's argument.) 76 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this point. 77 Informally: 'necessarily p' is equivalent to 'if it were not the case that p, a contradiction would be true' and 'possibly p' is equivalent to 'it is not the case that, if it were the case that p, a contradiction would be true'. (See Williamson 2007a, 2007b; Lewis 1973; Stalnaker 1968.) 31 this that intuitive judgements are metaphysical possibility judgements-and it follows that rationalism is false.' The fallback argument raises some new concerns, but rather than pursuing those, let us take note of the features it shares with the original argument against rationalism: both arguments require that we have a general capacity to handle counterfactuals-a general-purpose cognitive capacity that is causally responsible for all, or at any rate most, of our counterfactual judgements.78 Moreover, the explanation of our intuitive judgements that this capacity provides is supposed to make redundant an explanation in terms of a special-purpose capacity or mechanism. Last, the general capacity is supposed to provide, not just a causal explanation of our intuitive judgements, but an epistemology for them. Do we have a general capacity of the requisite sort? Nothing of relevance here hinges on whether capacities are distinct from dispositions (or from abilities); for our purposes, then, a capacity is just a disposition, and a 'cognitive' capacity is a disposition to engage in some cognitive activity-such as reasoning, seeing depth or writing a dissertation. But what it is to 'handle' a counterfactual? Judging from Williamson's usage, it is (at least) to rationally assess it, and to determine its truth-value in light of that assessment.79 3.2 Capacities and counterfactuals There is a sense in which it is uncontroversial, indeed trivial, that we have a general capacity to handle counterfactuals: for any activity φ, we can introduce the general capacity to φ-the unique disposition that is manifest when and only when someone φs. In this sense, I obviously have the general capacity to φ, for any activity φ in which I am able to engage. The attribution to me of the general capacity to φ can still be both informative and explanatory-it can even provide a minimal explanation of particular φ-ings of mine. Thus my general capacity to learn languages explains my learning French, and my general capacity to handle counterfactuals explains why I believe that if I made the supper it would be inedible. Whether such explanations are causal explanations is debatable, but even if they are, it should be clear that they are not exhaustive-that in each case there is room for further explanations, in particular, room for 'lower-level' explanations: explanations that make reference to the specific way or ways that the general capacity to φ is realized or implemented in me.80 (Presumably there is a hierarchy of implementation levels, but for brevity I will sometimes write as if there is only one level.) For many purposes, a lower-level explanation is what we need: the existence of a minimal explanation of the first mentioned sort-a so-called 'virtus dormitiva' explanation-certainly does not make this kind of explanation redundant. Next, a virtus dormitiva explanation puts almost no constraints on the available lower-level explanations; importantly, it is compatible with lower-level explanations that trade in a variety of 78 In his 2005 and 2007a, Williamson writes as if the capacity in question is responsible for all counterfactual judgements. In 2007b he writes as if there are exceptions: the general capacity is only responsible for most or typical such judgements (ibid. p. 151 – 152.) On the face of it, this weakens the argument, absent compelling reason to think that intuitive judgements are not in fact atypical. But I will not press this point here. And the objection I give below is not substantially affected by this change of view since, as we will see, I am willing to grant that our intuitive judgements are explained by the general capacity Williamson has in mind-whatever the exact scope is of that capacity. 79 That is: form the belief that it is true/false (or neither), in light of that assessment. 80 Neurophysiological and biological explanations would be clear examples. But importantly, there is also room for further psychological explanations. (See Cummins 2000; Davies 2005; Marr 1982.) 32 realizing mechanisms. It does not rule out the possibility that the target capacity is realized in many different ways, even in the same subject-that it is realized by a multitude of different mechanisms, processes and/or further capacities (perhaps at each level of implementation). Furthermore, it tells us nothing about the detailed workings of the realizing mechanism(s). The upshot of this should be clear: on the current reading, the claim that we have a general capacity to handle counterfactuals is obviously true but, on that reading, it is compatible with there being many different cognitive processes, mechanisms and/or further capacities involved in the production of counterfactual judgements. In particular, it leaves open that there is a specialpurpose capacity or mechanism involved in the evaluation of all 'philosophically interesting' counterfactuals (such as COUNTERFACTUAL81) and that this special-purpose capacity is exclusively a priori. It even leaves open that the evaluation of philosophically interesting counterfactuals recruits a faculty of rational intuition-whatever exactly that is supposed to be. Those who postulate such a faculty are not plausibly interpreted as saying that their account precludes a virtus dormitiva explanation of the relevant class of judgements. Of course, there are strong independent reasons to reject the view that some counterfactual judgements, or for that matter any other judgements, are arrived at by a faculty of rational intuition-at least as that faculty is traditionally conceived: as a quasi-perceptual organ that somehow gives us direct 'insight' into the truth of the contents in question.82 Crucially, none of its advocates has been able to explain how this faculty would work, or to provide independent evidence for its existence.83 But Williamson does not reject the view on these, familiar grounds- he rejects it on the grounds that it is unmotivated. On the current reading, however, the claim that we have a general capacity to handle counterfactuals does not in fact undercut the motivation for the view. (Nor does it undercut the motivation for postulating some less extravagant specialpurpose capacity.) Presumably, then, this is not the intended reading. What Williamson needs is generality at the appropriate level of implementation: that our general capacity to handle counterfactuals, identified as such, be realized in us by another highly general capacity or mechanism; indeed, it must be thus realized at the very same level of implementation at which the faculty of rational intuition, or other special-purpose mechanism, is supposed to be located. Only then do we have two genuinely competing explanations on the table. Whether there is generality at the appropriate level is at least in part an empirical question. But the empirical data is notoriously hard to interpret-especially, of course, for a non-expert-and the relevant literature is only of limited help: the research on counterfactual processing is still at an early stage, and many of the going theories are seriously underdeveloped. That said, there is one issue on which there is already near-consensus: most cognitive scientists that work on the topic seem to agree that the evaluation of counterfactuals is far from a unified affair-that it involves many different capacities and/or mechanisms. Which one gets recruited in a specific case appears to depend, among other things, on the content and complexity of the given counterfactual claim, and the pragmatic concerns and background beliefs of the subject.84 This 81 Or counterfactuals with a contradiction as the consequent (see n. 77). 82 Or that gives us direct insight into some necessary truths from which the relevant counterfactuals follow (cf. sub-sect. 3.4). 83 See Boghossian 2003; Wright 2004. 84 See e.g. Byrne 2005, Evans & Over 2004; Kahneman 2003; Roese 1997; Sloman 2005; Stanovich & West 2003. 33 near-consensus may seem to suggest that all the available evidence points towards a negative answer. But that would be too quick. 3.3 Mental simulation According to Williamson, the way the general capacity to handle counterfactuals is realized in us, in the vast majority of cases, is as a capacity to run certain other cognitive capacities 'offline', or as a capacity for offline mental simulation. Here is a representative passage: We have our ordinary capacities for making judgements about what we encounter, and a further capacity to evaluate counterfactuals by running those capacities 'offline'; that is already enough for philosophy to get going, without any need of a kick-start from a special faculty of intuition (Williamson 2005, p. 18).85 In general, and to a first approximation, to say that a given capacity is (or that is realized by) a capacity for offline mental simulation is to say that it involves the 'redeployment' of some other cognitive capacity or mechanism-one that normally performs a different function. And the primary difference between the normal (online) and the offline function does not lie in the type of information, if any, that the capacity or mechanism draws on, but rather in the type of representational state that it takes as input-e.g. perhaps it manipulates desires and beliefs when it is run online, but manipulates functionally similar pretence correlates (so-called 'pretend beliefs' and 'pretend desires') when run offline. Other than that, the capacity behaves in much the same way in both cases.86 This is very rough, but it should be enough to appreciate two crucial points: in contrast to the uncontroversial (but trivial) claim discussed above, the claim that our general capacity to handle counterfactuals is for the most part realized as a capacity for mental simulation is far from trivial-it is a substantial empirical hypothesis.87 However, it is a highly abstract empirical hypothesis. The details of the underlying cognitive machinery are left wide open: what they are like depends in the first instance on what other capacity or mechanism is being run offline in any given simulation exercise (and on how that capacity or mechanism in turn is implemented). The hypothesis also leaves open-as it surely should-that what is being run offline in the evaluation of a given counterfactual claim may depend, among other things, on the specific content of that counterfactual. In one way, this is good news for Williamson-mental simulation is a suitably high-level realizer, and so the simulation hypothesis is compatible with the near-consensus noted earlier: that the evaluation of counterfactuals involves a rich variety of low-level cognitive capacities or mechanisms.88 But the abstractness of the hypothesis also makes it uncongenial to his overall aims. On the face of it, nothing prevents his rationalist opponent from endorsing it: the only type of explanation that the simulation hypothesis precludes is a 'theory-based' explanation-one that 85 See also his 2007a, Sect. 3, and 2007b, pp. 147 – 155. 86 See Evans & Over 2004, and Goldman 1992, for simulation-based accounts of our capacity for counterfactual reasoning. Other capacities that have been explained in terms of mental simulation include our capacity for mental imagery (Currie 1994), our capacity to predict behavior (Goldman 1989; Gordon 1985), and our capacity for empathy (Goldman 1993). For useful discussions, see Davies & Stone 1998; Nichols, Stich, Leslie & Klein 1996; Weinberg & Meskin 2006. 87 At least this is the most plausible way to understand it in this context. (For a contrasting approach, see Heal 1998.) 88 This compatibility is noted by Evans and Over, whose simulation-based account of counterfactual processing is among the best developed in the literature. They present their account as 'a high level description of many different processes that contribute to hypothetical thought' (Evans & Over 2004, p. 158). Apparently Williamson too understands the simulation hypothesis this way (see his 2007b, p. 152), but he does not appreciate the problem this creates for his argument. 34 postulates a body of tacitly known, domain-specific information to account for the evaluation of (some or all) counterfactuals. But there is no principled reason why a 'special capacity rationalist'-say, the advocate of a faculty of rational intuition-would have to subscribe to that. For all that has been said, the relevant special purpose capacity may have an online as well as an offline use, or it may be part of some more complex capacity that does. Take the case of interest here. Perhaps my intuitive judgement about an actual problem case, and my judgement about the corresponding hypothetical case are-at some relatively high level of implementation-generated by the same capacity (run offline and online respectively). On one model, a certain inferential mechanism is involved: when run online, it takes me from certain beliefs about the actual case-e.g. the belief that Smith based his belief on a false lemma-to the judgement that Smith has a justified true belief without knowledge; when run offline, it takes me from certain suppositions and pretend-beliefs to the Gettier judgement (on present assumptions: a counterfactual judgement). This inference mechanism draws on information that in turn is provided by means of some special purpose capacity-e.g. it draws on the 'rational insight' that, necessarily, anyone who relies on a false lemma fails to know-and it does so in both cases. Importantly, that does not imply that both of the resulting judgements are a priori: since some of the beliefs that are implicated in the online use of the mechanism are (at best) empirically justified, the resulting judgement-that Smith has a justified true belief without knowledge-is empirical too. And I take it that this is the right thing to say about that judgement. But the offline use of the mechanism may still yield a judgement that is a priori. The suppositional reasoning process that generates my intuitive judgement about the hypothetical case may or may not draw on any empirical evidence; if it does not, and if my judgement is justified, it is a priori justified. Of course more must be said-the present point is just that the simulation hypothesis is strictly compatible with the view that intuitive judgements about hypothetical problem cases are a priori;89 indeed, with the view that they are arrived at by means of a faculty of rational intuition. To sum up: an explanation of our counterfactual judgements in terms of mental simulation does not preclude or make redundant further explanations of some (or all) such judgements and, although it is less permissive than a virtus dormativa explanation, it still does not constrain these explanations enough-in fact, it too is compatible with the most extreme form of special capacity rationalism. The upshot is that Williamson's argument against rationalism (or his arguments, counting the fallback manoeuvre) does not go through even on the second-more substantial- reading of the claim that we have a general capacity to handle counterfactuals. At this point, a natural move would be to explore whether there is some further reading on which the argument does go through. But we can spare ourselves the effort: there are principled reasons to think that there is no such reading. 3.4 The epistemology of counterfactuals? The assimilation of intuitive judgements to counterfactual judgements is supposed to undermine the motivation for special capacity rationalism. But recall that that view is motivated by two distinct explanatory needs-the special-purpose capacity is invoked to explain both the formation of intuitive judgements and what makes them justified and reliable (cf. sub-section 1.2 above). 89 Note that this is overlooked by Yablo 2002. Chalmers, on the other hand, makes the opposite mistake (see e.g. his 1996). 35 Accordingly, the general capacity to handle counterfactuals must be able to provide a competing epistemology for intuitive judgements (in addition to a competing causal-psychological explanation). Is it fit for the purpose? It should be clear by now that it is not, if conceived as a capacity for mental simulation: the simulation hypothesis allows for a variety of different mechanisms at lower levels of realization and, crucially, leaves it open that a difference in realizing mechanism at some such level may make an epistemic difference.90 But in fact that was to be expected, given the scope of the hypothesis. By all appearances, counterfactual judgements can be justified in a variety of ways: deductively, inductively, by memory or testimony, etc. What kind of justification one has to believe a given counterfactual depends in the first instance on which counterfactual it is-what content it has-and on one's overall cognitive and epistemic situation. This should be totally uncontroversial: if there is variation of this sort at all-if there are interestingly different kinds of justification and knowledge-then there is variation of this sort among our counterfactual judgements. But then any hypothesis, a fortiori any causal-psychological hypothesis, about counterfactual judgements as such is bound to be very limited in its epistemological implications. We should certainly not expect to get an (acceptable) epistemology for some specific subclass of counterfactual judgements out of it-say, for our judgements of philosophically interesting counterfactuals. Notably, counterfactual judgements are heterogeneous also in the following respect: by all appearances, some such judgements are capable of being a priori justified, whereas others are not. The only kind of justification that I could have for believing that if I had made the supper it would have been inedible, or that if I fell out the window I would break my neck, is a posteriori justification. Likewise for many other actual and possible counterfactual beliefs-but not all. Thus, for instance, my belief that if twelve people had been killed more than eleven people would have been killed,91 my belief that if God had existed then God would have existed, and my belief that Balder would be a bachelor if he were an unmarried man, are all, on the face of it, capable of being a priori justified. (Indeed, they are as good candidates as any.) This casts further doubt on the idea that we can give an epistemology for intuitive judgements- explain what makes them justified and reliable-in terms of the general capacity to handle counterfactuals, regardless of how that capacity is conceived: as a capacity in the minimal sense, as a capacity for mental simulation, or as something else altogether. Any account that is pitched at this level of generality fails to sustain a number of central epistemic distinctions-including that between a priori and a posteriori justification. (Furthermore, for all we have been told so far, our judgements of philosophically interesting counterfactuals fall on the a priori side of the distinction more often than not.) Of course, if there were independent reason to think that the a priori/a posteriori distinction does not survive scrutiny-that, ultimately, there is no such distinction-then the failure of a theory to sustain that distinction would not be a major flaw. But if we had independent reason to think that, we would also have a much quicker way with rationalism: we could simply argue that, since nothing is a priori, intuitive judgements are not a priori. The appeal to the general capacity to handle counterfactuals now drops out as irrelevant.92 90 This is noted by Peacocke, in his 1998, p. 132. 91 Cf. Williamson 2007a, p. 12, and 2007b, p. 143. 92 Another conceivable tactic, on which that appeal remains essential, would be to argue that there is no a priori/a posteriori distinction among counterfactual judgements in particular. But how would one argue that? What reason could there possibly be 36 We seem to have reached a dilemma: either there is independent reason to doubt that the a priori/a posteriori distinction survives scrutiny, or there is not. If there is, then the assimilation of intuitive judgements to judgements of counterfactuals does no work in the argument against rationalism. If there is not, then a plausible epistemological theory should be able to accommodate that distinction. A theory that (just) appeals to our general capacity to handle counterfactuals violates this constraint, since it fails to discriminate between different counterfactual judgements. Clearly, then, there is explanatory work (of the second sort too) left to do: the general capacity to handle counterfactuals is simply too general to be of much use in explaining what makes intuitive judgements reliable and justified-even if those judgements are judgements of counterfactuals. Whether the best explanation involves appeal to a special-purpose capacity is a further question. But it is a question that can only be settled by assessing individual candidate explanations on their merits. 3.5 Final remarks Williamson acknowledges that there are prima facie paradigms of the a priori and the a posteriori to be found among our counterfactual judgements, but he goes on to argue that appearances deceive: that the distinction does not survive scrutiny (at least not beyond a narrow range of 'easy cases').93 For our purposes, the important point is that the main reasons he provides for thinking so are perfectly general-they do not require mention of the capacity to handle counterfactuals. Thus it looks like he opts for the first horn of the dilemma. To clarify: Williamson argues that there are cases where the subject's perceptual experience plays a role, in the formation of her (justified or knowledgeable) judgement, that is neither strictly evidential nor purely enabling. If the judgement were a posteriori, experience would play an evidential role; if it were a priori, experience would (at most) play an enabling role-thus, it seems, the judgement is neither a priori nor a posteriori. The central example he uses to argue this point involves a certain counterfactual judgement, but the argument is supposed to generalize to many other counterfactual judgements-and beyond. That it generalizes is crucial, since the existence of a few hard (even borderline) cases does not undermine the a priori/a posteriori distinction-at most it shows that the distinction is not perfectly sharp. Two considerations are provided: first, he argues that our perceptual experience can (and sometimes does) influence the reliability of our cognitive capacities-including the capacities that are run offline when we engage in mental simulation. Derivatively, it can affect the reliability with which our simulation-based judgements are produced. This is not yet enough for experience to play a strictly evidential role (in the formation of these judgements). But it makes for more than a purely enabling role, since reliability is epistemically relevant-according to Williamson, it is essential to both knowledge and justification.94 The possibility of this 'intermediate' role for experience is illustrated with a case in which a subject arrives at the judgment that if two marks for doubting the a priority of my belief that if God were to exist then God would exist that is not also, at the very least, a reason to doubt the a priority of my belief in the corresponding metaphysical necessity claim or the corresponding indicative conditional? 93 See his (2007a), pp. 32 – 3, and (2007b), Ch. 5, Sect. 5. 94 See, in particular, his 2007b, p. 166. (Nothing here hinges on the difference between 'safety' and other notions of reliability; cf. Williamson 2000a.) 37 had been nine inches apart, they would have been at least nineteen centimeters apart, by running her capacity to make 'naked eye judgements' of distances in inches and centimetres offline. (She does not know the conversion ratio.) And that capacity is supposed to depend for its reliability- both online and offline-on her past perceptual experience (see Williamson 2007b, p. 165 – 6). The judgement in the example is a counterfactual judgement, but it is clear that a judgement with a similar causal history and a different content (e.g. the corresponding indicative, material, or strict conditional) would have served equally well: it is the fact that the judgement is simulationbased-not that it has a counterfactual content-that does the work in the example.95 This does not yet show that the capacity to handle counterfactuals is idle in the argument since, for Williamson, that capacity just is a capacity for mental simulation. However, the example, on its own, does not take us very far: the hard work lies in showing that experience plays the specified intermediate role in a critical mass of cases. And that is by no means obvious. In particular, it is not obvious that it plays that role relative to any judgements that are prima facie candidates for being a priori justified-not even relative to any (in the present context) controversial candidates, such as the Gettier judgement.96 It is at this point that Williamson resorts to perfectly general considerations. A few judgements with a prima facie claim to a priority-including the Gettier judgement, the judgement that it is necessary that whoever knows something believes it, and the judgement that whoever knew something believed it-are explicitly assimilated to the comparative distance judgement in the central example (Williamson 2007b, p. 168, 188). But he does not explain why we should think that the prima facie a priori judgements, like the comparative distance judgement, are based on the offline use of a capacity that crucially depends on perceptual experience for its reliability. Instead he outlines, and rejects, a number of specific positive accounts of the epistemology of these judgements-'traditional' accounts, on which experience either plays a strictly evidential, or a purely enabling, role. The upshot is supposed to be that there is no plausible account of either sort available. (To say that, of course, is just to say that there is no plausible account available on which the judgements come out a posteriori, and a priori, respectively.) 95 And it is very implausible that only judgements of subjunctive conditionals are simulation-based (as Williamson would be the last to dispute)-one would at least expect the simulation hypothesis to extend to judgments of other conditionals (cf. Byrne 2005; Evans & Over 2004). 96 The problem is this: it is indeed plausible that many of our cognitive capacities depend for their reliability on repeated practice-practice in applying the target capacity. Such practice may or may not involve specific perceptual experiences on the part of the subject. In some cases, it seems to require it; the present example is a case in point-it is impossible to practice the capacity to judge distances in inches and centimetres by sight in the absence of certain visual experiences. But that is because the capacity at issue is a (partly) perceptual capacity: it operates on specifically visual input (when performing its normal function, i.e. when run online). In other cases, the practice of a capacity typically-or even invariably, actually-involves experience, but it does not require it; e.g. the practice of various mathematical capacities typically involves experiences of marks on paper; however, it is possible-say, for someone with abnormally strong short-term memory-to practice the same capacities, equally well, in their head). Now, I take it that experience plays a purely enabling role in the latter type of case-e.g. it plays a purely enabling role in the formation of our mathematical judgements, even if our experience-involving practice significantly affects the reliability with which those judgements are produced (and even granted that reliability is epistemically relevant). The former type of case is the only one that is at all problematic-the type that is exploited in Williamson's central example. Is that enough? As I just pointed out, the judgement in that example is based on the offline use of certain perceptual capacity-without the aid of any perceptual beliefs, or any other perceptual reasons. Why should we think that a wide range of judgements fall in this category? For one thing, it seems very implausible that any judgements with a prima facie claim to a priority fall in it (including those of most interest here: intuitive judgements about cases). 38 Williamson does not examine very many candidates-notable omissions include special capacity rationalism97-but let us suppose that he examines the best. The crucial point is that his criticism of the selected candidates does not mention, or presuppose, that any of the judgements whose status is in question are simulation-based, or that they have counterfactual-or other modal- contents. The individual account that receives the most attention is the (rationalist) view that the judgements are 'epistemically analytic'-very roughly, that they are explained and justified by the mere fact that we understand their contents. Against this, he argues that it is possible to understand each of the contents at issue-e.g. COUNTERFACTUAL-without (justifiably) believing that content. And, as anyone familiar with Williamson's overall work on that topic will know, this is part of an extended effort to show that there are no epistemically analytic judgements.98 Fortunately, there is no need for us to engage that effort here-the present (and final) point is dialectical: it looks like the weight of the argument against the a priori/a posteriori distinction is carried by considerations that are completely unrelated to the simulation hypothesis, and to the assimilation of intuitive judgements to judgements of counterfactuals; namely the alleged absence of a good positive account of the a priori (and/or of the a posteriori)-one with wide enough scope to take us beyond the narrow range of 'easy cases'. Williamson's criticism of extant accounts may, for all I have said, be compelling-but nowhere does it appeal to our general capacity to handle counterfactuals. Thus that capacity does in fact drop out as irrelevant.99 Department of Philosophy ANNA-SARA MALMGREN University of Texas at Austin 1 University Station Austin Texas 78713 [email protected] BIBLIOGRAPHY Aesop: 'The Boy Who Cried Wolf', in Gibbs, Laura (ed.) 2002: Aesop's Fables. A New Translation by Laura Gibbs, Oxford World Classics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Alexander Joshua and Weinberg, Jonathan 2007: 'Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy', Philosophy Compass, pp. 56 – 80. Alward, Peter: 'Truth in Fiction: The Story Concluded', manuscript. Bealer, George 1996: 'A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy', Philosophical Studies, 81, 121 – 42. ------ 2000: 'A Theory of the A Priori'. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81, pp. 1 – 30. 97 Of course he takes himself to have refuted that view already but, if what I argued above is correct, he has not. 98 See e.g. his 2003b and 2007b, Ch 4. 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Toward'Intellectually'Virtuous'Discourse:' Two'Vicious'Fallacies'and'the'Virtues'that'Inhibit'Them' ' ' Robert'K.'Garcia'and'Nathan'L.King' ' ! Robert!K.!Garcia! Texas!A&M!University! [email protected]! www.robertkgarcia.com! ! Nathan!L.!King! Whitworth!University! [email protected]! http://philpapers.org/profile/74972! ! ! ! Request'from'the'authors:' ! If!you!would!be!so!kind,!please!send!us!a!quick!email!if!...! ! • you!are!reading!this!for!a!university!or!college!course,!or! • you!are!citing!this!in!your!own!work.! ! It!is!rewarding!to!know!how!our!work!is!being!used,!especially!if!it!has! been!adopted!as!required!or!recommended!reading.!!! ! Thank!you.! ! ! Citation'Information:' ! Garcia,!R.!and!King.!N.!(2016).!!"Toward!Intellectually!Virtuous!Discourse:!! Two!Vicious!Fallacies!and!the!Virtues!that!Inhibit!Them"!(with!Nathan! King)!in!Intellectual)Virtues)and)Education:)Essays)in)Applied)Virtue) Epistemology,!edited!by!J.!Baehr.!Routledge,!202\220.!!! Public discourse is ailing. Instead of yielding mutual understanding and respect, our debates are often infected with suspicions, accusations, belief polarization, and ideological entrenchment. One malady is what Richard Lipsky calls the athleticization of politics, "the transposition of sports values into political discourse" (1979, p. 29). Martha Nussbaum describes the phenomenon as follows: When people think that political debate is something like an athletic contest, where the aim is to score points for their own side, they are likely to see the 'other side' as the enemy and to wish its defeat, or even humiliation. It would not occur to them to seek compromise or to find common ground . . . with their adversaries. (2010, p. 11) Unfortunately, the conditions that characterize public discourse often contaminate the classroom as well. As evidence of the effects of athleticization in the classroom, we offer both a confession and an observation. The confession is that we are wary of discussing extremely controversial topics in the classroom. In fact, we are so wary that we tend to steer classroom discussion away from such topics and sometimes leave certain topics out of a syllabus. So much for the confession. The observation is that many of our colleagues have made similar confessions. But perhaps exculpation is not hard to find: After all, such topics are avoided precisely because it is believed-not unreasonably-that discussing them would produce more heat than light, that discussing abortion, for example, is likely to transform a community of learners into a horde of gladiators. Although such wariness is understandable, it is also tragic. One aim of education in a democratic nation is the promotion of healthy civic discourse. Another is to prepare students to make valuable contributions to the same. In part, the latter aim is accomplished by providing students with an environment that fosters the intellectual virtues that characterize an examined life. This requires an atmosphere in which the student enjoys the freedom to discover and articulate what she believes, to examine how well her beliefs hang together, and to probe for underlying assumptions and 12 Toward Intellectually Virtuous Discourse Two Vicious Fallacies and the Virtues that Inhibit Them Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 202 19-10-2015 15:16:22 Toward Intellectually Virtuous Discourse 203 biases-without the fear that self-disclosure will trigger accusations and pigeonholing from fellow students. We offer no panacea for the disease of classroom athleticization. Nor do we have a simple prescription that will ensure productive discussions outside the classroom. Nevertheless, we offer some "experimental treatments" for promoting the healthy discussion of controversial issues. In the first two sections of the chapter, we identify and explain two fallacious patterns of thought that often afflict discussions of controversial issues: assailment-byentailment (section 1) and the attitude-to-agent fallacy (section 2). In effect, these sections diagnose two diseases of discourse. We conclude each section with practical suggestions-in the form of thinking routines-for treating these disorders. We will argue that part of the cure is to be found in the intellectual virtues. In particular, we will explain how the virtues of intellectual carefulness, fairness, charity, and humility can inoculate the mind against the fallacies we identify. 1. ASSAILMENT-BY-ENTAILMENT In this section we draw attention to a mistaken pattern of thinking which is common both inside and outside the classroom. It occurs twice in the following dialogue in which two students-Frank and Judith-are discussing the moral status of abortion. FRANK: Hey Judith, what's your take on abortion? Don't you agree that abortion on demand is morally wrong? JUDITH: Actually, no. I think that abortion is morally permissible. FRANK: What!? I couldn't disagree more. I just can't believe-like you do-that it's okay to murder an innocent person! JUDITH: Whoa-who said I believe that? Besides, I just can't believe-like you do-that it's okay to curtail the rights of women! What's going on here? The discussion begins with disclosure but ends with censure. It begins with Frank and Judith sharing what they believe about abortion but ends with each accusing the other of holding a further (and repugnant) belief. In their opening statements, Frank and Judith discover that they disagree over the moral status of abortion. But notice what happens next. In the last two statements, we find belief attributions. In each statement, a belief is attributed to the other person. Frank attributes to Judith the belief that it's permissible to murder an innocent person. Judith, in turn, attributes to Frank the belief that it's permissible to curtail the rights of women. Moreover, in each case the attributed belief is a repugnant one-that is, a belief that is extremely distasteful or offensive. The exchange illustrates a twofold dynamic that often hampers the discussion 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 203 19-10-2015 15:16:22 204 Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King of controversial topics. The destructive dynamic concerns the belief attribution, which involves both a fallacious inference and a failure of intellectual virtue. We will discuss each of these in turn. The above belief attributions commit a logical fallacy we call assailmentby -entailment. This can be understood as a special type of straw man fallacy-a pattern of reasoning that involves characterizing an opponent's views so that they appear less plausible than they really are.1 To see the problem, notice that Frank and Judith engage in belief attribution because of their unstated beliefs-specifically beliefs about conditional claims. Consider Frank. He doesn't explicitly say so, but he believes the following conditional: If abortion is morally permissible then it is permissible to murder an innocent person. In their exchange, Frank discovers that Judith believes the conditional's if-clause, that abortion is morally permissible. He then accuses her of believing something particularly repugnant-the conditional's then-clause, that it is permissible to murder an innocent person. This attribution is a mistake on Frank's part. Although he believes the conditional, he has no evidence that Judith does. Thus, his belief attribution-his accusation that Judith believes the conditional's then-clause-is unwarranted. Now consider Judith, who makes the same kind of mistake. Her unstated belief is in the following conditional: If abortion is morally wrong then it is permissible to curtail the rights of women. She learns that Frank believes the conditional's if-clause. She then accuses him of believing something particularly repugnant-the conditional's then-clause, that it is permissible to curtail the rights of women. But she has no evidence that Frank believes the conditional. So her belief attribution is also unwarranted. We call this fallacy assailment-by-entailment. The "entailment" is expressed by the conditional claim, the claim of the form "P entails Q." The "assailment" consists in one person's attributing a repugnant belief to another person, thus, in effect, censuring them. It will be convenient to have generic names for these two people. So-with apologies to namesakes-let's use "Abe" as a name for anyone who commits assailment-by-entailment and "Vic" for Abe's unfortunate victim. Using these names, we can now describe the general features of the fallacy. Abe believes P entails Q, where Q is an especially repugnant thing to believe. He comes to discover that Vic believes P, but Abe lacks sufficient reason to think that Vic believes P entails Q. Nevertheless, Abe attributes to Vic the belief that Q. Let's now reflect on what is generally wrong with assailment-byentailment . As the example illustrates, Abe attributes an especially repugnant belief to Vic. The attribution, however, is unjustified. That is, Abe lacks sufficient evidence for thinking that Vic holds the repugnant belief. Notice that Vic may, in fact, hold the belief; the problem is that Abe has insufficient grounds for thinking that Vic does. In fact, in some cases, Abe has evidence that Vic actually rejects the repugnant belief. This evidence might be direct, in the form of Vic's explicit and emphatic rejection of the belief in question; 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 204 19-10-2015 15:16:22 Toward Intellectually Virtuous Discourse 205 or it might be indirect, consisting in the evidence that Vic is an educated, morally upright person, and that most such persons wouldn't hold such a repugnant belief. Most generally, assailment-by-entailment involves failing to mind one's evidence. In this respect, it is similar to many other fallacies. What makes assailment-by-entailment interesting, however, is that it conflates alleged or actual logical entailment with belief attribution. In short, Abe conflates what he takes Vic's beliefs to entail with what he takes Vic to believe. To unpack this, let us reconstruct Abe's thinking as proceeding along the following lines: 1. Vic believes P. 2. If P is true then Q is true. 3. So Vic must believe Q. Suppose Abe is right in accepting (1)-Vic does believe P. And suppose Abe is right that P entails Q; that is, (2) is true. Abe nevertheless errs in moving to the belief attribution represented by (3). That is, Abe errs in moving from (1) and (2) to (3). In other words, even if Abe is correct in believing (1) and (2), it doesn't follow that (3) is true, much less that Abe is justified in believing (3). (Of course, if Abe is wrong and (2) is false, he commits two errors rather than one. He makes a bad inference and employs a false premise in doing so. But we'll leave the second error to the side in order to focus on the first.) To further understand Abe's error, keep in mind that there are different doxastic attitudes one can have toward a claim: one can believe it (affirm), disbelieve it (deny), or suspend judgment about it (neither affirm nor deny). Suspending judgment is the cognitive equivalent of shrugging your shoulders. Now, to see that Abe's move from (1) and (2) to (3) is a mistake, suppose for the sake of argument that Abe is correct in thinking that Vic believes P, and moreover, is correct in thinking that P entails Q. Suppose, that is, that (1) and (2) are true. Nevertheless, any of the following could still be the case: • Vic believes P but doesn't have any attitude toward Q; the content of Q has never crossed his mind. • Vic believes P but doesn't have any attitude about the connection between P and Q; although he believes P and has thought about Q, he has never thought about whether P entails Q. • Vic believes P but suspends judgment on Q; he has thought about whether Q is true but can't make up his mind. • Vic believes P but suspends judgment on whether P entails Q; he can't make up his mind about whether or not the entailment holds. • Vic believes P but denies Q; he understands Q and thinks that Q is false. • Vic believes P but denies that P entails Q; he understands both P and Q, but denies that the entailment holds. 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 205 19-10-2015 15:16:22 206 Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King In each case, Vic believes P but does not believe P entails Q. Because of this, the fact that (1) and (2) are true is consistent with any number of scenarios in which (3) is false.2 Thus, Abe errs in moving from (1) and (2)-where the latter is a claim about what Abe thinks Vic's belief entails-to (3), what Abe thinks Vic must believe. Put differently, Abe mistakenly draws a conclusion about what Vic must believe from what he (Abe) thinks Vic's belief entails. Abe knows that Vic believes P, but because Abe lacks good reasons for thinking that Vic also believes that P entails Q, Abe errs in assuming that Vic believes Q. Lacking such reasons, Abe's belief attribution ([3] above) is unjustified. Notice that Abe's reasoning to (3) is fallacious even if Abe is correct about P's entailing Q, and even if Vic has good reason to believe that P entails Q. In some cases in which Abe performs the assailment-by-entailment inference on Vic, Vic may indeed hold incoherent or otherwise irrational beliefs. And in some such cases, Abe may be justified in taking (or even declaring that) Vic's set of beliefs to be incoherent or otherwise irrational (perhaps, given his other commitments, Vic ought to believe Q). None of that is under dispute here. The present point is about whether Abe is justified in charging Vic with the specific crime of believing Q. And for reasons just discussed, Abe's reasoning in that matter is fallacious. A logical mistake is part of what goes wrong in assailment-by-entailment. A helpful way to describe this logical mistake is that it is a failure of carefulness. For whatever else intellectual carefulness involves, it surely requires attending to one's evidence. And in committing assailment-by-entailment, Abe fails to do this, blurring together alleged logical entailment and belief attribution while hastily inferring that Vic believes something awful. There is more, however. Abe also fails to exhibit the intellectual virtues of fairness and charity. More on these virtues in a moment. First, it will help to explain in more detail what we mean by intellectual virtues. In general terms, intellectual virtues are habits of a well-functioning mind, dispositions that make for cognitive excellence. As understood here, intellectual virtues are cognitive character traits that involve a motivation for intellectual goods like true belief, knowledge, and wisdom. As character traits, intellectual virtues are typically acquired via training and inculcation-they aren't "hard-wired."3 Further, as character traits, intellectual virtues differ from faculties (e.g., vision) and skills (e.g., mathematical proficiency). These latter features help explain why intellectually virtuous agents are admirable. They have to work to achieve their virtue (unlike someone born with good vision). And their character traits involve their deep and fundamental commitments in a way that mere skills typically do not. In addition to intellectual carefulness, fairness, and charity, such mental habits include humility, honesty, firmness, courage, perseverance, and open-mindedness.4 With this general understanding of the intellectual virtues in place, let's consider fairness and charity in particular. We can begin by comparing these intellectual virtues with their moral counterparts. The difference between behaviors characteristic of intellectual 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 206 19-10-2015 15:16:22 Toward Intellectually Virtuous Discourse 207 fairness and charity is akin to the difference between two familiar moral principles: SILVER RULE: Don't do to others what you wouldn't have them do to you. GOLDEN RULE: Do unto others as you would have them do to you. The Silver Rule, well known across religious and secular moral traditions, is a negative imperative ("don't do X") that corresponds to our notion of moral fairness. The Golden Rule, predominant in the Judeo-Christian tradition, is a positive imperative such that, if we obey it, we both fulfill and go beyond the requirements of the Silver Rule. Fulfilling the Golden Rule, it is often thought, suffices for the expression of moral charity. This analogy, though just a start, helps us to see at least this much: In moral matters, to be charitable is to go beyond fairness. It is to give to another more than he or she deserves, and to do so virtuously. With this point in hand, we can unpack the concepts of intellectual fairness and charity- as we'll see, a similar point applies in the intellectual realm. As a provisional way to put the difference between intellectual fairness and charity, we may say that intellectual fairness is a matter of not treating the views of others as less plausible than they actually are, while intellectual charity is a matter of treating the views of others as plausible as one reasonably can-even if doing so requires improving upon the views others actually hold. It will help to focus on the specific intellectual activity of interpreting others' views.5 In carrying out this activity, we act with intellectual fairness when we refrain from interpreting others' views as less plausible than they really are. Being disposed to refrain in this way is central to possessing fairness as a character trait-fair agents are disposed to refrain from unfair intellectual acts. They act fairly toward others in the midst of intellectual activities. A fair agent does not treat her discussion partners in ways she would not wish to be treated (as concerns intellectual endeavors). Further, because she exhibits intellectual fairness, the agent with this trait will tend to act fairly for the sake of intellectual goods like true belief, knowledge, and wisdom, where these goods concern both her interlocutor and the issue under dispute. A thinker who is intellectually fair avoids acting unfairly in part as a consequence of a general concern for the truth and related goods. This general concern leads to a motivation to hold true beliefs about his interlocutors (and so avoid unjustified belief attributions about them) and to seek the truth about the disputed issue. With respect to the latter, the intellectually fair agent will not (say) dismiss a view because a poorly developed version of it is implausible. To dismiss a view for such a reason is to exhibit disregard for truth-after all, a more plausible version of the view may lurk nearby. Whereas intellectual fairness requires that one refrain from rendering another person's views as less attractive than they really are, intellectual 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 207 19-10-2015 15:16:22 208 Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King charity requires more. In interpreting others' views, we act with charity when we interpret those views so as to make them seem as plausible as we reasonably can, even if this requires "massaging" those views in order to improve them. We don't merely avoid attributing to others positions that are less plausible than the ones actually held. Rather, we seek the most plausible versions of our interlocutors' views, where this sometimes requires making "friendly amendments" to those views. Further, we do this both for the sake of those interlocutors and for the sake of the truth. Such charity is intellectually virtuous in part because it ensures that all parties to a dispute become familiar with the most plausible available alternatives. It helps to ensure informed selection from among competing views and helps us avoid rejecting the spirit of a view on the grounds that many renderings of its letter are implausible. An example may further clarify the distinction between fairness and charity. Consider a student discussing the moral status of physician-assisted suicide. Having cited a number of utilitarian considerations, the student concludes, "So we can see that allowing physician-assisted suicide achieves the ideal of Mill's principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number." The professor sees that this is a patently inaccurate reading of Mill, and so is faced with a choice. She can treat the student with mere fairness or she can treat the student with charity. As a way of doing the former, she might opt for a dead literal interpretation and then criticize the student on the grounds that "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" is both an inaccurate portrayal of Mill and an inherently problematic phrase. (She might point out that the "greatest happiness" part pulls against the "greatest number" part-if one distributes scarce goods so as to produce the greatest happiness for a given individual, then there's less to go around for everyone else.) Having left the student's expressed argument in shambles, the professor might move on to the next topic for discussion. However, instead of treating the student with mere fairness, she could say something like this: I see what you're after, though your portrayal of Mill's principle needs a bit of nuance. If we employ Mill's principle accurately in this context, we'll need to say that an action is right in proportion as it tends to promote happiness (or pleasure) and wrong in proportion as it tends to promote unhappiness (or pain).6 And you make a good case that the policy you recommend appears right, given that principle. Now let's talk a bit more about the details of your argument. The professor who pursues the latter route is taking occasion to improve her student's view while preserving its spirit. Though she is correcting the student, she is doing so by providing an amendment to which the student will be amenable. In exercising charity, she's doing this in part for the student's sake-she's helping the student avoid an important error and inch toward the truth. It is good (epistemically) for the student that she does this. 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 208 19-10-2015 15:16:22 Toward Intellectually Virtuous Discourse 209 It is also good (epistemically) for the rest of the class and for the professor herself. Her charitable interpretation is part of a process that allows all involved in the discussion to see the most plausible argument that a utilitarian can put forth on the issue. Thus, her charity is distinctively intellectual inasmuch as it aims at epistemic goods. Let's return to our discussion of assailment-by-entailment in order to see how this fallacy involves failures of intellectual fairness and charity. Recall the exchange between Frank and Judith over the morality of abortion. For his part, Frank attributes to Judith the belief that it is permissible to murder an innocent person. But surely this attribution is unfair and uncharitable. The attributed belief-that it is permissible to murder an innocent person-is extremely implausible and morally outrageous. Thus, in attributing that belief to Judith, Frank attributes to her a belief that is (likely) less plausible than the one she actually holds; further, he fails to attribute to her view as much plausibility as he reasonably can. After all, several alternative interpretations of Judith's position are readily available. Among them: Perhaps she doesn't believe the conditional claim that Frank believes, namely, that if abortion is morally permissible then it is permissible to murder an innocent person. Thus, while Judith believes that abortion is morally permissible, she doesn't believe that it is permissible to murder an innocent person. To be sure, Frank can still disagree with Judith. Indeed, Frank might think that Judith has made a mistake-even a terrible one-in failing to believe that abortion entails murder. But inasmuch as intelligent, good-willed people can disagree about that entailment relation (i.e., the conditional claim), Frank can attribute intelligence and good will to Judith even while thinking that she has made a mistake in not seeing things his way. In this case, it's more charitable for Frank to think Judith has made a mistake-even a terrible one-than to attribute to her the belief that it is permissible to murder an innocent person. The latter belief is deeply offensive-especially in Frank's eyes-and, in any case, Judith can reasonably deny that she holds it. In sum, in refraining from attributing the repugnant belief to Judith, Frank can act in step with intellectual virtue without acting out of step with his evidence (about Judith or the abortion issue). Of course, for exactly similar reasons, Judith fails to treat Frank with intellectual fairness and charity. Judith attributes to him the belief that it is permissible to curtail women's rights. But, again, this attribution is unfair and uncharitable. That belief is extremely implausible and morally outrageous-especially in Judith's eyes. Thus, in attributing that belief to Frank, Judith fails to think as well of him as she reasonably can-she treats his views as less plausible than they really are, a failure of fairness that implies a failure of charity. After all, an alternative interpretation of Frank's position is also available: He doesn't believe the conditional that Judith believes, that if abortion is morally wrong then it is permissible to curtail the rights of women. Thus, while Frank believes that abortion is morally wrong, 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 209 19-10-2015 15:16:22 210 Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King he doesn't believe that it is permissible to curtail women's rights. And so on. For Judith, acting in step with intellectual virtue would involve refraining from the belief attribution; moreover, she can do so without acting out of step with her evidence. As already suggested, thinkers who possess the intellectual virtues of carefulness, fairness, and charity will characteristically avoid committing the assailment-by-entailment fallacy. Intellectually careful agents are disposed to consider whether their evidence supports the claim that their dissenters hold repugnant beliefs. And intellectually fair and charitable agents are disposed to avoid attributing repugnant beliefs to others-at least when more friendly attributions are reasonable. When such agents exercise good cognitive character, they will avoid committing the assailment-by-entailment fallacy. Of course, it's one thing to understand how virtuous thinkers act, and quite another to be disposed to act in those ways. For example, when students lack the intellectual virtues, their character won't help to save them from vicious thinking. So, it's important to say something about how the virtues may be acquired, or at any rate, about how students can more often behave in ways virtuous thinkers would behave, even before these students actually acquire the virtues. Recent work on thinking routines is helpful to this end. In his book Intellectual Character (2002), Ron Ritchhart notes several features of so-called "thinking routines." These are routines involving thinking that: (i) consist of a few steps; (ii) are easy to teach and learn; (iii) are easily supported; (iv) can be used repeatedly in a number of different contexts; and (v) are explicitly geared toward helping those who practice them become better thinkers. One such routine is "Claim-Support-Question" (or CSQ). When students apply this routine, they isolate the claim under consideration; they then examine the support that has been provided for the claim; finally, they ask questions (e.g., they ask to what extent the support for the claim is adequate). The link between thinking routines and intellectual virtues is simple: By using thinking routines, students engage in cognitive behavior that approximates that of excellent (virtuous) thinkers. As author and educator Philip Dow explains, "Thinking routines serve as an important bridge connecting our everyday thinking with intellectually virtuous aims."7 Thinking routines, in other words, can help foster students' acquisition of intellectual virtues by enabling students to practice the thinking patterns of intellectually virtuous thinkers. And even in cases where students don't finally acquire the virtues, thinking routines can help students more often think in characteristically virtuous ways. With this in mind, we suggest two thinking routines that are especially relevant to avoiding the assailment-by-entailment fallacy. Because both routines ask students to consider the logical link between claims and supporting evidence, they can be regarded as sitting on the "scaffolding" of the CSQ 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 210 19-10-2015 15:16:22 Toward Intellectually Virtuous Discourse 211 routine. Indeed, the first suggested routine is a strategic application of CSQ. In the context of controversial discussions, these routines should foster cognitive behaviors characteristic of a careful, fair, charitable thinker. • Attitude or Entailment? When they are tempted to attribute a repugnant belief to a classmate (or when they have already done this), students should be asked to consider the attitudes they are attributing to others, along with the grounds for those attributions. They should isolate a claim (e.g., so-and-so believes murder is permissible), and question the support for that claim (e.g., that so-and-so is pro-choice, a position which a pro-life student may take to have a repugnant entailment). For instance, the students may be invited to ask a question of the form: How might someone accept the antecedent of a conditional but not its consequent (and so not the conditional itself)? The distinction between belief attribution and logical entailment provides further help here, and instructors can introduce that distinction. Perhaps students merely have grounds for thinking that a dissenter's belief entails the repugnant claim. Once students see this, the debate becomes less personal. It becomes more about testing for logical entailments and less about pinning problematic beliefs to one's classmates. Attitude or Entailment can be combined with a second routine-one that is especially appropriate once logical entailments become the focus of discussion: • Real or Apparent Entailment? If a student thinks that his dissenter's belief entails something repugnant, instructors may ask the student to consider inviting his dissenter to discuss whether or not the entailment holds. For example, Frank and Judith might be invited to discuss the following questions: Does the pro-life view really entail that it is permissible to curtail women's rights? And, does the pro-choice view really entail that it is permissible to murder innocent people? Perhaps the relevant beliefs only appear to have the repugnant entailments. For students to act in ways characteristic of carefulness, fairness, and charity, they should at least consider these possibilities, and this may advance their discussion. Of course, there are many additional ways of helping students avoid the assailment-by-entailment fallacy, just as there are many more ways of fostering intellectual virtues. The routines just described are simply two clear, concrete ways of helping students move toward intellectual virtue and away from a fallacy that plagues many classroom discussions. We'll return to the idea of thinking routines below. But first, we want to name and shame a second fallacy that often arises in debates over controversial issues. 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 211 19-10-2015 15:16:22 212 Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King 2. THE ATTITUDE-TO-AGENT FALLACY Having committed the error of assailment-by-entailment, we can make ourselves vulnerable to further bad inferences. More specifically, we can dispose ourselves to make unwarranted inferences from a person's attitude toward a claim (belief, disbelief, suspension of judgment) to a conclusion about the agent herself. In what remains, such inferences will be dubbed attitude-toagent inferences. Let's return to the abortion example to illustrate such an inference. After learning that Judith is pro-choice, Frank accuses her of believing that murder is permissible. And Judith, after learning that Frank is pro-life, accuses him of believing that it's permissible to curtail women's rights. As we saw, both of these moves involve the assailment-by-entailment fallacy. But one can imagine their conversation continuing (and ending!) with the following disparagements: FRANK: You're a moral monster! JUDITH: You're a misogynistic pig! These accusations stem from belief attributions: Frank moves from Judith believes that it's permissible to murder innocent people to Judith is a moral monster, whereas Judith moves from Frank believes that it's permissible to curtail women's rights to Frank is a misogynist. Each is a clear attitude-toagent inference. Moreover, each inference is unjustified. Generally speaking, there is a logical gap between she believes such-and-such and she is a so-and-so. That is, an isolated claim about a person's propositional attitude does not justify a negative evaluation of the person herself.8 Below, we will say more about the nature and folly of this kind of mistake. And we'll draw upon recent research in social psychology to show that the attitude-to-agent fallacy is dangerous for an additional reason: We're easily tempted toward it. But first, let's consider another example. Comedians Kate Smurthwaite and Steve Harvey recently made headlines for their controversial remarks about people who hold religious views opposed to their own. In a heated discussion on the British TV debate show The Big Questions, Smurthwaite (an atheist) quipped, "Faith by definition is believing in things without evidence. And, personally, I don't do that because I'm not an idiot."9 Lest you think only atheists are capable of such bluster, consider an exchange between Harvey and Joy Behar on Larry King Live. Harvey, a Christian, was unsure how to define the term "atheist." So he asked Behar for a definition. She replied, "An atheist is someone who doesn't quite believe that . . . there is some god out there." Harvey responded, "Well then, to me, you are an idiot. . . . If you believe that, then I don't like talking to you." In each of these cases, the comedian moves immediately from a claim about their dissenter's attitude (belief or disbelief in God) to a claim about the dissenter. In Smurthwaite's case it's having faith that suffices to make one an idiot; in Harvey's, it's the lack of it. 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 212 19-10-2015 15:16:22 Toward Intellectually Virtuous Discourse 213 What's wrong with these attitude-to-agent inferences? Most generally, they're faulty because their premises (claims about an agent's attitude toward some proposition) are poor evidence for their conclusions (claims about the agent herself). And no inference is good if its premises fail to provide good evidence for its conclusion. There is, in short, a large logical chasm between a single belief attribution (e.g., she's against affirmative action) and a negative evaluation of an agent (e.g., she's a racist). Having been warned about this gap-it is to be hoped-we'll be less prone to fall into it. The above attitude-to-agent inferences are fallacies of insufficient evidence. But many fallacious inference patterns share this fault. So, it will be helpful to diagnose attitude-to-agent fallacies in more detail. This diagnosis draws attention to certain features of the fallacies that, once recognized, can help inoculate us against them. The first feature we'll highlight concerns the way attitude-to-agent inferences often fail to exclude alternative explanations of a dissenter's belief. Consider Harvey's inference: PREMISE: Kate is an atheist (she believes there's no God). CONCLUSION: Kate is an idiot. Harvey doesn't define what he means by "idiot"-definitions aren't his strong suit. But he seems to take the term not to convey some sort of general disdain (as would, say, "jackass"), but rather to connote some sort of cognitive defect (perhaps ignorance or close-mindedness or dogmatism). But taken this way, the premise of Harvey's argument not only fails to force us to the conclusion, by itself, it doesn't even point us in that direction. There are many alternative conclusions that are consistent with the premise of this argument. Consider just three of them: • Kate thought carefully about God's existence and formed her belief on the basis of the best evidence she could muster. • Kate formed her atheistic belief after moderately careful reflection on the basis of moderately good evidence. • Kate formed her atheistic belief hastily, on the basis of poor evidence, but this is uncharacteristic of her-she's usually quite careful. All of these conclusions-and more besides-are consistent with the premise that Kate is an atheist. And given just this premise, all of these conclusions are hypotheses that explain Kate's atheism at least as well as the explanation that Kate is an idiot. The atheist-to-idiot inference fails to rule out these alternative hypotheses. Without further evidence, one has no more reason to accept the idiot conclusion than any of its alternatives. Given these "live" alternatives, one is likely to believe falsely if one infers that Kate is an idiot. One should not draw this inference-at least not without further evidence. (Parallel remarks apply to Smurthwaite's theist-to-idiot inference.) 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 213 19-10-2015 15:16:22 214 Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King It is worth pausing to unpack this point. In general, if we disagree with someone, we can stick to our guns without attributing anything negative to the other person's character. This is true even when we know that the other person has all the same relevant evidence that we ourselves have. Suppose, to return to our example, that Steve is a theist who has all the same evidence relevant to God's existence as Kate has. Steve then meets Kate and discovers that she's an atheist. He then learns that Kate has all of the same evidence that he (Steve) has. In these circumstances, Steve need not infer that Kate is an idiot. Indeed, he shouldn't infer this. But what can he sensibly think about her instead? One straightforward and charitable thing for Steve to think is that Kate has simply made a mistake in evaluating the evidence. Somehow, she doesn't see what Steve is able to see-perhaps because of some subtle blind spot or uncharacteristic error in reasoning.10 Consistent with this, Steve might nevertheless admire Kate's intellect on the whole and assume that she is sincerely seeking the sober truth. Crucially, this line of thought is right even if Steve knows he and Kate have all the same evidence. But why think he's in position to know this? And why think that we will often be in a good position to think that we and our dissenters share the same evidence? To put it tersely, it can be difficult even to grasp the contents and workings of our own minds. It is very often more difficult to grasp the contents and workings of someone else's.11 This counsels even further caution about making the inference from what someone believes to a general and negative assessment of her intellectual character. For if we aren't sure what evidence our dissenter has, we're very poorly placed to make a judgment about whether her belief is rational given that evidence-let alone to make a judgment to the effect that she's an irrational or intellectually vicious person. One mistake does not an idiot make. Two analogies may help amplify this point. Suppose we're watching a baseball game and watch just one performance of a particular batter. Suppose that, on this occasion, the batter strikes out. We shouldn't infer from this that he's a lousy hitter. Having viewed just one performance, we're in no position to draw an overarching claim about the player's hitting competence. And if this is right, then the parallel point applies to what Steve should think about Kate. This point is especially apt when it comes to certain controversial topics. Here, such inferences are more like thinking someone is clumsy because he fails a difficult parkour flip. Just as such acrobatics place humans at the edge of their physical abilities, discussion of controversial issues in religion, ethics, and politics places us at the edge of our cognitive limits-which is all the more reason to insist on fairness and charity in these contexts. Here is the take-home point: At least without further evidence, we're unjustified in making inferences from another agent's doxastic attitudes (she believes P) to negative attributions regarding the agent herself-that she's dumb or wicked or treacherous. It's worth noting that the attitude-to-agent inference is something like the reverse of an ad hominem argument. In a typical ad hominem, one moves 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 214 19-10-2015 15:16:22 Toward Intellectually Virtuous Discourse 215 from a negative assessment of a dissenter-"she's biased or uninformed or stupid" to a claim that the dissenter's belief is false-"she's wrong about X." In an attitude-to-agent inference, one moves from what one takes to be an erroneous belief to a negative assessment of another's character. It is uncontroversial that the first maneuver is a logical mistake-there's a large logical gap between premise and conclusion. But as should be clear, the second sort of inference is also fallacious. It is not as though the logical gap shrinks when one tries to jump from the other direction.12 What makes an attitude-to-agent inference dangerous isn't merely the fact that it's careless and unwarranted-though that would be bad enough. It's also unfair and uncharitable. In the context of assessing another person's intellectual character, fairness requires that one refrain from attributing to another a character that is worse than it reasonably seems, given one's evidence. Charity requires that one actively seek to attribute to another the best cognitive character one reasonably can, given one's evidence. But then, clearly, moving straight from she and I disagree to she's an idiot is neither fair nor charitable. Inferring the latter claim from the former should be our last resort. It is a move to be made only after we have explored and eliminated alternative attributions that are consistent with the fact that our discussion partner holds a contrary view. To sum up intellectual fairness in this context: We wouldn't want others to perform a negative attitude-to-agent inference on us, so we shouldn't perform this inference on them. To sum up intellectual charity in this context: We would want others to perform the most winsome assessments of our intellectual character that they reasonably can, so we should perform this assessment on them. As we've seen, the attitude-to-agent fallacy should be avoided for several reasons. It leads us into false and unwarranted beliefs. Worse still, it leads us into false and unwarranted beliefs that are harmful to others. In virtue of this, it breeds dissension and soils discourse. These features alone should prompt us toward vigilance against the fallacy. But there's another reason we should redouble our efforts to avoid it: Research in social psychology suggests that humans are disposed to commit the fallacy. As psychologist Robert Abelson insightfully observes, we treat our beliefs like possessions. Consider how we speak of our beliefs. We acquire them, we obtain them, we buy into them, we maintain them, we abandon them, we discard them-just as we do our cars and computers. As a result, when our beliefs are under attack, we protect them just as we protect our physical possessions.13 And clearly, when we find ourselves party to disagreement over our cherished beliefs, those beliefs are under attack. In such circumstances, we may be especially vulnerable to questionable inferences. And while this vulnerability may make such inferences understandable, it does not make them epistemically justifiable. One well-known mechanism that can lead to poor inferences is cognitive dissonance. Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson describe it like this: "Cognitive dissonance is a state of tension that occurs whenever one holds two 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 215 19-10-2015 15:16:22 216 Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King cognitions (ideas, attitudes, beliefs, opinions) that are psychologically inconsistent."14 Such dissonance, they explain, produces mental discomfort that prompts us to resolve the tension between competing cognitions. Suppose, for example, that Bud drinks a lot of beer and, because he's not drunk all the time, he knows that he drinks a case of beer every day. If he also comes to believe that drinking large amounts of alcohol is bad for his health, he will experience cognitive dissonance. He'll then be prompted to remove this dissonance. Bud might tell himself, "Perhaps there's a flaw in the studies thought to expose the dangers of alcohol." Or Bud might resolve the dissonance by giving up the habit, or by telling himself that he'll quit very soon. It's easy to see how cognitive dissonance might make a person vulnerable to the attitude-to-agent fallacy. Notice that the phenomenon of disagreement is a common source of dissonance. For when we're made aware of intelligent, sincere people who disagree with us, we thereby receive at least some evidence that our beliefs are mistaken or unwarranted15-and this can introduce dissonance. To make this concrete, suppose Peggy believes that God exists and comes to believe that Sue, an intelligent and good-willed person, disagrees with her. Dissonance theory says that under such circumstances, Peggy will attempt to reduce the dissonance between these two beliefs. And if she's prone to protect her most cherished beliefs, Peggy will do this by trying to salvage her belief about God. She may be tempted to do this by abandoning her belief that Sue really is intelligent and sincere, and by adopting some other (less flattering) belief about Sue. In other words, the cognitive dissonance may well tempt Peggy toward the attitude-to-agent fallacy. Of course, things don't have to go this way. The disagreement may lead Peggy to revise her belief about God, or to make a more virtuous inference about Sue (e.g., that Sue has simply made a mistake). But given her awareness of the stakes and the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance (psychologists liken our tendency to reduce it as akin to the tendencies to reduce hunger and thirst), the circumstances should clearly raise Peggy's guard. Under the circumstances described, she's clearly more prone to making attitude-to-agent inferences than she would otherwise be. An additional reason for caution is the human tendency toward what psychologists call fundamental attribution error.16 This error-called "fundamental" because it's so pervasive in human cognition-concerns our tendency to overestimate the influence of stable character on the actions of others and to underestimate the influence of others' situations in explaining their behavior. For example, if we see another bump into a table, we're apt to characterize him as clumsy. If we ourselves bump the table, well, it was poorly placed and the room was too small. Likewise, if we notice that someone is nervous before singing in public, we're prone to characterize her as a nervous person. If we ourselves are nervous prior to a performance, it's just because we're in a stressful situation-it's not because we're characteristically nervous. If we see a father bawling out his kids, we think he's a mean 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 216 19-10-2015 15:16:22 Toward Intellectually Virtuous Discourse 217 dad, but if we yell at our kids, it's because we're especially stressed and they're being especially obnoxious. The research on fundamental attribution error is ongoing. At this stage, there is no consensus about the exact frequency with which human subjects fall prey to this sort of reasoning. However, many psychologists think we are highly susceptible to this mistake. This is relevant to our discussion of the attitude-to-agent fallacy. For the two inference patterns are strikingly similar. In a simple case, when committing the fundamental attribution error, one moves from a single performance (he yelled at his kids) to a character attribution (he's a mean person). In committing the attitude-to-agent fallacy, one moves from a single belief of another person (she's an atheist) to a broader negative evaluation of the person herself (she's an idiot). Further, suppose we think of beliefs as cognitive performances. Given that thought, whenever someone commits the attitude-to-agent fallacy and concludes that her dissenter has bad character, she thereby commits the fundamental attribution error. So some cases of the attitude-to-agent fallacy are themselves instances of the fundamental attribution error. In light of the similarity between the two inference patterns, the research on fundamental attribution error should set us on guard against the attitude-to-agent fallacy. If we're prone to commit the one, there's reason to think we're prone to commit the other.17 We'll close this essay by showing briefly how the intellectual virtues of carefulness, fairness, charity, and humility can help avert the attitude-toagent fallacy, and by suggesting some thinking routines that may help students engage in more intellectually virtuous ways. First, the above attitude-to-agent inferences suggest a lack of mindfulness about the link between a claim (she is a so-and-so) and the evidence invoked to support it (she believes such-and such). Normally, characteristically careful agents will not commit errors of this sort. Likewise, when the cause of a disagreement can be explained without attributing bad character (for example, when it can be explained by a dissenter's error in evaluating evidence), a fair thinker will refrain from attributing bad character to her dissenter. And a charitable thinker will actively seek to cast her opponent's intellectual character in the best reasonable light. When it comes to the attitude-to-agent inference, it almost goes without saying that exercising fairness and charity curbs the fallacy and leads to better discussions. After all, fair, charitable people tend not to call an interlocutor idiotic or dangerous simply because they espouse a different view. And it's not as though it would take much to improve discussions in which people do engage in such name-calling. A dab of fairness and a dash of charity can improve the quality of such discussions significantly. Moreover, the exercise of these virtues will invite consideration of why one's dissenter believes as she does. To put it in a personal way: If I refrain from thinking that my dissenter is an idiot, I'm thereby open to consider alternative explanations of her belief. Perhaps she has not assessed her evidence well; or 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 217 19-10-2015 15:16:22 218 Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King perhaps her evidence is misleading. Or perhaps I'm the one who has made a mistake or whose evidence is misleading. Intellectual humility would seem to require that I at least consider these possibilities-especially once I come to see that the "she's an idiot" explanation is both unfair and unjustified. And if I cease to see my dissenter as an idiot, I may come to see her as someone from whom I can learn. If I come reasonably to see her as intelligent and well meaning, I may even consider the possibility that I am mistaken. But again: Learning that the virtues benefit those who possess them is of little help to those who don't yet have them. Those in that group need help-help in eventually acquiring the intellectual virtues and in more often thinking like virtuous thinkers in the meantime. The following applications of the CSQ thinking routine are among the resources that may help: • Attitude or Agent? Students who are tempted to attribute to a dissenter (agent) a vicious character trait should consider whether they have good grounds for this. In particular, they should question whether their only support for this attribution claim is their dissenter's attitude toward the proposition under dispute. If it is, then the corresponding inference is unjustified. • Alternative Explanations: As a supplement to Attitude or Agent, students should consider alternative (non-character-based) explanations for their dissenter's belief. For example, perhaps the dissenter simply made an error on this occasion, or perhaps she's perfectly rational, after all-perhaps the student making the attribution has made the mistake. • Argue the Opposite: Students who hold a position on an issue can be assigned to argue in favor of the opposite of their position. So, for instance, if a student supports a pro-choice position on abortion, he or she may be required to argue for the pro-life view (and vice versa). This sort of assignment-doubtless in use by many professors-allows students to enter sympathetically into their dissenters' views. It thereby fosters intellectual fairness and charity. Regular practice with these routines can dispose students to stop and evaluate the support for claims that their dissenters are idiots, moral monsters, and the like. The routines thereby foster intellectual carefulness and do so in a way that leads students to consider the possibility that those with whom they disagree are worth taking seriously. In other words, the routines foster carefulness in a way that also fosters fairness, charity, and humility. 3. CONCLUDING REMARKS The athleticization of the classroom makes it difficult for educators to provide an atmosphere in which students can engage in mutually beneficial and constructive dialogue. We have identified two patterns of thought that 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 218 19-10-2015 15:16:23 Toward Intellectually Virtuous Discourse 219 frequently contribute to this difficulty-the assailment-by-entailment and attitude-to-agent fallacies-and have shown how damaging these fallacies can be, both to public discourse and to classroom discussions. These fallacies eat away at the quality of our discussions like a cancer; thus, they demand a cure. We have suggested that the intellectual virtues of carefulness, charity, fairness, and humility are part of this cure. Those who possess these virtues are largely inoculated from the fallacies, and even those who are still vulnerable to the fallacies can lessen their effects by seeking to inculcate the virtues. We have suggested several thinking routines that can be employed to this end, including Attitude or Entailment?, Real or Apparent Entailment?, Attitude or Agent?, and Alternative Explanations. It is our hope that the use of such routines, together with an increased mindfulness of the above fallacies, might help to foster genuine self-understanding, mutual understanding, and healthy civic discourse.18 NOTES 1 Not all instances of the straw man fallacy are instances of assailment-byentailment. In general, one commits a straw man when one characterizes the position of one's dissenter so as to make it seem less reasonable or attractive than it really is. That is, one attributes to the dissenter a less reasonable or less attractive view than she really holds and does so for the sake of discrediting that position. However, in the case of assailment-by-entailment, one does this in a very subtle and specific way: Namely, one starts with a belief a dissenter actually holds. One then adds a claim about what that belief entails, where this claim may or may not be true, and may or not be believed by one's dissenter, and where the consequence of the conditional is something repugnant. One then attributes the corresponding repugnant belief to one's dissenter. As the examples of assailment-by-entailment in section 1 make clear, to reason in this way is to commit a kind of straw man fallacy-for it is a way of making an opponent's beliefs seem less reasonable than they really are. Thanks to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for helpful discussion here. 2 Even in the case where Vic believes P and Vic believes that P entails Q, it still doesn't follow that Vic believes Q. Belief is not closed under logical entailment. 3 Some epistemologists-"virtue reliabilists"-understand intellectual virtues as reliable (truth-conducive) innate cognitive faculties, such as good vision and good reasoning. We have no objection to this terminology, nor to the idea that "faculty virtues" play a key role in a complete virtue epistemology. We view our project, which focuses on so-called "character virtues," as complementary to the work of virtue reliabilists. For prominent expressions of virtue reliabilism, see Sosa (2007) and (2009), and Greco (2010). For discussion of the relationship between faculty virtues and character virtues, see Baehr (2011, ch. 4). 4 For further discussion, see especially Roberts and Wood (2007). 5 The discussion of intellectual charity in this section benefits from that of Roberts and Wood (2007, pp. 73–78). 6 Mill (2001, p. 7). 7 Dow (2013, p. 132). 8 Of course, if one has information about a person in addition to knowing that he believes the isolated claim, then one may be justified in moving from a 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 219 19-10-2015 15:16:23 220 Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King claim about what someone believes to a negative assessment of his character. If I know that you're a well-educated, modern adult who has thought long and hard about the issue, and then learn that you believe sex slavery is permissible, I have reason to think that your character is morally suspect. But in a way, such a case illustrates the point to be made in this section: For in the case just described, I don't move from an isolated claim about your belief to a negative assessment of your character. The additional information about your education and social setting are doing crucial evidential "work" in the inference. But in that case, the inference isn't an attitude-to-agent inference of the sort under discussion. 9 It is possible to see something like assailment-by-entailment in Smurthwaite's comments. For present purposes, we leave this to the side. 10 For a detailed development of this line of thought, see Thomas Kelly (2005). Though Kelly's work addresses the issue of what one should think of one's dissenters, its primary focus is a related question: Should disagreement lead one to abandon one's own beliefs about the disputed topic itself? This question has spawned a large literature in epistemology. See, in addition to Kelly's paper, Feldman (2006) and Christensen (2009). See also the essays in Feldman and Warfield (2010), Machuca (2013), and Christensen and Lackey (2013). For a book-length introduction to the epistemology of disagreement, see Frances (2014). 11 For more on this point, see King (2012). 12 Thanks to Keith Wyma for helpful discussion here. 13 See the discussion of Abelson's work in Thomas Gilovich (1991, pp. 85–87). 14 Aronson and Tavris (2007, p. 13). Festinger (1957) is the seminal work on dissonance theory. 15 On this, see Christensen (2009). 16 See Ross and Nisbett (1991). 17 As we suggest, it would be premature to claim that the research demonstrates conclusively that we're vulnerable to the fundamental attribution error, much less the attitude-to-agent fallacy (see Sabini, Siepmann, and Stein, 2001). Nevertheless, even if the evidence doesn't justify full belief that we're prone to the attitude-to-agent fallacy, it seems to justify caution whenever we find ourselves embroiled in disagreement. Unless and until we get strong evidence that we have no fallacious tendency, it's best to stand watch against it. 18 The authors contributed equally to this essay. The authors wish to thank Jason Baehr for the opportunity to extend and further develop their previous efforts on these topics, which appeared in Garcia and King (2013). Some of the paragraphs here are borrowed and adapted from that work. For helpful comments and discussion, we would like to thank Mike Austin, Nathan Ballantyne, Tomás Bogardus, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Amy Garcia, Gary Varner, Kristie King, Tim Pawl, Dan Speak, Shari Tishman, Peter Wicks, Keith Wyma, and Dan Yim. We thank Jason Baehr and an anonymous reviewer for providing extensive and helpful comments. 6244-716-1pass-PIII-012-r03.indd 220 19-10-2015 15:16:

Los Foros de CTS, edición especial 2015 191 La teoría de las dos ciencias: ciencia burguesa y ciencia proletaria * Agustín Ostachuk ** ¿Cuál es la relación entre ciencia e ideología? ¿Son dos cosas incompatibles, complementarias o son la misma cosa? ¿Debe evitar la ciencia dejarse "contaminar" por la ideología? ¿Hay una única manera de hacer ciencia? ¿Todas conducen a los mismos resultados y nos dan la misma visión del mundo? Nos centraremos en la figura de Alexander Bogdanov, médico y filósofo ruso, para debatir sobre estos y otros temas de relevancia actual. Sus teorías dieron origen a lo que después se denominó la "teoría de las dos ciencias", que da título a este trabajo. Alexander Bogdanov: biografía Alexander Bogdanov nació en Goradnia, actual Bielorrusia, en el año 1873. Comenzó sus estudios de medicina en la Universidad de Moscú, viéndose obligado a continuarlos en 1894 en la Universidad de Járkov (Ucrania), debido a su participación en una protesta estudiantil. Se especializó en psiquiatría. En 1904 fue arrestado por sus actividades revolucionarias y debió exiliarse nuevamente, momento en el cual se convierte en uno de los fundadores del movimiento bolchevique. Participó * El artículo fue publicado originalmente el 30 de enero de 2012. Una versión actualizada se encuentra publicada actualmente en nuestro sitio web. Esperamos su comentario en: http://www.revistacts.net/elforo/442-el-debate-la-teoria-de-las-dos-ciencias-ciencia-burguesa-y-cienciaproletaria. ** Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP), Universidad Nacional de San Martín (UNSAM), Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET). Correo electrónico: [email protected]. Los Foros de CTS, edición especial 2015 Agustín Ostachuk 192 activamente del levantamiento de 1905 como líder del Soviet de San Petersburgo. Lideró la facción izquierda de los bolcheviques, hasta que perdió protagonismo frente al dominio de Lenin. Después de la revolución, Bogdanov fundó en 1918 el Proletkult, el movimiento cultural del proletariado. Desde ese mismo año hasta 1923, dirigió la Academia de Ciencias Sociales. En 1926, fundó el Instituto de Hematología y Transfusiones Sanguíneas de Moscú. Dos años después murió como consecuencia de participar en sus propios experimentos. Bogdanov publicó numerosos trabajos sobre los más diversos temas: filosofía, psicología, economía, política, sociología y cultura. Sus principales trabajos filosóficos fueron dos trilogías: Empiriomonismo (1904-1906) y Tectología (1912-1916). Ésta última se considera actualmente la primera expresión de lo que luego Ludwig von Bertalanffy popularizó como Teoría General de los Sistemas. Alexander Bogdanov: filosofía Una de las principales influencias filosóficas y científicas de Bogdanov fue el físico Ernst Mach (1838-1916). Mach desarrolló una teoría del conocimiento y de la historia de la ciencia que intentaba eliminar el dualismo entre mente y materia. En sus teorías los elementos percibidos como sensaciones, pertenecientes a nuestro mundo interior, y aquellos que existen en el mundo exterior, son los mismos. La filosofía de Mach ha sido denominada usualmente como Empirio-criticismo. Bogdanov, a pesar de reconocer una fuerte influencia de Mach en sus propias investigaciones, estableció desde su primera obra filosófica una clara distancia entre ambos sistemas, lo cual se refleja en el título de la obra: Empirio-monismo. De esta manera, Bogdanov buscaba completar con su teoría la tarea emprendida por el Empirio-criticismo de eliminar el dualismo entre materialismo e idealismo, que a su entender había dejado inconclusa. Para Bogdanov, la noción empirio-criticista de experiencia todavía estaba cargada con un alto contenido dualista. Mach, víctima de su positivismo, se quedó en el nivel descriptivo al establecer la noción de elemento como el estado de indiferenciación primario entre lo físico y lo mental, por lo que, como consecuencia, no fue consciente de que le faltaba explicar el por qué de esta unión. En este sentido, Bogdanov reformuló el concepto empirio-criticista de "experiencia" y lo transformó en el concepto de "experiencia de trabajo", el cual será un concepto fundamental a lo largo de todo su desarrollo intelectual. Este nuevo concepto, que establecía al trabajo como base de su teoría del conocimiento, le permitió conectar su sistema con la doctrina de Marx y, como consecuencia de ambos, determinar la primacía de la práctica por sobre la teoría. Las tesis de Bogdanov tienen una serie de implicancias epistemológicas, especialmente en relación al sentido y significado de la verdad para la ciencia. De esta manera, Bogdanov afirmó que la noción de "verdad objetiva" era un fetiche metafísico, y que la ciencia sólo producía "verdades epocales". La ciencia debía restablecer su unión con el trabajo, ya que "la ciencia es la experiencia colectiva del trabajo organizado", y la verdad es una "forma organizativa de la experiencia" en la que los hechos son relativos a la experiencia (Lecourt, 1977: 151). Desde este punto Los Foros de CTS, edición especial 2015 193 Agustín Ostachuk de vista, la ideología es considerada la organización de ideas que expresan, en cada momento de la historia, las formas de organización del trabajo. Bogdanov rechazaba, entonces, el concepto de verdad objetiva y la noción correspondiente de un mundo objetivo independiente del sujeto cognoscente. Para él, el mundo, es decir, el "mundo conocido por nosotros", en oposición a la "cosa-en-símisma" metafísica, es producto de la praxis colectiva humana. La noción de leyes objetivas e irrevocables de desarrollo social no era para él una explicación científica del mundo humano, sino que que debía ser explicada en términos históricos y sociológicos. La teoría de las dos ciencias: ciencia burguesa y ciencia proletaria Bogdanov centraba su crítica de la práctica científica contemporánea en la separación entre ciencia y trabajo. Esta unión original entre ciencia y trabajo había sido rota en las sociedades capitalistas. De esta manera, la ciencia olvidó sus orígenes por completo y todos sus problemas contemporáneos derivaron de este hecho. Una de las consecuencias de este olvido es que la ciencia perdió de vista la idea de la unidad de los métodos y se desintegró en un grupo desorganizado de disciplinas especializadas, donde cada una de ellas se desarrollaba en forma completamente independiente de las demás y todas perdían la posibilidad de beneficiarse mutuamente. Esta especialización, denunciada por Bogdanov, era consecuencia y reflejo de la anarquía que reinaba en la producción capitalista, que progresivamente se iba diseminando en toda la sociedad. La especialización de la ciencia reforzaba una tendencia inherente de este tipo de sociedades: la de "fetichizar" los resultados que se obtienen, es decir, expresarlos en un lenguaje esotérico inaccesible a la mayoría de la población y guardarlos como un secreto en posesión de sólo aquellos que los comprenden. Todo esto ocasionó la formación de una casta de académicos e intelectuales aristócratas que actúan al servicio de los grupos de poder. De esta manera, la ciencia se convirtió en un instrumento autoritario para el gobierno de las clases explotadoras. Bogdanov resumió todo esto en el lema: "La ciencia burguesa es una ciencia que crea burgueses" (Lecourt, 1977: 155). La tarea para las clases trabajadoras en este contexto consiste en restablecer la unión entre ciencia y trabajo. Para ello debería hacer dos cosas: 1) confiar y depender de la actividad colectiva del trabajo, para oponerse a la ideología individualista de los "propietarios" del conocimiento; y 2) reformar el lenguaje científico, simplificándolo y unificándolo, para asegurar no su vulgarización (ya que vulgarización implica una distorsión de los contenidos de acuerdo a los objetivos ideológicos de la clase dominante), sino su difusión real. Como resultado se obtendría la socialización del conocimiento científico. Para él, todo conocimiento deriva de la praxis: de la praxis productiva, es decir, de la interrelación del hombre con la naturaleza y con los demás hombres en el proceso Los Foros de CTS, edición especial 2015 Agustín Ostachuk 194 de trabajo. Por lo tanto, para Bogdanov el conocimiento es siempre relativo, unido a clase, determinado sociológicamente y orientado a la praxis. No hay nada "objetivo" en las llamadas "leyes objetivas de desarrollo". Las teorías de Bogdanov fueron recibidas favorablemente por un numeroso y ecléctico grupo de personas, y condujeron a la formación de un movimiento cultural denominado Proletkult ("Cultura Proletaria") en 1918. Este movimiento respondía a la necesidad expresada por Bogdanov de que la única forma de lograr los cambios sociales a los que aspiraba era empezar desde sus mismas raíces: la cultura. Algunos años después, en 1950, un grupo de científicos y filósofos franceses, entre los que se encontraban Raymond Guyot y Jean Desanti, publicaron un manifiesto titulado Ciencia burguesa y ciencia proletaria. En él se establecía que la ciencia tiene un componente de clase que no sólo afecta las condiciones sociales y materiales de investigación, sino que también determina los conceptos y teorías a las que da origen. Este manifiesto surgió como consecuencia de un fuerte debate que apareció por aquellos años en torno a los resultados experimentales agrícolas obtenidos por el investigador ucraniano Trofim Lysenko. Bibliografía ADAMS, M. (1989): "Red Star: Another Look at Aleksandr Bogdanov", Slavic Review, vol. 48, n° 1, pp. 1-15. BIGGART, J. (1987): "Bukharin and the Origins of the 'Proletarian Culture' Debate", Soviet Studies, vol. 39, n° 2, pp. 229-246. GARE, A. (2000): "Aleksandr Bogdanov and Systems Theory", Democracy & Nature, vol. 6, n° 3, pp. 341-359. LECOURT, D. (1977): Proletarian Science?, Nueva Jersey, Humanities Press. WALICKI, A. (1990): "Alexander Bogdanov and the Problem of the Socialist Intelligentsia", Russian Review, vol. 49, n° 3, pp. 293-304.

Journal of Practical Ethics JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS54 Not a Defence of Organ Markets Janet Radcliff e Richards University of Oxford ABSTRACT Selgelid and Koplin's article 'Kidney Sales and the Burden of Proof' (K&S 2019) presents a series of detailed and persuasive arguments, intended to demolish my own arguments against the prohibition of organ selling. And perhaps they might succeed, if the case described by the authors were the one I actually make. However, notwithstanding the extensive quotations and the detailed explanations of the way I supposedly argue, this account of my position comprehensively mistakes both the conclusions I reach and the arguments I give for them. I know that there are around many misconceptions about my views on this subject, but I have always hoped they could not survive a reading of what I had actually written. I have just-after a gap of many years-looked again at the two most recent of the texts Koplin and Selgelid refer to, and it goes without saying that I can see various things I could now do better; but I do still fi nd these misinterpretations hard to understand. And since anyone with nothing to go on but this article would reasonably conclude that the original texts were not worth reading, I am grateful to the editors for the opportunity to try to set the record straight. I presume not many readers would be interested in a detailed comparative commentary on the texts, showing where this account gets my intentions wrong. I shall try instead to explain how what I do mean-and what I think I say-diverges from what is said here, and then go on to a brief outline of what my arguments and conclusions really are. I hope this may also give some sense of why, for all the opposition I have encountered since I was fi rst drawn into this debate, I persist in thinking that the work I have been doing is important not only for this topic but for analysis in practical ethics more generally. Volume 7, Issue 3 Not A Defence Of Organ Markets 55 1. MARKETS The fi rst, crucial, misunderstanding, which underpins and vitiates everything that is said in the article, appears in the abstract as well as throughout the text. I emphatically do not argue for "markets" in organs, let alone for minimally restricted markets (K&S 2019, p.44). I certainly do not suggest that payment of living donors is an inherently desirable means of acquiring organs, let alone that it is better than other means. In fact, I do not argue for any "policy" whatever. What I do is argue against the total prohibition of payment for transplant organs that was put in place pretty well instantaneously when the practice came to light, and has remained, for most people involved in policy making, a fi xed principle ever since. That is a totally diff erent matter. There is more to say about this, and I shall clarify further later, but the idea that opposition to a principle of total prohibition amounts to an advocacy of markets, or any other positive policy, is a straightforward mistake-made, I presume, by the many people who seem to think I am an advocate of markets. To be against the total prohibition of anything-abortion, recreational drugs, homosexual practices or whatever-is not in itself to commit yourself to anything at all about what should happen in the absence of total prohibition. There are indefi nitely many possibilities. And in fact I make this explicit (JRR 2012, p.57): To argue that prohibition is unjustifi ed is to leave wide open the question of what arrangements for regulation there should be if payment were not totally prohibited. And later (JRR 2012, p.103) The arguments...do not reach any positive conclusion about what policies and arrangements there should be about payment. The starting point of the enquiry is the absolutely minimal claim that there is a presumption against total prohibition, and the conclusion is the equally minimal one that this presumption still stands. This conclusion merely opens up rather than settles the question of what kinds of restrictions and regulations there should be-including, possibly, in some places and at some times, a total ban. Opposition to total prohibition is compatible with recommending unregulated Journal of Practical Ethics JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS56 markets, or state monopoly of buying, or sales so stringently controlled that hardly anyone could meet the required conditions, or even, for that matter, allowing transactions only on alternate Tuesdays. In fact I have no fi xed views about policy at all, and for what it is worth I fi nd the idea of the sale of organs from living vendors as horrible as does everyone else. But what I do think is that there have been from the outset deep intellectual, and therefore moral, confusions at the root of this issue, and that these have corrupted the debate ever since. My concern is with these confusions. You can identify mistakes without making any claims at all about what should happen if the mistakes were removed, just as a mathematician might expose (crucial) miscalculations in the plans for building a bridge without making any claims about how bridges should be built. I am engaged not in policy making-for which I am totally unqualifi ed-but in what Locke, if he had been writing in this context, might have called sweeping away the rubbish that lies in the way of policy discussions (Locke 2001, p.13). That is far from suffi cient for resolving debates about policy, but it is an absolutely necessary contribution to them if they are to be morally serious. 2. BURDENS OF PROOF This mistake seems to be the root of the second, which is a global misconception of what is going on in the burden of proof argument (JRR 2012, pp. 14-17). I am not sure about the details of where this goes wrong, because I am not entirely sure what the authors think I think. But the idea seems to be that I am engaged in two-way contest between a policy of prohibition and a policy of markets, and that I illegitimately think I can settle the case in favour of markets by arbitrarily claiming that the prohibition side bears the burden of proof, which its proponents cannot meet. Whether or not I am right in thinking this is what they think I think, it is certainly not what I say. My question is simply whether a global policy of total prohibition, almost universally put in place as soon as the issue came to light, is justifi ed. And the burden of proof argument is essentially that this policy is on the face of it seriously at odds with values and principles normally professed by most advocates of prohibition themselves. It is straightforwardly in confl ict with the normal liberal principle that competent people should be allowed to judge their own best interests, and make mutually benefi cial exchanges that harm no one else. It is also in striking tension with our general presumption that it is an intrinsically good thing to get organs to save Volume 7, Issue 3 Not A Defence Of Organ Markets 57 lives, and that it is an intrinsically bad thing to reduce the choices available to people who are already badly off , into which category come most potential vendors.1 It was striking that when the organ selling issue fi rst arose, these drawbacks of prohibition were not even mentioned. Nobody seemed to consider the matter of sending a would-be organ vendor back to the daughter whose life he could now not aff ord to save, or the would-be purchaser who would now go back to death or, if lucky, dialysis. Nobody commented on the dissonance of prohibition with our normal principles of liberty and autonomy. But to anyone who holds these values, there is a presumption-a prima facie case-against prohibition. This does not mean that prohibition is unjustifi ed, but it does mean that-by the standards of anyone who holds these values, which as far as I know is everyone in the debate-it needs justifi cation. As I say in the book, this is "purely a methodological device for getting the argument into order" (JRR 2012, p.46). All it does is make clear the problem that needs to be addressed: a tension between the immediate impulse to ban organ sales and other values held by people involved in transplant debates, but which was apparently not noticed in the original rush to prohibition. It is certainly not proposed as a means for "resolving" (K&S 2019, p.37) debates about practical ethics in general (I only wish there were such a means), but just for making the structure of this particular problem clear. It does not "stack the odds" (K&S 2019, p.37) against anyone, because it amounts simply to a challenge to people who hold sets of beliefs that seem to be in tension to show that the two can be reconciled, or to give up one of them. So the burden of proof challenge is essentially this. If you accept the general principle that people should be allowed to decide their own best interests, and that it is intrinsically good to save lives and increase the options for the badly off , and you want a general principle that curtails all these in the area of organ selling, you need a justifi cation. And unless you are willing to give up the familiar background principles, which no one seems willing to do, the default is, by your own standards, that total prohibition is unjustifi ed. 1. K&S write as though the starting point of the argument is only the second of these three: the inherent desirability of getting organs for transplant. This is because, although they mention a series of my articles in this area, the discussion in their article is entirely rooted in the book, and the book as a whole specifi cally deals with questions about the justifi ability of obstacles placed in the way of various kinds of organ procurement. In all the earlier articles-with which K&S seem to be familiar-I mention all three of these issues; and in the earliest most of the stress is on the reduction of options of the would-be vendors. If I had anticipated that the discussion in the book would be treated as a general discussion about prohibition, rather than just as about its limiting organ procurement, I might have done it diff erently. However, it makes no diff erence to the substance of the argument. Journal of Practical Ethics JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS58 From then on, the rest of the debate is about whether the proposed justifi cations work. 3. THE CRITICISMS The detailed criticisms in the numbered sections of the article form its main substance. I have nothing to say about the criticisms in the fi rst section and its three subsections (K&S 2019, pp.41-46), since they are all directed at arguments I do not use, to conclusions I do not reach. Criticism 2 (K&S 2019, pp.47-48) about starting presumptions, I don't follow. My only starting presumptions are the ones mentioned in the previous section. The only one mentioned in the book is the presumption in favour of getting life-saving organs (JRR 2012, p.45). Criticisms 3 and 4, about excessively high standards of evidence (K&S 2019, pp.48-52) and failure to allow for the cumulative eff ect of arguments (K&S 2019, pp.52-53), will be addressed in the fi nal section below. It is however, worth mentioning a couple of points in the second section of criticism 1, (K&S 2019, p.42ff ) about appealing to diff erent goals, because these make misleading or false claims about what I say. First, in asserting that the supply of transplantable organs can be increased in any number of ways, and listing several (K&S 2019, p.43ff ), the text seems to imply that in my supposed enthusiasm for markets I somehow overlook these much nicer possibilities for organ procurement. But I don't overlook them; in fact I specifi cally mention them (JRR 2012, pp.9194). It is quite common for people arguing in defence of prohibition to say "there are better ways of getting organs!" as if this provided a justifi cation, and I do discuss this claim. It is true that I don't go into the details of what these better ways might be, but this is not because I have any doubt that they exist. It is because, once again, I am discussing not the general question of what the best policies for organ procurement might be, but the specifi c claim that the possibility of their existence provides a justifi cation for prohibition. From this point of view the details of better ways are irrelevant because, I argue, the line of argument does not work anyway. If these ways of getting organs could produce enough of them, there would be no point in prohibition because it would have nothing to do: nobody would want to buy, and nobody Volume 7, Issue 3 Not A Defence Of Organ Markets 59 would be able to sell. And conversely, if they did not produce enough, prohibition would still be preventing potential buyers and sellers from doing something that might benefi t both.2 The implication that I have overlooked these things again comes from the idea that the overall topic is how best to get organs, and that I am advocating markets in organs. Then, very important, is the claim that I defend minimally regulated markets (K&S 2019, p.44). I do no such thing. There is here a reference to p146 of the book, and (looking at it again) I can see how a quick glance, from the standpoint of someone who already presumed that I was engaged in a defence of markets, might suggest that I was objecting to regulations as such. But this interpretation is possible only if the surrounding context is ignored. I do criticize certain proposals that have been put forward for organ markets, and I do claim that the particular restrictions some of them propose are not justifi ed. But the context makes it clear that the criticism is not of restrictions as such; it is that these particular restrictions have not been justifi ed. Criticizing the justifi cations of particular forms of restricted markets is very diff erent from criticizing restrictions as such. The section in which this appears is the fi nal section of the chapter "Methodological Morals", which is crucial for understanding the way the line of argument works as a whole. But apart from this totally mistaken, or at least seriously misleading, claim about what I say about restrictions, the article shows no indication at all of awareness that this chapter even exists. It is perhaps not surprising that it also shows no recognition of what my arguments and conclusions actually are. I do say at the beginning of this chapter that anyone whose overriding concern is to get on with the practicalities of the problems can (temporarily) omit it and move on to the next. Perhaps I should have said explicitly that this exemption did not apply to anyone who was specifi cally setting out to discuss the methodology. 4. OVERVIEW I have never had any interest in promoting organ sales. My interest in this subject has from the outset been the extraordinary state of public debate, and the potential for harm that lies in all the mistakes of reasoning that are habitually made. My purpose 2. A similar sounding, but quite diff erent, argument is that allowing organ sales might in practice reduce procurement by these methods (JRR 2012, p.94ff ). These tend to be confl ated. The diff erence is discussed in the book. Journal of Practical Ethics JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS60 in the various iterations of this subject has been not to keep repeating the same point, but to use the persisting interest in it to try to clarify various aspects of methodology of argument in practical ethics. This is a diffi cult and slow process-or at least I fi nd it so-and it is still ongoing. In the book I made some advances on earlier attempts, especially in the chapter just mentioned. Here I will try to pull together various elements of the book more tightly than I managed there. I shall also explain what my practical conclusions really are-nothing to do with the establishment of markets in organs-and outline how the arguments to those conclusions are supposed to work. In doing so I shall reply to criticisms 3 and 4 in the article. To do this I will make use of two distinctions made in the book. K&S mention these, but they seem to regard them as the same (K&S 2019, p.39ff , including footnote), and do not discuss the signifi cance of either of them. Perhaps I can make things clearer here. The distinctions are between: Arguments in defence of prohibition that appeal to principle, and ones that depend on practicalities (principle vs. practicality defences) Policies reached as the conclusions of arguments, and principles introduced as constraints at the beginning (constraints vs. policy debates.) These need explaining. Take the second fi rst. When we debate policies in practical contexts, there are usually constraints we take for granted from the outset: ranges of possibilities that we refuse even to consider. Debates about policies for organ procurement have always taken place against established principles that were in place long before transplantation was possible: no murder, no kidnapping, a requirement of valid consent (JRR 2012, pp.32-35). But there could in principle be a quite diff erent debate, about whether we should change these background rules. You might argue that since the organs from one person could save the lives of many, surgeons should be allowed to go out and kidnap people when they needed spare parts, we should modify existing rights to allow for it; or, perhaps, that criminals should be deprived of these rights, as has been said to happen in China (JRR 2012, pp.23-25). At the moment nobody seems to suggest that we should change our current background rights, but we can recognize it as a possible subject of debate, distinct from current policy debates that take place against the background of those Volume 7, Issue 3 Not A Defence Of Organ Markets 61 rights. And if we did change the background rights, subsequent policy debates would be diff erent. This means that the question of what the background framework should be is logically prior to questions of policy within a framework. The two kinds of question are distinct. What I am arguing is that the organ selling debate must be recognized as falling into two parts in the same way. First, there is the question of whether there should be a principle of prohibition, constraining all subsequent debates about organ procurement in practice. If there is a constraining principle, that settles prohibition as a practical conclusion. But if it is decided that there should be no such overriding, constraining principle, that leaves detailed questions of policy wide open. The question of whether prohibition should be established in particular circumstances would remain open, to be determined by whatever other moral and practical considerations did frame the debate. It might still be decided at particular times and in particular places that there should be a policy of prohibition, but not because it was entailed by a general principle. Both these debates are about prohibition, but they are quite different, and it is essential to distinguish them.3 Now the prohibition of organ selling happened as soon as the practice came to light, initially without argument or discussion, as if it should obviously be a constraint on future debates about organ procurement in the way the prohibition of murder and kidnapping are. And so it has remained ever since. The policies of the World Health Organization, and the Declaration of Istanbul (JRR 2012, p.83) are striking illustrations of this. Nearly all practical debates about organ procurement policies still take place against the background of prohibition as an established constraint. So the fundamental question about prohibition is not about details of practical policies, but about whether it is legitimate as a fi xed starting position for all detailed debates about procurement policy. This is where the burden of proof argument comes. Most people who immediately agreed on the principle of prohibition also normally accept our values of autonomy, life-saving and expanding options; but prohibition is in tension with all three, and so calls for justifi cation. And indeed, the point is implicitly conceded by the fact that since the problem was raised in this form, there has been a never-ending stream of proposed justifi cations. The next stage of the debate is to assess these. 3. In the book (141) I argue that it is a mistake to consider the second kind of question as being about prohibition at all. That is a detail, but important. Journal of Practical Ethics JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS62 And here is the relevance of distinction 1, above, between attempted justifi cations depending on principle and ones appealing to practice. They are usually not distinguished in the debate, but the diff erence is important, as will appear. The fi rst justifi cations off ered for total prohibition were usually ones that appealed to existing principles-ones that are normally, already, accepted as constraints on what can be done. For instance, many took the form of claims that organ vendors could not satisfy the requirement for valid consent. If that had been true, it would have followed that organ selling could be ruled out directly, on the grounds that it could not comply with existing rules for valid consent, in spite of the prima facie case against prohibition. Prohibition would be directly entailed by the consent requirement. Many other proposed justifi cations have worked in similar ways, as appeals to existing standards. There is obviously no space, here, to go into the details. But in sum, my claim about arguments of this kind (pp 58-94) is that they all fail on grounds of ordinary rationality. The conclusions do not follow from the premises, or the premises are in confl ict with what their proponents would accept in other circumstances, or there is no coherent principle at all (105). Now, to go back to K&S, these are presumably the arguments that their criticism 4 complains that I take separately, without considering their cumulative eff ect. And indeed I do, but this is because arguments of this kind must be discussed separately, simply because they are arguments: claims that the principle of prohibition follows directly from some already accepted principle. Each of these arguments is off ered individually as a justifi cation for prohibition, and if the argument fails to support the conclusion, it is simply useless. It is not like weak evidence, or small considerations in favour, which may indeed be used cumulatively. Arguments of this kind cannot be used in that way, because if they fail they have no weight at all. The idea that failed arguments have some value if taken together is what Antony Flew called the "ten leaky buckets fallacy" (Flew 1966, pp.62-63). If a bucket won't hold water, you are not helped by having ten of them. This is one reason why it is important to recognize the distinction between the arguments for prohibition depending on principle and the ones depending on practicalities. The second kind of argument, claiming that prohibition is best all things considered, does indeed depend on cumulative evidence about how diff erent policies will turn out. And here, I presume, is where K&S would advance their claim that I demand unreasonably high standards of evidence: the ones I describe on pp94-101. Volume 7, Issue 3 Not A Defence Of Organ Markets 63 But here again is a point where it is essential to bear in mind the distinction just described between the two possible kinds of debate: about prohibition as a starting constraint, and about prohibition as a particular policy in the absence of such a constraint. Suppose that there were no general principle against payment and you were considering particular policies for regulating payment for organs, say in a particular country at a particular time. There might be dozens of proposals on the table, including one of outright prohibition. In such a case of course cumulative evidence in favour of diff erent possibilities would be relevant, and the same standards of evidence and argument would apply to them all. This is also a context in which it would be entirely appropriate to consider harms that might happen, and how likely they were to happen: the kinds of consideration listed on K&S 2019, p.42ff . These are the sorts of practical issue raised throughout the literature of opposition to prohibition-the kinds of issue I think I am being accused of disregarding-and of course they would all be important to consider in that situation. But we are not in that situation, and these practical problems are not under current discussion. The question here is that of whether prohibition should be in place as a matter of constraining principle, as it is now, ruling out policies involving payment before detailed procurement policy discussions even begin. It is in this context that I claim that if evidence of this cumulative kind is used, an extremely high standard of proof should certainly should be required. A line of argument based on claims about a preponderance of harms over good would need to show that a constraining principle of no payment would do better than any possible arrangement that did allow for payment. Even if that were possible even in principle (which I doubt) it would certainly need overwhelmingly strong evidence to overcome the presumptions against prohibition. So that is my answer to the challenge, in section 3, that I demand unreasonably high standards of evidence. If I had been defending a particular policy, such as markets, against others, in a situation with no background constraint of prohibition, those evidence requirements would indeed be far too high. But I am discussing the logically prior question of whether there should be a prohibition constraint at all, and that would certainly require exceedingly high standards of evidence. I fi nd it incredJournal of Practical Ethics JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS64 ible that anyone recognizing the nature of the challenge could regard us as having anything like adequate evidence yet.4 Even if someone wants to dispute that, however, another thing is certain, which is that we certainly could have had no such evidence when prohibition was fi rst introduced. If any of the arguments of principle had worked, deriving prohibition from existing principles such as the need for consent, that might have justifi ed the immediacy of the prohibition response. We might have seen directly that there was a confl ict between allowing organ selling and already entrenched principles. But these other attempts at justifi cation of prohibition as a principle, depending on empirical evidence, could not possibly have provided a justifi cation at the time. This means that the shift from arguments of principle to all-things-considered arguments amounts to an implicit admission that there was no justifi cation when prohibition was originally, instantaneously, adopted. And this leads to my second practical conclusion, which I will introduce here, as in the book, with a favourite quotation from Mill, anticipating modern moral psychology by 150 years: So long as opinion is strongly rooted in the feelings, it gains rather than loses in stability by having a preponderating weight of argument against it. For if it were accepted as a result of argument, the refutation of the argument might shake the solidity of the conviction; but when it rests solely on feeling, the worse it fares in argumentative contest, the more persuaded adherents are that their feeling must have some deeper ground, which the arguments do not reach; and while the feeling remains, it is always throwing up fresh intrenchments of argument to repair any breach made in the old (see JRR 2012, p.108). Everything about the organ selling debate exemplifi es this. A strong feeling against organ selling leads to a determination to keep prohibition by one means or another, and when one argument fails another is immediately off ered. The determi4. I see now that on pp 99-100 I make a concession to the possibility that arguments of a cumulative kind might just work. I think that was wrong. This is an occupational hazard of active work in the disentangling of arguments: I was still struggling with the details of the distinction between arguments within a particular framework and arguments about the framework when I had to hand the text over to the publisher. If I had worked on it a bit longer, and had time to go through the earlier chapter again, I would have seen that those arguments could not justify a principle of prohibition, and would be relevant to questions only of policy making that did not take place against the background of such a principle. Volume 7, Issue 3 Not A Defence Of Organ Markets 65 nation to fi nd some way to justify prohibition has continued unabated since the issue fi rst arose. That being the case, there is the interesting question of what exactly the motivating feeling might be, and I speculate about it in the book. I suspect that it is something in the broad area of disgust, which has been endlessly rationalized in terms of the interests of the interests of the very people-the sick and the badly off -whose interests it potentially overrides. But whatever it is, it is objectively clear that it has systematically corrupted the arguments so far, and unless it is recognized for what it is, it will go on corrupting reasoning about policies – even if the current principled objections to payment for organs are theoretically withdrawn. 5. CONCLUSION Of course K&S are right to say that we should be trying to fi nd the best policies all things considered. But my contention is that the deep opposition to allowing paid donation systematically obstructs any serious attempt to do this, in two ways. First, the general prohibition of payment for organ donation rules out of consideration, from the start, indefi nitely many possible policies that might be best all things considered. Since prohibition as a principle is unjustifi ed, as long as it remains it positively obstructs any genuine eff ort to fi nd out what really would be best. It should be abandoned, and we should reopen the whole question from the point of view that should have been taken from the start: recognizing that prohibition prevents competent adults from doing what seems to them to be in their best interests, and concentrating instead on trying to work out how best to prevent the harms that obviously might arise as people try to take advantage of new possibilities open to them, while allowing as far as possible for the good. Second, even if this were done, the evidence of the arguments so far, showing a determined resistance to allowing payment, means that the problem would still persist in a covert way. Questions about the all-things-considered merits of policies are immensely complicated and full of factual uncertainties, and hardly ever capable of defi nitive answers. In arguments of this kind people with strong intuitions about some subject will of course pick out elements of evidence that support what they already believe, and still fail to see what they might otherwise recognize as better by their own considered standards. There is probably no way of preventing this comJournal of Practical Ethics JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS66 pletely, but at least a full awareness of the problem would give us the best possible chance. The organ selling context is of course not the only one in which issues like this arise, and where deep preconceptions hide fl aws in arguments that would never be made in neutral contexts. It happens in other parts of the organ procurement debate, as well as indefi nitely many other kinds of context. It is essential to look out for such mistakes. As I say on the cover of the book, if you die from mistakes in moral reasoning, you are as dead as if you die from mistakes in medicine. REFERENCES Flew, Antony, 1966. God and Philosophy, London: Hutchinson Koplin, Julian J., and Selgelid, Michael J., 2019. Kidney Sales and the Burden of Proof, Journal of Practical Ethics, 7(2): Locke, John, 2001. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Kitchener, Ont.: Batoche Radcliff e Richards, Janet, 1996. Nepharious Goings On: Kidney Sales and Moral Arguments. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 21: 375–416. doi:10.1093/jmp/21.4.375. ---2012. The Ethics of Transplants: Why Careless Thought Costs Lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

works" as clusters of epistemological principles-rules for the evaluation of evidence and assessment of propositions. The effect is that, on this view, ontologists of seemingly different viewpoints are understood not as talking past each other but as assessing the truth of propositions in different ways. This is an interesting and new idea, and very much worth a thorough investigation. References Carnap, Rudolf. (1950) 1956. "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." In Meaning and Necessity, 205–21. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hirsch, Eli. 2011. Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology. New York: Oxford University Press. Moore, George Edward. 1939. "Proof of an External World." Proceedings of the British Academy 25, no. 5: 273–300. Pryor, James. 2000. "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist." Noûs 34, no. 4: 517–49. Thomasson, Amie. 2015. Ontology Made Easy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vera Flocke Indiana University–Bloomington Philosophical Review, Vol. 129, No. 1, 2020 DOI 10.1215/00318108-7890533 Kris McDaniel, The Fragmentation of Being. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. ixþ 320 pp. According to ontological pluralism, being isn't univocal-there is more than one kind of being or way to exist. And let ontological degreeism be the view that being is gradable-some entities enjoy more being or a greater degree of existence than others. Being fragments just in case either ontological pluralism or degreeism is true. While the idea that being fragments has played an import role in the history of philosophy, it's perhaps an understatement to say that it hasn't held much currency in contemporary analytic metaphysics. In his book The Fragmentation of Being, Kris McDaniel argues, however, that both ontological pluralism and degreeism are reasonable and fruitful views deserving of our consideration. The first six chapters of The Fragmentation of Being are devoted to ontological pluralism. In the first chapter McDaniel develops a version of this thesis that combines elements of views articulated by Heidegger and Theodore Sider. According to this Sideggerian view, while the unrestricted quantifier captures a generic notion of being, there are special restricted quantifiers that both capture more specific notions of being and are more natural (i.e., carve reality B O O K R E V I E W S 149 Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-pdf/129/1/149/726468/149trogdon.pdf by VPI/SU user on 17 January 2020 closer to the joints) than the unrestricted quantifier. (Importantly, these special restricted quantifiers aren't mere restrictions of the unrestricted quantifier, for in this case the latter would be more natural than the former.) The view follows Heidegger in taking there to be both various specific modes of being in addition to a general, overarching form of being. And the view follows Sider in extending David Lewis's notion of naturalness from predicates and their semantic values to other linguistic items such as quantifier expressions and their semantic values. The second chapter focuses on the broadly Aristotelian idea that there is a metaphysical form of analogy. According to McDaniel, analogous properties are general properties that, while more natural than disjunctive properties, are less natural than their various "specifications" or "analogue instances" (52). (And analogousness, like naturalness, is also said to apply to ingredients of reality in addition to predicates and properties.) McDaniel sketches what he takes to be reasonable ontological views relative to which existence is plausibly regarded as being analogous in nature. He discusses views, for example, that distinguish between concrete and abstract existence as well as atemporal and temporally relativized existence. Chapters 3 through 6 are devoted to arguing that ontological pluralism is useful to our theorizing about time, ontological categories, "almost nothings," and persons, respectively (140). Each chapter appeals to a special case of the Sideggerian view: while the unrestricted quantifier isn't perfectly natural, there are various perfectly natural restricted quantifiers. As for time, McDaniel formulates an A-theory of time (a theory according to which the present is in some way metaphysically distinguished), which states that existence is analogous. For McDaniel, two specifications of existence are "past existence" and "present existence" (78). Among the perfectly natural restricted quantifiers, one ranges over past entities and another over present entities. Turning to ontological categories, McDaniel articulates a novel version of the view that ontological categories are ways of being. The perfectly natural restricted quantifiers represent ontological categories, so to belong to an ontological category is to fall within the range of one of these special quantifiers. With respect to almost nothings such as holes, cracks, and shadows, McDaniel claims that they are "beings by courtesy," where being-by-courtesy is another specification of existence understood as an analogous property (146). An entity is a being by courtesy just in case it falls within the range of the unrestricted quantifier but not any perfectly natural quantifier. Turning to persons, McDaniel states that we're metaphysically distinguished-we're "fully real" in particular-just in case we fall within the range of one of the perfectly natural restricted quantifiers (170). For McDaniel, a sufficient condition for being fully real in this sense is to instantiate some perfectly natural property. McDaniel canvases various proposals according to which we instantiate such properties, though he ultimately doesn't endorse any particular proposal. B O O K R E V I E W S 150 Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-pdf/129/1/149/726468/149trogdon.pdf by VPI/SU user on 17 January 2020 The remaining chapters are devoted to ontological degreeism. In the seventh chapter McDaniel clarifies the notion of degrees of existence by considering various accounts of its relation to the notion of degreed naturalness. One proposal flows from the Sideggerian take on ontological pluralism: for x to exist to degree n is for the most natural quantifier that ranges over x to be natural to degree n. Another proposal, one that McDaniel prefers, reverses the direction of definition: for x to be natural to degree n is for x to exist to degree n. The eighth and ninth chapters are devoted to arguing that ontological degreeism is useful to our theorizing about grounding and essence, respectively. Supposing that grounding is a relation between facts, and degreed existence is one measure of "ontological superiority" among many, McDaniel proposes that we define grounding roughly as follows: for one fact to ground another is for the former to be ontologically superior to the latter (e.g., the former exists to a higher degree than the latter) and for these facts to stand in a "connective relation" or a chain of such relations (237, 239, resp.). The connective relations are characterized by the fact that they induce relations of ontological superiority on their relata-a two-place relation R is a connective relation just in case it's necessary that x bears R to y just in case x is ontologically superior to y. The connective relations at issue in the definition of grounding are relations between facts in particular-McDaniel suggests that modal entailment between facts, fact determination, fact constitution, and disjunction formation between facts are candidate connective relations between facts. Turning to essence, McDaniel's discussion is wide-ranging. One of the many proposals he considers is this: the particular essence facts (e.g., part of what it is to be Ranger is that x is Ranger only if x is a dog) are grounded by general facts about the essences of different types of things, and these general essence facts in turn are grounded by facts concerning the ontological categories, which are represented by the special perfectly natural restricted quantifiers. As my selective summary of the book indicates, this is an ingenious work replete with interesting and often surprising proposals and distinctions. And, while I didn't stress this above, another virtue of the book is its sustained and fruitful engagement with a host of historical figures, some of which (happily) are outside of the Western tradition. As McDaniel states in the postscript, his project involves taking some "old ideas"-that there are modes and degrees of being- and putting them in "new clothing," so as to connect them to the concerns of contemporary analytic metaphysicians (290). In my view, McDaniel has succeeded in this task. I'll end with some brief critical remarks that focus on ontological degreeism. I worry about the proposed theoretical applications of this thesis, particularly the definition of grounding. And, as we will see below, McDaniel has his own concerns about the proposal, ones that I think he might underestimate. I have three general concerns. B O O K R E V I E W S 151 Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-pdf/129/1/149/726468/149trogdon.pdf by VPI/SU user on 17 January 2020 First, it strikes me that the notion of a connective relation is underdeveloped. McDaniel claims that the inventory of connective relations between facts is to be established by doing (first-order) metaphysics-if we think, for example, that there are determinable and determinate properties, then we should also think that there is a connective relation-fact determination-holding between facts concerning the instantiation of these properties. Now, metaphysics is hard, so I don't expect McDaniel to propose what is in his estimation an exhaustive list of the connective relations between facts. Still, without having at least some idea (however provisional) of what such a list might look like, it's hard to evaluate the plausibility of McDaniel's proposed definition of grounding, specifically whether there are cases of bare grounding (cases in which one fact grounds another yet these facts don't stand in connective relations or chains of such relations).1 The second concern is related to the first-as McDaniel himself notes, there are straightforward grounding claims that, if true, apparently involve bare grounding. McDaniel mentions the following case: the fact that x is intrinsically desired by God grounds the fact that x is intrinsically good. By way of response, McDaniel suggests that you might think that fact constitution is the connective relation in play here. But, while I understand what material constitution is, I confess that I don't have a good grip on what fact constitution comes to, if this relation is understood to be distinct from grounding itself. McDaniel recommends that we "seriously consider the assumption [that there is no bare grounding] but neither decisively accept nor reject it independently of doing other first-order metaphysical explorations" (244). My impression is that here McDaniel underestimates the problem of bare grounding for his proposal, as there are many rationally permissible if not plausible views formulated in terms of grounding that seem to commit us to claims that involve bare grounding. Here are two examples: given essentialism about modality, the fact that Ranger is essentially a dog grounds the fact that it's necessary that Ranger is a dog; and, given mathematical structuralism, the fact that thus-andso abstract structure has thus-and-so features grounds the existence and nature of the number 4. It's unclear what connective relations might be operative in such cases. Now, we could always cook up some candidate connective relation to cover these cases, but this would run counter to McDaniel's methodological 1. And it may be that some of McDaniel's potential connective relations between facts aren't genuine candidates for him given his other commitments. Regarding fact determination, McDaniel claims that determinate properties aren't ontologically superior to their determinable properties. This suggests that facts concerning the instantiation of the former aren't ontologically superior to facts concerning the instantiation of the latter either, which in turn suggests that fact determination isn't a connective relation after all (see p. 240n42 for discussion of this matter). B O O K R E V I E W S 152 Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-pdf/129/1/149/726468/149trogdon.pdf by VPI/SU user on 17 January 2020 recommendation to let (first-order) metaphysics decide which relations are the connective relations. The third issue concerns McDaniel's characterization of the connective relations in terms of ontological superiority. It's fairly standard to understand the implementing mechanisms for causation partly in terms of causation itself. Part of what it is to be a causal mechanism is to be a structured entity that induces particular patterns of causation. I'm inclined to think that we should say something similar about McDaniel's connective relations, which he claims are relations that implement grounding. Don't say that to be a connective relation is to be a relation that induces certain patterns of ontological superiority; say instead that these relations by their nature induce particular patterns of grounding.2 Kelly Trogdon Virginia Tech Philosophical Review, Vol. 129, No. 1, 2020 DOI 10.1215/00318108-7890546 Andrew Bacon, Vagueness and Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. xviþ 340 pp. Many investigations of vagueness treat it as primarily a linguistic phenomenon. Their objective is to give a model of the meanings of vague words and use it to analyze the sorites paradox, borderline cases, and other phenomena distinctive of vagueness. Nobody would deny that, in addition to saying vague things, we think vague thoughts. But on the standard approach, the investigation of vague language is primary, and what we say about vague thought is derivative from this. Thought is an afterthought. The main aim of Bacon's impressive book is to argue that this approach is backward. According to Bacon, we should start by investigating vagueness in thought and explain linguistic vagueness in terms of it. In embracing this order of explanation, he sets himself apart not just from supervaluationists, who typically think of vagueness as a matter of "semantic indecision," but also from epistemicists (like Williamson [1994]), who explain our ignorance in borderline cases in terms of our ignorance about the way the meanings of vague terms depend on use. 2. Thanks to Sam Cowling and Kris McDaniel for helpful discussion. B O O K R E V I E W S 153 Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-pdf/129/1/149/726468/149trogdon.pdf by VPI/SU user on 17 January

ACERBI, Ariberto LABASTIDA, Francisco Fernàndez LUISE, Gennaro (a cura di) ; Presodi A. Acerbi, F. Femàndez Labastida, G. Luise La fi losofia come paideia. Contributi sul ruolo educativo degli studi filosofici ; Roma : Armando, © 20 16 256 p. ; 20 cm. (Studi di fi losofi a) ISBN: 978-88-6992-129-2 l F. Trabattoru 11 D. Torrijos-Castrillejo 111 1. José Sanguinati et al. L La paideia nella storia della filosofi a 2. Modelli esemplari di poideia 3. Paideia inesercizio CDD 100 IO 20 16 Armando A rmando s.r.l. Piazza della Radio, 14 00146 Roma D irezione Ufficio Stampa 06/5894525 Direzione editoriale c Redazione 06/58 17245 A mministrazione Ufficio Abbonamenti 06/5806420 Fax 06/58 18564 Internet: http .z/www.armando.it E-Mail: red a zi one@armando .it ~ segreteri a@armand o .it 18-01-038 rdiritti di traduzione, di ri produz ione e di adattamento, totale o parziale, con qualsiasi mezzo (compresi i microfi lm e le copie fotostatiche), in li ngua italiana, sono ri servati per tutt i i Paesi . Fotocopi e pe r uso personale dell ello re posso no essere effe tt uate nei limiti del 15% di ciascun volume/fa scicolo di peri odico dietro pagamento alla SIAE del compenso previsto dall ' art. 68, comma 4, de ll a legge 22 aprile 194 1 n. 633 ovvero dall' accordo stipulato Ira SIAE, SNS e CNA , CONFARTIGIANATO, CASA, CLAAI , CONFCOMMERCIO, CONFESERCEN TI il 18 dicembre 2000. Le riproduzi oni a uso diffe rente da quello personale potranno avvenire , per un numero di pagine non superiore al 15% del presente vo lume/fascicolo, solo a seguito di specifi ca autorizzazione rilasciata da AIDRO, Via del le Erbe, n. 2 , 20 121 M ila no, telefax 02 809506, e-ma il a idro@ io l. it Material protegido por oerechcs de euior Sommario Presentazione 7 P ARTE PRIMA : LAPAIDEIA NELLA STORiA DELLA Il FiLOSOFIA. ALCUNI MODELLI ESEMPLARI Capitolo primo Platone: filosofia come educazione del desiderio 13 di F RANCO T RABATTONI Capitolo secondo La dimensione comunitaria della formazione filosofica 27 secondo Aristotele di D AVID T ORRIJOSC ASTRILLEIO Capitolo terzo Il senso della filosofia nella prospettiva di Clemente Alessandr ino di .TUAN Joss S ANGUINETI Capitolo quarto Quale filosofia per quale paideia? La risposta di Tommaso d' Aquino di A NTONIO P ETAGINE Capitolo quinto Univer sità in conflitto e funzione pubblica dell'insegnamento in Kant di G ENNARO L UISE Capitolo sesto I principi della paideia secondo Rosmini di P AOLO P AGANI Capitolo settimo John Henry Newman: il valore educativo dell ' ''autentica filosofia" e il suo rapporto con la fede di G IUSEPPE B ONVEGNA Capitolo ottavo es. Peirce: la vita della scienza e il desiderio di apprendere di .TAIME N UBIOLA 5 1 69 81 105 Il 5 Material protegido por oerechcs de euior So mmario Capitolo nono Dare vita al pensiero, dare pensiero alla vita. 131 L'educazione filosofica tra Hannah Arendt e Maria Zambrano di M ARIA T ERESA Russo Capitolo decimo La formazione (Bildung) nel pensiero di H.-G. Gadamer: 141 tra esperienza e tradizione di F RANCISCO F ERNÀNDEZ L ABASTIDA PARTE sEcoNDALA PAlD~A IN ESERCIZIO. IDEE, 161 PROBLEMI, METODI Capitolo primo L'analisi filosofica sulle metafore dell'educazione, 163 tra logica e retorica di M ARiA G . A MILBURU Capitolo secondo Filosofia, educazione e modernità. Una riflessione 173 critica sul passato per orientare nel presente di G IUSEPPE M ARI Capitolo terzo La filosofia di fronte alla questione delle competenze 185 di A LESSANDRA M ODUGNO Capitolo quarto Ontologia della filosofia e docenza 195 di G IACOMO SAMEK L ODOVICI Capitolo quinto Insegnare ad argomentare e a dibattere di A DELINO C AriANI 205 Capitolo sesto Pratica professionale, valutazione e management. 225 Il ruolo della riflessività nell'azione cooperativa di P AOLO M ONTI Capitolo sellima Economia e vita professionale. Il contributo 235 della riflessione etico-filosofica di BENEDEñ G IOVANOLA Nota sugli autori 245 Indice dei nomi 251 Material protegido por oerechcs de euior Cap itolo secondo La dimensione comunitaria della formazione filosofica secondo Aristotele di D AVID T ORRIJOSC ASTRILLEJO' La concezione aristotelica dell ' attività fi losofica (la quale in certa misura è necessaria per la pienezza della vita umana') tende ad essere considerata da parte di alcuni come un ' attività solitaria e individualista, persino narcisista-, soprattutto quando quella è confrontata con l'esempio immediatamente precedente del maestro Platone . Invece del dialogo, Aristotele riprende il genere del monologo in prosa, che alcuni dei presocratici e dei sofìsti avevano adottato. In tal senso, la sua metodologia sembra fa vorire maggiormente la fi gura dell ' individualità, slegata da un contesto sociale". Per questo motivo, riteniamo opportuno chiederci se Aristotele è in qualche • Universidad Eclesiastica San Damaso. Facoltà di Fi losofia, Calle Jerte 10, 28005, Madrid (Spagna). E-mail: [email protected]. 1 È nota la somiglianza tra la descrizione della contemplaz ione nei trattati et ici e la descrizione della fi losofia nella M etafi sica: cfr. P. D EFOURNY, Contemplation in A rtstotle sErmes, in Ethics & Politics, in 1. B ARNES, M , SCHOFIELD , R. S ORABJI (a cura di), A rticles on Aristotle, London, Duckworth, 1977, voI. 2, p. 111. 2. R M ARTEN, "Esotenk und Exotenk" oder "Die philosophische Bestimmung wahrhensfòhtger Offemltchken ", demonstnert an Platon und Aristoteles, in I-I. H OLZHEY (a cura di), Esoterik und Exoterik del' Philosophie: Bettrage Z1I Geschichte und Sinn philasophischer Selbstbestimmung; RudolfW Meyer zum 60. Geburtstag, Basel, Schwabe, 1977, p. 27: «In der Th eorie sch àtzt das wahre menschliche Selbst sich selbst. Es muBvon keinem Anderen akzeptiert werden, muB mit niemandem interagieren, verwendet sich unm òglich fiìr Andere (Gluckseligkeit als eine Art SelbstgenuB, aber in ke iner Weise als Caritas)». Per l' accusa di narcisismo : cfr., ad esempio, 1. W HITEBROOK, Perversion and Utopia.A Study in Psychoanalysis and Criticai The01Y, Massachusetts, Massachusetts Institute ofTeclmology, 1995, p. 38. 3 Sulla base di Sop h. el., 7, 169a 37-40, M.T. P ADILLA L ONGORIA, in La filosofia como dialéctica. El madelo dialogico del filo sofar socràtico-platonico, Berlin, Akademikerverlag, 2012, p. 18, a fferm a: «[...] para Anst òteles, el acto cientifico, en cl caso ideai, es un acto solitario; es meramente un asuntc para un ind ividuo que se hal la cara a cara con las cosas . A l 27 Material protegido por oerechcs de euior Cap itolo secondo modo responsabile dell a svalutazione dell a dimensione comunitaria nell a vita filosofica, oppure se la sua opera ci offre una prospettiva diversa sul lavoro del filosofo. 1 Necessità di una comunità di vita per la filosofia Secondo Aristotele, una delle caratteristi che dell a vita compiuta è l' '' autosufficicnza" . Le attività migliori bastano a se stesse; la stessa cosa accadrà, perciò, in grado supremo, per la fi losofia. In effetti, la vita teoretica, a di fferenza della vita dell ' uomo d 'azione, potrebbe essere sviluppata, in linea di principio, senza bisogno di altre persone con cui condividerla : il saggio invece sarà in grado di contemplare anche stando da solo, e tanto più quanto più sarà sapiente; forse si troverà in condizione migli ore se avrà dci collabo ratori, ma ugualmente sarà in massimo grado autosufficiente". In realtà, in questo luogo Aristotele considera l ' autosuffi cienza in modo generale, come un carattere che rende un 'attività preferibile ad un ' altra. Solo un essere divino può avere una vita interamente dedicata all a contemplazione, senza l'i nterferenza di un' altra attività. Invece, l' essere umano si vede costretto ad occupazioni distinte da quella che costituisce la sua più completa perfezione, le quali possono persino distrarlo da essa (Eth. Nic., X , 8, l l78b 3-7 ). Come dice Aristotele, anche la beatitudine propri a degli dèi consiste nella contemplazione (ibi, ll 78b 2 1-22), ma l'eccellenza dell a loro natura permette loro di godeme con ogni perfezione e continuità, senza che ciò gl' impedisca di realizzare un ' atti vità benefica nei confronti degli esseri umani". Così, a causa dell a debolezza umana e sull ' esempio di Socrate (Phaedr, 278d), lo Stagirita sembra accontentarsi di aspirare alla sapienza più dell a sapienza stessa, la quale sarebbe patrimonio escl usivo dell a divin ità (Eth. Nic., X, 7, l l77a 22-27) mismo tiempo, Arist òte les pone énfasis en que el dialogo con otros s610 obstruye la relaci òn directa con las cosas, porque media con ellas a través de palabras». 4 Eth. Ntc., X, 7, 11 77a 32-b l ; trad. it. di C. Natali, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2003. Sull'uso di ta cos, termine che si presta ad ambiguità: cfr. E. B ERTI, Le emoziom dell 'amicizia e lafi losofia, in ID., Filosofia pratica, voI. 3, N uovi studi aristotelici, Brescia, Morcelliana, 2008, p. 146, nota 18. 5 Nemmeno la fe licità divina, fondata sulla contemplaz ione di sé, merita di essere considerata "narcisista", a motivo de lla sua attività benefattrice (inoltre, tale attività benefica non ostacola in alcun modo la conoscenza di sé): cfr. D. T ORRlJOSC ASTRILLEJO, Dìos en la etica de Anst òteìes, «Pens am iento», 255 (20 12), pp. 5-23. 28 Material protegido por oerechcs de euior La dimensione comunitaria della formazione filosofica secondo Aristotele Tullavia, che cosa signifi ca che uno fil osoferebbe «in condizione migliore se avrà dei collaboratori»? l compagni potrebbero apparire prescindibili, ma in realtà non lo sono, poiché, secondo Aristotele, esistono tre sensi di "necessario" : il costretto e il violento, quanto non può essere in altro modo, oppure «ciò senza di cui non esiste il benex". In quest' ultimo senso, che il contemplare in compagnia sia "migliore" (pÉÀnov) dev 'essere inteso come una vera necessità. Per questo, gli esseri umani cercano la vita in comune, incluso quanti non debbono soddisfare una necessità pratica impellente, ma solo l'altra necessità di una vita compiuta , la quale non è così urgente, però sì, è di maggior valore : l'uomo è per natura un anima le socievole. Essi quindi, anche se non hanno bisog no d' aiu to reciproco, desiderano non di meno vivere insieme: non solo, ma pure l 'interesse comune li raccoglie, nella misura in cui og nuno è [spinto dal desiderio di prendere parte a una vita buona]. Ed è proprio questo il fin e e di tutti in com une e di ciascuno in parti colare". La vita comune è, perciò, necessaria per raggiungere il bene onesto e non solo l'utile, perché il bene comune è «cosa migliore e pi ùperfetta [... ] è migliore e pi ùdivine» (Eth. Nic., I, 2, l 094b 810) In tal modo, l'autosuffi cienza dell 'uomo felice non è riferita al suo isolamento dagli altri, né tanto meno al suo egoismo, ma alla perfezione insita in quella felicit à". Di conseguenza, sarà pi ù perfetta la contemplazione che non sia di vantaggio per un solo in6 Metaph. , 1\, 7, 1072b 1113; trad. il. di G. Reale, Milano, Bompiani, 2002. Cfr. ibi , 60 , 5. 7 Po!. , III, 6, 1278b 19-24; trad. il. di R. Laurenti, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1996. fLa sezione tra parentesi nel testo citato corregge la traduzione (segnatamente: «in rapporto alla parte di benessere che ciascuno ne trae»), per meglio assecondare la versione spagnola adottata dali ' autore (etomar parte en una vida buena», trad. sp. di P. Lòpez Barj n de Quiroga-E. Garcia Femandez) . N.d.T. ]. 8 L' interpretazione di KelU1Y sulla felicità si muove in una linea, diremmo noi, "esclusivamente" intellettualista. Eppure lo stesso studioso inglese afferma: «The self-suffic iency of happ iness, Aristotle says, does not consist in its being a Iife for a henn it, but rather in its being an activity which by itself and without anything else, makes life choice-worthy and complete» (A K ENNY, A ristotle on Happiness , in J B ARNES et al. [a cura di] , op. cit. , p. 31). A proposito dell' egoismo, così si esprime un interprete " inclusivo" come E. B ERTI, Il cancello di amicizia in A ristotele, in ID., op. cit. , p. 107: «Aristotele si rende conto, tuttavia, che questa dottrina potrebbe essere sospettata di egoismo, cioè di un amore per se stessi inteso in senso riprovevole, perciò chiarisce che amare se stessi non signifi ca amare il proprio piacere o la propria utilità, bensì amare il proprio bene, cioè la propria virtù, la propria perfezione [. . .]; coloro invece che am ano il proprio bene amano anche il bene degli altri, perché amano compiere azioni "belle", cioè nobili, disinteressate, degne di lode». Si veda anche M. P A K ALUK , Fnendship , in G. ANAGNOSTOPOULOS (a cura di), A Companion toAristotle, Malden, Blackwell, 2009, pp. 476-477. 29 Material protegido por oerechcs de euior Capitolo secondo dividuo ma che sia capace di essere estesa a più soggetti. La prospettiva che dobbiamo adottare è, pert anto, quella del bene comune, cui, per natura, è aperto ogni essere umano. Inoltre, la comunità è propria della razionalità, poiché questa si occupa delle cose che possono essere meglio condivise". 2 La natura della vita com une tra filosofi Per intendere la natura della società dei fi losofi, dobbiamo ricordare che, per Aristotele, là dove c ' è un qualche tipo di comunità, si dovrà potere rilevare, altresì, un tipo di amicizia (Eth. Nic., VIII , 9, ll 59b 26-27); e non si dimentichi che «non solo è necessaria, l' am icizia è anche cosa nobile» Cibi, l , l 155a 29) Aristotele distingue tre tipi di amicizia: quella che si fonda sul piacere, un ' altra basata sull' utili tà e, infine, una terza il cui sostegno è la virtù . A sua volta, ognuna di esse può dividersi in due, a seconda che si dia in lUl contesto di uguagli anza o di superiori tà e inferi orità tra amici (Eth. Eud., VII, 4, , 1239a 1-4). E evidente come Aristotele direbbe che la comunità tra fi losofi dev 'essere qualificata quale un'amicizia virtuosa, poiché la virtù "più ecce llente" è propria dell'intelletto (Eth. Nic. , X, 7, ll 77a 1214). Secondo questo schema generale, possiamo distinguere due specie di questa amicizia fi losofica: quella che esiste tra fi losofi maturi che godono di ugu aglianza tra di loro e l 'amicizia tra il maestro e il discepolo, tra loro diseguali. Aristotele non insiste particolarmente sul peculiare rapporto amicale tra fil osofi ; tuttavia, parlando precisamente dell ' amicizi a, diverse volte egli afferma che la cosa più importante per l 'uomo è il pensare e che in ciò, soprattutto, consiste il suo essere, poiché il pensare è quanto vi è in lui d i più umano IO Ciò non è det to a caso, perché, per Aristotele, vivere è essere : ad esempio, l'essere della pianta è la nutrizione, la riproduzione, ecc. se ci si riferisce all ' attività come tale, non alla potenza I 1 Il vivere, ossia l'essere specificamente umano, si attualizzerà, perciò, nel pensare; dunque, esso sarà la cosa migliore e quanto dev 'essere condiviso nella convivenza tra am ici. 9 E. B ERTI, Amitié et philosophie chez Aristote, in Io ., op. cit. , p. 132: «(. ..] done la collabora tion, en philosophie, es t préférable à la solitude et, puisq ue le bonheur est ce qu' il y a de plus préférable en abso lu, le bonheur suprème, pour le philosophe, n'est pas la solitude, mais bien la collaboration avec Ics autres phi losophes». iO Cfr. E/h. mc. , IX, 4, 1166a 17, 22-23; 8, 1168b 35 11 69a 2; 9, 11 7Gb 13 ; X, 8, 11 78a 7. 11 C rT. E. B ERTI, «Per 1 viventi l 'essere è il vivere )) (Aristotele, De an ima 415 b J3), in Io., Fisica, antropologia e metafisica, vol. 2, Nuovi studi aristotelici, Brescia, Morcelliana, 200 5, pp. 134-137. 30 Material protegido por oerechcs de euior La dimensione comunitaria della formazione filosofica secondo Aristotele La cosa sarà chiara se stabiliremo che cosa è la vita come attività e come fine. Ora , è manifesto che è percepire c conoscere, sicché anche vivere insieme è percepi re insi eme e conoscere insieme. Ma percepire se stesso e conoscere se stesso è la cosa più desi derabile per ognuno e per questo in tutti è innata l'aspirazione a vivere: bi sogna infatti ammettere che vivere è una sorta di conoscenza 12. L a convivenza implica, per sua natura, la presenza conoscitiva dell ' amico all ' amico, o ltre alle att ività stesse che si condividono, ed un a certa conversaz ione, una «comunità di ragionamenti e pen siero» 13 Com e l' essere umano è presente a sé in ogni attività (Eth. Nic., IX, 9, 11 70a 32-b l), non solo nell a contemplaz ione, allo ste sso modo un amico è presente all 'a ltro amico. Tuttavia, nell ' ami cizi a tra filosofi si condivide il pensare, e, perciò, l ' attività che rappresenta quanto per l'uomo è in sé più desiderabile costi tuisce lo stesso bene cond iviso tra questi am ici 14 C'è una critica abbastanza diffusa verso la teoria ari stotelica sull' amicizia cui dobbiamo prestare attenz ione, poiché co lpisce alla radice la dimensione sociale della conoscenza. Secondo alcuni, l'amico sarebbe incapace di aprirsi all 'altro in quanto tale; infine, la concezione ari stotel ica dell'amicizia rim arrebbe chiusa in un certo narcisismo, come, ad esempio, di recente ha sostenuto Lee Millerl 5 La sua argomentazione si appoggia sulla presunta incapacità della fil osofi a aristotelica di giustificare la conoscenza dei singolari, poiché tutta la scienza si basa sull ' universale. Tuttavia, si d imentica così che Ari stotele ammette, quanto meno, la cognizione di un singolare: lo stesso soggetto conoscente. Inoltre, allo stesso modo che tale soggetto ha coscienza del proprio essere, egli conosce intellettivamente (ODvUlatlàvw8a t) l'esistenza individuale dell ' amico : «il percepire e pensare che percepiamo e pensiamo è percepire e pensare che noi siamo [.. .] e quindi si deve percepire insieme anche l'esistenza dell ' amico» 16 12 Eth. Eud., VII, 12, 1244b 23-29; trad. it. di P. Donini, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1999. 13 E/h. Mc., IX, 9, 11 7Gb 11-12 . Cfr. E/h. El/d. , VlI, 12, 1245" 11 -23. 14 Aristotele esalta lo "studiare insieme" (o uvtìsropsiv: Eth. EIId., VIl, 12, 1245b 4) sopra ogni altra attività. In un contesto analogo, in E/h. Ntc., IX, 12, 1172a 5, fa riferimento al "condividere le ricerche filosofiche" (O'u!-upt)cocrOlpOùcrtv: è un hapax). 15 P.L. MILLER, Fmdmg Onese/[with Friends, in R. P OLANSKY, The Cambridge Companion fa A ristotle 's Nicomachean Ethies, New York, Cambridge, UP, 2014, pp. 320-321: «Whether or not Aristotle saw narcissism as a problem, ethical or otherwise, we shall conclude that il makes him unable to account for the love of a particular person in her difference or otherness [... l. We cannot know a di fferent individuai as sueh, so neither can we love her as such». 16 Eth. Nic., IX,9, 11 70a 32 b 11. Il singolare è oggetto della e pòvnoic, secondo E th. Ntc., VI, 8, 11 42a 14, ma anche della yvwl.*n], oùveo«; e persino del voòr; (ibid. , II , 1143a 25 b 7). La conoscenza teorica dei singolari è trattata in Metaph. , Z, 6, 103 la l 5ss. Si veda 3 I Material protegido por oerechcs de euior Cap itolo secondo D ' altra parte, lo Stagiri ta dichiara espressamente che l ' amicizia consiste pro prio nell ' amore verso l ' amato in quanto altro e per il suo bene, non per il bene dell ' amante; inoltre, l' amico è amato nella sua singolarità, per quella persona che essa è, non come un altro qualsiasi : Si crede infatti che sia amico colui che vuole per un altro i beni (o quelli che crede essere beni) e non per se stesso, ma proprio in vista de/1 'altro; in altro modo , se si vuole per uno l'esistenza in grazia di lu i medesim o e non per sé 17 . [1] 1 piacere che ne deriva in quanto egli è quella persona è quello proprio dcII ' amicizia . Infatti si ama lui come tale, non p erché è altra pers ona'", L'indi vidualità dell ' ami co è conosciuta e amata per se stessa, non come una mera occasione per esercitarsi nella virtÙo nella contemplazione ; il che sarebbe come ridurre l' amicizia virtuosa ad un ' amicizia fondata sull'utilità. Come la virt ùè desiderabi le per se stessa, così pure lo è l' amico, soprattutto quando egli è buono. Se applichiamo tutto ciò all 'amicizia tra fi losofi, questa è desiderabile per il bene stesso che un tale am ico rappresenta, con il quale è possibile condividere un 'attività tan to eccellente come la fi losofia. Nondimeno, si ama questo am ico, non un qualsiasi altro fi losofo. Pertanto , dovremmo prendere sul ser io l' amicizia che Aristotele in persona dice di avere verso il suo maestro Platone e verso i suoi condiscepo li, che ch iama: "nostr i amici" !". In questo luogo, egli di ce, inoltre, di anteporre la ver ità agli amici, il che ci offr e un ulteriore argomento di ri fl essione. Gli am ici sono desiderabi li pi ù dei beni capaci di essere da loro condivisi; lo dimostra l' affenn azione che un vero am ico può scegliere di morire con gli am ici, disprezzando persino il bene grande della propria vita?". Tuttavia, in m ateria così prezio sa come la filosofi a, è di m aggior inoltre M . P ERAL A, Aristotle on Singular Thought, «Joum al ofthe History of Phtlosophy», 53 (20 15), pp. 349-375. 17 Eth. Eud., VIl, 6, 1240a 24-26; trad. c it. , corsivo mio. L'esistenza dei singolari, che è lasciata in sospeso dali'intellett o teorico (il qualche mira all'essenza: An. POSI., II, 2, 90b30s.; Metaph. , E.1, 1025b 1618), è tenuta totalmente in conto, al pari di ogni determinazione parti colare (Eth. Ntc., II, 7, 1I 07a 3 1 e ss .), dall'intell etto pratico. 18 Eth. Eud., VlI, 2, 1237b 2-4; corsivo mio, traduzione leggermente modificata. 19 cpiÀouS uvopas (Eth. Nic., l , 6, 1096a 13). Anche l'elegia dedicata all'amico defunto Enn ia (cfr. Diogenes Laertius, V, 7) rivela la sua percezione personale dell'amicizi a in intima unione con la virt ù. 20 Cfr. E/h. M c., LX, 8, 11 69a20; E /h. El/d. , VII, 6, 1240b 10_ 32 Material protegido por oerechcs de euior La dimensione comunitaria della formazione filosofica secondo Aristotele valore opporsi ag li amici e rim anere da soli in compagnia della verità; ciò però non implica disprezzarli, ma vivere fino alle ultime conseguenze l' affetto che li uni sce. 3 Conclusione. L'educazione filosofica in una vita comune di amicizia L' insegnamento della filosofia deve intendersi ultim amente come un'amicizia virtuosa determ inata dalla disuguaglianza tra il maestro e il discepolo" . Non c 'è amicizia completa tra due finché questi non sono uguali ; tuttavi a, quando l' uno è giunto a un dominio della scienza potrà stringere una vera amicizia col suo maestro, in modo simile a come Aristotele arriv ò a considerare Platone un suo amico. Finché si impara, il discente deve vedere nel docen te un benefattore. Ciononostante, il bene ricevuto è cosi grande che, come in altre occasioni molto signifi cative, non è possibile al beneficato altra forma di ringrazi amento se non di rendere onore al suo benefattore: Pare che le cose sti ano cos ì anc he tra quelli che si riuni scono per fil osofare , dato che il valore non si misura co n il metro delle ri cchezze, e non è possibile dare in cambio un o nore de l tutto equivalente , ma forse è sufficiente restituire quanto si può , proprio come si fa con gli dci c con i genitoriP . Aristotele paragona l' atteggiamento di Socrate e di Pla tone, i quali insegnavano senza lucro, con quello dei sofìsti, che lo facevano in cambio di una retribuzione (l 164a 22-23). A differenza di questi, il suo maestro si è mostrato interessato a lui , con un'amicizia virtuosa ( 1164b 1): il suo servizio non mirava ad alcun compenso ma era stato compiuto solo per amore del beneficiato (l 164a 35). Questa è la qualità caratteristica del benefattore virtuoso, che ha il suo modello esemplare nella divinità e nei genitori. Questi si distinguono per avere donato ai loro generati non solo l' essere, ma anche "l' educazione'<". 2 1 Cfr. E/h. Elid., VlJ, 12, 1245a 1618. 22 E/h. N /c., IX, I , 11 64b 2-6. 13 nUlowfri'ivat (Eth. Nic., VIII, 12, l lGl a 7). Diogene Laerzio (V, 19) attesta che, per Aristotele, sono maggiormente degni di onore g li educatori dei genitori che hanno solo generato 33 Material protegido por oerechcs de euior Capitolo secondo In conclusione, queste considerazioni sull' opera di Aristotele ci obbli gano a riconoscere che, secondo lui, la vita comune è d' importanza cruciale per la fi losofia, così per l'esercizio come pure per il suo apprendimento. A dire il vero, il suo approccio al sapere non è stato mai disgiunto dalla convivenza, non solo perché egli si formò nell 'ambito de ll 'Accademia, ma perché egli stesso riunì attorno a sé un gruppo di studiosi e, in particolare, mantenne strette relazioni con alcuni dei suoi collaboratori, come Teofrasto. Inoltre, neppure il suo stile letterario è del tutto estraneo alla dimensione dialogica del linguaggio. Oltre ai ben noti trattati esoterici, egli pubblicò vari dia loghi, oggi perduti. Ma quegli stessi trattati non trascurano mai l ' ascolto dell e opinioni autorevoli , secondo quanto è estesamente esposto nei Topici?"; di fatto, questi testi sono stati elaborati in un contesto sociale, quello del Liceo : donde l'uso della prima personale p lurale. Dunque, non si può guardare ad Aristotele come ad un maestro soli tario, ma, al contrario, come ad un fi gura che voll e riunire persone dali ' indole più diversa nel comune abbraccio della ragione. Per questo motivo, riteniamo che il suo metodo di lavoro può essere assunto ancor oggi come un modello di educazione, poiché riesce a includere l 'universalit à dello spirito umano e la convivenza tra le persone . il loro figli ; infatti questi S0 l10 responsabili soltanto del loro vivere mentre gli altri lo S0 l10 del loro vivere bene . 24 Di fatto, nonostante il giudizio di Padilla Longoria con il quale abbiamo iniziato, questa stessa autrice finisce per riconoscere: «A pesar de que Arist òteles rechaza de inmediato la idea de la dialéctica co cl sentido platonico, no puede evitar ser plat ònico y dialogico [ . .. ] . Mas aùn: Arist òteles recurre continuamente a la dialéctica en cl sentido platonico porque et estilo metodol ògicc de expos ici òn de sus propias hip òtesis y tesis comprende un dialogo hist òrico y una referencia constante a las tesis de otros filòsofos» (op. cit., pp. 27-28). 34 Material protegido por oerechcs de euior

AFTER THE ASCENT: PLATO ON BECOMING LIKE GOD JOHN M. ARMSTRONG !"#"$%& Platonic dialogues indicate that humans should strive to become like god. Until recent work by Julia Annas and David Sedley, this had gone largely unnoticed in contemporary Plato scholarship.1In this article I explorethe idea further by arguing that Plato's later conception of god made a di*erence to how he conceived of becoming like god. In particular, I argue that Plato's identification of god with !"#$ or intelligence in the Timaeus, Philebus, and Laws influences his conception of assimilation to god.Rather than fleeing from the sensible world, becoming like this god commits one to improving it. In the Laws especially, following god requires an e*ort to unify the city under intelligent law and to educate the citizens ã John M. Armstrong 2004 I sincerely thank Julia Annas, Dirk Baltzly, David Bradshaw, Rose Cherubin, Thomas Christiano, Eve Browning Cole, Daniel Graham, Joel Martinez, Stephen Menn, Mitchell Miller, Martha Nussbaum, Nicholas Smith, Paul Woodru*, and especially the Editor for their helpful comments. Previous versions were presented at meetings of the American Philosophical Association's Central Division, the Virginia Philosophical Association, the Arizona Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, the University of Arizona's Philosophy Department, and to audiences at Southern Virginia University and the Virginia Military Institute. The Center for Hellenic Studies generously supported this essay's research and writing during the summer of 2000. Translations of the Greek are my own unless otherwise indicated. 1 Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New (Ithaca, NY, 1999), ch. 3; Sedley, '"Becoming like God" in the Timaeus and Aristotle', in T. Calvo and L. Brisson (eds.), Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias: Proceedings of the IV Symposium Platonicum (Sankt Augustin, 1997), 327–39, and 'The Ideal of Godlikeness', in G. Fine (ed.), Oxford Readings in Philosophy: Plato (2 vols.; Oxford, 1999), ii. 309–28. For other discussions see J. Duerlinger, 'Ethics and the Divine Life in Plato's Philosophy', Journal of Religious Ethics, 13 (1985), 312–31; H. Merki, %&μ"'()*$ +,-.: Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gott•ahnlichkeit bei Gregor vonNyssa (Freiburg, 1952); and C. G. Rutenber, The Doctrine of the Imitation of God in Plato (New York, 1946). The idea of godlikeness in Greek literature and philosophy prior to Plato is treated in D. Rolo*, Gott•ahnlichkeit, Verg•ottlichung und Erh•ohung zu seligem Leben: Untersuchungen zur Herkunft der platonischen Angleichung an Gott (Berlin, 1970). Created on 1 December 2003 at 20.14 hours page 171 172 John M. Armstrong in virtue. Plato's otherworldliness is therefore tempered by-of all things-his theology. Ever since ancient Platonists such as Eudorus, Philo, and Alcinous, Plato's notion of 'becoming like god' (/μ"'()*$ 0,-.) or 'following god' (1234"50"$ 0,-.) has been understood to be a flight from this world to a higher one.2This is due partly to the ancients' heavy reliance on this Theaetetus passage: But bad things cannot be destroyed, Theodorus, for there must always be something opposed to the good. Nor can they gain a place among gods. Rather, by necessity they haunt mortal nature and this place here. That's why one must try to flee from here to there as quickly as possible. Fleeing is becoming like god so far as one can, and to become like god is to become just and pious with wisdom. (176 a 5–b 2) Socrates says that we should escape from this world and its a*airs by trying to fit ourselves for dwelling where there is no evil, by trying to become fully virtuous, by trying to become like god. We will otherwise be forever stuck here, continually reborn to a life of misery, folly, and injustice (176 e–177 a). This conception of the soul's predicament-of an immortal being confined to the surface and depths of the earth unless it escapes to the heavens through moral virtue and philosophic wisdom- is common in Plato.3 In the Phaedo Socrates calls philosophy a 'practice of dying' (64 a) by which philosophers purify their souls of the body's influence while seeking knowledge of 'what is pure, ever existing, immortal, and changeless' (79 d 1–2).4 If one practises philosophy correctly, then after death one's soul 'arrives at that which is invisible,which is similar to it, and that which is divine and immortal and wise, and arriving there it falls to it to be happy . . . [and] truly to spend the rest of time with gods' (81 a; cf. 69 c, 2 Eudorus ap. Stob. Ecl. ii. 49. 8–50. 10 Wachsmuth; Philo, Fug. 62–3, and Opif. 69–71; Alcinous, Did. 28, in J. Whittaker (ed.), Alcinoos: Enseignement des doctrines de Platon (Paris, 1990). Cf. Plut. 550 d–e (De sera numinis vindicta); Apul. Plat. 23; Anon. on Plato's Theaetetus, vii. 14–20, in Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, iii (Florence, 1995), 278; Hipp.Ref., 1. 19. 17 =H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin, 1879), 569. 13–16. 3 Cf.Gorg. 523 a–527 e;Phaedo 113 d–115 a;Rep. 614 a–621 d;Phdr. 248 c–249 c; Tim. 90 a–92 c; Laws 904 c–905 c. 4 'Wisdom' here translates 673!8)*$ (79 d 7). Alcinous seems to quote from this passage when he writes, 'The soul engaged in contemplation of the divine and the thoughts of the divine is said to be in a good state, and this state of the soul is called "wisdom [673!8)*$]", which may be asserted to be no other than likeness to the divine [9:$ ;7<$ 9< 0,="! /μ"*>),($]' (Did. 153. 5–9, trans. Dillon). Created on 1 December 2003 at 20.14 hours page 172 After the Ascent 173 111 a–c). InRepublic 6 Socrates says that 'by consorting with what is divine and ordered [i.e. the Forms], the philosopher becomes as ordered and divine as is possible for a human being' (500 c– d). After knowing the Forms, the guardians think that ordinary human a*airs are trivial and must be compelled to rule the city (519 c *.). In the Phaedrus our pre-mortal souls are said to have seen the Forms 'because we were pure and unmarked by this thing we are carrying around now, which we call a body, imprisoned like an oyster in its shell' (250 c 4–6). The philosopher's thought takes flight, remaining aloof of ordinary human pursuits and recollecting the realities that his soul once beheld when following a god around heaven's circuit (249 c–d). These are powerful images, and their influence upon Plato's ancient interpreters and subsequent philosophical and theological traditions has been profound. To take just one example from the first century ad, Philo of Alexandria claimed that 'what is good is upward-moving [1!>6"*9"!], and if it should ever come to us-for its father is fond of giving-it rightly urges us to follow in its path. The bad, however, remains here below, dwelling as far away as possible from the divine chorus' (Fug. 62). He cites our Theaetetus passage as proof, but any of the others could have served as well. What is unfortunate is that these images of flight and purificationdo not properly capture Plato's valuation of the earth and the human body even in the Phaedo and Phaedrus. The closing myth of the Phaedo describes a beautiful 'true' earth as it appears from above, adorned with colourful seas, plants, and precious stones 'so that it is a sight for blessed onlookers to behold' (109 a–111a).5 In the Phaedrus seeing a beautiful face or body can cause a soul to recollect the Beauty it once saw, and this recollection can result in the soul's trying to make the beloved's soul become as like a god as possible (250 b *., esp. 252 d–253 c). Beautiful bodies and souls-things in the changing world-can therefore help a soul return to following its god around the rim of heaven. Moreover, the return process might involve studious attention to another soul and so also help it re-enter thewinged entourage of its god.Plato's emphasis on escaping this world need not, then, entail his complete devaluation of it. 5 For an insightful account of the myth's connection to the teleology of the Phaedo's 'autobiographical' passage and the Timaeus, see D. Sedley, 'Teleology and Myth in the Phaedo', Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 5 (1989), 359–83. Created on 1 December 2003 at 20.14 hours page 173 174 John M. Armstrong Still, we might wonder whether the notion of becoming like god was very well formed in these influential dialogues, for in them the nature of the god to whom one is to assimilate oneself is not presented very clearly.TheRepublic sometimes speaks of becoming likemorally uprightOlympians, but at other times of becoming like the Forms (Rep. 383 c, 500 b–c; cf. Phaedo 65 d). The Theaetetus mentions god as the ideal, but says nothing about god's properties except that he 'is never and in no way unjust, but is as just as possible' (176 b 8–c 1), leaving it open as to whether god is a soul, a Form, or something else. In the Phaedrus we follow the wellordered Olympians around heaven, but our souls are most amazed and nourished by the Forms in the plain beyond (246 a–248 c). If Plato would have us assimilate ourselves to god, he should provide a clearer notion of what god is and what it is about god that we should follow or emulate. We find more clarity in the Timaeus, Philebus, and Laws, where Plato embraces a conception of god as !"#$ or intelligence.6 As an ethical virtue, intelligence appears throughout the dialogues, especially if one understands it to be identical or closely similar to wisdom (673!8)*$, )"6'?).7 In these late dialogues, however, Plato conceives of intelligence as both the highest virtue of the soul and the supreme e¶cient cause of order in the cosmos. By understanding what intelligence does in individuals, societies, and the world, we can better explain why assimilation to god takes on newmeaning in the Laws, involving concern for the order of human a*airs rather than a dismissive flight from them.8 Plato mentions intelligence as a cosmic causal principle in the so-called autobiographical passage of the Phaedo (95 e *.). The appearance of intelligence there is short-lived, however, for Socrates says that he did not find in Anaxagoras' book the account he wanted of intelligence's responsibility for the world and its arrangement. Wedo find suchan account, though, in thePhilebus, where Socrates himself posits intelligence as one of four fundamental categories 6 See R. Hackforth, 'Plato's Theism',Classical Quarterly, 30 (1936), 4–9, repr. in R. E. Allen (ed.), Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (London, 1965), 439–47; S. Menn, 'Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and as the Good', Review of Metaphysics, 45 (1992), 543–73; and S. Menn, Plato on God as Nous (Carbondale, Ill., 1995). 7 See e.g. Ap. 27 e 6; Crito 51 b 2; Lys. 210 b 6; Gorg. 466 e 11;Meno 88 b 5. 8 The divine craftsman makes an appearance at Rep. 530 a–b as the arranger of celestialmovements, but this seems to haveno impact upon theRepublic's conception of assimilation to the divine. Created on 1 December 2003 at 20.14 hours page 174 After the Ascent 175 of being (23 c–d). Intelligence's role in this new ontology is to mix limit with the unlimited to produce harmonious and wellproportioned things such as the most perfect forms of music, the seasons, health in the body, and virtues in the soul (25 d–26 b).9 There are several points to note about Plato's conception of intelligence in thePhilebus. First, intelligence is presented as an e¶cient cause that always causes for the best (Phileb. 26 e 6, 27 b 1, 28 d–e, 30 d 10–e 1; cf. Phaedo 97 c). Second, intelligence is held to be god. Socrates says that his account agrees with the ancient view that 'intelligence forever rules the universe' (30 d 5) and that 'all the wise agree . . . that intelligence is our king, both of heaven and of earth' (28 c 7–8; cf. 28 a 4–6, 33 b 7). Related to both points, Socrates calls this cause 'the thing that constructs or fashions' (9< @8μ*"57A"#!, 27 b 1), a description applied in the Timaeus to the divine craftsman of the universe. Third, Socrates argues that the intelligence we use to produce health and other forms of order on a small scale is but part of the intelligence that orders the universe as a whole (30 a–c). We acquire intelligence, however, only by avoiding the strongest and most intense pleasures, for these impede understanding of 'what is naturally good in a human being and in the universe and . . . what the Form [of the Good] itself is' (64 a 1–3). Fourth, intelligence (!"#$) and wisdom (673!8)*$) are identical as evidenced by Plato's synonymous treatment of the terms (cf. 28 a 4, 59 d 1, 66 b 5–6). This conception of god opens the way to a new understanding of imitating the divine. Like god, we are agents: e¶cient causes of change in the world (cf. Tim. 89 a). Unlike god, however, we can be more or less intelligent and thus more or less e*ective at creating order in the world and in ourselves. To become like god, then, is not only to have goodness, beauty, or proportion feature more prominently in our own souls; it is to e*ect order in the world of change.We should become like god, then, because we, like god, are e¶cient causes and because god is the exemplary e¶cient cause.10 If this is right, we can see that becoming like god need not involve unremitting flight from the world. As with the ideal 9 See J. M. Cooper, 'Plato's Theory of Human Good in the Philebus', Journal of Philosophy, 74 (1977), 713–30, repr. in id., Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton, 1999), 151–64. 10 This claim is supported by the view that the applied sciences, in order to be included in the good human life, must be directed by the divine sciences, e.g. knowledge of justice itself (Phileb. 62 a–d). Created on 1 December 2003 at 20.14 hours page 175 176 John M. Armstrong life in the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic, becoming like the god of intelligence involves knowledge of the Good itself, but unlike that ideal, the good human life involves the application of one's knowledge to the world of change, creating harmonious mixtures of limit and unlimited as an intelligent craftsman. The cosmic role of intelligence in the Timaeus is similar to that in the Philebus, but Timaeus' account of becoming like god raises a question about the object to which we are to assimilate ourselves. Like the Philebus, the Timaeus identifies the highest god with a cosmic demiurge (/ @8μ*"57A3$, 28 a 6). The demiurge desires all created things to become as much like him as possible, imposing order on what would otherwise be chaos (29 e–30 a, 69 b). To bring order to the world, the demiurge put intelligence in soul and soul in body, thereby making it possible for intelligence to order the perceptible world through the agency of the world soul (29 e– 30 b, 69 b).11 As for our individual souls, the rectilinear motions of corporeal nature that we experience upon embodiment disrupt the intelligent, circular motions of the immortal part (42 a, 43 a– b, 69 b–d).12 The immortal soul recovers its natural condition by disciplining the body and its passions (44 b, 86 b–89 c) and by devoting itself 'to the love of learning and to true wisdom' (90 b 6–7). As Timaeus explains, We should redirect the revolutions in our heads that were thrown o* course at our birth,13 by coming to learn the harmonies and revolutions of the universe, and so assimilate with its objects our faculty of understanding, as it was in its original condition. And when this assimilation is complete, we 11 For arguments against the view that !"#$ exists, as opposed to comes-to-be, only in soul, see Menn, Plato on God asNous, ch. 4; and R. Mohr, 'The Relation of Reason to Soul in the Platonic Cosmology: Sophist 248e–249d', in id.,The Platonic Cosmology (Leiden, 1985), 178–83. 12 See T. Johansen, 'Body, Soul, and Tripartition in Plato's Timaeus', Oxford Studies inAncient Philosophy, 19 (2000), 87–111, on the interrelations of intelligence, soul, and body.E.N.Lee, 'Reason andRotation: CircularMovement as theModel of Mind (Nous) inLater Plato', inW.H.Werkmeister (ed.), Facets of Plato's Philosophy (Assen, 1976), 70–102, suggests that intelligence's circular movement involves a comprehensive or non-perspectival apprehension of the object of thought. 13 Sedley translates ;,7B 9C! AD!,)*! as 'concerned with becoming' to suggest that corrupted thoughts are about becoming rather than being ('The Ideal of Godlikeness', 323). I adopt Zeyl's 'at our birth' because the passage seems to echo the account of the soul's embodiment at 43 a–44 a and because learning 'the harmonies and revolutions of the universe' would seem to involve thinking about the movements of celestial bodies and the world soul, as well as investigating the mathematical relations underlying their movements. Created on 1 December 2003 at 20.14 hours page 176 After the Ascent 177 shall have achieved our end: that most excellent life o*ered to humankind by the gods, both now and forevermore. (90 d 1–7, trans. Zeyl, adapted) Those who do not achieve this state are reincarnated as lower forms of life, including birds, snakes, and fish. They can eventually escape the cycle of reincarnation only by recovering fully their original intelligence (92 c). This account of assimilation di*ers from the one inspired by the Philebus' conception of god. Rather than imitating god's causal activity by producing well-proportioned mixtures ourselves, the immortal part of the soul is to imitate the motions of the world soul by coming to understand them. Trying to understand the principles of cosmic order is di*erent from applying them to the world of becoming. Hence, the Timaeus emphasizes contemplating the cosmos as our end-perhaps in lieu of trying to improve it. Was Plato an escapist after all? In the Laws we find the contemplative and the active aspects of godlikeness, suggesting that both appealed to Plato in his late years. To begin, we notice that the Laws, like other dialogues, advocates becoming like god or becoming divine. For example, the Athenian Stranger assumes that becoming divine is what people in fact desire when he says that 'the one intending to become divine' should not recklessly pursue pleasures with the belief that this will make one free from pain (792d 4–7). In book 12 he says that no one should be appointed as a guardian of the laws who is not divine and has not laboured over the arguments concerning the existence and nature of the gods (966 c–d). The guardians must know how virtue, the beautiful, and the good are each one and many and be able to demonstrate this in argument (965 c–966b). The Athenian says, 'Those who are to be real [E!9($] guardians of the laws must truly [E!9($] understand the things concerning the truth of [all serious matters], and must be capable of interpreting it in speech and of following it in deed' (966 b 5–7).14Understanding, articulating, and acting according to the truth about virtue, beauty, and goodness are, of course, extremely high standards. The guardians grasp the highest objects of knowledge and know how to apply and explain what they understand. Both sides of godlikeness are manifest in their lives. 14 In the Philebus intelligence and wisdom (!"#$ and 673!8)*$) are said to be terms most appropriately and accurately applied to 'thoughts about what truly is [9?=$ ;,7B 9< F! E!9($ G!!"'?*$]' (59 d 1–5). Created on 1 December 2003 at 20.14 hours page 177 178 John M. Armstrong Cosmology also has a role. The Athenian says that the guardians should study the nature of soul and the orderly motion of the stars 'and of all other things of which intelligence [!"#$] is master, having set in order the entire universe' (966 d 9–e 4). If one studies astronomy in the rightway, onewill see that the heavens are purposefully and precisely ordered and therefore are guided by soul and intelligence (967 a–b). This recalls the theology of book 10, where the Athenian counters various views he considers impious. He argues that the sun, moon, and stars have souls which move them across the heavens and that these souls, because they are completely virtuous, are to be called gods (899 b). This is meant to establish, against the atheist, that gods exist.What makes a soul good is being guided by intelligence, and the Athenian identifies intelligence as the highest god (897 b).15The gods take care of us as their property (902 b). They attend to the smallest details of human life and cannot be swayed by bribes to overlook our crimes (902 e, 905 d).16 Far from being aloof, then, the gods are highly concerned about human a*airs and seek to order the world in the best way possible. The world has its own disorderly tendencies, however, which compete with the gods' e*orts. The Athenian says that in this 'immortal battle' between good and evil we have a part: to fight-with gods and spirits as allies ()Hμμ?I"*, 906 a 6)-against personal and civic injustice (906 a–c). The guardians play a special role in the struggle. The law against impiety requires them to persuade those with impious beliefs to accept a correct conception of the gods (909 a). More generally, the guardians must apply their knowledge of cosmic intelligence and soul to civic life.17 In book 12 the Athenian says: After [a guardian] has considered the way in which these matters relate to the Muse, he should apply them harmoniously to customs and to the practices of character. He should be able to give an account of as many of these customs and practices as have an account. The one incapable of acquiring these abilities in addition to the popular virtues [@8μ")'?*$ 15 See E. B. England (ed.), The Laws of Plato (2 vols.; Manchester, 1921), ad loc., for discussion of textual variants of 0,<! J70.$ 0,"=$, and Hackforth, 'Plato's Theism', for a persuasive argument that !"#$ is the same supreme god in Laws 10 as it is in the Philebus and Timaeus. 16 The attentiveness of the gods in emphasized at e.g. 892 b, 896 d, 897 a, 897 c, 900 d, 902 c, 903 a. 17 Cf. Cic. Rep. 6. 16. 24–9, where civic duty is portrayed as important but none the less instrumental to the soul's flight to heaven. Created on 1 December 2003 at 20.14 hours page 178 After the Ascent 179 17,9?=$] would hardly ever become a competent ruler of an entire city, but would be an assistant to other rulers. (967 e 2–968 a 4) The Muse, i.e. the songs and dances that play a large role in the social and educational life of the city, should reflect the heavenly order by encouraging the rule of intelligence in the citizens' souls.18 The guardians will supervise these and all other practices, sometimesmodifying or supplementing the laws set by the Athenian and his companions (769 d*.).19 In this passage we notice the seamlessness with which the Athenian shifts from the guardian's theoretical studies to their application. The explanation is apparent: the divine men of the Laws imitate on the social level what god does at the cosmic level. As the demiurge of the Timaeus looked to an eternal model before creating our world (Tim. 29 a), the guardians too combine knowledge and practice. Contemplation and action are harmonious aspects of the ideal life. Few are guardians, however. Magnesia's ordinary citizen, although not expected to understand the good itself and the details of intelligence's ordering of the cosmos, is expected to acquire virtue and to study some mathematics and astronomy.20 To an extent, then, the ordinary citizen becomes like god by ordering his or her own soul. Virtue is acquired by disciplining one's emotions and appetites-one's 'human nature'21-in accordance with the value judgements of the city's laws. The laws, because they are good laws, embody intelligence (cf. 714 a 1–2, 890d, 957 c 3–7). Intelligence is the leading virtue (631 b–d). Hence, obeying and studying the law improve the citizens' souls. Obeying the law does this by controlling and guiding pleasures and pains so that the citizens experience the correct feelings in response to various sorts of action and character, especially as portrayed in drama, song, and dance (cf. 653 a *.). Studying the law, moreover, gives the citizens a bet18 653 a *., 700 d *., 775 b, 829 d; cf. Rep. 401 d–402 a. 19 See G. R.Morrow, Plato's Cretan City: A Historical Interpretation of the Laws (Princeton, 1960), 195–215, on the guardians' roles. 20 Cf. 747 b 1–6, 809 c–d, 818 c 3–8. In the Timaeus the study of number helps in the recovery of a soul's original intelligence (47 a–c). The Athenian of the Epinomis agrees: 'If number should ever be taken away from human nature, we would never become wise in anything' (977 c 1–3). The idea might be, to put it in the Philebus' terms, that without number we would not understand limit or quantity, and so not understand measure and proportion and, hence, the good. 21 For the Laws' identification of human nature with the soul's passional side, see e.g. 713 c, 732 e 4–5, 782 d 10–b 1, 937 d 8–e 2, 947 e 7–8. Created on 1 December 2003 at 20.14 hours page 179 180 John M. Armstrong ter understanding of intelligence's value judgements. Until one acquires the full virtue of intelligence for oneself, the law should serve as a surrogate intelligence. In this way, the divine can come to rule over the human in all citizens.22 In a key passage of book 4, the Athenian imagines that the future citizens of Magnesia are present, and he addresses them with words that will open the law code's preamble. Here again we find emphasis upon following god and some clues about god's nature. The Athenian declares: The god, just as the ancient saying goes, holding the beginning, the end, and the middle of all things, accomplishes his end in an undeviating course by revolving according to nature. Justice follows him always, avenger of those who abandon the divine law. The one intending to be happy follows her [Justice] with deference and order. But anyone who is pu*ed up by arrogance, or exalted by money, honours, or a nice shape of the body together with youthful impetuousness and a lack of intelligence, his soul inflamed with insolence, thinking that he needs neither a ruler nor some other leader but is capable of leading others, he is forsaken, bereft of god.23 (715 e 7–716 b 1) Justice follows god, and we, if we are to be happy, must follow justice. We know from other passages that justice entails courage and temperance and is the intelligent mastery of pleasures, pains, and desires (631 b–632a, 644 c *.; cf. Tim. 42 b). The unjust soul is 'bereft of god'-dominated by passion and devoid of intelligence. The emerging picture, then, is that misguided a*ections can prevent intelligence from taking its natural place in the soul (cf. 653 a *.; 672 c) and that justice consists of having a*ections that readily follow right judgement about the good. After theAthenian finishes his initial statement,Cleinias declares, 'One thing is clear: all men should aim to be among those following the god' (716 b 8–9). The Athenian then explains what it is that 22 For a masterful account of ordinary citizens' capacities for virtue in the Laws, see C. Bobonich, Plato's Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics (Oxford, 2002). 23 The scholiast on this passage says that 'god is clearly the demiurge' (G. C. Greene (ed.), Scholia Platonica (Haverford, 1937), 317). His demiurge must be part of the created world, then, for god here seems to be the outermost sphere of theworld soul as it moves in a perfect circle-either that or the outer sphere's intelligence. God's location is ethically significant because being in the world of change makes god, at least in this respect, like us. Alcinous seems to notice the di*erence when he says that we should become like the god in the heavens, not the god above the heavens (Did. 181. 42–5). Created on 1 December 2003 at 20.14 hours page 180 After the Ascent 181 makes us like god, emphasizing, as Socrates does in the Philebus, the prominence of measure in the good life: What action is dear to and follows god? One, as a single ancient saying has it: 'If it is measured, like is dear to like'; but unmeasured things are dear neither to each other nor to the measured. For us, the god would be the measure of all things, and much more so than any, as they say, human being. The one who would be dear to such a being must himself do everything in his power to become like that being. According to our argument, the temperate person among us is dear to god, for he is similar. The intemperate person, on the other hand, is dissimilar and di*erent, and is unjust. (716 c 1–d 3) The idea is not that temperance and justicemakeus likegodbecause god is temperate and just. Rather, we become like god by becoming measured. For souls such as ours, becoming temperate and just constitutes the appropriate measure. God, and not a human being as Protagoras thought, serves as the measure of all things for us because god, as the intelligently moving soul of the cosmos, is the perfect instantiation of measure. If measure is the good, then the point is simply that we become like god as we instantiate the good. This instantiation, moreover, involves the development of the thoughts, feelings, and actions constitutive of virtue. To the ordinary citizen of Magnesia, this would require obedience to the laws and an ongoing e*ort to play one's part in a well-ordered city. Becoming like god, then, involves attention to the city's virtue on the part of the guardian and the non-guardian, although in di*erent ways. In an early dialogue such as the Apology or Euthyphro, Socrates would have explained caring for the citizens' virtue as service to the god. The connection between civic improvement and divine reverence continues in the later dialogues, but against a metaphysical backdrop that connects the ordering agent of the universe with that which orders individual souls and cities. As we saw in Laws 10, god, as the ultimate craftsman, attends to the smallest details of the world in order to achieve its salvation, virtue, and happiness (903 b–c). The lesson for the young atheist is that his life, like everything else in creation, is for the good of the universe. At the level of politics, the good statesman, as a good craftsman, attends to the good of the city by caring for its parts, i.e. the citizens (cf. 902d 6 *.). Magnesia does not have the equivalent of a statesman among its citizens-someone above the law who directs Created on 1 December 2003 at 20.14 hours page 181 182 John M. Armstrong the city's a*airs though possession of the political art. Magnesia does have guardians, however, and they must understand, explain, and defend the city's laws. This, along with their obedience to the law, is their contribution to the good of the whole and is the way in which they become like god. Ordinary citizens do not supervise the city's institutions in the way that the guardians do. Their ordering activities are more focused on their own souls and so their assimilation to the divine is more limited. They none the less contribute to the city's order, and this contributes to the order of the universe, which is the aim of god's creative e*orts. This attention to the creation and maintenance of psychological and civic order might suggest that Plato had abandoned the conception of godlikeness that would have us flee from worldly a*airs. Not so. That one's soul should seek separation from the body's influence finds an echo in the Laws when the Athenian remarks that soldiers should not fear Pluto, god of the underworld, but 'should honour him as being in reality always the best for the human race. As I would assert in all seriousness, communion is in no way better for soul and body than separation' (828d 3–6).Moreover, the Athenian suggests that citizens of extraordinary virtue will escape this world after death and be transported to a better place where they presumably will dwell with the astral gods for ever (904 d 6–e 1). Even in theLaws, then, flight from the world of becoming retains some appeal for Plato. But we have seen the metaphysical foundation for an alternative conception. When we consider the role of intelligence in Plato's cosmology and theory of virtue, we can see the deep and elegant connection between metaphysics and ethics in Plato's thought (cf. Laws 631 c–d). If Plato's ancient interpreters had built this into their accounts of becoming like god, Plato would no doubt have been understood to be less of an escapist than he has been reputed to be. Nothing prevents us from correcting that reputation now, however. And it seems best that we do so, for we can then see better the overall integrity of his later philosophy. Southern Virginia University BIBLIOGRAPHY Annas, J., Platonic Ethics, Old and New (Ithaca, NY, 1999). Created on 1 December 2003 at 20.14 hours page 182 After the Ascent 183 Bobonich, C.,Plato's Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics (Oxford, 2002). Cooper, J. M., 'Plato's Theory of Human Good in the Philebus', Journal of Philosophy, 74 (1977), 713–30; repr. in id.,Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton, 1999), 151–64. Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, vol. iii (Florence, 1995). Diels, H., Doxographi Graeci (Berlin, 1879). Duerlinger, J., 'Ethics and the Divine Life in Plato's Philosophy', Journal of Religious Ethics, 13 (1985), 312–31. England, E. B. (ed.), The Laws of Plato (2 vols.; Manchester, 1921). Greene, G. C. (ed.), Scholia Platonica (Haverford, 1937). Hackforth, R., 'Plato's Theism', Classical Quarterly, 30 (1936), 4–9; repr. in R. E. Allen (ed.), Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (London, 1965), 439– 47. Johansen, T., 'Body, Soul, and Tripartition in Plato's Timaeus', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 19 (2000), 87–111. Lee, E. N., 'Reason and Rotation: Circular Movement as the Model of Mind (Nous) in Later Plato', in W. H. Werkmeister (ed.), Facets of Plato's Philosophy (Assen, 1976), 70–102. Menn, S., 'Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and as the Good', Review of Metaphysics, 45 (1992), 543–73. Plato on God as Nous (Carbondale, Ill., 1995). Merki, H., %&μ"'()*$ +,-.: Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gott•ahnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa (Freiburg, 1952). Mohr, R., 'The Relation of Reason to Soul in the Platonic Cosmology: Sophist 248e–249d', in id., The Platonic Cosmology (Leiden, 1985), 178– 83. Morrow,G. R.,Plato's CretanCity: AHistorical Interpretation of theLaws (Princeton, 1960). Rolo*, D., Gott•ahnlichkeit, Verg•ottlichung und Erh•ohung zu seligem Leben: Untersuchungen zur Herkunft der platonischen Angleichung an Gott (Berlin, 1970). Rutenber, C. G., The Doctrine of the Imitation of God in Plato (New York, 1946). Sedley, D., '"Becoming likeGod" in theTimaeus andAristotle', inT.Calvo and L. Brisson (eds.), Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias: Proceedings of the IV Symposium Platonicum (Sankt Augustin, 1997), 327–39. 'The Ideal of Godlikeness', in G. Fine (ed.), Oxford Readings in Philosophy: Plato (2 vols.; Oxford, 1999), ii. 309–28. 'Teleology and Myth in the Phaedo', Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 5 (1989), 359–83. Whittaker, J. (ed.), Alcinoos: Enseignement des doctrines de Platon (Paris, 1990). 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Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (2011) / 1 3Articles ARTICLES STUDIE Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics James Franklin The philosophy of mathematics since Frege has been dominated by an oscillation between Platonism and nominalism. Frege and many later authors defended a Platonist view of the reality of the "abstract objects" of mathematics such as numbers and sets,1 while nominalists tried to show that mathematics as applied in science can do without reference to such objects.2 To pose the problem in those terms neglects the Aristotelian option: that mathematics may be about some real properties of the (physical and/or nonphysical) world, such as its quantitative properties, or its symmetry, continuity, structure or pattern. Such a view is neither Platonist (since those properties are not in an "abstract" world but realised or at least realisable in the actual world, and in simple cases are perceivable) nor nominalist (since those properties are real aspects of things). Despite some Aristotelian currents in certain authors, there is no recognised complete Aristotelian option or school in the philosophy of mathematics.3 1 Notable recent examples include S. Shapiro, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); J. R. Brown, Philosophy of Mathematics: An introduction to the world of proofs and pictures (London: Routledge, 1999); M. Colyvan, The Indispensability of Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 2 H. Field, Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); J. Azzouni, Defl ating Existential Consequence: a case for nominalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 3 A preliminary eff ort in J. Franklin, "Aristotelian realism", in The Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. A. Irvine (Handbook of the Philosophy of Science series, Amsterdam: North-Holland/Elsevier, 2009), 101–153. Other works with Aristotelian tendencies include J. Bigelow, The Reality of Numbers: 4 Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (2011) / 1 Articles James Franklin Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics An Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics, if it can be sustained, promises to remedy several notable defects in the philosophy of mathematics. First, there is the neglect of applied mathematics,4 since both Platonism and nominalism make it hard to see how mathematics can be so successful in real-world applications. Second, there is the confl ict between ontology and epistemology in mathematics, with Platonism taking the well-known objectivity of mathematics seriously but leaving it mysterious how we can access objects in another world, and nominalism making epistemology easy but making the objectivity and applicability of ma the matics a mystery.5 The neglect of epistemology accounts for two strange absences in the philosophy of mathematics: understanding (and mathematics is where one fi rst goes to experience pure understanding) and measurement (the primary way in which mathematics joins to the world). Thirdly, there is the divorce between the philosophy of mathematics, on the one hand, and developmental psychology and mathematics education, on the other – surely the considerable knowledge of infants' mathematical learning6 should be compatible with the correct philosophy of mathematics? An Aristotelian realism shows obvious promise of resolving these tensions, by exhibiting real properties of things that can be the objects of learning in children, the objects of understanding in adults, and the basis of the applications of applied mathematics. The fi rst task of an Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics is to achieve clarity as to what properties of the real world, exactly, are the objects of mathematics. A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988); J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Science and Necessity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), ch. 2; P. Forrest and D. M. Armstrong, "The nature of number", Philosophical Papers 16 (1987): 165–186; A. D. Irvine, ed., Physicalism in Mathematics (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990); P. Maddy, Realism in Mathematics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); T. Wilholt, Zahl und Wirklichkeit: Eine philosophische Untersuchung über die Anwendbarkeit der Mathematik (Paderborn: Mentis, 2004). 4 Noted in S. Körner, The Philosophy of Mathematics: An introductory essay (London: Hutchinson, 1960) and M. Steiner, The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998). 5 Noted in P. Benacerraf, "Mathematical truth", Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 661–679; nominalist answers include G. Hellman, Mathematics Without Numbers (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) and M. Leng, Mathematics and Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Platonist answers include R. C. Koons, Realism Regained (New York, Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 15. 6 S. Dehaene, The Number Sense: How the mind creates mathematics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Z. P. Dienes, Building Up Mathematics (London: Hutchinson, 1960), esp. ch. 2; A. Baroody, M.-L. Lai and K. S. Mix, "The development of young children's early number and operation sense and its implications for early childhood education", in Handbook of Research on the Education of Young Children, ed. B. Spodek and O. N. Saracho, 2nd ed. (Mahwah NJ : Lawrence Erlbaum, 2006), ch. 11; comment in P. Kitcher, The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 107–8. Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (2011) / 1 5Articles James Franklin Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics There is an old answer to this question, namely "quantity", which remains partly true but requires some supplementation. "THE SCIENCE OF QUANTITY" From the time of Aristotle to the eighteenth century, one philosophy of mathematics dominated the fi eld. Mathematics, it was said, is the "science of quantity". Quantity is of two kinds, discrete and continuous, studied respectively by arithmetic and geometry. Aristotle not only provided the general metaphysical  amework of nonPlatonist realism but laid down a number of themes specifi c to mathematics. Mathematics was for him a study of properties of physical things, abstracted  om them only in thought: Obviously physical bodies contain surfaces, volumes, lines and points, and these are the subject-matter of mathematics ... the mathematician does not consider the attributes indicated as the attributes of physical bodies. That is why he separates them, for in thought they are separable  om motion ... While geometry investigates physical lengths, but not as physical, [the more physical branch of mathematics,] optics, investigates mathematical lengths, but as physical.7 The contrast of this realism with Platonism is explicit: "mathematical objects exist and are as they are said to be", but they are not separate objects. "There are attributes peculiar to animals as being male or as being female (yet there is no male or female separate  om animals). So there are properties holding true of things merely as lengths or as planes."8 Aristotle also laid out the basic distinction between discrete and continuous quantity, along with the resemblance between them in their both referring to divisibility into parts: "Quantum" means that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts of which each is by nature a "one" and a "this". A quantum is a plurality if it is numerable, a magnitude if it is measurable. "Plurality" means that which 7 Aristotle, Physics II, 2, 193 b 23–194a11, discussed in J. Lear, "Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics", Philosophical Review 91 (1982): 161–192; H. Mendell, "Aristotle and mathematics", in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2004 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), url = 〈http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ sum2004/entries/aristotle-mathematics/〉. 8 Aristotle, Metaphysics XIII, 3, 1077 b 18 – 1078 a 9. 6 Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (2011) / 1 Articles James Franklin Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics is divisible potentially into non-continuous parts, "magnitude" that which is divisible into continuous parts.9 And on discrete quantity, he emphasized – if a little cryptically – the relativity of number to the universal being used to divide the mass being counted into units: "The one" means the measure of some plurality, and "number" means a measured plurality and a plurality of measures ... The measure must always be some identical thing predicable of all the things it measures, e.g. if the things are horses, the measure is "horse", and if they are men, "man". If they are a man, a horse, and a god, the measure is perhaps "living being", and the number of them will be a number of living beings.10 Likewise in continuous quantity, he noted the reliance of measurement on relation to the quantity we take for a unit: "... measure means that by which each thing is primarily known, and the measure of each thing is a unit–in length, breadth, depth, weight and speed ... In all these cases, then, the measure and starting-point is some indivisible unit (since even in the case of lines we treat the one-foot line as indivisible)."11 That is not to say that Aristotle takes quantity itself to be relative; simply that our knowledge or measurement of it must be relative to a unit. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a version of an Aristotelian theory of mathematics as a realist science of quantity, both discrete and continuous, was standard.12 Newton writes of continuous quantity, in his characteristic magisterial style: By Number we understand not so much a Multitude of Unities, as the abstracted Ratio of any Quantity, to another Quantity of the same kind, which we take for Unity.13 9 Aristotle, Metaphysics V, 13, 1020 a 7 – 12. 10 Aristotle, Metaphysics XI V, 1, 1088 a 4–11; further in H. G. Apostle, Aristotle's Philosophy of Mathematics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1952); V. E. Smith, St Thomas on the Object of Geometry (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1954); D. Bostock, "Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics", in Oxford Handbook on Aristotle, to appear. 11 Aristotle, Metaphysics X, 1, 1052 b 22–30. 12 E.g. I. Barrow, The Usefulness of Mathematical Learning Explained and Demonstrated (London, 1734, repr. London: Cass, 1970), 10-15; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1st ed. (Edinburgh, 1771), article "Mathematics", vol. III, 30–31; P. Mancosu, Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical Practice in the Seventeenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 16, 35–37, 56, 88; D. M. Jesseph, Berkeley's Philosophy of Mathematics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), ch. 1. 13 I. Newton, Arithmetica Univeralis (1728), 2; similar in L. Euler, Elements of Algebra, 3rd ed. (London, 1822); both discussed in Bigelow and Pargetter, Science and Necessity, 60–61. Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (2011) / 1 7Articles James Franklin Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics The realist quantity theory apparently then died of inanition. A version of it was defended by John Stuart Mill, but the criticisms of Mill made by Frege were generally thought to have ruled out any such realist theory. The quantity theory plainly gives an initially reasonable picture of at least elementary mathematics, with its emphasis on counting, measuring, and calculating with the resulting numbers. It promises direct answers to questions about what the object of mathematics is (certain properties of physical and possibly non-physical things such as their size), and how those properties are known (the same way other natural properties of physical things are known – by perception in simple cases and inference  om perception in more complex ones). Let us examine quantity more closely  om a modern point of view. QUANTITY: CONTINUOUS QUANTITY AND RATIOS The division of quantity into continuous and discrete at least highlights the fact that it is far  om clear initially whether the two kinds have much in common, for example whether the ratio "the double" has much in common with the counting number 2. So let us examine them separately. The crucial concept of continuous quantity is that of ratio or proportion. John Bigelow, one of the most Aristotelian of recent philosophers of mathematics, introduces ratios as follows. The Aristotelian language is chosen to keep close to physically real relations, and also to remind us how easily we deal with the reality of relations, and relations between relations: Physical objects, like elephants and Italians, humming-birds and Hottentots, have many physical properties and relations: volume and surface area, for example. And the physical properties of these objects stand in important relations to one another. In particular, such physical properties stand in relations of proportion to one another. There is a relation between the surface area of the humming-bird and that of the Hottentot; and this may or may not be the same as the relationship that holds between the surface areas of an Italian and an elephant. Relationships such as proportion will hold not only between surface areas but also between volumes. Conceivably, the relationship between the surface areas of two objects might be the same as the relationship between volumes for two other objects. But it is a fact of considerable biological signifi cance that the relation between surface areas of two objects will not, in general, be the same as the relationship between their volumes. Ignoring diff erences in shape (say, by supposing an elephant were shaped like an Italian, or vice versa), it turns out that if the elephant has ten times the height then it will have a hundred times the surface area and a thousand times the volume. The 8 Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (2011) / 1 Articles James Franklin Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics volumes of the elephant and the Italian, or the Hottentot and the hummingbird, will be "more diff erent" than their surface areas. There are several distinct relationships present; furthermore, there are distinctive ways in which these relationships diff er  om one another. There are also distinctive relationships among these relationships. These facts have consequences of physical signifi cance: for instance, with regard to problems of heat regulation. It is  om such fertile soil as this that most of mathematics has grown.14 Thus for example the universal "being 1.57 kilograms in mass" stands in a certain relation, a ratio, to the universal "being 0.35 kilograms in mass". Pairs of lengths can stand in that same ratio, as can pairs of time intervals. The ratio itself is just what those binary relations between pairs of masses, lengths and time intervals have in common ("A ratio is a sort of relation in respect of size between two magnitudes of the same kind": Euclid, book V, defi nition 3). Thus there are determinate relations such as "being one-third the volume of " that hold between physical objects, and then there are "topic-neutral" ratios which are relations between those determinate relations – for example, the ratio 3 : 2 holds between "being three times as massive as" and "being twice as massive as".15 The theory of the ancients that the science of continuous quantity is geometry does need some qualifi cation. It was always hard to regard shape as straightforwardly "quantity" – it contrasts with size, rather than resembling it – though geometry certainly studies it. Further, there is an alternative body of knowledge with a better claim to being the science of continuous quantity in general, namely, the calculus. Stemming  om Aristotelian debates on the continuum,16 the study of continuity requires the notion of a limit, as described and made use of in the diff erential calculus of Newton and Leibniz, and made more rigorous in the real analysis of Cauchy and Weierstrass. MEASUREMENT AND THE APPLICABILITY OF MATHEMATICS As a case study on what such an Aristotelian perspective on (continuous) quantity can do, we present recent realist work on measurement theory. 14 J. Bigelow, "Sets are haecceities", in Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D. M. Armstrong, ed. J. Bacon, K. Campbell and L. Reinhardt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) ch. 4, at 74–75. 15 D. M. Armstrong, "Are quantities relations? A reply to Bigelow and Pargetter", Philosophical Studies 54 (1988): 305-316. 16 A. Newstead, "Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the Continuum", in Aristotle and Contemporary Science II, ed. D. Sfendoni-Mentzou, J. R. Brown and J. Hattiangadi (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2001), 113-129. Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (2011) / 1 9Articles James Franklin Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics Nowhere is the divergence between the Aristotelian and Platonist standpoints more obvious than in how they approach the problem of the applicability of mathematics. That very description of the problem has a Platonist bias, as if the problem is about the relations between "abstract" mathematical entities and something distinct  om them in the "world" to which they are "applied". On an Aristotelian view, there is no such initial separation between mathematics and its "applications", since the quantity, symmetry, continuity and so on that pure mathematics studies is the same symmetry and continuity that is found in the physical world. That undesirable assumed split between mathematical entities and their "applications" is fi rst evident in accounts of measurement. Considering the fundamental importance of measurement as the fi rst point of contact between mathematics and what it is about, it is surprising how little attention has been paid to it in the standard literature of the philosophy of mathematics. What work there has been has tended to concentrate on "representation theorems" that describe the conditions under which quantities can be represented by numbers.17 "Measurement theory offi cially takes homomorphisms of empirical domains into (intended) models of mathematical systems as its subject matter", as one recent writer expresses it.18 That again poses the problem as if it is one about the association of numbers to parts of the world, which inevitably leads to a Platonist perspective on the problem. But a closer look suggests an Aristotelian reinterpretation. What is it about the quantitative properties of the measured world that ensures that a homomorphism to numbers exists? The standard treatment (of measurement of length) begins by looking at the properties of concatenating identical rods, and axiomatising those properties as a basis for showing that the homomorphism exists.19 But the quantitative properties exist prior to the homomorphism and are the condition of its existence: as the Aristotelian maintains, the system of ratios of lengths, for example, pre-exists in the physical things being measured, and measurement consists in identi ing the ratios that are of interest in a particular case; the arbitrary choice of unit that allows ratios to be converted to digital 17 E.g. C. W. Savage and P. Ehrlich, Philosophical and Foundational Issues in Measurement Theory (Hillsdale, NJ : L. Erlbaum, 1992). 18 Azzouni, Defl ating Existential Consequence, 161. 19 D. H. Krantz, R. D. Luce, P. Suppes and A. Tversky, Foundations of Measurement, vol. 1 (New York: Academic, 1971), ch. 1. 10 Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (2011) / 1 Articles James Franklin Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics numerals for ease of calculation is something that happens at the last step.20 That in turn suggests an Aristotelian realist view of the real numbers arising in measurement. As the Australian Aristotelian Michell puts it, in language similar to that used of ratios above: The commitment that measurable attributes sustain ratios has a further implication, viz., that the real numbers are spatiotemporally located relations. It commits us to a realist view of number. If Smith's weight is 90 kg, then this is equivalent to asserting that the real number, 90, is a kind of relation, viz., the kind of relation holding between Smith's weight and the weight of the standard kilogram. Since these weights are real, spatiotemporally located instances of the attribute, any relation holding between them will likewise be real and spatiotemporally located. This kind of relation is what was referred to above as a ratio. So the realist view of measurement implies that real numbers are ratios. By way of contrast, the standard view within the philosophy of mathematics is that numbers are abstract entities of some kind, entities not intrinsic to the empirical context of measurement, but related externally to features of that situation by human convention. This neatly fi ts the representational view of measurement and in the 20th century, the representational view has dominated philosophical thinking about measurement. The representational view was strongly informed by non-realist thinking within the philosophy of mathematics.21 QUANTITY: DISCRETE QUANTITY, NUMBERS AND SETS Discrete quantities arise in quite a diff erent way  om ratios. It is characteristic of "unit-making" or "count" universals like "being an apple" or "being a horse" (in Aristotle's example) to structure their instances discretely. That is what distinguishes them  om mass universals like "being water". A heap of apples stands in a certain relation to "being an apple". That relation is the number of apples in the heap. The same relation can hold between a heap of shoes and "being a shoe". The number is just what these binary relations have in common.22 Thus, suppose there are seven black swans on the lake now. The proposition refers to a part of the world, the black biomass on the lake, and a structuring 20 Similar comments in Bigelow and Pargetter, Science and Necessity, 60–61. 21 J. Michell, "The logic of measurement: a realist overview", Measurement 38 (2005): 285–294; relation to Aristotle discussed in C. B. Crowley, Aristotelian-Thomistic Philosophy of Measure and the International System of Units (SI) (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1996). 22 From D. M. Armstrong, Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), ch. 13; originally  om P. Forrest and D. M. Armstrong, "The nature of number", Philosophical Papers 16 (1987): 165–186; and mostly in G. Kessler, "Frege, Mill and the foundations of arithmetic", Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 65–79. Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (2011) / 1 11Articles James Franklin Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics property, being a black swan on the lake now. Both are necessary to determining that the relation between the mass and the property should be "seven": if it were a diff erent mass (e.g. the black swans on or beside the lake) or a diff erent unitmaking property (e.g. being a swan organ on the lake now) then the numerical relation would be diff erent. Therefore numbers are not properties of parts of the world simply, but must be properties of the relation between parts of the world and the unit-making properties that structure them. So the fact that the heap of shoes stands in one such numerical relation to "being a shoe" and another numerical relation to "being a pair of shoes" (made much of by Frege23) does not show that the number of a heap is subjective, or not about something in the world, but only that number is relative to the count universal being considered. For Aristotelians, the universal is real and so is its relation to the heap it structures. Whereas ratios have nothing to do with sets, numbers are intimately connected with them. Given a set, there is something to count. And conversely, if there is counting, there is a set of entities being counted, and indeed sets are good for little else. Given a heap and a unit-making property structuring it, there is immediately created (there supervenes) both the set of things of which the heap is the mereological sum, and a number of things in that set. If there is no unitmaking property – if there is just stuff – there is no number and no set. If there is a unit-making property, there is a set and a number of elements in the set. So what are sets,  om an Aristotelian point of view? The Aristotelian cannot rest content with the Platonist story that sets are a simple Platonist entity at which questions should stop, and that the membership relation is sui generis. That conception is problematic, but even if it were intelligible and satisfactory, it would interpose a Platonist entity in a story where there should be no role for it, the story of how unit-making properties structure a heap into something able to be counted. The Aristotelian desires a theory according to which sets are ontologically nothing over and above there being a unit-making property to structure a heap. Several closely-related theories are available. The leading one is that of David Armstrong. He adopts David Lewis's proposal that a set is the mereological sum of its singletons, and adds the idea that the singleton of x is simply the 23 G. Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884), trans. J. L. Austin, 2nd revised ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), § 22, p. 28 and § 54, p. 66. 12 Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (2011) / 1 Articles James Franklin Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics state of aff airs of there being some unit-making universal that singles out x.24 The essence of the suggestion is that at the basic philosophical level necessary in these questions, we cannot help ourselves naively to the notion of "object". When we assert "The cat sat on the mat", "The", in "the cat", indicates that we are dealing with a single unifi ed object, cut out  om the background. In the apparent continuum of matter that is the universe and the fl ux it undergoes, what cuts out the single warm furry item, draws its boundaries and points it out as an individual thing deserving a common noun?25 It is the property, the repeatable unit-making property "being a cat", that cuts the cat  om the background, and in doing so creates a singleton (and when actually repeated creates other sets) and at the same time creates something to be counted. This view of sets raises the possibility that small sets of physical objects should be directly perceivable, as argued by Maddy.26 If I open an egg carton and see that there are three eggs in it, I perceive both the pale curved surface of the egg-heap and that it is structured by "being an egg" into three parts, each an egg. That is suffi cient to perceive the heap as a set of three eggs. Perception of sets of sets of physical objects is not beyond our capabilities either. For example, in this diagram, Fig. 1 Why 2 × 3 = 3 × 2 the point of the ovals is to guide the visual system so as to see the six objects as alternately two sets of triples and three sets of pairs. That is what allows the intellect to grasp the relation between the parts and hence achieve its certain 24 D. M. Armstrong, "Classes are states of aff airs", Mind 100 (1991): 189-200; several proposals listed in A. Paseau, "Motivating reductionism about sets", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 295–307. 25 B. C. Smith, On the Origin of Objects (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996). 26 P. Maddy, Realism in Mathematics, 58–67. Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (2011) / 1 13Articles James Franklin Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics knowledge of the equation 2 × 3 = 3 × 2, based on its understanding of why it must be so. "THE SCIENCE OF STRUCTURE" It became clear that, even if the "science of quantity" theory were correct about elementary mathematics, it was not adequate to cover some of the subjectmatters of modern higher mathematics. A contemporary Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics must expand its view of the objects of mathematics. The earliest case of a serious mathematical problem that seemed clearly not well described as being about "quantity" was Euler's example of the bridges of Königsberg. The bridges connected two islands and two riverbanks as shown in the diagram. Fig. 2 The bridges of Königsberg The citizens of Königsberg in the eighteenth century noticed that it was impossible to walk over all the bridges once, without walking over at least one of them twice. Euler proved they were correct.27 The result is intuitively about the "arrangement" or pattern of the bridges, rather than about anything quantitative like size or number. As Euler puts it, the result is "concerned only with the determination of position and its properties; it does not involve measurements." The length of the bridges and the size of the islands are irrelevant. That is why we can draw the diagram so schematically. All that matters is which land masses are connected by which bridges. Euler's result is now regarded as the pioneering eff ort in the topology of networks. There now exist large bodies of work on such topics as graph theory, networks, and operations research problems like timetabling, where the emphasis is on arrangements and connections rather than quantities. 27 L. Euler, "Solutio problematis ad geometriam situs pertinentis" (1776), trans. in Graph Theory 1736–1936, ed. N. Biggs, E. Lloyd and R. Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 3–8. 14 Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (2011) / 1 Articles James Franklin Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics A second kind of example where structure contrasts with quantity is symmetry, brought to the fore by nineteenth-century group theory and twentiethcentury physics. Symmetry is a real property of things, things which may be but need not be physical (an argument, for example, can have symmetry if its second half repeats the steps of the fi rst half in the opposite order; Platonist mathematical entities, if any existed, could be symmetrical). The kinds of symmetry are classifi ed by group theory, the central part of modern abstract algebra.28 In the 1990s, there was a prominent "structuralist" school in the philosophy of mathematics, led by Resnik and Shapiro, which rightly highlighted the role of structure in mathematics.29 However they viewed structures as a Platonist entity similar to sets. CONCLUSION Platonists and nominalists have comprehensively exposed each others' inadequacies in the philosophy of mathematics. The resources are now available for a revival of Aristotelian realism. It will not be in the strict Aristotelian tradition of the "science of quantity", but will still be a moderate realist view, neither Platonist nor nominalist, which will include quantity in the subject-matter of mathematics. James Franklin is professor of mathematics and statistics at the University of New South Wales. He is the author of The Science of Conj ecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal; Corrupting the Youth: A History of Philosophy in Australia; What Science Knows: And How It Knows It, and other books. He has completed a book on Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics. Address: School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of New South Wales, Sydney 2052, Australia E-mail: j. [email protected] Web: http://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/ 28 H. Weyl, Symmetry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952); G. Hon and B. R. Goldstein, From Summetria to Symmetry: The making of a revolutionary scientifi c concept (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008). 29 S. Shapiro, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); M. D. Resnik, Mathematics as a Science of Patterns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (2011) / 1 15Articles James Franklin Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics SUMMARIUM De philosophia mathematicae Aristotelica Philosophia mathematicae hodierna aut Platonismum, aut nominalismum amplectitur, realismo Aristotelico neglecto remanente. Secundum sententiam Aristotelicam mathematica circa formas seu rationes, quae vere in rebus reperiuntur, agit. Mathematica ergo non versatur circa "obiecta abstracta" incorporea, ut Platonici volunt, nec est mera "lingua scientiarum", ut nominalistae docent. Sententia Aristotelis, mathematicam scil. esse "scientiam quantitatis", ad minimum arithmeticae elementaris indolem bene exprimit. Ratio nempe seu proportio e. g. duarum altitudinum est perceptibilis mensurabilisque relatio realis inter duas formas a parte rei repertas. In eadem proportione quoque duo pondera aut intervalla temporis convenire possunt. Proportio seu ratio est exemplar quantitatis continuae; sed etiam quantitates discretae, ut numeri integri, sunt relationes, videlicet multitudinis ad universale, quod unitatem defi nit. Numerus e. g. foliorum arboris est relatio frondis ad "folium-esse"; quae relatio aequalis esse potest relationi, quam multitudo caligarum dicit ad "caligam-esse". Sublimior mathematica hodierna autem circa formas quandas reales, quae naturaliter non videntur esse quantitates, versatur; quapropter defi nitio mathe matices ut "scientiae quantitatis" laxari debere videtur. Symmetria, topologia et similia sunt obiectum mathematices, non tamen praecise dicunt quantitatem, sed potius structuram, ordinem, dispositionem partium in toto etc. ABSTRACT Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics Modern philosophy of mathematics has been dominated by Platonism and nominalism, to the neglect of the Aristotelian realist option. Aristotelianism holds that mathematics studies certain real properties of the world – mathematics is neither about a disembodied world of "abstract objects", as Platonism holds, nor it is merely a language of science, as nominalism holds. Aristotle's theory that mathematics is the "science of quantity" is a good account of at least elementary mathematics: the ratio of two heights, for example, is a perceivable and measurable real relation between properties of physical things, a relation that can be shared by the ratio of two weights or two time intervals. Ratios are an example of continuous quantity; discrete quantities, such as whole numbers, are also realised as relations between a heap and a unit-making universal. For example, the relation between foliage and being-a-leaf is the number of leaves on a tree, a relation that may equal the relation between a heap of shoes and being-a-shoe. Modern higher mathematics, however, deals with some real properties that are not naturally seen as quantity, so that the "science of quantity" theory of mathematics needs supplementation. Symmetry, topology and similar structural properties are studied by mathematics, but are about pattern, structure or arrangement rather than quantity.

Reasonableness, Intellectual Modesty, and Reciprocity in Political Justification Author(s): R. J. Leland and Han van Wietmarschen Reviewed work(s): Source: Ethics, Vol. 122, No. 4 (July 2012), pp. 721-747 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/666499 . Accessed: 27/08/2012 11:58 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Ethics. http://www.jstor.org Reasonableness, Intellectual Modesty, and Reciprocity in Political Justification* R. J. Leland and Han van Wietmarschen Political liberals ask citizens not to appeal to certain considerations, including religious and philosophical convictions, in political deliberation. We argue that political liberals must include a demanding requirement of intellectual modesty in their ideal of citizenship in order to motivate this deliberative restraint. The requirement calls on each citizen to believe that the best reasoners disagree about the considerations that she is barred from appealing to. Along the way, we clarify how requirements of intellectual modesty relate to moral reasons for deliberative restraint. And we argue against attempts to weaken our requirement of intellectual modesty by emphasizing those moral reasons.I. INTRODUCTION Does a stable and just liberal society need its citizens to qualify their commitment to controversial religious, moral, philosophical, and political tenets? Must good citizens be intellectually modest about their worldviews? These questions about the intellectual demands of liberalism have a long history in political philosophy, and they have received different answers fromdifferent forms of liberalism. In this article, we answer these questions on behalf of political liberalism. We propose a framework for* The authors share equal responsibility for this article. We received comments on drafts from Michael Bratman, Eamonn Callan, Joshua Cohen, Krista Lawlor, Micah Lewin, Sara Mrsny, Debra Satz, Julius Sensat, and Rob van Someren Gréve. The editorial process at Ethics led to more comments from two anonymous referees, Peter Vallentyne, and several anonymous editors. We gratefully acknowledge these people's advice and criticism, which clarified our thoughts and improved our argument. Earlier versions were presented at Stanford's Dirty Leviathan graduate student political theory retreat, the second Copenhagen Conference in Epistemology, the second annual conference on Practical Philosophy in Groningen, and at the University of Amsterdam. Thanks to audience members at these events for their comments. Ethics 122 ( July 2012): 721–747 © 2012 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/2012/12204-0005$10.00 721 722 Ethics July 2012thinking about these questions systematically, and we argue that political liberalism must demand a very strong form of intellectual modesty. Political liberals attempt to show how a just and stable society could be established despite citizens' endorsement of conflicting religious, philosophical, and moral views and resulting disagreements about important political matters. Political liberals respond to this disagreement by calling for a strong form of deliberative restraint: citizens should bracket some of their convictions when they deliberate about fundamental political issues, including their religious, philosophical, and moral convictions. The issue of intellectual modesty arises here because this deliberative restraint needs a stable and plausible rationale. One may think that citizens will not set aside their fundamental convictions unless they are intellectually modest in holding those convictions. In Section II, we develop a framework to address the issue of intellectual modesty in a systematic way. Our starting point is a general characterization of citizens' motivation for restraint: citizens refrain from appealing to their fundamental convictions because they believe those convictions are disputed by reasonable people. The idea of reasonable disagreement carries two connotations here. First, reasonable disagreement may just mean that morally decent people disagree. On this understanding, citizens believe that their convictions are disputed by people who are willing to treat their fellow citizens as free and equal persons and who are willing to abide by fair political decisions. Second, reasonable disagreement may mean that intellectually capable people disagree. On this understanding, citizens believe that their convictions are disputed by informed, intelligent, and sincere reasoners. The belief that intellectually capable people disagree with your convictions represents a form of intellectual modesty; themere belief thatmorally decent people disagree does not. In Section II, we propose a way to precisely characterize these two connotations and how they may work together to motivate deliberative restraint. The framework we adopt conceives of intellectual modesty as a matter of how a citizen understands the intellectual resources and capabilities of those with whom she disagrees. This conception of intellectual modesty contrasts with the ways in which political liberals have discussed the issue. Brian Barry, for example, argues that citizens apply restraint because they are insufficiently certain about their views.1 John Rawls focuses on citizens' beliefs about the kinds of obstacles people face when reasoning about moral, philosophical, and religious issues (what he calls "the burdens of judgment").2 In many other cases, political liberals are1. Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 168–73. 2. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 54–58. Leland and van Wietmarschen Reciprocity in Political Justification 723vague and imprecise about the kind of intellectual modesty that gives a citizen reasons for restraint.3 Our focus on how citizens should conceive of the competence of those who disagree with them clarifies the kind of intellectual modesty that political liberals should ask of citizens. Our framework also sets the stage for more precise arguments among political liberals about how much intellectual modesty they must ask citizens to demonstrate. In Section III, we argue that political liberals must require citizens to accept a very strong form of intellectual modesty: citizensmust believe that even themost capable reasoners disagree about the considerations that are excluded from political deliberation. We provide three arguments in favor of this strong requirement. First, this requirement gives the best explanation of citizens' deliberative restraint (Sec. III.A). Second, it gives the best explanation of how political decisions can be justifiable to all reasonable citizens even though citizens reasonably disagree with those political decisions (Sec. III.B). Third, a view that imposes our strong requirement can permit citizens to draw on considerations, like complex scientific findings, which are undisputed among experts but controversial among less capable reasoners. Other views cannot (Sec. III.C ). Some philosophers have argued that political liberalism need not require any form of intellectual modesty.4 Our arguments are in clear conflict with such views. It is hard to say whether political liberals who are unclear about the intellectual demands of their position would be happy to accept our view. We think our arguments show that they should be committed to the strong form of intellectual modesty we advocate, but we expect many of them would reject our view as being too demanding. In Section IV, we consider some worries about the demandingness of our view. We show that some concerns about demandingness are misplaced but that others may provide a serious challenge to political liberalism. We welcome this result, since we intend this piece as a sympathetic investigation of what political liberalism must require, not a defense of the view. Our argument demonstrates that a full defense of political liberalism must take concerns about intellectual modesty seriously, and it further provides a framework to take these concerns on in a systematic way.3. Joshua Cohen, "Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus," in Philosophy, Politics, Democracy: Selected Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 52–58; Thomas Nagel, "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy," Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (1987): 229–37; Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 167–74; Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 25. 4. Erin Kelly and Lionel McPherson, "On Tolerating the Unreasonable," Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (2001): 38–55; Leif Wenar, "Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique," Ethics 106 (1995): 32–62. 724 Ethics July 2012II. A FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT REASONABLENESS AND DEMANDS OF INTELLECTUAL MODESTY A. Reciprocity in Political Justification To properly understand how the issue of intellectual modesty arises for political liberals, we need to explain some of the key claims of political liberalism in more detail. Political liberals worry about disagreements bearing on politics because these disagreements threaten to render an ideal of mutual justifiability unrealizable. When citizens disagree radically, both in their political judgments and in the considerations that inform these judgments, it can look impossible to render political decisions justifiable to each citizen. Political liberals answer this challenge with a justificatory principle that requires citizens to exercise deliberative restraint:5 politi consi justifi politi publi politi above (rath princReciprocity in Justification: When deliberating about fundamental political issues, each citizen must only appeal to those considerations she can reasonably expect all other reasonable people to accept.Political liberals claim that citizens have a duty to honor the reciprocity principle when deliberating on fundamental political issues.5 Citizens who are reasonable comply with this duty. Political liberals believe that when citizens keep (some of) their disputed views out of their political decision making, then those disagreements no longer pose a threat to the mutual justifiability of the resulting decisions. The reciprocity principle guides a citizen's political deliberation by drawing a line between a set of considerations she can appeal to (call these "public considerations") and a set of considerations she cannot appeal to ("nonpublic considerations"). Political liberals disagree about which considerations are public and which are nonpublic. For instance, somemay regard complicated scientific findings as nonpublic in virtue of the expertise required for understanding these findings. Others may regard such results as publicly available. In this article, we are concerned with the attitude reasonable citizens have toward their nonpublic views and whether that attitude involves a form of intellectual modesty. We don't attempt to fully specify which considerations are public and which are not. But we do make two assumptions about the public/nonpublic. Political liberals also endorse a similar principle as a necessary condition on cal justification: political decisions are justified only if they can be supported by derations that all reasonable citizens can reasonably be expected to accept. This catory principle says nothing about what citizens should or should not do in their cal deliberation; it only says that political decisions should in fact be supported by c considerations. We have no objections to the justificatory principle, but we believe cal liberalism is also committed to the deliberative principle of reciprocity introduced . Because we are interested in the demands political liberalism places on citizens er than on the justification of political decisions), we will focus on this deliberative iple of reciprocity in justification. Leland and van Wietmarschen Reciprocity in Political Justification 725divide; these assumptions reflect a consensus among political liberals about the need to exclude or include particular considerations when making fundamental political decisions. First, the set of public considerations includes (though it is not limited to) a number of central liberal-democratic political values, including the thought that people should be treated as free and equal persons. We will say more on this in Section II.D. Second, the set of nonpublic considerations includes (though itmay not be limited to) citizens' views about religious, philosophical, and moral issues. We will call citizens' views in these areas "sectarian views."6 These may include the following: conceptions of what is of value in human life; ideals of personal character, friendship, familial, and associative relations; ontological views; and conceptions of humanity's place in the world. The assumption that sectarian views are nonpublic is important for our discussion because most-if not all-reasonable citizens endorse some set of sectarian views and because citizens often regard their sectarian views to be of great importance to their lives. This means that if political liberalism demands that citizens be intellectually modest in their nonpublic convictions, then political liberalism requires most citizens to be intellectually modest about some of their most important commitments. The reciprocity principle asks reasonable citizens to refrain from appeal to considerations that they cannot expect other reasonable citizens to accept. Political liberals claim that a reasonable citizen who applies this principle to her political deliberation will regard the principle as barring her from appeal to any of her nonpublic views. This is because a reasonable citizen will conclude that she cannot expect all other reasonable citizens to accept her nonpublic views. In Section III.A, we argue that reasonable citizens must be committed to a strong form of intellectual modesty about their nonpublic views in order to secure this result. This is an argument for a particular conception of reasonableness. Our view competes with conceptions of reasonableness that emphasize moral constraints rather than constraints of intellectual modesty to explain reasonable citizens' deliberative restraint. We propose a way to compare competing conceptions of reasonableness based on how they balance these kinds of constraints (Secs. II.C and II.D). B. Expectations about Acceptance In order to discuss the different kinds of constraint that conceptions of reasonableness impose on citizens, we need to explain how we understand expectations about what others can accept. Expectations can be6. In contemporary English, the term 'sectarian' often carries a disparaging connotation. We do not mean to communicate that here. 726 Ethics July 2012understood normatively or predictively. When I predictively expect you to do something, I think you will do it. When I normatively expect you to do it, I think you should do it. The expectations involved in the reciprocity principle are normative: when I expect all reasonable citizens to accept some proposition, p, I think all reasonable citizens should accept p.7 We take normative expectations about acceptance to conform to the following schema: if you think someone should accept p, then you think she would accept p under some suitable psychological idealization. The aspects of the person's psychology that are relevant to this idealization are those that determine how well she is situated to make a judgment about p. These aspects will differ depending on what type of proposition p is (whether it is a meteorological proposition or an aesthetic one, e.g.). But, speaking generally, we can say that a person is better situated to judge whether p insofar as she has access to considerations relevant to p and possesses intellectual virtue in settling questions in the domain of p. To simplify our discussion, we will use the phrase "competence on p" to indicate a single measure combining a person's access to relevant considerations and possession of the relevant intellectual virtues. According to our characterization of normative expectations, if you expect someone to accept p, then you think she would accept p given some idealization of her competence on p. We do not suppose that reasonable citizens agree on a single conception of competence, even when it comes to a specific issue. In fact, our conception of what an expectation is involves no restriction on these different conceptions of competence. This is important because requiring reasonable citizens to accept a particular view of competence would impose a view on them that conflicts with many sectarian views. So our view allows that when one reasonable citizen considers what he can expect his fellows to accept, he may rely on conceptions of intellectual virtue and relevant considerations that are very different from the conceptions another reasonable citizen uses. For example, one may take formal training in theology to be a mark of competence on religious issues, while another may disagree and take competence on those issues to require prolonged contemplation of the divine. Given this understanding of expectations about acceptance, we can now describe what a reasonable citizen does when applying the reciprocity principle to determine whether she can appeal to some consideration p. First, she imagines her fellow reasonable citizens to be at or above a certain level of competence on p. Second, she determines whether she7. We use 'acceptance' as a catch-all phrase for different affirmative attitudes people take toward propositions. This allows us to stay neutral on disputes about what types of attitudes are expressed by normative and evaluative judgments. Leland and van Wietmarschen Reciprocity in Political Justification 727believes all her fellow citizens would accept p at that level of competence. If she believes they would, then she concludes that she can appeal to p ; otherwise, she concludes that she cannot. C. Two Constraints on Expectations: Intellectual Modesty and Modesty in Expectations The reciprocity principle bars reasonable citizens from appealing to their nonpublic views. The basis for this exclusion is the fact that each reasonable citizen does not expect all her reasonable fellows to accept her excluded views. The reciprocity principle would not lead to this result if reasonable citizens could have any expectations they wanted. Rather, there must be some constraints on what reasonable citizens can expect other reasonable citizens to accept. Our conception of expectations about acceptance allows us to identify two types of constraint on these expectations. These constraints correspond to the two connotations of "reasonable disagreement" that we mentioned in Section I. Requirements of intellectual modesty lead reasonable citizens to conceive of reasonable disagreements as disagreements which arise among intellectually competent people, whereas requirements of modesty in expectations require reasonable citizens to conceive of reasonable disagreements as disagreements which arise among morally decent people. Requirements of intellectual modesty are limits on a person's beliefs about the level of competence above which all people converge in accepting some consideration.8 A reasonable personmay believe that everyone who reflects on whether God exists at a high level of competence will come to believe that God does not exist. Or she may believe that there is disagreement about the existence of God among people at all levels of competence. A more demanding requirement of intellectual modesty would ask reasonable citizens to believe disagreement exists at all levels of competence, requiring them to accept that even the best judges disagree about the existence of God. A less demanding requirement would only ask them to believe that disagreement persists at moderate levels of competence, allowing them to believe that more competent judges would converge on a particular view. This would allow citizens to believe that the best judges all deny the existence of God even if less capable reasoners are theists. Conceptions of reasonableness can also constrain a second feature of citizens' expectations: the level of competence toward which a reasonable citizen idealizes when considering what she can expect others to8. It is conceivable that all people at a low level of competence agree to a single view but that people at higher levels of competence disagree about the issue. This possibility does not substantially affect our discussion, and we will ignore it. 728 Ethics July 2012accept. Constraints of this type are moral limits on howmuch reasonable citizens can expect of one another. We call them requirements of modesty in expectations. When a citizen is considering whether she can expect all reasonable people to accept intelligent design, she may imagine all reasonable people to be at a high level of competence on that question and then ask whether they would all accept intelligent design. Alternatively, she may imagine all reasonable people to be at only a moderate level of competence and then ask whether they would all accept intelligent design. Requirements of modesty in expectations limit how far a reasonable citizen can idealize her fellows' competence when she forms judgments about what she can expect them to accept. Suppose that a strong requirement of modesty in expectations prohibits reasonable citizens from idealizing past a low level of competence but that some reasonable citizen believes that once persons are moderately competent they all agree that intelligent design is false. In that case the reciprocity principle prevents the citizen from appealing to the falsity of intelligent design. This limit does not arise because the citizen believes the truth about intelligent design is difficult to figure out (she believes the opposite) but rather because she is required not to expect very much from other citizens in the context of political deliberation. Note that both requirements of intellectual modesty and requirements of modesty in expectations take on the views about competence held by the each citizen that they apply to. For example, if reasonableness were to require one to believe that the most competent people disagree about the existence of God, then each reasonable citizen is required to believe that disagreement arises among the most competent people on that issue, whoever he or she thinks those are. Citizens are not asked to agree about which group is most competent on settling the issue of God's existence and then required to accept that there is disagreement within that group. The same is true for requirements of modesty in expectations: any limits on the level of competence toward which reasonable citizens can idealize in forming their expectations apply to each citizen in a way that is relative to her own conception of competence on the issue under consideration. Recall that political liberals want certain considerations to be nonpublic-that is, to be excluded by the reciprocity principle. Requirements of intellectual modesty and modesty in expectations jointly explain why reasonable people do not appeal to their nonpublic views when making political decisions. The reciprocity principle bars a reasonable person from appealing to one of her views whenever the level of competence at which she believes all reasonable people converge on that view is above the level of competence toward which she idealizes when forming expectations about what her fellows should accept. This means that Leland and van Wietmarschen Reciprocity in Political Justification 729conceptions of reasonableness only successfully ensure that reasonable citizens cannot appeal to their nonpublic views if they satisfy the following balancing condition: the level of competence at which a reasonable person can believe reasonable citizens converge on her nonpublic views is higher than the level of competence toward which she can idealize when forming her expectations about what others can accept. The first level of competence mentioned in the balancing condition is set by a requirement of intellectual modesty; the second is set by a requirement of modesty in expectations. Different configurations of intellectual and expectational modesty can satisfy the balancing condition, but a weak requirement of intellectual modesty must be matched by a strong requirement of modesty in expectations, and vice versa. To see this, consider some particular nonpublic view. If a conception of reasonableness contains a weak requirement of intellectual modesty, which allows citizens to believe that everyone above a moderate level of competence converges on this view, then this conception must require that citizens not idealize up to (or beyond) this moderate level when forming expectations. And if a conception of reasonableness allows citizens to idealize toward very high levels of competence when forming their expectations about acceptance, then that conception must require that citizens believe that reasonable people disagree even at those very high levels of competence. So far, we have seen how expectations about acceptance work and how a conception of reasonableness must balance two constraints on expectations about acceptance, constraints of intellectual modesty and modesty in expectations. The balancing condition gives us a systematic way of thinking about different conceptions of reasonableness, ranging from those with high demands of modesty in expectations to those with high demands of intellectual modesty. In Section III, we will argue in favor of one of these conceptions. But first we need to explain an additional feature of conceptions of reasonableness: their inclusion of a set of liberal democratic political values. D. Political Values and the Argument against Minimalism While requirements of intellectual modesty and modesty in expectations must be part of a conception of reasonableness in order to exclude nonpublic views, they are insufficient for reasonableness. As we said in Section II.A, the reciprocity principle does not just prohibit appeal to a set of nonpublic views; it also identifies a set of public views that are available for political decision making. Political liberals assume that this set includes some central liberal-democratic political values. To ensure that these values are public, political liberalism endorses the following as a requirement of reasonableness: 9 centr libera these aside 1 ical L tionis 31 n. 730 Ethics July 2012Political Values: A reasonable person accepts a set of central liberaldemocratic political values and expects all other reasonable persons to accept those values as well.Political Values ensures that citizens can draw on core liberal-democratic political values when applying the reciprocity principle to their deliberations. Its inclusion in conceptions of reasonableness reflects the fact that political liberals take a particular set of political values as the starting point of their theory: if you are unwilling to treat your fellow citizens as free and equal persons, then you are unreasonable. Political Values is a requirement of reasonableness that is independent of any demands of intellectual modesty and modesty in expectations. So reasonable citizens are not committed to the view that at high levels of competence everyone would accept the central liberal-democratic political values; people who deny these values are unreasonable even if they rank among the most competent reasoners on matters of political morality.9 Some authors have argued that Political Values is not only necessary but also sufficient for reasonableness.10 On such a view, reasonableness just requires acceptance of the central liberal-democratic political values, without involving any kind of intellectual modesty or modesty in expectations. Explaining why this minimalist conception of reasonableness fails will illustrate the importance of intellectual modesty and modesty in expectations. This minimalist conception of reasonableness fails because it does not place sufficient constraints on what reasonable people can expect their fellow reasonable citizens to accept. The problem can be illustrated by a figure we will call a "rationalist fundamentalist." This person accepts the central political values and expects other reasonable citizens to accept those values as well. On the minimalist conception, this is sufficient for him to be reasonable. The rationalist fundamentalist also endorses a particular religious doctrine and believes that everyone with a good (but unexceptional) level of competence on religious matters would endorse the same view. In addition, when he forms judgments about what he can expect all reasonable people to accept, he idealizes up to or above this. There is much to say about whether political liberals are justified in taking the al political values as their starting point and about whether it is plausible for political lism to regard all those who deny the central political values as unreasonable. But issues are not relevant for our discussion of intellectual modesty, so we leave them . 0. See Kelly and McPherson's "On Tolerating the Unreasonable" and Wenar's "Politiberalism." Martha Nussbaum tentatively endorses a view like this as well in "Perfect Liberalism and Political Liberalism," Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (2011): 19–21, 50. Leland and van Wietmarschen Reciprocity in Political Justification 731unexceptionally good level of competence. Consequently, he expects all reasonable people to accept his religious views. All this is consistent with being reasonable on the minimalist view. This means that the reciprocity principle allows the rationalist fundamentalist to appeal to his religious doctrine in political deliberation. But this conflicts with the political liberal's aim to use the reciprocity principle to rule out sectarian considerations in fundamental political decisions. So the minimalist's strategy to let the political values do all the work inmotivating reasonable citizens' deliberative restraint fails. III. A DEFENSE OF INTELLECTUAL MODESTY In Section II.D, we saw that all conceptions of reasonableness include Political Values. And our argument against minimalist conceptions of reasonableness showed that Political Values alone is insufficient-conceptions of reasonablenessmust also impose requirements of intellectual modesty and modesty in expectations. Now the crucial question is how a requirement of intellectual modesty should be balanced against a requirement of modesty in expectations. In Section II.C , we established a balancing constraint on the relation between the intellectual modesty and modesty in expectations that a conception of reasonableness imposes. Weak requirements of intellectual modesty must be combined with strong demands of modesty in expectations, and weak demands of modesty in expectations must be matched with strong demands of intellectual modesty. For the remainder of this article we will argue for a conception of reasonableness that includes a strong requirement of intellectual modesty. We will defend this conception against competitors that require less intellectual modesty but include a stronger requirement of modesty in expectations. Our favored conception states that a person is reasonable if and only if he satisfies the following requirements:Political Values : He accepts the central liberal-democratic political values and expects all other reasonable people to do the same. Universal Disagreement : For each of his nonpublic convictions and political conclusions, he believes that reasonable people at all levels of competence endorse views that conflict with his own. Unconstrained Expectations : When forming a judgment about whether all reasonable persons can be expected to accept a certain consideration, he is permitted to idealize toward any level of competence present among his reasonable fellows.Political Values is not important for our discussion of intellectual modesty, so we will not explain it further. But we want to make a few 732 Ethics July 2012clarificatory remarks about Universal Disagreement and Unconstrained Expectations before going on to press the case for our conception of reasonableness against competitors. To get a feel for Universal Disagreement, suppose that a citizen has a rough conception of what it takes to be competent on some issue, so that he can rank people in accordance with this conception. We imagine this ranking to be imprecise enough for there to be multiple people in the highest-ranked group. For each issue that is nonpublic, Universal Disagreement asks each citizen to believe that disagreement persists on the issue even among the most competent people.11 We call this constraint Universal Disagreement because it requires citizens to believe that disagreement goes "all the way up": there is no level of competence above which people converge on a single answer. Universal Disagreement refers to the beliefs citizens have about disagreement on each of their nonpublic views. We do not intend to suggest that reasonable citizens conceive of any of their views as nonpublic before applying the reciprocity principle. Instead, we mean to say that, for each view which the political liberal regards as nonpublic (including all sectarian views),Universal Disagreement requires reasonable citizens to believe that there is disagreement about that view among themost competent. So when a citizen refrains from reliance on a particular nonpublic view-her belief about the ensoulment of the unborn, for example-she does not begin by identifying that belief as nonpublic and then go on to exclude it. Instead, she considers the belief, recognizes there is disagreement about it among the most competent, and excludes it as a result. Universal Disagreement also extends to disagreements about political conclusions, those disagreements over fundamental political issues that persist among reasonable people even when these people refrain from appeal to their nonpublic views in political deliberation. Citizens must believe that political disagreements arise at all levels of competence in political reasoning. In Section III.B, we will explain why this extension is important and why disagreement about political conclusions is treated differently than disagreement about nonpublic considerations.11. Consider the idea of a range of disagreement, the number of different views present among reasoners at a fixed level of competence. How wide must a reasonable citizen believe the range of disagreement among the most competent to be according to Universal Disagreement? A narrow range will not do. It is not enough for someone with, say, a comprehensive utilitarian view to believe that the only highly competent people who deny his utilitarian views are Orthodox Jews. On the other hand, reasonable citizens are not required to believe that every view which people actually hold on any given nonpublic question is held by some of the most competent people. A reasonable citizen may believe that all competent judges would deny that the host literally transforms into the body of Christ despite the fact that some reasonable citizens believe this on religious grounds. It is impossible to be more precise than to say that reasonable citizens believe that for each of their nonpublic views, a wide range of conflicting views is held by people at the highest levels of competence. Leland and van Wietmarschen Reciprocity in Political Justification 733Universal Disagreement is restricted to people, here and now, in a world like our own. This allows reasonable people to believe that certain entities-for example, God and the angels-are at a level of competence at which there is no longer disagreement about nonpublic views or political conclusions. Further, reasonable people may remain agnostic about human progress in reasoning on nonpublic issues, or they may even be confident that some day the truth will be revealed to all humans in a way that will be available to each. Universal Disagreement only requires citizens to believe about nonpublic considerations and political conclusions that no one currently occupies a level of competence at which disagreement disappears. When a reasonable person forms judgments about what she can reasonably expect other reasonable people to accept, Unconstrained Expectations allows her to idealize toward any level of competence currently present among her fellow citizens. But Unconstrained Expectations (despite the name) does not permit idealization to the level of competence of enlightened future generations, God, or the angels. This restriction follows from the kind of project of justification that the principle of reciprocity is designed to regulate-namely, citizens' search for grounds to justify political decisions to one another. Within this context, Unconstrained Expectations places no significant constraint on the expectations of reasonable people: they are allowed to idealize toward the highest level of competence found among those engaged in mutual justification.12 Political Values, Universal Disagreement, and Unconstrained Expectations jointly ensure that the reciprocity principle allows all reasonable citizens to appeal to the central political values and prohibits their appeal to nonpublic views. Universal Disagreement commits reasonable citizens to a strong form of intellectual modesty about their nonpublic views: they believe that all their nonpublic views are disputed by the most competent people, including people who are equally ormore competent than they are themselves. Given our assumption that sectarian views count as nonpublic, this is a demanding form of intellectual modesty: reasonable people believe that their sectarian views, views that they often regard to be central to their lives, are disputed by their most competent fellow citizens. The most important competitors to our view try to make do with a weaker requirement of intellectual modesty. A radical weakening of Universal Disagreement would define reasonableness so as to permit12. It is important to note that a reasonable person does not regard as unreasonable those who fall short of the level of competence toward which she idealizes. She may expect all reasonable citizens to accept some view because all highly competent judges agree with that view, but this does not imply that she only takes the highly competent people to be reasonable. 734 Ethics July 2012reasonable citizens to have any beliefs about the level of competence above which disagreement runs out on nonpublic issues or political conclusions. This would permit reasonable citizens to judge, for example, that any reflective person with basic competence in religious matters would believe that God does not exist. Put crudely, reasonable people could think that belief in God is stupid. Our discussion of the balancing constraint in Section II.C showed that a weak demand of intellectual modesty must be matched by a strong demand of modesty in expectations. Otherwise the reciprocity principle will not bar reasonable citizens from appealing to nonpublic views in political deliberation. So, instead of Unconstrained Expectations, such views require reasonable people not to idealize beyond a very low degree of competence when forming expectations about what others can accept. Again, put crudely, reasonable people cannot expect their fellows to be more than stupid. On this view, reasonable disagreement is understood entirely in terms of the moral connotation of "reasonable," not in terms of the intellectual connotation. Reasonable people are only required to think that morally decent people (people who accept the basic political values and guide their deliberation in light of the reciprocity principle's demands) disagree with them; they need not think that intellectually virtuous people do.13 A less radical weakening of Universal Disagreement would require citizens to believe that disagreement about nonpublic views and political conclusions goes up to high levels of competence, but it would permit them to deny that disagreement goes all the way up. On this view, reasonable peoplemust believe nonpublic and political issues to be really difficult, but they may nonetheless believe that there is an intellectual elite that converges on a single answer. This weakening of Universal Disagreement would have to be matched by a strengthening of modesty in expectations: reasonable people are allowed to idealize toward a high level of competence when they form their expectations about what others can accept, but they cannot idealize all the way up. They need to stay below the level at which they think people converge on a single answer. Our conception of reasonableness and the competitors we have just discussed all meet the most basic demand on a conception of reasonableness: they yield an interpretation of the reciprocity principle such that it rules in appeal to the central political values and rules out appeal to nonpublic views. Besides meeting this basic demand, there are various13. It is possible to interpret the views of Kelly, McPherson, and Wenar along these lines. If this were the correct way of understanding their views, then the argument against minimalism presented in Sec. II.D would no longer refute their views. But the arguments we present in Secs. III.A to III.C would still apply against their views. Leland and van Wietmarschen Reciprocity in Political Justification 735considerations that favor some conceptions of reasonableness over others. We will now provide three arguments that favor our conception over its competitors. The problems we identify with both radical and less radical competitors to our view are the same in kind, but they are more severe for the radical alternatives. For this reason, we will only discuss the less radical revision, which we callModest Expectations.14 If our arguments successfully undermine that view, then, a fortiori, they undermine the radical view. Later, in Section IV, we will discuss the motivation for favoring weaker forms of intellectual modesty: the worry that Universal Disagreement is overly demanding. A. Rationale for Restraint The first argument concerns the rationale reasonable people have for exercising restraint in political deliberation. Consider the case of Sarah, a citizen who endorses No Abortion: Human life is ensouled at the moment of conception, and the intentional killing of the ensouled human being is impermissible. Political liberalism asks Sarah not to appeal to No Abortion when she deliberates and decides about fundamental political issues. Given the importance of No Abortion, this is asking a lot, and the restraint that political liberals call for needs a stable and plausible rationale. In this subsection, we argue that our conception of reasonableness does better than Modest Expectations on this score. If Sarah conforms to our conception of reasonableness, she believes that her nonpublic views, including No Abortion, are rejected by some of the most competent judges on the issues under consideration. If she were to appeal to No Abortion, she would be willing to make fundamental political decisions by appeal to a consideration she recognizes that the most competent judges disagree about. Such willingness is straightforwardly at odds with the requirement that fundamental political decisions should be justifiable to all reasonable citizens. In addition, as a reasonable citizen, Sarah is committed to the political values which include the ideal of treating one's fellow citizens as free and equal persons. Were Sarah to draw on No Abortion to justify fundamental political decisions, she would fail to take her fellows' objections sufficiently seriously. After all, her reasonableness entails that she regards these objections as sincere, informed objections that could be raised by her most competent co-citizens. Disregard of such objections is incompatible with free and equal partnership in political rule. This means that the ideal of mutual justifiability and the ideal of treating one's fellows as free and equal persons give reasonable citizens a plausible motivation for14. Jonathan Quong defends a view like Modest Expectations in his "Political Liberalism without Skepticism," Ratio 20 (2007): 320–40. In conversation, Joshua Cohen has expressed a preference for a view like this over our, more demanding, view. 736 Ethics July 2012refraining from appeal to their nonpublic views, on our conception of reasonableness. According to Modest Expectations, Sarah is reasonable even if she thinks that themost competent judges all accept No Abortion. Advocates of Modest Expectations claim that the reciprocity principle prevents Sarah from appealing to No Abortion by forbidding Sarah from idealizing toward the highest levels of competence when she forms her expectations about what her reasonable fellows can accept. But this attempt to provide Sarah with a plausible and stable rationale for restraint faces several obstacles. The first problem is that Modest Expectations places no restrictions on the way a reasonable person explains the fact that not all of her fellow citizens achieve the highest levels of competence. According to Modest Expectations, Sarah is reasonable even if she thinks that No Abortion is impossible to reject without culpably neglecting one's epistemic responsibilities. For instance, Sarah may believe that all those who reject No Abortion culpably fail to avail themselves of readily available information, are misled by pride, or hold their beliefs because the truth is inconvenient to them. If she thinks those who disagree are intellectually blameworthy, then it seems she should insist that her fellows properly perform their deliberative duties rather than accommodate their culpable intellectual failings. It seems Sarah lacks a good reason to refrain from appeal to No Abortion in this case. Worries remain even if we suppose that Sarah does not blame people for failing to reach the level of competence at which she believes disagreement about No Abortion runs out. Suppose instead that Sarah believes it is simply an unfortunate fact that not all people have the intellectual resources required to appreciate that No Abortion is true. According to Modest Expectations, Sarah is morally required not to idealize to the highest levels of competence. The most promising candidate explanation of this requirement seems to be a notion of respect.15 Perhaps appeal toNoAbortion is disrespectful to those who disagree with No Abortion and are not competent enough to appreciate the reasons that support No Abortion. Putting the point differently, wemight say that appeal to No Abortion is disrespectful to some reasonable citizens because the reasons that support No Abortion are inaccessible to them. The problem with this proposal is that it is not generally disrespectful to motivate important political decisions by appeal to considerations that are not accessible to all citizens. For example, the basic economic structure of contemporary democratic societies is often justified by appeal to complicated economic facts and theories that many citizens are not in a15. We thank an anonymous reviewer from Ethics for challenging us to consider this explanation. Leland and van Wietmarschen Reciprocity in Political Justification 737position to understand. This may be unfortunate for various reasons, but it does not seem to be a matter of disrespect. It may still seem that Sarah's appeal to No Abortion shows a lack of respect for reasons other than the mere inaccessibility of No Abortion to some of her fellow reasonable citizens. We do not believe an advocate of Modest Expectations can support this claim because none of Sarah's attitudes plausibly amount to a disrespectful stance toward her fellows. Of course, Sarah does regard many of her fellow citizens as intellectually inferior, at least on issues like No Abortion: she takes everyone who disagrees with her on No Abortion to be less competent than she is. But Modest Expectations cannot point to that attitude as a disrespectful one because it is precisely the attitude that Modest Expectations wants to make room for as reasonable. When Sarah appeals to No Abortion, she holds her fellow citizens up to a standard that is-by her lights-higher thanmost of them canmeet. This does not seem to conflict with plausible conceptions of respect: expecting a lot of people does not plausibly express a disrespectful attitude toward those people. A final worry is that any rationale for restraint that Modest Expectations supports will be weakened when the stakes involved in political decision making are high, as they often are in cases where citizens are tempted to appeal to nonpublic considerations. From Sarah's perspective, the restriction that rules out appeal to No Abortion is likely to result in a decision to legitimizemurder.Modest Expectations requires Sarah to restrain herself based on a moral commitment not to expect too much of her fellow citizens by way of competence in reflecting on the relevant issues. High stakes put pressure on such a commitment: the higher the stakes are, the more one is entitled to expect from one's fellows. This makes Sarah's commitment to restrain herself from appealing to her nonpublic views unstable. Our view avoids the problems that Modest Expectations faces. On our view, even if Sarah thinks that most reasonable people who in fact disagree with her about No Abortion are culpably ignorant, she believes that people would still disagree if they were brought up to the highest levels of competence. This belief provides her with a rationale for restraint. High stakes do not threaten this rationale in the way they threaten the rationale provided by Modest Expectations. On our view, Sarah's restraint rests on a commitment to a form of intellectual modesty rather than a moral requirement not to expect too much of her fellow citizens. High stakes do not put pressure on this commitment to intellectual modesty: the fact that some consideration would be relevant for a highly important political decision does not justify the thought that the consideration is more readily accessible to people. To clarify, we do not suggest that a citizen who is reasonable according to our conception will be unmoved by her nonpublic convictions. A 738 Ethics July 2012reasonable citizen who accepts No Abortion as well as Universal Disagreement may find herself in an extremely difficult situation, torn between the demands of political life and those of her sectarian religious and moral convictions. Nor is our claim that the demands of political life will always prevail in such cases of conflict. Our claim is simply that our view can account for how the pull of the civic demand to limit oneself to mutually acceptable considerations can persist even in the face of serious sectarian counterpressure. Views that don't include Universal Disagreement in their conception of reasonableness lack a plausible story of why citizens should take the demand to refrain from appeal to nonpublic views seriously when they face high stakes situations where this civic demand conflicts with core nonpublic commitments. B. The Asymmetry Problem The second argument for our conception of reasonableness is that it allows for a satisfactory answer to the charge often labeled "the asymmetry problem." The problem is that political liberals are allegedly inconsistent in their treatment of reasonable disagreement about nonpublic views and reasonable disagreement about fundamental political decisions. Political liberals think that reasonable disagreement about nonpublic considerations makes it inappropriate for citizens to draw on these considerations when making fundamental political decisions. Political liberals recognize that reasonable people disagree about fundamental political decisions as well. Nonetheless, they think fundamental political decisions can be mutually justifiable, despite the fact that those decisions are disputed by reasonable people. This asymmetry, a number of critics argue, cannot be justified.16 We take the challenge to be the following. The reciprocity principle rules out all nonpublic considerations for the purpose of political deliberation. What remains is a set of public considerations, including the central political values. A number of citizens deliberate and decide about a fundamental political issue. Suppose they are all fully reasonable, so they draw exclusively on public considerations. Political liberalism recognizes that they will still reach different conclusions. They will disagree, for example, about which conception of justice is best supported by the16. See Simon Caney, "Anti-perfectionism and Rawlsian Liberalism," Political Studies 43 (1995): 248–64; Joseph Chan, "Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism," Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2000): 20–22; Simon Clarke, "Contractarianism, Liberal Neutrality, and Epistemology," Political Studies 48 (1999): 637–41; and Steve Scalet, "Liberalism, Skepticism, andNeutrality:MakingDowithoutDoubt," Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (2000): 213–16. Some of these arguments are directed at Brian Barry's views in Justice as Impartiality. For an overview of this literature and a proposed solution, see Jonathan Quong, "Disagreement, Asymmetry, and Liberal Legitimacy," Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 4 (2005): 301–30. Leland and van Wietmarschen Reciprocity in Political Justification 739central political values. Some may favor Rawls's conception of justice as fairness, while others may favor classical liberalism. In this situation, political liberalism holds that a political system based on either of these views is justified if the selection of that system is based on a fair decision procedure.17 The challenge is to explain why this decision is mutually justifiable. The case of Bob, a reasonable citizen, can help make this challenge more explicit. Bob believes that the central political values best support Rawls's conception of justice as fairness. Suppose that some of Bob's fellow reasonable citizens agree with Bob about justice as fairness, but many other of his reasonable fellows believe that the central political values support classical liberalism. Also suppose that a fair procedure selects classical liberalism as the conception of justice that is to shape Bob's society's basic institutions. How is this decision justifiable to Bob? Our explanation has two parts. The first part we share with other authors.18 The idea is that although Bob does not agree with the political decision, at least the decision is made on the basis of a set of considerations that Bob himself accepts and regards as appropriate for political decision making. Bob's fellow citizens opt for classical liberalism in a way that he finds mistaken, but their decision is supported by the central political values, not by nonpublic considerations. This means that there is a shared set of premises that constitutes a mutually acceptable basis for adjudicating among fundamental political claims, even though reasonable people disagree about which conclusions can be supported on that basis. The presence of a shared set of premises helps, but it does not do enough to explain how the decision is justifiable to Bob. The problem is that Bob may regard all alternatives to justice as fairness to be deeply and obviously flawed interpretations of the political values. If this is the case, then the fact that Bob recognizes that his political opponents reach their conclusions on the basis of the central political values does not seem to help much. The second part of our explanation appeals to Universal Disagreement to avoid this problem. Recall that Universal Disagreement applies to reasonable citizens' political conclusions as well as their nonpublic views. It is now clear what this means: reasonable citizens believe that, at any level of competence, people will disagree about fundamental political issues even when they only take public17. One may question whether an appeal to a fair decision procedure is available to the political liberal at this point. After all, which procedure would be a fair one might itself be the object of reasonable disagreement. This is a question political liberals will have to answer, but we cannot pursue an answer on their behalf here. 18. This part of our explanation is similar to Jonathan Quong's in "Disagreement, Asymmetry, and Liberal Legitimacy." 740 Ethics July 2012considerations into account.19 So Bob believes that the most competent political deliberators endorse a range of different political views. These views are held upon sincere reflection by people Bob considers equally or more intellectually virtuous than he is, on the basis of exclusively public considerations including the central political values. It seems that he must see those views as sensible interpretations of the central political values. If classical liberalism falls in this set, then there is an intuitive sense in which the decision is justifiable to him: he regards the view as a sensible interpretation of the central political values. Universal Disagreement ensures that, for any reasonable citizen, there is such a set of fundamental political decisions that the citizen disagrees with but regards as sensible. We cannot specify here how large these sets will be and how much their members will differ among reasonable citizens. But as long as there is some substantial overlap, our view can provide an explanation for the mutual justifiability of political decisions despite reasonable disagreement about those decisions. If a fair decision procedure selects a political view that is in this overlap, then not only can this view be justified by appeal to considerations all reasonable people can accept, but all reasonable people consider the view a sensible interpretation of those considerations. If the overlap is less than perfect, then conformity to the reciprocity principle does not guarantee that all reasonable people consider the fairly selected decision to be sensible. But our view keeps such a result on the table as a serious possibility. This possibility becomes remote when reasonableness is understood according to Modest Expectations. According to this conception, Bob is reasonable if he thinks that, while people at high levels disagree with him about justice as fairness, all people at yet higher levels of competence agree that justice as fairness is the best interpretation of the central political values. This means that Bob may regard none of the alternatives to justice as fairness to be a sensible interpretation of the political values, in the sense described above. So as long as there are several people with attitudes like this who hold conflicting political views, it is not possible to select a political decision that all reasonable citizens regard as sensible. Suppose that Bob loses out in a fair decision procedure and the basic institutions of his society are shaped roughly along the lines of19. So Universal Disagreement mentions nonpublic considerations and political conlusions separately because of the different roles they play in the theory. The distinction between public and nonpublic views concerns the considerations citizens draw on when they deliberate about fundamental political issues. Political conclusions are reached by citizens when they so deliberate, given the restrictions placed on them by the reciprocity principle. There is no sense in which political and nonpolitical considerations receive unequal treatment: the set of nonpublic considerations will contain plenty of views that are partly or entirely about politics. Leland and van Wietmarschen Reciprocity in Political Justification 741classical liberalism. As in the case of Sarah, we find it hard to see how Bob could have a stable and plausible rationale for accepting this resolution of the disagreement, according to Modest Expectations. After all, Bob believes that classical liberalism is not supported by the values of freedom and equality, and he thinks that everyone at a very high level of competence would agree with him. Modest Expectations will have to rely on the idea that Bob is morally required not to expect his fellow citizens to be at this high level of competence. For reasons we gave in the previous subsection, we do not think this moral requirement is supported by a plausible conception of respect. In addition, as before, this moral requirement will be hard to sustain when the stakes involved in political decision making are high. From Bob's perspective, the inegalitarian elements of classical liberalism imply that his fellow citizens-perhaps himself included-are not treated as equal persons in his political society. This would seem to be a fundamental injustice. According to Modest Expectations, the decision is nonetheless justifiable to Bob because he cannot expect his fellow citizens to be at a level of competence at which they would see that he is right. But the high stakes involved in political decision making puts pressure on Bob's commitment to modesty in expectations: it seems that the higher the stakes are, the more Bob can expect from his fellow citizens. Our view draws on Bob's belief that the most competent judges disagree with his conclusion that justice as fairness is best supported by the political values. This belief is not put under pressure by high stakes: the fact that some question is highly important does not make us think it is easier to answer. C. Including Scientific Views A third argument for our conception of reasonableness involves appeal to scientific views as public considerations. As we said in Section I, we do not aim to settle which considerations count as public and which do not. Still, different conceptions of reasonableness may do better or worse when it comes to accommodating clear intuitions about which considerations should fall on which side of the line. In this section, we argue that our conception of reasonableness is preferable to its competitors because our conception can permit appeal to complicated scientific findings that are uncontroversial among experts, but the competitors cannot. The question of whether greenhouse gas emissions are causing global warming is one such finding. Even people who are very informed, and whose sincere reflection on climate change displays a high level of intellectual virtue, can come to different views on the nature and causes of climate change. Nonetheless, the best climate scientists agree that human emissions cause global warming. Other considerations will be similar to beliefs about climate change, in 742 Ethics July 2012that citizens will disagree on them up to high levels of competence while the experts converge on a single answer. We will call such considerations "expert views." We think a conception of reasonableness is more attractive if it can admit expert views to the set of considerations available for political deliberation. OnModest Expectations, it is unlikely that expert views would count as public considerations. Given the nature of expert views, many or most people have good reason to believe that disagreement occurs even at very high degrees of competence. But Modest Expectations does not allow them to idealize above very high levels of competence when they form expectations about what reasonable citizens can accept. As a result, the reciprocity principle would bar them from appeal to expert views. This is completely in line with the rationale Modest Expectations provides for political restraint: when considerations are so hard that very competent people disagree about them, you cannot appeal to those considerations because there are limits to what you can expect of your fellow citizens. It seems undeniable that expert views are sufficiently complex that very competent people disagree about them. Our conception of reasonableness avoids this problem because Unconstrained Expectations permits reasonable people to idealize up to the highest levels of competence. On our conception of reasonableness, the rationale for restraint is that some considerations are disputed at all levels of competence, so nomatter how high a citizen's expectations are, those views will still be disputed. Since our view permits citizens to expect the most from their fellows, it allows citizens to idealize to the highest level of competence and so to appeal to expert considerations. Two clarificatory points are in order. First, Unconstrained Expectations permits reasonable citizens to idealize up to the highest level of competence but does not require that they do so. Second, as we said in Section II.A, we do not assume that reasonable citizens converge on a single conception of competence even when it comes to a particular type of consideration. Both points prevent our argument from showing that the reciprocity principle allows all reasonable citizens to appeal to expert views. Reasonable citizens who set their expectations low or who have a conception of competence such that expert views are disputed even among the most competent will be barred from appeal to expert views.20 So the conclusion of our argument here is modest: given plausible beliefs about expert views and given high expectations, our conception makes significant room for appeal to expert views, while Modest Expectations rules out such appeal.20. This may lead to a further worry. We just saw that different reasonable people may be allowed to appeal to different sets of considerations because reasonable peoplemay have different conceptions of competence and because they may set their expectations at different levels. Call the view that human emissions cause global warming "Greenhouse." Leland and van Wietmarschen Reciprocity in Political Justification 743IV. DEMANDINGNESS In Section III, we argued that political liberalism should demand a significant form of intellectual modesty of its citizens. Some authors would clearly object to this conclusion;21 the response of others is more difficult to predict.22 We think the main reasons for hesitation are concerns about the demandingness of Universal Disagreement. Concerns about demandingness take a number of forms, and we will discuss each in turn. In some cases, the concern rests on the belief that much depends on whether particular citizens are considered reasonable. The thought is that unreasonable citizens can be politically marginalized-that their claims can safely be ignored or that they can be dealt with coercively in a manner that the claims of reasonable citizens could not be. If this were right, then the requirements for counting as reasonable would need to be very low. However, the view of unreasonableness on which this objection depends is mistaken. Reasonableness is an ideal of citizenship appropriate for politically liberal societies, and the stability of these societies requires that many people live up to the ideal at least to some extent. But all the political and personal liberties, as well as the claims people have regarding the distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth, are fixed independently of who does or does not live up to the ideal of citizenship. Unreasonable citizens can speak in any political forum and run for any office, just like their reasonable fellows. It is true that when21. We have in mind Kelly and McPherson, Wenar, and Quong. 22. The responses, e.g., of John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, Charles Larmore, Amy Gutmann, and Dennis Thompson. The reciprocity principle may rule out appeal to Greenhouse for one citizen but not for another. This may seem puzzling: shouldn't the reciprocity principle settle, for each consideration, whether it is available for public justification? Remember that we are concerned with the demands reasonableness places on individual citizens when they apply the reciprocity principle as a guideline for their political deliberation. It is plausible to think that whether appeal to Greenhouse is a violation of one's duty to apply the reciprocity principle can depend on one's attitudes, so it is not a problem that the reciprocity principle sometimes yields different answers for different citizens. But, as we discussed in note 5, political liberals also endorse a similar principle as a necessary condition on political justification: political decisions are justified only if they can be supported by considerations that all reasonable citizens can reasonably be expected to accept. It seems that when we want to use this justificatory principle to evaluate political decisions we do face a problem: if the argument supporting a political decision depends on Greenhouse, does it pass the justificatory principle or not? At this point, political liberals may have different views. A very permissive line would be that decisions satisfy the justificatory principle as long as they are justified by considerations that some reasonable citizens are allowed to appeal to. A very demanding line would be that decisions only pass the principle when justified in terms of considerations that all reasonable citizens can appeal to. And one could defend various options in between. We will not decide this issue here. We thank an anonymous reviewer from Ethics for pressing us on this point. 744 Ethics July 2012citizens rely on nonpublic considerations to justify their fundamental decisions, they neglect their political duties. But criticism of these citizens seems appropriate to us, and this is unconnected to any oppression or contempt for those who reject the requirements of reasonableness. A second concern about demandingness is the idea that requiring reasonable citizens to accept Universal Disagreement is inconsistent with the aims of political liberalism because Universal Disagreement is itself a nonpublic-even sectarian-commitment. It is true that Universal Disagreement is inconsistent with a number of actual sectarian views. But this is in itself not a problem for our conception of reasonableness; any conceptionmust have this feature, if only because Political Values is quite obviously inconsistent with some sectarian views. The political liberal's aim is not to develop a conception of reasonableness that is consistent with every existing sectarian view but to develop one that is consistent with a wide variety of different sectarian views. Universal Disagreement looks to be consistent in this way. This only takes care of part of the worry: there would still be a problem if Universal Disagreement would commit citizens to claims about the fundamental limits of human reason or to the view that basic metaphysical, religious, and philosophical facts are intrinsically unknowable by the human intellect. Such a commitment would stray beyond the confines of the political in a way that political liberals find objectionable. But Universal Disagreement does not commit reasonable citizens to any view of this type: it just requires them to believe that people at all levels of competence disagree about nonpublic issues and political conclusions. A reasonable citizen could accept larger claims about the limits of reason as explanations of this kind of disagreement, but she is not required to do so. Nor is she required to accept that our disagreements could not ultimately be resolved: Universal Disagreement only commits citizens to a view of the status of our current disagreements. This commitment is compatible with a wide variety of sectarian views. Third, people worry that Universal Disagreement leads to skepticism. It should be clear that it is quite possible to accept Universal Disagreement and also confidently hold your nonpublic views; it seems to us that it is common for people to do so.23 So the modesty that Universal Disagreement imposes does not in itself represent a lack of confidence in one's nonpublic views and political conclusions.24 But one might worry that while Universal Disagreement does not by itself represent a skeptical attitude, accepting Universal Disagreement imposes23. See, e.g., Gideon Rosen, "Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism," Philosophical Perspectives 15 (2001): 69–91. 24. In this respect, we disagree with Barry, who appeals to skepticism to motivate deliberative restraint. See chap. 7 of Justice as Impartiality, esp. 168–73. Leland and van Wietmarschen Reciprocity in Political Justification 745rational pressure to lower one's confidence in disputed issues. This suggestion is most plausible in so far as we understand our nonpublic and political commitments as beliefs. The effect of informed and intelligent disagreement on the rationality of one's beliefs is currently a hotly debated topic in epistemology. Some parties in the debate argue that disagreement with equally competent people should lead to a significant reduction of confidence.25 Others argue that this is not, or at least is not always, the case.26 If Universal Disagreement does turn out to put rational pressure on citizens to significantly reduce their confidence in nonpublic views and political conclusions, then the need to include Universal Disagreement in the conception of reasonableness points to a problem for political liberalism. Finally, Universal Disagreement may simply look like an implausible demand-especially when it comes to sectarian views-regardless of whether its acceptance leads to skepticism. The question here is whether citizens have any reason to believe that their sectarian views are disputed at all levels of competence.27 If citizens tend to have good reason to believe that their most competent fellow citizens all agree with their sectarian convictions, then political liberalism would impose a troubling requirement on people to believe something they have good reason to reject. This would be a problem, but we don't think Universal Disagreement is implausible in this way. It should be easy for our readers to see that their philosophical views are disputed at the highest levels of competence. Take any of your philosophical convictions, and you can probably think of at least a handful of the most intelligent and informed philosophers who hold conflicting views.28 We think the situation is similar when it comes to religious views: no matter what religious doctrine one accepts, it should not be too hard to find highly informed and25. See, e.g., David Christensen, "Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News," Philosophical Review 166 (2007): 187–217; Adam Elga, "Reflection and Disagreement," Noûs 41 (2007): 478–502; and Richard Feldman, "Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement," in Epistemology Futures, ed. Stephen Hetherington (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 216–36. 26. See, e.g., Thomas Kelly, "Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence," in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 111–74; and David Enoch, "Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but Not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement," Mind 119 (2011): 953–97. 27. Our arguments in favor of Universal Disagreement provide reason to believe that political liberalism should include Universal Disagreement in its conception of reasonableness; they do not provide citizens with reasons to believe their views are disputed at all levels of competence. 28. For discussion of such cases, see Peter Van Inwagen, "It Is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence," in Faith, Freedom and Rationality, ed. Jeff Jorden and Daniel Howard-Snyder (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 137–53. 746 Ethics July 2012intellectually virtuous people with opposing views.29 In the case of moral and political views, we have to keep in mind that reasonable people are not committed to the belief that the central political values are disputed at the highest levels of competence (though they are permitted to believe this). Leaving the central political values aside, it seems plausible to believe that the most competent people dispute one's moral convictions and political conclusions. The worry about reasons for believing in accordance with Universal Disagreement also raises the issue of what a liberal state would be entitled to do in an attempt to get citizens to live up to its ideal of reasonable citizenship. The question is not just whether citizens here and now have reason to accept Universal Disagreement, but whether they would have reason to do so if they lived in a just liberal society. Such a society may include institutions-for example, public schools-that facilitate acceptance of requirements such as Universal Disagreement. We think these are important and interesting questions that our discussion clarifies and foregrounds, but we cannot answer them in this article.30 However, we are optimistic that most citizens in a just liberal society will have reason to accept Universal Disagreement. In sum, we think that the first two concerns about demandingness are misplaced. We are fairly confident that political liberals will be able to respond to the fourth concern, the worry that Universal Disagreement is something citizens have good reason to reject. But we think that issue raises interesting questions that should be further pursued. The third concern, the worry that Universal Disagreement imposes pressure toward skepticism, should also be discussed further. We think that responding to this concern is the most serious challenge for political liberalism that emerges from our investigation. V. CONCLUSION We set out to investigate whether political liberalism must require its citizens to be intellectually modest. In Section II, we provided a framework for systematically thinking about different conceptions of reasonableness and the different levels of intellectual modesty involved in those conceptions. In Section III, we argued for a conception of reasonableness that includes a very significant demand of intellectual modesty. The key feature of this view is Universal Disagreement: a reasonable person29. See Gary Gutting, Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1982) for detailed discussion of the importance of disagreements of this kind. 30. See Eamonn Callan's Creating Citizens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) for a discussion of some of these issues. Leland and van Wietmarschen Reciprocity in Political Justification 747must believe that reasonable people at all levels of competence disagree with his nonpublic views and political conclusions. We recognize that Universal Disagreement represents a stronger form of intellectual modesty than most political liberals would prefer. However, it should not be surprising that the requirements of reasonableness are demanding. After all, these requirements support and provide a rationale for a strong form of restraint in political deliberation. As we have shown, the burden of providing a plausible and stable rationale for this restraint has to be shouldered by a combination of moral and intellectual requirements of reasonableness. On our view, much of the burden is shouldered by Universal Disagreement rather than by a moral requirement to have modest expectations about one's fellow citizens. This intellectually modest distribution of the burden provides a better rationale for restraint and a better response to reasonable political disagreement, and it leaves room for a satisfactory treatment of scientific views.

entropy Article Logical Entropy: Introduction to Classical and Quantum Logical Information Theory David Ellerman ID Department of Philosophy, University of California Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521, USA; [email protected] Received: 10 August 2018; Accepted: 4 September 2018; Published: 6 September 2018



 Abstract: Logical information theory is the quantitative version of the logic of partitions just as logical probability theory is the quantitative version of the dual Boolean logic of subsets. The resulting notion of information is about distinctions, differences and distinguishability and is formalized using the distinctions ("dits") of a partition (a pair of points distinguished by the partition). All the definitions of simple, joint, conditional and mutual entropy of Shannon information theory are derived by a uniform transformation from the corresponding definitions at the logical level. The purpose of this paper is to give the direct generalization to quantum logical information theory that similarly focuses on the pairs of eigenstates distinguished by an observable, i.e., qudits of an observable. The fundamental theorem for quantum logical entropy and measurement establishes a direct quantitative connection between the increase in quantum logical entropy due to a projective measurement and the eigenstates (cohered together in the pure superposition state being measured) that are distinguished by the measurement (decohered in the post-measurement mixed state). Both the classical and quantum versions of logical entropy have simple interpretations as "two-draw" probabilities for distinctions. The conclusion is that quantum logical entropy is the simple and natural notion of information for quantum information theory focusing on the distinguishing of quantum states. Keywords: logical entropy; partition logic; qudits of an observable 1. Introduction The formula for "classical" logical entropy goes back to the early Twentieth Century [1]. It is the derivation of the formula from basic logic that is new and accounts for the name. The ordinary Boolean logic of subsets has a dual logic of partitions [2] since partitions (=equivalence relations = quotient sets) are category-theoretically dual to subsets. Just as the quantitative version of subset logic is the notion of logical finite probability, so the quantitative version of partition logic is logical information theory using the notion of logical entropy [3]. This paper generalizes that "classical" (i.e., non-quantum) logical information theory to the quantum version. The classical logical information theory is briefly developed before turning to the quantum version. Applications of logical entropy have already been developed in several special mathematical settings; see [4] and the references cited therein. 2. Duality of Subsets and Partitions The foundations for classical and quantum logical information theory are built on the logic of partitions ([2,5]), which is dual (in the category-theoretic sense) to the usual Boolean logic of subsets. This duality can be most simply illustrated using a set function f : X → Y. The image f (X) is a subset of the codomain Y and the inverse-image or coimage f−1 (Y) is a partition on the domain X, where a partition π = {B1, . . . , BI} on a set U is a set of subsets or blocks Bi that are mutually disjoint and jointly exhaustive (∪iBi = U) In category theory, the duality between subobject-type constructions (e.g., limits) and quotient-object-type constructions (e.g., colimits) is often indicated by adding the prefix "co-" to Entropy 2018, 20, 679; doi:10.3390/e20090679 www.mdpi.com/journal/entropy Entropy 2018, 20, 679 2 of 22 the latter. Hence, the usual Boolean logic of "images" has the dual logic of "coimages". However, the duality runs deeper than between subsets and partitions. The dual to the notion of an "element" (an "it") of a subset is the notion of a "distinction" (a "dit") of a partition, where (u, u′) ∈ U ×U is a distinction or dit of π if the two elements are in different blocks. Let dit (π) ⊆ U ×U be the set of distinctions or ditset of π. Similarly an indistinction or indit of π is a pair (u, u′) ∈ U ×U in the same block of π. Let indit (π) ⊆ U ×U be the set of indistinctions or inditset of π. Then, indit (π) is the equivalence relation associated with π, and dit (π) = U ×U − indit (π) is the complementary binary relation that might be called apartition relation or an a partness relation. The notions of a distinction and indistinction of a partition are illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1. Distinctions and indistinctions of a partition. The relationships between Boolean subset logic and partition logic are summarized in Figure 2, which illustrates the dual relationship between the elements ("its") of a subset and the distinctions ("dits") of a partition. Figure 2. Dual logics: Boolean subset logic of subsets and partition logic. 3. From the Logic of Partitions to Logical Information Theory In Gian-Carlo Rota's Fubini Lectures [6] (and in his lectures at MIT), he remarked in view of duality between partitions and subsets that, quantitatively, the "lattice of partitions plays for information the role that the Boolean algebra of subsets plays for size or probability" ([7] p. 30) or symbolically: Logical Probability Theory Boolean Logic of Subsets = Logical Information Theory Logic of Partitions . Andrei Kolmogorov has suggested that information theory should start with sets, not probabilities. Entropy 2018, 20, 679 3 of 22 Information theory must precede probability theory, and not be based on it. By the very essence of this discipline, the foundations of information theory have a finite combinatorial character. ([8] p. 39) The notion of information-as-distinctions does start with the set of distinctions, the information set, of a partition π = {B1, . . . , BI} on a finite set U where that set of distinctions (dits) is: dit (π) = {(u, u′) : ∃Bi, Bi′ ∈ π, Bi 6= Bi′ , u ∈ Bi, u′ ∈ Bi′}. The normalized size of a subset is the logical probability of the event, and the normalized size of the ditset of a partition is, in the sense of measure theory, the measure of the amount of information in a partition. Thus, we define the logical entropy of a partition π = {B1, . . . , BI}, denoted h (π), as the size of the ditset dit (π) ⊆ U ×U normalized by the size of U ×U: h (π) = |dit(π)||U×U| = |U×U|−∑Ii=1|Bi×Bi | |U×U| = 1−∑ I i=1 ( |Bi | |U| )2 = 1−∑Ii=1 Pr (Bi) 2. In two independent draws from U, the probability of getting a distinction of π is the probability of not getting an indistinction. Given any probability measure p : U → [0, 1] on U = {u1, . . . , un}, which defines pi = p (ui) for i = 1, . . . , n, the product measure p× p : U ×U → [0, 1] has for any binary relation R ⊆ U ×U the value of: p× p (R) = ∑(ui ,uj)∈R p (ui) p ( uj ) = ∑(ui ,uj)∈R pi pj. The logical entropy of π in general is the product-probability measure of its ditset dit (π) ⊆ U ×U, where Pr (B) = ∑u∈B p (u): h (π) = p× p (dit (π)) = ∑(ui ,uj)∈dit(π) pi pj = 1−∑B∈π Pr (B) 2. The standard interpretation of h (π) is the two-draw probability of getting a distinction of the partition π, just as Pr (S) is the one-draw probability of getting an element of the subset-event S. 4. Compound Logical Entropies The compound notions of logical entropy are also developed in two stages, first as sets and then, given a probability distribution, as two-draw probabilities. After observing the similarity between the formulas holding for the compound Shannon entropies and the Venn diagram formulas that hold for any measure (in the sense of measure theory), the information theorist, Lorne L. Campbell, remarked in 1965 that the similarity: suggests the possibility that H (α) and H (β) are measures of sets, that H (α, β) is the measure of their union, that I (α, β) is the measure of their intersection, and that H (α|β) is the measure of their difference. The possibility that I (α, β) is the entropy of the "intersection" of two partitions is particularly interesting. This "intersection," if it existed, would presumably contain the information common to the partitions α and β. ([9] p. 113) Yet, there is no such interpretation of the Shannon entropies as measures of sets, but the logical entropies precisely fulfill Campbell's suggestion (with the "intersection" of two partitions being the intersection of their ditsets). Moreover, there is a uniform requantifying transformation (see the next section) that obtains all the Shannon definitions from the logical definitions and explains how the Shannon entropies can satisfy the Venn diagram formulas (e.g., as a mnemonic) while not being defined by a measure on sets. Given partitions π = {B1, . . . , BI} and σ = { C1, . . . , CJ } on U, the joint information set is the union of the ditsets, which is also the ditset for their join: dit (π) ∪ dit (σ) = dit (π ∨ σ) ⊆ U × U. Given probabilities p = {p1, . . . , pn} on U, the joint logical entropy is the product probability measure on the union of ditsets: Entropy 2018, 20, 679 4 of 22 h (π, σ) = h (π ∨ σ) = p× p (dit (π) ∪ dit (σ)) = 1−∑i,j Pr ( Bi ∩ Cj )2. The information set for the conditional logical entropy h (π|σ) is the difference of ditsets, and thus, that logical entropy is: h (π|σ) = p× p (dit (π)− dit (σ)) = h (π, σ)− h (σ). The information set for the logical mutual information m (π, σ) is the intersection of ditsets, so that logical entropy is: m (π, σ) = p× p (dit (π) ∩ dit (σ)) = h (π, σ)− h (π|σ)− h (σ|π) = h (π) + h (σ)− h (π, σ). Since all the logical entropies are the values of a measure p× p : U ×U → [0, 1] on subsets of U ×U, they automatically satisfy the usual Venn diagram relationships as in Figure 3. Figure 3. Venn diagram for logical entropies as values of a probability measure p× p on U ×U. At the level of information sets (w/o probabilities), we have the information algebra I (π, σ), which is the Boolean subalgebra of ℘ (U ×U) generated by ditsets and their complements. 5. Deriving the Shannon Entropies from the Logical Entropies Instead of being defined as the values of a measure, the usual notions of simple and compound entropy 'burst forth fully formed from the forehead' of Claude Shannon [10] already satisfying the standard Venn diagram relationships (one author surmised that "Shannon carefully contrived for this 'accident' to occur" ([11] p. 153)). Since the Shannon entropies are not the values of a measure, many authors have pointed out that these Venn diagram relations for the Shannon entropies can only be taken as "analogies" or "mnemonics" ([9,12]). Logical information theory explains this situation since all the Shannon definitions of simple, joint, conditional and mutual information can be obtained by a uniform requantifying transformation from the corresponding logical definitions, and the transformation preserves the Venn diagram relationships. This transformation is possible since the logical and Shannon notions of entropy can be seen as two different ways to quantify distinctions; and thus, both theories are based on the foundational idea of information-as-distinctions. Consider the canonical case of n equiprobable elements, pi = 1n . The logical entropy of 1 = {B1, . . . , Bn} where Bi = {ui} with p = { 1 n , . . . , 1 n } is: |U×U−∆| |U×U| = n2−n n2 = 1− 1 n = 1− Pr (Bi). The normalized number of distinctions or 'dit-count' of the discrete partition 1 is 1 − 1n = 1− Pr (Bi). The general case of logical entropy for any π = {B1, . . . , BI} is the average of the dit-counts 1− Pr (Bi) for the canonical cases: h (π) = ∑i Pr (Bi) (1− Pr (Bi)). Entropy 2018, 20, 679 5 of 22 In the canonical case of 2n equiprobable elements, the minimum number of binary partitions ("yes-or-no questions" or "bits") whose join is the discrete partition 1 = {B1, . . . , B2n}with Pr (Bi) = 12n , i.e., that it takes to uniquely encode each distinct element, is n, so the Shannon–Hartley entropy [13] is the canonical bit-count: n = log2 (2 n) = log2 ( 1 1/2n ) = log2 ( 1 Pr(Bi) ) . The general case of Shannon entropy is the average of these canonical bit-counts log2 ( 1 Pr(Bi) ) : H (π) = ∑i Pr (Bi) log2 ( 1 Pr(Bi) ) . The dit-bit transform essentially replaces the canonical dit-counts by the canonical bit-counts. First, express any logical entropy concept (simple, joint, conditional or mutual) as an average of canonical dit-counts 1− Pr (Bi), and then, substitute the canonical bit-count log ( 1 Pr(Bi) ) to obtain the corresponding formula as defined by Shannon. Figure 4 gives examples of the dit-bit transform. Figure 4. Summary of the dit-bit transform. For instance, h (π|σ) = h (π, σ)− h (σ) = ∑i,j Pr ( Bi ∩ Cj ) [ 1− Pr ( Bi ∩ Cj )] −∑j Pr ( Cj ) [ 1− Pr ( Cj )] is the expression for h (π|σ) as an average over 1− Pr ( Bi ∩ Cj ) and 1− Pr ( Cj ) , so applying the dit-bit transform gives: ∑i,j Pr ( Bi ∩ Cj ) log ( 1/ Pr ( Bi ∩ Cj )) −∑j Pr ( Cj ) log ( 1/ Pr ( Cj )) = H (π, σ)− H (σ) = H (π|σ). The dit-bit transform is linear in the sense of preserving plus and minus, so the Venn diagram formulas, e.g., h (π, σ) = h (σ) + h (π|σ), which are automatically satisfied by logical entropy since it is a measure, carry over to Shannon entropy, e.g., H (π, σ) = H (σ) + H (π|σ) as in Figure 5, in spite of it not being a measure (in the sense of measure theory): Figure 5. Venn diagram mnemonic for Shannon entropies. Entropy 2018, 20, 679 6 of 22 6. Logical Entropy via Density Matrices The transition to quantum logical entropy is facilitated by reformulating the classical logical theory in terms of density matrices. Let U = {u1, . . . , un} be the sample space with the point probabilities p = (p1, . . . , pn). An event S ⊆ U has the probability Pr (S) = ∑uj∈S pj. For any event S with Pr (S) > 0, let: |S〉 = 1√ Pr(S) (χS (u1) √ p1, . . . , χS (un) √ pn)t (the superscript t indicates transpose) which is a normalized column vector in Rn where χS : U → {0, 1} is the characteristic function for S, and let 〈S| be the corresponding row vector. Since |S〉 is normalized, 〈S|S〉 = 1. Then, the density matrix representing the event S is the n× n symmetric real matrix: ρ (S) = |S〉 〈S| so that (ρ(S))j,k = { 1 Pr(S) √pj pk for uj, uk ∈ S 0 otherwise . Then, ρ (S)2 = |S〉 〈S|S〉 〈S| = ρ (S), so borrowing language from quantum mechanics, ρ (S) is said to be a pure state density matrix. Given any partition π = {B1, . . . , BI} on U, its density matrix is the average of the block density matrices: ρ (π) = ∑i Pr (Bi) ρ (Bi). Then, ρ (π) represents the mixed state, experiment or lottery where the event Bi occurs with probability Pr (Bi). A little calculation connects the logical entropy h (π) of a partition with the density matrix treatment: h (π) = 1−∑Ii=1 Pr (Bi) 2 = 1− tr [ ρ (π)2 ] = h (ρ (π)) where ρ (π)2 is substituted for Pr (Bi) 2 and the trace is substituted for the summation. For the throw of a fair die, U = {u1, u3, u5, u2, u4, u6} (note the odd faces ordered before the even faces in the matrix rows and columns) where uj represents the number j coming up, the density matrix ρ (0) is the "pure state" 6× 6 matrix with each entry being 16 . ρ (0) =  1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6  u1 u3 u5 u2 u4 u6 . The nonzero off-diagonal entries represent indistinctions or indits of the partition 0 or, in quantum terms, "coherences" where all 6 "eigenstates" cohere together in a pure "superposition" state. All pure states have a logical entropy of zero, i.e., h (0) = 0 (i.e., no dits) since tr [ρ] = 1 for any density matrix, so if ρ (0)2 = ρ (0), then tr [ ρ (0)2 ] = tr [ρ (0)] = 1 and h (0) = 1− tr [ ρ (0)2 ] = 0. The logical operation of classifying undistinguished entities (like the six faces of the die before a throw to determine a face up) by a numerical attribute makes distinctions between the entities with different numerical values of the attribute. Classification (also called sorting, fibering or partitioning ([14] Section 6.1)) is the classical operation corresponding to the quantum operation of "measurement" of a superposition state by an observable to obtain a mixed state. Now classify or "measure" the die-faces by the parity-of-the-face-up (odd or even) partition (observable) π = {Bodd, Beven} = {{u1, u3, u5} , {u2, u4, u6}}. Mathematically, this is done by the Lüders mixture operation ([15] p. 279), i.e., preand post-multiplying the density matrix ρ (0) by Podd and by Peven, the projection matrices to the odd or even components, and summing the results: Entropy 2018, 20, 679 7 of 22 Poddρ (0) Podd + Pevenρ (0) Peven =  1/6 1/6 1/6 0 0 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0 0 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  +  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0 0 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0 0 0 1/6 1/6 1/6  =  1/6 1/6 1/6 0 0 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0 0 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0 0 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0 0 0 1/6 1/6 1/6  = 12 ρ (Bodd) + 1 2 ρ (Beven) = ρ (π). Theorem 1 ( Fundamental(classical)). The increase in logical entropy, h (ρ (π))− h (ρ (0)), due to a Lüders mixture operation is the sum of amplitudes squared of the non-zero off-diagonal entries of the beginning density matrix that are zeroed in the final density matrix. Proof. Since for any density matrix ρ, tr [ ρ2 ] = ∑i,j ∣∣ρij∣∣2 ([16] p. 77), we have: h (ρ (π))− h (ρ (0)) =( 1− tr [ ρ (π)2 ]) − ( 1− tr [ ρ (0)2 ]) = tr [ ρ (0)2 ] − tr [ ρ (π)2 ] = ∑i,j (∣∣ρij (0)∣∣2 − ∣∣ρij (π)∣∣2), if (ui, ui′) ∈ dit (π), then and only then are the off-diagonal terms corresponding to ui and ui′ zeroed by the Lüders operation. The classical fundamental theorem connects the concept of information-as-distinctions to the process of "measurement" or classification, which uses some attribute (like parity in the example) or "observable" to make distinctions. In the comparison with the matrix ρ (0) of all entries 16 , the entries that got zeroed in the Lüders operation ρ (0) −→ ρ (π) correspond to the distinctions created in the transition 0 = {{u1, . . . , u6}} −→ π = {{u1, u3, u5} , {u2, u4, u6}}, i.e., the odd-numbered faces were distinguished from the even-numbered faces by the parity attribute. The increase in logical entropy = sum of the squares of the off-diagonal elements that were zeroed = h (π)− h (0) = 2× 9× ( 1 6 )2 = 1836 = 1 2 . The usual calculations of the two logical entropies are: h (π) = 2× ( 1 2 )2 = 12 and h (0) = 1− 1 = 0. Since, in quantum mechanics, a projective measurement's effect on a density matrix is the Lüders mixture operation, that means that the effects of the measurement are the above-described "making distinctions" by decohering or zeroing certain coherence terms in the density matrix, and the sum of the absolute squares of the coherences that were decohered is the increase in the logical entropy. 7. Quantum Logical Information Theory: Commuting Observables The idea of information-as-distinctions carries over to quantum mechanics. [Information] is the notion of distinguishability abstracted away from what we are distinguishing, or from the carrier of information. . . . And we ought to develop a theory of information which generalizes the theory of distinguishability to include these quantum properties. . . ([17] p. 155) Let F : V → V be a self-adjoint operator (observable) on a n-dimensional Hilbert space V with the real eigenvalues φ1, . . . , φI , and let U = {u1, . . . , un} be an orthonormal (ON) basis of eigenvectors of F. The quantum version of a dit, a qudit, is a pair of states definitely distinguishable by some observable. Any nondegenerate self-adjoint operator such as ∑nk=1 kP[uk ], where P[uk ] is the projection Entropy 2018, 20, 679 8 of 22 to the one-dimensional subspace generated by uk, will distinguish all the vectors in the orthonormal basis U, which is analogous classically to a pair (u, u′) of distinct elements of U that are distinguishable by some partition (i.e., 1). In general, a qudit is relativized to an observable, just as classically a distinction is a distinction of a partition. Then, there is a set partition π = {Bi}i=1,...,I on the ON basis U so that Bi is a basis for the eigenspace of the eigenvalue φi and |Bi| is the "multiplicity" (dimension of the eigenspace) of the eigenvalue φi for i = 1, . . . , I. Note that the real-valued function f : U → R takes each eigenvector in uj ∈ Bi ⊆ U to its eigenvalue φi so that f−1 (φi) = Bi contains all the information in the self-adjoint operator F : V → V since F can be reconstructed by defining it on the basis U as Fuj = f ( uj ) uj. The generalization of "classical" logical entropy to quantum logical entropy is straightforward using the usual ways that set-concepts generalize to vector-space concepts: subsets → subspaces, set partitions→ direct-sum decompositions of subspaces (hence the "classical" logic of partitions on a set will generalize to the quantum logic of direct-sum decompositions [18] that is the dual to the usual quantum logic of subspaces ), Cartesian products of sets→ tensor products of vector spaces and ordered pairs (uk, uk′) ∈ U ×U → basis elements uk ⊗ uk′ ∈ V ⊗ V. The eigenvalue function f : U → R determines a partition { f−1 (φi) } i∈I on U, and the blocks in that partition generate the eigenspaces of F, which form a direct-sum decomposition of V. Classically, a dit of the partition { f−1 (φi) } i∈I on U is a pair (uk, uk′) of points in distinct blocks of the partition, i.e., f (uk) 6= f (uk′). Hence, a qudit of F is a pair (uk, uk′) (interpreted as uk ⊗ uk′ in the context of V ⊗V) of vectors in the eigenbasis definitely distinguishable by F, i.e., f (uk) 6= f (uk′), distinct F-eigenvalues. Let G : V → V be another self-adjoint operator on V, which commutes with F so that we may then assume that U is an orthonormal basis of simultaneous eigenvectors of F and G. Let { γj } j∈J be the set of eigenvalues of G, and let g : U → R be the eigenvalue function so a pair (uk, uk′) is a qudit of G if g (uk) 6= g (uk′), i.e., if the two eigenvectors have distinct eigenvalues of G. As in classical logical information theory, information is represented by certain subsets (or, in the quantum case, subspaces) prior to the introduction of any probabilities. Since the transition from classical to quantum logical information theory is straightforward, it will be presented in table form in Figure 6 (which does not involve any probabilities), where the qudits (uk, uk′) are interpreted as uk ⊗ uk′ . Figure 6. The parallel development of classical and quantum logical information prior to probabilities. The information subspace associated with F is the subspace [qudit (F)] ⊆ V ⊗ V generated by the qudits uk ⊗ uk′ of F. If F = λI is a scalar multiple of the identity I, then it has no qudits, so Entropy 2018, 20, 679 9 of 22 its information space [qudit (λI)] is the zero subspace. It is an easy implication of the common dits theorem of classical logical information theory (([19] (Proposition 1)) or ([5] (Theorem 1.4))) that any two nonzero information spaces [qudit (F)] and [qudit (G)] have a nonzero intersection, i.e., have a nonzero mutual information space. That is, there are always two eigenvectors uk and uk′ that have different eigenvalues both by F and by G. In a measurement, the observables do not provide the point probabilities; they come from the pure (normalized) state ψ being measured. Let |ψ〉 = ∑nj=1 〈 uj|ψ 〉 ∣∣uj〉 = ∑nj=1 αj ∣∣uj〉 be the resolution of |ψ〉 in terms of the orthonormal basis U = {u1, . . . , un} of simultaneous eigenvectors for F and G. Then, pj = αjα∗j (α ∗ j is the complex conjugate of αj) for j = 1, . . . , n are the point probabilities on U, and the pure state density matrix ρ (ψ) = |ψ〉 〈ψ| (where 〈ψ| = |ψ〉† is the conjugate-transpose) has the entries: ρjk (ψ) = αjα∗k , so the diagonal entries ρjj (ψ) = αjα ∗ j = pj are the point probabilities. Figure 7 gives the remaining parallel development with the probabilities provided by the pure state ψ where we write ρ (ψ)† ρ (ψ) as ρ (ψ)2. Figure 7. The development of classical and quantum logical entropies for commuting F and G. The formula h (ρ) = 1− tr [ ρ2 ] is hardly new. Indeed, tr [ ρ2 ] is usually called the purity of the density matrix since a state ρ is pure if and only if tr [ ρ2 ] = 1, so h (ρ) = 0, and otherwise, tr [ ρ2 ] < 1, so h (ρ) > 0; and the state is said to be mixed. Hence, the complement 1− tr [ ρ2 ] has been called the "mixedness" ([20] p. 5) or "impurity" of the state ρ. The seminal paper of Manfredi and Feix [21] approaches the same formula 1− tr [ ρ2 ] (which they denote as S2) from the viewpoint of Wigner functions, and they present strong arguments for this notion of quantum entropy (thanks to a referee for this important reference to the Manfredi and Feix paper). This notion of quantum entropy is also called by the misnomer "linear entropy" even though it is quadratic in ρ, so we will not continue that usage. See [22] or [23] for references to that literature. The logical entropy is also the quadratic special case of the Tsallis–Havrda–Charvat entropy ([24,25]) and the logical distance special case [19] of C. R. Rao's quadratic entropy [26]. What is new here is not the formula, but the whole back story of partition logic outlined above, which gives the logical notion of entropy arising out of partition logic as the normalized counting measure on ditsets of partitions; just as logical probability arises out of Boolean subset logic as the normalized counting measure on subsets. The basic idea of information is differences, distinguishability and distinctions ([3,19]), so the logical notion of entropy is the measure of the distinctions or dits of a partition, and the corresponding quantum version is the measure of the qudits of an observable. Entropy 2018, 20, 679 10 of 22 8. Two Theorems about Quantum Logical Entropy Classically, a pair of elements ( uj, uk ) either "cohere" together in the same block of a partition on U, i.e., are an indistinction of the partition, or they do not, i.e., they are a distinction of the partition. In the quantum case, the nonzero off-diagonal entries αjα∗k in the pure state density matrix ρ (ψ) = |ψ〉 〈ψ| are called quantum "coherences" ([27] p. 303; [15] p. 177) because they give the amplitude of the eigenstates ∣∣uj〉 and |uk〉 "cohering" together in the coherent superposition state vector |ψ〉 = ∑nj=1 〈 uj|ψ 〉 ∣∣uj〉 = ∑j αj ∣∣uj〉. The coherences are classically modeled by the nonzero off-diagonal entries √pj pk for the indistinctions ( uj, uk ) ∈ Bi × Bi, i.e., coherences ≈ indistinctions. For an observable F, let φ : U → R be for F-eigenvalue function assigning the eigenvalue φ (ui) = φi for each ui in the ON basis U = {u1, . . . , un} of F-eigenvectors. The range of φ is the set of F-eigenvalues {φ1, . . . , φI}. Let Pφi : V → V be the projection matrix in the U-basis to the eigenspace of φi. The projective F-measurement of the state ψ transforms the pure state density matrix ρ (ψ) (represented in the ON basis U of F-eigenvectors) to yield the Lüders mixture density matrix ρ′ (ψ) = ∑Ii=1 Pφi ρ (ψ) Pφi ([15] p. 279). The off-diagonal elements of ρ (ψ) that are zeroed in ρ ′ (ψ) are the coherences (quantum indistinctions or quindits) that are turned into "decoherences" (quantum distinctions or qudits of the observable being measured). For any observable F and a pure state ψ, a quantum logical entropy was defined as h (F : ψ) = tr [ P[qudit(F)]ρ (ψ)⊗ ρ (ψ) ] . That definition was the quantum generalization of the "classical" logical entropy defined as h (π) = p × p (dit (π)). When a projective F-measurement is performed on ψ, the pure state density matrix ρ (ψ) is transformed into the mixed state density matrix by the quantum Lüders mixture operation, which then defines the quantum logical entropy h (ρ′ (ψ)) = 1− tr [ ρ′ (ψ)2 ] . The first test of how the quantum logical entropy notions fit together is showing that these two entropies are the same: h (F : ψ) = h (ρ′ (ψ)). The proof shows that they are both equal to classical logical entropy of the partition π (F : ψ) defined on the ON basis U = {u1, . . . , un} of F-eigenvectors by the F-eigenvalues with the point probabilities pj = α∗j αj. That is, the inverse images Bi = φ −1 (φi) of the eigenvalue function φ : U → R define the eigenvalue partition π (F : ψ) = {B1, . . . , BI} on the ON basis U = {u1, . . . , un} with the point probabilities pj = α∗j αj provided by the state |ψ〉 for j = 1, . . . , n. The classical logical entropy of that partition is: h (π (F : ψ)) = 1−∑Ii=1 p (Bi) 2 where p (Bi) = ∑uj∈Bi pj. We first show that h (F : ψ) = tr [ P[qudit(F)]ρ (ψ)⊗ ρ (ψ) ] = h (π (F : ψ)). Now, qudit (F) ={ uj ⊗ uk : φ ( uj ) 6= φ (uk) } , and [qudit (F)] is the subspace of V ⊗ V generated by it. The n × n pure state density matrix ρ (ψ) has the entries ρjk (ψ) = αjα∗k , and ρ (ψ) ⊗ ρ (ψ) is an n 2 × n2 matrix. The projection matrix P[qudit(F)] is an n2 × n2 diagonal matrix with the diagonal entries, indexed by j, k = 1, . . . , n: [ P[qudit(F)] ] jjkk = 1 if φ ( uj ) 6= φ (uk) and zero otherwise. Thus, in the product P[qudit(F)]ρ (ψ) ⊗ ρ (ψ), the nonzero diagonal elements are the pj pk where φ ( uj ) 6= φ (uk), and so, the trace is ∑nj.k=1 { pj pk : φ ( uj ) 6= φ (uk) } , which by definition, is h (F : ψ). Since ∑nj=1 pj = ∑Ii=1 p (Bi) = 1, ( ∑Ii=1 p (Bi) )2 = 1 = ∑Ii=1 p (Bi) 2 + ∑i 6=i′ p (Bi) p (Bi′). By grouping the pj pk in the trace according to the blocks of π (F : ψ), we have: h (F : ψ) = tr [ P[qudit(F)]ρ (ψ)⊗ ρ (ψ) ] = ∑nj.k=1 { pj pk : φ ( uj ) 6= φ (uk) } = ∑i 6=i′ ∑ { pj pk : uj ∈ Bi, uk ∈ Bi′ } = ∑i 6=i′ p (Bi) p (Bi′) = 1−∑Ii=1 p (Bi) 2 = h (π (F : ψ)). To show that h (ρ′ (ψ)) = 1− tr [ ρ′ (ψ)2 ] = h (π (F : ψ)) for ρ′ (ψ) = ∑Ii=1 Pφi ρ (ψ) Pφi , we need to compute tr [ ρ′ (ψ)2 ] . An off-diagonal element in ρjk (ψ) = αjα∗k of ρ (ψ) survives (i.e., is not zeroed and has the same value) the Lüders operation if and only if φ ( uj ) = φ (uk). Hence, the j-th diagonal element of ρ′ (ψ)2 is: Entropy 2018, 20, 679 11 of 22 ∑nk=1 { α∗j αkαjα ∗ k : φ ( uj ) = φ (uk) } = ∑nk=1 { pj pk : φ ( uj ) = φ (uk) } = pj p (Bi) where uj ∈ Bi. Then, grouping the j-th diagonal elements for uj ∈ Bi gives ∑uj∈Bi pj p (Bi) = p (Bi) 2. Hence, the whole trace is: tr [ ρ′ (ψ)2 ] = ∑Ii=1 p (Bi) 2, and thus: h (ρ′ (ψ)) = 1− tr [ ρ′ (ψ)2 ] = 1−∑Ii=1 p (Bi) 2 = h (F : ψ). This completes the proof of the following theorem. Theorem 2. h (F : ψ) = h (π (F : ψ)) = h (ρ′ (ψ)). Measurement creates distinctions, i.e., turns coherences into "decoherences", which, classically, is the operation of distinguishing elements by classifying them according to some attribute like classifying the faces of a die by their parity. The fundamental theorem about quantum logical entropy and projective measurement, in the density matrix version, shows how the quantum logical entropy created (starting with h (ρ (ψ)) = 0 for the pure state ψ) by the measurement can be computed directly from the coherences of ρ (ψ) that are decohered in ρ′ (ψ). Theorem 3 (Fundamental (quantum)). The increase in quantum logical entropy, h (F : ψ) = h (ρ′ (ψ)), due to the F-measurement of the pure state ψ, is the sum of the absolute squares of the nonzero off-diagonal terms (coherences) in ρ (ψ) (represented in an ON basis of F-eigenvectors) that are zeroed ('decohered') in the post-measurement Lüders mixture density matrix ρ′ (ψ) = ∑Ii=1 Pφi ρ (ψ) Pφi . Proof. h (ρ′ (ψ))− h (ρ (ψ)) = ( 1− tr [ ρ′ (ψ)2 ]) − ( 1− tr [ ρ (ψ)2 ]) = ∑jk (∣∣∣ρjk (ψ)∣∣∣2 − ∣∣∣ρ′jk (ψ)∣∣∣2). If uj and uk are a qudit of F, then and only then are the corresponding off-diagonal terms zeroed by the Lüders mixture operation ∑Ii=1 Pφi ρ (ψ) Pφi to obtain ρ ′ (ψ) from ρ (ψ). Density matrices have long been a standard part of the machinery of quantum mechanics. The fundamental theorem for logical entropy and measurement shows there is a simple, direct and quantitative connection between density matrices and logical entropy. The theorem directly connects the changes in the density matrix due to a measurement (sum of absolute squares of zeroed off-diagonal terms) with the increase in logical entropy due to the F-measurement h (F : ψ) = tr [ P[qudit(F)]ρ (ψ)⊗ ρ (ψ) ] = h (ρ′ (ψ)) (where h (ρ (ψ)) = 0 for the pure state ψ). This direct quantitative connection between state discrimination and quantum logical entropy reinforces the judgment of Boaz Tamir and Eliahu Cohen ([28,29]) that quantum logical entropy is a natural and informative entropy concept for quantum mechanics. We find this framework of partitions and distinction most suitable (at least conceptually) for describing the problems of quantum state discrimination, quantum cryptography and in general, for discussing quantum channel capacity. In these problems, we are basically interested in a distance measure between such sets of states, and this is exactly the kind of knowledge provided by logical entropy [Reference to [19]]. ([28] p. 1) Moreover, the quantum logical entropy has a simple "two-draw probability" interpretation, i.e., h (F : ψ) = h (ρ′ (ψ)) is the probability that two independent F-measurements of ψ will yield distinct F-eigenvalues, i.e., will yield a qudit of F. In contrast, the von Neumann entropy has no such simple interpretation, and there seems to be no such intuitive connection between preand post-measurement density matrices and von Neumann entropy, although von Neumann entropy also increases in a projective measurement ([30] Theorem 11.9, p. 515). The development of the quantum logical concepts for two non-commuting operators (see Appendix B) is the straightforward vector space version of the classical logical entropy treatment of partitions on two set X and Y (see Appendix A). Entropy 2018, 20, 679 12 of 22 9. Quantum Logical Entropies of Density Operators The extension of the classical logical entropy h (p) = 1− ∑ni=1 p2i of a probability distribution p = (p1, . . . , pn) to the quantum case is h (ρ) = 1− tr [ ρ2 ] where a density matrix ρ replaces the probability distribution p and the trace replaces the summation. An arbitrary density operator ρ, representing a pure or mixed state on V, is also a self-adjoint operator on V, so quantum logical entropies can be defined where density operators play the double role of providing the measurement basis (as self-adjoint operators), as well as the state being measured. Let ρ and τ be two non-commuting density operators on V. Let X = {ui}i=1,...,n be an orthonormal (ON) basis of ρ eigenvectors, and let {λi}i=1,...,n be the corresponding eigenvalues, which must be non-negative and sum to one, so they can be interpreted as probabilities. Let Y = { vj } j=1,...,n be an ON basis of eigenvectors for τ, and let { μj } j=1,...,n be the corresponding eigenvalues, which are also non-negative and sum to one. Each density operator plays a double role. For instance, ρ acts as the observable to supply the measurement basis of {ui}i and the eigenvalues {λi}i, as well as being the state to be measured supplying the probabilities {λi}i for the measurement outcomes. In this section, we define quantum logical entropies using the discrete partition 1X on the set of "index" states X = {ui}i and similarly for the discrete partition 1Y on Y = { vj } j, the ON basis of eigenvectors for τ. The qudit sets of (V ⊗V) ⊗ (V ⊗V) are then defined according to the identity and difference on the index sets and independent of the eigenvalue-probabilities, e.g., qudit (1X) ={( ui ⊗ vj ) ⊗ ( ui′ ⊗ vj′ ) : i 6= i′ } . The, n the qudit subspaces are the subspaces of (V ⊗V)2 generated by the qudit sets of generators: • [qudit (1X)] = [( ui ⊗ vj ) ⊗ ( ui′ ⊗ vj′ ) : i 6= i′ ] ; • [qudit (1Y)] = [( ui ⊗ vj ) ⊗ ( ui′ ⊗ vj′ ) : j 6= j′ ] ; • [qudit (1X , 1Y)] = [qudit (1X) ∪ qudit (1Y)] = [( ui ⊗ vj ) ⊗ ( ui′ ⊗ vj′ ) : i 6= i′ or j 6= j′ ] ; • [qudit (1X |1Y)] = [qudit (1X)− qudit (1Y)] = [( ui ⊗ vj ) ⊗ ( ui′ ⊗ vj′ ) : i 6= i′ and j = j′ ] ; • [qudit (1Y|1X)] = [qudit (1Y)− qudit (1X)] = [( ui ⊗ vj ) ⊗ ( ui′ ⊗ vj′ ) : i = i′ and j 6= j′ ] ; and • [qudit (1Y&1X)] = [qudit (1Y) ∩ qudit (1X)] = [( ui ⊗ vj ) ⊗ ( ui′ ⊗ vj′ ) : i 6= i′ and j 6= j′ ] . Then, as qudit sets: qudit (1X , 1Y) = qudit (1X |1Y) ] qudit (1Y|1X) ] qudit (1Y&1X), and the corresponding qudit subspaces stand in the same relation where the disjoint union is replaced by the disjoint sum. The density operator ρ is represented by the diagonal density matrix ρX in its own ON basis X with (ρX)ii = λi and similarly for the diagonal density matrix τY with (τY)jj = μj. The density operators ρ, τ on V define a density operator ρ⊗ τ on V⊗V with the ON basis of eigenvectors { ui ⊗ vj } i,j and the eigenvalue-probabilities of { λiμj } i,j. The operator ρ⊗ τ is represented in its ON basis by the diagonal density matrix ρX ⊗ τY with diagonal entries λiμj where 1 = (λ1 + * * *+ λn) (μ1 + * * *+ μn) = ∑ni,j=1 λiμj. The probability measure p ( ui ⊗ vj ) = λiμj on V ⊗V defines the product measure p× p on (V ⊗V)2 where it can be applied to the qudit subspaces to define the quantum logical entropies as usual. In the first instance, we have: h (1X : ρ⊗ τ) = p× p ([qudit (1X)]) = ∑ { λiμjλi′μj′ : i 6= i′ } = ∑i 6=i′ λiλi′ ∑j,j′ μjμj′ = ∑i 6=i′ λiλi′ = 1−∑i λ2i = 1− tr [ ρ2 ] = h (ρ) and similarly h (1Y : ρ⊗ τ) = h (τ). Since all the data are supplied by the two density operators, we can use simplified notation to define the corresponding joint, conditional and mutual entropies: Entropy 2018, 20, 679 13 of 22 • h (ρ, τ) = h (1X , 1Y : ρ⊗ τ) = p× p ([qudit (1X) ∪ qudit (1Y)]); • h (ρ|τ) = h (1X |1Y : ρ⊗ τ) = p× p ([qudit (1X)− qudit (1Y)]); • h (τ|ρ) = h (1Y|1X : ρ⊗ τ) = p× p ([qudit (1Y)− qudit (1X)]); and • m (ρ, τ) = h (1Y&1X : ρ⊗ τ) = p× p ([qudit (1Y) ∩ qudit (1X)]). Then, the usual Venn diagram relationships hold for the probability measure p × p on (V ⊗V)2, e.g., h (ρ, τ) = h (ρ|τ) + h (τ|ρ) + m (ρ, τ), and probability interpretations are readily available. There are two probability distributions λ = {λi}i and μ = { μj } j on the sample space {1, . . . , n}. Two pairs (i, j) and (i ′, j′) are drawn with replacement; the first entry in each pair is drawn according to λ and the second entry according to μ. Then, h (ρ, τ) is the probability that i 6= i′ or j 6= j′ (or both); h (ρ|τ) is the probability that i 6= i′ and j = j′, and so forth. Note that this interpretation assumes no special significance to a λi and μi having the same index since we are drawing a pair of pairs. In the classical case of two probability distributions p = (p1, . . . , pn) and q = (q1, . . . , qn) on the same index set, the logical cross-entropy is defined as: h (p||q) = 1−∑i piqi and interpreted as the probability of getting different indices in drawing a single pair, one from p and the other from q. However, this cross-entropy assumes some special significance to pi and qi having the same index. However, in our current quantum setting, there is no correlation between the two sets of "index" states {ui}i=1,...,n and { vj } j=1,...,n. However, when the two density operators commute, τρ = ρτ, then we can take {ui}i=1,...,n as an ON basis of simultaneous eigenvectors for the two operators with respective eigenvalues λi and μi for ui with i = 1, . . . , n. In that special case, we can meaningfully define the quantum logical cross-entropy as h (ρ||τ) = 1− ∑ni=1 λiμi, but the general case awaits further analysis below. 10. The Logical Hamming Distance between Two Partitions The development of logical quantum information theory in terms of some given commuting or non-commuting observables gives an analysis of the distinguishability of quantum states using those observables. Without any given observables, there is still a natural logical analysis of the distance between quantum states that generalizes the "classical" logical distance h (π|σ) + h (σ|π) between partitions on a set. In the classical case, we have the logical entropy h (π) of a partition where the partition plays the role of the direct-sum decomposition of eigenspaces of an observable in the quantum case. However, we also have just the logical entropy h (p) of a probability distribution p = (p1, . . . , pn) and the related compound notions of logical entropy given another probability distribution q = (q1, . . . , qn) indexed by the same set. First, we review that classical treatment to motivate the quantum version of the logical Hamming distance between states. A binary relation R ⊆ U ×U on U = {u1, . . . , un} can be represented by an n× n incidence matrix I(R) where: I (R)ij = { 1 if ( ui, uj ) ∈ R 0 if ( ui, uj ) /∈ R. Taking R as the equivalence relation indit (π) associated with a partition π = {B1, . . . , BI}, the density matrix ρ (π) of the partition π (with equiprobable points) is just the incidence matrix I (indit (π)) rescaled to be of trace one (i.e., the sum of diagonal entries is one): ρ (π) = 1|U| I (indit (π)). From coding theory ([31] p. 66), we have the notion of the Hamming distance between two 0, 1 vectors or matrices (of the same dimensions), which is the number of places where they differ. Since logical information theory is about distinctions and differences, it is important to have a Entropy 2018, 20, 679 14 of 22 classical and quantum logical notion of Hamming distance. The powerset ℘ (U ×U) can be viewed as a vector space over Z2 where the sum of two binary relations R, R′ ⊆ U ×U is the symmetric difference, symbolized as R∆R′ = (R− R′) ∪ (R′ − R) = R ∪ R′ − R ∩ R′, which is the set of elements (i.e., ordered pairs ( ui, uj ) ∈ U ×U) that are in one set or the other, but not both. Thus, the Hamming distance DH (I (R) , I (R′)) between the incidence matrices of two binary relations is just the cardinality of their symmetric difference: DH (I (R) , I (R′)) = |R∆R′|. Moreover, the size of the symmetric difference does not change if the binary relations are replaced by their complements: |R∆R′| = ∣∣(U2 − R)∆ (U2 − R′)∣∣. Hence, given two partitions π = {B1, . . . , BI} and σ = { C1, . . . , CJ } on U, the unnormalized Hamming distance between the two partitions is naturally defined as (this is investigated in Rossi [32]): D (π, σ) = DH (I (indit (π)) , I (indit (σ))) = |indit (π)∆ indit (σ)| = |dit (π)∆ dit (σ)|, and the Hamming distance between π and σ is defined as the normalized D (π, σ): d (π, σ) = D(π,σ)|U×U| = |dit(π)∆ dit(σ)| |U×U| = |dit(π)−dit(σ)| |U×U| + |dit(σ)−dit(π)| |U×U| = h (π|σ) + h (σ|π). This motivates the general case of point probabilities p = (p1, . . . , pn) where we define the Hamming distance between the two partitions as the sum of the two logical conditional entropies: d (π, σ) = h (π|σ) + h (σ|π) = 2h(π ∨ σ)− h (π)− h (σ). To motivate the bridge to the quantum version of the Hamming distance, we need to calculate it using the density matrices ρ (π) and ρ (σ) of the two partitions. To compute the trace tr [ρ (π) ρ (σ)], we compute the diagonal elements in the product ρ (π) ρ (σ) and add them up: [ρ (π) ρ (σ)]kk = ∑l ρ (π)kl ρ (σ)lk = ∑l √ pk pl √ pl pk where the only nonzero terms are where uk, ul ∈ B ∩ C for some B ∈ π and C ∈ σ. Thus, if uk ∈ B ∩ C, then [ρ (π) ρ (σ)]kk = ∑ul∈B∩C pk pl . Therefore, the diagonal element for uk is the sum of the pk pl for ul in the same intersection B ∩ C as uk, so it is pk Pr (B ∩ C). Then, when we sum over the diagonal elements, then for all the uk ∈ B ∩ C for any given B, C, we just sum ∑uk∈B∩C pk Pr (B ∩ C) = Pr (B ∩ C) 2 so that tr [ρ (π) ρ (σ)] = ∑B∈π,C∈σ Pr (B ∩ C) 2 = 1− h (π ∨ σ). Hence, if we define the logical cross-entropy of π and σ as: h(π||σ) = 1− tr [ρ (π) ρ (σ)], then for partitions on U with the point probabilities p = (p1, . . . , pn), the logical cross-entropy h (π||σ) of two partitions is the same as the logical joint entropy, which is also the logical entropy of the join: h (π||σ) = h (π, σ) = h (π ∨ σ). Thus, we can also express the logical Hamming distance between two partitions entirely in terms of density matrices: d (π, σ) = 2h (π||σ)− h (π)− h (σ) = tr [ ρ (π)2 ] + tr [ ρ (σ)2 ] − 2 tr [ρ (π) ρ (σ)]. 11. The Quantum Logical Hamming Distance The quantum logical entropy h (ρ) = 1− tr [ ρ2 ] of a density matrix ρ generalizes the classical h (p) = 1−∑i p2i for a probability distribution p = (p1, . . . , pn). As a self-adjoint operator, a density matrix has a spectral decomposition ρ = ∑ni=1 λi |ui〉 〈ui| where {|ui〉}i=1,...,n is an orthonormal basis for V and where all the eigenvalues λi are real, non-negative and ∑ni=1 λi = 1. Then, h (ρ) = 1−∑i λ2i so h (ρ) can be interpreted as the probability of getting distinct indices i 6= i′ in two independent measurements of the state ρ with {|ui〉} as the measurement basis. Classically, it is the two-draw probability of getting distinct indices in two independent samples of the probability distribution λ = (λ1, . . . , λn), just as h (p) is the probability of getting distinct indices in two independent draws Entropy 2018, 20, 679 15 of 22 on p. For a pure state ρ, there is one λi = 1 with the others zero, and h (ρ) = 0 is the probability of getting distinct indices in two independent draws on λ = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0). In the classical case of the logical entropies, we worked with the ditsets or sets of distinctions of partitions. However, everything could also be expressed in terms of the complementary sets of indits or indistinctions of partitions (ordered pairs of elements in the same block of the partition) since: dit (π) ] indit (π) = U ×U. When we switch to the density matrix treatment of "classical" partitions, then the focus shifts to the indistinctions. For a partition π = {B1, . . . , BI}, the logical entropy is the sum of the distinction probabilities: h (π) = ∑(uk ,ul)∈dit(π) pk pl , which in terms of indistinctions is: h (π) = 1−∑(uk ,ul)∈indit(π) pk pl = 1−∑ I i=1 Pr (Bi) 2. When expressed in the density matrix formulation, then tr [ ρ (π)2 ] is the sum of the indistinction probabilities: tr [ ρ (π)2 ] = ∑(uk ,ul)∈indit(π) pk pl = ∑ I i=1 Pr (Bi) 2. The nonzero entries in ρ (π) have the form √ pk pl for (uk, ul) ∈ indit (π); their squares are the indistinction probabilities. That provides the interpretive bridge to the quantum case. The quantum analogue of an indistinction probability is the absolute square |ρkl |2 of a nonzero entry ρkl in a density matrix ρ, and tr [ ρ2 ] = ∑k,l |ρkl | 2 is the sum of those "indistinction" probabilities. The nonzero entries in the density matrix ρ might be called "coherences" so that ρkl may be interpreted as the amplitudes for the states uk and ul to cohere together in the state ρ, so tr [ ρ2 ] is the sum of the coherence probabilities, just as tr [ ρ (π)2 ] = ∑(uk ,ul)∈indit(π) pk pl is the sum of the indistinction probabilities. The quantum logical entropy h (ρ) = 1− tr [ ρ2 ] may then be interpreted as the sum of the decoherence probabilities, just as h (ρ (π)) = h (π) = 1−∑(uk ,ul)∈indit(π) pk pl is the sum of the distinction probabilities. This motivates the general quantum definition of the joint entropy h (π, σ) = h (π ∨ σ) = h (π||σ), which is the: h (ρ||τ) = 1− tr [ ρ†τ ] quantum logical cross-entropy. To work out its interpretation, we again take ON eigenvector bases {|ui〉}ni=1 for ρ and {∣∣vj〉}nj=1 for τ with λi and μj as the respective eigenvalues and compute the operation of τ†ρ : V → V. Now, |ui〉 = ∑j 〈 vj|ui 〉 ∣∣vj〉 so ρ |ui〉 = λi |ui〉 = ∑j λi 〈vj|ui〉 ∣∣vj〉, and then, for τ† = ∑j ∣∣vj〉 〈vj∣∣ μj, so τ†ρ |ui〉 = ∑j λiμj 〈 vj|ui 〉 ∣∣vj〉. Thus, τ†ρ in the {ui}i basis would have the diagonal entries〈 ui|τ†ρ|ui 〉 = ∑j λiμj 〈 vj|ui 〉 〈 ui|vj 〉 , so the trace is: tr [ τ†ρ ] = ∑i 〈 ui|τ†ρ|ui 〉 = ∑i,j λiμj 〈 vj|ui 〉 〈 ui|vj 〉 = tr [ ρ†τ ] which is symmetrical. The other information we have is the ∑i λi = 1 = ∑j μj, and they are non-negative. The classical logical cross-entropy of two probability distributions is h (p||q) = 1 − ∑i,j piqjδij, where two indices i and j are either identical or totally distinct. However, in the quantum case, the "index" states |ui〉 and ∣∣vj〉 have an "overlap" measured by the inner product〈 ui|vj 〉 . The trace tr [ ρ†τ ] is real since 〈 vj|ui 〉 = 〈 ui|vj 〉∗ and 〈vj|ui〉 〈ui|vj〉 = ∣∣〈ui|vj〉∣∣2 = ∣∣〈vj|ui〉∣∣2 is the probability of getting λi when measuring vj in the ui basis and the probability of getting μj when measuring ui in the vj basis. The twofold nature of density matrices as states and as observables then allows tr [ ρ†τ ] to be interpreted as the average value of the observable ρ when measuring the state τ or vice versa. We may call 〈 vj|ui 〉 〈 ui|vj 〉 the proportion or extent of overlap for those two index states. Thus, tr [ ρ†τ ] is the sum of all the probability combinations λiμj weighted by the overlaps〈 vj|ui 〉 〈 ui|vj 〉 for the index states |ui〉 and ∣∣vj〉. The quantum logical cross-entropy can be written in a number of ways: Entropy 2018, 20, 679 16 of 22 h (ρ||τ) = 1− tr [ ρ†τ ] = 1−∑i,j λiμj 〈 vj|ui 〉 〈 ui|vj 〉 = tr [ τ† (I − ρ) ] = ∑i,j (1− λi) μj 〈 vj|ui 〉 〈 ui|vj 〉 = tr [ ρ† (I − τ) ] = ∑i,j λi ( 1− μj ) 〈 vj|ui 〉 〈 ui|vj 〉 . Classically, the "index state" {i} completely overlaps with {j} when i = j and has no overlap with any other {i′} from the indices {1, . . . , n}, so the "overlaps" are, as it were, 〈j|i〉 〈i|j〉 = δij, the Kronecker delta. Hence, the classical analogue formulas are: h (p||q) = 1−∑i,j piqjδij = ∑i,j (1− pi) qjδij = ∑i,j pi ( 1− qj ) δij. The quantum logical cross-entropy h (ρ||τ) can be interpreted by considering two measurements, one of ρ with the {|ui〉}i measurement basis and the other of τ with the {∣∣vj〉}j measurement basis. If the outcome of the ρ measurement was ui with probability λi, then the outcome of the τ measurement is different than vj with probability 1 − μj; however, that distinction probability λi ( 1− μj ) is only relevant to the extent that ui and vj are the "same state" or overlap, and that extent is 〈 vj|ui 〉 〈 ui|vj 〉 . Hence, the quantum logical cross-entropy is the sum of those two-measurement distinction probabilities weighted by the extent that the states overlap. The interpretation of h (ρ) and h (τ||ρ), as well as the later development of the quantum logical conditional entropy h (ρ|τ) and the quantum Hamming distance d (ρ, τ) are all based on using the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of density matrices, which Michael Nielsen and Issac Chuang seem to prematurely dismiss as having little or no "special significance" ([30] p. 103). When the two density matrices commute, ρτ = τρ, then (as noted above) we have the essentially classical situation of one set of index states {|ui〉}i which is an orthonormal basis set of simultaneous eigenvectors for both ρ and τ with the respective eigenvalues {λi}i and { μj } j. Then, 〈 uj|ui 〉 〈 ui|uj 〉 = δij, so h (ρ||τ) = ∑i,j λi ( 1− μj ) δij is the probability of getting two distinct index states ui and uj for i 6= j in two independent measurements, one of ρ and one of τ in the same measurement basis of {|ui〉}i. This interpretation includes the special case when τ = ρ and h (ρ||ρ) = h (ρ). We saw that classically, the logical Hamming distance between two partitions could be defined as: d (π, σ) = 2h (π||σ)− h (π)− h (σ) = tr [ ρ (π)2 ] + tr [ ρ (σ)2 ] − 2 tr [ρ (π) ρ (σ)] so this motivates the quantum definition. Nielsen and Chuang suggest the idea of a Hamming distance between quantum states, only to then dismiss it. "Unfortunately, the Hamming distance between two objects is simply a matter of labeling, and a priori there are not any labels in the Hilbert space arena of quantum mechanics!" ([30] p. 399). They are right that there is no correlation, say, between the vectors in the two ON bases {ui}i and { vj } j for V, but the cross-entropy h (ρ||τ) uses all possible combinations in the terms λi ( 1− μj ) 〈 vj|ui 〉 〈 ui|vj 〉 ; thus, the definition of the Hamming distance given below does not use any arbitrary labeling or correlations. d (ρ, τ) = 2h (ρ||τ)− h (ρ)− h (τ) = tr [ ρ2 ] + tr [ τ2 ] − 2 tr [ ρ†τ ] This is the definition of the quantum logical Hamming distance between two quantum states. There is another distance measure between quantum states, namely the Hilbert–Schmidt norm, which has been recently investigated in [29] (with an added 12 factor). It is the square of the Euclidean distance between the quantum states, and ignoring the 12 factor, it is the square of the "trace distance" ([30] Chapter 9) between the states. tr [ (ρ− τ)2 ] Hilbert–Schmidt norm, where we write A2 for A† A. Then, the naturalness of this norm as a "distance" is enhanced by the fact that it is the same as the quantum Hamming distance: Theorem 4. Hilbert–Schmidt norm = quantum logical Hamming distance. Entropy 2018, 20, 679 17 of 22 Proof. tr [ (ρ− τ)2 ] = tr [ ρ2 ] + tr [ τ2 ] − 2 tr [ ρ†τ ] = 2h (ρ||τ)− h (ρ)− h (τ) = d (ρ, τ) . Hence, the information inequality holds trivially for the quantum logical Hamming distance: d (ρ, τ) ≥ 0 with equality iff ρ = τ. The fundamental theorem can be usefully restated in this broader context of density operators instead of in terms of the density matrix represented in the ON basis for F-eigenvectors. Let ρ be any state to be measured by an observable F, and let ρ = ∑Ii=1 Pφi ρPφi be the result of applying the Lüders mixture operation (where the Pφi are the projection operators to the eigenspaces of F). Then, a natural question to ask is the Hilbert–Schmidt norm or quantum logical Hamming distance between the preand post-measurement states. It might be noted that the Hilbert–Schmidt norm and the Lüders mixture operation are defined independently of any considerations of logical entropy. Theorem 5 (Fundamental (quantum)). tr [ (ρ− ρ)2 ] = h (ρ)− h (ρ). Proof. tr [ (ρ− ρ)2 ] = tr[ ( ρ† − ρ† ) (ρ− ρ)] = tr [ ρ2 ] + tr [ ρ2 ] − tr [ρρ] − tr [ρρ] where ρ† = ρ, ρ† = ρ, tr [ρρ] = tr [ρρ] and tr [ρρ] = tr [ ρ ∑Ii=1 Pφi ρPφi ] = tr [ ∑ ρPφi ρPφi ] . Also tr [ ρ2 ] = tr [( ∑i Pφi ρPφi ) ( ∑j Pφj ρPφj )] = tr [ ∑i Pφi ρP 2 φi ρPφi ] using the orthogonality of the distinct projection operators. Then, using the idempotency of the projections and the cyclicity of the trace, tr [ ρ2 ] = tr [ ∑i ρPφi ρPφi ] so tr [ρρ] = tr [ρρ] = tr [ ρ2 ] , and hence, tr [ (ρ− ρ)2 ] = tr [ ρ2 ] − tr [ ρ2 ] = h (ρ)− h (ρ). 12. Results Logical information theory arises as the quantitative version of the logic of partitions just as logical probability theory arises as the quantitative version of the dual Boolean logic of subsets. Philosophically, logical information is based on the idea of information-as-distinctions. The Shannon definitions of entropy arise naturally out of the logical definitions by replacing the counting of distinctions by the counting of the minimum number of binary partitions (bits) that are required, on average, to make all the same distinctions, i.e., to encode the distinguished elements uniquely, which is why the Shannon theory is so well adapted for the theory of coding and communication. This "classical" logical information theory may be developed with the data of two partitions on a set with point probabilities. Section 7 gives the generalization to the quantum case where the partitions are provided by two commuting observables (the point set is an ON basis of simultaneous eigenvectors), and the point probabilities are provided by the state to be measured. In Section 8, the fundamental theorem for quantum logical entropy and measurement established a direct quantitative connection between the increase in quantum logical entropy due to a projective measurement and the eigenstates (cohered together in the pure superposition state being measured) that are distinguished by the measurement (decohered in the post-measurement mixed state). This theorem establishes quantum logical entropy as a natural notion for a quantum information theory focusing on distinguishing states. The classical theory might also start with partitions on two different sets and a probability distribution on the product of the sets (see Appendix A). Appendix B gives the quantum generalization of that case with the two sets being two ON bases for two non-commuting observables, and the probabilities are provided by a state to be measured. The classical theory may also be developed just using two probability distributions indexed by the same set, and this is generalized to the quantum case where we are just given two density matrices representing two states in a Hilbert space. Sections 10 and 11 carry over the Hamming distance measure from the classical to the quantum case where it is equal to the Hilbert–Schmidt distance (square of the trace distance). The general fundamental theorem relating measurement and logical entropy is that the Hilbert–Schmidt distance (=quantum logical Hamming distance) between any pre-measurement state ρ and the state ρ resulting from a projective measurement of the state is the difference in their logical entropies, h (ρ)− h (ρ). Entropy 2018, 20, 679 18 of 22 13. Discussion The overall argument is that quantum logical entropy is the simple and natural notion of information-as-distinctions for quantum information theory focusing on the distinguishing of quantum states. These results add to the arguments already presented by Manfredi and Feix [21] and many others (see [23]) for this notion of quantum entropy. There are two related classical theories of information, classical logical information theory (focusing on information-as-distinctions and analyzing classification) and the Shannon theory (focusing on coding and communications theory). Generalizing to the quantum case, there are also two related quantum theories of information, the logical theory (using quantum logical entropy to focus on distinguishing quantum states and analyzing measurement as the quantum version of classification) and the conventional quantum information theory (using von Neumann entropy to develop a quantum version of the Shannon treatment of coding and communications). Funding: This research received no external funding. Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflicts of interest. Appendix A. Classical Logical Information Theory with Two Sets X and Y The usual ("classical") logical information theory for a probability distribution {p (x, y)} on X×Y (finite) in effect uses the discrete partition on X and Y [3]. For the general case of quantum logical entropy for not-necessarily commuting observables, we need to first briefly develop the classical case with general partitions on X and Y. Given two finite sets X and Y and real-valued functions f : X → R with values {φi}Ii=1 and g : Y → R with values { γj }J j=1, each function induces a partition on its domain: π = { f−1 (φi) } i∈I = {B1, . . . , BI} on X, and σ = { g−1 ( γj )} j∈J = { C1, . . . , CJ } on Y. We need to define logical entropies on X × Y, but first, we need to define the ditsets or information sets. A partition π = {B1, . . . , BI} on X and a partition σ = { C1, . . . , CJ } on Y define a product partition π × σ on X × Y whose blocks are { Bi × Cj } i,j. Then, π induces π × 0Y on X × Y (where 0Y is the indiscrete partition on Y), and σ induces 0X × σ on X×Y. The corresponding ditsets or information sets are: • dit (π × 0Y) = {((x, y) , (x′, y′)) : f (x) 6= f (x′)} ⊆ (X×Y)2; • dit (0X × σ) = {((x, y) , (x′, y′)) : g (y) 6= g (y′)} ⊆ (X×Y)2; • dit (π × σ) = dit (π × 0Y) ∪ dit (0X × σ); and so forth. Given a joint probability distribution p : X × Y → [0, 1], the product probability distribution is p× p : (X×Y)2 → [0, 1]. All the logical entropies are just the product probabilities of the ditsets and their union, differences and intersection: • h (π × 0Y) = p× p (dit (π × 0Y)); • h (0X × σ) = p× p (dit (0X × σ)); • h (π × σ) = p× p (dit (π × σ)) = p× p (dit (π × 0Y) ∪ dit (0X × σ)); • h (π × 0Y|0X × σ) = p× p (dit (π × 0Y)− dit (0X × σ)); • h (0X × σ|π × 0Y) = p× p (dit (0X × σ)− dit (π × 0Y)); • m (π × 0Y, 0X × σ) = p× p (dit (π × 0Y) ∩ dit (0X × σ)). All the logical entropies have the usual two-draw probability interpretation where the two independent draws from X×Y are (x, y) and (x′, y′) and can be interpreted in terms of the f -values and g-values: Entropy 2018, 20, 679 19 of 22 • h (π × 0Y) = probability of getting distinct f -values; • h (0X × σ) = probability of getting distinct g-values; • h (π × σ) = probability of getting distinct f or g-values; • h (π × 0Y|0X × σ) = probability of getting distinct f -values, but the same g-values; • h (0X × σ|π × 0Y) = probability of getting distinct g-values, but the same f -values; • m (π × 0Y, 0X × σ) = probability of getting distinct f and distinct g-values. We have defined all the logical entropies by the general method of the product probabilities on the ditsets. In the first three cases, h (π × 0Y), h (0X × σ) and h (π × σ), they were the logical entropies of partitions on X × Y, so they could equivalently be defined using density matrices. The case of h (π × σ) illustrates the general case. If ρ (π) is the density matrix defined for π on X and ρ (σ) the density matrix for σ on Y, then ρ (π × σ) = ρ (π)⊗ ρ (σ) is the density matrix for π × σ defined on X×Y, and: h (π × σ) = 1− tr [ ρ (π × σ)2 ] . The marginal distributions are: pX (x) = ∑y p (x, y) and pY (y) = ∑x p (x, y). Since π is a partition on X, there is also the usual logical entropy h (π) = pX × pX (dit (π)) = 1− tr [ ρ (π)2 ] = h (π × 0Y) where dit (π) ⊆ X× X and similarly for pY. Since the context should be clear, we may henceforth adopt the old notation from the case where π and σ were partitions on the same set U, i.e., h (π) = h (π × 0Y), h (σ) = h (0X × σ), h (π, σ) = h (π × σ), etc. Since the logical entropies are the values of a probability measure, all the usual identities hold where the underlying set is now (X×Y)2 instead of U2, as illustrated in Figure A1. Figure A1. Venn diagram for logical entropies as values of a probability measure p× p on (X×Y)2. The previous treatment of h (X), h (Y), h (X, Y), h (X|Y), h (Y|X) and m (X, Y) in [3] was just the special cases where π = 1X and σ = 1Y. Appendix B. Quantum Logical Entropies with Non-Commuting Observables As before in the case of commuting observables, the quantum case can be developed in close analogy with the previous classical case. Given a finite-dimensional Hilbert space V and not necessarily commuting observables F, G : V → V, let X be an orthonormal basis of V of F-eigenvectors, and let Y be an orthonormal basis for V of G-eigenvectors (so |X| = |Y|). Let f : X → R be the eigenvalue function for F with values {φi}Ii=1, and let g : Y → R be the eigenvalue function for G with values { γj }J j=1. Each eigenvalue function induces a partition on its domain: π = { f−1 (φi) } = {B1, . . . , BI} on X, and σ = { g−1 ( γj )} = { C1, . . . , CJ } on Y. We associated with the ordered pair (x, y), the basis element x⊗ y in the basis {x⊗ y}x∈X,y∈Y for V ⊗V. Then, each pair of pairs ((x, y) , (x′, y′)) is associated with the basis element (x⊗ y)⊗ (x′ ⊗ y′) in (V ⊗V)⊗ (V ⊗V) = (V ⊗V)2. Entropy 2018, 20, 679 20 of 22 Instead of ditsets or information sets, we now have qudit subspaces or information subspaces. For R ⊆ (V ⊗V)2, let [R] be the subspace generated by R. We simplify the notation of qudit (π × 0Y) = qudit (π) = {(x⊗ y)⊗ (x′ ⊗ y′) : f (x) 6= f (x′)}, etc. • [qudit (π)] = [{(x⊗ y)⊗ (x′ ⊗ y′) : f (x) 6= f (x′)}]; • [qudit (σ)] = [{(x⊗ y)⊗ (x′ ⊗ y′) : g (y) 6= g (y′)}]; • [qudit (π, σ)] = [qudit (π) ∪ qudit (σ)]; and so forth. Tt is again an easy implication of the aforementioned common dits theorem that any two nonzero information spaces [qudit (π)] and [qudit (σ)] have a nonzero intersection, so the mutual information space [qudit (π) ∩ qudit (σ)] is not the zero space. A normalized state |ψ〉 on V ⊗V defines a pure state density matrix ρ (ψ) = |ψ〉 〈ψ|. Let αx,y = 〈x⊗ y|ψ〉, so if P[x⊗y] is the projection to the subspace (ray) generated by x ⊗ y in V ⊗ V, then a probability distribution on X×Y is defined by: p (x, y) = αx,yα∗x,y = tr [ P[x⊗y]ρ (ψ) ] , or more generally, for a subspace T ⊆ V ⊗V, a probability distribution is defined on the subspaces by: Pr (T) = tr [PTρ (ψ)]. Then, the product probability distribution p× p on the subspaces of (V ⊗V)2 defines the quantum logical entropies when applied to the information subspaces: • h (F : ψ) = p× p ([qudit (π)]) = tr [ P[qudit(π)] (ρ (ψ)⊗ ρ (ψ)) ] ; • h (G : ψ) = p× p ([qudit (σ)]) = tr [ P[qudit(σ)] (ρ (ψ)⊗ ρ (ψ)) ] ; • h (F, G : ψ) = p× p ([qudit (π) ∪ qudit (σ)]) = tr [ P[qudit(π)∪qudit(σ)] (ρ (ψ)⊗ ρ (ψ)) ] ; • h (F|G : ψ) = p× p ([qudit (π)− qudit (σ)]) = tr [ P[qudit(π)−qudit(σ)] (ρ (ψ)⊗ ρ (ψ)) ] ; • h (G|F : ψ) = p× p ([qudit (σ)− qudit (π)]) = tr [ P[qudit(σ)−qudit(π)] (ρ (ψ)⊗ ρ (ψ)) ] ; • m (F, G : ψ) = p× p ([qudit (π) ∩ qudit (σ)]) = tr [ P[qudit(π)∩qudit(σ)] (ρ (ψ)⊗ ρ (ψ)) ] . The observable F : V → V defines an observable F⊗ I : V ⊗V → V ⊗V with the eigenvectors x⊗ v for any nonzero v ∈ V and with the same eigenvalues φ1, . . . , φI (the context should suffice to distinguish the identity operator I : V → V from the index set I for the F-eigenvalues). Then, in two independent measurements of ψ by the observable F⊗ I, we have: h (F : ψ) = probability of getting distinct eigenvalues φi and φi′ , i.e., of getting a qudit of F. In a similar manner, G : V → V defines the observable I ⊗ G : V ⊗ V → V ⊗ V with the eigenvectors v⊗ y and with the same eigenvalues γ1, . . . , γJ . Then, in two independent measurements of ψ by the observable I ⊗ G, we have: h (G : ψ) = probability of getting distinct eigenvalues γj and γj′ . The two observables F, G : V → V define an observable F ⊗ G : V ⊗ V → V ⊗ V with the eigenvectors x⊗ y for (x, y) ∈ X×Y and eigenvalues f (x) g (y) = φiγj. To interpret the compound logical entropies cleanly, we assume there is no accidental degeneracy, so there are no φiγj = φi′γj′ for i 6= i′ and j 6= j′. Then, for two independent measurements of ψ by F⊗ G, the compound quantum logical entropies can be interpreted as the following "two-measurement" probabilities: • h (F, G : ψ) = probability of getting distinct eigenvalues φiγj 6= φi′γj′ where i 6= i′ or j 6= j′; • h (F|G : ψ) = probability of getting distinct eigenvalues φiγj 6= φi′γj where i 6= i′; Entropy 2018, 20, 679 21 of 22 • h (G|F : ψ) = probability of getting distinct eigenvalues φiγj 6= φiγj′ where j 6= j′; • m (F, G : ψ) = probability of getting distinct eigenvalues φiγj 6= φi′γj′ where i 6= i′ and j 6= j′. All the quantum logical entropies have been defined by the general method using the information subspaces, but in the first three cases h (F : ψ), h (G : ψ) and h (F, G : ψ), the density matrix method of defining logical entropies could also be used. 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Grounding in the Philosophy of Mind: A Defense Alyssa Ney Forthcoming in Scientific Compositon and Metaphysical Ground. K. Aizawa and C. Gillett, eds. Palgrave-Macmillan 1. Introduction One of the major trends in metaphysics in recent years has been in the development and application of novel conceptual frameworks for representing facts about realism, fundamentality, and metaphysical priority. Of particular interest have been the concepts of grounding (proposed by Paul Audi (2012), Kit Fine (2001), Gideon Rosen (2010), and Jonathan Schaffer (2009) among others)1, the concept of the real (proposed by Fine (2001)), and that of metaphysical structure (proposed by Ted Sider (2011)). All of these have been proposed as new primitive concepts, and often their introduction is motivated by the argument that other notions metaphysicians use in order to frame their positions are inadequate for the task of characterizing the important metaphysical issues. Formulations of metaphysical problems and views in terms of existence, quantification, and modal notions should be replaced (Fine, Schaffer) or supplemented (Audi, Rosen, Sider) with formulations in terms of these new distinctively metaphysical notions. Schaffer is especially direct. He complains that "contemporary metaphysics, insofar as it has been inspired by the Quinean task [of determining what exists], has confused itself with trivialities" (2009, p. 361). This confusion about what the important issues are is tied to not having the conceptual tools to represent the issues that matter. The deep questions are "not whether there are such things, but how." We want to know not what exists, but what is grounded in what. Sider, in his Writing the Book of the World, 1 Witmer, Butchard, and Trogdon (2005) defend a related "in virtue of" notion. Bennett (2001) speaks of "building." 2 does not dismiss the importance and challenge of settling existence questions, but similarly emphasizes that this is not what metaphysics at bottom is about. It is instead about finding out "how the world fundamentally is, as opposed to how we ordinarily speak or think about it" (2011, p. 1, my emphasis). Fine (2001, 2009, 2012) and Rosen (2010) too argue that the important metaphysical questions cannot be formulated using only those representational tools accepted as legitimate by most contemporary metaphysicians: physical, logical (including quantificational), mereological, and modal concepts.2 Part of the remedy, the prescribed metaphysical fix, is to embrace the use of new primitive metaphysical concepts such as that of the real, grounding, or metaphysical structure. These suggestions have been met with mixed reactions in philosophical circles. Some of those working on first-order metaphysical problems were quick to see the utility of these notions. For example, Jamie Dreier noted soon after the publication of Fine's 2001 defense of unanalyzed grounding and reality concepts that these were precisely the concepts needed to clarify longstanding disputes between noncognitivists and realists in meta-ethics in the face of "creeping minimalism." However, in the philosophy of mind, these proposals have been met with skepticism. A commonly voiced complaint over the past decade, one heard frequently in conversation if not so often in print (though see Jessica Wilson's (2014)), is that these metaphysical concepts are philosophically superfluous; they add nothing to the concepts philosophers of mind have already had in their toolboxes for years. Even if Fine, Schaffer, and the others are correct that some metaphysicians have neglected issues of ontological priority and fundamentality, this is 2 Why have metaphysicians limited themselves to physical, logical, mereological, and modal notions? Daniel Nolan discusses this issue in his (2014). 3 far from the case in the philosophy of mind where the central issue, the mind-body problem, is not one about existence, but rather ontological dependence. Philosophers of mind rarely debate whether we have minds or mental states, whether many claims in psychology are true. Rather, the primary issue concerns the mind's relation to a more fundamental physical reality. Over the past several decades, philosophers of mind and science have worked hard to distinguish and make precise many notions (of reduction, supervenience, realization, and emergence), positions (such as reductive and nonreductive versions of physicalism, functionalism, and various versions of emergentism), even principles governing what is real (such as Alexander's Dictum3) that serve to characterize the relevant notions of ontological priority and fundamentality. To say that we need to introduce new concepts, new primitive notions of fundamentality or grounding, in order to characterize these issues, one must somehow be ignorant of these developments, or worse, willfully neglecting this important work. Now I believe this reaction to the proponents of primitive grounding and fundamentality notions is natural and to be expected, especially given the rhetorical choices of those who defend grounding. However my goal here is to demonstrate some important uses for these metaphysical notions in the philosophy of mind and why I believe they add something extremely useful to the discussion.4 Confusions about the proper use of fundamentality and grounding notions in metaphysics in general and the metaphysics of mind in particular come from several sources. One is, as I have already suggested, the way that proponents of grounding have 3 This is a principle frequently appealed to by Jaegwon Kim and others in the metaphysics of mind. It says that for something to be real it must possess causal powers. 4 In other work, I apply these resources to debates in the philosophy of causation and mental causation. 4 sometimes chosen to characterize what is motivating the introduction of these concepts. These metaphysical revisionists emphasize the distinctive virtues of using these notions over the concepts of supervenience, necessitation, reduction via conceptual analysis, and so on. This has (quite naturally) led philosophers of mind to believe that grounding is being proposed as a replacement for not only these, but also all of the other notions that are often appealed to in the philosophy of mind such as identity and realization. This, I will show, is not necessarily the case. The grounding framework gives us more resources not fewer and it has room to incorporate those that have already been developed (even if this is not usually acknowledged). Second, different philosophers have proposed different concepts using the common term 'grounding.' Since the differences between these proposals are subtle, the nuances are often neglected and a vague or obscure notion of grounding is quickly rejected without attention to the individual virtues of the different proposals. I will argue that Fine's framework has distinctive advantages but to see this it needs to be carefully teased apart from the others. As I hope to show, Fine's framework may be useful as a foundation for developing an approach to the mind-body problem that can resolve and clarify debates. I hope to show that by utilizing Fine's distinctions, we are able to offer novel, conciliatory positions allowing us to move past some debates that have been carrying on in the philosophy of mind for decades. 2. Grounding and Anti-Realism In order to see what may be added by an appeal to grounding, let's start by noting something about the metaphysical relations that are typically discussed in the philosophy 5 of mind such as typeor token-identity, constitution, and propertyor event-realization.5 We are apt to talk about the obtaining of one of these relations when we have some entities (or types or ways of conceiving some entities or types) that are already assumed to exist. Our interest isn't in whether or not these entities or types exist, but rather in characterizing the metaphysical relationship of one to the other. A common view about grounding is that it is some kind of primitive relation among entities that is something like identity, constitution, or realization but more abstract, a sort of generalized ontological dependence or priority relation.6 This is true on some conceptions of grounding, e.g. Jonathan Schaffer's and the related "buildingrelations" discussed by Karen Bennett (2011), but this is not so for all proposals. For example, Fine introduces grounding (and his notion of reality) not so that we may better understand cases in which we have some entities each of which is antecedently assumed to exist. Rather, he introduces grounding to deal with situations in metaphysics in which one wants to deny the existence of a class of entities. The central topic of Fine's 2001 paper introducing grounding was how philosophers who wish to endorse anti-realist positions about various domains can have overall consistent views. This emphasis is continued in his more recent work: 5 Of course, there exists a diverse variety of ways of understanding the constitution and realization relations. The differences among them will not matter for what follows. Note that I will not discuss supervenience and necessitation as these notions have been widely recognized for years in the philosophy of mind to be insufficient to characterize the sense in which mental phenomena may be ontologically dependent on physical phenomena. See Kim (1984) and Wilson (2005). 6 Here I am using 'dependence' to indicate a relation that when it obtains, need not imply that one of the relata is more fundamental than the other. (Ontological dependence is not an asymmetric relation.) When I speak of the obtaining of an ontological priority relation, what is prior is thereby implied to be more fundamental than what it is prior to. 6 If [the anti-realist] wishes to deny the reality of the mental, for example, then he must explain or explain away the appearance of the mental...The question now is: how is this explanatory challenge to be construed? What is it to explain the appearance of a world with minds in terms of a mindless world or the appearance of a world with value in terms of a purely naturalistic world? My own view is that what is required is that we somehow ground all of the facts which appear to presuppose the reality of the mental or of value in terms of facts which do not presuppose their reality. (2012, p. 41, my emphasis in bold) Here is one of the main examples Fine's paper takes up. Suppose some philosopher is a nominalist about abstract entities. Then it looks like she will hold, as one of her main philosophical claims: (1) Numbers do not exist. And yet, even if she is a nominalist, it seems clear that she should not want to deny something all of us accept, the simple mathematical fact expressed by (2) There is a prime number between 2 and 5. That is to say, she won't want to be a skeptic about mathematical truth. But of course (2) trivially entails: (3) There are numbers. (Numbers exist.) And so, if the nominalist does not wish to be a skeptic about mathematical truth, it looks as if she is faced with an inconsistent set of beliefs. Fine notes that this isn't a distinctive problem for nominalism but is a general problem for various species of metaphysical anti-realism. The moral noncognitivist will find her position in tension with the basic moral truths she holds; the presentist will find her position in tension with mundane past7 tensed truths (that the North won the U.S. Civil War, that dinosaurs existed before humans); and so on. Fine (2001) considers various resolutions to this problem, but for our purposes it will only be necessary to present his favored solution which gives the anti-realist who is not skeptical about mathematical truth a way to have an overall consistent view. First, the non-skeptical nominalist will not deny (2) since it states a basic mathematical fact and is a mathematical truth if anything is. Nonetheless it is just this, a mathematical truth. That is to say, when the mathematician or student of mathematics states such a fact, that there is a prime number between 2 and 5, we should recognize that she is not intending to assert something that is a particularly deep metaphysical truth, a fact about what the metaphysical structure of the world is and what kinds of entities are real or not real. And yet we (who think metaphysics is a worthy task, who sometimes assert views about such matters) sometimes make claims that do concern the deep metaphysical structure of the world. Fine thus proposes the introduction of a primitive operator on sentences or propositions: In reality. This operator is a component of sentences or propositions7 that are intended to state claims reflecting fundamental metaphysics. And of course, this is the sort of claim the nominalist intends. Recognizing this, we can say that really there is no tension between the nominalist's main claim and (2) (or even (3)). For what the nominalist intends to assert is not (1) that numbers do not exist, but rather that in reality, 7 Fine's official view is that this operator (and the grounding operator to be described shortly) should be taken to apply to sentences (2012, p. 46), but he sometimes speaks of propositions grounding other propositions. I will sometimes speak loosely as well of facts grounding other facts. This should be understood as indicating the grounding of a sentence describing one fact in some sentences describing some other facts. 8 numbers do not exist.8 And as long as we do not conflate this reality locution with quantificational idioms like 'there exists,' we can see that there is no contradiction between: (4) In reality, numbers do not exist, and (3) There are numbers. (Numbers exist.) Thus, the tension introduced by non-skeptical anti-realism is resolved. To this, some have objected that they don't have a grip on what Fine means by 'in reality.'9 As noted, the reality operator is officially introduced as a primitive, but this shouldn't lead one to worry we have no grip on what it adds to a sentence. Fine gives a positive characterization of it as follows: One might think of the world and of the propositions by which the world is described as each having its own intrinsic structure; and a proposition will then describe how things are in themselves when its structure corresponds to the structure of the world. Thus it is this positive idea of the intrinsic structure of reality... that should be taken to inform the relevant conception of what is fundamental or real. (2001, p. 25) The real propositions are those that describe the intrinsic structure of reality. This isn't to say that propositions that do not describe the intrinsic structure of reality may not be true. They of course may be. But it is the goal of the metaphysician (at least some of the time) 8 See Fine (2009) for an explanation of the distinction. 9 This is a critique raised by Thomas Hofweber (2009), Chris Daly (2012), and (preemptively) Carnap (1950). 9 to make claims that are not just true but also real, that do describe the intrinsic structure of reality. Some will complain that this positive characterization of the reality operator doesn't address the concern since it relies on a further esoteric notion, "the intrinsic structure of reality." Since it is difficult or impossible to provide a definition of these metaphysical notions, perhaps it is worth providing a simple example to try to better capture what a non-skeptical anti-realism is supposed to look like. If one can understand how a non-skeptical anti-realism looks when applied to a mundane case in which we philosophers don't already have theoretical commitments, perhaps it will be clearer how the framework may be implemented to state new and coherent positions in the philosophy of mathematics or mind-body debate. Consider any ordinary situation in which some person sincerely and with good (external) reasons asserts: (5) There is a mess in the kitchen. In that situation, must we assume the speaker intends to make a deep metaphysical claim? A claim that there are in reality such things as "messes" and that one of these messes is located in the kitchen? Of course not.10 And yet even if the claim is not intended to track metaphysical structure, it can still be perfectly true. I've asked you after all to imagine such a situation, one in which the claim is true. I submit this isn't very puzzling. A nonskeptical anti-realist could give many alternative accounts of mess-talk, ways for (5) to be reasonable to assert, indeed true, while there are no such things in reality as messes. Here 10 One indication of this is that one could have expressed the same thing by saying instead of 'There is a mess in the kitchen,' 'The kitchen is a mess.' If she was trying to express something about the deep metaphysics of the situation, these would not be equivalent. 10 are three such accounts. First, perhaps "There is a mess" is just an idiomatic way of saying that things are arranged in a way someone does not like, so that the word 'mess' is somewhat like the word 'sake,' a noun that contributes meaning to a sentence while always lacking denotation. Another possibility is that there are messes, but whether something is a mess is a subjective matter. Messes aren't objective existents. Rather what is a mess depends on what most normal people are apt to consider a mess. So although a speaker of (5) may say something true, it will not be something that describes how things are in reality. When we say that there is something in reality, we mean after all that there is something that exists in the mind-independent world, not merely from the point of view of one perspective or another. But even if there are objective facts about when 'There is a mess' is true, this still wouldn't entail that a speaker of (5) expresses the claim that in reality, there are such things as messes and one of them is in the kitchen. Let's pause a moment to see a third account according to which (5) may express an objective truth and yet still not be real.11 On a functionalist understanding of "mess," a claim like (5) is true when there are some things or other in the kitchen capable of playing a certain causal role, whatever is the causal role associated with our concept, mess. I'll tentatively work with: being a collection of things that persists in a location without good reason that is apt in the circumstances to cause obstruction and annoyance. Suppose in our imagined situation what plays that role is a pile of dirty dishes in the sink. Functionalists may take different 11 In outlining this third way for how it may be that a sentence is true, yet not true in reality, I am departing from Fine's official view. Fine's descriptions of cases involving sentences that are not true in reality generally involve subjectivity such as we find in the first two accounts above. However, as I will now argue, this third way also constitutes a way in which a sentence may be true while not correctly describing the intrinsic structure of a given situation. 11 approaches when they consider (5)'s connection to reality in this situation. One approach would be to adopt a functionalist realism about messes. Then one will say that in reality there are messes, one such mess is the pile of dishes in the sink, and since the sink is in the kitchen, the sentence expresses a truth about what there is in reality.12 However, one might be concerned about this approach for several reasons. One is that the concept of mess permits multiple realization and so it seems wrong to think that messes just are piles of dishes in sinks. I'll however focus on another reason for rejecting this functionalist realism about messes. This is that a pile of dishes in a sink is only properly counted as a mess in a particular context, namely one in which the dishes are there without good reason and apt to cause annoyance and obstruction. In other circumstances, such as when one places a pile of dishes in a sink in order to promptly clean them, a pile of dishes doesn't count as a mess but a means to an end. So it isn't right to think of the pile of dishes itself as the mess. Piles of dishes aren't the right kinds of things on their own to be messes. Nor would it be correct to think of the larger mereological sum consisting of the pile of dishes, the sink, and all of the things apt to be annoyed or obstructed in the situation as the mess. That's not a mess either. (Anyway, if that were the right account, it would make (5) false, since that object is too big to be in the kitchen.) Better, one sympathetic to a functionalist approach to (5) should deny that (5)'s truth depends on the existence of any one kind of thing, a mess, but rather depends on a particular kind of situation being instantiated.13 There being a mess amounts to a situation that may involve dishes but also a variety of other kinds of objects, but only in the larger circumstance in 12 This would be to endorse what is usually called an occupant or realizer functionalism about messes. Messes are the things that occupy the mess-role. 13 A good predecessor to what I am suggesting here is Ryle's (1949) discussion of category mistakes. 12 which the objects play the causal role associated with the concept of mess. This is an account in which the truth of the sentence (5) is objective in the sense that its truth does not depend in any way on someone's perspective. It depends merely on what kinds of things there are in the world and how they are arranged. But the sentence is still not true in reality because interpreted as a claim about what there is in reality, it would make a false claim that in reality there are such things as messes that are located in kitchens. According to this anti-realist functionalist account, sentences like (5) latch onto the world in a more complicated way, by referring to a more spatially extended situation, a causal network. Is there a mess in the kitchen? Yes, but not because in reality there are messes and one of them is located in the kitchen. Rather, there is a mess in the kitchen because there are in reality many kinds of things, dishes and sinks and people, interacting in the right way to make this sentence true. So there are many ways it could turn out that when someone asserts (5), they are not making a claim accurately tracking the kinds of things there are in reality. This isn't to say that one is thereby speaking figuratively or not expressing a fact or saying something that isn't true, interesting, or justified. Not all assertions, not even all true, justified, and interesting assertions need to mark out the kinds of things there are in reality in a way that would interest a metaphysician. I hope I've indicated some ways this could work out for the everyday case in which one says someone has made a mess. We can now see where the notion of grounding enters in Fine's framework. It is precisely here, to show how those sentences that are not tracking the intrinsic structure of reality may yet be true. Formally, grounding is a two-place sentential operator acting on a sequence of sentences <Q, R, ...> (the grounds) and a target sentence P (the grounded) 13 where: <Q, R, ...> grounds P. Although again Fine does not analyze this notion, offering it rather as an ideological primitive, he clarifies the notion thus: If the truth that P is grounded in other truths, then they account for its truth; P's being the case holds in virtue of the other truths' being the case. (2001, p. 15) To say that some true sentences may not themselves be real, yet nonetheless be grounded in the real is to say that while these truths do not themselves track metaphysical structure, they have an explanatory basis in truths that do. The details of this basis might itself be complicated (involving facts about individual perspectives or, as I've argued, causal networks). But ultimately a true statement will have a set of facts that explains its connection to reality. Once these are provided, there is no longer any explanatory gap left over regarding why the grounded sentence is true, or why the fact it describes obtains. In addition to the primitive notions of reality and ground, Fine also introduces a third notion that is defined in terms of the notions of the real and ground. This will be useful in what follows. It is the notion of reduction: The true proposition P reduces to the propositions Q, R, ... iff (i) P is not real; (ii) P is grounded in Q, R, ...; and (iii) each of Q, R,... is either real or grounded in what is real. (2001, p. 26) Fine argues that this definition of reduction is superior to those that have been proposed previously. In particular, it is superior to accounts of reduction in terms of supervenience or other modal notions in that it is explicit in this account that what is reduced is not real (2001, p. 11). Here, it is worth emphasizing again that Fine is interested in a notion of reduction that will be useful for formulating anti-realist positions. I started this section by 14 acknowledging that in many debates in the philosophy of mind, the assumption is that we do not want to be anti-realists or eliminativists about the mental. Mental phenomena are assumed to be real, the question is rather what relation they bear to physical phenomena. For example, in a situation in which Tom is in pain, the reductionist, nonreductive physicalist, and emergentist will typically all agree the mental state is real. Their debate concerns rather whether Tom's being in pain is identical to a physical state, is realized by, but not identical to a physical state, or is instead caused by rather than constituted by a physical state of Tom's. In a debate that has this form, we may note that Fine's notion of reduction will not be particularly useful since it doesn't capture any of these three options. As one might already guess, I do not agree that the debate should be understood in this way, as limited to a choice between these three options. One of the main points I want to make is that the grounding framework gives us a way of framing views on the mind-body problem that are (in at least some domains) more reasonable than those that have previously been articulated. We will come back to this when we examine the case of phenomenal and other psychological states in more detail momentarily. As a final exegetical point, note that this framework and all that has been said up until now leaves open the possibility that a sentence may be true, grounded in other sentences, and yet itself be real. This would be a case of grounding without reduction, where what is grounded reflects metaphysical structure as well as its grounds. The distinction between the case of grounding with reduction and grounding without reduction will play a role in the applications below. 3. Grounding With or Without Reduction 15 Although Fine's framework makes room for cases of grounding without reduction, where the grounded is real just as the ground, this situation is treated in his work as something of an obscurity, brought up mainly to solve a puzzle that might arise in cases of infinite mereological (or otherwise explanatory) descent. Indeed, Fine is explicit that with grounding there is a presumption that the grounded is not real (2001, p. 27). This is a place where we can see a clear difference between Fine's (as well as Rosen's) grounding framework and those of others, for example of Audi (2012) and Schaffer (2009). Suppose again we are discussing the status of the fact that Tom is in pain. In Audi's framework, if this fact is grounded in some fact about physical states (say that Tom's C-fibers are firing), this is to say that there is a kind of noncausal determination relation obtaining between these facts, one that arises due to an essential connection between the properties that constitute these facts. In this way of thinking about grounding, grounding isn't even compatible with reduction in Fine's sense. Pain has to be real for there to be an essential connection between it and the physical property figuring in the grounding claim. In Schaffer's framework as well, we find that where a grounding relation obtains, there is no presumption that the grounded is not real. Instead for Schaffer, quite the opposite, anything that is grounded must be real. Grounding is a relation that obtains, not like for Audi between facts or for Fine between sentences, but instead between entities of any ontological category. So Schaffer might speak of Tom's pain being grounded in some physical feature of Tom's brain or body. To say for some entity that it is grounded is just to say that it has the status of a derivative entity (2009, p. 373), which entails that it is an entity and hence real. I propose that it is an advantage of 16 the Finean framework that it does not have this consequence of Audi and Schaffer's frameworks that what is grounded is automatically real or an element of one's ontology. But why? Why should it be an advantage of the account rather than a cost that it permits this flexibility? Wilson (2014, pp. 244-248) has argued this is a liability for grounding approaches – there is what she calls the metaphysical underdetermination problem for theories of grounding. This is that knowing a grounding fact obtains leaves completely open all of the interesting questions we care about when we raise questions of existence, ontological dependence, priority, and fundamentality. This is a problem because if the argument for introducing a new grounding primitive was that the logical, mereological, and modal relations metaphysicians were previously using were inadequate to capture the metaphysical relations between (say) mental phenomena and physical phenomena or mathematical phenomena and observable phenomena, then an appeal to grounding doesn't offer an improvement in this respect and so is unmotivated. This is an important worry. To respond, we may start by noting that nothing in the framework I have discussed here suggests that a bare appeal to grounding can answer the question of the precise nature of the metaphysical relation between (for example) mental and physical phenomena by itself, nor even questions about their existence. When we just say a truth is grounded, we do not say what its grounds are. But although simply saying a truth is grounded won't answer all of the metaphysical questions that interest us (and so close the explanatory gaps a grounding claim is supposed to close, according to Fine), stating what those grounds are will. To see this return to: (7) Tom is in pain. Here are four proposals for the grounds of (7): 17 (8) Tom's C-fibers are firing. (9) Tom's C-fibers are firing. The firing of one's C-fibers is typically caused by tissue damage and typically causes withdrawal behavior. One is in pain if one is in the kind of state that in the relevant circumstances is typically caused by tissue damage and typically causes withdrawal behavior. (10) Tom is in an internal state of the kind that in the circumstances is typically caused by tissue damage and typically causes withdrawal behavior. One is in pain if one is in the kind of state that in the relevant circumstances is typically caused by tissue damage and typically causes withdrawal behavior. (11) Tom believes he is in pain. We may also consider a fifth possibility that while (7) is true and real, the event it describes is caused by the event described by (8), but (7) is not grounded in anything.14 What we see here are different candidate grounds for (7) (or the denial of a ground altogether) that correspond to different ways of answering the question of the relation between pain facts and physical facts. These correspond to five canonical views in the metaphysics of mind: (brute, i.e. non-functionalist) type identity theory, occupant functionalism, causal role functionalism, a subjectivist theory, and emergentist dualism. This of course by no means exhausts the range of available options. But it suffices to demonstrate how even though merely saying that something is grounded does nothing to eliminate metaphysical underdetermination, saying in what it is grounded will. 14 A complication arises here in that (7) refers to Tom, a human being, and that we should not think of facts about human beings as generally ungrounded. Let's postpone this issue and just ask the question of whether (7) is grounded relative to its ascription of pain. 18 The question that next naturally arises and is indeed pressed by Wilson is then why the concept of grounding is needed when we already have at our disposal these concepts of identity, realization, causation, as well as mereological notions.15 Can't we accommodate all of the options mentioned above without also using the notion of ground? We may first remark that what we have in effect shown is how (using the grounding framework), we may bypass any explicit mention of identity, realization, etc. while still seeing a diversity of metaphysical options via the variety of grounds possible for (7). But the more important point is again to insist on being careful about which grounding framework we are considering. For some frameworks (e.g. Schaffer's), Wilson's concern would be justified. We may dispense with the grounding notion in favor of identity, realization, and the like (assuming we also have available a way of saying which entities are real or fundamental). Grounding is just a less specific way of describing the ontological dependence of some entities on some other entities. But Fine is interested as we have seen in accommodating a form of non-skeptical anti-realism. In the Tom case, this would amount to a view according to which (7) is true, but not real. The view is anti-realist in the sense that its proponent is denying the reality of mental states without claiming that sentences like (7) are false. A view like that cannot be accommodated using the frameworks of identity, realization, or emergence. The view rejects the existence of identity, realization, causal, and mereological relations between pain and physical phenomena, because it rejects the reality of mental phenomena. Yet, it is not the eliminativism of Paul or Patricia Churchland (1981, 1986) either. According to their eliminativism, it is not just that 15 There is a question about whether we need the concept of real as well. Wilson allows that we need at least something like this, a concept of fundamentality. 19 mental states are not real, but that all psychological claims that would appear to be about them are false as well. Using the grounding framework we can say that many psychological statements are true even though they are not real, so long as they are grounded in what is real. This is accommodated because grounding is not a relation between entities that must exist (like identity, realization, mereological relations, etc.) but rather an operator acting on sentences, sentences that may or may not have constituents corresponding to features of the world. The next sections will show why accommodating this as a coherent position will be useful for resolving longstanding debates. We can now answer the question raised at the beginning of this section: why is it a good thing that the grounding framework permits different accounts, some according to which what is grounded is real and some according to which what is grounded is not real (cases of Finean reduction)? The reason is because psychological and other statements vary in the way they track metaphysical structure. When we see the grounds, we can see in virtue of what a given sentence is true. And then by examining these particular grounds, we can tell whether or not what is grounded is real or not. We have now introduced enough of the framework to be able to see how those who worry that grounding (at least in Fine's sense) is just a vague way of getting at the ontological dependence relations philosophers of mind have been discussing for decades are misunderstanding the proposal. Because ground is an operator on entire sentences, not individual entities, it plays a different role than most of these notions (certainly identity, realization, and causation, which link an entity or entities). It allows us to discuss cases in which the target sentence uses noun phrases that do not correspond to genuine ontology. 20 This opens up an expanded range of positions about a topic of discourse. In the next sections, we will focus on the case of psychology. 4. The "Special Sciences" Debate What I want to suggest is that some debates in the philosophy of mind can be resolved (not merely clarified) by appeal to this framework. The debate I will discuss is the one that has essentially determined the main divide we now see in the field between on the one hand, reductive physicalists (reductionists), and on the other, nonreductive physicalists, particularly functionalists. In his paper, "Special Sciences: Or, the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis," Jerry Fodor argued that the special sciences (psychology, biology, economics, etc.) were in an important sense autonomous from fundamental physics. Although the subject matter of the special sciences consists entirely of physical things of one sort or another, the explanations provided by the special sciences cite distinctive properties not reducible to physical properties (1974, p. 103). If we consider any special science law – Fodor's example in the paper was Gresham's law, the law that "good money drives out bad money" – it will be capable of covering a physically diverse and heterogeneous variety of objects: silver or copper coins, strings of wampum, someone's writing a check. Fodor draws on Putnam's earlier (1967) point about multiple realization. Although each instantiation of a special science law will involve the instantiation of a physical type, this type will vary from one instantiation to another. This shows, according to Fodor that "[n]ot all natural kinds (not all the classes of things and events about which there are important, counterfactual-supporting generalizations to make) are, or correspond to, physical natural kinds" (1974, p. 113). 21 Applying this point to the case of pain, Fodor's claim is that when there are true, justified, and important psychological laws involving psychological predicates like 'pain,' since these laws may be instantiated by creatures possessing a heterogeneous variety of physiologies, we cannot identify this psychological kind with any particular physical kind.16 At best we might try to say that pain is identical to some wild disjunction of physical kinds. But such a "heterogeneous and unsystematic disjunction" (1974, p. 108) would not be the sort of kind that would appear in our scientific theories and so is not the sort of kind in which we should believe. One influential critique of Fodor's position was given by Jaegwon Kim who argued that Putnam and Fodor's claims about the heterogeneous multiple realization of special science kinds actually undermines the possibility of our possessing genuine laws in the special sciences. Kim asked the following question: If pain is nomically equivalent to [the property of possessing one of the physical realizers of pain], the property claimed to be wildly disjunctive and obviously non-nomic, why isn't pain itself equally heterogeneous and nonnomic as a kind? (1992, p. 323) Kim presents this concern as an issue about the projectibility of these irreducible special science kinds. As Kim points out, for concepts to be useful in science, they should denote kinds whose instantiations lead to stable behavior. For any scientific kind K, we should expect the existence of some true generalizations saying that if K is instantiated, then some particular kind of behavior will follow. This is what it means to say that K is 16 And recall Putnam (1967) on pain: "Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims. He has to specify a physical-chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of a suitable physical –chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical-chemical state." 22 projectible. Kim raises the point that if special science kinds are not realized by fairly univocal physical kinds but instead may be realized on different occasions by varied and heterogeneous sorts of underlying physical processes (and so are nomically equivalent to wildly disjunctive physical kinds), then this threatens their projectibility. For then we cannot expect all instantiations of the kind to lead to similar behavior. What behavior will result will depend on the specific realization we find on that occasion. And if this is right, it threatens the putative special science law's ability to support counterfactuals. Kim thus argues that we should believe that in any science, fundamental or otherwise, the concepts that are employed should be such as to pick out univocal physical kinds. This raises a skeptical worry about the physically irreducible kinds Fodor says that psychology and the other special sciences describe. Another worry Kim famously raised for Fodor's position is a metaphysical worry concerning causal overdetermination. In Mind in a Physical World and elsewhere, Kim suggests that the irreducible special science kinds posited by Fodor would at best be epiphenomena since on any given occasion (assuming physicalism, a position Fodor explicitly endorses) there will always be a complete physical causal explanation for any occurrence. There doesn't seem to be room then for Fodor's irreducible special science kinds to have any causal impact on what happens, and so positing them seems explanatorily superfluous. This is of course what is commonly known as the causal exclusion problem for nonreductive physicalism. Kim's proposal in the end is not to reject that we may use psychological predicates like 'pain' to refer to genuine kinds. Rather, he simply insists that we must be using these terms to refer to physical kinds with univocal causal profiles. If what we call 23 pain in humans is quite different physiologically from what we call pain in mollusks so that we can't speak of a common physical type between them, then humans and mollusks will not instantiate any common psychological kind and the psychological laws for humans will differ from the psychological laws for mollusks. What resulted and has continued to this day is a disagreement between reductionists like Kim and nonreductive physicalists like Fodor. My claim is that the grounding framework can let us state a view that lets both sides have at least most of what they want (and all of what was reasonable in the two positions). We start by assuming what neither party here denies (since both are physicalists): that there are some fundamental physical features and so a set of real claims about the instantiation of these features. The solution comes when we are able to recognize that the two parties are arguing past each other because they aim to capture different sort of facts. On the one side (Kim's) are those who are predominantly interested in issues of metaphysics what kinds of entities are real, what kinds of properties do they have, are there causal relations and if so between which entities do these relations obtain? On the other side are those (like Fodor) who are predominantly interested in something else – establishing certain claims as true or explanatory in a given scientific context. If we allow the possibility of a non-skeptical anti-realism of the kind outlined above, then we do not need to reinterpret psychological claims that appear to be tracking diverse realizations as claims about physical kinds to make sense of how they may be true. But nor need we see them as referring to irreducible special science kinds. We may adopt a view that is metaphysically reductionist, one denying the reality of special science kinds, while allowing the truth of special science claims. 24 So first let's be explicit how this gets Fodor what he wants. We can immediately concede as he insists that many claims in psychology and (perhaps) economics are true and factual, justified and important. This being so, we must also say they are grounded in what is real. So to understand what it is in virtue of which they are true (in the metaphysical sense), we have to understand these grounds. But given Fodor's interest in capturing special science laws in the sense they are intended, there is no reason to say that these special science claims will themselves be real, to say that they correspond directly to the intrinsic structure of reality. To use one of Fodor's own cases, to make a financial claim is not to attribute an intrinsic feature to some piece of metal or paper, but instead to capture a complex web of causal relations. Although some special science claims may be intended to track the intrinsic structure of reality (as I'll discuss below), the point of emphasizing the autonomy of the special sciences from fundamental physics in Fodor's work seems precisely to emphasize that many psychological claims are not intended as claims of fundamental metaphysics, about what kinds of things there are, but rather intend to track causal patterns that may be instantiated by a broad variety of things. Fine's framework allows us to say that even if this is so, the special science claims in which Fodor is interested may be true. And this seems to be precisely what Fodor most wants. Gresham's law, good money drives out bad money, can be true. But for this to be so, the world need not be carved up into little things that are money.17 As in the third account of mess talk above, the truth of such claims may be explained by facts that do 17 It is clear that many who have followed Fodor in adopting nonreductive physicalism want more, want to say that many special sciences claims aren't just true and justified but also that they refer to "additional" higher level special science kinds. However, there does not seem to be any justification for this further ontological claim and there are reasons (those noted by Kim) against it. 25 track reality, but not what is suggested by the grammar of the financial claim. If functionalism is correct, we may see monetary truths as grounded not in facts about a particular ontic kind that is instantiated in wallets and banks, but rather truths about a complex web of causal facts. Then we should give up the claim that money is a kind of thing altogether. But again, this doesn't undermine the truth of the claim, just its success at reflecting metaphysical structure. Seeing things this way also gives Kim most of what he wants. To say that a special science claim is true and justified does not require saying its predicates refer to real kinds. So it does not require we posit the existence of additional higher level kinds any more than the truth of 'There is a number between 2 and 5' (in any normal mathematical context) requires the existence of numbers. As such, there is no threat of overdetermination or epiphenomena. Special science claims, when true, will be grounded in real claims (seeing how is an important first order project in the metaphysics of science in which the various conceptual tools of realization and constitution may be brought to bear), but to be so grounded does not require the existence of potentially overdetermining higher order kinds. Kim's point about projectibility, on the other hand, is trickier. It is not clear to me (and I don't think it has been clear to many) why projectibility should require that a special science concept denote a kind with a univocal physical causal profile. One way to ensure that a claim be projectible is for it to track a physical kind, but it is not clear why this is a necessary condition. Scientists may succeed in tracking consistent behavior, capturing interesting patterns, even where no underlying metaphysical unity in the objects 26 can be found and we should allow for that.18 What we seem to have in such cases are disunity in the kinds of objects there are and unity in broader causal patterns. Thus, while the framework I am proposing eschews realism about psychological kinds that may appear to be the denotations of psychological predicates, it finds a way to ground the truth (and projectibility) of claims involving these predicates in real facts about causal patterns. Just as it appears questionable whether Kim is correct that psychological claims that are projectible and support counterfactuals must refer to univocal kinds, it is similarly doubtful whether Fodor is correct that psychological laws always make claims that track physically heterogeneous sets of circumstances. As philosophers of neuroscience have been keen to emphasize (Bechtel and Mundale 1999), psychological claims are diverse. It is a virtue of the framework I am developing here that it has room to distinguish the variety of psychological claims in a perspicuous way. Let me say a bit more about what I mean. The reductionism/nonreductive physicalism debate is most of the time presented as if it is all or nothing. One must either be a reductionist about all of psychology or a nonreductive physicalist tout court. But psychological statements vary in their connection to underlying neurophysiology and so functionalism (and nonreductive physicalism) may be more plausible in some cases than in others. Recognizing this, some are content to be functionalists about propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires, but reductionists about phenomenal states (e.g. Ned Block). In the present framework, this would amount to adopting an anti-realism about propositional attitude ascriptions, but a realism about phenomenal ascriptions. Since there 18 See Loewer (2009) for a discussion of this issue. 27 is nothing incoherent in this combination of positions, we see another virtue of having an approach to the mind-body problem that does not presuppose an answer yes or no to the question of whether a sentence that is true and grounded must therefore be automatically real (or not real). And even when we look more closely within the realm of phenomenal or intentional phenomena, the metaphysical connection of psychological statements to neurophysiology may vary. Finally, to close, let's come back to the example of 'Tom is in pain' and see how the variety of grounds for (7) Tom is in pain, may suggest a form of realism or anti-realism along the lines defended here. Above I presented four options for how one might understand the grounds of (7).19 We may set aside (8) as both Fodor and Kim (and most others) would deny that this suffices to close the explanatory gap between the mental and physical. We may also set aside (11) for our purposes. Although it is an interesting and important reductive option, typically reductive and nonreductive physicalists are not happy to ground claims about phenomenal states in claims merely about our beliefs.20 The disagreement, if there is one, rather would be between (9) and (10): (9) Tom's C-fibers are firing. The firing of one's C-fibers is typically caused by tissue damage and typically causes withdrawal behavior. One is in pain if one is 19 Here, I am considering proposals for the full, as opposed to partial, grounds for (7). See the distinction in Fine (2012). 20 This represents a position in the ballpark of what is proposed in Dennett (1991). The fact that this view shows how Dennett's position is able to accommodate true phenomenal claims is also a virtue of the account, but one I do not have the space to explore here. 28 in the kind of state that in the relevant circumstances is typically caused by tissue damage and typically causes withdrawal behavior. (10) Tom is in an internal state of the kind that in the circumstances is typically caused by tissue damage and typically causes withdrawal behavior. One is in pain if one is in the kind of state that in the relevant circumstances is typically caused by tissue damage and typically causes withdrawal behavior. We may allow that (9) and (10) are both real and also that either may in principle explain the truth of (7). But there is a question of which of (9) or (10) gives the best explanation of (7) as it is asserted in a given context. Which is the correct grounding explanation for (7) has ramifications for whether one should take a realist or anti-realist position about "pain". (9) does, while (10) does not, explain the truth of (7) in terms of the existence of a particular kind of state that is a pain state.21 (10) reveals pain talk to be metaphysically grounded not in the instantiation of a particular kind of state, but rather a broad causal nexus. Those who take (10) to be the correct view about what grounds (7) will thus (on the picture I have sketched here) adopt a non-skeptical anti-realism about pain. This is what I have argued is the reasonable position to take if one accepts with Fodor (and Putnam and the very many other nonreductive physicalists) that psychological states using the concept pain do not refer to a homogenous physical kind, but accepts the metaphysical points of Kim (and Lewis and other reductionists). 5. A Comment on 'Reality' 21 Recall the discussion of various views about mess talk. 29 As a sidebar, it is worth acknowledging a bit of awkwardness in Fine's terminological framework as applied to the mind-body debate. In the framework I am proposing, only psychological statements that are tracking univocal physical kinds make claims about reality. Those that do not may be true, justified, and important, but not real. Some have asked whether we really want to say that in all cases in which functionalism is motivated, i.e. all attitude ascriptions or (if Fodor is right about 'pain') pain ascriptions, these claims are not 'real.' In every sense of 'real' that matters to us for most but the most esoteric purposes, one can see how this is really not very helpful. The use of 'not real' here is too easily confused with a way of rejecting a statement. After all, does a metaphysician really want to offer the diagnosis that someone's pain is not real? One response would be to note that the claim of non-reality is made as a point about metaphysical structure only, nothing else. But here we might try to avoid such confusions by seeking out alternative terminology. One option would be to replace the word 'real' with 'fundamental.' However, I can imagine similar complaints brought to bear. 'Fundamental' is a technical term used by metaphysicians, but it also has connotations to the general public of relative importance and do we want to imply that statements about pain are somehow less important than statements of neurophysiology? It is better if we can sidestep that confusion. Anyway, if 'fundamental' means has no further explanation or brute, then this isn't the word we are looking for. As already noted, to say a sentence is real does not entail it is not grounded. To cite a simple example, conjunctions have grounding explanations in terms of their conjuncts, but many would allow that a conjunction tracks reality no worse than its conjuncts taken together. 30 Another option would be to replace 'real' with 'intrinsic.' Making this move from 'real' to 'intrinsic', we would remove the implication that a pain ascription fails to be correct, or grounded in reality, or important. But I am not sure if using 'intrinsic' does any better at removing confusion than 'real.' We wouldn't want to imply a claim that is intrinsic in this sense may not be a claim about relations, e.g. 'The mass of the proton is greater than the mass of the electron' does appear to express a claim about reality. But we would have to be clear that the intrinsic/real statements are those that make a claim about the properties or relations instantiated by the entities referred to by the sentence, rather than describing how they are with respect to other things or individual perspectives or nothing at all. So in describing a relation between two objects (as in 'The mass of the proton is greater than the mass of the electron') we are thereby attributing an intrinsic feature to the pair (cf. Lewis 1986). Perhaps a more technical-sounding term like 'ontological' would be best. But we could raise further concerns about that too, since 'ontological' fails to track all kinds of metaphysical distinctions there might be in nature. In lieu of finding more satisfactory terminology, I'll continue to use Fine's 'real' in the remainder of this paper. 6. Other Frameworks After all of this, one might still be wondering why we need to use this new framework of grounding to make the distinctions I've wanted to make in this paper, in particular in order to introduce the conciliatory position I discussed in Section 4. Several have asked why we can't simply say that we should analyze psychological statements in terms of statements about causal networks and leave it at that. Talk of analysis is something 31 metaphysicians (and philosophers of mind) have long been comfortable with and doesn't require introducing new terminology like 'real' and 'ground.' This is prima facie a reasonable point, but there are many problems with this approach that metaphysicians are by now well familiar with. First, it is not possible in many cases to provide the relevant analyses. But more generally, even if we had them, analyses don't tell us in virtue of what in the world a claim is true, what our ontological commitments ought to be if we accept that claim, only in what circumstances it is true. This point was articulated years ago by William Alston in a paper critical of Quinean approaches to ontological commitment (Alston 1958). Suppose a nominalist about universals wishes to allow that sentences like 'Patience is a virtue' may be true while denying the existence of universals. She may then analyze 'Patience is a virtue' in terms of some sentence that doesn't quantify over universals, something like 'Patient people are virtuous people.' The trouble Alston noted is that the result of the analysis is simply the claim that these two sentences mean the same thing. But agreeing the sentences are semantically equivalent doesn't entail anything about the reality or unreality of universals. Rather we then see the sentences assert the existence of patience as much as they assert the existence of patient people. What Alston argued, and what Fine and Rosen and I are pressing, is that if one wants to say that Xs are not real, but Ys are, and that the X-truths that are grounded in Y-truths, then one should just come out and say this and use this language, since such metaphysical claims cannot be replaced by talk of analyses. One interesting view in many ways similar to what I am proposing here but formulated without a grounding framework was developed in 2007 by Carl Gillett. This view, which he calls compositional reductionism, also aims to reconcile the different 32 insights of reductionism and nonreductive physicalism. The central idea of compositional reductionism is that for reasons of ontological parsimony we should reject the existence of psychological kinds that are not identical to causally univocal physical kinds, but we should also allow that the claims made by psychologists are not intended to track physically univocal kinds. Gillett's compositional reductionist accommodates these points by saying that a sentence like my 'Tom is in pain,' may have associated with it two sets of truth conditions: 'Tom is in pain' is true iff Tom instantiates a particular physical type (say, his Cfibers are firing). 'Tom is in pain' is true iff Tom instantiates the higher order property of instantiating a physical type that in the circumstances plays the pain-role. Psychological statements like 'Tom is in pain' may be true because they satisfy something like the first set of truth conditions. They cannot satisfy the second set of truth conditions according to the compositional reductionist, because there are no such things as higher order properties. This in many ways looks very similar to the non-skeptical anti-realism I have proposed here. But there are problems. The first problem with Gillett's strategy is similar to what was just noted of the proposal to replace ground and reality talk with talk simply of analyses. Merely stating truth conditions doesn't necessarily tell us in virtue of what metaphysically a given claim is supposed to be true, rather than stating a semantic equivalence. But the starkest problem with this proposal is that although it is advertised as a way to reconcile the insights of reductionism and nonreductive physicalism, the position does not give the nonreductive physicalist what he wants at all. And this is because it 33 makes what psychologists say consistently false. They are, according to the view, trying to assert claims meeting the second set of truth conditions and yet, according to the view, there are no such higher order properties.22 According to Gillett, although we may use psychological statements like 'Tom is in pain' so as to track the first set of truth conditions, he agrees with Fodor that psychologists usually do not. Instead Gillett argues they use psychological sentences to express claims about the instantiation of irreducible psychological kinds. This means that the kinds of claims psychologists generally make when asserting their hypotheses, making predictions and providing explanations, are, according to the compositional reductionist, false. Gillett is assuming that for a sentence like 'Tom is in pain' to be true, it must be tracking a kind, the referent of 'pain.' What the grounding framework gives us is a way of seeing how sentences may be true in virtue of how reality is structured without requiring that the true sentences directly mirror this structure. The key point the position I am defending relies upon is that one truth (or set of truths) may explain another even while demonstrating why the explanantia may mislead as to reality's structure. Now, I should note that there are other metaphysical frameworks that have been developed that are also able to accommodate something like the position I articulate in this paper and don't suffer the problems just noted. For example, John Heil develops quite a similar position in Chapter 9 of his most recent book (2012). Heil's approach differs from mine in that he uses the framework of truthmaking rather than grounding to 22 In fairness to Gillett, he isn't defending compositional reductionism in his paper, only aiming to set it out as an interesting view worthy of consideration. He presents the complaint I just made as a puzzle that those who want to advocate the position would have to solve. I am arguing that it is not a problem for the different view I propose here. 34 make his point but the broad sketches of the two approaches are the same.23 In the truthmaking framework, there is a basic set of facts about genuine ontology and then a truthmaking relation is postulated to obtain between these facts and sentences (or other truthbearers). Unlike Heil, I believe the grounding framework of Fine is superior to the truthmaking framework. In my view, it is going to be important to see some truths as grounded in what is not real and this is essentially nonsense in the truthmaking framework. I have also been influenced by Fine's critique of truthmaking developed in his (2012).24 Sider's metaphysical framework using the fundamental notion of 'structure' to replace Fine's 'real' and the introduction of a concept of a metaphysical semantics (distinct from that of a linguistic semantics) to replace talk of grounding is also an interesting alternative framework that might allow one to state the kind of non-skeptical anti-realist view I defend here. I haven't argued against Sider's framework in this paper either. My goal rather has been to argue that a desirable approach to solving the mindbody problem should be able to capture situations in which a sentence is true, its truth is grounded or made true by facts about the world, and yet it misleads on matters of ontology. If one prefers to adopt Sider's framework or perhaps the truthmaking framework to accommodate this, fine. One is still thereby acknowledging that one must move beyond the tools for presenting metaphysical positions that philosophers of mind have traditionally allowed themselves. And this is what needs to be recognized. 7. Conclusion 23 They were developed independently. 24 But see Asay (manuscript) for a rebuttal. 35 I hope to have shown here how at least one grounding framework may be useful in the philosophy of mind, providing us especially with a range of anti-realist views that do not reject the truth, factuality, importance, or justification we have for claims in psychology. Psychological claims may possess all of these honorifics without undermining the search for a unified, sparse, and nonredundant underlying metaphysics.25 Work Cited Alston, William. 1958. Ontological Commitments. Philosophical Studies. 9:8-17. Armstrong, David. 2004. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Asay, Jamin. Manuscript. Run Aground. Audi, Paul. 2012. Grounding: Toward a Theory of the In-Virtue-Of Relation. Journal of Philosophy. 109: 685-711. Bechtel, William and Jennifer Mundale. 1999. Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States. Philosophy of Science. 66: 175-207. Bennett, Karen. 2011. Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required). Philosophical Studies. 154: 79-104. Carnap, Rudolf. 1950. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology. In Meaning and Necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Churchland, Patricia. 1986. Neurophilosophy. Cambridge: MIT Press. Churchland, Paul. 1981. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy. 78: 67-90. Daly, Chris. 2012. Scepticism about Grounding. In Metaphysical Grounding. F. Correia and B. Schnieder, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 81-100. Dreier, James. 2004. Meta-ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism. Philosophical Perspectives. 18:23-44. 25 I thank Ken Aizawa, Louise Antony, Jamin Asay, Carrie Figdor, Kit Fine, Carl Gillett, Jens Harbecke, Kerry McKenzie, Kelly Trogdon, and especially Jessica Wilson for comments and criticism that led to substantial improvements of this paper. 36 Kim, Jaegwon. 1984. Concepts of Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 45: 153-176. Kim, Jaegwon. 1992. Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 52: 1-26. Kim, Jaegwon. 1998. Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge: MIT Press. Fine, Kit. 2001. The Question of Realism. Philosophers' Imprint. 1: 1-30. Fine, Kit. 2009. The Question of Ontology. In Metametaphysics. D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fine, Kit. 2012. Guide to Ground. In Metaphysical Grounding. F. Correia and B. Schnieder, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 37-80. Fodor, Jerry. 1974. Special Sciences. Synthese. 28: 97-115. Gillett, Carl. 2007. Understanding the New Reductionism: The Metaphysics of Science and Compositional Reduction. Journal of Philosophy. 104: 193-216. Heil, John. 2012. The Universe As We Find It. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hofweber, Thomas. 2009. Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics. In Metametaphysics. D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 260319. Kim, Jaegwon. 1992. Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 52: 1-26. Lewis, Davis. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell. Loewer, Barry. 2009. Why Is There Anything Except Physics? Synthese. 170: 217-233. Nolan, Daniel. 2014. Hyperintensional Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies. 171: 149160. Putnam, Hilary. 1967. Psychological Predicates. In Art, Mind, and Religion. W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill, eds. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 37-48. Rosen, Gideon. 2010. Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction. In Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. R. Hale and A. Hoffman, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 109-136. Ryle, Gilbert. 1949/2002. The Concept of Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Schaffer, Jonathan. 2009. On What Grounds What. In Metametaphysics. D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 347-383. Sider, Theodore. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 37 Wilson, Jessica. 2005. Supervenience Formulations of Physicalism. Noûs. 39(3): 426459. Wilson, Jessica. 2014. No Work for a Theory of Grounding. Inquiry. 57: 1-45. Witmer, Gene, William Butchard and Kelly Trogdon. 2005. Intrinsicality Without Naturalness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 70: 326-350.

Thaumàzein 3, 2015 Guido Cusinato ANTHROPOGENESE HUNGER NACH GEBURT UND SHARING DER GEFÜHLE AUS MAX SCHELERS PERSPEKTIVE Inhaltsangabe: 1) Max Scheler und der emotional turn; 2) Emotion und Gefühl; 3) Hunger nach Geburt und stete Geburt; 4) Philosophische Anthropologie und Philosophie als Umbildung; 5) Liebe und Umbildung der Person; 6) Begegnung mit dem Du als Form der Mit-Teilung (sharing); 7) Mit-Teilung der Gefühle als Fundament der sozialen Ontologie; 8) Mit-Teilung der Geburt als Fundament der Ontologie der Person; 9) Gefühle: Die selbstreferentielle, zentrische Natur und die anthropogenetische, ex-zentrische Natur; 10) Kultivierung der Gefühle und Vorbild; 11) Mit-Teilung und care: die Ehrfurcht; 12) Mit-Teilung der Expressivität als Grundlage der Phänomenologie der Andersheit; 13) Die unmittelbare Wahrnehmung der Expressivität des Anderen; 14) Neutralisierung der Theorie der Expressivität?; 15) Das Tagebuch einer Schizophrenen im Lichte der Phänomenologie Schelers. 1) Max Scheler und der emotional turn in den letzten Jahrzehnten hat man eine Wiederbelebung des Interes-ses gegenüber den Gefühlen beobachten können, so dass man heute emphatisch vom emotional turn spricht. Für die öffentliche Meinung hat diese Veränderung im Zeitraum von 1987 bis 1996 stattgefunden, als die Bücher von Ronald De Sousa (1987), Antonio Damasio (1993), Daniel Goleman (1995) und Joseph LeDoux (1996) regelrechte Bestseller geworden sind.1 Während der Hochkonjunktur des linguistic turn bildeten philosophische Studien über die zentrale Relevanz der Gefühle für die Entwicklung einer Theorie der Erkenntnis, Ethik oder Andersheit noch bis zum Anfang der Achtzigerjahre eher Ausnahmen. Die Gefühle wurden hauptsächlich als innere psychologische Zustände untersucht. Der ihnen gewidmete Raum z.B. in der kognitiven Psychologie jedoch 1 Am Anfang der Achtzigerjahre gab es zwar schon wichtige Studien über Emotionen, blieben aber dem breiten Publikum unbekannt. Ich denke hierbei z.B. an: R.B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking. Preferences need no Inferences, «American Psychologist», 35 (1980), 151-175; P. ekmann, Expression and the Nature of Emotion, in: k. scherer, P. ekman (Hrsg.), Approaches to Emotion, Hillsdale (NJ) 1984, 319-344. © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 30 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 war so begrenzt, dass der Psychologe Robert Zajonc 1980 wie folgt feststellen konnte: «Contemporary cognitive psychology simply ignores affect. The words affect, attitude, emotion, feeling, and sentiment do not appear in the indexes of any of the major works on cognition».2 Damasios Untersuchungen daraufhin über den berühmten Fall Phineas Gages und die Verbreitung der Ergebnisse der brain imaging techniques sind als eine folgenreiche Weichenstellung für die breite Etablierung des emotional turn anzusehen. Worin besteht aber dieser emotional turn? Wenn man die Hauptströmungen der aktuellen Diskussion über diese Wende analysiert, entdeckt man in der Tat, dass sehr oft die alten Konzeptionen wieder in den Vordergrund treten, die bereits in der zweiten Hälfte des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts im Streit zwischen der kognitiven Psychologie und dem Behaviorismus vorkommen. Ich beschränke mich der Einfachheit halber darauf, zwei Hauptströmungen des heutigen emotional turn zu nennen. Die erste Richtung ist von der Tradition der Kognitionspsychologie massgeblich geprägt. In ihr herrscht die Idee, dass die Gefühle das Ergebnis eines kognitiven Prozesses seien, dass sie Werturteile seien, wie z.B. Martha Nussbaum behauptet. Die zweite Richtung bezieht sich unmittelbar auf die Ergebnisse der Neurowissenschaften und neigt dazu, die Gefühle als homöostatische Regulatoren des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Organismus und der Umwelt und, in einigen Fällen, den sozialen Beziehungen zu interpretieren. Es ist nun fast paradox, dass sich bis jetzt keine dieser zwei Richtungen des aktuellen emotional turn mit der Phänomenologie des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts adäquat auseinandergesetzt hat, die zweifelslos einen der wichtigsten Versuche der Wiederaufwertung der Gefühle darstellt. Insbesondere überrascht die Tatsache, dass direkte Bezugnahmen auf die am Anfang des letzten Jahrhunderts von Max Scheler entfaltete Phänomenologie der Gefühle fehlen, da ja gerade hier in reichem Masse die eingehenden Analysen der affektiven Sphäre zu finden sind. Scheler stellt 1913 fest, dass «alles primäre Verhalten zur Welt überhaupt [...] eben nicht ein „vorstelliges", ein Verhalten des Wahrnehmens, sondern [...] ein emotionales [...] Verhalten»3 sei. Scheler nähert sich hier bereits 2 R. B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking ..., 152. 3 GW II, 206. Hervorhebung wie im Original. GW = m. scheler, Gesammelte Werke, hrsg. von Maria Scheler und Manfred S. Frings, Bd. I-XV, Bern, München, 30 31 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 dem Gedanken des sharing der Gefühle, der die Vorstellung der Gefühle als private Zustände des Bewusstseins endgültig hinter sich bringt. Nicht das, was sich bloss in uns befindet, sind die Gefühle, sondern vielmehr das, was zum emotionellen Durchbruch in die Wirklichkeit Anlass gibt.4 Sie sind es nämlich, die die Landschaft unserer Erfahrung zeichnen; sie sind es, die uns Umrisse und Farben dieser Landschaft sehen lassen, die Höhen und Tiefen skizzieren, wo es ansonsten nur die flache Oberfläche einer farblosen Ebene gegeben hätte.5 Ausgehend von dieser These, denkt Scheler die Gefühle als das, worauf sich der vorreflexive Weltbezug des Menschen stützt, und nimmt somit einige wichtige Aspekte der Daseinsanalyse Heideggers vorweg. Warum findet man dann bei den heutigen Befürwortern für den Vorrang des Emotionalen kaum Verweise auf Schelers Phänomenologie der Gefühle? Meines Erachtens trägt die Schuld daran nicht das zufällige Versäumnis, sondern eine Distanz der Perspektiven. Scheler entwickelt nämlich einen Gefühlsbegriff, der in vielerlei Hinsicht für den Standpunkt der zwei Hauptströmungen des aktuellen emotional turn inakzeptabel bleibt. Und dies führt zur am Anfang gestellten Frage: Taucht in diesen beiden Hauptströmungen tatsächlich ein neuer Gefühlsbegriff auf? In anderen Worten: Handelt es sich dabei um eine substantielle Wende, die einen neuen Ansatz des Gefühlsbegriffs mit sich bringt, oder lediglich um eine Interessenverschiebung, die ein in Vergessenheit geratenes Thema wieder auf die Tagesordnung setzt? Schelers These, dass alles primäre Verhalten zur Welt ein emotionales Verhalten sei,6 kann gar nicht von der kognitivpsychologischen Richtung des aktuellen emotional turn geteilt werden. Das kognitivpsychologische Paradigma kann durch das Bild eines Sandwiches dargestellt werden: Zwei Scheiben Brot sind einerseits durch den perzeptiven Bonn 1954-1997. 4 Zwischen diesen von Scheler behandelten Thematiken und der These der «extended emotions» – vgl. j. krueger, Varieties of extended emotions, «Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences», 13 (2014), 533-555; J. krueger, T. sZanto, Extended Emotions, «Philosophical Compass» (im Druck) – gibt es meines Erachtens eine sehr aufschlussreiche Konvergenz. 5 Vgl. GW III, 26-27. 6 GW II, 206. 32 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 Reiz und andererseits durch die motorische Reaktion sowie die Emotionen dargestellt, während der mittlere, reichste und entscheidendste Teil – die Schicht mit Käse oder Schinken – den bewussten kognitiven Apparat figuriert. Der perzeptive Reiz wird diesem Paradigma zufolge zuerst in eine Vorstellung übersetzt und – ausgehend von den Urteilen und den Zielen, die sich das Subjekt setzt – von dem kognitiven Apparat überarbeitet. Erst später wird eine motorische und emotive Antwort darauf hervorgerufen. Auch die zweite „neurowissenschaftliche" Richtung, die in Antonio Damasio einen ihrer Hauptvertreter findet, kann nicht mit Schelers Feststellung, dass das primäre Verhalten zur Welt ein intentionales und emotionales sei, einverstanden sein. Eine der umstrittensten Fragen im Denken Damasios betrifft die Annahme oder Ablehnung der Intentionalität der background feelings. In Schelers Theorie der Schichtung des emotionalen Lebens findet man ebenfalls einen analogen Begriff.7 Besonders im Formalismus kann man nämlich zwei Arten von Gefühlen herauslesen: «sinnliche Gefühle» wie Zustände, die als «nicht-intentionale leibliche» background feelings; und «Lebensgefühle» wie Funktionen, die als «intentionale leibliche» background feelings gedeutet werden können.8 Das Lebensgefühl ist ein intentionales feeling, das über die Bedingungen des gesamten Leibes informiert und sich einerseits von dem sinnlichen Gefühl unterscheidet, das die an einer Stelle des Leibes lokalisierte Empfindung betrifft, andererseits von den seelischen Gefühlen und den Persönlichkeitsgefühlen: Während die sinnlichen Gefühle ausgedehnt und lokalisiert sind, nimmt das Lebensgefühl zwar noch an dem Gesamtausdehnungscharakter des Leibes teil, ohne indes eine spezielle Ausdehnung „in" ihm und einen Ort zu besitzen. Behaglichkeit und Unbehaglichkeit, z.B. Gesundheitsund Krankheitsgefühl, Mattigkeit und Frische, können nicht in analoger Weise nach ihrer Lokalisierung und ihrem Organ bestimmt werden, wie wenn ich frage: wo tut es dir weh? [...] Und gleichwohl sind diese Gefühle, im Unterschied 7 Über die Schichtung des emotionalen Lebens bei Scheler vgl. I. Vendrell Ferran, Die Emotionen. Gefühle in der realistischen Phänomenologie, Berlin 2008, 151-152. 8 GW II, 342. 32 33 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 von den seelischen und geistigen Gefühlen wie Trauer und Wehmut, Seligkeit und Verzweiflung, ausgesprochene Leibgefühle.9 Es existieren also Scheler zufolge zwei Klassen von background feelings: die «sinnlichen Gefühle», die, obgleich nicht-intentional, eine regulative Funktion in der Wechselwirkung zwischen dem Leib und der Umwelt übernehmen, und die «Lebensgefühle», die Scheler als intentionale und leibliche feelings konzipiert. Man sollte hierbei unterstreichen, dass Scheler schon im Formalismus an eine leibliche Intentionalität denkt, die nicht an die Intentionalität des Bewusstseins beim frühen Husserl, sondern eher an die «fungierende Intentionalität» erinnert, von der Husserl in der Formalen und transzendentalen Logik spricht und die dann von Fink und Merleau-Ponty wiederaufgenommen und weiterentwickelt wird. Im Bezug auf die ökologische Funktion der organischen Empfindungen wie Schmerz und Lust oder auf diejenigen Gefühle, die wie Zorn oder Freude in den sozialen Beziehungen ihre Relevanz haben, ist die Divergenz zwischen Scheler und Damasio nicht unüberbrückbar. Sie wird aber unversöhnlich, sobald man an die «Persönlichkeitsgefühle» denkt. Bis jetzt sind die Gefühle hauptsächlich vom psychologischen, kognitiven, homöostatischen und neurologischen Standpunkt aus betrachtet worden. Meines Erachtens besteht Schelers Beitrag darin, dass er eine neue Dimension der Gefühle hervorgehoben hat, in die sowohl die Frage nach der Individuation der biologischen Arten als auch die nach der Bildung der Person einfliessen. Von Aristoteles übernimmt Scheler den Gedanken, dass die Empfindungen wie Lust und Unlust die Funktion haben, das Leben zu fördern oder zu hemmen.10 Gleichwohl hält Scheler eine Verfeinerung dieser Aristotelischen These für notwendig. Er stellt die Theorie der Tiefenschichten der Gefühle auf, nach der folgende Stufen der Gefühle unterschieden werden: Gefühlsempfindung, Vitalgefühl, seelisches Gefühl und Persönlichkeitsgefühl. Wenn wir uns diese Unterscheidung vor Augen halten, erkennen «wir sofort [...], dass sich jene „Förderung" und „Hemmung" [...] nicht immer auf „dasselbe" im Menschen bezieht, das 9 Ebd., 340. 10 GW VI, 38. 34 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 da gefördert und gehemmt wird».11 Bei den Gefühlsempfindungen wird die Interaktion eines spezifischen Organs, oder eines Teils von ihm, mit dem ganzen Organismus gefördert oder gehemmt; bei den Vitalgefühlen die ökologische Interaktion zwischen dem Leib und seiner Umwelt; bei den seelischen Gefühlen die soziale Anerkennung. Die Persönlichkeitsgefühle agieren gemäss einer anderen Logik: Seligkeit und Verzweiflung können zwar in ihrer reinsten Form gegenüber den Gesundheitszuständen meines Leibes relativ unverändert bleiben, ändern sich jedoch je nachdem, ob die Momente der Teilnahme und die Entfaltung der solidarischen Beziehungen zu dem Anderen als gelungen erlebt werden. Wenn wir diese solidarische Begegnung mit dem Anderen erweitern, bis sie die kosmische Idee der Weltoffenheit erreicht, können wir in der Seligkeit oder Verzweiflung fühlen, dass es die Weltoffenheit selbst ist, die sich entweder öffnet und uns begegnet oder sich schliesst und uns ablehnt. Auf der Ebene des Personzentrums sind die Gefühle auf die „Förderung" und „Hemmung" des Bildungsprozesses der Person gerichtet. Sie wirken nämlich auf den conatus essendi des ordo amoris und sein Sichpositionieren in die Weltoffenheit. Diese Positionierung ereignet sich nicht auf solipsistische Weise, weil «das Sein des Menschen [...] ebenso ursprünglich Fürsichsein, Miteinandersein, Miteinandererleben und Miteinanderwirken» ist.12 Diese Aspekte, die sich um die «Förderung» und «Hemmung» des Bildungsprozesses, die Phänomenologie der Andersheit und die Frage nach der Weltoffenheit drehen, stellen sich meiner Meinung nach als das dar, was aus Schelers Phänomenologie der Gefühle am meisten die aktuelle Debatte über den emotional turn beeinflusst hat. Hinsichtlich dieser Aspekte ist die Bezugnahme auf Scheler allerdings explizit und 11 Ebd., 39. 12 GW V, 371. Scheler führt den Terminus «Miteinandersein» im Formalismus (19131916) ein (vgl. GW II, 515) und behält ihn weiter auch in der Schrift Vom Ewigen im Menschen (1921) (vgl. GW V, 184; 371). Im Unterschied zu Heidegger scheint mir jedoch, dass der entscheidende Moment für Scheler – konsequent mit seiner These des Primats des Emotionalen beim Weltbezug – nicht das «Miteinandersein», sondern das «Miteinanderfühlen» ist. Scheler setzt sich bezüglich dieses Begriffs mit Heidegger auseinander in: Idealismus-Realismus, vgl. GW IX, 261-266. 34 35 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 relevant. Ich denke insbesondere an die Analysen Peter Goldies,13 an die von Shaun Gallagher und Dan Zahavi eröffnete Diskussion über die Phänomenologie des Anderen und schliesslich an jene Strömung, die den Namen der phänomenologischen Psychopathologie trägt und seit jeher für Schelers Phänomenologie offen und sensibel gewesen ist, und zwar nicht nur am Anfang (vor allem Kurt Schneider und Eugène Minkowski), sondern auch neuerdings in der Schizophrenieund Melancholieforschung (z.B. John Cutting und Giovanni Stanghellini).14 2) Emotion und Gefühl Bevor wir fortschreiten, ist es wohl erforderlich, eine begriffliche Präzisierung zu „Emotion" und „Gefühl" vorzunehmen. Bei seiner Unterscheidung zwischen «Gefühl» und «Emotion» scheint Scheler von dem Begriff der «Antwortreaktion» auszugehen: Mit dem Terminus «Emotion» meint er das, was als Folge einer Antwortreaktion auf eine Wertnehmung gefühlt wird, während er mit «Gefühl» auch Persönlichkeitsgefühle wie Liebe und Hass im Sinne hat, die in keiner «Antwortreaktion» bestehen,15 sondern die Funktion haben, die Werte zu entdecken oder sie zu verbergen. Dieser Unterschied überzeugt mich jedoch nicht, da sich eine Emotion meines Erachtens nicht nur auf eine passive Antwortreaktion beschränkt, sondern einen Prozess der „Metabolisierung" darstellt, der durchaus sehr kreativ sein kann. Ich stimme hingegen Scheler insofern zu, als er «Gefühl» und «Emotion» als das Eine konzipiert, das den Zugang zur Welt eröffnet. Ich schlage vor, „Emotion" und „Gefühl" als zwei verschiedene Stu13 P. goldIe, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration, Oxford 2000. 14 J. cuttIng, Scheler, Phenomenology and Psychopathology, «Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology», 16 (2009), 143-159; g. stanghellInI, r. rosFort, Emotions and Personhood, Oxford 2013. John Cutting, ein schottischer Psychiater und einer der besten Kenner der Schizophrenie in der Welt, hat nicht nur mit dem Thema «Scheler und Psychopathologie» in mehreren Aufsätzen auseinandergesetzt, sondern auch selbst eine Übersetzung der Texte aus dem Band XI und XII der Gesammelten Werke vorgelegt, die mehr als 430 Seiten beträgt, da er Scheler für einen der wichtigsten Bezugspunkte in der Philosophie für die Psychopathologie hält (vgl. M. scheler, The Constitution of the Human Being, Translated by John Cutting, Milwaukee 2008). 15 GW II, 266. 36 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 fen der Metabolisierung der Wertnehmung zu verstehen.16 Die „Emotion" ist die anfängliche Metabolisierung, die von den von Paul Ekman aufgezählten expressiven Schemata ausgeht. Die menschliche Plastizität ermöglicht nun eine kreative, keineswegs automatische Metabolisierung, so dass eine bestimmte Person, obwohl von einem gemeinsamen Schema ausgehend, die Emotion der Traurigkeit immer individueller erleben kann. Wenn sich eine plastische Emotion mehrmals wiederholt und durch die Erfahrung aufgearbeitet wird, sedimentiert sie sich allmählich in ein „Gefühl", das auf den expressiven Schemata fusst, die nicht nur von Kultur zu Kultur, sondern auch von Individuum zu Individuum verschieden sind. In der Emotion gibt es wesentlich eine dynamische Begegnung mit etwas Neuem, die mich in ein unerforschtes Gebiet hineinführt, da ihr die im Gefühl bereits konsolidierten patterns fehlen. Das Gefühl ist insofern immer das Ergebnis der Metabolisierung einer Emotion. In der Emotion öffne ich den Weg zu jener affektiv-semantischen Umstrukturierung, die zur Werkstätte neuer Gefühle werden kann. Die Natur der Emotion bestätigt sich dadurch, dass ich zum ersten Mal, wenn ich einer für mich neuen Situation entgegentrete, sehr bewegt bin, wie man im Italienischen eben durch das Adjektiv „emozionato" zum Ausdruck bringt, während ich bei den späteren Malen immer weniger gerührt bin – „mi emoziono" –, da es mir gelingt, mit neuem affektivem habitus mit grösserer Beherrschung umzugehen. In der Metabolisierung einer Emotion in ein Gefühl prägt ihr das Personzentrum den eigenen ordo amoris ein und gerade durch diesen kreativen Prozess der Metabolisierung wird meine personale Singularität geboren. Die Metabolisierung einer Emotion in ein Gefühl stimmt also mit dem Individuationsprozess der Person überein.17 3) Hunger nach Geburt und stete Geburt Was ist nun eigentlich die Funktion, die Gefühle im Bildungsprozess der Person innehaben? Hunger und Angst spielen eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Orientierung der Wechselwirkung eines Organismus mit der Umwelt. Es gibt ferner Gier nach Anerkennung, nach Reichtum und 16 Vgl. g. cusInato, La Totalità incompiuta, Milano 2008, 110-111. 17 Vgl. g. cusInato, Periagoge. Teoria della singolarità e filosofia come cura del desiderio, Verona 2014, 238-247. 36 37 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 nach Macht, die den Menschen als soziales Wesen in die Spirale dessen hineinstürzen kann, was René Girard mimetisches Begehren nennt. Wird die Person durch einen besonderen Hunger dazu bewegt, sich in die Weltoffenheit zu positionieren? Und was ist vor allem eine Person? Einen der wichtigsten Beiträge in den letzten Jahren zur Entfaltung einer Philosophie der Person liefert die Arbeit von Lynne Rudder Baker. Ihre Theorie der materiellen Konstitution nimmt an, dass die Existenz einer ontologisch neuen Entität mit dem Erscheinen einer neuen wesentlichen Eigenschaft übereinstimmt.18 Wenn z.B. der David von Michelangelo im Vergleich zum Marmorblock, aus dem er ausgestaltet wurde, neue wesentliche Eigenschaften besitzt, so soll er als ontologisch neue Entität anerkannt werden. Baker wendet diese Theorie auf den Personenbegriff an und kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die Person eine ontologisch neue Entität sei, da sie «a first-person perspective» besitzt: «on the Constitution View, a human person is constituted by a particular biological body, but the person is not identical to the body».19 Diese «first-person perspective» erlaubt der Person, sich selbst als sich selbst und ihre eigenen Gedanken als ihre eigenen zu denken.20 Gleichwohl bleibt meiner Meinung nach Bakers Anwendung ihrer Theorie der materiellen Konstitution auf den Personenbegriff noch allzu abstrakt. Einen Ausdruck, der wohl einen der entscheidendsten Momente der ganzen Frage trifft, hat Schelling geprägt: «Hunger nach Sein».21 Dieser ist durch eine Sehnsucht bewegt, die Scheler «Leere des Herzens»22 nennen wird. Ausgehend von den von Scheler in der Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos entfalteten Thesen, verfeinert María Zambrano ferner den Gedanken durch einen noch wirkungsvolleren Begriff: «hambre de nacer del todo» (Hunger danach, ganz geboren zu werden): 18 L.R. baker, Persons and Bodies. A Constitution View, Cambridge (UK) 2000. 19 L.R. baker, Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection, in K. tImPe (ed.), Arguing about Religion, New York 2009, 448-460, 452. 20 «From a first-person point of view, one can think about oneself as oneself and think about one's thoughts as one's own» (L.R. baker, Persons and Bodies ..., 91). 21 Vgl. G. cusInato, Person und Selbsttranszendenz. Ekstase und Epoché des Ego als Individuationsprozesse bei Schelling und Scheler, Würzburg 2012, 17 ff. 22 Vgl. ebd., 23 ff. 38 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 Das Tier wird geboren ein für allemal, der Mensch hingegen ist nie ganz geboren, er muss sich Mühe geben, sich selbst aufs Neue zu zeugen, oder hoffen, gezeugt zu werden. Die Hoffnung ist Hunger danach, ganz geboren zu werden – danach, das zu vollziehen, was wir in uns bloss als Entwurf tragen.23 Ich übernehme den Ausdruck von Zambrano, wobei ich ihn mit Scheler im Sinne der «Leere des Herzens» verstehe und ihn von der Gier nach sozialer Anerkennung unterscheide. Ich möchte die Hypothese aufstellen, dass die wesentliche Eigenschaft, die die Person kennzeichnet, nicht die Fähigkeit ist, sich selbst als sich selbst und ihre eigenen Gedanken als ihre eigenen zu denken, wie Baker vorschlägt, sondern der «Hunger nach Geburt»: Die Person ist eine ontologisch neue Entität, da sie nie ganz geboren und immer wieder von einem unversieglichen Hunger nach Geburt nach vorne getrieben wird. Person ist derjenige, der Hunger nach Geburt hat und einen „Raum" sucht, um in der Begegnung mit der Andersheit wiedergeboren zu werden. Hinter diesem Hunger nach Geburt verbirgt sich auch die Angst davor, misslungen, deformiert oder nicht genügend geboren zu werden. Der Hunger nach Geburt und der Bildungsprozess sind eng miteinander verbunden. Nur die Person ist hungrig nach Bildung, weil nur sie ohne feste Gestalt (Bild) geboren wird. Der Hunger nach Geburt ist in Wahrheit der Hunger nach Bildung. Ein solcher Bildungsprozess liegt aber ausserhalb des selbstreferentiellen Horizontes des Selbst. Um sich zu bilden, muss die Person sich selbst transzendieren und sich in dem durch die Begegnung mit einer anderen Singularität freigelegten Raum umbilden. Der Bildungsprozess der Person erfolgt nicht durch eine zentrische cura sui, die sich intimistisch um die Kultivierung der „schönen Seele" kümmert. Er gewinnt vielmehr eine kosmologische Relevanz und wird zu einer ex-zentrischen cura mundi, die in der solidarischen Perspektive der Weltoffenheit wirkt. Die stete Geburt der Person ist ein ganz anderer Prozess als die Metamorphose einer Raupe in einen Schmetterling. Während diese Metamorphose schon im genetischen Code der Raupe festgelegt ist, kennzeichnet sich die stete Geburt der Person dadurch, dass sie die biologische und kulturelle Matrix des eigenen ursprünglichen Selbst übertrifft 23 Vgl. M. Zambrano, Hacia un saber sobre el alma, Madrid 1989, 94. 38 39 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 und sich dank der Begegnung mit der Andersheit dem Unerwarteten öffnet. Um geboren zu werden und eine noch höhere Steigerung zu erreichen, muss die Person zuerst den verderblichen Teil in sich selbst sterben lassen, der in der Logik des Ressentiments und des Neides versunken ist und gar ihren Tod herbeiführen kann. Diese kleinen „Wiedergeburten" spiegeln die Übergänge von dem begrenzten Sichtpunkt des sozialen Selbst, das noch nicht den Bildungsprozess der Person erlebt hat, zu dem des „erweiterten Selbst" wider, das die Weltoffenheit erreicht. Die Person birgt in sich auch eine dunkle Seite, die „schwarze Sonne" des eigenen Egozentrismus, die die Offenheit für die Zukunft zudeckt. Die Herausbildung des élan personnel – um den Ausdruck Eugène Minkowskis zu gebrauchen – kann nicht als eine einfache lineare Steigerung vorgestellt werden, in der das eigene Sein von einem Augenblick zum anderen der Zukunft übertragen und es sich bei jedem weiteren Schritt vergrössern würde, sondern setzt die Erfahrung des Schmerzes, die Scheidung vom kontingenten Teil des Selbst, voraus. Der thematische Zusammenhang der Geburt mit der Person wurde bereits in der christlichen Tradition erkannt, wie es die Episode von Nikodemus aus dem Johannesevangelium uns schön vorführt. Es handelt sich weder um die biologische Geburt des ersten Geborenwerdens noch um die Wiedergeburt ins Jenseits. Vielmehr gebärt sich die Person im diesseitigen, irdischen Leben wieder. Im Hinblick darauf kann man auch bei Scheler einige entscheidende Ansätze finden. In seinem Aufsatz Reue und Wiedergeburt (1917) war das Problem zunächst auf den dramatischeren Ablauf der Wiedergeburt der Person eingeschränkt, der durch den Akt der Reue stattfindet. Es ist aber diese Analyse des Phänomens der Reue, die Scheler dazu führt, einen dynamischeren Begriff des ordo amoris zu entwickeln. Denn das Phänomen der Reue zeigt, dass die Person kein statischer ordo amoris ist. Wenn der ordo amoris bedeutsame Erfahrungen funktionalisiert, tritt ein Prozess der Rückmeldung ein, der eine Restrukturierung der ganzen Ordnung des Fühlens mit sich bringt. Die Bildung der Person wird zur Bildung des ordo amoris, so dass sich aus der Lehre von dem ordo amoris beim späten Scheler allmählich die Lehre von der Bildung ausprägt. Aus Schelers Perspektive besteht im Zentrum der affektiven Struktur der Person das Problem der Bildung. Keine selbstreferentielle Bedeu40 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 tung ist aber der Bildung der Person zuzuschreiben. Die Person bildet sich durch ein unaufhörliches Aus-sich-selbst-Hinausgehen, d.h. durch eine Epoché des Ego. Im Hunger nach Geburt enthüllt sich der Person nicht nur ihr unvollendetes Geborensein, sondern auch ihre NichtSelbstgenügsamkeit. Die ständige Selbsttranszendierung, die die Bildung der Person skandiert, stimmt mit der Geburt der Person überein. Meines Erachtens befindet sich der Drehpunkt der philosophischen Anthropologie der Bildung in der Frage nach der menschlichen Plastizität: «der Mensch hat sich in seinem uns bekannten Werdegang bis heute als ein Wesen von ungeheurer Plastizität erwiesen».24 Der Mensch ist plastisch in dem Sinne, dass er kein «morphologisch endgültig fixiertes Wesen» ist.25 Ein in der Umweltgeschlossenheit versunkenes Individuum stellt sich keine Frage nach der Bildung. Diese Frage drängt sich nur einer Person auf, die sich bei der Erfahrung der Weltoffenheit als einer geschlossenen und prästabilierten Form beraubt entdeckt. Es gibt Scheler zufolge einen genauen Unterschied zwischen intentional auf den plastischen Bildungsprozess der Person hin orientierten Gefühlen einerseits und Stimmungen und Gefühlszuständen andererseits, die keine Intentionalität auf den nämlichen Prozess ausüben. Von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus kann der Begriff des Hungers nach Geburt die von Matthew Ratcliffe gestellte Frage nach den «existential feelings» als primärem Weltbezug zuspitzen.26 Heidegger teilt Schelers These, dass alles primäre Verhalten zur Welt überhaupt ein emotionales sei. Der Mensch lebt jedoch nicht einfach mit dem Gefühl, in der Welt zu sein. Er fühlt und spürt einen Hunger nach Geburt, der ihn dazu treibt, sich in die Weltoffenheit zu positionieren, um einen neuen Sinnhorizont für die eigene Existenz zu gewinnen. Der conatus des ordo amoris schafft es, die Umweltgeschlossenheit zu überwinden und sich intentional auf die Welt hin zu strukturieren, nur wenn er von dem Hunger nach Geburt gedrängt wird. Ohne Hunger nach Geburt gibt es keinen élan personnel und keinen Weltbezug. 24 GW IX, 151. 25 Vgl. ebd., 148. 26 Vgl. m. ratclIFFe, Feelings of Being. Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality, Oxford 2008. 40 41 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 4) Philosophische Anthropologie und Philosophie als Umbildung27 Woher kommt der dem élan personnel zugrunde liegende Hunger nach Geburt? Daraus, dass es keine einzige, allgemeine Menschennatur gibt, die im Voraus das menschliche Handeln prästabilieren könnte, ergibt sich, dass der Mensch mit den fürs Überleben nötigen Mitteln unausgestattet auf die Welt kommt. In gewissem Sinne kommt er auf die Welt, ohne ein für allemal die eigene Geburt abgeschlossen zu haben. Die unvollendete Geburt bestimmt den Menschen dazu, weiterhin geboren zu werden, um sich eben mit der Form zu versehen, über die er am Zeitpunkt seiner biologischen Geburt noch nicht verfügt. Wenn die Person eine ontologisch neue Entität ist, die sich von allen anderen Entitäten durch den Prozess der steten Geburt unterscheidet, dann hat die philosophische Anthropologie nicht mehr mit der Dynamik der innerhalb der Interiorität des Subjekts eingeschlossenen psychischen Zustände zu tun. Sie ist nicht auf eine psychologische Dimension verbannt. Durch ihre Herausstellung der steten Geburt rückt 27 Der Terminus «Umbildung» hat einen hohen Stellenwert im Denken Schelers. Vor Scheler taucht er auch bei Max Weber auf, z.B. in dem Text Umbildung der Charisma (M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, in: Studienausgabe der Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe, Band I, 22.4, Tübingen 2009, 138-162), und noch ausgeprägter bei Goethe, der ihn in Zusammenhang mit dem Begriff der Bildung setzt und ins Zentrum seiner Morphologie rückt (vgl. J. W. Goethe, Bildung und Umbildung organischer Natur, in: Schriften zu Natur und Erfahrung. Schriften zur Morphologie II, Gesamtausgabe Bd. 19, Stuttgart 1959, 13-458). Bei Scheler bedeutet er weder von aussen auferlegte Verwandlung noch einfache Änderung, wie es beim opportunistischen Sichanpassen oder dem Farbwechsel eines Chamäleons zum mimetischen Zweck der Fall sein kann. Die Umbildung ist vielmehr ein Prozess der Bildung, die nicht innerhalb eines selbstreferentiellen Horizontes stattfindet, sondern in den von dem als Vorbild verstandenen Anderen freigelegten, mäeutischen Raum hineinwächst. Die Umbildung «ist weder Nachahmung noch Gehorsam, sondern ein von der Haltung der Hingebung an das Vorbildexempel umspanntes Hineinwachsen des Personseins selbst und der Gesinnung in Struktur und Züge des Vorbildes. Das Vorbild, veranschaulicht an seinem liebesintendierten Exemplar, zieht und ladet, und wir „folgen", dieses Wort nicht genommen im Sinne eines Wollens und Tuns – die nur auf Gehorsam gegen einen echten Befehl oder pädagogischen Scheinbefehl oder auf Kopierung abzielen, resp. darin bestehen könnten, und partiell heteronom wären –, sondern im Sinne einer freien Hingabe an seinen autonomer Einsicht zugänglichen Personwertgehalt. Wir werden so, wie das Vorbildexemplar als Person ist, nicht, was es ist. Erst eine Folge dieser wachsenden Hineinbildung in das Vorbild ist die Neubildung respektive – je nachdem – die Umbildung der Gesinnung, der Gesinnungswandel und die Sinnesänderung» (GW II, 566). 42 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 sie vielmehr von der bloss psychologischen auf die anthropogenetische Ebene. Mithin wird der Psychologismuskritik an der philosophischen Anthropologie der Boden entzogen. Die Thematik des Hungers nach Geburt und der steten Geburt ist nämlich mit dem anthropologischen Problem der Neotenie und der Plastizität eng verbunden. Der Raum der Weltoffenheit, in dem die stete Geburt geschieht, ist exzentrisch sowohl bezüglich der Umweltgeschlossenheit des Organismus als auch des sozialen Gemeinsinns (common sense). Es lohnt, sich daran zu erinnern, dass sich eigentlich der Terminus Exzentrizität dank Plessner als Begriff der philosophischen Anthropologie durchgesetzt hat. Allein er drückt sehr gut auch Schelers Position aus, der ihn seit 1925 zumindest an zwei Stellen benutzt. Es ist allerdings Schelling gewesen, der ihn von der Astronomie entliehen und ihm eine anthropologische Sinnrichtung beigegeben hat, um darauf die ganze moderne Philosophie der Person zu gründen. Durch das Studium des ersten Keplerschen Gesetzes über die elliptischen Bahnen der Planeten kommt Schelling dazu, sich den Menschen als ein exzentrisches Sein vorzustellen. Von diesem Moment an steigt die elliptische Bewegung der Planeten um zwei Brennpunkte, von denen einer durch die Sonne dargestellt wird, zur emblematischen Metapher der menschlichen Natur und Freiheit auf. Es ist die Angst des Lebens selbst, die den Menschen aus dem Gravitationsfeld des ersten Zentrums hinaustreibt, in das er erschaffen wurde, da dieses Zentrum auf jeden Prozess der Singularisation lähmend wirkt. Dieses exzentrische Hinaustreiben nennt der späte Schelling «Ekstase». Um die eigene Freiheit zu bilden, muss der Mensch ekstatisch aus sich selbst hinausgehen und sich durch die Loslösung vom zentrischen Selbst auf den – im Sinne Schellings unvordenklichen – zweiten Brennpunkt der Ellipse beziehen. Der Hunger nach Geburt treibt ihn zu diesem Schritt, indem er das Missbehagen und die Leere gegenüber der zentrischen Logik des ersten Brennpunktes spürbar macht. Unausgestattet mit einem schon vollendeten Bild von sich selbst auf die Welt gekommen, verspürt der Mensch den quälenden Hunger nach Bildung, der ihn zur steten Geburt anspornt, um aus sich eine ursprünglich fehlende Gestalt herauszubilden. Aufgrund dieses Hungers nach Bildung verändert sich der Sinn des Philosophierens selbst völlig. 42 43 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 Durch die Gründung der philosophischen Anthropologie der Bildung setzt sich Scheler ein äusserst ehrgeiziges Ziel: die Legitimierung der Philosophie nicht durch das Plausibilisieren derselben als soziale Wissenschaft im Kontext der damaligen wissenschaftlichen Akademie28 – dadurch würde sie sich in etwas anderes verwandeln und sich folglich de-legitimieren lassen –, sondern die Rechtfertigung der Philosophie als solche durch die Wiederentdeckung des ursprünglichen mäeutischen Sinnes der Praxis der existentiellen Umbildung. Im Hinblick darauf gewinnt die philosophische Anthropologie den Sinn des Philosophierens als Umbildung, das sich als eine Alternative zu dem üblichen akademischen Stil der Philosophie versteht. Man darf nicht vergessen, dass Scheler eine sehr konfliktreiche Beziehung zur damaligen akademischen Philosophie hatte. Ihm wurde zweimal von der Universität gekündigt und im Zeitraum zwischen 1910 und 1919 – in einer der fruchtbarsten Phasen seines Philosophierens – die universitäre Lehrtätigkeit verboten. In den Jahren, in denen er durch Vorträge und private Seminare seinen Lebensunterhalt zu verdienen hatte, konnte er persönlich erleben, was es bedeutet, ausserhalb der akademischen Welt zu philosophieren. Diese Jahre brachten ihm die Entdeckung der materialen Phänomenologie des affektiven Lebens, die ihm den Einblick öffnete, über die konkrete Dynamik des Ressentiments, der Reue, des Hasses, der Liebe, der Einfühlung und der Sympathie sowie über die soziale Dynamik des deutschen Nationalismus, des Sozialismus und insbesondere des Ausgleichs der gewaltigen Unterschiede – durch die noch heute die epochale Entwicklung hindurchgeht, wie die zwischen dem Westen und dem Osten und zwischen Mann und Frau – zu reflektieren. 5) Liebe und Umbildung der Person Scheler bemerkt, dass im Menschen an erster Stelle ein Umschwung [erfolgt], ja wenn man will, eine Art geradezu von Umkehrung der Grundbeziehung, die zwischen dem organischen Leben und der geistigen „Ordnung" besteht [...]. Und dieser Umschwung, diese Umkehr, resp. der metaphy28 Vgl. J. FIscher, Philosophische Anthropologie. Eine Denkrichtung des 20. Jahrhunderts, Freiburg/München 2008. 44 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 sische Aktus, [...], ist das, was in einem nicht zeithaft-empirischen Sinne „Menschwerdung" bedeutet.29 Was ermöglicht die Umkehrung? Was gibt der Person Mut, um sich festen Verwurzelungen zu entreissen und auf alle schützenden Rüstungen der Subjektphilosophie, auf alle psychologisch beruhigenden Moralen zu verzichten? Was ist die Sprengladung, die die Perspektive des egologischen Pols explodieren lässt? Scheler gibt eine plastische Antwort dazu: Allein die Liebe «bricht die im Menschen befindliche Quelle der Seinsrelativität alles Umwelt-seins».30 Schon der frühe Scheler setzt sich mit dem Thema der «Umkehrung» auseinander. Es geht um einen Perspektivenwechsel (con-versio), der nur aufgrund eines Überschusses an Kräften möglich ist, obwohl er auch in einer verzerrten Weise vollzogen werden kann, wie das Phänomen des Ressentiments (per-versio) zeigt. Er ist eine Umbildung, die über die Logik der Umweltgeschlossenheit hinausgeht, die als besonderer Aktvollzug – Aktvollzug des Sichverlierens – zu verstehen ist. In der Schrift Ordo amoris beschreibt Scheler die Liebe als Sichloslassen von dem egologischen Pol und als Umkehrung zur Teilhabe: Sie ist «Urakt, durch den ein Seiendes – ohne aufzuhören, dieses begrenzte Seiende zu sein – sich selbst verlässt, um an einem anderen Seienden [...] teilzuhaben und teilzunehmen».31 Was heisst nun, dass ein Seiendes sich selbst verlässt, ohne seine Singularität zu verlieren? Hier geht das Seiende die kathartische Reduktion, den Prozess der Einklammerung des egologischen Gesichtspunkts, hindurch, der aus beiden Aspekten der in-versio des egologischen Prozesses der Zentrizität und der conversio zu dem von der Person dargestellten ontologisch Neuen hin besteht. Die Person bildet sich, indem sie die eigene Zentrizität in die Exzentrizität umkehrt. Das geschieht jedoch nicht in der Verschlossenheit einer solipsistischen cura sui, mit der das selbstreferentielle Selbst sich selbst als schöne Seele errichtet, sondern in der die Welt erschliessenden Begegnung mit dem Anderen. In Liebe und Erkenntnis hatte Scheler unter Berufung auf Augustinus 29 GW XII, 129. 30 GW V, 90. 31 GW X, 356. 44 45 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 im Akt des Liebens die Fähigkeit anerkannt, sich für eine von der Welt ausgehende Intentionalität zu öffnen. Schelers Satz: «alle Erweiterung und Vertiefung unseres Weltbildes [ist] an eine vorangängige Erweiterung und Vertiefung unserer Interesseund Liebessphäre geknüpft»,32 muss man nicht im gnoseologischen, sondern im anthropogenetischen Sinne verstehen, den der späte Scheler durch den Begriff der Weltoffenheit zum vollen Ausdruck bringen wird. Die Entfaltung des Weltbildes in uns, oder das Erscheinen des Bildes oder der Bedeutung [...], desgleichen die Füllesteigerung in der Gegebenheit des Gegenstandes bei zunehmender Liebe und Interesse, ist ihm [Augustinus] nicht bloss eine Tätigkeit des erkennenden Subjekts, das in den fertigen Gegenstand eindringt, sondern gleichzeitig eine Antwortreaktion des Gegenstandes selbst: ein „Sichgeben", ein „Sicherschliessen" und „Aufschliessen" des Gegenstandes, d.h. ein wahrhaftiges Sich offenbaren des Gegenstandes. Das ist ein „Fragen" gleichsam der „Liebe", auf das die Welt „antwortet", indem sie sich „erschliesst" und darin selbst erst zu ihrem vollen Dasein und Wert kommt.33 Die Fülle der Existenz und der Werte in dieser Antwort ist unmittelbar proportional zur Intensität des agapischen Aktes, der sie veranlasst hat. Jede «Steigerung der Anschauungsund Bedeutungsfülle, in der uns ein Gegenstand vor dem Bewusstsein steht, [ist] eine abhängige Folge des sich steigernden Interesses [...] der Liebe zu ihm».34 Das Lieben begnügt sich nicht damit, das zu sehen, was sich bereits in der faktischen und kontingenten Welt befindet. Es macht Raum für das frei, was noch nicht da ist: Liebe ist nicht emotional bejahendes Anstarren gleichsam eines Wertes, der da vor uns steht und gegeben ist. Sie geht auch nicht auf gegebene Dinge (oder reale Personen) bloss vermöge der positiven Werte, die sie an sich haben und die schon vor dem Eintritt der Liebe „gegeben" wären. [...] Liebe ist erst da vorhanden, wo noch hinzutritt zu dem an ihr „als real" bereits gegebenen 32 GW VI, 96. 33 Ebd., 97. 34 Ebd., 96. 46 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 Werte die Bewegung, die Intention auf noch mögliche „höhere" Werte [...]. Insofern zeichnet die Liebe der empirisch gegebenen Person immer ein „ideales" Wertbild gleichsam voraus.35 Die Liebe wird «die intentionale Bewegung, in der sich von einem gegebenen Werte A eines Gegenstandes her die Erscheinung seines höheren Wertes realisiert. Und eben dieses Erscheinen des höheren Wertes steht in Wesenszusammenhang mit der Liebe».36 Nur in dem durch die Intentionalität der Liebe geöffneten Raum bildet sich die geliebte Person, da sie dort immer erneut geboren werden kann. Dies ist möglich, da die Liebe das Wertbild vorwegnimmt, um das herum sich die Geburt selbst ereignet. Dabei spricht Scheler nicht von einer Liebe, die ex nihilo ein Wertbild erschaffen würde. Es heisst nicht, «die Liebe schaffe erst die Werte selbst oder das Höhersein der Werte. Durchaus nicht! Aber bezogen auf alles mögliche Wertfühlen und Wertnehmen [...] lässt sie [...] völlig neue und höhere Werte ins Dasein treten».37 Im trans-subjektiven Akt der Liebe zeichnet sich der Raum für den Bildungsprozess der Person. Scheler baut seine Phänomenologie der Andersheit auf diesem Begriff des Liebens auf. In der Erfahrung des Liebens werde ich mir vor allem dessen bewusst, dass ich nicht selbstgenügsam bin, dass meine Existenz in der Begegnung mit der Andersheit verankert ist. Der Ausgangspunkt ist nicht mehr mein selbstreferentielles Ego, sondern das Mich-Öffnen für die Andersheit. 6) Begegnung mit dem Du als Form der Mit-Teilung (sharing) In der ersten Auflage des Sympathiebuchs (1913) kehrt Scheler den damals noch herrschenden kartesianischen Gesichtspunkt um, der vom Ich ausgeht, und vertritt die These, dass kein Ich ausserhalb seiner Beziehung zum Du gedacht werden kann, da das Ich dem Wir entspringt und sich nur in dem Masse individualisiert, in dem es sich aufgrund einer ursprünglichen «Du-Evidenz»38 – aufgrund des Vorrangs des Wir 35 GW VII, 156. 36 Ebd., 156. 37 Ebd., 157. 38 Vgl. GW VII, 228-232. 46 47 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 und des Du – seiner selbst bewusst wird.39 Analysiert man diesen Du-Begriff etwas näher, so entdeckt man, dass es um eine unpersönliche «Duheit» oder ein «Du überhaupt» geht. Diese abstrakte «Duheit» ist jedoch kein letztes Wort Schelers zum Thema der Begegnung mit der Andersheit. Sie betrifft das Du, dem nicht die Person, sondern das Ich oder die Ichheit begegnet.40 In der Schrift Vom Ewigen im Menschen (1921) spricht Scheler sogar von einem Gegensatz: Es gibt «kein über den möglichen Gegensatz von Ich und Du erhabenes mögliches Ich».41 Der Terminus «Gegensatz» scheint darauf hinzuweisen, dass dieses Du die Andersheit darstellt, mit der das Ich im Kampf um die soziale Anerkennung – und nicht in der persönlichen Begegnung – zu tun hat. Ein Paar Jahre später – in seiner Schrift Ich und Du (1923) – wird Martin Buber das Problem der Ich-Du-Beziehung völlig anders behandeln. Die Beziehung zum sächlichen Anderen (dem Neutrum) sei anders als die Begegnung mit dem Du. Wenn das Ich dem Du begegne, tue sich ein Raum des Zwischen auf, in dem zwei Individuen im Sinne der Menschwerdung entstünden. Wenn sich das Ich aber zum Du wie zu einem Ding, d.h. wie zu einem Es, verhalte, werde die Begegnung unmöglich und diese kehre sich in «Vergegnung» um. Man darf nicht ausser Acht lassen, dass Buber und Scheler hierbei unter dem «Du» keineswegs dasselbe denken. Darum sollte Bubers Frage nach dem Du nicht mit Schelers Analyse der «Duheit», d.h. des bei jeder sozialen Handlung vorausgesetzten «Du überhaupt», sondern vielmehr mit seiner Auseinandersetzung mit der Phänomenologie der Person in Zusammenhang gesetzt werden. An einer Stelle im Formalismus beobachtet Scheler, dass die höchste Modalität in der Rangordnung der Werte «gleichzeitig die unteilbarste und eben darum mit-teilbarste der Wertmodalitäten» sei.42 Indem Scheler den Terminus „mit-teilbarste", anstatt „mitteilbarste" verwendet, wird der Akzent auf die Bedeutung der Mit-Teilung im Sinne des 39 Vgl. GW IX, 261. 40 Vgl. GW VII, 240. 41 GW V, 308. 42 GW II, 542. 48 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 englischen sharing verschoben,43 das neuerdings vor allem in der evolutionary anthropology von Michael Tomasello44 sowie in der social anthropology von Alan Barnard45 eine tragende Rolle übernimmt. Insbesondere hat der Letztere das Problem des symbolischen Denkens mit dem des Akts des sharing meines Erachtens auf eine Weise in Verbindung gesetzt, die einen Vergleich mit Schelers Perspektive recht interessant machen kann. Der Akt des sharing impliziert dabei eine präzise emotionale Bestimmung, so dass der emotional turn auf die social anthropology erweitert wird. Über die Zitate aus dem Formalismus hinaus, die das Gewicht nachweisen, das der Gedanke des sharing in Schelers Phänomenologie innehat, ist es gar beeindruckend, wie viele Komposita mit der Präposition „mit" Scheler zwischen 1913 und 1923 benutzt: Mitvollzug, Mitgefühl, Mitleiden, Miteinandersein, Miteinanderfühlen, Miteinanderwirken, Miteinander-erleben, Miteinander-leben, Miteinanderglauben, Miteinanderdenken, Miteinanderwollen, Miteinanderhoffen, usw. In all diesen Komposita ist eine Form von sharing impliziert: Das Miteinanderfühlen ist eine Form von sharing des Fühlens, das Miteinandersein eine des Seins, das Miteinanderglauben eine des Glaubens, der Mitvollzug der Akte eine der Akte. Auch Schelers Theorie der relativ natürlichen Weltanschauung, die einer Theorie des common sense entspricht, kann als eine Form von sharing der Absichten, Meinungen und Urteile ausgelegt werden, die durch die Tradition weitervermittelt werden.46 43 Zum Begriff der «Mit-Teilung» bei Scheler vgl. G. cusInato, Person und Selbsttranszendenz ..., 184-188. Auf der zentralen Relevanz des Begriffs sharing bei Scheler besteht auch Alessandro Salice in seiner Arbeit in diesem Band der «Thaumàzein»: Shared Emotions – A Schelerian Approach. Siehe auch: S. Van hooFt, Scheler on Sharing Emotions, «Philosophy today», 38 (1994), 18-28; a. krebs, Two parents stand beside the dead body of a beloved child: Max Scheler on Shared Feeling, «Appraisal Journal», 8 (2011), 1-21. 44 Vgl. M. tomasello, M. carPenter, J. call, T. behne, H. moll, Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition, «Behavioral and Brain Sciences», 28 (2005), 675-735; M. tomasello, M. carPenter, Shared Intentionality, «Developmental Science», 10 (2007), 121-125; m. tomasello, Origins of Human Communication, Cambridge (MA) 2008. 45 Vgl. das bedeutende Werk: A. barnard, Genesis of Symbolic Thought, Cambridge (UK) 2012. 46 Nach Scheler handelt jedes Individuum in der Gesellschaft, indem es die natür48 49 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 Dieses obsessive und eindringliche Beharren Schelers auf der Präposition „mit" ist kein Zufall, sondern ein Zeichen für die Hauptrolle, die er der Praxis der Mit-Teilung beimisst, stützen sich doch auf diese Praxis seine Phänomenologie der Andersheit, Ontologie der Person sowie soziale Ontologie. Gleichzeitig, von 1913 bis 1916, entwirft Scheler drei Ideen, die mit dem Begriff der Mit-Teilung eng verbunden sind und dazu dienen, verschiedene Formen der Begegnung mit einer anderen Person herauszustellen: Rezeptionszentrum, Mitvollzug und Miteinanderfühlen. Man sollte nicht den Gegensatz von Ich und Du vor der Folie der Priorität des Wir, sondern diese drei Ideen zum Vergleich mit Bubers Analyse der Ich-Du-Beziehung heranziehen. a) Rezeptionszentrum: Scheler zufolge ist die Person einerseits ein aktives Aktzentrum gegenüber der biologischen und der psychischen Sphäre und andererseits ein Rezeptionszentrum gegenüber der geistigen Sphäre.47 Dieser Unterscheidung liegen die Gefühle der «Demut» und «Ehrfurcht» zugrunde. Die Bereitschaft, dem Anderen einen Wert zuzuerkennen, und die Fähigkeit, dem Wert des Anderen zuzuhören, ohne ihn zu vergegenständlichen und ihn gezwungenermassen auf den eigenen Standpunkt zurückzuführen, hängen nach Scheler von einer besonderen Veranlagung zur Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben und dem Kosmos ab. Ohne Demut würde das Individuum in eigener Eifersucht verfangen bleiben und jeden Wert ausserhalb von sich selbst als Drohung und gar als Einverleibung des eigenen Seins wahrnehmen, «denn jeder erblickte Wert ist ihm wie Diebstahl und Raub an seinem Selbstwert».48 Daraus würde sich keine Möglichkeit der Begegnung zwischen Ich und Du ergeben und der Kosmos zum Arsenal der dem Subjekt verfügbaren Ressourcen und Mittel herabgesetzt. Dank der Veranlagung zu Demut und Ehrfurcht allein wird die Intentionalität sichtbar, die die umliche Selbstverständlichkeit des common sense voraussetzt, in der es eingeschlossen bleibt, gemäss nämlich der «relativ natürlichen Weltanschauung», zu der per definitionem «alles, was generell in dieser Gruppe als fraglos „gegeben" gilt» (GW VIII, 61) gehört. Daher rührt, dass z.B. ein Arbeiter die Geste eines Kollegen, ihm eine Zange zu reichen, sofort und unmissverständlich in ihrem Ausdruck versteht, da er sich auf einen Arbeitskontext bezieht, den er mit ihm gemeinsam teilt. Scheler fragt gerade nach einem Ausdruck, der von den Regeln des sozialen Kontexts abweicht. 47 Vgl. GW X, 236. 48 GW III, 21. 50 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 gekehrte Richtung von derjenigen von Husserl in den Ideen I dargestellten hat: nicht die Intentionalität, die sich aus dem Bewusstsein des Subjekts verbreitet, sondern die Gegenintentionalität – d.h. die Noesis des Noema –, die aus dem Kosmos strahlt, um die Person als Rezeptionszentrum zu erleuchten. Demgemäss beweist die Person ihre Realität und Lebendigkeit nicht dadurch, dass sie ein intentional aktives Subjekt wäre, sondern in dem Masse, dass sie sich durch die Erleuchtung der Gegenintentionalität fruchtbar macht; b) Mitvollzug: Indem die Person Rezeptionszentrum wird, entzieht sie sich dem Gravitationsfeld des eigenen, wie eine „schwarze Sonne" strahlenden Egozentrismus, kommt zum anderen Brennpunkt der Ellipse und fängt an, in der Dimension der solidarischen Mit-Teilung zu wirken. Der Mitvollzug eines Aktes bringt die Mit-Teilung eines Aktes zuwege. Als Rezeptionszentrum begnügt sich die Person nicht mehr mit dem «Vollzug» eines vereinzelten und selbstgenügsamen Aktes. Sie lebt nun ausschliesslich in dem «Mitvollzug» der Akte. Der Begriff des Mitvollzugs spielt eine zentrale Rolle in Schelers Philosophie der Person im Ganzen, da er das „Materiale" selbst darstellt, von dem die Person durchwoben ist. Die Person existiert nur insofern, als sie durch den Mitvollzug eines Aktes an der Existenz anderer Personen teilnimmt; c) Miteinanderfühlen: Dieses ist eine Form der Mit-Teilung des Fühlens, die den Mitvollzug eines Aktes einschliesst und sich infolgedessen deutlich von der einfachen Gefühlsansteckung abhebt. Die Begegnung mit der Existenz des Du findet statt, wenn zwei Rezeptionszentren, die an dem Mitvollzug eines Aktes teilnehmen, das Miteinanderfühlen erleben können. Die authentische Erfahrung des Miteinanderfühlens unterscheidet sich von den Fällen der Verführung oder Schwärmerei, in denen solcher Einklang bloss vorgetäuscht wird, denn sie betrifft nicht das „Selbst" überhaupt, sondern das als Rezeptionszentrum verstandene „erweiterte Selbst". Beim Miteinanderfühlen geht die Person aus dem eigenen selbstreferentiellen Fühlen hinaus, um sich, dank des Mitvollzugs des Aktes, in der trans-subjektiven Dimension der Mit-Teilung des Fühlens einzuwurzeln. Jetzt gibt es keine zwei getrennten Personen mehr, die je alleine vor sich hin etwas fühlten und zugleich wahrnähmen, dass auch die andere das Gleiche fühlte. Es gibt nunmehr eine Begegnung zwischen zwei Personen, aus der ein neues Miteinander50 51 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 fühlen hervorquillt: «Das heisst nicht: A fühlt dies Leid und B fühlt es auch, und ausserdem wissen sie noch, dass sie es fühlen – nein, es ist ein Mit-einanderfühlen».49 Besonderen Nachdruck legt Scheler darauf, dass es beim Miteinanderfühlen nicht um das Hinzuaddieren meines traurigen oder freudigen Gefühls zu dem des Anderen geht, sondern um die Bezugnahme auf eine mit-teilende Erfahrung, die der Unterscheidung meiner Freude von der des Anderen vorangeht. Der Augenblick der Mit-Teilung ist weder meiner noch deiner, sondern ein Moment, in dem ich mich von meinem egologischen Pol loslasse und in der Begegnung mit der Andersheit die Geburt als Person fortsetze. Von solcher Begegnung auf der Ebene des Miteinandererlebens und -fühlens, und nicht auf der psychischen Ebene der inneren Gemütsstimmung des Subjekts, rührt die exzentrische Abweichung von dem common sense und common feeling. Die Bildung ist ein Prozess, in dem die Person sich von dem eigenen „kontingenten Selbst", einschliesslich des sozialen Selbst, loslöst und durch die Teilnahme an der Ebene des Miteinanderfühlens dazu gelangt, zusammen mit dem Anderen im Mitvollzug des Aktes geboren zu werden. Im Miteinanderfühlen zählt weder das, was für mich als Subjekt der sozialen Anerkennung wichtig ist, noch das, was die Grenzen meines Egos erweitert, sondern das, was die Intensität und den Wert des Miteinandererlebens steigert. 7) Mit-Teilung der Gefühle als Fundament der sozialen Ontologie Schelers Sympathiebuch kann man auch als eine Pionierarbeit für die Phänomenologie und die Ontologie des Sozialen betrachten. In ihm ringt er darum, einen Zusammenhang zwischen Formen der Mit-Teilung der Gefühle und denen der sozialen Einheit zu finden. Die Tragweite dieser Reflexionen wird sichtbar, vor allem wenn man an die aktuelle Debatte über die soziale Ontologie und die we-intentionality denkt. John Searle hat darauf hingewiesen, dass sich die soziale Ontologie auf das Phänomen der kollektiven Intentionalität (oder we-intentionality), d.h. auf Formen der Mit-Teilung der Intention und des Glaubens stütze. Scheler hält nicht nur die Mit-Teilung der Intention und des Glaubens, dank des Miteinanderdenkens, -glaubens, -hoffens usw. für möglich,50 49 GW VII, 23. Vgl. auch GW II, 516. 50 Vgl. GW V, 377. 52 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 sondern auch die Mit-Teilung der Gefühle: Das Miteinanderfühlen ist z.B. ein sharing der Gefühle und der Gefühlsintentionen; ferner schlägt er vor, der Mit-Teilung der Gefühle eine zentrale Stellung in der sozialen Ontologie beizumessen; schliesslich überträgt er die Mit-Teilung der Gefühle auch auf die Tierwelt und sieht bei den Tieren rudimentäre Formen der sozialen Einheiten voraus.51 Im Formalismus bekundet Scheler die Absicht, das in der ersten Auflage des Sympathiebuchs dargestellte Schema in Richtung einer sozialen Ontologie zu entwickeln: Es gibt eine Theorie von allen möglichen sozialen Wesenseinheiten überhaupt, die voll zu entwickeln und dann zum Verständnis der faktischen sozialen Einheiten (Ehe, Familie, Volk, Nation usw.) anzuwenden das Grundproblem einer philosophischen Soziologie und die Voraussetzung jeder Sozialethik ausmacht. Wie die Vorrede sagt, gedenken wir diese Disziplin in einem besonderen Werke zu entwickeln.52 Gleich darauf folgend stellt Scheler eine zweite Version des Zusammenhangs zwischen Formen der Mit-Teilung der Gefühle und denen der sozialen Einheit zur Diskussion: 1) «Diejenige soziale Einheit, die sich (gleichzeitig) durch verständnisfreie sog. Ansteckung und unwillkürliche Nachahmung konstituiert. Sie heisst unter Tieren „Herde" und so sie unter Menschen stattfindet „Masse"»;53 2) «Diejenige soziale Einheit, die sich in einem so gearteten Miterleben resp. Nacherleben (Mitfühlen, Mitstreben, Mitdenken, Miturteilen usw.) konstituiert».54 Sie heisst «Lebensgemeinschaft»;55 3) Anders als bei der Herde und der Lebensgemeinschaft, bei denen Scheler eine unmittelbare Verbindung zwischen der Mit-Teilung der Gefühle und der Konstitution der sozialen Einheit feststellt, ist die 51 Vgl. GW II, 515 52 Ebd. Vgl. auch GW VIII, 437. 53 Vgl. GW II, 515. 54 Ebd. 55 Ebd., 516. 52 53 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 Verbindung bei der Gesellschaft durch einen bewussten Akt vermittelt: «In der Gesellschaft [...] an Stelle des Miteinandererlebens tritt mittelbare Verständigung über das von jedem zunächst „für sich" Erlebte».56 In diesem Sinne ist die Gesellschaft «als eine künstliche Einheit von Einzelnen zu definieren, in der kein ursprüngliches „Miteinandererleben" im früher charakterisierten Sinne stattfindet».57 Die Gesellschaft ist «im Unterschiede zu Lebensgemeinschaft [...] eine Einheit mündiger und selbstbewusster Einzelpersonen».58 Das, was die «Einzelperson» in der Gesellschaft kennzeichnet, ist die «Selbstverantwortlichkeit».59 In der Gesellschaft ist aber die Einzelperson keine echte unvertretbare Singularität, «sondern von Hause aus gleich und gleichwertig [...]. Unterschiede und Wertunterschiede erwachsen in ihr und zwischen ihren Elementen allein aus der verschiedenen Leistungswerten der Einzelnen in der Wertrichtung der der Gesellschaft korrelaten Werte des Angenehmen und Nützlichen».60 4) Die Gesamtperson, die sich auf einer solidaristischen Form der Mit-Teilung der Verantwortung («Mitverantwortlichkeit») aufbaut, der ihrerseits das Prinzip der im Akt des Liebens Gestalt annehmenden «unvertretbaren Solidarität» zugrunde liegt.61 Es handelt sich hierbei jedoch um einen der problematischsten Begriffe in Schelers Denken, die am schärfsten kritisiert wurden, und es war wohl kein Zufall, dass ihn Scheler selbst im Sympathiebuch nicht mehr benutzt. Viele Missverständnisse entstehen aus der Vermengung der trans-subjektiven Ebene, die man durch die Überwindung der egozentrischen Perspektive erreicht, mit der trans-personalen Ebene, die auf eine Annullierung der Singularität der Person deutet. Die Gesamtperson bei Scheler ist nicht trans-personal, sondern stellt den trans-subjektiven Raum dar, in dem zwei oder mehrere Einzelpersonen einander begegnen und interagieren. Dieses transsubjektive Moment hat eine Intentionalität, die nicht auf die Summe der 56 Ebd., 519. 57 Ebd., 517 58 Ebd., 518. 59 Ebd. 60 Ebd., 519. 61 Vgl. ebd., 523; GW X, 266. 54 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 Intentionalitäten der Einzelpersonen reduziert werden kann. Ich würde auch eine kollektivistische Interpretation dieses Begriffs der Gesamtperson ausschliessen. Ein höheres Risiko der kollektivistischen Wendung liegt meiner Meinung nach bei den ersten drei Formen der Mit-Teilung der Gefühle vor. Bei Scheler bleibt die Einzelperson auf die Gesamtperson irreduzibel, da sie durch «Unersetzbarkeit» und «Mitverantwortlichkeit» zu charakterisieren bleibt. Zwischen Gesamtperson und Einzelperson besteht vielmehr ein Korrelationsverhältnis. Was den entscheidenden Schritt von der dritten zur vierten Form der Mit-Teilung ausmacht, ist die «Mitverantwortlichkeit», die eine viel höhere Phase des Bewusstseins voraussetzt, das nicht nur rein intellektuell, sondern vor allem affektiv wirkt. Was hier auf dem Spiel steht, ist eine Umbildung der Existenz, die eine besondere Tèchne der Überwindung der selbstreferentiellen Perspektive des eigenen Ego, einschliesslich der Erschütterung der Evidenz des common sense – in Schelers Terminologie der «relativ natürlichen Weltanschauung» – voraussetzt: die Tèchne der phänomenologischen Reduktion.62 Bis zu einem gewissen Punkt folgte das Individuum dem common sense und common feeling. Die kollektive Intentionalität oder we-intentionality entspricht den ersten drei Formen der Mit-Teilung, während der Gesamtperson keine „kollektive Intentionalität" zukommt, die die Verantwortlichkeit der Einzelperson tilgen würde. In der vierten Form der Mit-Teilung wird das Individuum eine unvertretbare und mitverantwortliche Singularität, getreu dem Prinzip der Solidarität: Dieses Prinzip besagt, dass in dem Masse, in dem die Wertordnung realisiert wird durch menschliches Handeln [...], und in dem Masse, als sie nicht realisiert wird und ihr entgegengewollt wird, jeder Mensch für sich als Individuum mitverantwortlich ist, und zwar in der höchsten Form, die das Prinzip annehmen kann, unvertretbar, das heisst ganz individuell mitverantwortlich ist. Nach diesem Prinzip der „Gegenseitigkeit" ist jeder an unver62 Um die Selbstverständlichkeit der natürlichen Evidenz zu überwinden, in der das kontingente Selbst gefangen bleibt, gibt es Scheler zufolge drei Weisen, denen drei Arten der Reduktion entsprechen: wissenschaftliche, dionysische und phänomenologische Reduktion (vgl. GW XI, 251). Vgl. G. cusInato, Person und Selbsttranszendenz ..., 124-136. 54 55 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 gleichlich viel mehr Dingen „schuld", hat aber auch an viel mehr guten Dingen verdienstlich mitgewirkt, als er selbst je wissen kann. Unendlich ist die Kette der Wirkungen nach dem Gegenseitigkeitsprinzip.63 In der zweiten Auflage des Sympathiebuchs zählt Scheler erneut vier Formen der Mit-Teilung der Gefühle auf: 1) Einsfühlung (ein Terminus, der in der Ausgabe 1913 nicht erschien) bzw. Gefühlsansteckung; 2) Nachfühlung (ein Begriff, den Scheler anstelle der Einfühlung einführt, um vor allem die eigene Position von der Theodor Lipps' besser abzuheben); 3) Mitgefühl und 4) Liebe. Man kann annehmen, dass der Einsfühlung die Herde und Masse, der Nachfühlung die Lebensgemeinschaft und dem Mitgefühl die Gesellschaft jeweils entspricht. Anders als mit den ersten drei Formen, steht es kompliziert mit der vierten Form der sozialen Einheit. Wie man sofort sehen kann, verzichtet Scheler auf den Begriff der Gesamtperson, so dass viele Interpreten den Eindruck bekamen, er wolle die vierte Form der sozialen Einheit unbestimmt lassen. Kann man behaupten, dass Scheler nach seiner Verfassung des Formalismus die vierte Form der sozialen Einheit schlichtweg herausgestrichen hat? In Wahrheit nimmt er in der zweiten Auflage des Sympathiebuchs genau dieselbe Frage auf, die er in der oben angeführten Stelle aus dem Formalismus gestellt hatte.64 Hier werden die vier Formen vollständig genannt: 1) Herde, Horde oder Masse; 2) Lebensgemeinschaft (primär Familie); 3) Gesellschaft, und 4) «Gemeinschaft unersetzbarer geistiger Personen».65 Man kann im Rahmen dieses Beitrags nicht bei zahlreichen Diskussionen um diese Unterscheidungen verweilen. Ich beschränke mich auf die Bemerkung, dass unter der Berücksichtigung dieser Seiten aus dem Sympathiebuch die Behauptung nicht korrekt ist, für Scheler gehe die Gemeinschaft der Gesellschaft voran: Nur die Lebensgemeinschaft, und nicht die Persongemeinschaft, geht der Gesellschaft voran. 63 GW XIII, 58. 64 Hier bezieht sich Scheler auf die «verschiedenartigen Wesensformen von Gruppen, die wir in der Wesenslehre der menschlich-sozialen Gruppen – wie ich schon in meinem Buche über Formalismus in der Ethik zu begründen begonnen habe – unterscheiden müssen» (GW VII, 214). 65 GW VII, 214. 56 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 Auch bezüglich des viel umstrittenen Begriffs der Gesamtperson möchte ich gleich den Kern der Frage treffen: Was für eine Bedeutung hat die Mit-Teilung auf der Ebene der vierten Form der sozialen Einheit? Führt sie eine Auflösung der personalen Singularität mit sich? Wer fühlt eigentlich im Miteinanderfühlen: die Einzelpersonen oder ein neues trans-personales Subjekt? Und, wenn wir zugeben, dass es nicht um ein trans-personales Subjekt, sondern um Einzelpersonen geht, fühlen diese Personen ein einziges Erlebnis oder zwei unterschiedliche Erlebnisse? Bezüglich dieser Fragen kann man bei Scheler eine gewisse Zweideutigkeit feststellen, auf die mit Recht viele Forscher hinweisen: Einerseits scheint er zu meinen, dass es ein einziges Gefühl gibt, das zwei Personen miteinander erleben, wenn er etwa im Formalismus beobachtet: «Der Gehalt des Miteinandererlebens ist in der „Gemeinschaft" ein wahrhaft identischer Gehalt»,66 oder wenn er im Sympathiebuch den Fall beider Eltern vor dem Sarg ihres Kindes analysiert;67 andererseits besteht er darauf, dass jedes Erlebnis jeder Person anders gegeben ist, da jede Person eine absolute Intimsphäre hat: Darum kann uns auch noch gegeben sein, dass der andere ein individuelles Ich hat, das von unserem verschieden ist, und dass wir dieses individuelle Ich, wie es in jedem seelischen Erleben steckt, nie voll adäquat erfassen können, sondern immer nur unseren durch unser individuelles Wesen mitbedingten Aspekt seines individuellen Ich. Auch dass der „andere" – wie wir selbst – eine absolute Intimsphäre seines Ich hat, die uns nie gegeben sein kann, ist mit diesem Wesenszusammenhang gesetzt.68 Angesichts dieser offensichtlich schwer lösbaren Aporie halte ich es für eine triftige Alternative, die vierte Form der Mit-Teilung als Grundlage für den besonderen Individuationsprozess der Person zu verstehen.69 Um diese Problem zu beheben, sucht Scheler selbst eine Lösung, als er in der zweiten Auflage des Sympathiebuchs seine Aufmerksamkeit von dem Begriff der Gesamtperson auf den der Unersetzbarkeit der 66 GW II, 516. 67 Vgl. GW VII, 23-24. 68 Ebd., 20 f. 69 Vgl. G. cusInato, Periagoge ..., 238-246. 56 57 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 Person verschiebt. Im Moment des Miteinandererlebens löst sich die Singularität der Person keineswegs auf, sondern kommt im Gegenteil in ihrer spezifischen und unnachahmlichen Form zur Geltung. Wie kann man mit diesem Widerspruch umgehen? Meiner Ansicht nach ist es problematisch zu meinen, dass zwei Einzelpersonen beim oben erwähnten Fall ein und dasselbe durchgehend „identische" Erlebnis hätten. Die Behauptung, dass jede von beiden ihr eigenes Erlebnis habe, das unabhängig von dem der anderen Person entstehe, ist nun auch nicht vertretbar. Die Frage soll man nicht vom statischen, sondern vom dynamischen Standpunkt aus betrachten. Im Moment der Begegnung entsteht ein einziges trans-subjektives Erlebnis, das in den jeweiligen Einzelpersonen verschiedene Prozesse der Umbildung anregt. Im Akt der Mit-Teilung erfolgt eine Abweichung vom jeweils eigenen Erlebnisfluss, die ein und dasselbe identische trans-subjektive Miteinandererleben zum Ausgangspunkt hat, woraufhin jede Einzelperson gemäss ihrem ordo amoris ihr jeweiliges Leben fortsetzt. Das Erlebnis des Miteinandererlebens ist nicht von den Einzelpersonen unabhängig; die jeweilige Einzelperson in diesem Erlebnis darf jedoch nicht mit einem selbstreferentiellen Selbst verwechselt werden. In anderen Worten: Am Anfang gibt es eine Mit-Teilung, ein und dasselbe Miteinandererleben, und gleich danach wieder zwei verschiedene Erlebnisströmungen. Was den Ausgangspunkt bildet, sind nicht zwei autonome Individuen, die sich summieren lassen, sondern ist die trans-subjektive Begegnung selbst beider Individuen, die über sich hinaus gehen und Rezeptionszentren werden. Im Augenblick der Begegnung verlassen zwei Personen den fatalistischen Weg des eigenen Schicksals (destino), um daraufhin ihre jeweilige neue Berufung, neue Sendung (destinazione) in Freiheit fortzuführen. Gleich nach der durch die Begegnung zustande gekommenen exzentrischen Abweichung von dem kontingenten Selbst scheidet sich der Weg in neue expressive, singularisierende Pfade, da gewisse Erlebnisse offensichtlich nur der jeweiligen, besonderen Person zugänglich bleiben. Am Anfang steht kein metaphysisches trans-personales Subjekt, das die personalen Singularitäten nivellieren würde, sondern eine trans-subjektive Begegnung, die sich durch eine Epoché der jeweiligen selbstreferentiellen Subjekte, und keineswegs durch die Annullierung 58 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 der Einzelperson, verwirklicht. In der Mit-Teilung eines Aktes oder eines Erlebnisses auf der trans-subjektiven Ebene gibt es kein selbständiges Subjekt mehr, das, von seinem selbstreferentiellen egologischen Pol ausgehend, handelt, fühlt und sich erst danach dessen bewusst wird, dass auch ein anderes Subjekt denselben Akt vollzieht oder dasselbe Erlebnis hat. Vielmehr befinden sich hier zwei Personen, denen es gelungen ist, sich aus dem egologischen Pol zu befreien, der sich durch die vorigen drei Formen der Mit-Teilung herausgebildet hat, so dass sie einander in der solidarischen und trans-subjektiven Form der MitTeilung begegnen. Schelers Theorie der absoluten Intimsphäre der Person verweist deutlich darauf, dass jede an der Mit-Teilung teilnehmende Person von dem Standpunkt ihres unersetzbaren ordo amoris her dieses Miteinandererleben metabolisiert und deswegen eine präzise Mitverantwortlichkeit für dieses Erlebnis hat. Daraus lässt sich meines Erachtens kein Rückfall auf eine intimistisch-private Konzeption der Person folgern. In der vierten Form der Mit-Teilung geschieht etwas vollkommen Neues: In der Mit-Teilung eines Aktes oder eines Gefühls mit dem Anderen geht die Person nicht nur über ihr selbstreferentielles Selbst hinaus, sondern erlebt eine weitere Geburt. Die Mit-Teilung wird ebendeshalb ein anthropogenetischer Akt. In der Mit-Teilung eines bedeutsamen Gefühls oder Erlebnisses mit einer anderen Person bin ich nicht mehr das, was ich vorher gewesen bin, sondern werde weiter geboren. Der Andere, der mich als Rezeptionszentrum empfängt, wird zum „Schoss" meiner weiteren Geburt. Wenn keine weitere Geburt geschehen sollte, würde sich das Miteinandererleben in ein und dasselbe statische Erlebnis übersetzen. In meinem Weiter-geboren-Werden hingegen wird es zu einem anderen Erlebnis auch für mich selbst. 8) Mit-Teilung der Geburt als Fundament der Ontologie der Person Die Mit-Teilung liegt nicht nur einer sozialen Ontologie, sondern auch einer Ontologie der Person zugrunde. Den verschiedenen Formen der Mit-Teilung sowie der sozialen Einheit entsprechen nämlich verschiedene Individuationsprozesse. Ich möchte die These vertreten, dass, während die drei ersten Formen der Mit-Teilung der Sympathie – Einsfühlung (bzw. Gefühlsan58 59 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 steckung), Nachfühlung und Mitgefühl – die Individuationsprozesse des sozialen Selbst betreffen, die vierte Form der Mit-Teilung den Individuationsprozess der Person prägt. Durch die Praxis der drei ersten Formen der Mit-Teilung hebt sich ein Kind aus der auf das Wir zentrierten Sphäre der Einsfühlung empor und gewinnt allmählich das Bewusstsein des Du und des Ich. Diese Individuationsprozesse des sozialen Selbst erreichen ihren Höhepunkt in der dritten Form der sozialen Einheit, in der Gesellschaft, in der die Mit-Teilung als Mitgefühl vollzogen wird, das Scheler nicht zufällig mit der Anerkennung,70 d.h. mit dem Kampf um die soziale Anerkennung, in Verbindung setzt. In der sich in dem durch das Mitgefühl freigelegten Raum vollziehenden MitTeilung strebt das Individuum danach, von dem Anderen anerkannt zu werden. Diesem Typus der Mit-Teilung entspricht ein Individuationsprozess, der noch auf den Aufbau des selbstreferentiellen Subjekts zielt. Die vierte Form der Mit-Teilung hingegen geschieht durch die Akte des Liebens und des Hassens und kehrt die Richtung der Anerkennung um. Dank der Epoché des Ego und der Praxis der vierten Form der Mit-Teilung wird das Individuum ein personales Rezeptionszentrum. In der Haltung der Demut bringt die Person der Andersheit eine andere Art von Anerkennung entgegen: Sie verlangt nicht mehr nach sozialer Anerkennung, sondern umgekehrt erkennt die Andersheit in ihrer Veranlagung der Ehrfurcht an und macht sich bereit, mit ihr die weitere Geburt zu teilen. Die vierte Form der Mit-Teilung ist nichts anderes als die Mit-Teilung der weiteren Geburt, die mit dem der Anthropogenese der Person zugrunde liegenden Individuationsprozess Schritt für Schritt einhergeht. Wenn die Person in der Mit-Teilung eines Aktes, eines Erlebnisses usw. dem Anderen begegnet, setzt sie sich in eine transsubjektive Dimension, in der nicht die eigene Singularität, sondern der eigene Egozentrismus getilgt wird. In der Offenheit der Begegnung mit der Andersheit entdeckt die Person jenen Raum für ihre weitere Geburt, den sie in ihrer selbstreferentiellen Perspektive nicht finden konnte. Die Person kann ihre stete Geburt nur in der Begegnung mit dem Anderen fortsetzen, und zwar im Raum der solidarischen Mit-Teilung, in dem der Akt mitvollzogen wird. Die Ontologie der Person veranlasst also 70 Vgl. M. schlossberger, Die Erfahrung des Anderen. Gefühle im menschlichen Miteinander, Berlin 2005, 199-208. 60 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 eine Praxis der solidarischen Mit-Teilung mit der Andersheit. Die Tragweite der solidarischen Bedeutung der Mit-Teilung begreift man, sobald man die Person vom Standpunkt des Unersetzlichkeitsprinzips aus zu betrachten beginnt.71 Der Akt der Mit-Teilung führt nicht zur Annullierung der Singularität der Person, sondern zur Kräftigung derselben. Er stimmt mit dem Individuationsprozess überein, der die Person unersetzbar und daher einzigartig macht. Dieser Prozess steht in Wechselbeziehung mit der vierten Form der sozialen Einheit – der «Gemeinschaft unersetzbarer geistiger Personen» – und bringt eine ursprüngliche Mitverantwortlichkeit der Person mit sich. Jede solidarische Mit-Teilung eines bedeutsamen Aktes oder Gefühls birgt in sich einen weiteren Schritt zur Geburt und zur Fortführung des Individuationsprozesses der betroffenen Personen und nimmt somit eine anthropogenetische Funktion an. Sie bildet meine Singularität und die der mich umgebenden Personen. 9) Gefühle: Die selbstreferentielle, zentrische Natur und die anthropogenetische, ex-zentrische Natur Haben alle Gefühle dieselbe Natur und folgen derselben Logik? Michael Lewis hat in seinem Buch Shame. The Exposed Self 1992, ausgehend von der Analyse der Scham, eine Gruppe der primären Emotionen (non-self-conscious-emotions), die keine Prozesse der Selbstbewusstwerdung brauchen, von einer Gruppe der sekundären Emotionen (selfconscious-emotions) wie Scham oder Schuldgefühl unterschieden, in denen das Selbstbewusstsein mitwirkt. Lewis' Kriterium scheint mir jedoch noch zu sehr an die Zentralität des Selbstbewusstseins gebunden. Wenn man das, was die Person als ontologisch neue Entität kennzeichnet, nicht im Selbstbewusstsein, sondern, wie oben vorgeschlagen, in der plastischen Mit-Teilung der weiteren Geburt finden kann, dann sollte auch die vierte Klasse der Gefühle, die Scheler „geistige Gefühle" oder „Persönlichkeitsgefühle" nennt,72 im Hinblick auf die vierte Art der Praxis der Mit-Teilung analysiert werden. Im ökologischen Selbst leiten Angst, Schmerz oder Lust das 71 Zum «Unersetzlichkeitsprinzip» bei Scheler vgl. G. cusInato, Person und Selbsttranszendenz ..., 140-141. 72 Vgl. GW II, 344. 60 61 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 «Leibschema».73 Ohne dieses Schema würden alle Bewegungsmöglichkeiten vom Leib als bedeutungslos und folglich gleichgültig wahrgenommen. Die ersten zwei Gefühlklassen – „sinnliche Gefühle"; „Leibgefühle" oder „Vitalgefühle" – haben die Funktion, die Wechselwirkung mit der Umwelt zu regeln. Auf der Ebene des sozialen Selbst erfüllen die „seelischen Gefühle" eine Aufgabe, die sich auf die Erweiterung der eigenen sozialen Anerkennung richtet. Dabei wird die selbstreferentielle Logik der Antwortreaktion nicht gänzlich überwunden, da man ihr z.B. im Neid oder Ressentiment weiterhin folgt. Die Natur des Gefühls ändert sich zutiefst, wenn es sich auf die „Persönlichkeitsgefühle" bezieht. Liebe und Hass, Seligkeit und Verzweiflung dienen nicht dazu, die Wechselwirkung mit der Umwelt (wie beim ökologischen Selbst) oder den Kampf um die soziale Anerkennung (wie beim sozialen Selbst) zu regeln, sondern lenken vor allem die vierte Art der Praxis der Mit-Teilung, die die Geburt der Personen sowie der Gemeinschaft der Personen ermöglicht. Auf der Ebene des Personzentrums erfüllt das Gefühl also nicht mehr eine ökologische oder psychologische, sondern eine plastische und anthropogenetische Funktion: Es fördert oder hemmt die stete Geburt, die ein fundamentales Element für die soziale Ontologie und die Ontologie der Person darstellt. Wenn dies stimmt, dann besteht der entscheidende Unterschied nicht zwischen non-self-conscious-emotions und self-conscious-emotions, sondern zwischen der selbstreferentiellen, zentrischen Natur und der anthropogenetischen, exzentrischen Natur der Gefühle. 10) Kultivierung der Gefühle und Vorbild Um leichten Missverständnissen vorzubeugen, sollte man sofort jenen romantischen Mythos zurückweisen, der das unmittelbare Fühlen emphatisiert. Sehr oft begnügt sich das unmittelbare Fühlen in Wahrheit mit der blossen Widerspiegelung des Gemeingefühls, in dem es eingebettet ist. Die menschlichen Gefühle sind wie Sämlinge, die wachsen und sich entfalten müssen. Erst wenn sie blühen, sind sie imstande, sich in einen ordo amoris einzugliedern und das Personzentrum zur steten 73 Um den Unterschied zwischen Leib und Körper herauszustreichen, spricht Scheler nicht, wie Paul Schilder, vom «Körperschema», sondern vom «Leibschema». Zum Begriff des «Leibschemas» vgl. GW VIII, 316; GW IX, 34, 218. 62 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 Geburt hin wirksam zu leiten. Dieser Bildungsprozess impliziert keine autoritär erzieherische, von oben herabblickende Handlung der „Berichtigung". Es gibt kein abstraktes Ideal, dem man die Entfaltung der Gefühle anpassen müsste, da diese nicht irrational, sondern – mehr oder weniger reife und wirksame – Stellungnahmen gegenüber den Werten sind. Ausdrücklich setzt Scheler die Gefühle mit der Wertnehmung in Zusammenhang, die Vorstellungen und Urteilen vorangeht und nicht von dem Willen modifiziert werden kann, sondern im Gegenteil den letzten Bezugsrahmen des Willens ausmacht. Die plastische Kultivierung der Gefühle und der Emotionen vollzieht sich durch die vierte Form der Praxis der Mit-Teilung. Aufgrund der menschlichen Plastizität erweist sich die solidarische Mit-Teilung der vierten Art nicht nur als Mit-Teilung der Gefühle, sondern vor allem als Mit-Teilung der Kultivierung (bzw. Bildung) der Gefühle, die dank des Mitvollzugs der Akte geschieht und auf das Vorbild der Andersheit verweist. Mit dem „Vorbild" bezeichne ich eine Andersheit, die durch ihre Akte eine gelungene Metabolisierung der Gefühle zeigt und durch ihre Vorbildwirksamkeit eine solidarische Mit-Teilung der steten Geburt ermöglicht. Im Akt des Liebens kann z.B. eine Person zum Pionier werden, der den Horizont der Werterfahrung erweitert. Wie Scheler bemerkt, ist für den Menschen «die Entwicklungsfähigkeit des Wertfühlens eine unbegrenzte [...]. Indem sich sein Fühlen entwickelt, schreitet er erst in die Wertfülle der vorhandenen Werte hinein».74 Je mehr der Mensch diese axiologische Erweiterung mit-teilt, desto mehr entwickeln sich die Beziehungen innerhalb einer Persongemeinschaft, desto mehr bildet sich anthropogenetisch die Singularität verschiedener Personen. Die Person, die die Mit-Teilung eines Wertes besser fördert, wird bezüglich der Erfahrung dieses Wertes vorbildwirksamer. Kraft dieses Vorbildcharakters ist jede weitere, von einer Person ermöglichte Werterfahrung eine Hilfe bei der Bildung und dem Wachstum anderer Personen. Jeder gelungene Schritt im Bildungsprozess einer Person kann für die Entwicklung der Singularität der anderen Personen vorbildwirksam werden. Scheler zufolge ist jede personale, vorbildwirksa74 GW II, 272. Über das Vorbild als neuen Auftakt der Ethik bei Max Scheler vgl. g. cusInato, Person und Selbsttranszendenz ..., 172-187. 62 63 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 me Singularität für die Erweiterung der gesamten axiologischen Erfahrungsgrenze «unersetzlich».75 Der Terminus Vorbild meint hier etwas ganz anderes als Modell. Das Vorbild zeigt durch seine Existenz und Akte, dass ein Akt der solidarischen Mit-Teilung möglich ist, während das Modell gemäss der Girardschen Logik des mimetischen Begehrens handelt. Das Vorbild setzt eine Epoché des Ego voraus und impliziert deswegen ein con-ducere, eine gemeinsam vollzogene Mit-Teilung des Hungers nach Geburt, während das Modell auf ein se-ducere, also darauf aus ist, die Andersheit auf das eigene Selbst zurückzuführen, um sie zu nivellieren. Das Vorbild wird mithin „universell", nicht insofern es all diejenigen, die es ansteckt, dem gleichen Modell ähnlicher macht, sondern insofern es sie einzigartiger und individueller werden lässt. Die Kraft des Vorbildes, die im Sinne der „Mit-Teilung" wirkt, kann in diesem Fall zum Auftakt für eine neue Art von nicht oppositiver Logik werden. Sie wirkt durch „Überredung", d.h. indem sie die Konflikte, die ansonsten zu Zusammenstössen führen könnten, nicht auf die selbstreferentielle Verstärkung der psychischen und sozialen Identität hin, sondern auf die Förderung personaler Umbildung hin leitet. Das Vorbild ist immer dort gegenwärtig, wo diese geistige Verschiebung geschieht. Wo es eine intentionale Abweichung vom Streit um blosse psychische und soziale Anerkennung gibt, dort wirkt die Kraft eines Vorbildes. Durch das Vorbild werden die unterschiedlichen Perspektiven nicht zu einem oppositiven oder gar militärischen Konflikt geführt, sondern münden in einer solidarischen Mit-Teilung. 11) Mit-Teilung und care: die Ehrfurcht Das Konzept der Mit-Teilung kann auch auf den Begriff der care neues Licht werfen.76 Die entscheidende Gewichtigkeit der care in der 75 «Im Actus der Liebe erscheinen wesensnotwendig mögliche Werte an etwas (in der Richtung des „Höheren"), die ohne diesen Actus (für Vorziehen und Fühlen) nicht erscheinen» (GW X, 234). 76 Es ist bekannt, dass die «Sorge» nicht zu den Termini der philosophischen Anthropologie Schelers gehört. Das heisst jedoch nicht, dass die im Begriff der Sorge enthaltene anthropogenetische Problematik – «das „In-der-Welt-sein" hat die seinsmässige Prägung der „Sorge"» (M. heIdegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen 1967, 198) – in Schelers Denken nicht vorhanden wäre. Sie wird im Begriff des Menschen als Ergebnis 64 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 Gesellschaft darf nicht unterschätzt werden. Es ist die care, die die Gesellschaft zustande bringt: Ohne Pflege – im Sinne von Kranken-, Altenund Säuglingspflege – und ohne Solidarität mit den am Rande der Gesellschaft Existierenden würde keine Gesellschaft dauerhaft bestehen.77 In der aktuellen Debatte über die ethics of care wird der Zusammenhang der Gefühle mit der care überwiegend im Hinblick auf die Einfühlung betrachtet.78 Nur mithilfe einer präzisen Phänomenologie der verschiedenen Formen der Mit-Teilung der Gefühle kann man allerdings den voreiligen Sprung von der verwickelten Frage nach dem Verhältnis der Gefühle mit der care zu einer übermässigen Emphase der Einfühlung vermeiden. Die Einfühlung allein – verstanden als Vermögen, das von dem Anderen Erlebte als solches zu fühlen und zu verstehen – kann jedoch nicht genügen, um die care zu begründen: Ein Sadist hat hoch entwickeltes Einfühlungsvermögen, das er keineswegs für eine pflegende Sorge um die Andersheit einsetzt. Ausser Einfühlung wirken bei der Praxis der care Gefühle wie Liebe, Geduld, Ehrlichkeit, Vertrauen, Demut und Hoffnung mit, zu denen man zumindest noch Verwunderung, Brüderlichkeit und Mitleid hinder «Bildung» entfaltet. Man muss ferner bemerken, dass sich Scheler von Heidegger kritisch distanziert. Scheler zufolge ist es allzu reduktiv, den emotionalen Durchbruch, mit dem der Mensch sich in die Welt positioniert, auf die Angst zu gründen. Die Triebfeder für Scheler ist vielmehr der Eros (GW IX, 272). Schelers Kritik richtet sich also nicht unmittelbar auf die Sorge selbst im Sinne der Platonischen epimeleia, sondern auf die mit der Angst untermauerte Sorge bei Heidegger. Eine derartige Sorge würde nach Scheler den Menschen unweigerlich in die Umweltgeschlossenheit einkerkern und ihn daran hindern, an die Weltoffenheit zu gelangen (Vgl. GW IX, 277-278). Scheler beobachtet weiterhin bezüglich Heidegger: «Aber eben da die Angst bannt und fixiert, kann sie auch nicht der Motor für den Progress der Teilhabe, des Wissens – und Erkennens sein. Im Gegenteil: Sie wirkt diesem Progress entgegen und ist die Nahrung aller Illusionen [...]. Der Eros, nicht die Angst ist das Vehikel steigender Teilhabe und des Erkenntnisprozesses. Vor dem Eros öffnet sich die Welt» (GW IX, 272). 77 Die Denkrichtungen der feminist care ethics und der ethics of care haben zweifelslos einen der wichtigsten konkreten Anstösse zur aktuellen Debatte über die care gegeben. Ich denke dabei vor allem an die folgenden Arbeiten: J. C. tronto, Moral Boundaries: a Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, New York 1993; R. groen- hout, Connected Lives. Human Nature and an Ethics of Care, Lanham (MD) 2004; E. PulcInI, Care of the World: Fear, Responsibility and Justice in the Global Age, Dordrecht 2013. 78 Unter den neueren Arbeiten siehe M. slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, London 2007. 64 65 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 zufügen kann. Was haben all diese Gefühle gemein, die für die vierte Form der Mit-Teilung massgeblich sind? Man kann sich an eines der wenigen Merkmale erinnern, die Platon dem Göttlichen zuschreibt, dass es nämlich «neidlos» (aphthonos) handelt.79 Dasselbe Konzept der Neidlosigkeit stellt sich auch in Bezug auf den philosophischen Dialog heraus: Mit Mühe nur, wenn jedes von ihnen [den hier im Anschluss aufgezählten Gegenständen, G. C.] am anderen getrieben wird – Benennungen, Erklärungen, Ansichten und Wahrnehmungen – und wenn es in wohlwollenden Prüfungen geprüft wird, und von Menschen, die ohne Missgunst (aneu phthonon) fragen und antworten, leuchten Einsicht und Verständnis über jeden Gegenstand auf, wenn man sich anspannt, soweit es in menschlichem Vermögen steht.80 Die Neidlosigkeit folgt einer anderen Logik als das mimetische Begehren Girards und ist imstande, die Blüte des Anderen zu bewundern. In der care wird aber doch noch nach etwas Anderem gefragt. Wie kann man andernfalls die Präsenz der Gefühle wie Ekel, Abscheu oder Mitleid erklären? Die care nimmt die Entwicklung und Reifung aller affektiven Schichten in Anspruch. Neben Einfühlung und Neidlosigkeit fühlt die Person hier die Mitverantwortung, die sich auf die MitTeilung des Aktes gründet, durch den sie das eigene selbstreferentielle Ego überwindet und der Scheler zufolge mit der phänomenologischen Reduktion übereinstimmt: Es liegen der phänomenologischen Reduktion Gefühle wie Demut und Ehrfurcht zugrunde.81 Demut als tèchne der Ausschaltung des Egozentrismus und Ehrfurcht im Sinne der Achtung vor dem Anderen stellen für ihn zwei zentrale Tugenden dar, da wir durch sie lernen, nicht dem, was besitzt und erobert werden kann, 79 Tim. 29e. 80 Epist. 7, 344b. Zitiert nach: Platon, Werke in acht Bänden, hg. v. G. eIgler, Bd. V, bearb. v. D. Kurz, dt. Übers. v. F. Schleiermacher und D. Kurz, Darmstadt 1990. 81 Zum Begriff der Ehrfurcht bei Scheler vgl. G. cusInato, Person und Selbsttranszendenz ..., 119-120. Die folgende Arbeit entfaltet sich in einer mit Schelers Analysen konvergierenden Perspektive: E. housset, L'intelligence de la pitié. Phénoménologie de la communauté, Paris 2003. Der Terminus Ehrfurcht steht auch im Mittelpunkt der Reflexion Albert Schweitzers (1875-1965). Vgl. A. schweItZer, Die Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben. Grundtexte aus fünf Jahrzehnten, München 1966, 20. 66 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 sondern dem, was uns umbilden kann, Wert zu schenken.82 Die Übung der Demut erlaubt dem Menschen, von der Logik der Anspannung, d.i. der Erweiterung des Ego, zu der Logik der Entspannung überzugehen.83 Damit jedoch dieser Übergang geschehen kann, muss die Demut von der Ehrfurcht begleitet werden. In der Ehrfurcht führe ich das, was mich umgibt, weder auf mich zurück, noch strebe ich danach, es zu besitzen. Vielmehr wird in ihr sichtbar, was Schelling bekanntlich als «unheimlich» bezeichnet,84 d.h. was in seiner irreduziblen Andersheit anerkannt wird und gerade deswegen Unruhe herbeiführt. Wie Scheler sagt, wo immer wir zur ehrfürchtigen Haltung gegenüber den Dingen übergehen, da sehen wir, wie ihnen etwas hinzuwächst, was sie vorher nicht besassen; wie etwas an ihnen sichtbar und fühlbar wird, was vorher fehlte: Eben dies „Etwas" ist ihr Geheimnis, ist ihre Werttiefe. Es sind die zarten Fäden, in denen sich jedes Ding in das Reich des Unsichtbaren hineinerstreckt. [...] Die Ehrfurcht ist die einzige und notwendige Haltung des Gemütes, in der diese „Fäden ins Unsichtbare hinein" zur geistigen Sichtbarkeit gelangen.85 Die Ehrfurcht bringt den Menschen aus der vergegenständlichenden Perspektive hinaus und führt in unsere Erfahrung eine weitere Dimension ein, indem sie uns die Phänomene als nicht nur im optischen Sinne vielseitige Gegenstände sehen lässt. Durch die Ehrfurcht lernen wir, Phänomene in einem anderen Licht zu erblicken und uns über sie zu wundern. 12) Mit-Teilung der Expressivität als Grundlage der Phänomenologie der Andersheit Die Theorie des Zusammenhangs zwischen der Praxis der Mit-Teilung der Gefühle und der Entstehung der verschiedenen Formen der so82 Vgl. GW III, 13-31. 83 Vgl. G. cusInato, Person und Selbsttranszendenz ..., 122-123. 84 «Unheimlich nennt man alles, was im Geheimniss, im Verborgnen, in der Latenz bleiben sollte und hervorgetreten ist» (F.W.J. schellIng, Philosophie der Mythologie, SW XII, 649). Diese Stelle zog die Aufmerksamkeit sowohl Freuds als auch Heideggers auf sich. 85 GW III, 26. 66 67 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 zialen Einheiten knüpft an den Gedanken einer ursprünglicheren Form der Mit-Teilung der Expressivität an, die alle Lebewesen mit einbezieht. Der Terminus «Expressivität» tritt allerdings nicht bei Scheler auf. Er steht im Zentrum der philosophischen Anthropologie Plessners und meint insbesondere das Ausdrucksbedürfnis, dem alle kulturellen Leistungen des Menschen entstammen. Hier verwende ich ihn im Sinne der „Ausdruckskraft" und verbinde ihn unmittelbar mit Schelers These des Primats des Ausdrucks, nämlich dass „Ausdruck" [...] das Allererste ist, was der Mensch an ausser ihm befindlichem Dasein erfasst, und dass er irgendwelche sinnliche Erscheinungen zunächst nur soweit und insofern erfasst, als sich seelische Ausdruckseinheiten in ihnen „darzustellen" vermögen. [...] Primär ist alles überhaupt Gegebene „Ausdruck".86 Diesen Satz sollte man zusammen mit dem bereits zitierten lesen, demzufolge alles primäre Verhalten zur Welt überhaupt ein emotionales Verhalten ist.87 Aufgrund seiner These des Vorrangs des Wertnehmens vor dem Wahrnehmen,88 ist Scheler davon überzeugt, dass «das Fühlen seinerseits von Hause aus ein „objektivierender Akt" ist, der keiner Vorstellung als Vermittlers bedarf».89 Das Fühlen bezieht sich auf die Ebene der Expressivität durch sein unmittelbares Zustreben auf den Wert, da der Wert derjenige ist, der das Sichgeben des Phänomens zustande bringt. Das Fühlen vernimmt also den Wert nicht als Vorstellung irgendeiner Eigenschaft, die einem schon in seiner Gegebenheit dargestellten Phänomen sekundär zuzuschreiben wäre, sondern als ersten Boten des Phänomens.90 Der Wert ist das Urphänomen, das apriorisch das Sichoffenbaren des Phänomens selbst regelt und bestimmt. Die Thematik des Kantischen Apriori wird somit radikal unter anderem Licht gedacht als materiales, empirisches Apriori. Daraus folgt, dass die Regeln, die die expressive Gegebenheit eines Phänomens bestimmen, nicht von den Verstandeskategorien des Subjekts abhängen: Das mate86 GW VII, 233. 87 Vgl. ebd., 206. 88 Vgl. GW II, 206; 209; GW VII, 41; GW VIII, 109. 89 GW II, 265. 90 Vgl. G. cusInato, Person und Selbsttranszendenz ..., 140-142. 68 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 riale Apriori der Empfindung ist in der Triebstruktur des Leibs zu finden und verweist auf die Semiose, die den Zusammenhang zwischen Organismus und Umwelt anordnet; die Erfahrung des sozialen Selbst wird durch den common sense und das common feeling im Voraus bestimmt; der existentielle Horizont der Person schliesslich wird durch ihren ordo amoris bestimmt und durch die Erfahrungen funktionalisiert, die für die Bildung der Person relevant sind. 13) Die unmittelbare Wahrnehmung der Expressivität des Anderen In der aktuellen Diskussion über die Phänomenologie der Andersheit erhält die Kritik, die Scheler 1913 an der Simulationsund Analogieschlusstheorie übte, zunehmend Anerkennung. Insbesondere gilt seine Annahme einer unmittelbaren Wahrnehmung der Expressivität des Anderen nunmehr als eine triftige Alternative zur Theory Theory und Simulation Theory.91 Schelers Annahme gründet jedoch auf einer Reihe von Voraussetzungen, die heutzutage noch wenig bekannt sind, etwa auf der Unterscheidung des Leibs vom Körper und der Einsicht, dass der Leib als Ausdrucksfeld der Intentionalität des Lebensgefühls betrachtet werden könne: Während die sinnlichen Gefühle sich weiterhin als mehr oder weniger tote Zustände darstellen, hat das Lebensgefühl immer schon funktionalen und intentionalen Charakter. Die sinnlichen Gefühle mögen sich [...] als „Anzeichen" für gewisse Zustände und Prozesse in Organen und Geweben darstellen [...]. Damit gelangen sie nicht über jenen toten Zustandscharakter hinaus. Dagegen fühlen wir im Lebensgefühl unser Leben selbst, d.h. es ist uns in diesem Fühlen etwas gegeben, sein „Aufstieg", sein „Niedergang", seine Krankheit und Gesundheit, seine „Gefahr" und seine „Zukunft".92 Bei dieser Intentionalität des Lebensgefühls liegt der Akzent nicht so sehr auf dem Leiblichen, wie es später bei Merleau-Ponty der Fall sein wird, sondern auf dem originellen und noch beunruhigenderen Begriff des Lebensdrangs. Nach Schelers Ansicht ist das Leibliche nicht das 91 Vgl. S. gallagher und D. ZahaVI, The Phenomenological Mind, London-New York, 2012, 201-202. 92 GW II, 342. 68 69 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 Letzte, worauf es ankommt, denn der Leib ist ein Ausdruck des Lebens, nicht das Leben ein Ausdruck des Leibes. Der Leib lebt, nicht weil er leiblich ist, er wird vielmehr durch eine Art „expressive Intentionalität" belebt. So wie Husserl in den Logischen Untersuchungen I von einer Bedeutungsintention spricht, die den physischen Aspekt des Ausdrucks (phonische Sequenz, Schriftzeichen usw.) zu beleben vermag, denkt Scheler an eine präkategorische expressive Intentionalität, die den Leib gegenüber dem Körper zum ontologisch Neuen macht und ihn lebendig werden lässt. Aufgrund dieser Intentionalität kann sich das Leibschema bilden. Auf diese Weise kann der Mensch die Expressivität des Anderen „unmittelbar" wahrnehmen, d.h. nicht unbedingt durch Vorstellungen und Begriffe vermittelt, da sie in der affektiv-emotionalen sowie in der sinnlich-motorischen Sphäre des Leibschemas verwurzelt – oder besser „embodied" – ist. Deswegen, beobachtet Scheler, kann auch ein neugeborenes Kind den Ausdruck der Mutter erkennen, ohne ihn vorher durch die logischen Inferenzen oder Analogieschlüsse rekonstruieren zu müssen. Alles, was uns gegeben ist, ist uns folglich gegeben in den Ausdrucksphänomenen – wiederum nicht durch Schluss, sondern „unmittelbar" – [...] im Sinne originären „Wahrnehmens": wir nehmen die Scham im Erröten wahr, im Lachen die Freude. Die Rede, es sei uns „zunächst nur ein Körper gegeben" ist völlig irrig. Nur dem Arzt oder dem Naturforscher ist so etwas gegeben, d.h. dem Menschen, soweit er künstlich von den ganzen primär gegebenen Ausdrucksphänomenen abstrahiert. [...] Wir können auch andere „innerlich wahrnehmen", insofern wir ihren Leib als Ausdrucksfeld für ihre Erlebnisse erfassen.93 Dank der unmittelbaren Wahrnehmung der Expressivität sehe ich [...] nicht nur „Augen" eines andern, sondern auch, „dass er mich ansieht", ja selbst, „dass er mich so ansieht, als wolle er vermeiden, dass ich sehe, dass er mich ansieht"! So nehme ich noch wahr, dass er zu fühlen nur „vorgibt", was er gar nicht fühlt, dass er das mir bekannte Band zwischen seinem Erleben und dessen „natürlichen Ausdruck" zerreisst und eine andere Ausdrucksbewegung an die Stelle setzt, wo sein Erleben ein bestimmtes Ausdrucksphänomen forderte. So vermag ich sein Lügen z.B. nicht nur durch den Nachweis zu wissen, er müsse gewusst ha93 GW VII, 21. 70 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 ben, was er anders darstellt, und die Sache verhalte sich anders, als er sagt – sondern unmittelbar vermag ich unter Umständen sein Lügen selbst wahrzunehmen, gleichsam den Aktus des Lügens selbst.94 Durch die These der unmittelbaren Wahrnehmung der Expressivität des Anderen entblösst sich jedoch der Andere keineswegs vollständig. Es gibt nämlich einen Kern im Anderen, der aufgrund der absoluten Singularität seiner Wertkonstellation unzugänglich bleibt. Ich kann daher das Erlebnis meines Freundes unmittelbar vernehmen, werde es aber allein von dem unersetzlichen Gesichtspunkt meines ordo amoris – und nicht von seinem – aus erleben: Darum kann uns auch noch gegeben sein, dass der andere ein individuelles Ich hat, das von unserem verschieden ist, und dass wir dieses individuelle Ich, wie es in jedem seelischen Erleben steckt, nie voll adäquat erfassen können, sondern immer nur unseren durch unser individuelles Wesen mitbedingten Aspekt seines individuellen Ich. Auch dass der „andere" – wie wir selbst – eine absolute Intimsphäre seines Ich hat, die uns nie gegeben sein kann, ist mit diesem Wesenszusammenhang gesetzt.95 Besonders wichtig ist die Kritik, die Scheler an der Simulationstheorie übt. Heutzutage interpretiert Vittorio Gallese das Phänomen der Spiegelneurone im Sinne einer embodied simulation, die an Theodor Lipps' Theorie der projektiven Einfühlung erinnern mag. Gerade diese Perspektive lehnt aber Scheler ab: Eine Simulation und eine Nachahmung setzen eine Synchronisierung meines Leibschemas mit dem des Anderen voraus. In seiner Kritik an Theodor Lipps bemängelt Scheler gleichsam ante litteram an der Simulationstheorie, dass sie das Problem nach vorne schiebe, statt es zu lösen, indem sie das voraussetze, was sie beweisen möchte: Die Nachahmung auch als blosse „Tendenz" setzt vielmehr irgendein Haben des fremden Erlebnisses schon voraus und kann schon darum nicht erklären, was sie hier erklären sollte. Ahmen wir z.B. (unwillkürlich) eine Gebärde der Furcht oder der Freude nach, so wird die Nachahmung nie bloss durch das optische 94 Ebd., 245-255. 95 GW VII, 20-21. 70 71 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 Bild dieser Gebärde ausgelöst, sondern immer erst dann tritt der Nachahmungsimpuls ein, wenn wir die Gebärde bereits als Ausdruck der Freude oder der Furcht erfasst haben. Soll – wie Theodor Lipps meint – diese Erfassung selbst erst möglich sein durch eine Nachahmungstendenz und die durch sie hervorgerufene Reproduktion einer früher erlebten Freude oder Furcht (+ projektive Einfühlung des so Reproduzierten in den anderen), so bewegen wir uns in einem offensichtlichen Zirkel. Das gilt auch für die „unwillkürliche" Nachahmung von Bewegungen. Sie setzt die Nachahmung der inneren Handlungsintention, die sich in ganz verschiedenen Bewegungen der Körperteile realisieren kann, bereits voraus.96 Von Schelers Standpunkt aus würde die Erklärung des Phänomens der Spiegelneurone eine viel radikalere Hypothese verlangen: eine Synchronisierung aller expressiven Formen des Lebens. Genauer besehen, handelt es sich dabei um dieselbe Frage, die man sich bezüglich der expressiven Intentionalität des Leibschemas stellt: Wie ist es möglich, dass ein Leib unmittelbar mit der expressiven Intentionalität eines anderen Leibschemas in Wechselwirkung stehen kann? Um eine derartige Wechselwirkung zu ermöglichen, ohne auf projektive Einfühlung oder Analogieschlüsse zurückzugreifen, sollte man die Existenz einer universalen Grammatik des Ausdrucksfeldes des Lebens annehmen. 14) Neutralisierung der Theorie der Expressivität? Im Rückblick auf die bisherige Rezeption von Schelers Phänomenologie der Andersheit kann man eine ziemlich einzigartige Tatsache feststellen. Im Allgemeinen wird die These der unmittelbaren Wahrnehmung der Expressivität des Anderen mit grosser Gunst aufgenommen, während die ihr zugrunde liegenden Prämissen, gar bedrohliche Vorbedingungen einer Dimension der Einsfühlung sowie einer universalen Grammatik des Ausdrucksfeldes des Allebens,97 abgelehnt werden – Vorbedingungen, die heute, näher betrachtet, an die wenig beruhigenden Szenarien à la Gregory Bateson erinnern. Auf diese Diskrepanz stösst man schon bei Edith Stein. In ihrer Dissertation 1917 übernahm 96 Ebd., 21-22. 97 Zum Begriff des Allebens vgl. GW VII, 120-121; GW VII, 132-136; GW XI, 185201. 72 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 sie die These der unmittelbaren Wahrnehmung der Expressivität des Anderen, die Scheler vier Jahre vorher in der ersten Auflage des Sympathiebuchs vorgelegt hatte, riss sie jedoch aus ihrem Gedankenzusammenhang mit der genetischen Priorität des Wir und des Du vor dem Ich, um sie in den Kontext der Husserlschen Theorie der Intersubjektivität einzugliedern. Mit Edith Stein tritt jedoch noch ein gewichtigerer Einwand hervor. Im Sympathiebuch kehrt Scheler die überlieferte These um, nach der man von den eigenen Erlebnissen ausgehen müsse, um die Erlebnisse des Anderen zu verstehen, und stellt fest, dass der Mensch mehr in Anderen als in sich selbst lebe. Im gleichen Zuge beobachtet er, dass das neugeborene Kind in einer emotiven Kommunion mit der Mutter lebe und sich das Bewusstsein des eigenen individuellen Ich und der eigenen Erlebnisse erst später erwerbe: Nur langsam erhebt das Individuum sein Haupt über den Fluss des Gemeinsamen und entdeckt sich als ein Seiendes, das eigene Gefühle und Ideen hat.98 Wie soll man diesen Gedanken auslegen? Interpretatorische Inkonsequenz tritt häufig dann auf, wenn man diese Stelle mit einer auf der Seite zuvor befindlichen Beschreibung des «ursprünglichen Stroms» durcheinanderbringt, in dem das Bewusstsein des Ich von dem des Du noch nicht differenziert wird. So wird des Öfteren geschlossen, dass es am Anfang nur einen noch nicht im Unterschied des Ich vom Du aufgegangenen, undifferenzierten Strom gebe, aus dem sich dann ontologisch ein neugeborenes Kind erhebe. Dieser Auslegung folgend, müsste man sich tatsächlich wie Edith Stein die Frage stellen, ob ein Individuum, das vorher nicht existiert hat, aus jenem undifferenzierten Strom auftauchen könne. Dabei wird allerdings nicht berücksichtigt, wie sich Scheler mit dem Problem des Leibschemas und der Existenz einer Intentionalität befasst, die schon auf der leiblichen Ebene in Form von Lebensgefühl wirkt.99 Aufgrund des Leibschemas sowie der leiblichen Intentionalität kann das Neugeborene Erfahrungen vollziehen und somit Erlebnisse haben. Scheler selbst bemerkt dazu, dass sich diese Erlebnisse auf irgendeine Form vom Selbst beziehen müssen: «jedes Erlebnis [gehört] zu einem Ich überhaupt [...] und, wo immer ein Erlebnis gegeben, [ist] auch 98 Vgl. GW VII, 241. 99 Vgl. ebd., 342. 72 73 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 ein Ich überhaupt mit gegeben».100 Wenn das Neugeborene schon Erlebnisse hat, obwohl es noch im undifferenzierten Strom eingeschlummert ist, so hat es notwendigerweise von Anfang an ein Selbst. Was sich über den undifferenzierten Strom der Einsfühlung erhebt, ist also nicht das Selbst, sondern allein das Bewusstsein des eigenen Selbst. Ausser mehreren interpretatorischen Schwierigkeiten lauert tatsächlich etwas Beunruhigendes hinter Schelers Theorie der Expressivität. Er nimmt an, dass es gleichsam eine universale Grammatik [gibt], die für alle Sprachen des Ausdrucks gilt und oberste Verständnisgrundlage für alle Arten von Mimik und Pantomimik des Lebendigen ist. Nur darum können wir z.B. auch noch die Inadäquatheit einer fremden Ausdrucksbewegung mit dem Erlebnis wahrnehmen, ja den Widerstreit dessen, was die Bewegung ausdrückt, mit dem, was sie ausdrücken soll.101 Daraus folgt, dass die Erfahrung der Realität in der Dimension des Lebensdrangs verwurzelt ist. Um mit der expressiven Realität eines anderen Lebewesens in Berührung zu kommen, muss ich vorher schon mit der expressiven Realität des Lebensdrangs in Berührung stehen, der bei Scheler nicht blind ist, wie bei Schopenhauer, sondern von vornherein eine gewisse Orientierung hat.102 Hinter Schelers Begriff des Lebensdrangs kann man eine komplexe Überarbeitung von Spinozas conatus essendi erkennen, wobei er Schellings Spinoza-Interpretation einiges zu verdanken hat. In Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos findet Scheler «Stufenfolgen» der Selbstorganisation verschiedener Lebensformen, denen jeweils unterschiedliche Weisen entsprechen, die universale Grammatik der Expressivität zu deklinieren: Gefühlsdrang, Instinkt, assoziatives Gedächtnis und praktische Intelligenz. Sie bilden eine steigende Stufenfolge der selbstreferentiellen Rückwendung des Lebens zu sich selbst, die mit der Zunahme der Rückmeldung aufgrund der zunehmenden Komplexität der Lebenssysteme korrespondiert. Diesen ersten vier zentrischen Ebenen folgt die exzentrische Ebene der Person. Ange100 Ebd., 240. 101 Ebd., 22. Vgl. auch ebd., 112. 102 Vgl. GW V, 227. 74 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 langt an dieser Stelle, vollzieht Scheler die Trennung von der Spinozaschen Logik der Steigerung des conatus essendi, um Schellings Idee einer exzentrischen Abweichung zu übernehmen, durch die sich das Personzentrum bildet. Der ordo amoris unterscheidet sich nämlich darin von Spinozas Logik des conatus essendi, dass er die Selbsttranszendierung und Wiedergeburt als Momente der Diskontinuität in sich umfasst. Man sollte meines Erachtens nicht ausser Acht lassen, dass bei der Berührung mit der expressiven Ebene des Lebensdrangs keine psychologische oder epistemologische Frage, sondern der Zugang zum Realen auf dem Spiel steht. Scheler hat sich bereits im Sympathiebuch mit der Frage auseinandergesetzt, als er eine Reihe aufeinanderfolgender Ebenen herausstellt, die von der primordialen affektiven Identifizierung der Einsfühlung – der «urtümliche[n] Wurzel und Nahrungsquelle für alle „höheren" Formen des emotionalen sympathischen Lebens»103 – über die Gefühlsansteckung und das Mitgefühl bis schliesslich zum Miteinanderfühlen geht, das zusammen mit Liebe und Hass die besondere affektive Stellung des Menschen charakterisiert. Die Grundform dieser Wechselwirkung, durch die – dank der universalen Grammatik des Ausdrucksfeldes des Lebens – jedes Lebewesen mit dem ursprünglichen Lebensdrang in Berührung kommt, ist die «Einsfühlung».104 Auf der Ebene der tiefsten Einsfühlung folgt diese Grammatik nicht dem Prinzip der Erhaltung und Ökonomie. Scheler nimmt nämlich die Existenz einer ursprünglichen Drangphantasie an, die jenes Prinzip der Erhaltung und Ökonomie des Lebens übersteigt und auf eine spielerische Erschaffung eines Überschusses und Reichtums der Lebensformen zielt.105 103 GW VII, 112. 104 Vgl. GW VII, 41. 105 Vgl. GW XI, 42; 264. In einer ähnlichen Richtung drückt sich auch F.J.J. Buytendijk aus. Bezüglich des Einflusses Schelers auf Buytendijk beobachtet Dehue, Buytendijk sei «profoundly impressed by the person and the work of Scheler, large parts of which were literally adopted into his own work» (T. dehue, Changing the Rules: Psychology in the Netherlands 1900-1985, Cambridge (UK) 1995, 73). 74 75 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 15) Das Tagebuch einer Schizophrenen im Lichte der Phänomenologie Schelers Wie schon erwähnt, haben die Voraussetzungen für die Theorie der Expressivität bei Scheler von Anfang an nicht wenig Verwirrung ausgelöst. Die hier implizierten Fragen über die universale Grammatik des Ausdrucksfeldes des Lebens haben jedoch heute noch eine ausserordentliche Relevanz. Daher schliesse ich meine Überlegungen damit, die Thematik aus einem anderen Blickwinkel darzustellen. Was würde passieren, wenn einem Individuum der Lebensdrang, sich affektiv in die Welt zu positionieren, fehlt und der Kontakt zum Ausdrucksfeld des Lebens verloren geht? Es ist genau das, was in Marguerite Sechehayes Tagebuch einer Schizophrenen beschrieben wird. Renée, die Protagonistin des Tagebuchs, erzählt in erster Person, was ein derartiges Individuum erleben würde. Für Renée ist die Welt zum Reich des Wahnsinns geworden. Weil sie keinen Lebensdrang nach Realität mehr hat, wird die ganze libidinöse Energie der affektiven Sphäre auf das solipsistische „Ego" geleitet. Ihre Welt verliert so die Realität. Es handelt sich um ein Energieungleichgewicht, das sich im Ich auftut.106 Bei Renée übersetzt sich der Verlust der libidinösen Energie, die ja Lebensquelle ist, in ein Unvermögen, sich mit der expressiven Ebene des Lebens in Verbindung zu setzen, so dass ihr alle anderen Lebewesen wie mechanische und künstliche Dinge vorkommen, die völlig leblos und irreal sind, während die unbeseelten Gegenstände träger Raum werden, auf den sie ihre Wahnvorstellungen und Halluzinationen projizieren kann. Der Wind107 oder die Puppe Riquette108 werden dadurch lebendig und bemächtigen sich einer bewussten Ausdrucksfähigkeit. Was Renée am meisten in Erstaunen versetzt, als sie endlich geheilt ist, ist das Vermögen, mit der expressiven Ebene der Realität in Berührung zu kommen. Enthusiastisch erzählt sie von der nunmehr ihr wieder zugänglich gewordenen Realität: 106 «Die gesamte Energie, die Libido, hat sich auf das individuelle Ich, auf das Ego verlagert, und lässt die sozialen Bereiche affekt-entleert» (M. sechehaye, Tagebuch einer Schizophrenen, Frankfurt a. M. 1973, 113). 107 Ebd., 21-22. 108 Ebd., 28-30. 76 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 sobald ich mich draussen befand, konnte ich feststellen, dass sich meine Wahrnehmung der Welt vollkommen verändert hatte. Statt eines unendlichen, irrealen Raums, aus dem alle Dinge sich nackt und isoliert abhoben, sah ich zum ersten Mal die Realität, die wunderbare Realität. Die Leute, denen wir begegneten, waren keine Automaten oder Phantome mehr, die bedeutungslose Gesten vollführten; nein, es waren Männer und Frauen mit ihren besonderen Eigenschaften, ihrer Persönlichkeit. Ebenso ging es mit den Dingen. Es waren nützliche Dinge, die einen Sinn hatten, die Freude bereiteten. Zum Beispiel das Auto, das mich in die Pension zurückbrachte, die Kissen, an die ich mich lehnte. Ich verschlang alles mit den Blicken, was mir unter die Augen kam, voller Staunen, wie vor einem Wunder. „Das ist sie, das ist sie", wiederholte ich, und meinte damit: „Das ist sie, die Realität". [...] Welch neue Freude, auf die Dinge einzuwirken, mich ihrer zu bedienen, wie es mir gefiel, und vor allem Lust und Vergnügen an der Veränderung zu haben. Bisher konnte ich keinerlei Veränderung ertragen.109 Die Realität stellt Renée als eine gefärbte Landschaft dar, in der eine Wechselwirkung mit den Gegenständen und den Personen möglich ist und eine Umbildung stattfinden kann. Der Wahnsinn ist hingegen für sie wie eine sterile Mondlandschaft, ohne Möglichkeit der Veränderungen: Für mich war der Wahnsinn ein Land – der Realität entgegengesetzt –, in dem ein unerbittliches Licht herrschte, das keinen Platz für Schatten lässt und uns blendet. Es war eine unendliche Weite, grenzenlos, flach, flach – ein mineralisches, mondartiges Land, kalt wie die Steppen des Nordpols. In dieser Weite ist alles unveränderlich, reglos, versteinert, kristallisiert.110 Was konnte Renée den Kontakt mit der Realität zurückgeben? Aus dem, was Sechehaye schildert und erläutert, scheint das Entscheidende nicht die Intelligenz oder die Verständnisfähigkeit, sondern die symbolisch-affektive Sphäre zu sein. In eine ähnliche Richtung bewegt sich Scheler, wenn er in der schon mehrmals zitierten Stelle von 1913 schreibt: alles primäre Verhalten zur Welt überhaupt sei ein emotionales Verhalten.111 Ohne dieses emotionale Verhalten würde die Reali109 Ebd., 81-82. 110 Ebd., 31-32. 111 Das «emotionale Realitätsproblem» wird vor allem im Teil V der Schrift Idealis76 77 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 tät, gleichsam ein mineralisches Land, unveränderlich, reglos, kristallisiert. Der ordo amoris hätte hier keinen Spielraum, das emotionale Verhalten der Person zu lenken und regsam bei ihrer Positionierung in die Welt mitzuwirken. Der emotionale Durchbruch ereignet sich Scheler zufolge dort, wo eine Mit-Teilung des Lebensdrangs ermöglicht wird. Der Impuls des Lebensdranges ist die unumgängliche Mitbedingung für alle möglichen Empfindungen und Wahrnehmungen.112 Die Emotionen und die Gefühle färben die Landschaft unserer Erfahrung. Sie sind es, die ihre Umrisse, Gestalten und Irregularitäten auftauchen lassen und sichtbar machen. Ohne den durch sie verkörperten Drang nach Realität nähme die Landschaft unserer Erfahrung einen flachen, eintönigen Charakter an. Insbesondere dank jener Konstellation der Gefühle, die sich um die Ehrfurcht bildet, werden die Offenheit gegenüber der Andersheit und daraufhin die Färbung unserer Erfahrungen und Erlebnisse möglich: Das Phänomen des „Horizonts" und der „Perspektive" ist nicht nur in den Bezirk des rein Optischen beschlossen. [...] Die „Ehrfurcht" aber ist es, die in der Region der Werte diese Horizontnatur und diesen Perspektivismus unserer geistigen Natur und Welt aufrechterhält. Die Welt wird sofort ein flaches Rechenexempel, wenn wir das geistige Organ der Ehrfurcht ausschalten. Sie allein gibt uns das Bewusstsein der Tiefe und Fülle der Welt und unseres Ich und bringt uns zur Klarheit, dass die Welt und unsere Wesen einen nie austrinkbaren Wertreichtum in sich tragen.113 Ohne emotionalen Durchbruch gibt es kein Leibschema, das dem Raum Sinn geben und die leibliche Perspektive lenken kann: So verstand Renée, als sie sich ihrer ersten Symptome gewahr wurde, in der Turnstunde die Anweisungen nicht und verwechselte rechts und links.114 Durch den Kontaktverlust mit der expressiven Ebene der Realität wird auch der Leib einer bekannten Person zum mechanischen Körper, dem mus-Realismus entfaltet (vgl. GW IX, 256 ff.). 112 Zum Impuls des Lebensdrangs, der nach Scheler die Bedingung vor der Bezugnahme auf die Realität darstellt, siehe GW VII, 41; GW IX, 43. Zum Verhältnis des Lebensdrangs mit der phänomenologischen Reduktion vgl. GW XI, 97. Scheler benutzt den Ausdruck «Drang nach Realität» in einer Stelle im Nachlass aus den späten Zwanzigerjahren (vgl. GW XI, 128). 113 GW III, 27. 114 M. sechehaye, Tagebuch einer Schizophrenen ..., 18. 78 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 die Expressivität fehlt. Wenn Renée eine alte Freundin sich nähern sieht, sieht sie diese nach vorne kommen wie eine mechanische Marionette: Während des ganzen Besuchs meiner Freundin versuchte ich verzweifelt, Kontakt zu ihr zu bekommen, zu spüren, dass sie wirklich da war, lebendig und greifbar. Aber es wurde nichts daraus. Auch sie gehörte zu jener irrealen Welt. Und dennoch erkannte ich sie ganz genau. Ich wusste, wie sie hiess, und alles, was mit ihr zu tun hatte, und trotzdem kam sie mir fremd vor, irreal, wie eine Statue. Ich sah ihre Augen, ihre Nase, ihren sprechenden Mund, ich hörte den Klang ihrer Stimme, ich verstand alles, was sie sagte, und trotzdem meinte ich einer Fremden gegenüber zu stehen.115 Aus Schelers Sicht sind Schizophrenie und Melancholie Pathologie des ordo amoris. Scheler analysiert das Phänomen des mangelnden emotionalen Durchbruchs nicht in Bezug auf die Schizophrenie, wie es Sechehaye tut, sondern auf die Melancholie116 und führt es auf eine pathologische Form der an-affektiven Apathie zurück, die er mit dem Begriff der «Fühllosigkeit» bezeichnet: «Die Fühllosigkeit tritt häufig bei Kranken ein (z.B. in der Melancholie) und stellt sich hier als Folge eines ausschliesslichen Versenktseins in die eigenen Gefühle dar, die es zu einer fühlenden Aufnahme des fremden Erlebens überhaupt nicht kommen lässt».117 Was Scheler jedoch unter dem Begriff der Fühllosigkeit denkt, ist keineswegs die vollständige Abwesenheit der Affektivität, sondern das Fehlen der intentionalen Gefühle, insbesondere der sogenannten «geistigen Gefühle» oder «Persönlichkeitsgefühle», die den Bildungsprozess der Person leiten.118 Er unterscheidet nämlich intentionale Gefühle von nicht-intentionalen Gefühlszuständen119 und Stimmungen, die «nie und 115 Ebd., 24-25. 116 Zur Thematik «Scheler und die Psychopathologie» vgl. R. glaZInskI, Zur Philosophie und Psychopathologie der Gefühle bei Max Scheler und Kurt Schneider: systematische und historische Überlegungen, Köln 1997; A. krahl, M. schIFFer- decker, Max Scheler and Kurt Schneider. Scientific Influence and Personal Relationship, «Fortschritte der Neurologie-Psychiatrie», 66 (1998), 94-100; J. cuttIng, Scheler, Phenomenology and Psychopathology ...; L. sass, On Scheler and Psychiatry, «Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology», 16 (2009), 171-174. 117 GW VII, 25. 118 GW II, 344 ff. 119 Vgl. ebd., 261-266. 78 79 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 nimmer als „Gefühle", d.h. ichbezüglich erlebt sind».120 «Ein Zornaffekt „steigt in mir auf" und „läuft dann in mir ab". Hier ist die Verbindung des Zorns mit dem, „worüber" ich zornig bin, sicher keine intentionale und keine ursprüngliche».121 Erheblich anders ist es, wenn ich „über etwas begeistert", oder fröhlich, oder verzweifelt bin, denn «im Verlaufe des intentionalen Fühlens „erschliesst" sich uns vielmehr die Welt» selbst.122 Die Bildung der Person, d.h. die stete Geburt, erfolgt dank dieses Sicherschliessens des Wertgehaltes der Welt, und dazu ist ein von „Persönlichkeitsgefühlen" gelenkter emotionaler Durchbruch unumgänglich. Die der Melancholie typische apathische Depression ist im Gegenteil eine Stimmung, die nicht auf den Bildungsprozess der Person gerichtet ist und deswegen keine anthropogenetische Funktion hat. Bei der Melancholie findet deswegen keine weitere Geburt der Person statt. Der Melancholiker, da ihm ein funktionalisierender ordo amoris fehlt, bleibt den Gemütslagen und Stimmungen ausgeliefert, die für den Bildungsprozess der Person nicht funktional sind und deswegen keine affektive Stellung in der Welt metabolisieren können. Dadurch verliert er die Dimension der Zukunft. Scheler leistet einen vorzüglichen Beitrag zur phänomenologischen Psychopathologie durch seine Unterscheidung der drei Formen der Überwindung des common sense – in Schelers Termini «relativ natürlicher Weltanschauung»123–, denen drei Arten der Reduktion entsprechen: wissenschaftliche, dionysische und phänomenologische Reduktion.124 Vor allem die dionysische Reduktion kann meines Erachtens sehr gut veranschaulichen, wie Scheler das Phänomen der Melancholie konzipiert. Die Fühllosigkeit, die die Melancholie charakterisiert,125 erweist sich nämlich als Unvermögen der Mit-Teilung der Gefühle auf allen Ebenen, einschliesslich der elementarsten Ebene der Einsfühlung, die im Mittelpunkt der dionysischen Reduktion steht. 120 Ebd., 263. 121 Ebd. 122 Ebd. 123 Zur Entwicklung dieser Themen vgl. W. blankenburg, Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit: Ein Beitrag zur Psychopathologie symptomarmer Schizophrenien, Berlin 2012. 124 Vgl. GW XI, 251. 125 Vgl. GW VII, 25. 80 guIdo cusInato © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 Scheler sieht, dass es für den modernen Menschen immer schwieriger wird, den ursprünglichen Kontakt mit dem Ausdrucksfeld des Allebens herzustellen. Leben und Menschen haben in ihrer Entwicklung nicht nur wesentliche Fähigkeiten „gewonnen", sondern auch solche verloren. So hat der Mensch die spezifizierende Einsfühlungsfähigkeit des Tieres und viele seiner „Instinkte" zugunsten einer Hypertrophie des „Verstandes", der Zivilisierte die Einsfühlungsfähigkeit des Primitiven, der Erwachsene die des Kindes fast ganz verloren.126 Um jenen Kontakt mit dem Urdrang, d.h. natura naturans,127 wieder aufblühen zu lassen, denkt Scheler daher an eine „Technik" und gibt ihr den Namen «dionysische Reduktion»,128 der er den «dionysischen Menschen» entsprechen lässt.129 Hier richtet sich die Reduktion darauf aus, die bewussten intellektuellen Tätigkeiten und den common sense durch Narkose, rauschende Musik, Tanz, Orgie, symbolische Geschlechtermischung auszuschalten, «um das grosse Retour zu den „Müttern" zu vollziehen: um in ekstatischem Gefühlsdrang die unio zu finden mit der zeugenden Allkraft».130 Die Melancholie spielt sich in einer Richtung ab, die man in gewissem Sinne als entgegengesetzt betrachten kann. Die durch die Fühllosigkeit verursachte Orientierungslosigkeit treibt dazu, den Kontaktverlust mit der expressiven Ebene des Lebensdrangs durch eine Hyperrationalisierung und eine konformistische Nivellierung des Erlebten auf den common sense zu kompensieren. Der conatus essendi der Person kann dabei keinen Zugang zur Zukunft finden und kehrt sich in einen Prozess der Ent-Geburt und der «incuria sui», in eine Zucht zur Unpersönlichkeit um. Erst wenn die Person aus dem Zustand der Fühllosigkeit hinausgeht und die Fähigkeit wiedergewinnt, alle Formen der Mit-Teilung der Gefühle und vor allem der Persönlichkeitsgefühle zu vollziehen, kann ihr 126 GW VII, 42. 127 Vgl. GW XI, 266. 128 Vgl. ebd., 251-254. 129 Vgl. GW IX, 129. 130 GW VIII, 443; vgl. auch GW XI, 254 80 81 guIdo cusInato anthroPogenese © 2015 Guido Cusinato doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.38 conatus essendi wieder vorwärts schreiten. Das ist die Frage, mit der sich Scheler in Bezug auf die phänomenologische Reduktion auseinandersetzt. Übersetzung von Rie Shibuya abstraCt In this article I develop two arguments, taking Max Scheler's phenomenology as a starting point. The first one is that emotions are not private and internal states of consciousness, but what makes us come into contact with the expressive dimension of reality, by orienting our placement in the world and our interaction with others. The second thesis is that some emotions have an "anthropogenetic" nature that is at the roots of the ontology of a person and of social ontology: it is through practices of "sharing" certain emotions that the humanity has been born and that the various forms of social realities are established. In accordance with one of María Zambrano's phrases, I propose to trace these anthropogenetic emotions back to the «hambre de nacer del todo» («hunger for being fully born») of a being that never stops being born again.

Modality and Expressibility∗ Matthew Mandelkern† December 17, 2018 Penultimate draft; to appear in the Review of Symbolic Logic Abstract When embedding data are used to argue against semantic theory A and in favor of semantic theory B, it is important to ask whether A could make sense of those data. It is possible to ask that question on a case-by-case basis. But suppose we could show that A can make sense of all the embedding data whichB can possibly make sense of. This would, on the one hand, undermine arguments in favor of B over A on the basis of embedding data. And, provided that the converse does not hold-that is, that A can make sense of strictly more embedding data than B can-it would also show that there is a precise sense in whichB is more constrained thanA, yielding a pro tanto simplicity-based consideration in favor of B. In this paper I develop tools which allow us to make comparisons of this kind, which I call comparisons of potential expressive power. I motivate the development of these tools by way of exploration of the recent debate about epistemic modals. Prominent theories which have been developed in response to embedding data turn out to be strictly less expressive than the standard relational theory, a fact which necessitates a reorientation in how to think about the choice between these theories. Keywords: relative expressibility; semantic theories; epistemic modals; attitude predicates 1 Introduction When embedding data are used to argue against semantic theory A and in favor of semantic theory B, it is important to ask whether A could, after all, make sense of those data. It is possible to ask that question on a case-by-case basis. But suppose we could show that A can make sense of all the embedding data which B can make sense of. This would, on the one hand, undermine arguments in ∗This paper is a descendant of work presented at MIT, the Eighth Philosophy and Semantics in Europe Colloquium at the University of Cambridge, the 2015 Bucharest Colloquium for Analytic Philosophy, and the 2016 Central APA, and of the final chapter of Mandelkern 2017a. Thanks to audiences at those talks and to Justin Bledin, David Boylan, Daniel Drucker, Kai von Fintel, Vera Flocke, Peter Fritz, Cosmo Grant, Irene Heim, Valentine Hacquard, Matthias Jenny, Roni Katzir, Justin Khoo, Angelika Kratzer, Harvey Lederman, Jack Marley-Payne, Vann McGee, Maša Močnik, Dilip Ninan, Milo PhillipsBrown, Agustın Rayo, Daniel Rothschild, Bernhard Salow, Paolo Santorio, Ginger Schultheis, Roger White, and Stephen Yablo for very helpful comments and discussion on these topics. Thanks to Fabrizio Cariani, Simon Goldstein, Jonathan Phillips, Robert Stalnaker, Shane Steinert-Threlkeld, and three anonymous referees for this journal for extensive comments and discussion. †All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL, United Kingdom, [email protected] 1 favor of B over A on the basis of embedding data. And, provided that the converse does not hold- that is, that A can make sense of strictly more embedding data than B can-it would also show that there is a precise sense in which B is more constrained than A, yielding a pro tanto simplicity-based consideration in favor of B. In this paper I develop formal tools which allow us to make comparisons of this kind, which I call comparisons of potential expressive power. I motivate the development of these tools through discussion of the recent debate about epistemic modals (words like 'might' and 'must', on a broadly epistemic reading). Recent work has used embedding data to argue against the standard relational theory-on which epistemic modals have, roughly, the semantics of modal operators in standard modal logics-and in favor of various revisionary theories. But comparisons of potential expressive power show that those revisionary theories are strictly less expressive than the standard theory, in the sense that the relational theory can make sense of any embedding data involving epistemic modals which those theories can make sense of, but not vice versa (within very mild limits). This necessitates a reorientation in how to think about the choice between these semantics. The situation is roughly the opposite of the way it is standardly presented: we can rest assured that the relational theory can account for any data which those revisionary theories can account for. But not vice versa: we may well discover data that the relational theory can make sense of, but that the revisionary theories cannot. This, in turn, shows that there is a precise sense in which these revisionary theories are simpler than the relational theory, which may count in their favor. The tools developed here allow us to state these facts in a rigorous and general way, which, among other things, makes application to other debates straightforward. Considerations of relative potential expressive power cannot on their own decide between two semantic theories, but they can help us determine what kinds of arguments from natural language on the basis of embedding data are possibly good arguments in the choice between those theories. In the final part of the paper, I consider in more detail the empirical picture concerning the behavior of epistemic modals in attitude contexts, and what this behavior tells us about the theory of epistemic modals in light of the foregoing expressibility results. 2 Background I begin by introducing the relational semantics for epistemic modals; Yalcin (2007)'s data and his revisionary domain semantics response to those data; and Ninan (2016)'s response to Yalcin, which shows that the relational semantics can replicate the predictions of the domain semantics. 2 2.1 The relational theory On the relational theory (e.g. Kripke 1963; Kratzer 1977, 1981), epistemic modals denote quantifiers over a set of worlds: namely, over those worlds which are accessible from the world of evaluation relative to a binary accessibility relation between worlds (equivalently and more conveniently, a corresponding modal base function from worlds to sets of worlds). The accessibility relation for epistemic modals is generally taken to track the contextually relevant evidence: a world is accessible from another world just in case it's compatible with the contextually relevant evidence in that world. 'Might' is treated as an existential quantifier, so pMight φq is a claim that the contextually relevant evidence leaves it open that φ is true;1 'must' is treated as the dual universal quantifier, so pMust φq is a claim that the contextually relevant evidence entails that φ is true. More formally:2 Definition 2.1. Relational Semantics: Where f is a modal base: • [[Might φ]]f,w= 1 iff ∃w′ ∈ f(w) : [[φ]]f,w′ = 1 • [[Must φ]]f,w= 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ f(w) : [[φ]]f,w′ = 1 2.2 Yalcin (2007)'s challenge Yalcin (2007) observed that, when you embed a sentence with the form pφ and might not φq (which he calls an epistemic contradiction) under 'Suppose', the result is infelicitous:3 (1) a. #Suppose it's raining and it might not be raining. b. #Suppose (φ and might not φ). The issue for the relational approach is that it seems to predict that a sentence like (1-a) will be perfectly felicitous. To spell out the problem, let's focus (as Yalcin does) on the corresponding declarative sentence. A sentence like (2) is felt to attribute inconsistent suppositions to Alfred, a fact which explains why the imperative variant will be felt to be infelicitous: (2) a. Alfred supposes it's raining and it might not be raining. 1Greek letters range over all sentences. Italic roman letters below range over atomic sentences. I will leave off a context parameter throughout, for readability; insofar as the languages we are working with contain context-sensitive terms (beyond epistemic modals), these should be read as implicit throughout. 2This presentation simplifies Kratzer's theory in two ways, one irrelevant (for Kratzer, a modal base is a function from worlds to sets of propositions, not worlds, and quantification is over the intersection of that set), and one possibly relevant (for Kratzer, modals are evaluated relative to a second parameter, an ordering source). Insofar as an ordering source plays in interesting role in what follows, though, it makes the relational theory even more expressive than it is on the present simplification. 3Parallel observations concerning the embedding of sentences with this form in the scope of quantifiers were made in Groenendijk et al. 1996; Aloni 2001, and were used to motivate the update semantics, discussed below. I focus on Yalcin's version of the argument only because it is simpler. 3 b. A supposes (φ and might not φ). But, given the relational semantics, it looks like (2-a) is predicted to say that Alfred supposes that it's raining, and supposes that the contextually salient body of evidence is compatible with the proposition that it's not raining. In other words, (2-a) should be roughly equivalent to (3), which is not felt to attribute any kind of inconsistency to Alfred. (3) Alfred supposes that it's raining and that, for all he knows, it's not raining. To make this worry more precise, we need to spell out some background assumptions which, as we will see, are crucial for getting the puzzle going. First, Yalcin assumes that connectives have classical Boolean semantics.4 Second, Yalcin generalizes Hintikka (1962)'s theory of attitude predicates to the relational semantics as follows. On Hintikka's approach, attitude predicates denote universal quantifiers over the possible worlds compatible with the relevant attitude (for attitude verb V and agent A, let 'VA,w' denote the worlds compatible with everything that A V's in w). Yalcin assumes further that attitude verbs do not change the setting of the modal base parameter, so the schematic result is as follows: Definition 2.2. Simple Hintikkan semantics: • [[A V's φ]]f,w= 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ VA,w : [[φ]]f,w ′ = 1 Thus, in particular, pA supposes φq, evaluated at modal base f and world w, just says that φ is true at every world compatible with A's suppositions inw, relative to f . Together with the relational semantics for epistemic modals and Boolean semantics for connectives, we thus predict that pA supposes (φ and might not φ)q, as evaluated at modal base f and world w, says that every world in A's supposition state makes φ true (relative to f ), and that every world in A's supposition state can access under f some world where φ is false. So, if the modal base tracks something like A's knowledge, then (2-a) should just mean something like (3), and thus should not be felt to ascribe incompatible suppositions to Alfred. 2.3 Yalcin (2007)'s domain semantics This is a puzzle for the combination of the relational semantics with the simple Hintikkan semantics for attitude verbs given here together with the Boolean semantics for connectives. Yalcin (2007) responded to this puzzle by developing a theory that is revisionary twice over, rejecting both the relational theory of epistemic modals and the simple Hintikka semantics for attitude verbs. First, Yalcin 4That is, [[φ and ψ]]f,w= 1 iff [[φ]]f,w= 1 and [[ψ]]f,w= 1; and [[Not φ]]f,w= 1 iff [[φ]]f,w= 0. 4 adopts a domain semantics for epistemic modals (crediting an early version of MacFarlane 2011). On the domain semantics, epistemic modals denote quantifiers over a set of worlds (information state) s which is supplied, not by an accessibility relation, but rather as a world-independent parameter of the index. Definition 2.3. Domain semantics: • [[Might φ]]s,w= 1 iff ∃w′ ∈ s : [[φ]]s,w′ = 1 • [[Must φ]]s,w= 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ s : [[φ]]s,w′ = 1 Thus pMight φq says that the truth of φ is compatible with a given information state; pMust φq says that the truth of φ is entailed by a given information state. The domain semantics is just like the relational semantics except that it substitutes information states where the relational semantics has functions from worlds to information states. Let me note that I will use 'domain semantics' and 'relational semantics' to denote just the semantics for epistemic modals given here and above, separate from the semantics for attitude verbs and connectives that each of these theories has been typically coupled with (I use 'relational/domain framework' for a semantic theory which extends the relational/domain theories). This lets us focus on the question of how those particular semantics for epistemic modals can be motivated on their own, rather than as part of a package deal. Yalcin generalizes the classical semantics for the connectives to the domain semantics in the obvious way.5 Yalcin, finally, develops a new semantics for attitude verbs, which builds on the core Hintikka semantics, but stipulates that the attitude verb supplies the set of attitude worlds as the domain of quantification for its complement. Schematically, for attitude verb V, Yalcin proposes:6 Definition 2.4. Yalcin semantics for attitude verbs: • [[A V's φ]]s,w= 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ VA,w : [[φ]]VA,w,w ′ = 1. That is, pA V's φq is true at w and s just in case φ is true at every world compatible with what A V's at w, relative to VA,w. This combination of views accounts for Yalcin's data as follows. Consider a sentence with the form of (4): (4) A supposes (φ and might not φ). Given Yalcin's approach to attitude verbs (plus Boolean connectives), (4) will be true at w, relative to any information state, just in case, at every world w′ in SA,w (the set of worlds compatible with A's 5Namely, [[φ and ψ]]s,w= 1 iff [[φ]]s,w= 1 and [[ψ]]s,w= 1, and [[Not φ]]s,w= 1 iff [[φ]]s,w= 0. 6Yalcin presents a semantics only for 'supposes', but suggests that it should be extended to other attitudes in the obvious way; for simplicity, I am presenting the general format here. Likewise for Ninan's semantics below. 5 suppositions in w), pφ and might not φq is true relative to 〈SA,w, w′〉. This follows just in case, for every world w′ in SA,w, φ is true at 〈SA,w, w′〉; and, for every world w′ in SA,w, there is some world w′′ in SA,w such that φ is false at 〈SA,w, w′′〉. Clearly these two conditions can only both be met if SA,w is empty. Thus a sentence with the form of (4) will ascribe inconsistent suppositions to A. This, again, suffices to account for Yalcin's data: the imperative version of (4) will be infelicitous because it will be a command to make an inconsistent supposition.7 2.4 Ninan (2016)'s response Yalcin's proposal is, again, revisionary in two respects: it couples a new semantics for modals (the domain semantics) with a new semantics for attitude verbs. Ninan (2016) shows that there is a way to account for Yalcin's data while maintaining the relational semantics for epistemic modals. For any set of worlds s, let fs be the constant function which takes any world to s. Then, for attitude verb V, modal base f , and world w, Ninan proposes: Definition 2.5. Ninan semantics for attitude verbs: • [[A V's φ]]f,w= 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ VA,w : [[φ]]f VA,w ,w′ = 1. The resemblance to Yalcin's attitude semantics is clear, and this approach accounts for Yalcin's data in essentially the same way that Yalcin's semantics does, but within a relational framework. To see this, suppose pA supposes (φ and might not φ)q is true at world w and modal base f . Given Ninan attitude semantics, plus the relational semantics for modals and Boolean connectives, this holds just in case, for every world w′ compatible with A's suppositions at w, w′ has the following properties: (i) φ is true at 〈 fSA,w , w′ 〉 ; (ii) there is some world w′′ in fSA,w(w′) such that φ is false at 〈 fSA,w , w′′ 〉 . Given that fSA,w(w′) = SA,w, it is easy to confirm that these conditions are only met when A's suppositions are inconsistent, and so pA supposes (φ and might not φ)q will entail that A's suppositions are inconsistent, as in Yalcin's system. 3 Relative potential expressibility Is it a fluke that Ninan was able to reproduce, in a relational framework, the interaction of Yalcin's attitude verbs with the domain semantics-or is there a deeper fact about the relationship between the domain and relational semantics which accounts for this? This is an important question for both practical and theoretical reasons. Practically, this is an important question because Yalcin's data are not 7Yalcin (2007) in fact claims that, on his semantics, a sentence with the form pA supposes (φ and might not φ)q is itself a contradiction, but this would only follow if we add a presupposition that the attitude is consistent, as Ninan (2016) proposes. 6 the only challenge to the relational semantics from embedding behavior. Yalcin 2007 discusses similar data involving epistemic contradictions in the antecedents of conditionals, and related challenges on epistemic modals in a variety of different embedding environments has raised related challenges for relational approaches and been used to argue in favor of revisionary semantics.8 Ninan's system shows that the relational semantics can make sense of just some of these data. One way to proceed would be to go through each data point, and see whether the relational framework can replicate the predictions of the revisionary accounts with respect to those data. But this approach is inefficient; and, more problematically, even if this method showed that all known data can be accounted for in the relational framework, this would still leave open the possibility that more data are lurking undiscovered which a revisionary approach can account for, but which the relational semantics cannot account for. It would be far more helpful if we could show that the relational framework can account for any embedding data which can be accounted for in the revisionary frameworks. From a more theoretical point of view, answering this question will elucidate the structure of the underlying relationship between the relational semantics and its competitors. And intuitively, it is very natural to think that there is a sense in which the domain semantics is simpler and more constrained than the relational semantics, as Ninan (2016) points out. In this section I will spell out a general framework which allows us to spell out these intuitions in a precise way, by comparing the expressive power of two theories of a given fragment- like the relational and domain semantics-with respect to what embedding operators are definable within those two theories. Let me first note that, in the choice between semantic theories, embedding data invariably provide just one motivation. There will also be framework-level considerations which are at least somewhat independent of particular embedding data. In the debate about epistemic modals in particular, issues about assertability, disagreement, and retraction have played a crucial role. Thus, for instance, Yalcin advocates the domain semantics as part of an expressivist approach to epistemic modality; MacFarlane advocates it as part of a relativist approach. Ninan, for his part, remains neutral about the 'postsemantics' he intends for his semantics, but the relational semantics is most commonly coupled with a contextualist post-semantics (though it needn't be). The choice between these frameworks turns, at least in substantial part, on issues that are independent of embedding data.9 As Ninan (2010) discusses in detail, while it is possible that embedding data will have some impact on the choice between these frameworks, the impact will be at best indirect; embedding data tell us about the logic of the operator we are studying, but not about assertion, disagreement, truth, and so on.10 I will focus in this paper 8See Beaver 1994; Groenendijk et al. 1996; Gerbrandy 1998; Aloni 2000, 2001; Yalcin 2015; Rothschild and Klinedinst 2015; Ninan 2018; Mandelkern 2019. 9See e.g. Lewis 1980; Ninan 2010; Rabern 2012, 2013 on the distinction between assertoric and semantic content; for relativist approaches, see e.g. Egan et al. 2005; Stephenson 2007; MacFarlane 2011, 2014; for expressivism, e.g. Yalcin 2007; Swanson 2015; Moss 2015; for contextualism, e.g. Dowell (2011); Khoo (2015); Mandelkern (2018a). 10Though there may be an indirect bearing-for instance, the logical facts may go more naturally with one conception 7 narrowly on the choice of semantic theories, not post-semantic theories. Abstracting from the particulars of epistemic modals, the kind of question that I want to address is the following. Given two semantic theories of a given language, suppose that we add an arbitrary new sentence operator to the language, and extend the first semantic theory to give a compositional semantics for the resulting language.11 Can we be guaranteed to find a way of extending the second semantic theory to give a compositional semantics for that operator such that the operator has exactly the same logic, according to the second theory, as it does according to the first theory? If so, we know that the first theory is no more expressive than the second theory with respect to embedding data. That is, for any embedding data involving an operator O not covered by the first theory, if the first theory can be extended to make sense of those data-that is, if we can extend the first theory so that we have a semantics for O which makes all the right predictions about O's logic-then we can also cover the same data in the second theory: we can give a semantics for O in the second theory which makes all the right predictions about O's logic. We can spell this out more precisely as follows. First, we make precise the notion of a semantic theory (which I'll denote T , T ′, and so on) for a language (a set of sentences L) which is meant to correspond roughly to the kinds of systems that semanticists construct to make sense of fragments of natural language. For propositional languages, we will let our models be sequences comprising a set of possible worlds; a valuation function which takes atomic sentences in the language to subsets of the set of possible worlds; a set of indices; and an interpretation function. Indices ordinarily will be sequences which include a possible world or set of possible worlds (from the stock of worlds in the model), and may also include other parameters, like an accessibility relation or set of worlds. Interpretation functions interpret the language relative to the set of indices, given the model's valuation function: for any sentence and index, the interpretation function tells us whether the sentence is true or false at that index. This extended notion of a model (relative to a standard account in modal logic) allows us to schematize in a general way very different kinds of semantic theories, and thus to compare those approaches. Finally, a semantic theory of a language is any set of models of that language. A semantic theory for a language yields a logic for the language: for a set of sentences Γ and sentence ψ from the language, Γ T ψ means that, in every model in T , ψ is true at every index where all the elements of Γ are true.12 All of this is spelled out more formally in Appendix A. With this in hand, we can define our notion of relative potential expressibility as follows: Definition 3.1. Relative Potential Expressibility: Given two semantic theories T and T ′ for a language of logical consequence than another, as e.g. Veltman (1996); Groenendijk et al. (1996); Yalcin (2007) have argued with regards to epistemic modals. 11By 'compositional', I mean that the meaning of a sentence containing the operator in question with scope over some sequence of sentences is obtained by applying the meaning of the operator (which we assume is an n-place propositional function) to the meaning of the sentences it takes scope over. 12I write φ T ψ for {φ} T ψ. 8 L, T is no more expressive than T ′ with respect toL (written T L T ′) iff, for any set of new sentence operatorsO, for any extension T O of T to LO, there is an extension T ′O of T ′ to LO which preserves the logic of O from T O. LO is the closure of L under the elements of O. What it means for T ′O to preserve the logic of O from T O is the following: for any set of sentences Γ ⊆ LO at least one of which contains an operator from O (i.e. one of which is in LO \ L), for any sentence ψ in LO, (Γ T O ψ)↔ (Γ T ′O ψ). (More details, again, in the appendix; '↔' abbreviates meta-language 'iff'.) The notion of relative potential expressibility spelled out here is somewhat different from the extant notions of expressibility I know of, which are typically concerned with comparisons between different languages rather than with comparisons between different semantic theories of a language with respect to arbitrary extensions of the language. But relative potential expressibility is just what we need to answer the questions posed at the beginning of this section. If T L T ′, this tells us that T ′ can do anything T can with regard to arbitrary extensions of L, and thus that T ′ can make sense of any embedding data that T can make sense of.13 Before exploring the application of this framework, let me note a helpful characterization result. Relative potential expressibility between certain kinds of well-behaved semantic theories boils down to something very simple: the existence of a truth-preserving injection from the indices of a model in the first theory to those of a model in the second. Fact 3.1. Characterization of Expressibility: For any semantic theories T and T ′ and language L, if T is isomorphic with respect to L, and T ′ is isomorphic with respect to L, then T L T ′ iff there is a modelM∈ T and a modelM′ ∈ T ′ such that there is a injection g from the indices ofM to those ofM′ which preserves the truth of all sentences in L, i.e. such that ∀φ ∈ L, for any index i fromM, φ is true at i inM iff φ is true at g(i) atM′. A semantic theory T is isomorphic with respect to L iff ∀M,M′ ∈ T :MLM′ ∧M′ LM. The proof of Fact 3.1, and of all the other facts stated in the rest of this section, are relegated to Appendix A. I state this characterization result here because it greatly simplifies the proofs of the facts that follow, and, I think, provides some intuitive grip on those results: whether one semantic theory is less expressive than another (in the relevant sense) depends on the structural relations between the semantic theories, and in particular whether the first semantic theory can, from a very abstract perspective, be embedded into the second semantic theory in a truth-preserving way. 13There is some work on comparing expressive power across different classes of structures, though not to my knowledge anything along the lines of what I am proposing here; see Pinheiro Fernandes 2017 for an overview and relevant citations, in particular Mossakowski et al. 2009, which proposes a structurally similar framework (in particular in their definition of sublogics), but one that remains quite different in its details. Cf. also French (2017) for investigation of the notion of notational equivalence over possible extensions of the language. 9 Let me make a final note about the relation between relative potential expressibility and the relative strength of logics. If T L T ′, then the logic of L in T ′ can be no stronger than the logic of L in T (they may have the same logic, but it may also be that the logic of L in T is strictly stronger than the logic of L in T ′).14 But it is not guaranteed to be weaker (even if T is strictly less expressive than T ′, i.e. T ≺L T ′). Nor does the converse follow: if the logic of L in T ′ is no stronger than the logic of L in T , there is no guarantee that T L T ′; likewise, if the logic of L in T ′ is strictly weaker than the logic of L in T , there is no guarantee that T L T ′. So, while relative potential expressibility has some bearing on relative logical strength, these two ways of comparing semantic theories are orthogonal. (Even if they turned out to coincide, this would itself be a substantive fact, since it would not have been at all obvious that they should coincide; that they fail to coincide shows that they get at distinct features of semantic theories).15 3.1 The domain and relational semantics With this discussion in hand, I will turn my attention to the specific comparisons of expressive power which I will focus on here: namely, comparisons between different semantics for epistemic modals. A note to readers: the rest of this section is concerned with introducing a variety of semantics for epistemic modals and comparing their expressive power. I succinctly summarize these results at the beginning of the next section (§4); readers uninterested in the details that follow may wish to skim up to that point. Since our focus is on epistemic modals, I will compare semantic theories for a very simple language L♦ comprising infinitely many atomic sentences pi : i ∈ N (which I will write p, q, r etc.) together with sentences of the form ♦φ, for any sentence φ ∈ L♦ (♦ abbreviates 'might').16 Let R denote the relational semantics, and D the domain semantics. These are, again, classes of models, in 14It may look as though, if T L T ′, then we can prove that the logic of L in T ′ must be the same as in T : we simply introduce a one-place sentence operator Id to L, and give Id the semantics in T of the identity function: for all φ, [[Id(φ)]]T = [[φ]]T . Then we will be guaranteed to be able to give Id a semantics in T ′ such that the logic of Id in the extension of T ′ matches that of Id in the extension of T . But the fact that we can do this does not, contrary to first appearances, guarantee that L has the same logic in the extension of T ′ as in the extension of T , because nothing guarantees that Id will still denote the identity function in the extension of T ′-this is no part of the logic of Id. 15An anonymous referee for this journal points out that there are, however, interesting cases in which these two notions do coincide. It seems to me both a striking fact that they do not coincide in general, and that there are limited cases where they do, and it seems worth further exploration exactly when they coincide, and why. Things would have been otherwise had we defined T L T ′ in a slightly different way, such that this means that for arbitrary extensionLO ofL and extension T O of T , we can extend T ′ to a model T ′O which matches the logic of LO in T O , i.e. which is such that for any Γ∪{ψ} ⊆ LO , (Γ TO ψ)↔ (Γ T ′O ψ). We instead said that T ′O only must match the logic of O in T O . This means that T L T ′ does not at all entail that T and T ′ have to agree on the logic of L. This, in turn, makes it possible to compare the relative expressive power of semantic theories which start with different logics for a given language-as the domain and relational semantics do-with respect to possible enrichments of those languages, something which, as we will see, turns out to be very revealing. Otherwise comparisons of relative potential expressive power would be limited to starting languages with identical logics. 16I let sentences of the language name themselves for brevity. 10 the sense given above; I assume that the models in every case contain sets of possible worlds and valuation functions such that for any set of atoms, exactly that set is true at some world, and any two worlds differ on the truth of some atom. Recall that for any model r ∈ R, an index in that model is any pair 〈f, w〉, with f a modal base and w a possible world drawn from r's stock of worlds. An atomic sentence p is true in r at 〈f, w〉 just in case the model's valuation function takes p to true at w; and ♦φ is true in r at 〈f, w〉 just in case there is a world w′ in f(w) such that φ is true at 〈f, w′〉 according to r. Recall that an index in any model d ∈ D is a pair 〈s, w〉, with s an information state and w a possible world. An atomic sentence p is true in d at 〈s, w〉 just in case p is true at w according to d's valuation function. A sentence with the form ♦φ is true at 〈s, w〉 in d just in case there is a world w′ ∈ s such that φ is true at 〈s, w′〉 according to d. We have some flexibility in how we think about entailment in the domain framework. The classical notion of entailment would say that for any domain model d, Γ d ψ iff ψ is true at every index in d where all the members of Γ are. But a different route, suggested by Yalcin (2007), would be to treat entailment as preservation of acceptance rather than truth, where an index 〈s, w〉 accepts a sentence φ iff for every world w′ ∈ s, φ is true at 〈s, w′〉. Preservation of truth is a strictly stronger notion than preservation of acceptance: if ψ is true at every index where all the members of Γ are, then ψ is also accepted at every index where all the members of Γ are. But preservation of acceptance does not entail preservation of truth; to take a simple example, p entails ♦p in the preservation of acceptance sense, but not in the preservation of truth sense (at least not without further stipulation about our models).17 So which logical notion will be the most illuminating for our purposes? I think it is the preservation of truth notion, for a few reasons. For one thing, on the preservation of acceptance notion, the domain semantics ends up being equivalent to the state-based semantics discussed below. So, just for the sake of diversity, it is worth exploring a different perspective on the domain semantics; readers who are interested in what we would find with a preservation of acceptance notion are referred to the discussion of the state-based semantics below. Second, this perspective renders the domain semantics more expressive than it otherwise would be; the acceptance-based approach renders the world parameter of indices essentially invisible, bleaching the semantics of a good deal of expressive strength (as we will see below in the discussion of the state-based semantics). There are many ways to think about the logic of a given system; I think that for present purposes it makes sense to take a vantage point which does not wash out any part of the semantics' inherent expressive power. This allows us to explore the expressive power of the semantics itself, as it were, rather than of the semantics under a certain, possibly limiting, perspective. Thus I will stick with the preservation of truth notion of consequence for both the relational and domain semantics. 17Yalcin (2007) countenances the possibility that a domain index 〈s, w〉 should always be such that w ∈ s, in which case this disanalogy would drop out. With or without this addition, the acceptance-based logic remains strictly weaker than the truth-based logic across extensions of the language. 11 With this in mind, we can show that the domain semantics is no more expressive than the relational semantics: Fact 3.2. D L♦ R. Proofs of all these results are, again, included in the appendix, but I will say a bit here about the intuition behind each proof. In this case, the proof strategy is to choose an arbitrary model in D and construct a function g which takes any index 〈s, w〉 in that model to 〈fs, w〉, where fs is the constant function from worlds to s. Then Fact 3.2 follows from our characterization result in Fact 3.1.18 Next we show that the relational semantics is not less expressive than the domain semantics with respect to L♦: Fact 3.3. R L♦ D. Fact 3.3 follows immediately from the observation that, for any index i in any model in D, ♦φ is trueD at i iff ♦(♦φ) is; but the same does not hold in R. This will make it impossible to find a truthpreserving injection from the indices of any R to those of any D model. I should note here that this difference in logics in the logic of L♦ itself may be taken on its own as an argument for, or against, the domain semantics, depending on what one thinks of the claim that ♦(♦φ) is always equivalent to ♦φ-a claim, again, validated by D but not byR. Yalcin claims this kind of logical feature as a virtue of his theory, while Moss (2015) criticizes this prediction. I will not explore that debate here, though. Our concern is with a very different question: ignoring the logical differences between the domain and relational semantics within L♦, which theory is better equipped to account for embedding data which involve operators beyond our starting language L♦? It is this latter question I focus on here, though the former may, of course, play an important independent role in the final choice between these theories. Thus from Facts 3.2 and 3.3, we have that the domain semantics is strictly less expressive than the relational semantics with respect to L♦. Fact 3.4. D ≺L♦ R. It is worth noting that 'might's are not generally able to stack in natural language: that is, sentences with the form pMight (Might φ)q are generally infelicitous.19 This may make it seem as though Fact 3.3 holds due to an irrelevant technicality. But this is not so: we still have an expressive inequality between the domain and relational semantics even if we add a syntactic constraint which rules out embedded 'might's (and thus which renders the logics of each theory for this more limited language fully equivalent). In other words, where L♦− is the language comprising just atomic sentences from L♦ and sentences of the form ♦pi, where pi is any atom, we still have: 18Note that it is easy to extend this to a proof that the domain semantics is no more expressive than the relational semantics with respect to an expanded language containing not just atoms and 'might' sentences, but also sentences formed with the Boolean connectives. 19Though see Moss 2015 for discussion of nested epistemic modals. 12 Fact 3.5. D ≺L♦− R. The intuition behind these facts is that sets of worlds are in some sense less fine-grained than functions from worlds to sets of worlds (though this is not a fact about cardinality: given a fixed infinite stock of worlds, the set of domain indices and the set of relational indices have the same cardinality). 3.2 The update and state-based semantics An important fact about the formal tools developed here is that it is straightforward to apply them to further comparisons: nothing in the kind of comparison we are doing here depends on details of the domain or relational semantics. In the rest of this section, I will illustrate this by exploring the relative potential expressive power of a few more revisionary semantics of epistemic modals which have been motivated by embedding data. In each case, the relational semantics comes out as the most expressive option. First, the comparison of expressive power can be extended to the update semantics. In the update semantics U , due to Veltman (1996), building on Heim 1982, 1983, the intension of a complex sentence is a dynamic object: a function from information states (usually called contexts in this literature) to information states. The most natural way to think about this approach from the point of view of the formal framework we are using is to think of our "indices" as pairs of contexts, with φ "true" at a pair 〈s, c〉 in U just in case 〈s, c〉 ∈ [[φ]]U . As for the domain semantics, we have different options for thinking about entailment. The option most parallel to the approach we've taken so far would treat entailment as preservation of truth, so that φ U ψ just in case the function denoted by φ in U is a subset of a function denoted by ψ in U (likewise, ceteris paribus, for multi-premise entailment). This is a non-standard way of thinking about entailment in the dynamic framework. A different approach would be to treat our indices simply as contexts, rather than pairs of contexts, and then treat entailment as preservation of acceptance, where a context c accepts a sentence φ just in case c is a fixed point for φ, i.e. just in case [[φ]]U (c) = c. This would bring our notion of entailment in line with Veltman (1996)'s (third) notion of entailment as preservation of acceptance. Just as for the domain semantics, however, I think the truth-based notion is the more interesting one, for essentially the same reasons. First, on an acceptance-based notion, the update semantics ends up, again, equivalent for our purposes to the state-based semantics, so the discussion of the state-based semantics below will suffice to show what would result from an acceptance-based perspective on the update semantics. Second, the truth-based notion of consequence is strictly stronger than the acceptance-based notion, i.e., if Γ entails φ in the truth-based notion, Γ also entails φ in the acceptance-based notion, but not vice versa. The truth-based notion of consequence thus provides a more expressive perspective on the update semantics; again, the update semantics can plausibly be coupled with a variety of different logics, but I think for present 13 purposes it makes sense to couple it with a logic which does not wash out any of its expressive power, and so I will stick with the truth-based notion.20 Readers interested in the perspective gained from an acceptance-based vantage point on the update semantics are, again, referred to the discussion of the state-based semantics below. With this background, we can gloss the usual update semantic rules for atomic sentences and ♦ as follows. For any model u ∈ U , an atomic sentence p is trueu at 〈s, c〉 just in case c is the result of removing all worlds w from s such that vu(p, w) = 0, where vu is u's valuation function. And a sentence of the form ♦φ "tests" whether φ is compatible with the input context: ♦φ is trueu at 〈s, c〉 just in case, roughly, s includes a φ-world and s = c, or s doesn't include a φ-world, and c = ∅; more precisely, just in case [[φ]]u(s) 6= ∅ and s = c, or else [[φ]]u(s) = ∅ and c = ∅. We first show that the update semantics is no more expressive than the relational semantics with respect to L♦: Fact 3.6. U L♦ R. The proof goes by way of constructing an injection from pairs of contexts to relational indices which preserves truth for all sentences in L♦. The injection goes by way of distinguishing a variety of different cases, and is not particularly intuitive, which makes Fact 3.6 somewhat surprising. We can also show that the relational semantics is more expressive than the update semantics: Fact 3.7. R L♦ U . The proof is identical to the proof of Fact 3.3 (thatR L♦ D). Thus we have: Fact 3.8. U ≺L♦ R. Interestingly, though, we do not have parallel results for the domain semantics: Fact 3.9. U L♦ D. Fact 3.10. D L♦ U . We can prove these facts by showing that there is no truth-preserving injection from the indices of U to those ofD, and vice versa.21 Thus the domain and update semantics are expressively incommensurable- though both are strictly less expressive than the relational semantics. 20It is also worth noting that not everything in the update framework is definable in terms of acceptance-in particular, the update treatment of 'might' cannot be reformulated in an equivalent way just in terms of the fixed points of its complement. To see this, let Acc(φ) be the set of φ's accept states, i.e. Acc(φ) = {c : [[φ]]U (c) = c}. In standard extensions of the update semantics to conjunction and negation, for atomic p, Acc(p ∧ ¬p) = Acc(♦p ∧ ¬p) = {∅}: these sentences have all the same fixed points, namely, just ∅. But they interact differently with ♦: e.g. ♦(p ∧ ¬p) is only accepted by ∅, whereas ♦(♦p ∧ ¬p) is accepted by some non-empty sets, namely those which include both pand p-worlds; and so the update semantics for ♦ cannot be defined just in terms of the accept states of its complement (though see Gillies 2018 for a variant which can be). 21These facts are particularly interesting in relation to the limited equivalence between the update and domain semantics proved in Rothschild 2017. See also Rothschild and Yalcin 2015, 2016 for detailed discussion of dynamic semantics and their relation to static semantics. 14 Note, finally, that these relations are all preserved for L♦−, the language which does not allow stacked 'might's. First, we have D L♦− U (the proof is the same as the proof of Fact 3.10). That, together with Fact 3.5 (that D ≺L♦− R), and the fact that  is transitive (see Fact 3.13 below), shows that R L♦− U ; otherwise, we would have D L♦− U . Finally, the proof that U L♦ R extends immediately to L♦−, so we have: Fact 3.11. U ≺L♦− R. The last system I will discuss here is the state-based semantics of Hawke and Steinert-Threlkeld 2016.22 The state-based semantics S is very similar to the update semantics, except an index is a single set of worlds. At any model s ∈ S , an atomic sentence p is true at a set of worlds c just in case, for every world w ∈ c : vs(p, w) = 1. And a sentence of the form ♦φ is true in s just in case φ is true in s in some {w} ⊆ c. The state-based semantics is strictly less expressive than the domain semantics: Fact 3.12. S ≺L♦ D. Furthermore, for any language L, L is transitive across semantic theories isomorphic over L; this follows from Fact 3.13: Fact 3.13. For any language L and class of semantic theories T isomorphic with respect to L, L is a partial pre-order over T. So we also have: Fact 3.14. S ≺L♦ R. 3.3 Quantified modal languages The final comparison of expressive power which I will explore here concerns quantified modal languages. This is a particularly interesting topic for present purposes because epistemic modals embed in fascinating ways in the scope of quantifiers-ways that have been used to argue against the standard semantics and in favor of various quantified enrichments of the update semantics. The present expressibility results can, however, be extended to show that, if we extend all these frameworks to quantificational languages in the most straightforward way, the expressive hierarchies for the nonquantified language remain unchanged. To show this, consider a standard quantificational language L♦v , built out of a vocabulary comprising variables xi : i ∈ N; n-place relation symbolsRni : i ∈ I for every n ≥ 0; and a one-place sentence operator ♦. L♦v is the smallest set comprising atomic sentences with the form of an n-place relation 22It is a more complicated matter to extend the comparison to the bilateral state-based semantics in Aloni 2016, SteinertThrelkeld 2017, Chapter 3. 15 symbol Rn followed by an n-tuple of variables; and sentences of the form ♦φ, for any φ ∈ L♦v . We can extend the basic relational semantic theoryR to a semantic theoryR∃ for this quantified language by adding a domain to the semantic theory, and adding a variable assignment (a function from variables to elements of the domain) to our indices, so that they amount to triples comprising a variable assignment, accessibility relation, and world. Our valuation function now takes a world and an n-place relation symbol and returns an n-place relation on the domain. Our truth clauses for atomic sentences and ♦ will be generalized in the usual way, and our semantics for ♦ remains essentially unchanged.23 We can treat quantifiers as sentence operators (shifting variable assignments, in the usual way) which we can freely add to our language. We can likewise enrich the domain semantics to a semantic theory D∃ of L♦v in a parallel fashion, augmenting our indices so they are triples of variable assignments, information states, and worlds, and extending the interpretation function in the obvious way. It is clear that these changes do not affect the expressive hierarchy between the domain and relational semantics. That is, we have: Fact 3.15. D∃ ≺L♦v R ∃. The proof is a straightforward generalization of the proof of the parallel result for the non-quantified case. Things get more interesting when we turn to the update semantics.24 The most obvious way to incorporate quantification into the update semantics is to simply treat intensions as functions from a variable assignment to a function from contexts to contexts (as in Yalcin 2015), so that U∃-indices have the form 〈a, 〈s, c〉〉, for a a variable assignment and s and c contexts.25 For any model u∃ ∈ U∃, we say that, for atomic sentence p of the form Rn(〈x1, x2, . . . xn〉), p is trueu∃ at 〈a, 〈s, c〉〉 iff c is the result of removing from s all and only worlds w such that 〈a(x1), a(x2), . . . a(xn)〉 /∈ vu∃(Rn, w). And we say that ♦φ is trueu∃ at 〈a, 〈s, c〉〉 iff [[φ]]u∃(a)(s) 6= ∅ ∧ s = c, or [[φ]]R∃(a)(s) = ∅ = c. If we go this way, then, once again, the expressive hierarchy from above will be preserved: the quantified update semantics will be strictly less expressive than the quantified relational semantics. Fact 3.16. U∃ ≺L♦v R ∃. 23I.e. for any model r∃ ∈ R∃, where 〈a, f, w〉 is a relational index, with a a variable assignment, f a modal base, and w a possible world, we say that an atomic sentence of the form Rn(〈x1, x2, . . . xn〉) is truer∃ at 〈a, f, w〉 iff 〈a(x1), a(x2), . . . a(xn)〉 ∈ vr∃(Rn, w), and ♦φ is truer∃ at 〈a, f, w〉 iff there is a world w′ ∈ f(w) such that φ is truer∃ at 〈a, f, w′〉. 24I'll set aside the state-based semantics for now; I don't know of quantificational versions of that semantics. 25Interestingly, this is not the most common way to incorporate quantification into the dynamic framework in which the update semantics is cast. In the standard quantified extension of that framework, developed in Heim 1982, 1983, indices are treated, not as pairs of a variable assignment and a pair of information states, but rather as pairs of 'files', where a file is a set of world/variable assignment pairs. I will not explore the expressive hierarchies that would result from this more complicated way of going. 16 4 The upshot There is much more to explore here, but I will stop for the present. Let me briefly summarize the situation, and then emphasize a few upshots of this discussion. The (quantified) domain semantics, (quantified) update semantics, and state-based semantics are all strictly less expressive than the (quantified) relational semantics with respect to a language comprising 'might' and atomic sentences. In other words, for any way of extending this language with a new set of sentence operators and any way of extending the domain, update, or state-based semantic theories to give semantics for those operators, we can extend the relational framework to these operators in a way which exactly replicates the logic of that operator in the given semantics. But the converse is not true: there are operators definable in the relational framework whose logic cannot be replicated in the domain, update, or state-based frameworks. This shows that there are no data involving 'might' embedded under some operator which the domain, update, or state-based semantics can make sense of, but which the relational semantics cannot make sense of.26 This, in turn, sheds new light on the debate about the semantics of epistemic modals. At a high level, that dialectic has sometimes been presented roughly as follows. First, a conservative assumption in favor of the relational semantics is generally taken for granted. Then, this assumption is challenged with data involving 'might' embedded under other operators which the relational semantics putatively has trouble accounting for. Finally, the data are used to advocate a revisionary semantics which can make sense of them when extended in an appropriate way to give a semantics for the embedding operator. The present results show that this gets things backwards. On the one hand, these results show that there are no embedding data which on their own tell against the relational semantics and in favor of the domain, update, or state-based semantics. That is, for any embedding data which we can account for within the domain, update, or state-based semantics by extending those semantics to the embedding operator(s) in question, we can account for the same data in the relational semantics by extending the relational semantics in a way which matches the logic of the new operator(s) in the 26Of course, this holds only as long as we focus on sentences where 'might' takes as a complement just sentences in our simple starting language. In fact, of course, 'might' can embed sentences of much more complexity. But, as far as the embedding behavior of epistemic modals goes, this limitation seems to be harmless; all of the data that I know of which have been used to motivate departures from the relational semantics stay within these bounds. This limitation follows from the assumption that LO is closed only under the operators in O, and not under the operators in the vocabulary of L. If we made the latter assumption, we would avoid this limitation, but the proofs below would not go through. Note that many (but not all) of the results above can be easily extended to more complex starting languages. (See brief discussion in Footnote 18. In some cases, no such extension will be possible, e.g. if we compare the update and relational semantics with a starting language which includes conjunction, given its standard entries in these two frameworks. But the comparison of that result to those above shows that the resulting failure has to do with those entries for conjunction, not with the semantics for epistemic modals; the results above show that the logical features of the standard update conjunction can be replicated in the relational framework.) 17 domain/update/state-based frameworks. But the converse does not hold, and so there may well be data which tell the other way: embedding data which the relational framework can make sense of, but which the domain, update, and state-based frameworks cannot make sense of. On the other hand, excessive expressive power is to be avoided in giving a semantics for natural language. So these results also provide the basis for an argument in favor of the revisionary, less expressive alternatives. If natural language does not make use of the full expressive power of the relational semantics, we may want to record this fact in our semantic theory. The less expressive a theory of 'might' is, the fewer stipulations are needed to make it match data from natural language. Thus, if the less expressive frameworks can make sense of the behavior of embedded epistemic modals, then the present expressibility results show that there should be a simplicity-based prejudice in their favor. This makes precise the intuition reported by Ninan and others that there is something about the domain semantics which makes it simpler than the relational semantics. These considerations are, of course, only pro tanto. There are many other considerations that can bear on the choice between semantic theories. For instance, one framework may be able to account for embedding data in a more natural way than another, (for instance, by doing so in a computationally simpler way; it is important to note that just because T L T ′, it does not follow that T ′ can match the logic of any extension of T in as computationally simple way as T does).27 Let me put all this a bit more generally, to bring out the utility (and limitations) of comparisons of potential expressibility. Consider a debate between two semantic theorists about how to make sense of some fragment of natural language. The first theorist may point to the logical behavior of sentences in some extension of this fragment as evidence in favor of her theory. The second theorist could respond by showing that there exists an extension of her preferred theory to that extension which also captures the logical behavior in question. But the present considerations show that a more general response is also available to her. If she can show that her theory has greater potential expressibility than the first theorist's, then she can show that the first theorist can't ever win an argument so easily: whatever extension the first theorist offers up, the second theorist will be able to match the logic of that extension. This does not decide which theory is correct. For one thing, this very fact, although it undermines the first theorist's original argument for her theory, may be taken as a different point in favor of the first theory, as it shows that there is a precise sense in which the first theory is less flexible than the second. Second, there may be other, independent considerations which bear on the choice between the theories. Thus considerations of relative potential expressibility are not decisive, but they play at least two important roles: they help us determine when an argument based purely on the logic of some extension of a semantic theory can on its own be an argument in favor of that theory 27Cf. debates in syntax, where more powerful grammars are sometimes preferred simply because of the ease with which they can capture the data; thanks to Roni Katzir for pointing out this connection. 18 and against another; and they help us make precise intuitions about the relative simplicity of theories. 5 The domain versus relational semantics This concludes my abstract discussion of relative potential expressibility. My plan for this final part of the paper is to briefly descend from these abstract considerations back into the more concrete debate about which theory is best able to account for epistemic modals in natural language. My goal is not to choose between these theories here. I will instead focus on a limited subset of embedding data, making a case study of the behavior of epistemic modals under attitude predicates. The goal will be to bring out the kinds of methodological considerations that should be brought to bear in deciding between different semantic theories in light of expressibility results like those proved above.28 As we saw above, Ninan (2016) shows that we can account for Yalcin's data in the relational system. More generally, Ninan's semantics for attitude predicates, plus the relational semantics, is in fact equivalent to Yalcin's system.29 In light of this equivalence, together with the expressibility results which showed that there is a sense in which the domain semantics is more constrained than the relational semantics, it would be tempting to conclude that the domain semantics is to be preferred over the relational semantics, at least modulo considerations about epistemic modals in other environments. But this would be too fast, because it turns out the predictions of Yalcin's and Ninan's systems are problematic.30 These systems have at least three serious empirical problems. First, as Dorr and Hawthorne (2013) point out, Yalcin's system (and hence Ninan's system) predicts that, for non-modal φ and agent A, the inference from φ to pA knows might φq will be valid: on these accounts, the latter is true just in case the truth of φ is compatible with A's knowledge, and any truth is compatible with anyone's knowledge. But this is obviously wrong. It is possible to fail to know that some truth might obtain; this is just what happens when one has a false belief. Suppose John sees Mark enter his office and close the door. Unbeknownst to John, Mark has a secret exit in the floor of his office, and has used this exit to leave the office and go to the bar. In this situation, 'John knows that Mark might be at the bar' seems plainly false. But, since Mark is in fact at the bar, the Yalcin/Ninan approach wrongly predicts this to 28In Mandelkern 2019, I explore a much wider variety of embedding data, and give a different response to those data. To be clear, I stand by the response I give there; the proposals I explore here are local and ad hoc in an entirely unsatisfying way, and serve a merely illustrative purpose. The 'bounded theory' that I develop there builds on the relational theory. However, as I point out there (Footnote 58), a similar response could be given in a domain framework. For what it's worth, my own view is that the relational framework is preferable, but for reasons having to do with higher-level considerations about communication (which I discuss in Mandelkern (2018a)), not on the basis of embedding data. 29I.e. for any attitude verb V, world w, information state s, and modal base f , pA V's φq is true in Yalcin's system at an index 〈s, w〉 just in case it is true in Ninan's system at the index 〈f, w〉. 30The same problems face the update semantics, when combined with the approach to attitudes in Heim 1992, or the eventrelative modal and attitude semantics of Hacquard 2006, 2010. 19 be true.31 The second problem is that the Yalcin/Ninan framework gets the entailment relations between pA knows might φq and pA believes might φq backwards. In this framework, the first says that the truth of φ is compatible with A's knowledge; the latter that it is compatible with A's beliefs (provided A's beliefs are consistent). Since whatever is compatible with someone's beliefs is compatible with their knowledge, but not vice versa, this framework predicts that pA knows might φq does not entail pA believes might φq; but that, as Dorr and Hawthorne (2013) point out, that pA consistently believes might φq does entail pA knows might φq. But this is wrong: just as in the non-modal case, likewise in the modal case, knowledge entails belief, but not vice versa. Birthers consistently believe that Obama may have been born in Kenya, but they don't know this. By contrast, if John knows Mark may be in his office, then he also believes this; 'John knows Mark might be in his office, but he doesn't believe Mark might be in his office' has the same sense of incoherence as in the non-modal case.32 The final problem for the Yalcin/Ninan system is that it predicts that 'must' is vacuous under attitudes.33 That is, sentences with the form pA V's must φq and pA V's φq are predicted to be semantically equivalent: modals embedded under an attitude verb are predicted only to contribute quantificational force, and since the universal quantificational force of 'must' matches the universal quantificational force of the embedding predicate, 'must' is predicted to have no effect. This prediction, however, is wrong. A construction with the form pA knows/believes must φq is generally only felicitous if A's evidence for the truth of φ is in some sense indirect.34 For instance-to modify a stock example-suppose that Sue is watching it rain, and on this basis concludes that it's raining out. Then we can say 'Sue knows/believes it's raining', but the 'must'-variant 'Sue knows/believes it must be raining' is quite odd. By contrast, suppose that Sue can't see outside, but sees some of her colleagues come inside with wet umbrellas, and on this basis concludes that it's raining out. Then either the 'must' or non-modal variant is acceptable. There are many kinds of explanation we might seek out for 31Yalcin (2012) discusses this problem in the context of the update framework. A referee for this journal helpfully points out that this prediction of the Yalcin/Ninan system would be palatable if there were some reading of 'knows' on which the inference from φ to pA knows might φq looks valid. If there were, then sequences like the following should have a coherent reading: 'Susie is completely convinced that it's sunny out; she is, after all, looking out at what appears to be a sunny sky. But she knows that it might be raining out, because in fact it's raining out, and the apparently sunny sky is just a clever projection.' On any reading, the last sentence here sounds like a non sequitur. 32See Hawthorne et al. (2016); Bledin and Lando (2017); Beddor and Goldstein (2018) for discussion of related cases. A referee for this journal helpfully points out that these first two problem stem from the same logical feature of the Yalcin/Ninan system: that on that system, pA consistently believes/knows φq is equivalent to pφ is consistent with A's beliefs/knowledgeq. These problems are, nonetheless, distinct, and are important to keep separate because it is possible to solve one problem without solving the other (as we will see presently). 33Assuming 'must' is defined as the dual of 'might', with negation given its standard Boolean meaning. This follows from the more general problem that to accept φ and to accept pMust φq amount to the same thing in this system, a problem Hacquard 2010, §6.1.2 discusses. 34This generalizes a common parallel observation about unembedded 'must'; see Karttunen 1972; Veltman 1985; Kratzer 1991; von Fintel and Gillies 2010; Kratzer 2012; Matthewson 2015; Lassiter 2016; Giannakidou and Mari 2016; Sherman 2018; Mandelkern 2017b, 2018b. For specific discussion of embedded 'must' see Ippolito 2017. 20 this difference, including broadly pragmatic explanations, but it is hard to see how the Yalcin/Ninan systems could provide the foundation for any such explanation, since, on this approach, the 'must' and non-modal variants are, again, semantically equivalent.35 The Yalcin/Ninan system is thus not empirically viable. Yalcin's and Ninan's system show us how to respond to Yalcin's data within a domain and relational semantics, respectively. In both cases, those responses have implausible results. The expressibility results above showed that the relational semantics has more expressive power than any of the alternative views we explored. The implausibility of the Yalcin/Ninan system may appear to show that we need an even more expressive semantics than the relational one in order to have the flexibility to account for Yalcin's data in a plausible way. But this would be too fast. The main point which I wish to make in this section is that reasoning like this would only be valid if Yalcin's and Ninan's systems were the weakest ways one could possibly account for Yalcin's data in the domain and relational frameworks, respectively. If this were so, then things would look very bad indeed for those frameworks: we would know that any way those frameworks could account for Yalcin's data will validate the implausible inferences just reviewed. This would, in turn, provide sufficient motivation to reject those theories and pursue a new, more expressive theory of epistemic modals. But, by contrast, if Yalcin's and Ninan's systems do not represent the weakest ways to respond to Yalcin's data within the domain and relational frameworks, respectively, then the failure of the Yalcin/Ninan systems tells us nothing about the viability of those frameworks. More generally, my point is the following: when faced with new data, the only way to show that a semantic system is incapable of making sense of those data is by looking at the weakest way that system can account for the data. It is only if the weakest possible account of the data within that system validates implausible entailments that we know we need a more expressive underlying system, rather than simply a different way of responding to the data within that system. And it turns out that the Yalcin/Ninan system is not the weakest way to account for Yalcin's data, within either the relational or domain frameworks. In both cases, there are much weaker constraints available, which account for Yalcin's data and avoid the problems just enumerated. To show this, 35It may look as though these data can be explained in a relatively conservative way within a close variant of the Yalcin/Ninan approach by adopting a presupposition of indirectness along the lines suggested by von Fintel and Gillies (2010). But, first, to do this, we would have to depart substantively from the domain semantics, since information states do not provide enough structure to formulate a presupposition like the one von Fintel and Gillies propose; on that proposal, modals are evaluated relative to a set of propositions (representing an agent's direct evidence), and presuppose that no single element of the set entails the modal's prejacent or its negation. Even if we modify the domain semantics so that the von Fintel and Gillies proposal is statable, Ippolito (2017) gives convincing arguments that indirectness does not project like a presupposition, and so should not be encoded as a presupposition at all (nor will we have better luck encoding it as a conventional implicature, which would face the same objections). I am inclined to think instead that a pragmatic view like the one that I develop in Mandelkern (2017b, 2018b) is more plausible (cf. Degen et al. 2015). But that approach crucially requires that there be a difference in truth conditions between 'must' sentences and corresponding non-modal sentences, and so cannot get off the ground if pA V's must φq is semantically equivalent to pA V's φq. There are, of course, pragmatic accounts which distinguish sentences which are semantically equivalent, but I do not see a natural account to apply to the present case. In any case, the first two two points alone provide motivation to look for alternatives. 21 I will explore what the weakest constraint is in each framework which accounts for these data. To make this discussion tractable, I will make two background assumptions: first, that our connectives are the standard Boolean ones;36 second, that attitudes are represented as sets of possible worlds, in the broadly Hintikkan framework that Ninan and Yalcin both assume-i.e. that attitude predicates have as their core semantic values universal quantifiers over accessible worlds. There may be reasons to relax both these assumptions, but they facilitate the present discussion, and are harmless as far as present purposes are concerned. Given all this, the weakest constraint in the relational framework which suffices to account for Yalcin's data-that is, to ensure that pA supposes (φ and might not φ)q entails that A's suppositions are inconsistent-is the following: provided A's suppositions are consistent, then some supposition world can only access other supposition worlds. We can schematically encode this constraint, which I'll call the subset relational constraint, as follows: Definition 5.1. Subset attitude semantics, relational version: • [[A V's φ]]f,w a. defined only if VA,w 6= ∅→ ∃w′ ∈ VA,w : f(w′) ⊆ VA,w subset relational constraint b. where defined, true iff ∀w′ ∈ VA,w : [[φ]]f,w ′ = 1 standard Hintikkan truth conditions To see that this constraint is necessary and sufficient to account for Yalcin's data in the relational framework, given our background assumptions, first assume that pA supposes (φ and might not φ)q is true; then we know that (i) all of A's suppositions worlds make φ true (relative to f ), and (ii) all of A's suppositions worlds can access a world where φ is false (relative to f ). But the subset relational constraint ensures that, if A's suppositions are consistent, then one of A's supposition worlds can only access other supposition worlds. It follows that (i) and (ii) are only both satisfied when there are no worlds compatible with A's suppositions. Note next that the subset relational constraint is necessary to account for Yalcin's data, given our background assumptions: if the constraint is violated, then pA supposes (φ and might not φ)q will not entail that A's suppositions are inconsistent. Suppose that A's suppositions are consistent at w, and the subset relational constraint is violated for some modal base f : that is, SA,w is non-empty, and ∀w′ ∈ SA,w : f(w′) \ SA,w 6= ∅. Let φ denote SA,w.37 By construction, every world in SA,w is a φ-world, and every world in SA,w will be able to access a world under f where φ is false. Thus pA supposes (φ and might not φ)q is true at w, even though A's suppositions at w are consistent. 36While adopting non-standard connectives could on its own explain Yalcin's data (as Rothschild and Klinedinst (2015); Mandelkern (2019) discuss) it would not on its own account for nearby order and scope variants. 37It will generally be possible to come up with a sentence that denotes the content of an attitude state in natural language: e.g. just let φ ='What A V's at w'. 22 Thus, given our background assumptions, the subset relational constraint is the weakest constraint which accounts for Yalcin's data in the relational framework. The first thing to note about this constraint is that it is much weaker than the constraint implicit in Ninan's system-that modal bases must be constant functions to the set of attitude world. And thus the relational semantics is by no means locked into the Yalcin/Ninan approach if it is to make sense of Yalcin's data. Before exploring the plausibility of the subset relational system (the system that results from the relational semantics together with the subset attitude semantics), let us explore the parallel question for the domain semantics. It turns out that there is no way to exactly replicate the subset relational system in the domain framework, given our background assumptions:38 something which is unsurprising, given the greater expressive power of the relational framework, and which provides a helpful concrete illustration of those expressibility results. But neither is the domain semantics locked into the Yalcin/Ninan framework. The weakest constraint in the domain framework which accounts for Yalcin's data is the following: a modal in the complement of pA supposesq is always evaluated relative to a subset of A's supposition worlds. A simple way to encode this constraint, which I call the subset domain constraint, is as follows:39 Definition 5.2. Subset attitude semantics, domain version: • [[A V's φ]]s,w a. defined only if s ⊆ VA,w subset domain constraint b. where defined, true iff ∀w′ ∈ VA,w : [[φ]]s,w ′ = 1 standard Hintikkan truth conditions Given this constraint, if pA supposes (φ and might not φ)q is true at 〈s, w〉, then (i) all the worlds compatible with A's suppositions in w make φ true (relative to s); and (ii) all the worlds compatible with A's suppositions are such that some world in smakes φ false (relative to s). These two conditions can only be jointly met if there are no worlds compatible with A's suppositions. Next suppose that A's suppositions are consistent atw, and that the subset domain constraint is violated for some information state s, i.e. s \ SA,w 6= ∅. Let φ denote SA,w. Then pA supposes (φ and might not φ)q will be true at 〈s, w〉, since (i) all of A's supposition world are φ-worlds; and (ii) some world in s makes φ-false, since s \SA,w is non-empty and by construction includes only p¬φq-worlds. So, if the subset domain constraint is violated, pA supposes (φ and might not φ)q can be true even if A's suppositions are consistent. 38The proof follows from the fact that, given our background assumptions and given any semantics for attitudes, the domain framework will validate the inference from pA V's might (φ or ψ)q to p(A V's might φ) or (A V's might ψ)q; but this inference is invalid in the subset relational framework. See Stalnaker 1984; Yalcin 2011 for criticism of one prediction of this inference pattern: that pA believes might φ or A believes might ¬φq is a logical truth. 39A different route to an approach which ends up being essentially equivalent to the subset domain semantics goes by adding an ordering source to Hacquard (2010)'s event-relative semantics; see Hacquard 2010, §6.1.2 for a brief discussion of this possibility. 23 Thus, given our background assumptions, the subset domain constraint is the weakest constraint which accounts for Yalcin's data in the domain framework. And, once more, this constraint is much weaker than the one relied on in Yalcin's framework-that modals under attitudes are evaluated relative to exactly the set of attitude worlds. Thus the domain semantics, like the relational semantics, is not locked into the Yalcin/Ninan approach if it is to make sense of Yalcin's data. The key question at this stage is whether the subset relational or subset domain systems improves over the Yalcin/Ninan systems. Strikingly, both do (albeit to varying degrees). First, both approaches predict that non-modal φ does not entail pA knows might φq, avoiding the most serious problem for the Yalcin/Ninan system: this is because, on both approaches, pA knows might φq is strictly stronger than pφ is compatible with A's knowledgeq. Second, both approaches, unlike the Yalcin/Ninan approach, predict that pA knows might φq Strawson entails pA believes might φq (in the terminology of von Fintel 1997): whenever both sentences are well-defined, if the first is true, the second is as well (holding fixed the modal base/information state parameter). The subset relational approach also correctly predicts that pA consistently believes might φq does not entail pA knows might φq; by contrast, the subset domain approach still wrongly predicts this entailment is Strawson valid. Finally, both approaches predict that pA V's must φq and pA V's φq are not semantically equivalent: the subset relational approach predicts that neither entails the other, while the subset domain approach predicts that the latter entails the former, but not vice versa (in both cases, there is much more to be done to marshal these facts into an explanation of how 'must' patterns under attitude verbs, but this is a clear improvement over the Yalcin/Ninan prediction that pA V's must φq is semantically equivalent to pA V's φq). The subset domain system is less attractive than the subset relational system with respect to its predictions about the relation between belief and knowledge. But there is much more to explore before we come to any conclusion here; in particular, we must, among other things, explore alternative approaches which relax the two background assumptions we have made here.40 The goal of the present excursus is not to decide between the domain and relational approaches, but rather to emphasize that, in deciding whether some embedding data show that a given semantic framework is not expressively powerful enough to make sense of natural language, we must always explore the weakest constraint within that framework which makes sense of those data. It is only if that constraint makes implausible commitments that the data truly tell against the framework in question. In the present case, these considerations showed that there are much weaker ways to account for Yalcin's data in both the domain and relational framework than with the implausible Yalcin/Ninan framework. These weaker 40Again, in Mandelkern (2019), I explore a system which abandons Boolean semantics for the connectives. In a different direction, Beaver 1992, 2001; Rothschild 2011; Yalcin 2012; Willer 2013 develop systems which avoid the first two of these problems by treating attitude states, not as sets of worlds, but as sets of sets of worlds. Those approaches avoid the first and second problems raised here, though they still face the third problem: they predict that pA V's must φq is semantically equivalent to pA V's φq, at least within any eliminative fragment like the ones they are working with. 24 approaches are both much more plausible than the Yalcin/Ninan system, and thus these embedding data do not, after all, tell against either framework as a candidate semantics for epistemic modals. Let me conclude by pointing to a more indirect upshot of this discussion. The domain semantics has a substantially stronger logic than the relational semantics; in particular, enriched with standard classical treatments of the connectives, the domain semantics validates the logic K45 (or S5, if we also impose a reflexivity constraint by assuming that, for all domain indices 〈s, w〉, w ∈ s)41 whereas the relational system validates just the much weaker logic K (again, unless we assume a reflexivity constraint (as I have not), in which case we would have a T logic). Interestingly, Ninan's system, although it adopts the relational semantics, still validates K45 in a local sense: the axioms of K45 will be valid in the scope of an attitude verb. This may make it look as though Yalcin's data are really an argument for K45: we could validate K45 directly by adopting the domain semantics, or indirectly (in a local way) by adopting Ninan's semantics, but either way, we must validate K45, at least in the scope of attitude predicates, if we are to make sense of the data. But the subset relational approach shows this is wrong: it is mere happenstance that the most prominent treatments of the data both validate this strong logic (at least in the scope of attitude predicates), for the subset relational approach does not validate K45 even for modals in the scope of attitude verbs (e.g. on this approach, pA believes might pq can be true without pA believes must (might p)q being true, and pA believes must pq can be true without pA believes must (must p)q being true). And so we can make sense of Yalcin's data without validating K45 even in a local sense. This shows that-even though (I have argued) there is an argument for the domain semantics on the basis of its expressive weakeness-there is no argument from Yalcin's data for the domain semantics on the basis of its stronger logic, which turns out to be strictly orthogonal to accounting for those data. (There may, of course, be other arguments that we want a stronger logic for epistemic modals than K; my present point is simply that the present discussion shows that Yalcin's embedding data do not provide such arguments.) 6 Conclusion I have argued that we can gain new insight into controversies about the semantics of natural language expressions by taking an abstract perspective on the potential expressive power of different semantic theories. I have developed a formal framework to make these comparisons precise, and have used this framework to explore the relative potential expressive power of different semantics for epistemic modals. These comparisons show that, for any embedding operator which can be defined in the domain, update, or state-based semantics, a corresponding operator can be defined in a relational framework, but not conversely. This shows that the dialectic in this debate is roughly the opposite of 41See Schultz 2010; Holliday and Icard 2017. 25 what it has often been taken to be. On the one hand, the relational theory can do anything that these revisionary theories can do, showing that it is not defenders of the relational framework who must fight rearguard actions when new data are discovered, but rather defenders of the revisionary frameworks who must show that those frameworks have the expressive power to account for those data. But, on the other hand, the relative expressive weakness of the domain, update, and state-based semantics provides powerful pro tanto considerations in their favor. In the last part of the paper, I explored the comparison between the relational and domain frameworks in light of these results, focusing on the behavior of modals under attitudes. I emphasized there the importance of methodological parsimony in choosing between semantic frameworks: the only way to see whether a given semantic framework has the expressive power to account for some new domain of data is by finding the weakest way the framework can do so, and then asking if the result makes implausible commitments. I have focused on epistemic modals here because they provide an apt illustration of the utility of the expressive comparisons I have developed. While I hope this discussion has advanced our understanding of the meaning of epistemic modals, my broader goal has been to develop a formal framework with widespread application in semantics. Semantic theory has often advanced thanks to results regarding expressive power-for instance in the theory of tense and temporal adverbs,42 or of generalized quantifiers.43 The framework for comparing relative potential expressibility introduced here makes precise a new kind of question we can ask about the expressive power of different semantic frameworks, and the characterization result proved shows how to straightforwardly answer those questions. There is much more work to do in exploring the applications of this framework, as well as exploring and extending the underlying formalism. Of particular interest is a set of questions about computational complexity: if T L T ′, that means that, for any operator we can give a semantics for in T , we can replicate that operator's logic in an extension of T ′, but this does not tell us anything about the relationship between the complexity of T ′ to the complexity of T . Ideally, we would like to know whether we can replicate all operators from possible extensions of T without an upgrade in computational complexity. I believe this work will pay handsome dividends. Potential expressibility results cannot on their own determine which of two semantic theories is correct, but they can clarify the dialectical relationship in which competing theories stand, thus clarifying what kinds of evidence we can expect to find for and against them based on embedding data, and making precise one sense in which a theory can be simpler than another. 42See Kamp 1970; Cresswell 1990. 43See Peters and Westerståhl (2008, Parts 3-4) for an overview. 26 A Definitions and proofs In this appendix I give definitions of the technical terms used in §3, and provide proofs of the claims made there. A.1 Definitions Definition A.1. Languages, Models, Semantic theories: Given a propositional language L, built from a vocabulary comprising a set A of atomic sentences p, q, r . . . and sentence operators O, and comprising only (and typically all) (i) atoms from A, and (ii) strings of the form On(〈φ1, φ2, . . . φn〉) for any n-place sentence operator On ∈ O and sentences φi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n in L,44 a modelM of L is a sequence 〈W, v,I, [[*]]〉, whereW is a non-empty set of possible worlds (any set); v is an atomic valuation function, which takes any atomic sentence of L and any possible world fromW to either 1 ("true") or 0 ("false"), and which takes any atomic sentence of L to the subset ofW where that sentence is true; and I is a non-empty set of indices (again, any set). [[*]] is an interpretation function for L which takes an atomic sentence to a set of indices in the model; takes an n-place sentence operator On to a function from an n-tuple of sets of indices to a set of indices; take any sentence of the form On(〈φ1, φ2 . . . φn〉), for any n-place sentence operator On ∈ O and any n-tuple 〈φ1, φ2, . . . φn〉 of sentences of L, to [[On]](〈[[φ1]], [[φ2]] . . . [[φn]]〉); and which is otherwise undefined. For convenience, we also stipulate that [[*]] takes any sentence φ of L and any index i (written [[φ]]i) to 1 just in case i ∈ [[φ]], and otherwise to 0. Finally, a semantic theory T of L is a non-empty set of models of L. Given a quantified language Lv , built from a vocabulary comprising a set V of variables x1, x2, . . . , a set R of relation symbols, and a set O of sentence operators; and comprising only (and typically all) (i) atoms of the form Rn(〈x1, x2, . . . xn〉), for Rn an n-place relation in R, and xi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n variables from V; and (ii) strings of the form On(〈φ1, φ2, . . . φn〉) for any n-place sentence operator On ∈ O and any sentences φi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n in Lv , a model of Lv is just like a model of a propositional language, except it also includes a domain D of individuals, and the atomic valuation function takes a possible world and an n-place relation symbol to an n-place relation (a subset of Dn, the set of n-tuples of elements of D). Interpretation functions and semantic theories are constructed as for propositional languages. Definition A.2. Extension of a Language: Given a language L, and a set O of sentence operators disjoint from the vocabulary of L,45 the extension of L to O, written LO, is the smallest set containing L and closed under the elements of O, i.e. where a is the function giving the arity of sentence operators, the smallest set containing L such that if O ∈ O, a(O) = n, and l ∈ (LO)n, then On(l) ∈ LO. Definition A.3. Extension of a model and semantic theory: Given a language L, a modelM of L, and an extension LO of L, an extensionMO ofM to an interpretation of LO with respect to L is an interpretation which is exactly likeM except with respect to its interpretation function, which must agree withM's interpretation function on sentences of L, i.e. ∀φ ∈ L : [[φ]]M ⊆ [[φ]]MO . Given a semantic theory T of L, an extension T O of T to LO is a semantic theory each of whose members extends some model in T from L to LO such that any two models in T O agree on the logic of O.46 44We will generally use lower-case italic letters to range over atoms, and Greek letters to range over all sentences. 45I will call any set of operators which meets this novelty constraint a 'set of new operators'; I sometimes leave this novelty condition implicit for brevity in introducing extensions of languages. 46I will usually leave the relativization to the initial language implicit. For any modelM, I write [[*]]M forM's interpretation function, and likewise for its other parameters. 27 A.2 Proofs For convenience, I repeat the definition of relative potential expressibility here; I then turn to proofs of the claims of §3: Definition 3.1. Relative Potential Expressibility: For any semantic theories T and T ′ of a language L, T L T ′ iff, for any set of new operators O, for any extension T O of T to LO, there is an extension T ′O of T ′ to LO which agrees with T O on logic ofO: that is, which is such that, for any Γ ⊆ LO such that ∃φ ∈ Γ : φ ∈ LO\L, and for any sentence ψ in LO, (Γ T O ψ) ↔ (Γ T ′O ψ). For a set of sentences Γ, sentence ψ, and semantic theory T , Γ T ψ iff for every modelM∈ T , Γ M ψ iff every index inM which makes all the sentences in Γ true also makes ψ true. We also define a derivative notion of relative expressibility between models: for any modelsM andM′ of a language L,M L M′ iff, for any set of new operators O, for any extensionMO ofM to LO, there is an extension M′O of M′ to LO which preserves the logic of O from MO: that is, which is such that, for any Γ ⊆ LO such that ∃φ ∈ Γ : φ ∈ LO \ L, and for any sentence ψ in LO, (Γ MO ψ)↔ (Γ M′O ψ). The proof of Fact 3.1 goes by way of two lemmas: Lemma A.1. For any modelsM andM′ of a language L,M L M′ iff for any extension LO of L with a set of new operators, and any extensionMO ofM to a model of LO, there is an extensionM′O ofM′ to LO such that there exists a function g from the indices ofM to the indices ofM′ such that for any sentence φ of LO and index i inM, φ is true at i inMO iff φ is true at g(i) inM′O. Proof. [⇒] For arbitrary models M and M′ of an arbitrary language L, suppose M L M′. Recall that means that, for any set of new operators O and any extensionMO ofM to LO, there is an extensionM′O of M′ to LO which preserves the logic ofO fromMO. Consider an arbitrary set of new operatorsO and arbitrary extension MO of M to LO. We will show that there is an extension M′ON of M′ to LO such that there is a function g from the indices ofM to the indices ofM′ such that for any sentence φ of LO and index i inM, φ is true at i inMO iff φ is true at g(i) inM′ON . We do so by way of considering first a different extended language which contains LO, and a different extension ofMwhich also extendsMO. In particular, consider the extension ofL toO∪N , whereO∩N = ∅, no operator in N is in the vocabulary of L, and the cardinality of N is greater than the cardinality of the set of indices ofM (if that set is finite) or equal in cardinality to the set of indices ofM (if that set is infinite). Now extendM to a new modelMON of the resulting language, LO∪N , with the following properties: (a) MON is an extension ofMO, so that ∀φ ∈ LO : [[φ]]MO = [[φ]]MON , and the indices ofM O N are the same as the indices ofMO; (b) for some sentence ψ ∈ LO∪N , for each index i of M, there is an O ∈ N , call it Oi, which uniquely specifies i, in the sense that Oi(ψ) is true at i inMON and false everywhere else inMON ; and (c) for some unary sentence operator ¬ ∈ N , ¬ is given the classical semantics of negation inMON , i.e. for any φ ∈ LO∪N , ¬(φ) is trueMON at i iff φ is not trueMON at i. Now extendM′ to a modelM′ON of LO∪N which preserves the logic of O ∪ N fromMON ; we know this will be possible by our assumption thatMLM′. Now, define a function g such that, for any index i inMON , g takes i to an index g(i) inM′ON such that (i) Oi(ψ) is true at g(i) inM′ON and (ii) some sentence in LO∪N is false at g(i). We know there is such an index; otherwise, we would have Oi(ψ) M′ON ¬(Oi(ψ)), and thus Oi(ψ) MON ¬(Oi(ψ)), but we know the latter is false by our semantics for Oi and ¬ inM O N . Now for any sentence φ of LO∪N : 28 • Suppose first φ is true at i inMON . ThenOi(ψ) MON φ, and thus by our assumption thatOi has the same logic inM′ON as inMON , Oi(ψ) M′ON φ, and thus φ is true at g(i), since Oi(ψ) is true at g(i). • Suppose next that φ is not true at i in MON . Then ¬φ is true at i in MON , and thus Oi(ψ) MON ¬φ and thus Oi(ψ) M′ON ¬φ, and thus ¬φ is true at g(i) inM ′O N , since Oi(ψ) is true at g(i). Thus we can conclude that φ is not true at g(i) inM′ON ; if it were, since our logic for negation is classical inMON , and thus inM′ON , we would have that everything is true at g(i) inM′ON , contrary to assumption. Thus for any φ in LO∪N , we have φ true at i inMON iff φ is true at g(i) inM′ON ; thus in particular, for any φ in LO, which is a subset of LO∪N , φ is true at i inMON iff φ is true at g(i) inM′ON ; and, sinceMON is an extension ofMO, it follows that for any φ in LO, φ is true at i inMO iff φ is true at g(i) inM′ON . Since O andMO were selected arbitrarily, this shows that, for any extension LO of L and extensionMO ofM, we can find an extension ofM′ to LO with the property that there is a function from the indices ofM to those ofM′ which preserves truth and falsity for the sentences of LO in the extended models. [⇐] For arbitrary modelsM andM′ of an arbitrary language L, suppose that, for any arbitrary extension LO of L with a set of sentence operators, and any arbitrary extension MO of M to a model of LO, there is an extensionM′O ofM′ to LO such that there exists a function g from the indices ofM to the indices ofM′ such that for any sentence φ ∈ LO and index i inM, φ is true at i inMO iff φ is true at g(i) inM′O. We can use this fact to construct a new extensionM′O− ofM′ which matches the logic of O inMO, as follows. Let M′O− be just like M′O, except that, at every index i of M′O which is not in the image of g, for any sentence φ ∈ LO \ L, φ is false at i inM′O− (we can do this because the truth of φ at i will depend just on the semantics we give to our new operators, since if φ is in LO \ L, it must by definition of LO have an operator from O with highest scope in the sentence). Note thatM′O− is still an extension ofM′ to LO; and g will still preserve truth for the relevant sentences: since we did not change the truth of any sentences in the image of g, for any φ ∈ LO, φ is trueMO iff φ is trueM′O− at g(i).47 Now suppose that Γ MO ψ for (Γ ∪ {ψ}) ⊆ LO, and that ∃φ ∈ Γ : φ ∈ LO \ L. Then by the fact that g preserves truth for sentences of LO between MO andM′O−, we have that, within the image of g, ψ is trueM′O− everywhere that all the members of Γ are; and by construction we have that one member of Γ, namely φ, is falseM′O− everywhere outside of the image of g; and so Γ M′O− ψ. Likewise suppose that Γ 2MO ψ; then there is some i where all of Γ is trueMO and ψ is falseMO , and so at g(i) all of Γ is trueM′O− with ψ is falseM′O− , and thus we have Γ 2M′O− ψ. Thus we have (Γ MO ψ)↔ (Γ M′O− ψ). Since this construction was perfectly general, it shows that, under our assumption, for any extensionMO ofM to an extension LO of L, we can find an extension ofM′ to LO which matches the logic of O inMO, and soMLM′. We turn to our second lemma: Lemma A.2. Characterization of Model Expressibility: For any modelsM andM′ and language L,M L M′ iff there is a function g (call it a witness function with respect to L) from the indices ofM to those ofM′ which is such that (i) for any sentence φ of L and index i inM, φ is true at i inM iff φ is true at g(i) inM′; and (ii) g is an injection. Proof. [⇒] Suppose for arbitraryM,M′ and L, there is no function g from the indices ofM to those ofM′ which is such that (i) for any sentence φ of L and index i inM, φ is true at i inM iff φ is true at g(i) inM′; and (ii) g is an injection. Find a set of new operators O with cardinality equal to the set of indices inM. Let f be a bijection from the indices ofM to O. ExtendM to a new modelMO of LO, with the property that, for any index i inM, for any sentence φ ∈ LO, f(i)(φ) is trueMO at i and falseMO at every other index of 47'TrueM' is shorthand for 'true inM'. 29 M; that is, f(i) "tags" i inMO. Now consider an arbitrary extensionM′O ofM′. Suppose there is a function g from the indices of M to the indices of M′ with the property that, for all φ ∈ LO, φ is trueMO at i iff φ is trueM′O at g(i). Since L ⊂ LO, and since extensions of models of a given language preserve truth for sentences in the original language, we know that, for all φ ∈ L, φ is trueM at i iff φ is trueM′ at g(i). Then it follows from our assumption that g is not an injection: for someM-indices i and i′ with i 6= i′, g(i) = g(i′). Choose some φ ∈ LO. We know by construction ofMO that f(i)(φ) is trueMO at i and falseMO at i′. But, since g(i) = g(i′), f(i)(φ) will either be trueM′O at both g(i) and g(i′), or false at both, and thus it will not be the case that, for every sentence φ of LO, if φ is true at i inMO, then φ is true at g(i) inM′O, contrary to assumption. Thus, sinceM′O was chosen arbitrarily, there is no extension ofM′ to LO such that there is a function which preserves truth and falsity for all sentences in LO betweenMO andM′O; and thus by Lemma A.1,M LM′. [⇐] Suppose, for arbitraryM,M′ and L, there is such a truth-preserving injection g. Given an arbitrary set O of sentence operators and an arbitrary extensionMO ofM to LO, we show there is an extensionM′O of M′ to LO which has the property that, for any sentence φ ∈ LO, φ is true at an index i inMO just in case φ is true at g(i) inM′O. Let K index the elements of O. For each Ok : k ∈ K, extendM to the modelMk which is just likeM, except its interpretation function [[*]]Mk is augmented with the semantic rule for Ok from [[*]]MO . Then, for eachOk, extendM′ to the modelM′k which augments the interpretation function ofM′ with a semantic rule for Ok as follows. For brevity, for any set α and function f , define f [α] to be the pointwise application of f to α where defined, i.e. f [α] = {f(a) : a ∈ α ∧ f(a) is defined}. Let g−1 be the inverse of g, defined only on the image of g; that g−1 is a well-defined function follows because g is an injection. Now, suppose first that Ok is a unary sentence operator; then letM′k extendM′ with the following semantic rule: [[Ok]]M′k = λsM′ .g[[[Ok]]Mk(g −1[s])], where sM′ ranges over sets ofM′ indices. Thus inM′k, Ok takes a set ofM′ indices; then finds the pre-image (where defined) of this complement with respect to g; then applies the semantic rule for Ok inMk to this pre-image; and finally, returns the pointwise application of g to the resulting set. Now note that, for any set s ofM-indices and set s′ ofM′-indices, if i ∈ s ↔ g(i) ∈ s′, it follows that i ∈ [[Ok]]Mk(s)↔ g(i) ∈ [[Ok]]M′k(s ′). To see this, assume for arbitrary s and s′ that i ∈ s↔ g(i) ∈ s′. Now note that s = g−1[s′]: if i ∈ s, then by assumption g(i) ∈ s′, and thus g−1[s′] will include i, by construction; and if i /∈ s, then by assumption g(i) /∈ s′, and since g−1 is an injection, by construction, we know that i /∈ g−1[s′]. We thus have [[Ok]]M′k(s ′) = g[[[Ok]]Mk(g −1[s′])] = g[[[Ok]]Mk(s)]. In other words, whenever i ∈ s↔ g(i) ∈ s′, then [[Ok]]M′k(s ′) is just the pointwise application of g to [[Ok]]Mk(s), and thus, since g is an injection, i ∈ [[Ok]]Mk(s) ↔ g(i) ∈ [[Ok]]M′k(s ′). The generalization of this construction to n-place sentence operators, for any n, is straightforward. We use this method to constructM′k for all k ∈ K. Now, whereM′ = 〈W, I, v, [[*]]M′〉 or 〈D,W, I, v, [[*]]M′〉, letM′O = 〈 W, I, v, ⋃ k∈K [[*]]M′k 〉 or〈 D,W, I, v, ⋃ k∈K [[*]]M′k 〉 , respectively. By our construction, we know that for any O ∈ O and any sets of M-indices s and M′-indices s′ such that i ∈ s ↔ g(i) ∈ s′, [[O]]M′O (s′) = g[[[O]]MO (s)], and thus i ∈ [[O]]MO (s) ↔ g(i) ∈ [[O]]M′O (s′). We know by assumption that, for all sentences φ ∈ L, i ∈ [[φ]]M ↔ g(i) ∈ [[φ]]M′ , and thus (since extending a model never changes its interpretation of a sentence already in the language of the original model) i ∈ [[φ]]MO ↔ g(i) ∈ [[φ]]M′O . Now consider any sequence of sentences ~ψ with the property that for each ψj in the sequence, i ∈ [[ψj ]]MO ↔ g(i) ∈ [[ψj ]]M′O . Then we know that, by our construction, for any k ∈ K and index i ofM, i ∈ [[Ok(~ψ)]]MO ↔ g(i) ∈ [[Ok(~ψ)]]M′O . Since the sentences of LO are built recursively from the sentences of L and the operators in O, it follows by an induction on the complexity of formulae that, for any φ ∈ LO, i ∈ [[φ]]MO ↔ g(i) ∈ [[φ]]M′O . Since O andMO were chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that, for any set of new operators O, for any extensionMO ofM to LO, there is an extensionM′O ofM′ to LO such that there is a function g with the property that, for any sentence φ ∈ LO, φ 30 is true at an index i inMO just in case φ is true at g(i) inM′O; and thus by Lemma A.1,MLM′. We turn now to our proof of Fact 3.1: Fact 3.1. Characterization of Expressibility: For any semantic theories T and T ′ and language L, if T is isomorphic with respect to L, and T ′ is isomorphic with respect to L, then T L T ′ iff there is a modelM∈ T and a modelM′ ∈ T ′ such that there is a witness function g from the indices ofM to those ofM′ with respect to L. A semantic theory T is isomorphic with respect to L iff ∀M,M′ ∈ T :MLM′ ∧M′ LM. Proof. For abitrary semantic theories T , T ′, and language L, suppose that T and T ′ are both isomorphic with respect to L: [⇒]: Suppose there is no pair of modelsM ∈ T andM′ ∈ T ′ such that there is a witness function g from the indices ofM to those ofM′. It follows by Lemma A.2 that for any modelsM∈ T andM′ ∈ T ′,M LM′. Choose arbitrary modelM ∈ T andM′ ∈ T ′, and find a set of operators O and extensionMO ofM to LO such that there is no extension of M′ which matches the logic of O in MO. We know this will be possible since otherwise M L M′. We can show moreover that no model M′′ ∈ T ′ can be extended to match the logic of O inMO; else since T ′ is isomorphic, we could extendM′ to match the logic of O inMO, contrary to assumption. Consider any extension T O of T to LO which includesMO and any extension T ′O of T ′ to LO. If these agreed on the logic ofO, then, since all the models within each theory agree with each other on the logic of O, then every model in T ′O would agree with every model in T O on the logic of O, contrary to our assumption that no extension of any model in T ′ matches the logic of O inMO; so T ′O does not agree with T O on the logic of O; since T ′O was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that no extension of T ′ agrees with T O on the logic of O; and so we have T L T ′. [⇐] Suppose there is a modelM ∈ T and a modelM′ ∈ T ′ such that there is a witness function g from the indices ofM to those ofM′. It follows by Lemma A.2 thatMLM′. Consider any extension LO of L with a new set of operators O, and extensionMO ofM to a model of LO. Find an extensionM′O ofM′ of LO which matches the logic of O fromMO. Now extend every model in T ′ other thanM′ to match the logic of O inM′O; we know this will be possible because T ′ is isomorphic with respect to L. Call the resulting set of models T ′O. For any way of completing the extension of T to a new semantic theory T O of LO, all the models in the extension will agree withMO on the logic of O, by definition of an extension, and so T O and T ′O will agree on the logic of O. Hence T L T ′. Fact 3.2. D L♦ R. Proof. Recall that our language L♦ contains an infinite set of atoms p, q, r . . . closed under the one-place sentence operator ♦, and that we assume that all of our semantic theories are sets of models whose sets of worlds and valuation functions are such that, in any model, any two worlds differ on the truth of some atom, and such that for any combination of atoms, exactly that set of atoms is true at some world, according to that model's valuation function. The relational semantics R is the class of models r of the form 〈Wr, vr, Ir, [[*]]r〉, where Ir = {〈f, w〉 : f : Wr → ℘(Wr) ∧ w ∈ Wr} and [[*]]r defined as specifed in §3; likewise the domain semantics D is the class of models d of the form 〈Wd, vd, Id, [[*]]d〉, where Id = {〈s, w〉 : s ⊆ Wd ∧w ∈ Wd}, with the interpretation function again specified as above. D is clearly isomorphic with respect to L♦, as is R, so by Fact 3.1 it suffices to show that there is a d ∈ D and an r ∈ R s.t. d L♦ r. Choose d at random and let 31 r be any model in R built on the same set of worlds and valuation function as d. Let g be a function Id → Ir as follows. For any index 〈s, w〉 ∈ Id, let g(〈s, w〉) = 〈fs, w〉, where fs is the constant function from worlds to s. For any atomic sentence p of L♦, p will be trued at i iff p is truer at g(i), since we are assuming the same stock of worlds and atomic valuation in both models, and since the truth of atomic sentence in these frameworks depends only on the world parameter of the index and the atomic valuation. Now for any sentence φ ∈ L♦, assume for induction that φ is trued at i iff it is truer at g(i). We show that, for arbitrary index i, ♦φ is trued at i iff ♦φ is truer at g(i). i will have the form 〈s, w〉, for information state s and world w, and, by our semantics for ♦ in d, ♦φ will be trued at i iff φ is trued at some element in the set Φ = {〈s, w′〉 : w′ ∈ s}. g(i) will have the form 〈fs, w〉, and, by our semantics for ♦ in r, ♦φ will be truer at g(i) iff φ is truer for some element in the set Ψ = {〈fs, w′〉 : w′ ∈ fs(w)}. Now note that, thanks to the way we constructed g and the fact that fs(w) = s, g will be a bijection from Φ to Ψ. And so it follows from our assumption for induction that φ will be trued at some element in Φ just in case φ is truer at some element in Ψ, and thus ♦φ will be trued at i iff ♦φ is truer at g(i). It thus follows by induction on the complexity of formulae that, for any sentence φ of L♦ and any index i, φ is trued at i iff φ is truer at g(i). Finally, it is easy to see that g is an injection. Given Fact 3.1, it thus follows that D L♦ R. Fact 3.3.R L♦ D. Proof. Consider any models d ∈ D and r ∈ R. Consider an r-index 〈f, w〉, with f(w) = {w′}, vr(p, w′) = 0, f(w′) = {w′′}, and vr(p, w′′) = 1. Then ♦p will be falser at 〈f, w〉, while ♦(♦p) will be truer at 〈f, w〉. There is no function g which replicates this pattern in d-i.e. which has ♦p falsed at g(〈f, w〉) and has ♦(♦p) trued at g(〈f, w〉). This is for the simple reason that, for any index i in Id, ♦φ is trued at i iff ♦(♦φ) is, since ♦(♦φ) is trued at 〈s, x〉, for any x, iff ♦φ is trued at 〈s, w′〉 for some w′ ∈ s iff φ is trued at 〈s, w′′〉 for some w′′ ∈ s iff ♦φ is trued at 〈s, x〉 for any x. Thus there is no function from the indices of r to those of d which preserves truth for all φ ∈ L♦. Since these models were chosen at random, we have that there is no model r ∈ R and model d ∈ D s.t. r L♦ d and thus by Fact 3.1 we haveR L♦ D. Fact 3.5. D ≺L♦− R. Proof. ThatD L♦− R follows as an immediate corollary of Fact 3.2. The proof thatR L♦− D is as follows. Consider any models r ∈ R and d ∈ D. Let h be a bijection Wr → Wd such that ∀p ∈ L♦− : ∀w ∈ Wr : vr(p, w) = vd(p, h(w)); that there is such a bijection follows from our assumptions about the stocks of worlds and valuation functions in any model of D and R. Now consider three different modal bases f , f ′, and f ′′ from pairs in Ir, and some world w ∈ Wr, with f(w) = f ′(w) = f ′′(w) = ∅. Consider any function g : Ir → Id which preserves truth for φ ∈ L♦−. Suppose that g(〈f, w〉) = 〈s, x〉, g(〈f ′, w〉) = 〈s′, x′〉, and g(〈f ′′, w〉) = 〈s′′, x′′〉, with 〈s, x〉 , 〈s′, x′〉 , and 〈s′′, x′′〉 all different. Since all worlds differ on the truth of some atom, we know that x = x′ = x′′ = h(w), else we would have that at least one of g(〈f, w〉), g(〈f ′, w〉), or g(〈f ′′, w〉) differs from its pre-image on the truth of some atom, contrary to the assumption that g preserves truth. So we must have that s 6= s′ and s 6= s′′ and s′ 6= s′′. It is easy to see that, for any atom p, ♦p is falser at all of 〈f, w〉, 〈f ′, w〉, and 〈f ′′, w〉. But there are only two d-indices with h(w) as their world parameter which make ♦p falsed for every atom p, namely 〈∅, h(w)〉 and 〈 {wfd}, h(w) 〉 , where wfd is the world inWd such that for every atomic sentence p, vd(p, w f d ) = 0. And so either 〈s, x〉 , 〈s′, x′〉 , or 〈s′′, x′′〉 will make ♦p trued for some p, contrary to the assumption that g preserves truth. Thus any truth-preserving function must take two of 〈f, w〉, 〈f ′, w〉, and 〈f ′′, w〉 to the same index in Id, and thus will fail to be an injection. Since d and r were chosen arbitrarily, Fact 3.5 follows by Fact 3.1. 32 Fact 3.8. U ≺L♦ R. Proof. Recall that U is the set of models u of the form 〈Wu, vu, Iu, [[*]]u〉, where Iu = {〈s, c〉 : s ∪ c ⊆ Wu}, with [[*]]u as specified in §3, and assuming again that in any U-model, any two worlds differ on the truth of some atom, and for any set of atoms, there is a world where exactly they are true. First note that U is isomorphic with respect to L♦. Next, let u be an arbitrary U-model, and let r be a model inR built on the same set of worlds and valuation function. Let wtu be the world inWu which is such that, for every atom p ∈ L♦ : vu(p, wtu) = 1, and letwfu be the world inWu which is such that, for every atom p ∈ L♦ : vu(p, wfu) = 0. Where Φ is a set of atomic sentences, we let Φ refer to the unique world fromWu which verifies those sentences according to vu, and vice versa. Let h be an injection which takes any pair of subsets ofWu to a subset ofWu (that there is such a function follows from the fact thatWu must be infinite given our starting language and assumptions about worlds). We stipulate further that h( 〈 {wfu},∅ 〉 ) = {wtu}, h(〈{wtu}, {wtu}〉) = {wtu, w f u}; h( 〈 {wfu , wtu}, {wtu} 〉 ) = {wfu}; and that h(〈s, c〉) includes wtu whenever wtu ∈ s and s = c. For any sets r, s, let frs be the function which takes every world inWu to r except wfu , which it takes to s, and let frs∗ be the function which takes every world in Wu to r except wtu, which it takes to s. We can then define a witness function g as follows: for any pair 〈s, c〉 of contexts (subsets ofWu), with p ranging over atomic sentences in L♦: g(〈s, c〉) =  〈 fsh(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : ∀w ′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′} 〉 iff s = c 6= ∅〈 f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : (∀w ′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)} 〉 iff c ⊂ s ∧ c 6= ∅〈 f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, w f u 〉 iff c * s〈 f {w:∀p:p∈w→∀w′∈s:p/∈w′} h(〈s,c〉)∗ , {p : ∀w ′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′} 〉 iff s 6= c ∧ c = ∅〈 f {wtu} h(〈s,c〉), w t u 〉 iff s = c = ∅ First note that g is an injection, since each pair of contexts is taken to an index whose modal base is uniquely tagged by h(*). Now note that, for any sentence φ ∈ L♦ and i ∈ Iu, φ is trueu at i iff φ is truer at g(i). To see this, consider first atomic q. Atomic q is trueu at 〈s, c〉 iff c is the result of removing all and only q-worlds from s:48 • if s = c 6= ∅, then this holds iff all the worlds in s are q-worlds iff q ∈ {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′} iff q is truer at g(〈s, c〉) = 〈 fsh(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : ∀w ′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′} 〉 ; • if c ⊂ s ∧ c 6= ∅, then this holds iff all the worlds in c, but none of the worlds in s \ c, are q-worlds, iff q ∈ {p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)}, iff q is truer at g(〈s, c〉) = 〈f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′′)}〉; • if c * s, then this never holds, in which case q is also falser at g(〈s, c〉) = 〈 f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, w f u 〉 ; • if s 6= c ∧ c = ∅, then this holds iff no world in s is a q-world iff q ∈ {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′} iff q is truer at g(〈s, c〉) = 〈f{w:∀p:p∈w→∀w ′∈s:p/∈w′} h(〈s,c〉)∗ , {p : ∀w ′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}〉; • if s = c = ∅, this holds in any case whatsoever, in which case q is also truer at g(〈s, c〉) = 〈 f {wtu} h(〈s,c〉), w t u 〉 . Consider next sentences of the form ♦q, for atomic q. In the update semantics, again, ♦q is treated as a "test": it takes a context c and returns c unchanged just in case [[q]]u(c) 6= ∅, and otherwise returns ∅. That means that, for atomic q, 〈s, c〉 ∈ [[♦q]]u iff 48For atomic p, a p-world is a world w where vu(p, w) = 1; a p-world is a world where vu(p, w) = 0. 33 • (i) there is a q-world in s and s = c; then ♦q is truer at g(〈s, c〉) = 〈 fsh(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : ∀w ′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′} 〉 , since fsh(〈s,c〉)∗(w) will contain a q-world for any w 6= w t u; and {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′} = wtu iff s = {wtu}, in which case by construction of h we have that h(〈s, c〉) contains wtu, and thus fsh(〈s,c〉)∗({p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′}) will then also contain a q-world, namely wtu; • or (ii) there is no q-world in s, and c = ∅. – Suppose first that s 6= c. Then ♦q will be truer at g(〈s, c〉) = 〈f{w:∀p:p∈w→∀w ′∈s:p/∈w′} h(〈s,c〉)∗ , {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}〉, since the fact that q is false throughout s ensures that q will be true at some world in {w : ∀p : p ∈ w → ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}, and f{w:∀p:p∈w→∀w ′∈s:p/∈w′} h(〈s,c〉)∗ takes every world but wtu to {w : ∀p : p ∈ w → ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}. Moreover in this case we have {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′} = wtu iff 〈s, c〉 = 〈 {wfu},∅ 〉 ; then h(〈s, c〉) = {wtu} by construction of h, and so f{w:∀p:p∈w→∀w ′∈s:p/∈w′} h(〈s,c〉)∗ ({p : ∀w ′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}) again contains a q-world. – Suppose next that s = c. Then♦q will be truer at g(〈s, c〉) = 〈 f {wtu} h(〈s,c〉), w t u 〉 , since f{w t u} h(〈s,c〉)(w t u) = {wtu}. Next, suppose that ♦q is falseu at 〈s, c〉; this will hold iff: • s doesn't contain a q-world and c 6= ∅; then either – s = c; then g(〈s, c〉) = 〈 fsh(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : ∀w ′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′} 〉 . We know {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′} 6= wtu, for we would only have {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′} = wtu if 〈s, c〉 = 〈{wtu}, {wtu}〉, in which case s contains a q-world contrary to assumption; and so we have fsh(〈s,c〉)∗({p : ∀w ′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′}) = s; since s doesn't contain a q-world, ♦q is falser here; – or c ⊂ s∧c 6= ∅; then g(〈s, c〉) = 〈f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : (∀w ′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′)∧(∀w′′ ∈ (s\c) : p /∈ w′′)}〉. Suppose first {p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)} 6= wtu; so we have f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗({p : (∀w ′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)}) = ∅ and so ♦q is falser. Suppose next {p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)} = wtu; then 〈s, c〉 must be〈 {wtu, w f u}, {wtu} 〉 ; but then it contains a q-world, contrary to assumption; – or c * s; then g(〈s, c〉) = 〈 f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, w f u 〉 , and so f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗(w f u) = ∅ and so ♦q will be falser here; • or s contains a q-world and s 6= c; then – either c ⊂ s ∧ c 6= ∅; then g(〈s, c〉) = 〈f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : (∀w ′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)}〉. Suppose first {p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)} 6= wtu; so we have f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗({p : (∀w ′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)}) = ∅ and so ♦q is falser here; suppose next {p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)} = wtu, then 〈s, c〉 must be 〈 {wtu, w f u}, {wtu} 〉 ; by construction h( 〈 {wfu , wtu}, {wtu} 〉 ) = {wfu}; and so in this case, f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗({p : (∀w ′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′)∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s\ c) : p /∈ w′′)}) = {wfu} and so again ♦q is falser; – or c * s; then g(〈s, c〉) = 〈 f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, w f u 〉 , and so f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗(w f u) = ∅ and so ♦q will be falser here; – or s 6= c ∧ c = ∅; then g(〈s, c〉) = 〈f{w:∀p:p∈w→∀w ′∈s:p/∈w′} h(〈s,c〉)∗ , {p : ∀w ′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}〉. Provided {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′} 6= wtu, we have f {w:∀p:p∈w→∀w′∈s:p/∈w′} h(〈s,c〉)∗ ({p : ∀w ′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}) = {w : 34 ∀p : p ∈ w → ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′} which will not contain a q-world, since there is a q-world in s. And in this case we have {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′} = wtu iff 〈s, c〉 = 〈 {wfu},∅} 〉 , contrary to our assumption that s contains a q-world. Finally, in any update model, for any φ ∈ L♦ and any update index i, ♦(♦φ) is trueu at i iff ♦φ is trueu at i. And this will also hold relative to any point in the image of g: • When s = c = ∅, then both ♦φ and ♦(♦φ) will be truer (by an obvious induction on the length of formulas which I leave implicit here); • when c * s, both will be falser; • when c ⊂ s ∧ c 6= ∅, g1(〈s, c〉)(g2(〈s, c〉)) is empty, making both false; unless g2(〈s, c〉) = wtu, which holds only when s = {wfu , wtu} and c = {wtu}, in which case by construction of h, we have g1(〈s, c〉)(g2(〈s, c〉)) = {wfu}.49 Since g1(〈s, c〉)(wfu) = ∅, we again have false; • when s = c 6= ∅ and g2(〈s, c〉) 6= wtu, we have g1(〈s, c〉) has the same value at g2(〈s, c〉) and at every element of g1(〈s, c〉)(g2(〈s, c〉)), provided s does not include wtu; and whenever s includes wtu, we have g1(〈s, c〉)(wtu) includes wtu by construction of h, and thus that ∀w ∈ s : wtu ∈ g1(〈s, c〉)(w), and thus that ♦φ is true at g2(〈s, c〉) and at every world in g1(〈s, c〉)(g2(〈s, c〉)); and g2(〈s, c〉) = wtu iff s = c = {wtu}, in which case ♦φ is true for any φ at g(〈s, c〉); • when s 6= c ∧ c = ∅, g2(〈s, c〉) = wtu iff s = {w f u}; then h(〈s, c〉) = {wtu}, so then ♦φ is true at g(〈s, c〉) for all φ. When g2(〈s, c〉) 6= wtu, we know that wtu /∈ {w : ∀p : p ∈ w → ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′} and so g1(〈s, c〉)(g2(〈s, c〉)) is the same as g1(〈s, c〉) applied to any element of g1(〈s, c〉)(g2(〈s, c〉)). And thus we can conclude that ♦φ is trueu at i iff ♦φ is truer at g(i), for any φ ∈ L♦. Thus g is an injection from the indices of u to those of r which preserves truth for all sentences of L♦, and thus by Fact 3.1 we have U L♦ R.50 The proof thatR L♦ U will be as for Fact 3.3. Fact 3.9. U L♦ D. Proof. Consider arbitrary u ∈ U and d ∈ D. Consider the three u-indices 〈∅, {w}〉 , 〈∅, {w′}〉 , 〈∅, {w′′}〉, with w, w′, and w′′ all different. These three indices all make p falseu, for any atomic p ∈ L♦; they also make ♦φ falseu, for any φ ∈ L♦, and thus make every sentence in L♦ falseu. There are, however, only two indices in d which make every sentence in L♦ falsed, namely 〈 ∅, wfd 〉 and 〈 {wfd}, w f d 〉 , where wfd is the world where, for every atomic sentence p, vd(p, w f d ) = 0. Thus any truth-preserving function g : Iu → Id will have to map at least two of the u-indices in question to the same d-index, and thus will fail to be an injection. Thus Fact 3.9 follows by Fact 3.1. Fact 3.10. D L♦ U . 49gn is the nth projection of g, i.e. gn(X) = xn iff g(X) = 〈x1, x2, . . . xn, . . .〉. 50Note that not every operator which can be added to U will be well-defined if we want the intension of any sentence in U to be a function from contexts to contexts, rather than just a relation; there are different approaches within broadly update-style frameworks to this question (e.g. Heim 1983 vs. Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991). 35 Proof. Consider arbitrary u ∈ U and d ∈ D. There are exactly three u-indices which make all sentences in L♦ trueu, namely 〈∅,∅〉 , 〈 {wfu},∅ 〉 , and 〈{wtu}, {wtu}〉, where w f u is the world where, for every atomic sentence p, vu(p, w f u) = 0 and where wtu is the world where, for every atomic sentence p, vu(p, w t u) = 1. There are more than three d-indices which make all sentences in L♦ trued: these include 〈Wd, wtd〉 and 〈{wtd}, wtd〉, as well as 〈s, wtd〉 for any s such that {wtd} ⊆ s ⊆ Wd, with wtd defined as for wtu. Thus any function from the indices of d to those of u which preserves truth for all sentences in L♦ will have to map more than three d-indices to three u-indices, and so will fail to be an injection. Since d and u were chosen arbitrarily, by Lemma A.2 and Fact 3.1, D L♦ U . Fact 3.12. S ≺L♦ D. Proof. Recall that S is the set of models s of the form 〈Ws, vs, IS , [[*]]s〉 with Is = {s : s ⊆ Ws}, with [[*]]s specified as in §3, and assuming again that in any model, any two worlds differ on the truth of some atom, and for any set of atoms, exactly that set is true at some world. Note again that S is isomorphic with respect to L♦. Chose a model s ∈ S and find a model d ∈ D s.t. Ws = Wd and vs = vd. For convenience we identify every world inWs with the set of atomic sentences it makes true according to vs. Let the function g take any information state s ⊆ Ws to 〈s, ⋂ s〉. For atomic p, p is trues at s iff for all w′ ∈ s, vs(p, w′) = 1, iff p ∈ ⋂ s, iff p is trued at g(s) = 〈s, ⋂ s〉. For atomic p, ♦p is trues at s iff s contains a p-world (according to vs) iff ♦p is trued at g(s) = 〈s, ⋂ s〉. Finally, it holds in both s and d that ♦(♦φ) is true at an index iff ♦φ is, and so we know that for any φ ∈ L♦, ♦φ will be trues at i iff ♦φ is trued at g(i). Note finally that g is an injection: for any s and s′, if s 6= s′, then the first elements of g(s) and g(s′) will differ. Thus by Lemma A.2 we have s L♦ d and so by Fact 3.1 we have S L♦ D. But we do not have the converse: D L♦ S. Consider any models s ∈ S and d ∈ D. Consider three d-indices 〈∅, w〉 and 〈∅, w′〉, and 〈∅, w′′〉 with w, w′, and w′′ all distinct. For any φ ∈ L♦, ♦φ is falsed at all these indices. The only indices which make ♦φ falses for every φ ∈ L♦ are ∅ and {wfs }, where wfs is the world which makes every atom false according to vs, and thus any truth-preserving function will have to take two of the d-indices to the same s index, and thus will fail to be an injection; thus by Lemma A.2 and Fact 3.1, D L♦ S. Fact 3.13. For any language L and a set of semantic theories T each of which is isomorphic with respect to L, L is a partial pre-order over T. Proof. L will be transitive: suppose T L T ′, witnessed by a function g : It → It′ , for t ∈ T , t′ ∈ T ′, and T ′ L T ′′, witnessed by a function f : It∗′ → It′′ , for t∗′ ∈ T ′, t′′ ∈ T ′′. By isomorphism, there is a truth-preserving injection h : It′ → It∗′ . f ◦ (h ◦ g) will witness T L T ′′. L is reflexive, witnessed by the identity function. It is not anti-symmetric, since it is easy to see that there are different semantic theories T and T ′ isomorphic with respect to L such that T L T ′ and T ′ L T (for instance, two standard semantic theories for a language just comprising atomic sentences, with the same set of possible worlds but different valuations, may have this property). And it is not necessarily connected, since, as we saw in the comparison of D to U , there are semantic theories which are incommensurable with respect to a given language. Fact 3.15. D∃ ≺L♦v R ∃. Proof. Note that D∃ andR∃ are both isomorphic with respect to L♦v . Consider a model d∃ ∈ D∃. Find a model r∃ ∈ R∃ built on the same domain, set of worlds, and valuation function. For any index 〈a, s, w〉 ∈ Id∃ , with a a variable assignment, s a set of worlds, and w a world, let g be the function which takes 〈a, s, w〉 to the r∃-index 36 〈a, fs, w〉, where fs is again the constant function to s. g will witness d∃ L♦v r ∃; the proof is a generalization of the parallel result in the proof of Fact 3.2; and so we have D∃ L♦v R ∃. But there is no truth-preserving injection in the other direction, for the same reasons given in the proof of Fact 3.3. Note moreover that the proof of Fact 3.5 can be extended to show that D∃ ≺L♦−v R ∃. Fact 3.16. U∃ ≺L♦v R ∃. Proof. First note U∃ is isomorphic with respect to L♦v . Then our proof is very much as in the proof of Fact 3.6. We construct a witness function g from an arbitrarily chosen model u∃ ∈ U∃ to a model r∃ ∈ R∃ built on the same set of worlds, valuation function, and domain, using the function h defined in the proof of Fact 3.6; with the notation defined there: g(〈a, 〈s, c〉〉) =  〈 a, fsh(〈s,c〉)∗, ιw : ∀R : vu∃(R,w) = ⋂ {vu∃(R,w′) : w′ ∈ s} 〉 iff s = c 6= ∅ 〈a, f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, ιw : ∀R : vu∃(R,w) =⋂ {vu∃(R,w′) : w′ ∈ c} \ ⋃ {vu∃(R,w′) : w′ ∈ (s \ c)}〉 iff c ⊂ s ∧ c 6= ∅〈 a, f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, w f u∃ 〉 iff c * s 〈a, f{w:∀R∀ ~d:~d∈v u∃ (R,w)→∀w ′∈s:~d/∈v u∃ (R,w ′)} h(〈s,c〉)∗ , ιw : ∀n : ∀Rn : vu∃(Rn, w) = Dn \ ⋃ {vu∃(Rn, w′) : w′ ∈ s}〉 iff s 6= c ∧ c = ∅〈 a, f {wt u∃} h(〈s,c〉), w t u∃ 〉 iff s = c = ∅ R ranges over relation symbols in the vocabulary ofL♦v ;wtu∃ is the world such that vu∃(R n, wtu∃) is the universal n-ary relation, for any n-place relation symbol Rn; and wf u∃ the world such that vu∃(Rn, w f u∃ ) is the empty relation, for any Rn. 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On Strengthening the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision: Proper Ordinal Interval Operators Richard Booth Cardiff University Cardiff, UK Jake Chandler La Trobe University Melbourne, Australia Abstract Darwiche and Pearl's seminal 1997 article outlined a number of baseline principles for a logic of iterated belief revision. These principles, the DP postulates, have been supplemented in a number of alternative ways. Most suggestions have resulted in a form of 'reductionism' that identifies belief states with orderings of worlds. However, this position has recently been criticised as being unacceptably strong. Other proposals, such as the popular principle (P), aka 'Independence', characteristic of 'admissible' operators, remain commendably more modest. In this paper, we supplement the DP postulates and (P) with a number of novel conditions. While the DP postulates constrain the relation between a prior and a posterior conditional belief set, our new principles notably govern the relation between two posterior conditional belief sets obtained from a common prior by different revisions. We show that operators from the resulting family, which subsumes both lexicographic and restrained revision, can be represented as relating belief states associated with a 'proper ordinal interval' (POI) assignment, a structure more fine-grained than a simple ordering of worlds. We close the paper by noting that these operators satisfy iterated versions of many AGM era postulates, including Superexpansion, that are not sound for admissible operators in general. 1 Introduction Darwiche & Pearl's (1997) seminal paper put forward a number of now popular baseline principles of iterated belief revision. These principles, the DP postulates, have been strengthened in various manners. Most proposals for doing so–such as natural (Boutilier 1996), lexicographic (Nayak, Pagnucco, and Peppas 2003), and restrained (Booth and Meyer 2006) revision (see (Peppas 2014) for an overview)– have yielded sets of principles strong enough to entail the following strong 'reductionist' principle: the set of beliefs held by an agent after a sequence of two revisions is fully determined by the agent's single-step revision dispositions. This thesis can alternatively be cashed out in terms of an identification of belief states, the relata of the revision function, with total preorders (TPO's) over possible worlds. Booth & Chandler (2017) have however recently provided considerations that suggest this reductionist posiCopyright c© 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved. tion to be too strong. Other supplements to the DP postulates, however, have fallen short of having such a consequence. This is true of the popular principle termed '(P)' by Booth & Meyer (2006) and 'Independence' by Jin & Thielscher (2007), which, together with the DP postulates, characterises the family of 'admissible' revision operators that includes both lexicographic and restrained operators but excludes Boutilier's natural ones. In this paper, we supplement both the DP postulates and (P) with a number of novel conditions. While the DP postulates constrain the relation between a prior and a posterior conditional belief set, our new principles notably govern the relation between two posterior conditional belief sets obtained from a common prior by different revisions. We take as our foil two postulates of this variety considered by Booth & Meyer (2011). These characterised a family of nonprioritised revision operators, for which they offered a representation in terms of what we shall call 'proper ordinal interval assignments'. Here, we show that these two postulates become implausible in the context of prioritised revision, which is the focus of the present paper. First of all, they turn out to characterise lexicographic revision when one supplements the remaining postulates of Booth & Meyer, i.e. (P) and the DP postulates, with the AGM postulate of Success. Secondly, they fall prey to an intuitive class of counterexample. After noting this, we then consider two, more plausible, weaker counterparts that have not yet been discussed in the literature. We show that these can be obtained from Booth & Meyer's construction by adding a 'naturalisation' step. This is essentially an application of Boutillier's natural revision operation to the posterior TPO obtained by Booth & Meyer's method of non-prioritised revision. We call the resulting family of iterated revision operators, which subsumes both lexicographic and restrained revision operators, the family of 'Proper Ordinal Interval (POI)' operators and offer semantic and syntactic characterisations thereof. We close the paper by noting that POI revision operators satisfy iterated versions of a large number of AGM era postulates, including Superexpansion. The plan of the remainder of the article is as follows. In Section 2, we first introduce some basic terminology and definitions. Section 3 recapitulates Booth & Meyer's framework and introduces its two key postulates. These postulates are then critically discussed in Section 4. Section 5 outlines our construction of the POI family of operators. In Section 6, we discuss the weakenings of Booth & Meyer's postulates that are satisfied by the members of our new family. In Section 7, the family is then characterised semantically and syntactically, in two different manners. We wrap up the paper with a fairly substantial discussion, in Section 8, of the extent to which the members of the POI family satisfy extensions of various strong AGM era postulates to the iterated case. We then conclude in Section 9. Due to space limitations, proofs or proof sketches are only provided for a small subset of the propositions and theorems stated. The appendix contains a detailed sketch of the proof of what is arguably our main result (Theorem 2). The remainder of the proofs are available in an extended version of the paper, which can be accessed at http://arxiv.org/abs/1807.09942. 2 Preliminaries The beliefs of an agent are represented by a belief state Ψ. Ψ determines a belief set [Ψ], a deductively closed set of sentences, drawn from a finitely generated propositional, truthfunctional language L. Logical equivalence is denoted by ≡ and the set of logical consequences of Γ ⊆ L by Cn(Γ). The set of propositional worlds is denoted by W , and the set of models of a given sentence A is denoted by [[A]]. We shall occasionally use x to denote, not the world x, but an arbitrary sentence whose set of models is {x}. In terms of belief dynamics, our principal focus is on iterated revision–rather than contraction–operators, which return, for any prior belief state Ψ and consistent sentence A, the posterior belief state Ψ ∗ A that results from an adjustment of Ψ to accommodate the inclusion of A in [Ψ]. The function ∗ is assumed to satisfy the AGM postulates (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson 1985; Darwiche and Pearl 1997)–henceforth 'AGM', for short–which notably include the postulate of Success (A ∈ [Ψ ∗A]). This ensures the following convenient representability of singleshot revision: each Ψ has associated with it a total preorder Ψ over W such that [[[Ψ ∗ A]]] = min(Ψ, [[A]]) (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991; Grove 1988). This ordering is sometimes interpreted in terms of relative '(im)plausibility', so that x Ψ y iff x is considered more 'plausible' than y in state Ψ. In this context, Success corresponds to the requirement that min(Ψ∗A,W ) ⊆ [[A]]. The single-shot revision dispositions associated with Ψ can also be represented by a 'conditional belief set' [Ψ]c. This set extends the belief set [Ψ] by further including various 'conditional beliefs', of the form A ⇒ B, where ⇒ is a non-truth-functional conditional connective. This is achieved by means of the so-called Ramsey Test, according to which A⇒ B ∈ [Ψ]c iff B ∈ [Ψ ∗A]. Following convention, we shall call principles couched in terms of belief sets 'syntactic', and principles couched in terms of TPOs 'semantic'. The principles that we will discuss will be given in both types of format, with the distinction reflected in the nomenclature by the use of a subscript '' to denote semantic principles. We shall also be touching on a broader class of nonprioritised iterated 'revision' operators, for which Success does not necessarily hold. These will be denoted by the symbol ◦. To avoid ambiguity, we will follow a convention of superscripting every principle governing a belief change operator with the relevant operator symbol (here: ∗ or ◦). Finally, ∗ will be assumed to satisfy a principle of irrelevance of syntax that we shall call 'Equivalence': (Eq∗) If A ≡ B and C ≡ D, then [(Ψ ∗A) ∗ C] = [(Ψ ∗B) ∗D] or semantically (Eq∗) If A ≡ B, then Ψ∗A=Ψ∗B as well as the DP postulates, which constrain the belief set resulting from two successive revisions, or, equivalently, the conditional belief set resulting from a single revision: (C1∗) If A ∈ Cn(B), then [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] = [Ψ ∗B] (C2∗) If ¬A ∈ Cn(B), then [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] = [Ψ ∗B] (C3∗) If A ∈ [Ψ ∗B], then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] (C4∗) If ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗B], then ¬A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] whose semantic counterparts are given by: (C1∗) If x, y ∈ [[A]], then x Ψ∗A y iff x Ψ y (C2∗) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]], then x Ψ∗A y iff x Ψ y (C3∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x ≺Ψ y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y (C4∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x Ψ y, then x Ψ∗A y In fact we shall further assume that ∗ satisfies the principle (P∗), which strengthens both (C3∗) and (C4∗): (P∗) If ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗B], then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] Its semantic counterpart is given by: (P∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x Ψ y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y Satisfaction of AGM, (Eq∗), (C1∗), (C2∗) and (P∗) means that ∗ is an 'admissible' revision operator, in the sense of (Booth and Meyer 2006). The constraints considered so far are notably satisfied by two well-known kinds of revision operators: restrained operators and lexicographic operators.1 In semantic terms, these both promote the minimal A-worlds in the prior TPO to become minimal worlds in the posterior TPO. Regarding the rest of the ordering, restrained revision operators preserve the strict ordering ≺Ψ while additionally making every A-world x strictly lower ranked than every ¬A-world y for which x ∼Ψ y (where ∼Ψ is the symmetric closure of Ψ), so that x Ψ∗A y iff: (i) x ∈ min(Ψ, [[A]]), or (ii) x, y /∈ min(Ψ, [[A]]) and either (a) x ≺Ψ y or (b) x ∼Ψ y and (x ∈ [[A]] or y ∈ [[¬A]]). Lexicographic revision operators make every A-world lower ranked than every ¬A-world, while preserving the ordering within each of [[A]] and [[¬A]], so that x Ψ∗A y iff: (i) x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], or (ii) (x ∈ [[A]] iff y ∈ [[A]]) and x Ψ y. Natural revision operators, however, fail to satisfy (P∗) and are thus not members of the family of admissible revision 1Note the use of the plural here: we speak of restrained/lexicographic operators. It is of course customary, in the literature, to refer to the restrained/lexicographic operator. However, this way of speaking is only appropriate to the extent that belief states are identifiable with TPOs. operators. These operators simply promote the minimal Aworlds to be Ψ∗A-minimal, while leaving everything else unchanged, so that x Ψ∗A y iff: (i) x ∈ min(Ψ, [[A]]), or (ii) x, y /∈ min(Ψ, [[A]]) and x Ψ y. 3 Two principles of non-prioritised revision The DP postulates, as well as (P∗), constrain the relation between a prior conditional belief set on the one hand, and a posterior one on the other. But one might wonder what kinds of constraints govern the relation between two posterior conditional belief sets obtained from a common prior by different revisions. To the best of our knowledge, the only two articles to consider principles of this nature are (Booth and Meyer 2011) and, more briefly, (Schlechta, Lehmann, and Magidor 1996). In the former, a slightly more general form of the following pair of syntactic principles is discussed: (β1+∗) If A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B] (β2+∗) If ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B] whose semantic counterparts are given by: (β1+∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y Ψ∗A x, then y Ψ∗C x (β2+∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then y ≺Ψ∗C x On the relative plausibility interpretation of , the latter can be informally glossed as follows: if (i) there exists some potential evidence, consistent with a world x but not with a world y, such that x would be considered no more plausible than (respectively: strictly less plausible than) y after receiving it, then (ii) there is no potential evidence whatsoever that would lead x to be considered more plausible than (respectively: at least as plausible as) y. It is easy to see that, on the assumption that Ψ∗>=Ψ (which follows from (C1∗)), these respectively generalise (C3∗) and (C4 ∗ ), which correspond to the special cases in which C is a tautology. These postulates can be interpreted in a number of ways. One way is in terms of the binary relations (over consistent sentences in L) of overrules and strictly overrules (Booth and Meyer 2011). We say B overrules A (in Ψ) iff A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], while B strictly overrules A (in Ψ) iff ¬A ∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B].2 Then (β1+∗) says that, ifB overrulesA in Ψ, then A will not be believed following any sequence of two revisions starting in Ψ ending with B, while (β2+∗) says that, if B strictly overrules A in Ψ, then A will be rejected following any such sequence of two revisions. We noted above that it was a more general form of (β1+∗), (β2+∗) and their semantic counterparts that interested Booth & Meyer. The reason for this is that their topic of interest was not in fact ∗, but rather a more general kind of operator: a non-prioritised "revision" operator ◦, which does 2Incidentally, the first relation also corresponds to the condition under which Chandler (2017) proposed that one takesB to provide a reason to not believe A. The second relation is related to the condition under which he claimed one takes B to provide a reason to believe ¬A (Chandler 2013). not necessarily satisfy the Success postulate. They showed that these operators could be represented as relating belief states to which a certain type of structure is associated. We provide in what follows a brief overview of their framework. First, some key definitions: Definition 1. ≤ is a proper ordinal interval (POI) assignment to W iff it is a relation over W± = {wi | w ∈ W and i ∈ {−,+}} such that: (≤ 1) ≤ is a TPO (≤ 2) x+ < x− (≤ 3) x+ ≤ y+ iff x− ≤ y−. Definition 2. Where  is a TPO over W and ≤ is a POI assignment toW , we say that≤ is faithful to iff it satisfies: (≤ 4) x+ ≤ y+ iff x  y. Booth & Meyer then assumed that each belief state Ψ is associated, not only with a TPO Ψ, but with a POI assignment ≤Ψ that is faithful to it (they remained agnostic as to whether states are to be identified with POI assignments; we will follow suit). This assignment was then taken to determine the agent's posterior TPO upon revision by A, i.e. Ψ◦A, in the following manner: Definition 3. ◦ is a non-prioritised POI revision operator iff ◦ is a function from state-sentence pairs to states, such that for every state Ψ there is a POI assignment ≤Ψ such that, for any sentence A, x Ψ◦A y iff rA(x) ≤Ψ rA(y), where rA(x) = { x+ if x ∈ [[A]] x− if x ∈ [[¬A]]. General forms of our principles (β1+∗) and (β2+ ∗ ) turn out to play a key role in this model. Indeed, Booth & Meyer (2011, Theorem 1) show that ◦ is a non-prioritised POI revision operator if and only if it satisfies (C1◦), (C2 ◦ ), (P ◦ ), (β1+◦) and (β2+ ◦ ), where these principles are obtained from their counterparts for (prioritised) revision in the obvious manner, by substituting the ◦ symbol for ∗. Non-prioritised POI revision operators can helpfully be understood diagrammatically. Figure 1 represents a proper ordinal interval assignment that is faithful to x ≺Ψ y ≺Ψ z. The left and right interval endpoints respectively represent the positive (*)+ and negative (*)− counterparts of each world. Figure 2 represents, by means of the filled circles, the TPO resulting from the corresponding non-prioritised revision by y ∨ z, i.e., x ∼Ψ◦y∨z y ≺Ψ◦y∨z z. It also illustrates failure of Success, since x ∈ min(Ψ◦y∨z,W ). x y z Figure 1: proper ordinal interval assignment x y z Figure 2: posterior TPO after non-prioritised POI revision by y ∨ z We note that lexicographic revision operators are special cases of this family in which x+ <Ψ y− for all x, y ∈W . 4 The principles in a prioritised setting In spite of their arguable appropriateness in a non-prioritised setting, (β1+∗) and (β2+ ∗ ) prove to be problematically strong when one imposes Success. For one, it turns out that, in such a context the only kind of operators satisfying (β1+∗) are lexicographic revision operators, and hence that (β1+∗) imposes the reductionist assumption that we have suggested is objectionable. Indeed: Theorem 1. Let ∗ be a revision operator satisfying AGM and (β1+∗). Then it also satisfies the Recalcitrance property (Nayak, Pagnucco, and Peppas 2003): (Rec∗) If A ∧B is consistent, then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]. Proof: If A ∧B is consistent, then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∧B) ∗B] from AGM. Then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] by (β1+∗). 3 Since we know (see, e.g., (Booth and Meyer 2011; Nayak, Pagnucco, and Peppas 2003)), that lexicographic revision operators are the only admissible operators satisfying (Rec∗), we obtain the following corollary, which also gives us an alternative characterisation of lexicographic revision: Corollary 1. The only operators satisfying AGM, (C1∗), (C2∗) and (β1+∗) are lexicographic revision operators.4 These principles also face a class of direct counterexamples that match the following general pattern: A provides a defeasible reason to believe ¬B (for example, let B = 'She missed the target at 5 yards' and A = 'She is a pro archer') and C is equivalent to the conjunction of A and a defeater for A's support for ¬B (for example, let C = 'She is a pro archer but isn't wearing her glasses'). Under these conditions, it can plausibly be the case that ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] but A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B], contradicting both principles. This negative result raises the following question: Is there any way to weaken (β1+∗) and (β2+ ∗ ) to allow a wider, but intuitively plausible family of iterated prioritised revision operators? The answer, as we will now show, is 'yes'. 5 Success via naturalisation The guiding idea in what follows is to take the family of operators discussed in the section before last and ensure satisfaction of Success, not by adding the principle to the list of characteristic postulates but rather by minimally transforming the TPO associated with the posterior belief state by means of an operation analogous to natural revision. More precisely, the proposal is to define ∗ as the composition of a non-prioritised POI revision operator ◦ and a natural revision operator
: Ψ∗A=(Ψ◦A)
A Recalling the definition of natural revision in Section 2, we can equivalently say: 3Assuming consistency of inputs, the implication would also run the other way, yielding equivalence of (Rec∗) and (β1+∗). 4What about (β2+∗)? Lexicographic revision satisfies it trivially, since it satisfies: If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], then x ≺Ψ∗A y. We can analogously show that it implies, given AGM, the following weakening of (Rec∗): If A ∧ B is consistent, then ¬A /∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B]. But this is too weak to allow us to recover (Rec∗) and indeed, (β2+∗) is not uniquely satisfied by lexicographic revision. Definition 4. ∗ is a naturalisation of ◦ iff: x Ψ∗A y iff either (i) x ∈ min(Ψ◦A, [[A]]), or (ii) x, y /∈ min(Ψ◦A, [[A]]) and x Ψ◦A y. We use N(∗, ◦) to denote the fact that this relation obtains between the two functions. Definition 5. ∗ is a proper interval order (POI) revision operator iff N(∗, ◦) for some non-prioritised POI revision operator ◦. This kind of suggestion generalises one that was made in (Booth and Meyer 2006), in which restrained revision operators were shown to be naturalisations of a particular class of non-prioritised revision operators due to Papini (2001). Indeed, the latter satisfy: x Ψ◦A y iff (a) x ≺Ψ y or (b) x ∼Ψ y and [x ∈ [[A]] or y ∈ [[¬A]]]. These conditions, of course, simply correspond to (ii)(a) and (ii)(b) in the definition of restrained revision operators given in Section 2. The proposal is also somewhat reminiscent of the manner in which the Levi Identity (Levi 1977) treats non-iterated revision as the composition of a contraction and an expansion ([Ψ ∗A] = [Ψ÷¬A] +A), with our natural revision step
playing the role of the expansion step +. states POIs TPOs sets Ψ ≤Ψ Ψ [Ψ] Ψ ◦A ≤Ψ◦A Ψ◦A [Ψ ◦A] Ψ ∗A ≤Ψ∗A Ψ∗A [Ψ ∗A] ◦A
A ∗A Figure 3: functional dependencies in POI revision Figure 3 provides a general overview of the model, with the various arrows denoting functional determination. From bottom to top, each belief state Ψ is mapped onto a POI ≤Ψ. This POI determines a TPO Ψ, such that x Ψ y iff x+ ≤Ψ y+. Finally the TPO in turn determines a belief set [Ψ], such that A ∈ [Ψ] iff min(,W ) ⊆ [[A]]. These mappings are potentially many-to-one, so that we obtain increasingly coarse descriptions of an agent's beliefs as one moves upwards. From left to right, the function ◦ maps the prior belief state Ψ onto an 'intermediate' state Ψ ◦ A, before the function
maps the latter onto the posterior state Ψ ∗A = (Ψ ◦A)
A. We have used dashed arrows to denote some further functional dependencies. The constraints of (Booth and Meyer 2011) ensure that the prior POI assignment ≤Ψ determines the 'intermediate' TPO Ψ◦A. Finally, the constraints operating on the function
ensure that this in turn determines the posterior TPO Ψ∗A. This last step is achieved by moving the Ψ◦A-minimal A-worlds to the front of the ordering. Figure 4 represents the result of naturalising the posterior TPO depicted in Figure 2, with y being moved into the leftmost position. x y z Figure 4: posterior TPO after naturalisation The naturalisation step ensures that we have B ∈ [Ψ ∗A] iff min(Ψ, [[A]]) ⊆ [[B]], so AGM will now clearly be satisfied, including Success. Furthermore, the following general fact about naturalisation establishes that the set of POI revision operators is a subset of the set of admissible operators: Proposition 1. For any iterated revision operators ◦ and ∗, such that N(∗, ◦), if ◦ satisfies (Eq◦), (C1◦), (C2◦) and (P◦), then ∗ will satisfy (Eq ∗ ), (C1 ∗ ), (C2 ∗ ) and (P ∗ ). Indeed, we have already noted that non-prioritised POI revision operators satisfy (C1◦), (C2 ◦ ) and (P ◦ ). Furthermore, Booth & Meyer show that they also satisfy (Eq◦). The family of POI revision operators includes some familiar figures: Proposition 2. Both lexicographic and restrained revision operators are POI revision operators. Indeed, we have pointed out, at the end of Section 3, that lexicographic revision operators are themselves non-prioritised POI revision operators. Furthermore, since they satisfy Success, they will be identical with their own naturalisations. Regarding restrained revision operators, the result was established in Proposition 14 of (Booth and Meyer 2006): they are, as we noted above, naturalisations of Papini's 'reverse' lexicographic revision operators, which are non-prioritised POI revision operators. 6 Two weaker principles It is easy to see that neither (β1+∗), nor (β2+ ∗ ) are generally satisfied by POI revision operators. Indeed, let W = {x, y, z} and ≤Ψ be given as follows: z+ < y+ < z− < y− < x+ < x−. Then y ≺Ψ∗x∨z x, but x ≺Ψ∗x y. However, as we shall see from Proposition 6 in the next section, we do nevertheless obtain the following weakened versions of these principles, which incorporate into their antecedents the further requirement that x 6∈ min(, [[C]]): (β1∗) If x 6∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], and y Ψ∗A x, then y Ψ∗C x (β2∗) If x 6∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then y ≺Ψ∗C x Regarding the syntactic counterparts of these principles: Proposition 3. (a) Given AGM, (β1∗) is equivalent to: (β1∗) If A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] and B → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C], then A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B] (b) Given AGM, (β2∗) is equivalent to: (β2∗) If ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] and B → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C], then ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B] These principles are particularly interesting insofar as they avoid the kind of counterexample to (β1+∗) and (β2+ ∗ ) that we raised earlier. Indeed, in the scenarios in question, we also intuitively have B → ¬A /∈ [Ψ ∗ C], rendering them perfectly consistent with the weaker (β1∗) and (β2∗). It will turn out to be useful, in the final sections of the paper, to have noted the following equivalent formulations of (β1∗) and (β2 ∗ ): Proposition 4. (a) Given (C2∗) and (C4∗), (β1∗) is equivalent to the conjunction of the following two principles: (γ1∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y Ψ∗A x, then y Ψ∗A∨C x (γ3∗) If x /∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A ∨ C]], y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]], and y Ψ∗A∨C x, then y Ψ∗C x. (b) Given (C1∗) and (C3∗), (β2∗) is equivalent to the conjunction of the following two principles: (γ2∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x (γ4∗) If x /∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A ∨ C]], y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]] and y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x, then y ≺Ψ∗C x. Note that, given the assumption that Ψ∗>=Ψ, which follows from (C1∗), (γ1 ∗ ) and (γ2 ∗ ) respectively entail (C3∗) and (C4 ∗ ) (let C = ¬A). However, none of these four new principles, and hence neither of (β1∗) and (β2 ∗ ), are generally sound for admissible operators: Proposition 5. None of (γ1∗) to (γ4∗) follows from AGM, (C1∗), (C2 ∗ ) and (P ∗ ) alone. 7 Characterisations of POI operators We have now identified a number of sound principles for the class of POI revision operators, which, we would like to remind the reader, subsumes both restrained and lexicographic operators. Next, we would like to characterise it. 7.1 Semantic characterisation For our semantic characterisation, we need to introduce three more postulates, the first two of which are respective strengthenings of (β1∗) and (β2 ∗ ), which can be recovered by setting z = y: (α1∗) If x 6∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z Ψ y and y Ψ∗A x, then z Ψ∗C x (α2∗) If x 6∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z Ψ y and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then z ≺Ψ∗C x (α3∗) If x 6∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z ≺Ψ y and y Ψ∗A x, then z ≺Ψ∗C x Proposition 6. (α1∗), (α2∗) and (α3∗) are satisfied by POI revision operators. These principles can perhaps be viewed as qualified pseudo- 'transitivity' principles, if one ignores the subscripts. (α1∗) and (α2∗) amount to the conjunctions of (β1 ∗ ) and (β2 ∗ ) with the following semantic postulates, respectively: (β3∗) If z 6= y, x /∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z Ψ y, and y Ψ∗A x, then z Ψ∗C x (β4∗) If z 6= y, x /∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z Ψ y, and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then z ≺Ψ∗C x So Proposition 6 shows that (β1∗) and (β2 ∗ )–and hence, in view of Proposition 4, (γ1∗) to (γ4 ∗ )–are sound for POI revision operators. We can now present our main result, which is a semantic characterisation of the family: Theorem 2. ∗ is a POI revision operator iff it satisfies AGM, (Eq∗), (C1 ∗ ), (C2 ∗ ), (P ∗ ), (α1 ∗ ), (α2 ∗ ), and (α3 ∗ ). In conjunction with the results of Booth & Meyer regarding non-prioritised POI revision operators, Propositions 1 and 6 establish the left-to-right direction of the above claim. For the other direction we need to show that, if ∗ satisfies the relevant semantic properties, then there exists a non-prioritised POI revision operator ◦ such that N(∗, ◦). The construction works as follows: From ∗, define ◦ by setting, for all x, y ∈ W , x Ψ◦A y iff x Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. Given (Eq∗), (C1∗) and (C2 ∗ ) this is equivalent to: x Ψ◦A y iff  x Ψ y if x ∼ A y x Ψ∗¬y y if x /A y x Ψ∗¬x y if y /A x where (i) x EA y iff x ∈ [[A]] or y ∈ [[¬A]], (ii) x ∼A y iff x EA y and y EA x, (iii) x /A y iff x EA y but not y EA x. A detailed outline of the proof is given in the appendix. 7.2 Two syntactic characterisations In this part we offer two different syntactic characterisations of the family of POI revision operators. The first involves the following postulates: (Ω1∗) If ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨B] and A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then B 6∈ [(Ψ ∗B) ∗A] (Ω2∗) If ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨B] and ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then ¬B ∈ [(Ψ ∗B) ∗A] (Ω3∗) If ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨B] and A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then ¬B ∈ [(Ψ ∗B) ∗A] These principles admit an interpretation in terms of the notions of overruling and strictly overruling that we introduced in connection with (β1+∗) and (β2+∗). Indeed, (Ω1∗) and (Ω2∗) stipulate conditions under which the obtaining of these relations entail that of their converses, while (Ω3∗) offers a condition that is sufficient for B's overruling A to entail A's strictly overruling B. We remark that, for both lexicographic and restrained operators, it can be shown that the overrules and strictly overrules relations collapse into the same relation. Furthermore, for lexicographic revision, we have that B overrules A iff A ∧ B is inconsistent (cf. the postulate (Rec∗) in Theorem 1), while, for restrained revision, B overrules A iff both ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗B] and ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗A] (i.e., iff A and B counteract, to use the terminology from (Booth and Meyer 2006)). Clearly, in both cases, the overrules relation is symmetric, and so unrestricted versions of (Ω1∗)-(Ω3∗) hold for these two sets of operators. With Proposition 2 in mind, we now offer: Proposition 7. Given AGM, the following are equivalent: (a) (Eq∗), (C1 ∗ ), (C2 ∗ ), (P ∗ ), (α1 ∗ )–(α3 ∗ ), and (b) (Eq∗), (C1∗), (C2∗), (β1∗), (β2∗), (Ω1∗)–(Ω3∗). While it employs some fairly accessible principles, this first characterisation 'bundles' the contribution of (P∗) into the principles (Ω1∗)–(Ω3∗). For this reason, we offer a second characterisation that separates out the contributions and maps each characteristic semantic principle onto a corresponding syntactic counterpart. Indeed, it turns out that the exact syntactic counterparts of (β3∗), (β4 ∗ ), and (α3 ∗ ) are given as follows, where Y denotes exclusive OR: Proposition 8. (a) Given AGM, (β3∗) is equivalent to (β3∗) If B2 /∈ [Ψ ∗B1], B1 → A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B2], and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C], then B2 ∧A /∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B1 YB2]. (b) Given AGM and (C4∗), (β4∗) is equivalent to: (β4∗) If B2 /∈ [Ψ ∗B1], B1 ∧ ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B2], and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C], then B2 → ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B1 YB2]. (c) Given AGM and (C3∗), (α3∗) is equivalent to: (α3∗) If ¬B2 ∈ [Ψ ∗B1], B1 → A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B2], and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C], then B2 → ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B1 YB2]. Since we already have syntactic counterparts for (β1∗) and (β2∗), as well as (P ∗ ), the above result completes a second syntactic characterisation of the POI family. This one-to-one correspondence between semantic and syntactic principles, however, comes at a cost, since we note that (α1∗)–(α3∗) are clearly much harder to interpret than (Ω1∗)–(Ω3∗). 8 Iterated versions of AGM era postulates In this final section of the paper, we investigate various further properties of POI revision operators, discussing in the process an interesting issue that has somewhat been neglected in the literature: the extension, to the iterated case, of the various AGM era postulates for revision. 8.1 Some postulates that are sound In Section 6, we briefly noted that (β1∗) and (β2 ∗ ) could each be reformulated as the conjunction of a pair of principles. We showed that these principles, which had not been discussed in the literature to date, are not generally satisfied by admissible revision operators. It turns out, furthermore, that they are particularly noteworthy, since we can show that, in various combinations, they enable us to recover iterated generalisations of the following strong AGM postulates for revision and related well-known principles: (K7∗) [Ψ ∗A ∧ C] ⊆ Cn([Ψ ∗A] ∪ {C}) (DR∗) [Ψ ∗A ∨ C] ⊆ [Ψ ∗A] ∪ [Ψ ∗ C] (DO∗) [Ψ ∗A] ∩ [Ψ ∗ C] ⊆ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C] (DI∗) If ¬A /∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C], then [Ψ ∗A ∨ C] ⊆ [Ψ ∗A] (K7∗) is one of the two 'supplementary' AGM postulates, and is also known as 'Superexpansion'. 'DR', 'DO' and 'DI' respectively abbreviate 'Disjunctive Rationality', 'Disjunctive Overlap' and 'Disjunctive Inclusion'. As is well known in the literature, given the other AGM postulates, (DR∗) is a consequence of the second supplementary postulate (K8∗), aka 'Subexpansion', while (DO∗) is equivalent to (K7∗) and (DI∗) to (K8∗). The iterated generalisations that we recover are obtained by replacing all mentions of the belief states in the principles above by that of their corresponding revisions by a common sentence B and making some minor adjustments. In each case, assuming Success and [Ψ ∗ >] = [Ψ], setting B = > enables us to recover the non-iterated counterpart. We have: (iK7∗) [(Ψ ∗A ∧ C) ∗B] ⊆ Cn([(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ∪ {A ∧ C}) (iDR∗) [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] ⊆ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ∪ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B] (iDO∗) [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ∩ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B] ⊆ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] (iDI∗) If ¬A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B], then [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] ⊆ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] Although (iK7∗) and (iDI∗) are, to the best of our knowledge, new to the literature, we note that (iDR∗) and (iDO∗) were already discussed and endorsed by Schlechta et al (1996). Our results are the following. Proposition 9. In the presence of AGM, (C1∗) and (C2∗), (a) (γ1∗) and (γ4∗) jointly entail (iDO ∗) and (b) (γ2∗) and (γ3∗) jointly entail (iDR ∗). Proposition 10. Given AGM and (C1∗), (a) (γ1∗) is equivalent to (iDI∗) and (b) (γ2∗) is equivalent to (iK7∗). Before moving on to the next subsection, a brief comment is in order regarding the well-known results, starting with the work of Gärdenfors (1986), which show that iterated versions of even the weak 'basic' AGM postulates lead to triviality. How do these results square with our claims to recover iterated versions of various postulates that are substantially stronger? The answer lies in a difference in the approach to generalising these principles. In the literature surrounding the triviality results, the generalisations were obtained by replacing all references to belief sets by references to corresponding conditional belief sets. But this way of proceeding yields a significantly different set of generalisations to ours. To illustrate, consider the following 'basic' AGM postulate, which is a weakening of (K7∗) : (K3∗) [Ψ ∗A] ⊆ Cn([Ψ] ∪ {A}) In triviality result literature, however, its iterated counterpart is: [Ψ ∗A]c ⊆ Cn([Ψ]c ∪ {A}). Etlin (2009) shows this principle to play badly with a pair of principles of conditional logic that he argues to be plausible. On our method for generating generalisations, however, we obtain the following weakening of our (iK7∗): (iK3∗) [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ⊆ Cn([Ψ ∗B] ∪ {A}) This principle is insufficiently strong to play the required role in the derivations of triviality and simply turns out to be a consequence of the DP postulates.5 8.2 Some postulates that are not sound We have not recovered the iterated version of Subexpansion: (K8∗) If ¬C /∈ [Ψ ∗A], then Cn([Ψ ∗A] ∪ {C}) ⊆ [Ψ ∗A ∧ C] which is given by: (iK8∗) If ¬(A ∧ C) /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then Cn([(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ∪ {A ∧ C}) ⊆ [(Ψ ∗A ∧ C) ∗B] For this, we consider the following rather strong principle: (P+∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x Ψ∗A∨C y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y This principle strengthens the conjunction of (γ1∗) and (γ2∗) in much the same way that (P ∗ ) strengthens the conjunction of (C3∗) and (C4 ∗ ) (which, recall, are respective weakenings of (γ1∗) and (γ2 ∗ )). Taken contrapositively, the principle inherits the weak antecedent of (γ1∗) but the strong consequent of (γ2∗). Given Ψ∗>=Ψ, which follows from (C1∗), (P ∗ ) is recovered as the special case of (P+∗) in which C = ¬A. We now note: Proposition 11. (iK8∗) is equivalent, given AGM and (C1∗), to the conjunction of (γ1 ∗ ) and (P+ ∗ ). Where does our POI family stand with respect to this principle? Well we can establish the following: Proposition 12. (P+∗) is satisfied by both lexicographic and restrained revision operators. Since lexicographic and restrained revision operators satisfy (γ1+∗), this establishes, that they satisfy (iK8 ∗). This is interesting, since it shows, not only that the principle is consistent with our previous constraints, but that adding it to these does not yield the kind of 'reductionism' that has been argued to be objectionable. However, it remains the case that Proposition 13. (P+∗) is not generally satisfied by POI revision operators. In fact, a weaker property than this one fails to hold across the family. Indeed, (P+∗) generalises the following Separation property, discussed by Booth & Meyer (2006) under the name of 'UR', the special case of (P+∗) in which C = A: (Sep∗) If x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], then x ≺Ψ∗A y or y ≺Ψ∗A x 5More specifically, it follows from (C1∗) and (C4∗). Note that (C1∗) and (C3∗) enable us to also recover the following iterated version of 'Preservation', which, given the other AGM postulates, is equivalent, in its non-iterated form, to (K4∗): (iPres∗) If ¬A /∈ [Ψ ∗B], then [Ψ ∗B] ⊆ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]. If one adds (P∗) to these principles, one also recovers the corresponding iterated version of (K4∗): (iK4∗) If ¬A /∈ [Ψ∗B], then Cn([Ψ∗B]∪{A}) ⊆ [(Ψ∗ A)∗B]. We omit the proofs here, since these claims are not central to our discussion. (iK3∗) and (iPres∗) are respective weakenings of (iK7∗) and (iDI∗). (iK4∗) is a weakening of the iterated version of Subexpansion, (iK8∗), discussed in the next section. This principle can be captured by a 'Non-Flush' constraint on the POI assignment, which states that it is never the case that two intervals line up flush, in the sense that x+ ∼ y−. This condition is not satisfied in general by POI assignments. Indeed, consider the following assignment to W = {x, y, z}: x+ < y+ < x− < y− ∼ z+ < z−. Non-Flush fails, with the result that so too does (Sep∗) fails, and hence so does (P+∗), since y ∼Ψ∗x∨z z. This establishes Proposition 13. At this point, a natural question arises: Why has the narrower family of POI revision operators satisfying (Sep∗), or indeed, (P+∗), not made a more central appearance in the present paper? The answer to this is that (Sep∗) remains in our view an extremely strong property. This becomes most apparent when one considers its syntactic counterpart: (Sep∗) Either ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] or A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] This principle states that, once one has revised one's beliefs by a certain sentence, one will remain opinionated as to whether or not that sentence is true upon any further single revision. But this seems too strong: letA be any sentence and B be the sentence 'The Oracle says that it might not be the case that A'. Plausibly A,¬A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]. Also of interest is the iterated version of 'Disjunctive Factoring', which is equivalent to the conjunction of (K7∗) and (K8∗), in the presence of the other AGM postulates:6 (DF∗) (i) If ¬C ∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C], then [Ψ ∗A ∨ C] = [Ψ ∗A] (ii) If ¬A,¬C /∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C], then [Ψ ∗A ∨ C] = [Ψ ∗A] ∩ [Ψ ∗ C] (iii) If ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C], then [Ψ ∗A ∨ C] = [Ψ ∗ C] The iterated version is given by: (iDF∗) (i) If ¬C ∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B], then [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] = [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] (ii) If ¬A,¬C /∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B], then [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] = [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ∩[(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B] (iii) If ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B], then [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] = [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B] (iDF∗)(ii) is entailed by the combination of (iDO∗), for the right-to-left direction, and (iDI∗), for the left-to-right direction, both of which we have established to be sound for POI revision operators. Regarding (iDF∗)(i): Proposition 14. The semantic counterparts of the right-toleft and left-to-right directions of (iDF∗)(i) are respectively: (γ5∗) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]] and y Ψ∗A∨C x, then y Ψ∗C x (γ6∗) If y ∈ [[¬A]], and y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x, then y ≺Ψ∗C x. We note that the second of these two principles, in conjunction with (γ2∗), obviously gives us (β2+ ∗ ). However, due to the requirement that x ∈ [[¬A]] in the antecedent of the 6This condition is typically stated in weaker terms, as: [Ψ∗A∨ C] is equal to either [Ψ∗A], [Ψ∗C], or [Ψ∗A]∩ [Ψ∗C]. However, the equivalence that is proven is in fact with the stronger principle. See (Gärdenfors 1988, Proposition 3.16). second principle, the latter does not give us (β1+∗), in conjunction with (γ1∗). Where do they stand in relation to our family of operators? The answer is the following: Proposition 15. Neither (γ5∗) nor (γ6∗) are generally satisfied by POI revision operators. However: Proposition 16. Both (γ5∗) and (γ6∗) are satisfied by lexicographic revision operators. This establishes that (iDF∗) is satisfied by lexicographic revision operators, since we have individually shown that they satisfy all the component principles. 9 Conclusions and further work This paper has investigated a significant, yet comparatively restrained, strengthening of the seminal framework introduced two decades ago by Darwiche and Pearl. Unlike the majority of existing models of iterated revision, ours falls short of identifying belief states with simple total preorders over worlds. Indeed, it incorporates further structure into these, in the form of proper ordinal intervals.7 This is achieved by combining Booth & Meyer's framework for non-prioritised revision with a 'naturalisation' step. The resulting family of POI revision operators, which is a subfamily of the so-called 'admissible' family, has been characterised both semantically and syntactically. It has also been shown that POI revision operators are distinctive, within the class of admissible ones, in satisfying iterated counterparts of many (albeit not all) classic AGM era postulates. In future work, we first plan to consider the consequences of relaxing (P∗). This condition fails for a more general family of 'basic ordinal interval (BOI)' revision operators. These operators, which include natural revision operators, are naturalisations of non-prioritised operators based on ordinal interval assignments that satisfy, not (≤ 2), but the weaker requirement that x+ ≤ x−. As it turns out, our proof of the soundness of (α1∗)–(α3 ∗ ) with respect to POI operators carries over here, leaving us in a strong position to provide a characterisation for this more general family. Secondly, as Figure 3 reminds us, the constraints that we have discussed impose few constraints on the result of more than two iterations of the revision operation. While the structure associated with belief states currently determines the posterior TPO, nothing has been said regarding the nature of the posterior POI. 7Others have also enriched belief states beyond mere TPOs or equivalent structures. Spohn, for instance, identifies states with 'ranking functions', aka 'OCFs' (Spohn 1988; 2012). Others, such as Konieczny & Pérez (2000) identify states with histories of input sentences (see also (Lehmann 1995) and (Delgrande, Dubois, and Lang 2006) for related work). However, the comparison with Spohn's approach is not straightforward, since his model features a whole parameterised family of revision-like functions. Regarding Konieczny & Pérez's model, if (C2∗) is imposed, then their proposal reduces to lexicographic revision. Acknowledgements This research was partially supported by the Australian Government through an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship (project number FT160100092) awarded to Jake Chandler. Appendix Theorem 2. ∗ is a POI revision operator iff it satisfies AGM, (Eq∗), (C1 ∗ ), (C2 ∗ ), (P ∗ ), (α1 ∗ ), (α2 ∗ ), and (α3 ∗ ). Detailed proof sketch: As remarked earlier, soundness follows from the results of Booth & Meyer and Propositions 1 and 6. For the completeness part, let ◦ be defined from ∗ as it was just after Theorem 2 in the main text. We establish the result by proving two main lemmas: first, we show that ◦ is a non-prioritised POI revision operator (Lemma 1) and then we show that N(∗, ◦) (Lemma 3). Lemma 1. ◦ is a non-prioritised POI revision operator We show that ◦ satisfies each of (C1◦), (C2◦), (P◦), (β1+◦) and (β2+ ◦ ), as well as the requirement that Ψ◦A is a TPO over W . The main difficulty lies in establishing the soundness of this last property. To do this we will use the following useful auxiliary lemma: Lemma 2. Let x, y, z be distinct worlds such that y Ψ z. Then the following are equivalent: (i) If x Ψ∗¬y y, then x Ψ∗¬z z, and (ii) If x Ψ∗x∨z y, then x Ψ∗x∨y z. Totality of Ψ◦A follows from totality of Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) and (Eq∗), since we have x Ψ◦A y ⇔ x Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. To show that Ψ◦A is transitive, we consider the eight cases according to whether each of x, y, and z is in [[A]] or not: (i) x, y, z ∈ [[A]] or x, y, z ∈ [[¬A]]: Follows from transitivity for ∗. (ii) x, y ∈ [[A]], z ∈ [[¬A]]: Then we must show that, if x Ψ y and y Ψ∗¬z z, then x Ψ∗¬z z. Since x, y ∈ [[A]] and z ∈ [[¬A]], we know that x 6= z and y 6= z. Then from x Ψ y and (C1∗), we obtain x Ψ∗¬z y. From the latter and y Ψ∗¬z z, we then obtain x Ψ∗¬z z by transitivity for ∗. (iii) x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z ∈ [[A]]: Then we must show that, if x Ψ∗¬y y and y Ψ∗¬y z, then x Ψ z. By transitivity for ∗, it follows, from x Ψ∗¬y y and y Ψ∗¬y z, that x Ψ∗¬y z. From x, z ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], we know x 6= y and z 6= y. So from x Ψ∗¬y z and (C1∗), we obtain x Ψ z. (iv) x ∈ [[A]], y, z ∈ [[¬A]]: Then we must show that, if x Ψ∗¬y y and y Ψ z, then x Ψ∗¬z z. If z = y, then x Ψ∗¬z z follows immediately from x Ψ∗¬y y. So we may assume z 6= y. By Lemma 2, what we must establish is then equivalent to: if x Ψ∗x∨z y and y Ψ z, then x Ψ∗x∨y z. Or contraposing: if z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x and y Ψ z, then y ≺Ψ∗x∨z x. So assume z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x and y Ψ z. Now, if x Ψ z, then x Ψ∗x∨y z by (C3∗). So assume z ≺Ψ x. We therefore have: x ∈ [[x ∨ y]], z /∈ [[x ∨ y]], z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x, y Ψ z and x /∈ min(, [[x ∨ z]]). From this, by (α2∗), we can then infer that y ≺Ψ∗x∨z x. (v) x ∈ [[¬A]], y, z ∈ [[A]]: Then we must show that, if x Ψ∗¬x y and y Ψ z, then x Ψ∗¬x z. Since x ∈ [[¬A]] and y, z ∈ [[A]], we know that x 6= y and x 6= z. Hence from y Ψ z, we know y Ψ∗¬x z. The implication then follows from transitivity for ∗. (vi) x ∈ [[¬A]], y ∈ [[A]], z ∈ [[¬A]]: Then we must show that, if x Ψ∗¬x y and y Ψ∗¬z z, then x Ψ z, or, equivalently, that, if x Ψ∗¬x y and z ≺Ψ x, then z ≺Ψ∗¬z y. So suppose x Ψ∗¬x y and z ≺Ψ x. If y Ψ x, then by (P∗) we would have y ≺Ψ∗¬x x: contradiction. Hence we may assume x ≺Ψ y. From this and z ≺Ψ x we have, by transitivity, z ≺Ψ y and hence y /∈ min(, [[y∨z]]). From this and x Ψ∗¬x y, using postulate (β1∗), we can deduce x Ψ∗y∨z y. We therefore have: y ∈ [[y∨z]], x /∈ [[y∨z]], x Ψ∗y∨z y, z ≺Ψ x and y /∈ min(Ψ, [[x ∨ y]]). From this, by (α3∗), we can then infer that z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x, and so z ≺Ψ∗¬z y, by (γ2∗), as required. (vii) x, y ∈ [[¬A]], z ∈ [[A]]: Then we must show that, if x Ψ y and y Ψ∗¬y z, then x Ψ∗¬x z. If x = y, then this holds immediately, so we may assume x 6= y. Now suppose x Ψ y and y Ψ∗¬y z. If z Ψ y, then z ≺Ψ∗¬y y by (P∗): contradiction. So we may assume y ≺Ψ z. From this and x Ψ y, we know, by transitivity, that x ≺Ψ z, so z /∈ min(Ψ, [[x ∨ z]]). It then follows that y Ψ∗x∨z z by postulate (β1∗). We therefore have: z ∈ [[x∨ z]], y /∈ [[x∨ z]], y Ψ∗x∨z z, x ≺Ψ y and z /∈ min(Ψ, [[y ∨ z]]). From this, by (α1∗), we can then infer that x ≺Ψ∗y∨z z, and so x Ψ∗¬x z, by (γ1∗), as required. We now prove our second main lemma: Lemma 3. N(∗, ◦) We require: x Ψ∗A y iff (i) x ∈ min(Ψ◦A, [[A]]), or (ii) x, y /∈ min(Ψ◦A, [[A]]) and x Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. Since ◦ satisfies (C1◦), we can however replace this with: x Ψ∗A y iff (i) x ∈ min(, [[A]]), or (ii) x, y /∈ min(, [[A]]) and x Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. With this in mind: (a) Left-to-right direction: Suppose that x Ψ∗A y and x /∈ min(, [[A]]). If y ∈ min(, [[A]]), then y ≺Ψ∗A x, by Success: contradiction. Hence y /∈ min(, [[A]]). It remains to be shown that x Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. If x ∼A y, then the conclusion follows by (C1∗)–(C2 ∗ ). If y / Ax, then the conclusion follows from x Ψ∗A y and (γ1∗). Finally, if x /A y, then x ∈ [[A ∨ ¬(x ∨ y)]] and y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ ¬(x ∨ y))]]. Together with x /∈ min(Ψ, [[A]]) and x Ψ∗A y, the desired conclusion then follows by postulate (β2∗). (b) Right-to-left direction: If x ∈ min(, [[A]]), then x Ψ∗A y by Success. So suppose x, y /∈ min(, [[A]]) and x Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. We must show x Ψ∗A y. If x ∼A y, then the conclusion follows by (C1∗)–(C2∗). If x/A y, then the conclusion follows by (γ2∗). Finally, if y /A x, then the conclusion follows from postulate (β1∗). References Alchourrón, C. E.; Gärdenfors, P.; and Makinson, D. 1985. On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 50(2):510– 530. Booth, R., and Chandler, J. 2017. The irreducibility of iterated to single revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 46(4):405–418. Booth, R., and Meyer, T. 2006. Admissible and restrained revision. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 26:127– 151. Booth, R., and Meyer, T. 2011. How to revise a total preorder. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40(2):193–238. Boutilier, C. 1996. Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25(3):263–305. Chandler, J. 2013. Transmission failure, AGM-style. 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Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 1 Many thanks to Thomas Baldwin, Nicholas GriUn, and Gary Ostertag for critical discussion of the work of G.yE. Moore. I am grateful to the Editor for assistance. I am grateful to the American Philosophical Society for the award of a Franklin Grant (2007) for research in Cambridge that led to this paper. My thanks to Juliet Moore for permission to quote from G.yE. Moore's unpublished papers. russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 28 (winter 2008–09): 101–26 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036-01631; online 1913-8032 rticles "HE WAS IN THOSE DAYS BEAUTIFUL AND SLIM": BERTRAND RUSSELL AND G.yE. MOORE, 1894z–1901 Consuelo Preti1 Philosophy / The College of New Jersey Ewing, nj 08628, usa [email protected] Moore and Russell's philosophical and personal paths through the early years of the twentieth century make a fascinating chronicle. Some of this story is familiar; but material from the unpublished Moore papers adds new and forceful detail to the account. It is a commonplace by now that Russell and Moore were not friends, although they maintained a long professional association. Their most intellectually intimate phase came early on, reaching a peak in 1897–99. But I show that during this period Moore developed an indisputable antagonism toward Russell, which I argue was motivated by a form of intellectual self-preservation from the Russellian juggernaut. This paper examines aspects of the development of their views and their relationship between 1894 and 1901. 1.wintroduction The 1903 publication of Bertrand Russell's The Principles of Math-ematicsz and G.yE. Moore's Principia Ethicaz was the culminationof an important early phase in their respective philosophical development. The years just prior to publication of these seminal works were years in which notable and transformational advances in their indiJa n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 102 consuelo preti 2 See, for instance, Russell, Auto. 1: 134–5; MPD, p. 54; and PoM, p. xviii. These acknowledgments, I believe, have distorted the historical record to some degree. It is, for example, widely believed that Russell and Moore worked closely together, exchanging drafts of their work for comment, etc. I argue below that there is little evidence of this. 3 Moore, "An Autobiography", in The Philosophy of G.yE. Moore, ed. P.yA. Schilpp (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern U. P., 1942), pp. 3–39. 4 See Nicholas GriUn, Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1991), and SLBRz 1 for an account of Russell and Moore's mutual inXuence, especially during the period 1897–99. See also Thomas Baldwin, G.yE. Moorez (London: Routledge, 1990), and Peter Hylton, Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1990). Some of the material I discuss below (letters from Russell to Moore, for instance) has been examined previously by scholars. The additional perspective contributed by the material from the Moore papers requires revisiting some of it here. 5 Most of Moore's papers are preserved in Cambridge U. Library. Some material is in Trinity College Library. For a catalogue of the former, see Kathleen Cann, "The Papers of George Edward Moore (1873–1958), Philosopher", Wittgenstein Studies, disk 1 (1995). vidual thinking rose to the surface. Accounts of Russell's and of Moore's evolution from undergraduate Idealists to founders of analytic philosophy, however, have linked their work more substantively than is strictly the case. This is probably due to an uncritical acceptance of Russell's early fulsome published acknowledgments to Moore, where he does not stint in crediting to Moore the forward action that led the charge against Idealism at the turn of the century, a key inXuence on Russell's own early work.2 Moore's own report of the early connection between his work and Russell's, on the other hand, is mindful of the details, modest, and professionally respectful; but it is not eTusive, and it cannot be said that Moore describes their early relationship as particularly close.3 In fact, Russell and Moore had a complex and ultimately uneasy bond. Any account of it-even the partial one I will oTer here-requires an analysis of a variety of sources.4 Russell's letters (SLBRz vol. 1), and chronologies of Russell's life and writings in his Collected Papers, volumes 2 and 3 (among other sources), give a clear picture of Russell's movements, the development of his work during the period, and his relations with Moore. Further details, which help to reconstruct Moore's parallel early philosophical development and Wll in the story of their relationship, are taken from material in Moore's unpublished papers, which I examine in what follows.5 Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd "He Was in Those Days Beautiful and Slim" 103 6 These mostly record events from his arrival in Cambridge in 1892 up to about 1913. The ones that survive (Cambridge U. Library, Add. MSS 8330 1/1/1–1/1/9) are titled, respectively, "Chronological Table of my Life"; "People I See"; "Books and Music"; "Work"; "Play, Exercise, Health"; "Visits" and "Visitors"; "Chronological List of my Philosophical Writings"; "Summer Holidays"; and "Reading Parties". Moore did keep diaries, but he obviously destroyed some of them. Those that survive record events in 1908, 1909–16, and 1924. There are some supplementary diaries/notebooks of 1909–28 and diary extracts of 1929–39. 7 Add. 1/1/2. Paul Levy, G.yE. Moore and the Cambridge Apostles (New York: Holt, 2.wrussell and moore: 1894–97 Moore arrived at Trinity to study classics in 1892, but shifted to moral sciences after his Part i Classics tripos in 1896. Moore had been tapped by one of his teachers (a former Apostle) at Dulwich College as a notable possibility for membership in that secret society, and was duly elected in February 1894. Russell was jubilant about Moore in these early days-he had himself identiWed Moore as an able candidate for the Society-and welcomed him joyously to the fold. A comparison of Russell's autobiographical descriptions of the eTect Moore had on him when they Wrst met, with his contemporary letters to Alys about Moore, show a remarkable consistency. Russell writes: In my third year ... I met G.yE. Moore, who was then a freshman, and for some years he fulWlled my ideal of genius. He was in those days beautiful and slim, with a look almost of inspiration, and with an intellect as deeply passionate as Spinoza's. He had a kind of exquisite purity. (Auto. 1: 64) To Alys, on 18 February 1894, Russell wrote, We all felt electriWed by him, as if we had slumbered hitherto and never realized what fearless intellect pure and unadulterated really means. If he does not die or go mad I cannot doubt that he will somehow mark himself out as a man of stupendous genius. (Quoted in Monk 1: 69) No similar enthusiasm, however, is evident toward Russell in what there is of Moore's descriptions of his years at Cambridge-and Moore was warmly devoted to those he considered his close friends. Moore kept a number of chronologies and lists, particularly early on,6 and in one of them he notes that in the long vacation, "Get to know Russell, Crompton, Mayor, Wedgwood; V[aughan]-W[illiams]; Dakyns very well."7 Yet Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 104 consuelo preti Rinehart and Winston, 1979) contains descriptions of the young men with whom Moore forged friendships. 8 6 August 1893; 30 June 1897; 12 December 1898; 18 March 1899; 20 June 1899. 9 Although they were not intimates, there was a professional bond, and there were many activities which sustained it over many years: overlap at Trinity before the Wrst War; meetings of the Aristotelian Society; Apostolic dinners; reviews of each other's work; Moore's editorship of Mindz; the Strong fellowship fund; Wittgenstein, etc. But there was also a series of sticky episodes between them (the 1903 reading-party imbroglio [see note 50]; Moore's evasiveness about his 1914 notes on Wittgenstein's Logic). More of the story has yet to be told. Moore never mentions meeting Russell to his parents, to whom he wrote very regularly after going up. The Wrst mention of Russell that Moore makes to his parents in letters is 6 August 1893 (that he will lunch with Russell that day), and further references to Russell are sparse in the letters he writes them during his time at Cambridge.8 It is possible to argue that Russell had a great deal of aTection for Moore at the start, and retained it throughout much of their early association. But it cannot be claimed that Moore ever felt the same way about Russell. Although we must believe that Moore did garner signiWcant intellectual stimulation from Russell at an important time in his early philosophical development, he seems mostly to have enduredz him. Moore was never at ease with Russell and, over time, grew increasingly distressed by him. We might begin to explain this by noting a remark of Russell's in his autobiography (Auto. 1: 68). Russell recounts that he entered Cambridge a "shy prig" but that by his fourth year he had become "gay and Xippant" and that "philosophy altogether seemed to me great fun". If true, even to some extent, this could partly explain why Moore found Russell so diUcult. Moore was a bit of a shy prig all his life, it might be said, and while he could be lighthearted, there is little reason to think he was at any time Xippant. Nor can it be said that he ever thought philosophy was "great fun". Moore took philosophy very seriously and worked very hard at it-and Russell is probably right that Moore, though ferocious in philosophical argument (among trusted friends), was, at least early on, "colossally ignorant" and a "child" in "the everyday world". They really were tuned very diTerently, so to speak; but the depth of the antagonism Moore developed for Russell, as revealed below, makes their decades-long association the more surprising, overall.9 The problem was not simply their mismatched personalities, though Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd "He Was in Those Days Beautiful and Slim" 105 10 Add. 8330 8R/33/1–43. 11 Russell says so himself, of course (Auto. 1: 64). It is even more diUcult to ascertain the exact nature of Russelly's inXuence on Moore-Moore's 1942 acknowledgment to Russell to one side. Moore acknowledges no one, for instance, in the Preface to Principia Ethicaz; and in his dissertations he restricts acknowledgments to the work of Bradley and Sidgwick in a general theoretical way. 12 I don't think GriUn would disagree (ibid., pp. 55–60). 13 Add. 8330 8S/44/1. I would add to this Wittgenstein's Werce loyalty to Moore (in spite of episodes like the one that led to their estrangement between 1914 and 1929), and it is true that they were quite diTerent; and there is no grievous personal betrayal that would explain Moore's relatively sudden rupture with Russell at about 1899–1900. Instead there is evidence that part of what featured in Moore's developing vexation with Russell was a kind of professional self-preservation, made necessary by Russell's relentless (perhaps unwitting) pressure to mould Moore's work in directions that Moore found undesirable. I think that, especially early on, Russell was always a bit puzzled by Moore's aloofness and wished for more openness from him. In what survives of the correspondence from Russell to Moore (43 letters in all10), Russell asks to see Moore for "philosophical talk", or to come for a visit, seventeen times, but Moore rebuTs him often-and we can be sure that Russell would have asked to see him more times than what is recorded. Russell may not have fully grasped that Moore's reserve was more fundamental than Russell wished it were, or even thought it should be. 3.w1897–98 Between 1897 and 1898 both Moore and Russell experienced a key period of transformative philosophical development. GriUn, in Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship, circumspectly analyzes the evidence for what Russell might have owed to Moore at this period, which he maintains would have come mostly through conversation.11 I think he is right about this; but it may be that this inXuence was not inconsiderable. The diUculty is making that latter claim plausible in the absence of evidence we can examine. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give this issue the attention it deserves, but I would emphasize the evidence of Moore's eTect on his contemporaries and near-contemporaries that bolsters the case for his capacity to inXuence people, far beyond what the surviving record discloses.12 Strachey,13 Keynes and Woolf, as we know, recorded their Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 106 consuelo preti the intimacy and warmth that come through in Desmond MacCarthy's letters to Moore. MacCarthy (1877–1952) very often writes that Moore's letters were "a great comfort to him". 14 J.yM. Keynes, Two Memoirs (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1949); Leonard Woolf, Sowing: an Autobiography of the Years 1850–1904 (London: Hogarth P., 1960). 15 For discussion of the inXuences on Moore's work, see C. Preti, "On the Origins of the Contemporary Notion of Propositional Content: Anti-Psychologism in Nineteenth Century Psychology and G.yE. Moore's Early Theory of Judgment", Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part a, 39 (zJune 2008): 176–85. devotion to Moore and his ideas in superlative terms.14 We might dismiss these as excessive or even embarrassingly self-indulgent, but seen in the context of their paeans to their friend and mentor, Russell's are no less genuinely keen in their expression of gratitude. There is no doubt that it was during the relatively brief period of 1897–99 that Moore and Russell had the most mutually productive of their intellectual interactions. At some point toward the end of this time, however, Moore backed oT somewhat abruptly, but permanently. Such intellectual intimacy between Moore and Russell that grew between 1897 and 1899 was never regained thereafter. In the summer of 1897 Moore began to work on his Prize Fellowship dissertation, a study of Kant's moral theory with an emphasis on the nature of practical reason and freedom of the will. A letter from Moore to his parents about his plans for the summer conWrms that he saw Russell at about this time: ... am back [in Cambridge] again to work hard till August 31st. I have decided not to go to Bayreuth, so as to do my best at my dissertation, which has remained hitherto very backward ... went down to Haslemere on Thursday to stay with the Russells at their Fernhurst cottage ... talked a lot of philosophy with Russell. (30 June 1897) There is no evidence, however, that whatever Russell and Moore discussed in June had anything to do with the speciWc work that Moore was doing in his 1897 dissertation-though I think it likely that Moore's adoption of a criticism of Kant's psychologism from a roughly Bradleian view, preliminarily addressed in the 1897 dissertation, was motivated by the discussions they had during the early summer of 1897.15 Part of what they discussed at this meeting is thought to have been Russell's paper "Why Do We Regard Time, But Not Space, as Necessarily a Plenum?" (Papers 2). GriUn (p. 321) describes the content of this paper as reopenJa n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd "He Was in Those Days Beautiful and Slim" 107 16 There is reason to think that Russell and Moore spent this time together discussing physics, space, and even plenal theory. Moore published a review of An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry, which appeared in Mindz n.s. 8 (1899): 397–405; according to his own notes, he worked on it the entire "May" term of 1899. Two surviving letters from the Trinity mathematician G.yH. Hardy to Moore (dated "Aug. 98" and "July 99" in Moore's hand) are technical discussions of Russell on the space-constant. The 1899 letter refers to Moore's review of the Essay. Moore and Hardy were good friends and colleagues; Moore notes in his list 1/1/1 in 1897 that during the Long Vacation he saw Hardy "once a week". Given Hardy's expertise, Moore probably consulted him on technical details of Russell's work (Moore notes in list 1/1/1 that he saw Hardy "very often" in 1898–99), to which he might have been introduced during these discussions with Russell in the summer of 1897. 17 These are preserved along with both drafts of Moore's dissertations in the Trinity College Library (Add. Ms a. 247 2 (1)). Henry Sidgwick and Edward Caird's comments on the 1897 draft survive, as do Bernard Bosanquet's comments on the 1898 draft. The other examiner of the 1898 dissertation was James Ward. ing a discussion that Russell had published, scant weeks prior, in An Essay on the Foundations of Geometryy; in the end, it presaged an important change in Russell's view about physics.16 In October 1897 Russell was travelling in Italy and wrote to Moore: I am sorry to see from "Nature"-the only English paper I get-that you did not, apparently, get your Fellowship at this shot.... The important thing for you, however, is what people say of your chances for next year, and whether they commended your dissertation. Please write and tell me all such facts as may be told concerning the examiners' opinions. From what you told me of not having nearly Wnished your work, I infer it will be longer and better next year.... Please write to me as soon as possible about your aTairs. (19 Oct. 1897, copy in ra1 710) From what Russell says here, Moore had informed him as to how the work was going (possibly in discussion: no letter survives), but Moore had not shared the news that he had failed to win a fellowship at this juncture. In any case, the news from the examiners was not very good. No letter from Moore to Russell concerning the examiners' views survives, but their comments do.17 Henry Sidgwick wrote, among other things, that "[Moore's] exposition of his own views is rather diUcult to judge, as, in the earlier part of his dissertation, he does not quite suUciently distinguish them from the views he attributes to Kant"; Caird claimed that "... partly, I think, because Mr. Moore has not suUciently studied how to be clear to those who are not looking at things at his Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 108 consuelo preti 18 In my article cited in note 15, I brieXy discuss the evidence that Lotze's metaphysics-which was not an untrammelled Absolute Idealism by any stretch-was an inXuence on Moore's anti-psychologism at this period by way of Stout and Ward; Lotze's inXuence on Moore is noted critically by Sidgwick in his comments on Moore's 1897 dissertation. 19 This material survives (Russell's in ra3 rec. acq. 385, fos. 98–121; originals at Texas). An examination and comparison, though not possible here, would supply another opportunity to Wll in the details of Moore and Russell's intellectual progress at this time. 20 As in 1895 when Moore was reading Lotze with a fellow student, Charles Percy Sanger (letter from Russell to Alys, SLBRz 1: #65); Moore, list 1/1/1. 21 Moore, list 1/1/1. 22 Moore, list 1/1/2. Bernard Berenson was Russell's brother-in-law. 23 Moore, review of J.yG. Fichte, The Science of Ethics as Based on the Science of precise angle, he is extremely diUcult to understand. It has cost me much to do so, and I do not think the fault is entirely mine." Both Caird and Sidgwick, however, praised Moore's originality and ability, and, as a result, Moore spent another year revising his dissertation for another attempt at a fellowship, which was ultimately successful. In Lent Term 1898 both Moore and Russell attended McTaggart's lectures on Lotze. Rudolph Hermann Lotze, by now a shadowy Wgure in the history of philosophy, was a deeply inXuential thinker in the late nineteenth century, both on the Continent and in Cambridge, and the philosophers who taught Moore and Russell-Stout, McTaggart, and Ward-were thoroughly familiar with his work.18 Both Moore and Russell took extensive, practically verbatim notes at McTaggart's lectures19 and found opportunities to discuss Lotze's metaphysics and his logic.20 Between March and July 1898, Russell was at the Millhangar (Russell saw Moore in Cambridge for a few days in May 1898), and Moore began to think about revisions to his dissertation. Moore's lists now contain more frequent references to Russell: June. To Russells at Millhangar. July–August. Long [Vacation] at Cambridge (river party at end of July?).21 Long Russell brings Berenson July 28.22 Moore's list 1/1/7 ("Chronological List of my Philosophical Writings") contains an entry in which he notes that in 1898 "During Wrst two terms and Long till end of August, work for second Dissertation but probably write nothing till May Term. Also write review of Kroeger's Fichte,23 at Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd "He Was in Those Days Beautiful and Slim" 109 Knowledge (trans. A.yE. Kroeger, ed. W.yT. Harris), International Journal of Ethics 9 (1898): 92–7. 24 Review of M. Guyau, "Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction" (A Sketch of Morality Independent of Obligation or Sanction), trans. from 2nd edn. by Gertrude Kapteyn, International Journal of Ethics 9 (1899): 232–6. 25 "The Nature of Judgment", Mindz n.s. 8 (1899): 176–93. See my article cited in note 15 for the evidence. 26 See GriUn, Chap. 7, for the details of the composition and of the archival material. Easter, at Wingate, I think. Also probably in Long write review of Guyau24 published next January." Moore wrote to Desmond MacCarthy on 19 June 1898 that he had written "about 6 pages dissertation and done less work than ever. I go to London tomorrow.... Then a week with the Russells...." Two months later Moore wrote to MacCarthy that: I need only say in general that I have not been very industrious. I have some 60 new pages Wnished, but it can hardly be that I shall be able to write on all the points that I intended. You may judge from the fact that all I have written so far is Metaphysics-not a word of Ethics. I have arrived at a perfectly staggering doctrine: I had never seen where my principles would lead me. An existent is nothing but a proposition: nothing is but concepts. There is my philosophy.... I am pleased to believe that this is the most Platonic system of modern times; though it is also not so far from Kant, as you might think at Wrst ... it had never occurred to me ... that reality is in fact independent of existence.... (14 Aug. 1898) In spite of what he says, Moore was fully occupied with his work in the spring and summer of 1898, and his visit to Russell at the end of June 1898 on the available evidence, marks a crucial turning-point in their work. Moore visited Russell for a week at about the time he began writing the 1898 draft of his dissertation, which consists of the 1897 draft, mostly unrevised, with Chapter ii added, and some deletions. Moore's important 1899 paper, "The Nature of Judgment", was siphoned from the new chapter.25 It was here that Moore introduced a strongly realist view of the objects of judgment, arguing further that these (which he refers to as "propositions", whose constituents are "concepts") are the mindand language-independent constituents of reality. Russell, meanwhile, was at Friday's Hill until September, deep in the eTort of producing the precursor to The Principles of Mathematics, the multiply revised and ultimately abandoned "An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning" (Papers 2).26 Russell wrote to Moore from Friday's Hill on 20 July 1898, Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 110 consuelo preti 27 It should be noted that relational theories of judgment were not exactly new at this period and featured in literature that both Moore and Russell will have been familiar with, in the work of Lotze, Bradley, and Stout. Later, in a letter to Moore dated 13 September 1898 (see p. 114), Russell was thinking hard about relations. He told Moore, "I am really discussing all relations of a certain type", the discovery of which, a few paragraphs earlier in the letter, he claimed "is the true business of Logic...." telling him: I have succeeded in Wnishing my Book i, by skating over the diUculties and leaving them to be discussed later. I am having a typed copy sent to you, but I don't expect you to read it till after your Fellowship, as it will be at least 6 months before I attack Book i again. I hope your Dissertation is growing with all speed.... (Copy in ra1 710) Although, as GriUn points out, it is not possible to tell what precisely Moore and Russell discussed in June 1898, nor which parts of "An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning" had been written (in order to establish a direction for inXuence), it is relatively safe to say that what emerged from their talk at this period was the recognition that the progress of their respective ideas would require (at least) an analysis of judgment- and not just any analysis. This needs fuller treatment than I can give it here, but the following is a compressed proposal as to the direction of an argument. The distinction between the act of judgment and the object of a judgment-the distinction between the psychological act of judging and what today we would call its propositional content-was at the heart of Chapter ii of Moore's 1898 dissertation, where he argued the object of judgment was a mindand language-independent proposition constituted by (necessary) relations between concepts. The evidence supports that Russell began to rethink his views about relations through his conversations with Moore on judgment as a complex of non-psychologistically construed concepts.27 We should emphasize that for Moore, what was ultimately at stake was the normativity of ethical propositions; for Russell, in due course, the logical form of the fundamental propositions of mathematics. Moore's dissertations both focus on what he identiWes as a key weakness in Kant-the nature of practical reason, or ethical judgment. Moore comes to argue, most forcefully in the 1898 dissertation, that a fatal psychologism infected Kant's account of ethical judgment. Kant's view that the Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd "He Was in Those Days Beautiful and Slim" 111 28 That is, Moore dismisses Kant's transcendental argument as failing to avoid outright psychologism. 29 It is possible that Russell had a version of Chapter i of Book i more or less complete, but that he redrafted it afterz his June 1898 conversation with Moore. Thus, upon completing the redraft, he noted on the Wrst page of the manuscript (Book i, Chapter i) that "this m.s. was Wnished, July 1898". GriUn (p. 307) in fact suggests that Book i of the manuscript could have been composed quite late in the process. will is both constrained (by the good and by reason) and yet free, was incoherent. Moore identiWes the problem in Kant as what today we would call the causal-role problem of content. As Moore reads Kant, the object of the will must have a causal eTect on our mental states (desires, for instance), or it could not be practical-Kant is thus forced to render it as psychologistic in nature.28 But the object of the will, on Kant's view, must also have normative properties; and Moore argues ultimately that no mentalistic or psychological entity could have any claim to genuine normativity. We must assume that Chapter ii of the 1898 dissertation at least partly included the discussion of the distinction between empirical and necessary propositions that turns up in the published "Nature of Judgment" (pp. 188–9), along with a defence of Moore's admittedly idiosyncratic view that all propositions are necessary, even the ones that are composed of existential concepts (like "existence"). Moore here battles to defend the view that Kant's criterion for the distinction between a prioriz and a posterioriz propositions (which he takes as at least coextensive with "necessary" and "empirical") fails, because "even existential propositions have the essential mark which Kant assigns to a prioriz propositions-that they are absolutely necessary." The basis for Moore's position is that there is a distinction between concepts that "exist in an actual part of time" (empirical), and those that do not (necessary). Since all propositions are composed of concepts (or arez complex concepts themselves), and all propositions are mindand language-independent in nature, no proposition (or its constituents) can exist in any part of time or space. Furthermore, all reality consists of such concepts. The available evidence shows that Russell had made greater strides, and in greater detail, on an account of the structure and elements of judgment by mid-July 1898 than Moore did (ever).29 Russell's emphasis in Book i, Chapter i ofz "An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning" ("The Manifold", "The Elements of Judgments"), in his own words, is to: Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 112 consuelo preti 30 It must be noted here that both Moore and Russell were familiar with this very Bradleian issue. 31 For an account of the inXuences on Moore which directed him toward anti-psychologism, see my article cited in note 15. Thus I would argue that Russell began to see the importance of an extra-mental metaphysics of relations (as "external" and not "internal") before he started to work on his Leibniz lectures; that is, in June of 1898, in his conversations with Moore. 32 Russell had written to Alys on 12 March 1898 that he read a paper, now lost, to the Society, "... to an audience of about 10 people.... [T]hey left most of the discussion to Moore, and he and I soon lapsed into a duologue.... No one could understand what we ... discover the peculiarities, and to lay bare the fundamental ideas, of the various classes of mathematical judgments. Judgments of number, of quantity, of order, of extensive continuity, of motion, and of causality, will be successively examined.... The foremost class of judgments, from every point of view, is the class in which a predicate is asserted of a subject. This class has been supposed to include all judgments, but we shall Wnd, as we proceed, that the vast majority of mathematical judgments, though sometimes capable of this form, are essentially of various other kinds. (Papers 2: 167) Here Russell has not abandoned the subject/predicate understanding of the logical form of a proposition-but he has begun to evince more than some dissatisfaction about it. The other emphasis in this part ofz "Analysis", as Russell notes, is the role of what he calls "existence" in the treatment of the constituents of judgment.30 Thus I think there is evidence here that Russell owes to Moore the more decided emphasis that Moore begins to make at this juncture on (1) the signiWcance of a nonpsychological account of judgment and its content-which is at the heart of Moore's analysis of Kant's moral theory in his 1897 and 1898 dissertations-and (2) the nature of the concept of existence and the upshot of those views for a new metaphysics.31 That the realist metaphysics which characterizes the nature of the objects of judgment was at the heart of the next step in Moore and Russell's intellectual development is not in doubt, and I think it is clear that it was during this phase of their work- and their relationship-that they took it on board. But a case can be made for this period as marking the beginning of serious trouble in their personal relations as well. I would explain this by noting that Russell was on the cusp of a breakthrough with respect to his own work, and that, at this time, the only person with whom he could discuss his ideas with any hope of being understood was Moore.32 Russell Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd "He Was in Those Days Beautiful and Slim" 113 were saying, and he was the only man who thought he could. Moore told me afterwards, by way of a friendly goodnight, that I too hadn't perceived what we were arguing about. All the same I got him into several nasty holes, which he was unable to get out of." The subject of the paper was existence. See SLBR 1: #74. 33 Both GriUn (p. 57 n. 84) and Levy (p. 207) remark on the oddity of a Society meeting in 1899 when Moore read a paper of Hardy's on non-Euclidean geometry to an audience of one: Russell. The vote, on the question "Is space probably Euclidean?", was split, Moore plaintively claiming yes, "but not demonstrably by me at present". might have been overenthusiastic about Moore, and, of course, he was possibly blinded by his enthusiasm with respect to Moore's actual gifts. Moore was never going to be able to keep up with Russell in the rariWed realms of philosophical logic-Russell was a mathematician who, in shifting his intellectual interests to philosophy, practically invented a subdiscipline that reXected how he shaped it to his own interests in the foundations of mathematics.33 Moore was a classicist, conservatively trained, and less than even competently trained in mathematics overall. It is diUcult to think that Moore could ever give Russell a truly profound critical run for the money in the technical areas of mathematics and logic where Russell was casting his lines. In the summer of 1898, however, most of that work was yet to come-and Russell found, or was determined to Wnd, in Moore, a kindred mind. Their work was proceeding swiftly along parallel courses, but in both paths the signiWcant advance was a philosophicalz shift-one toward a diTerent conception of metaphysics. Even if Russell did not mistake Moore's talents for anything but what they were, they were considerable, in their way, and it is not entirely surprising that both men derived signiWcant intellectual stimulation from the other. The problem for Moore may have sprung from Russell's enthusiastic grasp of both the subject matter they were discussing and the various ways it could develop, which may have led to his importuning Moore to adopt an intellectual direction that Moore did not Wnd amenable. Moore's increasing resentment toward Russell might be explained in part as Moore wanting to be left alone to pursue his own work, rather than being pressured, in eTect, to become a philosophical logician. And it is possible that Moore had begun to feel as if his intellectual energies were being consumed as mere fuel to the Russellian juggernaut. Some evidence of this can be found in the correspondence between them in this period and shortly after. Moore began to become more reserved with Russell around this time. Russell wrote to Moore on 13 September 1898, the day before Russell departed for the Continent, not reJa n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 114 consuelo preti 34 I think that Russell means to imply by his remark that nobody but he (Russell) will understand the dissertation, given the relatively unexpected departure in formulation of the nature of judgment that Moore oTers there and that grew from their discussions in the summer of 1898. I also think, given the evidence I adduce throughout this paper, that Russell meant to give genuine credit to Moore for having hit upon a "new logic" (as for instance, in notes 40 and 46 below), remarkable as that may seem to contemporary philosophers. I believe that I can explain how Moore hit upon it, but must defer the argument to another paper. turning until November. He tells Moore that he was "very glad" to get a letter from him as he "had been anxious to know what you felt about your dissertation when it Wnally went in." This suggests that Moore had not communicated much on the substance of his work from about early July or so. Russell adds: I am curious to know how a really thorough account of Kant might be written: I imagine it would be a new departure in literature! I fear Caird's hair will stand on end when he hears that an existent is a proposition.... [B]ut I imagine I agree with what you mean. I agree most emphatically with what you say about the several kinds of necessary relations among concepts, and I think their discovery is the true business of Logic (or Meta[physics] if you like).... I didn't intend you to look at my work till after your fellowship: when that time is come, you can get Bks. ii–iv from Whitehead. (Copy in ra1 710) There is little evidence that Moore availed himself of the invitation to give Russell critical comments on the manuscript of "An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning" (though he might have beneWted from some of Russell's more precise formulations in his own account of the logical structure of judgment in the 1898 dissertation). In any case, Russell wrote to Moore a month later from Fiesole (14 Oct. 1898) to congratulate him on having won a Prize Fellowship, telling him that he had been nervous about it: "there seemed no ground for doubting it, but I felt as one does about catching a train." He then asked Moore, "if you are not busy with your School of Ethics lectures", to write and "let me know details as to your dissertation, etc.", adding, disarmingly, "I wonder whether anybody understood your dissertation."34 This letter suggests that Russell didn't know the actual details of Moore's position as they had been Wnally settled, let alone that he had read the dissertation. But he knew enough about it to know that it was, in part, a critique of Kant, and that its attack on a putative psychologism in Kant, and its defence of a realist metaphysics, were suUciently unorthodox as to cause some anxiety about the Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd "He Was in Those Days Beautiful and Slim" 115 35 See Tom Regan, ed., G.yE. Moore, The Elements of Ethicsz (Philadelphia: Temple U. P., 1991), pp. xv–xvi, for its history. The autumn lectures developed into Principia Ethica. 36 Note the "your". success of Moore's candidacy for the Prize Fellowship, especially as one of the examiners was the inXuential Oxford neo-Hegelian, Bernard Bosanquet. Bosanquet, whose examiner's comments survive, wrote that he "found himself almost wholly unable to appreciate the theoretical point of view which the author has adopted. It appears to me to lie beyond the limit of paradox which is permissible in philosophy." Bosanquet's disparagement notwithstanding, the dominance of neo-Hegelianism yielded shortly after to precisely the theoretical point of view that Moore had adopted. 4.w1899–1900 In the autumn term of 1898 (and again in early 1899) Moore presented a series of lectures on ethics at the short-lived London School of Ethics.35 Russell was at the Millhangar (Moore's list at 1/1/1 notes that he went to visit Russell there in December) and wrote to Moore on 1 December 1898 that his dissertation, which he has now read, appears to him "to be on the level of the best philosophy I know. When I see you, I should like to discuss some diUculties which occur in working out your theory of Logic."36 Russell then formulates a series of criticisms that show how deeply he was determined to see Moore's work as a critical element in the development of a philosophical logic that had begun to motivate his own rapidly evolving views-while perhaps not noticing that he himself was providing much of the logical headway: I believe that prop[osition]s are distinguished from mere concepts, not by their complexity only, but by always containing one speciWc concept, i.e. the copula "isz". That is, there must be, between the concepts of a prop[osition], one special type of relation, not merely some relation. "The wise man" is not a prop[osition], as Leibnitz says. Moreover, you need the distinction of subject and predicate: in all existential prop[osition]s, e.g., existence is a predicate, not subject. "Existence is a concept" is not existential. You will have to say that "isz" denotes an unsymmetrical relation. This will allow concepts which only have predicates and never arez predicates-i.e. things-and will make everything except the very foundation perfectly orthodox. (Copy in ra1 710) Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 116 consuelo preti 37 Moore's notes on Russell's lectures survive but are confusingly dated "Lent Term 1898". 38 Baldwin agrees (p. 312). 39 See my article cited in note 15. 40 Russell's tone in a letter to Bradley somewhat later strikes me as disappointed: "I hope some day, when the second volume of my present work is Wnished, to attempt something more on the purely philosophical side of Logic. Hitherto I have been hoping Moore would do this better than I could but I believe he contemplates going into more Russell had agreed to give a set of lectures on Leibniz in Lent Term 1899,37 and his correspondence here with Moore illustrates my supposition above, where we see how swiftly Russell was able to adapt insights generated in his conversations with Moore the summer before.38 GriUn notes (p. 308) that Moore might have been increasingly annoyed by a feeling of being trampled by Russell's far more agile mind; but also at the feeling of having his own insights-laboriously arrived at-absorbed and redistributed in record time by Russell, featuring almost immediately in publication. GriUn puts this down to a feeling Moore could have had that he'd been scooped, so to speak, and that Russell's fervent acknowledgments to Moore, especially in the Principles, are an attempt to mitigate any suggestion of having appropriated his ideas. Moore oTers very little detail about the reason for his growing antagonism to Russell (his letters to MacCarthy are the most candid and he is not forthcoming even there), and there is no evidence in the surviving Moore papers that Moore believed Russell had appropriated his work (of course, he could have destroyed any material where he recorded feelings about that). But I have been arguing that one underlying cause of Moore's irritation with Russell at this stage is Moore's beginning to resent Russell's insistence on emphasizing the more structural or logical aspects of the metaphysical views he (Moore) was trying to develop as the basis of ethics. It is safe to say that "The Nature of Judgment" is challenging, if not downright incoherent at times, and it is also safe to say that the core of that article was developed in conversation with Russell in the early summer of 1898.39 But it is, ironically, a paper that stands out from the Moorean corpus precisely because of its emphasis on the analysis of the logical form of the objects of judgment. Moore's inclinations were not toward that kind of work, judging from how the rest of it went. So Moore may have begun to believe that Russell was dismissing his (Moore's) own philosophical leanings, in an eTort to bring Moore's thinking in line with his own interests.40 Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd "He Was in Those Days Beautiful and Slim" 117 purely metaphysical questions" (11 Feb. 1904, SLBR 1: #126). 41 Moore's paper was titled "Do We Love Ourselves Best?" and is an argument against egoism; it was given on 4 February 1899 (Add. 8875 12/1/19). 42 The Apostles had their own idiom for referring to outsiders and themselves, some of which is in evidence in Russell's paper. The emissary might have been Crompton Llewelyn Davies (see my article cited in note 15). One incident around this time seems to illustrate Moore's growing impatience with Russell's teasing, if not something more. Russell, as we know, devoted a few months to learning the philosophy of Leibniz in order to prepare for the lectures on Leibniz he had agreed to give in McTaggart's place. In his list 1/1/2, Moore notes "Quarrel with Russell at beginning of Lent Term [1899]", though he adds no further detail. Levy claims (p. 114) that what Moore is referring to here is the occasion (on 10 February 1899) at which Russell gave a paper to the Apostles called "Was the World Good before the Sixth Day?". The paper refers either to views that Moore discussed at his own Apostolic paper of the week before,41 or those he was in the process of developing through his lectures on ethics. Russell's style in "Was the World Good before the Sixth Day?" is exceptionally arch and teasing, and Levy suggests that Moore might have felt more than put out by what he thought was gratuitous ridicule or misrepresentation of his position. In his paper Russell refers to an emissary, sent by the Society to report of Moore's success in rendering "these shadows42 even more foolish and wicked than they naturally are": ... beauty is good per se, and a purely material world, with no one to contemplate it, is better if it is beautiful than if it is ugly. Such is the argument which, though invented for the further perdition of shadows, has, alas! deceived our brother himself. Let us now endeavour to persuade him that this sophism, like the world of matter, can only be good as a means, and must never be taken as an end. (Papers 1: 113) Moore's notes on the vote at the end of the paper contain the comment, "The whole thing is absurd, the question has never been raised." The "question" Moore refers to could be what was ultimately put to a vote (as was the practice at Apostolic meetings), which had two parts: "Is matter beautiful?" and "Is matter good?". Moore had not discussed that question either in his lectures at the School of Ethics, or in his Apostolic paper of the week before. But the Apostles were known to vote on questions only tenuously related to the subject of the paper, so if Moore was Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 118 consuelo preti 43 The autumn lectures were titled "The Elements of Ethics", and the spring lectures "Kant's Moral Philosophy". Two typescripts of the 1898 lectures survive (Add. 8875 14/1/1 and 14/1/2), both bound in brown leather covers, now detached. 14/1/2 is a carbon of 14/1/1 except for Lecture iii (the carbon of which is bound into 14/1/1, suggesting that it was misbound). Both contain the same dedication which later appears as the dedication to Principia Ethica. Typescript 14/1/1 contains a number of handwritten marginal comments. Some of these are in Moore's hand, some are in Russell's, and I would argue that some are written by Sorley, who appears to have read the typescript for Cambridge University Press. It is not entirely clear when the typescripts were made and bound (neither is dated), nor for what purpose (the 1899 lectures, for instance, survive in manuscript, not typescript, and are unpublished). The 1898 lectures were published by Regan (see note 35). Regan makes no mention of the marginalia; his copy-text was most likely 14/1/2. We know from Russell's own notes that he read what he refers to as Moore's "Lectures on Ethics" in February 1899 ("What Shall I Read?", Papersz 1: 361). We do not know for certain that he read Moore's work in the form of typescript 14/1/1, but it seems likely. No references to the typescript survive in any of the letters between Russell and Moore. A number of the comments in Russell's hand, though brief, are fairly substantive, but Moore does not, as I mentioned above, acknowledge Russell in the preface to Principia Ethica (see note 11). Some of the comments are also reXected in a letter from Sorley to Moore dated 16 March 1902 (Add. 8330 8S/32/1). In that letter, Sorley writes to Moore "about your book which has been accepted by the Press", subject to revision, and proceeds to make a series of comments, ending by hoping that Moore "will not mind [his] making these purely critical remarks." Moore, typically, agonized over the revision but at last submitted a Wnal version to Cambridge University Press (he received the Wrst proofs on 25 March 1903). Precisely what was altered, and what was retained, is speciWed in Baldwin, ed., Principia Ethica, rev. edn. (Cambridge U. P., 1993), pp. 312–13. A number of compelling questions arise, however, with respect to Russell's role in the revision of Moore's lectures and their Wnal form as Principia Ethica. When, precisely, did Russell see the typescript? Why doesn't Moore acknowledge his comments? What is the evidence that Sorley's is the third hand on the typescript? What are the marginal comments? Are any of them reXected in Moore's Wnal draft? Are any of the comments linked to later work of Russell's? These and other questions are discussed in my paper, "Attributing the Marginal Comments in G.yE. Moore's 1898 Elements of Ethicsz Typescript" (of which a draft was read to the Department of Philosophy at McMaster in 2008). annoyed, it is unclear why. I think, however, that although Moore was not likely to be put out by criticism of his work, he might well have been deeply irritated by an idiosyncratic discussion of an important fundamental issue for his own work. Moore had been lecturing at the School of Ethics for an entire term by February 1899, and, as noted, the autumn 1898 lectures were reworked a few years later and published as Principia Ethica.43 Moore seems to have had great diUculty revising these lectures, and a main part of what ultimately became a key element in Principia Ethicaz underwent signiWcant modiWcation. That element-the nature of Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd "He Was in Those Days Beautiful and Slim" 119 44 See Russell, Auto. 2: 78, and GriUn (p. 308) on a diUculty of just this kind between Whitehead and Russell. 45 Yet those philosophical talks could have a deleterious eTect on Moore. Consider that in a letter to him on 14 January 1903 (Add. 8330 8M/3/15), MacCarthy wrote, "No news-but I want talk badly. The need of it sent me round to Russell last night. We had good talk-or rather I listened to good talk-but I want something more." Philosophical "talk" with Russell was undeniably dominated by Russell, which Moore found fatiguing and diUcult. Moore's feelings are, I think, summed up in a diary entry years later: "Russell calls ... asks me to walk with him and I Wnd him agreeable and can ask questions I want to: then to tea with him: he says 'Then you don't understand it either', about distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by description and this hurts me: why? I can't help worrying over his points after, even when I wake at night ..." (21 Jan. 1913, Add. 8330 1/3/3). the Good, and an account of it that bears some similarity to the one Moore defends in his book-comes into focus in "Was the World Good before the Sixth Day?". Moore could have felt proprietary, sensitive, and intellectually at a bit of a loss at this time on this issue, taking Russell to have appropriated a position on it before he was ready to do so himself.44 Or it could be that Moore, while not going so far as to think Russell would pinch his ideas, began to want to reserve his ideas so he could cultivate them thoroughly his own way, before Russell had a chance to bend them to his own interests, or bleed them dry. Moore may have begun to believe that Russell would not refrain from doing just that. A mysterious entry in Moore's list 1/1/2 suggests some additional diUculty with Russell in early 1899: "Russells at Granary in Lent Term. Avoid them. Never go on Sundays". Relations seemed to be worsening between them; Moore wrote to MacCarthy in April that he had been to see the Russells: where I got on "better than I deserved", but was looking forward most ardently to coming here before the end. Certainly we got through some real good philosophical discussion: I have learnt something. (29 April 1899) Moore's allusion to wanting to leave (and to having anticipated little in the way of enjoyment from the visit) clearly expresses the apprehension that now begins to characterize his relations with Russell; but also (not inconsistently) that the philosophical substance of their discussions was still valuable to him.45 What he might have learned he doesn't say; but we know that soon afterward Moore was hard at work on his review of Russell's Essay on the Foundations ofz Geometry. Although the technicaliJa n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 120 consuelo preti 46 Of interest also is a letter that Russell wrote Couturat on 5 May 1900: "I want very much to know what is the greatest length which will be allowed for my paper at the Congress: I see that I have chosen a topic that cannot be treated brieXy, largely because my arguments depend in part upon a new logic (videz Moore, 'The Nature of Judgment', Mind, April 1899)" (SLBRz 1: #86). ties were hardly Moore's area of expertise, his criticism of Russell's psychologism there appears to have shook Russell free of any lingering attraction to neo-Hegelianism. Russell was suUciently impressed with Moore's criticisms that in a letter to Couturat he wrote that Moore is the "most subtle" Englishman in "pure logic" (SLBRz 1: #83). No contemporary understanding of Moore's philosophical ability emphasizes his expertise in pure logic. This is another piece of evidence of Russell's tendency to direct Moore's intellectual interests in ways that may have become exasperating to Moore.46 An entry in Moore's list 1/1/7 for 1899z-z"1899. May term, do nothing but write review of Russell's Foundations of Geometry. Long, do nothing at all. What was I supposed to be doing?"z-zintimates some nervous tension, and subsequent letters from Russell may not have helped matters. Russell wrote on 18 May and 21 May 1899 Wrst to ask whether the review had been done in time, and then to request that Moore return his corrected copy of the book. On 18 July 1899, by which time Russell had read the review, he wrote to Moore to say: "I am sorry you will not be able to come here [Fernhurst], as there are a multitude of topics I should like to discuss.... I had not written to you about your review, because on all important points I agreed with it". But he goes on to argue a few points about the space-constant and the inWnitesimal, all of which might have added to Moore's feeling of being unduly pressured to think carefully about topics that were not interesting to him-or, it must be said, topics that he found obscure. Russell ends this letter with "Do write and tell me what you are doing and thinking", which suggests that Moore was neglecting their communications. And shortly after, as we see below, Russell turned to Moore frequently and unapologetically for discussion and critical commentary of his work on A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, as well as his thoughts on logic. It is diUcult to see this as anything but a genuine desire on Russell's part to communicate his thoughts and his work with a valued friend, esteemed colleague, and (in his view) like-minded philosopher. But it is hard to avoid the supposition that all this exasperated Moore, who was Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd "He Was in Those Days Beautiful and Slim" 121 47 Moore wrote twelve articles in all for the Dictionary. 48 I am not entirely convinced about this but must defer argument here. 49 Austin E.yA.yW. Smyth (1877–1949), later Librarian to the House of Commons. conscientious to a fault but who had begun to feel frequently frustrated in his own advancement, particularly with respect to producing Wnished work-and it is possible that Russell, who was beginning a period of extraordinary intellectual production, was somewhat insensitive in his keenness to share his insights with Moore. I think that Moore started to feel smothered by Russell and overwhelmed by his requests, which Moore did not consider he could refuse but which interfered with his getting on with his ideas according to his own lights. 5.w1900–01 There is archival material that supports this conclusion. Moore notes in his list 1/1/7 that he spent Lent Term of 1900 writing his paper "Necessity"; a paper for the Moral Sciences Club on Ward's GiTord Lectures; and some of the articles he had agreed to produce for Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.47 Moore also notes that he spent the Long Vacation of 1900 "reading proofs of Russell's Leibniz" (it appears, on the evidence of Russell's letters below, that he was reading it throughout the Lent Term, too). In his list 1/1/2, Moore notes that in "1900–1: Lent Term. Russells at West Lodge again: meet R[ussell] for talk regularly one afternoon a week." But Moore was writing very slowly, and feeling less than productive, something he complained about quite regularly to his parents and to MacCarthy at this period. GriUn (in SLBR 1: re #85), like Regan, puts this down to a period of depression.48 If Moore was depressed, it could well be because he was sinking under the weight of Russell's forceful claims on him-and he began to show extreme irritation with Russell. A contretempsz reported by Russell to Alys took place in January 1900. It is another example of Russell teasing Moore, and Moore getting totally fed up with him. Russell, at tea with Moore (recovering from "Xu") and a fellow Apostle named Smyth,49 playfully secreted Moore's pipe and tobacco, so that Moore was left "without any means of smoking. Whereupon [Moore] got up silently and walked out with a very black face. I have not seen him since." But although Russell calls Moore's attitude "foolish" in his letter to Alys, I think he didn't quite understand it; and a genuine note of sheepishness and hurt seems evident Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 122 consuelo preti 50 In a journal entry in 1903 (Papers 12: 21), Russell noted his having been disinvited from a reading party Moore had organized. Russell had been asked by fellow Apostle R.yC. Trevelyan (known as "Bob Trevy"), who had not vetted the invitation Wrst with Moore. Moore, acutely mortiWed, wrote to tell Russell that he was not welcome (reported to MacCarthy, letter of 18 March 1903, Add. 8330 8R/33/23; Moore's letter to Russell is lost). In his journal entry Russell wrote that "My three weeks' holiday was reduced to a week with George Trevy in Devonshire, because Moore, to whose reading party I was going, wrote curtly to say he didn't want me. He has never forgiven me my homilies, though they produced the reformation I hoped for." It is possible that some of Russell's homilies had centred on his perception of Moore's idleness-which will have infuriated Moore, if his "idleness" was due to Russell's demands on him. 51 It's true that Moore's output was very slow at this period-but even in his autobiography Moore claims always to have been very reluctant to work. It seems clear that Moore began to feel far too exposed, scrutinized, and turned inside out, so to speak, by Russell, which had the unfortunate eTect of paralyzing him. Consider Wood's description of Russell's writing: "... his manuscripts and letters run on page and after page with ... hardly a word being crossed out or altered...." He reports that Russell once declared "I have never rewritten anything since", after being told he should rewrite and Wnding the revision worse than the original (Alan Wood, Bertrand Russell, the Passionate Sceptic [London: Allen and Unwin, 1957], pp. 50–1). Moore revised everything, painstakingly, so much so that he sometimes failed to publish a piece he had worked on at great length (e.g., a 44-page draft of an unpublished review of Russell's Principles of Mathematics survives, Add. 15/2; copy in ra). in the letter. In the same letter, Russell says that both he and Smyth were equally concerned about Moore's "idleness" and had "a long talk about him, but found no method of inducing him to reform."50 It is ironic that, if I am right, what Russell did not see was that part of the problem aTecting Moore was the weight of Russell's own demands on him.51 Moore wrote to MacCarthy on 18 February 1900, saying "I think Russell has seen that I wish to avoid him: but of course I am still very anxious about the situation", and on 2 April 1900, asking "Would it be convenient for me to stay with you for Wednesday or Thursday night this week? ... I want to avoid Russell, who writes me he is coming to the Whiteheads' on Wednesday and will lunch with me on Thursday...." Things were deteriorating, but Russell was either unaware of it or determined to ignore it, as when he sent Moore his proofs of The Philosophy of Leibniz, asking him to send "any suggestions, as you go through them". On 9 May he wrote to thank Moore: "I am grateful to you for taking so much trouble" but also to argue with him "with regard to your criticisms". On 9 June Russell wrote to Moore to ask him to vet a list of Latin quotations from Leibniz (some of which he has helpfully copied out, longhand, in the letter): "I hardly like to pass quotations in inverted Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd "He Was in Those Days Beautiful and Slim" 123 52 Russell also asked Moore to make arrangements to send him an m.a. cap and gown for a function requiring academic regalia. This could be just a friend asking a friend for a favour; on the other hand, the request might have struck Moore as a bit peremptory, to say nothing of far too clerical-though Russell seems to have had some awareness of how it might be taken. commas without your veriWcation", though telling him that "you will have to get the book out of the Varsity library, as I have the Trinity copy myself." On 27 June Russell wrote, "many thanks for returning so many proofs so soon."52 On 2 June Moore wrote a letter to MacCarthy that highlights at least part of the general source of his anxieties. After remarking that he has been "wretchedly lazy this week, not, compared with my usual standard, but considering I had 4 articles and Immortality to write", he went on: The most important news, to my feeling, is that Sidgwick has become very ill ... he has formally resigned his Professorship; and what I wanted to talk of, but have had no chance yet, is that I can't help hoping I might get it. I fear the hope is quite absurd. I must talk to McT[aggart], and if he says no, I should probably not go in. But you know both Ward and he have mentioned it as a possibility for me, a few years later. I feel perhaps I ought to regret now that I did not make more eTort to get my Lectures published. Now it's too late. I can't think of any one very distinguished who could go in: Ritchie, Sorley, Mackenzie: I don't think so well of them as myself.... Caird and Stout know something of my work. Keynes and Maitland something of me. And others might be inXuenced by testimonials ... Certainly I shan't be able to help thinking a lot of it, till it is over; and I shall be disappointed pretty badly. You mustn't talk of this, unless you are talked to, and then discreetly; for I may be perfectly mad.... P.S. Sunday evening. McT[aggart] just said he was going in for the Professorship, as better than Mackenzie. He did not seem to have thought of me, and it was not a time to raise the question. But I must. (Add. 8330 2/5/16) William Sorley (1855–1935), later named Knightbridge Professor, was elected to Wll Sidgwick's position. On 12 July Moore wrote again to MacCarthy, "You saw Sorley was elected to the Professorship? It is very satisfactory, in the sense that nobody can be disappointed or think himself wronged. But I think he must be a weak person. I've not read anything of his, except a puT of Ward." Moore exhibits here some apprehension regarding his academic future which was not, in the event, misplaced. After his fellowship was over in 1904, Moore had no academic position until 1910, when he lectured at Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 124 consuelo preti Morley College in London, and it was not until 1911 that he returned to Cambridge to take over Ward's position. In 1900 it was premature to think that he was qualiWed to take over Sidgwick's position. In the same letter to MacCarthy, Moore wrote that given his other commitments, "I shall certainly not get anything done this vac.-nothing of my future book. I only hope I may do this." By 1900 Moore had published four reviews and four articles in Mind, two of the latter being culled from his dissertations. The evidence supports the idea that Moore had always had it in mind to produce a book, but it may not have been until the lost opportunity of the Sidgwick position that the imperative of producing work that would make him a solid competitor for a future position at Cambridge (or indeed anywhere else) became clear. This realization could have added to Moore's edginess with respect to Russell, at this period. Russell was amazingly proliWc, which may have emphasized Moore's own diUculties in working, at least to Moore himself-and made Russell's claims on him more diUcult to tolerate. Moore, all the same, began to refer more often to producing a substantive piece of work in his letters to his parents throughout 1900, and by mid-1901 he began to get out from under the commitment to the Dictionaryz articles. A letter from Moore to MacCarthy at this time, however, suggests that relations with Russell had reached a new low: I heard by chance that the Russells were coming to the Whiteheads' next weekend. I found that could still make a great cloud on my horizon, and am resolved to run away. I shall oTer myself to Wedgwood, Wrst of all; there is in any case, a sort of arrangement with him. If that fails, there are 2 alternatives. Perhaps, I may take courage to stay here: there is a certainty of Mayor, and possibility of Sanger and Theo.-all fortiWcations against the enemy; and if you would come, there is one more and a stronger. Or, could I come to you? Would it be of any use? Or, if no use, at least, not inconvenient? I sleep with the Davies' the night of the dinner ... the next day I plan to carry oT Ainsworth with me to Torquay, and then abroad with my sister.... Still as far as I can see, I shall be out of the way till the middle of July.... My work has gone all to pieces. I've been trying, and have done so many hours per diem, but very little of it has been writing. (2 June 1901) What is striking about this letter is that Moore instituted evasive manoeuvres to avoid Russell if he could, and the letter expresses in no uncertain terms that Moore's attitude to Russell is now outright aversion. We cannot doubt that Moore found Russell's lively inquisitiveness and Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd "He Was in Those Days Beautiful and Slim" 125 53 The Listenerz 61 (30 April 1959): 755–60. The friends were Russell, Woolf, Morton White, and John Wisdom. appetite for philosophical discussion anathema when he himself was struggling for clarity and producing little, as he was at this time. Russell would hardly hesitate to "viva" a fellow Apostle and friend vigorously for the pure pleasure of it, and for Moore, holding his own against Russell was simply too demanding if he wasn't ready (or even if he was). It is clear that although Moore found Russell's philosophical appetite stimulating at times, he began to resent feeling like grist for the Russellian mill. In the end, Moore simply could not spend too much time in Russell's company without risk of feeling completely hampered in his own progress, and without risk of a debilitating level of what seems to be real frustration and even anger. 6.wconclusion A year after Moore's death, The Listener published an article entitled "The InXuence and Thought of G.yE. Moore: a Symposium of Reminiscence by Four of His Friends", one of whom was Russell.53 Russell's recollection includes signiWcant critical commentary of the kind of work that Moore became famous for, but it is remarkable for the emphasis Russell placed on the impression that Moore's early work had on him: Moore had, in these early years, a quality which, in spite of all his subsequent achievements, he never entirely recovered. I asked him once whether he considered me a prig and he replied, "No. A pedant." I think that in his later years, the accusation of pedantry could be brought against some of his more minute discussions. His Wrst important publication, "The Nature of Judgment" (published in 1899) retains, to my mind, more of the early quality of intellectual intensity than is to be found in his later writings. I do not mean that what is said in that article is more true than what is said later. I am thinking only of the kind of intellectual passion that it displays.... Those who are too young to remember the academic reign of German idealism in English philosophy after T.yH. Green can hardly appreciate what Moore achieved in the way of liberation from intellectual fetters. All honour and gratitude are due to him for this achievement. (Papers 11: 210, 212) I have been arguing that, to a signiWcant extent, Russell's relationship with Moore was forged in but also suTered from the intellectual passion Ja n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 ( 8 :4 1 p m ) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 126 consuelo preti 54 See my paper cited in note 15. 55 GriUn notes (pp. 58–61) that Russell's enthusiasm for Moore waned signiWcantly when Moore came back to Cambridge in 1911. Among the reasons for this, I believe, is Russell's realization that Moore had in fact gone his own way intellectually-which Russell could have found just too tame. Russell may have been disenchanted by this, having projected his own voracious eagerness to establish a new philosophy onto Moore (the waxing and waning of Russell's relationship with Wittgenstein could be described similarly). Of interest here is a series of letters from Russell to Moore between 1904 and 1905 (Add. 8330/8R/33/25–31; copies in ra1 710) that highlight Moore's seeming reluctance to be drawn into a project with Russell. S.yP. Waterlow (who had been at Trinity in 1897– 1900) had proposed a book on what Russell described to Moore as what "we" think. Russell took the matter in hand with all eUciency, writing to Moore about which chapter he ought to contribute, emphasizing in one letter and then another the importance of writing for a popular market, and asking for meetings with Moore. Moore resisted; the book never appeared. 56 Their correspondence, and a relationship of sorts, continued, however, until shortly before Moore's death in 1958. On 25 October 1958, the day after Moore died, Dorothy Moore received a poignant telegram from Russell, then in Penrhyndeudraeth (Add. 9778 5/62): "Profoundly grieved by your husbands death deepest sympathy Russell." that Russell describes above-but that Russell seemed oblivious to the role his own "passion" played in an account of their relationship. Russell might well have thought that Moore's dissertation drafts (especially that of 1898), with their emphasis on a logico-metaphysical realism, were the beginning of a new metaphysics dedicated uncompromisingly to a view he could share and develop as relevant to his own work in logic and the foundations of mathematics. I have argued elsewhere that "The Nature of Judgment" itself can be read as an anticipation of a contemporary metaphysics of mind in its emphasis on the realist and logically structured nature of the proposition and its constituents.54 It is not surprising, in retrospect, that Russell found Moore's early forays into the metaphysical (for Russell, logicaly) basis of ethics far more interesting and motivating than Moore's subsequent emphasis on ethics.55 In the end Russell's own passion and dedication to his work clashed badly with Moore's, and whatever intimacy had taken root in their relationship was the casualty.

International Journal of Academic Research and Development 94 International Journal of Academic Research and Development ISSN: 2455-4197, Impact Factor: RJIF 5.22 www.academicsjournal.com Volume 2; Issue 1; January 2017; Page No. 94-99 ITS for CSS and HTML Mariam W Alawar Department of Information Technology, Faculty of Engineering & Information Technology, Al-Azhar University, Gaza Abstract In this paper we show how a student can learn the basics of the system databases using (W3school CSS) which was built as intelligent tutoring educational system by using the authoring tool called (ITSB). The learning material contains CSS and HTML. We divided the material in a group of lessons for novice learner which combines relational system and lessons in the process of learning. The student can learn using example of CSS, and types of CSS color. Furthermore, the intelligent tutoring system supports not only lessons; but exercises of different difficult levels for each lesson. When a student finish successfully the first difficulty level in a lesson, the student is allowed to move to the next difficulty level of the exercises of the lesson. Keywords: intelligent tutoring system, HTML, CSS, W3school 1. Introduction Tutoring systems square measure represented as having 2 loops. The outer one executes once for every task, wherever a task typically consists of solving a fancy, multi-step problem. The inner loop executes once for every step taken by the student within the resolution of a task. The inner loop will provide feedback and hints on every step. The inner loop may assess the student's evolving ability and update a student model that is employed by the outer loop to pick out a next task that's acceptable for the student. For those that understand very little concerning tutoring systems, this description is supposed as a demystifying introduction. For tutoring system consultants, this description illustrates that though tutoring systems take issue widely in their task domains, user interfaces, software package structures, data bases, etc., their behaviors are in reality quite similar. Human tutoring is widely believed to be the foremost effective style of instruction on the world, and experimental work confirms that professional human tutors will manufacture very massive learning gains [22, 33]. Ever since computers were fictional, they appeared capable of turning into hardworking and economical alternatives to professional human tutors. This dream has evidenced troublesome to attain, however vital progress has been created. This focuses totally on intelligent tutoring systems (ITS), a very effective instructional technology that began within the late Nineteen Sixties and is simply currently rising from laboratories into the sector. Though ITS tutors emphasized their structure (i.e., the software package modules and data sources) [33]. Our intelligent tutoring system uses an authoring tool called ITSB to model the domain knowledge and generate student models rules. The research presented in this paper is significant because we show that ITS can be used to support students learning design tasks. The paper describes the system's architecture and functionality. The system observes students' actions and adapts to their knowledge and learning abilities. ITS system has been evaluated in the context of genuine teaching activities. We present the results of two evaluation studies with students taking CSS courses, which show that ITS is an effective system. The students have interest in the system's adaptability and found it a valuable asset to their learning [33]. CSS is a language that designates the style of an HTML manuscript; CSS defines how HTML elements should be presented. This intelligent tutoring system will teach students CSS from basic to advanced [1, 2]. 2. Literature Review There are many Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) that were designed and developed for many areas such as: a comparative study between Animated Intelligent Tutoring Systems (AITS) and Video-based Intelligent Tutoring Systems (VITS) [26], ADO-Tutor: leaning ADO.NET [16], C# Language [6], Computer Networks [10], CPP-Tutor for C++ Programming Language [30], effectiveness of elearning [4, 32, 34], effectiveness of the CPP-Tutor [23], elearning system [24], Health problems related to addiction of video game playing [7], Java Expression Evaluation [1], Linear Programming [28, 31], learning Computer Theory [13], Learning Java Objects [3], Mathematics Intelligent Tutoring System [2], Oracle Intelligent Tutoring System (OITS) [8], parameter passing in Java programming [27], Photoshop (CS6) Intelligent Tutoring System [36], predicting learners performance using NT and ITS [30], stomach disease Intelligent Tutoring System [11], teaching advanced topics in information security [23], teaching AI searching algorithms [35], teaching database [29], teaching DES information security algorithm[17], teaching grammar English tenses [9], teaching Mongo Database [20], teaching the 7 Characteristics for Living Things [19], teaching the right letter pronunciation in reciting the Holy Quran [5], and Diabetes Intelligent Tutoring System [12]. 3. ITS architecture Existing ITSs vary immensely in architecture. Actually, it is almost a rarity to find two ITSs based on the same International Journal of Academic Research and Development 95 architecture. These results from the experimental nature of the work in the area: there is yet no straightforward general architecture for such systems. Before, there was significant agreement in the literature that ITSs contain the four basic modules [33]:  The knowledge module.  The student module.  The tutoring module.  The user interface module. Figure 1 exemplifies the overall form of and ITS architecture, which will serve as a basis for our current ITS. The knowledge module includes the facts and rules of the specific domain to be transported to the student, i.e. the knowledge of the experts. It has already been mentioned that in traditional CAI, the expertise to be communicated is contained in pre-stored presentation material called lessons, which are planned by the teacher and simply presented to the student under given situations. The tutoring module works as control engine. The student module provides the system with all required information so it can adapt itself to the student. The user interfaces module has two interfaces: one for the student and the other for the teacher as shown in Fig 1 [33]. Fig 1: CSS-Tutor architecture 3.1 Knowledge Module This module deals with the chapters/lessons in the course of designed for Software Professionals or students who are keen to learn CSS and HTML in simple and easy way. It will toss light on CSS-Tutor conceptions and after completing this course one will be at an intermediate level of expertise, from where one can take it at higher level of expertise. CSS-Tutor provides great performance, availability, and easy scalability. CSS-Tutor works on concept of design all attribute for any web application or mobile. System offers a series of lessons from one to twenty ones knowledge about CSS and html so the student become able to understand and accommodate the databases in a clever way and access to the stage where the student can work for the deployment and use of data sitting with a programming languages [1, 4]. 3.2 Student Model A new student account should be made to have a profile where it permits the student to learn course materials and answer questions. The profile consists of information related to the student such as last session date, student number, student name, current score, overall score, level difficulty, and problem number during the each session. The current student score denotes student score for each difficulty level within a lesson. The overall student score represents student score for all levels in a lesson. 3.3 Tutoring Module Tutoring module or Expert module works as a director that panels the functionality of the entire system. Through this module, a student can answer questions on the first level of difficulty and if he/she gets 75% score or more, he/she is permitted move to the second level of difficulty. But if he/she fails to get the marks, he/she must repeats to the questions at the same level of difficulty. 3.4 User Interface Module This tool supports two types of users: students and teachers. When the teacher logs in the system, the teacher can add lessons, exercises, answers of exercises, initial ITS basic information, initial information about the student, configure and adjust the color, font name, and size of all buttons, menus, combo boxes. This interface provides the system with the required enthusiasm and springiness. A screenshot of the teacher interface is shown in Fig 2, Fig 3, Fig 4, Fig 5 and Fig 6. Fig 2: Form for adding questions and answers International Journal of Academic Research and Development 96 Fig. 3: Form for adding Lessons and Examples Fig. 4: Form for adjusting Fonts of all screens of the system Fig. 5: Form for adding constants of the system International Journal of Academic Research and Development 97 Fig. 6: Form for adding initial students' information When the student logs into the system, he/she will be able to understand the lessons, examples and questions. The lessons are located in the rectangle with the name "lessons area" and the examples for each lesson are located in the rectangle with the name "example area". When the student ticks on Exercises button then "new problem" button is enabled and the student can click on it to be given a new problem to solve. The student must click on the "check button" to check his id it is correct or not. When the student wants to see his/her performance should click on "stats" button. See Fig 7 and Fig 8. Fig. 7: Student lessons and examples form Fig 8: Student Exercises form. International Journal of Academic Research and Development 98 4. Evaluation We have evaluated the CSS-Tutor for teaching Development of CSS and HTML by presenting it to a group of teachers who specializes in CSS and HTML and a group of students in AlAzhar University taken the course. We asked both groups to assess the CSS-Tutor. Then we asked them to fill questionnaire about the CSS Tutor. The questionnaire consisted of questions concerning benefit of ITS, comprehensiveness of the material, quality of CSS-Tutor design. The result of the evaluation by teachers and students were as anticipated. 5. Conclusion In this paper, we have designed an Intelligent Tutoring System called CSS-Tutor for teaching Development CSS and HTML by using ITSB authoring tool. 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www.crossingdialogues.com/journal.htm NEW IDEAS Crossing Dialogues Association The Mind as an Emerging Confi guration of the Personal Brain JAKOB KORF Department of Biological Psychiatry, University of Groningen (The Netherlands) This essay examines the relationship between metabolic brain processes and psycho-physiological activities or mental activity. It is argued that metabolic brain processes, including those involved in the production of energy, proteins and other molecules are restorative and conditional, rather than directly involved in mental activities. This stance suggests that life-time acquired learning and memory is precipitated as a permanent and personal confi guration of the brain, that is in principle accessible to neurophysiological examination. Current neuroscience largely ignores implicitly or explicitly the search for new emergent confi gurations of the brain. Keywords: philosophy of mind, functional MRI, brain metabolism, fi rst person perspective. DIAL PHIL MENT NEURO SCI 2012; 5(1): 21-24 21 INTRODUCTION From both philosophical and neurobiological points of view a major issue is whether brain physiology encompasses the mind or not. Might we consider the mind as a property of the brain or, alternatively, is the mind beyond the scope of neurobiology? This essay is an attempt to convince the reader that mental function, including those attributed to cultural, environmental or societal infl uences can in principle be understood in the context of brain physiology. For brevity, mental and psychological activity, being higher brain activities, is opposed to brain activity directly related to sensory perception and locomotion. The present essay is an extension of my previous work (Korf and Grambergen 2007; Korf 2010). I discuss two neurobiological studies: the former is about visual activation of the brain and the latter is an example at the neuronal level. This is to illustrate the temporal relationship between brain metabolism and electrophysiological activity. It appears that brain metabolism is a prerequisite for higher activities and that brain metabolism is detached from psychological or mental activity. The conclusion led us to propose an emerging neurobiological confi guration containing our life-time acquired memories and that making us the person we are. NEUROBIOLOGICAL EXAMPLES In current neuroscience functional brain imaging techniques, such as functional MRI (fMRI), have a major position in psychological and clinical research and practice. The underlying assumption of fMRI is that the psychological or mental tasks require energy. Differences of regional blood fl ow (rCBF) between two experimental conditions (e.g. rest and task performance) are assumed to refl ect the involvement of particular brain regions in executing the tests. Images of blood-oxygen-level dependence (BOLD), the fMRI contrast of blood deoxyhemoglobin, are acquired with spatial and temporal resolution of 1-4 millimeters and 1-4 seconds respectively. The local response to energy utilization is an increase of blood fl ow, after a delay of 0.5-2 seconds and peaking over 4-6 seconds, before returning to baseline metabolism. In contrast, increases of cerebral electrophysiological activity following exposure to challenges (visual and auditory stimuli or executing psychological tasks) are observed in far shorter time intervals, in the order of 50 milliseconds or less (De Zwart et al. 2009). This report shows delayed and nonlinear relationships between the BOLD signals and the electrophysiological responses that precede the increase of blood fl ow. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences DIAL PHIL MENT NEURO SCI 2012; 5(1): 21-24 Korf Figure 1 shows an example with experimental details. The speed of neuronal activity in a mental task can also be illustrated with a linguistic study: meaningful from nonsense words are already distinguished within 50 milliseconds (details in VanTurennout et al. 1989). These experiments support the idea that brain metabolism is a delayed response to the neuronal processing of psycho-physiological stimuli and tasks. Figure 1 Relationship between physiological activation studies and brain energy metabolism: effect of trains of visual stimuli on subsequent increase of brain regional blood fl ow, as assessed with functional MRI (fMRI). The direct physiological effects of the stimuli are shown as magnetic electroencephalographs (MEG). Redrawn from De Zwart et al. 2009 The latter idea is also supported by examining the timing of neuronal activity and energy use at the molecular scale. The human brain consumes approximately 25% of the energy of the whole body at physical rest, and approximately 70% of the brain energy supports and maintains neurotransmission processes and the generation of nerve action potentials (Attwell and Iadecola 2002; Korf and Gramsbergen 2007; Mangia et al. 2009). I describe schematically the sequence of some molecular processes during an action potential. Due to protein conformations, the sodium and potassium channels are opened and closed, thus allowing the entrance and egress of sodium and potassium ions, respectively. The signal to open the channels happens within 0.1 millisecond (or less), whereas the cycle of opening and closing of the channels lasts less than 2 milliseconds (Figure 2), the rest-potential being restored after 5 milliseconds. After a number of action potentials the intracellular levels of sodium ions increased concomitant of decreasing potassium ions. Opening and closing of the channels require very little energy, whereas restoration of the original trans-membrane ion gradients consumes far more energy. Energy consumption follows neural activity to prepare the neuron for future activity. Apparently, protein conformations (presumably in the sub-nanosecond range) are key processes in the initiation and execution of neuronal and consequently mental (i.e. psychological, and possibly psychopathological) activity. Fast neuronal activity is unrelated to brain metabolism and escapes detection with fMRI. IMPLICATIONS The emphasis thus far is on energy metabolism, but similar reasoning applies to any other metabolic process. For instance, gene transcription, protein synthesis or neurotransmitter formation and degradation do not directly cause functional brain activity. Instead, these processes provide the conditions enabling the brain to react fast and precise and to acquire and store information. If, as argued, brain metabolism is conditional, what could be a general process explaining mental functions? I distinguish two alternatives: the fi rst one explaining short-term processes (i.e. short-term memory) and the second accounting for long-term information (including long-term memory). Short-term memories, that are memories stored for only a couple of hours, are highly vulnerable to transient inter22 Figure 2 Relationship between physiological activation studies and brain energy metabolism: subsequent alterations of protein confi gurations during the development of an action potential of a typical brain neuron. Left proteins are the sodium and potassium channels, right is the energy requiring pump that restores the sodium/potassium ion gradient over the neuronal outer membrane following several action potentials. Gray broken line: course of the membrane potential. Composed from Jensen et al. 2011, Yu and Catterall 2003, Kühlbrandt 2004 and Wikipedia www.crossingdialogues.com/journal.htm ruptions of normal and ongoing brain activity, such as metabolism, cerebral blood fl ow, epileptic insults (in psychiatric practice convulsive therapy), accidents and severe hypothermia. Patients have loose or no memories of the period preceding the transient interruption, whereas long-term memory remains largely intact. In the uninterrupted functioning brain at least a part of the short-term memories turns to be stored permanently, thereby becoming resistant to interruptions. For instance after a coma of several weeks or even months, the awakened patient may still realize who he is, recognize his family and remember most of his school knowledge as before, in addition to the loss of several memories and capabilities depending on the extent and location of possible brain damage. All this together suggests that long-term memories become part of the "hardware" of the brain and of the person, a feature that is remarkable in view of the continuous turnover of all brain and body molecules during life. These considerations should not be misunderstood as to propose that the brain is the "hardware" and that the metabolism is the "software" (of a computer). Major differences are: the "hardware" -the brainis only partly pre-programmed and fi xed in space and time largely by gene related processes, but it is continuously modifi ed, thereby becoming highly personal during life. Moreover, although being based on general and universal principles, brain physiology is also personal and does only apply to the personal brain. The combined metabolic/physiological processes and the pseudo-stabile hardware of the brain together create some kind of a personal universe, containing (all) personal information acquired during life. Memories acquired during life are not stored in a strictly temporal order: we do not remember childhood experiences after retrograde inspection by starting with the more recent memories. Rather, the proposed personal universe contains memories that are retrieved by association, not necessarily by sequential storage. In this respect personal memorizing is more like current computer search machines showing up all (often unrelated) items, containing (some) similar terms, but most often unrelated to the time when these items were fi rstly stored in the 23 network, unless programmed this way. The current concept is very close to the analysis of J.R. Searle, concluding that some conceptualization of mind corresponds to a concomitant structure of the brain. Such a correspondence does not happen through a strict correlation, i.e. that particular brain structures produce some particular "parts" of the mind, but rather that the mind is an emerging property of the brain (Searle 1992; Vicari 2008). Although being materialistic, such an emerging confi guration cannot be deduced or predicted from its building blocks. Such emerging brain confi gurations have causative power over the underlying elements. For instance, structures of the human brain, such as the cerebral cortex or the prefrontal cortex, have at least some power over such processes as the release of hormones from lower and evolutionary older regions such as the hypothalamus and pituitary gland. Applied to psychiatry: major life-events have long been recognized as contributing to the development of depression. Hence, depression has often been primarily attributed to a poor regulation of the stress-hormone hydrocortisone (cortisol) at the level of the pituitary gland. But there is an important difference between stress and a life-event: stress aims primarily the organism to survive, whereas a major life-event is the consequence of a personal cognitive perception, e.g. the death of a beloved partner. CONCLUDING REMARKS The present conceptualization proposes that every mental function can in principle be understood as brain physiology. The proposal has 3 major features: First, it aims at incorporating current neurobiological knowledge of the brain, thus acknowledging ontogenesis and evolution as guiding principles; Second, it hypothesises brain confi gurations emerging from brain elements with properties irreducible or unpredictable from the underlying elements. These presumed higher structures have causative power over the constitutive elements; Third, because of the fi rst and second features, it takes fi rst-person experiences into account and avoids dualistic mind/brain concepts. DIAL PHIL MENT NEURO SCI 2012; 5(1): 21-24 Korf 24 Corresponding Author: Jakob Korf Emeritus Professor of Biological Psychiatry University of Groningen (The Netherlands). Department of Biological Psychiatry CG64 UMCG P.O.Box 30.001 9700 RB Groningen The Netherlands Tel +31-503612100 email: [email protected] Copyright © 2012 by Ass. Crossing Dialogues, Italy REFERENCES Attwell D, Iadecola C. The neural basis of functional brain imaging signals. Trends Neurosci 2002;25:621-625. De Zwart JA, van Gelderen P, Jansma JM, Fukunaga M, Bianciardi M, Duyn JH. Hemodynamic nonlinearities affect BOLD fMRI response timing and amplitude. Neuroimage 2009;47:1649-1658. Jensen CS, Rasmussen HB, Misonou H. Neuronal traffi cking of voltage-gated potassium channels. Mol Cell Neurosci 2011;48:288-297. Korf J. The isoenergetic brain: the idea and some implications. Neuroscientist 2010;16:118-124. Korf J, Gramsbergen JB. Timing of potential and metabolic brain energy. J. Neurochem 2007;103:1697-1708. Kühlbrandt W. Biology, structure and mechanism of P-type ATPases. Nature Reviews Mol Cell Biol 2004;3:282-295. Mangia S, Giove F, Tkác I, Logothetis NK, Henry PG, Olman CA, Maraviglia B, Di Salle F, Uğurbil K. Metabolic and hemodynamic events after changes in neuronal activity: current hypotheses, theoretical predictions and in vivo NMR experimental fi ndings. J Cereb Blood Flow Metab. 2009;29:441-463. Searle JR. The rediscovery of mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1992. Turennout M, Hagoort P, Brown CM. Brain activity during speaking: from syntax to phonology in 40 milliseconds. Science 1998;280:572-574. Vicari G. Beyond conceptual dualism: ontology of consciousness, mental causation, and holism in John R. Searle's philosophy of mind. Rodopi, Amsterdam, 2008. Yu FH, Catterall WA. Overview of the voltage-gated sodium channel family. Genome Biol 2003;4:article 207.

ProtoSociology An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research Volume 34, 2017 Meaning and Publicity Edited by Richard N. Manning www.protosociology.de © ProtoSociologyVolume 33/2016: Borders of Global Theory © 2017 Gerhard Preyer Frankfurt am Main http://www.protosociology.de [email protected] Erste Auflage / first published 2017 ISSN 1611–1281 Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Natio nal- bibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.ddb. de abrufbar. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Das Werk einschliesslich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Je de Ver- wertung ausserhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zu stimmung der Zeitschirft und seines Herausgebers unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Über setzungen, Mikroverfil mungen und die Einspeisung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbiblio grafie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.ddb.de. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or trans- mitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of ProtoSocio logy. © ProtoSociology Volume 33/2016: Borders of Global Theory ProtoSociology An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research Volume 34, 2017 Meaning and Publicity Edited by Richard N. Manning Contents Introduction Meaning and Publicity: Two Traditions ................................................. 5 Richard N. Manning Part I Historical Background Speaking Your Mind: Expression in Locke's Theory of Language ............ 15 Lewis Powell Meaning, Communication, and the Mental ........................................... 31 Patrick Rysiew Intentionality and Publicity .................................................................... 44 Madeleine L. Arseneault Part II Meaning and Interpretation Quine, Publicity, and Pre-Established Harmony .................................... 59 Gary Kemp Reflections on Davidsonian Semantic Publicity ...................................... 73 Richard N. Manning Meaning, Publicity and Knowledge ........................................................ 98 Marija Jankovic and Greg Ray Contents4 © ProtoSociologyVolume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity Part III Contemporary Criticisms and Developments A Puzzle about Context and Communicative Acts .............................................................................. 119 Daniel W. Harris The Publicity of Meaning and the Perceptual Approach to Speech Comprehension .......................................................................... 144 Berit Brogaard Local Meaning, Public Offense ............................................................... 163 Robert Shanklin On Contemporary Linguistics and Sociology Analyses on Arbitrariness of Chinese Characters from the Perspective of Morphology ..................................................................... 181 Feng Li Formal Semantics of English Sentences with Tense and Aspect ............... 197 Wenyan Zhang The Axial Age and Modernity: From Max Weber to Karl Jaspers and Shmuel Eisenstadt .................................................................................. 217 Vittorio Cotesta Contributors .......................................................................................... 241 Impressum ............................................................................................. 242 On ProtoSociology ................................................................................. 243 Ordering ................................................................................................ 244 Published Volumes ................................................................................ 245 Bookpublications of the Project ............................................................. 251 © ProtoSociology Volume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity Speaking Your Mind: Expression in Locke's Theory of Language Lewis Powell Abstract There is a tension between John Locke's awareness of the fundamental importance of a shared public language and the manner in which his theorizing appears limited to offering a psychologistic account of the idiolects of individual speakers. I argue that a correct understanding of Locke's central notion of signification can resolve this tension. I start by examining a long standing objection to Locke's view, according to which his theory of meaning systematically gets the subject matter of our discourse wrong, by making our ideas the meanings of our words. By examining Locke's definition of "truth", I show that Lockean signification is an expression relation, rather than a descriptive or referential relation. Consequently, the sense in which our words signify our ideas is roughly that our utterances advertise our otherwise undisclosed mental lives to each other. While this resolves one aspect of the public/private tension, I close with a brief discussion of the remaining tension, and the role for normative constraints on signification to play in generating a genuinely shared public language. Introduction John Locke opens book three of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding by highlighting the social role of language. It is because we are social creatures, Locke tells us, that we require language. At the same time, the actual account of the workings of language that he offers is hyper-individualized and based in the psychologies of particular speakers. Locke explains the importance to humans of having a shared language, but, in essence, offers a theory on which each speaker has their own idiolect. So, there is a prima facie tension between Locke's view of language's fundamentally social purpose and his account of its fundamentally individualistic mechanisms. In this paper, I show how Locke resolves this tension between the social purpose of language and its individualistic mechanisms. One of the most common concerns about Locke's theory, from his own day forward, was the objection that his individualistic, psychologistic account of the meaning of language winds up getting the subject matter of our discourse wrong. Locke has long been accused of incorrectly maintaining that when we Lewis Powell16 © ProtoSociologyVolume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity speak, we are always talking about our own ideas and mental states, rather than ever talking about objects and qualities in the external world. If correct, this objection is a major concern for Locke's philosophy of language, as it is untenable to offer an account of language on which all of our assertions are making claims about the contents of our own minds. Fortunately for Locke, this objection turns on a misunderstanding of his views. In the first section of this paper, I present this "wrong subject matter" objection, found in the writing of Locke's contemporary John Sergeant, which was also offered later by John Stuart Mill, and which continues to be raised as an objection to Locke's account. In section two, I show how a careful reading of Locke's claims about truth show that the objection is misplaced. Locke's theory of language does not render our own minds the constant and essential subject matter of our discourse. Instead, Locke's theory presages an expressivist approach to thinking about language. In the third section of the paper, I turn to a remaining set of worries about how Locke's individualistic psychological account of meaning leaves him with a theory of individual idiolects, and no theory of a common public language. While some thinkers could rest content without accounting for a shared language, Locke's concern for the social nature of communication seem to require him to address this worry. In the conclusion of the paper, I articulate Locke's normative approach to resolving the idiolect problem without positing a genuine public language. Section 1: The Wrong Subject Matter Objection John Locke is one of the few figures of the early modern period to offer an explicit, systematic treatment of the workings of language. The entirety of book three of the Essay concerns his account of language, and the very opening of his discussion helps to establish the outlook and orientation of his theorizing: §1. god having designed Man for a sociable Creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnished him also with Language, which was to be the great Instrument, and common Tye of Society. Man therefore had by Nature his Organs so fashioned as to be fit to frame articulate Sounds, which we call Words. But this was not enough yet to produce Language; for Parrots, and several other Birds, will be taught to make articulate Sounds distinct enough, which yet, by no means, are capable of Language. §2. Besides articulate Sounds therefore, it was farther necessary, that he should 17Speaking Your Mind: Expression in Locke's Theory of Language © ProtoSociology Volume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity be able to use these Sounds, as Signs of internal Conceptions; and to make them stand as marks for the Ideas within his own mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Men's Mind be conveyed from one to another. (Essay, 3.1.1–2) In these two sections Locke establishes some of the most integral and core commitments of his account of language, including both the view that the purpose of language is to allow humans to enter into proper social relationships with one another, as well as the view that the mechanism by which language functions is the use of articulate sounds as outward manifestations of one's thoughts. According to Locke, the contents and events of one person's mind are obscured from others. But humans are social creatures, and so, cannot flourish in isolation from each other. The primary purpose of language, then, is to act as antidote to our natural state of social isolation, by permitting us to actually share the goings on of our inner lives with each other. Locke then proposes that the way language serves to do this is for an individual's utterances to serve as signs of their thoughts, permitting them to create outward manifestations of their inner lives. Stated this way, Locke's basic picture has a lot of prima facie appeal. However, because of Locke's focus on the social role of language in allowing us to share our mental lives with each other, his primary semantic relationship is one that obtains between words or utterances and an individual speaker's thoughts and ideas. This feature has led to some fairly longstanding criticisms of Locke's views. To outline the basics of Locke's view: a term like "Elizabeth" will signify your idea elizabeth.1 And a term like "human" will signify your idea human. In general, substantive terms will signify ideas. A word like "is" (or "is not") on the other hand, will signify an act of the mind, like affirming (or denying).2 So the sentence "Elizabeth is human" signifies affirming human of elizabeth. A slightly less cumbersome way to phrase this would be to say that the sentence "Elizabeth is human" signifies the judgment/belief that Elizabeth is human. In Locke's own day, John Sergeant offered what I term the "wrong subject matter" objection against his idea-based theory of meaning, with a similar objec1 I here adapt a convention, common to contemporary philosophy of mind, of designating ideas or concepts with all caps. 2 These positions are outlined straightforwardly in Essay 3.1 (for substantive terms) and 3.7.1 (for the copula). Lewis Powell18 © ProtoSociologyVolume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity tion offered later by Mill, and still offered casually today.3 Here is Sergeant's presentation of the objection: 16. It may be perhaps replied, that the Ideas are only meant by the Words; because when we speak, we intend [Note: Proof 10th. Because when the thing it self is intended to be made known, the Thing it self is the first meaning, or what is first meant by the words. ] to signify our Thoughts. I answer, that, however it may be pretended that what is meant immediately by the words, is our Thoughts, when our own Thoughts or Judgments about any matter, are the things desir'd to be known; yet, when the Things are the Objects enquired after, as, when a Master teaches a Scholler Natural Philosophy, or any other Truth, the Intention of the Speakers does primarily aym and mean to signify the Things or Truths themselves; and not our Thoughts concerning them; and, therefore, the Things themselves are in the Intention and Mind, or are the Meanings of the Speakers, or Discoursers. And this passes generally in all other occasions, except only when the Knowledge of our Interiour Thoughts is ultimately aymed at. Thus, when a Gentleman bids his Servant fetch him a Pint of Wine; he does not mean to bid him fetch the Idea of Wine in his own head, but the Wine it self which is in the Cellar; and the same holds in all our Commerce and Conversation about things without us. (Sergeant 1697, Preliminary Second [emphasis added]) Sergeant's objection, despite it's now-archaic presentation, is clear. When I say "get me the wine" I am asking for someone to retrieve actual wine, not to produce the idea of wine in my mind. Generally when I use the word "wine", unless I am specifically trying to talk about my interior mental life, I am talking about wine itself, not my idea of wine. Here is a slightly more formal presentation of this objection: Wrong Subject Matter (WSM) Objection: 1. If "Elizabeth" signifies elizabeth, then the sentence "Elizabeth is human" is about elizabeth, not Elizabeth herself. 2. The sentence "Elizabeth is human" is about Elizabeth herself, not elizabeth. 3. So, it is not the case that "Elizabeth" signifies elizabeth. Let us grant premise (2), as it seems extremely plausible. So, the strength of this objection to Locke's view hinges on the strength of premise (1). The WSM objection maintains that "Elizabeth" signifying the idea elizabeth means that utterances involving the term are thereby about the idea. And this point relies 3 Mill (2006), 1.2.1 19Speaking Your Mind: Expression in Locke's Theory of Language © ProtoSociology Volume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity on the assumption that signification and aboutness will go hand in hand: if the things signified by a sentence are the things the sentence is about, it would be impossible for the Lockean view to escape this objection. So behind premise (1) is something like the principle that signification implies aboutness, and for individual words, that would be something like the principle that they refer to the things they signify. Locke doesn't give us an explicit account of aboutness, making it harder to identify directly whether this is a principle Locke would subscribe to. However, there is still good reason to find this assumption questionable, and it has been questioned by a number of Locke scholars. Norman Kretzmann (1968) has argued that ideas on Locke's theory of meaning function more like Fregean senses than referents (and thus, would not necessarily go hand in hand with "aboutness"). EJ Ashworth (1981), Paul Guyer (1994) and Walter Ott (2003) have also argued that that the sense of signification which Locke is using, inherited from ancient, medieval, or other early modern sources, does not track reference (and thus would not track aboutness). One notable exception is Michael Losonsky (2007), who grants that, for Locke, names refer to ideas, but attempts to defend the plausibility of such a view. My own interpretation differs in some important ways from those of Kretzmann, Ashworth, Guyer, and Ott but, importantly, aligns on this issue: that a term signifies something, for Locke, does not mean the term refers to that thing, or that utterances involving the term are automatically about the thing signified. So, the plan is to avoid the objection by denying premise (1). However, in order for this to be a successful reply to the objection, it is important to provide a sustainable account of how Locke avoids commitment to (1). And here, it is helpful to outline a positive account of Lockean signification. Section 2: Locke's Expressivist Account of Meaning And Assertion In this section, I will show how Locke articulates what I term a sincerityconditional semantic theory. Many contemporary semantic theories we are familiar with are primarily in the business of providing truth conditions for sentences. The meaning assigned to a sentence on such accounts may be the truth conditions themselves, or a proposition which maps directly on to some truth conditions, or the like. If one is accustomed to such a perspective, it is natural to look at what Locke assigns as the meanings of sentences, and attriLewis Powell20 © ProtoSociologyVolume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity bute to him a confusion about the subject matter of our discourse. Against that background perspective, if someone proposes that the meaning of the sentence "Elizabeth is human" is the belief that Elizabeth is human, rather than the state of affairs of Elizabeth being human, or a third-realm proposition that Elizabeth is human, or a function from worlds where Elizabeth is human to the value "true", it is natural to think that Locke's account of the meaning of the sentence will get the result that the sentence is true provided the speaker has that belief, rather than it being true provided that Elizabeth is a human being. But this way of interpreting his view deeply misunderstands the relationship Locke sees between language and mind. For Locke, the role of language is to help us advertise our otherwise undisclosed mental states to others. So when someone utters the sentence "Elizabeth is a human" the thing that Locke's account treats as having primary importance is the relationship between the speaker and the psychological state they are attempting to put on display. The WSM objection effectively assumes that Locke's account does so by making the sentence describe the speaker's mental state. But, describing and displaying are different. Their difference is similar to the difference between: 1: I am feeling pain. 2: Ouch! These two sentences are arguably related to the same mental state (a first personal pain sensation), but they differ in that the former straightforwardly describes oneself as having that mental state, while the other one seems to be an utterance we can make sense of because, typically, the person who (sincerely) says it is in that mental state. But they are not describing themselves as being in that mental state by saying "ouch", they are merely allowing it to have an outward manifestation.4 So now, compare these two sentences, for Locke: 3: I believe that Elizabeth is a human. 4: Elizabeth is a human. The defense of Locke here is that (3) and (4), like (1) and (2), can be related to the same mental state (a belief that Elizabeth is a human). But, whereas (3) describes that mental state, (4) displays, manifests, or expresses it. In other 4 This distinction is familiar in much contemporary literature on expressivism, See, for example, Schroeder (2008). 21Speaking Your Mind: Expression in Locke's Theory of Language © ProtoSociology Volume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity words, when someone utters (4), they have done so in order to advertise being in that mental state. They are not talking about that mental state, they are, instead, giving voice to that mental state.5 Locke's fundamental semantic interest isn't in the descriptive facet of language, it is in language's power to advertise or display what is going on in our head. Locke's account of the meaning of a sentence doesn't map a sentence to its truth conditions, rather it maps the sentence to the mental state that one is advertising through uttering that sentence, which I'll term the sentence's sincerity conditions. If we think about the meanings of the sentences as their sincerity conditions, we can see why having the meaning of a given sentence be a judgment does not automatically involve getting the subject matter wrong. Instead, Locke is taking a stance on a different relationship than the one that Sergeant seems to be concerned with.6 Showing that the utterance isn't about my own judgment is one thing, but it is a further step to show how Locke's theory can secure the result that the utterance is in fact about Elizabeth. As mentioned, Locke doesn't offer an account of aboutness. He does, however, offer us a reasonably robust discussion of truth. And for the relevant issue here, that serves our purposes well. We can see whether Locke delivers on premise (2) by seeing what his account of truth would say about the truth conditions for a sentence like "Elizabeth is human". Here is Locke's general definition of truth: §2 Truth then seems to me, in the proper import of the Word, to signify nothing but the joining or separating of Signs, as the Things signified by them, do agree or disagree one with another. The joining or separating of signs here meant is what by another name, we call Proposition. So that Truth properly belongs only to Propositions: whereof there are two sorts, viz. Mental and Verbal; as there are two sorts of Signs commonly made use of, viz. Ideas and Words. (Essay, 4.5.2) Here we get a sort of correspondence account of truth. A joining (or separat5 The difference between this approach and Ashworth's "making known" is subtle, but significant. Ashworth's interpretation includes in the signification of a word/sentence a great deal more than just the idea/thought being displayed. 6 It is worth noting that Sergeant's objection dealt with an imperative sentence, and everything I am saying here is focused on declaratives. The point I am making can be generalized fairly easily. As an example, if imperative sentences are used to display desires (rather than beliefs) we can see how the reply to Sergeant would go: my utterance "(you) bring me the wine" signifies a desire of mine built out of my idea of the addressee, my idea of the wine, my idea of the act of bringing, and my idea of myself. That's not to say the desire is about my ideas, but that it is built out of them. Lewis Powell22 © ProtoSociologyVolume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity ing) of signs – a proposition – is true just in case the the things signified by the signs agree (or disagree) with one another. So, propositions join (or separate) signs, and the things signified by those signs stand in relations of agreement (and disagreement). If the signs are joined, and the things signified agree, the proposition is true. And, if the signs are separated, and the things signified disagree, then the proposition is true. Otherwise, the proposition will not be true. Importantly, Locke distinguishes between two types of propositions here, mental and verbal. As Locke clarifies in 4.5.5, mental propositions are composed of ideas, and (many) ideas signify objects in the world, while verbal propositions, on the other hand, are composed of words and words signify ideas. So far all that has been said, there is still room for the Sergeant/Mill worry: my relevant beliefs may be directly about the world, but my utterances might not turn out to be about the world (they may even still turn out to be about my beliefs). However, looking to Locke's further elaboration on these two types of truth, we can see that this is not the case: §6 [ ... ] When Ideas are so put together, or separated in the Mind, as they, or the Things they stand for do agree, or not, that is, as I may call it, mental Truth. But Truth of Words is something more, and that is the affirming or denying of Words one of another, as the Ideas they stand for agree or disagree: And this again is twofold. Either purely Verbal, and trifling, which I shall speak of, or Real and instructive; which is the Object of that real Knowledge, which we have spoken of already. (Essay, 4.5.6) Locke's treatment of mental truth here is very brief. A judgment is mentally true just in case the ideas joined (separated) in it, or the things they stand for, agree (disagree).7 As to the truth of words, Locke tells us that it is "the affirming or denying of Words one of another as the Ideas they stand for agree or disagree". Here we see that the account for an utterance like "Elizabeth is human" will affirm "human" of "Elizabeth" which will then be true provided that our idea human agrees with our idea elizabeth. What is crucial to appreciate here about Locke's account is that there are two relevant pairs of concepts being deployed: joining/separating, and agreement/disagreement. For Locke, a verbal proposition is true when the verbal signs are joined (separated) in parallel with the agreement (disagreement) of the ideas signified, not when words are joined (separated) in parallel with the joining (separating) of the ideas signified. So, as I argued above, an utterance of "Elizabeth is human" isn't made true by the speaker having the belief that 7 The disjunction here is to cover the case of ideas without archetypes (Pegasus, Centaurs, etc.). In such cases, the agreements will terminate with the ideas themselves, rather than depending on some further agreement between the objects, since there are no objects. 23Speaking Your Mind: Expression in Locke's Theory of Language © ProtoSociology Volume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity Elizabeth is human. Instead, it is made true by some concordance between the speaker's idea elizabeth and their idea human.8 In fact, a few section later (4.5.11), Locke defines a concept of "moral truth" (not in the sense of the truths of morality, but rather a morally relevant definition of truth) as "speaking Things according to the perswasion of our own Minds, though the Proposition we speak agree not to the reality of Things". This is a definition of what we'd more likely call honesty, and Locke specifically distinguishes it from his account of "the truth of words". One way to put my proposal is that the core of Locke's account of language tells you what it takes to utter a sentence honestly, rather than what it takes for an utterance of it to be true. The truth conditions will be a secondary feature, derived from this primary assignment of sincerity conditions.9 To summarize: "Elizabeth is human" is a verbal proposition, composed of "Elizabeth" signifying the idea elizabeth, "human" signifying the idea human, and "is" signifying the act of affirmation or the joining of those two ideas. The whole thing signifies a judgment joining human and elizabeth. But for "Elizabeth is human" to be true, requires that human and elizabeth agree with each other, not that they have been joined by the speaker. And for human and elizabeth to agree with each other requires that the things they stand for agree with each other (namely Elizabeth and the astra idea human). Setting aside whether Locke winds up having the right truth conditions for the belief that Elizabeth is human, the general structure of his account of verbal truth seems correct, here: the truth conditions for the sentence "Elizabeth is human" and the judgement that Elizabeth is human wind up being the same, systematically. And this seems right. The truth conditions of your utterances should match the beliefs you are displaying by making such utterances.10 And this, it is clear, his account captures. However, there is one remaining related concern, which will be the focus of the next section. So far, we've been ignoring the fact that my idea elizabeth and your idea elizabeth might be different in their particulars. Locke talks explicitly about people having different qualities built in to their idea of gold 8 My treatment of Lockean judgments here is cursory and oversimplified in some ways. For a better, more thorough treatment of Locke's account of judgment, see Smalligan-Marusic (2014). 9 By advertising your belief that Elizabeth is human, you have publicly put yourself on the hook for possessing that belief, and can be held to account or challenged by someone with a contradictory belief. On this account, assertion is the result of publicizing one's beliefs. 10 Other approaches can obviously capture this systematic alignment in the other direction: because the sentence has certain truth-conditions, believing what you say means that you would only utter it if you possessed the belief that has those truth conditions. Lewis Powell24 © ProtoSociologyVolume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity or of swans, and the same thing will go for ideas of individual people, or really, any of our ideas. At first glance, this means we would all be speaking subtly different languages, and talking past each other constantly. If it is part of my idea of Elizabeth that she was 30 feet tall, then my utterance of "Elizabeth is 30 feet tall" would turn out to be true, rather than false. And that seems like the wrong result. Section 3: The Problem of Idiolects Locke's theory, as it has been so far laid out, looks like it fundamentally offers an account of individual idiolects.11 In fact, Locke even implicitly recognizes this when describing our ideas of swans as an example of complex ideas of substances (emphasis added): Thus the Idea which an English-man signifies by the Name Swan is white Colour, long Neck, red Beak, black Legs, and whole Feet, and all these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in the Water, and making a certain kind of Noise, and, perhaps, to a Man, who has long observed those kind of Birds, some other Properties, which all terminate in sensible simple Ideas, all united in one common subject. (Essay, 2.24.14) We can use this case to lay out the concern for Locke's view. Consider four individuals, First, Locke's standard Englishman (the layperson), and his swan observer (the expert). Let's also consider someone with an underdeveloped views of swans (the novice) and someone with mistaken views of swans (the bungler). So, the idea that the first signifies by the term "swan" is composed of the qualities enumerated by Locke in the passage above. The idea that the second signifies by the term is composed of all of those, plus some extra qualities common to swans (e.g. that they are largely herbivorous). The idea the third signifies by the term is composed of a partial subset of the qualities Locke enumerated (omitting the redness of the beak). And the idea the the fourth signifies by the term includes all those enumerated by Locke, and also some qualities not actually possessed by swans (e.g. that they can breathe underwater). Let's examine what the view of truth outlined in the last section seems to commit Locke to for utterances of some swan related sentences by these four: S1. Swans are white. 11 A somewhat similar worry to the one developed here is presented in Stainton (1996), p. 101. 25Speaking Your Mind: Expression in Locke's Theory of Language © ProtoSociology Volume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity S2. Swans have red beaks. S3. Swans are mostly herbivorous. S4. Swans are able to breathe underwater. It seems that regardless of which of the four utters (S1), it will turn out true. All of them signify an idea by "swan" that agrees with the idea WHITE. The layperson, the expert, and even the bungler would also clearly speak truly when they utter (S2), though we don't yet know what Locke would say about the novice's utterance here, because while the sort of agreement between ideas that is involved when the one idea is partially composing the other is clearly sufficient, we haven't established what else could be sufficient for the ideas to agree. Similarly, the expert's uttering (S3) is clearly true on the account we have so far, but it is as yet unclear how to assess whether anyone else speaks truly in uttering it. And lastly, it seems like Locke is committed to saying the bungler speaks truly when uttering (S4), and though we need to know more to decisively assess this, it is unlikely that any of the other three would speak truly by uttering (S4). However, even merely allowing that the bungler can utter (S4) truly is sufficient to raise this worry. Locke's view is obviously going to be a non-starter if the swan expert speaks truly in saying "Swans are able to breathe underwater". But that would mean that when the bungler utters that sentence, and the expert says "Swans are not able to breathe underwater", the two are talking past each other, because they are effectively speaking different languages. The bungler is saying a true thing about a fictional type of bird, while the expert is denying a false claim about an actual species. An ideal treatment would have room for error in addition to ignorance. We want a view on which all four people are speaking the same language, and so, a view on which the truth-value of the four sentences above doesn't depend on which of the four is speaking. And there is a special challenge for Locke in offering such a view, because of Locke's specific focus on language's role for displaying the contents of our minds to others. So, prima facie, the utterances of the bungler should be signifying the idea he possesses. Interestingly, Locke has the resources to develop a view on which he could offer a reply that maintains that the bungler both signifies his bungled idea and that he utters something false when he speaks, though it is not clear that he ultimately offers such a reply. Towards the end of the second book of the Essay Locke outlines several pairs of contrasting attributes which can be (in Lewis Powell26 © ProtoSociologyVolume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity some sense) applied to ideas.12 Significant for our purposes is the contrast he draws between real and fantastical ideas, and the discussion of true and false ideas. With respect to the first, the bungler's idea is fantastical, rather than real, because there is no external archetype for his idea of a long-necked, red-beaked ( ... ) white bird that breathes water. Locke would say that, at best, the Bungler is believing (and thus) saying something on a par with claims about centaurs and gorgons. But this is not good enough for our purposes, as it does nothing to render anything about the claim false. At the same time, it is helpful in explaining how Locke can get the intuitively correct results for the novice's utterance of (S2) and both the novice and layperson's utterances of (S3). Because the other three all do have ideas with an external archetype, Locke can appeal to the actual co-existence of red-beakedness and herbivorousness with the other qualities that are in their ideas of swans to explain why their swan ideas in fact agree with the ideas of herbivorousness and red-beakedness.13 However, this real/fantastical distinction will only help with ideas of substances (swans, humans). If the dispute concerns ideas of modes, which don't require external archetypes, there would be no distinction to be drawn, as the direction of fit is reversed. So, Locke's distinction between true and false ideas is much more helpful for a general response to the worry: §1 though Truth and Falshood belong, in Propriety of Speech, only to Propositions; yet Ideas are oftentimes termed true or false (as what Words are there, that are not used with great Latitude, and with some deviation from their strict and proper Significations?) Though, I think, that when Ideas themselves are termed true or false, there is still some secret or tacit Proposition, which is the Foundation of that Denomination: as we shall see, if we examine the particular Occasions, wherein they come to be called true or false. (Essay, 2.32.1) Ideas are never, strictly speaking, true or false. But we do sometimes label them true or false, and Locke here claims that this is done only when there is an accompanying proposition or judgment which is itself genuinely false. Locke goes on to outline the two primary ways in which ideas are rendered false in this derivative sense: §4 When-ever the Mind refers any of its Ideas to any thing extraneous to 12 These pairings are: clarity/obscurity, distinctness/confusion, real/fantastical, adequate/inadequate, and true/false. 13 It is unsurprising that agreement between ideas is not a purely internal relation between them, since Locke does not think that all truths are a priori. 27Speaking Your Mind: Expression in Locke's Theory of Language © ProtoSociology Volume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity them, they are then capable to be called true or false. Because the Mind in such a reference, makes a tacit Supposition of their Conformity to that Thing: which Supposition, as it happens to be true or false; so the Ideas themselves come to be denominated. The most usual Cases wherein this happens, are these following: §5 First, When the Mind supposes any Idea it has, conformable to that in other Men's Minds called by the same common Name; v.g. when the Mind intends, or judges its Ideas of Justice, Temperance, Religion, to be the same, with what other Men give those Names to. Secondly, When the Mind supposes any Idea it has in it self, to be conformable to some real Existence. Thus the two Ideas, of a Man, and a Centaur, supposed to be the Ideas of real Substances, are the one true, and the other false; the one having a Conformity to what has really existed; the other not. Thirdly, When the Mind refers any of its Ideas to that real Constitution, and Essence of any thing, whereon all its Properties depend: and thus the greatest part, if not all our Ideas of Substances, are false. (Essay, 2.32.4–5) Here, Locke tells us that the main judgments that accompany ideas permitting them to become (derivatively) true or false are (a) when one assumes that the idea they signify by a name is conformable to the idea that other people signify by that name, (b) when one assumes that the idea in question is conformable to some really really existing thing, and (c) when one assumes that the idea captures the things real essence. This last one is largely irrelevant for our purposes here, but the first two both seem applicable to the case of the bungler: the bungler is tacitly assuming that their idea swan corresponds to other people's idea swan, and that their idea swan corresponds to certain actual long-necked white birds out in the world. Locke's take on the bungler's utterance then is that the bungler signifies their judgment that breathe underwater agrees with their idea swan, and that that judgment is, in isolation, true, but their idea swan is doubly false, neither corresponding to other people's use of "swan" nor to reality. Locke doesn't tell us that these tacit judgments are in fact conveyed, signified or displayed by the bungler's utterance of the sentence. That view would roughly amount to the idea that most utterances express a conjunction of beliefs, including a belief that the words you just used signify corresponding ideas to the ones other people used as well as a belief that your ideas correspond to things out in the world. And so the utterance by the bungler would be overall false because it amounts to a conjunction of one true (irrelevant, fantastical belief ) and two false beliefs about their idea swan. Instead, Locke seems to take the stand that the bungler's utterance was true in his idiolect, but that there are some important/relevant false beliefs involved in the bungler's overall situation. So, as it has been presented here, Locke's view accepts the counterintuitive consequence that the bungler has said something true in this case, but attempts Lewis Powell28 © ProtoSociologyVolume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity to mitigate that consequence by pointing out the related falsities in the beliefs of the speaker. But if the bungler simply didn't have views about what other people's ideas of swans were like (or vandalism, if we want to use an example of a mode), they'd escape the falsity Locke is able to identify here. But if we are each speaking our own individual languages, how can Locke offer any criticism of a speaker like Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty,14 who intentionally uses words in a manner indifferent to their commonly accepted meanings? Conclusion: A Lockean Public Language? William Lycan (2008) provides a nice statement of just this concern as an objection to ideational theories of meaning: Meaning is a public, intersubjective, social phenomenon. An English word has the meaning it does for the entire community of English speakers, even if some members of that community happen not to understand that word. Butideas, images, and feelings in the mind are not intersubjective in that way; they are subjective, held only in the minds of individual persons, and they differ from person to person depending on one's total mental state and background.Therefore, meanings are not ideas in the mind. (Lycan 2008, p. 68) Here, I think the best way to understand Locke's avenue for reply involves recognizing that the social purpose of language produces normative force for speakers.15 Simply put: if the primary goal of speaking is to disclose the contents of your mind to others, you have good reason to try to coordinate the signification of your terms with them. As Locke puts it in his discussion of the abuses of language: §29 [ ... ] He that applies the Words of any Language to Ideas, different from those, to which the common use of that Country applies them, however his own Understanding may be fill'd with Truth and Light, will not by such Words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his Terms. For however, the Sounds are such as are familiarly known, and easily enter the Ears of those who are accustomed to them; yet standing for other Ideas than those they usually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the Mind of the Hearers, they cannot make known the Thoughts of him who thus uses them. (Essay, 3.10.29) 14 Caroll, 1872. 15 Ott (2004) notes that there is normativity here, but does not elaborate on its role in coordinating our usage. 29Speaking Your Mind: Expression in Locke's Theory of Language © ProtoSociology Volume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity I think this fairly plausible point from Locke is why he is not concerned with generating a full account of a public language of the sort Lycan is describes. Having a public language would allow Locke to say that Humpty Dumpty is speaking falsely, but Locke's view is rather that Humpty Dumpty's use of language is impractical. Locke doesn't need his utterances to be false; the important complaint is that Humpty Dumpty's meaning is opaque to his audience. And if the point of his uttering something is to give us a glimpse of what's going on in his head, then he's not going to succeed – unless he explains what he means by the words (or, more effectively) conforms his signification to that of other speakers. So, for Locke, speakers are normatively encouraged to seek as much overlap as possible in the constellation of their individual idiolects.16 One could even say that when there is a certain critical mass of overlap, that becomes the meaning of the term in some public language, but the background normative system will do the actual work of explaining what Humpty Dumpty and the bungler are doing wrong.17 So, for Locke, the individualist mechanics of language are prerequisites for achieving its social purpose, but they can function in isolation. The social purpose further provides norms on how to communicate effectively, and those norms are what do the work of encouraging us to speak language the same way. References Ashworth, E. J. (1981). "Do words signify ideas or things?" The scholastic sources of Locke's theory of language. Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (3):299–326. Carroll, Lewis, John Tenniel, George Dalziel, Edward Dalziel, and Richard Clay. 1872. Through the looking-glass, and what Alice found there. Macmillan and Co. Guyer, Paul (1994). 5 Locke's philosophy of language. In V. C. Chappell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke. Cambridge University Press. pp. 115. Mill, John Stuart (2006); A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive. Books I-III. In 16 Losonsky (2007) discusses this, pessimistically, under the heading of "rectification", however the sense of "rectification" he is concerned with includes not just inter-speaker coordination, but accurate tracking of how our ideas correspond to the external world. The former is the major concern for the problem of idiolects, while the latter is the source of the bulk of Locke's pessimism about rectification. 17 On this sort of proposal claims about what a sentence says in the public language are going to more or less amount to complex statistical/sociological claims about pluralities of speakers. Interestingly, unless we add some further apparatus to this view, it also tells us that the expert is doing something wrong, by including more in their idea than the common person does. Specifically, the expert is likely to take as obvious certain swan claims that others will not find obvious at all. Lewis Powell30 © ProtoSociologyVolume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Liberty Fund. Kretzmann, Norman (1968). The main thesis of Locke's semantic theory. Philosophical Review 77 (2):175–196. Locke, John (1979). The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Clarendon Press. Losonsky, Michael (2007). Language, meaning, and mind in Locke's Essay. In Lex Newman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding". Cambridge University Press. Lycan, William G. (2008). Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge. Schroeder, Mark (2008). Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford University Press. Sergeant, John (1697). Solid Philosophy Asserted Against the Fancies of the Ideists. Garland. Marušić, Jennifer Smalligan (2014). Propositions and Judgments in Locke and Arnauld: A Monstrous and Unholy Union? Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (2):255–280. Stainton, Robert J. (1996). Philosophical Perspectives on Language: A Concise Anthology. Broadview Press. © ProtoSociology Volume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity Contributors Madeleine Arseneault, Associated Professor, Department of Philosophy, SUNY New Paltz, New Paltz, United States of America. Berit Brogaard, Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, United States of America. Vittorio Cotesta, Professore di Sociologia, Università degli Studi Roma Tre Dipartimento di scienze della formazione, Roma, Italy. Daniel Harris, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Hunter College Cuny, The City University of New York, New York, United States of America. Marija Jankovic, Assistant Professor, Departments of Philosophy, Davidson College, Davidson North Caroline, United States of America. Gary Kemp, Dr. Senior Lecture, School of Humanity, University of Glasgow, Scotland. Feng Li, Assistant Professor, School of Foreign Languages, Jinling Institute of Technology, Nanjing, People's Republic of China. Richard N. Manning, Associate Professor, College of Arts and Sciences, University of South Florida, Tampa, United States of America. Lewis Powell, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Suny Buffalo, Buffaly, New York, United States of America. Greg Ray, Associated Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, Gainesville, United States of America. Patrick Rysiew, Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Victoria, Victoria BC, Canada. Robert Shanklin, Lecture, Colleague of Arts and Science, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, United States of America. Zhang Wenyan, Dr., Postdoctorial, Department of Chinese, Capital Normal University, Beijing, People's Republic of China. Impressum ProtoSociology: An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research issn 1611–1281 Editor: Gerhard Preyer Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Institute of Sociology, Dep. of Social Sciences Editorial staff: Georg Peter Project Multiple Modernities: Reuss-Markus Krausse (East-Asia Representative) Layout and digital publication: Georg Peter Editorial office: ProtoSociology, Stephan-Heise-Str. 56, 60488 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, phone: (049)069–769461, Email: [email protected], [email protected] --------------- Die Zeitschrift soll 1/2jährlich erscheinen. Die Anzahl der jährlich erschei nen den Hefte und Sonderhefte bleibt jedoch vorbehalten. Copyright: Die in dieser Zeitschrift veröffentlichten Beiträge sind urheber rechtlich ge schützt. Alle Rechte sind vorbehalten. 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Vol 33, 2016 Borders of Global Theory – Reflections from Within and Without, ISBN 9783744838924, 49,50.–€ Vol 32, 2015 Making and Unmaking Modern Japan, ISBN 9783837077780, 32.–€ Vol. 31, 2014 Language and Value, ISBN 9783739258904, 32.-€ Vol. 30, 2013 Concepts – Contemporary and Historical Perspectives, ISBN 9783738641653, 32.-€ Vol. 29, 2012 China's Modernization II, ISBN 9783739258966, 32.-€, Vol. 28, 2011 China's Modernization I, ISBN 9783734761270, 32.-€, ProtoSociology An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research Volume 33, 2016 The Borders of Global Theory – Reflections from Within and Without Edited by Barrie Axford Contents eBook, ISBN-13: 9783744860666, 17,99 € Book on Demand, ISBN-13: 9783744838924, 49,50 € Introduction: Global Scholarship from Within and Without Barrie Axford Thinking Globally – What Does it Mean Today? Reflections on "Critical Thinking" in Global Studies Manfred B. Steger Globality and the Moral Ecology of the World: A Theoretical Exploration Habibul Haque Khondker Real Leaps in the Times of the Anthropocene: Failure and Denial and 'Global' Thought Anna M. Agathangelou On the Possibility of a Global Political Community: The Enigma of 'Small Local Differences' within Humanity Heikki Patomäki Insights from the Galaxy of Scholarship Geohistory of Globalizations Peter J. Taylor Autonomy, Self-determination and Agency in a Global Context Didem Buhari Gulmez The Neglect of Beauty: What's In and What's Out of Global Theorising and Why? Heather Widdows Mastery Without Remainder? Connection, Digital Mediatization and the Constitution of Emergent Globalities Barrie Axford Global Theory – To be Continued Whither Global Theory? Jan Aart Scholte 245Published Volumes © ProtoSociology Volume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity ProtoSociology An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research Volume 32, 2015 Making and Un-Making Modern Japan Edited by Ritu Vij Contents eBook, ISBN-13: 9783741218866, 17,99 € Book on Demand, ISBN-13: 9783738622478, 32,– € Making and Un-Making Japanese Modernity: An Introduction Ritu Vij Part I The Vicissitudes of Japanese Modernity Naturalized Modernity and the Resistance it Evokes: Sociological Theory Meets Murakami Haruki Carl Cassegard Ethno-politics in Contemporary Japan: The Mutual-Occlusion of Orientalism and Occidentalism Kinhide Mushakoji Part II Citizenship, Migrants and Welfare in Modern Japan A Dilemma in Modern Japan? Migrant Workers and the (Self-)Illusion of Homogeneity Hironori Onuki Pretended Citizenship: Rewriting the Meaning of Il-/Legality Reiko Shindo What Japan Has Left Behind in the Course of Establishing a Welfare State Reiko Gotoh Part III Risk, Reciprocity, and Ethnonationalism : Reflections on the Fukushima Disaster The Failed Nuclear Risk Governance: Reflections on the Boundary between Misfortune and Injustice in the case of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster Hiroyuki Tosa Ganbarō Nippon: Tabunka Kyōsei and Human (In)Security Post 3–11 Giorgio Shani Reciprocity: Nuclear Risk and Responsibility Paul Dumouchel On Contemporary Philosophy and Sociology Civil Religion in Greece: A Study in the Theory of Multiple Modernities Manussos Marangudakis Underdetermination and Theory-Ladenness Against Impartiality. Nicla Vassallo and M. Cristina Amoretti The Challenge of Creativity: a Diagnosis of our Times Celso Sánchez Capdequí Published Volumes246 © ProtoSociologyVolume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity ProtoSociology An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research Volume 31, 2014 Language and Value Edited by Yi Jiang and Ernie Lepore Contents eBook, ISBN-13: 9783739258904, 17,99 € Book on Demand, ISBN-13: 9783738622478, 32,– € Introduction Ernest Lepore and Yi Jiang I. Semantics and Ontology The Relation of Language to Value Jiang Yi Refutation of the Semantic Argument against Descriptivism Chen Bo Semantics for Nominalists Samuel Cumming Semantic Minimalism and Presupposition Adam Sennet Compositionality and Understanding Fei YuGuo Values Reduced to Facts: Naturalism without Fallacy Zhu Zhifang II. Word Meaning, Metapher, and Truth Philosophical Investigations into Figurative Speech Metaphor and Irony Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone Norms of Word Meaning Litigation Peter Ludlow The Inconsistency of the Identity Thesis Christopher Hom and Robert May Describing I-junction Paul M. Pietroski Predicates of Taste and Relativism about Truth Barry C. Smith Mood, Force and Truth William B. Starr A Semiotic Understanding of Thick Term Aihua Wang III. Features of China's Analytical Philosophy An Echo of the Classical Analytic Philosophy of Language from China: the Postanalytic Philosophy of Language Guanlian Qian The Chinese Language and the Value of Truth-seeking: Universality of Metaphysical Thought and Pre-Qin Mingjia's Philosophy of Language Limin Liu Mthat and Metaphor of Love in Classical Chinese Poetry Ying Zhang 247Published Volumes © ProtoSociology Volume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity ProtoSociology An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research Volume 30, 2013 Concept – Contemporary and Historical Perspectives Contents Concepts in the Brain: Neuroscience, Embodiment, and Categorization Joseph B. McCaffrey Recalling History: Descartes, Hume, Reid, Kant, Ockham Conceptual Distinctions and the Concept of Substance in Descartes Alan Nelson The Concept of Body in Hume's Treatise Miren Boehm Conceiving without Concepts: Reid vs. The Way of Ideas Lewis Powell Why the "Concept" of Spaces is not a Concept for Kant Thomas Vinci Ockham on Concepts of Beings Sonja Schierbaum On Contemporary Philosophy Paradoxes in Philosophy and Sociology Note on Zeno's Dichotomy I. M. R. Pinheiro The Epigenic Paradox within Social Development Robert Kowalski Concepts, Sense, and Ontology What Happened to the Sense of a Concept-Word? Carlo Penco Sense, Mentalese, and Ontology Jacob Beck Concepts Within the Model of Triangulation Maria Cristina Amoretti A Critique of David Chalmers' and Frank Jackson's Account of Concepts Ingo Brigandt The Influence of Language on Conceptualization: Three Views Agustin Vicente, Fernando MartinezManrique Representations, Contents, and Brain Views of Concepts and of Philosophy of Mind-from Representationalism to Contextualism Sofia Miguens Changes in View: Concepts in Experience Richard Manning Concepts and Fat Plants: Non-Classical Categories, Typicality Effects, Ecological Constraints Marcello Frixione eBook, ISBN-13: 9783739258973, 17,99 € Book on Demand, ISBN-13: 9783738641653, 32,– € Published Volumes248 © ProtoSociologyVolume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity ProtoSociology An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research Volume 29, 2012 China's Modernization II – Edited by Georg Peter and Reuss-Markus Krausse Contents Neoliberalism and the Changes in East Asian Welfare and Education Business Opportunities and Philanthropic Initiatives: Private Entrepreneurs, Welfare Provision and the Prospects for Social Change in China Beatriz Carrillo Garcia Time, Politics and Homelessness in Contemporary Japan Ritu Vij Educational Modernisation Across the Taiwan Straits: Pedagogical Transformation in Primary School Moral Education Textbooks in the PRC and Taiwan David C. Schak Is China Saving Global Capitalism from the Global Crisis? Ho-fung Hung On Contemporary Philosophy International Development, Paradox and Phronesis Robert Kowalski Précis of "The World in the Head" Robert Cummins Communication, Cooperation and Conflict Steffen Borge On Contempary Theory of Modernisation Multiple Modernities and the Theory of Indeterminacy-On the Development and Theoretical Foundations of the Historical Sociology of Shmuel N. Eisenstadt Manussos Marangudakis Changing China: Dealing with Diversity Dissent of China's Public Intellectuals in the Post-Mao Era Merle Goldman Modernization of Law in China-its Meaning, Achievements, Obstacles and Prospect Qingbo Zhang China's State in the Trenches: A Gramscian Analysis of Civil Society and Rights-Based Litigation Scott Wilson Manufacturing Dissent: Domestic and International Ramifications of China's Summer of Labor Unrest Francis Schortgen and Shalendra Sharma eBook, ISBN-13: 9783739258966, 17,99 € Book on Demand, ISBN-13: 9783738641646, 32,– € 249Published Volumes © ProtoSociology Volume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity ProtoSociology An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research Volume 28, 2011 China's Modernization I Contents Changing China: Dealing with Diversity Class, Citizenship and Individualization in China's Modernization Björn Alpermann Chinese Nation-Building as, Instead of, and Before Globalization Andrew Kipnis Principles for Cosmopolitan Societies: Values for Cosmopolitan Places John R. Gibbins On Modernization: Law, Business, and Economy in China Modernizing Chinese Law: The Protection of Private Property in China Sanzhu Zhu Chinese Organizations as Groups of People-Towards a Chinese Business Administration Peter J. Peverelli Income Gaps in Economic Development: Differences among Regions, Occupational Groups and Ethnic Groups Ma Rong Thinking Differentiations: Chinese Origin and the Western Culture Signs and Wonders: Christianity and Hybrid Modernity in China Richard Madsen Confucianism, Puritanism, and the Transcendental: China and America Thorsten Botz-Bornstein China and the Town Square Test Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom Metaphor, Poetry and Cultural Implicature .. Ying Zhang On Contemporary Philosophy Can Science Change our Notion of Existence? Jody Azzouni The Epistemological Significance of Practices Alan Millar On Cappelen and Hawthrone's "Relativism and Monadic Truth" J. Adam Carter eBook, ISBN-13: 9783739258928, 17,99 € Book on Demand, ISBN-13: 9783734761270, 32,– € Published Volumes250 © ProtoSociologyVolume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with His Responses Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter (Eds.) Introduction: Raimo Tuomela's Philosophy of Sociality, Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter I Collective Intentionality, Membership, and Reasoning, Kirk Ludwig Methodological Individualism, the Wemode, and Team reasoning Response by Raimo Tuomela Michael Schmitz What is a Mode Account of Collective Intentionality? Response by Raimo Tuomela Hans Bernhard Schmid What Kind of Mode is the We-Mode? On Raimo Tuomela's Account of Collective Intentionality Response by Raimo Tuomela David Schweikard Voluntary Groups, Noncompliance, and Conflicts of Reasons: Tuomela on Acting as a Group-Member. Response by Raimo Tuomela Raul Hakli, Pekka Mäkelä Planning in the We-mode Response by Raimo Tuomela II Social Ontology and Social Institutions Arto Laitinen We-mode Collective Intentionality and its Place in Social Reality Response by Raimo Tuomela Martin Rechenauer Tuomela meets Burge. Another Argument for Anti-Individualism Response by Raimo Tuomela Springer International Publishing AG, 2017 251Bookpublication © ProtoSociology Volume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity Sociology Ohnmächtige Weltmacht China: Modernisierung ohne Harmonie, Gerhard Preyer, Reuss-Markus Krausse, Springer VS Verlag Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2017. Struktur und Semantic Map Zur soziologischen Theorie Shmuel N. Eisenstadts, Gerhard Preyer, Springer VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2016 . Varieties of Multiple Modernities: New Research Design, Gerhard Preyer and Michael Sussman (eds.). Brill Publisher, 2015. Hybridisierung China – Modernisierung und Mitgliedschaftsordnung der chinesischen Gesellschaft. Reuss-Markus Krausse. Spinger/ VS Verlag, 2015. Chinas Power-Tuning: Modernisierung des Reichs der Mitte, Gerhard Preyer, ReussMarkus Krausse, Spinger/VS Verlag 2013. Rolle, Status, Erwartungen und soziale Gruppe. Gerhard Preyer. Spinger/VS Verlag. 2012. Selbstbeobachtung der modernen Gesellschaft und die neuen Grenzen des Sozialen. Georg Peter und Reuss Markus Krausse (Hrsg.). Spinger/VS Verlag. 2012 Zur Aktualität von Shmuel N. Eisenstadt- Eine Einleitung in sein Werk. Gerhard Preyer. VS Verlag 2011. In China erfolgreich sein-Kulturunterschiede erkennen und überbrücken. Gerhard Preyer, Reuss-Markus Krausse. Gabler Verlag 2009. Borderlines in a Globalized World. New Perspectives in a Sociology of the World System. Gerhard Preyer, Mathias Bös (eds.). Kluwer 2002. Philosophy Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with His Responses, Gerhard Preyer, Georg Peter (eds.). Springer Academic Publishers 2017. Prereflective Consciousnes – Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, Sofia Miguens, Clara Morando, Gerhard Preyer (eds.). Routledge 2015. From Individual to Collective Intentionality-New Essays, edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, and Gerhard Preyer. Oxford University Press 2013. Consciousness and Subjectivity. Sofia Miguens, Gerhard Preyer (eds.). Ontos Publishers 2012. Triangulation-From an Epistemological Point of View. Maria Cristina Amoretti, Gerhard Preyer (eds.). Ontos Publishers 2011. Intention and Practical Thought. Gerhard Preyer. Humanities Online 2011. Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism-New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter (eds.). Oxford University Press 2007. Contextualism in Philosophy. Knowledge, Meaning an Truth. Gerhard Preyer, Georg Peter (eds.). Oxford University Press 2005. Concepts of Meaning. Framing an Integrated Theory of Linguistic Behavior. Gerhard Preyer, Georg Peter, Maria Ulkan (eds.). Kluwer 2003. Rep. Springer Verlag, Wien. Logical Form and Language. Gerhard Preyer, Georg Peter (eds.). Oxford University Press 2002. The Contextualization of Ratio nality. Gerhard Preyer, Georg Peter (eds.). Mentis 2000. Bookpublications of the Project (extract) 252Bookpublications © ProtoSociology Volume 34/2017: Meaning and Publicity

Conscious will, reason-responsiveness, and moral responsibility Markus E. Schlosser Forthcoming in the Journal of Ethics This is the manuscript (which may differ from the final print version in minor details) Abstract: Empirical evidence challenges many of the assumptions that underlie traditional philosophical and commonsense conceptions of human agency. It has been suggested that this evidence threatens also to undermine free will and moral responsibility. In this paper, I will focus on the purported threat to moral responsibility. The evidence challenges assumptions concerning the ability to exercise conscious control and to act for reasons. This raises an apparent challenge to moral responsibility as these abilities appear to be necessary for morally responsible agency. I will argue that this challenge collapses once the underlying conditions on moral responsibility are specified in sufficient detail. I will argue, in other words, that the empirical evidence does not support a challenge to the assumption that we are, in general, morally responsible agents. In the final section, I will suggest that empirical research on human agency is nevertheless relevant to various questions about moral responsibility. Keywords: Moral responsibility, conscious control, automaticity, reason-responsiveness, situationism, philosophy of cognitive science 1. Introduction Over the past few decades, it has often been argued that common conceptions of human agency are untenable in the light of empirical evidence from psychology and cognitive neuroscience. It has also often been suggested that this evidence challenges the assumption that we are free and morally responsible agents. Intuitively, it is not difficult to see why the evidence seems to threaten free will and moral responsibility. This is obviously an important issue, and a great amount of attention has been devoted to the empirical challenge to free will. In contrast, the challenge to moral responsibility has not received much detailed analysis. I will focus here on this empirical challenge to moral responsibility, and I will argue that the challenge collapses once the underlying necessary conditions on moral responsibility are specified in sufficient detail. First, I will provide summary accounts of the empirical challenges (section 2). Then I will explain why we can set the issue of free will aside and why it makes sense to focus on the empirical challenge to moral responsibility (section 3). In the main part, I will 2 distinguish between two lines of argument (section 4). According to the first, the empirical evidence undermines moral responsibility, because it shows that conscious will is an illusion. According to the second, the evidence undermines moral responsibility, because it shows that we are not responsive to the right reasons. Both arguments are general and largely theory-independent insofar as they are based on widely accepted conditions on moral responsibility, and insofar as they do not depend on the claims and commitments of particular theories of moral responsibility. I will argue that neither of the two arguments withstands closer inspection (sections 5 and 6). We will see, moreover, that there is empirical evidence in support of the assumption that we are able to exercise conscious control and that we are reason-responsive. We will see, in other words, that there is empirical evidence in support of the assumption that we are, in general, morally responsible agents. In section 7, I will say more about which theories of moral responsibility are covered by this general response, and I will explain why the response applies to criminal responsibility as well. Further, I will turn to theories that are not covered by the main response, and I will argue that the empirical evidence does not raise a challenge to these theories either. In the final part (section 8), I will suggest that empirical evidence on human agency can nevertheless be relevant to various practical questions on moral responsibility and that it provides valuable theoretical knowledge concerning the mechanisms that underlie morally responsible agency. It will be admitted, however, that some of the evidence shows that we-or most of us-are less reason-responsive than we would like to think. 2. Empirical challenges: A brief summary In order to introduce the challenge to free will and moral responsibility, let me begin with brief summary accounts of the main conclusions that have been drawn from the evidence that is most relevant to the issue at hand. Representative examples of the evidence for these claims will be discussed in due course. We can distinguish between the following four empirical claims (EC): (EC1) Actions are not consciously initiated. Empirical evidence supports the view that our actions are initiated by unconscious processes rather than conscious 3 intentions: some actions are preceded by conscious intentions, but they are not initiated by them (Libet 1985; Wegner 2002; Soon et al. 2008). (EC2) Most actions are not consciously controlled. Empirical evidence supports the view that most actions are automatic: most actions are controlled by stimulus-driven mechanisms that operate outside conscious awareness and without conscious guidance (Kihlstrom 1987; Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Custers and Aarts 2010). 1 (EC3) Reason explanations are not causal explanations. Empirical evidence supports the view that commonsense reason explanations of actions are based on interpretation or post-hoc rationalization rather than on access to the causes of our actions: what we take to be our reasons are interpretive or theoretical constructs rather than the real causes of our actions (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Gazzaniga and LeDoux 1978; Wegner 2002; Johansson et al. 2006). (EC4) Character traits do not explain behavior. Empirical evidence supports the view that behavior is to be explained primarily in terms of situational features, which suggests that commonsense explanations of behavior in terms of character traits (such as honesty, kindness, and courage) are systematically mistaken (Ross and Nisbett 1991; Harman 1999; Doris 2002). EC1 – 4 challenge common assumptions about human agency: assumptions that underlie traditional philosophical and commonsense conceptions of human agency. Intuitively, they also challenge the assumption that we have free will and that we are, in general, justified in holding each other morally responsible-they challenge free will and moral responsibility, for short. EC1 is most frequently mentioned in this respect, but EC2 – 4 are also relevant here, as I will explain in due course (see, most prominently, Libet 1999; Wegner 2002; see also Doris 2002; Nelkin 2005; Roskies 2006; Pockett et al. 2006; Baer et al. 2008; SinnottArmstrong and Nadel 2011). 1 Obviously, EC1 and EC2 are closely related and there is a potential overlap as the conscious control of action can plausibly be taken to involve the conscious initiation of action. Nevertheless, the two claims can be distinguished from each other insofar as they are based on distinct strands of empirical research. 4 3. Free will and moral responsibility Anyone who is interested in the traditional philosophical and in the empirical debate about free will and moral responsibility will have noticed that these two debates are largely disconnected. The main question in the traditional philosophical debate has been whether or not free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. In the empirical debate, the main issue has not been whether our choices and actions are causally determined, but how they are caused. In particular, there has been much debate about the role of consciousness in the control of action and about the influence of situational factors-issues that have not been at the forefront in the philosophical debate. There has also been much philosophical debate about the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. According to a traditional view, free will is necessary for moral responsibility insofar as the ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. This view has been challenged more recently. In particular, both free will and moral responsibility have been disassociated from the ability to do otherwise, and it has been argued that they are independent in the sense that moral responsibility may be compatible with determinism even if free will is not (see Frankfurt 1969; Fischer 1994; Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Clarke 2003). In contrast, in the empirical debate the relationship between free will and moral responsibility has not been discussed, and it has remained unclear whether the evidence is supposed to challenge free will and moral responsibility, or whether it is supposed to challenge moral responsibility because it challenges free will. However, in light of the evidence, the former interpretation is clearly more plausible. To see this, note that none of the empirical claims (EC1 – 4) challenges free will and moral responsibility directly. Rather, they challenge certain features of human agency that are presumed to be necessary for free will and moral responsibility. In particular, EC1 and EC2 challenge commonsense assumptions about conscious control, EC3 challenges assumptions about the ability to act for reasons, and EC4 challenges an assumption about the role of character traits. Given this, the empirical claims seem to challenge free will insofar as the mentioned abilities and features of human agency are necessary for free will. The same holds for moral responsibility. The empirical claims seem to challenge moral responsibility insofar as the mentioned abilities and features of human agency are necessary for moral responsibility. 5 This means that we can set the empirical challenge to free will aside and focus on the challenge to moral responsibility, as the latter does not depend on the former. Moreover, I think that there are good reasons to do just that. First, it is sometimes remarked that we care about free will only insofar as it is necessary for moral responsibility. Even if this claim is too strong, as I think, it seems safe to say that we care about moral responsibility at least as much as we care about free will. Despite this, the empirical challenge to moral responsibility has not received much detailed analysis in comparison to the challenge to free will. 2 Second, I suspect that most of the attention has been devoted to the challenge to free will because it has been assumed that one can address the challenge to moral responsibility by addressing the challenge to free will. However, as mentioned, in philosophy the relationship between free will and moral responsibility has been controversial. It may be, then, that the strategy of addressing the challenge to moral responsibility by addressing the challenge to free will is based on false assumptions concerning the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. Given this, it makes sense to investigate whether the empirical evidence raises a challenge to moral responsibility independently of whether or not it raises a challenge to free will. Third, the nature of free will has itself been controversial. Recently, it has become common to bypass this issue by defining "free will" as whatever kind of agency or control that is required for moral responsibility (see, for instance, Pereboom 2001; Vargas 2007; Nelkin 2011). On this view, it makes not only sense to focus on the challenge to moral responsibility. Rather, we have to investigate whether the evidence challenges moral responsibility in order to see whether it challenges free will, because free will is defined in terms of moral responsibility. Given all this, we have more than ample reason to focus on the empirical challenge to moral responsibility. 2 The empirical challenge to moral responsibility has received much attention, but not much detailed analysis. It has usually been addressed by way of addressing the challenge to free will, and the two challenges have often not been clearly distinguished. See Libet 1999; Wegner 2002; Greene and Cohen 2004; Roskies 2006; and many of the contributions to Pockett et al. 2006; Baer et al. 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong and Nadel 2011. Doris 2002 and Nelkin 2005 focus on the challenge to moral responsibility, but their discussion is restricted to the challenge from EC4. 6 4. The empirical challenge to moral responsibility Let us turn, then, to the question of how the empirical challenges might generate a challenge to moral responsibility. My main aim here is to provide a diagnosis that is based on widely accepted assumptions about moral responsibility and that is largely independent from the claims and commitments of particular theories of moral responsibility. This will enable me to provide a general response that is largely theory-independent in this sense. (We will return to this and to theories that are not covered by this strategy in section 7.) As mentioned, EC1 and EC2 challenge commonsense assumptions about conscious control, EC3 challenges assumptions about our ability to act for reasons, and EC4 challenges an assumption about the role of character traits. It is widely agreed that the ability to act for reasons is necessary for moral responsibility, and it seems only plausible to assume that moral responsibility requires the ability to exercise conscious control over one's actions. Given this, we can identify, to a first approximation, two conditions on moral responsibility that would seem to generate an empirical challenge on the basis of EC1 – 3: (CC) Moral responsibility requires conscious control. (AR) Moral responsibility requires the ability to act for reasons. EC4, which is commonly known as situationism, would seem to raise an obvious challenge to character-based accounts of moral responsibility. Such accounts are rather uncommon, as it seems clear that acting in accord with character traits is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral responsibility (see Doris 2002, 128–132; Nelkin 2005). Moreover, traditional character-based accounts are motivated by the idea that an agent can be held responsible only if the behavior in question can be attributed to an enduring feature of the agent (Hume 1960/1740, 411). This does not require that the agent possesses character traits in a robust and traditional philosophical sense (such as honesty, kindness, or courage). It requires only the possession of enduring behavioral dispositions, and it is generally acknowledged that this is compatible with the evidence for situationism (see Doris 2002 and Nelkin 2005). Given this, we can safely ignore the challenge from EC4 to character-based accounts. However, the evidence for EC4 may also be taken to challenge the assumption that we are responsive to the relevant reasons, and thereby to generate a challenge on the basis of AR, as I will explain below (section 6.2). 7 CC and AR are plausible conditions, but they are also extremely vague. In order to assess whether CC and AR do indeed generate a challenge to moral responsibility (in conjunction with EC1 – 4), it is necessary to specify them in more detail. In the following two sections, I will propose plausible specifications, and I will argue that sufficiently refined versions of CC and AR fail to support a general empirical challenge to moral responsibility. 5. Moral responsibility and conscious control Does moral responsibility require conscious control? All depends here on how this condition is understood more specifically, and there is a host of issues that one may wish to have clarified. At what point must the agent have or exercise conscious control? Over which action? Does the agent have to be aware of performing an action under a certain description? What is the underlying notion of control? What kind of consciousness is required? And so on. If we gave answers to all these questions, we would obtain a highly specific condition. This would, presumably, commit us to specific views on moral responsibility, and it would exclude others-something that I would rather avoid. But we can make progress here if we turn the approach around: instead of reflecting on CC itself, we can begin by asking how EC1 and EC2 are supposed to undermine moral responsibility by undermining the condition on conscious control in CC. Before we turn to that, let me add some general qualifications. First, I will assume that the required kind of consciousness is access consciousness, not phenomenal consciousness: to require conscious control is to require that conscious access to the relevant mental representations plays the right role in the control of one's actions. This is a plausible qualification that does not beg any questions, as the empirical evidence for EC1 and EC2 concerns only the role of reportable (that is, accessible) representations. Second, one might construe CC as a condition on being a morally responsible agent. This would seem to be uncontroversial, but also uninteresting. The interesting question is how we can turn CC into a more specific and plausible condition on moral responsibility for particular actions (and omissions). Third, if we construe CC as a condition on moral responsibility for actions, then we have to restrict it to direct (or 8 underived) responsibility. To see why, consider the case of drunk driving, which is a standard example of indirect (or derived) responsibility. One may be held morally responsible for the consequences of drunk driving even if one does, at the time, not have sufficient conscious control over one's actions. The reason that is usually given here is, roughly, that the responsibility derives from earlier actions over which one had conscious control and which were known, at that time, to incur considerable risks. The responsibility for drinking is direct, and it grounds the indirect responsibility for the consequences of drunk driving. 3 Examples of this kind show that it would clearly be implausible to impose a condition along the lines of CC on cases of indirect responsibility. Accordingly, the discussion will be restricted to direct moral responsibility (and I shall omit this qualification from now on). As indicated, I propose to make CC more specific not by reflecting further on this condition, but by turning to the empirical challenges. How do we have to specify CC so that EC1 and EC2 raise a challenge to moral responsibility? The most obvious and the most important point to note here is that the empirical evidence in support of EC1 and EC2 concerns exclusively the role of conscious states that either proximally precede or accompany the execution of overt behavior-it concerns, as I shall say, the role of consciousness in the proximal and online control of action. Taking this into account, one may specify CC as follows: An agent is morally responsible for an action (or omission) only if the agent exercises proximal and online conscious control over it. However, this condition is clearly too strong. Obvious counterexamples are provided by habitual actions and by cases that involve unintentional omissions. Consider the following. Suppose that you were driving on the motorway and that you forgot to indicate before you pulled over to overtake another car. Suppose that this resulted in an accident. It seems highly implausible to suggest that you are responsible for causing the accident only if you exercised proximal and online conscious control over not indicating. Most would agree, here, that you may well be fully responsible even if you did not exercise proximal and 3 Cases that involve severe addiction are more complicated, but we can ignore this issue here. 9 online conscious control over not indicating (depending on further details of the case). Note that this case is complex, in the sense that it is neither a pure action nor a pure omission. It involves an action, an omission, and an outcome (the accident). We assume that the outcome is to be explained in terms of both the action and the omission. To say that you may be fully responsible is to say, then, that you may be fully responsible for the outcome because you may be responsible for both the action and the omission. It seems, however, that we can turn CC into a condition that can accommodate such cases if we turn it into a claim about the ability to exercise proximal and online conscious control: (ACC) An agent is morally responsible for performing (or failing to perform) an action only if the agent is able, at the time, to exercise proximal and online conscious control over that action. Return to the example. We assume that you caused the accident partly because you did not indicate. According to ACC, you are responsible for this omission only if you were able, at the time, to exercise proximal and online conscious control over indicating. For all we know, this condition holds. Everyone, we may assume, who is able to drive a car is able to exercise conscious control over whether or not to indicate (other things, such as the mechanics and electronics of the car, being equal). With some adjustments, the example suggests also that ACC can accommodate responsibility for habitual actions and omissions. Suppose that you did not indicate because you have the bad habit of not indicating before you overtake. This does not change anything. Given that the omission was habitual, you probably did not exercise proximal and online conscious control over not indicating. Yet, there is no reason to think that you were unable to exercise conscious control over whether or not to indicate, and you may well be fully responsible. 4 The same would seem to hold for the manifestations of a good habit to indicate (when you are supposed to). There is no reason to think that you are unable to 4 Note the difference between this case and cases of indirect (or derived) responsibility, such as drunk driving. Indirect responsibility is grounded in earlier acts for which one is directly responsible. This cannot be said about the present case, for it is not clear that the omission of not indicating can be traced back to earlier acts. We assume that you have a habit of not indicating, but you may not have done anything to acquire this habit. 10 exercise conscious control over whether or not to indicate, and you may be fully responsible for manifesting the habit (and the consequences thereof). Note that this condition on omissions and habitual actions is only plausible. It is plausible to hold that one can be held responsible for an omission only if one could have done intentionally and consciously what one failed to do, and it is plausible to hold that one can be held responsible for a habitual action (or omission) only if one could have done intentionally and consciously what one did (or failed to do) out of habit. ACC appears to be a plausible condition and it appears to generate challenges to moral responsibility on the basis of EC1 and EC2. In the following two sections, I will assume ACC for the sake of argument, and I will respond to the challenges from EC1 and EC2 in turn. It is important to note, here, that should ACC be too strong or untenable for other reasons, then so much the worse for those who think that the empirical evidence on conscious control challenges moral responsibility. ACC is the best candidate for establishing a plausible connection between moral responsibility and conscious control-if ACC is untenable, then so are the empirical challenges from EC1 and EC2. 5.1. Conscious control and EC1 According to EC1, consciousness plays no role in the initiation (or proximal control) of action. I will argue now that EC1 is compatible with the control condition in ACC, because the exercise of proximal conscious control can be conditioned. In order to explain this, it will be helpful to consider Benjamin Libet's well-known neuroscientific challenge to free will. We will see here that the focus on responsibility enables a response that goes beyond the standard reply to this challenge. In the Libet experiment, participants were instructed to initiate a certain movement when they felt like doing so. During this, the occurrence of the readiness potential (RP) was recorded. The RP is an unconscious brain potential that was known to precede voluntary movements. Libet found that RPs precede the conscious intentions to move by about 350ms, and he drew two main conclusions from this: movements are not consciously initiated and we do not have free will in the sense we commonly think we do (Libet 1985 and 1999). Both conclusions have been challenged for various reasons and the issue has remained controversial to this day (Pockett et al. 2006; Mele 2009; Sinnott-Armstrong and Nadel 11 2011; Schlosser 2012a). I will argue here only that the evidence is compatible with the assumption that participants possessed and exercised a kind of proximal conscious control that is sufficient for moral responsibility, and I will set aside the questions of whether this kind of control is the same as genuine conscious initiation and sufficient for free will. In the main experiment, participants were instructed to initiate a certain movement when the "urge to act" arises (Libet 1985). According to Libet, some participants reported that "during some of the trials a recallable conscious urge to act appeared but was 'aborted' or somehow suppressed". They "waited for another urge to appear" which was then executed as instructed (ibid., 538). Let us call this the initiation experiment and let us refer to the mentioned trials as spontaneous veto trials. In order to investigate this further, Libet conducted a version of the experiment in which participants were instructed to inhibit the movement when the urge to move arises. Let us call this the instructed veto experiment. We may assume that participants in both experiments formed distal intentions at the beginning of the experiment in accord with the instructions: an intention to perform the movement when the urge arises or an intention to inhibit the movement when the urge arises. The reports from the spontaneous veto trials suggest that the former do not determine the execution of the movement whenever an urge to move arises. But it seems nevertheless clear that the distal intentions were causally efficacious in the initiation experiment, because all participants did eventually what they intended to do (Zhu 2003, for instance). The same can be said about the instructed veto experiment. Presumably, participants intended to comply with the instruction to inhibit the movement, and that is what they did. In all cases, the distal intentions conditioned the proximal control, as I shall say: they conditioned whether the agent initiated or inhibited the movement. Libet argued that the instructed veto experiment supports the claim that we have "conscious veto control" (Libet 1999). In particular, it seems to support the claim that all participants, including the ones in the initiation experiment, were able to consciously inhibit the movement. It has been noted that this argument is highly problematic, as the veto experiment is highly problematic. The veto experiment seems to require something impossible: that one intends to move and intends not to move (Mele 2009, for instance). What has not been noted, however, is that the comparison between the regular initiation and the spontaneous veto trials supports the same conclusion: given that some participants in 12 the initiation experiment inhibited the movement in response to becoming consciously aware of the urge to move, and given that nothing in the instructions or in the circumstances can account for this, we have reason to think that all participants in the initiation experiment were able to inhibit the movement in response to becoming consciously aware of the urge to move. This alone suffices to satisfy ACC, which requires only an ability to exercise conscious control. However, one might insist, plausibly, that it must also be shown here that the participants exercised conscious control, as they paid close attention and formed conscious intentions. 5 According to a standard response to Libet's challenge, the evidence is at least compatible with the interpretation that participants exercised proximal conscious control (see Zhu 2003; Mele 2009). This response emphasizes the point that motivational states (such as desires and urges) must be distinguished from executive states (such as intentions and decisions), and it suggests that participants first became consciously aware of an urge to move in response to which they decided to execute the movement. This interpretation is compatible with the evidence and it suggests that participants exercised proximal conscious control-it suggests this especially in light of the assumption that they were able to inhibit the movement in response to becoming consciously aware of the urge to move. Given what has been said above, we can identify a further role for consciousness in the initiation of the movements, but we also have to qualify the standard reply concerning the agent's exercise of proximal control. As pointed out, participants formed distal intentions that conditioned whether they initiated or inhibited the movement-intentions that conditioned their proximal control. For all we know, the distal intentions were formed consciously. Given this, it seems clear that consciousness played also a distal role in the initiation of the movements. However, this also means that the agent's exercise of proximal control was conditioned by the distal intentions. Here is where the focus on responsibility 5 I shall assume here for the sake of argument that the conscious events that proximately preceded the movements were conscious intentions. I should note, however, that this assumption has also been questioned. For instance, Keller and Heckhausen (1990, 359) suggested that the conscious events in question were the result of the "selective attention" to look for an urge to move, which was, in turn, induced by the artificial setup and the instructions of the experiment. They suggested, in other words, that the conscious events in question were neither intentions nor conscious events that precede ordinary actions. 13 becomes relevant. One might think that an action is performed with free will only if it is not conditioned in this sense, perhaps because one thinks that free will requires that the agent is the genuine and spontaneous initiator of the action (whatever that means, exactly). 6 In contrast, the exercise of unconditioned conscious control is clearly not required for moral responsibility. To see this, take any two instances of a wrongful act and assume that the initiation of the action was conditioned by a distal intention only in one of the two cases. There is absolutely no reason to think that the agent who executed a distal intention is any less responsible for the action (other things being equal). To the contrary, the fact that the agent executed a distal intention suggests that the action was planned or premeditated, which would, if anything, seem to increase the degree of responsibility. Note that it does not matter that the distal intentions did not condition the precise timing of the action. The Libet experiment required initiation (or inhibition) within a certain timeframe, and so we may assume that participants formed distal intentions to initiate (or inhibit) the action within that timeframe, which clearly conditioned the timing of their proximal control. More importantly, the precise timing of an action is usually irrelevant to moral responsibility. We are typically responsible for performing (or failing to perform) certain types of action, not for the precise timing of their execution-and if the timing matters, it matters usually only insofar as performing a certain movement at a certain time is constitutive of being a particular type of action. Further, the timing of everyday actions is usually conditioned or constrained by situational factors, and successful execution usually depends on this kind of sensitivity. The fact that our actions are conditioned in this way does not render us less responsible, especially if they are conditioned in accord with distal intentions. And the vast majority of our everyday actions are conditioned by distal intentions and plans. In fact, it is difficult to think of individual acts that are entirely unconditioned-or truly spontaneous-as even spontaneous acts are usually constrained by some of our long-term plans, beliefs, or commitments. 6 Libet and his followers assumed such a strong conception of free will (Libet 1999; Wegner 2002). Some philosophers think that free choices can be conditioned by antecedent states and events only if the conditioning is not deterministic (Kane 1998; O'Connor 2000; Pereboom 2001; Clarke 2003). Others, including myself, think that free will is compatible with deterministic causation as well. In any case, the point here is merely that it seems at least prima facie plausible to require unconditioned control for free will. 14 Note, further, that most experiments on voluntary action and decision-making provide indirect support for the claim that we are able to exercise proximal conscious control by way of forming distal intentions. In most experiments, participants are asked, in effect, to form distal intentions about how to exercise proximal control during the experiment. If everything goes well, they do what they are asked to do, usually in response to becoming aware of certain stimuli or circumstances. Moreover, there is also plenty of direct evidence from the research on implementation intentions for this. Implementation intentions are distal intentions to perform a certain action when certain circumstances obtain. The evidence shows that forming implementation intentions has a medium-to-strong effect on subsequent behavior (for an extensive meta-analysis see Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006). This is good evidence for the kind of control described above: consciously formed intentions that lead to the exercise of proximal control in response to becoming aware that certain conditions or circumstances obtain. To conclude, then, the exercise of unconditioned conscious control is not required for moral responsibility, and the claim that we can consciously initiate actions by way of exercising conditioned conscious control is compatible with EC1 and supported by empirical evidence. Note that this response is largely independent from the particular details of the Libet experiment, as it is based primarily on considerations concerning the role of distal intentions in the conditioning of proximal conscious control. It is, in other words, a perfectly general response to the challenge to moral responsibility from EC1. 7 5.2. Conscious control and EC2 According to EC2, most of our actions are not consciously controlled. Much of the empirical evidence for EC2 stems from priming studies in which behavior is manipulated in ways that bypasses awareness and conscious control. Two main conclusions have been drawn from this research. First, the evidence shows that the control of actions does not require consciousness-that control can be automatic. Second, the evidence suggests that much of our everyday behavior is automatic. 7 Elsewhere I have responded to the closely related neuroscientific challenge to free will and to Daniel Wegner's empirical argument for the claim that conscious will is an illusion. See Schlosser 2012a and 2012b. 15 There is a vast amount of research on automaticity. In order to illustrate why the evidence is supposed to support the two claims it should suffice to consider three representative types of automaticity: over-learned motor skills, automatic stereotype activation, and automatic imitation. Much of the claimed automaticity in everyday life consists in over-learned motor skills. When one learns a new motor skill, one first has to pay attention to the individual steps. After some practice, the execution becomes automatic and conscious guidance is not required any more. This is thought to be a good thing, as it frees up attention for other tasks. Priming of stereotypes or trait concepts has been shown to increase the tendency to act in accord with the stereotype or trait. For instance, priming with words that are associated with the elderly induces temporarily a slower walking pace and priming with words related to rudeness leads to more interruptions during conversation than in the control group. Further, experiments have shown that we tend to imitate without awareness or conscious control. In particular, given certain goals and circumstances, we automatically imitate the posture of interlocutors. Given this-and many other studies on automaticity-, one can see why researchers have been drawn to the conclusion that much of our behavior is automatic (for more on all this see Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Custers and Aarts 2010). Is any of this incompatible with the control condition in ACC? Note, first of all, that most instances of automaticity are either basic act units that are in the service of conscious intentions or mere modulations of ongoing activity. For instance, the automatic actions that one performs while driving a car usually serve the conscious plan to drive from A to B, and the priming of stereotypes merely modulates how one walks, how one interacts with others, and so on. More importantly, the claim that the control of action does not require consciousness is fully compatible with the control condition in ACC. This condition requires the ability to exercise conscious control, not the actual exercise of conscious control. Given this, the claim that much of our behavior is not consciously controlled is clearly compatible with the claim that we are able to exercise conscious control over much of our behavior. To illustrate, return to our previous example and assume now that you have a good and reliable habit to indicate-that you tend to indicate automatically when you are supposed to. As mentioned, there is absolutely no reason to think that you are not able to exercise conscious control over your indicating actions. The same holds, to take 16 only one other example, for the tendency to imitate another person's posture. Nothing in the evidence suggests that this behavior cannot be consciously controlled. If it is brought to one's attention, one could stop imitating, and if one wants to imitate, one could consciously do so. One might object here that this does not hold for the automatic performance of highly skilled actions. Many actions become merely routine or over-learned with repetition. But some actions become also more skillful. For such actions, conscious control is not only not required, but it is detrimental to a successful performance. In other words, for some actions, control has to become automatic and unconscious for it to reach a certain level of skill. Common examples are the highly skilled movements of, say, athletes or dancers. Given this, one can imagine cases in which an agent is unable to exercise conscious control over an action for which the agent is, intuitively, responsible. Imagine, for instance, a sharpshooter who can hit a moving target only by getting into a state of high responsiveness in which he pulls the trigger automatically, and without conscious control, during a swift move of aiming ahead of the target's trajectory. However, far from showing that EC2 raises a challenge to moral responsibility, this shows only that there are exceptional cases. As it stands, ACC requires the ability to exercise proximal and online control. This makes sense for the vast majority of our actions, and there is no good reason to think that it does not hold for the vast majority of our actions. It holds even for most cases that involve highly skilled movements. Consider, for instance, the movements of a skilled tennis player. Arguably, the player must get into a certain flow of automatic actions and reactions in order to perform well. However, what is automatic here is only the fine-tuning of the player's online control and there is absolutely no reason to think that the player cannot consciously initiate, influence, and abort his play. There is no evidence that would suggest this, and the example strongly suggests that it would simply be crazy to think so. Let us return, then, to the sharpshooter example. We assume that a successful execution of the shot cannot be under his conscious control. This concerns only the finetuning of his online control over when to pull the trigger during the move of aiming ahead of the target. But for all we know, he has the intention to shoot, and he has conscious proximal control over whether or not to initiate the whole sequence. This is why he appears 17 to be responsible. The lack of online conscious control does not exempt him from responsibility, because he has proximal conscious control over the initiation of the sequence that allows him to exercise automatic control over when to pull the trigger. We could refine ACC further so as to accommodate such cases. But there is no need to do so, as such cases are highly unusual-ACC remains a very plausible condition that holds for the vast majority of our actions. The important point is that neither EC1 nor EC2 give rise to a general challenge to moral responsibility on the basis of ACC. We have seen, moreover, that there is evidence which provides indirect support for the assumption that we are morally responsible agents, because it provides support for the claim that we are able to exercise conscious control over our actions. 6. Moral responsibility and reason-responsiveness According to AR, moral responsibility requires the ability to act for reasons. This condition is widely accepted. But like CC, it requires further clarification. Note, first of all, that the condition requires the ability to act for reasons. This is only plausible as one may be responsible for an action independently of the reasons one acted for. In particular, one may be responsible for failing to act for certain reasons. It is now common to express this point by the claim that one must be reason-responsive: it is required that one is able to respond to reasons (see, for instance, Wallace 1994; Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Vargas 2007). Second, some philosophers have argued that acting for reasons does not require that the reasons play a causal role in the performance of the action. However, the widely held standard view is that an agent acts for reasons only if the reasons-or the mental states that represent the reasons-are causes of the action (Davidson 1963; Goldman 1970; Mele 2003; Schlosser 2010). Third, it seems clear that one may be morally responsible only if one is able to act for moral reasons. I shall express this by saying that the agent must be able to respond-or be responsive-to the relevant reasons. I take it that this has an epistemic component. That is to say, it is not sufficient that one is responsive in the sense that the reasons can trigger the right response. Rather, the agent must be able to respond to the relevant reasons qua reasons-in virtue of knowing and comprehending that they are reasons for the action. Given all this, condition AR can be reformulated as follows: 18 (ARR) An agent is morally responsible for performing (or failing to perform) an action only if the agent is, at the time, able to respond to the relevant reasons (qua reasons). This is another plausible condition on moral responsibility that appears to give rise to a challenge in connection with the empirical evidence. The most obvious threat here consists in the evidence for EC3. 6.1. Reason-responsiveness and EC3 According to EC3, evidence shows that ordinary and commonsense reason explanations of actions are not genuine causal explanations, because it shows that the reasons that we give are based on self-interpretation, theorizing, or post-hoc rationalization, rather than on direct or introspective access to the causes of our actions. Moreover, processes of selfinterpretation are thought to be subject to various biases, and so the reasons that we give in commonsense explanations are likely to be biased too. Consider, first, two observations. Strictly speaking, the evidence for EC3 cannot show that we are not reason-responsive, as it shows, at best, that the reasons that we take ourselves to be acting for are not the causes of our actions. This is compatible, in principle, with the claim that we are responsive to the relevant reasons and it is compatible with the claim that we are responsive to the reasons that we take ourselves to be acting for, because the fact that one does not respond to certain reasons (qua reasons) does not show that one is not able to respond to them. Although this is correct, strictly speaking and in principle, I think that we should not make much of it. The only kind of evidence for reasonresponsiveness that we can ever have stems from cases in which we act for reasons (qua reasons). If it were true that the reasons that we take ourselves to be acting for are never the real causes of our actions, then our reason-responsiveness would indeed be in doubt. A second point to note is that the evidence stems primarily from post-hoc interviews and questionnaires. This provides only indirect evidence about what reasons the participants took themselves to be acting for during the task. It may be, for instance, that perceived pressures to appear reasonable or implicit biases to maintain a certain self-image easily override one's memory. Or we may simply be rather poor in remembering and reporting our reasons-especially if they are reasons for the rather insignificant choices that 19 participants usually have to make in experimental situations. It is important to bear these points in mind. However, I think that we should not make much of this either. Some reports may be skewed by the implicit pressures of the situation, self-serving biases, or bad memory functions, but it is unlikely that this can explain away all the evidence in support of EC3. Whether we like it or not, we tend to confabulate reason explanations, at least in certain circumstances or with respect to certain actions. A more significant point is that most of the evidence stems from cases in which there are either no good or no salient reasons to choose one option rather than another. Consider, for instance, the famous position effect, which is perhaps the most frequently mentioned piece of evidence in support of EC3 (Nisbett and Wilson 1977, 243–44). Participants were asked to evaluate articles of clothing and to select the best quality product. In one study, they were shown four different night gowns. In a second study, they were shown four identical nylon stockings. In both cases, participants showed a pronounced tendency to rate the article positioned at the far right highest. They were entirely unaware of this position effect, and when they were asked to explain their choices, they referred to differences in quality. It is worth to note two points here, which are hardly ever mentioned. First, it would have been very odd if participants had given the position as a reason, because the position is clearly not a good reason to prefer any one item over the others. Second, it is unclear whether there were any salient reasons to prefer one gown over the others in the first study, and it is clear that there was no reason to prefer one of the four products in the second study. Given this, it should really be not so surprising that participants were very poor in giving their reasons. If there are no salient reasons, or if there are no good reasons at all, how could one do a good job in giving good reasons? In other words, it is not so surprising that participants confabulated reason explanations, because they had to. If there are no good or salient reasons, and if the experiment requires you to give reasons, what else can you do? This helps us to see why the evidence for EC3 should not be taken to raise doubts about our reason-responsiveness. Suppose that you failed to do what you had reason to do: there was a good reason, R, to perform a certain action, but you failed to respond to R. What evidence would count for (or against) the claim that you were reason-responsive, given that you did not respond? Suppose there are similar circumstances in which you act for the reason R, because R is more salient on these occasions. This would be evidence for 20 the claim that you would have acted for R in the original scenario, had R been more salient. This, in turn, would lend support to the claim that you were responsive to R in the original scenario, even though you did not respond. It would, even, provide some reason to assume that you are, in general, responsive to reasons of this kind. 8 Similarly, consistent failure on your part to respond to reasons of a certain kind-no matter how salient the reasons and no matter how high the stakes-, would provide evidence in support of the claim that you are not responsive to reasons of that kind. The point here is, then, that the empirical evidence in support of EC3, including the mentioned position effect, fails to show that we are not reason-responsive, because it does not provide evidence of this kind. 9 There is, in fact, plenty of evidence in support of the assumption that we are reasonresponsive. In a meta-analysis of evidence concerning the efficacy of intentions, Webb and Sheeran (2006) analyzed forty-nine studies of cases in which participants are given good reasons for significant real-life choices, such as reasons to take physical exercise, to wear a seatbelt, engage in parent-child communication, to have regular health checkups, to practice safe sex, to quit smoking, and so on. They found that the evidence supports the hypothesis that interventions on intentions by way of giving good reasons engenders the corresponding changes in intentions and actions. In particular, their meta-analysis shows that the intervention of reason-giving has a medium-to-large effect on changes in intentions, and that changes in intentions have a small-to-medium effect on changes in behavior. Note, here, that the modest effect size on changes in behavior is perfectly in line with reasonable expectations concerning the efficacy of intentions. We know, from everyday experience and observation, that intentions are not very effective when they are up against strong habits or addictions. The important point is that there is a robust effect from reason-giving all the way to changes in behavior across a wide range of real-life situations. Further, note 8 According to Fischer and Ravizza (1998), reason-responsiveness can be analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals. I am sympathetic to this view, but here I presume only the weaker claim that the truth of certain counterfactuals counts as evidence for reason-responsiveness. 9 Note that it would not seem to be particularly difficult to gather this kind of evidence. With respect to the position effect, for instance, it would be interesting to see what happens in cases where there are clear qualitative differences. This would provide a contrast class that may tell us something interesting about our responsiveness to the relevant reasons. 21 that some of the cases have clearly an ethical dimension. Given this, the meta-analysis provides at least some empirical support for the assumption that we are responsive to moral reasons (qua reasons). Finally, the received view, as expressed in EC3, is considerably stronger than the view that Nisbett and Wilson proposed in their seminal article. Their main claim was that verbal reports of mental states are based on self-interpretation, theorizing, or post-hoc rationalization, rather than on direct or introspective access. They noted, however, that this is perfectly compatible with the possibility that we are "often right about the causes of our judgments and behavior" (1977, 253). So, the reasons that we give in ordinary explanations of actions can be the real causes of our actions, and it is possible that they often are the real causes of our actions. This just means that, on their view, we can be responsive to the relevant reasons, and it is perfectly possible that we often are responsive to them. As far as I can see, this point holds for all the evidence that is usually given in support of EC3. This evidence supports, at best, an epistemic view about how we form beliefs about our reasons for actions, and it is, as such, perfectly compatible with the claim that the reasons that we take ourselves to be acting for can, and often are, the real causes of our actions (qua reasons). Moreover, the mentioned meta-analysis (Webb and Sheeran 2006) even casts doubt on the epistemic view that ordinary reason explanations are always based on selfinterpretation (theorizing or post-hoc rationalization). If one is given explicit reasons for a certain action, then it seems unlikely that one will confabulate a post-hoc rationalization, simply because one will not have to confabulate a reason explanation-unlike in cases where there are no good or no salient reasons. Reasons that were made explicit are relatively easy to remember and it is relatively easy to reproduce them, and so it seems likely that one will give those reasons when one is asked to explain one's action. 6.2. Reason-responsiveness and EC4 According to EC4, commonsense explanations of behavior in terms of character traits are systematically mistaken, because behavior is to be explained primarily in terms of situational features. As indicated, the empirical evidence for this view may be taken to challenge the assumption that we are responsive to the relevant reasons, and hence to challenge moral responsibility in conjunction with ARR (see Nelkin 2005). In order to 22 explain and discuss this, I shall consider two representative examples: the Milgram experiment and the evidence concerning the effects of mood on helping behavior. 10 In the Milgram experiment (Milgram 1963), participants showed a willingness to administer high levels of electric shocks to a person sitting in an adjacent room as punishment for mistakes in a memory test. The procedure started with shocks that were described as "slight", ending with "danger: severe shock", and "XXX". During this, more and more (prerecorded and fake) signs of distress and pain became audible through a speaker. The majority of participants (26 out of 40) went on to punish with the highest level of shock. Milgram interpreted the results in terms of obedience, as participants were told that they had to continue, as required by the experiment, when they hesitated or questioned the procedure. These orders were issued by an experimenter, who was present in the room, overlooking the proceedings. There is a large amount of evidence which shows that morally insignificant factors in the environment can affect the willingness to help by way of inducing positive or negative changes in the agent's mood (see, for instance, Carlson et al. 1988; Miller 2009). What is particularly surprising here is that both being in a positive mood and being in a negative mood leads to an increase in helping behavior relative to mood-neutral control groups. Various explanations have been proposed, for instance in terms of mood management: it may be that a good mood increases helping because helping behavior sustains the good mood and that a bad mood also increases helping because helping someone relieves the bad mood. There are problems with this and there are explanations that do not appeal to mood management, but these issues need not concern us here. Whatever the best explanation, it is surprising and counterintuitive that we are, apparently, least willing to help when we are in a neutral mood. Does evidence of this kind show that we are not responsive to the relevant reasons? In the Milgram experiment, the majority failed to respond to salient moral reasons. They responded, rather, to less important reasons to obey authority. The evidence on mood and helping behavior may be taken to show that we do not respond to moral reasons even when 10 As Nelkin (2005) points out, the challenge here does not stem from the thesis of situationism (EC4) itself, but from the empirical evidence for this view. 23 we engage in moral behavior. Under closer inspection one can see, however, that the evidence is not only compatible with the assumption that we are responsive to moral reasons, but that it provides some support for it. In the Milgram experiment, many of the participants who were willing to administer high shocks showed clear signs of reluctance and distress. Arguably, this is a sign of responsiveness to moral reasons. The assumption that they recognized a conflict between their behavior and what morality requires provides at least a good explanation of their reluctance and distress. More importantly, further experiments have shown that the results vary in significant ways with the level of "personalization" (Bandura 1999): Milgram's (1974) research on obedient aggression is widely cited as evidence that good people can be talked into performing cruel deeds. What is rarely noted is the equally striking evidence that most people refuse to behave cruelly, even under unrelenting authoritarian commands, if the situation is personalized by having them inflict pain by direct personal action rather than remotely and if they see the suffering they cause [...]. (202) As explained in the previous section, such variability in responses to reasons is not only compatible with the assumption that we are reason-responsive. Rather, the fact that the likelihood of an appropriate response varies in proportion to the salience (or "personalization") of the relevant reasons is evidence for the claim that we are responsive to the relevant reasons, even in those cases where we fail to respond. Concerning the influence of mood on helping behavior, it is crucial to note that the evidence shows only that being in a good or bad mood increases or augments the tendency to help. It does not show, or even suggest, that participants help only because they are in a good or bad mood (see Miller 2009). For all we know, they help partly because helping is a good thing to do and partly because their mood enhances or augments the motivation to act for that reason. Again, the fact that variations in the circumstances and the subsequent changes in mood tend to increase helping behavior suggests that we are, in general, responsive to the relevant moral reasons, even in those cases where we fail to help. To illustrate, consider any participant, P, who was assigned to a mood-neutral condition and who did not help. The evidence suggests that the right manipulation of P's mood would have made P's helping 24 likely: had P been assigned to a mood-manipulation condition, P would probably have helped. And, for all we know, if P had helped, P would have helped partly because helping is a good thing to do. This may be taken to suggest that P is responsive to the relevant moral reasons, even though he did not respond to them. Similar points hold, mutatis mutandis, for most of the evidence for EC4, and so I conclude that the evidence for EC4 fails also to generate a general challenge to moral responsibility. 7. Theories of moral responsibility and criminal responsibility This completes my main response to the empirical challenges to moral responsibility. As pointed out, this response is general and largely theory-independent insofar as it applies to the most widely accepted theories of moral responsibility, and insofar as it does not depend on the claims and commitments of particular theories. In this section, I will first say more about which theories are covered by this main response, and I will argue that this response applies also to criminal responsibility. Then I will turn to theories that are not covered by the main response. 7.1. The scope of the main response I proposed a diagnosis of the empirical challenge that distinguishes between a condition on conscious control (ACC) and a condition on reason-responsiveness (ARR). All theories of moral responsibility require that mental states, such as desires, beliefs, and intentions, have an influence on our choices and actions. Few theories make explicit claims concerning the role of consciousness in the initiation and control of action, but there is no theory according to which conscious control is not required at all. In particular, no theory requires the exercise of conscious control as a general necessary condition on moral responsibility, and no theory explicitly denies a condition along the lines of ACC-which requires the ability to exercise conscious control. Given this, it seems that the offered responses to the 25 empirical challenges from conscious control are perfectly general: they would seem to apply to all theories of moral responsibility. 11 Theories in which the notion of reason-responsiveness takes center stage have been very prominent in the recent debate. They are, as far as I can tell, currently the most widely accepted theories of moral responsibility. The most influential version of this view is the theory developed by Fischer 1994 and Fischer and Ravizza 1998. Other theories that appeal explicitly to reason-responsiveness include Wallace 1994; Arpaly 2003; Vargas 2007; and Nelkin 2011. Further, there are numerous other theories that do not explicitly employ the notion of reason-responsiveness, but that assume a condition along the lines of ARR-a condition that requires the ability to act for the relevant reasons. They include compatibilist theories, such as Dennett 1984; Wolf 1990; Mele 1995; and incompatibilist theories, such as van Inwagen 1983; Kane 1998; O'Connor 2000. Given all this, we can see that the offered responses to the empirical challenges from ARR cover the great majority of prominent theories of moral responsibility, including standard compatibilist and incompatibilist positions. 7.2. Criminal responsibility So far, the focus has been on moral responsibility. I will show now, in brief, that the main response applies also to criminal responsibility by showing that the proposed conditions on conscious control and reason-responsiveness are in line with the conditions on criminal responsibility. I will base my considerations here on the Model Penal Code (American Law Institute 1985). Consider, first, the condition on conscious control (ACC). The Model Penal Code requires that a culpable act is voluntary and it defines this negatively: it gives examples of involuntary acts (such as reflexes, sleepwalking, hypnosis) and it states that any bodily movement is involuntary "that is otherwise not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual" (§ 2.01). According to the commentary, this is 11 As pointed out in section 5, ACC appears to be the best candidate for establishing a plausible connection between moral responsibility and conscious control. Should ACC be untenable, then so are the empirical challenges to moral responsibility from conscious control. 26 supposed to capture "conduct that is not within the control of the actor" (215). Arguably, to require that something is "within" the control of the agent is to require that the agent is able to exercise control over it. Further, the qualification that the control may be "either conscious or habitual" strongly suggests that criminal responsibility does not require the exercise of conscious control. This shows that the conditions on criminal responsibility are in line with ACC, which requires the ability to exercise conscious control. According to ARR, moral responsibility requires the ability to respond to the relevant reasons (qua reasons). A good indication that this is in line with the conditions on criminal responsibility is provided by the Model Penal Code's section on "mental disease or defect excluding responsibility" (§ 4.01). This section states that an agent is not responsible for criminal conduct if the agent "lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law" (ibid., brackets in original). Although this passage refers to "conduct as a result of mental disease or defect", it clearly highlights the underlying presupposition that one must be able to understand the reasons why certain acts are wrong and to adjust one's behavior accordingly-a presupposition that is in line with ARR. See also Morse (2006, 37), who points out that "legally responsible or legally competent agents are people who have the general capacity to grasp and be guided by good reason". Given, then, that ACC and ARR are in line with the conditions on criminal responsibility, and given that the empirical evidence does not undermine AAC and ARR, as I have argued, we can conclude that the empirical challenges to common conceptions of human agency do not raise a general challenge to criminal responsibility either. 7.3. Self-disclosure and consequentialist theories In section 4, I already addressed one type of view that is not covered by the main response: character-based accounts. My approach was twofold. First, I noted that character-based accounts are unpromising and widely rejected, and then I pointed out that the empirical evidence would not undermine such views anyway. There are two more types of theories that are apparently not covered by the main response: consequentialist theories (for instance Schlick 1939; Smart 1963) and, what I shall call, self-disclosure theories. The latter come in two main versions. Hierarchical self-disclosure theories require, roughly, that the agent 27 identifies (or would identify) with the desire that motivates the behavior in question (Frankfurt 1971; Dworkin 1988). Non-hierarchical views require that the behavior in question is an expression of the agent's deep concerns and values (or the agent's "deep self") without imposing conditions concerning the agent's identification with desires. Some versions of non-hierarchical views require reason-responsiveness (Watson 1975; Arpaly 2003), whereas others require only that the agent is in principle reason-responsive-that an ideal agent would respond (Scanlon 1998; Smith 2005). My approach here is again twofold. First, I think it is fair to say that self-disclosure and consequentialist views are not nearly as widely endorsed as reason-responsiveness theories. In the case of consequentialist theories, this is an understatement. They are widely considered to be untenable (see, for instance, Strawson 1962; Wallace 1994; Scanlon 1986). Hierarchical theories are plagued by internal regress problems (Watson 1975) and they are, perhaps, better interpreted as accounts of self-governance rather than moral responsibility (Bratman 2004, for instance). They are, in any case, not particularly promising as accounts of moral responsibility. The most obvious problem stems from cases of weak-willed actions for which the agent is intuitively responsible, but which are motivated by desires with which the agent neither does identify nor would identify (see, for instance, Fischer 2012). Non-hierarchical self-disclosure views are free from the mentioned regress problems, but it is not clear that they can account for responsibility for weak-willed actions. In any case, it is not difficult to see that the empirical challenges to common conceptions of agency (EC1 – EC4) do not raise general challenges for those views either. Let us consider first non-hierarchical self-disclosure views. As mentioned, some versions of this view require reason-responsiveness. They are covered, in part, by the main response- they are covered insofar as the empirical challenges do not undermine the assumption that we are reason-responsive, as I have argued. Does the evidence challenge the assumption that our actions often express our concerns and values? The evidence for EC3 shows that our beliefs about which attitudes motivate our actions are, in certain circumstances, prone to errors. The evidence for EC4 shows that we tend to underestimate the influence of situational factors, and that we tend to overestimate the extent to which our actions express our attitudes. Further, the evidence for EC2 includes the evidence on the automatic influence of implicit biases, such as implicit gender or racial stereotypes (Greenwald and 28 Banaji 1995, for instance). This raises difficult questions for non-hierarchical selfdisclosure views. Are implicit attitudes ever part of one's "true self"? Are they, perhaps, part of one's true self if they are in line with one's explicit attitudes? And so on. However, despite raising difficult questions, the evidence does clearly not show that our actions never express our attitudes (including our deep concerns and values). It does not even show that our actions rarely express our attitudes. For all I can see, the evidence is compatible with the assumption that our actions often express our concerns and values, partly because the expression of attitudes does not depend on reliable self-knowledge; partly because I see no reason to assume that most intentional actions are driven by implicit biases or situational factors; and partly because the influence of implicit biases and situational factors does not rule out the influence of the agent's concerns and values. Moreover, we have seen that there is positive and direct evidence for the assumption in question. The meta-analysis concerning the efficacy of intentions (Webb and Sheeran 2006) shows that changes in the agent's explicit attitudes tend to bring about the corresponding changes behavior, which suggests, among other things, that our actions tend to express our concerns and values. Let us turn, then, to hierarchical versions of the self-disclosure view. One might worry here that some of the evidence for EC2 and EC4 raises a challenge for such views (concerning the latter see Doris 2002, 140–146). If one is influenced by implicit biases or by situational factors that one is not aware of, then it seems that one is not in a position to identify with the attitudes that motivate one's behavior. Moreover, one probably would not identify with them, as implicit biases and the motives that drive responses to situational cues are often in conflict with one's explicit attitudes (by which I mean, roughly, attitudes that are consciously accessible and reflectively endorsed). Yet it is not obvious that one is not morally responsible for the resulting behavior (more on this in section 8). My main response here is that there is no reason to suppose that this worry generates a general challenge to moral responsibility-a challenge to the assumption that we are, in general, morally responsible agents. There are two points to be made here. First, even if the influence of implicit biases and situational factors is more widespread than we would like to think, I see no reason to suppose that they influence most of the actions for which we tend to hold each other responsible. Second, it is questionable that agents would never identify with the influence of implicit biases or the motives that drive responses to 29 situational cues. Some implicit influences may be in line with one's explicit attitudes. Further, on many occasions, it may well be that we would identify with implicit attitudes even if they are not in line with our explicit attitudes. Proponents of hierarchical theories often assume that to identify with a motive is the same as endorsing that motive in accordance with one's explicit evaluative attitudes. However, there is a plausible weaker notion of identification. One may be said to identify with a motivational attitude by accepting that the attitude is "one's own", and one may accept this even if that attitude is not in line with one's explicit evaluative attitudes. Suppose you learn that an action of yours was motivated by an implicit attitude in a way that conflicts with your explicit evaluative attitudes. You may not identify with the attitude in any sense, and you may, thereby, refuse to take responsibility for the action. However, I see no reason to suppose that we would always take such a stance. There may well be many cases in which we would accept such new self-knowledge as a discovery that tells us something about ourselves and in which we would, thereby, take responsibility for the behavior in question. Finally, even though it is not obvious that one is not morally responsible for actions that are influenced by implicit biases or situational cues, it is also not obvious that one always is responsible in such cases (we will return to this in section 8). All in all, we can conclude that this worry does not have the potential to generate a general challenge to moral responsibility. This brings us, finally, to consequentialist theories. Very roughly, such views justify the practices of praise and blame in terms of their social utility-their good consequences for society as a whole. Usually, they require freedom from coercion and constraint, and they acknowledge that certain physical and mental impairments can excuse or exempt an agent from moral responsibility. But they do not impose further general conditions concerning the agent's freedom or control. Rather, they presuppose that the practices of praise and blame are effective in maximizing utility and regulating society. It seems clear that none of the empirical challenges to common conceptions of agency (EC1 – EC4) raises a challenge to this assumption. Some of the evidence may be taken to provide useful information on how the practices of praise and blame can be improved so as to maximize 30 their efficacy in the regulation of behavior. But there is nothing in the evidence that suggests that such practices are altogether ineffective. 12 8. The relevance of empirical research I have argued that the empirical evidence does not support a general challenge to responsibility. I did not mean to suggest, however, that empirical evidence on human agency is irrelevant to questions concerning responsibility. To the contrary, I think it is quite obvious that this research can be highly relevant in several ways. A detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. But before I conclude, I shall add a few observations and remarks to substantiate this point. Most obviously, perhaps, scientific evidence can be of relevance in individual cases by helping to establish that excusing or mitigating conditions obtain. For instance, it has been suggested that a teacher's obsession with child pornography was entirely due to a tumor in the frontal lobe, which rendered him also unable to control the urges to acquire pornographic material (Burns and Swerdlow 2003). Whether or not evidence of this kind does excuse or mitigate depends, of course, on the details of the particular case. But it seems clear that evidence of this kind can be relevant in individual cases. More generally, empirical evidence suggests that damage to certain brain areas and certain kinds of substance abuse can diminish or undermine the ability to inhibit urges and impulses (Burns and Bechara 2007). This may diminish or undermine the agent's ability to exercise conscious control and it may diminish or undermine the agent's ability to act for reasons. Given this, empirical evidence can and should inform also our views on certain types of cases, and this point is not restricted to cases that involve pathologies or addictions. Take, for instance, the evidence on the influence of implicit biases. Such biases are widespread among individuals with different ethnic, social, and economic backgrounds (Greenwald and Krieger 2006) and their influence may bypass awareness in various ways. One may be unaware of having a certain bias, one may be unaware of its activation on particular occasions, and one may be unaware of the way in which it affects one's 12 I am setting aside here the difficult question of whether imprisonment and other forms of legal punishment are effective means for the regulation of behavior and society-this is a separate issue. 31 judgments and actions. It has been controversial whether or not one can ever rid oneself of implicit biases, but it is generally agreed that their influence can be reduced and controlled (Blair 2002; Devine et al. 2002). Despite this, we face an epistemological problem here, as we are usually unaware of their activation and of the way in which they influence our judgments and actions. So, even if we are, in principle, able to control or counteract the influence of implicit biases, conscious control is severely hampered by the fact that it is difficult to know when and how to exercise it. Something similar can be said about some of the evidence for EC3 and EC4. Usually, the influence of situational factors does not render us unable to exercise conscious control, and it does not undermine our responsiveness to reasons. But some of the evidence for EC3 and EC4 raises questions concerning the scope or the degree of our responsibility in certain situations, as it shows that irrelevant factors can influence our judgments and actions in ways that bypass conscious awareness. As before, we face the epistemological problem that it is difficult to know when and how one should try to control the influence of such factors, as it is difficult know when and how they influence our choices and actions. Further, it cannot be denied that some of the evidence shows also that we-or most of us-are less responsive to reasons than we would like to think. Most find the results of the Milgram experiment and of other infamous studies, such as the Stanford prison experiment (Haney et al. 1973), disturbing and contrary to prior expectations. The evidence on mood enhanced helping behavior is less shocking, as a lot less seems to be at stake. But it is also surprising, in some respects, and contrary to common sense-although what is contrary to common sense here is not so much the degree of reason-responsiveness, but the way in which it is modulated. I do not want to suggest that any of this shows that we are always excused in certain types of cases, and I doubt it shows that responsibility is always diminished in certain types of cases. First, the fact that some circumstances decrease our reason-responsiveness is not sufficient to excuse or mitigate. To me, it seems that the degree of reason-responsiveness that is compatible with the evidence is sufficient for the ascription of full moral (and criminal) responsibility-given, of course, that no other excusing or mitigating conditions 32 obtain. 13 Second, it is questionable that responsibility requires that one can become aware of the influence of certain factors if it is possible to acquire indirect (theoretical or inferential) knowledge about when and how such factors are operative. It is even unclear that responsibility requires that one has such indirect knowledge. Arguably, in some cases it is sufficient that one could have acquired the relevant knowledge-cases in which one "should have known". This suggests that the assessment of such cases depends on epistemic conditions. Unfortunately, there is no widely accepted view concerning the relevant epistemic conditions on responsibility, and it is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to propose and defend such a view. However, even if the evidence does not establish excusing or mitigating conditions for certain types of cases, it is nevertheless relevant. It raises important questions, it provides important knowledge about the causes of our actions, and it can thereby help us to better our agency. Further, it can be argued that some of the evidence generates new responsibilities for institutions and organizations-responsibilities to provide training and to require the use of procedures that are known to reduce the influence of implicit biases and certain situational factors (see Jolls and Sunstein 2006, for instance). Finally, empirical evidence can and should inform theoretical questions concerning the capacities that underlie responsible agency. In philosophy, it has been common to assume that reason-responsiveness is of one piece, as it were-that there is one single mechanism or faculty of practical reason that is responsive to reasons for action. In particular, it has been common to assume that one and the same mechanism is operative during offline (or reflective) deliberation and online decision-making. In contrast, in the cognitive sciences it is now widely assumed that reasoning and decision-making is implemented by two distinct systems (or types of processes): system 1 is automatic, effortless, and heuristics-based and system 2 is conscious, deliberate, and rule-based. This framework has been successfully deployed in many areas of research (for overviews see Sloman 1996; Evans 2008). System 2 is plausibly associated with the ability to engage in 13 According to Fischer and Ravizza (1998), reason-responsiveness requires that there is an understandable pattern of counterfactual scenarios in which the agent recognizes the relevant reason and that there is at least one possible world in which the agent acts on that recognition (69–81). This account would seem to support my claim that the degree of reason-responsiveness is sufficiently robust in the cases in question. 33 practical reasoning, and hence with reason-responsiveness. However, some of the evidence suggests that system 1 is reason-responsive as well, as it seems to show that system 1 leads in some tasks to better choices than system 2 (Dijksterhuis 2004, for instance). The implicit claim here is that system 1 is by itself reason-responsive. This may be challenged and there is evidence to suggest that reason-responsive processing depends on an interplay between the two systems (Baumeister et al. 2011, for instance). However, if it turns out that both system 2 and system 1 are reason-responsive mechanisms, then we should abandon the assumption that there is one single faculty of practical reason. Let me close with two more remarks on this. First, dual-system theory is not universally accepted (for critical reviews see Osman 2004; Keren and Schul 2009). But even a dual-system account of practical reason would seem to vindicate the assumption that we are reason-responsive. It would, however, make questions and answers concerning our reason-responsiveness more complex. For instance, either one of the two systems may be reliably responsive to the relevant reasons in some circumstances, but unreliable and unresponsive in others. The two systems may interact in most situations, they may interfere with each other in some cases, there may be cases in which processing switches between the two systems, and so on. Second, it seems clear that empirical research on dual-system theories of reasoning and decision-making is highly relevant to the question of how reasonresponsive the agent is in different circumstances and with respect to different kinds of reasons (De Neys 2006, for instance). 9. Conclusion I have argued that the empirical challenges to common conceptions of human agency fail to generate a general challenge to moral (and criminal) responsibility. They fail to show that we lack the required abilities, and so they fail to show that we are, in general and unless specific excusing or mitigating condition obtain, responsible agents. Despite this, empirical evidence is clearly relevant. It can and should inform our theoretical understanding of the mechanisms that underlie responsible agency, and it may change normative judgments in individual cases or with respect to certain types of cases. We have seen that the evidence on human agency is not only compatible with the relevant conditions on conscious control and reason-responsiveness, but that there is plenty 34 of empirical evidence in support of both conscious control and reason-responsiveness. Given this, we can conclude that the empirical evidence on human agency is not only compatible with the assumption that we are, in general, responsible agents, but that it provides, in fact, support for it. I have addressed here only the relevance of existing empirical evidence on human agency for the obvious reason that one can only speculate about the relevance of future findings. I think it may well be that evidence from psychology and cognitive neuroscience will become more and more relevant in the future as the science of human agency progresses. Is there any reason to think that we will face more credible general challenges to responsibility from future findings on human agency? Perhaps the right answer here is simply that we have to wait and see-or that this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Let me point out, however, that some of the considerations that I have presented here may be taken to suggest that it is difficult to see how future findings could possibly generate a more credible challenge. In particular, it is difficult to see how future experiments could show that we are unable to exercise conscious control or that we lack the ability to respond to reasons, as controlled experiments on human agency seem to presuppose that we have those abilities. They presume that participants are able to exercise control in response to becoming aware of certain cues and in accord with instructions, which provide them with reasons for action within the context of scientific experimentation. Given this, it seems reasonable to think that the relevance of empirical evidence to moral (and criminal) responsibility will remain restricted to individual cases and types of cases, and to our theoretical understanding of the underlying mechanisms. 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Problems with Aquinas 'Third Way' Edward Moad, Department of Humanities, Qatar University Of Thomas Aquinas' five proofs of the existence of God, the "Third Way" is a cosmological argument of a specific type sometimes referred to as an argument from contingency. The Aristotelian argument for the existence of the First Unmoved Mover was based on the observation that there is change (or 'motion'), coupled with the principle that nothing changes unless its specific potential to change is actualized by an actual change undergone by some other thing. It then arrives at the conclusion that there exists something in a constant state of pure activity, which is not itself moved but sets everything else in motion. The operative sense of 'contingency' this argument turns on, then, is that of motion. That is, things have the potential to change in certain ways (depending on the kind of things they are), but may or may not do so; whether they actually do being contingent on whether they are acted on in the right way by something else. For this reason, Aristotle's argument delivers a first mover, which brings about the motion in all that exists, but not a being that brings about the very existence of everything else. The argument referred to specifically as the argument from contingency, by contrast, turns on the idea of the contingency of the very existence of anything at all. That is, if something exists which may not have, and the fact that it does exist rather than not is contingent on the action of other existing things, which are themselves contingent, then the existence of the whole lot of contingent things, taken together, is also contingent. From this, the argument ultimately concludes that there is a necessary existent – something that exists, for which it is not the case that it might not have existed, and the existence of which does not therefore depend on any other existing things, but on which the existence of all other things depends. The object of this paper is not, however, arguments from contingency in general, but specifically Aquinas's 'Third Way' as it appears in his Summa Theologica. I will raise three objections to this argument. First, the argument depends on the premise, that if everything were contingent, then there would have been a time during which nothing exists, but this is not self--‐evident and no argument is given for it here. Secondly, Aquinas tells us that a key premise in this argument, that an infinite order of things necessary through one another is impossible, has been proven just previously (in the 'second way') with respect to an infinite order of efficient causes. But this argument fallaciously equivocates between two different senses of the term 'first', and the fallacy does not disappear when applied to the 'third way'. Thus, Aquinas not only fails, in this argument, to prove the existence of a thing necessary in itself, but fails to prove that anything is necessary at all. Lastly, this argument suffers from a puzzling ambiguity as to the meaning of the term 'necessity', and either way of interpreting the term consistently in the argument raises difficulties. We will begin by quoting the key passage below, and then offer the argument in standard form for ease of analysis, posing some questions and issues that arise with certain of its premises along the way. We find some things that are possible both of existing and not existing since some things are found to be generated and corrupted, and therefore to be possible both of existing and of not existing. But it is impossible for everything of this kind to exist always since what is possible of not existing at some time does not exist. Therefore, if all things were capable Problems with Aquinas 'Third Way' Edward Moad, Department of Humanities, Qatar University of not existing, at some time no thing would exist. But if this were true, even now nothing would exist since what does not exist does not begin to exist except through something else which exists; so that if no being existed, it would be impossible for anything to begin to exist, and thus nothing would now exist, which is plainly false. Therefore, not all beings are contingent or possible; there must exist some thing which is necessary. But every necessary being either has a cause of its necessity from elsewhere, or it does not. But it is not possible to proceed ad infinitum in necessary beings which have a cause of their necessity, just as this was not possible in efficient causes, as was proved [in the Second Way]. Therefore, it is necessary to posit something which is necessary through itself, not having the cause of its necessity from elsewhere, but is the cause of necessity to other things, which is what everyone calls "God."1 The argument breaks down as follows: 1) Some things are found to be generated and corrupted. 2) Anything that is generated and corrupted is possible both of existing and not existing (implicit). 3) Therefore, there are things that are possible of both existing and not existing (1 and 2). We have inserted here, as the implicit premise (2), what is minimally necessary to take us from 1) to 3). But this leaves open the question, whether we are also to understand, here, that anything that is possible both of existing and not existing, is generated and corrupted, so that, essentially, the contingent just is the generated and corrupted; or whether the category of the contingent might include that which is not generated and corrupted. That is, can there be something that is everlasting, without beginning or end, and yet is such that it might not have existed? From the next premise, it appears not. 4) What is possible of not existing at some time does not exist. 5) Therefore if all things were capable of not existing, at some time no thing would exist (4). A false inference This seems to entail that all that is contingent is either generated or corrupted, if not both. But is the inference from 4) to 5) valid? In purely formal terms, from the premise that, for everything, there is some time at which it is non--‐existent [∀x ∃t (∼∃x @t)]; it does not follow that there is a time at which everything is non--‐existent [∃t ∀x (∼∃x @t)]. For this inference to be valid, certain other conditions must obtain. First, the number of existing things must not be potentially infinite. If it is, then things can begin and cease to exist in succession perpetually. Then, for each thing, there could be a time at which it does not exist, and yet no time at which nothing exists. So the inference is invalid unless the potential number of existing things is finite (and, as we might safely assume, the self--‐same thing cannot begin and cease to exist repeatedly). Secondly, it must be the case that time is ontologically independent of contingent 11 ST I, q. 2, a. 3. Problems with Aquinas 'Third Way' Edward Moad, Department of Humanities, Qatar University things (e.g. time cannot be the measure of motion). Otherwise, though it is possible for nothing to exist, there can be no time at which nothing exists. But let us for now assume that true premises can be established, which will make the inference valid. Then it should also follow that, if everything other than God is capable of not existing, then at some time nothing other than God exists. And that, it seems, would constitute a philosophical proof that the world as a whole is not eternal. But as is well known, Aquinas himself argues that this cannot be proven philosophically, but only by reference to divine revelation. But if he is right about that, then it follows that 5) is false. And this means that either the inference from 4) to 5) is fallacious, or that premise 4) itself is false. What role, then, do these premises play in the overall proof? 6) What does not exist does not begin to exist, except through something else which exists. 7) Therefore, if nothing existed, it would be impossible for anything to begin to exist (6). 8) Therefore, if at some time nothing existed, then nothing would exist now (7). 9) Therefore, if all things are capable of not existing, then nothing would exist now (5,8). 10) But something does exist now. 11) Therefore not all beings are capable of not existing (i.e. contingent or possible) (9, 10). 12) Therefore, there exists something which is necessary (i.e. not capable of not existing) (11). The inference from 5) to 9) is valid. But aside from premise 5), the truth of which, as we note, has not been established, it also depends on the truth of premise 6). This is, of course, a key premise. Much of the discussion over cosmological arguments in general has focused on the principle of sufficient reason, this being taken to be a key premise in such arguments, generally. It is important to point out then, that premise (6) is not the principle of sufficient reason. For as it stands, premise (6) is entirely compatible with the proposition that there is an infinite series of things, each of which begins to exist through a previous existing thing (or things) in the series, and it is just this proposition that is normally taken as ruled out by the principle of sufficient reason, on the grounds that in such a case, there will not be sufficient reason for the existence of any member of the series. Of course, if the principle of sufficient reason is true, then premise (6), quite intuitively, follows. If there is sufficient reason for the existence of something, it is hard to see how this would not involve reference to some already existing thing. One might be audacious enough to suggest that it is simply a law of nature that some things pop into existence out of nothing, and then offer that as sufficient reason, but they would have to avoid the implication that it is the existence of such a law that constitutes the reason (whatever the existence of a law of nature, in itself, is supposed to consist in). But premise (6) does not entail the principle of sufficient reason. And this fact relieves me of the unenviable choice between attempting to defend the principle on the one hand, or of trying to conceive doing philosophy under the pretense of its falsehood, on the other. Premise (6), as distinct from the principle of sufficient reason, also has the advantage that it does not raise the same Problems with Aquinas 'Third Way' Edward Moad, Department of Humanities, Qatar University question to the coherence of the notion of a Creator endowed with voluntary will. For if the existence of the world is a consequence, as a cosmological argument traditionally aims to show, of voluntary creative choice on the part of God, then it seems to follow that there is no sufficient reason to be given for its existence, if this is to be understood as something in virtue of which He could not have done otherwise. So here, I will be content to grant premise (6), and avoid the unpleasant suggestion that it is possible that something pop into existence out of nothing. And, since something does evidently exist now, the inference to premise (12) is valid. Ambiguity in modal terms With 12), this section of the argument arrives at the existence of something that is necessary; that is, something for which non--‐existence is impossible. Consequently it is not capable of generation or corruption, since the premise (2) implicit in the inference from 1) to 3) has it that anything that is generated and corrupted is contingent (i.e. something for which non--‐existence is possible). Consequently, that which is necessary exists at all times. So, if (6) provides the only condition by which a thing needs a cause for its existence, then that which is necessary needs no cause for its existence. So, in (12), we will have arrived at an uncaused cause of the existence of other things. With an additional proof that there can only be one uncaused cause of existence, we might be justified in identifying that as God. The fact that everything else is contingent could be a premise for an additional proof that the necessary existent causes the existence of everything else by a voluntary act of will (i.e. it might not have created any of them). And the premise (4), again, would entail that the world is not eternal. But this is not what Aquinas does here. Instead, he goes on to argue that: 13) Every necessary being has a cause of its necessity from elsewhere, or it does not. 14) But it is not possible to proceed ad infinitum in necessary beings which have a cause of their necessity, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. 15) Wherefore, it is necessary to posit something which is necessary through itself, not having the cause of its necessity from elsewhere, but is the cause of necessity to other things, which is what everyone calls God. Here, we are presented with a distinction between a necessary being, the necessity of which is caused by something else, and a necessary being that is necessary 'through itself.' For a thing to be necessary, is for it to be impossible that it not exist. So, the cause of its being necessary will be the cause, not only of its existence, but also of its being impossible not to exist. Avicenna had also distinguished the 'necessary through another' from the 'necessary in itself', but the former was just the contingent – the 'possible in itself', where its being caused to exist was just its being necessary, given the cause. In this case, the cause of a thing's being necessary could be understood just as the cause of the existence of that which is contingent in itself, but necessary through that which caused it to exist. But here, Aquinas distinguishes the contingent thing that is Problems with Aquinas 'Third Way' Edward Moad, Department of Humanities, Qatar University caused to exist by something else, from the necessary thing the necessity of which is caused by something else. But what does this mean? We might say, contra Avicenna, that a contingent thing might be caused to exist by something else, and yet not be necessary through that cause, if it remains that it might not have been caused to exist by it. By contrast, something is necessary through another, if it is caused to exist by another, and it is not the case that it might not have been. In the latter case, the cause would have to be something that is itself necessary, and necessarily causes the existence of its effect. In the former case, however, even if the cause itself exists necessarily, it must at least be a contingent matter that it caused its effect – it has to remain the case that it might not have caused its effect. This leaves the way open for the traditional understanding of God, as creating the universe by a voluntary act of will. For even though God Himself is understood to exist necessarily, it need not be the case that He necessarily creates this world, or any world at all. All that is caused to exist by His voluntary act would remain ultimately contingent, since His causing them to exist does not entail causing them to be necessary. Conversely, if being caused to exist were equivalent to being made 'necessary through another', as in Avicenna's system, then the argument would lead us, not only to a being that exists necessarily, but one who necessarily causes the existence of exactly that which does exist, and who could not have done otherwise. This would rule out creation as a voluntary act of will, and that would not be the sort of God that Aquinas aims to prove. So there is good reason for Aquinas to want to distinguish the contingent that is caused to exist (but remains contingent), from that which is made necessary through another. But if there is something that is necessary through another, in this sense, then it follows that there is something that God causes involuntarily, because again, if he created it voluntarily, then it would remain contingent. Now, the only reason we have been given here to believe in the existence of the necessary at all, is the fact that contingent things exist, and their existence depends on the existence of the necessary. Thus, the only necessary through another, which we have been given reason to believe exists, is one on which the existence of contingent things depends. But, if these things depend on the existence of this necessary through another, and they remain contingent, then it would be as if God involuntarily causes the existence of another voluntary creator (or at least a random 'existence generator' if such a thing is possible). Conversely, if this necessary through another is not another voluntary creator or random existence generator, involuntary caused by God, then those things on which it depends are not contingent after all, but additional things made necessary through another. In that case, according to premise (2) they are not susceptible of generation and corruption, and should presumably exist at all times. But according to the first (and strongest) premise in this argument, that is false. Then anything necessary through another, for which we have any reason to believe exists, will be a voluntary creator or random existence generator that God involuntary causes to exist for all time. According to premise (14), it is not possible to proceed ad infinitum in these things. But there could still be quite a large number (you might call it a pantheon). Of course, however many they may be, it would be argued, they all ultimately depend, for their existence, on the necessary through itself (which we call God). The troubling thing remains that, Problems with Aquinas 'Third Way' Edward Moad, Department of Humanities, Qatar University their being necessary, He would not have any choice in the matter. Assuming that Aquinas is committed to an omnipotent God Who has complete voluntary control over whatever else exists, he would not want to admit the existence of any such things necessary through another, in this sense. Of course, premise (13) does not entail the existence of such. It merely acknowledges the logical possibility of it. But to be effective in proving the existence of the sort of God that Aquinas presumably wants to prove, an additional argument ruling out this possibility is required, and the fact that this is missing here constitutes a weakness of this argument. But another possible explanation is that by 'necessary' here, Aquinas really means, not that it is impossible for the thing not to exist, but simply that it is 'not subject to generation and corruption.' In this case, the 'necessary through another' connotes a thing that exists at all times (angels, immortal souls, etc.). But, since they exist at all times by the voluntary will of God, of course, we cannot strictly say that it is impossible for them not to exist, unless we simply define the possibility of a thing's non--‐existence as the actual non--‐existence of the thing at some time. In this case, what Aquinas means by 'necessary through another' is really just 'everlasting', while true necessity (as in, non--‐existence really being impossible for a thing) is limited to the necessary in--‐itself (which in this case really means, everlasting through itself, but arguably amounts to the same thing). The problem with this interpretation is that it contradicts premise (4), that 'what is possible of not existing at some time does not exist.' Because the 'necessary through another', understood this way, is possible of not existing and yet, there is no time at which it does not exist. But if, to resolve this, we understand the 'possible of not existing' as simply that which is generated and corrupted, then the premise is a tautology: that which at some time does not exist, at some time does not exist. Likewise, for the whole inference from (1) to (3): premise (2) essentially becomes 'anything that is generated and corrupted is generated and corrupted', and therefore (3) 'there are things that are generated and corrupted.' So, on this interpretation, we purchase consistency with premise (4) at the cost of making it, along the first section of this argument, largely vacuous. So the problem, here, is that there is an ambiguity in the meaning of the modal terms in the argument. If we understand 'necessary thing' as that the non--‐existence of which is impossible, then the argument fails to prove the existence of the kind of voluntary creator that it presumably aims to prove. On the other hand, if we understand a 'necessary thing' as simply 'everlasting', then either premise (13) contradicts premise (4), or everything from (1) to (4) on the argument is rendered vacuous. Fallacy of equivocation But whichever way that goes, why is it not possible to proceed ad infinitum in things necessary through another? This has been proved, says Aquinas, in the case of efficient causes, which was dealt with in his 'second way.' It appears then, that the force of the 'third way' proof depends on that of the 'second way'. So to the latter we must turn. This proof is given as follows. In the world of sensible things, we find that there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, Problems with Aquinas 'Third Way' Edward Moad, Department of Humanities, Qatar University possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate cause is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only. Now, to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be any ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore, it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.2 Here is how this argument breaks down: 1) In the world of sensible things, we find that there is an order of efficient causes. 2) It is impossible for a thing to be the efficient cause of itself. 3) In all efficient causes following in order, the first cause is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate cause is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only. 4) To take away the cause is to take away the effect. 5) Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor intermediate cause (3 and 4). 6) If, in efficient causes, it is possible to on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause. 7) If, in efficient causes, it is possible to on to infinity, there will be no ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes (5 and 6). 8) There are ultimate effects and intermediate efficient causes. 9) Therefore, in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity (7 and 8). 10) Therefore, there is a first efficient cause. The conclusion of this argument is that there is a first efficient cause, which is absolutely first in the sense that it is not the effect of any prior cause. In premise (3) however, we are told that, in all efficient causal orders, the first cause is the cause of the intermediate cause, etc. So either this is a circular argument, or the term 'first' is to take a different sense in the premise, from that which it takes in the conclusion. The efficient causal orders that have been shown to exist are those we observe among sensible things. Among these, obviously, we do not observe the first cause referred to in the conclusion. Otherwise, there would be no need for a proof. In the causal orders we do observe, we find first causes in a relative sense – that is, 'first' in relation to an intermediate cause or causes, and an ultimate effect, in a circumscribed series of causes, and not 'first' in the absolute sense, of not being the effect of any prior cause. 2 Ibid Problems with Aquinas 'Third Way' Edward Moad, Department of Humanities, Qatar University So, when we get to (5), the inference is valid, so long as we mean, by 'first', the same thing we mean in (3). But when we come to (6), the meaning of 'first' shifts. It is true that an infinite causal series would have no 'first' cause in the absolute sense (that is, of a cause that is not the effect of any prior cause), but not that there would be no 'first' cause in the relative sense in which the term is used in the previous premises. If we were to stick with this sense of 'first' cause, as the prior cause in any circumscribed set of causes within a larger series, then it would be more plausibly to say that, if the series goes on to infinity, there are an infinite number of 'first' causes. Thus, when Aquinas infers (7) from (5) and (6), it is based on an equivocation in the operative sense of the term 'first'. So this argument is invalid. Will it make a difference, if this argument were given in terms of things 'necessary through another' rather than in terms of efficient causes? It does not look promising. The first premise would go 'in the world if sensible things, we find there is an order of things necessary through another.' This is manifestly not the case. What we observe of sensible things is subject to generation and corruption. And even if we did observe something that is everlasting, we could never observe it as such. Our first premise, rather, would have to be, 'from what we observe of the world of sensible things, we may deduce the existence of something necessary'. But this premise would only hold, if the first section of the 'third way' – namely, the inference from premise (4) to (5) – is valid, and we have seen that it is not. That is, it has not been proven that, if everything is non--‐ existent at some time, then there is some time at which everything is non--‐ existent. The second premise of the 'second way' was that 'it is impossible for a thing to be the efficient cause of itself.' In that context, the premise is sound. But in the context of the 'third way', this premise will say 'it is impossible for something to be necessary in itself.' And this, of course, is in direct contradiction to the very conclusion of the 'third way'. So there must be some substantial differences between the argument for premise (13) of the 'third way', against an infinite order of things necessary through one another, and the argument against an infinite order of efficient causes, as given in the 'second way'. Following the pattern of the latter as closely as possible, however, our argument for premise (13) of the 'third way' would be: 1) In all things necessary through on another, following in order, the first necessary thing is that through which the intermediate necessary thing is necessary, and the intermediate necessary thing is that through which the ultimate necessary thing is necessary. 2) To take away that, through which a thing is necessary, is to take away the necessity of that thing. 3) Therefore, if there were no first necessary thing among things necessary through one another, there would be no ultimate, nor intermediate necessary thing (1 and 2). 4) If in things necessary through another, it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first necessary thing. Not surprisingly, the same equivocation in the sense of the term 'first' appears here, as in the previous case. Premise (4) is true so long as we mean an absolute first necessary thing (for which there is no prior thing through which it is necessary). But that is not the same sense in which the term appears in the Problems with Aquinas 'Third Way' Edward Moad, Department of Humanities, Qatar University premises. In that sense of 'first' – that is, a first necessary thing in relation to any given order of three things necessary through one another – premise (4) is arguably false. If it is possible to go on to infinity in the order of things necessary through one another, then arguably there are an infinite number of 'first' necessary things. Thus, to infer, on the basis of (3) and (4), that with an infinite series of things necessary through one another, there will be no such things at all, would constitute the same fallacy of equivocation that we found in the argument against an infinite order of efficient causes. So this argument is no more effective in proving premise (13) of the 'third way' than it was in the case of 'second way'. Thus, there is no valid inference, given here, to the conclusion that there exists a thing necessary in itself.

[Forthcoming in Exploring the Philosophy of Death and Dying: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. Routledge] Taking Stock of the Risks of Life Without Death August Gorman Abstract: In this chapter I argue that choosing to live forever comes with the threat of an especially pernicious kind of boredom. However, it may be theoretically possible to circumvent it by finding ways to pursue an infinite number of projects consistent with one's personality, taking on endlessly pursuable endlessly interesting projects, or by rekindling old projects once you've forgotten about them. However, each of these possibilities is contingent upon having certain traits that you are likely not currently in a good position to assess. I therefore argue that no one is in a good position to be confident about her prospects for living forever. Keywords: immortality, boredom, death, value, memory Bio: August Gorman is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Georgetown University. Their research examines normative concepts through the lens of atypical psychologies, and they have published articles on topics in moral responsibility, well-being, and meaningfulness in life. I. Introduction We usually take it to be a bad thing when someone dies. But is the general fact that humans die a bad thing? Some have argued that our own mortality is for the best; if we lived long enough each one of us would become fatally bored and, as a result, find nothing meaningful in the prospect of continuing to live.1 Others claim that they would very gladly take an elixir that promised them eternal life on earth, and accuse those who think immortality would be a bad thing of being merely curmudgeonly. If we enjoy our lives right now even though we sometimes get bored, they reason, what difference should it make how many days, months, years, or centuries we extend them by?2 Call this the Anti-Curmudgeon position.3 In this chapter I defend a middle position between the Curmudgeon and Anti-Curmudgeon positions: I believe that there is a special worry about boredom for immortal lives, but there are several ways that a person might be able to avoid it, in theory. However, none of us are in a very good position to determine whether or not we are one of the lucky few that would be able to avoid it via any of these ways. Because of the structure of this decision, I argue that it would be irrational to approach the choice to take (or pass on) an immortality elixir with anything approaching confidence. II. Boredom and the Threat of Running Out of Life's Pages In order to assess whether or not we would fall into an intolerable boredom if we lived forever, we'll need to get a clearer understanding of just what boredom is, exactly, and what sorts of things it is sensitive to. Although boredom is a near-ubiquitous experience, it is surprisingly puzzling. Think about watching your favorite movie five times in a row. Your favorite movie is something you presumably care about, so why on the fifth watching in a row does it appear to you as something you don't care about? It's not as if something has changed about the movie itself or about your ability to appreciate it, in theory. If you wait a few months and watch it again you might find that it's not boring at all. You come to care about it all over again. The same can be true of boredom with life in general. One day you might feel like there is nothing in the world that could possibly hold your interest, but the next day the world opens itself up to you again and everything feels full of possibility. It temporarily appears to you as though you have run out of ways to take an interest in your favorite movie, or run out of things in life to participate in that you could take an interest in. But as we all know, perceptions can be deceiving. We might perceive there to be water by the horizon on the street in front of us, but it is only the reflection of sunlight on the pavement.4 What causes the illusion in everyday sorts of boredom? One conjecture is that we acquire a sort of evaluative tunnel vision when we engage with something in the same manner over and over again. In doing so, we temporarily close ourselves off to engaging our other capacities for interacting in a way that will hold our interest.5 Maybe we can't possibly listen to the lilting in Judy Garland's voice as Dorothy when she says "there's no place like home" any more after the fifth watching and this temporarily overshadows how much there is left to discover about the symbolism of the Wizard, or the cinematography of the Yellow Brick Road scenes. Getting too accustomed to a narrow set of life activities might also produce a sort of tunnel vision towards the value of life itself. What, then, is the particular worry about boredom in a life without death? Curmudgeons sometimes talk as though we would need to find some sort of life-project that could stave off boredom at every moment. Here I think Anti-Curmudgeons are right to point out that there is no more reason to worry about the ordinary fleeting sorts of boredom in an immortal life than there is in a moral one. But sometimes boredom isn't fleeting; the perception that there's nothing about a particular pursuit left that one cares about is accurate. The Wizard of Oz on not the fifth, but the hundredth watching might be an example. You might have actually exhausted all of the things about the film that you would find worthwhile to engage with. Call this "insurmountable boredom." The real concern with boredom in immortal life, as I see it, is that a person might come to find herself insurmountably bored with life itself. Such a person would believe that she has run out of pursuits that she would find worthwhile to engage in, and she would actually be right about this. Anti-Curmudgeons John Martin Fischer and Ben Mitchell-Yellin describe those who are worried about this kind of boredom as being almost as if they were "caught in the grips of a problematic metaphor." According to Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin, Immortality Curmudgeons sometimes seem to think of the relevant projects as though they were books in a library that contains a large but finite number of books. The idea is that, given an infinite amount of time, a human being could read all the books in the library (Fischer and MitchellYellin 2014, 358). What, exactly, is meant to be problematic about this metaphor? Well, for one, you might question why you need projects to have an enjoyable infinite life in the first place. Some AntiCurmudgeons allege that they would be very happy to live an infinite life of just enjoying the pleasures of nice meals and kissing their spouses, no projects required. And these sorts of pleasures are not the sorts of things we need to worry about running out of. However, I think our inquiry into the nature of boredom helps illuminate why we might think we would need projects of some sort to live a worthwhile life. While it might be that if we're going to be alive we prefer to have a life filled with these sorts of pleasures, I doubt that if it were to really come down to it, they could give us a reason to want to continue living for billions of years. In our mortal lives, the kinds of pleasure we get from these sorts of things can be temporarily interrupted when we feel an overwhelming sense of boredom. And boredom, it seems, is not sensitive to the availability of pleasant activities, but the availability of activities that we see as interesting and worthwhile. So having something novel to give you a reason to go on does seem to be crucial, since insurmountable boredom could permanently impinge on our ability to enjoy life. This is why I think the idea of a library of pursuits is somewhat apt, after all. In the remainder of this chapter I will explore the different ways a person might nevertheless avoid running out of pages to read. III. Is there really a finite number of books in the library? Even if we concede that we need life projects in order to stave off the threat of boredom, we may legitimately wonder whether or not there is really any risk of running out of possibilities. Aren't there an infinite number of pursuits any one person could take on? And even if there aren't now, with an increasing number of inventions and the progress of technology, won't there constantly be new activities to pursue? In 1950 no one could have anticipated that becoming a skilled hacker could be a life project someone could choose, and our current imaginations may be severely limited in terms of predicting what may become possible over the stretch of eternity. But even if in one sense anyone is free to take up poker, or linguistic anthropology, or competitive dog grooming at any time, only certain pursuits will be ones that a particular person will be able to get herself to actually come to take a genuine interest in. I am not sure whether or not our personalities constrain our interests to the point in which the field of possibility for potential interesting pursuits such that it includes only a finite number of things, in the first place. But I think there is a real risk here that they do. In other words, it's not a library of all the pursuits a person could take on in theory that we have to worry about being finite, but our personal libraries of possible pursuits. You might think that being faced with the necessity of finding new pursuits is a special sort of case that would enable new paths forward. Perhaps we could build our personal libraries to be larger out of necessity. I think these circumstances might encourage us to look beyond the obvious candidates for projects towards other things that we would realize we do have genuine interest in if we were to try them. That said, a long list of things you can do on a rainy day does not stave off a severe case of everyday boredom, a case in which you merely perceive yourself to have run out of things that would actually engage you. Similarly, the mere availability of things you can, in theory, do with your life won't magically make you genuinely interested in any of them. No matter how much I may want to become interested in opera in order to share in my grandmother's passion, I can still fail to take an interest in it. This may the case even if I have willingly repeatedly exposed myself to the art form; it might, for me, just never 'take.'6 Similarly, the sheer necessity of taking up new pursuits to stave off boredom would not enable us to jerry-rig new interests. Our personalities, it seems, sometimes set narrower bounds on what we can come to take a genuine interest in than the circumstances we find ourselves in. IV. Do all of the books really have a finite number of pages? Another way we might circumvent insurmountable boredom is by having at least one book in our personal library that is infinitely long. Some Anti-Curmudgeons claim that it would be very easy to acquire one, or even to write more pages yourself. They draw on the idea that new opportunities for fulfilling desires related to old projects can refresh old desires. For example, Jeremy Wisnewski imagines a case in which a musician has the goal to "be the best musician ever by mastering every instrument" (Wisnewski 2005, 33-34). Even after this goal is completed, in a few hundred years, he reasons, a new instrument could be invented and it could revive the old project. Furthermore, the musician could actually invent her own instruments for this purpose, and could do so infinitely. I think this is a bit too fast, though. Not every new instrument that could be invented would provide a musician with an interestingly different challenge. And in order to successfully stave off boredom, a person needs a project to have available ways of engaging with it that haven't already been exhausted. Now, there is surely a large number of variations on musical instruments that would be interestingly different to try to master, but I'm not sure how we could come to know that it would actually be an infinite number. The risk here is that what sustained the initial interest in the pursuit may not persist and that the musician would be left with the desire to pursue mastery of each new instrument only because it provides her with a life project that in theory could keep her busy throughout eternity. But it's not as though just having the desire "I want to master every instrument" sustains one's genuine interest indefinitely independent of the conditions that made it seem like a worthwhile pursuit in the first place. This raises an interesting question, though. Could there be a pursuit that a person could both pursue infinitely and also find infinitely interesting? If there are any such pursuits, they would need to involve repetition in the sense that in your 5000th year doing it, what you're doing is still describable under the same description as when you started doing it. That is, if your pursuit is to become an experienced bird-watcher, you can't have avoided boredom just by moving on to watching squirrels instead; "becoming an experienced bird-watcher" still has to be the goal you're aiming at. But somehow, this repetition has to be such that it wouldn't cause boredom. What bores though, as we've discovered, is not just repetition of any sort, but rather, running out of ways to engage with something. So the things a person would do in order to satisfy her desire to engage in this pursuit would have to be topically linked while producing an infinite number of ways to engage. Perhaps there are such pursuits. Consider certain kinds of desires of self-improvement. For example, maybe a person could spend a lifetime attempting to satisfy a desire to paint the best painting she has ever painted. With just the assumption that you won't paint a painting that you will know is the best that you could ever paint, it is enough to guarantee that this could be an infinitely pursuable goal. This stands in contrast to the leap of faith you would have to make to bank on being able to infinitely artificially extend a pursuit like mastering every instrument. While it seems likely that there are an infinite number of instruments we could invent, we already know that once you've painted the best painting you've ever painted you can still aim to do better. What's more, it doesn't seem outside of the realm of possibility that this pursuit could be not only endlessly pursuable but also endlessly interesting. While each painting you would paint would be motivated by the same desire - the desire to paint the best painting you have ever painted - the things that you might do to go about fulfilling that desire might drastically differ over time. The varieties of technique and style, subject matter and color scheme that that you might employ to create an infinite array of compositions seems like a good candidate for the kind of thing that could stave off boredom of the worrisome sort. That said, we can only speculate about a human's ability to genuinely take an interest in one of these sorts of pursuits for eternity. I doubt that our intuitions about whether or not there are people who could take an interest in these sorts of projects will be reliable when we scale up to think about eternity. Even less reliable, I imagine, are our intuitions about whether any of us as an individual is in fact a person who could come to genuinely take an interest in such a pursuit and sustain it indefinitely. V. Couldn't we just reread the books once we've forgotten them? Why though, do we need infinitely long books, when we could just read old books where we've forgotten the story or perhaps even forgotten that we read them in the first place? In practice, after a long enough time wouldn't we forget all about what we've pursued in the past, allowing us to resurrect an interest in our old pursuits, even those not infinitely pursuable or infinitely interesting, by coming to them afresh?7 There seems to be something to this thought. After all, our memories are certainly finite, whereas our lives would be infinite. Why couldn't I take up playing chess again one thousand years later after having previously mastered it to the point where I exhausted everything I found interesting about it? Are you bound to forget everything that was interesting about learning to play chess, though? It would be a massive oversimplification to think of memory loss in mortal lives like a disk drive that just erases the earliest years to make room for the new ones once its full up. Instead, we find that memory retention is often selective. You likely remember the day you graduated from high school, whereas it's much less likely you remember what you did ten days later. The risk here is that the sorts of pursuits we would come to genuinely take the most interest in, or least the aspects of them that most command our attention, are not the sorts of things that are easily forgotten. It's hard to say what memory loss would look like over the span of thousands of years. Perhaps we might even develop increased capacities for retaining what's most valuable to us with practice over thousands of years! This should give us pause. But say we are able to forget what it was like to master chess playing after enough years. Would there be something futile about living only to become good at chess when you know that you've already gotten everything there was to get out of it way back when? Consider a brief thought experiment. Imagine you're feeling like there is no way for you to enjoy life and you go to a therapist. The therapist tells you that there is only one way that she can help you. She can offer you a pill that will erase part of your memory so that you can have the opportunity to re-enjoy what you once did before you felt like there was nothing left to enjoy about living. If this idea bothers you, then you should worry that in the scenario in which you want to live forever only to pursue things you've forgotten you'll similarly start to find these pursuits to be futile.8 This is a problem because this feeling of futility can potentially interfere with your ability to genuinely take an interest in your activities. Now, intuitions may vary quite a bit here due to different natural propensities: some people reread Harry Potter any time it starts to fade from memory, and some people don't see the point.9 But it's not just this difference in personality as it manifests in mortal life that comes into play. It is, I think, quite difficult to know how one would react when running up against the enormity of facing a justified inability to find anything in life meaningful for the rest of eternity. What if we could take a pill that would make us forget not only what it was like to become a chess master whether or not we ever pursued learning to play chess, but also forget the fact that we ever erased our memory in the first place? While this cordons off the futility worry, it introduces a new worry. On this view, the only way that immortality would not be intolerably boring would be to take a pill that so interrupts the psychological continuity of our selves to a rather large degree. This sort of break in psychological continuity threatens to sever our very identities. We might then wonder what interest we really should have in these futures if it may not even really be us who survive. VI. How do these contingencies bear on what we should choose for ourselves? I have argued that there are more contingencies to whether or not someone would enjoy immortal life than either Curmudgeons or Anti-Curmudgeons have generally conceived of. And the sorts of things that make a difference to whether or not you are the kind of person who could enjoy a meaningful life without death are very difficult to assess without already having lived for a very long time. I have focused on the contingencies related to whether or not you would face intolerable boredom, but there are other possible contingencies. (Just to name one: are you the kind of person who needs a due date to get motivated to do anything? If so, you might spend a lot of time procrastinating with the entire expanse of forever stretched out before you to fulfill your dreams.) This leads to an interesting question: what, then, should you do if faced with the opportunity to take an elixir that would make you live forever? This question is particularly vexed because the structure of the decision runs into two somewhat notorious problems for decision theory. First, there is the fact that, as I have argued, there are various features that affect what it's like to live forever that you wouldn't be privy to without having actually lived for a very long time and/or lived with the understanding that you'd continue doing it forever. This is potentially an example of what L.A. Paul calls a "transformative decision" (Paul 2015).10 According to Paul, in cases of transformative choice, the rationality of an approach to life where we think of ourselves as authoritatively controlling our choices by imaginatively projecting ourselves forward and considering possible subjective futures is undermined by our cognitive and epistemic limitations. If we attempt to fix the problem by adjusting our decision‐theoretic models and eliminating the role for imagination and first personal assessment, the authenticity of our decision‐making is undermined (Paul 2015b). Even if you were able to imaginatively project yourself into the future in order to ascertain exact probabilities for the chances that you would be able to pursue interesting projects indefinitely, assuming the probabilities are somewhere in between 0% and 100%, the decision would still not be straightforward. This is because decision theory runs into a number of paradoxes with infinite values, and so seems unable to give us straightforward answers in these sorts of cases. Notice, for example, that the value of a choice that leads to a 3% chance of an infinitely bad outcome is still -∞ and the value of a choice that leads to a 97% chance of an infinitely good outcome is still ∞. Given these problems, unless you are willing to bet all your chips on some form of transfinite decision theory, it strikes me that it would be somewhat irrational to be confident about how to proceed.11 VII. Conclusion To summarize, while I have agreed with Anti-Curmudgeons that it might be misleading to think that the library of potential pursuits that exist in general has a finite number of books, each of which has a finite number of pages, there are still several reasons to worry about running out of pages to read that will genuinely sustain your interest. Whether or not any one individual would run out of pages is contingent on the contents of their personal library, which contains only the pursuits she would be able to genuinely take an interest in that would, for her, effectively stave off insurmountable boredom. While it is theoretically possible that a person might have an infinite number of books, books that are infinitely long, or books that are infinitely re-readable, it would be a real gamble to bet on any one of those things being the case. Given the presence of these sorts of contingencies, I have left open the possibility that it may be theoretically possible for a person to live an infinitely long life on earth free of insurmountable boredom. However, I believe that you should proceed very cautiously, as you have no reason to be confident that that person is you. Bibliography Altshuler, R. (2015), 'Immortality, Identity, and Desirability', in Michael Cholbi (ed.), Immortality and the Philosophy of Death, Rowman & Littlefield 191-203. Beglin, David (2017). Should I choose to never die? Williams, boredom, and the significance of mortality. Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2009-2028. Belshaw, Christopher (2015). Immortality, Memory and Imagination. The Journal of Ethics 19 (3-4):323-348. David Blumenfeld (2009) 'Living Life Over Again', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2), 357-386. Bortolotti, L. and Nagasawa, Y. (2009), 'Immortality Without Boredom', Ratio 22 (3):261-277. Bruckner, D. (2012), 'Against the Tedium of Immortality', International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20 (5): 623-644. Burley, M. (2009a), 'Immortality and Boredom: A Response to Wisnew- ski', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (2):77-85. ---(2009b), 'Immortality and Meaning: Reflections on the Makropulos Debate', Philosophy, 84 (4):529-547. ---(2015), '"The End of Immortality!" Eternal Life and the Makropulos Debate', Journal of Ethics, 19 (3-4): 305-321. Calhoun, C. (2011), 'Living with Boredom', Sophia, 50: 269-279. Chappell, S. G. (2007), 'Infinity Goes Up On Trial: Must Immortality Be Meaningless?', European Journal of Philosophy, 17: 30-44. Cholbi, Michael (2015). Immortality and the Exhaustibility of Value. In Immortality and the Philosophy of Death. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 221-236. Coren, D. (2018). 'Always Choose to Live or Choose to Always Live?' Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (2):89-104. Fischer, J. M. (2009), 'Why Immortality is Not So Bad', Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fischer, J. M. and Mitchell-Yellin, B. (2014), 'Immortality and Boredom', Journal of Ethics, 18: 353–372. Felder, R. M. (2018). Forgetting in Immortality. Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (4): 844-853. Galloway, D. (2012), 'Bernard Williams on Living Long and Living Well', Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 18 (5): 1087-1090. Gorman, A.G. (2016), 'Williams and the Desirability of Body‐Bound Immortality Revisited'. European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3). Helm, Bennett W. (2001). Emotions and practical reason: Rethinking evaluation and motivation. Noûs 35 (2):190–213. Lauinger, W. (2014), 'Eternity, Boredom, and One's Part-Whole-Reality Conception', American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 88 (1): 1-28. Moore, A. W. (2006), 'Williams, Nietzsche, and the Meaninglessness of Immortality', Mind, 115 (458): 311-330. Nagel, Thomas (1986). The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press. Rosati, C. (2013), 'The Makropulos Case Revisited: Reflections on Immortality and Agency', in B Bradley F Feldman and J Johansson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Roberts, Robert C. (2003). Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press. Paul, L. A. (2015). Précis of Transformative Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):760-765. ---(2014). Transformative Experience. Oxford University Press. Prinz, Jesse J. (2006). Is Emotion a Form of Perception? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):137-160. Smuts, A. (2009), 'Wings of Desire: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality', Film and Philosophy, 13: 137-150. Tanyi, A. & Karlander, K. (2013), 'Immortal Curiosity', Philosophical Forum, 44 (3): 255-273. Tappolet, C. (2012). Emotions, perceptions, and emotional illusions. In Calabi Clotilde (ed.), Perceptual Illusions. Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 207-24. Temkin, Larry S. (2008), Is Living Longer Living Better?' Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25 (3): 193-210. Williams, B. (1973), 'The Makropoulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality', Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wisnewski, J. (2005), 'Is the Immortal Life Worth Living?', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 58: 27-36. Endnotes 1 For one of the most famous versions of this argument, see Williams (1973). For a similar take on the argument I provide in this paper that builds off of an interpretation of Williams' argument, see Gorman (2016). 2 Nagel (1987) writes that, "given the simple choice between living for another week and dying in five minutes I would always choose to live for another week.... I conclude that I would be glad to live for ever" (224). Coren (2018) provides a criticism of this argument. 3 Curmudgeons (of both stronger and weaker varieties) include Williams (1973), Moore (2006), Temkin (2008), Burley (2009a), Altshuler (2015), Cholbi (2015), and Beglin (2017). AntiCurmudgeons include Wisnewski (2005), Chappell (2007), Smuts (2009), Fischer (2009), Bartolotti and Nagasawa (2009), Bruckner (2012), Galloway (2012), Tanyi and Karlander (2013), Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin (2014), and Lauinger (2014). 4 Without arguing for it here, I assume something like a perceptual theory of emotion. For more on perceptual theories of emotions, see Helm (2001), Roberts (2003), Prinz (2006), and Tappolet (2012). 5 My account of fleeting boredom here is greatly influenced by Calhoun (2011). 6 I owe this example to Michael Cholbi. 7 For more on the role of forgetting see Bruckner (2012), Belshaw (2015), and Felder (2018). 8 See Blumenfeld (2009) for additional motivation for the futility worry. Blumenfeld gives several cases that aim to elicit this intuition via illustrating the way in which many of us seem to value new genuine achievement rather than merely having the experience of having achieved something. He also notes and diagnoses the diversity of responses to the futility worry. 9 Temkin (2008) points to the extreme variation as a factor in the stratification of views in the literature about the desirability of living forever. 10 Beglin (2016) also makes this connection. 11 See Cholbi (2015) for an argument that, given the probabilities, mortality is the better bet.

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2016 | Vol. 7 | Issue 11 | pp. 900-909 Kastrup, B. The Idealist View of Consciousness After Death ISSN: 2153-8212 © Bernardo Kastrup 2016 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 900 Research Essay The Idealist View of Consciousness After Death Bernardo Kastrup* Abstract To make educated guesses about what happens to consciousness upon bodily death, one has to have some understanding of the relationship between body and consciousness during life. This relationship, of course, reflects an ontology. In this brief essay, the tenability of both the physicalist and dualist ontologies will be assessed in view of recent experimental results in physics. The alternative ontology of idealism will then be discussed, which not only can be reconciled with the available empirical evidence, but also overcomes the lack of parsimony and limited explanatory power of physicalism and dualism. Idealism elegantly explains the basic facts of reality, such as (a) the fact that brain activity correlates with experience, (b) the fact that we all seem to share the same world, and (c) the fact that we can't change the laws of nature at will. If idealism is correct, the implication is that, instead of disappearing, conscious inner life expands upon bodily death, a prediction that finds circumstantial but significant confirmation in reports of near-death experiences and psychedelic trances, both of which can be construed as glimpses into the early stages of the death process. Keywords: ontology, metaphysics, mind-body problem, death, near-death experience, psychedelics, quantum physics 1 Introduction Our capacity to be conscious subjects of experience is the root of our sense of being. After all, if we weren't conscious, what could we know of ourselves? How could we even assert our own existence? Being conscious is what it means to be us. In an important sense-even the only important sense-we are first and foremost consciousness itself, the rest of our self-image arising afterwards, as thoughts and images constructed in consciousness. For this reason, the question of what happens to our consciousness after bodily death has been central to humanity throughout its history. Do we cease to exist or continue on in some form or another? Many people today seek existential solace in body-self dualism, which opens up the possibility of the survival of * Correspondence: Bernardo Kastrup, independent scholar, Veldhoven, The Netherlands Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.bernardokastrup.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2016 | Vol. 7 | Issue 11 | pp. 900-909 Kastrup, B. The Idealist View of Consciousness After Death ISSN: 2153-8212 © Bernardo Kastrup 2016 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 901 consciousness after bodily death (Heflick et al, 2015). But is dualism-with the many serious problems it entails, both philosophical and empirical (Robinson, 2016)-the only ontology that allows for this survival? Although consciousness itself is the only directly accessible datum of reality, both dualism and the mainstream ontology of physicalism (Stoljar, 2016) posit the existence of something ontologically distinct from consciousness: a physical world outside and independent of experience. In this context, insofar as consciousness is believed to be constituted, generated, hosted or at least modulated by particular arrangements of matter and energy in the physical world, the dissolution of such arrangements-as entailed by bodily death-bears relevance to our survival. This is the root of humanity's preoccupation with death. However, the existence of a physical world outside and independent of consciousness is a theoretical inference arising from interpretation of sense perceptions, not an empirical fact. After all, our only access to the physical is through the screen of perception, which is itself a phenomenon of and in consciousness. Renowned Stanford physicist Andrei Linde (1998) summarized this as follows: Let us remember that our knowledge of the world begins not with matter but with perceptions. ... Later we find out that our perceptions obey some laws, which can be most conveniently formulated if we assume that there is some underlying reality beyond our perceptions. This model of material world obeying laws of physics is so successful that soon we forget about our starting point and say that matter is the only reality, and perceptions are only helpful for its description. This assumption is almost as natural (and maybe as false) as our previous assumption that space is only a mathematical tool for the description of matter. (p. 12) The physical world many believe to exist beyond consciousness is an abstract explanatory model. Its motivation is to make sense of three basic observations about reality: (a) If a physical brain outside experience doesn't somehow generate or at least modulate consciousness, how can there be such tight correlations between observed brain activity and reported inner experience (cf. Koch, 2004)? (b) If the world isn't fundamentally independent and outside of experience, it can only be analogous to a dream in consciousness. But in such a case, how can we all be having the same dream? (c) Finally, if the world is in consciousness, how can it unfold according to patterns and regularities independent of our volition? After all, human beings cannot change the laws of nature. Nonetheless, if these questions can be satisfactorily answered without the postulate of a physical world outside consciousness, the need for the latter can be legitimately called into question on grounds of parsimony. Moreover, while Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2016 | Vol. 7 | Issue 11 | pp. 900-909 Kastrup, B. The Idealist View of Consciousness After Death ISSN: 2153-8212 © Bernardo Kastrup 2016 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 902 physicalism requires the existence of ontological primitives-which Strawson (2006, p. 9) called "ultimates"-beyond consciousness, it fails to explain consciousness itself in terms of these primitives (cf. Chalmers, 2003). So if the three basic observations about reality listed above can be made sense of in terms of consciousness alone, then physicalism can be legitimately called into question on grounds of explanatory power as well. And as it turns out, there is indeed an alternative ontology that explains all three basic observations without requiring anything beyond consciousness itself. This ontology will be summarized in Section 3 of this brief essay. In addition, the inferred existence of a physical world outside and independent of consciousness has statistical corollaries that can be tested with suitable experimental designs (Leggett, 2003; Bell, 1964). As it turns out, empirical tests of these corollaries have been carried out since the early eighties, when Alan Aspect performed his seminal experiments (1981). And the results do not corroborate the existence of a universe outside consciousness. These seldomtalked-about but solid empirical facts will be summarized in the next section. Without a physical world outside consciousness, we are left with consciousness alone as ground of reality. In this case, we must completely revise our intuitions and assumptions regarding death. After all, if consciousness is that within which birth and death unfold as phenomenal processes, then neither birth nor death can bear any relevance to the existential status of consciousness itself. What does death then mean? What can we, at a personal level, expect to experience upon bodily death? These questions will be examined in Section 4 of this essay. 2 The empirical case against a world outside consciousness A key intuitive implication of a world outside consciousness is that the properties of this world must not depend on observation; i.e., an object must have whatever properties it has-weight, size, shape, color, etc.-regardless of whether or how it appears on the screen of perception. This should clearly set the physical world apart from the sphere of consciousness. After all, the properties of a purely imagined object do not exist independently, but only insofar as they are imagined. As mentioned earlier, the postulated independence of the world from observation has certain statistical corollaries (Leggett, 2003) that can be directly tested. On this basis, Gröblacher et al. (2007) have shown that the properties of the world, surprisingly enough, do depend on observation. To reconcile their results with physicalism or dualism would require a counterintuitive redefinition of what we call objectivity. And since contemporary culture has come to associate objectivity with reality itself, the science press felt compelled to report on this study by pronouncing, "Quantum physics says goodbye to reality" (Cartwright, 2007). Testing similar statistical corollaries, another experiment (Romero et al, 2010) has confirmed that the world indeed doesn't Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2016 | Vol. 7 | Issue 11 | pp. 900-909 Kastrup, B. The Idealist View of Consciousness After Death ISSN: 2153-8212 © Bernardo Kastrup 2016 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 903 conform to what one would expect if it were outside and independent of consciousness. Other statistical corollaries (Bell, 1964) have also been experimentally examined. These tests have shown that the properties of physical systems do not seem to even exist prior to being observed (Lapkiewicz et al., 2011; Manning et al., 2015). Commenting on these results, physicist Anton Zeilinger is quoted as saying that "there is no sense in assuming that what we do not measure about a system has [an independent] reality" (Ananthaswamy, 2011). Finally, Ma et al. (2013) have again shown that no naively objective view of the world can be true. Critics have deeply scrutinized the studies cited above to find possible loopholes, implausible as they may be. In an effort to address and close these potential loopholes, Dutch researchers performed an even more tightly controlled test, which again confirmed the earlier results (Hensen et al., 2015). This latter effort was considered the "toughest test yet" (Merali, 2015). Another intuitive implication of the notion of a world outside consciousness is that our choices can only influence the world-through our bodily actions-in the present. They cannot affect the past. As such, the part of our story that corresponds to the past must be unchangeable. Contrast this to the sphere of consciousness wherein we can change the whole of an imagined story at any moment. In consciousness, the entire narrative is always acquiescent to choice and amenable to revision. As it turns out, Kim et al. (2000) have shown that observation not only determines the physical properties observed at present, but also retroactively changes their history accordingly. This suggests that the past is created at every instant so as to be consistent with the present, which is reminiscent of the notion that the world is a malleable mental narrative. Already back in 2005, renowned Johns Hopkins physicist and astronomer Richard Conn Henry penned an essay for Nature (2005) wherein he claimed that "The universe is entirely mental. ... There have been serious [theoretical] attempts to preserve a material world-but they produce no new physics, and serve only to preserve an illusion" (p. 29). The illusion he was referring to was, of course, that of a world outside consciousness. Thus from a rigorous empirical perspective, the tenability of the notion of a world outside and independent of consciousness is at least questionable. The key reason for resisting an outright abandonment of this notion is the supposed lack of plausible alternatives. What other ontology could make sense of the three basic observations about reality discussed in Section 1? In the next section, I will attempt to answer this question. 3 A simple idealist ontology The ontology of idealism differs from physicalism in that it takes phenomenal consciousness to be the only irreducible aspect of nature, as opposed to an Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2016 | Vol. 7 | Issue 11 | pp. 900-909 Kastrup, B. The Idealist View of Consciousness After Death ISSN: 2153-8212 © Bernardo Kastrup 2016 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 904 epiphenomenon or emergent property of physical arrangements. It also differs from dualism in that it takes all physical elements and arrangements to exist in consciousness-solely as phenomenal properties-as opposed to outside consciousness. Historically, idealism has had many different variations labeled as subjective idealism, absolute idealism, actual idealism, etc. It is not my purpose here to elaborate on the subtle, ambiguous and often contentious differences among these variations. Instead, I want to simply describe the basic tenets that any plausible, modern formulation of idealism must entail, given our present knowledge and understanding of the world. What follows is but a brief summary of a much more extensive derivation of idealism from first principles (Kastrup, forthcoming). The defining tenet of idealism is the notion that all reality is in a universal form of consciousness-thus not bound to personal boundaries-arising as patterns of excitation of this universal consciousness. Our personal psyche forms through a process of dissociation in universal consciousness, analogous to how the psyche of a person suffering from dissociative identity disorder (DID) differentiates itself into multiple centers of experience called alters (Braude, 1995; Kelly et al., 2009; Schlumpf et al., 2014). Recent research has demonstrated the literally blinding power of dissociation (Strasburger & Waldvogel, 2015). This way, there is a sense in which each living creature is an alter of universal consciousness, which explains why we aren't aware of each other's inner lives or of what happens across time and space at a universal scale. The formation of an alter in universal consciousness creates a boundary-a "Markov blanket" (Friston, Sengupta & Auletta, 2014, pp. 430-432)-between phenomenality internal to the alter and that external to it. Phenomenality external to the alter-but still in its vicinity-impinges on the alter's boundary. The plausibility of this kind of phenomenal impingement from across a dissociative boundary is well established: we know, for instance, that dissociated feelings can dramatically affect our thoughts and, thereby, behaviors (Lynch & Kilmartin, 2013), while dissociated expectations routinely mold our perceptions (cf. Eagleman, 2011). The impingement of external phenomenality on an alter's boundary is what we call sense perception. The world we perceive around ourselves is thus a coded phenomenal representation (Friston, Sengupta & Auletta, 2014, pp. 432-434)- which I shall call the extrinsic appearance-of equally phenomenal processes unfolding across the dissociative boundary of our alter. A living biological body is the extrinsic appearance of an alter in universal consciousness. In particular, our sense organs-including our skin-are the extrinsic appearance of our alter's boundary. As such, our brain and its electrochemical activity are part of what our inner life looks like from across its dissociative boundary. Of course, both the extrinsic appearance and the corresponding inner life are phenomenal in nature. They are both experiences. Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2016 | Vol. 7 | Issue 11 | pp. 900-909 Kastrup, B. The Idealist View of Consciousness After Death ISSN: 2153-8212 © Bernardo Kastrup 2016 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 905 A person's brain activity correlates with the person's reported inner life because the former is but a coded representation of the latter. We all inhabit the same world because our respective alters are surrounded by the same universal field of phenomenality, like whirlpools in a single stream. And we can't change the patterns and regularities that govern the world-i.e., the laws of nature- because our volition, as part of our alter, is dissociated from the rest of nature. See Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of all this. Figure 1. Idealism in a nutshell. Clearly, all three basic observations about reality discussed in Section 1 can be rather simply explained by this parsimonious idealist ontology. Moreover, unlike physicalism and dualism, the ontology can also be reconciled with the empirical results discussed in Section 2. It thus offers a more promising alternative for interpreting the relationship between body and consciousness than physicalism and dualism. The question that remains to be addressed is this: if idealism is true, what can we then infer about consciousness after bodily death? This is what the next section will attempt to answer. 4 What idealism says about consciousness after death The idealist ontology briefly summarized in the previous section asserts that the physical body is the extrinsic appearance-the image-of a dissociative process in universal consciousness. In other words, a living body is what dissociation- meant simply descriptively, not as something negative or pathological-in universal consciousness looks like. Therefore, the death and ultimate dissolution Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2016 | Vol. 7 | Issue 11 | pp. 900-909 Kastrup, B. The Idealist View of Consciousness After Death ISSN: 2153-8212 © Bernardo Kastrup 2016 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 906 of the body can only be the image of the end of the dissociation. Any other conclusion would violate the internal logic of idealism. The reasoning here is rather straightforward but its implications profound. The hallmark of dissociation is "a disruption of and/or discontinuity in the normal integration of consciousness, memory, identity [and] emotion" (Black & Grant, 2014, p. 191). Therefore, the end of dissociation can only entail a reintegration of "memory, identity [and] emotion" lost at birth. This means that bodily death, under idealism, must correlate with an expansion of our felt sense of identity, access to a broader set of memories and enrichment of our emotional inner life. This conclusion is the exact opposite of what our mainstream physicalist ontology asserts. Moreover, there is nothing in the popular dualist alternative- mainly found in religious circles-that requires it either. So idealism is not only unique in its ability to explain reality more parsimoniously and completely than physicalism and dualism, it also offers a unique perspective on death. Circumstantially but significantly, much of the literature regarding near-death experiences (NDEs) seems to corroborate this prediction of idealism (Kelly et al., 2009). To mention only one recent example, Anita Moorjani (2012) wrote of her felt sense of identity during her NDE: "I certainly don't feel reduced or smaller in any way. On the contrary, I haven't ever been this huge, this powerful, or this allencompassing. ... [I] felt greater and more intense and expansive than my physical being" (p. 69). It's hard to conceive of a more unambiguous confirmation of idealism's prediction than this passage, although Moorjani's entire NDE report echoes the prediction precisely. Moreover, as recent studies have shown (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012; PalhanoFontes et al., 2015; Carhart-Harris et al., 2016), psychedelic drugs reduce brain activity. This suggests that psychedelic trances may be in some way akin to the early stages of the death process, offering glimpses into how death is experienced from a first-person perspective. And as we know, psychedelic trances do entail an unambiguous expansion of awareness (Strassman, 2001; Griffiths et al., 2006; Strassman et al., 2008), which again seems to circumstantially corroborate idealism's prediction. 5 Conclusions To make educated guesses about what happens to consciousness upon bodily death, one has to have some understanding of the relationship between body and consciousness during life. This relationship, of course, reflects an ontology. So the question of what happens after death can be transposed into the question of which ontology is most plausible for making sense of the world during life. While physicalism is our culture's academically-endorsed, mainstream ontology and dualism a popular alternative in religious circles, neither ontology seems tenable in view of recent experimental results in physics. Moreover, both Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2016 | Vol. 7 | Issue 11 | pp. 900-909 Kastrup, B. The Idealist View of Consciousness After Death ISSN: 2153-8212 © Bernardo Kastrup 2016 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 907 ontologies suffer from problems such as lack of parsimony or limited explanatory power. A third ontology, known as idealism, overcomes not only these problems but can also be reconciled with the available empirical evidence. It elegantly explains the three basic facts of reality: (a) that brain activity correlates with experience, (b) that we all seem to share the same world, and (c) that we can't change the laws of nature at will. 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The Philosophy of Suresh Chandra Edited by R.C. Pradhan Indian Council of Philosophical Research New Delhi © Indian Council of Philosophical Research 2004 All rights reserved. No part o f this publication may be reproduced in any form, or by any means, without the written permission o f the publisher. Published by M ember-Secretary for INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH Darshan B ha wan 36 Tughlakabad Institutional Area, M ehrauli-Badarpur Road, (near Batra Hospital), New Delhi 110 062 ISBN: 81-85636-74-5 Typeset by Print Services B-17, 2nd Floor, Lajpat N agar Part 2, New Delhi 110 024 Printed in India at Saurabh Printers Pvt. Ltd., Noida 201 301 12 Paradox of Method: Suresh Chandra on Social Scientific Research KOSHY THARAKAN The reason why we think that interpretation is restricted to either inevitable distortion or literal reproduction is that we want the meaning of a man's works to be wholly posi- tive and by rights susceptible to an inventory which sets forth what is and is not in those works. But this is to be deceived about works and thought. -Maurice Merleau-Ponty in Signs The point that Merleau-Ponty raises here is quite significant to my discussion of Suresh Chandra's views regarding social scientific research. My paper is based on a Presidential Ad- dress delivered by Suresh Chandra at the Indian Philosophi- cal Congress held in Jadavpur quite some time ago. What he said then need not be the whole of his 'thought' on this topic. Some of the points that I raise might have already been taken care of by Suresh Chandra and even if it is not so, what I discuss here is still part of his thought and works in the sense in which Merleau-Ponty understands the work of a thinker. In another important sense, all that I discuss below is also a part of Suresh Chandra's thought and works because he him- self was one of my teachers in Hyderabad who trained me to think philosophically. Paradox o f Method 271 In order to understand the paradox of social science re- search as pointed out by Suresh Chandra, we may recall that scientific investigations consist in methodical inquiries. It is the adherence to 'method' that makes any inquiry scientific in the sense of being objective and the results thus attained as valid for all those who undertake the inquiry. Thus if the method is the route to scientific knowledge, our investiga- tions with regard to social reality to be 'scientific' cannot but stick to proper methodology. As Suresh Chandra rightly notes, there are two types of methods that are widely used in social science research, namely 'Positivistic' and 'Normative'. Ac- cording to him, it is '... these methods which are responsible for the paradoxical situation of social science.'5 The positiv- ists construe social science as fundamentally similar to natu- ral science. Thus the positivist standpoint represents what is known as 'methodological monism'. The rationale for such a unity of method thesis consists in the conviction that the social world originates from and is continuous with the natu- ral world and as such it has nothing to do with normative or ideological interpretation.2 As against the positivists, the pro- ponents of normative interpretation consider only such inter- pretations as legitimate for social sciences. They may very well concede a positivistic methodology for natural sciences but nevertheless argue for a different methodology for the study of social reality. Their rationale for holding such a 'methodological dualism' consists in their belief that the two worlds are not continuous with each other. Rather the social world is a construction and as such it involves ideological and norm ative elements. There is another strand of 'interpretivism' that upholds the unity of method. According to it any inquiry is interpretive as there is nothing like pure description. Since all observations are theory-laden, even our 272 KOSHY THARAKAN observations of the natural world also have an interpretive bearing. Suresh Chandra points out that the advocates of normative interpretation would even go to the extent of saying that a positivist social science, say history, is no 'history' if it merely replicates historical 'facts'. He uses an analogy from the domain of art to explain the interpretivists' standpoint. Thus he draws our attention to the debate between the advocates of 'Realism' in painting and the practitioners of 'Cubism'. According to the latter, it is only cubism, only abstract art is art. Their argument is that only in the case of abstract art is the mind of man made to think. In a realist painting, the job is better done by a camera and consequently the artist is redundant. In other words, the practitioners of abstract art construe art as a specialized 'discipline', as an academic pursuit. It needs an expert to judge the beauty of an abstract painting. Thus, with abstract painting, art is liberated from the hands of the common man. Similarly, the interpretivists argue that history done in the photographic fashion is no history. History is no science if it merely copies the events. Here the assumption is that 'science' is an abstraction and as such it cannot remain at the level of 'pure descriptions'. The concept of positivist science is based on the concept of pure description, something that does not involve any interpreta- tion. But such a concept of 'science' is a myth. Thus Suresh Chandra feels the need to lift history from the stage of pure descriptions. History done in the positivist mode is history cast in the photographic mould. To have the academic status, history must give up its photographic character. It must ac- quire the normative and ideological character, if it aspires to be a science. Now, the issue as I understand it concerns the question: can there be at any stage a photographic history, one that Paradox o f Method 273 needs to be lifted from pure descriptions? It seems to be an impossible stage. Unlike the ideological conviction of cu- bists regarding the prestige of art as something to do with its belonging to an academic discipline, a status it acquires by virtue of abstractions and interpretations, the interpretivists do have an epistemological point to negate the plausibility of positivist science. The interpretivists would argue that there could be no photographs' of social or historical events sim- ply because there is nothing to be photographed. The social world is a construction. It is this assertion of the interpretivists that generates what Suresh Chandra identifies as the Second Paradox of social science research. The paradox consists in '...the kind of opposition that an ideological interpreter gives to the positivistic interpretation of science.'3 As Suresh Chandra notes, according to the ideological interpreter there can be no such thing as a positivistic science. All science is ideological; there is no objective 'reality' and therefore no 'final court of appeal'. Even in art, the artist by using his hands and eyes distorts reality. He paints reality as he sees it and not reality as it is. But then what is the paradox involved here? There will not be any paradox of the kind Suresh Chandra refers to if the interpretivist claims that there is nothing like reality as it is, all that there is are our view- points. It is our viewpoints that make reality. It is not that Suresh Chandra fails to recognize this. He very well notes this when he makes the following remark about the interpretivist stance: 'Not only that none of us as a matter o f fact are in contact with the naked reality, but none of us could ever be in such a contact. The naked reality is a mi- rage; all reality is dressed up. Not only this, the dresses con- stitute the whole of reality.'4 Nevertheless, Suresh Chandra sees a paradox here. But the paradox arises only because he believes there are some 'facts' out there, some 'truths' to be 2 7 4 KOSHY THARAKAN known independent of our viewpoints.5 In other words, the paradox that he alludes to is an epistemic paradox of knowability. The knowability paradox arises from accepting that some truths are not knowable and that any truth is knowable .6 If there is reality as it is and all that we can capture by way of our epistemic practices is reality as we see it, then there indeed is a paradox. Suresh Chandra seems to sub- scribe to this. Suresh Chandra claims th a t£... the occurrence of a histori- cal event and so also of its being photographed are essential conditions for a genuine scientific history to be written.'7 According to him, the photographs do have a function, as it is the datum on which the historians work. The historian in explaining an event needs to capture the event first by way of a photograph and only if such a photograph is available can he proceed to 'explain' it. Thus Suresh Chandra argues that the positivistic account of history cannot be rejected as useless. Rather it is the foundation of all kinds of historical interpretations to be given. Here Suresh Chandra seems to dilute his original characterization of positivistic science. Earlier he talked about the positivistic science as based on the concept of 'pure description' and denounced it as a myth or in any case it was a myth for the interpretivists. So when he now talks about the necessity of positivistic account, as it is the foundation for any interpretation, it does not necessar- ily follow that such a foundation is devoid of any interpre- tation. Rather the datum, the event that needs to be explained is already the result of some interpretations. Thus the photo- graph is not a pure description devoid of any interpretations. The very fact that the historian chooses to capture the pho- tograph of a particular segment of historical reality rather than some other segment betrays his interpretive preferences. I think this is what we primarily mean when we say that all Paradox o f Method 275 observations are theory-laden and there is nothing like pure descriptions. But then this is not just a peculiarity of social scientific research. All our inquiries are carried out within this interpretive net. Once this is granted, the issue is the possibility of further interpretations of the very same photo- graphic datum. Obviously such possibilities rest on the avail- ability of the photograph in the first place. This I think is what Suresh Chandra means when he asserts the necessity of positivistic account. Nevertheless he envisages further inter- pretations of such data in the course of historical research. According to him, histories 'written in the positivistic fash- ion are nothing but files of the photograph.' Thus he says: '... the economic interpretation of history is not the photographic account of history, yet without the photographic account of history the economic interpretation of history would have been impossible.'8 My problem here is our difficulty to visu- alize any account of history as a photographic account. Take for example the recent controversy over an NCERT text- book. It characterizes the events that took place in Russia in the year AD 1917 as a 'coup'. Earlier accounts of the same event describe it as a 'Revolution'. The ideological interpre- tations are evident in the very labeling of the event. Either you may call it a coup or a revolution or any other descrip- tion you deem to be apt according to your ideological stance. But it seems impossible to characterize the event devoid of any labeling. Even a chronicle has to baptize the event and baptism of any sort is normative at some level. This does not mean that only the name exists and no 'event' at all, yet without the name we cannot refer to the event. Then where is the scope for a positivistic account of history? It may be that what Suresh Chandra calls a 'positivistic' account of history is one that faithfully captures the events as they were understood by the historical spectators themselves. 2 7 6 KOSHY THARAKAN In other words the events that took place in Russia in the year a d 1917 are understood or described by the people who 'witnessed' the events. I say 'witnessed' because I hope it would do justice to the positivistic ideal o f 'objectivity' thereby eliminating the subjective colourings of the participants who either acted in a manner of favouring the occurrence of the event or in a manner of preventing it from taking place. But even this prescription seems to be impossible according to Gadamer. For Gadamer interpretation is not a matter of re- construction a, la Dilthey. Rather it is mediation. In order to understand the past, we mediate the past meaning into our situatedness. That is, our historicity is an integral part of our understanding. It is historicity, even though it involves pre- suppositions and prejudices that open the past for us. The metaphor of 'fusion of horizons' captures this aspect of un- derstanding. For him, genuine understanding is a fusion of horizons in which the subject and object of knowing are fused together such that knowing the other is knowing one- self. It is this element of 'prejudice' in our understanding that marks Gadarper's philosophical hermeneutics from traditional hermeneutics. Thus it seems that the task of writing history in the positivistic manner is never realizable in the actual process of history writing. The impossibility of a positivistic account thus undercuts the second paradox that Suresh Chandra identifies with his- torical research. Nevertheless, a shade of this paradox may seem to remain in other social scientific inquiries, particu- larly in sociology and social anthropology. Recall that the second paradox that Suresh Chandra talks about arises only if we accept the notion of reality as it is over and above our perspectives or interpretations. Such a view is held explicitly by some interpretivists and implicitly by positivists with re- gard to the relevance of an agent's motives or intentions in Paradox o f Method 277 understanding his or her actions. Sociologists of Weberian legacy consider grasping the agent's point of view as neces- sary for our understanding of action. Here the assumption is that there is some 'fact of the matter' with regard to the agent's point of view that needs to be captured. Now, if it is argued that it is not possible to capture the agent's intentions or motives, as these are not amenable to objective sensory perception, the paradox resurfaces. Of course positivists skirt this paradox in social science research by arguing the irrel- evance of such mental states for our understanding of social reality. For them what is important in understanding social reality are the objective consequences of action rather than subjective intentions or motives. Thus after all there seems to be a paradox of the type Suresh Chandra identifies with social science research carried out in the Weberian fashion.9 The ideal of recapturing what the agents 'have in mind' as the goal of social scientific understanding operates with what Quine calls the 'museum myth' view of meaning. According to the museum myth, meanings are determined by the speak- er's intention. It conceives language as providing the 'labels' for meanings, which are mental entities. Quine's naturalism is a strong indictment of this myth of the museum. It rejects the very conception of capturing the agent's intentions, as there is no such determinate 'fact of the matter'. In other words, Quine proposes the 'indeterminacy of meaning' and the impossibility of translating the intentions of the agent, as there is always underdetermination of meaning by experi- ence. Consequently there can be no objective basis that de- termines the meaning of action, let alone recapturing the agent's intended meaning. For Quine, reference cannot be secured merely by recognizing a thing. The rationale behind this is Quine's thesis of 'inscrutability of reference' and the philosophical lesson that Quine wants to convey through these 278 KOSHY THARAKAN problems of reference is primarily the thesis of 'ontological relativity'. The adoption of such a framework is arbitrary, chosen by convention and it is erroneous to think that we can get to the 'roots of reference' in an absolutist manner. Thus the hope to find the uniquely correct meaning or the attempt to capture the agent's intended meaning is like the search after the Holy Grail. Thus the second paradox that Suresh Chandra talks about does not really arise, given that the social world is a con- struction by the agents by bestowing meaning on their acts and there is nothing like a uniquely correct meaning to which the agents have a privileged access. Thus only the first para- dox remains. It seems to me that Suresh Chandra himself ultimately recognizes only this paradox as even though he mentions these two paradoxes, the Presidential address he delivered was titled 'The Paradox of Social Science Research', thereby negating a plurality of paradox. The paradox as Suresh Chandra characterizes it consists in the impossibility of avoid- ing different competing ideologies. Since what is 'unwritten' is open to \ multiplicity of readings, different interpretations vie with each other for legitimacy and we have no 'final court of appeal' to settle it one way or other. It is important to note here that even this paradox does not arise if one claims that what is called social science is hardly a science. Science by its very nature is objective in the sense of being possible to arrive at intersubjective agreement. So the para- dox consists in claiming scientific status to social inquiries. Nevertheless, this way of avoiding the paradox is forestalled by Suresh Chandra. He considers such a move as an aca- demic absurdity and says it is no defense of an ideological interpretation.10 It is so because, as Suresh Chandra points out, the scientific status of history consists in its ability to 'acquire the normative and ideological character' and such a Paradox o f Method 279 normative dimension is the aspect of transcending the posi- tivist ideal of photographic history'. It is absurd to conceive the very same normative and ideological dimensions that ascribe the scientific status to history while jettisoning the scientific status of history. This absurdity may be the real paradox of social science research. If it is argued that the kind of interpretation that is central to doing 'science' is not the same as the kind of interpretation that besets social scientific understanding, then even this paradox does not arise. In fact, Charles Taylor provides such an argument." What makes us think that there is no distinc- tion between the two kinds of interpretation is our blind al- legiance to the new kind of 'interpretivism' that argues for the unity of method. According to Taylor, this new call for the 'unity of science' based on hermeneutics is not in tune with reality. He is in agreement with the post-positivist phi- losophers of science in holding that the logical positivist's understanding of science is unacceptable as it failed to assign any place for interpretation. Nevertheless, Taylor is of the opinion that such an interpretative element within the prac- tice of 'science' is different from the kind of understanding that is central to social sciences. Taylor points out that our scientific understanding arises as a refinement of our ordi- nary understanding. This ordinary understanding or 'pre-un- derstanding' is prior to any theoretical stance and cannot be exhaustively formulated. Rather, our formulation of how to deal with things or theorization makes sense to us because of this background knowledge or pre-understanding. When we say that science or for that matter any inquiry is interpretive, it is this ordinary understanding that we refer to. Interpreta- tion that is central to social sciences is much more than this kind of understanding. It is hot just the kind of understanding that is required for an implicit grasp of things. Rather it is the 280 KOSHY THARAKAN kind of understanding that one needs in order to grasp the 'desirability characterizations'. These desirability characteri- zations are descriptions that lie beyond the limits of natural sciences. Natural sciences are characterized by the require- ments of 'absoluteness'. Natural sciences, as Taylor points out, seek an account of the world independent of the mean- ings it has for human beings. Thus, I would say that even this paradox does not really obtain as the interpretative dimension that inscribes our in- quiry as scientific is not the same as that which generates a multiplicity of interpretations vying with each other. Such possibilities of different interpretations only underscore the 'essential contestability' of social sciences. Nevertheless such possibilities of interpretation do not rule out intersubjective agreement. Also, some interpretations may fare better than some other interpretations when we take the whole of the socio-historical world into account. Thus one may argue that the events of AD 1917 as they happened in Russia are better interpreted as a 'Revolution' in the context of struggle as envisaged in Marxian political theory. This line of argument, of course, presumes that the events are the outcome of cer- tain political ideology. The moving force of such ideologies may in turn rest on the existence of certain other socio-his- torical reality. Thus, though the social world, including the historical world, is a construction, an ideological one at that, as Suresh Chandra rightly points out, the whole of social reality cannot be treated as mere 'constructs'. It has got some 'thingly' reality that enables such constructions. Sometimes this 'thingliness' of the socio-historical world constricts our interpretations. For example, the strong archaeological evi- dence that may obtain in the course of our historical inves- tigations will rule out certain hitherto accepted interpreta- tions as no more valid. In other words, the 'photographic Paradox o f Method 281 data' as Suresh Chandra may call it, plays a crucial role in our interpretations. Here, it may be pointed out that the ar- gument for a 'methodological dualism' based on the discon- tinuity of the social world from the natural world is mis- taken. As has been pointed out above, there are occasions when the natural world provides the material basis or the 'thingliness' of the social world. To that extent the methods of natural sciences do have a role to play in our investiga- tions pertaining to the social world. Where the positivists got it wrong was their refusal to accept this 'thingliness' as al- ready interpreted. NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. Chandra, Suresh: 'The Paradox of Social Science Research', Presidential address for 'Logic and Scientific Method', Indian Philosophical Congress, 61st Session, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, October 1986, p. 1. 2. Suresh Chandra equates normative with ideological. But such identification need not obtain always. The positivist norm of 'objectivity' is one that attempts to eschew any ideology. Also, one may claim the possibility of an ideology that is non-normative . Thus, a scientific world-view as adopted by some natu- ralists tries to explain away the normative aspects of epistemic concepts such as 'justification' and 'rationality' by invoking a scientific ideology. 3. Chandra, Suresh: op. cit, p. 6. 4. Ibid., p. 7. 5. In Suresh Chandra's discussion on Pradhan's interpretation of Wittgenstein his belief regarding the notion o f 'reality as it is' can be seen explicitly. See in this connection Suresh Chandra: 'Seeing and Seeing As: Pradhan and Panneerselvam' in JICPR, Vol. XII, No. 3, 1995, pp. 111-23. 6. See Jonathan L. Kvanvig: 'Epistemic Paradoxes' in Concise Routledge Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, London, Routledge, 2000, p. 656. 282 KOSHY THARAKAN 7. Chandra, Suresh: 'The Paradox of Social Science Research', p. 3. 8. Ibid., p. 3. 9. Nagel criticizes Weber's verstehen thesis by stating that none of the psychological states that we impute to the agents may in reality be theirs and even if our ascription is correct their manifest behaviour interpreted in terms of these psychological states would not be intelligible in the light of our own expe- riences. See in this regard Ernest Nagel: 'Problems of Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences' in Philosophy o f the Social Sciences; A Reader, (Ed.) Maurice Natanson, New York, Random House, 1963, p. 203. 10. Chandra, Suresh: 'The Paradox of Social Science Research', p. 7. 11. Taylor, Charles: 'Understanding in Human Sciences', in Re- view o f Metaphysics, Vol. 34, September 1980.

„Missdeutung der Kritik"? Eberhards Vorbehalte gegen Kants kritische Philosophie Ulrich Diehl (Halle) Wer sich für heute für die Kant-Eberhard-Kontroverse interessiert, der wird sich auch eingehender mit der ausführlichen, sowohl historisch als auch systematisch angelegten Monographie Das Medusenhaupt der Kritik. Die Kontroverse zwischen Immanuel Kant und Johann August Eberhard von Manfred Gawlina befassen müssen. Der Titel dieser Monographie spielt auf eine Formulierung Kants im zweiten Teil des Ersten Abschnitts seiner Replik auf Eberhard an, indem er seinen kritischen Ansatz auf ironische Weise als „Medusenhaupt der Kritik" bezeichnet.1 Kant wollte damit die abschreckende Wirkung charakterisieren, die sein kritischer Ansatz von Anfang an auf die Metaphysik des philosophischen Rationalismus hatte. Weil Kant in diesem Abschnitt den Nerv der ganzen Debatte trifft, will ich ihn zum Einstieg ausführlich zitieren: Vorher hatte Herr Eberhard von einem Verstandesbegriffe, der auch auf Gegenstände der Sinne angewandt werden kann (dem der Kausalität), aber doch als einem solchen geredet, der, auch ohne auf Gegenstände der Sinne eingeschränkt zu sein, von Dingen überhaupt gelten könne, und so die objektive Realität wenigstens Einer Kategorie, nämlich der Ursache, unabhängig von Bedingungen der Anschauung, zu beweisen vermeint. Jetzt geht er [...] einen Schritt weiter und will selbst einem Begriffe von dem, was geständlich gar nicht Gegenstand der Sinne sein kann, nämlich dem eines einfachen Wesens, die objektive Realität sichern, und so den Zugang zu den von ihm gepriesenen fruchtbaren Feldern der rationalen Psychologie, und Theologie, von dem sie das Medusenhaupt der Kritik zurückschrecken wollte, frei eröffnen. (S. 125, AA 199) Kant bezieht sich in diesem Abschnitt nur auf zwei der „vier Kardinalthemen" (S. 2), um die sich nach Gawlina die Kontroverse zwischen Kant und Eberhard dreht, nämlich um: 1 Im Folgenden zitiere ich den Wortlaut des Disputes aus der Meiner-Ausgabe, die beide Texte enthält. Bei Kant-Zitaten führe ich zusätzlich die Seitenzahlen aus der Akademieausgabe an; bei den EberhardZitaten die Seitenzahlen aus der Originalausgabe. 2 1. den Status von Raum und Zeit 2. die Gültigkeit des Gebrauches der Kategorien, 3. die Bedeutung der Idee des Einfachen und 4. die Leistungsfähigkeit von Letztprinzipien. Zweifelsohne handelt es sich dabei um vier herausragende philosophische Themen, die zwischen Kant und Eberhard kontrovers behandelt werden.2 Allerdings fehlt der für Kant entscheidende Disput über die Frage nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von synthetisch-apriorischen Urteilen als Grundlage für eine apriorische philosophische Erkenntnis. Sowohl in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft als auch in den Prolegomena, hat Kant seine Position so darzustellen versucht, dass es sich hierbei um die eigentliche Schicksalsfrage der Möglichkeit metaphysischen Erkennens und Wissens und damit der Metaphysik als apriorischer Wissenschaft handelt. Denn wie wir vor allem aus den Prolegomena lernen können, geht Kant davon aus, dass es synthetische Urteile a priori in der Mathematik gibt, die anders als die analytischen Urteile apriori unsere Erkenntnis bzw. unser Wissen nicht nur im Bereich der Logik und Mathematik, sondern auch in den metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaften, d.h. in den philosophischen Voraussetzungen der Naturwissenschaften. Aus Kants Sicht handelt es sich dabei zumindest auch um ein Kardinalthema und nach der Auffassung der KdrV und der Prolegomena sogar um das Kardinalthema schlechthin. Man mag aus guten Gründen die letztere Einschätzung in Frage stellen, dass es für Kant nicht auch andere Kardinalthemen gibt. Was ich jedoch noch nicht so recht verstehe und was mir von Anfang an nicht so recht einleuchten will, ist Gawlinas Entscheidung, dieses zumindest für Kant entscheidende Thema nicht zu den Kardinalthemen der Kontroverse hinzuzunehmen.3 2 Vermutlich liegt es daran, dass Kant in seiner Replik auf Eberhard aus Gründen der vorgegebenen dialektischen Situation, Eberhards Angriffe abwehren zu müssen, gar nicht den Spielraum und die Gestaltungsmöglichkeit besass, über das notwendige Retournieren hinaus eine so komplizierte Angelegenheit so vollständig darlegen zu können, wie das von der Sache her notwendig gewesen wäre. Klar ist jedenfalls, dass Eberhard gar nicht erkannt hatte, welche entscheidende Relevanz das brisante Problem der Frage nach den transzendentalen Bedingungen der Möglichkeit des synthetischen Apriori gerade auch für das in dieser Kontroverse umstrittene Problem der potentiellen Wissenschaftlichkeit der Metaphysik hatte. 3 Ausserdem handelt es sich auch um vier philosophische Grundprobleme, die man ohne Mühe bis zu Platon und Aristoteles zurückverfolgen kann und die zum Teil von einigen Philosophen auch heute noch 3 Da ich hin diesem kurzen Beitrag sicher nicht zugleich auf alle „vier Kardinalthemen" eingehen kann, werde ich mich auf eines dieser vier Grundprobleme beschränken müssen. Ich werde dazu ein Problem auswählen, das m.E. am besten geeignet ist, die Grundzüge der Kontroverse zwischen Kant und Eberhard zu charakterisieren, die intellektuellen Profile der beiden Kontrahenten nach zu zeichnen und die Stärken und Schwächen der beiden Positionen zu benennen. M.E. eignet sich dazu vor allem das von Gawlina an zweiter Stelle genannte Problem der objektiven „Gültigkeit des Gebrauchs von Kategorien"(S. 2). Folgt man dann noch dem von Kant im oben genannten Zitat gegebenen Hinweis, ist es ratsam, sich unter den Verstandeskategorien vor allem auf die Kategorie der Kausalität zu konzentrieren, um den eigentlichen existenziellen Nerv der Debatte zu treffen. Denn in Bezug auf das Desiderat einer apologetischen Abwehr der von Hume in Frage gestellten objektiven Gültigkeit der Kategorie der Kausalität sind sich Kant und Eberhard einig. Beide Denker kämpfen gegen die radikalen skeptizistischen Konsequenzen, die der scharfsinnige Hume aus dem Lockeschen Empirismus gezogen hat. Beide Denker sind sich einig, dass diese Konsequenzen nicht nur für die weitgehende Zuverlässigkeit der Erkenntnisse der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaften über die Struktur von Raum und Zeit sowie über die materiellen Gegebenheiten und kausalen Zusammenhänge, sondern auch für die weitgehende Zuverlässigkeit der alltäglichen Wahrnehmung und Erkenntnis der Lebenswelt verheerend sind. kontrovers diskutiert werden. Zwar haben Positivisten und Szientisten in der Nachfolge des Wiener Kreises, wie z.B. Carnap, Neurath und Quine versucht, solche Probleme eher als blosse „metaphysische Scheinprobleme" abzutun; und zwar haben auch die Sprachanalytiker in der Nachfolge von Wittgenstein, Ryle und Austin versucht, sie als blosse Sprachverwirrung oder Missbrauch umgangsprachlicher Ausdrücke zu entlarven. Aber andere zeitgenössische Philosophen, die eher an Russell, Popper oder Strawson anknüpfen, nehmen diese philosophischen Grundprobleme, die nicht zuletzt auch die logischen, begrifflichen und methodischen Voraussetzungen der formalen und materialen Einzelwissenschaften betreffen, immer noch ernst. 4 Natürlich lassen sich die drei anderen der von Gawlina hervorgehobenen „vier Kardinalthemen", des „Status von Raum und Zeit", der Bedeutung der Idee des Einfachen und der „Leistungsfähigkeit von Letztprinzipien" weder bei Eberhard noch bei Kant ganz und gar vom Kategorienproblem und dem Problem der Kausalität absondern. Denn schliesslich ist das Prinzip des zureichenden Grundes selbst ein „Letztprinzip", dessen Leistungsfähigkeit von Kant und Eberhard unterschiedlich beurteilt wird. Auch sind die Differenzen zwischen einer leibnizianischen und einer kantischen Auffassung von Raum und Zeit ganz und gar nicht unerheblich, wenn man die beiden Positionen oder Denkansätze als Ganze verstehen und erklären will. Weiterhin sind auch die unterschiedlichen Auffassungen über die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer Letztbegründung, Systematisierung und Hierarchisierung von obersten evidenten philosophischen Prinzipien, wie dem Prinzip des Widerspruches und dem Prinzip des zureichenden Grundes weder nebensächlich noch irrelevant. Und schliesslich kommt auch der unterschiedlichen Beurteilung der Idee des Einfachen seit Platon und Aristoteles eine so erhebliche Rolle zu, dass sich weder Eberhard noch Kant einer eigenen Stellungnahme zu dieser Kontroverse entziehen könnten. Will man jedoch die Kontroverse zwischen Kant und Eberhard kurz und bündig darstellen und erklären, dann eignet sich kein Grundproblem besser als das Problem der objektiven Gültigkeit des Gebrauches der Kategorie der Kausalität. Denn einerseits kämpfen in dieser Sachfrage beide Denker gemeinsam gegen den skeptizistischen Empiristen Hume; andererseits unterscheiden sich beide Denker eben auch in dieser Sachfrage hinsichtlich der Reichweite des Satzes vom Grunde als dem allgemeinen Prinzip der Kausalität. Da Eberhards Verständnis des Satzes vom Gunde an Leibniz anknüpft und sich darin von Kants Verständnis der Verstandeskategorie der Kausalität unterscheidet, entzündet sich eben gerade hier Eberhards leibnizianische Kritik an Kants Problem objektiven Gültigkeit des Gebrauches der Kategorie der Kausalität. Und diese leibnizianische Kritik ist schliesslich der Grund und Anlass dafür, dass Eberhard Kants kritischen Denkansatz fälschlicherweise in die Nähe von Humes Empirismus zu rücken versucht, um sie auf diese Weise schärfer angreifen zu können.4 4 Auf ähnliche Art und Weise hat übrigens später der junge Hegel in seiner Jenaer Frühschrift Glauben und Wissen (1802) Kants „Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität" in die Nähe von Lockes psycho-5 1. Der existenzielle Nerv der Debatte Gleichwohl wird der eigentliche Nerv der Debatte nicht nur durch das abstrakte Problem der objektiven Gültigkeit der Kategorie der Kausalität und der geistigen Reichweite des Satzes vom Grunde bzw. des allgemeinen Prinzips der Kausalität bestimmt. Der eigentliche Nerv der Debatte, der die Kontroverse zwischen Kant und Eberhard so scharf und leidenschaftlich werden lässt, befindet sich vielmehr in der weltanschaulichen und existenziellen Frage nach dem Verhältnis der Seele des Menschen zu Gott. Eberhards leidenschaftlicher und heftiger Widerstand gegen Kants neuartiges Philosophieren wäre nämlich kaum zu verstehen, wenn es dabei bloss um gewisse Grundfragen der Philosophie der Logik, wie z.B. der angeblichen Ableitbarkeit des Satzes vom Grunde aus dem Satz des Widerspruches ginge, oder bloss um bestimmte philosophischen Grundprobleme der Kosmologie von Raum und Zeit, wie z.B. der angeblichen Überlegenheit der relationalen Auffassung Leibnizens gegenüber der quasi-substanziellen Konzeption Newtons, oder bloss um ein teils epistemologisches, teils ontologisches Grundproblem, wie z.B. die Frage nach der objektiven Geltung bestimmter Kategorien des Verstandes in ihrer Anwendung auf bestimmte Gegenstände der Erfahrung in Raum und Zeit. Solche philosophische Fragen kann man mit einer für alle grosse Philosophen charakteristischen Sachlichkeit behandeln, aber sie führen in der Regel kaum zu den persönlichen Animositäten, die polemische Streitschriften motivieren können, es sei denn, es geht dabei um allzu menschliche Eitelkeiten, pure Rechthaberei, universitäre Positionen oder finanzielle Zuwendungen, etc. Der alte Fuchs Kant hat schon gespürt, wo der Hund begraben liegt: die Frage nach der logisch-genealogischer Untersuchung des Verstandes zu rücken versucht, um sie dann Spinozas Metaphysik einer absoluten und wirklichen Einheit gegenüber zu stellen und ihr als unterlegen zu erweisen: „Nach Kant ist Übersinnliches unfähig, von der Vernunft erkannt zu werden; die höchste Idee hat nicht zugleich Realität." (S. 288) Vgl. dazu G.W.F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 2, Jenaer Schriften (1801-1807), Glauben und Wissen [...], Frankfurt/M. 1970, S. 288. 6 objektiven Geltung der Kategorien, wie vor allem der Kategorie der Kausalität erhält ihre weltanschauliche und existenzielle Brisanz überhaupt erst durch das persönliche Bedürfnis des dogmatischen Metaphysikers, „den Zugang zu den von ihm gepriesenen fruchtbaren Feldern der rationalen Psychologie, und Theologie" (S. 125 / AA 199) offen zu halten. So wie Augustinus von sich sagte, er wollte nur zwei Dinge in seinem Leben erforschen: Gott und die Seele, so will Eberhard partout verhindern, dass Kant ihm die notwendigen rationalen Beweismittel aus der Hand schlägt, die rationale Psychologie und rationale Theologie nun einmal brauchen, um diese „fruchtbaren Felder" ohne die Berufung auf eine Offenbarung als Quelle der Erkenntnis beackern zu können. Kant wird sich spätestens in seiner Religionsschrift dazu bekennen, dass Philosophen fortan auf solche rationalen Beweismittel zu verzichten haben und deswegen ganz und gar auf die historische und biblische Theologie der überlieferten Religionen setzen. Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft war bekanntlich ein gezielter philosophischer Angriff auf eben diese stolzen Anmassungen der menschlichen Vernunft, nicht nur in Sachen Kosmologie, sondern vor allem auch in Sachen Psychologie und Theologie, aus sich selbst heraus und aus reinem Denken, d.h. unabhängig von aller Menschlichen Erfahrung, aber auch ohne Berufung auf eine Offenbarung, Zuverlässiges über die Welt, die menschliche Seele und Gott im eigentlichen und strengen Sinne beweisen zu können. Eberhard geht nämlich davon aus, dass dort, wo im strengen Sinne nichts mehr darüber bewiesen werden kann, was Gott und die menschliche Seele sind und wie sie sich zueinander verhalten, die allgemeinen und objektiven Wahrheitsansprüche einer rein rationalen Psychologie und Theologie unhaltbar geworden sind. Eberhard scheint eben diese Konsequenzen der kantischen Metaphysikkritik zu befürchten: wenn über Gott und die menschliche Seele jenseits der Vielfalt der religiösen Erfahrungen und jenseits der überlieferten Glaubensformen der Offenbarungsreligionen nichts mehr objektiv erkannt und allgemein verbindlich gewusst werden kann, dann kann seiner Auffassung nach auch die Philosophie nicht mehr am offenbarten Glauben der Religionen und Konfessionen vorbei, alleine im Denken begründete Orientierung geben, sei es in Form einer rationalen Metaphysik, sei es in Form einer rationalen Klugheitsoder Pflichtenethik oder einer Naturrechtslehre. Eberhards weltanschaulich und existenziell motivierte Vorbehalte gegenüber Kants 7 Neuerungen sind zwar historisch verständlich, zumal sie Kants eigenen Vorbehalten gegenüber dem erkenntnistheoretischen Empirismus und dem moralphilosophischen Sensualismus weitgehend entsprechen. Aber anders als Eberhard würden nach-kantische Philosophen kaum noch vermuten, dass die Möglichkeit einer philosophischen Orientierung im praktischen Denken von der Möglichkeit einer rationalen Psychologie und Theologie abhängt. Im Gegenteil hat uns Kant gerade gezeigt, was es heissen kann, „sich im Denken zu orientieren", obwohl wir die trügerische Hoffnung der dogmatischen bzw. rationalistischen Metaphysik auf die Möglichkeit einer rein rationalen Psychologie und Theologie aufgeben müssen. Hinter Eberhards Befürchtung scheint die Annahme zu stehen, dass philosophische Ethik (d.h. Klugheitsethik, Moralund Rechtsphilosophie) ohne eine solche dogmatische bzw. rationalistischen Metaphysik gar nicht möglich ist.5 Obwohl Kant sich ähnlich wie Hume ganz entschieden gegen die Beweisbarkeit des Daseins Gottes und der Unsterblichkeit der Seele ausspricht, hält er ähnlich wie Eberhard an einem gewissen Zusammenhang zwischen Moralund Religionsphilosophie fest. Nach Kant führt die Moralphilosophie zwar zu religionsphilosophischen Konsequenzen, weil Gott und die Unsterblichkeit der Seele durchaus Postulate der praktischen Vernunft bleiben; aber die Moralphilosophie kann das Daseins Gottes und die Existenz einer unsterblichen Seele nicht mehr als beweisbare Resultate der theoretischen Philosophie in den beiden Bereichen der Metaphysik: rationale Psychologie und rationale Theologie voraussetzen. Auch hier zeigt sich einmal mehr Kants eigentümliche Stellung zwischen Hume und Leibniz. Deswegen versucht Eberhard auch immer wieder Kants kritische Philosophie in die Nähe zu den englischen Empiristen zu rücken, auch wenn er sie aus Kants damaliger Sicht und unserer heutigen Sicht ziemlich undifferenziert betrachtet und 5 Kant hingegen folgt darin dem platonischen Sokrates, dass es weder notwendig noch für die lebendige Sittlichkeit unbedingt förderlich ist, die sittliche Erkenntnis vom Glauben an die Existenz Gottes bzw. von Göttern abhängig zu machen. Platon hat in seinem Dialog Eutyphron bereits zu zeigen versucht, dass die sittliche Erkenntnis vom religiösem Glauben nicht nur unabhängig ist, sondern auch wegen dieser Unabhängigkeit zuverlässiger ist. Auch schon vor Kant verteidigten Leibniz und Wolff gegen den Pietismus am Beispiel der Chinesen die Auffassung, dass auch die Heiden ein hohes ethisches Bewusstsein haben können, obwohl sie nicht an den einen persönlichen Gott der Juden, Christen und Muslime glauben. Vgl. zu Platons Eutyphron auch Ulrich Diehl, Was ist das eigentlich, das Fromme? In: Gregor Fitzi, Platon im Diskurs, Heidelberg 2006, 145–167. 8 weitgehend falsch interpretiert. So unterscheidet Eberhard z.B. nicht angemessen zwischen den drei wichtigsten Varianten des englischen Empirismus: zwischen Lockes psychologistischer, aber realistischer Variante, Humes naturalistischer, aber skeptizistischer Variante und Berkeleys spiritualistischer, aber idealistischer Variante. Kant hingegen kannte diese Differenzen sehr wohl, was wir nicht nur seiner Kritik der reinen Vernunft, sondern vor allem seinen Prolegomena entnehmen können.6 Die in bestimmten Grundzügen auch heute noch interessante Kontroverse zwischen Kant und Eberhard wurde demzufolge hauptsächlich durch die Frage motiviert, ob Kants Versuch einer erkenntniskritischen und transzendentalphilosophischen Grenzbestimmung der menschlichen Erkenntnis in den für die menschliche Vernunft unabweisbaren metaphysischen Fragen nach Gott und der Seele des Menschen insgesamt überzeugend ist, oder ob dies von Eberhard zurecht vehement bestritten wird. Aus der neutralen Position eines Schiedsrichters betrachtet, dreht sich dann also die ganze Kontroverse um die Frage, welcher philosophische Denkansatz bzw. welche philosophische Position auch in dieser weltanschaulichen und existenziellen bzw. religiösen Hinsicht überzeugender und im Grossen und Ganzen tragfähiger ist: Kants neuartiger Kritizismus, der in verschiedenen Hinsichten zwischen Empirismus und Rationalismus zu vermitteln versucht, oder Eberhards althergebrachter Dogmatismus bzw. Rationalismus. 2. Eine Debatte zwischen zwei ebenbürtigen Kontrahenten? Kant hatte sich nach seiner kritischen Wende vorgenommen, sich nicht in laufende Diskussionen über sein metaphysikkritisches bzw. transzendentalphilosophisches 6 Kants eingehende kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Humes skeptizistischen Naturalismus beginnt schon in der Vorrede zu seinen Prolegomena (AA 257-264), setzt sich in der Behandlung des sog. Humeschen Problems der Kausalität fort (AA 312322) und gipfelt in dem Beschluss: Von der Grenzbestimmung der reinen Vernunft mit einer Kritik an Humes Deismus (AA 350-365). Locke tritt in den Prolegomena dafür etwas in den Hintergrund (AA 257, 270, 289) wird aber vor allem wegen seiner Unterscheidung zwischen primären und sekundären Qualitäten herangezogen. Kants ausführliche Kritik an Berkeleys dogmatischem Idealismus bzw. ontologischen Spiritualismus findet man hingegen im Anhang von dem, was geschehen kann, um Metaphysik als Wissenschaft wirklich zu machen, (AA 371-380). Diese Niveau an Differenziertheit in der Kritik am Empirismus fehlt hingegen bei Eberhard. 9 Unternehmen einzumischen. Statt dessen wollte er lieber seine wertvolle verbleibende Lebenszeit nutzen, sein ebenso tief schürfendes wie umfangreiches Unternehmen in weiteren Untersuchungen und Publikationen voran zu treiben. Durch Eberhards Angriff jedoch fühlt er sich jedoch offensichtlich so sehr provoziert, dass er mit seiner arbeitsökonomischen Maxime brach und zur Feder griff, um sein neuartiges philosophisches Unternehmen zu verteidigen und die von weitgehendem Unverständnis und bisweilen auch mangelnden Wohlwollen zeugenden Attacken Eberhards abzuwehren. Nun sollte man sicher nicht von vorne herein davon ausgehen, dass es Eberhard entweder an intellektuellem Vermögen oder auch nur an phänomenologischer Offenheit und geistiger Beweglichkeit fehlte, wenn bei der Lektüre seiner leibnizianischen Vorbehalte immer wieder deutlich wird, dass er an vielen Stellen weder die kantischen Positionen, Probleme und Reflexionen noch den Sinn und Zweck der metaphysikkritischen bzw. transzendentalphilosophischen Untersuchungen zu verstehen scheint. Gleichwohl stellt sich aus kantischer und heutiger Sicht der Eindruck ein, dass es ihm an Zeit, Musse und gutem Willen gefehlt haben könnte, sich auf Kants Neuerungen einzulassen. Wir machen uns heute kaum noch eine zureichende Vorstellung davon, wie bedrohlich schon alleine das empiristische Dreigespann Locke, Hume und Berkeley auf Eberhard und die sog. Leibniz-Wolff'sche Schule gewirkt haben musste. Angesichts dieses erlebten Bedrohungsszenarios konnten Eberhard und seine zeitgenössischen Anhänger kaum zwischen diesen tatsächlich auch von Kant als bedrohlich erlebten Positionen und Kants eigener, zwischen Empirismus und Rationalismus vermittelnder Position unterscheiden. Wolfgang Röd hat diese Ausgangslage m.E. sehr treffend charakterisiert, wenn er schreibt: Wie gross der Schritt war, den Kant auf dem Wege der Philosophie getan hat, wird augenfällig, wenn man sich vergegenwärtigt, wie schwer es den Zeitgenossen und den Angehörigen der folgenden Generation fiel, der Bedeutung des kritischen Ansatzes gerecht zu werden. Man erkannte zwar, dass mit Kant eine neue Art des Denkens zur Geltung gekommen war, man begriff aber oft nicht, worin dieses neue wirklich bestand. Deshalb glaubte man immer wieder, Kantische Gedanken mit traditionellen Auffassungen verbinden zu können und auf diese Weise einen Schritt über Kant hinaus zu tun. Dabei spielte einerseits die Leibnizsche Metaphysik eine wichtige Rolle, 10 andererseits blieb für manche der Humesche Skeptizismus attraktiv. 7 Nun gehört Eberhard sicherlich nicht zu den Anhängern Kants, die Kants Neuerungen bloss mit älteren Auffassungen zu verbinden versuchten. Vielmehr versuchte er sie gleich ganz abzuwehren, indem er sich in „die feste Burg" der sog. Leibniz-Wolffschen Schule zurückgezogen hatte. Warum und wieso Eberhard so reagiert, mag teilweise mit seiner Persönlichkeit, seinem intellektuellen Format und seinen eigenen philosophischen Überzeugungen zu tun haben, die weitgehend zu den Grundauffassungen der sog. Leibniz-Wolffschen Schule passten, zumal er sie wohl auch hauptsächlich dort erworben hatte. In seiner gründlichen Studie zur Kontroverse zwischen Kant und Eberhard scheint Gawlina nun aber von Anfang an den Versuch zu machen, eine eher neutrale Schiedsrichterposition einzunehmen bis hin zu der am Ende erörterten „Frage nach dem Sieger". Das hat von Seiten eines weniger voreingenommenen und entschiedenen Rezipienten seiner Studie viel für sich, weil es bei der Lektüre die Spannung bis zum Ende erhöht, wenn die beiden Kontrahenten als gleichwertige Diskussionspartner behandelt werden. In seinem ersten informativen Kapitel über die historische und pragmatische Konstellation der Kontroverse beschreibt und charakterisiert Gawlina zunächst das thematische Feld und den geschichtlichen Hintergrund, in der die Kontroverse stattfand. Dabei geht er zunächst der Reihe nach zuerst auf die „philosophische Landschaft" (S. VII) um den philosophischen Erneuerer Kant ein, sodann auf die „institutionelle Gestaltung des Diskurses" zwischen den beiden Kontrahenten, weiterhin auf die beiden Lager der Kantianer und Eberhardianer und schliesslich auf das Verhältnis zwischen Kant und Eberhard sowie auf die besondere „Rolle des Angreifers". Gawlinas Darstellung dieser kontextuellen Aspekte bietet vermutlich immer noch den neueren Stand der Forschung. Darüber hinaus enthält seine Monographie im dritten Kapitel eine ebenfalls sehr informative Darstellung, knappe Zusammenfassung und selektive Diskussion über die bisherige Literatur zur KantEberhard-Kontroverse. 7 W.Röd, Der Weg der Philosophie von den Anfängen bis ins 20. Jahrhundert. Zweiter Band: 17. bis 20. Jahrhundert, München: Beck 1996, S. 203. 11 Einerseits sind Gawlinas kompetente und bis heute repräsentativen Forschungen zur historischen Konstellation der Kant-Eberhard-Kontroverse so ausführlich und gründlich, dass ich sie hier weder detailliert genug darstellen und würdigen kann noch als ein eher kurzweiliger Leser dieser komplizierten Kontroverse ergänzen oder gar korrigieren könnte. Andererseits komme ich aufgrund meiner bisherigen Lektüre der beiden Beiträge von Eberhard und Kant teilweise zu Eindrücken, Interpretationen und Bewertungen, die mit denjenigen Gawlinas nicht immer übereinstimmen. Da Gawlina sicherlich über einen erheblichen Kenntnisvorsprung in Sachen bisheriger Literatur und Erforschung der historischen Konstellation verfügt und da ich hier gar nicht genügend Zeit habe, alle seine wertvollen Informationen und Einschätzungen darzustellen und zu diskutieren, werde ich mich auf den oben genannten neuralgischen Punkt der Debatte konzentrieren. Auch wenn Eberhard in den sieben kritischen Artikeln seines Philosophischen Magazins rhetorisch und sachlich in der Rolle des Angreifers gegen Kants neuartigen philosophischen Denkansatz auftritt, darf man dabei nicht übersehen, dass er sich dabei pragmatisch und institutionell in der Rolle des Verteidigers des althergebrachten und bereits etablierten Ansatzes der von Kant und seit Kant als „dogmatisch" bezeichneten rationalistischen Metaphysik der sog. Leibniz-Wolffschen Schule auftritt. Wie Gawlina zurecht bemerkt, kann man Kants Rolle umgekehrt als die eines angegriffenen Angreifers verstehen. Kant Replik Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll zeugt sachlich und rhetorisch von der Rolle eines Verteidigers, der sich pragmatisch und institutionell in der Position eines Angreifers befindet, der die wohl etablierte dogmatische Metaphysik der sog. Leibniz-Wolff'schen Schule in Frage stellt. Wer die Kontroverse zwischen Kant und Eberhard vorwiegend aus philosophiegeschichtlichem oder auch kulturgeschichtlichem Interesse studiert, der kann kaum ganz von den allseits überlieferten, vergleichsweise zuverlässigen und weitgehend unangefochtenen Auffassungen und Einschätzungen dieser beiden Kontrahenten auf dem Hintergrund der Geschichte der Philosophie der Frühen Neuzeit und Aufklärung absehen. Diesen überlieferten Auffassungen und Einschätzungen zufolge haben wir es bei Johann August Eberhard mit einem eher durchschnittlichen epigonalen Denker zu 12 tun, der bis heute im langen Schatten des originären und schöpferischen Universalgelehrten Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz und des sich von ihm herleitenden systematischen Schulphilosophen Christian Wolff steht. Im Vergleich dazu haben wir es bei Immanuel Kant mit einem mit einem mindestens ebenso originären und schöpferischen Philosophen wie Leibniz zu tun, der sowohl in qualitativer als auch wirkungsgeschichtlicher Hinsicht herausragt. Solche überlieferten Auffassungen können und dürfen wir sicherlich nicht immer von vornherein als blosse Vorurteile oder ungerechtfertige Rangverteilungen abtun, die dem gedeihlichen Gang der philosophie-geschichtlichen Forschungen nur hinderlich sein können. Insofern sie über die Generationen hinweg nach wiederholter geisteswissenschaftlicher Erfahrung, philosophiegeschichtlicher Überprüfung und eigener Lektüreerfahrung tatsächlich trefflich und gut begründet zu sein scheinen, darf man sie auch bis auf Weiteres bewahren. Natürlich kann es für einen philosophieoder kulturgeschichtlich Forschenden interessant, reizvoll und spannend sein, sich gerade einen solchen eher zweitoder drittrangigen Denker vorzunehmen und zu versuchen, ihn erneut unter die Lupe zu nehmen, um bisher ungeahnte Seiten hervorzukehren, um dabei unerkannte Stärken zu entdecken und um ihn dadurch evtl. sogar aus dem langen Schatten von Leibniz und Wolff herauszuholen. Auch ist es sicherlich ein legitimes Ziel und eine ehrenwerte Aufgabe solcher historischen Forschungen, die bisher etablierten Auffassungen und Einschätzungen erneut zu prüfen, in der Hoffnung sie evtl. auch hier und da korrigieren zu können oder den einen oder anderen Schatz zu heben. Wer die Kant-Eberhard-Kontroverse jedoch auch aus philosophischem Interesse studiert, um in der einen oder anderen Meinungsverschiedenheit, auf beiden Seiten die Formulierung der verschiedenen Positionen, die Explikation der wichtigsten Begriffe und die Überzeugungskraft der vorgetragenen Argumente kennen zu lernen, um sich dann der einen oder anderen Seite anzuschliessen oder sich sogar seine eigene differenzierende Auffassung zu bilden, der muss sich, wie Kant gegenüber Eberhard vorschlägt, von der Vorstellung frei machen, dass es den einen „klassischen Philosophen" gibt. Hier zählen weder Ruhm noch Ehre noch philosophiegeschichtlich 13 spezifisches Gewicht angesichts wirkungsgeschichtlicher Erfolge. Insofern tut Gawlina sicherlich gut daran, gewissermassen als neutraler Beobachter, Kommentator und Schiedsrichter, Kant und Eberhard wie zwei ebenbürtige Kontrahenten zu behandeln, um ausschliesslich deren Thesen, Begriffe und Argumente zur Geltung kommen zu lassen. Nicht nur Leibniz, sondern auch Kant kann nicht als der eine klassische Philosoph gelten. 3. Keine Debatte zwischen ebenbürtigen Kontrahenten Trotz der äusserst sachlichen, methodisch behutsamen, intellektuell nachvollziehbaren, und fast schon neutralen Vorgehensweise Gawlinas stellen sich bei meiner eher teilnehmenden und erwartungsvoll gespannten Lektüre von Eberhards sieben Artikeln und Kants Replik in zwei Teilen dann aber doch ganz andere Lektüreerfahrungen ein. Gerade diese Lektüreerfahrung bestätigt m.E. nun aber die überlieferte Sichtweise, dass die Kontroverse zwischen Kant und Eberhard ganz offensichtlich keine Kontroverse zwischen ebenbürtigen philosophischen Köpfen darstellt. Wie ich oben bereits angedeutet habe, zeigt sich das zum Beispiel an der qualitativen Differenz in der Kenntnis, Interpretation und Bewertung des englischen Empirismus. Vor allem aber zeigt es sich jedoch an der Tatsache, dass Eberhard sich auf Leibniz als einen grösseren Denker als seinen Gewährsmann berufen muss, während Kant es wagt, aufgrund seines eigenen, selbsttätigen Denkens nicht nur Leibniz, sondern auch noch Spinoza und Descartes, Wolff und Baumgarten zu widersprechen. Eberhard hingegen scheint zumindest geahnt zu haben, dass er es mit einem Grösseren zu tun bekommen hat, denn er verlässt sich von Anfang an nicht auf seine eigenen Überzeugungen und Argumente, sondern beruft sich auf die Autorität des sicherlich bedeutenderen Philosophen Leibniz und damit indirekt auch auf die damals an der Universität Halle bereits gut etablierte intellektuelle Hausmacht der sog. LeibnizWolff'schen Schule. Dabei ist es sicherlich keine Schande, sich auf Leibniz als seinen philosophischen Gewährsmann zu berufen. Aber die sog. Leibniz-Wolff'sche Schule war wohl damals nicht nur an der Universität Halle, sondern auch anderswo wohl eher eine Baumgarten-Wolff-Schule. Zumindest hat es sich schon für den jungen Kant, der selbst 14 in dieser philosophischen Schule ausgebildet wurde, so dargestellt. Aber auch über Kants Lebensund Studienerfahrung hinaus, dürfen wir annehmen, dass sich die Baumgarten-Wolff-Schule selbst auch schon als im Besitz einer methodisch und systematisch ausgeklügelten Systemphilosophie präsentiert hat, deren wesentliche Dogmen, oberste Prinzipien und abgeleiteten Resultate man gewissermassen als ein zu verbuchendes philosophisches Wissen erlernen konnte. Dabei mag man sich des öfteren auch auf das überragende Genie Leibnizens als originäre Stifterfigur berufen haben, während Wolff eher die undankbare Rolle des Gründers der philosophischen Schule zugekommen ist. Aus heutiger Sicht scheinen diese strategischen Berufungen jedoch wenig überzeugend zu sein. Denn dieser systemphilosophischen Grundeinstellung war gar nicht erst der intellektuelle Ausbruch aus den überkommenen Denkzwängen der Schule und der schöpferische Aufbruch in ein von da an Epoche machendes philosophisches Neuland eines Kant diametral entgegengesetzt, wie man allenthalben hören und lesen kann. Auch schon das schöpferische Talent eines Leibniz liess sich mit den Denkzwängen einer schriftlich fixierbaren und schulmässig lehrbaren Systemphilosophie kaum vereinbaren. Denn die disparaten und oftmals eher hypothetischen Gedankenexperimente in den wichtigsten Werken von Leibniz stellen zwar eine reichhaltige Fundgrube für die späteren Systemkonstruktionen seiner Epigonen dar, aber sie enthalten eigentlich weder die Vorarbeiten zu einem einzigen philosophischem System noch einen einheitlichen und fertigen Entwurf eines philosophischen Systems für den philosophischen Schulgebrauch.8 Eberhard jedenfalls hat in seiner Kritik an der kantischen Philosophie von beiden kulturellen Realitäten zu profitieren versucht: sowohl vom bereits etablierten guten Ruf 8 Vermutlich könnte man in den insgesamt eher disparaten philosophischen Theoremen und Gedankenexperimenten der wichtigsten Werke, einzelnen Entwürfen und zahlreichen Briefe von Leibniz genügend „Bausteine" und tragende „Elemente" finden, um sich eine ganze Reihe von divergenten philosophischen Systemen auszudenken und zusammen zu basteln. Die sog. Leibniz-Wolff'sche Schule scheint mir deswegen eher eine zweckmässige Erfindung seiner Epigonen Baumgarten, Wolff und Eberhard zu sein als ein von Leibniz selbst intendiertes oder gar anvisiertes Projekt. Insofern wäre es ein interessantes philosophieund universitätsgeschichtliches Forschungsprojekt, einmal gründlich der Entstehung des Mythos der sog. Leibniz-Wolffschen Schule nachzugehen und sie mit der Realität von Christan Wolffs Gelehrtenleben, seinem philosophischen Werk und seiner institutionellen Wirkung zu vergleichen. 15 der sog. Leibniz-Wolff'schen Schule mit Leibniz als ursprünglicher und schöpferischer Stifterfigur und Wolff als systematisierendem und konservierendem Schuloberhaupt. Mit dieser rhetorischen Strategie versucht er durchaus geschickt unter seinen Lesern Anhänger für seine Vorbehalte und Einwände gegen Kants neue Metaphysikkritik bzw. Transzendentalphilosophie zu gewinnen. Eberhard konnte davon ausgehen, dass vor allem die Autorität des Stifters im Leserkreis seines Philosophischen Magazins noch mehr Ehrfurcht erheischendes Gewicht hatte, als der Name Wolffs oder Baumgartens, galt er doch als die in ihrer Autorität bisher unbestrittene Gründerfigur einer bereits anerkannten und wohl etablierten philosophischen Schule. Doch was seinen Lesern damals noch zumindest als eine im rhetorischen Auftreten beeindruckende Stärke erscheinen musste, stellt sich zumindest dem kundigen Leser von heute doch wohl eher als eine Schwäche dar. Wer sich heute mit Eberhards Kantkritik befasst und sich dabei eine bleibende intellektuelle Bereicherung in Sachen Kant-Verständnis und Kant-Kritik erhofft oder gar im Hinblick auf eine eventuell doch noch mögliche Überwindung der kantischen Metaphysikkritik zwecks Rehabilitation einer klassischen kosmologischen bzw. theologischen Metaphysik erwartet, der wird von Eberhards Kantkritik zwangsläufig enttäuscht werden. Zu zahlreich sind die eher groben Fehldeutungen der philosophischen Positionen der englischen Empiristen Locke, Hume und Berkeley. Zu fragwürdig sind vor allem seine Kenntnisse von Leibniz selbst. Zu offensichtlich ist sein Unverständnis gegenüber dem andersartigen und neuartigen Denkansatz Kants. Das liegt zum anderen nicht nur an der wirkungsgeschichtlich Epoche machenden, sondern auch philosophisch bis heute intellektuellen Stärke der kantischen Position und zwar sowohl im Vergleich zu den verschiedenen Varianten des Empirismus als auch im Hinblick auf die verschiedenen Formen des Rationalismus. Der kundige Leser von heute, der auch nur einigermassen mit den unbestrittenen Grundzügen der kantischen Philosophie und ihren von Anfang an vorhandenen realen Ambivalenzen im intellektuellen Spannungsfeld zwischen den verschiedenen Spielarten des Empirismus und des Rationalismus vertraut ist, kennt die von Anfang an vorherrschenden Stolpersteine und Fallstricke für eine textuell angemessene und intellektuell hinreichend differenzierte Interpretation. Es ist ihm klar, dass eine jede textuell angemessene und 16 intellektuell hinreichende Interpretation der systematischen Grundzüge und argumentativen Feinstrukturen der kantischen Philosophie eine geistige Offenheit, phänomenologische Wachsamkeit, emotionale Empathie, intellektuelle Differenziertheit und philosophische Begabung voraussetzen, über die erfahrungsgemäss viele Leser der kantischen Werke leider gar nicht verfügen. 4. Eberhards Hauptthese in zwei Versionen Lässt sich meine emotionale und intellektuelle Enttäuschung bei der erwartungsvollen Lektüre der Eberhard'schen sieben Artikel zur kantischen Philosophie wenigstens an einem Beispiel darstellen, vermitteln und erläutern? Im Folgenden will ich es versuchen, indem ich (1.) Eberhards Hauptthese, (2.) Kants Erwiderung auf diese Hauptthese, (3.) die Differenzen bezüglich des Problems der Geltung der Kategorien am Paradebeispiel der Kategorie der Kausalität, (4.) die sich daraus ergebenden Differenzen bezüglich der rationalen Psychologie und Theologie und (5.) die Stärken und Schwächen der beiden Positionen abzuwägen versuche. Eberhards Hauptthese taucht in einer ersten Version im ersten Artikel Über die Schranken der menschlichen Erkenntnis auf: Das Resultat dieser Betrachtungen scheint mir zu sein: dass man ohne Vermessenheit behaupten könne, die Grenzbestimmung der menschlichen Erkenntnis nach der Leibnizianischen Vernunftkritik dürfe noch nicht aufgegeben werden; alles was die Kantische Kritik gründliches enthält, sei in ihrem Umfange enthalten, und ausserdem noch vieles, was diese ohne Grund verwirft. Das wird noch mehr einleuchten, wenn wir untersuchen, mit welcher von beiden man am besten dem H u m e s c h e n allgemeinen Idealismus begegnen könne. (S. 13 / OA 26) Einmal abgesehen davon, dass David Hume anders als Bishop Berkeley weder einen erkenntnistheoretischen noch einem ontologischen Idealismus vertritt, sondern einen erkenntnistheoretischen Skeptizismus und zugleich einen ontologischen Naturalismus, müssen beide Spielarten der Vernunftkritik in der Tat eine erkenntnistheoretische Position entwickeln, mit der man die skeptischen Vorbehalte und Einwände Humes gegenüber der Möglichkeit einer realistischen Deutung von Urteilen über Kausal17 zusammenhänge in der Alltagserkenntnis und in den Wissenschaften zurückweisen kann. Zunächst ist erst einmal offen, ob die Vernunftkritik von Leibniz oder von Kant dazu besser in der Lage ist. Prägnanter ist das Fazit am Ende des dritten Artikels Über das Gebiet des reinen Verstandes, in dem Eberhard eine längere zweite Version seiner Hauptthese präsentiert, indem er behauptet, 1. dass die Leibnizianische Philosophie eben sowohl eine Vernunftkritik enthält, als die Kantische, denn sie gründet ihren Dogmatismus auf eine genaue Zergliederung der Erkenntnisvermögen, indem sie genau anzugeben sucht, was durch ein jedes möglich ist; nur die Resultate von beiden sind verschieden. Sie kann also, wenn sie getreu dargestellt wird, nicht unkritisch genannt werden. 2. Dass die Leibnizische Philosophie alles Wahre der kantischen enthalten kann, aber ausserdem noch mehr. Zu diesem Mehr ist sie durch die gegründete Erweiterung des Gebietes des Verstandes im Stande, wozu sie ihre kritische Zergliederung der Erkenntnisvermögen berechtigt. (S. 59 / OA 289) Eberhard versucht, (1.) die leibnizianische Erkenntnistheorie als eine mindestens ebenbürtige „Vernunftkritik" darzustellen. Zutreffend ist, dass Leibniz sicherlich ebenfalls eine kritische, d.h. unterscheidende Auffassung vom menschlichen Vermögen der Vernunft hat. Eberhard versteht jedoch nicht, dass „kritisch" im Sinne von „Vernunftkritik" bei Kant eine bestimmte programmatische und methodische Bedeutung im Hinblick auf die transzendentalphilosophische Fragestellung hat, die bei Leibniz noch gar nicht vorkommt, da sie tatsächlich eine Neuerung darstellt. Zutreffend ist sicherlich auch, dass der sog. Dogmatismus von Leibniz ebenfalls eine „Zergliederung der Erkenntnisvermögen" enthält und in diesem begrifflichen Unterscheiden kritisch ist. Aber deswegen ist sie noch lange nicht kritisch im spezifisch kantischen Sinne, den Eberhard offensichtlich gar nicht kennt, geschweige denn versteht. Gawlina stellt zurecht heraus, dass Vernunftkritik im kantischen Sinne und Dogmatismus sich gegenseitig ausschliessen, sodass Eberhard, ohne es zu merken, Leibniz eine in sich widersprüchlich Position unterstellt. Eberhard versucht (2.) in vagen und unbestimmt quantifizierenden Ausdrücken, die Leibnizische Philosophie als eine solche hinzustellen, die „alles Wahre der Kantischen enthalten kann", als ob es sich um zwei Beutel handelt, und in den grösseren Beutel alles hinein passt, was in den kleineren Beutel auch hinein geht. Das klingt schon eher 18 einfältig. Dennoch ist das, was Eberhard zu diesem eher schiefen quantitativen Vergleich bewegt, die an und für sich berechtigte Feststellung, dass Leibniz' Auffassung von der Reichweite bzw. dem Gebiet der Verstandeserkenntnisse weiter gefasst ist als Kants Auffassung. Damit trifft er in der Tat eine relevante Differenz, die auch den existenziellen Nerv der Debatte berührt. 5. Kants klärende Erwiderung Kants Replik bezieht sich in einer freieren und wohlwollenden Paraphrase auf die beiden Hälften der längeren zweiten Version der Hauptthese, jedoch nicht ohne einen leicht herablassenden ironischen Unterton: Herr Eberhard hat die Entdeckung gemacht, dass ... die Leibnizische Philosophie eben so wohl eine Vernunftkritik enthalte, als die neuerliche, wobei sie dennoch einen auf genaue Zergliederung der Erkenntnisvermögen gegründeten Dogmatismus einführe, mithin alles Wahre der letzteren, überdem aber noch mehr in einer gegründeten Erweiterung des Gebietes des Verstandes enthalte. (S. 111 / AA 187) Damit trifft er wie schon im Titel seiner Replik Eberhards eher bloss ironisch als „Entdeckung" bezeichnete These, nach der alle eine „neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll." Eine solche unsinnige Behauptung kann Kant nicht auf sich sitzen lassen. Zu gross ist sein Respekt vor Leibniz, als dass er ihm absprechen würde, auch eine bestimmte kritische, d.h. bestimmte Begriffe unterscheidende und erkenntnistheoretisch abwägende Theorie der Vernunft vorweisen zu können. Zu offensichtlich verkehrt ist Eberhards auf Unkenntnis und Unverständnis beruhende falsche These, dass Kants neuere Vernunftkritik nicht zurecht einen gewissen Anspruch auf Neuheit mit sich bringt, weil sie ein bisher unbekanntes Verständnis von Metaphysikkritik zum Programm macht. Allein mit dem Fehlschlagen des Anspruchs auf Neuigkeit möchte es noch hingehen, wenn nur die ältere Kritik in ihrem Ausgange nicht das gerade Widerspiel der neuen enthielte; ... (a.a.O.) Kant stellt Eberhards Verteidigung der älteren und andersartigen Leibnizianischen 19 Vernunftkritik als den Versuch dar, „der Nachforschung der Elemente unserer Erkenntnis a priori und des Grundes ihrer Gültigkeit in Ansehung der Objekte" auszuweichen, um, stattdessen „einem unbegrenzten Dogmatism der reinen Vernunft Platz zu machen". Dann weist er darauf hin, dass die Kritik der reinen Vernunft jedoch gerade damit anfängt, die schwierige Schlüsselfrage zu beantworten: „Wie sind synthetische Urteile apriori möglich?" Schliesslich erinnert er daran, dass sie erst „nach einer mühevollen Erörterung aller dazu erforderlichen Bedingungen" „zu dem entscheidenden Schlusssatze gelangen" kann: dass keinem Begriffe seine objektive Realität anders gesichert werden könnte, als so fern er in einer ihm korrespondierenden Anschauung (die für uns jederzeit sinnlich ist) dargestellt werden kann, mithin über die Grenze der Sinnlichkeit, folglich auch der möglichen Erfahrung hinaus, es schlechterdings keine Erkenntnis, d.i. keine Begriffe, von denen man sicher ist, dass sie nicht leer sind, geben könne. (S. 113 / AA 188-189) Eberhards Kritik hebt nach Kant jedoch gerade mit dem Versuch einer Widerlegung von Kants These durch den Beweis des Gegenteils an, nämlich dass es allerdings Erweiterung der Erkenntnis über Gegenstände der Sinne hinaus gebe, und endigt mit der Untersuchung, wie dergleichen durch synthetische Sätze a priori möglich sei. (S. 113 / AA 189) Nun können wir endlich die wesentliche Differenz zwischen Eberhard und Kant genauer markieren: Eberhard sieht in Kant fälschlich – wie etwas später dann auch Schopenhauer und Heine – einen vielleicht unfreiwilligen, aber jedenfalls tragischen Zerstörer der Metaphysik, weil er die Objektivität unserer Verstandesbegriffe oder Kategorien von dem Kriterium abhängig machen will, dass ihnen eine sinnliche Anschauung korrespondieren kann. Verstandesbegriffe oder Kategorien, denen keine solche Anschauung entsprechen kann, können Kant zufolge leer sein. Das erinnert nicht zufällig an Kants programmatische Formulierung: „Begriffe ohne Anschauung sind leer. Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind." 9 Eberhard kann mit Leibniz ohne weiteres der zweiten These zustimmen, dass Anschauungen ohne Begriffe blind sind. Aber der ersten These, dass Begriffe ohne (potentielle) Anschauungen leer sind, dem kann er keineswegs zustimmen. Hier scheiden sich die Geister. 9 Kant, KdrV, S. ........... / AA .......... 20 Bis heute hält sich das weit verbreitete und hartnäckige Vorurteil, demzufolge Kants Metaphysikkritik eine skeptische Demontage oder gar mutwillige Zerstörung der Metaphysik sei, anstatt eines kühnen Versuches, die Metaphysik eben gerade dadurch zu retten, dass man endlich einmal gründlich die erkenntnistheoretischen bzw. transzendentalphilosophischen Bedingungen ihrer potentiellen Wissenschaftlichkeit untersucht. Gawlina weiss um dieses eklatante Vorurteil und verteidigt zurecht Kants prinzipielle Metaphysikfreundlichkeit im Zusammenhang mit Eberhards Verdacht gegenüber Kants angeblicher Metaphysikfeindlichkeit.10 Dabei bezieht er sich auch auf die kantische These, dass es eine in der menschlichen Vernunftbegabung selbst angelegte Naturanlage zum metaphysischen Fragen gibt. Dies scheint mir jedoch nicht genug zu sein, um diesen Verdacht zu zerstreuen, denn weder für Kant noch für Leibniz oder Eberhard kann es genügen, eine solche Naturanlage im Menschen vorzufinden, wenn diese Naturanlage in der menschlichen Vernunft aus prinzipiellen Gründen niemals an ihr Ziel kommen könnte, um sich in metaphysischer Erkenntnis oder Wissen zu erfüllen. Deswegen beharrt Eberhard gerade auf der Erfüllbarkeit der Möglichkeit metaphysischer Erkenntnis über die Grenzen der Sinnlichkeit hinaus und deswegen fordert Kant eine zuverlässiges Kriterium der Unterscheidung zwischen epistemisch gehaltvoller Erfüllung und potentiell illusionärer Nicht-Erfüllung und kennt kein anderes und besseres Kriterium als die potentielle Anschaulichkeit eines Gegenstandes in Raum und Zeit. 6. Die Verstandeskategorie der Kausalität und der Satz vom Grund Eberhard geht wie selbstverständlich davon aus, dass Leibniz ein „guter" erkenntnistheoretischer Realist sei und dass Kant jedoch Gefahr laufe, dem „schlechten" 10 Bekannt ist Kants Äusserung, dass er nun einmal das Schicksal habe, in die Metaphysik verliebt zu sein. Warum sollte auch jemand, der ganz und gar gegen die Metaphysik eingestellt ist und deswegen wie Hume empfiehlt, alle metaphysischen Bücher dem Feuer zu übergeben, wie Kant seine ganze Lebenszeit dafür aufwenden, einen Weg zu finden, die ewigen und zu keinem Ende kommenden Streitereien der Metaphysiker dadurch zu beenden, dass er ausführlich und gründlich untersucht, ob und inwiefern metaphysische Erkenntnisse überhaupt möglich sind? Kants kritischer bzw. transzendentalphilosophischer Ansatz dient nämlich der philosophischen Ausbildung der Urteilskraft in metaphysischen Angelegenheiten und nicht der Verwerfung der Metaphysik insgesamt wie bei den Naturalisten des 18. Jahrhunderts, den Positivisten des 19. Jahrhunderts und den Szientisten des 20. Jahrhunderts. 21 Idealismus der Empiristen allzu nahe zu kommen. Zwar gesteht er bereits in seinem ersten Artikel Kant ebenso wie Leibniz zu, dass sie einen solchen „schlechten" Idealismus vermeiden wollten. Eberhard ist, wie ich oben bereist angedeutet habe, fälschlich der Auffassung, dass die englischen Empiristen insgesamt erkenntnistheoretische Idealisten seien. Das trifft nach kantischer und heutiger Auffassung jedoch alleine auf Berkeley zu, der erkenntnistheoretisch das Sein eines Dinges mit seinem Wahrgenommenwerden identifiziert (esse est percipi) und nur einzelne Geister und den allumfassenden Geist Gottes für real existierende Wesen hält. Locke war zwar seinen eigenen Intentionen nach ebenfalls ein erkenntnistheoretischer Realist, obwohl seine genealogische und assoziationspsychologische Repräsentationstheorie alles andere als besonders geeignet zu sein scheint, wenn es darum zu tun ist, zu erklären, wieso wir davon ausgehen dürfen, dass zweifelsfreie Erkenntnis von Gegenständen in der Aussenwelt möglich ist. Hume jedenfalls hat die internen Probleme und Aporien der empiristischen Erkenntnistheorie Lockes so geschickt herauspräpariert, dass er einerseits unbedarfte naturalistische Annahmen über die allgemein verbreitete Gewohnheit der Menschen machte, an die Existenz von vom menschlichen Bewusstsein unabhängigen Gegenständen in der Aussenwelt zu glauben, andererseits jedoch die notwendigen Voraussetzungen für diesen Glauben in einigermassen zuverlässigen Annahmen über nicht beobachtbare, aber reale Kausalzusammenhänge radikal in Frage stellte. Indem Hume die Überzeugung von der objektiven Gültigkeit des Begriffs der Kausalität als einen zwar als blosse Gewohnheit allzu verständlichen, aber dennoch illusionären Irrglauben entlarven versuchte, erregte er nicht nur Kants Aufsehen, sondern riss ihn gleich auch noch aus dessen bis dahin währenden „dogmatischen Schlummer". Wenn ich z.B. an einem der Lichtschalter in diesem Zimmer das Licht anschalte, dann nehmen Sie streng genommen nur die Bewegung eines Menschen wahr dessen Arm und Hand den Schalter zu berühren scheint. Auf diese Bewegung folgt eine Kippbewegung des Schalters, die von einem leisen Klicken begleitet wird. Fast im gleichen Moment wird an der Decke der Kronleuchter hell. Was sie sehen und beobachten können sind bloss bestimmte Ereignisfolgen, die entweder ungefähr gleichzeitig oder aber merkbar zeitlich nacheinander auftreten. Was sie nicht sehen und beobachten können sind 22 bestimmte Verknüpfungen zwischen solchen Ereignissen, die wir als „Ursachen" bezeichnen und anderen Ereignissen, die wir als deren „Wirkungen" bezeichnen. Trotzdem fällen wir Urteile und machen wir Aussagen über Ursache-WirkungsZusammenhänge, wenn wir z.B. sagen, dass U.D. das Licht angeknipst hat, dass das Umlegen des Schalters das Angehen der Lampen verursacht hat, dass die andauernde Überhitzung der Birnen dazu geführt hat, dass einige von ihnen platzten, etc. Sowohl im Alltag als auch in den Wissenschaften fällen wir also Kausalurteile und machen Aussagen über Ursachen und Wirkungen. Diese Urteile und Aussagen haben keine hinreichende Evidenzbasis in dem, was wir wahrnehmen und beobachten können. Wir postulieren mit solchen Urteilen und Aussagen über Ursachen und Wirkungen verborgene Zusammenhänge, die wir als sog. Kausalmechanismen bezeichnen. Ist das alles bloss eine menschliche Gewohnheit ohne reale Grundlage in der beobachtbaren und verborgenen Wirklichkeit? Falls Hume darin recht hätte, dass es eigentlich keine nachweisbaren verborgenen Ursache-Wirkungs-Zusammenhänge gibt, sondern nur mehr oder weniger erfolgreiche kausalistische Denkund Verhaltensgewohnheiten, wie sind dann unsere mehr oder weniger zuverlässigen Prognosen im Alltag und in den Wissenschaften zu verstehen und zu erklären, die mit relativ hohen Wahrscheinlichkeiten aufwarten können? Wenn wir aufgrund von solchen Prognosen beispielsweise Satelliten in die Erdumlaufbahn schicken können, deren Geschwindigkeit und Flugbahn wir von der Erde aus per Funkkontakt steuern und regeln können, muss es dann nicht doch solche verborgenen Wirkzusammenhänge geben, als bestimmte Ereignisketten, die wir als Ursachen und Wirkungen analysieren und erklären können? Humes empiristisches Verständnis der Kausalität und seine skeptische Analyse der Kausalurteile und –aussagen als blosse Gewohnheiten ohne reale Grundlage in der Wirklichkeit verliert angesichts solcher Rückfragen schnell an Glaubwürdigkeit. Kant und Eberhard können beide Humes skeptische Position m.E. ganz zu recht nicht akzeptieren. Worin aber unterscheiden sich Kants kritizistische und Eberhards rationalistische Position im Hinblick auf das Kausalitätsverständnis? Eberhard folgt Wolff in der rationalistischen Annahme, dass man den ontologischen Satz vom Grund, dass alle Ereignisse und Tatsachen in der Welt einen Grund haben aus dem logischen Satz vom Widerspruch ableiten kann. Kant hält das nicht für möglich, zumal er strikt 23 zwischen logischen Denkgesetzen, wie dem denknotwendigen Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit, und einem auf die Realität hinzielenden Seinsgesetz, wie z.B. dem Prinzip der Kausalität, unterscheidet. Dafür hat Kant gute Gründe, denn ein logisches Denkgesetz, wie der sog. Satz vom Widerspruch bzw. das Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit, vermag bloss auszuschliessen, was rein logisch betrachtet nicht der Fall sein kann, weil es nicht einmal widerspruchsfrei gedacht werden kann; es vermag aber nicht zu sagen, welchen Seinsund Naturgesetzen die Ereignisse in der Welt tatsächlich unterworfen sind. Ein Seinsgesetz, wie der Satz vom Grund bzw. das Prinzip der Kausalität besagt hingegen, dass ein jedes Ereignis in der Welt durch andere Ereignisse verursacht sein muss, sodass es keine schlechthin unverursachten Ereignisse in der Welt geben kann. Anhand dieses allgemeinen Prinzips kann man zwar definitiv ausschliessen, dass es schlechthin unverursachte Ereignisse gibt, wie z.B. wenn jemand behaupten würde, dass das Licht in diesem Raum ohne irgendeine Ursache und „ganz von alleine" angegangen ist; man kann aber anhand dieses Prinzips alleine noch lange nicht bestimmen, durch welche Ursachen bestimmte Wirkungen in concreto bedingt sind. Dazu brauchen wir empirische Beobachtungen und Experimente. Das allgemeine Prinzip der Kausalität ist apriorisch und notwendig gültig. Die besonderen Kausalurteile sind aposteriorisch und bloss hypothetisch gültig.11 Eberhard meinte noch den Satz vom Grund aus dem Satz vom Widerspruch deduktiv folgern zu können, um ihn dann auf schlechthin alles in der Welt anwenden zu können, auch auf einzelne Seelen und auf Gott als den Entstehungsgrund bzw. Urheber der Welt. Für ihn ist dann vor allem die aristotelische Frage nach Gott als Letztursache der Welt bzw. als erster Beweger aller Kausalzusammenhänge nicht nur ein bestimmter Fall von kontingentem Wissen, das wir uns zufällig empirisch erworben haben, sondern es handelt sich für ihn noch um ein paradigmatisches Wissen der Metaphysik als höchster Wissenschaft, weil es angeblich mit höchster Evidenz und höchster Gewissheit 11 Auch in genealogischer Hinsicht gibt es deutliche Differenzen, auf die ich hier jedoch nicht ausführlich eingehen kann: Eberhard folgt Leibniz und Wolff darin, dass solche Verstandesbegriffe wie Ursache und Wirkung, Grund und Folge angeboren und nicht erworben sind. Kant folgt in genealogischer Hinsicht Locke in der Auffassung, dass es keine solchen angeborenen Verstandesbegriffe gibt, weil man über solche Verstandesbegriffe eigentlich noch nicht alleine durch blinde Wahrnehmungen ohne begriffliche Verarbeitung, instinktive motorische Verhaltensmuster ohne willentliche Steuerung und dispositionale Erwartungen ohne propositionale Urteile verfügt. 24 ausgestattet ist und weil es angeblich ohne Ausnahme strikt notwendig und allgemein ist. Kant hält es hingegen für unmöglich, das realitätsbezogene Prinzip der Kausalität deduktiv aus dem logischen Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit erschliessen zu können.12 Nach Kant ist das Prinzip der Kausalität ein echtes synthetisch-apriorisches Prinzip, das einerseits synthetisch ist, weil es weder deduktiv aus den Prinzipien der formalen Logik abgeleitet noch begriffsanalytisch alleine aus den Begriffen von Ursache und Wirkung gewonnen werden kann, und zugleich andererseits apriorisch ist, weil es auch nicht induktiv aus der Wahrnehmung und Beobachtung erschlossen werden kann. Letzteres wäre nämlich ein zirkuläres Verfahren, weil man das Prinzip der Kausalität immer schon verfügen können muss, um Erfahrungen von Ereignissen und Gegenständen in Raum und Zeit machen zu können. Ausserdem gilt das realitätsbezogene regulative Prinzip der Kausalität notwendig und allgemein; durch Induktion gewonnene Überzeugungen können hingegen immer nur eine bestimmte Wahrscheinlichkeit mit sich führen. Nach Eberhard muss es aufgrund des Satzes vom Grund auch eine letzte Ursache für die Existenz der Welt geben. Ein kosmologischer Gottesbeweis nach dem aristotelischen Vorbild der Notwendigkeit eines ersten Bewegers ist für ihn notwendig und gültig. Kant hält dies für einen Trugschluss, weil dem Prinzip der Kausalität nur eine regulative Funktion in der Anwendung auf Gegenstände und Raum und Zeit zukommt. Die Verstandeskategorie der Kausalität und der Satz vom Grund sind nach Eberhard ebenso unbegrenzt anwendbar wie der Satz vom Widerspruch. D.h. sie sind auch auf „metaphysische Gegenstände" wie Gott anwendbar. Demzufolge ist das folgende disjunktive Urteil notwendig wahr: „entweder es gibt Gott oder es gibt Gott nicht". Dieses Urteil hat die logische Form „p oder nicht p" und ist wie „x ist identisch mit x" oder „wenn p, dann p" ganz einfach aufgrund seiner logischen Form wahr, also logisch 12 Die formale Logik nach Peano und Frege, Russell und Whitehead, Wittgenstein und Gödel stimmt Kant darin zu. Naturgesetzlichen Prinzipien kommt keine strikte logische Notwendigkeit zu, die rein formal bestimmt wird, sondern nur noch eine gewisse ausserlogische Notwendigkeit, die materialer Natur ist, ganz gleich, ob man sie erkenntnistheoretisch als aposteriorische Prinzipien induktiver Verallgemeinerung (Hume, Mill), als apriorische Prinzipien theoretischer Naturwissenschaft (Kant, Mittelstrass), als methodologische Prinzipien (Duhem, Dingler) oder gar als kreative Hypothesen naturwissenschaftlicher Theoriebildung (Popper, Albert) aufzufassen versucht. 25 notwendig wahr. Die Verstandeskategorie der Kausalität und das Prinzip der Kausalität sind nach Kant aber eben gerade nicht so unbegrenzt anwendbar wie das Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit. Nach Kant ist es zwar auf nicht-metaphysische oder empirische Gegenstände wie das Licht in diesem Raum anwendbar, aber eben gerade nicht auf „metaphysische Gegenstände" wie Gott und die Welt. Demzufolge ist zwar das empirische Kausalurteil „Das Anund Ausgehen des Lichtes in diesem Raum muss irgendeine Ursache haben" zweifelsohne gültig, aber nicht das metaphysische Urteil: „Die Entstehung der Welt muss eine erste Ursache haben". Rein logisch betrachtet könnte das Universum auch einen ewigen Bestand (ohne erste Ursache) haben. Falls es aber keinen ewigen Bestand (ohne erste Ursache) hat, sondern einen ersten zeitlichen Anfang (mit Erstursache) , dann könnte es sich bei diesem ersten Anfang entweder um eine Art von Urknall handeln, aus dem Raum, Zeit, Materie, Energie und Struktur hervorgehen oder um einen Schöpfergott, der das Universum aus dem Nichts erschaffen hat. Von Seiten der formalen Logik lässt sich das nicht entscheiden, weswegen sie in dieser weltanschaulichen Hinsicht neutral ist. Dass der erste Anfang der schöpferische Akt Gottes gewesen sein muss, lässt sich dann aber nicht mehr rein logisch oder philosophisch beweisen. Es handelt sich bei dieser mythologischen Glaubensüberzeugung ebenso wie bei der naturwissenschaftlichen Hypothese vom Urknall um eine weltanschauliche Annahme über den Anfang der Welt. 7. „Missdeutung der Kritik" und die „Frage nach dem Sieger" Aus dem bisher Dargestellten wurde deutlich, dass Kants Diagnose zutrifft: Eberhard hat Kants kritischen Denkansatz noch nicht verstanden. Tatsächlich handelt es sich um eine „Missdeutung der Kritik" (S. 139 / AA 211) sowie insbesondere um ein Missverständnis der Differenzen zwischen der kantischen und der leibnizianischen Vernunftkritik. Ich will nun aber nicht darüber spekulieren, ob Eberhard seinen Gegner nicht hatte verstehen wollen oder nicht hat verstehen können. Mir genügt es hier festzustellen, dass aus heutiger Sicht klar ist, dass Eberhard die kantische Position noch nicht angemessen verstanden hat. Um die philosophische Position eines Andersdenkenden erfolgreich kritisieren oder gar widerlegen zu können, muss man sie jedoch zuerst einmal angemessen verstanden haben. Was das Verstehen angeht, scheint es mir aber 26 auch offensichtlich zu sein, dass Kant durchaus Eberhards leibnizianische Position besser versteht als Eberhard die kantische Position. Das mag pragmatisch betrachtet damit zusammen hängen, dass Kant selbst aus der Leibniz-Wollfschen Schule stammt und seine wohlüberlegten Gründe hatte, zumindest einige ihrer Auffassungen infrage zu stellen. Dieses Ergebnis wirft dann aber auch ein Licht auf die von Gawlina zum Abschluss behandelte „Frage nach dem Sieger" (S. 323) in der Kontroverse zwischen Kant und Eberhard. Leider geht er diese durchaus interessante Frage hauptsächlich von der wirkungsgeschichtlichen Seite an, ob und warum sich die eine oder andere Position bei den Schülern und Anhängern der einen oder anderen Position hat durchsetzen können. Damit verschiebt er das Interesse an der Frage nach dem philosophischen Wahrheitsanspruch, den selbstverständlich beide Positionen erheben, zum Interesse an der Frage nach den kulturgeschichtlichen Fakten des politischen Kampfes um die Selbstbehauptung der beiden Denkrichtungen in Form der Anzahl von Anhängern, Zeitschriften, Schulen, Universitäten, etc.. Dabei handelt es sich aber um die kulturgeschichtliche Frage nach der Wirkungsmacht des Stärkeren und nicht mehr um die philosophische Frage nach der theoretischen Wahrheit und dem praktischen Guten. Deswegen komme ich schliesslich im Hinblick auf die „Frage nach dem Sieger" zu einem anderen Resultat als Gawlina, wobei ich übrigens nicht nur kulturgeschichtliche Vermutungen anstelle, sondern auch einen bis heute gültigen philosophischen Geltungsanspruch erhebe: 1. Aus logischer Sicht hat Kant und nicht Eberhard recht: Materiale Prinzipien wie der Satz vom Grund lassen sich nicht aus den Prinzipien der formalen Logik gewinnen. Aus logischer Sicht führt Kants Denken zu einem Zugewinn an logischer und epistemologischer Stringenz und damit auch an philosophischer Rationalität in der Fortführung der Aufgabe der Vernunftkritik. 2. Die dogmatische Metaphysik in Form von rationaler Psychologie, Kosmologie und Theologie lassen sich nicht mehr aufrecht erhalten, insofern sie aus reiner Vernunft objektiv gültige Erkenntnisse über die Seele, die Welt und Gott gewinnen wollen. In 27 dieser Hinsicht ist Eberhards leibnizianische Position nicht haltbar. 3. Jenseits der formalen Logik und philosophischen Vernunftkritik geht es in der Kontroverse zwischen Kant und Eberhard um einen Streit über weltanschauliche und existenzielle Fragen, die nicht zuletzt auch das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie in der Hierarchie der Fakultäten betrifft und den wissenschaftlichen Status der Theologie als Wissenschaft. Nach Kants Kritik muss sich die Theologie von einer angeblich rein rationalen, allgemeingültigen und dogmatischen Wissenschaft in eine traditionsgebundene, parochiale sowie historisch-hermeneutische Glaubenslehre einer bestimmten Religion und Konfession verwandeln. 4. Kant leitet mit seinem erkenntniskritischen Untersuchungen zur Metaphysik, d.h. insbesondere zur rationalen Kosmologie, Psychologie und Theologie einen epochalen Paradigmenwechsel ein, der zu einer gewissen Emanzipation der Philosophie von der Theologie führt. Eberhard hingegen bleibt dem älteren Paradigma der LeibnizWollfschen Metaphysik verhaftet, demzufolge sich die Philosophie – bewusst oder unbewusst – dem Primat der Theologie unterordnet. 5. Die endgültige Entscheidung zwischen dem kantischen Paradigma eines autonomen Philosophierens und dem leibniz-wolffschen Paradigma eines Philosophierens unter dem Primat der Theologie hängt von der weiterführenden Frage ab, ob es sich bei diesem Paradigmenwechsel jenseits des unbestreitbaren Zugewinns an formallogischer Stringenz und epistemologischer Vernunftkritik insgesamt auch um einen Zuwachs an praktischer Urteilskraft sowie an politischer Klugheit handelt. 28 Literatur – Allison, Henry E.: The Kant-Eberhard Controversy, Baltimore/London 1973. – Diehl, Ulrich, Was ist das eigentlich, das Fromme? in: G.Fitzi: Platon im Diskurs, Heidelberg 2006, 147–167. – Gawlina, Manfred: Das Medusenhaupt der Kritik. Die Kontroverse zwischen Immanuel Kant und Johann August Eberhard, Berlin/New York 1996. – Hassler, Gerda: Johann August Eberhard (1739-1809) – ein streitbarer Geist an den Grenzen der Aufklärung – mit einer Auswahl von Texten Eberhards, Halle 2000. – Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 2, Jenaer Schriften (1801-1807), Glauben und Wissen oder Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantische, Jacobische und Fichtesche Philosophie, Frankfurt/M. 1970. – Irrlitz, G., Kant-Handbuch. Leben und Werk, Stuttgart / Weimar: Metzler 2002, S. 427429. – Kant, Immanuel: Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können (1783). Hg. von Karl Vorländer, Hamburg 1969. – ders.: Der Streit mit Johann August Eberhard. Hg. von Marion Lauschke und Manfred Zahn, Hamburg 1998. – Röd, Wolfgang: Der Weg der Philosophie von den Anfängen bis ins 20. Jahrhundert, München 1996.

Anna Esposito Antonietta M. Esposito Alessandro Vinciarelli Rüdiger Hoffmann Vincent C. Müller (Eds.) Cognitive Behavioural Systems COST 2102 International Training School Dresden, Germany, February 21-26, 2011 Revised Selected Papers 13 http://www.sophia.de Volume Editors Anna Esposito Seconda Università degli Studi di Napoli IIASS, Napoli, Italy E-mail: [email protected] Antonietta M. Esposito Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia Sezione di Napoli Osservatorio Vesuviano, Napoli, Italy E-mail: [email protected] Alessandro Vinciarelli University of Glasgow, School of Computing Science, Glasgow, UK E-mail: [email protected] Rüdiger Hoffmann Technische Universität Dresden Institut für Akustik und Sprachkommunikation, Dresden, Germany E-mail: [email protected] Vincent C. Müller Anatolia College/ACT Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Pylaia, Greece E-mail: [email protected] ISSN 0302-9743 e-ISSN 1611-3349 ISBN 978-3-642-34583-8 e-ISBN 978-3-642-34584-5 DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-34584-5 Springer Heidelberg Dordrecht London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2012950318 CR Subject Classification (1998): H.1.2, H.5.5, I.2.7, I.2.9-10, H.5.1-3, H.3.1, H.3.4, I.4.8, I.5.4, G.3, J.4, J.5 LNCS Sublibrary: SL 3 – Information Systems and Application, incl. Internet/Web and HCI © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, re-use of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Typesetting: Camera-ready by author, data conversion by Scientific Publishing Services, Chennai, India Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com) This book is dedicated to endings and to what is left behind Preface This volume brings together the advanced research results obtained by the European COST Action 2102 "Cross Modal Analysis of Verbal and Nonverbal Communication", primarily discussed at the EUCogII-SSPNet-COST2102 International Training School on "Cognitive Behavioural Systems", held in Dresden, Germany, February 21–26 2011 (www.ias.et.tu-dresden.de/ias/cost-2102/). The school was jointly sponsored by the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST, www.cost.eu) in the domain of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for disseminating the advances of the research activities developed within the COST Action 2102: "Cross-Modal Analysis of Verbal and Nonverbal Communication" (cost2102.cs.stir.ac.uk); by the European Network of Excellence on Social Signal Processing (SSPNet, www.sspnet.eu) and by the 2nd European Network for the Advancement of Artificial Cognitive Systems, Interaction and Robotics (EUCogII, www.eucognition.org/). The main focus of the school was on Cognitive Behavioural Systems. In previous meetings, EUCogII-SSPNet-COST2102 focused on the importance of data processing for gaining enactive knowledge, as well as on the discovery of new processing possibilities that account for new data analysis approaches, coordination of the data flow through synchronization and temporal organization and optimization of the extracted features. The next step will be to discover more natural and intuitive approaches for modelling and uncovering the wealth of information conveyed by humans during interaction for developing realistic and socially believable agents. This moves the research focus to cognitive systems and models of cognitive processes. It has been shown that cognitive processes – such as inference, categorization and memory – are not independent of their physical instantiations. Individual choices, perception and actions emerge and are dynamically a!ected/enhanced by the interaction between sensory-motor systems and the inhabited environment (including the organizational, cultural and physical context). This interplay carries up instantiations of cognitive behavioural systems. How can these aspects be modelled in order to bring machine intelligence close to human expectations? Are existing paradigms su"cient or is more research needed on signals and data? How trustful, credible and satisfactory will emotionally-coloured multimodal systems appear to the end user? How will their physical instantiation and appearance a!ect the human-machine interplay? The papers accepted in this volume were peer reviewed and include original contributions from early stage researchers. The volume presents new and original research results in the field of human-machine interaction inspired by cognitive behavioural human-human interaction features. The themes covered are cognitive and computational social information processing, emotional and socially believable Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) systems, behavioural and VIII Preface contextual analysis of interactions, embodiment, perception, linguistics, semantics and sentiment analysis in dialogues and interactions, and algorithmic and computational issues for the automatic recognition and synthesis of emotional states. The contents have been divided into two scientific sections according to a rough thematic classification. The first section, "Computational Issues in Cognitive Systems", deals with models, algorithms, and heuristic strategies for the recognition and synthesis of behavioural data. The second section, "Behavioural Issues in Cognitive Systems", presents original studies that provide theoretical and behavioural analyses on linguistic and paralinguistic expressions, actions, body movements and activities in human interaction. The papers included in this book benefited from the lively interactions between the many participants of the successful meeting in Dresden. Over 100 senior and junior researchers gathered for the event. The editors would like to thank the Management Board of the SSPNet and the ESF COSTICT Programme for their support in the realization of the school and the publication of this volume. Acknowledgements go in particular to the COST Science O"cers, Giseppe Lugano, Matteo Razzanelli, and Aranzazu Sanchez, and the COST 2102 rapporteur, Guntar Balodis, for their constant help, guidance and encouragement. The event owes its success to more individuals than can be named, but notably the members of the Dresden Local Steering Committee, who actively operated for the success of the event. Special appreciation goes to the President of the International Institute for Advanced Scientific Studies (IIASS), and to the Dean and the Director of the Faculty and the Department of Psychology at the Second University of Naples for making available people and resources for editing this volume. The editors are deeply indebted to the contributors for making this book a scientifically stimulating compilation of new and original ideas and to the members of the COST 2102 International Scientific Committee for their rigorous and invaluable scientific revisions, dedication, and priceless selection process. July 2012 Anna Esposito Antonietta M. Esposito Alessandro Vinciarelli Rüdiger Ho!mann Vincent C. Müller Organization International Steering Committee Anna Esposito Second University of Naples and IIASS, Italy Marcos Faundez-Zanuy University of Mataro, Barcelona, Spain Rüdiger Ho!mann Technische Universtät Dresden (TUD), Germany Amir Hussain University of Stirling, UK Vincent Müller Anatolia College, Pylaia, Greece Alessandro Vinciarelli University of Glasgow, UK Local Steering Committee Lutz-Michael Alisch TUD, Theory of Educational Sciences and Research Methods Rainer Groh TUD, Media Design Rüdiger Ho!mann TUD, System Theory and Speech Technology Klaus Kabitzsch TUD, Technical Information Management Systems Klaus Meissner TUD, Multimedia Technology Boris Velichovsky TUD, Engineering Psychology and Cognitive Ergonomics Gerhard Weber TUD, Human-Computer Interaction COST 2102 International Scientific Committee Alberto Abad INESC-ID Lisboa, Portugal Samer Al Moubayed Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden Uwe Altmann Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Germany Sigrún Maŕıa Ammendrup School of Computer Science, Reykjavik, Iceland Hicham Atassi Brno University of Technology, Czech Republic Nikos Avouris University of Patras, Greece Martin Bachwerk Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland Ivana Baldasarre Second University of Naples, Italy Sandra Baldassarri Zaragoza University, Spain Ruth Bahr University of South Florida, USA Gérard Bailly GIPSA-lab, Grenoble, France Marena Balinova University of Applied Sciences, Vienna, Austria Marian Bartlett University of California, San Diego, USA X Organization Dominik Bauer RWTH Aachen University, Germany Sieghard Beller Universität Freiburg, Germany Štefan Beňuš Constantine the Philosopher University, Nitra, Slovak Republic Niels Ole Bernsen University of Southern Denmark, Denmark Jonas Beskow Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden Peter Birkholz RWTH Aachen University, Germany Horst Bishof Technical University Graz, Austria Jean-Francois Bonastre Université d'Avignon, France Marek Boháč Technical University of Liberec, Czech Republic Elif Bozkurt Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey Nikolaos Bourbakis ITRI, Wright State University, Dayton, USA Maja Bratanić University of Zagreb, Croatia Antonio Calabrese Istituto di Cibernetica – CNR, Naples, Italy Erik Cambria University of Stirling, UK Paola Campadelli Università di Milano, Italy Nick Campbell University of Dublin, Ireland Valentın Cardeñoso Payo Universidad de Valladolid, Spain Nicoletta Caramelli Università di Bologna, Italy Antonio Castro-Fonseca Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal Aleksandra Cerekovic Faculty of Electrical Engineering , Croatia Peter Cerva Technical University of Liberec, Czech Republic Josef Chaloupka Technical University of Liberec, Czech Republic Mohamed Chetouani Université Pierre et Marie Curie, France Gérard Chollet CNRS URA-820, ENST, France Simone Cifani Università Politecnica delle Marche, Italy Muzeyyen Ciyiltepe Gulhane Askeri Tip Academisi, Ankara, Turkey Anton Cizmar Technical University of Košice, Slovakia David Cohen Université Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris, France Nicholas Costen Manchester Metropolitan University, UK Francesca D'Olimpio Second University of Naples, Italy Vlado Delić University of Novi Sad, Serbia Céline De Looze Trinity College, Dublin 2, Ireland Francesca D'Errico Università di Roma 3, Italy Angiola Di Conza Second University of Naples, Italy Giuseppe Di Maio Second University of Naples, Italy Marion Dohen ICP, Grenoble, France Thierry Dutoit Faculté Polytechnique de Mons, Belgium Laila Dybkjaer University of Southern Denmark, Denmark Jens Edlund Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden Matthias Eichner Technische Universität Dresden, Germany Organization XI Aly El-Bahrawy Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt Ciğdem Eroğlu Erdem Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul, Turkey Engin Erzin Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey Anna Esposito Second University of Naples, Italy Antonietta M. Esposito Osservatorio Vesuviano Napoli, Italy Joan Fàbregas Peinado Escola Universitaria de Mataro, Spain Sascha Fagel Technische Universität Berlin, Germany Nikos Fakotakis University of Patras, Greece Manuela Farinosi University of Udine, Italy Marcos Faúndez-Zanuy Universidad Politécnica de Cataluña, Spain Tibor Fegyó Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary Fabrizio Ferrara University of Naples "Federico II", Italy Dilek Fidan Ankara University, Turkey Leopoldina Fortunati Università di Udine, Italy Todor Ganchev University of Patras, Greece Carmen Garćıa-Mateo University of Vigo, Spain Vittorio Girotto Università IUAV di Venezia, Italy Augusto Gnisci Second University of Naples, Italy Milan Gnjatović University of Novi Sad, Serbia Bjorn Granstrom Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden Marco Grassi Università Politecnica delle Marche, Italy Maurice Grinberg New Bulgarian University, Bulgaria Jorge Gurlekian LIS CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentina Mohand-Said Hacid Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1, France Jaakko Hakulinen University of Tampere, Finland Ioannis Hatzilygeroudis University of Patras, Greece Immaculada Hernaez University of the Basque Country, Spain Javier Hernando Technical University of Catalonia, Spain Wolfgang Hess Universität Bonn, Germany Dirk Heylen University of Twente, The Netherlands Daniel Hládek Technical University of Košice, Slovak Republic Rüdiger Ho!mann Technische Universität Dresden, Germany Hendri Hondorp University of Twente, The Netherlands David House Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden Evgenia Hristova New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria Stephan Hübler Dresden University of Technology, Gremany Isabelle Hupont Aragon Institute of Technology, Zaragoza, Spain Amir Hussain University of Stirling, UK Viktor Imre Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary XII Organization Ewa Jarmolowicz Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland Kristiina Jokinen University of Helsinki, Finland Jozef Juhár Technical University Košice, Slovak Republic Zdravko Kacic University of Maribor, Slovenia Bridget Kane Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Jim Kannampuzha RWTH Aachen University, Germany Maciej Karpinski Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland Eric Keller Université de Lausanne, Switzerland Adam Kendon University of Pennsylvania, USA Stefan Kopp University of Bielefeld, Germany Jacques Koreman University of Science and Technology, Norway Theodoros Kostoulas University of Patras, Greece Maria Koutsombogera Inst. for Language and Speech Processing, Greece Robert Krauss Columbia University, New York, USA Bernd Kröger RWTH Aachen University, Germany Gernot Kubin Graz University of Technology, Austria Olga Kulyk University of Twente, The Netherlands Alida Labella Second University of Naples, Italy Emilian Lalev New Bulgarian University, Bulgaria Yiannis Laouris Cyprus Neuroscience and Technology Institute, Cyprus Anne-Maria Laukkanen University of Tampere, Finland Amélie Lelong GIPSA-lab, Grenoble, France Borge Lindberg Aalborg University, Denmark Saturnino Luz Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Wojciech Majewski Wroclaw University of Technology, Poland Pantelis Makris Neuroscience and Technology Institute, Cyprus Kenneth Manktelow University of Wolverhampton, UK Ra!aele Martone Second University of Naples, Italy Rytis Maskeliunas Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania Dominic Massaro University of California, Santa Cruz, USA Olimpia Matarazzo Second University of Naples, Italy Christoph Mayer Technische Universität München, Germany David McNeill University of Chicago, USA Jǐŕı Mekyska Brno University of Technology, Czech Republic Nicola Melone Second University of Naples, Italy Katya Mihaylova University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria Péter Mihajlik Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary Michal Mirilovič Technical University of Košice, Slovak Republic Organization XIII Izidor Mlakar Roboti c.s. d.o.o, Maribor, Slovenia Helena Moniz INESC-ID, Lisboa, Portugal, Tamás Mozsolics Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary Vincent C. Müller Anatolia College/ACT, Pylaia, Greece Peter Murphy University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland Antonio Natale University of Salerno and IIASS, Italy Costanza Navarretta University of Copenhagen, Denmark Eva Navas Escuela Superior de Ingenieros, Bilbao, Spain Delroy Nelson University College London, UK Géza Németh University of Technology and Economics, Budapest, Hungary Friedrich Neubarth Austrian Research Inst. Artificial Intelligence, Austria Christiane Neuschaefer-Rube RWTH Aachen University, Germany Giovanna Nigro Second University of Naples, Italy Anton Nijholt Universiteit Twente, The Netherlands Jan Nouza Technical University of Liberec, Czech Republic Michele Nucci Università Politecnica delle Marche, Italy Catharine Oertel Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Stanislav Ondáš Technical University of Košice, Slovak Republic Rieks Op den Akker University of Twente , The Netherlands Karel Paleček Technical University of Liberec, Czech Republic Igor Pandzic Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Croatia Harris Papageorgiou Institute for Language and Speech Processing, Greece Kinga Papay University of Debrecen, Hungary Paolo Parmeggiani Università degli Studi di Udine, Italy Ana Pavia Spoken Language Systems Laboratory, Lisbon, Portugal Paolo Pedone Second University of Naples, Italy Tomislav Pejsa University of Zagreb, Croatia Catherine Pelachaud CNRS, Télécom ParisTech, France Bojan Petek University of Ljubljana, Slovenia Harmut R. Pfitzinger University of Munich, Germany Francesco Piazza Università degli Studi di Ancona, Italy Neda Pintaric University of Zagreb, Croatia Matúš Pleva Technical University of Košice, Slovak Republic Isabella Poggi Università di Roma 3, Italy Guy Politzer Université de Paris VIII, France Jan Prazak Technical University of Liberec, Czech Republic Ken Prepin Télécom ParisTech, France Jǐŕı Přibil Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic Anna Přibilová Slovak University of Technology, Slovak Republic XIV Organization Emanuele Principi Università Politecnica delle Marche, Italy Michael Pucher Telecommunications Research Center Vienna, Austria Jurate Puniene Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania Ana Cristina Quelhas Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada, Lisbon, Portugal Kari-Jouko Räihä University of Tampere, Finland Roxanne Raine University of Twente, The Netherlands Giuliana Ramella Istituto di Cibernetica – CNR, Naples, Italy Fabian Ramseyer University Hospital of Psychiatry, Bern, Switzerland José Rebelo Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal Peter Reichl FTW Telecommunications Research Center, Austria Luigi Maria Ricciardi Università di Napoli "Federico II", Italy Maria Teresa Riviello Second University of Naples and IIASS, Italy Matej Rojc University of Maribor, Slovenia Nicla Rossini Università del Piemonte Orientale, Italy Rudi Rotili Università Politecnica delle Marche, Italy Algimantas Rudzionis Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania Vytautas Rudzionis Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania Hugo L. Rufiner Universidad Nacional de Entre Rıos, Argentina Milan Rusko Slovak Academy of Sciences, Slovak Republic Zsófia Ruttkay Pazmany Peter Catholic University, Hungary Yoshinori Sagisaka Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan Bartolomeo Sapio Fondazione Ugo Bordoni, Rome, Italy Mauro Sarrica University of Padua, Italy Gellért Sárosi Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary Gaetano Scarpetta University of Salerno and IIASS, Italy Silvia Scarpetta Salerno University, Italy Stefan Scherer Ulm University, Germany Ralph Schnitker Aachen University, Germany Jean Schoentgen Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium Björn Schuller Technische Universität München, Germany Milan Sečujski University of Novi Sad, Serbia Stefanie Shattuck-Hufnagel MIT, Research Laboratory of Electronics, USA Marcin Skowron Austrian Research Inst. for Art. Intelligence, Austria Jan Silovsky Technical University of Liberec, Czech Republic Zdenĕk Smékal Brno University of Technology, Czech Republic Stefano Squartini Università Politecnica delle Marche, Italy Piotr Staroniewicz Wroclaw University of Technology, Poland Ján Staš Technical University of Košice, Slovakia Vojtěch Stejskal Brno University of Technology, Czech Republic Organization XV Marian Stewart-Bartlett University of California, San Diego, USA Xiaofan Sun University of Twente, The Netherlands Jing Su Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Dávid Sztahó Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary Jianhua Tao Chinese Academy of Sciences, P. R. China Balázs Tarján Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary Jure F. Tasič University of Ljubljana, Slovenia Murat Tekalp Koc University, Istanbul, Turkey Kristinn Thórisson Reykjavık University, Iceland Isabel Trancoso Spoken Language Systems Laboratory, Portugal Luigi Trojano Second University of Naples, Italy Wolfgang Tschacher University of Bern, Switzerland Markku Turunen University of Tampere, Finland Henk Van den Heuvel Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands Betsy van Dijk University of Twente, The Netherlands Giovanni Vecchiato Università "La Sapienza", Roma, Italy Leticia Vicente-Rasoamalala Alchi Prefectural Univesity, Japan Robert Vich Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic Klára Vicsi Budapest University, Hungary Hannes Högni Vilhjálmsson Reykjavık University, Iceland Jane Vincent University of Surrey, Guilford, UK Alessandro Vinciarelli University of Glasgow, UK Laura Vincze Università di Roma 3, Italy Carl Vogel Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland Jan Voĺın Charles University, Czech Republic Rosa Volpe Université de Perpignan, France Martin Vondra Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic Pascal Wagner-Egger Fribourg University, Switzerland Yorick Wilks University of She"eld, UK Matthias Wimmer Institute for Informatics, Munich, Germany Matthias Wolf Technische Universität Dresden, Germany Bencie Woll University College London, UK Bayya Yegnanarayana International Institute of Information Technology, India Vanda Lucia Zammuner University of Padua, Italy Jerneja Žganec Gros Alpineon, Development and Research, Slovenia Goranka Zoric Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Croatia XVI Organization Sponsors The following organizations sponsored and supported the International Conference ! European COST Action 2102 "Cross-Modal Analysis of Verbal and Nonverbal Communication" (cost2102.cs.stir.ac.uk) ESF Provide the COST O"ce through and EC contract COST is supported by the EU RTD Framework programme COSTthe acronym for European Cooperation in Science and Technologyis the oldest and widest European intergovernmental network for cooperation in research. Established by the Ministerial Conference in November 1971, COST is presently used by the scientific communities of 36 European countries to cooperate in common research projects supported by national funds. The funds provided by COST less than 1% of the total value of the projects support the COST cooperation networks (COST Actions) through which, with EUR 30 million per year, more than 30 000 European scientists are involved in research having a total value which exceeds EUR 2 billion per year. This is the financial worth of the European added value which COST achieves. A "bottom up approach" (the initiative of launching a COST Action comes from the European scientists themselves), "à la carte participation" (only countries interested in the Action participate), "equality of access" (participation is open also to the scientific communities of countries not belonging to the European Union) and "flexible structure" (easy implementation and light management of the research initiatives) are the main characteristics of COST. As precursor of advanced multidisciplinary research COST has a very important role for the realisation of the European Research Area (ERA) anticipating and complementing the activities of the Framework Programmes, constituting a "bridge" towards the scientific communities of emerging countries, increasing the mobility of researchers across Europe and fostering the establishment of "Networks of Excellence" in many key scientific domains such as: Biomedicine and Molecular Biosciences; Food and Agriculture; Forests, their Products and Services; Materials, Physical and Nanosciences; Chemistry and Molecular Sciences and Technologies; Earth System Science Organization XVII and Environmental Management; Information and Communication Technologies; Transport and Urban Development; Individuals, Societies Cultures and Health. It covers basic and more applied research and also addresses issues of pre-normative nature or of societal importance. Web: http://www.cost.eu ! SSPnet: European Network on Social Signal Processing, http://sspnet.eu/ The ability to understand and manage social signals of a person we are communicating with is the core of social intelligence. Social intelligence is a facet of human intelligence that has been argued to be indispensable and perhaps the most important for success in life. Although each one of us understands the importance of social signals in everyday life situations, and in spite of recent advances in machine analysis and synthesis of relevant behavioral cues like blinks, smiles, crossed arms, head nods, laughter, etc., the research e!orts in machine analysis and synthesis of human social signals like empathy, politeness, and (dis)agreement, are few and tentative. The main reasons for this are the absence of a research agenda and the lack of suitable resources for experimentation. The mission of the SSPNet is to create a su"cient momentum by integrating an existing large amount of knowledge and available resources in Social Signal Processing (SSP) research domains including cognitive modeling, machine understanding, and synthesizing social behavior, and so: • Enable the creation of the European and world research agenda in SSP; • Provide e"cient and e!ective access to SSP-relevant tools and data repositories to the research community within and beyond the SSPNet, and • Further develop complementary and multidisciplinary expertise necessary for pushing forward the cutting edge of the research in SSP. The collective SSPNet research e!ort is directed towards integration of existing SSP theories and technologies, and towards identification and exploration of potentials and limitations in SSP. More specifically, the framework of the SSPNet will revolve around two research foci selected for their primacy and significance: Human-Human Interaction (HHI) and Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). A particular scientific challenge that binds the SSPNet partners is the synergetic combination of human-human interaction models, and automated tools for human behavior sensing and synthesis, within socially-adept multimodal interfaces. XVIII Organization ! EUCogII: 2nd European Network for the Advancement of Artificial Cognitive Systems, Interaction and Robotics (http://www.eucognition.org/ ! School of Computing Science, University of Glaskow, Scotland, UK ! Department of Psychology, Second University of Naples, Caserta, Italy ! Technische Universität Dresden, Institut für Akustik und Sprachkommunikation, Dresden, Germany ! International Institute for Advanced Scientific Studies "E.R. Caianiello" IIASS, www.iiassvietri.it/ ! Società Italiana Reti Neuroniche, SIREN, www.associazionesiren.org/ ! Regione Campania and Provincia di Salerno, Italy Table of Contents Computational Issues in Cognitive Systems An Approach to Intelligent Signal Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Matthias Wol! and Rüdiger Ho!mann The Analysis of Eye Movements in the Context of Cognitive Technical Systems: Three Critical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Sebastian Pannasch, Jens R. Helmert, Romy Müller, and Boris M. Velichkovsky Ten Recent Trends in Computational Paralinguistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Björn Schuller and Felix Weninger Conversational Speech Recognition in Non-stationary Reverberated Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Rudy Rotili, Emanuele Principi, Martin Wöllmer, Stefano Squartini, and Björn Schuller From Nonverbal Cues to Perception: Personality and Social Attractiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Alessandro Vinciarelli, Hugues Salamin, Anna Polychroniou, Gelareh Mohammadi, and Antonio Origlia Measuring Synchrony in Dialog Transcripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Carl Vogel and Lydia Behan A Companion Technology for Cognitive Technical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Andreas Wendemuth and Susanne Biundo Semantic Dialogue Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Günther Wirsching, Markus Huber, Christian Kölbl, Robert Lorenz, and Ronald Römer Furhat: A Back-Projected Human-Like Robot Head for Multiparty Human-Machine Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 Samer Al Moubayed, Jonas Beskow, Gabriel Skantze, and Björn Granström VISION as a Support to Cognitive Behavioural Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Luca Berardinelli, Dajana Cassioli, Antinisca Di Marco, Anna Esposito, Maria Teresa Riviello, and Catia Trubiani XX Table of Contents The Hourglass of Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 Erik Cambria, Andrew Livingstone, and Amir Hussain A Naturalistic Database of Thermal Emotional Facial Expressions and E!ects of Induced Emotions on Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 Anna Esposito, Vincenzo Capuano, Jiri Mekyska, and Marcos Faundez-Zanuy Prosody Modelling for TTS Systems Using Statistical Methods . . . . . . . . 174 Zdeněk Chaloupka and Petr Horák Modeling the E!ect of Motion at Encoding and Retrieval for Same and Other Race Face Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 Hui Fang, Nicholas Costen, Natalie Butcher, and Karen Lander An Audiovisual Feedback System for Pronunciation Tutoring – Mandarin Chinese Learners of German . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Hongwei Ding, Oliver Jokisch, and Rüdiger Ho!mann Si.Co.D.: A Computer Manual for Coding Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 Augusto Gnisci, Enza Graziano, and Angiola Di Conza Rule-Based Morphological Tagger for an Inflectional Language . . . . . . . . . 208 Daniel Hládek, Ján Staš, and Jozef Juhár Czech Emotional Prosody in the Mirror of Speech Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . 216 Jana Vlčková-Mejvaldová and Petr Horák Pre-attention Cues for Person Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Karel Paleček, David Gerónimo, and Frédéric Lerasle Comparison of Complementary Spectral Features of Emotional Speech for German, Czech, and Slovak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 Jǐŕı Přibil and Anna Přibilová Form-Oriented Annotation for Building a Functionally Independent Dictionary of Synthetic Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 Izidor Mlakar, Zdravko Kačič, and Matej Rojc A Cortical Approach Based on Cascaded Bidirectional Hidden Markov Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 Ronald Römer Modeling Users' Mood State to Improve Human-Machine-Interaction . . . 273 Ingo Siegert, R. Böck, and Andreas Wendemuth Pitch Synchronous Transform Warping in Voice Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . 280 Robert Vıch and Martin Vondra Table of Contents XXI ATMap: Annotated Tactile Maps for the Visually Impaired . . . . . . . . . . . 290 Limin Zeng and Gerhard Weber Behavioural Issues in Cognitive Systems From Embodied and Extended Mind to No Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 Vincent C. Müller E!ects of Experience, Training and Expertise on Multisensory Perception: Investigating the Link between Brain and Behavior . . . . . . . . 304 Scott A. Love, Frank E. Pollick, and Karin Petrini Nonverbal Communication – Signals, Conventions and Incommensurable Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 Lutz-Michael Alisch A Conversation Analytical Study on Multimodal Turn-Giving Cues: End-of-Turn Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 Ágnes Abuczki Conversational Involvement and Synchronous Nonverbal Behaviour . . . . . 343 Uwe Altmann, Catharine Oertel, and Nick Campbell First Impression in Mark Evaluation: Predictive Ability of the SC-IAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 Angiola Di Conza and Augusto Gnisci Motivated Learning in Computational Models of Consciousness . . . . . . . . 365 James Graham and Daniel Jachyra Are Pointing Gestures Induced by Communicative Intention? . . . . . . . . . . 377 Ewa Jarmolowicz-Nowikow TV Interview Participant Profiles from a Multimodal Perspective . . . . . . 390 Maria Koutsombogera and Harris Papageorgiou The Neurophonetic Model of Speech Processing ACT: Structure, Knowledge Acquisition, and Function Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398 Bernd J. Kröger, Jim Kannampuzha, Cornelia Eckers, Stefan Heim, Emily Kaufmann, and Christiane Neuschaefer-Rube Coding Hand Gestures: A Reliable Taxonomy and a Multi-media Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405 Fridanna Maricchiolo, Augusto Gnisci, and Marino Bonaiuto Individuality in Communicative Bodily Behaviours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417 Costanza Navarretta XXII Table of Contents A Cross-Cultural Study on the Perception of Emotions: How Hungarian Subjects Evaluate American and Italian Emotional Expressions . . . . . . . . 424 Maria Teresa Riviello, Anna Esposito, and Klara Vicsi A!ective Computing: A Reverence for a Century of Research . . . . . . . . . . 434 Egon L. van den Broek Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

J. Inform. Process. Cybernet. EIK 29 (1994) 6, 333–355 (formerly: Elektron. Inform.verarb. Kybernet.) Elimination of Cuts in First-order Finite-valued Logics By Matthias Baaz, Christian G. Fermüller and Richard Zach Abstract: A uniform construction for sequent calculi for finite-valued first-order logics with distribution quantifiers is exhibited. Completeness, cut-elimination and midsequent theorems are established. As an application, an analog of Herbrand's theorem for the four-valued knowledgerepresentation logic of Belnap and Ginsberg is presented. It is indicated how this theorem can be used for reasoning about knowledge bases with incomplete and inconsistent information. 1 Introduction Why elimination of cuts? Cut-elimination procedures play a central rôle in proof theoretic investigations of logical calculi. Their importance lies in the fact that they are local procedures. This is in contrast to the results obtained by proofs of cut-free completeness, which are global (and do not take existing proofs into account). For the analysis of given proofs-and this makes cut-elimination so important for computer science-a local procedure, which operates on given data, is needed. It allows one to look at parts of proofs independently of others, e.g., making the assumptions of a proof explicit. Cut elimination is also essential for the extraction of programs from proofs. The constructive nature of the cut elimination procedure ensures that the extraction algorithm of a function encoded by a proof is primitive recursive, whereas cutfree completeness properties (as in the case of analytic tableaux) only guarantees termination of extraction algorithms. Cut elimination also provides a bound for the term complexity of the cut-free proof, and consequently a bound on the complexity of the extracted function relative to the complexity of the functions represented by primitive function symbols. Why many-valued logics? Many-valued logics have enjoyed rising interest in recent years in computer science. For instance, many-valued logics can be used to model knowledge bases, or more accurately, epistemic states of knowledge. In the following, we will illustrate our results with an example based on such a logic: Belnap [6] has introduced a logic with the truth values false (f), unknown (u), contradictory (⊥) and true (t), corresponding to the epistemic status of the given facts. Ginsberg [12] has extended the study of logics of this kind to the general theory of logics over bilattices and uses it to model non-monotonic knowledge bases. Belnap's logic has recently been used for a representation of (possibly contradictory) knowledge and the problem of knowledge revision and update in [17]. Bilattice logics also find applications in the study of logic programming, see, e.g., [9, 10]. Another recent application of many-valued logics is in the verification of switch-level circuit designs [16]. The success of a logic for use in the context of knowledge representation and reasoning depends crucially on the availability of computational calculi for this logic. Without such calculi, 334 the study of a logic in relation to its application in computer science and artificial intelligence is destined to remain purely theoretical. In the case of many-valued logics, computational calculi can be given. Analytic calculi for many-valued logics have been known for quite some time. Sequent systems similar to those presented here have also been introduced by Schröter [22], Rousseau [21], Takahashi [25], and Carnielli [8]; equivalent tableaux formulations were given by Surma [24] and Carnielli [7] (Hähnle's work is based on the latter [13, 14, 15]). Calculi for automated theorem proving in many-valued logics are also legion. Apart from Hähnle's work on tableauxbased theorem proving, various resolution methods have been proposed, e.g., by O'Hearn and Stachniak [19] or Baaz and Fermüller [1, 2]. For more detailed surveys of the work done in these areas see [15, 27]. We present here sequent calculi for arbitrary finite-valued first-order logics with distribution quantifiers. These calculi are essentially the ones of [21] but differ from those of [25] (our rules are more general, and also more compact) and [8] (which is a calculus dual to ours, cf. [4]). First we establish soundness and completeness for this calculus. In Section 4 we give a cutelimination algorithm schema for this calculus modulo a parametric operator for reducing cuts on composite formulas. In the usual proof of the Hauptsatz for classical logic, this operator is fixed and defined by case distinction. We, however, give (in Section 5) a general method based on the resolution principle for finding such reductions. This method is also applicable to the classical case. It provides a uniform way to show that cut-elimination holds in systems where any propositional connectives or distribution quantifiers (which are, of course, definable in classical logic) are taken as primitive. Our method can be extended so as to reduce the degree of the cut formula not only by one, but to reduce it arbitrarily. This suggests the possibility of interactively reducing cuts of higher complexity in one step. This may have an application for implementing cut-elimination procedures, an undertaking thwarted until now due to its prohibitive complexity. Finally, in Section 6, we give an analog of Herbrand's Theorem for a first-order version of Belnap's logic and show how this can be used to extract information from proofs in the sequent calculus. 2 Preliminaries D e f i n i t i o n 2.1. A language L for a logic consists of countably many free variables, bound variables, function symbols (including constants), predicate symbols, as well as propositional connectives, quantifiers, and auxiliary symbols: "(", ")", ",". We use a, b, c, . . . to denote free variables; x, y, z, . . . to denote bound variables; P , Q, R, . . . to denote predicate symbols; 2 to denote connectives; and Q to denote quantifiers. Terms, subterms, formulas and subformulas are defined as usual. The degree of a formula is its depth, more precisely: d(A) =  0 if A is atomic max{d(A1), . . . , d(An)}+ 1 if A ≡ 2(A1, . . . , An) d(B) + 1 if A ≡ (Qx)A D e f i n i t i o n 2.2. A matrix for a language L is given by: 1. a nonempty set of truth values V = {v1, . . . , vm} of size m, 2. an abstract algebra V with domain V of appropriate type: For every n-place connective 2 of L there is an associated truth function 2:V n → V , and 3. for every quantifier Q, an associated truth function Q:℘(V ) \ {∅} → V 335 A language and a matrix for it together fully determine a logic L. L is said to be m-valued. The intended meaning of a truth function for a propositional connective is analogous to the two-valued case: Given formulas A1, . . . , An, which take the truth values w1, . . . , wn, respectively, the truth value of 2(A1, . . . , An) is given by 2(w1, . . . , wn). A truth function for quantifiers is a mapping from nonempty sets of truth values to truth values: Given a quantified formula (Qx)F (x), such a set of truth values describes the situation where the ground instances of F take exactly the truth values in this set as values under a given interpretation. In other words, for a non-empty set M ⊆ V , (Qx)F (x) takes the truth value Q(M) if, for every truth value v ∈ V , it holds that v ∈ M iff there is a domain element d such that the truth value of F (d) is v. The set M is called the distribution of F . This generalization of quantifiers dates back to [18]. Quantifiers of this type have been called distribution quantifiers in [7]. Example 2.1. The matrix for Belnap's logic consists of: 1. The set of truth values V = {f, u,⊥, t}. V carries the structure of a bilattice with two partial orders ≤k and ≤t as follows: f <t u,⊥ <t t and u <k t, f <k ⊥. t ↗ ↖ u ⊥ ↖ ↗ f 2. The truth functions for the connectives ¬, ∧, ∨ (∧ and ∨ are the glb and lub in the order ≤t, respectively): ¬ t f u u ⊥ ⊥ f t ∧ t u ⊥ f t t u ⊥ f u u u f f ⊥ ⊥ f ⊥ f f f f f f ∨ t u ⊥ f t t t t t u t u t u ⊥ t t ⊥ ⊥ f t u ⊥ f Furthermore, we have unary connectives Jw for every w ∈ V where Jw(u) = t if u = w and Jw(u) = f otherwise. 3. In view of the application in Section 6, we introduce the quantifiers ∀ (classical for all) and U (uniformity) defined by the following truth functions: ∀(W ) = { t if W = {t} f otherwise Ũ(W ) = lub≤k(W ) D e f i n i t i o n 2.3. A structure M = 〈D,ΦM〉 for a language L (an L-structure) consists of the following: 1. A non-empty set D, called the domain (elements of D are called individuals. 2. A mapping ΦM that satisfies the following: (a) Each free variable of L is mapped to an element of D. (b) Each n-ary function symbol f of L is mapped to a function fM:Dn → D, or to an element of D if n = 0. Additionally, ΦM maps elements of D to themselves. (c) Each n-ary predicate symbol P of L is mapped to a function PM:Dn → V , or to and element of V if n = 0. 336 D e f i n i t i o n 2.4. Let M be an L-structure. An assignment s is a mapping from the free variables of L to individuals. D e f i n i t i o n 2.5. An interpretation I = 〈M, s〉 is an L-structure M = 〈D,Φ〉 together with an assignment s. D e f i n i t i o n 2.6. Let I = 〈〈D,ΦM〉, s〉 be an interpretation. The mapping Φ can be extended in the obvious way to a mapping from terms to individuals: 1. If t is a free variable, then ΦI(t) = s(t). 2. If t is of the form f(t1, . . . , t2), where f is a function symbol of arity n and t1, . . . , tn are terms, then ΦI(t) = fM ( ΦI(t1), . . . , ΦI(tn) ) . D e f i n i t i o n 2.7. Given an interpretation I = 〈M, s〉, we define the valuation valI for formulas F to be a mapping from formulas to truth values as follows: 1. If F is atomic, i.e., of the form P (t1, . . . , tn), where P is a predicate symbol of arity n and t1, . . . , tn are terms, then valI(F ) = PM ( ΦI(t1), . . . , ΦI(tn) ) . 2. If the outermost logical symbol of F is a propositional connective 2 of arity n, i.e., F is of the form 2(F1, . . . , Fn), where F1, . . . , Fn are formulas, then valI(F ) = 2 ( valI(F1), . . . , valI(Fn) ) . 3. If the outermost logical symbol of F is a quantifier Q, i.e., F is of the form (Qx)G(x), then valI(F ) = Q ( {valIG(d) | d ∈ D} ) . 3 Sequent calculi D e f i n i t i o n 3.1. An (m-valued) sequent Γ is an m-tuple of finite sequences Γ(i) of formulas written thus: Γ(1) | . . . | Γ(m). If Γ is a sequent, then Γ(i) denotes the i-th component of Γ . If ∆ is a sequence of formulas and I ⊆ M = {1, . . . ,m} (or W ⊆ V ), we denote by [I:∆] ([W :∆]) the sequent whose i-th component is ∆ if i ∈ I (vi ∈ W ), and is empty otherwise. For [{i, j, . . .}:∆] we write [i, j, . . . :∆]. If Γ and Γ ′ are sequents, then we write Γ, Γ ′ for the sequent Γ(1), Γ ′(1) | . . . | Γ(m), Γ ′ (m). D e f i n i t i o n 3.2. Let I be an interpretation. I satisfies a sequent Γ , iff there is an i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, s.t., for some formula F ∈ Γ(i), valI(F ) = vi. I is called a model of Γ and we write I |= Γ . Γ is called satisfiable, iff there is an interpretation I s.t. I |= Γ , and valid , iff for every interpretation I, I |= Γ . The above definition boils down to the interpretation of an m-sided sequent as a disjunction of statements saying that a particular formula takes a particular truth value. Specifically, if a formula A occurs in Γ(i), the interpretation is "A takes the value vi." It is instructive to see that this interpretation yields the usual interpretation in the two-valued case: there, a sequent A1, . . . , Ar → B1, . . . , Bs is commonly read as being equivalent to (A1∧. . .∧Ar) ⊃ (B1∨. . .∨Bs). By propositional logic, this is equivalent to ¬A1 ∨ . . .∨¬Ar ∨B1 ∨ . . .∨Bs, or in plain English: either one of the Ai's is false or one of the Bj 's is true. R e m a r k 3.1. It is also possible to interpret sequents in a dual way, namely: if a formula A occurs in Γ(i), the interpretation is "A does not take the value vi." Sequent calculi for this semantics can also be uniformly obtained, they correspond to analytic tableaux [4, 27] 337 D e f i n i t i o n 3.3. An introduction rule for a connective 2 at place i is a schema of the form: 〈Γ,∆2:i(j)〉j∈I Γ, [i:2(A1, . . . , An)] 2:i where the arity of 2 is n, I is a finite set, frm ( ∆2:i(j) ) ⊆ {A1, . . . , An} (where frm(∆) denotes the set of formulas occurring in ∆) and the following condition holds: Let I be an interpretation. Then the following are equivalent: 1. 2(A1, . . . , An) takes the truth value vi under I. 2. For j ∈ I, M satisfies the sequents ∆2:i(j). It should be stressed that the introduction rules for a connective at a given place are far from being unique: Let the expression Avl denote the statement "A takes the truth value vl". Then every introduction rule for 2(A1, . . . , An) at place i corresponds to a conjunction of disjunctions of some Avl which is true iff 2(A1, . . . , An) takes the truth value vi (namely,∧k j=1 ∨m l=1 ∨ A∈∆2:i(j)(l) A vl). This represents an i-th partial normal form in the sense of [20]. Any such partial normal form for 2(A1, . . . , An)vi will do. In particular, the truth table for 2 immediately yields a complete conjunctive normal form, the corresponding rule is as in Definition 3.3, with: I ⊆ V n is the set of all n-tuples j = (w1, . . . , wn) of truth values such that 2(w1, . . . , wn) 6= vi; and ∆2:i(j)(l) = {Ak | 1 ≤ k ≤ n, vl 6= wk}. A rule constructed this way can have up to mn−1 premises (if 2 takes the value vi only once in the truth table), but standard methods for minimizing combinational functions, such as the Quine-McCluskey procedure, can be used to find rules that are minimal w.r.t. the number of premises and the number of formulas per premise. This procedure has been implemented in the system MULTLOG [3]. For an analysis of upper bounds for the number of premises for propositional and quantifier rules see [27, Ch. 1]. If a connective never takes a particular truth value vi, then the introduction rule at place i is actually a weakening rule (see below). Example 3.1. Consider the disjunction in Belnap's logic: The partial normal forms (A ∨B)f iff Af and Bf (A ∨B)u iff (Af or Au) and (Bf or Bu) and (Au or Bu) (A ∨B)⊥ iff (Af or A⊥) and (Bf or B⊥) and (A⊥ or B⊥) (A ∨B)t iff At or Bt yield the following introduction rules: Γ, [f :A] Γ, [f :B] Γ, [f :A ∨B] ∨:f Γ, [f, u:A] Γ, [f, u:B] Γ, [u:A,B] Γ, [u:A ∨B] ∨:u Γ, [t:A,B] Γ, [t:A ∨B] ∨:t Γ, [f,⊥:A] Γ, [f,⊥:B] Γ, [⊥:A,B] Γ, [⊥:A ∨B] ∨:⊥ The other rules are as follows: Γ, [f :A,B] Γ, [f :A ∧B] ∧:f Γ, [t, u:A] Γ, [t, u:B] Γ, [u:A,B] Γ, [u:A ∧B] ∧:u Γ, [t:A] Γ, [t:B] Γ, [t:A ∧B] ∧:t Γ, [f,⊥:A] Γ, [f,⊥:B] Γ, [⊥:A,B] Γ, [⊥:A ∧B] ∧:⊥ 338 Γ, [t:A] Γ, [f :¬A] ¬:f Γ, [u:A] Γ, [u:¬A] ¬:u Γ, [⊥:A] Γ, [⊥:¬A] ¬:⊥ Γ, [f :A] Γ, [t:¬A] ¬:t Γ, [f :A] Γ, [t: Jf (A)] Jf :t Γ, [u:A] Γ, [t: Ju(A)] Ju:t Γ, [⊥:A] Γ, [t: J⊥(A)] J⊥:t Γ, [t:A] Γ, [t: Jt(A)] Jt:t Γ, [u,⊥, t:A] Γ, [f : Jf (A)] Jf :f Γ, [f,⊥, t:A] Γ, [f : Ju(A)] Ju:f Γ, [f, u, t:A] Γ, [f : J⊥(A)] J⊥:f Γ, [f, u,⊥:A] Γ, [f : Jt(A)] Jt:f The remaining rules (Jv:w) for v 6= w are weakenings at place w. D e f i n i t i o n 3.4. An introduction rule for a quantifier Q at place i in the logic L is a schema of the form: 〈Γ,∆Q:i(j)〉j∈I Γ, [i: (Qx)A(x)] Q:i where I is a finite set, ∆Q:i(j)(k) ⊆ {A(α1), . . . , A(αq), A(τ1), . . . , A(τp)} (1 ≤ k ≤ m), the αr are metavariables for free variables (the eigenvariables of the rule) satisfying the condition that they do not occur in the lower sequent, the τs are metavariables for terms, and the following condition holds: For every interpretation I it holds that 1. If for all d1, . . . , dq ∈ D there are e1, . . . , ep ∈ D s.t. I |= ∆Q:i(j){e1/τ1, . . . , ep/τp, d1/α1, . . . , dq/αq} then valI ( (Qx)A(x) ) = vi. 2. If for all e1, . . . , ep ∈ D there are d1, . . . , dq ∈ D s.t. I 6|= ∆Q:i(j){e1/τ1, . . . , ep/τp, d1/α1, . . . , dq/αq} then valI ( (Qx)A(x) ) 6= vi. In the case of two-valued classical logic, we have the well-known introduction rules (at place "true") for ∀ and ∃: Γ → ∆, A(α) Γ → ∆, (∀x)A(x) ∀:t Γ → ∆, A(τ) Γ → ∆, (∃x)A(x) ∃:t Here, as above, α and τ are metavariables standing for free variables and terms, respectively. That is to say, in an actual proof A(α) is replaced by a formula A containing a free variable a (in place of α), and A(τ) is replaced by a formula A containing a term t (in place of τ). The "eigenvariable condition" imposed on ∀:> is that the free variable a must not occur in the lower sequent. In the case of two-valued logic it is common to use a and t instead of α and τ in the first place. In the general case considered here it is necessary to explicitly introduce the metavariables α and τ in order to state the conditions on the rule in the above definition. Intuitively, what the condition means is that the statements "for all domain elements d1, . . . , dq in place of the eigenvariables α1, . . . , αq, respectively, there are domain elements e1, . . . , ep in place of the terms τ1, . . . , τp, respectively, so that the sequents ∆Q:i(j) are all true" implies that "(Qx)A(x) takes the value vi," and conversely, that "(Qx)A(x) takes the value vi" implies that "there are domain elements e1, . . . , ep in place of the terms τ1, . . . , τp, respectively s.t. for all domain elements d1, . . . , dq in place of the eigenvariables α1, . . . , αq, respectively, the sequents ∆Q:i(j) are all true," hold. In the case of two-valued logic this means that, for any interpretation, (∀x)A(x) is true iff for all domain elements d, A(d) is true; (∃x)A(x) is true iff there is some domain element e s.t. A(e) is true. The subtlety here is that it is required 339 that there is a domain element and not a term (which evaluates to that domain element) for (∃x)A(x) to be true. In an actual proof, however, τ is replaced by a term. The truth function for a quantifier Q immediately yields introduction rules for place i in a way similar to the method described above for connectives: Let I = {j ⊆ {v1, . . . , vm} | Q(j) 6= vi}, then the rule is given as in Definition 3.4, with ∆Q:i(j)(l) = {A(αjw) | w ∈ j, w 6= vl} ∪ {A(τ j) | vl ∈ V \ {j}}. Again, we emphasize that in general this is not the only possible rule. Example 3.2. Consider the universal quantor ∀ for Belnap's logic: (∀x)A(x) takes the value t only if for all d ∈ D the instance A(d) takes t, and false otherwise, i.e., if there is a d ∈ D s.t. A(d) takes a value among f , u, ⊥. We obtain the following rules: Γ, [f, u,⊥:A(τ)] Γ, [f : (∀x)A(x)] ∀:f Γ, [t:A(α)] Γ, [t: (∀x)A(x)] ∀:t The remaining rules (∀:u) and (∀:⊥) are instances of weakening rules. Similarly, we obtain rules for U: Γ, [f :A(τ)] Γ, [f, u:A(α)] Γ, [f : (Ux)A(x)] U:f Γ, [u:A(α)] Γ, [u: (Ux)A(x)] U:u Γ, [t:A(τ)] Γ, [t, u:A(α)] Γ, [t: (Ux)A(x)] U:t Γ, [f,⊥:A(τ)] Γ, [t,⊥:A(τ ′)] Γ, [⊥: (Ux)A(x)] U:⊥ The sequents denoted by ∆ in the introduction rules for connectives and quantifiers are called auxiliary sequents. D e f i n i t i o n 3.5. A sequent calculus LM for a logic L is given by: 1. axiom schemas of the form: [V :A], 2. for every connective 2 and every truth value vi an introduction rule 2:i, 3. for every quantifier Q and every truth value vi an introduction rule Q:i, 4. weakening rules for every place i: Γ Γ, [i:A] w:i 5. contraction rules Γ, [i:A,A] Γ, [i:A] c:i 6. exchange rules Γ, [i:B,A],∆ Γ, [i:A,B],∆ x:i 7. cut rules for every two truth values vi 6= vj : Γ, [i:A] ∆, [j:A] Γ,∆ cut:ij The rules (4)–(7) are called structural rules. A sequent Γ is provable in a given sequent calculus, if there is an upward tree of sequents, rooted in Γ , s.t. every topmost sequent is an axiom and every other sequent is obtained from the ones standing immediately above it by an application of one of the rules. T h e o r e m 3.1. (Soundness) If a sequent is provable in LM, then it is valid. 340 P r o o f . By induction on the length of proofs: Axioms are obviously valid, since every formula has to take some truth value. Introduction rules preserve validity by definition. The weakening rules are obviously sound. The cut rules are sound, since no formula can take two different truth values. 2 T h e o r e m 3.2. (Completeness) If a sequent is valid, then it is provable in LM without cuts from atomic axioms. P r o o f . We use the method of reduction trees, due to Schütte [23] (see also [26, Ch. 1, § 8]). We show that every sequent S is either provable in the sequent calculus or has a counter-model. Let E be an enumeration of all tuples of terms over L. Call a free variable available at stage k iff it occurs in the tree constructed before stage k (if there is no such variable, pick any and call it available), and new otherwise. Call a p-tuple t of terms available for the reduction of F at place i with eigenvariables a1, . . . , aq at stage k on a branch B iff 1. t contains only variables which are available at stage k or are among a1, . . . , aq, and either 2(a). t has not been used for a reduction of F at place i on B in a stage before k, or 2(b). the instance of the premise lying on B of a reduction of F at place i in a stage before k where t has been used did not contain any term variables. A reduction tree is a tree of sequents constructed from Γ in stages as follows: Stage 0: Write Γ at the root of the tree. Stage k: If the topmost sequent Γ ′ of a branch contains an atomic formula A s.t. A ∈⋂ j∈I Γ ′ (j) then stop the reduction for this branch. Call a branch open if it does not have this property. Apply the following reduction steps for every formula F occurring at place i in the topmost sequent Γ ′ of an open branch, which has neither already been reduced at place i on this branch in this stage, nor is the result of a reduction at this stage: 1. F ≡ 2(A′1, . . . , A′n): Replace Γ ′ in the reduction tree by: 〈Γ ′,∆′2:i(j)〉j∈I Γ ′ where ∆′2:i(j) is an instance of ∆2:i(j) in the rule 2:i introducing F as in Definition 3.3, obtained by instantiating A1, . . . , An with A′1, . . . , A ′ n, respectively. 2. F ≡ (Qx)A′(x): Let α1, . . . , αp be all eigenvariables and τ1, . . . , τq be all term variables in the premises of the rule schema Q:i. Replace Γ ′ in the reduction tree by:〈 Γ ′,∆′Q:i(j) 〉 j∈I Γ ′ where ∆′Q:i(j) is an instance of ∆Q:i(j) in Q:i introducing F as in Definition 3.4, obtained by instantiating A with A′, the eigenvariables α1, . . . , αp with the first p-tuple a1, . . . , ap of new free variables in the enumeration E, and the term variables τ1, . . . , τq with the first available q-tuple t1, . . . , tq of terms in E containing variables which are either available or among a1, . . . , ap, Observe that F ∈ Γ ′(i) and thus F occurs in all upper sequents. Now let TS be the reduction tree constructed in this manner. If TS is finite, then every topmost sequent contains an atomic formula that occurs at each place in that sequent. A 341 cut-free proof of Γ from axioms containing these formulas is easily constructed by inserting weakenings and exchanges. If TS is infinite it has an infinite branch B by König's Lemma. For every atomic formula P (t1, . . . , tn) in B, there is an 1 ≤ l ≤ m s.t. P (t1, . . . , tn) never occurs at place l in any sequents in this branch. We construct an interpretation I as follows: the domain is the set of terms, ΦI(t) = t (t a term) and ΦI ( P (t1, . . . , tn) ) = vl, where vl is the truth value corresponding to the place l. If F is a formula occurring in B, and F occurs at place i anywhere in B, then valI(F ) 6= vi. This is easily seen by induction on the structure of F : In particular, no formula in Γ evaluates to the truth value corresponding to the position at which it stands. Hence I does not satisfy Γ . 2 We obtain as a consequence of the reduction tree construction the following P r o p o s i t i o n 3.1. Let F be any formula. The sequent [V :F ] is cut-free provable from atomic axioms. 4 Elimination of Cuts The completeness theorem above shows that for every valid sequent there is a cut-free proof of that sequent. When analyzing given arbitrary proofs-as in our application in Section 6-one would like to have a method of stepwise transformation to a cut-free proof. This corresponds to extracting algorithmic content from proofs. The proof of the cut-elimination theorem for the family LM of many-valued sequent calculi is analogous to the proof of the classical case given in [11]. It proceeds by moving the cuts in a given proof upwards and by reducing cuts to cuts on formulas of smaller complexity. The most important prerequisite for the proof is therefore the possibility to transform a cut on a composite formula to a derivation using only cuts acting on subformulas of the original cutformula. In this section, we give a cut-elimination procedure modulo such a notion of reduction of cuts in the form of a parametric operator. In Section 5 we will show how to obtain such an operator. Like in [11], we replace the cut rule by the obviously equivalent mix rule: Π Λ Πi\A, Λj\A mix:ij(A) where A occurs in Π(i) and Λ(j), and Πi\A (Λj\A) is obtained from Π (Λ) by deleting every occurrence of A in Π(i) (Λ(j)). Call the calculus obtained from LM by replacing the cut rule with the mix rule LM′. D e f i n i t i o n 4.1. The degree of a mix:ij(A) is the depth of the mix formula A. The degree of an LM′-proof P having only one mix:ij(A) as its last inference, denoted d(P ), is the degree of that mix. We call a thread (cf. [26, p. 14]) in P containing the left (right) upper sequent of the mix a left (right) thread. The rank of a left (right) thread is the number of consecutive sequents counting upwards from the left (right) upper sequent of the mix which contain the mix formula at place i (j). The left (right) rank of P , denoted rl(P ) (rr(P )) is the maximum of the ranks of its left (right) threads. The rank of P , denoted r(P ), is the sum of its left and right rank: r(P ) = rl(P ) + rr(P ). D e f i n i t i o n 4.2. An LM′-proof P is called regular, if every eigenvariable in P is the eigenvariable of only one quantifier introduction and occurs only in the subproof ending in that introduction. 342 In particular it cannot be the case in a regular proof that a free variable occurs as an eigenvariable in one inference and in a term which is replaced by a bound variable in another inference. It is easy to see that any proof can be transformed into a regular proof by renaming some eigenvariables. The crucial part of the cut-elimination theorem is the reduction of mixes. From a proof ending in one mix we pass to a proof containing several mixes acting on formulas of lower complexity. The important step is when the principal formula of the mix is introduced immediately above the mix. To deal with this case, we introduce the notion of mix reduction function Red below. Using this function we obtain from the premises of the introduction rules immediately preceding the mix a deduction of the conclusion of the mix from these premises, but using only cuts on the formulas occurring in the premises, thus lowering the degree. By applying Red to a mix we mean the modification of the proof by replacing the two introductions and the mix by this deduction. D e f i n i t i o n 4.3. Let A be a formula with outermost logical symbol f , let f :i and f :j be the introduction rules for f at places i and j, and let Π,∆f :i(k) (k ∈ Ii) and Λ, ∆f :j(l) (l ∈ Ij) be the premises of instances of f : i and f : j introducing A at places i and j, respectively. If f is a quantifier, then f : i and f : j have eigenvariables a1, . . . , ap and eliminate (i.e., replace by the bound variable) terms t1, . . . , tq. Then Red(A; f : i; f : j) = R is an LM′ derivation with the following properties: 1. The end sequent of R is the empty sequent, 2. Every topmost sequent of R is obtained from ∆f :i(s) or ∆f :j(r) by replacing some (including none) eigenvariables among a1, . . . , ap by terms among t1, . . . , tq, 3. R contains only mixes of degree < d(P ). The function Red is called a mix reduction function. R e m a r k 4.1. Note that Red eliminates only the outermost logical symbol of A, i.e., by applying Red once the degree of a mix is reduced by exactly one. It is also possible to work with a function Red which decreases the degree by more than one. When considering directly dependent rules, i.e., rules which can be replaced by a number of primitive rules, it is then evident how such an extension can be used to obtain cut-elimination procedures for the resulting calculi. It only requires some inspection of the proofs ending in the two introduction rules f : i and f : j and some manipulation to modify this extension so that mixes of degree d can be reduced in one step to mixes of degree < d− 1. This will be evident in the next section where we show how to obtain such a function Red. D e f i n i t i o n 4.4. Let R be an LM′-derivation with end-sequent Γ and let Π be a sequent. Then we denote by Π,R the derivation obtained from R by adding Π to the left of every sequent in R, and by appending exchanges and contractions as necessary so that the end-sequent of Π,R is Γ . We are now ready to state and prove the Hauptsatz for LM: T h e o r e m 4.1. Cuts can be eliminated in LM-proofs. For the reader not steeped in proof theory this statement seems curious. It seems that we have accomplished this result already (by the completeness theorem 3.2). A clarification is in order here: The phrase "cuts can be eliminated" has the status of a terminus technicus, and means much more than that for every proof there is one not using the cut rule. Roughly, it means that there is a primitive recursive procedure that transforms a given proof into a cut-free one, and moreover, this procedure is "local" in the sense that it eliminates one cut at a time (or in some variants a whole cluster of cuts). 343 L e m m a 4.1. Assume that from any proof P ′ which contains only one mix of degree < d that mix can be eliminated. Then all mixes can be eliminated from any LM′-proof P containing n mixes of degrees < d. P r o o f . By induction on the number n of mixes in P : For n = 1 this is the assumption. If n > 1, then let P ′ be some subproof of P which ends in a mix and contains only that mix. By assumption, the mix can be eliminated from P ′, yielding a proof P ′′ of the same end-sequent as P ′. By replacing P ′ in P by P ′′ we obtain a proof with n− 1 mixes, all of degree < d, and the induction hypothesis applies. 2 L e m m a 4.2. Let P be an LM′-proof containing only one mix:ij(A) as its last inference. Then P can be transformed to a mix-free LM′-proof P of the same end-sequent. P r o o f . Let P be an LM′-proof containing only one mix:ij(A) which occurs as the last inference in P . W.l.o.g. we assume that P is regular. P is of the form: .... P1 Π .... P2 Λ Πi\A, Λj\A mix:ij(A) The proof is by double induction on the rank and degree of P : 1. r(P ) = 2, i.e., left and right rank of P equal 1. We distinguish cases according to the type of the inferences immediately above the mix: (a) Π is an axiom [V :A]. P is of the form [V :A] .... P2 Λ [V \ vi:A], Λj\A mix:ij(A) We can derive Πi\A, ΛjA without a mix as follows: .... P2 Λ [j:A, . . . , A], Λj\A x [j:A], Λj\A c [V \ vi:A], Λj\A w (b) Λ is an axiom. Similarly. (c) Π is the conclusion of a structural inference. Since the left rank is 1, this inference must be a weakening introducing A at place i: .... P1 Πi\A Πi\A, [i:A] w: i .... P2 Λ Πi\A, Λj\A mix:ij(A) where Π is Πi\A, [i:A]. We obtain Πi\A, Λj\A without a mix as follows: .... P1 Πi\A Πi\A, Λj\A w 344 (d) Λ is the conclusion of a structural inference. Similarly. (e) Both Π and Λ are conclusions of introduction rules 2:i and 2:j for the connective 2:〈 .... Pir Π,∆2:i(r) 〉 r Π, [i:2(* * *)] 〈 .... Pjs Λ, ∆2:j(s) 〉 s Λ, [j:2(* * *)] Π,Λ mix:ij(2(* * *)) R = Red(A;2: i;2: j) is a derivation of the empty sequent with initial sequents among ∆2:i(r) and ∆2:j(s). Let P ′ir (P ′ js) be Pir (Pjs) with weakenings and exchanges appended so that the end sequent equals Π,Λ,∆2:i(r) (Π,Λ,∆2:j(s)). Let P ′ be the proof obtained from Π,Λ,R by writing P ′ir (P ′ js) above any topmost sequent of the form Π,Λ,∆2:i(r) (Π,Λ,∆2:j(s)). By the induction hypothesis and Lemma 4.1 the mixes can be eliminated from P ′. (f) Both Π and Λ are conclusions of introduction rules Q:i and Q:j for the quantifier Q:〈 .... Pir Π,∆Q:i(r) 〉 r Π, [i: (Qx)A(x)] 〈 .... Pjs Λ, ∆Q:j(s) 〉 s Λ, [j: (Qx)A(x)] Π,Λ mix:ij(Qx)A(x)) R = Red(A;Q: i;Q: j) is a derivation of the empty sequent. An initial sequent in R is of the form ∆Q:i(r)σ or ∆Q:j(s)σ, where σ is a substitution mapping some eigenvariables to terms. Let P ′ir (P ′ js) be Pir (Pjs) with weakenings and exchanges appended so that the end sequent equals Π,Λ,∆Q:i(r) (Π,Λ,∆Q:j(s)). Let P ′ be the proof obtained from Π,Λ,R by writing P ′irσ (P ′ jsσ) above any topmost sequent of the form Π,Λ,∆Q:i(r)σ (Π,Λ,∆Q:j(s)σ). P ′ is indeed a proof since (a) Π and Λ cannot contain any eigenvariables and (b) the terms in ranσ do not contain eigenvariables of any quantifier introductions in the Pir or Pjs. By the induction hypothesis and Lemma 4.1 the mixes can be eliminated from P ′. 2. rr(P ) > 1: Again, we distinguish cases: (a) Λ(i) contains A. We obtain the following mix-free proof: .... P1 Π Πi\A, [i:A, . . . , A] e Πi\A, [i:A] c Πi\A, Λj\A w (b) Π(j) contains A. Similarly. (c) Λ is the consequence of an inference J2, which is either structural (but not a mix), or a logical inference (not introducing A at place j). P is of the form .... P Π .... P1 Ψ1 . . . .... Pp Ψp Λ J2 Πi\A, Λj\A mix:ij(A) 345 Let j1, . . . , js, 1 ≤ jk ≤ p, be all indices s.t. Ψjk contains A. (There is at least one such jk, otherwise the right rank of P would equal 1). Consider the proofs P ′jk : .... Π .... Ψjk Πi\A, Ψjk j\A mix:ij(A) In P ′jk , rl(P ′ jk ) = rl(P ) and rr(P ′jk) ≤ rr(P )−1, and in sum r(P ′ jk ) ≤ r(P )−1. Hence the induction hypothesis applies and we have mix-free proofs P ′′jk of Π i\A, Ψjk j\A. For indices l not occurring in the above list, we have that Ψl equals Ψlj\A, and we define P ′′l as .... Pl Ψl Πi\A, Ψl w If J2 is a weakening at place j (and consequently, p = 1 and Ψ1j\A = Λj\A), then P ′′1 serves as our transformed proof. Otherwise, construct a proof as follows: .... P ′′ 1 Πi\A, Ψ1 j\A . . . .... P ′′ p Πi\A, Ψp j\A Πi\A, Λj\A J2 Πi\A, Λj\A x (d) Λ is the consequence of a logical inference J2 introducing A at place j. P is of the form .... P Π .... P1 Λ, ∆1 . . . .... Pp Λ, ∆p Λ, [j:A] J2 Πi\A, Λj\A mix:ij(A) Consider the proofs P ′k, 1 ≤ k ≤ p (Note that ∆k does not contain A-only proper subformulas of A-and hence ∆kj\A equals ∆k): .... P ′ Π .... Pk Λ, ∆k Πi\A, Λj\A,∆k (A, i, j) In Pk, rl(P ′k) = rl(P ), rr(P ′ k) ≤ rr(P )− 1 and in sum r(P ′k) ≤ r(P )− 1. Hence, the induction hypothesis applies and we obtain mix-free proofs P (k)′′ of Πi\A, Λj\A,∆k. Construct a proof P ′ as follows: .... P Π .... P ′′ 1 Πi\A, Λj\A,∆1 . . . .... P ′′ p Πi\A, Λj\A,∆p Πi\A, Λj\A, [j:A] J2 Πi\A,Πi\A, Λj\A mix:ij(A) Note that A does not occur at place j in Πi\A, since otherwise case 2.b would have applied, hence rr(P ′) = 1. With rl(P ′) = rl(P ) we have that r(P ′) < r(P ) and the 346 induction hypothesis yields a mix-free proof P ′′ of Πi\A,Πi\A, Λj\A. We obtain a mix-free proof: .... P ′ Πi\A,Πi\A, Λj\A Πi\A, Λj\A xc 3. rr(P ) = 1 and rl(P ) > 1: This case is dealt with in the same way as 2. above, mutatis mutandis. This completes the proof of the lemma (and the cut-elimination theorem). 2 5 Resolution-based Cut Reduction Operators In this section we give a definition of one of many possible cut reduction functions Red for the Hauptsatz. Our approach uses many-valued resolution. It is based on the observation that the soundness of the cut rule consists in the fact that a formula A cannot take two different truth values at the same time. Clauses are a convenient metalogical notation for expressing such negative statements, while sequents are not. There are, however, close relationships between clause and sequent calculi and in particular the resolution rule and the cut rule. It is not surprising, then, that resolution deductions can be translated to sequent calculus derivation using only cuts (or, as in our case, mixes). Many-valued resolution [1] is a straightforward extension of resolution for classical first-order logic. It is based on clause syntax: A clause is a set of literals, a literal is an atomic formula together with a truth value index. In usual resolution, the negation sign plays the rôle of the truth value index: ¬A means "A is false", A without negation sign means "A is true". In the many-valued case we have literals of the form Aw with the interpretation "A takes the value w." The free variables in a clause C are understood to be "universally quantified". More precisely, a structure M universally satisfies a clause C iff for all assignments s the interpretation 〈M, s〉 satisfies C (in the sense of Definition 3.2). M universally satisfies a set of clauses C iff M universally satisfies each clause C ∈ C. If no M universally satisfies C, then C is called universally unsatisfiable. The empty clause ∅ is, of course, universally unsatisfiable. In the following, we assume familiarity with basic resolution terminology. D e f i n i t i o n 5.1. Let C1 and C2 be variable disjoint clauses and let D1 = {Av1, . . . , Avp} ⊆ C1 and D2 = {Bw1 , . . . , Bwq } ⊆ C2 be subsets of C1 and C2 where v 6= w. If {A1, . . . , Ap, B1, . . . , Bq} is unifiable with most general unifier (mgu) σ, then R = (C1 \D1)σ∪ (C2 \D2)σ is called a resolvent of C1 and C2. A (tree-like) resolution deduction from a set of clauses C is an upward tree of clauses, where every clause either results from a clause in C by renaming of variables iff it is a topmost clause, or otherwise is a resolvent of the two clauses immediately above it. We write C ` D if there is a resolution deduction from C whose bottom clause is D. T h e o r e m 5.1. ([1, 27]) C ` ∅ iff C is universally unsatisfiable. D e f i n i t i o n 5.2. Let Γ be a sequent consisting of atomic formulas only. Then cl(Γ ) is defined as the clause cl(Γ ) = {Avi | A occurs in Γ(i)} Conversely, if C is a clause then the sequent seq(C) is defined by seq(C)(i) = A1, . . . , Ap 347 if Avi1 , . . . , A vi p are all literals with index vi in C. (We assume some arbitrary but fixed ordering of atoms.) Clearly, seq(cl(Γ )) is Γ up to exchanges and contractions. The mix reduction function Red takes as arguments a formula A with outermost symbol f and two rules f : i and f : j introducing f at places i and j. We shall now define one possible reduction function by showing how, for any two introduction rules, a schematic derivation of the empty sequent from the premises of the rules can be obtained. For any particular formula and rule applications the corresponding instance of the derivation is immediately obtained by matching formulas to schematic letters, terms to metavariables for terms, and variables to metavariables for eigenvariables. Consider the rule schemata 〈∆2:i(r)〉r∈Ii [i:2(A1, . . . , An)] 〈∆2:j(s)〉s∈Ij [j:2(A1, . . . , An)] Let ∆′2:i(r) (∆ ′ 2:j(s)) be obtained from ∆2:i(r) (∆2:j(s)) by replacing the schematic formula Ai by an atomic formula PAi . Let C be the set of clauses C = ⋃ r∈Ii {cl(∆′2:i(r)} ∪ ⋃ s∈Ij {cl(∆′2:j(r)} C is clearly universally unsatisfiable, since (the "conjunction" of) ∆′2:i(r) is equivalent to 2(*)vi and (the "conjunction" of) ∆′2:j(s) is equivalent to 2(*)vj , where i 6= j. By the completeness of many-valued resolution there is a resolution deduction R of ∅ from C. Note that the literals in C are all variable-free, and hence, in every resolution step, there is only one literal that is resolved upon. R can be translated to an LM′ deduction seq(R) of the empty sequent. We argue by induction: If R consists only of an initial clause cl(∆′), then seq(R) is the sequent seq(cl(∆′)). Otherwise, let .... R1 C1 ∪ {P vkAi } .... R2 C2 ∪ {P vlAi} C1 ∪ C2 be the last resolution step in R. We obtain seq(R) as follows: .... seq(R1) seq(C1 ∪ {P vkAi }) .... seq(R2) seq(C2 ∪ {P vlAi}) seq(C1), seq(C2) mix:ij(PAi) We can now take as Red(A;2: i;2: j) the derivation P where P is obtained from seq(R) by (a) replacing PAi by Ai and (b) adding (if necessary) derivations of seq(cl(∆)) from ∆ above the initial sequents (these require only exchanges). Example 5.1. Consider the case of a mix on two formulas with outermost logical symbol ∨ at places f and ⊥. The clause translation of the premises is C = {{P fA}, {P f B}, {P f A, P ⊥ A }, {P f B , P ⊥ B }, {P⊥A , P⊥B }} A possible resolution refutation is {P fB} {P fA} {P⊥A , P⊥B } {P⊥B } ∅ 348 From this we obtain the following deduction schema: [f :B] [f :A] [⊥:A,B] [⊥:B] mix:f⊥(A) ∅ mix:f⊥(B) For the quantifiers, consider the rule schemata 〈∆Q:i(r)〉r∈Ii [i: (Qx)A(x)] 〈∆Q:j(s)〉s∈Ij [j: (Qx)A(x)] Let ∆′Q:i(r) (∆ ′ Q:j(s)) be obtained from ∆Q:i(r) (∆Q:j(s)) by replacing the schematic formula A(α) by an atomic formula P (xα), and every formula A(τ) by P (cτ ). Let C be the set of clauses C = ⋃ r∈Ii {cl(∆′Q:i(r)} ∪ ⋃ s∈Ij {cl(∆′Q:j(r)} Again, C is universally unsatisfiable. Let R be a resolution deduction of ∅ from C. Since R is in tree form, the cumulative substitution ρ of R can be defined as usual. The initial clauses of R may be renamings of clauses in C. We choose these renamings so that a variable xα is renamed as xhα. We recursively translate Rρ into an LM ′-derivation as follows: If Rρ only consists of an initial clause cl(∆′), then seq(Rρ) is the sequent seq(cl(∆′λρ)) (λ is some renaming substitution). Otherwise, let .... R1 C1 ∪ {Lvl} .... R2 C2 ∪ {Lvk} C1 ∪ C2 be the last resolution step in Rρ, where L is an atom of the form P (x) or P (c) (x is a variable and c a constant symbol). Recall that the cumulative substitution has been applied to R, so resolution steps actually do take this special form with only one literal resolved upon. We obtain seq(Rρ) as follows: .... seq(R1) seq(C1 ∪ {Lvk}) .... seq(R2) seq(C2 ∪ {Lvl}) seq(C1), seq(C2) mix:ij(L) The substitution ρ replaces variables of the form xhα by constants cτ . take as Red(A;Q: i;Q: j) the derivation P where P is obtained from seq(Rρ) by (a) replacing P (xhα) resp. P (cτ ) by A(α) resp. A(τ) and (b) adding (if necessary) derivations of seq(cl(∆))λπ from ∆λπ above the initial sequents (these require only exchanges and contractions). Example 5.2. Consider the case of a mix on two formulas with outermost logical symbol U at places u and ⊥. The clause translation of the premises is C = { {P (xα)u}, {P (cτ )f , P (cτ )⊥}, {P (cτ ′)t, P (cτ ′)⊥} } One of the possible resolution refutations is {P (x′α)u} {P (xα)u} {P (cτ )f , P (cτ )⊥} {P (cτ )⊥} cτ/xα ∅ cτ/x ′ α 349 Note that two copies of the clause {P (xα)u} have been used. From this we obtain the following deduction schema: [u:A(τ/α)] [u:A(τ/α)] [f,⊥:A(τ)] [⊥:A(τ)] mix:uf(A(τ)) ∅ mix:u⊥(A(τ)) Similar considerations could also be used to obtain "macro-reductions" of composite formulas of depth > 1 in one step. This may lead to an algorithmic simplification of cut-elimination if the structure of the cut formula is of a specific type, e.g., monadic. 6 Reasoning about Knowledge in Belnap's Logic A consequence of the cut-elimination theorem is Gentzen's "Verschärfter Hauptsatz", also known as T h e o r e m 6.1. (Midsequent Theorem) Let Π be a sequent consisting only of prenex formulas. Any proof of Π can be effectively transformed to a cut-free proof of Π containing sequents Σ1, . . . , Σp, s.t., for all 1 ≤ j ≤ p, 1. Σj is quantifier-free, 2. every inference above Σj is either structural or propositional, and 3. every inference below Σj is either structural or a quantifier inference. P r o o f . By the cut-elimination theorem and Proposition 3.1, the given proof can be transformed to a cut-free proof P of Π from atomic axiom sequents. The order of a quantifier introduction (Q:i) in P is defined as the number of propositional inferences below (Q:i). The order o(P ) of P is the sum of the orders of all quantifier inferences occurring in P . We prove the theorem by induction on the order of P : 1. o(P ) = 0: There is no propositional inference occurring below any quantifier inferences. Let B be a branch in P . Let ΣB be the conclusion of the lowermost propositional inference on B, or the (atomic) axiom sequent on B if B does not contain any propositional inferences. If ΣB contains a quantified formula F , then F is introduced by weakenings. To see this, recall that Π contains only prenex formulas: By the subformula property, F is a subformula of a formula in Π, hence no propositional inferences apply to it. Eliminate F and all inferences applying to it from the part of B above ΣB , and add appropriate weakenings and exchanges directly below ΣB . After the above procedure has been applied to all branches B in P , the (finite) set of all ΣB serves as the set of Σj in the statement of the theorem. 2. o(P ) > 0: Then there is a quantifier inference (Q:i) with the following property: The topmost logical inference below (Q:i) is a propositional inference, say (2:j). The part of P between (Q:i) and (2:j) takes the following form: .... Γ1 . . . 〈 .... Γ ′,∆Q:i(k) 〉 k Γ ′, [i: (Qx)A(x)] Q:i .... ∗ Γ ′′ . . . .... Γn Γ 2:j 350 where the part denoted by ∗ contains only structural inferences, and Γ and Γ ′′ contain (Qx)A(x) as a sequent-formula. We can now lower the order by exchanging the positions of (Q:i) and (2:j): / ∖ .... Γ1 ∆Q:i(k), Γ1 . . . .... Γ ′,∆Q:i(k) Γ ′,∆Q:i(k), [i: (Qx)A(x)] w ∆Q:i(k), Γ ′, [i: (Qx)A(x)] e .... ∗ ∆Q:i(k), Γ ′′ . . . .... Γn ∆Q:i(k), Γn ∆, Γ 2:j Γ,∆Q:i(k) e ∖ / k Γ, [i: (Qx)A(x)] Q:i Γ e, c 2 Similar considerations can also be used for analyzing natural deduction proofs in many-valued logic as introduced in [5]. In the following example, we consider a representation of knowledge about (possibly inconsistent and incomplete) sets E of facts, using Belnap's logic enriched by the quantifiers ∀ and U. The facts are simply Boolean ground literals. These facts may be contradictory in the sense that both P and ¬P are present. Furthermore, it may be the case that for some ground atom A of the language, neither A nor ¬A is contained in the facts base. The facts may be thought of as evidences for certain state of affairs. They might, e.g., be protocols of certain experiments. The epistemic state s of a set of facts is the four-valued interpretation of all ground atoms induced by the facts base E: if both A and ¬A are facts, then s(A) = ⊥, if neither A nor ¬A is a fact then s(A) = u, if only A (¬A) is a fact then s(A) = t (f). The meta-knowledge is a set K of universal true sentences (∀x)B1(x), . . . , (∀x)Bq(x) of Belnap's logic. The meta-knowledge is assumed to be consistent with all possible epistemic states. In cases where the facts base is too large or unwieldy to work with, one might use instead the meta-knowledge to reason about the facts. For instance, we might deduce from K that the sentence (Ux)A(x) takes the truth value ⊥, expressing that the instances of A(x) are neither uniformly true nor uniformly false. This can be formalized in the sequent calculus by proving the sequent [f : (∀x)B1(x), . . . , (∀x)Bq(x)], [⊥: (Ux)A(x)]. A proof of this sequent can, by virtue of an analog of Herbrand's theorem, be analyzed to yield a finite sequence of critical pairs 〈A(t1), A(t′1)〉, . . . , 〈A(tp), A(t′p)〉 s.t. for every epistemic state under consideration, A(ti) and A(t′i) will take different truth values for some 1 ≤ i ≤ p. T h e o r e m 6.2. Let P be a proof of [f : (∀x)B1(x), . . . , (∀x)Bq(x)], [⊥: (Ux)A(x)] Then P can be transformed to proofs of [f : (∀x)B1(x), . . . , (∀x)Bq(x)], [w1:A(tw11 )], [⊥:A(t w1 1 )], . . . , [wr:A(t wr r )], [⊥:A(twrr )] for 〈w1, . . . , wr〉 ∈ {t, f}r. (The critical pairs then are 〈A(tt1), A(t f 1 )〉, . . . , 〈A(ttr), A(tfr )〉.) 351 P r o o f . Apply the midsequent theorem to P . None of the quantifier inferences in the proof have eigenvariable conditions (cf. Example 3.2). Let Σ1, . . . , Σp be the midsequents of this transformed proof. From each of these midsequents a sequent of the above form can be derived, possibly using weakenings. Observe that (∀:f) takes only one premise, hence one midsequent is sufficient in each case. 2 7 Conclusion We have introduced a general approach to obtaining sequent calculi for finite-valued firstorder logics. These sequent calculi enjoy cut-elimination and midsequent theorems. In special cases, the proof-theoretic properties can be exploited to obtain more specific results about the particular logics at hand. We illustrated this by exhibiting a version of Herbrand's theorem for a first-order extension of Belnap's four-valued logic suitable for reasoning about possibly inconsistent and incomplete knowledge bases. Similar results by proof-theoretic analysis such as interpolants constructed in Maehara's lemma (see [26, Ch. 1]) may be used for further classification of inconsistencies. References [1] M. Baaz and C. G. Fermüller. Resolution for many-valued logics. In A. Voronkov, editor, Logic Programming and Automated Reasoning. Proceedings LPAR'92, LNAI 624, pp. 107– 118, Berlin, 1992. Springer. [2] M. Baaz and C. G. Fermüller. Resolution-based theorem proving for many-valued logics. submitted, 1993. [3] M. Baaz, C. G. Fermüller, A. Ovrutcki, and R. Zach. MULTLOG: A system for axiomatizing many-valued logics. In A. Voronkov, editor, Logic Programming and Automated Reasoning. Proceedings LPAR'93, LNAI 698, pp. 345–347, Berlin, 1993. Springer. [4] M. Baaz, C. G. Fermüller, and R. Zach. Dual systems of sequents and tableaux for many-valued logics. Bull. EATCS, 51:192–197, 1993. paper read at 2nd Workshop on Tableau-based Deduction, Marseille, April 1993. [5] M. Baaz, C. G. Fermüller, and R. Zach. 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Takeuti. Proof Theory. Studies in Logic 81. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 2nd edition, 1987. [27] R. Zach. Proof Theory of Finite-valued Logics. Diplomarbeit, Technische Universität Wien, 1993. Zusammenfassung: Es wird eine uniforme Konstruktion von Sequentialkalkülen für endlichwertige Logiken erster Stufe mit sog. Distributionsquantoren vorgestellt. Für diese Kalküle werden Vollständigkeit, Schnittelimination und Mittelsequenzsätze gezeigt. Als eine Anwendung wird ein Analogon zum Herbrand'schen Satz für die vierwertige Wissensrepräsentationslogik von Belnap und Ginsberg abgeleitet. Dieser Satz kann zum Schliessen mit unvollständigen und inkonsistenten Daten verwendet werden. 353 Authors' addresses: Matthias Baaz Technische Universität Wien Institut für Algebra und diskrete Mathematik E118.2 Wiedner Hauptstrasse 8–10, A-1040 Wien, Austria [email protected] Christian G. Fermüller Richard Zach Technische Universität Wien Institut für Computersprachen E185.2 Resselgasse 3/1, A-1040 Wien, Austria [email protected] [email protected] Erratum The introduction rules for ∧:f and ∨:t given in Example 3.1 on page 338 are erroneous. The correct partial normal form for ∨ is: (A ∨B)t iff (At or Au or A⊥ or Bt) and (At or Au or Bt or Bu) and (At or A⊥ or Bt or B⊥) and (At or Bt or Bu or B⊥) The correct rules are: Γ, [u,⊥, t:A], [t:B] Γ, [⊥, t:A,B] Γ, [u, t:A,B] Γ, [u,⊥, t:B], [t:A] Γ, [t:A ∨B] ∨:t Γ, [u,⊥, f :A], [f :B] Γ, [⊥, f :A,B] Γ, [u, f :A,B] Γ, [u,⊥, f :B], [f :A] Γ, [f :A ∨B] ∧:f We are indebted to E. Reznik and M. Ultlog for drawing our attention to this mistake.

Przegląd Tomistyczny, t. X X (2014), s. 209-237 ISSN 0860-0015 M arek Piechowiak SWPS, Wydział Zamiejscowy w Poznaniu, Instytut Prawa SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II U wagi w stępn e Pełne opracowanie tytułowej problematyki wymagałoby monografii, a nie ar- tykułu. Stąd niniejsze studium stanowi jedynie zarys tytułowej problematyki, z położeniem akcentu na sprawy najbardziej podstawowe dla zagadnienia spra- wiedliwości prawa. Szczególna uwaga poświęcona jest samym podstawom filozoficznej refleksji Jana Pawła II nad sprawiedliwością i prawem. Argumentuje się, że u podstaw tej refleksji leży namysł nad relacją człowieka do dobra, która stanowi ontologiczną podstawę prawa i sprawiedliwości - nakazy i zakazy są wtórne wobec tej relacji. Celem prawa i sprawiedliwości jest dobro konkretnego, obdarzonego godnością człowieka, a nie np. przywracanie abstrakcyjnie pojętego porządku moralnego. Przy okazji okazuje się, że od strony konstrukcji teoretycznej filozofia prawa Jana Pawła II jest osadzona przede wszystkim na koncepcji Tomasza z Akwinu łączonej z konstrukcjami typowymi dla współczesnej ochrony praw człowieka. Analizy przebiegają od zagadnienia antropologicznych podstaw sprawiedli- wości przez problematykę działań realizujących sprawiedliwość do zagadnienia sprawiedliwości prawa stanowionego. Opracowanie zamykają uwagi wskazują- ce na kontekst teologiczny istotny dla problematyki sprawiedliwości, którego analiza wykracza poza podjęte zamierzenie koncentrujące się na problematyce fiłozoficznoprawnej. Opracowanie to nie pretenduje do opracowania całościowego, jeśli chodzi o korzystanie z dostępnych źródeł - analizy oparte są przede wszystkim na wy- branych tekstach Jana Pawła II, które w sposób szczególny podejmują tytułowe zagadnienie, są to przede wszystkim encykliki - Centesimus annus (1991), Veritatis splendor (1993) i Evangelium vitae (1995). Jedyne systematyczne, a przy tym syntetyczne - mające formę artykułu - opracowanie dotyczące wprost zagadnień filozoficznoprawnych w nauczaniu Jana Pawła II to pochodzące 2 1 0 MAREK PIECHOWIAK z 1990 roku, zatem napisane przed publikacją szeregu analizowanych tu źró- deł, studium Zenona Grocholewskiego Filozofia prawa w nauczaniu Jan a Paw- ła I I 1. Prezentowane niżej opracowanie jest komplementarne wobec studium Grocholewskiego, który za zasadnicze źródła w analizie filozoficznoprawnych poglądów Jana Pawła II przyjął encykliki Redemptor hominis (1979), Laborem exercens (1981) i Sollicitudo rei socialis (1987). Celem tego studium było ogólne zarysowanie filozoficznoprawnych poglądów Jana Pawia II, bez pretendowania do kompletności - m.in. zagadnienie sprawiedliwości jest wskazane przez sa- mego autora jako to, które jest ważne, a nie zostało podjęte. Kompleksowe opra- cowanie tej problematyki ciągłe czeka na swego autora2. Piszącemu te słowa nie udało się znaleźć żadnego opracowania tytułowej problematyki w perspektywie współczesnej filozofii i teorii prawa. Przedstawione niżej opracowanie koncentruje się wokół ujęcia przez Jana Pawła II sprawiedliwości w jej powiązaniu z prawem stanowionym; najistotniej- sza część dotyczy problematyki niesprawiedliwego prawa i jego obowiązywania; zmierza się także do ujęcia nauczania papieża za pomocą instrumentarium wła- ściwego współczesnej filozofii i teorii prawa i jednocześnie do umieszczenia tego nauczania w kontekście tradycji tomistycznej refleksji nad prawem. I . A n t r o p o l o g i c z n e p o d s t a w y s p r a w i e d l i w o ś c i 1. Ogólna charakterystyka sprawiedliwości Odwołując się do Leona X III i jego encykliki Rerum novarum, za fundamen- talną formulę sprawiedliwości Jan Paweł II uznaje formułę leżącą u podstaw europejskiej refleksji nad prawem: „oddać każdemu to, co mu się należy"3. For1Tłum. M. Jędraszewski, w: Z. G roc h o lew ski: Refleksje na tem at p ra w a , Kraków: Homo Dei, 2009, s. 59-97. 2 Szerokie omówienie problematyki sprawiedliwości w wymiarze międzynarodowym daje S. G regg , C ha llen gin g the M o d ern World: K a ro l Wojtyla/John P a u lI I a n d the D ev elo pm en t o f C atholic Social T eaching, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002, s. 179-214; panoramę zagadnień dotyczących sprawiedliwości społecznej daje M.T. Pakuła , Istota spraw iedliw ości społecznej w n a - uczaniu p a p ież a J a n a P aw ia I I (Z a ry sp ro blem a ty k i), „Studia Loviciensia" 8 (2006), s. 219-234. 3J an Paw eł II, Centesim us annus, 10: „Nie może się ono [państwo] ograniczać do »starania o dobro części obywateli«, to znaczy tych, którzy są bogaci i żyją w dobrobycie, a »zaniedbywać resztę«, stanowiącą niewątpliwie przeważającą większość społeczeństwa; w przeciwnym razie zo- staje naruszona zasada sprawiedliwości, która nakazuje oddać każdemu to, co mu się należy". J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 5 7 : „równość stanowi podstawę wszelkich autentycznych relacji społecznych". Na temat podstawowej formuły „każdemu to, co mu się należy", która powszech- nie była uznawana w starożytnej Grecji, zob.: M. P iec h o w ia k , D o Platona p o naukę o praw ach człowieka, w: K sięga jub ileu szo w a profesora Tadeusza Jasudow icza , red. J. Białocerkiewicz, M. Balcerzak , A. Czeczko-Durlak, Toruń: Towarzystwo Naukowe Organizacji i Kierownictwa „Dom Organizatora", 2004, s. 339-342. SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 2 1 1 mula ta obejmuje zasadę równości, zakazującą pomijania w działaniach państwa troszczenia się o pewne grupy społeczne, a jednocześnie nakaz szczególnej tro- ski o ubogich, słabszych, nieuprzywilejowanych4. 2. Wolność przyporządkowana do prawdy podstawą sprawiedliwości Ogólna refleksja nad sprawiedliwością obejmuje perspektywę negatywną - ana- lizę sprawiedliwości przez przyglądanie się niesprawiedliwości - oraz perspek- tywę pozytywną, w której wprost analizowana jest sprawiedliwość. U źródeł niesprawiedliwości jak pewnego faktu leży wolność oderwana od prawdy. Papież podkreśla, że chodzi o prawdę obiektywną - transcendentną: to ta litary zm rod zi się z n eg acji obiektyw nej praw dy: je ż e li nie istn ie je praw da tran scen d en tn a, p rzez p osłu szeństw o k tóre j cz ło w iek zdobyw a swą p ełn ą to żsa- m o ść, to n ie istn ie je też żad na pew na zasada, gw arantu jąca spraw iedliw e stosunki p om ięd zy lud źm i5. Uznając prawdę obiektywną, Jan Paweł II staje na stanowisku kognitywizmu aksjologicznego - oceny moralne są rezultatem poznania i mogą być prawdzi- we lub fałszywe. Czego dotyczy owa obiektywna prawda, co jest przedmiotem poznania będącego jej podstawą? Prawda będąca podstawą sprawiedliwości jest prawdą o człowieku. Jako źró- dło głębokiej niesprawiedliwości w dziedzinie gospodarczej Jan Paweł II, w na- wiązaniu do nauczania Leona X III, wskazuje na wolność, „która w dziedzinie działalności gospodarczej i społecznej odrywa się od prawdy o człowieku"6. Po- dobnie, oderwana od prawdy o człowieku wolność leży u podstaw współczes- nych zagrożeń dla życia pojawiających się w związku z prawną dopuszczalnością aborcji i eutanazji: w o ln o ść zap iera się sam ej siebie, zm ierza do au tod estru kcji i do zn iszczen ia dru- giego człow ieka, gdy p rzesta je uznaw ać i respektow ać k o n s t y t u t y w n ą w i ę ź , j a k a ł ą c z y j ą z p r a w d ą 7; 4 L eon XIII, R eru m n o v aru m , 25: „Chroniąc zaś prawa poszczególnych osób, państwo win- no mieć w sposób szczególny na względzie maluczkich i biednych. Warstwa bowiem bogatych, dostatkami obwarowana, mniej potrzebuje opieki państwa; klasy natomiast ubogie, pozbawione ochrony, jaką daje majątek, szczególniej tej opieki potrzebują. Dlatego państwo powinno bar- dzo pilnym staraniem i opieką otoczyć pracowników najemnych, stanowiących masy ludności biednej" (cyt. za: J an Paw eł II, C entesim us a nnus , 10). 5J an Paw eł II, Centesim us annus, 44. ćTamże, 4. 7Zob. J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 19. 2 1 2 MAREK PIECHOWIAK Konsekwencją oderwania wolności od prawdy jest absolutyzacja jednostki ludz- kiej i przekreślenie jej odniesienia do solidarności z drugimi, do pełnej akceptacji drugiego człowieka i do służenia innym8. Prawdzie o człowieku przeciwstawia papież ideologie, których celem jest re- alizowanie partykularnych interesów. Jan Paweł II uważa istnienie wpływowych ideologii - przeciwstawianych przez papieża „autentycznej filozofii"9 - za ko- nieczny warunek wystąpienia nienawiści i niesprawiedliwości na płaszczyźnie makrospołecznej: Jed n ak że n ienaw iść i niesp raw iedliw ość opanow u ją całe N arody i p opychają je do d ziałania ty lko w ów czas, gdy są uw ierzyteln iane i organizow ane p rzez ideologie, k tóre op iera ją się na n ich , zam iast na praw dzie o człow ieku 10. Ideowe podstawy sprawiedliwości tworzy obiektywna prawda o człowieku - przede wszystkim o równej godności wszystkich ludzi i równych prawach pod- stawowych przysługujących każdemu człowiekowi, niezależnie od ich uznania przez prawo stanowione; do takiej prawdy musi być odniesiona i nią się kierować wolność* 11. 3. Sprawiedliwość a godność Budowa społeczeństwa bardziej sprawiedliwego lub mniej niesprawiedliwego oparta jest na obronie osoby ludzkiej i ochronie jej godności. Koncepcja oso- by ludzkiej - stawiająca na pierwszym miejscu wartość godności, będącej źró- dłem praw, jest podstawą ujęcia sprawiedliwości. Podkreślić trzeba, że sprawie- dliwość znajduje swoją ontyczną (realną, bytową) podstawę w człowieku, a nie w jakimś zespole norm moralnych, norm prawa naturalnego czy w prawach czło- wieka. W realizacji sprawiedliwości nie chodzi ostatecznie o realizację prawa - moralnego, naturalnego, praw człowieka czy nawet prawa Bożego, ale o dobro człowieka12. O ochronie praw człowieka Jan Paweł II pisze, że nie jest ona celem samym w sobie - zmierza ona do rozwoju podmiotowości człowieka13. 8Tamże, 19. 9Ideologia przeciwstawiana jest „autentycznej filozofii", J an Paw eł II, Centesim us annus, 18. 10Tamże, 17. Por. tenże, O rędzie na Św iatow y D z ie ń Pokoju 1 9 8 0 , „Acta Apostolicae Sedis" (dalej: AAS) 71 (1979), s. 1572-1580. 11 J an Paw eł II, Centesim us annus, 1 7 : „Błąd ten - jak już powiedzieliśmy- kryje się w kon- cepcji ludzkiej wolności oderwanej od posłuszeństwa prawdzie, a zatem również od obowiązku poszanowania praw innych ludzi. Treścią wolności staje się wówczas miłość samego siebie po- sunięta aż do wzgardzenia Bogiem i bliźnim, miłość, która prowadzi do bezgranicznej afirmacji własnej korzyści i nie daje się ograniczyć żadnymi nakazami sprawiedliwości"; zob. też tamże, 22. 12 W tym kontekście przypomnieć wypada słynne zdanie z encykliki Jana Pawła II R edem ptor hom inis, 14: „człowiekjest [. . .] pierwszą i podstawową drogą Kościoła". 13 Zob. np. J an Paw eł II, Centesim us annus, 35. SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 213 Właściwością człowieka najważniejszą z punktu widzenia relacji społecznych i określania treści praw człowieka czy prawa naturalnego14 jest godność15, uzna- wana za źródło niepowtarzalnej wartości każdego człowieka i - dalej - praw człowieka. W nawiązaniu do wcześniejszego nauczania papieży Jan Paweł II pisze: Trzeba jednak już teraz wyraźnie sobie uświadomić, że tym, co stanowi wątek i w pewnym sensie myśl przewodnią encykliki i w ogóle całej nauki społecznej Kościoła, jest poprawna koncepcja osoby ludzkiej, jej niepowtarzalnej wartości, płynącej stąd, że człowiek jest „jedynym na ziemi stworzeniem, którego Bóg chciał dla niego samego" [Konstytucja duszpasterska o Kościele w świecie współ- czesnym Gaudium et spes, 24]. Uczynił go na swój obraz i podobieństwo (por. Rdz 1,26), obdarzając niezrównaną godnością, którą niejednokrotnie podkreśla encyklika. Istotnie bowiem oprócz praw, które człowiek nabywa własną pracą, istnieją takie, które nie mają związku z żadnym wykonanym przezeń dziełem, lecz wywodzą się z jego zasadniczej godności jako osoby16. Językiem teologicznym - mówiąc o tym, że człowiek jest chciany przez Bo- ga dla niego samego - Jan Paweł II wyraża powszechnie wiązaną z godnością intuicję, że człowiek istnieje jako cel sam w sobie (chceniu Boga odpowiada sposób istnienia człowieka)17, a nie jako środek dla osiągania innych celów18. Człowiek jako osoba nie jest rzeczą, którą można rozporządzać19. Godność jest 14 Krótko na temat relacji między prawami człowieka a prawem naturalnym w nauczaniu Jana Pawła II zob.: M. P iech o w ia k , P ra w a człow ieka i p ra w o naturalne ja k o podstaw a życia osobistego i społecznego, w: J a n P a w eł I I nauczyciel. Sym pozjum naukow e, Z ielona Góra 8 9 czerw ca 1 9 9 7 , Zielona Góra: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej im. Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, 1997, s. 89-103 15 J. R osado , D ie M enschenw iirde in d er Anthropologie Jo h a n n es P a u l IL E in e A nalyse im A u sg a n g von K a n ts B e g rü n d u n g d er M enschenrechte, „Imago Hominis", 1 (2006), s. 13-26. 16J an Paw eł II, Centesim us annus, 11. 17 Szerzej na ten temat zob.: M. P iech o w ia k , Tom asza z A k w in u koncepcja godności osoby lu d z - kiej ja k o podstaw y p ra w a . K o m en ta rz do rozdziałów 1 1 1 1 1 3 księgi I I I Tom asza z A k w in u Summa contra gentiles, „Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne", 14 (2003), s. 219-242. 18 Dookreślenia godności w twórczości Karola Wojtyły zob. np.: K. W o jt y ła : M iło ść i odpow ie- dzialność, Lublin: TN KUL, 1982, s. 30: „Ilekroć w twoim postępowaniu osoba jest przedmiotem [adresatem] działania, tylekroć pamiętaj, że nie możesz jej traktować tylko jako środka do celu, jako narzędzia, ale musisz liczyć się z tym, że ona sama ma lub bodaj powinna mieć swój cel"; K. W o jt y ła , C złow iek jes t osobą, w: tenże, Osoba i czyn oraz in n e studia antropologiczne, Lublin: TN KUL, 1994, s. 418: „Uznawać godność człowieka to znaczy wyżej stawiać jego samego niż wszystko, cokolwiek od niego pochodzi w widzialnym świecie. [... ] Człowiek nie żyje dla techni- ki, cywilizacji czy nawet kultury; żyje natomiast korzystając z ich pomocy, stale zachowując swoją własną celowość. Ta celowość wiąże się ściśle z prawdą: człowiek bowiem jest istotą rozumną - oraz z dobrem jako właściwym przedmiotem wolnej woli". 19J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 57. 214 MAREK PIECHOWIAK równa, i w konsekwencji równe są wynikające z niej podstawowe prawa czło- wieka, „które nie mają związku z żadnym wykonywanym przezeń dziełem", nie mają też związku z partykularnymi cechami człowieka, jak np. stopień rozwoju , '20czy sprawność . II. R e a l i z a c j a s p r a w i e d l i w o ś c i 1. D wa typy sprawiedliwości i opcja na rzecz słabszych Uznając równą godność wszystkich ludzi, Jan Paweł II odróżnia dwie formy sprawiedliwości - jedna wiąże się z „logiką wymiany równowartości"21, dla jej realizacji istotne są dzieła dokonywane przez człowieka, jego zasługi czy szkody, które wyrządza; druga - ważniejsza od pierwszej - to sprawiedliwość doty- cząca tego, „co należy się człowiekowi, ponieważ jest człowiekiem, ze względu na jego wzniosłą godność"22. Charakterystycznym elementem katolickiej nauki społecznej, a w szczególno- ści nauczania społecznego Jana Pawła II, jest przyjęcie - jako środka realizacji sprawiedliwości - opcji na rzecz słabszych, ubogich, doświadczających trudno- ści. Umacnianie sprawiedliwości jest konkretnym wyrazem miłości do człowie- ka, zwłaszcza ubogiego23. Z jednej strony opcja ta ma uzasadnienie w uznaniu równej godności, co wymaga zabiegania w równym stopniu o rozwój każdego człowieka - im więcej do tego rozwoju brakuje, tym większa pomoc jest po- trzebna. Z drugiej strony u podstaw tej opcji leżą rozstrzygnięcia antropologicz- ne, zgodnie z którymi działanie dla dobra innych jest fundamentalnym i najważ- niejszym wymiarem rozwoju człowieka - „osoba ludzka w pełni się realizuje w bezinteresownym darze z siebie"24. Człowiek potrzebujący daje „okazję" dla 20Jest to wątek obecny w całej encyklice E v a n g eliu m v ita r, wprost uznanie równej godności, zob. tamże, nr 8. *Jan Paw eł II, Centesim us annus, 34: „Ważniejsze niż logika wymiany równowartości i niż różne formy sprawiedliwości, które się z tym wiążą, jest to, co należy się człowiekowi, ponieważ jest człowiekiem, ze względu na jego wzniosłą godność". 22 Tamże. Rozróżnienie to nie idzie w parze z Arystotelesowskim odróżnieniem sprawiedli- wości wymiennej i rozdzielczej. Gdyby poszukiwać analogii w historii filozoficznej refleksji nad sprawiedliwością, należałoby wskazać na Platona odróżniającego dwa typy równości, na której fundowana bywa sprawiedliwość - równości co do miary, wagi i liczby; oraz doskonalszej od niej równości opartej na odpowiedniości czegoś do potrzeb konkretnego człowieka; zob. P laton , P ra w a , 756e-757d. 23J an Paw eł II, Centesim us a nnus, 58: „Konkretnym wyrazem miłości do człowieka, a przede wszystkim do ubogiego, w którym Kościół widzi Chrystusa, jest umacnianie sprawiedliwości". 24Tamże, 43. Por. konstytucja soborowa G audium etspes, której współautorem był jeszcze kar- dynał Karol Wojtyła: „Człowiek, będąc jedynym stworzeniem, którego Bóg chciał dla siebie sa- mego, nie może odnaleźć siebie w pełni inaczej, jak tylko przez bezinteresowny dar z siebie same- go". Przywołuję tu stare tłumaczenie konstytucji (cyt. za: Sobór Watykański I I : Konstytucje, dekrety, SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 215 takiego bezinteresownego działania, daje zatem sposobność, by osiągać większą doskonałość: P ełn a spraw iedliw ość stanie się m ożliw a d op iero w ów czas, gdy ludzie nie będą trak tow ać ubogiego, k tó ry prosi o w sparcie d la p o d trzym an ia życia, ja k k ło p o tli- w ego n atręta czy ja k o ciężar, ale d ostrzegą w n im sp osobność do czynien ia d obra dla sam ego dobra, m ożliw ość osiągn ięcia bogactw a w iększeg o25. Papież wskazuje, że to, co się człowiekowi należy ze względu na jego godność, obejmuje nie tylko to, co niezbędne jest dla przeżycia, ale także to, co pozwala człowiekowi czynnie współtworzyć dobro wspólne ludzkości26. Papież wyróżnia dwa typy potrzeb, które wymagają zaspokojenia. Jedne zaspokajane są za pomo- cą dóbr, które można kupić, te potrzeby zatem może zaspokoić wolny rynek; są jednak potrzeby, „które nie mają dostępu do rynku"27. Istotna jest pomoc potrzebującym „w zdobywaniu wiedzy, we włączaniu się w system wzajemnych powiązań, w rozwinięciu odpowiednich nawyków, które pozwolą im lepiej wykorzystać własne zdolności i zasoby"28. Akcentowana jest zatem pomoc pozwalająca ludziom, którym się pomaga, by wzięli swoje spra- wy we własne ręce, tzw. „pomoc dla samopomocy". Takie podejście jest typowe z punktu widzenia zasady pomocniczości i ma na celu umożliwienie człowieko- wi realizacji jego podmiotowości jako osoby, w tym umożliwienie - niezbęd- nego dla pełnego rozwoju - działania dla innych. Niemniej jednak owa pomoc dla samopomocy charakteryzować powinna nie tylko działania społeczności deklaracje, Poznań: Pallottinum, 1967, s. 865, 867) ze względu na pojawiające się w nim określenie „bezinteresowny", które w nowym przekładzie zostało zastąpione przez „szczery". Tekst łaciński jest następujący: „Haec similitudo manifestat hominem, qui in terris sola creatura est quam Deus propter seipsam voluerit, plene seipsum invenire non posse nisi per sincerum sui ipsius donum". W tekstach Jana Pawła II w języku polskim mowa jest o bezinteresowności - jednoznacznie na taki kierunek rozumienia wypowiedzi soborowej wskazuje np. tekst przemówienia Jana Pawła II do przedstawicieli świata kultury zgromadzonych w Teatrze Narodowym (Warszawa, 8 czerwca 1991 roku), 2 i 5 (Jan Paw eł II, D z i d a zebrane, red. P. Ptasznik, t. 9: H o m ilie i p rzem ó w ien ia z p ielgrzy m ek - E u ro p a , c l. 1: Polska, Kraków: Wyd. M , 2008, s. 560-564). Zob. także J an Paw eł II, M ęż cz y z n ą i niew iastą stw orzył ich, Lublin: RW KUL, 1981, s. 51-59 (rozdz. 5); ko- mentując formułę soborową, Jan Paweł II podkreślał radykalność daru (także przy obdarowaniu człowieka przez Boga, gdy sens daru odnajdowany jest „w powołaniu z nicości do istnienia", s. 52), a do tego lepiej nadaje się słowo „bezinteresowny" niż „szczery". 25J an Paw eł II, Centesim as annus, 58. 26 Tamże, 34: „To, co należy się człowiekowi, musi gwarantować możliwość przeżycia i wnie- sienia czynnego wkładu w dobro wspólne ludzkości". Zob. tamże, 35, gdzie mowa jest o tym, że walka o sprawiedliwość zmierza - poprzez ochronę praw człowieka - do istotnego dla realizacji własnej podmiotowości uczestniczenia „w sposób bardziej pełny i godny w życiu Narodu". 27 Tamże. 28 Tamże. 216 MAREK PIECHOWIAK wyższego rzędu wobec społeczności niższego rzędu czy wobec jednostek, ale także działania w wymiarze horyzontalnym - między jednostkami. Owa podmiotowość realizuje się w pełni w bezinteresownym działaniu dla dobra innych, Jan Paweł II podkreśla przy tym wagę tworzenia wspólnoty i dzia- łania we wspólnocie, krótko - „Poprzez swoją pracę człowiek angażuje się nie tylko dla samego siebie, ale także dla drugich i z drugimi"29. 2. Walka o sprawiedliwość Jan Paweł II przychyla się do stanowiska Piusa XI, który w encyklice Quadragesimo anno pisał: W a lk a klas bo w iem , je ś li się z n ie j w ykluczy gw ałty i n ienaw iść w stosunku do drugiej strony, p rzem ien ia się pow oli w sz lachetne w spółzaw od nictw o, oparte na dążeniu do spraw iedliw ości30. W walce o sprawiedliwość ważną rolę odgrywają ruchy społeczne, np. ruch ro- botniczy31. Walka o sprawiedliwość powinna być walką bez przemocy. Skoro u pod- staw niesprawiedliwości, zwłaszcza tej znajdującej systemowy wymiar, są błędne ideologie, podstawowym sposobem owej walki bez przemocy jest ujawnianie prawdy o godności i prawach każdego człowieka32. Niesprawiedliwe systemy polityczne, nie mając oparcia w prawdzie o rzeczywistości ludzkiej, znajdują je w przemocy, która utrzymuje się dzięki nienawiści. Stąd ci, którzy walczą w imię sprawiedliwości z całymi systemami politycznymi, narażeni są na szcze- gólne niebezpieczeństwo, że sami opanowani zostaną przez nienawiść i prze- moc - uniknięcie tego wymaga świadomie podejmowanego wysiłku dawania świadectwa prawdzie; niezbędny jest przy tym duch przebaczenia i pokoju33. 29 Tamże, 43. 30Pius XI, Q uadragesim a a n n o , AAS 23 (1931), s. 213; przekład i cytowanie za: J an Paw eł II, Centesim us a nnus 14; por. tenże, L aborem exercens, 11-15. 3J an Paw eł II, Centesim us a n n us , 16; także działalność związana „z zakładaniem spółdzielni wytwórczych, spożywców oraz spółdzielni kredytowych, z rozwijaniem oświaty ludowej i kształ- cenia zawodowego, z tworzeniem eksperymentalnych form udziału w życiu przedsiębiorstwa i całego społeczeństwa" (tamże); współcześnie przede wszystkim ruch solidarności w Polsce, zob. np. tamże, 22. Zob. M . P iec h o w ia k , Solidarność- w p o szu k iw a n iu ideow ej tradycji interpretacji kategorii konstytucyjnej, w: W po szu k iw a n iu now ychform solidaryzm u społecznego, 1.1: Id ea solidary- zm u w e w spółczesnej filozofii p ra w a i polityki, red. A. Łabno, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2012, s. 145-185. 32J an Paw eł II, Centesim us annus, 23: „Zasługuje dalej na podkreślenie fakt, że do upadku tego »bloku«, czy imperium doprowadza prawie wszędzie walka pokojowa, która posługuje się jedynie bronią prawdy i sprawiedliwości"; 33Tamże, 27. SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 217 Doniosłą rolę w walce o sprawiedliwość odgrywa stanowienie prawa. W kon- tekście prawa do życia papież zwraca uwagę, że „Choć prawa nie są jedynym narzędziem obrony ludzkiego życia, odgrywają rolę bardzo ważną, a czasem de- cydującą w procesie kształtowania określonej mentalności i obyczaju"34. Przy czym dla ochrony prawa do życia nie wystarczy zniesienie niegodziwych praw, ale trzeba „usunąć przyczyny, które sprzyjają zamachom na życie"35. III. S p r a w i e d l i w o ś ć p r a w a i p a ń s t w a 1. Sprawiedliwość a działania państwa - zasada pomocniczości W państwie podstawowym wymiarem niesprawiedliwości jest naruszanie praw człowieka, a także przyrodzonych, naturalnych obowiązków, nie będzie jednak ono możliwe bez odpowiednio ukształtowanego państwa i społeczeństwa. Gdy Jan Paweł II komentuje wypowiedzi Leona X III dotyczące oceny ideologii ko- munistycznej, obok naruszenia praw człowieka (praw właścicieli) jako przejaw niesprawiedliwości rozwiązań wskazuje psucie ustroju państwa i dogłębne wzbu- rzenie społeczeństwa36. Troska o sprawiedliwość nie jest wyłącznie zadaniem państwa. Państwo two- rzy przestrzeń, w której członkowie wspólnoty politycznej mogą sami trosz- czyć się o sprawiedliwość. Tworzenie tej przestrzeni oparte jest na gwaranto- waniu podstawowych praw człowieka - gwarantowanie tych praw (stanowią- cych zasadniczy element dobra wspólnego37) jest podstawowym celem państwa, 34J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 90. 35 Tamże. 36J an Paw eł II, Centesim us annus, 12: „Warto raz jeszcze odczytać z uwagą jego słowa: »So- cjaliści, wznieciwszy zazdrość mniemają, że dla usunięcia przepaści między nimi znieść trzeba prywatną własność, a zastąpić ją wspólnym posiadaniem dóbr materialnych. Przez tę przemia- nę spodziewają się uleczyć obecne zło (niesprawiedliwy podział bogactw i nędzę proletariatu). To jednak nie rozwiąże trudności, a samej klasie robotników przyniesie w rezultacie szkodę. Po- gląd ten jest ponadto niesprawiedliwy; zadaje bowiem gwałt prawnym właścicielom, psuje ustrój państwa i do głębi wzburza społeczeństwo«. Nie można było lepiej ukazać szkód, jakie miał wy- rządzić tego rodzaju socjalizm, stając się systemem państwowym, znanym później pod nazwą »socjalizmu realnego«". 37 Szersze przedstawienie koncepcji dobra wspólnego wypracowanej w nauczaniu społecznym Kościoła katolickiego zoh.: M. Sa d o w ski, Godność człow ieka i dobro w spólne w papieskim naucza- n iu społecznym ( 1 8 7 8 2 0 0 5 ) , Wrocław: Uniwersytet Wrocławski, 2010, zwł. s. 269-359 (rozdział poświęcony nauczaniu Jana Pawła II); syntetycznie zob.: M . P iec h o w ia k , D obro w spólne ja k o fu n d a m e n t polskiego p o rzą d k u konstytucyjnego, Warszawa: Oficyna Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, 2012, s. 118-153, zwł. 133-136. 218 MAREK PIECHOWIAK a korzystanie z tych praw przez podmioty wspólnoty politycznej jest także re- alizacją sprawiedliwości38. Jan Paweł II podkreśla, że zgodnie z całą nauką społeczną Kościoła - opartą na chrześcijańskiej koncepcji osoby, w yrazem sp ołecznej natu ry człow ieka nie je s t jed y n ie państw o, ale także różne grupy p ośrednie, p o czyn ając od rodziny, a ko ń cząc na w sp ó ln o tach gospod ar- czych , sp ołecznych, p o lityczn ych i ku lturalnych, k tóre ja k o p rze jaw te jż e ludzkiej natu ry posiad ają - zaw sze w ram ach dobra w spólnego - swą w łasn ą autonom ię. T o w łaśn ie nazw ałem „pod m iotow ością" sp ołeczeństw a, k tó ra w raz z p o d m io to - w ością je d n o stk i, zo sta ła un icestw iona p rzez „socjalizm realny"39. 2. Sprawiedliwość kryterium obowiązywania prawa i bycia prawem a. Relacje między prawem a moralnością Jan Paweł II zauważa, że przedstawiana przez niego nauka Kościoła dotycząca relacji między prawem - świeckim prawem stanowionym (nazywanym w ency- klice Evangelium vitae prawem cywilnym) - a moralnością wpisuje się w wiel- kie tradycje prawodawstwa40. Zadaniem, celem prawa jest ochrona dobra wspólnego osób tworzących spo- łeczeństwo, a ochrona ta dokonuje się „poprzez uznanie i obronę ich pod- stawowych praw, umacnianie pokoju i moralności publicznej"41. Takie działa- nie jest równoznaczne z ochroną „ładu społecznego opartego na prawdziwej sprawiedliwości"42. Jan Paweł II w numerze 71 Evangelium vitae z aprobatą przytacza słowa Ja- na X X III zawarte w encyklice Pacem in terris: Pod kreśla się d zisiaj, że praw dziw e dobro w spólne polega p rzede w szystkim na p oszanow aniu praw i obow iązków ludzkiej osoby. W o b e c tego głów nym zad a- niem spraw ujących w ładzę w państw ie je s t dbać z je d n e j strony o uznaw anie tych 38J an Paw eł II, Centesim us a n n us , 11: „Jeśli Leon XIII apeluje do Państwa, by zgodnie z za- sadami sprawiedliwości zostały polepszone warunki życia ludzi ubogich, czyni to w słusznym przekonaniu, że zadaniem Państwa jest czuwanie nad dobrem wspólnym i troska o to, by wszyst- kie dziedziny życia społecznego, nie wyłączając gospodarki, przyczyniały się do urzeczywistnia- nia go, respektując słuszną autonomię każdej z nich. Jednakże nie znaczy to, że zdaniem Papieża wszystkie rozwiązania kwestii społecznej winny pochodzić od Państwa. Przeciwnie, podkreśla on niejednokrotnie konieczność ograniczenia interwencji Państwa oraz jego charakter instrumental- ny, jako że jednostka, rodzina i społeczeństwo są w stosunku do niego wcześniejsze, Państwo zaś istnieje po to, by chronić ich prawa, bynajmniej zaś nie po to, by je tłumić". 39Tamże, 13. Por. Sollicitudo reisocialis, 15, 28. 40J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 71. 41 Tamże; por. Sobór Watykański II, D eklaracja o wolności religijnej Dignitatis humanae, 7. 42J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 71. SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 217 Doniosłą rolę w walce o sprawiedliwość odgrywa stanowienie prawa. W kon- tekście prawa do życia papież zwraca uwagę, że „Choć prawa nie są jedynym narzędziem obrony ludzkiego życia, odgrywają rolę bardzo ważną, a czasem de- cydującą w procesie kształtowania określonej mentalności i obyczaju"34. Przy czym dla ochrony prawa do życia nie wystarczy zniesienie niegodziwych praw, ale trzeba „usunąć przyczyny, które sprzyjają zamachom na życie"3 . III. S p r a w i e d l i w o ś ć p r a w a i p a ń s t w a 1. Sprawiedliwość a działania państwa - zasada pomocniczości W państwie podstawowym wymiarem niesprawiedliwości jest naruszanie praw człowieka, a także przyrodzonych, naturalnych obowiązków, nie będzie jednak ono możliwe bez odpowiednio ukształtowanego państwa i społeczeństwa. Gdy Jan Paweł II komentuje wypowiedzi Leona X III dotyczące oceny ideologii ko- munistycznej, obok naruszenia praw człowieka (praw właścicieli) jako przejaw niesprawiedliwości rozwiązań wskazuje psucie ustroju państwa i dogłębne wzbu- rzenie społeczeństwa36. Troska o sprawiedliwość nie jest wyłącznie zadaniem państwa. Państwo two- rzy przestrzeń, w której członkowie wspólnoty politycznej mogą sami trosz- czyć się o sprawiedliwość. Tworzenie tej przestrzeni oparte jest na gwaranto- waniu podstawowych praw człowieka - gwarantowanie tych praw (stanowią- cych zasadniczy element dobra wspólnego37) jest podstawowym celem państwa, 34J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 90. 35 Tamże. 36 J an Paw eł II, Centesim us a n n us , 12: „Warto raz jeszcze odczytać z uwagą jego słowa: »So- cjaliści, wznieciwszy zazdrość mniemają, że dla usunięcia przepaści między nimi znieść trzeba prywatną własność, a zastąpić ją wspólnym posiadaniem dóbr materialnych. Przez tę przemia- nę spodziewają się uleczyć obecne zło (niesprawiedliwy podział bogactw i nędzę proletariatu). To jednak nie rozwiąże trudności, a samej klasie robotników przyniesie w rezultacie szkodę. Po- gląd ten jest ponadto niesprawiedliwy; zadaje bowiem gwałt prawnym właścicielom, psuje ustrój państwa i do głębi wzburza społeczeństwo«. Nie można było lepiej ukazać szkód, jakie miał wy- rządzić tego rodzaju socjalizm, stając się systemem państwowym, znanym później pod nazwą »socjalizmu realnego«". 37 Szersze przedstawienie koncepcji dobra wspólnego wypracowanej w nauczaniu społecznym Kościoła katolickiego zoh.: M. Sa d o w ski, Godność człow ieka i dobro w spólne w papieskim na u cza - n iu społecznym ( 1 8 7 8 2 0 0 5 ) , Wrocław: Uniwersytet Wrocławski, 2010, zwł. s. 269-359 (rozdział poświęcony nauczaniu Jana Pawia II); syntetycznie zob.: M. P iec h o w ia k , D obro wspólne jako fu n d a m e n t polskiego p o rzą d k u konstytucyjnego, Warszawa: Oficyna Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, 2012, s. 118-153, zwł. 133-136. 218 MAREK PIECHOWIAK a korzystanie z tych praw przez podmioty wspólnoty politycznej jest także re- alizacją sprawiedliwości38. Jan Paweł II podkreśla, że zgodnie z całą nauką społeczną Kościoła - opartą na chrześcijańskiej koncepcji osoby, w yrazem sp ołecznej natu ry człow ieka n ie je s t je d y n ie państw o, ale także różne grupy pośrednie, p o czyn ając od rodziny, a ko ń cząc na w sp óln otach gosp od ar- czych , sp ołecznych, p olitycznych i ku lturalnych, k tó re ja k o p rze jaw te jż e ludzkiej natu ry posiad ają - zaw sze w ram ach d obra w spólnego - swą w łasn ą autonom ię. T o w łaśn ie nazw ałem „pod m iotow ością" sp ołeczeństw a, k tó ra w raz z p o d m io to - w ością je d n o stk i, zo sta ła un icestw iona p rzez „socjalizm realny"39. 2. Sprawiedliwość kryterium obowiązywania prawa i bycia prawem a. Relacje między prawem a moralnością Jan Paweł II zauważa, że przedstawiana przez niego nauka Kościoła dotycząca relacji między prawem - świeckim prawem stanowionym (nazywanym w ency- klice Evangelium vitae prawem cywilnym) - a moralnością wpisuje się w wiel- kie tradycje prawodawstwa40. Zadaniem, celem prawa jest ochrona dobra wspólnego osób tworzących spo- łeczeństwo, a ochrona ta dokonuje się „poprzez uznanie i obronę ich pod- stawowych praw, umacnianie pokoju i moralności publicznej"41. Takie działa- nie jest równoznaczne z ochroną „ładu społecznego opartego na prawdziwej sprawiedliwości"42. Jan Paweł II w numerze 71 Evangelium vitae z aprobatą przytacza słowa Ja- na XX3II zawarte w encyklice Pacem in terris\ P od kreśla się dzisiaj, że praw dziw e dobro w spólne p olega p rzede w szystkim na poszanow aniu praw i obow iązków ludzkiej osoby. W o b e c tego głów nym zad a- niem spraw ujących w ładzę w państw ie je s t d bać z je d n e j strony o uznaw anie tych 38J an Paw eł II, Centesim us a n n us , 11: „Jeśli Leon XIII apeluje do Państwa, by zgodnie z za- sadami sprawiedliwości zostały polepszone warunki życia ludzi ubogich, czyni to w słusznym przekonaniu, że zadaniem Państwa jest czuwanie nad dobrem wspólnym i troska o to, by wszyst- kie dziedziny życia społecznego, nie wyłączając gospodarki, przyczyniały się do urzeczywistnia- nia go, respektując słuszną autonomię każdej z nich. Jednakże nie znaczy to, że zdaniem Papieża wszystkie rozwiązania kwestii społecznej winny pochodzić od Państwa. Przeciwnie, podkreśla on niejednokrotnie konieczność ograniczenia interwencji Państwa oraz jego charakter instrumental- ny, jako że jednostka, rodzina i społeczeństwo są w stosunku do niego wcześniejsze, Państwo zaś istnieje po to, by chronić ich prawa, bynajmniej zaś nie po to, by je tłumić". 39Tamże, 13. Por. Sollicitudo reisocialis, 15, 28. 40J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 71. 41 Tamże; por. Sobór Watykański II, D eklaracja o wolności religijnej Dignitatis humanae, 7. 42 J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 7 1 . SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 219 praw, ich p oszanow anie, uzgad nian ie, o ch ro n ę i sta ły ich w zrost, z d rugiej zaś strony to , aby każdy m ó g ł łatw iej w yp ełn iać sw oje obow iązki. A lb o w iem „podsta- w ow ym zad aniem w szelk ie j w ładzy p u bliczn ej je s t strzec n ienaru szalnych praw człow ieka i d bać o to , by każdy m óg ł z w iększą ła tw ością w yp ełn iać swe obow iąz- k i". D la te g o , je ś li spraw ujący w ładzę nie u zn a ją praw człow ieka albo je gw ałcą, to n ie ty lko sp rzen iew ierzają się p ow ierzonem u im zadaniu; rów n ież w ydaw ane p rzez n ich zarząd zen ia pozbaw ione są w szelk ie j m o cy o b o w iązu jącej43. Ogólnie rzecz ujmując sprawiedliwość prawa stanowi kryterium rozstrzygające o tym, że regulacje niesprawiedliwe przestają być prawdziwym prawem, moral- nie obowiązującym44, nie mają mocy prawnej45; pozbawione są wszelkiej mocy obowiązującej46, są prawami niegodziwymi47. Ustawa niesprawiedliwa to usta- wa, która „nie uznaje" godności osoby48 i wynikających z niej praw człowieka. Niesprawiedliwe ustawy, godząc w prawa człowieka, „zagrażają samym korze- niom społecznego współżycia"49. Zatem prawa człowieka stanowią kryterium obowiązywania prawa. Prawo stanowione przez państwo różni się od moralnego pełnionymi zadania- mi (celami) i zakresem oddziaływania. Celem nie jest wprost rozwój moralny człowieka, ale warunki takiego rozwoju i to warunki, których określenie jest istotne z względu na dobre funkcjonowanie życia społecznego. Zakres oddzia- ływania prawa stanowionego jest węższy niż zakres oddziaływania prawa moral- nego50 i władza państwowa może niekiedy powstrzymywać się - dla uniknięcia większych szkód - od zakazywania czegoś, co jest zakazane w świetle prawa moralnego51 i - dodajmy- jednocześnie należy do sfery tego, co powinno być także zakazane przez prawo stanowione, gdyż nie wszystkie zakazy moralne do- magają się regulacji prawnych. Jednak w ładza nie może nigdy uznać, że 43J an XXIII, Pacem in terris (11 kwietnia 1963), II, AAS 55 (1963), s. 273-274; tekst cyto- wany wewnątrz jest wzięty z: Pius XII, O rędzie radiow e na uroczystość Z esłania D u ch a Świętego 1 9 4 1 (1 czerwca 1941), AAS 33 (1941), s. 200; tekst odsyła także do: Pius XI, Encyklika M i t b ren n en d er Sorge (14 marca 1937), AAS 29 (1937), s. 159; Encyklika D iv in i R edem ptoris (19 ma- ja 1937) III, AAS 29 (1937), s. 79; Pius XII, O rędzie radiow e na B oże N a ro d zen ie (24 grudnia 1942), AAS 35 (1943), s. 9-24. ^ J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 72. 45Tamże, 90: „ustawa łamiąca naturalne prawo niewinnego człowieka do życia jest niesprawie- dliwa i jako taka nie może mieć mocy prawnej". 46 Tamże, 71. 47Tamże, 90. 48 Tamże, 90. 49Tamże, 90. 50 Tamże, 71. 51 Tamże, 71. Papież powołuje się na Akwinatę, S T , I-II, q. 96, a. 2. 220 MAREK PIECHOWIAK prawem jed n o stek je s t łam anie podstawowych praw52, tym bardziej nie może nakazywać łam ania podstawowych praw. Omawiając stosunek prawa do moralności, Jan Paweł II cytuje encyklikę Ja- na X X III Pacem in terris'. Władzy rozkazywania domaga się porządek duchowy i wywodzi się ona od Boga. Jeśli więc sprawujący władzę w państwie wydają prawa względnie nakazują coś wbrew temu porządkowi, a tym samym wbrew woli Bożej, to ani ustanowione w ten sposób prawa, ani udzielone kompetencje nie zobowiązują obywateli [...]. Wtedy w rzeczywistości kończy się władza, a zaczyna potworne bezprawie53. W numerze 72 Evangelium vitae Jan Paweł II przywołuje naukę Tomasza z Akwinu: Prawo ludzkie jest prawem w takiej mierze, w jakiej jest zgodne z prawym rozu- mem, a tym samym wypływa z prawa wiecznego. Kiedy natomiast jakieś prawo jest sprzeczne z rozumem, nazywane jest prawem niegodziwym; w takim przy- padku jednak przestaje być prawem i staje się raczej aktem przemocy54. Każde prawo ustanowione przez ludzi o tyle ma moc prawa, o ile wypływa z pra- wa naturalnego. Jeśli natomiast pod jakimś względem sprzeciwia się prawu na- turalnemu, nie jest już prawem, ale wypaczeniem prawa \legis corruptio]55■ Podążając za wypowiedzią Akwinaty poprzedzającą ostatni cytat, można tak- że dodać, że prawo stanowione przez ludzi „tyle ma mocy prawa, ile jest sprawiedliwe"56. Zgodnie z nauką Tomasza z Akwinu uznaje Jan Paweł II, że prawa, które są sprzeczne z dobrem wspólnym, „są całkowicie pozbawione rzeczywistej mo- cy prawnej"57. O prawie dopuszczającym przerywanie ciąży i eutanazję papież pisze, że „przestaje być prawdziwym prawem, moralnie obowiązującym", gdyż 52J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 71. 53J an XXIII, Pacem in terris, s. 271. 54T omasz z A kw in u , S T , I-II, q. 93, a. 3, ad 2. 55T omasz z A kw in u , S T , I-II, q. 95, a. 2. W tym samym miejscu Akwinata cytuje św. Au- gustyna: „Non videtur esse lex, quae iusta non fuerit", D e libero arbitrio, I, 5, 11 (PL 32, 1227), zob. niżej przypis 94. 56 „Inquantum habet de iustitia, intantum habet de virtute legis" (T omasz z A kw in u , S T , I-II, q. 95, a. 2). 57J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 72. Por. Tomasza z Akwinu definicję prawa-lex: „Prawo nie jest niczym innym jak pewnym rozporządzeniem rozumu, dla dobra wspólnego, od tego, komu powierzona jest troska o społeczność, promulgowane" (T omasz z A kw inu , S T , I-II, q. 90, a. 4, co.). Jeśli nie jest to odnotowane, teksty Tomasza z Akwinu podaję we własnym przekładzie. SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 221 prawo takie „przeciwstawia się zdecydowanie i nieodwracalnie możliwości re- alizacji dobra wspólnego"58. Zanegowana zostaje racja istnienia prawa. Unice- stwiona zostaje osoba, dla której istnieje zarówno społeczeństwo, jak i prawo, które je organizuje. b. Prawo naturalne a praw a człowieka W nauczaniu Jana Pawła II treści, które Tomasz z Akwinu wiązał z kategorią „prawo naturalne", wyrażane są zwykle za pomocą kategorii „prawa człowieka". Warto podkreślić, że Jan Paweł II pojmuje prawo naturalne przede wszystkim na sposób typowy dla pojmowania praw podmiotowych - na pierwszym miej- scu nie są określane obowiązki, ale należne człowiekowi dobra, ze względu na które dopiero dookreślane są obowiązki. Najważniejsza wypowiedź na ten temat znalazła się w encyklice Veritatis splendor, w której prawo naturalne zostało po- jęte jako uporządkowany zespół „»dóbr dla osoby«, które służą »dobru osoby« - dobru, jakim je s t ona sama i je j doskonałości"59. Dla czytelnika nieobeznanego z tradycją klasyczną, przede wszystkim z kon- cepcją prawa Tomasza z Akwinu, stwierdzenie takie musi się wydać zaskakujące - prawo nie jest tu pojmowane jako zespół norm ani jako zespół uprawnień czy kompetencji, ale jako zespół dóbr. Za takim rozumieniem prawa stoi funda- mentalna intuicja, że prawo jest tym, co jest racją działania - jego zaistnienia i jego kształtu; wszelkie zaś ludzkie działania podejmowane i kształtowane są ze względu na prawdziwe lub rzekome dobra, do których zmierzają, dobra ma- jące rozwijać osobę i jej doskonałości. W tradycji klasycznej dobro to cel. Stąd najogólniejsze określenie prawa sformułowane przez Tomasza z Akwinu brzmi: „Prawo nie jest niczym innym, jak racją działania, wszelka zaś racja działania za- wiera się w celu"60. To ze względu na dobra i na dobro człowieka formułowane są nakazy i zakazy. Takie pojmowanie dobra jako prawa jest widoczne w innej wy- powiedzi w Veritatis splendor, gdy Jan Paweł II pisze, że „o m ora lne j j akości czynów stanowi relacja między wolnością człowieka a prawdziwym dobrem. Dobro to ustanowione jest, jako odwieczne prawo, przez Mądrość Bożą, która każe każdej istocie zmierzać do jej celu"61. Najgłębsza struktura prawa oparta na relacji człowieka do dobra jest pierwot- na zarówno wobec praw podmiotowych pojętych jako zespół rozmaitych sytu- acji prawnych tworzących funkcjonalną całość ze względu na dobro prawnie do- niosłe, jak i wobec nakazów czy zakazów. Nakazy czy zakazy są wtórne wobec 58J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 72. 59 J an Paw eł II, Veritatis splendor, 79, podkr. M.P. 60„Lex nihil aliud sit quam ratio operis, cuiuslibet autem operis ratio a fine sumitur" (T omasz z A kw in u , S u m m a contra gentiles, lib. 3, cap. 114, n. 5). 61 J an Paw eł II, Veritatis splendor, 72. 222 MAREK PIECHOWIAK przyporządkowania człowieka i jego działania do dobra. Prawo pojmowane jako zespół norm (także tak pojmowane prawo naturalne)62 jest w tej perspektywie ewidentnie wtórne wobec moralności, którą Jan Paweł II charakteryzuje jako „Racjonalne skierowanie ludzkiego czynu ku dobru w jego prawdzie oraz dobro- wolne dążenie do tego dobra, poznanego przez rozum"63. O moralnej jakości czynu stanowi przede wszystkim to, że „wybory dokonywane przez wolność są zgodne z prawdziwym dobrem człow ieka"64, a nie z jakimś nakazem czy zakazem. Warto podkreślić, że przytoczone określenie moralności jest sformu- łowane bez zastosowania takich kategorii, jak obowiązek, norma, reguła, nakaz czy zakaz65. Refleksja Jana Pawła II nad relacją między prawem a moralnością nie jest refleksją po prostu nad relacją między dwoma zespołami (systemami) norm. W swej istocie jest to stanowisko typowe dla tradycji arystotelesowskotomistycznej . Nie byłoby trafne uznanie, że encyklika - wpisując się w tradycję nauczania Kościoła katolickiego, w której tomizm jest uznany za podstawowy kierunek filozoficzny przydatny dla tego nauczania - jest „bardziej kościelna" niż jej autor, który jako filozof Karol Wojtyła chętnie sięgał do fenomenolo- gii. Podkreślić wypada, że choć Jan Paweł II / Karol Wojtyła stosował i cenił metody wypracowane w ramach fenomenologii, to jednak nie przyjmował - stanowiącej istotę filozofii Edmunda Husserla - metody epoche polegającej na 62Jako zespół norm prawo naturalne pojmowane jest przez Tadeusza Ślipko: „Prawo na- turalne oznacza na podstawowych imperatywach oparty zbiór norm kategorialnych, obiektywnych i absolutnych (czyli powszechnych i niezm iennych), które uzdalniają podm ioty rozumne do spełniania aktów wewnętrznie dobrych, a unikania w ew nętrz- nie złych"; przy czym „przez termin »normy« rozumieć należy reguły postępowania, które nie orzekają o moralnej wartości określonych kategorii aktów ludzkich, ale wyrażają tylko nakaz względnie zakaz ich spełniania" (T. Ś lipko , Z arys etyki ogólnej, Kraków: WAM, 1974, s. 254, podkr. w tekście). 63J an Paw eł II, Veritatis splendor, 72. 64 Tamże. 65 Szerzej zob.: M. P iech o w ia k , P ra w a człowieka i p ra w o naturalne ja k o podstaw a życia osobi- stego i społecznego, s. 89-103; tenże, C zy p ra w o naturalne to zespół n o rm ?, w: Ecclesiae in iustitia servire. Opuscula Thaddaeo Walachowicz p ia e m em oriae dedicata, red. F. Lenort, Poznań: Wydział Teologiczny UAM, 2003, s. 11-20; P raw o naturalne a p ra w a człowieka, w: Substancja - N a tu ra - P raw o naturalne, red. A. Maryniarczyk, K. Stępień, P. Gondek, Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2006 (Zagadnienia Współczesnej Metafizyki, 8), s. 391-408; tenże, K la - syczna koncepcja osoby ja k o podstaw a p o jm ow ania p ra w człowieka. Wokół Tom asza z A k w in u i Im - m anuela K a n ta propozycji ugru n tow a n ia godności człow ieka, w: P raw o naturalne - natura p ra w a , red. P. Dardziński, F. Longchamps de Bérier, K. Szczucki, Warszawa: Wyd. C.H. Beck, 2011, s. 3-20; tenże, M a n as a R oute f o r L a w , w: G iov a n n i Paolo I I : L e v ie della giustizia . I t in e ra r ip e r ig iu ris t i del terzo m illennio, red. A. Loiodice, M. Vari, Roma: Bardi Editore, 2003, s. 46-47. SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 223 „wyłączeniu istoty spod aktualnego istnienia"66; przedmiotem dociekań nie jest istota człowieka oderwana od realnego istnienia, ale „cały człowiek" jako kon- kretny działający podmiot. Mając na uwadze metodologiczny problem ustalenia relacji między autorem encykliki a Karolem Wojtyłą, zarówno jako konkretną osobą, jak i jako auto- rem prac filozoficznych w okresie przed wyborem na papieża, warto zauważyć, że cytowane wyżej określenie prawa naturalnego jako zespołu dóbr dla osoby, zawarte w Yeritatis splendor, bardzo dobrze koreluje z poglądami Wojtyły wyra- żonymi w studium Osoba:podmiot i wspólnota, opublikowanym po raz pierwszy w 1976 roku67: D z ia ła n ie lud zkie, czyli czyn, m a różne cele i różne p rzed m io ty i w arto ści, ku k tó ry m się zw raca. Jed n a k ż e zw racając się do tych różnych celów , p rzed m iotów i w arto ści, cz ło w iek nie m oże się w sw oim d ziałaniu św iadom ym nie zw rócić do siebie sam ego ja k o do celu , n ie m oże b ow iem od nosić się do różnych p rzed m io - tów d ziałania i w ybierać różnych w arto ści, n ie stanow ią p rzez to o sobie sam ym . . . i o sw ojej w łasnej w artości68. Podobnie, cytowane wyżej określenie moralności zawarte w Yeritatis splendor dobrze koreluje np. z wypowiedzią z tego samego studium antropologicznego: B y ć w olnym to zn aczy nie tylko 'ch c ie ć ', ale także 'w ybierać' i 'rozstrzygać', a to w szystko m ów i nam ju ż o tran scen d en tn ym p rzyporządkow aniu d obra do praw - dy w d ziałaniu , w czynie. [ . . . ] W sum ieniu urzeczyw istn ia się auten tyczn a tran s- cen d en cja osoby w czynie, d zięki n iem u b ow iem actus h u m an u s kszta łtu je się ja k o ch cen ie i w ybór 'dobra praw dziw ego'69. Podstawową strukturą leżącą u podstaw refleksji nad moralnością i nad prawem jest splot relacji obejmujący relację obdarzonego godnością człowieka do właści- wego mu rozwoju i relacje do dóbr-celów realizujących ten rozwój. To te relacje 66 K. W o jt y ła , Osoba i czyn, w: tenże, Osoba i czyn oraz in n e studia antropologiczne, Lublin: T N KUL, 1994, s. 62 (przyp. 4). Zob. także jednoznaczne opowiedzenie się za perspektywą realistyczną typową dla filozofii tomistycznej w: tenże, O soba:podm iot i wspólnota, w: tenże, Oso- ba i czyn oraz in n e studia antropologiczne, Lublin: TN KUL, 1994, s. 371-414, zwł. s. 381-382: „Świadomość nie jest samodzielnym podmiotem, chociaż [ .. .] może ona być traktowana tak, jak- by była podmiotem. Ten sposób traktowania świadomości stoi u podstaw całej tzw. filozofii trans- cendentalnej, która rozpatruje akty poznania jako świadomościowe akty intencjonalne, a więc zwrócone ku poza-podmiotowym, a więc przedmiotowym teściom (fenomenom). Jak długo ta- ki typ analizy świadomości ma charakter metody poznawczej, może wydać i wydaje wspaniałe owoce. Nie można natomiast tej metody z uwagi na stojące u jej podstaw wyłączenie (epoche) świa- domości z rzeczywistości, z bytu realnie istniejącego, uznawać za filozofię samej rzeczywistości, przede wszystkim zaś rzeczywistości człowieka, osoby ludzkiej". 67„Roczniki Filozoficzne", 2 (1976), s. 5-39. 68 K. W o jty ła , O soba:podm iot i w spólnota, s. 385. 69 Tamże, s. 389. 224 MAREK PIECHOWIAK (a nie same normy czy obowiązki) są w punkcie wyjścia poznania moralnego i poznania sprawiedliwego prawa70. Taka perspektywa ujęcia prawa naturalnego i jego podstaw, w której ontologicznie pierwotne są relacje człowieka do dobra, w której to cele są racją działa- nia, jest perspektywą w sposób konsekwentny antropocentryczną - na pytanie: „dlaczego mam działać tak, a nie inaczej, dlaczego powinienem?", podstawo- wa odpowiedź brzmi: „bo to jest dobre dla człowieka"; zatem, mówiąc krótko, prawo jest dla człowieka. Inaczej będzie, gdy prawo naturalne pojęte zostanie przede wszystkim jako zespół norm; wówczas na postawione pytanie o rację działania odpowiedzieć wypada: „bo takie jest prawo", „bo taka jest norma po- stępowania"; zatem człowiek działa dla prawa. c. Bezwzględny obowiązek niepodporządkowania się niesprawiedliwemu prawu - prawo do sprzeciwu sumienia Jan Paweł II w numerze 74 Evangelium vitae, przywołuje ogólne zasady moralne dotyczące współudziału w złych czynach: S tan o w czy nakaz sum ienia zabran ia ch rześcijan o m , p od obnie ja k w szystkim lu - d ziom dobrej w oli, form alneg o w spółudziału w praktykach , k tó re zo sta ły co praw da d opuszczone p rzez praw odaw stw o państw ow e, ale są sprzeczne z P ra - w em B o ż y m . Z m oraln ego pu nktu w id zen ia nigdy n ie w olno fo rm aln ie w sp ół- d ziałać w czynien iu z ła 71. Ta ogólna zasada dotyczy wszelkiego typu czynów złych, nie tylko czynów we- wnętrznie złych (złych z samej swej natury), ale także złych ze względu na okre- ślony kontekst kształtujących go okoliczności72. 70 Taki sposób myślenia o podstawach prawa, w których pierwszorzędne znaczenie ma przy- porządkowanie człowieka do dobra, rozwijał Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, zob. przede wszystkim M.A. K rą piec , Człow iek i p ra w o naturalne, Lublin: TN KUL, 1986; zob. np. tamże, s. 13: „Cały porządek postępowania człowieka, jako porządek realizowania dobra, jest zarazem porządkiem właściwie rozumianego prawa naturalnego"; tak filozofia moralności, jak i filozofia prawa są re- fleksją nad działającym człowiekiem i nie są autonomiczne wobec antropologii czy metafizyki. Novum antropologii filozoficznej Wojtyły upatruje Krąpiec w eksploracji przez Wojtyłę danych dostępnych w tym, co tradycja klasyczna nazywa refleksją towarzyszącą; zob. M.A. K rą piec , Fun kcja refleksji w a nalizie czynu m oralnego (n a m arginesie pracy K . K a rd . Wojtyły Osoba i czyn), „Roczniki Filozoficzne", 2 (1980), s. 114-118. Nieco inne podejście znalazło się w etyce Tadeusza Stycznia - następcy Karola Wojtyły na Katedrze Etyki KUL, który u podstaw doświadczenia moralnego i etyki jako autonomicznej dyscypliny filozoficznej przyjął przeżycie powinności i sądy powinnościowe; zob. np.T. Styc zeń , A B C etyki, Lublin: RW KUL, 1981, s. 5; tenże,,J a w św ietle swego są d u :p o w in ien em , „Roczniki Filozoficzne", 2 (1980), s. 148-154. W latach osiemdziesią- tych ubiegłego wieku toczył się na KUL gorący spór o podstawy etyki i filozofii praktycznej; zob. „Roczniki Filozoficzne", 2 (1983). 71 J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 74. 72 Por. tamże. SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 225 Pisząc o przerywaniu ciąży i eutanazji, Jan Paweł II stwierdza, że są one zbrod n iam i, k tó ry ch żad na lud zka ustaw a nie m oże uznać za dopuszczalne. U s ta - wy, k tóre to czynią , n ie ty lko n ie są w żaden sposób w iążące dla sum ienia, ale staw iają w ręcz człow ieka w o b ec p o w a ż n e j i k o n k r e t n e j p o w i n n o ś c i p r z e - c iw s t a w i e n ia s ię im p o p r z e z s p r z e c iw s u m i e n i a 73. Jan Paweł II wskazuje na naturalne prawo odmowy współudziału w niesprawie- dliwości, które powinno być chronione prawem stanowionym: O d m o w a w spółudziału w niesp raw iedliw ości to nie ty lko ob o w iązek m oralny, ale także podstaw ow e ludzkie praw o. G d y b y ta k nie było, cz ło w iek byłby z m u - szony p op ełn iać czyny z natu ry sw ojej uw łaczające je g o god n ości i w ten sposób je g o w oln ość, k tó re j auten tyczn y sens i cel p o lega na d ążen iu do praw dy i dobra, zo sta łab y radykaln ie naruszona. C h o d z i tu za tem o praw o podstaw ow e, k tóre w łaśn ie z tego w zględu pow inno być przew id ziane w ustaw odaw stw ie p aństw o- w ym i p rzez n ie ch ro n io n e74. Regulacja prawa stanowionego dotycząca sprzeciwu sumienia powinna realizo- wać postulat, że „Kto powołuje się na sprzeciw sumienia, nie może być narażony nie tylko na sankcje karne, ale także na żadne inne ujemne konsekwencje praw- ne, dyscyplinarne, materialne czy zawodowe"75. W żadnej dziedzinie życia prawo nie może zastąpić sumienia76. Jednak zda- niem Jana Pawła II, mimo wielkiej wartości przypisywanej tak sumieniu, jak i wolności, „społeczeństwo ma prawo i obowiązek bronić się przed nadużyciami dokonywanymi w imię sumienia i pod pretekstem wolności"77. Zasygnalizować tu wypada pewną trudność, której wprost papież nie podejmuje, jak praktycznie pogodzić to prawo i obowiązek społeczeństwa z prawem jednostki do sprzeciwu sumienia. d. U dział w tworzeniu niesprawiedliwych praw W perspektywie prawa do życia jako prawa fundamentalnego wśród fundamen- talnych oraz opcji na rzecz słabszych szczególnie ciężkim naruszeniem sprawie- dliwości jest negowanie prawa do życia ludzi najsłabszych - nienarodzonych 73Tamże, 73. 74Tamże, 74. 75 Tamże. 76Tamże, 71. 77 Tamże, 71. Por. Sobór Watykański II, D eklaracja o w olności re lig ijn ej Dignitatis humanae, nr 7. 226 MAREK PIECHOWIAK dzieci - przez prawne dopuszczanie aborcji; czy ludzi chorych i słabych z ra- cji wieku - przez prawne dopuszczanie eutanazji78. W grę wchodzą działania, które należą do tzw. czynów wewnętrznie złych. Czyny wewnętrznie złe to ta- kie świadome i dobrowolne działania, które są zawsze złe z moralnego punktu widzenia i nie mogą być nigdy, w żadnych okolicznościach, dozwolone ani jako cel, ani jako środek do dobrego celu79. Przykładem takiego działania jest zabicie niewinnej istoty ludzkiej - „Żadna władza nie ma prawa do tego zmuszać ani na to przyzwalać"80, pisze Jan Paweł II: Szczy tem zaś sam ow oli i niesp raw iedliw ości je s t sytuacja, w k tórej n iek tó rzy - na przykład lekarze lub praw od aw cy- roszczą sobie w ładzę decydow ania o tym , k to m a żyć, a kto p ow in ien u m rzeć81. Zauważyć trzeba, że również przy refleksji nad problematyką działań, które są złe w każdych okolicznościach, ontycznie podstawowym punktem odniesienia nie są normy, które nie dopuszczają wyjątków, ale dobra dla człowieka. Papież wskazuje na istnienie wartości ludzkich i moralnych, których się nie ustanawia, ale jedynie odkrywa, „których żadna jednostka, żadna większość ani żadne pań- stwo nie mogą tworzyć, zmieniać ani niszczyć, ale które winny uznać, szanować i umacniać"82. Wartości takie należą do samej istoty i natury człowieka oraz wyrażają i chronią godność osoby83. W Yeritatis splendor Jan Paweł II cytuje fragment deklaracji Persona humana mówiący o niezmiennych prawach, „któ- re wpisane są w konstytutywne elementy ludzkiej natury i występują w tej sa- mej postaci u wszystkich istot obdarzonych rozumem"84. Niezmienność praw i norm jest wtórna wobec niezmienności struktury bytu ludzkiego. Zawsze cho- dzi o ochronę dobra osoby - „nawet życie ludzkie, choć jest fundamentalnym dobrem człowieka, zyskuje sens moralny dopiero przez odniesienie do dobra osoby, którą zawsze należy afirmować dla niej samej"85. 78J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 20. 79Tamże, 57: „Świadoma i dobrowolna decyzja pozbawienia życia niewinnej istoty ludzkiej jest zawsze złem z moralnego punktu widzenia i nigdy nie może być dozwolona ani jako cel, ani jako środek do dobrego celu. Jest to bowiem akt poważnego nieposłuszeństwa wobec prawa moralnego, co więcej, wobec samego Boga, jego twórcy i gwaranta; jest to akt sprzeczny z fun- damentalnymi cnotami sprawiedliwości i miłości". 80 Kongregacja Nauki Wiary, D eklaracja o eutanazji Iura et bona (5 maja 1980), II, AAS 72 (1980), s. 564; J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 57. 81 J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 66. 82 Tamże, 71. 83 Tamże. 84J an Paw eł II, Veritatis splendor, 52, przyp. 94. Kongregacja Nauki Wiary, D eklaracja o n ie- których kwestiach etyki seksualnej Persona humana (29 grudnia 1975), nr 4, AAS 68 (1976), s. 80. 85J an Paw eł II, Veritatis splendor, 50. SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 227 Jan Paweł II wskazuje ogólną regułę dotyczącą tworzenia i kształtowania praw dotyczących wewnętrznie złych czynów: w przypadku praw a w ew nętrzn ie niesp raw iedliw ego, ja k im je s t praw o dopusz- cza jące przeryw anie ciąży i eu tan az ję, n ie w olno się n igdy do n iego stosow ać „ani uczestn iczyć w kształtow an iu o p in ii p u bliczn ej przychylnej tak iem u praw u, ani te ż okazyw ać m u poparcia w g łosow aniu "86. Jednocześnie wskazuje jednak na sytuację, w której należy postąpić odmiennie. Jest tak, gdy głosow anie w p arlam en cie m iałoby zdecydow ać o w prow adzeniu praw a bardziej restryktyw nego, to znaczy zm ierza jącego do ogran iczen ia liczb y legalnych ab o r- c ji, a stanow iącego alternatyw ę dla praw a bard ziej perm isyw nego, ju ż obow iązu- ją ce g o lub pod danego głosow aniu . [ . . . ] W om aw ianej tu sytuacji, je ś li n ie byłoby m ożliw e od rzucen ie lub całk ow ite zn iesien ie ustaw y o przeryw aniu ciąży, p arla- m en tarzysta , k tóreg o o so b isty absolu tn y sp rzeciw w obec p rzeryw ania c iąży byłby ja sn y i znany w szystk im , p ostąp iłby słu szn ie, ud ziela jąc sw ego p oparcia p ro p o - zy c jo m , k tóry ch celem je s t o g r a n i c z e n i e s z k o d l i w o ś c i tak ie j ustaw y i z m ie - rza jących w ten sposób do z m n ie jszen ia je j negatyw nych skutków na p łaszczyź- nie ku ltu ry i m oraln ości p u b liczn ej. T a k p ostęp u jąc bow iem , n ie w sp ółd ziała się w sposób n iedozw olony w uchw alaniu n iespraw iedliw ego praw a, ale raczej p o - d ejm u je się słuszną i godziw ą p róbę o g ran iczen ia je g o szkodliw ych aspektów 87. Na podstawie tej wypowiedzi można sformułować ogólne warunki, które muszą być spełnione, aby oddać głos na rzecz prawa ograniczającego legalnie dokony- wane zło. Po pierwsze, nie jest możliwe odrzucenie lub całkowite zniesienie ustawy dającej prawo lub nakazującej dokonywanie czynów wewnętrznie złych. Po drugie, powszechnie znany powinien być sprzeciw parlamentarzysty wobec wchodzących w grę czynów wewnętrznie złych88. e. Czy żadne prawo niesprawiedliwe nie obowiązuje? Mając na uwadze wcześniejsze wywody, można zasadnie przyjąć, że działa- nia polegające na łamaniu podstawowych praw są czynami wewnętrznie złymi, 86J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 73; przytoczenie wewnątrz cytatu pochodzi z dokumentu Kongregacji Nauki Wiary, D eklaracja o p rz ery w a n iu ciąży (18 listopada 1974), nr 22, AAS 66 (1974), s. 744. 87 Tamże. 88Zob. P. Ś lęczka , P rzegłosow ane sum ienie. A n a liz a logiczn o -ety czn a p ra w niedoskonałych, Lu- blin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2008. 228 MAREK PIECHOWIAK a prawo stanowione, które przyznaje prawo dokonywania takich czynów (łama- nia podstawowych praw) lub nakazuje takie czyny (nakazuje łamanie podstawo- wych praw), jest prawem wewnętrznie niesprawiedliwym89. Tego typu prawo z jest - po pierwsze - prawem pozbawionym „wszelkiej mocy prawnej", po drugie - nie obowiązuje w sumieniu, a co więcej - powstaje obowiązek prze- ciwstawiania się temu prawu i zakaz postępowania zgodnie z nim. Nasuwa się jednak pytanie, czy to samo można powiedzieć o wszelkim pra- wie niesprawiedliwym, a takie jest m.in. każde prawo, które nie realizuje celu prawa, jakim jest dobro wspólne90. Chcąc odpowiedzieć na to pytanie, trzeba od- dzielić dwie kwestie, które w rozważaniach dotyczących aborcji i eutanazji szły z sobą w parze. Mianowicie kwestię posiadania przez prawo „mocy prawnej", bycia „prawdziwym prawem" od kwestii moralnego obowiązku postępowania zgodnie z prawem stanowionym. Jak wyżej powiedziano, w przypadku prawa wewnętrznie niesprawiedliwego prawo takie nie ma ani „mocy prawnej", nie jest „prawdziwym prawem", ani nie rodzi obowiązku moralnego postępowania zgodnie z nim, co więcej - towarzyszy mu zakaz postępowania zgodnie z nim. W numerze 71 Evangelium vitae Jan Pawel II wskazywał jednak, że „władza państwowa może niekiedy powstrzymać się od zakazania czegoś, co - gdyby zostało zabronione - spowodowałoby jeszcze poważniejsze szkody"91. Jan Pa- weł II podejmował przede wszystkim kwestię obowiązywania w sumieniu prawa wewnętrznie niesprawiedliwego, dotyczącego aborcji i eutanazji, pojętego jako prawo stanowione dające prawo do dokonywania czynów wewnętrznie złych lub nakazujące dokonywanie takich czynów. Niemniej jednak, sięgając do nauki 89J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 73. 90 Por. cztery kryteria sprawiedliwości wskazane w Tomasza z Akwinu definicja prawa-lex, S T , I-II, q. 90, a. 4, co.; oraz szerzej tamże, I-II, q. 96, a. 4, co.: „Prawa są niesprawiedliwe w dwojaki sposób: pierwszy, ponieważ są sprzeczne z dobrem ludzi. W przeciwieństwie do praw sprawie- dliwych są z tymże dobrem sprzeczne: albo ze względu na cel, gdy np. jakiś naczelnik nakłada swoim poddanym uciążliwe prawa nie służące pożytkowi wspólnemu, ale raczej zaspokajaniu własnej pożądliwości lub dla własnej chwały; albo z powodu ich twórcy; np. gdy ktoś w wydawa- niu prawa wychodzi poza granice powierzonej sobie władzy; albo wreszcie w swojej formie \ex fo r m a ]; np. gdy nierówno rozkłada się ciężary na społeczeństwo, chociaż one służą dobru wspól- nemu. [ ...] Drugi, ponieważ są przeciwne dobru Bożemu. Takimi na przykład są prawa tyranów zmuszające do bałwochwalstwa lub do tego wszystkiego, co jest sprzeczne z prawem Bożym"; cyt. wg: T omasz z A kw in u , S T , t. 13: P raw o, tłum. P. Belch, Londyn: Veritas, 1985, s. 8 3 -8 4 (skorygowana została ewidentna niedokładność tłumacza, który „ex forma" przełożył „w swojej treści"). 91 J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 71; powołuje się przy tym na Tomasza z Akwinu, S T , I-II, q. 96, a. 2, ad 2: „Zamiarem prawa ludzkiego jest prowadzenie ludzi do cnoty: nie od razu, lecz stopniowo. Nie od razu przeto nakłada mnogości niedoskonałych ludzi to, co już jest udziałem urobionych w cnocie: mianowicie żeby powstrzymywali się od wszelkiego zła. W przeciwnym razie ludzie niedoskonali, nie będąc w stanie udźwignąć takowych nakazów, wpadaliby w jeszcze gorsze zło" (cyt. wg: T omasz z A kw in u , S u m a teologiczna, t. 13: P raw o, s. 80). SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 229 Tomasza z Akwinu dotyczącej kwestii posłuszeństwa niesprawiedliwemu pra- wu, można wskazać sytuacje, w których w grę nie wchodzą czyny wewnętrznie złe, a niesprawiedliwość prawa wynikałaby np. z nieproporcjonalnego rozłoże- nia ciężarów. Idąc za Akwinatą, należałoby uznać, że prawo takie nie ma mocy prawnej i nie jest prawdziwym prawem, niemniej jednak w niektórych przypad- kach adresaci takiego prawa nie tylko mogą postąpić zgodnie z tym prawem, ale nawet powinni tak postępować. Akwinata pisze, że prawa niesprawiedliwe ze względu na sprzeczność z dobrem ludzi nie obow iązu ją w sum ieniu , chyba d la u n ik n ięcia zgorszen ia lub [ . . . ] z a m ie- szek \propter v ita n d u m scan d a lu m v e l tu rbationem \ . Z tego bow iem pow odu c z ło - w iek p ow in ien zrzec się naw et sw oich up raw nień, stosow nie do nauki P ań sk iej: „zm usza cię k to , żeb y iść z n im tysiąc kroków , id ź dwa tysiące. T em u , k to ch ce w ziąć tw o ją szatę, odstąp i p łaszcz"92. f Specyfika ujęcia relacji praw a do moralności Przyjmowana przez Jana Pawła II koncepcja prawa stanowionego jest - oczy- wiście - koncepcją niepozytywistyczną. Nie jest akceptowany rozdział między prawem a moralnością - warunkiem uznania jakiejś normy za normę praw- ną jest spełnianie przez nią kryteriów materialnych określonych standardami moralnymi, prawnonaturalnymi. Istotę tego stanowiska wyraża się dziś krótko formułą: lex iniusta non est lex - „prawo niesprawiedliwe nie jest prawem"93. Przy bliższej analizie można dostrzec, że stanowisko Jana Pawła II nie może być adekwatnie ujęte taką formułą. Przyjęta przez niego koncepcja pozwala sensownie mówić o niesprawiedli- wych normach prawa stanowionego przez ludzi, które należą do tworzonego systemu prawa. Takimi są normy tworzone w procesie legislacyjnym, w którym uczestniczy opisywany wyżej parlamentarzysta głosujący za ustawą ogranicza- jącą przerywanie ciąży. Warto w tym miejscu przywołać odróżnienie dwojakie- go rozumienia terminu „obowiązywanie prawa" - w jednym sensie, być pra- wem to tyle, co należeć do systemu prawa pozytywnego zgodnie z przyjętymi 92T omasz z A kw in u , S T , I-II, q. 96, a. 4, co.; cyt. wg: T omasz z A kw in u , Sum a teologiczna, 1 .13: P raw o, s. 84. Wyjątku takiego nie ma, gdy prawo jest niesprawiedliwe jako przeciwne dobru Bożemu, np. prawo nakazujące bałwochwalstwa. 93 Formułę tę przypisuje się Tomaszowi z Akwinu, jednak Akwinata dokładnie takiej formuły nigdzie nie użył. W P rim a Secundae (q. 95, a. 2, co.), powołując się na św. Augustyna (D e libero arbitrio, I, 11), pisze: „non videtur esse lex, quae iusta non fuerit" - „nie wydaje się, by było pra- wem to, co nie jest sprawiedliwe". U św. Augustyna formuła jest jeszcze słabsza w swej wymowie: „lex mihi esse non videtur, quae iusta non fuerit" - „nie wydaje mi się, by było prawem to, co nie jest sprawiedliwe"; zob. N. K retzm a n n , L e x iniusta non est lex L a w s on T ria l in A q u in a s ' C ourt o f Conscience, American Journal of Jurisprudence", 1 (1988), s. 99-122. 230 MAREK PIECHOWIAK w tym systemie regułami uznawania za prawo94. O obowiązywaniu w tym sen- sie rozstrzyga się z pozycji obserwatora systemu prawnego, z pozycji zewnętrz- nej. W innym sensie można mówić o obowiązywaniu prawa wówczas, gdy pra- wo stanowione stanowi faktyczną rację dla działań adresatów norm prawnych. Można powiedzieć, że przyjmuje się wówczas perspektywę wewnętrzną95. War- to tu wspomnieć o jeszcze jednym, trzecim, rozumieniu terminu „obowiązy- wanie prawa" - obowiązywanie prawa polegałoby na tym, że niespełnianie obowiązków formułowanych w systemie prawa stanowionego spotykałoby się z sankcją określoną w tym systemie96. Ten typ obowiązywania oparty jest na tym, że prawo stanowione stanowi rację działania dla egzekwujących prawo (np. dla sędziów). Mając na uwadze poczynione rozróżnienia, referowane tu poglądy Jana Pa- wła II można zinterpretować przynajmniej dwojako. Po pierwsze, prawo sta- nowione, które byłoby niesprawiedliwe, nie stanowi - jako takie - racji dzia- łania i to ani dla zwykłych adresatów norm; mówiąc językiem prawniczym - adresatów norm sankcjonowanych, ani dla egzekwujących prawo, będących ad- resatami norm sankcjonujących. Prawo dopuszczające przerywanie ciąży będzie wówczas postrzegane jako należące do systemu prawnego, jednak niestanowiące racji działania w zakresie, w jakim nakazuje działania moralnie niesłuszne. Może się zdarzyć, że - gdy w grę nie wchodzą działania, które same w sobie są moralnie (wewnętrznie) złe - prawo stanowione określi kształt działania, do którego zobowiązanie będzie miało charakter moralny, ale nie prawny. W myśl drugiej interpretacji niesprawiedliwość byłaby jednym z kryteriów przynależności normy do systemu prawa pozytywnego, a przez to i kryterium jej obowiązywania w pierwszym z wyróżnionych znaczeń. W analizach war- to sięgnąć tu do tzw. formuły Radbrucha97, szeroko dziś akceptowanej przez prawników, zwłaszcza w konstytucjonalizmie niemieckim98. Mając na uwadze doświadczenia funkcjonowania niesprawiedliwego prawa w okresie dominacji narodowego socjalizmu w Niemczech, Radbruch - wskazując na doniosłość 94Por. klasyczne w tei materii H.L.A. H a r t , Pojęcie praw a, przeł. T. Woleński, Warszawa: PWN, 1998, s. 114-139. 95 Por. tamże, s. 118-129 (paragraf Pojęcie obowiązku)', przyjęte tu stanowisko jest nieco od- mienne od stanowiska Harta. 96 Por. tamże, s. 21. 97G. Ra d bru ch , U staw ow e bezpraw ie i ponadustaw ow e p ra w o (1 9 4 5 ) , przeł. J. Stelmach, w: T. Gizbert-Studnicki, K. Płeszka, R. Sarkowicz, J. Stelmach, Współczesna teoria i filozofia p ra w a na zachodzie E uropy. Wybór tekstów, Kraków: Uniwersytet Jagielloński, 1985, s. 49-58 ; wersja oryginalna: Gesetzliches U nrecht u n d übergesetzliches R echt, „Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung", 5 (1946), s. 105-108; zob. J. Z ajadło , Fo rm u ła R adbrucha . Filozofia p ra w a na granicy po zy ty w i- z m u pra w n iczego i p ra w a natury, Gdańsk: Arche, 2001. 98 Zob. np. J. Z ajadło , O dpow iedzialność z a m ur. Procesy strzelców p r z y m u rz e berlińskim , Gdańsk: Arche, 2003. SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 231 wartości, jaką jest pewność prawa (bezpieczeństwo prawne) pozwalająca m.in. na przewidywanie zachowań uczestników życia społecznego - zaproponował następujące rozwiązanie: K o n flik t m ięd zy spraw iedliw ością i bezp ieczeństw em praw nym [p ew nością p ra- w a99] należałoby rozw iązać w ten sposób, ażeby praw o p ozytyw ne zagw aranto- w ane p rzez ustaw odaw stw o i w ładzę państw ow ą m iało p ierw szeń stw o rów nież i w tedy, gdy treściow o je s t n iesp raw iedliw e i n iecelow e, chyba że sp rzeczn ość ustaw y pozytyw nej ze spraw iedliw ością osiąga taki stop ień , że ustaw a ja k o „pra- w o niesp raw iedliw e" p ow inna ustąpić spraw iedliw ości. P rzep row ad zenie o strz e j- szej lin ii m ięd zy przyp ad kam i bezpraw ia ustaw ow ego a ustaw am i obow iązu jący- m i p o m im o swej niesp raw iedliw ej treści n ie je s t m ożliw e100. Zasadniczą tezę zawartą w tej części formuły określa się mianem tezy nieznośności ( Unerträglichkeitsthese) - formalnie poprawnie ustanowiona norma po- winna być stosowana, choćby była niesprawiedliwa i niecelowa, chyba że jej sprzeczność ze sprawiedliwością staje się nie do zniesienia, nie do wytrzymania (iein so unerträgliches M ass erreicht). Chodzi zatem o normę, która obowiązuje w pierwszym sensie - jest elementem systemu prawnego, a która - jeśli jest niesprawiedliwa w sposób nie do zniesienia - nie powinna być stosowana, nie obowiązuje w drugim sensie, tzn. nie jest racją faktycznego działania (Radbruch miał na myśli przede wszystkim adresatów norm sankcjonujących, np. sędziów) - krótko: lex iniustissima non est lex. Niektórzy znaczenie formuły Radbrucha redukują do tej właśnie tezy101. Można jednak zidentyfikować jeszcze jedną tezę należącą do formuły Rad- brucha, na podstawie której nie powinno się stosować formalnie poprawnie usta- nowionej normy. Jest to tzw. teza odmowy - niektórym normom (ustawom) odmawia się statusu bycia prawem. Kontynuując myśl zawartą w cytowanym wyżej fragmencie, Radbruch pisze: P rzep row ad zenie ostrze jsze j lin ii m ięd zy przypad kam i bezpraw ia ustaw ow ego a ustaw am i obow iązu jącym i p o m im o swej niesp raw iedliw ej treści nie je s t m o ż - liw e. M o ż n a je d n a k z ca łą o strością w ytyczyć in n ą lin ię gran iczn ą: tam , gdzie n igdy [gdzie w ogóle] n ie dąży się do spraw iedliw ości, gdzie rów ność będąca 99 „Pewność prawa" jest trafniejszym przekładem niż „bezpieczeństwo prawne". Na gruncie pol- skiej doktryny, z oparciem w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, bezpieczeństwo prawne jest, obok bezpieczeństwa obrotu prawnego, elementem wartości, jaką jest pewność prawa. Zob. M. Ko rd ela , Z arys typologii uzasadnień aksjologicznych w orzecznictw ie T ry bu n a łu K onstytucyjne- go , Bydgoszcz - Poznań: Branta, 2001, s. 87-88. 100 Przekład za: G. R adbruch , U staw ow e bezpraw ie i ponadustaw ow e p ra w o , w: M. S zyszkow ska , Z arysfilozofii p ra w a , Białystok: Temida 2, 2000, s. 262. 101 Zob. J. Z ajadło , F o rm u ła R adbrucha , s. 110. 232 MAREK PIECHOWIAK rd zen iem spraw iedliw ości od rzucana je s t św iadom ie przy stanow ien iu praw a p o - zytyw nego, tam tru dn o m ów ić, że ustaw a je s t jed y n ie „praw em niesp raw ied li- w ym '", gdyż traci ona w ogóle naturę praw a \da ist das Gesetz nicht etwa nur „unrichtiges''Recht, vielmehr entbehrt es überhaupt der Rechtsnatur]. N ie m ożn a b o - w iem praw a w ogóle, a w tym praw a pozytyw nego, określić in aczej n iż ja k o p o - rząd ek i stanow ien ie, k tó re zgod nie ze swą isto tą są p rzezn aczone służyć spraw ie- d liw ości. Z g o d n ie z tym kryteriu m w iele ustaw narod ow osocjalistycznych nigdy n ie osiągnęło god ności praw a o bow iązu jącego102. W myśl tezy odmowy niektóre formalnie poprawnie ustanowione normy nie tylko nie powinny być stosowane - nie powinny być racją działania (nie obo- wiązują w sensie drugim), ale nie obowiązują także w sensie pierwszym, nigdy nie stały się częścią systemu prawnego. W przypadku tezy odmowy Radbruch wskazuje - inaczej niż w przypadku pierwszej tezy - konkretne kryterium jej stosowania, jest nim świadome odrzucenie równości w samym procesie stano- wienia prawa. Radbruch miał na uwadze przede wszystkim odmówienie równe- go statusu pewnym grupom ludzi, np. ludziom pochodzenia żydowskiego. Pewna część refleksji Jana Pawła II dotycząca niesprawiedliwych ustaw da- je się dobrze ująć w kategoriach zaproponowanych przez Radbrucha. Ustawy dopuszczające przerywanie ciąży, a w szczególności normy przyznające upraw- nienie do przerwania ciąży i nakładające skorelowane z tym uprawnieniem obowiązki, należałyby do tych ustaw, które nigdy nie osiągnęły godności pra- wa, gdyż przyjmowane były przy odmówieniu niektórym ludziom statusu bycia człowiekiem. Zastosowanie miałaby teza odmowy. Z nauczaniem Jana Pawła II zgodne też będzie uznanie, że niektóre niespra- wiedliwe normy powinny być racją działania, jak np. takie, na których oparty jest umiarkowanie niesprawiedliwy system podatkowy. Czynność płacenia po- datku nie jest sama w sobie moralnie naganna (nie jest sama w sobie niesłuszna). Takiego typu normy byłyby - jak sądzę - uznane przez obu autorów za ele- ment systemu prawnego i za obowiązujące w sensie pierwszym. Przypuszczam także, że obaj autorzy zgodziliby się z tym, że w przypadku niektórych działań, które nie są same w sobie moralnie naganne, może być tak, że konflikt norm pra- wa stanowionego ze sprawiedliwością (celowością) stanie się nie do zniesienia i normy te nie będą stanowiły racji działania. Jednakże z punktu widzenia refleksji Jana Pawła II nie stanowią racji działa- nia normy prawa stanowionego nakazujące dokonywanie czynów, które same 102 „Es ist unmöglich, eine schärfere Linie zu ziehen zwischen den Fällen des gesetzlichen Un- rechts und den trotz unrichtigen Inhalts dennoch geltenden Gesetzen. Wo Gerechtigkeit nicht einmal erstrebt wird, wo die Gleichheit, die den Kern der Gerechtigkeit ausmacht, bei der Set- zung positiven Rechts bewusst verleugnet wurde, da ist das Gesetz nicht etwa nur »unrichtiges« Recht, vielmehr entbehrt es überhaupt der Rechtsnatur". Przekład za: U staw ow e bezpraw ie i p o - nadustaw ow e p ra w o , w: M. S zyszkow ska , Z arysfilozofii p ra w a , s. 262. SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 233 w sobie są moralnie naganne, które - mówiąc językiem Akwinaty - są w sprzeczności z prawem naturalnym pojętym jako ius naturale, niezależnie od tego, jakie korzyści lub straty mogłyby takie działania przynieść społeczeństwu lub jednostkom i nie ma w domenie tego typu działań miejsca na rozważa- nie „niesprawiedliwe" - „skrajnie niesprawiedliwe"; już samo „niesprawiedli- we" wystarcza, aby odmówić obowiązywania w sensie bycia racją działania. Jana Pawła II interesuje niemal wyłącznie kwestia obowiązywania jako bycia racją faktycznego działania. Różnicę między Radbruchem a Janem Pawłem II można by oddać i w ten sposób, że o ile ten pierwszy prowadzi refleksję z per- spektywy wyznaczonej formułą „niesprawiedliwe ustawy (normy) są racją dzia- łania, chyba że ...", to Jan Paweł II, w zgodzie z Akwinatą, z perspektywy wy- znaczonej formułą „niesprawiedliwe ustawy nie są racją działania, chyba ż e ...". 3. Sprawiedliwość karna Przyjęta przez Jana Pawła II perspektywa filozoficzna badania podstaw prawa, w której punktem wyjścia jest obdarzony godnością człowiek i jego dobro, znaj- duje swój wyraz także w refleksji nad sprawiedliwością karną i pojawia się w na- uczaniu Jana Pawła II przede wszystkim w związku z problematyką kary śmier- ci. Sprawiedliwość ta „winna coraz bardziej odpowiadać godności człowieka, a tym samym - w ostatecznej analizie - zamysłowi Boga względem człowie- ka i społeczeństwa"103. Zasadniczym celem kary wymierzanej przez społeczeństwo jest „naprawie- nie nieporządku wywołanego przez wykroczenie"104. W ramach tego celu zmie- rza się do osiągnięcia dwóch bardziej szczegółowych - jeden dotyczy dobra tego, kto jest karany; kara jest wówczas warunkiem odzyskania prawa do ko- rzystania z własnej wolności oraz „stanowi bodziec i pomoc do poprawy oraz wynagrodzenia za winy"105; drugi dotyczy społeczeństwa i innych osób - od- powiednia kara służy obronie ładu publicznego i bezpieczeństwa osób106. Kon- sekwentnie, ponieważ kara śmierci nie może przywrócić prawa do korzystania 103 J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 56. 104 Pius XI, Q uadragesim o anno, s. 178-181; cyt. za: J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 56. 105J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 56; w odniesieniu do tej formuły E v a n g eliu m vitae podaje w przypisie wyjątkowo wiele odniesień do wcześniejszego nauczania Kościoła: Encyklika A rca - num d iv in a e sapientiae (10 lutego 1880), Leonis XIII P.M. Acta, II, Romae 1882, s. 10-40; En- cyklika D iu tu rn u m illu d (29 czerwca 1881), Leonis XIII P.M. Acta, II, Romae 1882, s. 269-287; Encyklika Im m o rta leD ei (1 listopada 1885), Leonis XIII P.M. Acta, V, Romae 1886, s. 118-150; Encyklika Sapientiae C hristianae (10 stycznia 1890), Leonis X III P.M. Acta, X , Romae 1891, s. 10-41; Encyklika Q uod A postołki m uneris (28 grudnia 1878), Leonis XIII P.M. Acta, I, Ro- mae 1881, s. 170-183; Encyklika L iberta spraestantissim um (20 czerwca 1888), Leonis XIII P.M. Acta, VIII, Romae 1889, s. 212-246. 106J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 56. 234 MAREK PIECHOWIAK z własnej wolności przez skazanego, nie powinna być stosowana „poza przypad- kami absolutnej konieczności, to znaczy gdy nie ma innych sposobów obrony społeczeństwa. Dzisiaj jednak, dzięki coraz lepszej organizacji instytucji peni- tencjarnych, takie przypadki są bardzo rzadkie, a być może już nie zdarzają się wcale"107. 4. Pokój owocem sprawiedliwości Zgodnie z klasyczną tradycją refleksji nad sprawiedliwością108 i tradycją samej nauki społecznej Kościoła, papież podkreśla powiązanie pokoju ze sprawiedli- wością - nie ma pokoju bez sprawiedliwości109. W tym kontekście zasadni- czym wymiarem realizacji sprawiedliwości jest poszanowanie praw człowieka: P ok ó j sprow adza się w o stateczn o ści do p oszanow ania n ienaru szalnych praw człow ieka - d ziełem spraw iedliw ości je s t p o kó j - w o jn a zaś rodzi się z ich p ogw ałcen ia i łączy się zaw sze z w iększym je sz cz e p ogw ałcen iem ty ch praw 110. Uznanie powiązania poszanowania praw człowieka ze sprawiedliwością i po- kojem legło też u podstaw współczesnej ochrony praw człowieka powstałej po drugiej wojnie światowej - w pierwszym akapicie preambuły Powszechnej de- klaracji praw człowieka z 10 grudnia 1948 roku: „Zważywszy, że uznanie przy- rodzonej godności oraz równych i niezbywalnych praw wszystkich członków ro- dziny ludzkiej jest podstawą wolności, sprawiedliwości i pokoju na świecie"* 111. 107Tamże; Jan Paweł II przypomina w tym kontekście zasadę zawartą w nowym K atechizm ie Kościoła Katolickiego-. „Jeśli środki bezkrwawe wystarczają do obrony życia ludzkiego przed na- pastnikiem i do ochrony porządku publicznego oraz bezpieczeństwa osób, władza powinna sto- sować te środki, gdyż są bardziej zgodne z konkretnymi uwarunkowaniami dobra wspólnego i bardziej odpowiadają godności osoby ludzkiej" (2267); por. L eon XIII, L ibertas praestantissim um , s. 2 2 4 -2 2 6 . 108 Powiązanie sprawiedliwości z pokojem było już uwyraźnione w mitologii starożytnych Gre- ków, w której pojawiają się trzy siostry - hory: Eunomia (Praworządność), Dike (Sprawiedli- wość) i Eirene (Pokój), córki Temidy i Zeusa. 109 J an Paw eł II, Centesim us a n nus , 5: „Papież [Leon XIII] był jednak w pełni świadomy, że pokój buduje się na fundamencie sprawiedliwości: istotną treścią encykliki jest właśnie głoszenie zasadniczych wymogów sprawiedliwości w ówczesnej sytuacji gospodarczej i społecznej"; zob. J an Paw eł II, R edem ptor hom inis, 17. 110J an Paw eł II, R edem ptor hom inis, 1 7 . 111 Rez. 217 A (III) Zgromadzenia Ogólnego NZ, tekst polski np. w: P ra w a człowieka. W pro- w ad zen ie - Wybór źródeł, oprać. K. Motyka, Lublin: Morpol, 1999, s. 73-78; cytowana formuła była wielokrotnie powtarzana, np. w preambułach Międzynarodowych paktów praw człowieka z 16 grudnia 1966 r., gdzie wyraźnie uznano także godność za źródło praw człowieka: „uzna- nie przyrodzonej godności oraz równych i niezbywalnych praw wszystkich członków rodziny ludzkiej stanowi podstawę wolności, sprawiedliwości i pokoju na świecie, [...] prawa te wynikają z godności przyrodzonej osobie ludzkiej"; M iędzynarodow y p a k t p ra w gospodarczych, społecznych SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 235 Jak owocem sprawiedliwości czy oparcia organizacji społeczeństwa na praw- dzie o człowieku, przede wszystkim na jego przyrodzonych prawach, jest pokój, tak owocem niesprawiedliwości i ideologii nieuwzględniających tej prawdy jest wojna, także wojna totalna, której celem jest unicestwienie przeciwnika112. IV. T e o l o g i c z n y k o n t e k s t n a u k i o s p r a w i e d l i w o ś c i Opracowanie niniejsze należy do filozofii prawa. Jednak niezbędne jest choćby wskazanie kontekstu teologicznego, w którym umieszczone są rozważania typu filozoficznego. Nauka o sprawiedliwości znajduje swoje dopełnienie w teologii w ścisłym tego słowa znaczeniu113. To, co odpowiada godności człowieka, odpowiada „tym samym - w ostatecz- nej analizie - zamysłowi Boga względem człowieka i społeczeństwa"1 . Nie może być sprzeczności między prawem naturalnym poznawanym naturalnymi siłami poznawczymi człowieka a objawionym prawem Bożym - jedno i drugie ma u swych podstaw prawo odwieczne ustanowione przez Mądrość Bożą, która każe każdej istocie zmierzać do jej celu. To odwieczne prawo jest poznawane zarówno poprzez naturalny rozum człowieka (i dlatego stanowi »prawo naturalne«), jak i - w sposób integralny i doskonały - poprzez nadprzyrodzone Objawienie Boże (i stąd nazwa »prawo Boże«)115. i kulturalnych, rez. 2200 A (XXI) Zgromadzenia Ogólnego NZ, Dz. U. 1977, nr 38, poz. 169; M iędzynarodow y p a k t p ra w obywatelskich i politycznych, rez. 2200 A (XXI) Zgromadzenia Ogól- nego NZ, Dz. U. 1977, nr 38, poz. 167, ze zm. 112 Zob. J an Paw el II, Centesim us annus, 19. 113 Zob. J an Paw eł II, R edem ptor hom inis, 9: „Odkupienie świata - owa wstrząsająca tajemnica miłości, w której niejako na nowo »powtarza się« tajemnica stworzenia - jest w swoim najgłęb- szym rdzeniu »usprawiedliwieniem« człowieka w jednym ludzkim Sercu: w Sercu Jednorodzonego Syna, ażeby mogło ono stawać się sprawiedliwością serc tylu ludzi, w tym Przedwiecznym Jednorodzonym Synu przybranych odwiecznie za synów (por. Rz 8,29n.; E f 1,8) i wezwanych do Łaski, wezwanych do Miłości. [ ...] Bóg stworzenia objawia się jako Bóg odkupienia, jako Bóg, który jest wierny Sobie Samemu (por. 1 Tes 5,24), wierny swej miłości do człowieka i do świata, wyrażonej w dniu stworzenia. A miłość Jego nie cofa się przed niczym, czego w Nim Samym domaga się sprawiedliwość i dlatego Synowi swojemu nie przepuścił, ale Go »dla nas grzechem uczynił« (2 Kor 5,21; por. Ga 3,13)". 114J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 56. 115J an Paw eł II, Veritatis splendor, 72. Jan Paweł II w oczywisty sposób nawiązuje tu do Tomaszowej koncepcji prawa wiecznego - lex aeterna, które „nie jest niczym innym jak zamysłem bożej mądrości, o ile ukierunkowuje wszystkie akty i poruszenia" (T omasz z A kw in u , S T , I-II, q. 93, a. 1, co.), za Akwinatą, który prawo objawione określa mianem lex d iv in a (S T , I-II, q. 95, a. 4, co.), Jan Paweł II stosuje określenie „prawo Boże"; por. J an Paw eł II, Veritatis splendor, 45: „Chociaż w refleksji teologiczno-moralnej odróżnia się zwykle prawo Boże pozytywne, czyli objawione, od prawa naturalnego, zaś w ekonomii zbawienia prawo »stare« od »nowego«, nie należy zapominać, że te i inne pożyteczne rozróżnienia odnoszą się zawsze do prawa, którego 236 MAREK PIECHOWIAK Można powiedzieć, że jedno prawo wieczne promulgowane jest na dwa zasadni- cze sposoby- jako prawo naturalne, przez stworzenie człowieka zostaje „wpisa- ne w rozumną naturę osoby"116 i jest poznawalne w sposób naturalny. Pozytyw- ne prawo Boże promulgowane jest w Objawieniu, dlatego poznawanie prawa wiecznego na tej drodze zakłada wiarę w Objawienie. Można tu się odwołać do znanej metafory zaproponowanej w pierwszym zdaniu encykliki Fides et ratio : „wiara i rozum są jak dwa skrzydła, na których duch ludzki unosi się ku kontemplacji prawdy"117, także prawdy dotyczącej tego, co sprawiedliwe. Walka o sprawiedliwość ma, obok wymiaru moralnego, wymiar ściśle religijny - jest świadectwem „o Chrystusie Zbawicielu"118. Tak więc, aby nastała sprawiedliwość i osiągnęły swój cel wysiłki ludzi, którzy pragną ją urzeczywistnić, konieczny jest dar łaski ofiarowanej przez Boga. Dzięki niej i współpracy ludzkiej wolności możliwa jest owa tajemnicza obecność Boga w historii, czyli Opatrzność119. Sprzeciw sumienia uzyskuje swoje uzasadnienie w obowiązku religijnym, w myśl wyrażonego w Dziejach Apostolskich postulatu, że „trzeba bardziej słuchać Boga niż ludzi"120. Kontekst teologiczny jest wyraźnie widoczny także wówczas, gdy chodzi o walkę o sprawiedliwość - w relacji do Boga człowiek uzyskuje pomoc w za- chowaniu odpowiedniej postawy: z posłuszeństwa Bogu - któremu należy się bojaźń, wyrażająca uznanie Jego absolutnej i najwyższej władzy - człowiek czerpie moc i odwagę, aby przeciw- stawiać się niesprawiedliwym ludzkim prawom. Jest to moc i odwaga tego, kto gotów jest nawet iść do więzienia lub zginąć od miecza, gdyż jest przekonany, że „tu się okazuje wytrwałość i wiara świętych" (Ap 13,10)121. twórcą jest ten sam jedyny Bóg, i że prawa te przeznaczone są dla człowieka. Różne sposoby sprawowania przez Boga w dziejach pieczy nad światem i człowiekiem nie tylko nie wykluczają się nawzajem, ale przeciwnie - wspomagają się i przenikają. Ich wspólnym źródłem i celem jest odwieczny zamysł, pelen mądrości i miłości". 116J an Paw eł II, Veritatis splendor, 51. Tomasz z Akwinu definiuje prawo naturalne ja- ko „uczestniczenie [p a rticipado] prawa wiecznego w stworzeniu rozumnym" (S T , I-II, q. 91, a. 2, co.). U7J an Paw eł II, F id es et ratio, pierwsze zdanie. 118J an Paw eł II, Centesim us annus, 5 : „nauczanie i upowszechnianie nauki społecznej wchodzi w zakres misji ewangelizacyjnej Kościoła i stanowi istotną część orędzia chrześcijańskiego, po- nieważ ukazuje jego bezpośrednie konsekwencje dla życia społeczeństwa i czyni codzienną pracę i walkę o sprawiedliwość elementem świadectwa o Chrystusie Zbawicielu". 119Tamże, 59. 120 Dz 5,29; J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 73. 121 J an Paw eł II, E v a n g eliu m vitae, 73. SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ A PRAWO W NAUCZANIU JANA PAWŁA II 237 U w a g i k o ń c o w e Przeprowadzone badania wskazują, że Jan Paweł II podąża za tradycją klasyczną w ogólnej refleksji nad prawem, przede wszystkim za rozwiązaniami propono- wanymi przez Tomasza z Akwinu. Zgodnie z duchem czasu tradycyjna proble- matyka sprawiedliwości ogniskuje się wokół godności i wynikających z niej praw człowieka. To w godności i prawach człowieka poszukiwać trzeba zasadniczych kryteriów sprawiedliwości prawa. Prawo naturalne pojmowane jest jako zespół dóbr dla osoby - perspektywa ujęcia prawa jest w pełni antropocentryczna. W prawie naturalnym znajduje się zasadnicze kryterium sprawiedliwości pra- wa stanowionego. Prawo stanowione, które nie jest sprawiedliwe, nie ma mocy prawa, przede wszystkim w takim sensie, że nie stanowi samo w sobie racji działania. Niekiedy, ze względów moralnych, niesprawiedliwe prawo wymaga posłuszeństwa. Jeśli jednak prawo stanowione daje uprawnienia do czynów we- wnętrznie złych lub takie czyny nakazuje, to nie tylko nie obowiązuje w sumie- niu i nie jest racją działania, ale obowiązkiem jest postępowanie wbrew takiemu prawu. m arekp4@ gm ail.com JUSTICE AND LAW IN T H E TEACHING O F JOHN PAUL II S u m m a r y This article focuses on philosophical issues surrounding justice in positive law in light of the social teaching of John Paul II. The analyses begin with a con- sideration of the anthropological foundations of justice as a virtue, develop with a reflexion on the actions that realize the virtue of justice, and conclude with an examination of the criteria of justice in law. It is argued that relations between a human being and goods (the ends of actions) form the ontological basis of natural law and the justice of actions - orders and prohibitions are secondary in respect to these relations. The aim of any just law (and of natural law) is not the preservation or restoration of an abstractly-understood moral order based on norms (which include orders and prohibitions) but the integral development (i.e., the good) of a person, who is a being possessing dignity. John Paul II 's phi- losophy of law takes advantage primarily of Thomas Aquinas's approach to law 238 MAREK PIECHOWIAK and combines it with constructions that are typical of the contemporary human rights protection. John Paul I I 's conception of natural law is anthropocentric and based on subjective rights thinking. Human dignity and the human rights that derive from it provide the basic criteria for the justice of any law. Human rights, as subjective rights, are disclosed by natural law, which is understood as a set of goods for the human person. These goods are the ends of actions, and as such they determine actions and their forms. This point of view is compat- ible with Aquinas' definition: "law is nothing but a rational plan of operation, and ... the rational plan of any kind of work is derived from the end" (Summa contra gentiles, lib. 3, cap. 114, n. 5). Positive (human) law that is unjust has no normative power in the sense that it does not, in itself, provide reasons for the concrete actions of a concrete actor. Sometimes there are moral reasons for following an unjust law. However, if the law prescribes actions that are wrong in themselves (that is, internally wrong), then there is a moral obligation to act contrary to this legal norm.

Dissertationis Iani Martini Molendini Villa Cruoninga MMXVIII 2 Faculteit Digitale Media en Creatieve Industrie Bachelorprogramma Media, Informatie & Communicatie Scriptiebegeleider Hendrik Jan Diekerhof Datum 03/07/2018 Auteur Jan M. van der Molen Studentnummer 500715541 De relatie tussen beeldvorming in de media en de nasleep van onze 'vuile oorlog' in Indië Een onderzoek naar de vraag of beeldvorming in de Nederlandse kranten van invloed is geweest op hoe de Staat omgaat met nabestaanden van oorlogsmisdaden begaan in Indonesië. 3 Meer en meer wordt benadrukt dat de Nederlandse Staat flink heeft huisgehouden in voormalig Nederlands-Indië. En hoewel de oorlogsmisdaden begaan door Nederland inmiddels meer dan zeven decennia geleden plaatsvonden, is de worsteling van de Staat met kwesties als hoe om te gaan met de nabestaanden, nog zo vers als vandaag. Meerdere aspecten worden verondersteld te komen kijken bij het oplossen van die worsteling. Het beeld dat Nederlandse kranten al die tijd hebben gevormd over onze voormalige kolonie en onze activiteiten aldaar, is daar één van. Journalisten werken met invalshoeken en gieten nieuws in een vorm, welke een indruk achterlaat. Maar hoeveel invloed kan zo'n indruk hebben op het denken en doen van de Staat als het op de nabestaanden van de Indonesische Onafhankelijkheidsoorlog aankomt? Om na te gaan in hoeverre beeldvorming in de media, specifiek de Nederlandse kranten, van invloed is geweest op het handelen van de Staat, is er getracht een antwoord te vinden op de volgende onderzoeksvraag: In hoeverre bepaalt de beeldvorming in Nederlandse kranten over de periode van de Indonesische Onafhankelijkheidsoorlog van 1945 1949, hoe de Nederlandse Staat tot op heden is omgegaan met nabestaanden? Middels het uitvoeren van deductief framingonderzoek, heb ik eerst in cijfers een beeld geprobeerd te schetsen van de mate waarin beeldvorming in vier verschillende Nederlandse kranten aanwezig is. Dus: wat is de verhouding tussen krantenartikelen van 'neutrale aard' en artikelen geschreven om invloed uit te oefenen dan wel druk te zetten op het beleid van de Staat / haar vertegenwoordigers. Ik heb dit onderzoek uitgevoerd door een reeks krantenartikelen langs een 'meetlat' van vier beeldvormingindicatoren te leggen en te analyseren hoeveel van dergelijke artikelen zich bijvoorbeeld laten meten als zijnde sterk objectief of juist niet. De resultaten van deze analyses geven aan of er sprake is van veel beeldvorming in Nederlandse Abstract krantenartikelen en op welke manier die beeldvorming zich uit. Ik heb daarnaast experts op het gebied van media, geschiedenis, recht en Nederlands-Indië geïnterviewd om context te verschaffen bij de resultaten van het framingonderzoek en aan te geven: is deze beeldvorming van invloed geweest? De belangrijkste conclusie uit het onderzoek is dat, zoals het theoretisch kader al deed vermoeden, de beeldvorming in Nederlandse krantenartikelen uit de periode 1945-2018, bepalend kan zijn voor de houding van de Staat ten aanzien van nabestaanden van de dekolonisatieoorlog. Dit is het geval in zoverre dat de invloed van die beeldvorming, af en aan in samenspel met andere actoren binnen de maatschappij, 'tot in de Kamer kan reiken, tot discussie onder politici kan leiden, met zekerheid onderdeel vormt van het proces dat voorafgaat aan enige besluiten die de Staat neemt –en, zo niet: direct aanleiding geeft tot een reactie van de Staat'. Het beste voorbeeld van de mate waarin beeldvorming in de Nederlandse kranten bepaald heeft hoe de Staat met nabestaanden omgaat: het dekolonisatieonderzoek welke, dankzij de gigantische aandacht voor onder meer Rémy Limpachs boek De brandende kampongs van generaal Spoor in de kranten, ervoor zorgde dat er eindelijk geluisterd wordt naar de nabestaanden. Iets wat, zo is gebleken, zijzelf veel belangrijker vinden dan geld of excuses. 4 Met genoegen presenteer ik mijn bachelorscriptie. Ik rond hiermee, na een half jaar kennisverruimend werk, mijn studie Media, Informatie & Communicatie af aan de Hogeschool van Amsterdam. Het leek mij ideaal om het onderwerp van Nederlands-Indië te koppelen aan beeldvorming in de media, over de oorlogsmisdaden aldaar begaan –een mooie balans tussen mijn studierichting en persoonlijke interesse in geschiedschrijving. Hoewel het niet de enige redenen waren, droeg het doen van mijn profielwerkstuk over Indonesiës aardrijkskundige fenomenen en het gegeven dat onder medestudenten de invalshoek van mediainvloed en koloniale geschiedenis nog relatief ononderzocht was, bij aan het besluit om mijn scriptie te wijden aan de aandacht voor nabestaanden van oorlogsmisdaden, gepleegd door dit land in de jaren '40. Ik zou graag een moment nemen om wat mensen te bedanken. Deze betreffen in de eerste plaats dhr. H.J. Diekerhof, welke mij gedurende het half jaar van begeleiding, advies en feedback voorzien heeft. In de tweede plaats alle respondenten die ik heb mogen interviewen, gevolgd door het geduld en de interesse in mijn onderzoek vanuit mijn familie en op de laatste, nochtans niet minste plaats: de drukker die voor de productie van het fysieke inkijkexemplaar gezorgd heeft. Jan M. van der Molen VI Groningen / Amsterdam, juli 2018 Proloog We liepen op patrouille en kwamen wat boeren tegen. En ineens zette één van de jongens z'n gun erop: 'prrrt'. *gniffelt* Waarop de patrouille-commandant zei: 'Schei alsjeblieft uit met die flauwekul'. Nou, dat zijn geloof ik oorlogsmisdaden. – Joop Hueting, oud-stoottroeper Kranten en tijdschriften stonden niet echt te popelen. Het was echt een gevecht om het onderwerp op de agenda te krijgen. Je kreeg altijd te horen: 'Oh, Indië? Saai.' – Anne-Lot Hoek, historica & journaliste " " " " 25 Nederlandse mariniers tijdens een vuurgevecht in Indonesië, 1946. Spaarnestadphoto 26 4. Hoofdstuk IV 4.1 Inleiding In dit hoofdstuk presenteer ik de belangrijkste bevindingen en uitspraken uit mijn diepte-interviews met de respondenten. Ik geef hiermee antwoord op de deelvragen 'Wat voor beeld wordt er gevormd in Nederlandse kranten over geweldpleging door de Staat in Nederlands-Indië?', 'Welk beeld in Nederlandse kranten is exemplarisch voor positieve of negatieve berichtgeving over geweldpleging door de Staat in NederlandsIndië?', 'Wat zijn de belangrijkste reacties geweest van media, Staat of andere betrokkenen op de berichtgeving in kranten over Nederlandse oorlogsmisdaden in Indië?' en 'Hoe kijken representatoren voor media, Staat, betrokkenen en/of nabestaanden zelf aan tegen de beeldvorming over de misdragingen in Nederlands-Indië?' De vijf geïnterviewde experts hebben zich uiteraard uitgelaten over beeldvorming in Nederlandse kranten over verschillende perioden. Ik heb de paragrafen daar voor het gemak tevens chronologisch naar ingedeeld. 4.2 Resultaten 1945 - 1968 Volgens Tineke Bennema was het overheersende beeld in de Nederlandse kranten dat wij Indonesië in cultuur brachten. Dat, en het idee dat het ontzettend lucratief was, gezien er zoveel rijkdom naar Nederland kwam. Ze meent dat er wel wat kritiek was, maar dat het overwegende beeld één was van Nederlandse goeddoenerij. En niet enkel ten opzichte van onszelf in Indonesië, maar ook ten faveure van de 'inlanders', of inheemsen. Volgens Bennema was de realiteit echter dat, in tegenstelling tot de Engelsen, Nederland er bijvoorbeeld niets deed aan onderwijs. Maar daar werd niet over geschreven in de voornaamste kranten. Bennema: "Slechte dingen negeerde men, en goede dingen blies men enorm op." Het beeld van tevredenheid onder Indonesiërs werd dan ook gehandhaafd door hoe men Nederlandse 'goeddoenerij' definieerde. Zo was het houden van ~ IV ~ 'baboes' (Indische kinderoppassers) bijvoorbeeld een teken van beschaving, want 'zij hadden een baan'. Kester Freriks vult aan dat het beeld dat men van Indonesië had, vrij schokkend was. Er werd alles aan gedaan om een bepaald narratief te onderhouden, ten voordele van de koloniale Staat. Affiches met teksten als 'hier gaat de Nederlandse vlag neer –wilt u dat?', 'Japan heerst over Indonesië: wilt u dat?' en 'Indonesië heeft u nodig', zo zegt Freriks. Freriks: "Een Indisch vrouwtje dat geslagen wordt door een Japanner. En wij, als blanke mannen, voorop en groot afgebeeld, moeten haar dan komen bevrijden." Propaganda werd in veelvoud geproduceerd, om dat Indonesië maar bij ons te houden. Dit werd, zeker door de Nederlandse krant, voortdurend bevestigd en verantwoord door te beargumenteren dat Indonesische mensen 'heel blij waren dat wij daar rust en orde brachten'. Het brengen van werkgelegenheid, volksgezondheid en Gods Woord, gepaard met een fel racisme jegens de Japanner, waren allemaal redenen waarom wij in Indonesië moesten blijven. Freriks: "Wij hebben eigenlijk een onmondig, kinderlijk volk, zoals je vaak leest, opgevoed en tot beschaving gebracht. Dat was onze grote, heilige missie." Bennema beaamt: "Kijk naar mijn grootvader, die was inspecteur van politie en vond dat we daar alleen maar goede dingen gedaan hebben –ziekenhuizen gebouwd en dergelijke." Er werd gesproken over die 'spleetogen'. Die 'kleine mannetjes' met hun 'O-benen': ze 'konden niks' en 'maakten maar spullen na uit Europa'. – Tineke Bennema " " 27 Waar het aankomt op het handhaven van Nederlands-Indië, werd de Staat door de kranten in ieder geval geen strobreed in de weg gelegd. Volgens Freriks heeft een van de laatste gouverneur-generaals, J.P. de Jong, ooit nog gezegd: 'We hebben hier drie eeuwen met de knoet geregeerd, en we zullen nog drie eeuwen met de knoet blijven regeren'. Volgens Freriks was er dan ook nul komma nul belangstelling voor wat er daadwerkelijk in het land speelde. Als voorbeeld van de berichtgeving in Nederlandse kranten, haalt Freriks de 17e augustus van 1945 aan: de onafhankelijkheidsverklaring van Soekarno. Deze zou pas in september '45 enige aandacht krijgen in de kranten. Freriks: "Dus dat hebben ze heel lang, moedwillig verzwegen. Daarnaast was er eigenlijk maar één berichtje: 'ene' Soekarno en Hatta hadden de 'Repoebliek' uitgeroepen, en het werd daarom 'hoog tijd dat Nederland troepen stuurt'. En dat was één van de allereerste berichten in Trouw en het Handelsblad. Van meet af aan was daarmee in de hele Nederlandse pers, die vrijheidsbeweging van de Indonesiërs gebagatelliseerd –de toon was gezet." Volgens Freriks waren de redacties 'gewoon superrechts'. Er waren een groot aantal NSB'ers in het vooroorlogse Nederlands-Indië. En dit kon je dan terugzien in de samenleving, waar geen enkele aandacht mocht en kon zijn voor de wensen en de vrijheidsgedachte van de Indonesiër. Freriks: "Anton Mussert is zelfs nog in Nederlands-Indië geweest om daar toespraken te houden. Het was een reactionaire samenleving. En er was geen enkele aandacht voor het lot van de inlander." Anne-Lot Hoek sluit zich aan bij het gegeven dat de beeldvorming in de kranten over Indonesië, van sterke invloed was op de gedachtegang van de maatschappij, maar ook in dat de propaganda vanuit de Staat weer van grote invloed was op de media. Hoek meent: "Wat er hier doorkwam aan berichtgeving was heel beperkt, en dat beïnvloedde wat wij wisten van wat er in Indonesië gebeurde." Volgens Hoek zonden veel media een boodschap uit die aansloot bij de berichtgeving vanuit de Staat. "De media hebben te weinig gedaan om een kritisch tegenbeeld neer te zetten. Iets dat enkel uit hele linkse bladen zoals De Waarheid kwam. En als je nu dan soms dingen leest over hoe een blad als de Waarheid bepaalde incidenten beschrijft, dan denk ik weleens: 'ja, dat is spot-on'." Volgens Hoek was dergelijke berichtgeving in Nederlandse kranten echter heel radicaal –"het was allemaal links-radicalisme en onzin." Maar ook op de vraag in hoeverre de media zelf weer beïnvloed werden door de Staat, kan geantwoord worden: aanzienlijk. Hoek stelt dat voor veel berichtgeving de regeringsvoorlichtingsdienst juist weer de media van informatie voorzag. "En de media heeft dat nooit kritisch genoeg benaderd. Ze lieten zich te veel om de tuin leiden. Journalisten kwamen dan bijvoorbeeld in Indië aan om verslag te doen en kregen dan zo'n reisje, waarbij werd aangewezen waar ze naartoe mochten, onder begeleiding van iemand van Rijksvoorlichting. Dat is geen objectieve verslaglegging geweest." Tineke Bennema gaat hier op door, door te zeggen dat het ook lastig was om als journalist je weg te vinden in Indië. "Je spreekt de taal niet, je weet niet waar je moet zijn. Die kampongs waren allemaal eng en de cultuur kende je niet." Het gevolg was dat als journalisten niet al door de Staat zelf geleid werden in hun verslaglegging, ze heel veel praatte met de bureaucraten van het Nederlandse gouvernement om aan informatie te komen. Bennema voegt hieraan toe dat bijvoorbeeld Jeffry Pondaag (voorzitter van het Stichting Comité Nederlandse Ereschulden) zelf Mensen willen liever verhalen horen over hoe heerlijk het was en hoeveel rijst we hebben verbouwd –niet over wat een tragedies we daar hebben veroorzaakt. – Tineke Bennema " " 28 een Indonesiër is, en om die reden makkelijker contact kon maken en dingen kon blootleggen. Pondaag kon volgens Bennema makkelijker naar nabestaanden gaan zoeken. "En dat was een Nederlander waarschijnlijk nooit gelukt." Of dingen anders waren geweest als de Nederlandse kranten geschreven zouden hebben over het doen en laten van politici en hun lokale militaire vertegenwoordigers, zoals ze dat in 2018 doen, weet Anne-Lot Hoek te zeggen: "Waarschijnlijk was het van invloed geweest. Maar eigenlijk hebben we nu ook nog steeds geen weet van een hoop van wat defensie doet. En je moet een hele knappe onderzoeksjournalist zijn, wil je daar echt iets zinnigs over kunnen zeggen." Esther Captain sluit zich hierbij aan: "Ik denk zeker dat als er destijds meer kranten waren geweest die er bovenop zaten, en misstanden hadden kunnen rapporteren, dat dat zeker had uitgemaakt." Het feit dat media tussen '45 en '68 nu eenmaal niet zo kritisch schreven als tegenwoordig, wijt Rémy Limpach aan het feit dat media destijds veel gezagsgetrouwer waren. "Er waren wel een paar kritische blaadjes, voornamelijk uit de linkse en extreem linkse hoek. Maar het gros van alle mainstream media, die gingen gewoon mee in het mantra van 'Indië verloren, rampspoed geboren', 'we moeten daar rust en orde brengen', 'de republiek is een Japans maaksel' en 'Soekarno en dergelijke zijn allen fascisten'." Met andere woorden: de kranten stonden de Staat toe te juichen in haar keuze om meer gezag te willen uitoefenen in Indië. Anne-Lot Hoek zegt hierover dat men in die tijd hetgeen wat er in 'jouw' krant stond –die je ouders en grootouders ook lazen– als de waarheid beschouwde. "Mensen in die tijd waren vanwege de beperkte berichtgeving veel minder in staat om er een kritische beeldvorming op na te houden." En in die zin, zo meent Rémy Limpach, heeft de media absoluut gefaald. Limpach nuanceert wel: "Het was nog kort na de Tweede Wereldoorlog, dus die media lagen nog op de grond. En als je naar de oorlog zelf kijkt: linkse en extreemlinkse blaadjes waren gewoon helemaal niet toegestaan, dus er waren ook geen correspondenten die in Indië mochten rondlopen." Daarnaast, zo voegt hij eraan toe, waren kranten destijds nog straatarm. Het was echter niet zo dat de toestand in Indonesië helemaal niet besproken werd. Bladen als De Groene Amsterdammer, Vrij Nederland, Het Parool en het communistische De Waarheid hadden bijvoorbeeld niet veel abonnees, maar werden wel door ook Kamerleden gelezen. Limpach: "CPN'ers (Communistische Partij Nederland) en een minderheidsfractie van de PvdA hebben ook in het parlement kritische soldatenbrieven voorgelezen. En ook bepaalde schandalen, zoals de massamoord in ZuidCelebes, de moordpartijen in Rawagede en de Bondowoso-affaire, die hebben wel allemaal de krant en zelfs de VN gehaald." Met andere woorden: volgens Limpach was het ergens wel bekend in Nederland. "Niet in brede kringen, maar zeer zeker wel aan de top." Politici wisten dus wel van de oorlogsmisdaden af. Zij correspondeerden deels ook met militairen zelf. "Het PvdA-kamerlid Evert Vermeer bijvoorbeeld, die had contact met vijftienhonderd militairen met een PvdA achtergrond." Politici wisten dus wel van misstanden, en ook dat het Nederlandse optreden lang niet zo keurig was zoals werd gesuggereerd." Journalisten kwamen dan bijvoorbeeld in Indië aan om verslag te doen en kregen dan zo'n reisje, waarbij werd aangewezen waar ze naartoe mochten, onder begeleiding van iemand van Rijksvoorlichting. Dat is geen objectieve verslaglegging geweest. – Anne-Lot Hoek " " 29 Een verdere nuancering die Limpach aanvoert, is dat ondanks het beeld van 'aandachtsonthouding' van Nederlandse kranten voor misdaden in Indië, er eigenlijk nog wel relatief veel over gepubliceerd werd in de jaren '40. "Vooral in 1949 –het laatste oorlogsjaar. Toen nam het aantal gepubliceerde schandalen dermate toe dat de regering tandenknarsend besloot een aantal speciale juristen naar Indonesië te sturen, om onderzoek te doen." Maar daar hield het dan ook mee op. Er was veel verzuiling in die tijd en men was gezagsgetrouwer, zegt Limpach. "Zelfs de PvdA –die had dan wel moeite met de koloniale oorlog, maar heeft het offensief uiteindelijk gewoon gesteund. En dat heeft heel wat leden gekost." En zo'n besluit heeft volgens Limpach op zijn beurt ook weer invloed op de verschillende zuilen, en de kranten die daaraan vast plakken. Zo werd Raymond Westerling, één van de beruchtste oorlogsmisdadigers, op handen van de pers gedragen. Limpach vervolgt: "Ik zeg wel dat de media gefaald hebben, maar er speelde ook een politiek van de doofpot. De Nederlandse autoriteiten zaten niet echt op openbaring van de eerder genoemde schandalen te wachten." Berichtgeving in de kranten, kán dus cruciale druk uitoefenen op het handelen van de Staat. Ook, kennelijk, gedurende de periode 1945-1969. Limpach zegt hierover: "Als er te veel gepubliceerd wordt over bepaalde schandalen, dan kan het draagvlak afnemen onder zowel militairen als burgers. En dat beperkt uiteindelijk weer de bewegingsruimte van politici, en de militairen ter plaatse." Buiten kijf staat dus dat de Staat er in ieder geval belang bij had om het uitlekken van wat er gebeurde in Indië, te voorkomen. ". . . gewoon, door in rapporten te schrijven dat 'we vijftig man op de vlucht hebben neergelegd' in plaats van 'vijftig man tegen de muur gezet te hebben en hebben afgeschoten.'" Limpach sluit zich aan bij Kester Freriks in dat hij meent dat er nauwelijks tot geen belangstelling was voor wat er gebeurde in Indië. Niet omdat het niet controversieel genoeg was –want hoe controversieeler hoe beter doorgaans– maar omdat media en historici simpelweg geen aandacht aan het conflict besteedde. En nabestaanden aan Nederlandse kant, de veteranen, die spraken er ook amper over. Limpach concludeert: "De periode tussen '49 en de schokkende openbaringen van Joop Hueting in '69, wordt ook wel het 'grote zwijgen' genoemd." 1969 - 1970 Kester Freriks merkt op: "In Nederland was Joop Hueting inderdaad de eerste die zich als Indië-veteraan openlijk op tv uitsprak over de oorlogsmisdaden." Tot aan die periode, werd overwegend enkel het kolonialisme in stand gehouden, door in de krant te schrijven 'hoe goed wij zijn'. Freriks: "Want als je daar in de pers negatief over deed, dan verloor je meteen abonnees –want zo'n heethoofdig volkje waren de Nederlanders. De pers was de heersende macht geweest." Freriks interviewde Hueting laatst nog, om terug te blikken. "Da's wel een leuk verhaal, want eigenlijk zouden ze Huetings interview uitzenden rond Sinterklaas [1968], maar dat mocht niet van de VARA, want dat zou Nederlanders op zo'n feestelijke dag maar confronteren met die 'koloniale ellende'." Huetings interview is, zo zegt Freriks, zelfs uitgesteld tot voorbij kerst en oud en nieuw, ". . . zodat het ook dat niet zou verknallen." De uitzending sloeg in als een bom. Het was een piek in de meer kritische aandacht onder kranten voor het onderwerp van de oorlogsmisdaden gepleegd in Indonesië. Vooral in 1949 –het laatste oorlogsjaar. Toen nam het aantal gepubliceerde schandalen dermate toe dat de regering tandenknarsend besloot een aantal speciale juristen naar Indonesië te sturen, om onderzoek te doen. – Rémy Limpach " " 30 Esther Captain haakt hierop aan: "Je ziet door de geschiedenis heen, dat er telkens een soort 'oprispingen' zijn, omdat het onderwerp nooit echt tot de hele samenleving is doorgedrongen." Het gevolg was dat de berichtgeving hierover in Nederlandse kranten, fluctueerde in cycli van elkaar afwisselende 'stiltes' en 'pieken'. Net zolang, totdat de maatschappij zich in haar volledigheid zou scharen achter het anti-koloniale gedachtegoed. Zolang dat niet het geval was, beargumenteert Captain, ". . . zie je dat er telkens weer een oprisping opkwam, zoals het 'incident' met Joop Hueting." Kennis van 's Nederlands zwarte bladzijde in Indië, sijpelde dus langzaamaan de doofpot uit, en veroorzaakte scheuren in de zelfcensuur van Nederlandse media. Limpach spreekt van een tweede kandidaat-piekmoment. "In 1970 werd er een boek gepubliceerd door Indië-veteranen J.A.A. van Doorn en W.J. Hendrix, getiteld Ontsporing van geweld. En dat is een heel gedegen en gezaghebbende –en tevens de 1ste wetenschappelijke– studie, maar die werd tot dan amper tot niet besproken in de media." De twee veteranen hebben clandestien materiaal verzameld over die Nederlandse ontsporingen. Dankzij de media-explosie van Hueting dat jaar ervoor, was er interesse voor hun werk. Limpach: "Van Doorn en Hendrix hebben vóór '69 geprobeerd te publiceren –en heel lang geen uitgever gevonden. En pas na Joop Hueting, nadat de Nederlandse Staat een onderzoek inlaste, konden ze plotseling een uitgever vinden." Wat kort volgde, zo zegt Limpach, waren honderden publicaties van onder meer journalisten, bewindslieden en veteranen. En dat was niet zomaar een piek. "Bij al die ex-koloniale machten ontplofte min of meer tegelijkertijd die publiciteitsbom aan verslagen van oorlogsmisdaden." En net zoals bij de juristen die de Staat onder druk van schandalen eerder naar Indië stuurde, was ook hier een publiciteitsbom die de aanleiding gaf tot de Staat haar besluit om een onderzoek in te lassen –ook bekend als de 'excessennota'. Een piek aan kritische berichtgeving of niet, het maatschappelijk sentiment –vooral onder ex-militairen– van het 'grote zwijgen', persisteerde vooralsnog. Freriks zegt over Hueting post-interview: "Hij is bedreigd. De veteranen stonden nog dezelfde avond met geweren voor de deur. Hij was in Hilversum en zijn vrouw en zijn kinderen moesten halsoverkop het huis verlaten. Er kwamen telefoontjes binnen, van: 'Wij zijn veteranen en we komen jullie allemaal neerschieten –we hebben onze oude bataljons nog'. Hueting vluchtte naar de Veluwe." Een piek aan media-aandacht, betekende dus nog niet een piek aan kritiek op de Staat haar handelen in Indië. Freriks geeft aan: "Er stonden woedende stukken in de Telegraaf, tégen Hueting: 'Het is allemaal gelogen en meneer Hueting is gestoord. Hij is een psychiatrisch patiënt en heeft alles verzonnen.'" Met het uitspelen van die rel en de komst van de excessennota, vielen bij de regering de kleppen weer een beetje van de ogen, benadrukt Freriks. Wat deed zoveel kranten, ondanks onthullingen zoals die van Hueting, alsnog 'het zwijgen' prediken? Kester Freriks meent dat niet alleen kranten veelal hun mening over Indië klaar hadden, maar ook, zoals Limpach al aangaf, geen financiële middelen hadden om een ander perspectief breed uit te gaan meten. Freriks: "Dat werd ook van overheidswege en vanuit kranten en redacties tegengehouden. En zodra je wel kritische uitingen deed, zoals door De Waarheid, dan werd je bestormd en werden de ruiten ingegooid." Freriks verklaart dat er destijds voortdurend een link werd gelegd tussen anti-kolonialisme en communisme. "Net zoals bij de Vietnamoorlog: men dacht dat de communisten erachter zaten. Het was de jaren vijftig: Nederland was enorm verzuild en er van overtuigd dat de communisten aan de macht zouden komen en er een derde wereldoorlog zou losbarsten." Rémy Limpach vult aan dat de piek aan kritiek en Als er te veel gepubliceerd wordt over bepaalde schandalen, dan kan het draagvlak afnemen onder zowel militairen als burgers. En dat beperkt uiteindelijk weer de bewegingsruimte van politici, en de militairen ter plaatse. – Rémy Limpach " " 31 aandacht in de Nederlandse kranten, na 1969 nog even doorkabbelde en daarna weer in stilte verviel. Limpach: "Men dacht dat alleen de Duitsers, Amerikanen en Fransen oorlogsmisdaden konden begaan." De jaren 1969 en 1970 stonden in het teken van shock en onthulling. "Het stond in élke krant. En dat was het begin van het publieke debat." 1971 - 1987 Zoals gezegd, volgde na de Hueting-piek weer een relatief rustige periode. Er was kritiek geweest op het handelen van de Staat in Indonesië. En dit nam weer wat af. Kester Freriks: "Als je de berichtgeving leest over die politionele acties, dan lees je ook altijd zoiets als: 'Nederlandse soldaten zijn op beestachtige wijze vermoord'." De beeldvorming in de mainstream Nederlandse kranten was allerminst verdwenen. Nederlanders kregen sterk het idee dat Indonesiërs allemaal barbaren waren ten tijde van die politionele acties, zo meent Freriks. "Enkel door Hueting en de VARA was de nuance daarover naar buiten gekomen." Een volgende piek volgde rond 1984, met geschiedschrijver Lou de Jong. Limpach zegt over hem: "De Jong heeft toen een concept van zijn Nederlands-Indië-kritische boek Het koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog naar meelezers gestuurd. Een KNIL-veteraan was het er niet mee eens dat Lou de Jong bepaalde zaken als oorlogsmisdaden neerzette. Dat is toen richting de Telegraaf gelekt, waarover veel heisa is ontstaan. Lou de Jong moest dat vervolgens weer intrekken en heeft toen maar de term 'excessen' gebezigd." 1988 - 1995 Het publieke debat, zoals Limpach al aangaf, kwam op gang. Er was inmiddels onderzoek gepubliceerd. Maar zoveel aandacht en kritische noten als tegenwoordig, werd er nog steeds niet aan gewijd. Waarom niet? Waarom liet de berichtgeving over hetgeen zich daadwerkelijk in Indonesië had afgespeeld, zo lang op zich wachten? Anne-Lot Hoek heeft het collega-journalisten weleens gevraagd. "Collega's die wat ouder waren dan ik, vroeg ik: 'Waarom zijn jullie eigenlijk niet eerder naar Indonesië gegaan om het één en ander uit te zoeken? Je had er toch wel íets aan kunnen doen?' En dan kreeg je zo'n defensieve reactie van: 'Ja, maar wat hadden we dan moeten doen', 'er was helemaal geen geld en individuele journalisten kunnen zo'n onderwerp niet zomaar gaan oppakken.'" Hoek is echter van mening dat het wellicht gezien politieke omstandigheden niet altijd eenvoudig was, maar zeker wel haalbaar. "Men had er gewoon geen zin in." Hoek wijt het deels aan het gegeven dat het publiek niet afdoende geïnteresseerd was in Indië, ". . . dus waren journalisten dat ook niet." En dit is, zo meent ze, wat zorgde voor het voortbestaan van een vicieuze cirkel waarin Indië steeds maar ver weg bleef. Maar ook deze periode was niet zonder een piek, of 'oprisping'. Rémy Limpach geeft aan dat er vervolgens ophef ontstond over een interview met schrijver Graa Boomsma, telg van een dienstplichtige in NederlandsIndië. Limpach: "Graa Boomsma leek het optreden van Nederland in Indië met wandaden van de SS te vergelijken." Wat volgde was een rechtszaak waarin Boomsma werd beschuldigd van smaad tegen de Staat. Een tweede piek was het staatsbezoek van Beatrix aan Indonesië in 1995. Ze zou haar excuses geuit willen hebben aan de Indonesiërs voor de schending van hun mensenrechten. Premier Kok hield dat toen tegen. Limpach geeft aan: "En dan was mijn boek in 2016 misschien wel de laatste stuiptrekking in een lange reeks van incidenten." Ik ben weleens met Jeffry Pondaag naar de Tweede Kamer geweest, en daar vinden ze dan toch dat er met het tegemoetkomen van de weduwen uit Rawagede, niets te winnen valt. – Tineke Bennema " " 32 1996 - 2018 De laatste jaren is er veel verbeterd qua beeldvorming in de Nederlandse kranten, wat betreft de oorlogsmisdaden in Indonesië. Tineke Bennema zegt hier wel over: "Het was niet altijd even makkelijk voor ons om een artikel in de krant te zetten. Bijvoorbeeld een artikel dat ging over de onthoofding van een vooraanstaande Indonesische vrijheidsstrijder, door Nederlandse troepen. Dat werd eerst aan de NRC aangeboden en die hebben daar lastig over gedaan. Het NRC wilde eigenlijk niet dat wij dat presenteerden als een feitelijk relaas, maar liever enkel als een opiniestuk." Er heerste nog een vrees voor de reacties van de lezers, zo zegt Bennema. "Over een stuk van Marjolein van Pagee, zeiden ze dat er héél veel kritiek op was." Deze voorzichtigheid, benadrukt Bennema, is wel enorm verminderd –inmiddels heeft de krant heel veel gepubliceerd over dergelijke oorlogsmisdaden. Vooralsnog, sluit ze zich aan bij het idee dat nabestaanden van oorlogsmisdaden een andere behandeling door de Staat gehad hadden kunnen hebben, als het volk al in 1949 vierkant achter de huidige kritieken had gestaan. Dat de beeldvorming in de Nederlandse kranten vooral de laatste jaren de meest rigoreuze kanteling doorgemaakt heeft in de manier waarop ze berichten over de Indiëkwestie, is nog geen garantie voor dat de Staat daar ook zo over denkt. Bennema: "Ik ben weleens met Jeffry Pondaag naar de Tweede Kamer geweest, en daar vinden ze dan toch dat er met het tegemoetkomen van de weduwen uit Rawagede, niets te winnen valt. Want Indonesische nabestaanden maken simpelweg geen deel uit van hun achterban." Maar: de aandacht is er bij politici. En als het aan Limpach ligt, met meer gevolgen vandien dan Bennema het doet overkomen: "'t Feit is dat mijn onderzoek Kamervragen heeft uitgelokt. En dat was de laatste druppel die aanleiding gaf voor de Staat om met het besluit over de brug te komen het dekolonisatieonderzoek te starten." Ook Anne-Lot Hoek denkt niet dat het dekolonisatieonderzoek er geweest zou zijn zonder de nodige druk vanuit de media, de aandacht voor het proefschrift van Limpach of het activisme van iemand als Jeffry Pondaag. "De hele boel is aan de gang gezet door de rechtszaken van Liesbeth Zegveld en Jeffry Pondaag –dat heeft de hele zaak opengebroken. Ook bij de wetenschap, waar men nog vrij weinig wist van de praktijk van het inzetten van geweld." En de aandacht ervoor in de pers, is hierbij cruciaal geweest, geeft Hoek aan: "De wetenschap kreeg het absoluut niet zelfstandig op de agenda." Bennema vraagt zich vooral af wanneer de Staat nu eindelijk, officieel, in naam van de premier, schuld zal gaan bekennen. "Ik denk dat het er nooit van komt." De feiten liggen er, we weten van de oorlogsmisdaden, er zijn rechtszaken geweest en talloze journalisten zijn de laatste jaren dan eindelijk onbevreesd en gestaag bezig geweest het aan de orde te brengen. 'Máár', vervolgt Bennema: "Onlangs heb ik nog met Jeffry Pondaag ontdekt dat 'Nederland' tweegevechten hield. Degene die won overleefde, en de ander kreeg de kogel. We hebben daar toen een artikel over geschreven in Trouw: en niet één reactie. Nederland vindt het nog steeds moeilijk om te erkennen dat het fout zat." Anne-Lot Hoek is van mening dat de berichtgeving over onze zwarte bladzijde niet in balans is. Dat er te veel in dezelfde bladen en kranten gepubliceerd wordt en er uiteindelijk nog steeds maar een deel van de bevolking bereikt wordt. "Het zou goed zijn als ook een krant als het AD met enige regelmaat over het onderwerp zou schrijven, zodat er een andere doelgroep wordt bereikt." Ik had een gesprek met Sjoerd Sjoerdsma van D66, die beaamde de kracht van de media. Hij zei: 'De stukken die jij schrijft, dat zorgt wel voor discussie.' – Anne-Lot Hoek " " 33 Dat het in ieder geval nu makkelijker is om over het zo lang doodgezwegen Indië te schrijven, is volgens Hoek te danken aan activisten en de media zelf. "Doordat Liesbeth Zegveld ineens die zaak won, was er weer nieuws te maken van Indië." Daarvoor, zegt Hoek, was het moeilijk om er het nieuws mee te halen, omdat ". . . het een soort ouwe soep was, waar niemand eigenlijk nog werkelijk interesse in had. Men dacht: 'Ach, nu weten we het toch allemaal wel'." Haaks op wat Tineke Bennema eerder zei, of in ieder geval in contrast met, geeft Hoek aan dat de aandacht en het veranderende beeld in de media politici wel aan het denken zet: "Sjoerd Sjoerdsma van D66 nodigde mij uit op een gesprek naar aanleiding van een artikel over de zaak Rengat op Sumatra dat ik voor NRC schreef, en die beaamde de kracht van de media. Hij zei: 'De stukken die jij schrijft, dat zorgt wel voor discussie.'" Kester Freriks voegt hieraan toe: "Ik denk dat door het onderzoek dat nu wel mogelijk is en destijds nauwelijks is gedaan, de Staat zich niet meer van de discussie kan onthouden." De media, zo lijkt, zijn machtiger dan we denken. Wanneer er verandering in de beeldvorming in kranten opspeelt over een bepaald onderwerp, ontstaat er een soort druk die langzaam wordt opgevoerd en tot bepaalde consequenties leidt. Anne-Lot Hoek onderschrijft dit: "Omdat er steeds meer over wordt geschreven, ontstaat er een soort vliegwieleffect." Hoek beargumenteert dat de Staat zich vermoedelijk dermate onder druk voelde en dus, na twee keer een voorstel ertoe te hebben afgewezen, ingaf en geld vrijmaakte voor het dekolonisatieonderzoek. Of dat ook daadwerkelijk de gedachtegang is geweest, blijft onduidelijk. Hoek: "Officieel weten wij niet waarom de Staat persé een onderzoek wil, anders dan wat er in de officiële brief staat, waarin vrij vertaald werd gesteld dat men het belangrijk vindt rekenschap af te leggen. Maar dat is natuurlijk een hele vage formulering." Hoek geeft aan dat de Staat allicht op basis van het dekolonisatieonderzoek misschien wel de overweging maakt om met een soort totaaloplossing te komen. "Dat er toegewerkt wordt naar een aanpassing in het beleid richting Indonesië." Nochtans vindt ze dat de manier waarop de Staat tot op heden verkozen heeft zich op te stellen naar de nabestaanden toe, heel voorzichtig en afstandelijk is. Dat uit zich, meent Hoek, doordat het voorlopig bij onderzoek en wat geld blijft, en geen officiële erkenning van wat Indonesië ziet als de echte dag van onafhankelijkheid: 17 augustus 1945. Dergelijke afstandelijkheid komt ook naar voren in bijvoorbeeld de magere gerechtigheid voor de weduwen van Rawagede, wier geldelijke compensatie later onder dwang deels werd afgenomen door andere dorpsbewoners. De betrokkenheid van de Staat hierin lijkt wat teruggetrokken. Esther Captain zegt hierover: "We rekenen veel in geld af. Misschien zouden we een school of watervoorziening moeten bouwen. Of huizen voor die weduwen. Stenen kun je ze niet meer afnemen. Het is misschien verlegenheid van onze kant, dat wij alles cash willen afrekenen –dat is de boekhoudersmentaliteit die wij hier in Nederland hebben." Captain zegt dat als het onderzoek is afgerond en we overzicht hebben van wat het heeft opgeleverd, er eindelijk ruimte komt voor een maatschappelijk breder gedragen fase van reflectie. Bennema vult aan: "Daarna moeten journalisten er eerlijk op ingaan. Er moet een meer nationaal debat ontstaan." Zo ook, benadrukt ze, meer draagvlak voor de erkenning van onze 'vuile oorlog' onder politici. Captain denkt dat het onderzoek ervoor zal zorgen dat we ons makkelijker zullen kunnen verhouden tot het verleden. Dat we ons beter zullen kunnen verplaatsen in de nabestaanden van dat verleden. Captain: "Het verhaal over de nasleep Door het onderzoek dat nu wel mogelijk is en destijds nauwelijks is gedaan, kan de Staat zich niet meer van de discussie onthouden. – Kester Freriks " " 34 van de Tweede Wereldoorlog wordt nu opgepakt door een volgende generatie. Dus niet meer de generatie van de ooggetuige –de mensen die het zelf allemaal hebben meegemaakt– maar de generatie van de kinderen en eigenlijk zelfs de kleinkinderen." Zij zijn degenen, meent Captain, die niet langer uit vrees en schaamte hun ogen zullen sluiten voor de oorlogsmisdaden in Indonesië. Het feit dat het tot nu mogelijk is geweest voor nabestaanden om – indien zij kunnen aantonen dat hun slachtofferschap bewijsbaar ofwel 'aannemelijk' is– een schadevergoeding te kunnen ontvangen, heeft naast juridische redenen, ook van doen met een veranderend beeld in de maatschappij. De rechtbank wees de claim van de Staat dat zaken van nabestaanden verjaard zijn, af. De vraag is natuurlijk of dit een soort generositeit of concessie is vanuit de Staat naar de nabestaanden toe. Kester Freriks gaat zo ver als te stellen dat er weleens een band zou kunnen zijn tussen het flexibel opstellen van de Staat en de kritische noten in de media. Hij zegt daar wel bij: "Die schuldregeling is natuurlijk toch een beetje een slimme truc om de echte grote claims op afstand te houden." Nu lijkt de gewaarwording dat er weinig over is van de geringe aandacht voor de oorlogsmisdaden in de Nederlandse kranten van grofweg vóór 1995. Er is een kanttekening. Nu er officieel een staatsgesponsord onderzoek is naar de zogenoemde 'excessen' in Indië, lijken de media er voor te kiezen een nieuwe periode van afwachtendheid in te gaan en de kat wat uit de boom te kijken, zoals Anne-Lot Hoek het beschrijft. "Er wordt op dit moment wel veel opinie geschreven, maar vrij weinig aan onderzoeksjournalistiek gedaan naar het onderwerp. Er is denk ik een run geweest binnen de media, toewerkend naar de climax van het moment dat het onderzoek kwam. En toen viel het toch wel enigzins stil." Dan is er de vraag in hoeverre het onderzoek van impact is op de nabestaanden. Anne-Lot Hoek zegt dat bijvoorbeeld veteranen aan Balinese kant vrij opgewekt zijn. "Maar het is niet zo dat niemand in Indonesië meer wrok heeft, zoals de beeldvorming wel eens doet voorkomen. Er zijn ook nog mensen die de onafhankelijkheidsoorlog als heel problematisch hebben ervaren en het daar nog steeds moeilijk mee hebben. Dat is vaker de burgerbevolking –mensen die bijvoorbeeld een vader hebben verloren in de oorlog." De ene nabestaande heeft daarmee misschien meer baat bij het onderzoek, geldelijke rectificaties of erkenning, dan de andere. Of is iets als het dekolonisatieonderzoek meer een soort excuses die we maken voor onszelf? Hoek wijdt hierover uit: "Dat denk ik wel. Mijn ervaring in Indonesië is dat academici vooral geïnteresseerd zijn in onderzoek. En dat veteranen en nabestaanden minder in excuses en herstelbetalingen zijn geïnteresseerd, maar het juist veel belangrijker vinden dat er eindelijk iemand naar hun verhaal komt luisteren. Er is vanuit Nederland nauwelijks aandacht gekomen voor hun verhaal." Hoek denkt dat de mensen die een excuses of 'reparaties' van de Staat verlangen, dat dat vooral mensen zijn die persoonlijk geraakt zijn vanwege een verlies in de familie. En los van excuses of betalingen, zegt Hoek: "Veel vinden het belangrijker dat er iemand naar hun verhaal komt luisteren." Dat in die zin het dekolonisatieonderzoek meer iets is om met onszelf in het reine te komen, dan een gebaar van de Staat naar nabestaanden toe, is Esther Captain het wel mee eens. "Ik denk in eerste instantie dat het voor De media geven nabestaanden een stem, treden op als versterker . . . en kunnen zaken op de agenda zetten en druk uitoefenen. En dat is wanneer het een politiek probleem wordt, en de Staat er iets mee moet. – Rémy Limpach " " 35 Nederland is. Dus is het om met onszelf in het reine te komen? Ja, dat kan. Als historicus kun je zeggen dat die emotie erbij zit, maar het gaat toch ook vooral om een verandering in de geschiedschrijving." Voor Bennema is het duidelijk vooral het met jezelf in het reine komen dat indirect van waarde is voor de nabestaanden. De bevolking opleiden zodat het niet nog eens in stilte zal toekijken onder de misdragingen van haar regering, is het belangrijkst. Bennema: "En de eerste stap daarin is bekentenis afleggen. Iets waar we goed over moeten nadenken en expliciet over moeten zijn in de schoolboeken." Limpach lijkt eenzelfde visie aan te dragen. Hij is van mening dat zijn boek heel veel aandacht heeft gekregen, maar niet persé omdat het nu zo briljant is. De vele aandacht impliceert voor hem dat in de jaren daarvoor onze zwarte bladzijden gewoon zo veel minder ter sprake zijn geweest, en dat we ze nog steeds niet verwerkt hebben. "Als je naar Duitsland kijkt: die hebben de term 'vergangenheitsbewältigung'. In 'het reine komen met het verleden'. Het land heeft inmiddels een imago als zijnde de weltmeister in vergangenheitsbewältigung." Volgens Limpach komt dit, zoals Bennema al aangaf, door de aandacht ervoor in het onderwijs, maar ook door de opstelling van de media en musea. "Die reproduceren continu het onrecht dat Duitsland destijds de Joden heeft aangedaan." Opdat toekomstige nabestaanden nooit geboren zullen worden, lijkt het devies van de experts. Limpach heeft volgens Bennema gelijk in dat we ons verleden nog steeds niet zo efficiënt en moeiteloos kunnen verwerken als de Duitsers dat kunnen. Ondanks een verandering in het beeld van de dekolonisatieoorlog dat Nederlandse kranten vormen, de veranderende houding van de Staat tegenover nabestaanden en de groeiende aandacht voor de oorlogsmisdaden onder jonge generaties, komt veel kennis over die zwarte bladzijden volgens Bennema nog steeds maar mondjesmaat in Nederlandse media en ons bewustzijn terug. Zo betaalde Indonesië nog tot in 2002 een totaal van 600 miljoen gulden aan herstelbetalingen aan Nederland, voor bezittingen onteigend na de onafhankelijkheidsverklaring. "Er zijn maar heel weinig mensen die dat weten. En dit komt geheel door onze eenzijdige blik op de geschiedenis –en helaas is dit nog steeds het geval." Kester Freriks sluit zich hierbij aan: "In Nederland leeft nog steeds de nostalgie naar het vroegere Indië." Freriks meent ook dat eigenlijk weinigen weten wat die 'politionele acties' precies inhielden. De beeldvorming in kranten is dus veranderd –het beeld is alleen niet persé verbeterd. Zoals het beeld van die onafhankelijkheidsverklaring op de 17e van augustus, waar Freriks over geschreven heeft: "Iedereen heeft altijd gedacht –zelfs mensen die in Indië gewoond hebben– dat het een gigantische manifestatie was van Soekarno's militaire vertoon. Maar het waren vier mensen in Soekarno's tuin. Dus tot op heden wordt toch nog altijd die Indonesische kant eenzijdig belicht." Wat wel een zekere kracht van de media is, aldus Limpach, is dat ". . . de media de nabestaanden een stem geven, ze optreden als versterker en activisten een podium geven: ze kunnen zaken op de agenda zetten en druk uitoefenen. En dat is wanneer het een politiek probleem wordt, en de Staat er iets mee moet. Het huidige patroon voor nabestaanden is volgens Limpach hierbij: "Een advocaat representeert bepaalde claimanten en zoekt dan de media op om het te agenderen, en daarmee tegelijkertijd druk uit te oefenen." Limpach voegt hier nog aan toe: "En advocaten die makkelijker toegang vinden tot de media, zeggen vaak dat de Staat zich nog soepeler zou moeten opstellen en veel te defensief is." Het is misschien verlegenheid van onze kant, dat wij alles cash willen afrekenen –dat is de boekhoudersmentaliteit die wij hier in Nederland hebben. – Esther Captain " " 36 Tineke Bennema sluit af: "Als je kijkt naar alle kritische reacties op nieuwsartikelen die ons verleden in Indië uitpluizen, lijkt het zo te zijn dat veel mensen in Nederland er nog niet aan toe zijn om in de spiegel te kijken. En politici, die staan daarin misschien nog wel voorop. Toegeven dat we fout zaten, is ook geen klein dingetje." 4.3 Deelconclusie Vrijwel alle experts geven aan dat de beeldvorming in Nederlandse kranten over het handelen van de Staat in voormalig Nederlands-Indië, zorgde voor een tot op vandaag de dag voelbaar, gebrekkig draagvlak in de maatschappij voor het met onszelf in het reine willen komen. De resulterende neiging tot het verzwijgen, negeren en verbloemen van de oorlogsmisdaden begaan in Indonesië, leidde tot pieken, oprispingen of uitbarstingen van kritiek op de Staat ofwel op de leveraars van die kritiek. Deze pieken van grootschalige, openbarende of schokkende berichtgevingen in de Nederlandse kranten bestrijken een periode tot aan nu, en worden enkel gescheiden van elkaar door intervallen van relatieve onderbelichting van het onderwerp. De reden voor deze intervallen is een nog steeds bestaand doch licht aanwezig beeld dat 'Nederlands-Indië' een getaboeïseerd onderwerp is waar men zich liever niet aan brandt, dan er verantwoordelijkheid voor te nemen. Lang zorgde, of in ieder geval, droeg de beeldvorming in Nederlandse kranten bij aan racisme, discriminatie en een vals gevoel van suprematie jegens de Indonesiërs, zonder dat de Nederlandse bevolking daar zelf zozeer van op de hoogte was als ze dat nu kunnen zijn. Voorbeelden die reflecteren hoe Nederlanders diep van binnen toch nog trotser kunnen zijn op het vroegere 'bezitten' van Indië dan dat ze zich bekommeren om de tragedie van het kolonialisme, zijn er nog te veel. Een sentiment, zo concludeer ik op basis van de experts, welke de Nederlandse kranten veelal in stand hielden, en waarop de Staat weer kapitaliseerde. Maar: de experts dragen wel uit dat het beeld in de Nederlandse kranten van onze zwarte bladzijden in Indië verandert, en de beeldvorming afneemt. Een gevolg van de aandacht voor de herziening van onze geschiedschrijving. En nu nog, zo geven de respondenten aan, een maatschappijbreed begrip voor en van die geschiedschrijving. Als we dan kijken naar de volgende stap uit het hypotheseschema in figuur 2, over of de beeldvorming in kranten van invloed kan zijn op politieke beleidsvorming: 'Is dit ook het geval bij het beleid met betrekking tot de nabestaanden van oorlogsmisdaden gepleegd in Indonesië?' Dan ben ik geneigd te conluderen dat de diepte-interviews met de experts uitwijzen dat het antwoord hierop tevens 'ja', is. Het beeld in de Nederlandse kranten van onze zwarte bladzijden in Indië verandert, en de beeldvorming neemt af. " "

On the accuracy of group credences∗ Richard Pettigrew [email protected] October 8, 2016 We often ask for the opinion of a group of individuals. How strongly does the scientific community believe that the rate at which sea levels are rising increased over the last 200 years? How likely does the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England think it is that there will be a recession if the country leaves the European Union? How confident is the scholarly community that William Shakespeare wrote Hamlet? Suppose you ask me one of these questions, and I respond by listing, for each member of the group in question, the opinion that they hold on that topic. I list each scientist in the scientific community, for instance, and I give their credence that sea level rise accelerated in the past two centuries. By doing this, I may well give you enough information so that you can calculate the answer to the question that you asked; but what I give you does not amount to that answer. What you were asking for was not a set of credences, one for each member of the group; you were asking for a single credence assigned collectively by the group as a whole. What is this group credence? And how does it relate to the individual credences assigned by the members of the group in question? In this paper, I'd like to explore a novel argument for a familiar partial answer to the latter question. In particular, given a group of individuals, I'd like to say that any account of how we aggregate the credences of those individuals to give the credences of the group must have a particular property - the group credences should be a weighted average of the individual credences. Now, a weighted average is sometimes called a linear pool, and this constraint on the aggregation of credences is usually called linear pooling. I will not have much to say about how we should set the weightings when we first take our linear pool of the individual credences. But I will have something to say about how those weightings should evolve as new evidence arrives. I will also have something to say about the two standard objections to linear pooling as a constraint on the aggregation of credences. 1 Group opinions and group knowledge Before I present my argument, I'd like to say a little more about the first question from above. This was the more ontological of the two. It asked: What is a group credence? Indeed, it ∗Acknowledgments: I am very grateful to a number of people for helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper: Alexander Bird, Liam Kofi Bright, Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Branden Fitelson, Brian Hedden, Remco Heesen, Matt Kopec, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Jeff Sanford Russell, Julia Staffel, Brian Weatherson, Greg Wheeler, Kevin Zollman, as well as two anonymous referees for this journal. However, the paper reports my credences, not those of that group - I take responsibility for any flaws. This work was supported by the European Research Council Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007-2013), ERC grant 308961-EUT. 1 turns out that there are at least two different notions that might go by that name. I will be concerned with the notion of a group credence function at a time as a summary of the credal opinions of the individuals in the group at that time. But we might also think of the notion of a group credence function at a time as a summary of the potential knowledge that is distributed throughout the credal opinions of the individuals in the group at that time. Let's see these different notions in action. Suppose two historians, Jonathan and Josie, are researching the same question, but in two different archives. Both know that there may be a pair of documents, one in each archive, whose joint existence would establish a controversial theory beyond doubt. Jonathan finds the relevant document in his archive, but doesn't know whether Josie has found hers; and Josie finds the relevant document in her archive, but doesn't know whether Jonathan has found his. Indeed, each assigns a very low credence to the other finding their document; as a result, both have a very low credence in the controversial theory. According to the first notion of a group credence function as a summary of the credal opinions of the group's members, the group credence in the controversial theory should remain low. After all, both members of the group assign it a low credence. However, according to the second notion of a group credence function as a summary of the knowledge that is distributed throughout the credal opinions of the individuals in the group, the group credence in the controversial theory should be high. After all, between them, they know that both documents exist, and they both agree that this would give extremely strong evidence for the controversial hypothesis. These two notions of a group credence function are not independent. It seems natural to think that we arrive at the second sort of group credence function - the sort that summarises the knowledge distributed throughout the group - as follows: we take the credences of each of the members of the group; we let them become common knowledge within the group; we allow the members of the group to update their individual credences on this common knowledge; and then, having done this, we take the first notion of a group credence function - that sort that summarizes the credal opinions of the individuals in the group - with these updated individual credence functions as its input. That is, group credences as summaries of distributed potential knowledge are simply summaries of the opinions of the individuals in the group once those individuals are brought up to speed with the opinions of the other individuals.1 Thus, once Jonathan learns that Josie has very high credence that the relevant document from her archive exists, and once Josie learns that Jonathan has very high credence that the relevant document from his archive exists, they will both update to a high credence that both documents exist, and from there to a high credence that the controversial theory is true. Taking a summary of those updated credences gives us a high group credence that the controversial theory is true - and of course that is the correct summary of the potential knowledge distributed between Jonathan and Josie. Throughout, I'll be interested in the first sort of group credence function. That is, I'll be concerned with defending a norm for group credences understood as summaries of the 1Of course, much thought has been given to how you should respond when you learn of someone else's credences; this is the focus of the peer disagreement literature. For accuracy-based analyses of this problem, see (Moss, 2011; Staffel, 2015; Levinstein, 2015; Heesen & van der Kolk, 2016). Also, if the members of the group share the same prior probabilities, Robert Aumann's famous Agreement Theorem shows that there is just one rational way for members of the group to respond-they must all end up with the same credence function once they have updated on the common knowledge of one another's posterior probabilities (Aumann, 1976). Thus, in such a case, there will be no disagreement to resolve. But of course there are many cases in which things are not so simple, because the members of the group do not share the same priors. 2 opinions of the individuals in the group. 2 Linear pooling Having pinned down the notion of group credence function that will concern us here, let me introduce an example to illustrate the account of group credence functions that I will defend here, namely, linear pooling. Adila, Benicio, and Cleo are climate scientists. They all have opinions about many different propositions; but all three have opinions about the following proposition and its negation: The sea level rise between 2016 and 2030 will exceed 20cm. We'll call this proposition H; and we'll write H for its negation. The following table gives the credences that Adila (crA), Benicio (crB), and Cleo (crC) assign to the two propositions: crA crB crC H 0.2 0.4 0.5 H 0.8 0.6 0.5 But what credences does the group, Adila-Benicio-Cleo, assign to these two propositions? There are two standard proposals in the literature: linear pooling and geometrical pooling. On both, each member of the group is assigned a real number as a weighting-thus, we might let αA be Adila's weighting, αB for Benicio, and αC for Cleo. We assume that these weightings are non-negative real numbers; and we assume that they sum to 1. According to linear pooling, the group credence in a particular proposition is given by the relevant weighted arithmetic average of the individual credences in that proposition. For instance, CrLP(H) = αAcrA(H) + αBcrB(H) + αCcrC(H) = 0.2αA + 0.4αB + 0.5αC So, for example, if each weighting is the same, so that αA = αB = αC = 13 , then CrLP(H) = (0.2× 1 3 ) + (0.4× 1 3 ) + (0.5× 1 3 ) ≈ 0.37 and CrLP(H) = (0.8× 1 3 ) + (0.6× 1 3 ) + (0.5× 1 3 ) ≈ 0.63 More generally: Linear Pooling Suppose: • G is a group of individuals; • the credence functions of its members are cr1, . . . , crn; • cri is defined on the algebra of propositions Fi; • the credence function of the group is CrG; • CrG is defined on the algebra of propositions F = ⋂n i=1 Fi. Then there should be real numbers α1, . . . , αn ≥ 0 with ∑ni=1 αi = 1 such that CrG(−) = n ∑ i=1 αicri(−) If this holds, we say that CrG is a weighted (arithmetic) average or mixture or linear pool of cr1, . . . , crn. 3 Notice that, if the individuals' credence functions are probability functions, then so is any linear pool of them. We will assume throughout that the individuals' credence functions are indeed probability functions. And we will assume that each of the set of propositions Fi on which cri is defined is finite - thus, F = ⋂n i=1 Fi is also finite. What's so bad about a group credence function that is not a mixture of the individual credence functions held by the members of the group? That is, what is so bad about violating Linear Pooling? And what's so good about CrLP? Roughly, our answer will be based on the following pair of claims: (I) If CrG is not a mixture of cr1, . . . , crn, then there is an alternative group credence function Cr∗G such that, by the lights of each member of the group, the expected epistemic value of Cr∗G is strictly greater than the expected epistemic value of CrG (II) If CrG is a mixture of cr1, . . . , crn, then there is not even an alternative group credence function Cr∗G whose expected epistemic value is at least that of CrG by the lights of each member of the group. Consider, for instance, the candidate group credence function CrABC that assigns 0.1 to H and 0.9 to H. It is not a linear pool of crA, crB, and crC. What is wrong with it? Well, according to this argument, the following is true: there is some alternative group credence function Cr∗ that Adila, Benicio, and Cleo all expect to do better than Cr. And Cr∗ is itself a linear pool of crA, crB, and crC. And there is no alternative group credence function Cr′ that Adila, Benicio, and Cleo all expect to do better than Cr∗. In the next few sections, we make this more precise. We start, in section 3, by making precise how we measure epistemic value. Then, in section 4, we make precise why the claim just stated would, if true, establish Linear Pooling as a rational requirement; and we observe that a precise version of that claim is true. Finally, in sections 5 and 6, we address two common objections to Linear Pooling - it does not preserve probabilistic independences; and it does not commute with Bayesian conditionalization. 3 Epistemic value and accuracy The account of epistemic value that I favour is monistic. That is, I think there is just one fundamental source of value for credences. Following James M. Joyce (1998) and Alvin Goldman (2002), I take the epistemic value of a credence to be its accuracy. A credence in a true proposition is more accurate the higher it is; a credence in a false proposition is more accurate the lower it is. Put another way: the ultimate goal of having credences is to have maximal credence (i.e. credence 1) in truths and minimal credence (i.e. credence 0) in falsehoods; the epistemic value of a credence is given by its proximity to that ultimate goal. This is a credal version of veritism. How should we measure the accuracy of a credence? In fact, in keeping with other writings in this area, we will talk about measuring the inaccuracy of a credence rather than its accuracy; but I take the accuracy of a credence to be simply the negative of its inaccuracy, so there is nothing substantial about this choice. Now, the inaccuracy of a credence in a proposition should depend only on the credence itself, the proposition to which it is assigned, and the truth value of the proposition at the world where its inaccuracy is being assessed. Thus, we can measure the inaccuracy of a credence using what has come to be called a scoring rule. 4 A scoring rule s is a function that takes a proposition X, the truth value i of X (represented numerically, so that 0 represents falsity and 1 represents truth), and the credence x in X that we will assess; and it returns a number sX(i, x). So sX(1, x) is the inaccuracy of credence x in proposition X when X is true; and sX(0, x) is the inaccuracy of credence x in proposition X when X is false. What features should we require of a scoring rule s if it is to be a legitimate measure of inaccuracy? We will consider two. First, we will require that the inaccuracy of a credence varies continuously with the credence. That is: Continuity sX(1, x) and sX(0, x) are continuous functions of x. I take this to be a natural assumption. Second, we will require that the scoring rule s should be strictly proper. Take a particular credence p in a proposition X - so p is a real number at least 0 and at most 1. We can use p to calculate the expected inaccuracy of any credence x, including p itself. The expected inaccuracy of x from the point of view of p is simply this: psX(1, x) + (1− p)sX(0, x) That is, it takes the inaccuracy of x when X is true - namely, sX(1, x) - and weights it by p, since p is a credence in X; and it takes the inaccuracy of x when X is false - namely, sX(0, x) - and weights it by (1− p), which is of course the corresponding probabilistic credence in the negation of X. A scoring rule is strictly proper if, for any such credence p in a proposition X, it expects itself to have lowest inaccuracy out of all the possible credences in X. That gives us the following principle: Strict Propriety For any proposition X and any 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, psX(1, x) + (1− p)sX(0, x) is minimized uniquely, as a function of x, at p = x. This demand has been justified in various ways: see (Gibbard, 2008), (Joyce, 2009), or (Pettigrew, 2016, Chapters 3 and 4). Let me briefly sketch Joyce's argument for Strict Propriety. Suppose you are a veritist about credences: that is, you hold that the sole fundamental source of epistemic value for credences is their accuracy; and you hold that facts about the rationality of a credal state are determined by facts about its epistemic value. Then reason as follows: Let X be a proposition and p a credence. Then, intuitively, there is evidence you might receive to which the unique rational response is to set your credence in X to p. For instance, you might learn with certainty that the objective chance of X is p. Or your most revered epistemic guru might whisper in your ear that she has credence p in X. Suppose you do receive this evidence; and suppose that you do set your credence in X to p, in accordance with your evidence. Now, suppose that, contrary to Strict Propriety, there is some other credence x 6= p such that p expects x to be at most as inaccurate as p expects p to be: that is, ps(1, x) + (1− p)s(0, x) ≤ ps(1, p) + (1− p)s(0, p). Then, from the point of view of veritism, there would be nothing epistemically reprehensible were you to switch from your current credence p in X to a credence of x in X without obtaining any new evidence in the meantime. After all, we typically think that it is rationally permissible to adopt an option 5 that you currently expect to be at most as bad as your current situation. And, by hypothesis, p expects credence x in X to be at most as inaccurate - and thus, by veritism, at most as bad, epistemically speaking - as it expects credence p in X to be. But of course making such a switch would be epistemically reprehensible. It is not rationally permissible for you to shift your credence in X from p to x without obtaining any new evidence in the meantime; for, by hypothesis, having credence p in X is the unique rational response to your evidence.2 Therefore, there can be no such credence x in X. Thus, in general, for any credence p in any proposition X, there can be no alternative credence x 6= p in X that p expects to be at most as inaccurate as it expects itself to be. And that is just what it means to say that the measure of inaccuracy must be strictly proper. What do these strictly proper and continuous scoring rules look like? Here is an example. It is called the quadratic scoring rule: • qX(1, x) := (1− x)2 • qX(0, x) := x2 In other words: qX(i, x) = |i − x|2, where i = 0 or 1. So the quadratic scoring rule takes the difference between the credence you have and the credence you would ideally have - credence 1 if the proposition is true and credence 0 if it's false - and squares that difference to give your inaccuracy. A little calculus shows that q is strictly proper and continuous. Here is an example of a scoring rule that is continuous, but not strictly proper. It is called the absolute value measure: • aX(1, x) := 1− x • aX(0, x) := x In other words: aX(i, x) = |i− x|. So the absolute value measure takes the difference between the credence you have and the credence you would ideally have and takes that to give your inaccuracy. If p = 12 , every credence has the same expected inaccuracy from the vantage point of p; if p < 12 , credence 0 minimizes expected inaccuracy from the vantage point of P; and if p > 12 , credence 1 does so. So, while a is continuous, it is not strictly proper. 3 A scoring rule measures the inaccuracy of a single credence. But the groups of individuals whose individual and group credences we will be assessing will typically have more than one credence; they will have credences in a range of different propositions. Adila, Benicio, and Cleo all have credences in H and in H and no doubt also in many more propositions besides these. How are we to assess the accuracy, and thus epistemic value, of a credal state composed of more than one credence? We will adopt the natural answer. We will take the inaccuracy of a credence function - which of course represents a credal state consisting of credences in a number of propositions - to be the sum of the inaccuracies of the individual credences it assigns. That is, given a scoring rule s, we can define an inaccuracy measure I as follows: I takes a credence function cr and a possible state of the world w, and it returns 2Note that it is here that we appeal to the assumption that a credence of p in X is the unique rational response to your evidence. If your evidence merely made that credence one of a number of rational responses, we could not establish Strict Propriety. That would leave open the possibility that another credence q 6= p in X is also a rational response to your evidence. And that would mean that we could not rule out the possibility that ps(1, q) + (1− p)s(0, q) ≤ ps(1, p) + (1− p)s(0, p). 3There are also strictly proper scoring rules that are not continuous (Schervish et al., 2009). 6 the inaccuracy of that whole credence function at w; it takes the inaccuracy of cr to be the sum of the inaccuracies of the individual credences that cr assigns. In symbols: I(cr, w) = ∑ X∈F sX(w(X), cr(X)) Here, F is the set of propositions on which cr is defined; and w(X) gives the truth value of proposition X in state of the world w - so w(X) = 0 if X is false at w, and w(X) = 1 if X is true at w. Thus, for instance, if we take the quadratic scoring rule q to be our scoring rule, it would generate this inaccuracy measure: Iq(cr, w) = ∑ X∈F qX(w(X), cr(X)) = ∑ X∈F |cr(X)− w(X)|2 This, then, gives us our measure of epistemic disvalue. Pick a continuous and strictly proper scoring rule s; generate from it an inaccuracy measure I in the way outlined above. I(cr, w) is then the inaccuracy - and thus epistemic disvalue - of the credence function cr when the world is w. Given this, we can define the expected epistemic disvalue of one credence function from the point of view of another. Suppose cr is one credence function, and cr′ is another. Then we can define the expected inaccuracy of cr′ from the vantage point of cr as follows: ExpI(cr ′|cr) = ∑ w∈W cr(w)I(cr′, w) When this value is low, cr judges cr′ to be doing well; when this value is high, cr judges cr′ to be doing badly. Since s is strictly proper, and since I is generated from s in the way laid out above, it follows that there is an analogous sense in which I is also strictly proper: every credence function cr expects itself to be doing best. That is, for any two credence functions cr 6= cr′, ExpI(cr|cr) < ExpI(cr′|cr). For this reason, when an inaccuracy measure I is generated from a continuous and strictly proper scoring rule s in the way laid out above, we say that I is an additive and continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure. 4 The Accuracy Argument for Linear Pooling I am now ready to make fully explicit my argument for linear pooling. It has three premises. Here is the first: (P1) The epistemic disvalue of a group credence function cr at a world w is given by I(cr, w), where I is an additive and continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure. Here's the first thing this premise says: just as we can evaluate the epistemic value of the credence functions of individuals, so we can evaluate the epistemic value of the credence functions of groups. What's more, just as the epistemic value of an individual's credence function is its accuracy, so the epistemic value of a group credence function is its accuracy. This is plausible, but not uncontroversial. In many cases, we wish to identify a group credence function in order to use it to make decisions on behalf of the group. As a policymaker, I might ask what the scientific community thinks about future sea level rises because I want to decide ahead of time which mitigation strategies I should deploy. But we might also want to use it to say how the group, as a collective, represents the world. Plausibly, that's what 7 we're interested in when we ask about the authorship of Hamlet. We want to know something about how the scholarly community represents part of the world. Does that community think it most likely that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet, or that Edward de Vere did? Now, we know that individual credences play a dual role: they guide actions; but they also encode a representation of the world. Individual credences encode an individual's representation of the world; and that's why they have epistemic value, and why their epistemic value is their accuracy. The first thing that this first premise says is that group credences may also have this dual role: they guide the actions of that group; but they also encode facts about how that group represents the world. And, because of this, they have epistemic value as well as pragmatic value; and, moreover, their epistemic value is accuracy. The second thing that this premise says: the accuracy of group credence functions should be measured in the same way as the accuracy of individual credences; that is, by using an additive and continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure. Now, it is worth noting that we will assume that, while individuals may disagree on the inaccuracy measure they use to give their own inaccuracy and the inaccuracy of other individuals, they all agree on the measure they use to give the inaccuracy of the group credence function. That is, while they might differ on the way in which they value inaccuracy for themselves and others like them, when it comes to the inaccuracy of a group credence, they agree on how to value its accuracy; and that agreement is recorded in a single additive and continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure. The second premise of the argument is this: (P2) If, by the lights of every individual in a group, the expected epistemic value of one credence function is higher than the expected epistemic value of another credence function, then the latter cannot be the credence function of that group. This premise belongs to a familiar family of claims about group attitudes. We might call these unanimity preservation principles. They all say that, while the individuals in the group will doubtless disagree on many things, when they agree about a certain sort of judgment and speak with one voice about it, their stance on that judgement should be respected in our account of their group attitude. Recall our example from the start of the paper. Adila had credence 0.2 in H; Benicio had 0.4; and Cleo had 0.5. Suppose I had then presented an account of group credences on which the group credence of Adila-Benicio-Cleo is 0.1. You would likely have found this strange. Part of this reaction, I think, is fuelled by a unanimity preservation principle: since all individuals agree that H is at least 20% likely and at most 50% likely, the group credence should also agree with this - a group credence of 0.1 in H does not. But such principles must be handled with care. For instance, suppose we were to take the group credence in H to be 0.21. There doesn't seem to be anything troubling about that. And yet Adila, Benicio, and Cleo all agree that H is not 21% likely. This refutes the most general unanimity preservation principle, which says that, if each individual's credence function has a particular property, then the group credence function should also have that property. From this principle, it would follow that the group credence function must be the credence function of one of the individuals in the group - and that seems an extremely implausible demand. So, if we accept (P2), it cannot be because we think it is always the case that, when the individuals speak with one voice, the group that they form should speak with that voice too. Nonetheless, (P2) seems very plausible. The group credence function is something put forward by the group as a summary of their diverse views. And it is answerable only to 8 them. Thus, if they all judge one credence function to be better than another, the latter could not possibly be the credence function they put forward as their collective view. And that is what (P2) says. Note also that (P2) is a very natural application, in the epistemic case, of a principle that is very plausible in the practical case. Suppose that there are two mitigation strategies we might deploy against rising sea levels. And suppose that Adila, Benicio, and Cleo share exactly the same utility function, even though they differ in their credence function. Suppose that, from the vantage point of Adila's credence function, the expected utility of the first mitigation strategy is greater than the expected utility of the second. Suppose further that this is true from the vantage point of Benicio's credence function as well, and also from the vantage point of Cleo's credence function. That is, all three assign a higher expected utility to the first than to the second. That is, each of the three would, as good expected utility maximisers, choose the first over the second given the choice. Then it would seem bizarre to say that the group prefers the second to the first! And it would seem bizarre to say that the group endorses deploying the second strategy instead of the first. (P2) says the same in the epistemic case: if all three scientists agree on their ranking of two credence functions, then the group's ranking should agree; and the group credence function should not be outranked by some other credence function in the group's ranking. Now, it is worth noting that, if we were to represent our agents' doxastic states as full beliefs, rather than as credences, the unanimity preservation principle just sketched would be more controversial. In that case, because of the Discursive Dilemma and related problems, it is difficult to give an account of group beliefs and group preferences that respects such a unanimity preservation principle (Pettit, 2007, 197-8).4 For instance, suppose we form group beliefs by a process of majority rule: that is, a group believes a proposition just in case a majority of its members believe that proposition. And suppose that we have a trio of policymakers, A, B, and C, all of whom will prefer option a to option b iff they believe each of the propositions X, Y, and Z; otherwise, they will prefer b to a. And suppose that A believes X, Y, but not Z; B believes X, Z, but not Y; and C believes Y, Z, but not X. So the group believes X, Y, and Z, since each proposition is believed by a majority of A, B, and C. Then each member prefers b to a, since each fails to believe one of X, Y, or Z. But the group prefers a to b, since it believes X, Y, and Z. These sorts of problems don't arise in the credal case. Suppose each member of a group has the same utility function, and the group therefore has that same utility function. And suppose that the group credence function is obtained from the individual credence functions in accordance with Linear Pooling. Then if each member of the group assigns higher expected utility to option a than to option b, then so does the group - since the group credences are a weighted average of the individual credences and the group utility function is the utility function shared by all members of the group, the group's expected utilities are a weighted average of the individuals' expected utilities. As a result, there is no Discursive Dilemma in the credal case, and thus no threat to the sort of unanimity preservation principle that underpins (P2). The third premise of our argument, (P3), is a mathematical theorem that acts as a bridge between (P1) and (P2), on the one hand, and Linear Pooling, on the other: Theorem 1 Suppose I is an additive and continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure. And suppose cr1, . . . , crn is a collection of credence functions defined on the same set of propositions. 4Thanks to Matt Kopec for urging me to address this concern. 9 (I) If Cr is not a linear pool of cr1, . . . , crn, then there is Cr∗ that is a linear pool of cr1, . . . , crn such that, for each cri, ExpI(Cr ∗|cri) < ExpI(Cr|cri) (II) If Cr is a linear pool of cr1, . . . , crn, then there is no Cr∗ 6= Cr such that, for each cri, ExpI(Cr ∗|cri) ≤ ExpI(Cr|cri) We will not give the full proof here, though see the Appendix for a sketch of the proof. Thus, we have the following argument for Linear Pooling: (P1) The epistemic disvalue of a group credence function cr at a world w is given by I(cr, w) (where I is an additive and continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure). (P2) If, by the lights of every individual in a group, the expected epistemic disvalue of one credence function is lower than the expected epistemic disvalue of another credence function, then the latter cannot be the credence function of that group. (P3) Theorem 1. Therefore, (C) Linear Pooling. Before we move on, it is worth saying how the present argument relates to another approach to group credences that appeals to scoring rules and inaccuracy measures. This is the approach taken by Sarah Moss (2011). As in our framework, we have a group of individuals, each with their own credence function. In general, in contrast with our approach in (P1), Moss allows that each individual might use a different inaccuracy measure to give the inaccuracy of the group credence function; however, in her argument for Linear Pooling, she assumes that they all use the same one. Moss then seeks the group credence function that somehow effects a compromise between the credence functions of the individuals who comprise the group. As we have seen above, given an individual's credence function cr and an inaccuracy measure I, we can evaluate the expected inaccuracy of any credence function cr′ by the lights of that individual's credence function cr - it is ExpI(cr ′|cr). Moss suggests that we can also evaluate the expected inaccuracy of any credence function by the lights of the group. She suggests that we take the group's expected inaccuracy of some credence function cr′ to be a weighted average of the expected inaccuracies of cr′ by the lights of the various individual credence functions held by the members of the group, and with respect to their individual ways of measuring inaccuracy. That is, if the individual credence functions of the members of a group G are cr1, . . . , crn, and their inaccuracy measures are I1, . . . ,In, respectively, then there are weightings α1, . . . , αn such that the group expected inaccuracy of a credence function cr is calculated as follows: ExpG(cr) = n ∑ i=1 αiExpIi(cr|cri) Moss then claims that the group credence function should be the credence function that minimizes ExpG. What's more, she proves that, in the case in which each individual has the same inaccuracy measure (i.e. Ii = Ij, for each i, j) the credence function that minimizes 10 ExpG is CrG(−) = α1cr1(−) + . . . + αncrn(−) (Moss, 2011, 10). That is, Moss' method recommends Linear Pooling. This is an extremely interesting result, but I think it provides a weaker argument for Linear Pooling than the argument from premises (P1), (P2), and (P3) given above. The problem is that Moss' argument assumes that we obtain the group's expected inaccuracy for a credence function cr′ by taking a weighted arithmetic average of the individuals' expected inaccuracies for cr′. But the very question at issue here is how the numericallyrepresented judgments of individuals should be aggregated to give the numerically-represented judgments of the group that they form, whether those numerically-represented judgments are credences or expected inaccuracies. Taking weighted arithmetic averages is one method of aggregation - it is the one endorsed by Linear Pooling. But, as we saw at the beginning, there are others. But if you take the group's expected inaccuracy for cr′ to be obtained by these other methods of aggregation, the credence function that minimizes the group's expected inaccuracy will not typically respect Linear Pooling. So, Moss' argument begs the question against those who think that the aggregation of numerically-represented judgments should proceed otherwise than by taking weighted arithmetic averages of those judgments. The argument that I have presented here does not beg the same question. I make no assumption about how we aggregate the individual expected inaccuracies of a particular credence function to give the group expected inaccuracy of that credence function. Rather, I appeal to a unanimity preservation principle that says that, if every member of the group prefers credence function Cr∗ to Cr, then Cr is not the group credence function. 5 Objections to Linear Pooling: preserving independences As we mentioned above, the second premise of our argument, (P2), is a sort of unanimity preservation principle. And, as we saw, in conjunction with a standard account of the epistemic disvalue of a credal state, it can be used to establish Linear Pooling. However, it is often objected that precisely what is wrong with Linear Pooling is that it violates a plausible unanimity preservation principle. Linear pooling, as is often observed, does not preserve unanimous probabilistic independence (Laddaga, 1977; Lehrer & Wagner, 1983; Wagner, 1984; Genest & Wagner, 1987; Dietrich & List, 2015; Russell et al., 2015). We say that two propositions, H and E, are probabilistically independent relative to a credence function cr if c(H|E) = c(H); that is, if the probability of H does not change when we condition on E. Equivalently, H and E are probabilistically independent relative to cr if c(HE) = c(H)c(E); that is, if the probability of H and E both occurring is the probability of H occurring weighted by the probability of E occurring. Now, as is often observed, if two propositions are probabilistically independent relative to two credence functions cr and cr′, it is most likely that they will not be probabilistically independent relative to a mixture of cr and cr′. The following theorem, which is in the background in (Laddaga, 1977; Lehrer & Wagner, 1983), establishes this: Theorem 2 Suppose cr1, cr2 are credence functions, and Cr = αcr1 + (1 − α)cr2 is a mixture of them (that is, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1). Suppose that H and E are propositions and further that they are probabilistically independent relative to cr1 and cr2. If H and E are also probabilistically independent relative to Cr, then at least one of the following is true: (i) α = 0 or α = 1. That is, Cr simply is one of cr1 or cr2. 11 (ii) cr1(H) = cr2(H). That is, cr1 and cr2 agree on H. (iii) cr1(E) = cr2(E). That is, cr1 and cr2 agree on E. On the basis of this well-known result, it is often said that there is a sort of judgment such that linear pooling does not preserve unaminity on that sort of judgment. The kind of judgment in question is judgment of independence. According to this objection to linear pooling, an individual judges that two propositions are independent whenever those propositions are probabilistically independent relative to her credence function. Thus, if your credence function is cr, and if H and E are probabilistically independent relative to cr, then you judge H and E to be independent. So, since two propositions can be independent relative to each of two different credence functions, but dependent relative to each of the non-extremal mixtures of those credence functions, linear pooling does not preserve unanimous judgments of independence - Adila and Benicio may be unanimous in their judgment that E is independent of H, while at the same time nearly all linear pools of their credences judge otherwise. It seems to me that the mistake in this objection lies in its account of judgments of independence. I will argue that it is simply not the case that I judge H and E to be independent just in case my credence in H remains unchanged when I condition on E: it is possible to judge that H and E are independent without satisfying this condition; and it is possible to satisfy this condition without judging them independent. Let's see how. First, suppose I am about to toss to coin. I know that it is either biased heavily in favour of heads or heavily in favour of tails. Indeed, I know that the objective chance of heads on any given toss is either 10% or 90%. And I know that every toss is stochastically independent of every other toss: that is, I know that, for each toss of the coin, the objective chance of heads is unchanged when we condition on any information about other tosses. Suppose further that I think each of the two possible biases is equally likely. I assign each bias a credence of 0.5. Then my credence that the coin will land heads on its second toss should also be 0.5. However, if I consider my credence in that same proposition under the supposition that the coin landed heads on its first toss, it is different - it is not 0.5. If the coin lands heads on the first toss, that provides strong evidence that the coin is biased towards heads and not tails - if it is biased towards heads, the evidence that it landed heads on the first toss becomes much more likely than it would if the coin is biased towards tails. And, as my credence that the coin has bias 90% increases, so does my credence that the coin will land heads on the second toss. So, while I know that the tosses of the coin are stochastically independent, the outcome of the first and the second toss are not probabilistically independent relative to my credence function.5 5More precisely: There are two possible objective chance functions ch1 and ch2. If we let Hi be the proposition that the coin will land heads on its ith toss, then the following hold: • ch1(Hi) = 0.1 and ch2(Hi) = 0.9, for all i; • ch1(Hi Hj) = ch1(Hi)ch1(Hj) and ch2(Hi Hj) = ch2(Hi)ch2(Hj). And if we let Cchi be the proposition that chi is the objective chance function, then given that I know that either ch1 or ch2 is the objective chance function, I should assign credence 1 to the disjunction of Cch1 and Cch2 . That is, cr(Cch1 ∨ Cch2 ) = 1. Now, given that H1 and H2 are independent relative to ch1 and ch2, it seems natural to say that I judge H1 and H2 to be independent: I know that they are; and I assign maximal credence to a proposition, Cch1 ∨ Cch2 , that entails that they are. Now suppose I think it equally likely that the coin has the 0.1 bias or that it has the 0.9 bias. So cr(Cch1 ) = 0.5 = cr(Cch2 ). Then, by the Principal Principle, my credence in heads on the second toss should be 0.5, for it should be cr(H2) = cr(Cch1 )ch1(H2)+ cr(Cch2 )ch2(H2) = (0.5× 0.1)+ (0.5× 0.9) = 0.5. But suppose now that I condition on H1, the proposition that the coin lands heads on the first toss. If I were to learn H1, that would give me strong evidence that the coin is biased towards heads and not tails. After 12 Next, we can easily find examples in which two propositions are independent relative to my credence function, but I do not judge them independent. Indeed, there are examples in which I know for certain that they are not independent. Suppose, for instance, that there are just two probability functions that I consider possible chance functions. They agree on the chance they assign to HE and E, and thus they agree on the conditional chance of H given E. Both make H stochastically dependent on E. By the lights of the first, H depends positively on E - the conditional probability of H given E exceeds the unconditional probability of H. By the lights of the second, H depends negatively on E - the unconditional probability of H exceeds the conditional probability of H given E; and indeed it does so by the same amount that the conditional probability of H given E exceeds the probability of H relative to the first possible chance function. Suppose I have equal credence in each of these possible chance hypotheses. Then my credence in H lies halfway between the chances of H assigned by the two possible chance functions. But, by hypothesis, that halfway point is just the conditional chance of H given E, on which they both agree. So my conditional credence in H given E is just my unconditional credence in H. So H and E are probabilistically independent relative to my credence function. Yet clearly I do not judge them stochastically independent. Indeed, I know them to be stochastically dependent - what I don't know is whether the dependence is positive or negative.6 So it seems that, whatever is encoded by the facts that make H and E probabilistically independent relative to my credence function, it is not my judgment that those two propositions are stochastically independent: I can know that H and E are stochastically independent without my credence function rendering them probabilistically independent; and I can know that H and E are stochastically dependent while my credence function renders them probabilistically independent. Perhaps, then, there is some other sort of independence that we judge to hold of H and E whenever our credence function renders those two propositions probabilistically independent? Perhaps, for instance, such a fact about our credence funcall, the second chance hypothesis, Cch2 , makes heads much more likely than does the first chance hypothesis, Cch1 . And, indeed, again by the Principal Principle, cr(H2|H1) = cr(H2 H1) cr(H1) = cr(Cch1 )ch1(H2 H1)+c(Cch2 )ch2(H2 H1) cr(Cch1 )ch1(H2)+cr(Cch2 )ch2(H2) = (0.5×0.12)+(0.5×0.92) (0.5×0.1)+(0.5×0.9) = 0.82 1 = 0.82 > 0.5 = cr(H2). So, while I know that H1 and H2 are independent, and judge them so, it does not follow that they are independent relative to my credence function. The upshot: an individual might judge two propositions independent without those two events being probabilistically independent relative to her credence function. 6More precisely, suppose: (i) ch1(HE) = ch2(HE) and ch1(E) = ch2(E) (ii) ch1(H|E)− ch1(H) = ch2(H)− ch2(H|E) > 0 (iii) cr(Cch1 ) = 1 2 = cr(Cch2 ) First, note that: cr(H|E) = cr(HE) cr(E) = 1 2 ch1(HE) + 1 2 ch2(HE) 1 2 ch1(E) + 1 2 ch2(E) = chi(HE) chi(E) = chi(H|E) Next, if we let β = ch1(H|E)− ch1(H) = ch2(H)− ch2(H|E), then cr(H) = 1 2 ch1(H) + 1 2 ch2(H) = 1 2 (ch1(H|E)− β) + 1 2 (ch2(H|E) + β) = chi(H|E) = cr(H|E) 13 tion encodes our judgment that H and E are evidentially independent or evidentially irrelevant? I think not. If you think that there are facts of the matter about evidential relevance, then these are presumably facts about which an individual may be uncertain. But then we are in the same position as we are with stochastic independence. We might have an individual who is uncertain which of two probability functions encodes the facts about evidential relevance. Each of them might make E epistemically relevant to H; but it might be that, because of that individual's credences in the two possibilities, her credence function renders H and E probabilistically independent. If, on the other hand, you do not think there are facts of the matter about evidential relevance, it isn't clear how facts about my credence function could encode judgments about evidential relevance; nor, if they could, why we should care to preserve those judgments, even when they are made unanimously. Remember: we learned in section 4 that there will always be some features shared by all members of a group that cannot be shared with the group credence function. Elkin & Wheeler (2016) try to dramatise the objection we are considering by presenting a Dutch Book argument against groups whose group credences fail to preserve independences shared by all members of the group. Their idea is this: Suppose that, relative to the credence function of each member of a group, propositions H and E are probabilistically independent. And suppose that, relative to their group credence function Cr, H and E are not probabilistically independent - that is, Cr(HE) 6= Cr(H)Cr(E). Then, according to Elkin and Wheeler, there are two ways in which we can calculate the price at which the group will be prepared to buy or sell a £1 bet on the proposition HE - that is, a bet that pays £1 if HE turns out to be true, and which pays £0 if HE is false. First, the group will be prepared to buy or sell a £1 bet on HE at £Cr(HE), since that is the group credence in HE. Second, Elkin and Wheeler claim that the group should also be prepared to buy or sell a £1 bet on HE at £Cr(H)Cr(E), since Cr(H) is the group credence in H, Cr(E) is the group credence in E, and the group judges H and E to be independent. But, by hypothesis, £Cr(HE) 6= £Cr(H)Cr(E), and if an agent has two different prices at which they are prepared to buy or sell bets on a given proposition, it is possible to Dutch Book them. Suppose that Cr(H)Cr(E) < Cr(HE). Then we simply sell them a £1 bet on HE at £Cr(HE), which they consider a fair price. This will give the group a net gain of £(1 − Cr(HE)) if HE is true and a net gain of −£Cr(HE) if HE is false. And then we buy from them a £1 bet on HE at £Cr(H)Cr(E), which is their other fair price. This will give the group a net gain of £(Cr(H)Cr(E)− 1) if HE is true and a net gain of £Cr(H)Cr(E) if HE is false. Thus, their total net gain if HE is true is £(1− Cr(HE)) + £(Cr(H)Cr(E)− 1) < £0. And their total net gain if HE is false is −£Cr(HE) + £Cr(H)Cr(E) < £0. That is, the group is vulnerable to a series of bets, each of which it considers fair, but which collectively guarantee that it will lose money. And similarly with the signs reversed if Cr(HE) < Cr(H)Cr(E). The problem with this argument is the same as the problem with the original objection. The fact that H and E are probabilistically independent relative to each individual's credence function does not entail that each individual judges H and E to be independent. And without that, we have no reason to think that the group should also judge H and E independent, and thus no reason to think that the group should judge £Cr(H)Cr(E) a fair price for a £1 bet on HE. In sum: I conclude that it does not count against linear pooling that it does not preserve probabilistic independence. 14 6 Objections to Linear Pooling: updating on evidence Our second objection to linear pooling is closely related to the first. Both concern conditional probabilities - the first concerned their relationship to judgments of independence; the second concerns their relationship to rules of updating. As is often pointed out, linear pooling does not commute with updating by Bayesian conditionalization (Madansky, 1964; Genest, 1984; Dietrich & List, 2015; Berntson & Isaacs, 2013; Russell et al., 2015). The idea is this: Suppose that Adila and Benicio have credences in a range of propositions; and we take their group credence to be the linear pool of those credences determined by the weighting α for Adila and 1− α for Benicio. At this point, some new evidence arrives that is available to both members of the group. It comes in the form of a proposition that they both learn with certainty - perhaps they both learn the output from some climatological instrument. Bayesian conditionalization says that each individual, upon learning this evidence, should update their credences so that their new unconditional credence in a given proposition is just their old conditional credence in that proposition given the piece of evidence. How are we to update group credences in response to such evidence? There are two ways we might proceed: we might look to the individuals first, update their prior credence functions in accordance with the dictates of Bayesian conditionalization, and then take a linear pool of the resulting updated credence functions; or we might look to the group first, and update the group credence function in accordance with Bayesian conditionalization. Now suppose that, in the first approach, the weights used to pool the individual's posterior updated credence functions to give the group's posterior updated credence function are the same as the weights used to pool the individual's prior credence functions to give the group's prior credence function - that is, Adila's updated credence function is given weight α and Benicio's is given 1 − α. Then, in that situation, the two methods will rarely give the same result: updating and then linear pooling will most likely give a different result from linear pooling and then updating; or, as it is often put, linear pooling and updating do not commute. The following theorem makes this precise: Theorem 3 ((Madansky, 1964)) Suppose cr1, cr2 are credence functions, and Cr(−) = αcr1(−)+ (1− α)cr2(−) is a mixture of them (that is, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1). And suppose that αcr1(H|E) + (1− α)cr2(H|E) = Cr(H|E) ( = αcr1(HE) + (1− α)cr2(HE) αcr1(E) + (1− α)cr2(E) ) Then at least one of the following is true: (i) α = 0 or α = 1. That is, Cr simply is one of cr1 or cr2. (ii) cr1(H|E) = cr2(H|E). That is, cr1 and cr2 agree on H given E. (iii) cr1(E) = cr2(E). That is, cr1 and cr2 agree on E. This raises a problem for linear pooling, for it shows that the following are usually incompatible: (1) The rational update rule for individual credences is Bayesian conditionalization. (2) The rational update rule for group credences is Bayesian conditionalization. 15 (3) Group credences are always obtained from individual credences in accordance with Linear Pooling. (4) The weights assigned to individuals do not change when those individuals receive a new piece of evidence. The accuracy argument of section 4 seeks to establish (3), so we will not question that. And there are accuracy-based arguments in favour of Bayesian conditionalization as well. These are usually presented as establishing that individuals who plan to update otherwise than by conditionalization are irrational. For instance, Hilary Greaves & Wallace (2006) show that Bayesian conditionalization is the updating plan that, by the lights of the individual's prior credence function, uniquely minimizes the expected inaccuracy of the various possible posterior credence functions to which that updating plan might give rise, depending on the evidence it receives as input. And Briggs & Pettigrew (ms) show that, if an individual plans to update in any way other than by conditionalizing, there is an alternative plan they might have had that is guaranteed to result in less total inaccuracy for her when the inaccuracy of her initial credence function is added to the inaccuracy of her updated credence function. Surely, though, such arguments work just as well for the group credence functions. The argument of section 4 assumes that group credence functions, like individual credence functions, aim at accuracy. If that is so, then these two arguments for Bayesian conditionalization in the individual case tell just as strongly in favour of that updating rule in the group case. So we have (1) and (2).7 That leaves (4). Considerations of accuracy lead us to accept (1), (2), and (3); by doing so, they lead us to deny (4). In fact, this seems exactly right to me. To see why, let's begin by noting exactly how the weights must change to accommodate Bayesian conditionalization as the update plan for group credences in the presence of Linear Pooling. First, let's state the theorem, which is a particular case of the general result due to Howard Raiffa (1968, Chapter 8, Section 11): Theorem 4 ((Raiffa, 1968)) Suppose cr1, cr2 are credence functions, and 0 ≤ α, α′ ≤ 1. And suppose that α′cr1(H|E) + (1− α′)cr2(H|E) = αcr1(HE) + (1− α)cr2(HE) αcr1(E) + (1− α)cr2(E) Then at least one of the following is true: (i) α′ = αcr1(E) αcr1(E) + (1− α)cr2(E) and 1− α′ = (1− α)cr2(E) αcr1(E) + (1− α)cr2(E) 7See (Leitgeb, 2016) for a view that accepts (3) and (4), but rejects (1) and (2). Leitgeb notes that there is an alternative updating rule, a certain sort of imaging, that does commute with linear pooling - indeed, it is the only one that does. This alternative updating rule is the extremal case of what Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010) call Alternative Jeffrey Conditionalization, and which has since become known as Leitgeb-Pettigrew or LP Conditionalization (Levinstein, 2012). There is even an accuracy argument in its favour. Ben Levinstein (2012) raises worries about this updating rule; Richard Pettigrew (2016, Section 15.1) objects to the accuracy argument. 16 (ii) cr1(H|E) = cr2(H|E). In this case, there are no restrictions on α′. That is, to obtain the new weight, α′, for the first individual (whose initial credence function is cr1), we take the old weight, α, we weight that by the credence that the first individual initially assigned to E, and we multiply by a normalizing factor. To obtain the new weight, 1 − α′, for the second individual (whose initial credence function is cr2), we take the old weight, 1− α, we weight that by the credence that the second individual initially assigned to E, and we multiply by the same normalizing factor. That is, the new weight that is assigned to an individual is determined entirely by her old weight and the initial credence she assigned to the proposition she has now learned to be true; her new weight is proportional to her old weight and the accuracy of her credence in that proposition. And indeed that seems exactly right. For we might think of these weights as encoding some facts about the expertise or reliability of the individuals in the group. Thus, when we learn a proposition, we increase the relative weighting of an individual in proportion to how confident they were in that proposition initially - that is, we reward their reliability with respect to this proposition by assigning them greater weight in the future. Julia Staffel (2015, Section 6) objects to linear pooling on the grounds that it can only accommodate Bayesian conditionalization as the updating rule for individuals and groups by changing the weights assigned to the individuals in this way.8 Her worry is that, in certain cases, the required shifts in the weights are simply far more extreme than is warranted by the situation. Consider two polling experts, Nate and Ann. Over the course of their careers, they've been equally accurate in their predictions. As a result, when I ask for their group credence - the credence of Nate-Ann - I assign them equal weight: they both get a weight of 0.5. But then Ann has credence 0.8 in X and Nate has credence 0.2 in X, and X turns out to be true. When they both learn X, we have to shift the weights assigned to them in the group credence in order to preserve conditionalization - we have to shift Nate's from 0.5 to 0.2; and we have to shift Ann's from 0.5 to 0.8. That is, despite his long career of matching Ann's accuracy, one inaccurate prediction results in a drastic shift in the weight that Nate receives. Surely such an extreme shift is not justified by the situation. For instance, if Nate is now sceptical about a second proposition, Y, assigning it 0.1, while Ann is bullish, assigning it 0.9, then the group credence will be 0.74 - so, Nate's scepticism will do little to temper Ann's confidence. I agree that such shifts are counterintuitive. However, I don't agree that this is a reason to reject Linear Pooling. Here's one reason not to worry about them: while a single more accurate credence in a proposition that is learned might increase Ann's weighting substantially, it can just as easily be reduced again if she has a single less accurate credence in some other truth that is learned later. Thus, if Nate and Ann next learn Y, a proposition to which Nate assigns 0.8 while Ann assigns 0.2, then the weighting of both immediately returns to 0.5. Thus, there need be no worry that a drastic shift in favour of one agent, once undertaken, will force the group credence function to stick close to that agent's credence function. Another reason not to worry about drastic shifts: such shifts also occur in credences about chance hypotheses for any agent who satisfies the Principal Principle, a central tenet of Bayesian reasoning. Suppose I am in possession of a trick coin. You know that the bias of the coin towards heads is either 20% or 80%. You've watched 1,000 coin tosses: 500 came up heads; 500 tails. You began with credence 0.5 in each of the bias hypotheses. And you satisfy the Principal Principle at all times. This entails that, at each moment, your credence 8Thanks to Liam Kofi Bright, Julia Staffel, and Brian Weatherson for urging me to address this objection. 17 function is a linear pool of the possible chance functions, where the weight that you assign to a particular possible chance function is just your credence that it is the true chance function. As a result, having witnessed an equal number of heads and tails, your current credence in each of the bias hypotheses has returned to 0.5. But now you toss the coin again, and it lands heads. Then the Principal Principle and Bayesian conditionalization demand that your credence that the bias is 80% must shift to 0.8; and your credence in the bias is 20% must shift to 0.2. So, after a long run of equally good predictions, a single coin toss can shift your credences in the bias hypotheses dramatically. In fact, that single coin toss can shift your credences in the bias hypotheses exactly as dramatically as the weights assigned to individuals might shift if you adhere to Linear Pooling. And this is just a consequence of satisfying the innocuous and widely-accepted Principal Principle.9 This is my response to Staffel's objection. Above, we presented a paradox: (1), (2), (3), and (4) are often incompatible. Which should we reject? In the light of the accuracy arguments just given for (1), (2), and (3), it seems to me that we should reject (4). 7 Conclusion The individual credences of a group of individuals should be combined by linear pooling to give the collective credences of the group. If the group credences are not obtained in this way, there are alternative credences that every individual in the group expects to do better from an epistemic point of view; that is, each individual expects the alternative credences to be more accurate. This was the argument for Linear Pooling presented in section 4. In section 5, we noted that linear pools of individuals do not preserve the independences agreed upon by those individuals. But we concluded that this is no mark against Linear Pooling - these independences cannot be judgments of stochastic or evidential independence, and there is no other reason to preserve them. In section 6, we noted that linear pooling does not commute with conditionalization when the weight assigned to an individual remains unchanged after new evidence emerges. Again, we concluded that this does not tell against 9More precisely: There are two possible objective chance functions ch1 and ch2. If we let Hi be the proposition that the coin will land heads on its ith toss, then the following hold: • ch1(Hi) = 0.2 and ch2(Hi) = 0.8, for all i; • ch1(Hi Hj) = ch1(Hi)ch1(Hj) and ch2(Hi Hj) = ch2(Hi)ch1(Hj) Let Cchi be the proposition that chi is the objective chance function. And let cri be my credence function after the ith toss. Thus, by hypothesis, cr0(Cch1 ) = cr0(Cch2 ) = 0.5. Also, I assume that cri satisfies the Principal Principle at all times: that is, cri(−|Cchk ) = chk(−) One consequence of this is: cri(−) = cri(Cch1 )ch1(−) + cri(Cch2 )ch2(−) Thus, my credence function at any point is a linear pool of the possible objective chance functions ch1 and ch2, where the weights are determined by my credences in the chance hypotheses Cch1 and Cch2 . Now, after witnessing 500 heads and 500 tails, my credences are thus: cr1,000(Cch1 ) = cr1,000(Cch2 ) = 0.5. Now suppose I learn that the 1, 001st toss landed heads - that is, I learn H1,001. Then cr1,001(Cch1 ) = cr1,000(Cch1 |H1,001) = cr1,000(H1,001|Cch1 ) cr1,000(Cch1 ) cr1,000(H1,001) = ch1(H1,001) 0.5 0.5 = ch1(H1,001) = 0.2 And similarly, cr1,001(Cch2 ) = 0.8. 18 Linear Pooling - instead, it teaches us that weights should change in order to reward the accuracy of an individual's prior credences and to punish their inaccuracy. Linear pooling, then, places a requirement of rationality on the means by which the credences of individuals in a group are combined to give the collective credences of that group. The group credences of Adila, Benicio, and Cleo will be some mixture of their individual credences; the credence of the scholarly community that William Shakespeare wrote Hamlet must be some mixture of the credences assigned by the individual scholars that comprise that community; and so on. A final note: The argument presented here has nothing to say about the interpretation of the weightings posited by Linear Pooling. Linear Pooling itself, but also this argument in its favour, doesn't even claim that the most natural way for us to calculate or determine the group credence function is by determining these weights and then using them to produce the weighted average of the individual credence functions. All it claims is that, whatever the group credence function is, it had better be possible to recover it as a weighted average of the individual credence functions; there had better be some weights such that the weighted average given by those weights matches the group credence function. This does not require that the weights have any natural or plausible philosophical interpretation. What's more, the argument presented here is agnostic about whether there are further rational restrictions on the weightings. It provides a necessary condition that must be satisfied by any candidate for the group credence function; but it does not pretend that it is also sufficient. There may be further restrictions. Whether there are or not, I leave to future work. 8 Appendix: sketch of proof of Theorem 1 The proof relies on three well-known facts, (BD1), (BD2a), (BD2b), below. All three concern a species of function called an additive Bregman divergence. For more detail on the mathematics of additive Bregman divergences, see (Banerjee et al., 2005), (Predd et al., 2009), (Pettigrew, 2016, 84-95). (BD1) Given an additive and continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure I, there is an additive Bregman divergence D such that, for any two probabilistic credence functions cr, cr′, D(cr, cr′) = ExpI(cr ′|cr)− ExpI(cr|cr) That is, the divergence from one credence function to another is given by subtracting the expected inaccuracy of the former by its own lights from the expected inaccuracy of the latter by the lights of the former. (BD2a) Given any additive Bregman divergence, if C is a finite set of credence functions and cr′ is outside the convex hull of C, then there is cr∗ in the convex hull of C such that D(cr, cr∗) < D(cr, cr′), for all cr in C. (BD2b) Given any additive Bregman divergence, if C is a finite set of credence functions and cr′ is inside the convex hull of C, then, for any cr∗ 6= cr′, we have D(cr, cr′) < D(cr, cr∗), for some cr in C. Proof of Theorem 1(I). Suppose Cr is not a linear pool of cr1, . . . , crn. Then Cr lies outside the convex hull of the set of those credence functions. Thus, by (BD2a), there is Cr∗ inside that convex hull such that D(cri, Cr∗) < D(cri, Cr). And so, by (BD1), ExpI(Cr ∗|cri)− 19 ExpI(cri|cri) < ExpI(Cr|cri) − ExpI(cri|cri). And thus ExpI(Cr∗|cri) < ExpI(Cr|cri), as required. Proof of Theorem 1(II). Suppose Cr is a linear pool of cr1, . . . , crn. Then Cr lies inside the convex hull of the set of those credence functions. 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Two defenses of Composition as Identity Paul Hovda October 8, 2005 Two defenses of Composition as Identity 1 Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 Two arguments against CI 2 2.1 Collective plural predication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2 What goes wrong with the argument; first pass . . . . . . . . 4 3 Properties and Propositions 5 3.1 Multigrade relations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2 Fixed arities for "multigrade" relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3 'is one of' is not a relational expression . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.4 Revisiting Yi's argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4 The two defenses 7 4.1 Sub-realist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.2 Realist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1 Introduction The title of my paper is Two defenses of Composition as Identity. But my defenses today are limited in scope: I will only argue that the thesis that composition is identity is coherent; I will not argue that it is actually true. It's coherence is in question because of certain logical difficulties that confront it; I aim to solve those difficulties. Now, what is the thesis that Composition is Identity? Roughly, it says that if some things compose some thing x, then those things just are x. It's not that the whole is just the sum of the parts-the whole literally is the parts. Why is this an interesting idea? Among other virtues, it may support the claim that ontological commitment to composed entities is not really a further commitment, above and beyond commitment to the composers. AsDavid Lewis puts it, Mereology is ontologically innocent. (LOOKHANDOUT) You can undertake two commitments, once to object x and once to object y; or you could commit yourself to them all at once by committing yourself to the mereological fusion of x and y. It's the same commitment Paul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 2 either way. So once you have committed to some things, commitment to objects composed of those things is not a further commitment. A second virtue is that if composition as identity we may be able to explain why the part-whole relation behaves as it does, for example why it is transitive. We might be able to reduce the part-whole relation to something else. Perhaps for x to be a part of y is just for it to be the case that x and y compose y; which is to say, according to the thesis, that x and y just are y. But on the face of it, the thesis that composition is identity seemswrong because there is a glaring difference between the composed thing, on the one hand, and the composers, on the other: namely, the composed thing is a single thing, and the composers are not a single thing; they are many things. David Lewis, as I read him, actually gives up on Composition as Identity, and settles for the thesis that composition is like identity. He thus gives up, it seems to me, on the hope of proving the ontological innocence of mereology, and on the hope of explaining the part-whole relation in more basic terms. Let me introduce a further argument against composition as identity, adapted from the work of Byeong Yi. Yi's argument really gets at the core logical difficulty for CI. 2 Two arguments against CI First, we need some names and things. Consider John, Paul, George, and Ringo. We will name the left half of John, Johnleft, and the right half Johnright. Similarly for Paulleft and Paulright. An adaptation of Yi's argument goes like this: Paul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 3 (1) Jl and Jr compose John. Premise (2) Composition is identity. Suppose for reductio (3) Jl and Jr = John From (1) and (2) (4) John is one of John and Paul. (logical truth) (5) John is one of Jl and Jr and Paul. From (3) and (4) (6) Paul is composed of Pl and Pr. Premise (7) Paul = Pl and Pr. From (2) and (5) (8) John is one of Jl and Jr and Pl and Pr. From (5) and (7) (9) Every one of Jl and Jr and Pl and Pr is a half-man. Premise. (10) John is a half-man. From (8) and (9) Ted Sider gives an argument that if composition is identity, then plural quantification is in trouble. His argument turns on essentially the same issue as Yi's, but uses plural quantifiers and variables instead of names. My response to Yi's argument can be extended to Sider's as well; the way I deal with names and plural noun phrases extends fairly straightforwardly to plural variables under an assignment. 2.1 Collective plural predication In amoment I will say how Yi's argument wrong. Before proceeding, however, I must draw your attention to a certain general aspect of plural language. Consider the sentence John, Paul, and George sang. The sentence is ambiguous between two readings, commonly called the "distributive" and the "collective" readings. The distributive reading is brought out explicitly in the sentence John, Paul, and George each sang. The collective reading, on the other hand, is brought out explicitly by the sentence John, Paul, and George sang together. Note that the distributive readingmakes the original sentence logically equivalent with Paul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 4 John sang and Paul sang and George sang. Note that this does not logically imply the collective reading; if each of them sang, they may or may not have sang together. So the distributive does not imply the collective. Does the collective imply the distributive? In this case, it seems that it does. If they sang together, then each of them sang. But this implication flows from the character of the verb; in general, the collective version of a plural predication does not imply the singular version. Here is an example that shows this quite clearly. P and P ! Q entail Q. Here, I am using the symbols P and P ! Q and Q as names of symbolic sentences of a formal propositional language, and I mean to be speaking of tautological entailment. Here the collective reading of the sentence is true, but the distributive reading is false. It is not the case that each of P and P ! Q entails Q. But the two together do. The lessonwe take away is that the two readings are generally, logically independent; neither implies the other. There may be logical connections that flow from the predicates: with the intransitive verb 'sang', the collective predication implies the distributive, and not vice-versa. With the relational predicate 'entails Q', the distributive implies the collective, but not vice-versa. 2.2 What goes wrong with the argument; first pass Returning now to Yi's argument against CI, wee see an impotant ambiguity. Notice that line (3) is not an English sentence. What English sentence might be a good translation of what is intended? Here are some candidates: (3a) Jl and Jr are identical with John. (3b) Jl and Jr are each identical with John. (3c) Jl and Jr are, together (collectively), identical with John. (3a) is a good translation, because it too is ambiguous; it could be read as either (3b) or (3c). (3b) is false, though if it were true, it would support the Paul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 5 substitution step, the inference to line (5) of the argument. (3c) is true, I suggest, but does not support the inference to line (5). 3 Properties and Propositions Of course I have to explain why, and I will. My two defenses give slightly different accounts of just what is going on here. But before I go on to the details, I need to put a little bit more in place. I turn to a picture of properties, relations, and structured propositions that is compatible with the thesis that composition is identity. Traditionally, we have thought of properties and relations as having a fixed arity, a fixed number of places. Properties have an arity of one, since they are had by a single thing, while most familiar relations have an arity of two: they relate one thing to another. This metaphysical picture fits nicely with the grammar of classical first-order languages, in which each predicative symbol has a fixed arity. 3.1 Multigrade relations? Leonard and Goodman, in 1940, discussed what they called "multigrade" relations that seemed not to fit with this classical picture. Examples they give are "met with" and "are lodge-brothers". These appear to be satisfiable by arbitrarily many things, and hence, suggest that we should hold that the relation "met" is multigrade, meaning that it has no single arity, but is able to relate two things at once, or three things at once, or four things, etc. 3.2 Fixed arities for "multigrade" relations This is not how I will understand "multigrade" relations, however. I think that the traditional conception is basically right: every property and relation has a fixed arity, a fixed number of blank spots; SINGS has one, ENTAIL has two. The multigrade nature of these relations consists in the fact that more than one thing can simultaneously fill any of the blank spots. SEE HANDOUT FORWHY Reflection on all this quickly shows that any advocate of Composition as Identity should hold that all properties and relations are in principle Paul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 6 "multigrade", even ones that before might not have seemed to have been. Since I am identical with some atoms, it must be that those atoms are jointly in the one place of the property of speaking. They, together, have the property of speaking. Now the advocate of CI should not hold that everything that grammatically looks like a two-place relation is in fact a two-place relation, into each place of which any number of things can simultaneously go. 3.3 'is one of' is not a relational expression Now not all expressions that look like they express two-place relations in my sense are not in fact to be thought of that way. Two important examples are "is one of" and "is (are) among". For reasons that will become clear to you if you reflect on it, my defenses cannot regard these predicates as expressing relations, at least not typical fixed-arity relations. I think there are good arguments to be made for thinking that the expression "is one of" is a quantifer, on a par with "each of", but I don't have time to give them now. 3.4 Revisiting Yi's argument But given this, we can now make a little more headway in examining the argument from Yi. The advocate of CI should say that line (3) is ambiguous; (3c) was the true reading, but it does not support the substitution step from (4) to (5). This is, in part, because (4) involves a quantifier-it does not simply express a relation between things. Now I consider an objection: If (3c) is supposed to express an identity fact, and yet it does not support substitution of the terms asserted to be identical; don't we have a violation of the indiscernibility of identicals here? Answer: No. The expressions 'Johnleft and Johnright' on the one hand, and 'John' on the other are not semantically identical. There are some contexts that are sensitive to the difference between the expressions, and hence they are not inter-substitutable salva veritate. Among those contexts are ones that involve the quantifier "is one of". Despite the semantic difference between these expressions, they can be used to express an identity fact, and you can substitute the relevant entities, one for the other, so to Paul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 7 speak, in all facts. Identicals have all the same properties. What we get is that every property had by John-the man, not the expression-is had collectively by Johnleft and Johnright. Not "had by Johnleft and had by Johnright"! Rather, had by the two of them collectively. And conversely, anything that Johnleft and Johnright collectively do, John does. Any property they together possess, John possesses. So themetaphysical version of Leibniz' Law is upheld. But why exactly do the linguistic versions fail-what is the semantic difference between the terms? 4 The two defenses This question brings us to the details of the two defenses. Besides giving their basic metaphysical theses, I will present the ways that the two defenses interpret a language with plural predication and quantification. I hope that by giving coherent accounts of a logically powerful formalization of a fragment of English, the defenses can ensure the logical coherence of Composition as Identity. We will consider the semantics for the following formal language. It is an expansion of a standard first-order language, expanded to include plural terms and quantifiers. Terms: ! """"# """"$ Singular terms: % Constants: a, b, c, . . . Variables: x, y, z, . . . Plural terms: ! # $ Constants: aa, bb, cc, . . . Variables: xx, yy, zz, . . . Lists: a + x, a + x + xx, . . . Quantifiers: ! """""# """""$ Absolute: ", # (can bind all variables) Relative: ! ""# ""$ #( , ) "Each of": e.g., #(x, xx)F(x) "Each of xx is F" "( , ) "One of": e.g.: "(x, xx)F(x) "One of xx is F" (The first blank of the relative quantifier is to be filled with a singular variable, while the second can contain any term.) Paul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 8 Predicates: ! """# """$ Non-logical: F,G,R . . . (each with a fixed arity, n, saturated by any n terms to form an atomic wff) Logical: = (2-place) Propositional connectives: ¬, $, %,!,& Abbreviations:1 ' (is part of) e.g., x ' y abbreviates x + y = y ( (are among) e.g., xx ( yy abbr. #(x, xx)"(y, yy)x = y ) xx ) yy abbr. xx ( yy $ yy ( xx Examples: John and Paul are each singing. F(a) $ F(b) Each of John and Paul is singing. #x(x, a + b) F(x) John and Paul are singing together. F(a + b) Some thing is singing. "xF(x) Some things (at least two) "xx("(x, xx)"(y, xx)x *= y $ F(xx)) are singing together. Each of xx entails z #(x, xx)R(x, z) xx together entail z, but R(xx, z) $ none of them (alone) entails z ¬"(x, xx)R(x, z) There are some critics who "xx#(x, xx)(F(x) $ admire only one another #y(R(x, y) ! "(z, xx)y = z)) Note that when a plural term occurs directly as an argument of a predicate, including the identity predicate, we interpret the predication as collective. Distributive plural predication is represented through the use of the relative quantifiers. As a result, the traditional scheme of substitutivity of identicals will fail, for plural terms, though it will hold for singular terms. A weakened version will hold for plural terms, and unqualified substitutivity holds when plural terms are "equivalent". On the handout 1Here, and elsewhere, I omit the qualifications needed to avoid "variable collisions". Paul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 9 I've written down the valid versions of the substitutivity, but to see why they are valid will require a look at the semantics. Valid versions of substitutivity: t = s !(t) !(s) where t and s are singular terms, and !(s) arises from !(t) by replacing an occurrence of t in !(t) with s. tt = ss !(tt) !(ss) where tt and ss are plural (or singular) terms, and !(ss) arises from !(tt) by replacing an occurrence of tt in !(tt) that is not within a second argument of a relative quantifier with ss. tt ) ss !(tt) !(ss) where tt and ss are plural (or singular) terms, and !(ss) arises from !(tt) by replacing an occurrence of tt in !(tt) with ss. 4.1 Sub-realist I will call the first defense of CI the "Sub-realist" or "Atomist" defense. It assumes the principle of mereological atomism: Atomism: Everything is composed of atoms-i.e., of things that have nothing but themselves as parts. Further, it says that all facts that there are, including facts about composite objects, are really facts about mereological atoms. What appears on the surface of language and thought to be a single thing, is actually composed of many atoms, and indeed actually is those atoms. Not that it is each of those atoms, nor is it one of those atoms, either; it is identical with those atoms taken together. I now turn to the Sub-realist picture of language. The key notion for our us is the notion of an expression referring once, or twice, or some other fixed number of times. Singular terms will be terms that refer only once, while plural terms may refer multiple times. Now it is important not to be misled into thinking that I really mean something temporal, when I say a plural expression refers multiple times. Paul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 10 What I mean to be counting are not events, but holdings of the relation of reference. Here is a helpful analogy. Look at the sentences in the boxes, and ask yourself how many times the relation of entailment runs from sentences in the left box to sentences in the right box. That is, how many different instances are there in which sentences in the left box entail Q and in which entail P $ (Q $ R)? QP (PA Q) (¬P A(R& Q)) (P&(Q&R)) QP (PA Q) (¬P A(R& Q)) (P&(Q&R)) The second diagram uses branching arrows to indicate the bearings of the entailment relation, from left box to right box. Since the top two sentences in the left box together entail Q, there is an arrow from them to Q. Not Paul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 11 two arrows; not an arrow from each of them to Q, as neither of them alone entails Q. Looking at the right box, notice that Q is born the entailment relation three times, while P $ (Q $ R) is born it only once. This talk of bearing the relation some number of times, you see, has nothing essentially to do with time; it is a logical notion, having to do with the number of instances of something. The semantics will use this notion extensively. The semantic difference between singular terms and plural terms will be that singular terms refer only once, while plural terms bear the reference relation many times over. Paul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 12 Sub-realist semantic values relative to an assignment relation: Singular terms t t refers once, to some atom or some atoms collectively x a y b c a Plural terms t t refers multiple times (or just once), each time to some atom or some atoms collectively xx b c a Lists t + s if t refers to an atom or some atoms, so does t + s; if s refers to an atom or some atoms, so does t + s; and t + s refers to nothing else t+sb c a d t s Predicates F for a one-place predicate F, F refers multiple times, each time to some atom or some atoms collectively a F c b t = s satisfied just in case every atom among some atoms referred to by t is among some atoms referred to by s, and vice-versa t b c a d s Paul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 13 Atomic wffs F(t) if t is singular, F(t) is satisfied just in case the atom or atoms collectively referred to by t are collectively referred to by F; if t is plural, consider the atoms (call them "t-ATOMS") such that: every atom that is one of some atoms that t refers to is one of t-ATOMS, and no other atoms are among t-ATOMS. F(t) is satisfied just in case F refers to, collectively, t-ATOMS. "(x, t)!(x) satisfied just in case there is some atom or are some atoms collectively referred to by t such that !(x) is satisfied on the assignment relation just like the current one except that it assigns x to them. The Sub-realist can claim to make good on the two promises of the thesis that composition is identity. First, the Sub-realist claims that his ontology is minimal. The only single things you find in it are atoms. There are no additional composite objects; there are just ways of referring to atoms that superficially appear to be reference to single composite objects. These terms don't refer to single atoms, of course: the name 'John', for example does not refer to a single atom; it refers to 1028 atoms, collectively. But it is singular in an important sense: it only refers to them; it refers to no other thing or things. The Sub-realist goes on to give semantics for all expressions, including plural terms, quantifiers and predicates, using only atoms, referred to in various sophisticated ways. Second, the Sub-realist can really make good on the claim to explain mereological notions. The sentences that express the formalized theory of Atomistic Classical mereology become validities of his semantics. On the handout is a formalization of Atomistic Mereology, and I leave it as an exercise to prove that these sentences are all semantically valid-true in all models-with the Sub-realist semantics. I like to think of this as vindicating the claim that Mereology can be derived from definitions and logic, something like the way Frege wanted to derive arithmetic from definitions and logic-only we require that it be the logic of plurals, not mere first-order logic. 4.2 Realist Now the Sub-realist might be said to "reduce" composite things to atoms, though not perhaps in the strictest sense of the word "reduce". The second defense I will consider is certainly not reductivist; it holds that what apPaul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 14 pears to be a single thing composed of many atoms is really a single thing. But it is also, really many things. On this view, there simply is no single absolute number metaphysically associated with an object or with some objects; typical objects will be one thing, and also two things, and also n things, for many different n. I call it a "Realist" defense, for it emphatically holds that in the finally analysis, every composite thing really is a single thing, a single thing that is identical with many things. The Sub-realist, on the other hand, holds that each apparently single thing is really a unique larger number of things. The Sub-realist says that you will not find, in the final analysis, any single composite things. Only atoms, taken singly, collectively, and multiply, but still only atoms, appear in the Sub-realist semantics. The Realist says that when we refer to John, we refer to this one thing, John. Suppose that John is composed of 1028 mereological atoms. Then John is identical with those 1028 atoms, and when we refer to John, we refer to those atoms collectively. We also refer to Johnleft and Johnright, collectively. These are just many ways of describing the same fact. The Sub-realist, on the other hand, only holds that the name 'John' refers to the atoms collectively. Speaking strictly, there is no single thing that the name refers to. Still speaking strictly, the name is nonetheless "singular" in an important respect. It refers only once: to those atoms, collectively, and to nothing else. Thus the Realist would accept that all three of the following pictures are equally correct ways of picturing the same fact, that 'John' refers to John. Three ways of looking at the semantics of 'john': 'john' refers to John john john 'john' refers to Johnleft and Johnright (collectively) jr john jl 'john' refers to Johnleftleft, Johnleftright, Johnrightleft, and Johnrightright (collectively) john jll jlr jrl jrr The Sub-realist would only accept, in his strict and philosophical mode, a Paul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 15 picture that cannot be drawn here: one with 1028 arrowheads, but a single shaft emanating from the name. The difference between the Realist and the Sub-realist is subtle. The Sub-realist is committed to Mereological Atomism: everything is composed of atoms, but atoms have no parts besides themselves. The Realist is not committed Atomism, but his view is compatible with Atomism. On the assumption of Atomism, they will agree on many things. Let me try to bring out the issue one other way, by looking again at the diagnosis of the error in reasoning in the argument from Yi. Turn back to Yi's argument. The Realist will say that the plural expression 'Johnleft and Johnright' refers twice. It refers to two things. It refers to Johnleft, and it also refers to Johnright. It does not refer to John. The expression 'John' refers once. It refers to one thing. Sentence (3c) is true, while sentence (3b) is false. (3c) is true because the things referred to by the expression 'Johnleft and Johnright' are, together, identical with the thing referred to by the expression 'John'. (3b) is false because the things referred to by the first expression are not each identical with the thing referred to by the second expression. The Sub-realist will not exactly reject this story, but will want to say that it is underwritten by a deeper analysis of the situation, in which we only speak of reference, reference of various kinds, to atoms. The Realist can give a much-simplified semantics for the formal language. For example, singular terms each refer once, to a single thing, and plural terms refer multiple times, each time to one thing. The clause for identity wffs is simple: t = s is satisfied just in case the thing or things referred to by t, taken together, are identical with the thing or things referred to by s, taken together. It is less clear the extent to which the Realist makes good on the two virtues of Composition as Identity. The Realist claims that ontological commitment to each of some things is, by virtue of identity facts, commitment to something that is identical with all of those things taken together. One might argue that this really is a further commitment; the Sub-realist, for example, does not appear to be committed to such a thing. Further, it is not clear that the Realist can give as complete an explanation of mereological notions as the Sub-realist. For the Sub-realist, mereological talk ultimately reduces to quantification, by way of his reductive semantics for mereological talk. The Realist has a different perspective. He can define the part-whole relation in terms of identity, but its behavior does not auPaul Hovda Two defenses of Composition as Identity 16 tomatically flow from his semantics; it must be taken as primitive in the meta-language. Paul Hovda

euroPeAN JourNAl For PHIlosoPHY oF relIGIoN 5/2 (summer 2013), PP. 47-61 GOD AND EVIDENCE: A COOPERATIVE APPROACH PAUL K. MOSER Loyola University Chicago Abstract. This article identifies intellectualism as the view that if we simply think hard enough about our evidence, we get an adequate answer to the question of whether God exists. The article argues against intellectualism, and offers a better alternative involving a kind of volitional evidentialism. If God is redemptive in virtue of seeking divine -human reconciliation, we should expect the evidence for God to be likewise redemptive. In that case, according to the article, the evidence for God would aim to draw the human will toward cooperation with God's will. Accordingly, the available evidence for God would be volitionally sensitive in that one's coming to possess it would depend on one's volitional stance toward its source. The article identifies some implications for divine hiddenness, traditional natural theology, and the view that the evidence for God's existence is akin to evidence for a scientific hypothesis. In the noisy courtroom of public opinion, a theology stands or falls with its accompanying epistemology, in particular, with its stand on the matter of the evidence for God. If God is truly redemptive in seeking divine–human reconciliation, as suggested by large strands in the Jewish and Christian traditions, we should expect the evidence for God to be correspondingly redemptive. The implications of this lesson for theology are significant but widely neglected. This paper draws out some of these implications, and explains why a theology of a truly redemptive God resists any quick and easy dismissal on epistemological grounds and instead offers a profound existential challenge for inquirers about God. I. INTelleCTuAlIsm AND ITs uNDerPINNINGs If we simply 'think hard enough' about our evidence, do we get an adequate answer to the question of whether God exists? If we answer yes, then we favour an intellectualist approach to the question of whether God 48 PAul K. moser exists. such an intellectualist approach includes among its supporters atheists as well as theists. If one holds that the adequate answer received by thinking hard enough is no, then one is an atheist (for purposes of our discussion). In contrast, if one holds that the adequate answer is yes, then one is a theist. We may call a proponent of an intellectualist approach, whether atheist or theist, an intellectual about the question of God's existence. An intellectual, in this sense, can come from any academic discipline or from no such discipline. The discipline of academic philosophy, however, houses a large representation of intellectuals regarding God's existence, owing perhaps to its including some influential figures in the history of the intellectualist position. We may call their common position intellectualism, for lack of a better term. bertrand russell, for instance, was an influential proponent of intellectualism; he imagined himself protesting as follows upon meeting God: 'God, you gave us insufficient evidence.' (1970; cf. Dawkins 2006: 74–77) This paper contends that intellectualism is suspect at best and arguably false. In doing so, it will identify some widely neglected limits of human thinking relative to the evidence underlying human faith in God. A person's 'thinking hard enough', according to intellectualism, is not just a matter of having a lot of thoughts, as if the sheer quantity of one's thoughts was the key. The hard thinking in question includes one's using arguments, that is, one's using premises to infer conclusions, either deductively or inductively. This raises the question of the value of arguments regarding God's existence. Is our thinking hard about such arguments sufficient for our having an adequate answer to the question of whether God exists? The answer is no if humans can, and sometimes do, have relevant evidence independent of arguments regarding God's existence. For example, if a human can have a direct experience of God, which is neither a thought nor an argument, then there will be room for relevant evidence independent of arguments regarding God's existence. We should not exclude such experiential evidence at the start, in order to avoid begging some important questions about the evidence for God's existence. (see moser 2008, chap. 2, and 2010, chap. 4, for an attempt to make room for such evidence; cf. Farmer 1943, chaps. 3–4.) When is an answer to the question of whether God exists 'adequate'? An intellectual will offer this reply: when an answer comes from our 'thinking hard enough' about our evidence, it is adequate. even so, a convincing reply needs to offer more, given that adequacy in an answer 49GoD AND eVIDeNCe: A CooPerATIVe APProACH to our question comes from various domains. Objective adequacy requires the correctness or the truth of an answer, whereas evidential adequacy requires the suitable fit of an answer with one's overall evidence, but does not require the answer's truth. A person's overall evidence can be incomplete in a way that falls short of yielding truth in beliefs based on that evidence. For instance, widely shared astronomical evidence before Copernicus and Galileo was incomplete in this manner, at least in certain areas of inquiry. Cognitive adequacy, let us assume, includes both objective adequacy and evidential adequacy. Genuine knowledge that a claim is true has this kind of adequacy, regardless of whether one knows that one has this knowledge. many philosophers seek cognitive adequacy in their answers, because they seek to know that their answers are true. For current purposes, we may sidestep the many complications arising from Gettier-style problems for the view that justified true belief is sufficient for knowledge that a proposition is true (for some relevant details, see moser 1989, shope 2002). If intellectuals seek cognitive adequacy in their answer, they seek not only evidential adequacy but also objective adequacy. We have suggested, however, that the connection between evidential adequacy and objective adequacy is contingent, because the suitable fit of a contingent answer with one's overall evidence does not entail that the answer is true. This raises the issue of whether our thinking hard enough about our evidence will automatically yield an adequate answer to the question of whether God exists, if cognitive adequacy is the goal. The gap between evidential adequacy and objective adequacy in various actual cases recommends a negative reply to this issue. It would be implausible to retreat to the view that we (should) care only about evidential adequacy, and not objective adequacy. many people do care about objective adequacy, because they seek a correct answer to the question of whether God exists. In addition, evidential adequacy as characterized above is too limited for the purposes of many people. These people seek an answer that fits not only with the evidence we have but also with the evidence available to us. The evidence we now have can be arbitrarily or prejudicially restricted by us, such as when we arbitrarily or prejudicially exclude the pursuit of further relevant evidence in a case. our available evidence, in contrast, transcends such arbitrary or prejudicial exclusion. 50 PAul K. moser Consider a case involving my trusted employee who has always exhibited honesty and reliability at his job in the past. An equally trusted supervisor, however, has just called my attention to what appear to be this employee's financial irregularities in some recent transactions at work. I now have a difficult choice to make, regarding whether to investigate my trusted employee by pursuing and gathering further available evidence regarding his reliability. my current evidence does not indicate that this employee is unreliable; on the contrary, my preponderant evidence, based on an extensive work history, indicates that he is reliable. As for available evidence I do not (yet) possess, it may undermine the previous evidence by indicating that the employee is actually unreliable. If I seek a resilient answer to the question of whether my employee is reliable, I will need to pursue further available evidence that I do not yet possess. Perhaps most employers would undertake this kind of pursuit, but I could refuse to do so, owing, for instance, to fear of destroying my longstanding friendship with this employee. We may have difficulty in specifying exactly when evidence is available in some cases, but this general point does not count against a distinction between the broader evidence available to us and the more limited evidence we now have (or, possess). For current purposes, let's suppose that we now 'have' evidence only if we have had a salient awareness of it, but that we need not have had such an awareness of evidence available to us. This distinction will enable us to proceed with some clarity. (For an attempt to recruit this distinction to challenge evidence-based atheism, see moser 2012a. The current paper identifies the broader significance of this distinction for an epistemology involving a redemptive God.) II. INTelleCTuAlIsT sHorTComINGs evidence could be available to me but be sensitive, in its being possessed by me, to a certain volitional stance or inclination of mine, even if I do not actually possess the evidence in question. The volitional stance could include my being willing to love or to be faithful in a certain manner, perhaps toward the source of the available evidence. In this scenario, I could fail to possess the relevant available evidence as a result of my failing to love or to be faithful in a certain manner. I thus could be responsible, owing to my adopted volitional stance, for my not possessing evidence that is available to me. (Here we may use a conception of love, such as that of agapē in the New Testament, which requires one's intentionally 51GoD AND eVIDeNCe: A CooPerATIVe APProACH caring for what is good for people. For some helpful background for this conception, see Furnish 1972; cf. Ferré 1961.) suppose that you refuse to confide in me regarding your deepest motives in life, because (you know that) I do not have the proper love for you and hence should not be trusted with evidence regarding your deepest motives. We might imagine that I am the town gossip who cares only about the attention I bring to myself, even at the expense of others. Accordingly, you hide yourself from me in terms of who you really are, since I am a real threat to your good purposes, if not to your dignity as a person. In fact, it may be harmful to me as well as you to reveal your deepest motives to me, because I would handle this information in a bad way for all involved. understandably, you would have no desire to enable, or otherwise to promote, my harmful tendencies in handling confidential information. As a result, you plausibly would withhold from me evidence regarding your deepest motives and hence regarding yourself, that is, evidence concerning who you really are. even so, that evidence would be available to me, because (we may suppose) you would give it to me upon my coming to love you or to be faithful to you. We may call this volitionally sensitive available evidence, because my coming to possess this evidence would depend on my volitional stance toward the source of the evidence. God could have good, redemptive purposes in making at least some available evidence of God volitionally sensitive in its being possessed by us humans. This evidence then would be sensitive to our volitional stance toward God and God's will. God could be evidentially elusive in this manner for purposes of redeeming humans via moral-character transformation toward God's character of perfect love (agapē). That is, God could hide or withhold evidence of God's reality for the good of potential recipients of this evidence. This divine hiding could save (at least some) people from rejecting God outright when they are not ready to receive God as the rightful Lord of their lives. In that case, they would not be prepared to handle the evidence redemptively, in keeping with God's good purposes toward divine–human reconciliation. As redemptive, God would care about how people respond to evidence of God's reality, and would offer such evidence accordingly. As a result, God would not be a promiscuous exhibitionist or a superficial entertainer regarding the divine evidence offered to humans. more specifically, God would preserve a redemptive role for available divine evidence by encouraging its pursuit with a cooperative, obedient human 52 PAul K. moser will. such a human pursuit of divine evidence would contrast with any passive reception of evidence by humans. A number of biblical writers emphasize the importance of human pursuit of God. For instance, Jeremiah assigns the following announcement to God: 'When you search for me, you will find me; if you seek me with all your heart, I will let you find me, says the Lord.' (Jer. 29:13–14, NrsV; cf. lk. 11:9–13, matt. 7:7–11) Human pursuit of God and evidence for God can bring needed focus to human wills and lives, and prevent humans from becoming complacent and presumptuous relative to God. such a pursuit, therefore, can contribute to the redemption of humans as reconciliation to God. God could bob and weave in divine self-manifestation, for the sake of challenging people to approach God with due seriousness and reverence, and not to treat God as a controllable or dispensable object. In particular, some people may wake up to God as a valuable reality after feeling God's absence in their lives but then being confronted by God's self-manifestation, perhaps by the presentation of divine agapē in their conscience. We humans sometimes learn deeply from a sharp contrast between the absence and the presence of something in our experience. A redemptive God would seek to elicit a human decision in favour of God's character of agapē, in particular, a priority commitment that puts God and God's moral character first in human life. In this respect, redemption would be cooperative, as humans resolve to share in God's moral character as a priority in their lives. (on the central role of human decision in redemption, see minear 1966, chap. 3; moser 2013, chap. 4.) The relevant idea of divine self-manifestation in agapē figures in the apostle Paul's understanding of the evidential basis for belief and hope in God (see, for instance, rom. 5:5, 10:20). Following Isaiah, Paul invokes God's self-manifestation to unexpecting humans (in particular, Gentiles), and he understands it as seeking to 'pour out' divine agapē within receptive humans. This self-manifestation, being redemptive, would seek to have humans put divine agapē first in their lives, above all the alternatives, in keeping with the greatest love-command (see ramsey 1943). Paul seems to hold that God's self-disclosure is sensitive, at least to some extent, to human disclosure to God, whereby one allows oneself to be known, and laid hold of, by God (see Gal. 4:9; cf. Phil. 3:12). In any case, we should allow that God can disclose God's will to a person, perhaps in conscience, without that person's knowing that it is God's will thereby disclosed. (on the role of conscience, see Forsyth 1909, chap. 7.) 53GoD AND eVIDeNCe: A CooPerATIVe APProACH We should not infer that a person must earn or merit (evidence of) God's self-manifestation or become morally perfect to be presented with it. such an inference would seriously distort the moral character of a God who is worthy of worship and hence gracious and merciful. Instead, we should consider that a person may need to be willing to cooperate with God's perfect will if that person is to receive a clear self-manifestation from God. The problem is not that God would be personally injured in a devastating way by uncooperative humans; it is rather that such humans can dishonour (the dignity of) God and themselves. In fostering such dishonour, one can bring about a kind of relational harm, that is, harm to a potential good relationship between humans and God. one thereby could harm the purpose of God's self-manifestation to humans, if only by frustrating it, and thus harm oneself in turn. suppose that God seeks to redeem all constitutive aspects of human persons, including not just human thinking but also the willing, or volitional, activity integral to human agency. God then would offer a challenge to these aspects of human persons for the sake of their being transformed toward God's character and purposes and thus reconciled to God. This involves the question of who God wants a redeemed person to be in relation to God. It is plausible to suppose that God would desire redeemed human agents who reflect God's moral character and agency in intention and action, and not just redeemed thinkers. The volitional activity central to human agency is not just thinking or even thinking hard about evidence. It involves decisions regarding the kind of person one aims to be, in terms of moral character and practice. As a result, moral responsibility looms large in the make-up of a mature human agent. In being redemptive, God would not neglect the volitional make-up of human agents, but rather would aim to lead it, non-coercively, into cooperation with God's perfect will. In the spirit of Job, humans often strive to understand God and God's providential ways to gain security and assurance for themselves. We should not expect God's security or assurance, however, to arise from mere human understanding, which is painfully limited in scope, especially regarding God's purposes in particular cases. Instead, we should expect divine security and assurance for humans to emerge from their volitional activity in response to God. This lesson fits with the following simple but profound remark from the prophet micah: 'What is good, and what does the Lord require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God.' (micah 6:8, NrsV) 54 PAul K. moser In micah's perspective, God aims for more than hard thinking by humans, even hard thinking with correct and well-grounded content. God aims, in addition, for volitional activity from humans that includes loving and obeying God. Clearly, such volitional activity is not captured by 'thinking hard' about evidence. I can think hard about, and even accept, evidence for God but not welcome, love, or obey God at all. The volitional activity in question can be an avenue to more, and even better, evidence regarding God, as a human conforms to God's redemptive expectations. so, the evidence for God's reality from divine selfmanifestation could be sensitive to human wills, and thus could allow for divine hiding in the face of volitional resistance. In this portrait of God, we cannot simply think ourselves into an objectively adequate answer regarding God's reality, because God would want, by way of redemption, more than our thinking. God would want to redeem our full agency, including our volitional features (such as our love), because God would want us to reflect divine moral agency in willing cooperation with God. If God would not want the latter, then God would not want what is best for us, and this would rob God of worthiness of worship. one's being willing to obey God, in keeping with God's perfect will, mirrors the crisis of Jesus in Gethsemane. seeking to obey God and thereby to inaugurate God's kingdom, Jesus found himself called by God to give up his own life in self-sacrifice to God for the sake of others. This was a temporary struggle between Jesus and God, where Jesus anticipated his arrest and crucifixion by roman officials as part of God's plan of redemption. mark's Gospel sketches the situation: '[Jesus and his disciples] went to a place called Gethsemane ... He said to them, "I am deeply grieved, even to death ..." [H]e threw himself on the ground and prayed that, if it were possible, the hour [of his arrest and crucifixion] might pass from him. He said, "Abba, Father, for you all things are possible; remove this cup [of suffering and death] from me; yet, not what I want, but what you want".' (mark 14:32–36, NrsV) Gethsemane begins with a humanly experienced conflict between a human want and a divine want, but ends with a resolution in a human plea to God in favour of God's will. Accordingly, the Gethsemane approach to God puts God's perfect will first, even when a serious human want must yield to God's volitional challenge. The challenge from God could come in human conscience, where one is convicted by God of wandering away from what is good or right, and this challenge could be encouraged by other humans. even if some people regard human 55GoD AND eVIDeNCe: A CooPerATIVe APProACH conscience as just socially informed by humans, God still could work in conscience to challenge people to cooperate with God's will. In that case, receptive humans could find the God who hides, not in mere reflection, but instead in the experiential and volitional conflict of a Gethsemanestyle crisis, where God offers a new mode of life to humans on God's perfect terms. In following the example of Jesus in Gethsemane, humans then would resolutely allow God to be God at least in some area of their volitional and practical lives. We might think of a Gethsemane crisis as providing an opportunity for a kind of practical rationality toward God, via one's willingly moving toward cooperation with God. That is, one's will could move toward God's will by one's responding in obedience to God's challenging selfmanifestation in human conscience. If this is practical rationality toward God, its practicality consists in the non-coerced exercise of one's will to comply with God's will. It also would be substantive practical rationality, because it would encompass genuine goodness in cooperation with God's perfect will. In other words, it would not be purely instrumental practical rationality. God would represent a standard of goodness independent of the variability of human preferences or ends. In addition, God could nudge and encourage receptive people toward a Gethsemane crisis, and, therefore, they would not have to set up this crisis on their own. God would bring Gethsemane to humans as needed, at the opportune times. In the perspective offered here, intellectualism is an inadequate approach to the question of whether God exists. It neglects the plausible view that God would have definite redemptive purposes for humans and would reveal the evidence for God accordingly. As a result, God could provide available evidence for God's reality that is volitionally sensitive, in its being possessed by a human, to the direction of one's will relative to cooperation with God's will. many philosophers overlook this view, because they assume, in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, that God is (or would be) immutable or static rather than purposively elusive. It seems, however, that a God who is worthy of worship and hence morally perfect would have to be purposively elusive for the good of potential human recipients of divine evidence. such a God would oppose half-heartedness in humans toward God, and seek instead their whole-hearted commitment to God (see, e.g., Deut. 4:29, Jer. 29:13, mk. 12:29–30; on the idea of God as elusive, see minear 1966, chap. 8, Terrien 1978, moser 2008). 56 PAul K. moser We should acknowledge some pre-receptive evidence for God, where a person has initial evidence for God's self-manifestation (perhaps in conscience) but does not cooperate with God at all. such evidence would be elusive, unstable, and thin, because God would not want people to rest content with it, apart from cooperating with God. Consider a resolute enemy of God such as the biblical character called 'satan', who believes that God exists but does not receive God cooperatively as the Lord of his life. satan can reasonably believe (on elusive, pre-receptive evidence) that God exists, because God has self-manifested divine reality to satan to a very limited extent. However, in rejecting God's will, satan has freely prevented God from manifesting divine reality to a redemptive, cooperative extent, where God's powerful love is poured out in his heart (cf. rom. 5:5). In the biblical perspective, satan is not volitionally receptive to God at all, and therefore his pre-receptive evidence does not lead to the kind of salient transformative evidence arising from cooperation with God. III. moTIVes For INTelleCTuAlIsm Proponents of intellectualism have various motives for their position, three of which merit attention here. First, they often seek aid from considerations about a needed method. In particular, they adopt a method for belief formation and belief revision, and then wield it across the board. This strategy is not mistaken in principle, but it needs to be handled cautiously, in a manner that does not preclude reasonable acknowledgment of genuine features of reality. For instance, we should be suspicious of any method that precludes reasonable acknowledgment of either human agents or mid-sized physical objects, such as tables and human bodies. We might say, then, that an adequate method of belief formation will call for an adequate meta-method of belief formation: that is, an adequate method regarding (the identification of) an adequate method of belief formation. Inquirers must avoid, however, an endless regress of required methods, if only because we do not possess an infinite number of such methods in regress. A key question arising from a meta-method about a proposed method for belief will be: what does this method set as parameters for (evidential) acceptability in a set of beliefs? more specifically, does the method allow for (potential) reasonable acknowledgment of an elusive God who aims to redeem humans non-coercively? or, instead, does it 57GoD AND eVIDeNCe: A CooPerATIVe APProACH preclude such acknowledgment from the start? In the latter case, we may face methodological bias of a sort that can hinder the reasonable pursuit of truth. of course, one might try to establish that our barring acknowledgment of an elusive God is well-grounded in our available evidence. That task, however, sets a tall order indeed for advocates of the position in question, because our available evidence does not seem exclusive in the manner required. It seems more open-ended than suggested by the position at hand. If God exists and is available to humans, a method for inquiring about God should fit with reasonable, evidence-based acknowledgment of the character and purposes of God, and not preclude such acknowledgment. Philosophers have sometimes adopted methods that settle the issue of God's existence in advance of due attention to the relevant evidence. For instance, a method that requires an evidential basis in mundane sensory evidence will represent a highly questionable bias. The same is true of a method that requires conformity either to a materialist ontology or to the kind of experimental procedures typical of a chemistry laboratory. In general, then, we should not let a questionable method blind us from acknowledging genuine aspects of reality and the corresponding evidence. Instead, we should allow human experience of reality to play a key role in adjudicating among the many methods in circulation. otherwise, we may have the proverbial oddity of putting the cart before the horse, or, at least, we may have an implausible bias in our method. more to the point, we should not allow a method to preclude volitionally sensitive evidence of God from the start. The second motive for some commitments to intellectualism comes from an unduly restrictive demand for evidence of God. As suggested, bertrand russell (1970) anticipated his response if God were to meet him, perhaps after death: 'God, you gave us insufficient evidence.' russell might have considered a bit more modesty in the presence of God, perhaps by inquiring about available evidence of God that is volitionally sensitive in its being acquired by humans. In that case, russell might have asked: 'God, what purposes of yours led to your being subtle and elusive regarding the available evidence of your reality? Is such evidence volitionally sensitive in our acquiring it? If so, might this have a redemptive purpose?' It is disappointing that russell gives no indication of being aware of such plausible questions for a God who is redemptive toward humans. He should have asked about the moral character and purposes of a God worthy of worship, in order to avoid begging key questions 58 PAul K. moser about the evidence for God. In that case, however, russell would have had a big challenge on his hands, or at least on his will, because he, rather than God, would be subject to challenge on volitional grounds. The lesson is that intellectualism, advocating mere intellectual reflection to settle the question of God's existence, is existentially too thin for the kind of evidence suitable to a redemptive God. Humans in need of redemption should not expect to know a redemptive God on the cheap, as if no volitional challenge is needed. Just as there is no place for cheap grace in a robust theology, so also there is no place for redemptively cheap evidence of a gracious God who seeks the redemption of humans. many proponents of the arguments of natural theology run afoul of this lesson. These theorists assume that if atheists and agnostic just thought hard enough on our common evidence, they would come to acknowledge the reality of God. These atheists and agnostics, they assume, then would see the crucial role in reality for a First Cause, a Designer, or a Perfect being, which (at least according to Aquinas, the godfather of modern natural theology) we all know to be God. The needed evidence for God, according to this position, is in our midst and even in our possession, but we need to think more rigorously to see its bearing on theism. That position, however, is too shallow, volitionally and existentially. A serious problem is that the god of traditional natural theology (and its corresponding evidence) is not elusive in the manner to be expected of a redemptive God who bobs and weaves, and even hides, to challenge humans for their own redemptive good. This kind of redemptive God would not be the static solution to merely intellectual questions, but instead would seek to move humans, non-coercively, toward God at the level of their wills, to put God's will first in all things. That is, this God would aim to redeem humans as agents, and not just as thinkers. like intellectualism, traditional natural theology neglects this key lesson, and therefore is defective. (For elaboration, see moser 2010, chap. 3; 2012b; 2013, chap. 3.) We can put the problem at hand in terms of divine presence as divine self-manifestation to humans. If God self-authenticates divine reality for humans by the self-manifestation of God's moral character (including agapē), but seeks not to coerce humans to receive this manifestation, then God's self-manifestation is rejectable by humans. That is, the selfmanifestation of God's moral character to humans does not force the will of humans in a way that undermines their genuine agency in responding to God. As a result, God's self-manifestation allows humans to say no to it 59GoD AND eVIDeNCe: A CooPerATIVe APProACH by excluding it from their focus. In other words, God is willing to withdraw divine self-manifestation to leave room for genuine human agency regarding divine presence. such basic evidence of God's reality, then, is not static across human experience. It can vary relative to the volitional stance of its potential recipients, so as not to trivialize or to obscure the redemptive intent of divine intervention in human experience. (A notion of divine self-authentication, not to be confused with self-authentication of religious experience or of scripture, can be found in mackintosh 1912 and stewart 1940; see also moser 2013, chaps. 3, 5.) The third motive is not an avowed reason for intellectualism, but it still plays a psychological role in some commitments to intellectualism. The unexpressed motive, I propose, is desired avoidance of a volitional struggle with a redemptive God. such avoidance has a range of detrimental results, including a coupling of intellectualism with a destructive kind of intellectual pride. This pride manifests itself in the common attitude that opponents of intellectualism, of a theistic or an atheistic variation, are intellectually dim in a peculiar manner. such an attitude emerges even from many proponents of natural theology when their favoured evidence fails to convince critics. (We need not name names here.) This paper offers an alternative to such misplaced pride by shifting attention to volitional sensitivity in humans, beyond their intellectual skills. In doing so, it acknowledges the significance of the kind of volitional attitude candidly expressed by Thomas Nagel: 'I want atheism to be true ... I hope there is no God! I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that.' (1997: 130) Nagel worries that the existence of God would pose a serious 'cosmic authority problem' for us. The obstacle for Nagel, among many others, is clearly volitional, and not (just or even primarily) intellectual. even so, Nagel is right: the existence of a perfectly loving, redemptive God would raise a cosmic authority problem for us humans, because God's perfect will would challenge our imperfect wills. IV. CoNCluDING eXPeCTATIoNs In sum, intellectualism regarding the question of God's existence is a dead end relative to a truly redemptive God. It neglects the important consideration that a redemptive God would offer available evidence that is volitionally sensitive in its being possessed by humans. Whether atheist or theist, proponents of intellectualism have ignored this consideration to their own detriment. This lesson does not undermine the value of 60 PAul K. moser thinking in human faith in God. Instead, it puts such thinking in a proper context, with proper, redemptive bounds. This context allows God to seek to engage agents not just with their minds but also with their wills, for the sake of a human volitional commitment to the priority of God's will. As a result, inquirers should not uncritically expect God or enduring evidence for God's existence to be accessible just by human thinking about the evidence we possess. God would seek to engage humans redemptively as agents, not just thinkers, and we should expect evidence of God to be elusive, variable, and challenging to that end. In particular, we should expect salient evidence of God to come through a Gethsemane crisis rather than mere casual reflection on our evidence. As a result, we should doubt any suggestion, such as that of Dawkins (2006: 52, 59), that evidence for God's existence is to be treated just like evidence for a scientific hypothesis. As an elusive personal agent, God would differ in significant ways from typical scientific objects, and this would yield a relevant difference in the two kinds of evidence. Human inquiry about God, in the perspective offered here, is inextricably bound up with who a human intends and resolves to be, either in cooperation with God or in opposition to God (the latter including indifference toward God). In addition, the salient evidence for God comes not from abstract philosophical arguments, but instead from God's self-manifestation to humans at God's opportune times. This selfmanifestation can come in human conscience, but it cannot come just by human resources. We lack the power to manifest God's moral character on our own, and therefore we must be prepared to receive evidence for God as a redemptive gift rather than as our earning or creation. The redemptive gift would include the power of righteous love experienced typically in human conscience, and this power (as representing the moral character of God) is to be received and obeyed. Given its immediacy, humans have no need to argue to it by natural theology. This power amounts to divine self-authentication via the self-manifestation of God's moral character to humans. Inquiry about God looks very different from this perspective, especially very different from the troubled position of intellectualism. It takes on an existential value that intellectualism omits. In particular, it suggests that inquirers of God may very well be under inquiry themselves, by a redemptive God. each inquirer must settle firsthand whether this is actually so, specifically for his or her own will relative to a morally perfect will. In 61GoD AND eVIDeNCe: A CooPerATIVe APProACH this regard, the vital challenge of Gethsemane bears on all human agents, sooner or later. A theology accompanied by such an epistemology will be not only resilient in the face of familiar objections to theism but also existentially vital for cooperative humans. The outstanding question is, finally, whether we humans are sincerely willing to cooperate with God's perfect will. bIblIoGrAPHY Dawkins, richard. 2006. The God Delusion (New York: Houghton mifflin) Farmer, Herbert H. 1943. Towards Belief in God (New York: macmillan) Ferré, Nels. 1961. 'The Nature and Power of Christian experience', in Ferré, Searchlights on Contemporary Theology (New York: Harper), pp. 184–95 Forsyth, P.T. 1909. The Person and Place of Jesus Christ (london: Independent Press) Furnish, Victor Paul. 1972. The Love Command in the New Testament (Nashville: Abingdon Press) mackintosh, H.r. 1912. The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ (New York: Charles scribner's sons) minear, Paul s. 1966. Eyes of Faith, 2nd ed. (st. louis: Abbott books) moser, Paul K. 1989. Knowledge and Evidence (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press) moser, Paul K. 2008. The Elusive God (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press) moser, Paul K. 2010. The Evidence for God (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press) moser, Paul K. 2012a. 'undermining the Case for evidential Atheism', Religious Studies, 48 (1): 83–93 moser, Paul K. 2012b. 'Natural Theology and the evidence for God', Philosophia Christi, 14 (2): 305–11 moser, Paul K. 2013. The Severity of God (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press) Nagel, Thomas. 1997. The Last Word (New York: oxford university Press) ramsey, Paul. 1943. 'The Great Commandment', Christianity and Society, 8: 29–35 russell, bertrand. 1970. 'The Talk of the Town', The New Yorker (February 21, 1970), p. 29. Cited in Al seckel, ed., Bertrand Russell on God and Religion (buffalo: Prometheus, 1986), p. 11 shope, robert K. 2002. 'Conditions and Analyses of Knowing', in Paul moser, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (New York: oxford university Press), pp. 25–70 stewart, James s. 1940. 'Who is this Jesus?', in stewart, The Strong Name (edinburgh: T&T Clark), pp. 80-89 Terrien, samuel. 1978. The Elusive Presence (New York: Harper & row)

God, Powers, and Possibility in Kant's Beweisgrund Abstract: This paper proposes a novel reading of Kant's account of the dependence of possibility on God in the pre-Critical Beweisgrund. I argue that Kant has a broadly Aristotelian conception of possibility, according to which grounds of possibility are potential grounds of actuality. Since Kant also thinks that the order of the world requires an intelligent being as its originator, he holds that God grounds possibility by his understanding and will. Furthermore, I explore the significance of the distinction between internal and external possibility, the influence of Crusius, and the afterlife of Kant's view in his Critical philosophy. Kant is most famous for rejecting all attempts at proving the existence of God in the Critique of Pure Reason. Notwithstanding this, the younger Kant proposed such a proof himself in The Only Possible Ground of Proof (or Beweisgrund, for short) of 1762. This so-called "possibility proof" has recently received meticulous scrutiny and is, I think, quite well-understood now. In brief, Kant argues that all possibility must be grounded in an absolutely necessary being and then identifies this being with God. 1 However, the way God grounds possibility is controversial to an astonishing degree. Some scholars hold that God is the ground by instantiating possibilities 2 , others that he is the ground by thinking them in his understanding (call this "intellectualism") 3 , and Stang, on his former approach, that God is the ground by his power (Macht), which he calls the "power view" 4 . 5 Newlands rejects all this and argues that Kant does not have any account of God's grounding of possibility. 6 But, recently, Stang has argued that this alleged indeterminacy is on purpose because Kant denies that we can ever comprehend how God grounds possibility, albeit Stang claims that Kant's account is best understood in terms of the power view. 7 I think the main reason for this wide disparity of views is that the conception of a ground of possibility is not well-understood yet. Some readers would like to attribute an account of grounding to Kant that connects contemporary theories of metaphysical explanation with the principle of sufficient reason. While I do not attempt to argue against this view directly (and my account may even be consistent with it), I shall argue that Kant has a different conception of grounding in mind concerning the grounds of possibility. For he accepts a broadly Aristotelian account of possibility, according to which grounds of possibility are potential grounds of actuality. Consequently, God is the ground of possibility because he is the potential ground of the actuality of the world. As a result, Kant explicitly says that God must have an understanding and a will because these faculties are needed in order to be the "sufficient real ground" of possibility (OPGP 2:88). Thus, these are the faculties by which God grounds possibility. 2 I will begin by examining a widely neglected argument in Kant's Beweisgrund that aims to establish that God needs understanding and will in order to ground the order and harmony of the world. In section 2, I show that God needs understanding and will to ground internal possibility (the possibility in accordance with essences), as opposed to external possibility (the possibility in accordance with contingent causal conditions). Section 3 presents the strongest case for this reading: Kant apparently follows Crusius, who has a broadly Aristotelian account of possibility. Crusius holds that grounds of possibility are potential grounds of actuality and also that God grounds possibility by his understanding and will. The task of section 4 is to explore the connection of potentiality and possibility in Kant and how this relates to the distinction between internal and external possibility. Section 5 briefly shows that Kant does not fundamentally change his views on God's grounding of possibility in the Critical period, even though the important discussion of what can be learned from my account as regards the Critical conception of "real possibility" must be deferred to another occasion. 1. God as the Ground of Possibility by His Understanding and Will The first section of Beweisgrund is dedicated to what is known as the "possibility proof", which consists of two main steps. 8 At first, Kant argues that something can be possible only if an absolutely necessary being is the ground of possibility. Then he shows that this being has all the properties that are contained in the concept of God, so this being is God. One of these properties that the absolutely necessary being must have in order to be God is that it is a "spirit" (OPGP 2:88) – that is, a being with understanding and will, rather than a "blindly necessary ground" (OPGP 2:89). Kant briefly sketches three arguments to establish this conclusion. The first argument contends that the divine understanding and will are perfect realities and, as such, must belong to God, the second that God must have understanding and will because the effect cannot be greater than the cause. 9 But my thesis – that God grounds possibility by his understanding and will – turns on the third of these arguments. 10 I will refer to it as the 'Third Argument' and present it in full now: Third, order, beauty, perfection in everything which is possible presuppose a being by whose properties either these relations are grounded, or at least through whom as from a principal ground the things are possible according to these relations. Now the necessary being is the sufficient real ground of all that which is possible external to him; for this reason, even the property must be encountered in him through which, according to these relations, everything outside him can become 3 actual. But it appears that the ground of external possibility, of order, beauty, and perfection, is not sufficient unless a will that conforms to the understanding is presupposed. Thus, it will be necessary to attribute these properties to the Supreme Being. Everybody realizes that, irrespective of all the grounds of the generation of plants and trees, nonetheless regular flowerbeds, boulevards, and such like, are only possible through an understanding which conceives the plan and a will which executes it. In the absence of an understanding, all power [Macht] or generative power [Hervorbringungskraft], likewise all other data of possibility, are insufficient for making the possibility of such order complete. (OPGP 2:88) 11 The Third Argument is, in all its details, extremely difficult and we will unpack it in the subsequent sections. But let us begin with a broad outline of the argument: 1) The absolutely necessary being is the sufficient real ground of possibility.12 2) The empirically observable properties of the world reveal that possibility is grounded by an understanding. 13 3) Thus, the absolutely necessary being is the sufficient real ground of possibility by his understanding. (from 1) and 2)) 4) An understanding is the sufficient real ground of possibility only in conjunction with a will by which that which is thought by the understanding can be caused. 5) For this reason, the absolutely necessary being is the sufficient real ground of possibility by his understanding and will. 14 (from 3) and 4)) This valid argument turns on the premises 1), 2), and 4). Kant takes himself to have already established at this point that there must be an absolutely necessary being as the sufficient real ground of possibility, which is premise 1). 2) is the premise that leads to the conclusion that God must have an understanding; and Kant appeals to the then-popular analogy by human design to defend it: a human designer, craftsman, or architect can only be the sufficient ground of the possibility of gardens and the like if she has not only powers, but also an understanding by which she conceives a plan of regular flowerbeds or avenues. Likewise, so the argument goes, God can only be the ground of the world (with its order, perfection, and beauty) if he has an understanding. 15 Premise 4) argues that God's understanding would not be sufficient to ground possibility without a will by which he can create a world that he conceives in his mind. 16 So his will is needed to make the grounds of possibility complete: without God's will that actualizes the harmony in essences that his understanding makes up, the harmony would be impossible. 17 This does not 4 mean that God decrees by his will that something be possible (which would make Kant a voluntarist about possibility, a view he rejects 18 ), but rather that God can use his will so as to create a world. The reason why his understanding alone is not sufficient for possibility is that this faculty does not explain how something can be actual. This calls for an even closer relation between possibility and actuality than is usually assumed by Kant scholars. But first, we need to see what kind of possibility the Third Argument is about. 2. Internal and External Possibility Following a Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, Kant distinguishes between "internal" and "external" possibility. As we shall see in a minute, internal possibility is the possibility of something considered in itself and can be cognized according to the principle of contradiction. External possibility, by contrast, depends on contingent grounds. One of the confusing aspects of the Third Argument is that Kant speaks of the "ground of external possibility". What makes this so puzzling is that the expression 'external possibility' does not occur elsewhere in Beweisgrund. By contrast, Kant frequently speaks of God as the ground of "internal possibility". 19 What is more, he explicitly says that "there will be talked of no other possibility or impossibility than the socalled internal or absolute one" in Beweisgrund (OPGP 2:78). This clearly means that Kant does not intend to talk about external possibility. 20 The reason for his decision is that he considers external possibility to be unsuitable for the proof of God's existence. 21 One may raise the following objection against my reading of the Third Argument. When Kant says that God grounds possibility by his understanding and will, he only speaks about external possibility, which he needs in order to prove that the absolutely necessary being is a spirit; but Kant does not think that God grounds internal possibility by his understanding and will. In this section, I will argue against this interpretation. As I read Kant, God is the direct ground of internal possibility, but (in most cases) the indirect ground of external possibility. Contrary to the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, God needs his power not only to ground external, but also to ground internal possibility. Kant's source for the terminology of 'internal' and 'external possibility' appears to be the following passage in Wolff's Cosmology: Internally possible is what is possible regarded in itself, that is, which, considered in itself, does not include any contradiction [...]. Externally possible is what has a determinate cause in the visible world, that is, which is able to exist in it [...]. (Wolff, Cosm 111) 5 As Wolff understands it, external possibility is that which is consistent with the actual causal conditions. Internal possibility, on the contrary, is what is consistent with the essence of the thing. 22 According to Wolff, all intrinsic properties of a thing (as opposed to relations) are either essential properties (essentialia) which constitute the essence of a thing, necessary non-essential properties that are grounded by the essence (attributa), or contingent properties that are merely consistent with the essence (modi). 23 For this reason, the internal possibility of a thing contains all combinations of co-existing and succeeding modes that are consistent with the essence of a thing. 24 In contrast to external possibility, internal possibility can be cognized by the principle of contradiction alone. But cognizing external possibility requires knowledge of the causal conditions of the actual world. For external possibility is the agreement with contingent actual conditions, and Wolff holds that something can only exist if there can be a cause for it. This becomes clear by the notion of a "potential being", which he defines as that which "can have its sufficient ground of existence" in an existing being (Ont 175). Since a substance can only be a ground of actuality by virtue of its powers 25 , a substance is a potential ground of actuality and hence an actual ground of external possibility. However, since everything that is externally possible necessarily exists at one point of time (which is a consequence of Wolff's determinism) 26 , external possibility is co-extensional with actuality 27 . 28 Wolff's distinction harks back to Leibniz, who distinguishes between possibility "in itself" (per se) and possibility per accidens. The former is the possibility of something "in its own nature", the latter the possibility insofar as it depends on external conditions – for example, something may be possible per se but not per accidens because God does not choose to make it actual. 29 Clearly, Leibniz's conception of possibility per se is closely related to Wolff's notion of internal possibility. And although they disagree insofar as Wolff rejects Leibniz's doctrine of preestablished harmony with regard to causality within the physical world, they agree that God predetermines the course of events in the actual world. 30 Therefore, like Leibniz's possibility per accidens, Wolff's external possibility is dependent on what God chooses to happen. It is hard to tell what meaning exactly the expressions 'internal' and 'external possibility' have in Kant, as he does not bother to define them. However, he appears to use 'essence' and 'internal possibility' interchangeably in Beweisgrund 31 ; so I take it that Kant agrees with Wolff at least insofar as internal possibility is derivable from essences. He also, at least in principle, adopts Wolff's conception of external possibility. Kant argues that "conditioned possibility" – which is 6 plainly the same as external possibility – would not be suitable for a proof of God's existence because "conditioned possibility merely makes one see that something can only exist in certain connections; and the existence of the cause is proved here only insofar as the consequence exists" (OPGP 2:157). 32 This means, I take it, that external possibility depends on causal conditions which are themselves contingent and hence do not require the existence of an absolutely necessary being. Thus, "such a proof can only be done from internal possibility" (OPGP 2:157). Nonetheless, there is a notable difference to Leibniz and Wolff. According to Wolff, "therefore something is possible because it is represented by the divine understanding" (VG-Met 975), and Newlands argues convincingly that Leibniz has this view, too. 33 Kant denies that God's understanding alone grounds internal possibility, in part because he has a basically Crusian conception of grounds of possibility. Before we can turn to that, however, we have to address a potential objection that is based on Kant's use of the term 'external possibility' in the Third Argument. As I read it, he wants to prove that God needs understanding and will in order to ground internal possibility. However, in this argument, Kant refers to God as "the ground of external possibility, of order, beauty, and perfection", without explicitly mentioning internal possibility (OPGP 2:88, emphasis mine). This gives rise to the following objection: Internal possibility is required only for the first step of the possibility proof, that is, to show that there is an absolutely necessary being. The task of the Third Argument, however, is to prove that the absolutely necessary being is a spirit, without which it cannot be shown that this being is God. The argument accomplishes this by holding that God grounds external possibility by creating the world, which includes the contingent worldly grounds of external possibility. But to decide that the world has to be this way rather than another, God needs understanding and will. Consequently, the Third Argument does not show that internal possibility depends on God's understanding and will. 34 As sophisticated as this reading is, it would be a mistake to accept it. To begin with, we have just seen that Kant rejects that external possibility is suitable for a proof of God because external possibility is contingent. In fact, this argument would be a backlash into a kind of physicotheology that considers the order and harmony of the world exclusively dependent on God's choice. Such an account would only establish the "moral dependency" of the world. But Kant claims that the world exhibits also "non-moral [unmoralische] dependency" – that is, the harmony of the essences themselves, which is not the result of a choice, is dependent on God. 35 7 The traditional method of physico-theology, which Kant criticizes, proves God's existence by taking only moral dependency into regard. 36 According to Kant, this is wrong – among others, because this can only prove the existence of an "architect and not the creator of the world, who has ordered and formed the material, but not produced and created it" (OPGP 2:123). Even if one takes oneself to have proved the existence of an absolutely necessary being, one cannot infer from the fact that something is externally possible that the absolutely necessary being is the ground of the moral order of the world, since some more mediocre deities could have done the job of giving the world a moral order that depends on their choice as well. 37 Aside from these systematic considerations, the Third Argument itself contains textual evidence against the objection. Kant routinely associates "order, beauty, perfection" (and the like) with internal possibility for the reason that these properties of the world belong to its non-moral dependency. 38 When he speaks about God as "a being by whose properties either these relations are grounded, or at least through whom as from a principal ground the things are possible according to these relations" (OPGP 2:88), I take this to mean that God is not only the ground of the perfect harmony of essences, but also of all essences individually, as they are the relata of the harmony relation. So the Third Argument talks about God as the ground of internal possibility. The question remains, though, why Kant writes that God is "the ground of external possibility, of order, beauty, and perfection" (OPGP 2:88). Two viable explanations come to mind. First, the use of 'external possibility' may just be a mistake or misprint. This explanation would not be ad hoc. The term 'external possibility' appears out of a sudden, and the mistake/misprint may have been induced by the occurrence of the phrase "possible external to him" just one sentence earlier. The term 'internal possibility', however, would seem more appropriate in this sentence because the twofold use of 'of' indicates that "order, beauty, and perfection" is appositive to "external possibility". Another explanation would be that, if God grounds all possibility, he must also ground external possibility. Since the creation of the world includes causal relations 39 , on which external possibility depends, God is indirectly also the ground of external possibility. 40 Therefore, God grounds external possibility indirectly by creating a world. Either way, the texts do not support the interpretation that God does not ground internal possibility by his understanding and will. 8 The strongest case for this reading, however, can be made by taking the similarities to Crusius into account, who likewise thinks that God grounds possibility by his understanding and will. So let us have a look at Crusius. 3. Crusius on God, Powers, and Possibility In this section, I want to show that Kant has a largely Crusian approach of God's grounding of possibility. While this section is mainly textual, I will spell out Kant's account in more detail in the next section. It is a crucial feature of Crusius's account of possibility that all possibility has a "sufficient cause" in something that exists: We call possible that which is thought, but does not yet exist, or from the existence of which we as yet abstract. However, if something that does not yet exist is to begin to exist: then this must be produced through an efficient cause [...]. Therefore, that which is real in the possibilities of such things that do not yet exist – that is, which can have an influence in the coexisting and succeeding things – consists in the existence of a cause for a represented thing. And the possibility of such things that do not yet exist is, according to its higher concept, nothing else but the relation of a thing that we do not yet think as existing to an existing thing, by virtue of which the latter is a sufficient cause for the production of the former, which, as of yet, is only thought. (Crusius, E 56) If someone should find this passage difficult to parse, it would be hard to disagree. But the idea is a classical Aristotelian one: possibility is grounded in actuality. More precisely, existing things ground possibility through their powers. If something is possible, there is a "sufficient cause" for it. But this cause is not yet active. I take it that the meaning of "sufficient" is that the cause, once made active, produces the object that is grounded in the powers and, as it were, exists only in thought. 41 Therefore, according to Crusius, something is possible if there is a sufficient but not yet active cause for it. Using Scholastic terminology 42 , he distinguishes between powers that are present but not active and powers that are present and active: One says of that which is to be possible through a power in the first place, when it acts, that it is now present actu secundo, whereas it has formerly only been present actu primo. For this reason, to be present actu secundo means as much as to actually exist, insofar as one considers this existence as something to which one ascribes the actuality of a power. On the contrary, to be present actu primo means as much as to be possible through the already actually [wircklich] present power of a thing that merely does not act yet. (Crusius, E 64) 9 I take it that the only difference between powers that are present actu primo and those that are also present actu secundo is that the latter has been forced to act by a stimulus, whereas the former would act if being forced to act. Crusius holds that "real possibility" – the "possibility outside of thoughts", as opposed to "ideal possibility", or the "mere possibility in thoughts" (E 56) – obtains if something is grounded in powers that are present actu primo. For, in this case, "sufficient causes for the thing are really present [wirklich vorhanden], which only need to come into the state of action [in dem Stand der Action kommen dürfen]" (Crusius, E 56). 43 Crusius's account of possibility in general also applies to God as the ground of possibility. 44 Although Crusius primarily thinks of grounds and possibility in the world, he holds that God is the ground of the possibility of the world because he has the requisite powers to create the world: The ideal possibility of not existing things would not be useful for anything unless ideal possibility did not contain at least as much reality in itself that, for everything that contradicts neither itself nor other given truths, God at least is a sufficient cause if he were to make use of his omnipotence. (Crusius, E 56) This is what Crusius calls "absolutely possibility", which clearly resembles internal possibility. However, Crusius adds to the logical condition that there is no contradiction the condition that God must be the sufficient cause of possibility. 45 Furthermore, he holds that God needs his understanding to create the world: We encounter in the world an orderly and regular connection and sequence of things that obviously leads us to the fact that the world has been formed according to ideas and has an intelligent [verständige] cause. (Crusius, E 221, see also E 268) Since God creates the world by his will 46 , but "[e]very activity of the will already presupposes the understanding", which is "an indispensable ground of the possibility of any willing" (Crusius, E 445), God grounds the possibility of the world by his understanding and will. Seen in this light, the parallels to Kant are striking. Like Crusius, Kant holds that God grounds possibility by his understanding and will. The term Kant uses to indicate that God has the potentiality to act is "power" (Macht) – for example, Kant says that God has "a will accompanied by great wisdom and power" (OPGP 2:116). 47 Furthermore, Kant holds that God is a "sufficient real ground" because God must have the properties "through which [...] everything outside him can become actual" (OPGP 2:88). This suggests that "sufficient real ground" has the same 10 meaning as the Crusian term "sufficient cause", which means a potential ground of actuality. Hence, it is not an exaggeration to deem Kant a Crusian about God's grounding of possibility. 4. Potentiality and Possibility Newlands helpfully distinguishes between two questions that must be settled for any account of how God grounds possibility: Question 1 (Q1): On what in God do modal truths and modal truthmakers depend? Question 2 (Q2): What is the manner(s) of dependence by which modal truths and modal truth makers depend on God? (Newlands 2009: 158) As we have seen, Kant's answer for Q1 is: internal possibility depends on God's will and understanding. With regard to Q2, the answer is: God grounds internal possibility by being the potential ground of the actuality of everything that is internally possible. But we yet have to understand why Kant answers the questions the way he does. This shall be the task of the present section. With respect to Q1, it is clear that this question cannot be answered independently of Q2. If the answer to the latter were: 'God grounds possibilities by instantiating them', then he would ground them by the possibilities themselves. As Yong (2014: 36–8) has pointed out, this would be a circular explanation of the grounding of possibility. But it is also clear that the instantiation account is incompatible with Kant's claim that God does not instantiate worldly properties that would contradict his divine attributes. 48 Rather, God contains the "ultimate real ground of all other possibility" (OPGP 2:83) 49 , and my potentialist reading can explain how God can ground properties that he does not instantiate himself. As a result, God needs to possess capacities that allow him to be the cause of worldly things which instantiate possibilities. Now the question is: is God a "blindly necessary ground" (OPGP 2:89), or is he a "spirit" who, as such, possesses understanding and will (OPGP 2:87)? If God were the former, the "power view" would be true – God would still be the potential ground of actuality by his power, but not by his understanding and will. For Kant, this would not only be a defective account of God, but also render the great harmony of essences impossible. And as regards intellectualism, it is clear that God's understanding alone cannot be the sufficient potential ground of actuality – understanding just is 11 not a capacity that makes things actual. This shows why Kant answers Q1 by identifying the properties by which God grounds possibility with his understanding and will. As for Q2, we need to consider Kant's discussion of (internal) possibility within the possibility proof in some detail. To my mind, it does not get enough attention that Kant does not bother to argue that possibility, and internal possibility in particular, needs to be grounded. Rather, he uses the proposition that possibility needs grounds as an uncontested premise to argue that some being exists that grounds possibility. Kant introduces the concept of possibility by distinguishing between a formal and a material aspect of possibility. 50 The formal aspect concerns whether some predicates are consistent or contradict each other. But the relations of consistency and contradiction presuppose that there are relata that constitute the material aspect of possibility (Kant calls them the "real" or the "data" of possibility 51 ). Therefore, something is impossible either if there is a contradiction or if the data of possibility are not given. 52 Since Kant apparently thinks we can know a priori that something is possible 53 , he infers that something must exist that grounds possibility. 54 But why does Kant think that possibility must have grounds? Some interpretations vaguely understand the grounding relation in terms of contemporary "metaphysical explanation" and hold that possibility must be grounded in this manner in order to minimize "bruteness", that is, to leave only God (and maybe his properties) unexplained. On this reading, the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) demands that possibility be metaphysically explained. 55 However, at this general level it is unclear why we should ascribe such a view to Kant. Presumably, these interpreters base their reading on Kant's proof of the PSR in Nova Dilucidatio, a writing that appeared in print some years before Beweisgrund. Kant accepts two versions of the PSR in this writing, namely "Nothing is true without a determining 56 ground" (ND 1:393), and "No contingent thing can lack a ground that antecedently determines its existence" (ND 1:395). In Beweisgrund, however, he does not endorse the PSR in either form: in his refutation of what he shall later call the "cosmological proof", which attempts to prove God's existence from the fact that there must be an absolutely necessary ground for contingent existents, Kant objects that the proof rests on the PSR: Now the second step to the proposition that this independent thing is absolutely necessary is already much less reliable, as it must be made by means of the principle of sufficient reason, which is still challenged; however, I have no qualms about subscribing to everything so far. (OPGP 2:157) 12 Admittedly, it is not really clear whether Kant has doubts about the PSR himself or whether he just thinks that we should not appeal to the PSR because it would be a controversial premise. 57 But given that he criticizes the cosmological proof for its appeal to the PSR, it would be surprising if he assigned a role to the PSR in the possibility proof. This casts doubt on reading the grounds of possibility in terms of metaphysical explanation. 58 But if the PSR does not do the work, what then? The answer is that Kant has a potentialist account of possibility. On this view, grounds are an essential aspect of possibility – with the exception of God (who and whose properties are not in need of being grounded 59 ), being possible just is to have grounds of possibility. And since the potentialist view identifies grounds of possibility with potential grounds of actuality, being possible just is to have potential grounds of actuality. 60 This can not only explain the parallels to Crusius, but also why Kant gives no argument that possibility needs grounds. For it is just a conceptual truth that possibility has grounds. In the absence of competing explanations, these are strong reasons to ascribe a broadly Aristotelian potentialist analysis of possibility to Kant. With regard to God's grounding of possibility, the question then cannot be why possibility has grounds, but only why God is this ground. Answering this question is, of course, an important aspect of the possibility proof, and I do not further discuss the proof here. Yet, Kant's potentialist account of the grounds of internal possibility may seem to blur the distinction between internal and external possibility. Recall that, for Wolff and Leibniz, internal possibility consists in the consistency with a given essence, whereas external possibility also requires the agreement with actual causal conditions. According to this view, it is sufficient for internal possibility that God conceives the essences in his mind; only external possibility requires that there be a possible causal action that makes an object actual. But if we adhere to Kant's theory, the grounds of internal and external possibility are seemingly the same: they consist in powers that can make something actual. To be sure, this problem does not occur in the case of worldly substances, as their powers can only change the accidents (or modes) of substances, but not their essences and are hence not grounds of internal possibility. 61 But God is not only the direct ground of internal possibility, but in some cases – by the act of the creation of the world (as regards the immediate effect of God's action) or by miracles 62 – also the direct ground of external possibility. Therefore, an explanation is needed as to what distinguishes grounds of internal from those of external possibility. 13 I think this problem can be solved by considering that every actual thing, or state of things, is produced through an action that is itself dependent on contingent causal conditions. But potentiality is not sufficient to make an action possible. Consider first the example of a ball that is at rest, but has the power to roll. Despite of its power, it does not follow that it is externally possible that the ball rolls. For the ball might be located in a universe in which there is no motion at all, so there would not be another object that sets the ball into motion. By analogy, God's understanding and power are sufficient for internal, but not for external possibility because the mere possession of these faculties does not guarantee that an action is possible by which God can make something actual. Leibniz famously holds that God necessarily (qua his omnibenevolence) chooses the best possible world to exist 63 , and Kant defends him. 64 Thus, even though God has the power and understanding to create other worlds, the only world he can will to create is the actual world because this is the best possible world. Therefore, there can be no action that makes other worlds actual, which are hence not externally possible. Thus, the difference between grounds of internal and of external possibility is that the grounds of internal possibility only require potentiality, whereas the grounds of external possibility also need the possibility of an action. I am not suggesting that Kant in fact has this view (he says nothing about the problem), and some people may doubt that this is a particularly good solution. For example, one might object that Kant's model of grounding is inadequate, that it already presupposes the possibility of what God is supposed to ground, or that internal possibility is not in need of being grounded at all (which would undermine the "only possible ground of proof"). This would be criticism of Kant and not of my interpretation. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that his account does full justice to his central assumptions concerning possibility. First, it satisfies Kant's view that all possibility is grounded in causal powers (again with the exception of God). Second, the suggested account coheres with the assumption that internal possibility depends on God's essence and not on his choice. 65 It is crucial that internal possibility can be cognized according to the principle of contradiction because internal possibility is derivable from essences. Since internal possibility is the same in all possible worlds, there must be grounds of internal possibility in all these worlds, which is best achieved by an absolutely necessary being. And third, Kant can account for the fact that external possibility is not directly dependent on God's essence. For the grounds of external possibility are either contingent worldly grounds or God's decrees. 14 5. God's Grounding of Possibility in the Critical Period I have argued in this paper that Kant has a broadly Aristotelian account of possibility in Beweisgrund, according to which grounds of possibility are potential grounds of actuality. By way of concluding, I would like to have a brief look at the Critical period. Although Kant does not address the question of how God grounds possibility in his Critical writings, there are at least two passages in his lectures that, taken together, suggest that Kant still thinks that God grounds possibility by his understanding and will. Firstly, we read: For one can think the causality of God, or his capacity to make other things outside him actual, in no other way than in his understanding, or in other words: a being that is self-sufficient can only become the cause of other things outside him by his understanding; and this very causality of the understanding of making the objects of its representations actual is called will. (RT-Pölitz 28:1061) Kant is reported to be drawing a particularly close connection between God's understanding and his will: the understanding is not only a presupposition for his will; rather, the will is the causality of the understanding. This alone does not reveal that Kant holds that God grounds possibility by these capacities or that grounds of possibility are potential grounds of actuality, of course. But we read in another transcript: We represent the real possibility of things as derived from God because everything exists according to God's decree (as ens entium). (M-Dohna 28:698) This does not have to mean that Kant now accepts voluntarism about possibility. Rather, if we combine this passage with the passage from the Pölitz notes, we can adopt a reading that is compatible with the view from Beweisgrund. For God, who is the cause of the world by his decrees, must therefore also have the capacities of understanding and will, by which he is the potential cause of the world, and hence the ground of real possibility. However, I do not intend to make hasty conclusions from transcripts alone, but only want to point out the continuity that can be found here. And we must not overlook that there are also important differences to Kant's account in Beweisgrund. First, it goes without saying that the Critical Kant denies that we can prove God's existence. Second, Kant now thinks that God's understanding and will are, like all divine realities, properties of which we can have no determinate concept, but which we can only describe by analogy with human faculties. That is, we cannot attribute to God the faculties of understanding and will (which would be anthropomorphist), but only faculties 15 analogous to human understanding and will. 66 Third, the Critical Kant says that God is the ground not of internal (or external) possibility, but of "real possibility". But I must defer a reading of Kant's Critical conception of real possibility and what it means for the relation of God to the world to another occasion. This enterprise shall be as difficult as it is crucial. 67 References Abaci, Uygar (2017): "Kant, The Actualist Principle, and The Fate of the Only Possible Proof". Journal of the History of Philosophy 55/2, 261–291. Abaci, Uygar (2019): Kant's Revolutionary Theory of Modality. Oxford. Adams, Robert M. (1994): Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford. Adams, Robert M. (2000): "God, Possibility, and Kant". Faith and Philosophy 17/4, 425–440. Aristotle. De Anima. Translated by Robert Hicks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907. Baumgarten, Alexander G. (M): Metaphysica. Reprinted in vol. 17 of the Akademie-Ausgabe. Boehm, Omri (2014): Kant's Critique of Spinoza. Oxford. Borghini, Andrea and Williams, Neil E. (2008): "A Dispositional Theory of Possibility". Dialectica 62, 21–41. Chignell, Andrew (2009): "Kant, Modality, and the Most Real Being". Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 91, 157–192. Chignell, Andrew (2012): "Kant, Real Possibility, and the Threat of Spinoza". Mind 121/483, 635–675. Chignell, Andrew (2014a): "Kant and the 'Monstrous' Ground of Possibility: a Reply to Abaci and Yong". Kantian Review 19/1, 53–69. Chignell, Andrew (2014b): "Can Kantian Laws be Broken?" Res Philosophica 91/1, 103–121. Crusius, Christian August (E): Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten, wiefern sie den zufälligen entgegen gesetzet werden. Reprint of the edition Leipzig 1745. Hildesheim: 1964. Dunlop, Katherine (2018): "The origins and 'possibility' of concepts in Wolff and Kant: Comments on Nicholas Stang, Kant's Modal Metaphysics". European Journal of Philosophy 26, 1134–1140. Fisher, Mark, and Eric Watkins (1998): "Kant on the Material Ground of Possibility: From "The Only Possible Argument" to the "Critique of Pure Reason"". The Review of Metaphysics 52/2, 369–395. Hoffer, Noam (2016): "The Relation between God and the World in the Pre-Critical Kant: Was Kant a Spinozist?" Kantian Review 21/2, 185–210. 16 Insole, Christopher (2011): "Intellectualism, Relational Properties, and the Divine Mind in Kant's Pre-Critical Philosophy". Kantian Review 16/3, 399–427. Jacobs, Jonathan D. (2010): "A Powers Theory of Modality: or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Reject Possible Worlds". Philosophical Studies 151, 227–248. Kanterian, Edward (2018): Kant, God and Metaphysics: The Secret Thorn. London. Leibniz, G.W. (Con): Confessio Philosophi: Papers Concerning the Problem of Evil 1671–1678. Transl. and ed. by R. Sleigh. New Haven, 2005. Leibniz, G.W. (Con): "Mondadology". In Leibniz: Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays. Transl. and ed. by P. Schrecker and A. Martin Schrecker. Indianapolis, 1965. Lin, Martin (2012): "Rationalism and Necessitarianism". NOÛS 46/3, 418–448. Nachtomy, Ohad (2012): "Leibniz and Kant on Possibility and Existence". British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20/5, 953–972. Newlands, Samuel (2010): "The Harmony of Spinoza and Leibniz". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81/1, 64–104. Newlands, Samuel (2013): "Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility". Philosophical Review 122/2, 155–187. Pasnau, Robert (2011): Metaphysical Themes: 1274–1671. Oxford. Stang, Nicholas F. (2010): "Kant's Possibility Proof". History of Philosophy Quarterly 27/3, 275–299. Stang, Nicholas F. (2016): Kant's Modal Metaphysics. Oxford. Theis, Robert (1994): Gott: Untersuchung der Entwicklung des theologischen Diskurses in Kants Schriften zur theoretischen Philosophie bis hin zum Erscheinen der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Stuttgart. Vetter, Barbara (2015): Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality. Oxford. Watkins, Eric (2005): Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality. New York. Wolff, Christian (GM): Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt ("German Metaphysics"). Reprint of the 11th edition, 1751. Ed. by C.A. Corr. Hildesheim: 1983. Wolff, Christian (Ont): Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia ("Ontology"). Reprint of the second edition, Frankfurt and Leipzig 1736. Ed. by Jean École. Hildesheim: Olms, 1962. Wolff, Christian (Cosm): Cosmologia Generalis. Reprint of the 2 nd edition, 1737. Ed. by J. École. Hildesheim: 1964. Wolff, Christian (TN): Theologia Naturalis ("Natural Theology"), Part 1.1. Reprint of the second edition, Frankfurt and Leipzig 1739. Ed. by Jean École. Hildesheim: Olms, 1978. 17 Wood, Allen (1978): Kant's Rational Theology. Ithaca. Yong, Peter (2014): "God, Totality and Possibility in Kant's Only Possible Argument". Kantian Review 19/1, 27–51. Yong, Peter (2017): "The Grounds of Determinate Thought: Kant's Possibility Proof and the Development of German Idealism". History of Philosophy Quarterly 23/4, 251–269. 1 See OPGP 2:79f., 2:83. – I quote Kant according to volume and page numbers of the Akademie edition. Translations are usually mine, although I considered standard translations. The following abbreviations for titles are used: CPJ = Critique of the Power of Judgment, M-x = Metaphysics x (lecture), OPGP = The Only Possible Ground of Proof, Opt = Essay on Some Considerations on Optimism, Rel = Religion within the Boundaries of Reason Alone, RT-x = Rational Theology x (lecture), VT = On a Recently Raised Tone of Superiority. Wolff and Crusius are quoted according to paragraphs. 2 See Chignell 2009, 2012, 2014a, Boehm 2014. Adams (2000) defends a modest form of Spinozism. 3 See Insole 2011 and Hoffer 2016, who also point out that this view conforms to the views of Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten (see Insole 2011: 419f. and Hoffer 2016: 193–5 in particular). 4 See Stang 2010: 280f. 5 For an overview of the grounding of possibility in Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, see Newlands 2013. 6 See Newlands 2013: 177. 7 See Stang 2016: 118, similarly Abaci 2019: 130f. According to Stang (2016: 117f.), we cannot know how God grounds possibility because Kant says that "this thought rises far higher than a created being can reach" (OPGP 2:152f.). However, as Yong points out, this does not mean that it is "strictly unthinkable for us" how God grounds possibility, but only that we have no "causal concept" of it (Yong 2017: 259). 8 For detailed discussion of the possibility proof, see Wood 1978: 64–71, Fisher and Watkins 1998: 369– 80, Chignell 2009, Stang 2010, 2016: ch. 4–5, Boehm 2014: 20–43, Abaci: 2017: 264–70, 2019: 104–31, Kanterian 2018: 207–41. 9 See OPGP 2:87f. 10 This argument is usually neglected. Stang, however, admits that, on a "very natural reading" of the argument, God grounds possibility by his power and understanding (2016: 112). Unfortunately, he rejects 18 this reading without explaining why he considers it mistaken or how the argument should be read instead. Hoffer (2016: 196) uses the argument as evidence that God has an understanding, but ignores the role of God's will. – The location of the argument within the context of the possibility proof, however, is initially puzzling. For the Third Argument seems to appeal to empirical considerations about the order of nature, as Kant does in the second part of Beweisgrund. But since the possibility proof is a priori, it would be problematic to invoke an argument that draws on empirical assumptions. One way to avoid this problem could be that the Third Argument only establishes that the absolutely necessary being must have the capacities to ground the order of nature, but not that this being exists (which already has been established by an a priori argument at this point). However, I am not interested in the role of the Third Argument within the possibility proof here, but only in what it tells us about grounds of possibility. 11 See also OPGP 2:123. 12 Crucially, the absolutely necessary being does not ground his own possibility or the possibility of his own properties. For "his own possibility is originally given", and the absolutely necessary being does not contain the real ground of "the possibility of the most real being himself" (OPGP 2:86). When Kant writes that some possibilities are given in the absolutely necessary being "as a determination" and not as a consequence through him (OPGP 2:79), Kant means that God's determinations are possible because God himself is the absolutely necessary being. Hence, I agree with Stang (2016: 104, 118) against Adams (2000: 438) and Chignell (2009: 181). 13 Because of the perfect harmony that all possibilities must exhibit, I take it that God can only ground them as a whole (see Yong 2014: 39–41). Therefore, it is not possible to single out possibilities that are not dependent on God's understanding. See also section 2. 14 One may wonder whether Kant thinks that there are other necessary conditions for God's will, in addition to his understanding, to cause something. Arguably, this question cannot be answered conclusively. But since all powers necessarily conform to God's will (or else he would not be 19 omnipotent), his will is always sufficient to cause something. Hence, nothing that is relevant for my account depends on this. 15 Metaphysics Herder, which is from about the same time as Beweisgrund, makes basically the same point when it reports Kant to have said that "possibility cannot be the consequence of a choice, but must precede in the representation of the understanding" (28:134). 16 Conversely, the will presupposes the understanding, without which the will could not have a thought of something that it wants to be actualized. This distinguishes a blindly necessary ground – which also could ground possibility – from a spirit. 17 Aside from the quote, this is made clear, e.g., in OPGP 2:91f. 18 See Stang 2016: 113. As Stang points out, Kant argues that "the will makes nothing possible, but only decrees what is already presupposed as possible" (OPGP 2:100, see also OPGP 2:91, M-Herder 28:134). Since Kant talks specifically about decrees, it is clear that he is not denying here that God's will is the ground of internal possibility by its capacity. – I will show later that the Third Argument only concerns "internal possibility"; "external possibility", by contrast, is dependent on God's decrees. 19 See OPGP 2:78, 2:84, and elsewhere. 20 See also Abaci 2019: 108f. 21 See OPGP 2:157, also Chignell 2009: 181, Kanterian 2018: 265. 22 In Theologia Naturalis, Wolff calls internal possibility "possibility considered absolutely", and external possibility is called possibility "considered as it is restricted by the context [in systemata redacta]" (TN 142, see also GM 574). See also Dunlop 2018: 1135, Abaci 2019: 71f. 23 See Wolff, Ont 143, 146, 148, also Abaci 2019: 67f. 24 See TN 144. So it is not true that, as Hoffer (2016: 194) suggests, for Wolff or the Wolffians internal possibility is the same as essence. Rather, internally possible is whatever is compatible with an essence. 25 See Wolff, Ont 881. 20 26 See Wolff, Cosm 112, 114. Determinism means that everything that happens is hypothetically necessary, which rules out free choice and uncaused events. Thus, everything that is externally possible is hypothetically necessary and actual. 27 See Cosm 112, also Abaci 2019: 73. 28 Also see Dunlop's and Abaci's discussion of Wolff's views on possibility (see Dunlop 2018: 1134f., Abaci 2019: 59–74), although I disagree with Dunlop on "possibility in potentia remota", which she reads in a way that seems close to Crusian real possibility. 29 See, e.g., Leibniz, Con 57, also Chignell 2009: 167 n. 20, Stang 2016: 15 n. 11, and the references mentioned there. My views on Leibniz's distinction of the different kinds of possibility have been informed by Adams 1994: ch. 2, Newlands 2010, Lin 2012, and Abaci 2019: 35–54. 30 That Wolff thinks that God predetermines what happens in the world follows from determinism together with the fact that God creates the world. 31 See OPGP 2:92, 2:100, 2:162. 32 I take it that Kant speaks of a "cause" (and not of a ground of external possibility) because he agrees with Wolff that external possibility is co-extensional with actuality. 33 See Newlands 2013: 164–6. 34 I would like to thank xxx for discussion on this kind of objection. 35 See OPGP 2:100. 36 See OPGP 2:117. 37 For helpful discussion of Kant's treatment of physico-theology and the difference between moral and non-moral dependency, see Theis 1994: 127–32, Kanterian 2018: 248–59. 38 See OPGP 2:92, 2:95f., 2:98, 2:99, 2:101, 2:124. 39 See Hoffer 2016: 199–202. 40 We will see in section 4 that God is also the direct ground of external possibility in the case of creation or miracles. 21 41 See Crusius, E 56, 64, 66, 69, 83(a), 83(b), 405. 42 See Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 536. The distinction goes back to Aristotle's distinction of two senses of actuality. In De Anima, he argues that "soul is the first actuality of a natural body having in it the capacity of life", whereas the second actuality consists in the specific acts of the soul (De Anima ii 1, 412b5–6). 43 See also Crusius, E 63, 64, 69. 44 This has been pointed out by Stang (2016: 113), who nonetheless does not mention that, according to Crusius, God's understanding and will are needed for his omnipotence. Consequently, it is not true that Crusius is a voluntarist about God's grounding of possibility, as Chignell (2009: 181 n. 41) holds. 45 See Crusius, E 58. 46 See Crusius, E 278. 47 See also OPGP 2:117, 2:126, 2:132, 2:151, 2:159. 48 See OPGP 2:85f. 49 See also OPGP 2:79, 85, 87, and Stang 2016: 107–12. 50 See OPGP 2:77f. 51 See OPGP 2:77f. 52 See OPGP 2:78, 2:79. 53 See Chignell 2009: 164. 54 Some scholars believe that Kant identifies possibility with "thinkability" (see Wood 1978: 66, 68, Fisher and Watkins 1998: 371, Yong 2017: 253f.). But this is wrong. To be sure, Kant makes a strong connection between possibility and thinkability in Beweisgrund, arguing that "everything possible is something that can be thought" (OPGP 2:78). Notwithstanding this, he stops short of identifying possibility with thinkability and even claims that some concepts, which as such are thinkable, may be "deception" (OPGP 2:80) or "empty words" that do not signify possible things (OPGP 2:81). What Kant seems to mean instead is that possible is whatever is legitimately thinkable. And legitimately thinkable is 22 what is given, that is, what is grounded in something actual. For similar views to mine, see Chignell 2009: 168, Stang 2016: 118–20, Abaci 2017: 268f., 2019: 127–9. 55 See Fisher and Watkins 1998: 375 n. 15, Chignell 2009: 157f., Yong 2014: 28. 56 Following Crusius, Kant speaks of "determining" instead of "sufficient" grounds in this context (see ND 1:393). I stick by the usual terminology to avoid confusion. Furthermore, I use 'ground' and 'reason' interchangeably here. 57 When Kant says that he is willing to subscribe to the PSR, this is apparently not much more than a rhetorical move to put this worry aside and proceed to his main objection. Kanterian (2018: 267) argues that Kant in fact takes the PSR to be "unreliable" and already did so in Nova Dilucidatio. But the textual evidence is not straightforward as regards Beweisgrund; and as Kanterian himself notes earlier in his book, Kant accepts and proves the PSR in Nova Dilucidatio (see Kanterian 2018: 133). 58 Another problem about appealing to the PSR is that "the requirement that there be an explanation for real possibility does not dictate what counts as such an explanation" (Abaci 2019: 127). I agree with this. Potentialism about grounds of possibility may well be compatible with the PSR, but it would be only due to the fact that possibility is such that it requires grounds that we need to explain possibility. 59 See OPGP 2:79. Notably, Kant does not say whether his account is disjunctive or whether there is an overarching genus of possibility that applies both to God and the world. Nachtomy (2012: 957–62) argues that Leibniz has a disjunctivist account of existence that is quite analogous to the disjunctivist account of possibility Kant might accept (see Abaci 2019: 58 for a different reading). However, Nachtomy is unable to provide textual evidence that Leibniz consciously embraces disjunctivism, so we should be a bit cautious about this idea, in my view. The same problem applies to Kant – he might be a disjunctivist about possibility, or he might think that there is an overarching genus of possibility. Even so, Kant does not explicitly provide such an account. 60 Providing a compelling account of potentiality is tricky and beyond the scope of this paper; for recent systematic work, see Borghini and Williams 2008, Jacobs 2010, and Vetter 2015. Roughly, potentiality 23 means that, given the right circumstances, something has the intrinsic properties to be a ground of actuality. In the case of God, the right circumstances would be that he decrees to create a world, which would make his understanding and will grounds of the world's actuality; without God's decrees, his faculties are only potential grounds of the world's actuality. 61 Kant appears to endorse Baumgarten's (M 106) claim that essences are necessary and unchangeable (see M-Herder 28: 18). This view is very traditional and has also been championed by Wolff (GM 42, Ont 300). 62 Since the whole world owes its existence to God's creation, but substances cannot be created by worldly substances (maybe with the exception of living beings), worldly substances must be created directly by God. Miracles, on the contrary, "interrupt the order of nature" (OPGP 2:116); they are direct causal interventions by God and Kant clearly does not rule out their possibility. See Chignell 2014b for a helpful discussion of Kant's account of miracles. 63 See, for instance, Leibniz Mon 53–5. 64 See OPGP 2:153f., also his essay on optimism from 1758 (Opt 2:27–35). 65 This helps to refute an objection from Chignell (2009: 181), who argues that powers cannot ground internal possibility because they can only be grounds of external possibility. However, while it is true that worldly powers are only grounds of external possibility (because the existence of substances with these powers is contingent), God exists absolutely necessarily, so his powers can be grounds of internal possibility. 66 See CPJ 5:464n, Rel 6:65n, VT 8:400f.n, also A696f./B724f. Wood's discussion on this matter is most helpful (see Wood 1978: 86–93). 67 [acknowledgments]

BEING NEUTRAL: AGNOSTICISM, INQUIRY AND THE SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT Matthew McGrath Rutgers University Epistemologists generally agree that belief and disbelief do not exhaust one's doxastic options. Plausibly, there are also graded doxastic states of confidence in propositions. But even considering only "categorical" doxastic options, it's agreed that there is a third neutral option.1 Many expressions are used for it, including 'suspension of judgment', 'agnosticism', 'withholding of judgment', 'withholding', etc. Despite the different nuances in meaning, epistemologists typically proceed as if these all pick out the same thing.2 This supposedly common referent is not the mere absence of a doxastic attitude. Rocks do not believe, disbelieve, etc. but aren't in any sense neutral. To be neutral whether p, instead, is to be in a positive state on the question whether p, and in that sense to be an attitude.3 Just as belief and disbelief are taken to be mutually exclusive, at least putting aside irrationality and fragmentation of mind, 4 the same is thought to hold for the triad of belief, disbelief and the neutral attitude. Let's call the thesis that belief, disbelief and the neutral attitude are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of one's categorical doxastic options the tripartite conception. It is often thought, further, that the epistemology of the neutral attitude is continuous with that of belief and disbelief in certain key ways. I will use the label traditionalism for the conjunction of the tripartite conception and two further epistemological claims. The first is that all three doxastic attitudes admit of justification, both ex ante justification (justification to have a doxastic attitude) and ex post (having a doxastic attitude justifiably). 5 The second is that the only factors that are relevant to the (ex ante) justification of doxastic attitudes are epistemic in the following narrow sense: whether they obtain or not helps fix how strong or weak one's current epistemic position is with respect to whether p.6 Epistemic factors include: a. How strongly or weakly your evidence supports p (or not-p). b. Whether you know or appreciate (a). The obtaining of (a) and (b) helps fix the strength of your epistemic position with respect to whether p. By contrast, factors 1-4, even when known, do not:7 1. Whether you will later have better (worse) evidence concerning whether p than you now have. 2. Whether you will later be a better (worse) assessor of your evidence. 3. How valuable, or how much you value, knowing whether p. 4. How likely it is that, if you inquired further and acquired more evidence, you could come to know whether p. 1 and 2 concern comparisons between the present and future in terms of epistemic features (e.g., the quality of your evidence, your ability to assess one's evidence). Call these future2 comparative factors. 3 and 4, by contrast, bear on whether you should aim to answer the question at hand (e.g., the value of the goal, the availability of means to achieve it). Call these goal-related factors. Despite being about epistemic matters, neither of these sorts of factors, nor the knowledge that they obtain, is epistemic in the narrow sense we have defined. They do not help fix how strong or weak your epistemic position is with respect to whether p. Like many philosophers, I find traditionalism attractive. But it faces challenges. Some are familiar from the literature on practical reasons for belief.8 In this paper, I consider two less familiar challenges that target the neutral attitude. One focuses on future-comparative factors, the other on goal-related factors. I argue that the best response to these challenges on behalf of the traditionalist involves distinguishing several forms of neutrality a person can have with respect to a question. However, this paper is not solely or even primarily a defense of traditionalism. Whether you adhere to traditionalism or not, I hope to show you that you ought to distinguish several ways of being neutral on questions. Distinguishing these forms of neutrality gives us not only a way of finding room for non-epistemic factors in traditionalist epistemology but also a richer picture of the relevance of agency and the conative to our doxastic lives. 1. Two Challenges to Traditionalism Here are two examples, the first borrowed from Mark Schroeder (2012) and the second a variant of an example given by Joseph Raz (1975): Clearer and better evidence. On several occasions you've had skin discolorations that seemed suspicious for cancer. Each time the relevant tests came back negative. So, you have good but not definitive reason to think the latest round of spots, too, are benign. Nevertheless, when your doctor notes the spots, she orders a test (it's standard practice), which will come back in a few days. The results of this test, you know, will be definitive. Temporary impairment. You know your abilities to make sound judgments on subtle matters, such as whether which of two insurance plans is a better deal overall, are mildly impaired. (Perhaps it's 12am and you are tired, or you've had two drinks.) You also know that these impairments will be gone by tomorrow morning. There is no need to arrive at a conclusion until tomorrow evening, and you have time tomorrow to think it through. In the "clearer and better evidence" case, it seems you have a good reason to suspend judgment on the question at hand, namely the fact that you will acquire clearer and better evidence a little later. In the "temporary impairment" case, again, it seems you have a good reason to suspend judgment, namely the fact that your powers of judgment will be better in the morning. In both cases, the good reason seems to bear on whether you are justified in suspending judgment. Assuming these appearances are trustworthy, and making the usual assumption that suspension of judgment is the neutral doxastic attitude, it follows that traditionalism is false.9 The traditionalist needs to explain how this reasoning goes wrong. That's the first challenge. The second concerns the point of the neutral attitude. Jane Friedman writes: 3 "Why suspend judging? I take it that one sort of answer that people are initially tempted to give is something about one's deficient epistemic standing on some matter. Why suspend judgment? Because one is not in the position to know or because one's evidence fails to settle some matter or because one has insufficient reason to believe, and so on. But this sort of answer feels inadequate once we admit that suspending is a matter of taking up some attitude rather than merely not having some. Very plausibly, if my epistemic standing with respect to some propositions is deficient in the relevant senses, then I shouldn't believe those propositions. But if suspending is different from merely not believing, then the claim that I shouldn't believe those propositions is not equivalent to the claim that I should suspend judgment. Should I do this other thing, too? Why, as a rational subject whose epistemic circumstances are relevantly deficient, would I ever adopt this attitude of committed neutrality rather than simply not believe or stop believing?" (2017, 303-4) If it is a fully proper response to epistemic deficiency on whether p simply to lack belief on whether p, what is the point of also doing something positive, like suspending?10 Friedman's own answer connects suspension closely with inquiry. For her, suspension is the attitude the having of which is necessary and sufficient for inquiry. In having this "inquiring attitude," you are in a goal-directed state, the goal being to come to know the answer to the target question.11 Merely lacking belief is not a goal-directed state at all, let alone a state that ensures inquiry. And there is of course a point to being in this goal-directed state: taking on a goal can help you attain it. How good it would be to achieve a given goal, how much you care about achieving it, and the feasibility of means of achieving it all seem relevant to whether you are justified in taking on that goal. We regularly treat such factors as relevant to the justification of having a goal by taking on and giving up goals based on such factors. I might take on a goal of learning Italian because I think that it would be valuable to know it and that over time I can feasibly so. I might give up goal of completing the 2020 Boston Marathon because I realize it's very unlikely I could complete it even if I started training now (in late 2019). So, if suspension of judgment is a matter of having the goal of knowing the answer to a question, then goal-related factors should matter to its justification. How good it would be to know whether p, how much you value knowing whether p and the feasibility of obtaining the knowledge if you inquired further and gathered more evidence – these should help fix whether you are justified in having the neutral attitude. But as we've seen, traditionalism denies the relevance of such non-epistemic factors. The second challenge, then, is to give a traditionalism-friendly explanation of the point of the neutral doxastic attitude, i.e., to explain its point without going over to a view like Friedman's which treats it as a goal-directed state, with the consequent relevance of nonepistemic factors. Those are the challenges. I answer them on behalf of the traditionalist by arguing that there are several very different ways to be neutral on a question. I distinguish three: suspension of judgment, the inquiring attitude, and an attitude I call agnosticism. For the first two of these ways of being neutral, non-epistemic factors such as future-comparative and goalrelated factors matter to their justification. But they are not genuine doxastic attitudes. There is 4 a genuinely doxastic neutral attitude, agnosticism, but I argue that we have no reason, from the two challenges at least, to think that any but epistemic factors matter to its justification. Traditionalism thus survives the challenges. 2. Suspension of Judgment Consider the verb 'suspend' as it is used in "S suspended X," where X denotes an action or event. 'Suspend', used with that meaning, is a success verb. If a group suspends a planned protest, the group does not engage in the protest while it is suspended. Similarly, if I suspend judgment on whether p over a period of time, I do not, during that period, make a judgment on whether p, and so I neither judge that p nor that not-p. But in these cases, the not X-ing is something attributable to the relevant agent. It is an omission of X-ing. (Rocks don't omit meetings, decisions, etc., although they do not do those things.12) In general, omitting X is necessary but insufficient for suspending X. Consider someone who omits carrying out a planned protest because forgets about it. He doesn't thereby suspend the protest. The same goes for suspending judgment. Talk of "suspending judgment" conveys something beyond the omission of judgment, something future-directed. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first category of senses for 'suspend' is summarized as "to debar, postpone, defer, and related uses." I propose to take the notions of postponement and deferral – or putting off – as a basis for an account of suspending judgment.13 These notions are particularly appropriate because suspending judgment is suspending something that is not yet underway. (Of course, you are judging in a process sense, but you have made no judgment. More later on this distinction.) When we talk of suspending something already underway – suspending a political campaign, someone's participation a tax saving plan, or train service to a certain station – the notion of debarring or "temporarily stopping" may capture our meaning. But actions or events not yet underway cannot be stopped; rather, in suspending them one is putting them off. To suspend a meeting that hasn't started is to put it off; to suspend a decision not yet already made is to put off the decision. In this vein I propose: To suspend judgment on a question is to put off judgment on it. The account is of course more useful if supplemented with more information about what it is to put off judgment. I suggest it is a matter of omitting judgment because one is pursuing an aim about judgment. Let me say something about the 'because' and about the aim. First, not just any explanatory connection, not just any because, is sufficient. The sort of connection needed is found in humdrum cases such as that of a child omitting eating her cake now because she is saving it for later. The child is pursuing the aim of eating it later (and not before), and this explains in a rationalizing way why she omits eating it now. The child is in effect taking means to an end. The means here is constitutive – omitting eating it now is a part of eating it only later. Second, the aim involved could be as simple as an aim to judge on the question later (and not before). But, more generally, one put off judgment insofar as one is pursuing a conditional aim – an aim to judge when and only when certain conditions obtain 5 (which one does not yet believe obtain). For instance, you might aim to judge when you have strong evidence on the question, when you learn how to reason better about these sorts of issues, when you rid yourself of a certain bias, etc. These aims are ones the attainment of which improves the chances of making an epistemically high-quality judgment; but this is not strictly unnecessary. You might put off judgment until the cult leader gives you the "okay," until you are able to consider the question without becoming angry, or until you "feel like" judging the matter. Your judgment-related aim, finally, needn't be a full-blown intention to judge. You might have the aim by intending only to try.14 Given this account of suspension, there is a readily available account of refraining.15 Suspending and refraining from judgment are obviously related, though talk of "refraining" does not convey postponement or deferral in the way talk of "suspending" does. The Oxford English Dictionary gives as the current meaning for the verb 'refrain', "to stop oneself from doing something; to abstain, forbear." Refraining, abstaining, forbearing, all seem closely related to intentional omission.16 Thus, I propose: To refrain from judgment on a question is intentionally to omit judgment on it. It is clear enough that intentionally omitting judgment implies refraining from judgment. The converse is plausible, too, given a broad view of intentional omission. Suppose your faucet is leaky. You take a look at the problem. Suppose you realize your tools are insufficient for the job, and so you don't try to fix it yourself. Alternatively, maybe you've been trying to fix it but come to realize that your tools are insufficient and so stop trying for that reason. In such cases, it's plausible that you intentionally omit further repair-related activities. Many cases of refraining from judgment on a question are similar. Suppose you are asked a question by a friend. You might know that you don't know the answer and for that reason not even try to answer it. Or, perhaps you think about the question for a moment, consult your memory or consider your evidence, but upon concluding you don't know, stop your attempts. In such cases, plausibly you intentionally omit judgment. Given my accounts, it is plausible that if you suspend judgment, you also refrain from judgment. This is because if you put off something, plausibly you intentionally omit it. The child who puts off eating her cake until later intentionally omits eating it. She might or might not have the specific aim of not eating it now (aiming at this as a means to eating it later).17 However, the converse implication fails: refraining from judgment doesn't imply suspending it – you can intentionally omit judgment without putting it off. Suppose that the question your friend asks you is one you don't care about in the least. After thinking about it for a moment, you conclude you don't know and stop deliberation. In a case like this you probably won't be putting off judgment. You won't be aiming to judge the matter later or when your evidence is better, etc. You thus won't suspend judgment, only refrain from it. A few minutes later, you may well not be refraining any more either. One might look askance at dictionary-inspired accounts of suspending and refraining from judgment. But part of what I hope to show over the course of this paper is that these core meanings in ordinary English point us to philosophically important but neglected differences in ways of being neutral on questions. 6 Refraining from and suspending judgment are ways of exercising control over one's judgment and, since judgment is a way of coming to have beliefs, over one's beliefs. One can be responsible for how one exercises this control. If you suspend judgment for bad reasons or motivations, and you lack an excuse, you can be blameworthy for your suspension. For instance, a politician may suspend judgment on climate-change in an effort, perhaps unconscious, to avoid feeling pressure to act in ways that run contrary to the wishes of donors, or an employer may suspend judgment on whether an outgroup job candidate is suitable for prejudiced reasons. My accounts of suspension and refraining also fits well with the practice of the Pyrrhonian skeptics, who did not merely omit judgment but did so intentionally. Many of the modes of suspension Sextus Empiricus discusses are strategies for refraining from judgment in the face of some temptation to judge – constructing arguments for contrary sides on a question, recalling differences of opinion of experts, etc. Moreover, the Pyrrhonians approved of refraining from judgment because they were putting it off until epistemically acceptable conditions were met and while inquiring further in an effort to achieve these conditions. I now turn to two main objections to my accounts. The first is that my accounts fail to respect the fact that, irrationality and fragmentation aside, belief that p excludes refraining from judgment on whether p. One way to develop this objection is to appeal to an agential theory of judgment. Some have argued that judgment is itself a kind of action, e.g., a sincere affirmation that p, or an affirmation that p made with the aim of affirming truly and/or reliably (Shah and Velleman, 2005; Sosa, 2015). If some such theory is correct, it would seem that you could be rational in intentionally omitting judgment on whether p even if you already believed that p (and even if your mind was in no sense fragmented). You might know that the food you're eating at a dinner party is bland but intentionally fail to sincerely affirm that it is. You might put the question of its blandness out of your mind so that you can better enjoy the conversation. According to my account, this would be a case of refraining from judgment on whether the food was bland. But, so the objection goes, that's the wrong result. The core of this objection does not depend on assuming an agential theory of judgment. Plausibly, whatever the right account of judgment is, it is possible for someone to believe that p at a time but not judge that p at that time (without irrationality or fragmentation).18 Moreover, if this is possible, it ought to be possible, further, to believe that p at a time while intentionally not judging on whether p at that time (again without irrationality or fragmentation). For instance, maybe judgment that p consists in the non-agential but occurrent taking of p to be the case. You could intentionally omit such takings while believing that p. Intuitively, again, this doesn't seem like suspension of judgment. (Side note: this objection is a curious one. If you are intentionally omitting X, then it seems plausible that you are refraining from X, and similarly if you are intentionally omitting X because you are pursuing suitable aims concerning X-ing, it seems you are suspending X. The problem seems to be with figuring out what judgment is, not what refraining or suspension are.) I consider two possible replies to the objection, one that upholds my original accounts while trying to thread the judgment-belief needle and another that imputes a kind of error to our talk and thought about suspending judgment. 7 The first reply asserts a close relationship between judgment and belief. To judge that p is to make up your mind that p, whereas to believe that p is to have your mind made up that p. You could have your mind up that p at a time, of course, without then making it up that p. Plausibly, you might never have made it up. Perhaps this happens when we acquire beliefs just walking around town (e.g., the belief that you're walking across Main Street, or that it's cold outside). So, although belief doesn't entail judgment, judgment does entail belief – judgment is the formation of a belief through making up your mind. How does this help with the objection? There is something peculiar about a situation in which your mind is already made up that p and yet at the same time you are refraining from making up your mind on whether p. There may be no strict incompatibility here, but to be in such a situation without irrationality you would need to be self-blind in respect of your belief that p. For, if you knew your mind was already made up that p, you would be irrational to refrain from making it up that p, i.e., to intentionally not making it up. Compare: if I know I am at the company picnic, it seems irrational for me to have the sorts of mental states I would need to intentionally not arrive at the company picnic. The aim of not now arriving at the picnic would seem irrational because pointless: you know you're there, so of course you know you won't be arriving there, regardless of what you do. But the same goes for aims such as aiming to go to the picnic later and not before, or aiming to go to the picnic when and only when it stops raining. Finally, given that a mind that is self-blind about one of its beliefs is fragmented, we have the result that belief excludes refraining from judgment (and so suspending judgment), barring irrationality and fragmentation. The second reply does not identify judgment with making up one's mind. It concedes to the objector that it's possible to judge that p, without irrationality or fragmentation, even when you already believe that p and know that you do. But it claims that when we ordinarily (and in philosophy) talk of "suspending judgment," what we really have in mind is suspending not just any old judgment but belief-forming judgment (and similarly for talk of refraining from judgment). So, my above accounts need a small revision – we must insert 'belief-forming' before 'judgment' in the right-hand side. The final part of this second reply piggybacks off the first reply: absent fragmentation and irrationality, believing that p excludes intentionally not going in for belief-forming judgment. Belief implies having one's mind made up, and beliefforming judgment is a way of making up one's mind. There are costs to both replies. The first reply requires a controversial view of judgment. On this view, surprisingly, if I already believe that snow is white, I cannot judge that it is. This view may not fit very well with certain strands of ordinary thought and talk about judgment, though it does fit well with talk of suspending and refraining from judgment.19 The second imputes a mismatch between what we're wanting to talk and think about and the tools we use to do this. We want to talk and think about suspension of belief-forming judgment but we end up using the term 'judgment' (and concept of judgment) without any qualification. In order to make room for views of judgment on which it isn't necessarily a way of coming to believe, I rely on the second reply to the objection. Thus, I revise my accounts as follows: 8 To suspend judgment on a question is to put off belief-forming judgment, that is, to omit it because one aims to have it later (and not before) or when and only when certain conditions obtain (which one does not yet believe obtain). To refrain from judgment on a question is intentionally to omit belief-forming judgment on it. I want to make one final observation as I wrap up my answer to this first objection. Given that we have the general notion of suspension as putting off and the general notion of refraining as intentionally omitting, we can apply them directly to belief itself. Whereas we must be careful in stating how belief excludes suspending and refraining from judgment, by noting qualifications about irrationality and fragmentation, we can say without qualification that belief excludes suspending and refraining from belief. (As noted above, these are success notions: if you suspend X, you don't X, and similarly for refraining.) Moreover, these notions applied to belief are every bit as important to epistemology as they are when applied to judgment. The point of suspending or refraining from judgment in any normal case is to suspend or refrain from belief itself. We want to put off judgment on whether p because we want to put off belief on whether p, and similarly for refraining from judgment and refraining from belief. It is not an accident, of course, that we very often speak of suspending and refraining from judgment rather than belief, because as mentioned above one of our chief ways of exerting control over our beliefs is through exerting control over whether we judge on a question.20 The second objection is that my accounts go too far in a voluntarist direction. If one can intentionally omit judgment, then won't there be cases in which one omits judgment at will? And if so, it seems it is only be a short step to conceding that it is possible to make propositional judgments at will, i.e., to judge that p at will? If so, then given that one way of coming to believe something is by judging it to be so, it might seem we are only one further short step from doxastic voluntarism, namely the thesis that one can in some cases believe propositions at will.21 In discussing judgment at will, it's useful to begin by noting a process/product ambiguity in talk of "judging" or "judgment," an ambiguity under the surface in much of the above discussion. When we say, for example, that someone should "judge an issue carefully" or should "use critical judgment" on the issue, we have in mind a process or activity. This activity can stretch over time and is marked linguistically by the use of progressive verb aspect (e.g., "they are judging the matter carefully"). It is more naturally referred to as "deliberation" and consists, roughly, in trying to answer a question with one's current resources (evidence, memory). By contrast, when we say that someone "made a reasonable judgment," we have in mind the product of this process when it is successfully completed, which is not something that stretches over time. If you made a judgment on a question, you propositionally judged on the question, i.e., you judged that p for some candidate answer p to the target question. In discussions of suspending and refraining from judgment, it is the refraining of the product that it is primarily at issue. Typically, though, we omit the product by omitting or stopping the process. You try to answer a question, conclude you don't have good enough evidence, and so stop trying, with the result that you don't make a judgment either way. This is not omitting judgment at will, since one is omitting it indirectly, by omitting the process. Can we ever omit 9 judgment (the product) at will – that is, just by deciding to omit it and executing that decision directly? I don't know. But, as I will try to show, it's not necessary to answer this question in order to answer the "involuntarist" objection to my account. Suppose the answer is that, yes, we can omit judgment at will. Still, there is no short step to the possibility of (belief-forming) judgment that p at will. Audi (1999) observes that it doesn't follow from the fact that one can omit X-ing at will that one can X at will. Consider sneezing. One cannot sneeze at will. But presumably one can in some cases omit – suppress – a sneeze at will. In fact, it is independently more plausible, at least in the case of belief-forming judgment, that one can omit judgment at will than that one can judge and therein come to believe that p at will. One way we can see this difference in plausibility is to compare how natural it seems to voice the relevant proximal intentions, even privately. If we can X at will, we would expect that we sometimes do X at will and that the avowal of the proximal intention to X should seem natural. Compare two possible avowals from jurors: 1) "I hereby decide not to a form a belief right now on whether the defendant was at the scene of the accident" with 2)"I hereby decide to come to believe right now that the defendant was at the scene of the accident." To my ears, (1) seems natural and (2) does not, or at least seems much less natural. There is clearly much more to say on these issues, but I hope to have shown that there is no simple and straightforward argument from the possibility of omitting judgment at will to the possibility of belief at will. 22 3. Suspension, Refraining and Agnosticism If my account of suspending judgment is correct, then future-comparative factors, such as the fact that you would have clearer and better evidence later, or the fact that you would be a better judge later, can be relevant to whether you are justified in suspending judgment, even though those factors don't help fix your strength of epistemic position. Someone suspending judgment might reason, quite appropriately, as follows: "I will do better to wait to form a belief on whether p; for, if I form it now, the belief I form might well be true and perhaps justified and even knowledge, but if I form it later, my belief will more likely be true, justified and a case of knowledge. This speaks in favor of waiting to form a belief – of suspending judgment."23 So far it might seem like I'm helping to bury traditionalism. My account of suspending judgment and the intuitions I've marshalled about the relevance of future-comparative factors to its justification seem to comprise mutually supporting strands of evidence against traditionalism. But this appearance is misleading, as I hope to show in the next two sections. There is a neutral doxastic attitude of which traditionalism is true, but it is not suspension. I will call it 'agnosticism'. Suspension, even the state of being suspended, is not a doxastic attitude at all, nor is refraining. In this section, I argue that suspension (and refraining) are distinct from agnosticism. In the next, I use the results to answer the first challenge to traditionalism. Let me explain how I will understand 'agnosticism'. In many cases, we are too unsure/uncertain on a question to have a belief. I am (now in 2019) too uncertain on whether Trump will win reelection to have a belief either way. The uncertainty involved in such cases is not the mere absence of certainty or confidence. A rock is not uncertain about anything. I am in some state of confidence with respect to p; the rock isn't. Ordinary talk of "being agnostic" is a 10 fairly good, if imperfect24, approximation to the notion of being too uncertain to have a belief (or disbelief) on the matter. So, I will recruit it for my purposes: I will use 'being agnostic whether p' to mean having an intermediate state of confidence concerning whether p, i.e., having states of confidence for p and for not-p such that one's state of confidence for p is neither strong enough for belief that p nor low enough for disbelief (and similarly, mutatis mutandis, for one's state of confidence for not-p).25 What do I mean by "states of confidence"? I rely on an intuitive notion, making a few assumptions. I assume that a state of confidence concerning whether p consists of states of confidence for p and for not-p. And I assume as well that the latter sorts of states – states of confidence for particular propositions – are mental states that collectively ground comparative facts of the form S is more confident in p than S is in q. For instance, I have a state of confidence about whether the coin in my hand will come up heads when I flip it. I am not confident that heads will come up, nor that tails will. But I am more confident that heads will come up than I am of various other things, such as that neither heads nor tails will come up. Plausibly, I need to have a state of confidence for the proposition that heads will come up in order to help ground these comparative facts. On the other hand, I take no stand on familiar controversies over the nature of states of confidence and their relations to belief. I do not claim that states of confidence are credences of the sort familiar from Bayesian epistemology.26 Nor, relatedly, do I claim that all rational states of confidence must be measurable by a probability function.27 I stay neutral as well on questions of reduction, such as whether belief and disbelief are reducible to facts about confidences, or the converse, or neither.28 Although I am working with a rough and ready intuitive notion, I think the arguments below will not for the most part depend on the details of how the notion is explicated or refined. Where the details might matter, I indicate as much in the endnotes. Is suspending judgment the same as agnosticism, so understood? Note, for starters, that there are different connotations in talk of "suspending" and talk of "being agnostic" (either used in my stipulated way or in the ordinary way). Talk of "suspending judgment" suggests something about the future, whereas talk of "being agnostic" doesn't. Talk of "refraining from" as well as "suspending" judgment also suggests something agential – refusal, intentional omission – in a way that "being agnostic" doesn't. However, I want to go beyond the connotations of these terms. I will argue that there are both normative and non-normative differences between suspension of judgment and agnosticism, understood as having an intermediate state of confidence. These are two distinct phenomena. In fact, they come apart in numerous ways that it is useful to chart. I'll make similar arguments afterward for refraining from judgment. Two methodological points are worth making before turning to the arguments. The arguments below are more forceful assuming the accounts of suspending and refraining from judgment defended in the previous section. But they retain force even if we do not assume those accounts. Thus, I see those accounts and the arguments below as mutually supportive. The second point is that even should my accounts of suspending and refraining from judgment be incorrect, I may still be right in claiming that the phenomena I take those ordinary notions to 11 get at come apart from agnosticism. I of course think my accounts in the section 2 are right. But as I will explain further in section 4, the crucial point for the defense of traditionalism is that the phenomena of putting off judgment and intentionally omitting judgment are different from agnosticism. I'll start with normative differences. I claim that something can be a reason for you to suspend judgment but not a reason for you to be agnostic, and vice versa.29 If you want to make up your mind but haven't done so yet, so that you neither believe nor disbelieve, the fact that clearer and better evidence will come in later can be a reason for you to suspend judgment, as illustrated in Schroeder's case above. But can this fact be a reason for you to be agnostic? It doesn't seem so. If there are genuine reasons here, it ought to be reasonable to acquire or continue to hold the relevant attitudes for the purported reason. But it doesn't seem reasonable to acquire or remain in a state of intermediate confidence for the reason that better evidence is coming in. By contrast, it clearly can be reasonable for someone to suspend or continue to suspend judgment for this reason.30 Similar arguments are available concerning other reasons. For instance, the fact that tomorrow morning, when you are more alert, you will be a better assessor of your evidence on an important issue can be a reason for you to suspend judgment on the question, but not a reason for you to be agnostic about it. Consider again the case of the two health insurance plans your employer offers. It's a complex matter whether Plan A or Plan B is a better deal overall. You might well be able to come to a reasonable conclusion about which is best now, but you're quite tired. You know that in the morning you'll be better assessor of this evidence. Here the future-comparative fact that you'll be a better assessor of the evidence and so better judge of the matter seems to be a reason for you to wait till then to make up your mind on this important question. But this same comparative fact does not seem to be a reason for you to be agnostic, to be in a state of intermediate confidence. One might try to argue that your current impairment is reason for you to be in such a state, but it's far less plausible to think the comparative fact is. Correspondingly, there are cases in which comparative facts that place the future in a poorer light than the present are reasons for one not to suspend judgment without being reasons for one to be agnostic. These are cases of "epistemic worsening." For instance, suppose you know that you will never be better placed to believe the truth on whether p than you are now – you know that the only evidence that will ever be available on whether p is going to be destroyed in just a moment. Suppose, for vividness, the question is whether a certain political leader ordered the torture of a certain prisoner. You know that an official is coming in a few minutes to destroy the document you're relying on, which is the only record there is. You know that everyone who knows about whether the leader ordered the torture is either dead or would never risk the consequences of revealing the answer. Such facts seem to constitute a reason for you not to suspend judgment. But they clearly don't constitute a reason for you not to be agnostic. Indeed, it may be that, despite the dramatic situation, the evidence you have from the document makes it about 50% likely that the politician ordered the torture. This seems to be a reason for you to be in a state of intermediate confidence on the question. Something can also be a reason for you to be agnostic without being a reason for you to suspend judgment. Consider "don't care" cases like the following. Take some question that does not interest you in the slightest, say (for certain Americans) whether the Manchester 12 United or Chelsea football team has a better starting goalie. Suppose your UK friend is asking you about it, pushing you to give your opinion. Here it seems you have a reason to be agnostic, namely the fact that the evidence you have doesn't weigh in favor of either answer about whose goalie is better; but this fact isn't a reason for you to be suspend judgment, because it isn't a reason for you to try to get back to the question later (or under certain conditions). Epistemic worsening cases are similar. The fact that your evidence makes a proposition, p, 50% likely is a reason for you to be agnostic about whether p, but it doesn't seem like a reason for you to suspend judgment, because you know your judgment isn't going to be any better later, only worse. Agnosticism and suspending judgment can come apart non-normatively as well. From our examples above, we can see how you might be agnostic without suspending judgment if you are agnostic but know that your evidence and/or power of judgment will never be as good as they are currently, or if you are agnostic but don't care about getting back to the question or knowing the answer later. You might well not suspend judgment in these cases. Could the converse happen as well? Could you suspend judgment without being agnostic? This is less clear. But it could happen if you could ever intentionally omit judgment as well as all states of confidence. I adopt the following stipulation: 'Opinion' will be used inclusively to pick out belief, disbelief as well as states of confidence. Are there cases in which someone intentionally fails not only to judge but to have any opinion? I think examples make this at least plausible. In the American legal system, judges often instruct jurors to suspend judgment on the defendant's guilt until all the evidence has been presented. Suppose a juror complies with this instruction – as no doubt some do – by putting the question of the defendant's guilt firmly out of her mind until the end of the trial. This juror seems not only to suspend judgment but to suspend "opinion" on the matter, so that she is not even agnostic. Here is similar case. Suppose a college freshman, flipping open the textbook on Day 1 of Intro to Neuroscience, reads a question about which neurotransmitters play certain roles in certain forms of depression. He doesn't know the relevant evidence, and he can see that the question is given a detailed chapter-length treatment. In situations like this, a person might feel rather silly in having any state of confidence at all. Suspension of opinion might seem to make more sense until you have a much better sense of the lay of the land in this field. I take it this idea is familiar to novices in a field. True, the novice freshman and juror might have dispositions to bet certain amounts on various answers to the question on which they're suspending judgment and opinion. But these dispositions, arguably, reflect dispositions to have attitudes (including states of confidence) which they currently lack.31 32 Suspension is not the same as agnosticism. Might refraining from judgment be the same as agnosticism? Here I will be brief. Refraining and agnosticism come apart non-normatively. If one is in a state of being agnostic about something, one need not be refraining. A few minutes ago, I wasn't considering many "don't care" questions about which I have a stored agnosticism, e.g., the publication date of various articles, the middle name of some colleague, who won the Mexico Open, etc. I may not have wanted to have these attitudes, but sometimes we have them nevertheless. I wasn't refraining from judgment on these matters, intentionally not judging them. It is a harder question whether one could refrain from judgment without being 13 agnostic. As in the freshman and juror cases above, it is at least plausible that someone could suspend and so refrain from judgment it while not having any "opinion" and so not even agnostic attitudes. Normatively, agnosticism and refraining come apart as well. Consider again the case in which your powers of judgment on an important matter are temporarily impaired, and you know it. Suppose we add that you are also impaired with respect to your capacity to have justified agnostic attitudes. Suppose, for instance, that your current condition makes it likely that you will arrive at unjustified states of confidence on the matter. If you can't avoid "opinion," then your situation will be an epistemic tragedy. In such a situation, the fact that both your powers of judgment and your powers to have justified agnostic attitudes are impaired is a reason for you to refrain from judgment, but it is not a reason for you to be agnostic. "Don't cares" also give us cases in which something is a reason for one to be agnostic but not to refrain from judgment. Consider also those boring questions on which I was agnostic a few minutes ago. The fact that my (stored) evidence was roughly equally balanced was a reason for me to be agnostic about the relevant questions. But plausibly it wasn't a reason for me to refrain from judgment on them. Perhaps it would have been a reason for me to refrain if the question came up (say if someone asked me the question). But that didn't happen. 4. Response to the First Challenge Suspending from judgment is not the same as agnosticism, and nor is refraining. 33 In light of these distinctions, let's return to the first challenge to traditionalism. Traditionalism is in good shape regarding the neutral attitude of agnosticism. Unlike suspension, whether you are justified in being agnostic about whether p does not seem to be sensitive to future-comparative factors. Nor do goal-related factors seem relevant: you can justifiably be agnostic about whether Manchester United or Chelsea has the better goalie, regardless of such factors. Agnosticism has a good claim to being a genuinely doxastic attitude, unlike suspension. For one thing, like belief and disbelief and unlike suspension, its justification is unaffected by nonepistemic factors. There is thus a normative similarity between agnosticism, belief and disbelief, and a dissimilarity with suspension (and refraining). But, in addition, agnosticism also appears no more agential than belief or disbelief. Suspension of judgment, by contrast, involves not judging because of the pursuit of a judgment-related aim (aiming to judge in the future, or under certain conditions). As with belief and disbelief, being agnostic does not seem to require any such aim. Nor do any of these three plausibly require any intentional action or omission, even on a generous view of these notions, whereas refraining and suspension do. The latter are therefore agential in a way that agnosticism, belief, and disbelief are not. Finally, while agnosticism is clearly an attitude, like belief and disbelief; this is not true of suspension or refraining. Putting off attitudes isn't an attitude; intentionally omitting attitudes isn't an attitude. Finally, I return to the methodological point from earlier. What is at issue in the cases from Schroeder and Raz is putting off judgment. I have given an account which, if correct, would explain why it is fitting to apply the concept of suspending judgment in connection with those cases. But what ultimately matters to the defense of traditionalism, in the face of the first challenge, are two things: first, future-comparative factors matter to the justification for putting off judgment but don't matter to the justification of the very different phenomenon of 14 having an intermediate state of confidence; and second, having an intermediate state of confidence is a neutral doxastic attitude, while putting off judgment is not. Even if a traditionalist rejects my general account of suspending judgment, she could avail herself of this answer to the challenge. 5. Response to the Second Challenge The second challenge to traditionalism, which draws on work by Friedman, is that there must be some point to adopting the neutral attitude as opposed to merely lacking belief and disbelief, but that as far as adequate responses to epistemic deficiencies are concerned, lacking belief seems just as good as taking some neutral attitude. Friedman proposes that we can explain the point of taking the neutral attitude once we identify it with the "inquiring attitude" of aiming to know the answer to a question: the point of the neutral attitude is to bring about the goal of acquiring the knowledge. But traditionalism is not amenable to such a tight connection between any doxastic attitude and goal-directed states, because it would imply that goal-related factors are relevant to the justification of the neutral attitude. I will give a rather flatfooted response to this challenge on behalf of the traditionalist. Agnosticism, a genuine doxastic attitude, serves functions that the mere lack of belief and disbelief cannot. I will mention two. First, agnosticism can exert rational pressure on other states, which lack of belief cannot. For instance, if I am agnostic about whether supernatural beings exist and I know that if God exists there are supernatural beings, then I cannot, without irrationality, believe that God exists.34 By contrast, lacking an attitude about whether supernatural beings exist can exert no such pressure. Second, unlike the absence of attitudes, one can be more or less agnostic on a question, insofar as one can be more or less confident of answers to it. I may be agnostic about whether candidate A, B or C will win the election, but if I have more confidence in A winning than in B or C, I am less agnostic than I am if I have equal confidence in each winning. In this way, states of agnosticism in a good epistemic agent can be a way of keeping track over time of comparative facts about evidential support, whereas merely lacking belief and disbelief cannot. Even the state of being agnostic simpliciter in a good epistemic agent can reflect the fact that one's evidence at the time did not sufficiently support any of the answers to the question. So, I think the traditionalist is in good shape as far as the second challenge goes. But in light of the distinction between agnosticism and suspension of judgment, an intriguing possibility opens up. Perhaps Friedman is right about suspension of judgment. Suppose the traditionalist is right about agnosticism, i.e., that it is a neutral doxastic attitude whose job is to respect and track certain sorts of epistemic factors. Suspension of judgment is distinct from that attitude; so, what's its point? It is natural to wonder whether it is exactly what Friedman says it is: to direct us, in the way a goal-directed state does, to the attainment of knowledge. Given that this paper attempts not merely to defend traditionalism but to distinguish different ways of being neutral on questions, I will examine the relation between suspension and inquiry. 6. Suspension of Judgment and Inquiry 15 In the discussion below, I will speak of "inquiry," but, like Friedman, I mean this term to refer not to the actions sometimes involved in inquiring but to the state of mind that makes one an inquirer, the inquiring state of mind. Like Friedman, I understand this state of mind to be that of "aiming to figure out/know the answer to a question," and I take it to be closely related to "having a question on one's research agenda." My goal is to show that suspension of judgment comes apart from such phenomena. Like these phenomena, suspension involves the subject's having aims but not in the same way that inquiry does. I start by comparing inquiry with refraining from judgment. 6.1. Refraining from Judgment and Inquiry Refraining from judgment is distinct from inquiry. There are normative differences between them. Something can be a reason for you to refrain from judgment but not a reason for you to inquire, e.g., the fact that your powers of judgment are compromised. That fact (if known) is a reason for you to refrain from judgment, but it doesn't seem to be a reason for you to put a question on your research agenda, or aim to figure out the answer to the question, etc. This is especially clear if we enrich this reason by adding that your abilities in this respect are permanently compromised. For instance, you might know you have a powerful bias that you will never overcome.35 Something can also be a reason for you to inquire without being a reason for you to refrain from judgment. When known, the fact that it would highly desirable to learn the answer to a question and a very easy achievement – you could just think about it for a couple seconds and come to know the answer – seems like a reason for you to inquire into it, but does not seem like a reason for you to refrain from judgment on it. One might protest that you'd have to refrain from judgment in order to inquire. I will dispute this claim in a moment, but even if it were true, in principle something could be a reason for a person to j without being a reason for the person to y, where y-ing is a precondition for j-ing. Consider Maya, a Wyoming resident in a voting booth looking at the list of candidates for US Senate. Plausibly, the fact that Jones, although not an excellent candidate, is the best candidate running for senate in Wyoming is a reason for Maya to vote for Jones, but it doesn't seem like a reason for her to be (or continue being) a resident of Wyoming. Refraining from judgment and inquiry also differ non-normatively. One can refrain from judgment while also refraining from inquiry, i.e., while intentionally not inquiring.36 Again, if I know I'm biased on a question, I might refuse to go in for either judgment or inquiry. Or, looking back to "epistemic worsening" cases discussed above, suppose I know that I won't have any better evidence in the future than I now have but also that the evidence I have now is equally balanced between p and not-p. Because of the fact that my evidence will only get worse, I might give up inquiry on whether p and take the question off my research agenda. But, especially if I'm tempted by one of the answers, say p, which confirms my pet theory, I might need to fight off temptation by refraining – and indeed "withholding" – judgment on the question. In such a case, I would refrain from judgment but not inquire. It is a trickier question whether it's possible to inquire without refraining from judgment.37 I want to look into this in some detail. Consider two examples: 16 Example 1. You have taken a brief glance at two insurance plans, A and B, and A looks a bit better. But your glance was quite brief. You suspend judgment about which is better while you inquire into the matter further, e.g., by considering their advantages and disadvantages under various circumstances. Having done all this research, you return to the question whether A or B is better, believing you now have good enough evidence, but now with an aim of making a judgment on the matter without delay. You haven't quite yet made a judgment, though. At this time, you are still inquiring, still "mentally asking" whether A or B is better, but you are no longer refraining from judgment. Example 2. You're an umpire in baseball. A pitch has just been thrown and the batter did not swing. You haven't yet judged whether it was a ball or strike. But you're trying to judge without delay whether it was a strike or a ball, and so you're not refraining from judgment. You're inquiring insofar as you're mentally asking whether the pitch was a ball or strike, aiming to get it right, reliably. 38 The guiding idea behind these examples is that if you are trying to make a judgment without delay on a question – as opposed to planning to try to make a judgment after finishing some related sub-inquiry, or after reading another paper, or hearing another counterargument, etc. – then you are not refraining from judgment on the question. This fits with the account of offered in section 2: although the agent fails to judge in these cases, the agent is not intentionally failing to judge, and so is not refraining from judgment. Nevertheless, the agent is inquiring and so has whatever attitudes are necessary for inquiry. Thus, having those pro-attitudes cannot be the same as refraining from judgment.39 One might object that this argument equivocates on what one refrains from in refraining from "judgment." The objection is this: in my cases above, the agent isn't refraining from the process of judgment but is refraining from propositional judgment (the product), and so my cases are not ones in which a person fails to refrain from judgment while inquiring. Thus, for all I've argued, Friedman could be right that inquiry requires refraining from judgment. What could it mean, though, to refrain from judgment (the product) while engaging in an activity (judgment as process) the aim of which is to bring about the product without delay? Generally, if you are engaged in an activity with an aim to bring about X-ing without delay, you are not refraining from the product. If I am engaged in the process of throwing a dart at the bullseye, I am not refraining from hitting the bullseye. The same holds if anything more clearly for suspending: if you are trying there and then to X, you are not suspending X-ing – not putting it off.40 Consider also: would the Pyrrhonian skeptics, practicing their modes of suspension, ever find themselves in positions like the ones you're occupying in those examples? Would a Pyrrhonian try right away – with no further delay – to make a judgment on a question? I think the answer is no. This fits well with the claim that in going in for making a judgment without delay one is not refraining from – and not suspending – judgment. Insofar as the Pyrrhonian refrains from and suspends judgment in the product sense, she does not go in for judgment in the process sense. Perhaps there is a better way to press a related objection to my claims about the examples. One might claim that in those cases you are not aiming to judge without delay. You 17 are still putting off judgment insofar as you are aiming to judge on the question only when a certain condition is met, e.g., only when you are satisfied with an answer, and you are not so satisfied yet. The putting off will end as soon as you are satisfied. So, you are refraining from judgment in the product sense as well as in the process sense, but you are still inquiring. Perhaps even a Pyrrhonian could do what you are doing, if it meets this description. The trouble with this objection is that it treats a judgment that p too much like an action one performs based on a judgment that p. Compare a contestant in a game show, who in response to a question "Is p true?" has 30 seconds to push one or neither of two buttons – a "yes, p is true" button and a "no, p is false" button. If she pushes the button corresponding to the truth on whether p, she wins $1000; if she pushes the button corresponding to the false answer on whether p, she's out of the game and loses. If she omits button-pushing, she'll be able to keep playing for another round. The seconds are ticking away but she still has a few left. She may well be putting off button-pushing until she determines which answer is correct. Once she determines the correct answer, she will push the corresponding button. In the case of judgment, by contrast, the "determination" involved is not something that precedes and rationalizes judgment as it does button-pushing in the game show case; the determination is the judgment. The objector's talk of "being satisfied of an answer," similarly, is itself talk of judgment. I will explain this worry further. Although judgment is an event rather than a state, and although it is something one does and usually does for reasons, there is a danger in assimilating judgments to ordinary actions. We shouldn't think of judgment that p in normal cases as something one does for instrumental reasons, even instrumental reasons concerning the goal of judging truly on a question. To think of judgment that p in that way is to think of it as motivated not only by proattitude (a desire or intention) to judge/affirm the truth on a question but also by a cognition to the effect that p is the truth on the question, a cognition that is itself based on (or partially constituted by) a cognition that p. Without the cognition, there is no rationalizing explanation of why one affirmed that p rather than that not-p. But what is this cognition that p? It is tempting to use language similar to that of 'judgment' for it – it is your taking p to be the case, your assenting to p, your accepting that p. But then we are explaining judgment that p as motivated in part by judgment that p. We can avoid this consequence by taking the cognition not to be a judgment but instead a cognitive state, most likely a belief. But even on this view, judgment in the normal case is no longer itself something one does on the basis of evidence. It's rather belief that is based on evidence, with judgment rationalized by belief + a proattitude. But this seems wrong: judgment at least in normal cases is based on evidence. Moreover, if judgment in normal cases is merely an action based on a belief that p, then judgment is not a way of forming a belief in those cases. But that is implausible: in many (if not all) cases, judgment is a way of forming a belief. The examples of inquiry without refraining from judgment stand. I conclude that not only is refraining from judgment distinct from inquiry (and distinct from the desire-like attitudes involved in inquiry), but neither implies the other: one can refrain from judgment without inquiring and vice versa. 41 6.2. A One-Way Implication? 18 Given that suspending requires refraining, the previous section shows that suspending judgment is distinct from inquiry. But it remains to be seen whether suspending requires inquiry. It is not enough to have shown that refraining from judgment doesn't require inquiry, nor that something could be a reason for a person to refrain but not a reason for the person to inquire. Suspending essentially involves aims concerning judgment, aims that might seem to require inquiry. I concede that suspension is much more commonly accompanied by "aiming to know the answer" and "putting the question on one's research agenda" than mere refraining is.42 Still, I think there are reasons (related to some points made earlier) to deny that suspending requires such attitudes. If there is very little chance of learning the answer to a question, or even improving your epistemic standing on it, you might move it off your research agenda. There are only so many issues you can put on your research agenda. Thus, you might well suspend judgment on the issue, deferring judgment to a later time, if there is one, when your prospects for epistemic improvement on the question are better. Here a conditional aim about future judgment seems reasonable in a way that an unconditional aim to figure out the answer (or improve your standing on the issue) doesn't. I do not deny that suspension is closely related to attitudes such as wishing one could know the answer, or hoping to someday be in a position to know the answer or being curious. (Even if it doesn't require them, it is normally accompanied by them.43) But such weak proattitudes are not sufficient for inquiry. Inquirers must at least aim for epistemic improvement on the target question. Wishing and hoping for such improvement do not guarantee aiming for it. 7. Conclusion According to traditionalism, there are three doxastic attitudes – belief, disbelief and a neutral attitude – and each is justified exclusively in virtue of epistemic factors. Traditionalism is apparently threatened by the relevance of certain non-epistemic facts – e.g., about obtaining better evidence in the future – to the justification of suspending judgment. And it is threatened, as well, by the argument that there must be some point to suspension of judgment as opposed to merely lacking belief, and the best account of its point – an account that identifies it with "the inquiring attitude," a goal-directed state of aiming to know the answer to a question – commits one to thinking that other non-epistemic factors – e.g., about the value of the goal – are relevant to its justification. In my defense of traditionalism, I did not dispute the relevance of these factors to the justification of suspending judgment and inquiry, respectively. But I denied that the latter are doxastic attitudes. Agnosticism understood as having an intermediate state of confidence, by contrast, is. The challenges to traditionalism therefore leave it unscathed, because it is a view about doxastic attitudes. In addition to defending traditionalism, I distinguished ways in which we can be neutral on questions.44 I argued that, unlike agnosticism, both suspension and inquiry involve desirelike aiming at cognitive goals (judging later or under certain conditions in the case of suspension and knowing the answer to a question in the case of inquiry) , and thus enable us to control what we believe and their quality. There remained, though, a question about the relationship 19 between suspension and inquiry. I argued that these are distinct as well, and that neither implies the other. Suspending, first, involves intentionally not judging, whereas inquiry does not; and second, suspending involves a weaker aim – a suspender need not aim at getting knowledge in the future. A suspender may even take a question off her research agenda. By suspending, she may only ready herself to acquire such future knowledge should the opportunity present itself, however unlikely that may be. Let me conclude by flagging an important issue for future work. Suppose I am right that non-epistemic factors bear on the justification of suspension of judgment. Can we still characterize a sort epistemic deontology for suspension, a deontology of special relevance to epistemology? We after all do easily reason from "you ought to believe p" to "you ought not suspend judgment on whether p." Can we explain the force of such reasoning? Appealing to notion of "right kinds of reasons" seems an unpromising avenue. As Schroeder (2012) points out, the two main earmarks for distinguishing right from of wrong kinds of reasons for an attitude are motivational asymmetry and rationality asymmetry. But, by these earmarks, the fact that in a certain case someone will give me $1000 for suspending seems to be a right kind of reason to suspend: I can suspend for this reason, at least for the right sort of question, and it would not be irrational for me to do so.45 There are other alternatives, though. Perhaps we could think of epistemic deontology for suspension as simply derivative from the deontology for doxastic attitudes: roughly, one epistemically ought to suspend iff in all the relevant worlds in which one's doxastic states are as they ought to be one suspends, and mutatis mutandis for epistemic permissibility of suspension. Alternatively, we might approach epistemic deontology for suspension directly and not merely as derivative from that of doxastic attitudes, understanding, for instance, it in terms of the promotion of or respect for certain epistemic values. Given the agential elements involved in suspending judgment, a decision-theoretical approach, such as expected epistemic utility theory, seems worth exploring – considerably more so, I think, than it would be to understanding the deontology for belief and other doxastic attitudes.46 References Archer, A. (forthcoming). Agnosticism, inquiry, and unanswerable questions. Disputatio. Audi, R. (1999). Doxastic voluntarism and the ethics of belief. Facta Philosophica, 1, 87–109. Cassam, Q. (2010). Judging, believing, thinking. Philosophical Issues, 20, 80–95. Chisholm, R. M. (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Clarke, R. (2014). Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cohen, S. 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New York: Oxford University Press. Friedman, J. (2017). Why suspend judging? Noûs, 51, 302–326. Friedman, J. (2013a). Suspended judgment. Philosophical Studies, 162, 165-181. Friedman, J. (2013b). Rational agnosticism and degrees of belief. In T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goldman, A. (2010). Systems-oriented social epistemology. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3, 189–214. Kornblith, H. (1983). Justified belief and epistemically responsible action. The Philosophical Review, 92, 33–48. Kruglanski, A. and Webster, D. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: seizing and Freezing. Psychological Review, 103, 263–283. Kvanvig, J. (2014). Rationality and Reflection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lewis, D. (1996). Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 549–567. Lord, E. (forthcoming). Suspension of judgment, rationality's competition, and the reach of the epistemic. In The Ethics of Believing and Beyond (Routledge). 21 Ludwig, K. (2015). What are conditional intentions? Methode: Analytic Perspectives 4, 30–60. Masny, M. (forthcoming). Friedman on suspended judgment. Synthese. Matheson, J. (2015). The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. Dordrecht, NE: Springer. Moore, R. (1979). Refraining. Philosophical Studies, 36, 407–424. Raz, J. (1975). Practical Reason and Norms. London: Hutchinson & Co. Reisner, A. (2009). The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem. Philosophical Studies, 145, 257–272. Rinard, S. (2019). Equal treatment for belief. Philosophical Studies, 176, 1923–1950. Roeber, B. (forthcoming). Evidence, judgment and belief at will. Mind. Rosa, L. (forthcoming). Logical principles of agnosticism. Erkenntnis. Rosenkrantz, S. (2007). Agnosticism as a third stance. Mind, 116, 55–104. Ryan, S. (2003). Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief. Philosophical Studies, 94 , 47– 79. Schroeder, M. (2012). The ubiquity of state-given reasons. Ethics, 122, 457–488. Shah, N. and Velleman, D. (2005). Doxastic deliberation. Philosophical Review, 114, 197–234. Smith, A. K. (2015). Attitudes, tracing and control. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 32, 115–132. Smithies, D. (2012). Moore's paradox and the accessibility of justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85, 273–300. Sosa, E.(forthcoming). Suspension as spandrel. Episteme. Sosa, E. (2015). Judgment and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Steup, M. (2017). Believing intentionally. Synthese, 194, 2673–2694. Weatherson, B. (2008). Deontology and Descartes's demon. Journal of Philosophy, 105, 540– 569. 22 Wedgwood, R. (2002). The aim of belief. Philosophical Perspectives, 16, 267–297. Willard-Kyle, C. (manuscript). Valuable ignorance: wine ought to closure inquiry. 1 See, for instance Goldman (2010), Conee and Feldman (2004, 2010), Matheson (2015), Smithies (2011), and Sosa (2015). 2 Friedman (2017) takes philosophers using these terms to be talking about the same thing. In some of her earlier papers, she uses 'agnosticism' (2013a and 2013b). 3 For arguments against non-attitude views of neutrality, see Friedman (2013a). The point about rocks comes from Wedgwood (2002). For the most part, I focus on whether-questions, but one may of course suspend judgment on other sorts of questions. 4 If one's mind is fragmented (Lewis, 1996; Egan, 2008), one might count as both believing that p and being neutral on whether p (perhaps even rationally). Lewis suggests an existential account in the case of knowledge: the whole fragmented person knows that p iff some fragment knows that p. 5 I use 'justified in believing' to imply permissibility but not obligation (and not that one ought to believe). 6 Some clarifications here. The notion of strength of epistemic position comes from discussions of contextualism (cf. Cohen, 2005; Fantl and McGrath, 2009) and may be glossed in terms of meeting stricter or laxer epistemic standards. In the contextualist literature, philosophers typically give either an internalistic (e.g., in terms of evidence) or externalistic (e.g., in terms of reliability or truth-tracking) interpretation of these standards. In fact, rather than seeing the these construals as competitors we might do better to posit multiple dimensions in which epistemic positions can be stronger or worse. Epistemic factors would be those that help fix one's position on at least one of these dimensions. Traditionalists will still disagree among themselves about which of these dimensions, and so which of these sorts of epistemic factors, matter for justification. To keep things simple, I will mainly focus on evidentialist traditionalism, which takes the epistemic factors to be evidential, i.e., to be evidence bearing positively or negatively on whether p. Finally, to make traditionalism inclusive, we might allow epistemic factors to include those factors determinative of whether or not one's strength of epistemic position reaches certain thresholds, thereby allowing moderate forms of pragmatic and moral encroachment to count as traditionalist. 7 This statement is not true in full generality. Let p be I will live past today. Then clearly knowing that I will gain decisive evidence on p tomorrow can help fix how strong my epistemic position today on whether p. Putting aside these special exceptions in which the getting of evidence on p is evidence for or against p, factors 1-4 do not help fix how strong one's current epistemic position is on whether p. Thanks to Chris Willard-Kyle for discussion. 8 For recent defenses of practical reasons for belief, see Reisner (2009) and Rinard (2019). 9 Schroeder (2012) draws a slightly different lesson. He claims that in the "clearer and better evidence" case you have a non-evidential reason not to believe p, but one of the "right kind" rather than the "wrong kind," where Pascalian reasons to believe are paradigms of the latter. I think the putative reasons are more plausibly taken as reasons to suspend judgment on whether p. He does consider the possibility that future-comparative facts are reasons to withhold, rejecting it on the grounds that even in cases of this sort when you are not deliberating, you have reasons not to believe/intend. He assumes, I think implausibly, that withholding requires deliberation. The accounts I present in section 2 do not make deliberation a requirement for suspending or refraining from judgment. 10 I'll often abbreviate 'suspending judgment' as 'suspending' and similarly for 'refraining from judgment'. 11 In some cases, it might seem that inquiry aims not at knowing the answer but at less impressive outcomes such as having a true belief or perhaps a justified true belief. In my discussions of inquiry, following Friedman, I will speak of aiming at knowledge, but the reader should recall the possible weaker aims. 12 Thanks here to Christopher Willard-Kyle. 13 See Friedman (2017) for similar claims about suspending judgment. Friedman takes these remarks to support the identification of it with the inquiring attitude. I consider her account in section 6. 23 14 In addition to Friedman and myself, Sosa and Masny take aims to be importantly related to suspension. For Sosa (forthcoming) takes suspension of judging to be the intentional omission of judgment. For Sosa, there is no futuredirectedness to suspension, as there is for me. Masny (forthcoming) takes it to require intending to judge, whereas I think it requires conditional aims rather than unconditional ones. I follow Ludwig (2015) in thinking of conditional intentions (and aims) as being commitments to contingency plans, and so (roughly) commitments about "what to do upon (learning of) a certain contingency," whereas unconditional intentions are commitments about what to do are that are not "contingent on finding out some condition obtains." (32) 15 I choose to use the term 'refrain' rather than 'withhold' to avoid the latter's stronger association with holding back and resistance. These associations make it doubtful that suspending implies withholding. 16 Clarke (2014) treats talk of 'refraining' and 'intentional omission' as getting at the same core phenomenon of someone intentionally not doing a certain thing. 17 In general, intentionally omitting X-ing does not require intending or aiming not to X. See Clarke (2014) for discussion. 18 This is true even for views on which judgment that p entails belief that p (cf. Roeber, 2019). 19 For illuminating discussions of the relations between belief and judgment relevant to the discussion below, see Cassam (2010), Roeber (2019) and Sosa (2015). 20 Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to explain how belief excludes refraining from judgment exclude and for recommending that I discuss the notions of suspending and refraining from belief. 21 See Feldman (2001) for an argument against believing at will and Steup (2017) for a contrary view. See also Audi (1999) for a limited defense of doxastic involuntarism. Following Steup (2017), I don't build into my account of doing X at will that the intention to do X is voluntary. The key thing is the directness of X-ing based on an intention to do X. Thanks to Vierkant Tillman for discussion on this point. 22 This section only scratches the surface of the issue of control over our beliefs. Even if we can't believe at will, we may still have voluntary control over our beliefs in a certain sense of the word. As Weatherson (2008) points out, we often form beliefs when we had the capacity to hold off doing so: we could have stopped to think about other hypotheses or to evaluate the evidence more closely, and doing so may well have comported better with our own values. See also Smith (2015). 23 I am not alone in thinking that the prospect of future evidence can matter to the justification of suspension. See Chris Willard-Kyle (manuscript) for an argument ignorance is sometimes epistemically valuable. 24 Talk of "being agnostic" may connote that one could in some sense "go either way." Of course, one might be too uncertain to have a belief on whether p despite being so confident in p that one could not "go for" not-p. 25 If states of confidence can be inexact or "mushy," we might prefer an alternative and more demanding conception of agnosticism, according to which one is agnostic on whether p iff one has an intermediate state of confidence concerning whether p all of the sharpenings of which are themselves intermediate states of confidence whether p. This conception might capture the idea of a kind of "committed agnosticism." For, if one is agnostic in this sense, then no matter how one sharpens one's mushy states of confidence, one's confidences would not be strong enough either for belief or disbelief. Uncommitted agnosticism would amount to having a mushy state of confidence which could be sharpened in such a way as to support belief. Suppose your state of confidence whether p ranges, intuitively, from thinking p is morally certain to thinking it is merely slightly more likely than not. This state could be sharpened by dropping the lower range entirely, leaving a state of confidence that could support belief. 26 See Friedman (2013b) for an argument that suspension of judgment is not reducible to having a standard credence in a certain range. 27 Consider the imaginary case of throwing a dart with a point-sized tip at a normal dartboard (cf. Easwaran, 2014). Suppose one assigns some probability to there being an uncountably many equally probable outcomes here. One must assign probability less than 1/n for any natural number n to the proposition that the dart hits the exact center, and arguably one must assign it probability 0. It is at least intuitive, nevertheless, that once one sees where the dart hits (say a good distance from the center) one can (rationally) become more confident that it didn't hit the center. 28 Although I make no claims on these matters in this paper, see Fantl and McGrath (2009) for a proposal about the relations between belief, confidence and reasons. 29Two points here. First, I use the locution 'reason for you to j' to mean reason you have to j. Thus, I have in mind reasons possessed by the subject, where possession requires meeting an epistemic condition, plausibly 24 justification or knowledge. Second, I say 'can be a reason for you' rather than 'is a reason for you'. This is for two reasons. First, the reason must be possessed. Second, even if it is possessed, whether it is a reason for you to suspend judgment depends on how things stand with you, such as whether you do or should value knowing or having a true belief on the matter. 30 In conversation, I have encountered the following argument that future-comparative factors are not reasons to suspend judgment. Pick your favorite version of Schroeder's case. Either one's current evidence is good enough for justified belief that p or it isn't. Suppose it is. Then one ought to believe that p. But if one ought to believe that p, then one doesn't have a reason to suspend judgment about whether p. Suppose, on the other hand, one's evidence isn't good enough for justified belief that p. Then that fact is the real reason for one to suspend judgment, not any future-comparative fact. Either way, the future comparative fact is not serving as a reason. I reject several steps of this argument. First, even if one's evidence is good enough for justified belief, it doesn't follow that one lacks reasons to suspend judgment. As explained in endnote 5, I use 'justified' to pick out a permissive notion, not an "ought." Cases like the Schroeder case can be spelled out so that they are plausible examples of being justified in believing that p despite it not being the case that one ought to believe that p. (One's evidence is good enough, but it's a close call, and one may lack a full appreciation of the force of the evidence.) In such a case, future-comparative facts, at least when one cares or has reason to care about the question, can plausibly be good reasons for one to put off judgment on the question. Second, suppose one's evidence isn't good enough for justified belief that p. If one doesn't know this (or isn't justified in believing it), we might doubt that it is a reason that one S has to be agnostic (see the previous endnote). But even supposing one knows it, the mere fact that the evidence isn't good enough isn't a reason for one to suspend judgment if one doesn't care and has no reason to care about knowing/having a true belief whether p. (I develop this sort of point later in section 3.) 31 Might the freshman or the juror have a mushy state of confidence? This is of course possible, but I don't see why it must be the case. If you put a question out of your mind, I don't see why you must move into a state of confidence concerning it. If we work with the more demanding notion of agnosticism described in note 25, then it becomes much more plausible that the freshman or juror might suspend judgment while not being agnostic: if they have mushy states of confidence, those states likely will admit of belief-friendly sharpenings. 32 A second possible sort of case of suspension of judgment without agnosticism, which I will not attempt to explore further here, is one in which a subject has a state of confidence that is strong enough for belief but still lacks belief. Such a subject would not believe but not be agnostic either. Whether such a case is possible depends on the details of what it takes for a state of confidence to be strong enough for belief. For some discussion of this, see Fantl and McGrath (2009). Thanks to Chris Willard-Kyle for discussion. 33 Rosenkrantz (2007) distinguishes agnosticism from suspension of judgment. He is interested in agnosticism as a position – a claim that one can put forth about a subject matter. He distinguishes two forms of agnosticism, both of which are claims about lack of knowability. I reject the identification of what I call "agnosticism" with belief in such claims. A person might believe that neither p nor not-p is knowable while also failing to be in an intermediate state of confidence on the question whether p. This combination might be irrational but it is not impossible. The same considerations, I think, raise problems for the theory of 34 Cf. Rosa (forthcoming) 35 For similar points, see Archer (forthcoming). 36 Thanks to John Hawthorne for a helpful discussion on refraining from and suspending inquiry. 37 But aren't there clear cases of inquiry without refraining? Can't you inquire and believe? The matter deserves extended discussion. Briefly, though, I follow Friedman (2017) in thinking that any such cases involve peculiarities (such as irrationality or fragmentation). This is mainly because to believe that p is to be settled on an answer, p, to the question whether p. Thus, simultaneously to believe that p and inquire into whether p is – to borrow a way of putting it suggested by Chris Willard-Kyle – simultaneously to ask and answer the same question. 38 Compare Friedman (2013a) on mid-wondering cases. I agree that cases in which one is in the midst of wondering whether p are not cases of suspension of judgment. (Friedman is now committed to giving a different verdict, given her recent equation of suspension of judgment and the inquiring attitude, at least in cases of mid-wondering that are also cases of inquiry.) 39 Another interesting sort of case is that of a subject with high need-for-closure in sense of Kruglanski and colleagues (1996). Suppose a person very much wants to answer the question whether p as soon as possible, e.g., because he has been told by an experimentalist that the speed of the correct answer correlates with intelligence. He jumps on the first piece of evidence he thinks of which even vaguely supports p. Consider this person just 25 before he thinks about this piece of evidence. He's trying as soon as possible to judge and so isn't refraining from judgment. But it might be less clear that this is genuine inquiry – perhaps the person's aim is really just to judge, rather than to get it right, let alone know. 40 Remarking on a case from Robert Moore (1979), Clarke (2014) draws on a similar intuition in his claim that Ulysses does not refrain from jumping in the water when he hears the Sirens' song. Since he is trying to jump in he is not refraining from doing it. 41 An anonymous referee asks about a more occurrent notion of inquiry: mentally asking a question. One can mentally ask a question without caring to know the answer, for instance, if a friend verbally asks it of you and waits for your answer (as in the don't care cases considered above). Even this notion of inquiry comes apart from refraining from judgment, though. The two examples above of inquiry without refraining are cases in which one is mentally asking the question but not refraining from judgment. Conversely, there are also cases of refraining from judgment but not mentally asking the question. Certainly, a half-hour after receiving the instruction from the judge, a juror might continue to refrain from judgment about the defendant's guilt. But the juror is not at that time mentally asking whether the defendant is guilty. Could someone who is just then coming to refrain from judgment on a question not be asking the question? I think so. The juror may not ask the question of guilt at all, upon hearing the judge's instructions: the juror might immediately put the question out of mind without asking it. 42 Conee and Feldman (2018) argue that if one doesn't care about whether p, one might suspend judgment but not inquire. However, I think that suspending judgment involves a constitutive aim concerning judgment, and so usually involves cares in the neighborhood, such as caring to know whether p (though see the following endnote.) Matters are different for agnosticism. It is not at all abnormal to be agnostic about whether p despite not caring about whether p or about knowing whether p. 43 One could suspend judgment without caring about knowing whether p at all, without being curious, etc. if an authority told you to do so or if someone is going to reward you for doing so. 44 I am not alone in distinguishing various ways to be neutral on questions. Friedman (2013b) distinguishes suspension from having a standard credence in a certain range. After writing this paper, I learned of Lord's (forthcoming), which contains a valuable discussion of different ways of being neutral on questions and of which ways are within the reach of epistemic rationality. 45 Compare agnosticism. The fact I'm offered a reward to have an intermediate state of confidence on a question doesn't seem like the sort of thing that can be my basis for moving into or being in such a state, not in a fully conscious and direct way, as it can for suspending, and it would also be irrational to adopt an intermediate state of confidence on such a basis. 46 I am grateful to audiences at the 2019 Midwest Epistemology Workshop at the University of Nebraska, the Penn Reasons and Foundations in Epistemology Conference, the University of Oklahoma, Ohio State University, the University of St. Andrews, the University of Edinburgh and the International Colloquium in Analytic Epistemology in Santa Maria, Brazil. I thank John Bengson, Jessica Brown, David Enoch, Jane Friedman, Errol Lord, Wayne Riggs, Luis Rosa, Lewis Ross, Mark Schroeder, Declan Smithies, Martin Smith, Vierkant Tillman, as well as members of the 2018 and 2019 graduate seminars in epistemology at Rutgers. Special thanks go to John Hawthorne, Ernest Sosa and Chris Willard-Kyle for hours of discussion on the main ideas of the paper.

This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form will be published in Thought; Thought is available online at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)2161-2234 Unextended Complexes Martin Pickup, New College, Oxford Extended simples are fruitfully discussed in metaphysics. They are entities which are located in a complex region of space but do not themselves have parts. In this paper I will discuss unextended complexes, entities which are not located at a complex region of space but do themselves have parts. In particular, I focus on one type of unextended complex: pointy complexes (entities that have parts but are located at a single point of space). Four areas are indicated where pointy complexes might prove philosophically useful. Unextended complexes are therefore philosophically fruitful, in much the same way as extended simples. Keywords: Metaphysics, Extended Simples, Mereology, Location, Space, Gunk, Material Objects There is an interesting and growing literature in contemporary analytic metaphysics considering extended simples.1 Extended simples are entities that are extended in space but have no (proper) parts. The debate has focused on three things: (i) whether such entities are (metaphysically) possible, (ii) if so what they would be like, and (iii) what impact their possibility or impossibility might have on other questions in metaphysics. Of course, such entities would be very odd. They would occupy a complex region of space (or spacetime: I'll ignore this distinction from hereon) without 1 As a small sample, see Braddon-Mitchell and Miller (2006), Markosian (2004), McDaniel (2007a & 2009), Parsons (2000 & 2007) and Simons (2004). 2 themselves being complex. Thus the mereological structure of the entity and the mereological structure of its location would not align. We take it for granted that, typically, the mereological structure of object and their locations are in fact aligned (Schaffer (2009) calls this 'mereological harmony'). If the structure of entities and their locations must be aligned, then extended simples are metaphysically impossible. But why must they be aligned?2 Although extended simples would certainly be odd, it isn't clear they are impossible. Extended simples shouldn't be ruled out without good reason: they remain epistemically possible. In this paper I would like to highlight another type of entity for similar consideration: unextended complexes. Unextended complexes are entities that are not extended in space but have (proper) parts. What I call 'unextended complexes' have been introduced to the literature in a few different places.3 But they have so far been primarily discussed briefly, parenthetically and instrumentally, as a means to defend or attack some other claims. It also seems worthwhile to consider them as entities of philosophical interest in their own right. In this short paper, I will not be able to do so in full, but I hope to flag some interesting avenues of investigation that unextended complexes open up. 2 One reason would be if entities are somehow composed of the regions they occupy (Schaffer 2009). Other reasons can be given. But none will be indisputable. See Saucedo (2011) for a detailed and interesting discussion of ways that the structure of space and the mereological structure of objects might come apart. 3 There are two main areas in which unextended complexes have been discussed. Armstrong seems to endorse such entities, in the context of providing universals for quantities. He offers the suggestion that point particles have proper parts. In doing so, he makes it possible for these parts can be the bearers of certain quantitative universals that thereby solve an internal problem for his view. See Armstrong (1988) p315 and (1997) p64-65. See also Eddon (2007) Sect. III for a criticism. The second area is in the literature on mereology and location. Unextended complexes are briefly mentioned in a footnote of Markosian's (Markosian (1998), fn. 20), and Sider is credited with raising them. Wasserman (2003), McDaniel (2006, 2007b) and Saucedo (2011) discuss them in various degrees of detail in the context of the relationship between the locations of objects and their mereology. McDaniel (2007b) argues directly for their possibility; in the other papers they are addressed more indirectly. In each case, unextended complexes are pointed out as possible counterexamples to claims about the alignment of the structures of objects and their locations. In particular, they are used to attack principles stating what it takes to be a mereological simple and related claims about the possibility of gunk (see Markosian (1998) and Hudson (2001) for the views against which unextended complexes are here deployed). Note that all the previous discussion in the literature concerns a particular sort of unextended complex, what I call in the next section 'pointy complexes'. 3 A good starting point are the parallels of the three questions that have been the focus of the extended simples debate. We can ask (i) whether unextended complexes are (metaphysically) possible, (ii) if they are possible what they would be like, and (iii) what impact their possibility or impossibility might have on other questions in metaphysics. At the very least, considering these questions for unextended complexes might shed light on the more established issues concerning extended simples. 1. Two types of unextended complexes: abstracta and pointy complexes There are two ways for an entity to be an unextended complex, corresponding to two distinct ways to be unextended. Something can be unextended (a) by having no location in space at all or (b) by being located at a simple part of space. The existence of entities that have no spatial location at all is itself controversial: it is the question of whether there are abstract objects (on one understanding of 'abstract'). So it's disputed whether anything satisfies (a). But if abstract objects are metaphysically possible, then there's an obvious sense in which unextended complexes are plausibly metaphysically possible. If any abstract object has (proper) parts, then we have an unextended object which is complex.4 In other words, if it's metaphysically possible for there to be a complex abstract object, it's metaphysically possible for there to be an unextended complex. Examples that might be given include complex universals (the property of being 'red and heavy', for instance), sets that are not singletons (the set of all things in this room, for instance), and complex propositions (the proposition 'p or q', for instance). This is already an interesting result. For it puts pressure on the claim that the mereological structure of entities and their locations must align of metaphysical necessity: if we accept complex abstract objects we seem to have an immediate counterexample. Thus the possibility of abstract complexes 4 A contrarian might argue that even if there are abstract objects, they can't be complex. This is a reasonable move, but we need to hear the argument. 4 would undermine an argument against the possibility of extended simples that used such a principle. (Of course, the critic of extended simples could recover a restricted version of the principle that claims that if they have a location, the mereological structure of entities and their locations necessarily align. This would still tell against extended simples.) But many deny that there are abstract objects. Those who deny abstract objects are also likely to deny that abstract objects are metaphysically possible.5 So they will not accept the above argument for the metaphysical possibility of unextended complexes, and against mereological harmony. However, I think the weight of the majority would favour the claim that abstract object with proper parts are at least epistemically possible, i.e. we shouldn't rule out complex abstract objects. If this is so, then we also shouldn't rule out unextended complexes. This is a weaker claim than the claim that unextended complexes are metaphysically possible, but it further underwrites their interest. At the very least, we stand in need of a reason to reject complex abstract objects.6 However, I think abstract complexes, while they are indeed unextended complexes, are less interesting than entities that would be unextended complexes in virtue of satisfying (b) above: namely entities that are complex but are located in a simple place. The obvious way for an entity to be located at a simple place is for it to be located at exactly one point of space.7 An entity of this sort 5 There is space for a view whereby there are in fact no abstract objects, but they remain metaphysically possible. Those subscribing to such a view would be sympathetic to my point above. Thanks to a reviewer for prompting me to revise this section. 6 If an argument can be given for the metaphysical necessity of a mereological harmony principle, then this would be such a reason. 7 A reviewer has pointed out an alternative way for an entity to occupy a simple place: for the location of the entity to be an extended simple region of space. In other words, an entity might be an unextended complex by being an entity with mereological structure but located in a region of space that itself lacks mereological structure and is hence simple (rather than at a point of space). In order to make sense of such a possibility, being an extended region must not entail being a complex region. Given that one natural way to understand what it is to be an extended region is as being composed of more than one point, an alternative account of extension for regions would be needed. I think this is an interesting idea. I believe that what I say about pointy complexes could be generalised to include such cases. (A possible exception is the discussion in Sect. 2.1, where what account we give of extended regions could matter for how things could be located at them.) I won't develop the generalised argument in what follows in order to focus on pointy complexes, which are my main target. 5 will be unextended by being located at a single point of space. I will call such entities pointy complexes. A pointy complex would be an entity that has a spatial location, but that location is simple. The entity itself, by contrast, has proper parts. Just as in the case of an extended simple the mereological structure of the place the entity is located outruns the mereological structure of the entity, so in the case of a pointy complex the mereological structure of the entity outruns the mereological structure of the place it is located. This does seem strange. How could it be that something located at a single point of space has proper parts? But I contend that it is no stranger than the extended simple case, where something located at more than one point of space has no proper parts (I'll come back to this in 2.4). More provisionally: until a reason is given why pointy complexes are worse off than extended simples, we should treat their possibility equally.8 In the next section I want to briefly indicate some non-exhaustive areas where pointy complexes can be fruitfully considered. 2. Some applications of pointy complexes In general, unextended complexes (and in particular pointy complexes) are an additional fruitful resource for examining the issues in metaphysics where extended simples have been deployed. Unextended complex will also, I hope, give us an interesting perspective on what extended simples themselves are and their role. Here I'll briefly outline four ways that pointy complexes can 8 One such reason might be offered: there are no such thing as spatial (or spacetime) points. Although this would rule out pointy complexes, it wouldn't rule out a more general case where entities have a mereological structure which outruns the structure of their locations. Most of what I wish to do with pointy complexes can be done with entities whose mereological structure is simply more complex than their location structure. It is the lack of isomorphism between these that is the central dynamic. (Note that the same generalisation applies to extended simples for those who think there are no mereological atoms.) See the previous footnote for an alternative that permits simple places without points of space. Also see McDaniel (2007b), p239-241 for an argument for the metaphysical possibility of unextended complexes. 6 supplement some relevant debates. Note that although parallels are drawn between the roles of extended simples and unextended complexes, the content of the deployment of each is distinct. Although I am taking unextended complexes to offer structurally similar moves to those made using extended simples, the actual results of these moves are quite different. (i) One way extended simples have been used is to put pressure on our normal notions concerning entities' location. For what is the location of the extended simple? There are two main options for answering this question. The first is to take extended simples as multiply located. That is, the extended simple is fully located many times over: it occupies each of the points that make up its extension. The extended simple is akin to a time-travelling enduring object that thereby gains additional locations in its own past. The second option is to take extended simples as spanners. That is, the extended simple is fully located at only one place: the fusion of all the points that make up its extension. It spans this region without being located at any part of it. Either way, multilocation and spanning both give us novel ways to think about location concepts: either entities can be exactly located at more than once over or entities can have locations without being located at any subregions of that location. In a parallel way, pointy complexes put us under some pressure concerning a different notion: pointy complexes challenge our normal notions concerning occupation of points. For how the pointy complex occupy the point it is at? Again, there are two main options, corresponding to the ones above. The first is that the point is multiply occupied. That is, the point is occupied by each of the proper parts of the entity: these parts are all exactly located at the point. On this alternative, the parts are co-located.9 Or, secondly, the point could be spanned: the whole pointy complex could be located at the point without any of the parts of the entity having locations at all. That is, the point is occupied by no proper part of the entity 9 This option is tacitly assumed in the literature on unextended complexes so far. 7 but is occupied by the whole entity. On this alternative, the parts have no location. So pointy complexes give us novel ways to think about occupation: either points can be locations for more than one thing or complex entities can have locations without any of their parts having location. Therefore, pointy complexes are worth considering for those working on theories of location. (ii) A second application of extended simples is in the context of gunk. To say something is gunky is to say that it has infinitely descending parts: no matter how far down you go you you'll never reach simples. In other words, there are no relevant mereological atoms. Extended simples, by distinguishing the mereological structure of entities and of space, allow us make room for the following possibility: space is gunky but entities are not. So it could be that every part of space itself has (proper) parts, while objects are composed of mereological atoms. These atoms would be extended simples. As might be anticipated, pointy complexes give us the resources to say the converse: entities are gunky but space is not. It could be that every part of an entity has (proper) parts, while space itself is composed of simple points. The entities occupying these points would be pointy complexes. We can have points without atoms, as well as atoms without points.10 (iii) A third place that extended simples have been metaphysically fruitful is as a result of thinking about their properties. While extended simples might seem strange enough, work has been done to try to explain how it is metaphysically possible not only for there to be extended simples, but for them to be heterogeneous. Heterogeneous extended simples are 10 McDaniel (2006) argues for this possibility. 8 heterogeneous in the sense of exhibiting variation across the space that they occupy. For an example, try to imagine (!) an extended simple rod that occupies some region. Now imagine that this rod is red in one half of the region and green in the other half: it is heterogeneous by displaying variation in its colour across the region it occupies. But of course, being simple, it is not that the rod has a red half and a green half. Rather, the simple entity has variation without parts. This seems problematic, as the simple entity thereby seems both red and green (and these are incompatible). There has been interesting work on how to make sense of such a scenario. Some alternative proposals include (a) fundamentally distributional properties: properties that grant qualitative features across space and are not reducible to properties that grant qualitative features at points (Parsons), (b) fundamental relativisation of properties to space: properties contain irreducible spatial reference, (c) tropes: properties are tropes particularised to spatial locations (d) distinguishing between things and the stuff of which they are made: things are made of stuff, simple things can be made of complex stuff, and the complex stuff can ground the qualitative variation of the simple things (Markosian). Each of these makes a concrete claim about the metaphysics of properties or entities that applies more generally than just in the case of extended simples. Extended simples are therefore a tool for opening up these metaphysical alternatives. I want to suggest that pointy complexes offer a similar tool for opening up distinct metaphysical alternatives corresponding to an inversion of those listed above. Suppose that heterogeneous pointy complexes are metaphysically possible. They are heterogeneous in a different sense to extended simples: they exhibit variation across their parts (rather than across space). Heterogeneous pointy complexes, therefore, have qualitative variety in their parts while being spatially homogeneous (because they are only point-sized). For an example of this, first imagine (!) a pointy complex entity that has two parts. Now imagine 9 that one of the parts of the entity is red the other part of the entity is green. The entity would thereby display variation across its parts, but of course it is not a certain way at one point and another way at a different point. Instead, the point-sized entity has variation without extension. There are no distinct spaces where the parts of the entity have different properties, but nevertheless the parts differ. The issue then is how to make sense of qualitative variation in parts without variation across space. In other words, how can the parts of a pointy complex be qualitatively different if they are not in different places? How can the point permit the parts to be red and green? More generally, how can a single point of space allow exemplification of seemingly incompatible properties? A series of corresponding proposals might be considered: (a') fundamentally holistic properties: properties that grant qualitative variation across the parts of an entity and are not reducible to properties of the parts. Although it seems that the parts have distinct properties, in fact there is only a single holistic property had by the whole entity. This means that this single property is the only one exemplified at the point of space the pointy complex occupies, but that the parts exhibit qualitative variation in virtue of this single property, (b') fundamental relativisation of properties to parts: properties contain irreducible reference to the parts of entities, so that the multiple properties exemplified at the point are in fact compatible (red-with-respect-to-part-1, green-with-respect-to-part-2 etc,), (c') tropes: properties are tropes particularised to parts, so that the point exhibits the part-1-red trope and the part-2-green trope, (d) distinguishing between stuff and the things it makes up: simple stuff can compose complex things, and the complex things can ground the variation of the simple stuff. The parts of the thing are green and red and, in virtue of this, the stuff is too.11 11 This option needs the most work. For instance, it might require reversing or at least tinkering with the composition relation. I don't have space to explore this further here. 10 These four options are rather outlandish ways to conceive of properties, things and stuff. But as far as I can see there's nothing more outlandish here than in the extended simples case. So our views of what properties are and how they can be instantiated in space can be informed by considering pointy complexes. It is also interesting to reflect on the relationship between solutions to the heterogeneous extended simples and heterogeneous pointy complex cases. If there is a connection between solving the extended simples case and solving the pointy complex case, then considering the latter might give us novel reasons for deciding between competing solutions to the former. But if not, then heterogeneous pointy complexes offer philosophical consequences interestingly distinct from those of heterogeneous extended simples.12 In either case, they warrant further investigation. (iv) Finally, one particular (and extreme) application of extended simples is in a monist picture defended by Schaffer, among others. According to this version of monism, called existence monism, there is really only one thing. This thing is extended. The whole world is therefore an extended simple. Setting aside arguments about this position, we can use unextended complexes to see the correlate view: the whole world is an unextended complex. I will call this view unextensionalism. This will suffer from the opposite worries to the existence monist: rather than trying to explain why what seem to be many entities spread out in space is in fact one entity spread out in space, the proponent of unextensionalism will have to explain why what seem to be many entities spread out in space is in fact many entities not spread out in space. There are very many historical precedents for an unextensionalism view: idealism is a version of it. For the idealist has no (concrete) space, so the whole world will therefore lack extension. But the distinction above between two ways of being 12 I am grateful to a reviewer for flagging this second possibility, and its consequences, to me. 11 unextended invites consideration of a new version of unextensionalism: the whole world is a pointy complex. On this view, there is (presumably) one and only one point of space, which contains everything concrete. Call this view spatial monism. I do not offer spatial monism as a plausible candidate for a description of the way the world is. Rather, it is an interesting possibility that is highlighted by considering pointy simples. In much the way that extended simples provides the conceptual and metaphysical gap in which existence monism sits, pointy simples open up a corresponding gap for spatial monism. 3. Conclusion This paper has drawn attention to and examined the notion of unextended complexes, and in particular pointy complexes. I suggest that pointy complexes are no less plausible than extended simples, and that by using them in ways similar to the uses of extended simples we can explore interesting new metaphysical territory. The brief survey in Section 2 is indicative of their potential. Pointy complexes, and unextended simples more generally, should be added to the metaphysician's toolkit.13 References Armstrong, D. 1988. Are Quantities Relations? A Reply to Bigelow and Pargetter. Philosophical Studies 54: 305–316. ----1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: CUP. Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Miller, K. 2006. The Physics of Extended Simples. Analysis, 66: 222–226. 13 I am grateful to David Glick and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra for discussing aspects of this paper with me, and to reviewers for this journal for their helpful and insightful comments. 12 Eddon, M. 2007. Armstrong on Quantities and Resemblance. Philosophical Studies 136: 385–404 Hudson, H. 2001. A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person. Ithca: Cornell University Press. Markosian, N. 1998. Simples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76: 213-226 2004. Simples, Stuff and Simple People. The Monist, 87: 405–428. McDaniel, K. 2006. Gunky Objects in a Simple World. Philo, 9: 39–46. ----2007a. Extended Simples. Philosophical Studies, 133: 131–141. ----2007b. Brutal Simples. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 3., 233–266. Ed. Zimmerman. Oxford: OUP. ----2009. Extended Simples and Qualitative Heterogeneity. The Philosophical Quarterly 59: 325– 331. Parsons, J. 2000. Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts? The Monist, 83: 399–418. ----2007. Theories of Location. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 3., 201–232. Ed. Zimmerman. Oxford: OUP Saucedo, R. 2011. Parthood and Location. In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 6, 225–286. Ed. Bennett and Zimmerman. Oxford: OUP Schaffer, J. 2009. Spacetime the one substance. Philosophical Studies, 145: 131–148. Simons, P. 2004. Extended Simples: A Third Way Between Atoms and Gunk. The Monist, 87: 371– 384. Wasserman, R. 2003. Review Article: Hud Hudson's A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person. Philo, 6: 307–313.

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